Jan Ifversen and Christoffer Kølvraa

Department of European Studies
Institute of History and Area Studies
University of Aarhus, Denmark

kultji@hum.au.dk
eurock@hum.au.dk

European Neighbourhood Policy as Identity Politics

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My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, 'Good fences make good neighbors'.
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
'Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it
Where there are cows?
But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down.
Robert Frost, Mending Wall, 1914

Introduction

Almost since the idea of a European Neighbourhood Policy emerged in 2002 - as a framework for offering an alternative to those states that would come to border the post-enlargement union – the rhetoric presenting and arguing for such a policy has linked it to broader ideas of Europe’s role in the world and the special quality of European power. The formulation and discussion of the ENP in other words immediately went further than the instrumental, institutional and geographic scope of the policy relating also to questions of European identity – to the demarcation of who and how Europe was to be and act in the world.

This larger question of Europe’s place and power in the world has been prominent in the scholarly debate on Europe of recent years. Apart form the now classical idea of Europe as a civilian power, the field has witnessed the introduction of ever more attempts at conceptualising the distinct European way of being and acting in the world. The most influential of these is undeniably Ian Manners’ idea of Europe as a normative power (Manners 2002), but the idea of Europe’s external relations being guided by a specific and unique kind of morality which is present in Manners’ concept can also be found in many other conceptualisations of Europe; Europe as a Kantian power (Kagan 2002), a cooperative empire (Cooper 2002), a cosmopolitan society (Habermas 2003, Beck 2003) or a vanishing mediator (Balibar 2003) just to mention a few.

Although there is no direct references to this scholarly literature in the political rhetoric of the EU— expect from rare references to civilian power –the ENP is nevertheless presented as carrying a deeper or wider set of intrinsically European characteristics and qualities. Rhetorically the ENP emerges as the showcase or laboratory for articulating what Europe is in and for the world. It can
thus be argued that the ENP is as much about the identity of Europe as it is about the handling of the relations to the neighbouring states. The ENP can be analysed as identity-politics, because its formulation and exercise has the effect of highlighting a particular version of European identity, a specific European subject which is constructed as an actor in the world.

We employ a post-structualist understanding of identity. This in the most general terms views identity as discursively constructed and always dependent on the articulation of difference; The (collective) Self only emerges by being discursively differentiated from the surrounding Others. Conceiving of identity as a discursive construction with no determining essential or material underpinning means that our focus is on the self-perception and the self-description of political communities, and not some reality beyond the rhetoric. This approach ‘takes rhetoric seriously’ which means that the obvious material for analysis is textual. We draw on a corpus composed of the official documents formulating the ENP from 2002-04, but the larger part of this corpus is dominated by the speeches about the ENP and Europe’s role in the world delivered in the same period by the leading personnel in the Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP.

In this paper we will first clarify how we conceive of the theoretical connection between identity and foreign policy. Secondly we will briefly survey the dominant ideas of European identity. We then turn to the textual analysis investigating first the semantics of Neighbourhood at work in the ENP. This section will seek to clarify how neighbourhood -in the rhetoric around the ENP - is positioned in various relations of difference to other actors in the international sphere, and thereby ascribed a certain meaning. Finally we turn to the ‘performance of European Identity’ in the ENP arguing here that the discursive framing of Europe’s actions within the ENP, although drawing on well-established ideas of European identity, reiterates these in a way which fundamentally reframe the identity of the European subject in the discourse.

**Identity and Foreign Policy**

The place and the conceptualisation of identity in the analysis of foreign policy is ultimately dependent on the aim of the analysis. Foreign policy analysis in IR is still mostly aimed at causally explaining (or even predicting) foreign policy behaviour. In this framework identity often enters in one of two forms; it is either essentialised (and thereby in fact analytically destroyed) or it is ‘bracketed’. Orthodox realism takes the first path claiming that the state has certain interests which it always strives to protect. The particularities of a certain state’s (national) identity is as such irrelevant because the general identity of being a state is completely determined and stable. In this paradigm the state as a
A foreign policy actor has an essential and unchanging identity. Applying such a framework to the EU – although within this paradigm the EU can be denied even the status of a foreign policy actor, because it is not a state – requires that one, prior to analysis, can determine what kind of actor the EU is. This means, according to Ulrich Sedelmeier that even if realism often seek to describe the EU’s ‘international identity’ it does not work from a constructivist or sociological idea of identity but from a “rationalist or materialist framework that exogenises actors’ identities and interests” (Sedelmeier 2004:121). Such an attempt at acquiring an objective definition of the EU’s ‘international identity’ is thus used to assess the capacity and performance of the CFSP (Sedelmeier 2004: 121, 125-126). One proceeds from a prior and objective definition of the international identity of the EU – for example as ‘a civilian power’ – and evaluates the foreign policy behaviour on this basis. For our approach it is of little interest whether the Union lives up to a theoretical definition of what a ‘real’ civilian power might be. What we find interesting is in the words of Henrik Larsen, not “a question of what the Union in essentialist terms is, but rather what kind of actor is constructed in the discourses articulating the Union’s actorness” (Larsen 2004: 71).

Of course not all who seek to integrate the concept of identity into their foreign policy analysis are essentialists. It is possible to conceive of identity as an ‘input’ into foreign policy behaviour without resorting to realism. Christopher Hill and William Wallace has argued that effective foreign policy “rests upon a shared sense of national identity” and that this ‘conventional wisdom’ both shape interests and delimit the range of acceptable choices (Hill & Wallace 1996:8). Put plainly the norms – defined as the collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996:54) - of a particular political community, must be adhered to when formulating foreign policy in order for this policy to be conceived of as legitimate. Contrary to a realist perspective foreign policy, in this view, cannot simply be conceived of as the ruthless pursuit of interests, because when justifying foreign policy choices arguments related to identity will carry greater weight than those simply based on utility (Sedelmeier 2004 131).

The potential problems in this approach emerges when the relationship between the structure of identity and the behaviour in foreign policy is too rigidly conceptualised as one of causality. Placing identity as causally prior to foreign policy is as, Lene Hansen, argues only possible if one conceives of identity as uncontaminated by this activity (Hansen 2006:26). This does not necessarily entail an endorsement of an essentialised idea of identity. Most scholars dutifully stress that identity is not an essence, that it is ultimately always ‘in process’, but when identity is situated as (one of several) causal inputs explaining foreign policy choices, it must nevertheless be ‘bracketed’ – that is, it is held as stable in framework of the analysis. In other words, when the aim is to explain foreign policy behaviour
this element emerges as the variable of the analysis, and the identity is correspondingly conceived as a constant. Identity here might theoretically be in flux, but analytically it is a stable input.

Contrary to this approach, especially scholars of the so-called the Copenhagen School of security studies, have developed an approach that emphasises that identity is not only input but also an effect of foreign policy behaviour, and that it therefore is continually modified and reconstructed by the very process that other approaches seek to make it explain.

The basic innovation of the Copenhagen school is that they conceive of security problems as the result of securitization, rather than as naturally springing from material circumstances. Ole Wæver has convincingly argued that the articulation of a security problem is not reducible material facts – for example the presence of foreign military forces on one’s territory – but must be conceptualised as a speech act – as securitization - which elevates a certain problem to an existential threat. Successfully articulating a problem as a security issue means claiming that “we” are about to be destroyed and that consequently drastic measures must be employed. The connection to identity comes up because the articulation of a threat to ‘us’ demands an articulation of who ‘we’ are (Wæver 1996). Since security is about the destruction of a subject its articulation must include a construction of this subject. Identity, in this sense is, altered or transformed in the exercise of a political community’s foreign policy behaviour, because it is reworked in different confrontations with securitized Others. Our interests however of course go beyond questions of security. Although certainly securitization is present in the ENP rhetoric, it is, we will claim not, the only or the dominant way of handling the relationship to the neighbours. Furthermore in the securitization approach one naturally tend to focus primarily on the ‘output’ of identity - that is how the community is mobilised and (re)constructed as a consequence of successful securitising speech acts - and a lot less on the input – that is how already established ideas of ‘our’ identity limit the foreign- and security behaviour of the political community.

