SHARED IDEAL, DIVERGENT STRATEGIES?
EXPLAINING SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN E.U. AND U.S.
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

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Abstract

By the turn of the 21st century liberal democracy and democracy promotion have both become strongly entrenched norms in U.S. and E.U. foreign policies. Despite squabbles over a host of international issues, democracy as a system of government and an ideal is fundamentally shared by Americans and Europeans. Moreover, the erosion of state sovereignty and principles of non-intervention, as well as growing appreciation of the links between substantive democracy and economic development, peace and security, have made the goal of democracy promotion a shared one for Americans and Europeans. We argue that contemporary Europe and the United States are united by a normative commitment to democracy and the objective of supporting and promoting its development outside the transatlantic community. But does this mean that the E.U. and U.S. pursue the same democracy promotion strategies? We suggest that the answer is “sometimes, and sometimes not” and that it is dynamic. At times, and in different contexts, E.U. and U.S. strategies and instruments converge and diverge. Finally, we argue that divergence in strategies can be explained with reference to three key factors: the different histories and formative experiences that have shaped E.U. and U.S. thinking and institutions for promoting democracy abroad; differences in international “actorship”; and differences in conception of power.

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In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, President George W. Bush elevated rhetorically the promotion of liberty and democracy abroad to a central position in United States (US) foreign policy. In numerous statements, including his second inaugural address, President Bush has outlined a full-throated explanation for why the promotion of democracy is both a moral imperative and a central security interest for the United States. Although Bush has focused his remarks and American resources on the greater Middle East, he also has emphasized that the American mission of democracy promotion is global in scope.

President Bush has made it clear that he wants the mission to be shared by all established democracies, and especially by America’s oldest allies in Europe. In his February 2005 charm offensive on Brussels, Bush called upon Europeans to encourage democratic transformations in the broader Middle East “by taking up the duties of great democracies” and renewing “our great alliance of freedom.” Similarly, in June 2005, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, told delegates at a Transatlantic Democracy Network conference in Brussels that “the great common project” for Americans and Europeans was no longer the Cold War or the preservation of democracy in Europe, but “what we can do outside the transatlantic relationship to preserve peace and security and democracy around the world.” In June 2004, Bush tried to use the prerogative of the chair in hosting the G8 summit to launch a Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI), a project which aims to marshal American and European diplomatic and financial resources to press for greater political liberalization primarily in the Arab world.

Well before G8 leaders convened at Sea Island, Georgia, however, serious disagreements between Americans and Europeans erupted over the definition of the mission statement and the compatibility of European versus American approaches to democracy promotion. Europeans leaked drafts of the Sea Island documents as a way to embarrass the Americans for what they called imperialism, and stressed instead that the European Union already has its own European instruments to encourage democratic institutions in North Africa and the Middle East – the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Most tellingly, some European leaders wanted to remove the word, democracy, from the Sea Island documents altogether, and insert the word modernization in its stead. Eventually, G8 leaders did launch the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative, but the ambition reflected in the documents was far more modest than the Americans had wished, and bad feelings persisted.

On both sides of the Atlantic, the Sea Island rift seemed to confirm what Robert Kagan had observed years before – Americans and Europeans no longer shared a common understanding or strategic vision about the international order. American officials now identified threats to U.S. national security as coming primarily from badly governed countries or autocratic regimes hostile to the United States. Part of the strategy for diminishing these threats, from the American perspective, was projecting democratic values and institutions into hostile, Hobbesian regions of the world. As President Bush stated explicitly in his second inaugural address, “The survival of liberty in our land depends on the success of liberty in others lands.” By contrast, many Americans believed that European leaders did not perceive these threats from the periphery in the same way, did not believe that the promotion of democracy would lessen them, and were deeply sceptical that any joint effort with the United States to promote
democracy outside the transatlantic community would succeed. A secondary accusation was that Europeans were not serious about promoting democracy, preferring to let the United States shoulder the hard burden while Europe luxuriates in the role of “the good guy” and serves its own economic interests.

In parallel, many European foreign policy elites have greeted American official statements about democracy and human rights with incredulity. Fearing a new and radical brand of American imperialism, many Europeans have warned repeatedly that the United States should not seek to promote democracy “through the barrel of a gun.” And although the decision to invade Iraq was at the time only tangentially linked to the democracy promotion project, in the minds of many the Bush administration’s wider democratic vision has been thoroughly sullied by association. A voluble European narrative has, in other words, come to portray American “democracy promotion” pejoratively, as forming one of three pillars of a wider failed Bush doctrine, which also includes, according to the detractors, disdain for multilateral institutions and a penchant for the use of pre-emptive military force.

