PATTERNS OF REGIONAL AUTHORITY

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This paper summarizes some fundamental characteristics of regional authority in 42 democracies over the period 1950 to 2006 as evidenced in a new index.¹

The index covers countries in the OECD, the EU, and former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We assess regional authority for these countries on an annual basis from 1950, or since the introduction of democracy. So, for example, we evaluate Canada and Denmark from 1950, Portugal from 1976, Spain from 1978, and Hungary from 1990.² An appendix to this paper summarizes the coding scheme and presents numerical estimates for all levels of regional governance aggregated to the country level.

¹ Arjan Schakel (2007) cross-validates the Regional Authority Index with prior measures, including Brancati (2006), Hooghe and Marks (2001), Lane and Ersson (1999), Lijphart (1999), Treisman (2002), and Woldendorp et al. (2000).
² We encompass democratic regimes for pragmatic reasons having to do with the quality and availability of data, and limitations in our expertise. We also hypothesize that formal rules—the phenomena we code—are more effective constraints on structures of power in democracies than in non-democracies. However, there is no a priori reason why our coding scheme could not be extended to regimes in which rulers violate the letter or the spirit of the law.

Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are a case in point. Formal decentralization was undermined by the hegemony of the communist party. As James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon observe: “Given that ‘democratic centralism’ was a common underlying organizational principle, the actual configuration of local government structures was relatively homogenous across Eastern Europe during the communist period. A vertical pyramidal system of ‘elected soviets’ (councils) extended down from the national structures at the centre to the regional, district and local levels. . . . These organizational structures provided a façade of popular legitimacy for the regimes while real power was highly centralized to communist party structures . . . Regional administrations became essential outposts of central government for implementing the ‘leading and guiding role’ of the party in the country” (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 33-34, and 35.) It is no surprise, then, that, after the collapse of communism postcommunist governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe made it a priority to abolish regional government (O’Dwyer 2006: 219). In most countries, regionalization came only back on the political agenda after the consolidation of democracy.

Communist regimes provide a stark illustration of William Riker’s insight that the degree of centralization in federal systems is linked to the degree of political party centralization (1964; Volden 2004). While Riker confined his analysis to federal systems, the logic applies rather well to decentralization and regionalization more generally. Communist democratic centralism was not equally successful in hollowing out formal territorial decentralization. It failed where the communist party was regionally divided or federalized, as in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and, after 1969, Czechoslovakia, and it encountered serious opposition where regional party bosses were able to water down central authorities, as in Poland until the mid-1970s, and in Russia.
We follow Daniel Elazar (1991) in distinguishing between self-rule and shared rule. Self rule consists of a) the scope of policy for which a regional government is responsible (policy scope); b) the extent to which the region controls its financial envelope (tax authority); c) the extent to which a region is endowed with representative institutions (representation). We evaluate shared rule as the extent to which a region co-determines the authoritative decisions of the central government (role in central government). Our coding focuses on formal rules—formal norms, legislation, constitutional provisions—relating to these components. 3

We caste a wide net in determining whether a level of government is regional. We include what the European Union designates at NUTS 1, NUTS 2, and NUTS 3 levels, that is, all levels of government that lie between local and national government. Of the 42 democracies in our dataset, 8 countries have no regional tier, 22 have one regional tier, and 12 countries have two. The country scores we refer to below are calculated by aggregating the scores for each regional level. Because there is no theoretical limit to the number of regional levels in a country, the Regional Authority Index (RAI) has no mathematical upper limit. Among the countries we evaluate, the highest scores are for Bosnia-Herzegovina (35.8 in 2006), Germany (33.0), and Belgium (30.5). The mean RAI in 2006 is 11.9. The spread is wide: the standard deviation is 10.7.

Here we summarize some distinctive patterns that emerge from the data.

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3 The question of how formal rules constrain, or do not constrain, structures of party control, etc, is an empirical, not a definitional issue. We therefore do not include such phenomena in our index.
A pronounced, secular, uneven increase in regional authority

Of the 42 countries that we evaluate, 20 saw an aggregate increase in regional authority over the period that we evaluate them, 18 saw no change, and four show a decline in regional authority. Let us take a closer look at the countries in these categories.

No country has become appreciably more centralized. Sweden has experienced the greatest decline in regional authority; its Regional Authority Index decreased from 11.5 to 10.0 from 1950 to 2006 as a result of the abolition of the upper chamber of the Riksdag in 1970 which was composed of regional (Län) representatives. Serbia-Montenegro drops just over one point on the Regional Authority Index because in 2003 it shifted from a federation to a confederation which all but dissolved the center, rendering power sharing with central government meaningless. The RAI for Bosnia-Herzegovina dropped a fraction in 2000 when the capital district Brčko was granted special autonomy. Brčko has somewhat less say in central government decision making than the two main regions, and this affects the country score. Finally, Canada dropped a fraction in 1999 because the partition of the Northern Territories into two territories slightly reduces the weight of regional governments in the country score.