One particular approach is however able to position identity in a relation to foreign policy in such a way that it can take account of both the input dimension (the existence of norms and pre-established idea of ‘who we are’) and the output dimension (the altering or re-construction of identity through and in foreign policy behaviour). This is the conceptualization of foreign policy as a performance of identity.

The basis of the theory of performativity or performative identity as conceived in a gender perspective by Judith Butler (Butler 1990) and introduced into IR theory by among others Cyntia Weber (Weber 1995) and David Campbell (Campbell (1992) 1998), is to speak of subjects as effects of citational practices (Weber 1998:79). Performing an identity in this sense means ‘quoting’ the ‘normative resources’ or pre-established ideas of this identity in a new context (Weber 1998:82). Most
importantly, this does not mean that we have a stable identity which we then represent in differing contexts. What is meant is exactly the opposite, that lacking such a essential ground the subject appears only in the ongoing practice of citing or performing its identity. Identity is not prior to performativity – although this is exactly the illusion produced by it – but can only be upheld by the continuing performing of it in changing contexts. A performativity approach sidesteps the dichotomy between agency and structure in that performativity is neither improvisation nor imitation. The normative code cited does circumscribe the agency of the subject but the need to constantly reiterate identity in differing context also opens for a dimension of resignification of this very normative code (Laffey 2000:431). In this sense as Campbell notes states are always in a process of becoming: “stasis would be death” (Campbell (1992) 1998: 12).

However in a performative approach identity is still conceived as dependent on the marking out of difference. Foreign policy is therefore basically a boundary-producing political performance (Campbell (1992) 1998:62), in that it involves constructing both the Self and the Other. A successful identity performance takes place when the reiteration of the normative recourses operates in such a way that they clearly mark out the Self from the relevant Others in the (new) context. Performance draws on earlier established resources but is directed towards present Others. All three elements (resources, Others, and the identity of the Self) are theoretically conceived as constituted in the same performative move; the European neighbours only become so as part of the reiterative performance of the ENP, which establishes them in relation to EUrope and in doing so resignifies both the identities of both subjects.

When seeking to analyse such an identity performance it is however methodologically practical to separate the process. Firstly, if one is to analyse reiteration of certain normative resources, then it is practical to orientate oneself in the likely pool of well-established ideas, norms and concepts that the identity performance in question is likely to draw on. We will therefore begin with a brief survey the most established ideas of European identity.

Secondly, because the identity performance always seeks to designate the Self against a relevant Other, we next turn our attention to the construction of the Other which the ENP primarily revolves around; the neighbours. Through an analysis of the ‘positional semantics’ of the neighbourhood – by this we mean how, semantically, this category of countries are differentiated from other actors present in the ENP – we here investigate how Neighbourhood is constituted, i.e. which characteristics are assigned or denied the neighbours.
Finally, from the insights gained above, we analyse the performative construction of European identity in the ENP. Here we track what kind of European identity emerges from the reiterative practices installing Europe as the legitimate subject behind the ENP.

**European identity**

Let us for a moment delve into that discursive reservoir from where statements on European identity are drawn. As we know, identity often begins with culture. The matrix for spatial identities, that is, the 19th century concept of nation, forcefully links culture with territory (land, country etc.). Being in a nation means possessing a national culture. Claims of European identity have been formulated within this matrix. Such claims have to base themselves on the acknowledged existence of a European culture. But here the problems begin. First of all, statements on European culture have to come to terms with the solid existence of national cultures. This has often let to a metaphorical activity of producing concentric circles, pyramids or arches in which European identity/culture were rendered capable of incorporating other identities. Despite the intention the official catch phrase of unity in diversity clearly does not solve the problem, since one can always ask the legitimate and logical question of the meaning of unity. The other problem concerning statements on European cultural identity has to do with particular cultural traits solicited. Language – the fundamental trait of the 19th century nation - does not work. Cultural practices tend to be very diverse. Only two options are available: either to rely on a common European history or a strong image of the Other. In both cases, expressions of European cultural identity risk turning into a Euro-nationalism based on essentialisation and exclusion. This is obvious in the tendency in many statements on Christian Europe. The cultural borders thus make possible a fortress Europe defending its gates from the intrusion of others.

For these reasons, escaping culture is often a prerequisite for thinking of European identity. There are mainly two escape routes. One route is to differentiate between cultural and political identity. Political identity can be viewed as “the set of social and political values and principles that we recognize as ours” (Cerutti, 2003: 27). Two elements are important here: the singling out of particular political values and the active support for the values among Europe’s citizens. Among the values typically listed, we find fundamental rights, democracy, social justice, solidarity and – more contested – secularism. The question of support is often linked to the existence of democratic institutions within the European Union (citizenship, public sphere etc.). Habermas’ well-known idea of constitutional patriotism combines these elements. The constitutional principles embody the common political values.
Patriotism, on the other hand, contains a strong reference to support and identity. The turn towards political identity is backed by an argument pointing to the EU’s particular political nature as a “postmodern polity” (Wæver, 1996: 127), which makes it different from all other political entities. The other escape route is to link Europe with higher values. These values go beyond national and regional outlooks. They carry a transcending force that ultimately points to the universal. The idea of a universal Europe comes in two versions. Europe can be viewed through the lenses of cosmopolitanism. A cosmopolitan Europe is based on “clear ideas of inviolable dignity and of the moral duty to relieve the suffering of others” (Beck, 2003: 34), on the institutionalization of criticism and on “a critical and transformative self-understanding” (Delanty 2005: 18). Cosmopolitan Europe is characterized by an open-ended dynamics in which others lose their otherness. In another version, which is semantically attached to the concept of civilization, Europe embodies universality through its history, whether in a triumphalist way (e.g. enlightenment values) or by having overcome negative experiences (wars and moral breakdown). The talk of European civilisation tends to be more bound to inner values of a universal nature and thus to borders that can only be transgressed by a superior subject. In its most radical forms we arrive at ideas of a crusading Europe or a paradisiac Europe as in Robert Kagan’s caricatural image of a Kantian, inward-looking Europe living in a dream world (Kagan 2003).

Ideas of universality tend to dissolve borders and consequently notions of a European space. It relies heavily, however, on notions of time and history. What we might call a European narrative identity – following Paul Ricœur (Ricœur 1987) – is playing a crucial role in statements on Europe’s universal potentials. In general terms, narrative identity is about incorporating past events and changes into a present position. The past is thus viewed from a present position, although it might be narrated as a continuous history with a particular starting point. It can be argued that cosmopolitan Europe was conceived as an antithesis to the nationalistic Europe that lasted until 1945. Ulrich Beck sees the Nuremberg Trial as the foundational moment of new postwar Europe (Beck, 2003: 34). Habermas and others have pointed to the effect of redemption and learning acquired from the negative experiences of World War II: “Contemporary Europe has been shaped by the experience of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century and through the Holocaust (…). Self-critical controversies about this past remind us of the moral basis of politics (Habermas and Derrida, 2003: 296). Zygmunt Bauman emphasises the learning process: “Europe has learned, the hard way and at an enormous price paid in the currency of human suffering, how to get past historical antagonisms and peacefully resolve

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1 In much political thinking, patriotism signifies a voluntaristic and principled attachment, which is contrasted with the more mechanical and cultural relation involved in nationalism.
2 Cosmopolitan Europe is often viewed as a normative response to a globalized an transnational reality, see Habermas 2003.
conflicts…” (Bauman, 2004: 130). This particular narration inserts 1945 as a radical break with a long history of cultural diversity and narrowness, and the founding of a new Europe. Ole Wæver some time ago pointed to this formative role of Europe’s recent past. Formulated in the lingo of identity theory, he spoke of “Europe’s Other [as being] Europe’s own past” (Wæver 1998: 90). He even went as far as claiming that this ‘Other’ had become more important than more traditional cultural Others in European identity discourse. ³ In his view, the past represented a dynamics of fragmentation which constantly threatened to jeopardize integration.