Couched in these terms, it is hardly surprising that some Europeans have gone to great lengths to sharply distinguish the goals and means of EU external policy from those of the United States, not least in the area of democracy promotion. As many Europeans found themselves in vehement disagreement with the Bush administration’s position not only on Iraq, but on world trade, the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming and the International Criminal Court (ICC), they found it difficult to separate their displeasure over these issues from the more specific focus on democracy promotion. In some European quarters, agreeing with President Bush on anything became a politically unfashionable faux pas. The caricatures – whereby the White House bullishly champions the “spread of liberty” around the globe, while Europe urges caution and seeks stability instead – have thus infected elite perceptions, and distorted policy deliberations.

This paper constitutes a draft introductory chapter to a volume that seeks to explore this hypothesis about European and American conceptions of international order and their consequent approaches to democracy promotion. Is the current clash in European and American thinking about democracy promotion real or wrongly perceived? Are American and European approaches to democracy promotion fundamentally different and at odds with each other or actually similar and compatible? Are there gains to be made from greater coordination between European and American policies, or are the two sides of the Atlantic more successful in promoting if they work independently?

The analysis presented in the chapters of the collection offers a different, more nuanced assessment of the similarities and differences in European versus American approaches to democracy promotion. On the goal of democracy promotion, we see more agreement, than discord. The “West” broadly defined still shares a common set of principles about governance that both sides of the Atlantic still believe are worth propagating. On the tools and tactics of democracy promotion practiced by European and American actors, our study also uncovers more shared practices than competing approaches. European governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the business of promoting democracy deploy many similar techniques to their American counterparts. Both sets of institutions grapple with substantially identical challenges of project design, implementation and evaluation of outcomes. It is in the
development of national strategies towards autocratic regimes that American and European approaches sometimes differ. These differences are principally a function of the different types and capacities of power that Europeans and Americans can deploy in the name of democracy promotion. Put simply, European states have limited coercive capacities to destroy autocratic regimes. Rather than confrontation, therefore, Europe’s default mode for inducing internal change is “transformative engagement” and integration. American leaders also practice engagement and integration as strategies for fostering regime change, but indirectly through multilateral institutions, and with lesser institutional density than the one achieved in Europe. On rare occasions, however, American leaders have also pursued more coercive strategies, including at time military intervention, to foster democratic regime change.

SHARED NORMS, OBJECTIVES, AND ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS

Hyperbolic statements about American imperialism and European weakness mask substantial agreement between Europeans and Americans about the value of democracy and democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective. Democracy as an international norm is stronger than ever before, while the promotion of democracy has become a legitimate foreign policy priority for both Americans and Europeans.

Democracy’s Triumph as a System and Ideal

The first and most important cause of this normative consensus between Europeans and Americans about the value of democracy is the growing success of democracy and democratization over the past two decades and the commensurate declining appeal of alternative models of government. Seventy years ago, proponents of non-democratic regime types enjoyed audiences and support in Europe. Thirty years ago, the continent was divided between democratic and communist regimes. Because this ideological divide was so central to American and European strategic thinking, Western democracies tolerated and at times defended anti-communist, autocratic regimes as allies. Western leaders even made decisions to engage regimes in the communist world based in large measure by geo-strategic concerns. In the 1970s and 80s, for instance, both Americans and Europeans supported the odious Ceausescu regime in Romania because of its anti-Soviet tendencies. In a bi-polar world, the two hegemons fostered loyal protégés above all else; their grand strategic concerns discouraged political experimentations.

The end of the Cold War not only allowed for the expansion of democratic practices into the former communist world, but it also eliminated a chief rational for tolerating autocratic practices in the non-communist world. For instance, as a bulwark against communist expansion in southern Africa, the apartheid regime in South Africa could win supporters among Western democracies. The disappearance of world communist threat, however, also undermined the already weak tolerance for this South Africa’s dictators and many others. The collapse of the Soviet Union as a counterweight to American power also made more aggressive uses of U.S. and European military,
diplomatic, and economic power in the name of democracy promotion less risky. The larger role played by international actors (states, international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, and NGOs) in the democratic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and post-conflict stabilization of the Balkans has brought international dimensions of democratization to the fore. At the same time, more international actors now wield more resources and deploy more intrusive monitoring instruments than ever before in the name of human rights, good governance and democracy. Although obtaining exact, comparable figures of Western spending on democracy promotion remains difficult, it is clear that both Americans and Europeans have significantly increased funding for democracy assistance across a host of development, educational and conflict-resolution programs in the post-cold war period. Using donor’s own varied political assistance categories for 2001, for example, Richard Youngs estimates an approximate overall EU budget of $900 million, compared to $633 million in USAID allocation for the same period. By 2005 total United States government spending on democracy assistance (discounting post-war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq) climbed to approximately $1.5 billion, an amount roughly matched overall EU and individual European countries’ spending.