Eighteen, or almost half of the countries that we examine, saw no change. The reasons for this are self-evident, and they point to fundamental constraints on regionalization. The first constraint is country size. A country with a small population has little space to squeeze an intermediate level of government between local authorities and the national government. On functional grounds, there may be little reason to pay the costs of having an additional level of government if local authorities
cover populations up to, say 150,000, and national government serves a national population below three million. The jurisdictional challenge for these countries lies in creating governance above the national state, not below it (Hooghe, Marks, de Vries 2006).

Eight of the 18 countries that experience no change in regional governance begin our time series with a Regional Authority Index of zero and finish in 2006 with zero. All have a population of 2.5 million or less, and the median population for the eight is 1.09 million.4

A second constraint on regionalization is that countries with very high levels of regionalization face a ceiling effect. Our measurement instrument does not impose a mathematical upper limit on regionalization because it is always logically possible to create and empower an additional level of regional governance. Large countries tend to have two levels of regional governance, not one, and it would be possible for them to create a third or fourth level. But this is a logical, rather than a practical, possibility. On average, the most regionalized countries, which have tend to have federal constitutions, inch up much more slowly than non-federal countries: on our index, average annual change (since 1950 or since democratization) is 0.14 for non-federal and 0.0015 for federal countries. Three federal countries (Germany, Switzerland, and the United States) experienced no change.

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4 Bulgaria, with a population of just under eight million, is the one larger country in our dataset whose regional tier in 2006 is merely deconcentrated administration (a score of 1).
That leaves five countries which are not covered by the functional constraints of small population and the ceiling effect. These are Bulgaria (RAI = 1.0), Japan (8.0), the Netherlands (11.5), Portugal (2.5), and Turkey (5.0). The Netherlands was already quite decentralized in 1950 with stronger regional governance than all but three Western European countries, a historical residual of its confederal past. The remaining countries that saw no change are highly centralized given their population size. Bulgaria (with a population of 7.8 million) is the most centralized country in our dataset with a population greater than 2.5 million; Portugal (population 10.5 million) is the most centralized country in our dataset with a population greater than 7.8 million; Turkey (population 71.7 million) is the most centralized with a population greater than 10.5 million, and Japan (population 127.8 million) is the most centralized with a population greater than 71.7 million. Centralization and institutional stasis appear to be related. Each of these countries has a different story. However, in this essay we must try to contain our eagerness to chase after individual cases, but instead restrict ourselves to the general pattern.

What we can say is that it is easier to identify the characteristics of countries that did not regionalize than to identify the characteristics of countries that did regionalize. This is actually a revealing statement, for it suggests that the causes of regionalization are diverse. Regionalization has taken place in small countries and large countries.

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5 The Netherlands is an interesting case for examining Riker’s hypothesis concerning the interplay between party centralization and constitutional rules. While the provinces have extensive formal power over central government policy by means of their presence in the upper chamber, in reality upper chamber representatives sit and vote according to party affiliation rather than provincial loyalty.

6 Perhaps a common thread is an ideological attachment to national unity that reaches across the political spectrum to parties of the left as on the right.
This pattern is consistent with a postfunctionalist account of multilevel governance that assumes that the provision of governance is subject to functional pressures, but that the extent to which these pressures lead to reform depends on their distributional effects and their identity effects (Hooghe and Marks 2007). Functional pressures arise because some collective problems (such as town planning; fire protection, nursery schooling and kindergarten) are best handled at a population scale of tens of thousands, some (such as vocational and technical education; secondary education; and hospitals) are best handled at a scale of hundred of thousands, some (such as tourism promotion; environmental protection; and transport infrastructure) are best handled at a scale of millions, while yet other problems demand jurisdictions that are vastly larger. This functional approach presumes considerable dynamism, not stasis, if the policy portfolio of a polity changes. If conventional war-making dominates policy, as it did in the first half of the twentieth century, then one would expect functional pressure for concentrating decision making at the most centralized level available, i.e. the central state. War-making and extracting resources necessary for war was instrumental in the development of national systems of education, national systems of taxation, conscription, national ownership or control of mineral extraction, transport, and munitions. In the years immediately following World War II, central states were

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7 This list is derived from our (as yet unpublished) expert survey of efficient jurisdictional design.
also called upon to distribute extreme scarcity and to mobilize resources, human and financial, to begin rebuilding battered economies.