Narrative identity normally balances between a sense of continuity (so as to be recognizable through time) and a sense of change (to acknowledge change). Claims of European identity that tries to evade culture and acknowledge the negative moments in history must focus on breaks and new beginnings. Breaks and beginnings are crucial in constructions of narrative identity. They fulfil a mythical function. As other narrative identities, European identity needs myths. The basic function of myths is to create ontological stability. Through myths, the world becomes less chaotic and horrifying (Blumenberg, 1979: 127). The most important myths – the cosmogonic myths – recount the origin of human order and co-existence, the founding events (Ricœur 1987:273). They become the existential point of orientation for any community. They are at the core of the narrative constituting a communitarian identity (Bizeul, 2000: 23). Myths are, furthermore, particular ways of perceiving and mastering time. Through a constant reiteration of the myth – “the work on the myth” (Blumenberg 1979) – the present is linked to the founding events (Bottici and Challand, 2006: 316). Contrary to a historical narrative, the past is thus ever present and reaching into the future. Cosmogonic myths introduce beginnings. These might be new beginnings justifying new situations (Eliade, 1963: 33). Justification is based on the premise of overcoming a bad past. The myth might thus incorporate the idea of a heroic or redemptive move to overcome trauma, suffering or humiliation (Flood, 1993). In this case, a new beginning can signify as well a break with the past as a continuous reference to that same bad past which a community relates through a process of redemption.

If we search for mythical elements of European narrative identity the recounting of World War II and particularly the Holocaust seems to be obvious candidates. This is a narrative of a bad past leading to a total moral breakdown and the launching of a common European project as a new beginning avoiding the evils of fragmentation (nationalism) and triumphalist civilization (colonialism). The telos of the European project can therefore be the positive values arrived at through a negation of the bad past, epitomized in the perception of European integration as a peace project.

³ He wisely limited his claim to the field of security, however. Others have pointed to the return of ‘geopolitical’ otherings (Diez, 2004: 331).
Through the work on the myth, later developments within the integration process can be justified by being in accordance with the telos. Every development towards European unity can be derived from the new beginning as the same time as it confirms its presence. The myth differs from history in that it operates in a discourse creating emotions and pathos (Bottici and Challand, 2006: 321). Myths can be viewed as “control instrument for the dynamics of the emotional” (Dörner, 1995: 23). Emotions and pathos is aroused by claiming that the work of the myths is a work of memory. The foundational act is reiterated as an act of remembrance: The European we is constituted by a witnessing of the past atrocities. The foundational act operates in a circular movement: remembrance makes constant redemption necessary, and through redemption the European community can claim that it has learned from the past and thus progressed.4

Identities are not only formed through spatial and temporal coordinates. They do not only resolve questions of how we differentiate ourselves from many others and from who we were. They also depend on what we do. Identities are performative in the sense that they activate discursive resources which constitute actors. European identity also results from the fact that Europe can act. The myth depicted a Europe acting on itself. It is, however, also possible to imagine identity effects of Europe acting on Others. Ole Wæver has claimed that European identity building is “increasingly done on the outside” (Wæver, 1998: 90). By this, he seems to mean that the feeling of Europeanness depends on how Europe is performing in the world.5 Performance and actorness can be conceptualised in terms of power to act. The nature of this power in the EU’s external policies has been the subject of lengthy, scholarly debates. Much of the debate is about determining the EU’s particular political nature and actorness. The EU has been termed a civilian power due to its non-military means and its pacific goals (Duchene 1972). It can be viewed as civilian by default as in Robert Kagan’s famous depiction, in which case it has no rendezvous with the outside world, or it can be perceived as civilian by nature because of its particular governance structure and “postnational exceptionalism” (Nicolaidis 2005: 103). Finally, the EU can be seen as civilian by will. Will power has been conceptualized as “normative power” which provides an international identity (Manners 2000; Manners and Whitman 2003). This international identity is still formed within a positional game of othering and differentiation, but it does not rely on the cultural borders drawn up in the traditional, cultural discourse on European identity. If the EU’s international identity results from its normative power to promote and enforce universal norms we are in the realm of a cosmopolitan identity (Manners, 2005: 8). The EU is not, however, cosmopolitan by nature or rather by way of its particular polity. As shown by Ian Manners, the EU’s

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4 Obviously this discursive operation also includes the collectivization of mental activities such as remembering and witnessing.

5 The question of how others ascribe identity to Europeans is a different one.
normative power is inscribed in a “meta-narrative” that provides justification for the external polices following from it (Manners, 2004: 7). Such legitimacy producing “narratives of projection” (Nicolaïdis, 2005: 96) not only contains lists of exportable European values, they also hark back to the European narrative identity. An international European identity relies on the myth driving the narrative identity. Even scholars participate in the work of the myth: “To the extent that there exists the beginnings of a European answer, a global European narrative, its seeds have been germinating over the half past century in an ad hoc fashion, through a learning process that led Europe to accept and then embrace its distinctive approach to international affairs” (Nicolaïdis, 2005: 98). This “global narrative”, i.e. the self-justification of a European international identity, takes it starting point from new beginning at the mythical core of the European project. The myth explains what makes Europe particularly cosmopolitan and therefore different from other less universal actors.

The emergence, scope and method of the ENP

The discussion that led to the formulation of the European Neighbourhood Policy was sparked off by a letter from the then British foreign secretary Jack Straw to the Spanish EU presidency prior to a meeting of the General Affairs Council in April 2002. In his letter Straw called for a proximity policy towards the (future) eastern neighbours; Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The Council welcomed the idea as well as an offer from Javier Solana to prepare contributions for its elaboration (Council Conclusions 7705/02:10). The formal origin of what was to become the ENP was a joint letter to the Council in August that same year from Chris Patten and Javier Solana entitled “Wider Europe”. This was still however conceived as a plan for how to handle relations with the future eastern neighbours (Patten & Solana 2002, Cremona & Hillion 2006: 4), and was approved of as such in the General Affairs Council meetings in September and November (Council Conclusions 14183/02:12, Council Conclusions 12134/02:8)). When the idea was approved by the European Council in December it had however acquired a significant addition. The ambition for a future neighbourhood policy was now not only to create better relations to the eastern countries but also to those in the southern Mediterranean (Council Conclusions 15917/02:7, Council Conclusions 6604/03:5). According to Karen Smith this development was a consequence of a concern with the balance between the ‘southern’ and ‘eastern’ dimension of the Union, the Mediterranean entering the ENP mainly as a consequence of successfully applied pressure from a number of southern member states (Smith 2005:759). The first fully elaborated attempt at formulating a European Neighbourhood policy appeared in March of 2003 in the form of a Commission communication to the council and the
parliament entitled “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (COM (2003) 104). But one more widening of the group of countries making up ‘the neighbourhood’ was still to come. Following the Georgian revolution also the Southern Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia were included in June of 2004 (Smith 2005:759). The group of countries which was to be targeted in the envisaged policy was rather diverse, to say the least. The policy circumscribed the entire periphery of the Union from Morocco in the South to Belarus in the North, excluding only neighbours that had already been put on an enlargement track – the 10+2 Central and Eastern European countries, the former Yugoslavian countries, Albania and Turkey – and Russia which declined participation in the ENP, preferring instead a relationship with the Union configured around four common ‘spaces’6 (Pace 2005:3, Smith 2005:759). This geographical scope as well as the policy instruments and aims contained in the Wider Europe Communication formed the basis for the discussions up to the production of the Strategy Paper by the Commission in May of 2004 (Com(2004) 373) which introduced what was now simply ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy’ in its final form.