Even where authoritarians still prevail, they no longer champion an alternative form of government, but either claim that their regimes are democratic (as in Russia or Uganda) or that they are moving their countries gradually towards democracy (as in China, Egypt or Saudi Arabia). Even the most vehement proponents of illiberal, autocratic practices, including terrorist leaders, have felt compelled to incorporate democratic discourse in their political appeals.

Moreover, the appeal of the democratic ideas has produced a sea change in the way that the world is governed. By 2003, the number of democratic states in the world had grown from 39 in 1974 to 117, and the number of “Free States” (as rated by Freedom House) more than doubled, from 39 to 88.

**Eroding Norms of State Sovereignty and Non-intervention**

In addition to sharing a belief in the virtues of democracy, European and American leaders increasingly have come to embrace norms about the primacy of human rights over states rights. The notion of state sovereignty, although violated in practice for hundreds of years, has endured as a norm and continues to influence the conduct of international affairs. Nevertheless, during the last three decades, as new international rules protecting individual human rights have gained strength, the sanctity of sovereignty has eroded. In the 1970s and 80s, East European dissidents invoked the 1975 Helsinki Final Act to demand the recognition of their human rights, and eventually they triumphed. In the count down to the fall of communism, both Americans and Western Europeans concerned to promote democracy abroad drew upon human rights norms to legitimise their actions. Although diametrically opposed in many ways, presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan both made the promotion of human rights a central theme of their administrations. In Europe, democracy promotion abroad made its first cursory appearance in European Community (EC) documents with the 1986 Statement on Human Rights, the foreign ministers of the Community affirming “their commitment to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and emphasize the importance in this
The end of the Cold War greatly accelerated this trend. In 1990 the UN sent its first elections monitoring mission to a sovereign state, Nicaragua, and by 1992 Thomas Franck could make a spirited argument in favour of a “democratic entitlement” in international law. Throughout the 1990s the status and determinacy of the right to political participation were strengthened through pronouncements and the crafting of monitoring mechanisms by international actors, including the UN General Assembly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Human Rights Committee, the European and Inter-American Commissions on Human Rights, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe.

Most boldly, military intervention for the defence of fundamental individual rights has gained international legitimacy, and the protection of democracy now features prominently in the justification of such action. For instance, the UN Security Council responded vigorously to military coups against elected governments in Haiti (1991-1994) and Sierra Leone (1997-98), by authorizing external actors to reverse the usurping of power by force. In 1999, Australia sent its military forces to assist transition to democratic government in East Timor, as did the EU in 2003 in eastern Congo. Even when European and American have disagreed about the use of force, most notably regarding the American decision to invade Iraq, they have remained unanimously committed to the idea that post-conflict governments must be chosen in free and fair elections.

**Democracy and Development**

A third factor that has helped to produce shared support for democracy in Europe and the United States is a new understanding of the relationship between economic development and democracy. Thirty years ago, the conventional wisdom, which dominated development thinking and the work of international financial institutions (IFI), held that economic development and prosperity encourage democracy or in the words of Martin Lipset: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” For policymakers, this hypothesis offered a justification for tolerating anti-democratic practices in developing countries, especially when as in many parts of East Asia, these autocratic regimes were producing impressive economic growth. In the last decade, however, a mass of research has challenged old assumptions about the relationship between regime type and development. Several major studies and political documents, including the World Bank’s World Development Reports since 1997, as well as the UNDP Human Development Reports since 2002 and the UN Secretary General’s 2005 report: *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, have argued with supporting data that democratic government encourages economic development. The causal mechanisms between autocracy or democracy, on the one hand, and development, on the other, are still poorly understood. Still, there is now a consensus among Europeans and Americans that, at the very least, democracy need not be delayed to promote economic development. This paradigm shift in the development community has further eroded defences for autocratic rule and further enhanced the transatlantic commitment to democracy promotion. Accordingly, pressures are mounting
on the largest providers of development aid – notably the United States and European Union countries – to generate a more “democracy-centred development strategy”. xxiv

**Democracy and Security**

It is over the relationship between democracy promotion and security that serious analytic debates still remain between Europeans and Americans (as well as among Americans and among Europeans). Over the long run, few on either side of the Atlantic would dispute the idea that “the West” has clear security interests in seeing the spread of democracy around the world. The *consolidation* of democratic regimes in states formerly ruled by autocratic regimes and hostile to American and European interests has made the West safer. Democracies do not attack each other. xxv This hope about the relationship between domestic regime type and international behaviour advanced most eloquently by Immanuel Kant in *Perpetual Peace* centuries ago received empirical validation in the twentieth century. Today, every democracy in the world has cordial relations with other democracies, while no consolidated democracy in the world seriously threatens another consolidated democracy. Not all dictatorships in the world are foes of the United States or Europe but nearly all foes of the United States have been and are dictatorships or non-governmental organizations that embrace antidemocratic ideologies. With few exceptions, the countries that provide safe haven to non-state enemies of the United States and Europe are autocratic regimes. With rare exceptions, the median voter in consolidated democracies pushes extreme elements to the sidelines of the political arena. Democracies are also more transparent, which makes them more predictable actors in international politics. xxvi