The period since 1950 has seen unparalleled diversification in the policy portfolio of national states to welfare, environmental, educational, infrastructural, and microeconomic policies. Unlike conventional war-making, these policies do not press authority towards the central state. The functional logic of regional governance requires simply that the policy portfolio of national states has come to include policies that are most efficiently delivered at diverse jurisdictional scales, including a regional level between the local and national.

Countries that did not experience regionalization in the post-1950 period are, therefore, likely to be those that were not subject to this functional pressure—very small countries or countries that already had strong regional governments. Predicting the positive side of the equation is more difficult because one cannot assume that functional pressure leads to jurisdictional reform. This is not just because institutions are sticky, and correspondingly, that institutional reform is inherently difficult to point-predict. More importantly, political choice intervenes between functional pressures and institutional outcomes. The level of authoritative decision making has consequences for the distribution of power, for the distribution of income, and for self-governance. As we look further into the data we have gathered, the causal force of these intervening political factors will become apparent.

Figure 1 summarizes regionalization in the 21 democracies which we measure continuously from 1950 to 2006. The ratchet-like character of the process is evident. As
noted above, we are evidently dealing with a process that is nearly uni-directional and one that has taken place over an extended period of time. But there is another salient feature: a sharp discontinuity in the rate of change around 1970. Before 1970, the series is almost flat; after 1970, there is a sharp, sustained, upward trend.

[Figure 1 about here]

This discontinuity coincides with a cultural shock that swept across the globe in the late 1960s, and which in the West took the form of youth rebellion and new forms of self-expression that questioned or, more usually, confronted, conventional norms. Norms that were taken for granted—including materialism, cultural progress, and short hair—were explicitly challenged as were political norms, including deference to political leaders and centralized decision making. In 1973, E. F. Schumacher wrote a book entitled “Small is Beautiful” which fiercely questioned the virtues of a materialist culture based on ever larger organizations that were out of touch with human need. Preferences for greater self-determination and popular democracy were most likely to mobilize demands for change in centralized democracies, particularly where there were territorially concentrated ethnic minorities.8

The first moves in the early 1970s relaxed centralization in formerly highly centralized states—creating regions and communities in Belgium (1970); direct elections for Amter in Denmark (1970), a level of regional governance in France (1972); long-promised regionalization (including directly elected regional assemblies) in Italy (1972);

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8 We do not have a very good measure for territorially concentrated ethnic minorities, but two proxies—ethnic fragmentation (the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to a different ethnic group) and linguistic fragmentation (based on linguistic proximities)—are weakly associated with the level of regional authority (controlling for population size): 0.34 and 0.33 respectively.
regional councils in New Zealand (1974), directly elected Fylke in Norway (1975) and creation of comunidades autónomas in Spain (1978). These were followed by reforms that put guts in newly created territorial tiers—regions and communities in Belgium (1980), directly elected regional councils in New Zealand (1989)—or that deepened existing regional tiers—constitutional power sharing in Austria (1984), broader competencies for Italian (1976, 1989) and Spanish (1979-1994) regions, and competencies and direct elections for French regions (1982, 1986). This was also an era in which special autonomy was granted on an ad hoc basis to anomalous, often outlying, territories such as Greenland (from Denmark in 1979), the Northern Territory (Australia 1974), Corsica (1982), Canberra (Australia 1989), and Scotland and Wales (United Kingdom 1999).

The composition of regionalization

Figure 1 charts regionalization and its four main components for 21 democracies that we evaluate continuously since 1950. The pattern is revealing.

The greatest change has been in the institutionalization of directly elected regional assemblies. Elected institutions at the regional level have always been a facet of federal polities, but the idea has spread. The mean score on our 8-point scale is 2.3 for 1950; rising to 4.0 in 2006. Across the entire dataset of 42 countries, 23 countries had directly elected regional assemblies in 1950 or when they became democratic. In 2006, 33 countries had adopted the principle.

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The scale has a ceiling greater than eight because some countries have two regional levels.
Interestingly, this is a reform that cannot be laid at the door of functional pressures. The provision of elected assemblies appears more in line with the cultural changes of the post-sixties era than with an efficiency argument based on the territorial scope of externalities and economies of scale.

The second major change has been in the policy portfolio of regional governments. In 1950, the mean score was 4.3, rising to 5.8 in 2006. Again, the development is uneven: ten countries saw an increase in regional competencies; eleven (including all but one federal country, Australia) saw no change. The greatest increases were in Belgium (+8), Italy (+6.4), Greece (+5), and France (+4), and in several special autonomous regions: Greenland (+8), Scotland and Northern Ireland (+7), Wales (+4), and the Greater London Authority (+4).