The links between the emergence of the ENP and the process of enlargement may at first appear – and is in the political documents often presented as – to be of a pragmatic nature verging on the banal. The simple logic was that enlarging the Union presents us with new neighbours to which we must establish good relations. It is of course not wrong that in this basic sense the projected inclusion of 12 new countries into the Union was the fundamental raison d’être for the Neighbourhood policy (Kelly 2006:31). A closer look, however, quickly reveals that the links between the process of enlargement as such and the ENP are much more complex than this simple logic reveals. A key issue in the formulation of the ENP is and always was its relationship to the question of future membership. Karen Smith goes so far as to claim that the origins of the ENP might be seen in connection with ‘the Ukrainian Problem’. That is the fact that the Ukraine since the mid 1990’s had been voicing its (distant) aim of joining the Union. However, as 2004 approached the public apprehension further enlargements increased. The Union, as Smith puts it, seemed to be suffering form a degree of ‘enlargement fatigue’ and therefore the time was certainly not right for a debate of a future Ukrainian membership. The ENP can be seen as a way of evading further enlargement discussions for now (Smith 2005:758, 769) by

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6 The four common spaces are: 1) economic (including environment and energy), 2) freedom, security and justice, 3) external security, 4) research and education (including cultural programmes). Work on these common spaces draws upon elements of the ENP that are of common interest to the EU and Russia (Pace 2005:3 n15, ENP Strategy Paper COM(2004)373: 6)
constructing a framework that was not simply an alternative to enlargement in the sense of being a polite ‘no’ to the peripheral countries’ hope of future membership, but an alternative to the whole enlargement setting, avoiding to frame the Unions external relations in a way that immediately boiled down to questions about future memberships (Pace 2005:7). The ENP in this sense was an elaborate way of refusing to comment on the increasingly difficult enlargement question.

The classical vaugeness regarding the ultimate borders of the Union – the fact that any ‘European state’ may potentially join, but that there is no official geographical definition of Europe – means that especially the eastern border, and consequently the ‘European’ status of the eastern neighbours always sparks of debate – Turkey of course being the most illustrious recent example. The ENP can certainly not be understood as a final settlement of these borders (Smith 2005:757), but the inclusion of the southern dimension was nevertheless interpreted by many as a statement regarding them. Even if as Karen Smith argues a European inclusion of the southern Mediterranean – for example by drawing on the Roman Heritage in a new Mare Nostrum – is “not beyond the realms of imagination, particularly the imagination of those in the south” (Smith 2005:769), the inclusion of the Mediterranean neighbours in the ENP, was perceived as a move away from any enlargement perspective; as a downgrading of the membership expectations of the Ukraine to the level of Morocco, the only country ever to have been denied accession with the fundamental argument that it was not European (Cremona & Hillion 2006:17, Smith 2005:769). The southern and the Eastern dimension do make awkward bedfellows in the ENP if related to the question of enlargement since the neighbourhood then will consist both of countries with a strong claim of belonging to Europe even if not yet to the EU as well as of countries that has been manifestly declared non-European (Smith 2005:759). But indeed the former group might find solace in that the exit of Russia – the only Eastern Neighbour for which membership is neither desired nor thought possible – does leave the eastern dimension of the ENP open for hopes of a future upgrading to an enlargement perspective. The ‘Moroccan-connection’ is for the Eastern Neighbours further tempered by the fact that the ENP places great emphasis on ‘differentiation’. This means that the ENP rather appears as a series of bilateral relations than as a truly multilateral framework; the neighbours emerging with to some degree individually tailored relations with the Union according to their particular ambition and situation in a hub and spokes model (Smith 2005:771-772). Hopes might also be pinned on the fact that in a number of other ways the ENP is still very much reminiscent of the enlargement process (Cremona & Hillion 2006:8, Smith 2005:759). At the basic level the ENP has largely been conceptualised within the DG for Enlargement and only recently transferred to the DG for External Relations. (Kelly 2006:31). But furthermore even if it is perhaps only the Eastern Neighbours that have a realistic chance of joining in the foreseeable future the structure and methods
of the ENP is clearly borrowed from the enlargement experiences (Kelly 2006:38, 50). As Judith Kelly convincingly argues the Action Plans that sets out the content and priorities between the Union and the individual neighbours are modelled on the Association Agreements with enlargement countries, and the evaluating dimension of the ENP, the production of so-called ‘Country Reports’ is likewise modelled on the enlargement ‘Progress Reports’ (Kelly 2006:33-34). The insistence that the Neighbours should adopt much of the EU’s _acquis communitare_ does in a purely institutional perspective – according the Marise Cremona and Christophe Hillion – equally lack a firm rationale if there is no (underlying) membership perspective in the long run (Cremona & Hillion 2006:17). Even if the ENP on the one hand is at any given occasion declared to be something entirely separated from the enlargement discussion, there is on the other hand no doubt that the neighbourhood is something qualitatively different from a general non-European space, that is, from the rest of ‘the foreign’ beyond the enlarged Unions borders. As such it would - even if security looms large in the ENP and according to Cremona & Hillion actually underpins the whole policy (Cremona & Hillion 2006:3) - be a gross misrepresentation to claim that the ENP simply portrays the Neighbours themselves as a threatening (that is securitized) outside. The ENP remains a policy of engagement even if it makes no promises of the ultimate inclusion.

Even from this sketch of the ENP’s origins, geographical scope and methodological inspiration it should by now be clear that the ‘European neighbourhood’ is far from a self-evident, pre-established or natural category. Indeed it seems instead crisscrossed by unclarities and tensions.

The analysis of the positional semantics of the European Neighbourhood seeks to clarify how the ambiguity of the European Neighbourhood is handled in the ENP rhetoric by positioning this object in certain relationships to other actors on the international stage.

**The positional Semantics of the European Neighbourhood**

The insight that the European Neighbourhood as marked out in the ENP is an ambiguous space has been noted by several scholars. But only very few of these contributions interested in the European neighbourhood as a discursive construct or in its role as an Other to European identity, only few take the care to reflect on the ambiguities of the concept of neighbourhood itself or its relation to other forms of Othering, such as ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. To our knowledge the only analysis of the ENP that reflects on the semantics of neighbourhood itself is by Ruben Zaiotti. Musing on the proverb that ‘good fences make good Neighbours’ Zaotti points to the inherent ambiguity of ‘neighbours’: their
position outside the fence distances them from the ‘friends’ inside, which runs counter to the conventional idea that good neighbours can be helpful in warding of threats or enemies (Zaotti 2006: 2-4). The neighbourhood is a space lodged in between the safe inside of friends and the threatening outside of enemies.