Extrapolating from this historical experience regarding the positive security benefits of democracy’s advance, President Bush and his foreign policy team have argued forcefully since September 11th that the expansion of democracy in the greater Middle East will make the United States and its European allies more secure. As Bush explained, “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe - because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.” xxvii Far from ensuring stability, Bush and others have argued, Western support for autocratic Arab regimes has contributed to political repression, underdevelopment and the empowerment of extremist groups. When combined with weapons of mass destruction or even a suicide belt, these would strike at the heart of Western capitals. It is this threat, more than any other factor, which has spurred the Bush administration to embrace the idea of democracy promotion in the greater Middle East as a security objective.

Many Europeans agree in principle. Europe’s first Security Strategy, approved unanimously by European leaders in December 2003, for example, speaks of the need “to promote a ring of well-governed countries” in the EU’s volatile eastern and southern peripheries, and acknowledges that well-governed democracies constitute “the best protection of our security”. xxviii At the national level, the United Kingdom government under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair also has championed this logic, providing some of the most elegant deductive arguments for why the West has a security
interest in promoting democracy. In March 2005, for instance, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told a Labour Party gathering that the West’s share of responsibility for the dearth of democracy in the Arab world “is not down to too much enthusiasm for promoting democracy, but too little” and called on Western leaders to “set democracy as our compass.”

But others within Europe (and other Americans outside of the Bush Administration, Democrats and Republicans alike) have a different view. Some have posited that greater political liberalization in the Middle East will lead to instability. Others worry about that democracy in the Middle East will produce radical, anti-Western governments, a development that would not make the United States, Europe, and their allies in the region more insecure. In this context, European leaders have reminded their American peers that “What is a geostrategic issue for the United States is Europe’s backyard.”

Another set of critics claim that it is precisely Western involvement in the internal affairs of countries in the Middle East that has prompted terrorist attacks against the United States and Europe in the first place. More aggressive attempts to reshape political institutions in the region, so the argument goes, will produce less security for citizens of the West, not more. Finally, others have questioned the power of democratic ideas and institutions in actually reducing the incident of terrorist attacks.

Despite the absence of agreement between and among European and American foreign elites about the utility of democracy promotion as an instrument for enhancing Western security, broad based support for the policy of democracy promotion policy still remains with European and American publics. In fact, according to a 2005 survey commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compania di San Paolo, even more Europeans support the idea than do Americans. When asked if the EU should “help establish democracy in others countries” 74 percent of European agreed while 22 percent disagreed. When asked a similar question about the United States, 51 percent of Americans supported the idea that the U.S. should promote democracy abroad, while 42 percent did not support the idea.

In sum, there is broad agreement between American and European elites and their publics about the benefits of democracy as a system of government and democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective. Tensions between the United States and some countries in Europe, which intensified during the first term of the George W. Bush administration, have not undermined this deep, fundamental, and normative commitment to democracy on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. A comparison of the chapters on Europe and the United States in this volume reveals the shared and similar objectives of democratic promotion, not their differences. Elites do differ, however, about the priority and practicality of democracy promotion regarding certain countries. Democracy is championed by most as a goal worth pursuing, but democratisation—that is the process of trying to build democracy – is not embraced universally as a process in every country, which makes the West more secure.
DIFFERENT AND SIMILAR STRATEGIES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

If American and European are united by a normative commitment to democracy and the objective of its encouragement outside the transatlantic community, do they also embrace the same strategy for achieving this shared goal? The answer we provide collectively in this volume is “sometimes, and sometimes not.” Defining and elucidating the similarities and differences in democracy promotion strategies between Europe and the United States is a central theme of this book.