Regional power over taxation has grown, but on our 8-point scale the absolute change has been a modest increase from 2.2 in 1950 to 3.0 in 2006. The role of regions in central government decision making has risen only slightly, from 2.1 in 1950 to 2.4 in 2006.

These components of regional authority appear to be quite tightly coupled. Countries that saw an increase in one component tended to see an increase across the board. A principal components factor analysis of the four change variables (for 2006

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10 Among the 21 established democracies, one finds the greatest tax authority in 2006 in five federal countries: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the United States (8) and Belgium (6); Germany, where extensive power sharing offsets relatively weak tax autonomy for the Länder, has a score of 5 on our index. Among the later democracies, only Bosnia & Herzegovina (10.6), Serbia & Montenegro (8.9), and Spain (6) join this group.

11 The greatest increases occurred in Belgium (+4), Austria (+2), and Australia (+1.1); in Sweden, power sharing declined by 3.5 on an 8-point scale triggered by the abolition of the upper chamber.
minus 1950 for 21 democracies) produces a single factor explaining 66.7 percent of the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.83.\textsuperscript{12}

**Five generalizations**

We suggest the following five generalizations about the level of regional authority and the process of regionalization:

- **A ceiling effect**, in which the greater the level of regional authority in a country, the smaller its increase. We expect the effect to be an increasing, not linear, function of the level of regional authority. It can be modeled as the inverse of the square of the regional authority \((R)\).

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\uparrow R = \frac{1}{R^2}
\]

To evaluate the validity of this hypothesis (Richard Feynman [1965] would call it a “guess”) requires multivariate analysis, a project beyond this essay. Here we must be content to present a figure which provides some prima facie evidence for a negative association between the level of regional authority and its rate of increase.\textsuperscript{13}

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\textsuperscript{12} The Cronbach’s alpha for absolute levels of the four components across 42 countries in 2006 is 0.89.

\textsuperscript{13} This formulation of the ceiling effect applies to our current era of emergent multilevel governance, but there is nothing intrinsic about rising levels of regionalization (or rising levels of Europeanization). The logic of our argument is that multilevel governance could be reversed because the policy portfolio changes (compressing competencies to a single authoritative level, e.g., in response to war); for distributional reasons (for example, when a dictator identifies his own interest with that of compressing
An S-curve effect, where the association of country size (measured in population and in territory) on regional authority depends on the absolute size of a country. Across countries below a certain size, there is little functional benefit in regional authority. At some point (between two and three million population) the benefits of regional authority emerge, and increase rapidly until the population reaches between twenty and thirty million, at which point the benefits of regionalization in relation to population level off. No country in our dataset with a population of less than two million has regional governance. No country with a population of more than 20 million lacks regional governance.

- A diversity effect, in which countries with territorially distinct ethno-cultural minorities have higher levels of regional authority than more than homogenous countries. The diversity effect arises because individuals have preferences over policy and preferences over self-rule. The policy argument hypothesizes that

\[ \Delta R = \frac{1}{R^2} \]

The rationale for this is that regional authority in federal polities (which tend to have high levels of regional authority) is more difficult to reverse (i.e. stickier) than regional authority in non-federal systems. However, an evaluation of the validity of this hypothesis will have to wait for the current era of rising multilevel governance to end.
individuals with different ethno-cultural traditions desire heterogeneous mixes of public goods, such as education, welfare, and economic policy (Alesina and Spolaore 2001). The self-rule argument hypothesizes that individuals sharing ethno-cultural norms desire some self-rule, that is, a capacity to project institutionalized power into the future (Keating 1997; Loughlin 2001).

Figure 3 plots the level of regional authority against the natural logarithm of population for 2006 for the 42 countries in our dataset. As we expect, more populous countries are more regionalized. What is of interest here, however, is that countries that have unusually high regional scores tend to be those with ethnic minorities, which we identify with dark circles in the figure.

[Figure 3]

- A democracy effect, in which democracies have a higher level of regional authority than non-democracies. As noted above, this assertion is rooted in a strong prior: democracies allocate authority not in terms of a ruler’s ability to amass power in his own hands and eliminate that of challengers (or simply eliminate challengers), but in terms of winning votes in competitive elections. Monocracy suffocates multilevel governance, democracy is agnostic.