Zygmunt Bauman’s also points to an ambivalent position in between friends and enemies, which he – drawing on a classic study by Georg Simmel – establishes as that of ‘the stranger’ (Bauman1991: 53-61). Friends and enemies are opposite positions in the same system, whereas strangers because they cannot adequately be known and identified as either friends or enemies introduces ambivalence into the system. But even if both ‘neighbours’ and ‘strangers’ as such escape the complementary categories of friend/enemy, they are clearly not of the same nature. The lack of knowledge that constitutes the stranger, the inability to locate and identify him does not fit well with the manifest nearby presence of the neighbour. Being a stranger to one’s neighbour would be considered an abnormality, but neither is ‘neighbour’ directly opposed to stranger, because we are not expected to know our neighbours in the intimate detail that regards family. The neighbour turns out to be a denomination so – except for the claim to proximity – that its meaning easily changes in different circumstances. The neighbours can be a comforting buffer when we are under threat from our enemies. But they seem distant acquaintances when in the company of the friends which we have chosen to love. They are reassuringly recognizable in a world of strangers, but clearly outsiders when compared to the intimacy of the family. Bauman’s notion of strangers is not sufficient for clarifying the semantics of the neighbour, but it does point to the fact that when analysing the construction of an Other one cannot simply collapse the dimension of strangeness with that of enmity. This is the fundamental claim in Tzetan Todorov’s attempt to develop a multi-faceted model for the analysis of Othering. Analysing the different ways the Indians were viewed by the Spanish in their conquest of America, Todorov’s points out that to be known is not necessarily to be loved (Todorov 1982). Todorov’s model for analysing the perception of the Other has three dimensions; an axiological denoting the level of Love for the Other, an epistemological denoting the level of Knowledge about the Other and a praxeological denoting the level of ambition to exercise Power over the Other (Todorov 1982: 185).

We will use this model can to systematise the different ambiguities of the concept of neighbour. It can in fact also be used to interpret the semantic positioning of the European Neighbourhood as it emerges in the ENP rhetoric.

Following Todorov’s model, we will suggest that the ambiguity of neighbour has an epistemological dimension in which it is positioned on an axis between the familiar and the strange; an axiological dimension where the axis runs between friendship and enmity; and finally also a praxeological
dimension. The ambiguity on the praxeological axis stems from the double meaning of neighbourhood, on the one hand connoting an equal complementarity (in logical terms we are always each others neighbours) which does not grant a right to dominate, but on the other hand the entitlement following from the close proximity to show an interest in how the neighbour manages his domain (whether he keeps his side of the hedge nicely trimmed, so to speak). Neighbours are neither our masters nor our slaves (the two extremes in the praxeological axis) they are also on this axis situated precariously in the middle.

In analysing the positional semantics of the European Neighbourhood - that is, the range of relationships that in the ENP suspends and gives meaning to this diverse category of countries - these three dimensions seem very well suited. The positioning of the European neighbourhood is very much about their ‘Europeaness’, that is whether they belong to ‘the European family’ and are as such eligible for inclusion in future enlargements or whether they ultimately remain non-European ‘strangers’ (the epistemic axis). But it is also about the Neighbourhoods relation to a range of security threats – to the real enemies lurking on the outside (the axiological axis). Finally the special position of Russia and the strong presence of conditionality in the ENP does introduce a positioning in relation to ‘geopolitical weight’ (the praxeological axis).

**Enlargement, Europeaness and the Neighbours**

The differentiation from the enlargement candidate countries plays a prominent role in the semantic positioning of the Neighbours. Indeed, at the outset, when this proximity policy was still conceived as exclusively oriented eastwards the group of countries that were targeted could be commonly defined as those who “fall somewhat uncomfortably in between” (Patten & Solana 2002) the Southern Mediterranean - officially excluded from membership - and the Balkans for whom this was an explicit goal. Even with the inclusion of the Mediterranean into the ENP there is still, in the Communication on Wider Europe, no attempt to mask the existence of two distinctly different parts of the Neighbourhood, those for which “Accession has been ruled out” and those “European countries” whose “cases remain open” (COM (2003) 104:5). The Europeaness of the Eastern Neighbourhood seems not to be doubted here. This relates to the double meaning of ‘the European’ within an enlargement perspective. Accession to the Union is both a matter of completing a process (fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria) and of geographical location (only ‘European’ countries can join). Within this perspective Europe is both a destination and a starting point for EU membership. Extending or denying enlargement to a country is not just a statement about its current economic and political readiness, it also determines its geo-cultural essence. This duality shows itself clearly in the vocabulary applied to the recent enlargements. Enlargement was
metaphorically framed as a ‘family reunion’ (Petersson & Hellström 2003, Hellström 2003) or conceptualised as a reunification, both terms indicating that the countries now joining Europe had in some sense always already belonged to it. They where strictly speaking returning rather than arriving. This duality of Europe as both starting point and destination is central to the positioning of neighbours in the ENP. The manifest division of the neighbourhood into and eastern and a southern part is often avoided exactly by playing on this duality. Here in a quote from Günter Verheugen “Our neighbourhood policy does not close the door to the European aspirations of any country. On the contrary, by enhancing co-operation and encouraging reform, it should be of great help in supporting such aspirations, where they exist and are pertinent” (Verheugen2003a). What determines the ‘pertinence’ of certain countries remains conveniently unclear here. It might just as well be taken to refer to the geographical distinction between east and south (pertinence from location) as to the performance of a country as a neighbour (pertinence from progress). No promise for a future place in ‘the European family’ is issued, but everyone has been allowed to continue dreaming about one. By being the best of neighbours one might in turn be rediscovered as an estranged family member.

Yet enlargement perspective in the ENP is not only postponed, pending a test of neighbourliness, it is also often postponed on other grounds. Indications of an opening to the Neighbours are in most cases balanced by a series of cautionary remarks on the danger of overextending the Union. After all “we cannot go on enlarging for ever” or “[take] in every country that might apply to join”. This would destroy the Unions cohesiveness, equilibrium and capacity to act (Prodi 2002a). It would in Prodi’s version of a nightmare scenario “turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale” (Prodi 2002a). The postponement introduced in stating that the neighbours have no current perspective of accession is related not only to a future assessment of their performance as neighbours, it also directly to the undecided question of Europe’s final borders. As it is squarely put in the ‘Wider Europe Communication: In reality, however, any decision on further EU expansion awaits a debate on the ultimate geographic limits of the Union. This is a debate in which the current candidates must be in a position to play a full role” (COM(2003)104:5) and rephrased by Prodi; First [Before discussing the neighbours possibility of joining], we must answer people in the present Member States who are already starting to ask ‘Where does Europe stop?’” (Prodi 2002b). Such remarks are most often implicitly or explicitly signalled as relating only to the Eastern border. The Mediterranean is viewed as an essential and natural barrier, needing no explicit cultural, political or historical underpinning. But even if the Eastern Europeans here apparently are spared the fate of the Southern Mediterranean, there is still a manifest differentiation at play in that the neighbours clearly have no claim to take part in this discussion of the final European borders – it remains strictly the ‘family business’ of member- and candidate states.
As expected the semantic positioning of the Neighbours along an epistemic axis is neither as family or as stranger. Their Europeaness is neither denied nor confirmed, it is continually postponed. The ambiguity of the neighbours along this axis is handled by constructing them as longing to become family. They emerge as hoping – and as being encouraged to hope – that through the practice of good neighbourliness (in the ENP) they might still gain entrance to the European family - recognized eventually as really always having belonged to it.