At first glance, the differences seem more apparent than the similarities. To date, the EU’s principal tool for promoting democracy has been the conditional offer of inclusion in the regional governance system itself. The “pull” of the EU is unique among international and regional organizations in the world. The Union pulls democratizing countries into its orbit and then compels them to consolidate many democratic practices, procedures, and institutions before being offered EU membership. In entering the “Europe zone” domestic democratic reformers are empowered and democratic practices are effectively locked into a liberal regional community. By contrast, the United States is perceived as being in the business of “pushing” democracy, or for those critical of American foreign policy, of “exporting” democracy, without exposing itself to the risks of inclusion within its own body politic. This push model of democracy promotion is perceived by some to have a shallower, narrower impact and a more coercive quality to it, especially as in Afghanistan and Iraq, when American armed forces are involved in the process. The European preference for engagement and integration as a grand strategy for democracy promotion also produces sharp differences in approach with the United States regarding a number of autocratic regimes such as Cuba and Iran, cases in which American officials prefer a coercive, confrontational approach including diplomatic and trade isolation, economic sanctions and direct assistance to opposition movements seeking to overthrow the dictatorships.

The shifts in the priority assigned to democracy promotion also seems different in Europe and the United States, especially after September 11th and especially with reference in the Middle East. President Bush has elevated the focus and attention on democracy promotion as a strategic objective of American foreign policy after September 11th. The new emphasis on democracy promotion may have been a radical departure from Bush’s pre-September 11th approach to foreign policy, but it was not a revolutionary departure from previous American presidents. Rather, it was the reaffirmation of a longstanding tradition in American foreign policy. This tradition, however, is not followed uniformly by all American presidents, but instead zigs and zags in priority depending on the preferences of the president and his foreign policy team. By contrast, the increase in attention dedicated by EU institutions and member states to democracy promotion in the Middle East is newer, more moderate, but also more steady. Further, Europeans tend to have a more expansive definition of what constitutes democracy promotion, which includes policies aimed at promoting social modernization, trade-related regulatory development, human equality and social solidarity, protection of the environment, peaceful resolution of conflict and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law. Critics charge that this supposedly more holistic conceptualization masks a looser definition that in effect underscores the lower priority Europeans assign to the business of promoting overtly political democratic institutions.
and practices. This is reflected in differences of rhetoric used by officials in Brussels versus those in Washington that emphasizes a difference in priority and approach. Europeans almost never use the word “liberty” and even shy away from “democracy,” preferring instead more cautious phrases like “good governance” and “political modernization.” Where the “D-word” is used explicitly, it is usually bundled together in a pack of principles that also include fundamental rights, the rule of law, good neighborliness and respect for international law.

Upon closer inspection, however, these caricatures of European versus American strategies for democracy promotion only capture part of the story and obfuscate some similar strategies and practices. In fact, despite tensions and high politics differences, the post-9/11 period has produced notable convergence between American and European strategies in the Middle East and North Africa. Europeans – at both the national and supranational levels – also deploy push strategies for expanding democracy. Well beyond the European neighbourhood, a myriad of European initiatives deploy democratic conditionality and provide technical and financial assistance to new democracies that have no chance of joining the EU and to democrats struggling to overthrow antidemocratic regimes. On rare occasions, European troops have even been deployed in the name of promoting democratic regime change, and it is now the EU, not the US, that is leading post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkan countries. Similarly, Americans do not only practice “push” strategies, but also use American-designed international institutions, American markets, and American education and culture to pull democratizing countries and their citizens toward the democratic community of states. The OAS, NATO, WTO, G-8 and even the OSCE are just some examples of international institutions with deep American involvement that have also provided gravity to countries in transition.

The new policy challenges created by September 11th, as well as the rise of new global powers – notably Brazil, India and China – have produced a demand for policy innovation in the field of democracy promotion, an impulse which has prompted learning and policy convergence between Europeans and Americans. Because American policymakers have become more interested in promoting democratic change in autocratic regimes in the Middle East friendly to the United States, the orientation of activities under the US’s new Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) now mirror those of the EU’s Barcelona Process, whose mission has been the gradual promotion of political change in autocracies friendly to European interests. In the opposite direction, European policy makers have begun discussing the idea of a new European Democracy Fund that would competitively award financial assistance to developing countries that undertake measurable reforms, an approach to aid that the US’s new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) is also seeking to implement.

When looking at the specifics of European and American practices in promoting democracy within countries beyond the immediate orbit of the EU, the actual programs can look very similar. American and European agencies – notably The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the EU’s The European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and geographic programs (such as MEDA and the Lome/Cotonou framework) – fund a similar range of democracy aid projects, following a largely standard template of activities. For instance, in the post-Soviet world, the American method for fostering the development of civil society is hard to distinguish
from a European approach. Likewise, American and European strategies for promoting free and fair elections often look very much alike. Sometimes, European and American agents of democratic change do promote different policies. The death penalty, for instance, is viewed as fundamentally undemocratic by EU Member States, and its abolition has been made a formal precondition for accession. EIDHR has made the abolition of the death penalty one of its four thematic priorities. In contrast, the United States, while it does not actively promote the adoption of the death penalty in third countries, clearly sees the relationship between democracy and the death penalty differently.