We cannot evaluate the validity of this hypothesis in a dataset where the case selection is heavily biased to democratic polities, but the evidence that we have about change is in line with this expectation. The logical implication of the democracy effect is that a country that shifts from autocracy to democracy will be newly subject
to the pressures discussed above. Figure 4 charts average increases in regional
authority in three groups of countries, and reveals that the post-communist regimes
of Eastern Europe have high rates of change.

[Figure 4]

- A *trade insulation effect*, in which regionalization is stimulated when it has no
effect on trade and hindered when it disrupts trade. If reform to create regional
political autonomy does not harm a region’s participation in the international
division of labor, then we can speak of regional authority as a decomposable good.
A region can have its cake and eat it, so to speak. If economic autarky is part of the
package, then the economic cost of regionalization will be significant, and perhaps
prohibitive.

So when might political autonomy be detachable from economic autarky? Most
obviously, when rules concerning trade and economic exchange are already
detached from the national state, i.e. when there is an overarching set of
international rules that will be insulated from authoritative reform within a member
state. This is not the only circumstance in which regional authority is a
decomposable good, but it is one that we see very clearly in figure 4, above.
Conclusion

Regional governance appears to have an explicable set of logics that derive from its functional and political sources. In this paper we set some of these out with the help of a measure of regional authority covering 42 democracies since 1950.

The structure of jurisdictional design is distinctive in two respects. First, the direction of change appears to be highly uniform. Where we see jurisdictional change in the last 56 years it is almost exclusively in one direction. We detect 60 cases of jurisdictional reform of which 51 empowered regions. The average increase in regionalization as measured on the index is 2.95. The average regional decline across the nine contrary cases is \(-0.94\). So we detect five times as many instances of regionalization as anti-regionalization, and their mean individual value is three times as great.

We suspect that homogeneity of change is not unique to the post World War II period. The previous era, which may have lasted for considerably more than a century, was characterized by similar uniformity in the direction of change, but with the opposite sign. An era of centralization has been followed by an era of regionalization. We have suggested some reasons why this might have happened, but we have not mentioned several plausible alternative explanations, including international diffusion.

Second, there is very wide variation across countries in the level of regional authority (and by implication, in the level of central state authority). Seven of the 42

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14 Three of these are in the UK, and arise from the changing status of Northern Ireland and the reorganization of local authorities in Scotland and Wales prior to devolution.
countries we examine had no regional level of government, even after more than half a century of regionalization. Twelve countries have regions that exert considerable authority, scoring more than 20 on the Regional Authority Index. The standard deviation in the RAI, at 10.7 is almost as great as its mean level, 11.9. We suspect that this variation is also historically robust. Although many polities in the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century became more centralized, federal polities continued to co-exist with highly centralized polities.

The jurisdictional architecture of polities is in equal parts puzzling and fascinating. The measure we have created helps to reveal not simply the course of jurisdictional reform, but also some basic questions that remain unanswered.
Figure 1:
Evolution of Regional Authority in Established Democracies
(1950-2006)

Note: Yearly average for 21 democracies since 1950.
Policy scope = breadth of regional policy responsibility (0-8);
Representation = existence and role of regional legislature (0-4);
Tax authority = extent to which the region controls its revenue (0-8);
Power sharing = extent to which the region affects central government decisions (0-8).
Full coding described in Appendix.
Figure 2: The Ceiling Effect

Note: 21 democracies continuously evaluated 1950-2006. The RAI ≥ 20 category consists of Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States.
Figure 3:
Population, Ethnicity, and Regional Authority

Note: 42 countries.

Population: Natural log of 6 = population of 0.403 million; 8 = 2.98 million; 10 = 22.0 million; 12 = 162.8 million; 13 = 442.4 million.

Ethnicity: ethnic fragmentation index which represents the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to a different ethnic group (xxx). We dichotomize this variable at a natural breakpoint in our dataset, where 1= index value of 0.4 or greater.
Figure 4:
Annual Change in Regional Authority by Decade

Note: Annual change in Regional Authority Index for 35 democracies, 1950-2006, averaged by decade.
Appendix: An Index of Regional Authority

The region is a rubbery concept stretching above and below the national state. Our focus here is on subnational regions, but there is no generally accepted definition that we can take on board that will readily produce a set of homogenous units for cross-national comparison. Our first and immediate task then is to conceptualize the region in a way that meets, as far as possible, normal linguistic usage while providing the researcher with a meaningful and unambiguous unit of analysis.

Our basic conceptual decisions are as follows:

First, a region refers to a given territory having by single, continuous, and non-intersecting boundary with respect to the boundaries of other regions.

Second, a political region, the object of our analysis, is distinguished by a set of institutions responsible for binding decision making.