Borders, Security and the Neighbours

According to Thomas Diez one of the inherent paradoxes in the EU is that while the internal borders through integration are increasingly becoming ‘softer’ almost to the point of disappearing, at the same time the common external borders are becoming ‘harder’ both in terms of differentiating the ‘Europeans’ from the rest, and in terms of securitizing these border as the first and last lines of defence against threats from the outside (Diez 2006). As Bahar Rumelli notes even if the EU’s internal borders appear thoroughly post-modern (that is permeable and fluid) the external ones remains in many cases thoroughly ‘hard’ and modern (Rumellili 2004). This paradox is certainly also to be found in the ENP’s positioning of the Neighbours along an axiological axis between friends and enemies. In a modern border logic the (national) border simply separates the friends inside from the enemies outside, but this is clearly not how the ENP works. It is a policy of engagement, or as Prodi puts it of “sharing everything but institutions”.(Prodi 2002b). The securitized border of the Cold War (i.e. the ‘Iron curtain’) is a central reference in the ENP rhetoric. A proclaimed motive for the ENP is to avoid the emergence of new such dividing lines. Prodi’s catch phrase for the ENP, namely that it aims at establishing a ‘ring of friends’ around Europe, further indicates that the ENP has a ‘post-modern’ approach to the external borders. But this is certainly not the whole picture. Even the most rudimentary scrutiny of the ENP documents reveals a consistent and to some extent even dominant security theme in the policy. The ENP is in fact proclaimed as the regional implementation of the European Security Strategy (COM(2004)373 & ESS). There is in other words certainly no shortage of concerns about security threats in the ENP rhetoric. We might be working towards a ‘ring of friends’, but for now there is apparently still plenty off enemies around.

Indeed the very goal of forging a ‘ring of friends’ can be interpreted as indicating a simple strategy of moving the ‘modern border’ to the other side of the neighbours, thus installing them as a buffer zone or a series of satellite-states protecting against a threat geographically located beyond them. But this is not what is at play. The ENP rhetoric does in fact describe the neighbours as sites of various security problems and threats. The ENP is formulated as a response to the new situation resulting from
enlargement, where “(…)we will be getting nearer to zones of present or recent instability” (Verheugen 2004a) and the Security Strategy warns that “Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its border all pose problems for Europe” (ESS). Indeed from its very inception a proximity policy was envisaged to prevent a “negative spill over on the Union” (Patten & Solana). The threats are not simply located beyond the neighbours in the threatening subject of a grand enemy. But even if the neighbours are conceived as sites of security problems, this does not entail that they are themselves securitized as actors. The neighbours are not perceived as enemies. The actual security threats that the ENP singles out seem in fact to be ‘trans-national’ in character and ‘know no frontiers’ (Verheugen 2004b) They are characterised by being delocalized and unsettled. A central claim in the ENP is that such “threats to mutual security, (…) from the trans-border dimension of environmental and nuclear hazards, communicable diseases, illegal immigration, trafficking, organised crime or terrorist networks, will require joint approaches in order to be addressed comprehensively” (COM(2003) 393:5). This broad variety of threats are often combined and presented as each others causes and effects (according to Raphael Bossong this is a general trait also in the wider discourse about a CFSP (Bossong 2006)). The combination of dangers makes it easier to rhetorically subsume the security concerns under the heading of ‘instability’, of which the enumerated threats become both causes and symptoms. Consequently the securitizing in the ENP is not aimed at the neighbours themselves or at a clear and unified enemy subject beyond them, since in fact the actors responsible for the threats are to a large extent anonymized under this heading of ‘instability’. What this anonymization achieves is that the neighbours can be sites of insecurity, i.e. unstable, without being actors of insecurity, i.e. enemies. It follows from this that they are not to be held directly responsible for the threats ‘spilling over’ into the Union. Indeed this very choice of terminology absolves the neighbours by underlining that although they do present security problems to the Union they are not to blame. The Neighbours in the ENP are to be pitied rather than chastised it seems. The ENP does not demand that the neighbours deal with the security problems emanating from their territories, it seeks more gently to “motivate our partners to cooperate more closely with the EU. The closer this cooperation, the better it will be for the EU and its neighbours in terms of stability, security and prosperity, and the greater the mutual benefits will be” (Prodi 2002a). The benefits might be mutual but the active securing of them are often not. In the end it falls to Europe to “tackle instability and the insecurity (…) - by attacking the root causes(…)” (Prodi 2003a) and to “[offer] our partners the chance to share in the peace, stability and prosperity that we have enjoyed in the European Union” (Prodi 2004a).

Along the axiological axis the ENP rhetoric certainly deploys an image of future friendship, but this does not denote a present state of enmity. Rather on this axis ambiguity is captured as a state of
instability. The neighbours do threaten Europe’s security in that they might convey the spread of this infliction across the Union’s borders. But even if they thereby present Europe with a range of security problems, the fact that they ‘cannot help themselves’ in doing so, nevertheless means that they remain clearly distanced from the extreme of the axiological axis that would designate a true enemy. The security dimension of the ENP in this sense follow a logic of ‘helping ourselves by helping our neighbours’ combining ‘post-modern cross-border’ approachment with classical modern border concerns.

Geopolitics, Conditionality and the Neighbours

We come finally to the praxeological dimension, the last dimension in Todorov’s model in which positions move between the two opposite extremes of master and slave, but which for our purposes is conceptualised more as expressing the level of ‘geopolitical weight’ ascribed to the Other. By this we mean the extent to which the Other (i.e. here the Neighbours) is conceived as an equal and autonomous actor in dealings with the European Self, whether that is the Other appears as a fully sovereign subject.

Here it is interesting to look at the way Russia is present– or rather absent – within the ENP, because the rhetorical justification for Russia’s exit and absence does set a geopolitical differentiation between Russia and the rest of the Neighbourhood.

The difference between the so-called ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia based on four common ‘spaces’ and the ENP has been noted by several scholars. Cremona and Hillion for example stress that the basic terminology of the ENP, the fact that it is conceived as a policy, signals something distinctly different from alternatives such as ‘space’, ‘area’ or ‘process’. A policy is driven by the policymaker and directed at someone else. (Cremona and Hillion 2006:21). The indication of a manifest power discrepancy between Russia and the rest of the Neighbours also come through when Antonio Missiroli envisages the emergence of ‘trilateral relations’ between the Union and Moscow with the neighbours functioning as their ‘interface’ (Missiroli 2004: 21). Or when Karen Smith describes Russia’s motives for opting out of the ENP as that of preferring partnership on a more ‘equal’ basis (Smith 2005: 759). This indication is taken one step further by Michelle Pace who writes that the Russians opted for a subject-to-subject relationship, implicating – although Pace does not state this – that the relationship in the ENP can be conceived as subject-to-object (Pace 2005: 3).

Certainly Russia is placed at a different level from the rest of the neighbours. As demonstrated by Günter Verheugen “The Russian Federation is of course much more than a neighbour to the Union. Its geography, its size and potential, and its role in world affairs means that our relationship with Russia has developed into a far-going
strategic partnership.” (Verheugen 2003a). Russia is geopolitically above and beyond the rest of the neighbours. The EU and Russia are portrayed as “major international players (...) working together on numerous international issues, including on regional ones in areas which are close to both of us”(Verheugen 2003a). Russia is ascribed a role in the region closer to that of the Union than the other neighbours; “(...) the EU’s dialogue and co-operation with Russia on specific challenges emanating from, or relating to the other countries of the region are crucial to the chances of solving them” (Patten & Solana 2002). It is probably going too far to speak of on the one hand a subject to subject relationship between the Union and Russia, and on the other a subject to object relationship to the neighbours, but it is clearly nevertheless the case that two of the actors in this triangulation (EU and Russia) are ‘working together’ whereas the third (the neighbours) is being worked on. This asymmetry – which causes the neighbours to emerge in the rhetoric as less than full subjects – cannot be suppressed even by the constant insistence that the ENP is a ‘Partnership’ or is based on ‘joint ownership’ of the process.