European and American policymakers and NGOs sometimes promote different institutional designs. American rule of law groups, for instance, sometimes push for the introduction of jury trials, while Europeans, for the most part, do not. In certain specific contexts, including most recently in Afghanistan, American officials have advocated a presidential system, a constitutional design rarely invoked by European democracy promoters. Yet, even regarding institutional design, it would be a gross mischaracterization to posit that Americans and Europeans only promote their own systems of government. Depending on the context, American democracy promoting groups are just as likely to recommend proportional representation as they are the American first-past-the post electoral system. They are just as likely to push a parliamentary democracy as they are a presidential model, and federal as well as unitary systems of governments.

EXPLAINING SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

In addition to identifying key differences and similarities in European versus American approaches to democracy promotion, we should seek to account for them. We want to posit three main factors that might help explain differences, and leave open the possibility that the absence of these variables therefore would help, at least in part, account for similarities.

History and formative experiences in democracy promotion

First and most obviously is history. The contexts and main formative experiences that molded American and European democracy promotion policies have substantially varied. Since the birth of the United States, and even before, many American leaders have believed that their democratic system of government was not only responsible for the country’s freedom and prosperity, but that it made the United States an example and a moral force in the world. Some have gone further, extrapolating from this belief an operational conclusion; that it was the responsibility of the United States to share its experience of democracy with the peoples of the world. Different American administrations have placed different emphases on various aspects of democracy – be it free and fair elections, human rights, or a robust civil society – and have provided different justifications for American involvement, oscillating between “idealism” that trumpeted the morality of democracy and the universality of its promise, and “realism”
that stressed the benefits of a liberal international political and economic order for American national interests. And, the priority accorded to democracy promotion has also ebbed and flowed over time, varying both between administrations and even within the tenure of the same president.\textsuperscript{xxxix} Still, no American president has ever denied the importance of the objective, and even during the extensive periods when realists dominated American foreign policy, the goal was never completely abandoned. Indeed, as Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul’s analysis of American democracy promotion policies show, President Bush’s embrace of democracy promotion, far from amounting to a radical departure from the United State’s foreign policy traditions, represents an affirmation of one of its oldest.

In comparison with the United States, EU Member States are relative new comers to the democracy promotion business. As Michael Allen’s chapter on Western European national policies shows, prior to the post-1974 wave of democratization Western European governments drew largely pessimistic lessons about the efficacy of democracy promotion, and the important role played by the European Community in underwriting democratic consolidation in Southern Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was only gradually grasped by European policy makers. At the same time, the consuming nature of post war reunification inside Europe itself, and the restrictions imposed on Western governments by the bi-polar international environment have meant that democracy promotion emerged as a significant foreign policy objective of Western European national governments only in the last two decades. And even the 1990s, the central focus on internal changes within the EU often pushed democracy promotion outside of the EU to the backburner.\textsuperscript{xl} A notable exception are the German political party foundations (or Stiftungs), which were established in the aftermath of the Second World War, and were the first publicly funded (though non-governmental institutions) to support democratic institutions and programs in transitional countries – and which provided an important model for the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the United States in 1983.\textsuperscript{xli}

Moreover, although the EU, \textit{qua} EU, has become a leading international actor in the promotion of democracy, this is a relatively new development, and one that attests to the substantial expansion of the EU’s external ambitions in recent years. In fact, the Community/Union did not adopt the objective of promoting democracy until the late 1980s – and then merely as an ancillary to human rights objectives.\textsuperscript{xlii} It was only following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and after several Member States and international organizations (notably the World Bank) have entered the fray, that the EU proclaimed democracy promotion as an objective.

A related historical consequence is the fact that the key formative experiences in democracy promotion have differed for Americans and Europeans. In essence, the post-war transformations of Germany and Japan mark the United States’ clearest and most profound success in democracy promotion, whereas European leaders view the enlargement of the EU to Southern and then Central and Eastern Europe as having proven to be the Union’s most successful foreign policy strategy. The degree to which these different legacies shape contemporary American and European strategies for democracy promotion in different parts of the world is a question debated through several chapters in this collection. Still, it is clear that America’s formative experiences have entered current policy discussions about Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq and the Middle East,\textsuperscript{xliii}, whereas
the enlargement experience continues to guide European thinking about democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey, the Balkans, North Africa, Middle East, the caucuses, Central Asia, and beyond.

**International “actorship” and its consequences**

A second factor influencing variance in strategy in democracy promotion is the fundamentally different types of polities that the United States and the EU represent, which in turn determine in large measure how these different actors behave in the international system. Put simply, the United States is a nation-state that is not seeking to expand its boundaries, whereas the EU is an evolving regional organization, whose Member States (twenty five and growing) are engaged in an ongoing process to create a multi-layered supranational governance system.