Third, regions are located between local governments and national governments. For our purposes, then, a region is a coherent territorial entity situated between local and national government which possesses institutions that engage in binding decision making.

This definition is intentionally minimal. Our purpose is to define a particular set of objects while leaving unspecified their salient political characteristics for empirical evaluation. These include the extent to which a region exercises authority. If the region merely reflects the will of the central government, we describe regional governance as deconcentrated; to the extent that a region exerts independent influence over binding decisions, we describe it as autonomous.

Then there is the vexed issue of the possible existence of more than one level of regional governance in a country. Local governments and national governments define extremes within which there may be plural intermediate levels. How do we determine which level is the regional? In previous work, we selected the most authoritative level as the region that we measured. But this is problematic, for it is unable to account for countries where there are two levels of autonomous regional governance. Here we take a comprehensive approach. We measure the authority exercised by all intermediate levels of governance specified by the NUTS (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) classification of the European Union. This is more demanding, but it has the virtue of providing scores for regional governance at all appropriate levels. When using this index, the reader may choose to examine the disaggregated scores we provide for each regional level or aggregate scores for each country.

We estimate regional authority across 42 countries, including all 27 countries in the European Union, the Balkan countries, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Russia, Turkey, and several non-European countries—Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. We assess regional authority for each of these countries.

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15 Regional government encompasses all regional governments that meet the NUTS 1, NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 criterion. This classification scheme is used in most European countries, including several non-EU countries (e.g. Norway and Switzerland). For countries that do not use the NUTS classification, we apply the population size criteria which underlie the NUTS categorization.
continuously in annual increments for the period 1950 or since the introduction of democracy to 2006.

The index set out here builds on the Regional Governance Index in Hooghe and Marks (2001), but there are several differences:

- The unit of analysis for the prior index was the country; here it is the region.
- The prior index evaluated only the most authoritative regional level; here we evaluate all regional levels that meet the NUTS 1, 2, or 3 criteria.
- The prior index summarized scores by decade; here we provide scores on an annual basis as regional authority changes.
- We now extend the index to 2006.
- The prior index covered 14 EU countries; here we extend this to an additional 28 countries in and beyond Europe.
- Finally, the new index introduces a new dimension, regional tax authority, and significantly revises the other three dimensions.

We operationalize authority as a multi-dimensional concept. To begin with, it varies with respect to its breadth and its depth. Breadth refers to the scope of policy for which a region government is responsible. Depth refers to authority exercised over policy decisions. Authoritative depth is compounded of a) the extent to which the region controls its financial envelope; b) the extent to which a region exerts authority independently of the central government; and c) the extent to which a region co-determines the authoritative decisions of the central government.

We summarize the constituents of regional authority as follows:

- **Policy scope:** How broad is the policy responsibility of regional institutions?
- **Tax authority:** To what extent does the region control its revenue
- **Representation:** Does the region have an independent, elected, legislature?
- **Role of regions in central government:** To what extent can the region affect central government decisions?

These elements pertain to formal authority. They are explicitly mandated in legislation and in national constitutions. This enhances the reliability of our coding. But there is a more compelling reason for distinguishing formal authority from informal norms. We are interested in how formal rules are empirically related to informal sources of power arising from ideology, strategic bargaining, party (de)centralization, and corruption. We therefore need to evaluate formal rules independently from these factors.

Below we detail our coding for each of these dimensions.

**Policy Scope**

*Policy scope* taps the formal scope of regional governance over substantive policy making. Here, as elsewhere in our index, sequential categories are scored on a base-2
logarithm. This may be unfamiliar, but it has a logic that is perfectly adapted to our purpose. It is simple, intuitive, and substantively appropriate. The underlying idea is that the intervals in our scoring increase with the authority of a region. That is to say, the absolute difference in the authority exercised by a weak and a very weak region is far smaller than that between a strong and a very strong region. As we move along our scale, absolute differences increase while the ratio of one score to the next remains constant.

The categories set out below are cumulative. That is to say, a region with a given score is presumed to meet the criteria that produce a lower score. So all regions coded one or more have a functioning regional administration; all regions coded two or more exercise significant authority over economic policy, cultural-educational policy, and/or welfare state policy; and so forth.

- **1**: a functioning general-purpose regional administration;
- **2**: exercises significant authority in one of the following areas: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy;
- **4**: exercises significant authority in at least two of the following areas: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy;
- **8**: exercises significant authority in at least two of the following areas: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy; and has coercive or constitutive power over two or more of the following: local government, police, regional political institutions (e.g. regional administrative organization, the budget process, regional elections), residual powers (i.e. powers not constitutionally specified).