The ENP cannot fully install the neighbours as equal and autonomous subjects because basically it revolves around conditionality; one party performs to the satisfaction of the other and is rewarded.

The basic structure of the ENP is that of a full and stable subject (EU) directing and judging the progress of another who by implication does not have the same status; We need to set benchmarks to measure what we expect our neighbours to do in order to advance from one stage to another. We might even consider some kind of ‘Copenhagen proximity criteria’. Progress cannot be made unless the countries concerned take adequate measures to adopt the relevant acquis. The benefits would be directly felt. As would absence of any progress. (Prodi 2002a). This does of course not entail that Europe in the ENP assumes a position of ruling the neighbours. But the neighbours are repeatedly singled out as Europe’s responsibility. The ENP answers a need for the Union to “assume a clear responsibility in the region” (Prodi 2004b) or even to “assume the responsibilities of a regional leader, creating new special relationships with all its neighbours in the East and in the Mediterranean” (Prodi 2004c). The neighbourhood is after all “our backyard” (Prodi 2002a). This marking out of the neighbourhood as ‘an area of vital concern’ leads Michael Emerson to conceptualise the ENP as a European version of “a friendly Monroe Doctrine” (Emerson 2002, 2-3). But one should notice that the Union’s perceived primacy in the part of the international space that it designates as its neighbourhood is not constructed simply as proceeding from a ‘hard’ need to protect its interests. Rather “The EU’s achievements will continue to inspire hope in our neighbours on our new borders. And it is our duty to formulate a clear response to their expectations” (Prodi 2002b). By shifting from a framing of the ENP in terms of ‘our interests’ to questions of responsibility and duty to deliver on expectations, the neighbours can be situated as less than full subjects (contra Russia) without the Union emerging as the master ordering about his slaves.
The conceptualization of ambivalence along the praxeological axis takes place through the framing of the neighbours as ‘our responsibility’, opening them up to ‘direction’ from the Union in a way different from the Russian ‘spaces’. It would however be placing them too far towards the other end of the axis to speak of them simply as pawns in the games of the ‘major international players’. Rather the impression – also from the epistemological and the axiological axes – is that they are constructed as ‘damaged’ subjects. Ambivalence here is not just a position ‘in-between’, it also connotes a fundamental deficit or lack. Both the neighbours longing for family inclusion and their hopeless instability, in this vein signals an incompleteness, a fractured character, the remedy of which it is Europe’s special responsibility to deliver. It is exactly in the arguments legitimising the assumption, exercise and content of this special European responsibility towards the Neighbourhood that European Identity is most clearly performed in the ENP rhetoric.

Performing European Identity in the ENP

Performance always involves reiteration and as an identity performance the ENP rhetoric certainly draws on a range of well-established ideas of what constitutes Europe both as a community and as an international actor. It is in the reiteration of these ideas to make them correspond with the construction of the neighbours ‘damaged’ character, that we can now track the performance of European identity. An identity which when reiterated in this context changes in a number of significant ways.

Universal values, Global player, Hesitant Empire

The normative resource which is most obviously present in the ENP - given that there is a significant theme of European values running through the whole policy - is the cosmopolitan idea of Europe. In Prodi’s words the ENP quite simply aim “(…) to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union.”(Prodi 2002a), indeed “The desire to foster these values in the wider world is the major impetus behind the neighbourhood policy we are developing for eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.”(Prodi 2004a)

The ENP rhetoric reveals consistent tension between this rather one-sided ambition of the Union “(…) to project its values internationally (Prodi 2003a)” and the simultaneous emphasis on ‘joint ownership’ of the policy and on mutual ‘partnership’ with the neighbours. The tension is often rhetorically sidestepped by stating, for example, that the ENP serves to “(…) enhance relations with [the Unions] neighbours on the basis of shared values.” (COM(2003)104), without immediately explicating whether
these are values shared by the member states or by the Union and the neighbours in common. When such explication is given however it becomes clear that the values in question are those listed in EU treaties. The same tension is discernable in the ENP strategy paper when it states that the ENP "(...) seeks to promote commitment to shared values" but that "the level of the EU’s ambition in developing links with each partner through the ENP will take into account the extent to which common values are effectively shared" (COM(2004)373:13). We find here a distinction between the (universal) communality of these values – i.e. that we all want the rule of law - and their effective implementation (here the neighbours might be found lacking). But as shown earlier the point in the cosmopolitan version of European identity is exactly that the values are both European (in practice) and universal (in validity). They might historically be rooted somewhere, but they are potentially applicable everywhere. Europe can therefore promote and spread its values without violating the particularity of the neighbours; “We Europeans earnestly hope that these universal values can be shared by all our neighbours and partners, however diverse their cultures and traditions.” (Prodi 2003a). There is certainly in the ENP a reiteration of an image of Europe as the site where such universal values have been successfully implemented; that is a performance of the cosmopolitan European identity. Conversely we might note, the any form of a culturally bordered or ‘Fortress-like’ Europe is absent. Culture as in the statement by Prodi just quoted is in the context of the ENP, subjected to the universality of the values, converting it as in the Union’s motto to mere ‘diversity’. Indeed it would be hard to imagine how a reiteration of a manifest and closed off ‘European culture’ could ever work in the context of the ENP. Simply because the policy in itself is about transgressing borders. And indeed in our investigation of the semantics of neighbourhood we have not come across any strong references to European vs. non-European culture. However many way that the semantics of the European Neighbourhood marked it out, culture was not one of them.

But legitimising foreign policy solely in terms of the supposed universality of ones values would be a vulnerable position. This, after all, is hardly the first time that superior powers on the international scene have ascribed themselves privileged access to universality. If it hinged only on such a robust cosmopolitanism the European ambitions on the international stage would be wide open for accusations of ‘crusading’ or of ‘imperial behaviour’. Without much ado Bo Stråth makes such an accusation when he dismisses the ‘enlargement discourse in Brussels’ as “nothing other than a reworking of the white man’s burden discourse” (Stråth 2000: 419).

However the main impetus behind the ENP and in broader terms Europe’s whole role as a foreign policy actor, is not articulated as arising primarily from within Europe (the defence of interests) or even as a direct consequence of some selfascribed universality. Rather the impetus for Europe to develop a foreign policy (in the neighbourhood and beyond it) is to a large extent found outside Europe itself.
Europe is – reluctantly it often seems – called on to the international stage by the circumstances and by the expectations of the Others not by its own ambitions. Europe is portrayed almost as overtaken by its own outstanding success as a project of integration and reconciliation. As the official brochure on Europe’s external role simply entitled ‘A world player’ puts it; “Europe did not set out to become a world power. Born in the Aftermath of World War II, its first concern was bringing together the nations and peoples of Europe. But as the Union expanded and took on more responsibilities, it had to define its relationships with the rest of the world” (A world player 2004). The logic of this narrative of progress and expansion is simple; integration leads to enlargement which in turn leads to a new neighbourhood and a size demanding that one plays a role in the world. Here the circumstances - or as Prodi puts it “[r]eality dictates that the enlarged Union should be more than a mere economic area for the free movement of goods and services. It calls for a Union that can play its full role, both within the EU and internationally” (Prodi 2003b). This quote furthermore reveals that the EU is viewed as exceeding its classical ‘civilian’ nature – that is of being a great trading block or economic player. Now, it is often claimed, Europe must take “the first steps towards becoming an effective global player which can do more than simply defend its economic interests” (Verheugen 2002), towards correcting the blemishing handicap of being “an economic giant” but “a political dwarf on the world stage” (Prodi 2003c). Europe as a global power is certainly not ‘civilian’ Europe, but rather Europe as a normative power. Europe is described as a ‘a unique model in the world’ (Prodi 2004c) and it is therefore “(…) our duty to offer our experience and the model we have developed over half a century of life together, for the sake of peace and reconciliation in other parts of the world.” (Prodi 2004d). At the core of this version of European power is stability and peace. These norms and values are above all what is proclaimed to characterise the European way of conducting international relations. Europe as such emerges as “a force for stability throughout the world.” (Prodi 2004b) and is needed as a global player because “[s]adly, as we all know, the world is badly in need of a force for peace and solidarity such as ours” (2002b).