This difference creates possibilities and imposes constraints, which go some way towards explaining key differences between US and EU approaches. As a modern national entity, the United States maintains hard borders and has not taken in new Member States for nearly a half century. The history of European integration, in contrast, has been one of continuous, peaceful territorial widening – though in the aftermath of the “big bang” enlargement of May 1st, 2004, this trend may now be slowing down, with important consequences for democratic prospects in Turkey, the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the wider Mediterranean region. While the United States maintains a stringent separation between “in and out”, the EU has kept the question of borders deliberately fuzzy as a means of attracting and impacting the internal governance structures of neighbouring countries. Indeed, the EU has turned the conditional prospect of whole or partial inclusion in an integrated political and economic community into a *sui generis* strategy for deepening and locking in democratic transformations in peripheral countries eager for closer relations. The mechanisms by which the EU has pursued democratic enlargement now raise the crucial question of whether Europe’s “cooperative empire” has essentially reached it limits. At the same time, the fragmented nature of EU external relations policy - aggravated by reliance on limited treaty provisions, consensus-based decision-making procedures, and the cumbersome three pillar system - imposes formidable constraints on EU international actions, which American foreign policymakers do not face.

The complexities of policy formation on democracy promotion in a multi-level governance system are formidable – involving the taking into account of national level policies, as well as the actions of the supranational institutions and the gravitas of the EU as an international actor more broadly. Since the early 1990s, individual member states of the EU have expanded substantially the scope and budgets of their own democracy and human rights promotion programs and resisted pressures to surrender national control over these areas of foreign policy competence. Moreover, in the last few years, EU member state policies actually diverged in some respects, for example over the degree of autonomy of political aid units in national bureaucracies from security or other strategically motivated diktats.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the United States government acts as a unitary actor with regard to democracy promotion. The process of policy formation on democracy promotion within the United States government can be as contentious and fragmented as the one in the EU, and can suffer from a similar lack of inter-agency
coordination. Coherency is complicated by the presence of many American democracy promotion organizations that receive funding from the U.S. government but do not always act in accordance with the policies of the U.S. government.

**Power and methods of democracy promotion**

A third factor, which may explain differences in strategy, is type and degree of power. The United States is a global hegemon with interests and influence in every corner of the world. To date, Europe is a regional hegemon with interests and influence concentrated mainly, though not exclusively, in its “near abroad.” As the European Security Strategy puts it: “Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed.”

The neighbourhood is thus placed in a privileged position in the European security agenda. Assuming this asymmetry remains, American leaders will have to develop a wider range of tools for promoting democracy in different regions and in different kinds of regimes compared to their European counterparts. To pursue this global agenda towards all kinds of regimes – from full-blown dictatorships to illiberal democracies— American officials have deployed a vast range of tools and policies, including sanctions, covert operations and military occupation. With geostrategic interests in fewer countries and with lesser resources to project military power and a greater reluctance to use economic sanctions, Europe’s toolbox may be smaller or more concentrated on cooperative rather than coercive methods. Perhaps most importantly, the United States has the capacity to engage or confront most autocratic regimes around the world. The EU has mainly the capacity to engage. Only in rare exceptions does Europe have the capacity and internal consensus necessary to pursue confrontational or coercive strategies for fostering democratic regime change. Because the United States at times uses military force to destroy autocratic regimes, it must also be in the business of building democratic regime after war, a capacity that presumably is less important to the European strategy for democracy promotion.

These power asymmetries also may produce different American and European attitudes towards multilateral tools for democracy promotion. The United States has never relied on such institutions to conduct its foreign policy. Rather, successive US administrations, going as far back as Woodrow Wilson, have been torn between the desire to achieve the broad acceptance and legitimacy accorded by multilateral institutions, on the one hand, and considerations of decisiveness and utility, on the other. In contrast, Europeans see multilateralism both as an organizing principle among themselves and an essential tool for advancing their foreign policy interests outside of Europe, including democracy promotion.
COOPERATION, COMPATIBILITY OR COMPETITION?

In addition to underscoring the shared objectives about democracy promotion in Europe and the United States, and then tracing and explaining differences and similarities in American and European strategies for promoting democracy, a third and final theme that needs to be addressed by scholars of comparative democracy promotion is the benefits and pitfalls of greater cooperation between Europe and the United States in advancing democracy worldwide. Should the US and the EU cooperate in this endeavour? Can they cooperate? If so, where and how?