**Tax Authority**

The capacity to collect and spend money is an vital component of regional authority. One commonly-used measure is the amount of money a region spends. The problem with this is that deconcentrated regions (i.e. regions with little or no autonomy from central government) are, in some cases, big spenders. The approach we take here is to assess the extent to which a region has discretion to tax. We revise [explain how xxx] the criteria of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Tax Policy Studies, 1999) to measure the degree of formal control a region has over its sources of revenue. As with policy scope we apply a logistic scale for all positive integers to represent the cumulative nature of the scale and the increasing intervals between our evaluation points.

- **0**: revenue from any tax is unilaterally determined by the central government and/or the central government sets base and rate of regional taxes;
- **1**: the region sets the rate of regional taxes, but this does not encompass income, corporate, value added, or sales taxes;
• 2: the region sets the base and rate of regional taxes, but this does not encompass income, corporate, value added, or sales taxes; or the region sets the rate of one or more of income, corporate, value added, or sales tax;
• 4: the region sets the base for all regional taxes; or it has a veto over the central/regional distribution of revenue from income, corporate, value added, or sales taxes;
• 8: the region sets the base and rate of one or more of income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.

Representative Institutions
Regional executives may be accountable to the central state or to regional assemblies. Even when representative regional institutions cannot dismiss regional executives, such institutions increase the legitimacy, and therefore, the authority, of regional governments. Some regions have directly elected regional assemblies; others have indirectly elected regional assemblies; and yet others (the majority of regions in our dataset) have no regional assemblies. Our scoring assesses a) whether the executive is regionally elected or appointed by the central government, and b) whether the regional legislature is popularly elected, indirectly elected, or appointed by the central government. Our scoring here is non-cumulative, and it has a maximum score of four (i.e. half that of policy scope or tax power).

• 0: no regional legislative assembly;
• 1: regional legislative assembly is popularly elected or indirectly elected (i.e. composed of elected local government representatives), but the head of the regional executive is a national appointee;
• 2: regional assembly is indirectly elected (i.e. composed of elected local government representatives), and the executive head is elected by the assembly or is popularly elected;
• 4: regional assembly is popularly elected, and the executive head is elected by the assembly or is popularly elected.

Role in Central Government
Regions may exercise authority on account of their role in national decision making. We distinguish three avenues. First, regions may participate directly in making national laws. This requires that they are represented in the national legislature, usually in an upper chamber that is (partially or wholly) devoted to subnational interests. Second, regional governments may share executive responsibility with the national government for implementing policy in the region and in the country as a whole. Finally, and most importantly, regions may play a role in decisions about which level of government does what, how, and with what resources. Regions may, in short, co-determine the allocation of authority in a polity. The first and second avenues of power-sharing concern the role that regions play in national decision making and we score each a maximum of two
points; the final avenue concerns the extent to which regions write the rules of the
game, and we score this up to four points.

Regional authority in power sharing varies considerably. Mere representation
does not imply decisional power. By the same token, regional executives may convene
regularly with the central government in intergovernmental conferences, but such
meetings may not bind the central government. We therefore need to distinguish
between the share of regional representation in a legislature (often an upper chamber)
or executive, and the power of these bodies.

**Constitutional power sharing**
- **1**: the upper house is *popularly* elected and a majority or supermajority of
  representatives must approve constitutional change;
- **2**: regional *governments/parliaments*—or their representatives in the upper
  house—must be consulted on constitutional change and have the power to
  postpone decision, introduce amendments, increase the decision hurdle in
  the lower chamber, require a second vote in the lower chamber, or require
  approval by a popular referendum; or: a majority of regional
  governments/parliaments—or their representatives in the upper house—
  must approve constitutional change;
- **4**: a supermajority of regional *governments/parliaments*—or their
  representatives in the upper house—must approve constitutional change.

**Legislative power sharing**
We score 0.5 point for each of the following characteristics:
- Regions are the unit of representation in the upper chamber, i.e. the
distribution of representation in the legislature is determined by regional
weights, rather than “one citizen, one vote” in the country as a whole.
- Regional governments/legislatures designate representatives to represent
their interests in the upper chamber.
- Regions at a given level have a majority of representation in the upper
  chamber.
- The upper chamber has wide-ranging authority, that is to say, it has
  extensive legislative power, wields a veto on some important issues, or
  has the power to increase the decision hurdle (e.g. to a two-thirds majority
  in another legislature).