In the highly charged transatlantic relationship of the last several years, commentators and policy-makers have proposed some general and often competing answers to these questions. For instance, Michele Dunne has argued that “the idea of some kind of common or coordinated effort does not seem feasible or perhaps even necessary” since Europe is already far down the road of developing its own strategy, is already overburdened by efforts to coordinate among its own member states, and that “in any case the United States rarely wants to coordinate on any issue.” Instead she suggests, the US and the EU should strive for better complementarity, “which is why this issue should remain on the table for frequent discussion.” In a similar vein, there are those who maintain that any European association with American policies diminishes its power of influence since it robs Europe of its “credibility”, especially in the Arab world. On a different, more placatory note, the EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana, has declared that existing American and European strategies “reinforce each other” and that “this pluralism in promoting democracy is a source of strength.” Others have called for even more comprehensive plans for transatlantic cooperation as a necessity for meeting the new and immense challenges of promoting democracy in the Arab world. Certainly, analysis of case studies from Syria, Iran and Lebanon suggests a fair amount of common ground is actually shared by the two sides, yet with partly competing logics in approaches towards democratic reforms in the Middle East.

Transatlantic cooperation seems essential when practicing some forms of democracy promotion. For instance, sanctions only pressure autocratic regimes to change if all major powers enforce the sanctions regime. If some countries defect, then sanctions are likely to fail. Contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. and EU economic pressures are more effective than usually supposed, especially when pursued together. Similarly, diplomatic pressure works best when the West speaks with one voice. The unanimous decision by all European countries and the United States to not recognize the results of a falsified presidential election in Ukraine in November 2004 played a positive role in pressuring in compelling the incumbent, President Leonid Kuchma, to back down and all the election to be replayed. Had the West not been united, the outcome could have been different. On the other hand, there also are most certainly countries in which ties (for historical or geographical reasons) to Europe and the United States differ significantly and therefore it may be better for Europeans and Americans to pursue their programs for democracy promotion independent from each other. By examining in close detail what American and European governments and NGOs do to promote democracy and why they do it, the chapters that follow aim to provide some guidelines to policymakers about the
conditions under which greater cooperation might help the effort and under what conditions it should not even be attempted.

Given that there are significant differences between European and American efforts at promoting democracy, can we discern whether some methods and tools are better than others? For instance, does the European strategy for promoting democracy in pro-Western autocratic regimes work better than American approaches, and therefore American officials should learn and change? Is the opposite true? Or are their advantages to different methods? Are some European strategies better suited for promoting democracy in certain geographic or thematic areas, while the American approach works better when dealing with others? Evaluating what works best, when, and where is an important and grossly understudied subject. Closer cooperation between American and European scholars of democracy promotion is essential in making better determinations on the division of labor, actual pursuit and impact of American and European democracy promotion strategies, as well as existing and desired compatibility between them.

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i Address of President George W. Bush, Concert Noble, Brussels, 21 February 2005.


iii Less overtly, Japan also expressed reluctance to sign on to the American approach, but Japan will not be discussed in this volume, which focuses instead on European Union and United States strategies and instruments for democracy promotion.


vi The same has become true for many within the Democratic Party of the United States.


viii By “democracy promotion” we mean the deliberate use of rhetorical, positive, punitive or coercive measures aimed at creating, strengthening or maintaining democratic procedures, institutions, practices or norms in some or all levels of society and state organization.


x The approaches taken by the United States and the European Union towards Mexico are illuminating in this regard. Despite geographical proximity and economic leverage the United States has not viewed the NAFTA framework as a democracy promotion tool in its relations with Mexico. In contrast the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Mexico, that came into force in October 2000, represents the first treaty accepted by Mexico that explicitly conditions the relationship on respect for human rights and democratic principles. See: Szymanski M. and Smith M,


xx In the case of Haiti, the Security Council directly authorized the intervention (UN Security Council Resolution 940, 1994). In the case of Sierra Leone, the Security Council commended ECOWAS’s intervention post hoc and endorsed it (UN Security Council Resolution 1162, 1998).


xxiii Przeworski et al make a lesser claim, that on average democratic regimes perform no differently than autocratic regimes. This finding is still a major departure from earlier assessments about the advantages of autocracy for economic growth.

Democracies also make threats less often, but make more credible threats. See K. Shultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Address of President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, 6 November, 2003.


Gregory Gause III F., ‘Can Democracy Stop Terror?’ *Foreign Affairs*, 84/5 (September-October 2005).


As the president of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Carl Gershman, observes the role played by the largest of the Stiftungs – the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung of the Christian Democrats and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of the Social Democratic Party – in the democratic transitions of Portugal and


xliii Dobbins J. et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2003).


xlix China may be an exception, i.e. China is too powerful for the United States to confront as part of a strategy of democratic promotion.


lv German Marshall Fund Istanbul Paper Number 1, Democracy and Human Development in the Broader Middle East: A Transatlantic Strategy for Partnership (June 2004).