**Executive power sharing**
- **1**: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and
  regional governments *without* authority to reach binding decisions;
- **2**: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and
  regional governments *with* authority to reach binding decisions.
Asymmetrical and Special Autonomous Regions

We apply the same coding scheme for asymmetrical and special autonomous regions, though we make minor adjustments for the latter to take into account the special character of these regions. We speak of an asymmetrical arrangement when a region falls under a country-wide constitutional structure, but enjoys more (or sometimes less) extensive powers in terms of policy scope, representation, tax power or power sharing than other regions relative to the central government. Asymmetry is frequently proposed as a solution to the dissatisfactions that arise when a perception of significant ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences set a region apart from others. Asymmetrical arrangements may be temporary, as e.g. for the historical regions in Spain, or indefinite, as for example, for the territories in Canada or Australia. Special autonomous regions differ from asymmetrical or typical regions in that their statute is *sui generis*: they are exempt from the country-wide jurisdictional framework, and they receive special treatment in the constitution or equivalent formal statutory laws. So while asymmetrical regions could be described as “+/- typical regions,” special autonomous regions are more aptly conceived as opt-outs.

The peculiar situation of special autonomous regions makes it more difficult for them to claim shared rule. If there is an upper chamber that reflects regional interests, special autonomous regions are always in the minority; if there are intergovernmental meetings, they usually influence only the particular effects of a policy in the autonomous region; if the autonomous region has constitutional power, it is usually limited to its bilateral relation with the host country—not the constitutional architecture of the country as a whole. Shared rule, then, tends to be confined to shaping central policy *with respect to* the territory—rather than shaping policy for the country as a whole. The flipside is that special autonomous regions, unlike other regions, usually have considerable input in—sometimes ultimate authority over—central government policy in their territory.

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16 Most special autonomous regions would normally classify as a Local Authority Units (LAU) if one were to apply the formal population criteria of the NUTS categorization. But in reality, special autonomous regions usually fall under one of the upper NUTS categories. The Åland islands (Finland), for example, fall under the EU’s NUTS 1. Ceuta and Melilla (Spain) have been NUTS 3 since Spain became a member of the EU, and were upgraded to NUTS 2 in 1995 when they became full-fledged comunidades. Corse (France) and Açores and Madeira (Portugal) are NUTS 2 even though their population size would warrant a NUTS 3 classification.

17 Our notion of special autonomous region combines three special arrangements which Daniel Elazar defines as associated state, federacy, and home-rule territory—in order of declining autonomy. An associated state is an asymmetrical arrangement whereby a larger power and smaller polity are linked asymmetrically in a federal relationship in which the latter has substantial autonomy and in return has a minimal role in the governance of the larger power; like a confederation, it can be dissolved unilaterally by either of the parties under pre-arranged terms. A federacy is similar to an associated state in terms of internal autonomy, except that, like in a federation, the relationship between them can be dissolved only by mutual agreement. Finally, home rule territories have significant powers of self-government, but unlike the federacy and associated state relationships, the central government of the state typically plays an active role in some areas of the home-rule territory’s internal government, such as internal security, judicial matters, and economic and monetary matters (Elazar 1997: 398).
We apply the same criteria for measuring the authority of asymmetrical regions as we do for other regions. For special autonomous regions, we use the same criteria for policy scope, representation and tax power, and we tailor the criteria of power sharing to their special situation in the following way:

**Constitutional power sharing (0-4):**
- **1:** the regional government/legislature is consulted by the central government/parliament on constitutional amendments that affect its position in the national state, but the consultation is not binding;
- **2:** the regional government/legislature and central government/parliament co-decide constitutional amendments that affect the region’s position in the national state: both have veto power;
- **4:** the regional government/legislature can unilaterally accept or reject constitutional amendments that affect the region’s position in the national state.

**Legislative power sharing (0-2):**
We score each of the following characteristics in the following way:
- **0.5:** the region is the unit of representation in the upper and lower chambers;
- **0.5:** the regional government/legislature designates representatives in the upper chamber;
- **0.5:** the regional government/parliament/regional representation in the upper chamber is consulted on national legislation affecting the region;
- **0.5:** the regional government/parliament/regional representation in the upper chamber has veto power over national legislation affecting the region.

**Executive power sharing (0-2):**
- **1:** routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and the regional government for consultation on executive matters affecting the region; *no binding* authority;
- **2:** routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and the regional government for consultation and arbitration on executive matters affecting the region; *binding* authority.

**Country Scores**
We obtain country scores by aggregating the scores of constituent regions. Where a country has a special autonomous region, we weigh the score of the region by its population.
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Sources

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Country-specific


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International Monetary Fund: [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org)
Local Government and Public Sector Reform Initiative: [http://lgi.osi.hu](http://lgi.osi.hu)
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