But in the vast majority of cases the invocation of Europe by the Others is in fact much more emphasized than in the examples mentioned above. Solana for one directly speaks of a “demand for Europe” (Solana 2002a), and Prodi does not hesitate to claim that “[a]ll over the world there are people who see in us a hope for peace and a wise and balanced force. We cannot disappoint these expectations” (Prodi 2004b). As part of this framing the neighbours simultaneously becomes Europe’s first priority and something akin to a testing ground for Europe as a global player:

If we want to satisfy the rising expectations and hopes of countries abroad and the peoples of Europe, we have to become a real global player.

(...)
We have to assume our role as a global player. The development of a substantive proximity policy should be one of the first steps. We need to institute a new and inclusive regional approach that would help keep and promote peace and foster stability and security throughout the continent, ultimately promoting the emergence of better global governance. (Prodi 2002a)

Constructing motivation and driving force behind Europe’s global role in this way seemingly wards off any accusations of ‘an imperialism of values’ by effectively effacing any self-interested intentionality or ambition of the Union driving this policy. The ENP simply cannot be an imperial venture since there is no imperial agency pushing it on to the neighbours. Rather it is a combination of circumstances – the success and resulting strength of the Union as an economic power and an integration project in the present sad state of the world – and expectations from the surrounding world that all but forces the Union into its global actorness. This is certainly not ‘crusading Europe’ it is at best a performance of a ‘hesitant empire’, called out only reluctantly by those less fortunate to meet its undeniable moral responsibility as a normative model of peace and stability in a world – and especially in a neighbourhood – that apparently is characterised by anything but such a happy state of affairs. The neighbours - longing for Europe, plagued by instability and inescapably ‘our responsibility’ are the co-cast enrolled and suited for exactly this performance.

But one central aspect in the ENP rhetoric is still missing. What ultimately, in the rhetoric, repeatedly justifies that these longing expectations of peace and stability is and should be directed towards Europe – and not for example to the obvious alternative of a sole American superpower – is not simply the Union’s expertise of economic integration or institutional know-how. The content of the experience which Europe is called upon to make available to the rest of the world goes far beyond such practical competences, it is mythical.

Learning from our past suffering – and teaching the world

When Solana reassuringly tells his public “(...) I am convinced that the same reasons that give the European Union responsibilities - our size and interests, our history and values - also equip us to take responsibilities. The question, therefore, is not whether we play a global role, but how we play that role. (Solana 2002a), the presence of ‘history’ in his argument is neither coincidental nor banal. Running as a thread through the whole rhetoric of the ENP and the prospect of a common European role in the world is a very specific (hi)story of Europe’s past and moral origins.

After the horrors of the Second World War and the Holocaust, the desire for peace was the first and essential driving force of European unification. (...) Right down to the present day the desire for
peace is a vital part of the very idea of Europe, the way of looking at life and at the relations between peoples that we Europeans naturally recognise as our own. Nobody now would regard it as a realistic possibility that war should break out between France and Germany, or between Italy and Britain. (...) I can remember war, though I was still very young. And my father before me could remember war, and so could my grandfather, and all the generations before him. “Never again”, said the founding fathers of Europe, and meant it, and so it was.

Prodi (2003d), Europe the Dream and the Choices

This narrative has a clear cosmogenic structure. The World War II chaos serves as the ultimate justification for the cosmos of European integration. Peace and stability are of course universal values but they are nevertheless here tied to Europe as ‘naturally ours’. Not by laying claim to a triumphalist history of always having safeguarded these values (that would be the American narrative), but by claiming the ‘privileged’ experience of having witnessed their total and prolonged absence. As Prodi elsewhere admonishes: “To speak of peace is almost a cliché -- but only to those who do not suffer its lack. “SP 02 621). Here, however, a central tension becomes visible, because Prodi’s generation is by his own admission the last Europeans to have actually suffered the lack of peace. War today in Europe is unthinkable. On the surface this simply validates the mythical construction. But as noted earlier myths only function and deliver cosmogenic orientation for the community, if they are continually reiterated – ‘the work on myth’ is never and can never be finished. This means that although the central pole of myth is that of ‘chaos overcome’ it is deeply dependent on this chaos still retaining a relevance in the present; ‘Chaos over and done with’ spells the end of myth because its continued reiteration then simply appear as anachronistic – it turns into cliché. If the peace & stability cosmology of this myth as an ideological cornerstone of integration (preventing more Franco-German wars) today seems to be loosing it mobilizing power – ironically because such wars are virtually unimaginable – it becomes reinvigorated when reiterated in a quite different context, that of Europe’s role in the surrounding world. Here there are still plenty who ‘suffer the lack of peace’.

Reiterating the myth of suffering overcome in Europe, so that it can legitimate foreign policy, involves a specific move. The particular European history which gave birth to the EU, must in order to be applicable outside this frame be universalized. The European experience is now a learning process the lessons of which are a remedy – not simply for intra-European wars – but for human suffering in general

We have learnt to our cost the madness of war, of racism and the rejection of the other and diversity. Peace, rejection of abuse of power, conflict and war are the underlying and unifying values of the European project. (...) We have left behind us that realpolitik that we ourselves invented. (...) Let us not forget that
the Union is a unique political project and the only true political and institutional innovation in the world. And it is this innovatory approach that continues to hold out prospects of security and stability to the Member States, our future new members and neighbouring countries, and which indeed has become a global reference point.  

(Prodi 2003c): Enlargement and European Identity

In his final remarks, Prodi successively expands the ‘zone of validity’ for the application of the European experience. Members states certainly, but also the Neighbourhood and ultimately the world. As a consequence Europe is first of all marked out from those which need its experience (the neighbours first, but eventually the world), but also from a broader Western ‘cosmopolitan’ identity. Europe is not the only world player which professes to the values of peace, stability, rule of law etc., but it is the only one who – by its own experience- has gained the knowledge of how to progress from their absolute denial to their full implementation. This reiteration of a mythical identity of Europe in the context of foreign policy is innovative By universalizing the European experience one, in fact, can draw on a classical idea of evolutionary civilisation, without being associated with the imperial and colonial history of this idea. Civilisation entails a view of different societies existing on different stages of the same historical evolution. In the logic of civilisation a particular history (that of the ‘civilised world’) is being upgraded to the universal model for ‘historical progression’ in general and the Others are therefore perceived as ‘earlier’ versions of the Self. The basic legitimation of the mission civilisatrice in this framework is therefore a claim to a full insight into the Other, given that we have already experienced what he is experiencing now. We are not simply claiming that the ENP rhetoric is just a discourse of the ‘white man’s burden’. As we saw earlier such accusations are warded off by the performance of hesitance and now also by the distancing of European history from a triumphalist march of civilisation through the continued mythical invocation of the recent European collapse into barbarism. But there is a structural commonality between the logic of civilisation and the ‘mythical’ reiteration of European identity in the ENP. Barbarism is certainly located in Europe’s past, but contrary to scholars who believe that Europe’s main Other therefore is its own past (Wæver 1996:122), we point to the fact that this past barbarism is here brought up because it corresponds to a present barbarism outside Europe. A connection is thereby made between past Europeans and present neighbours and ‘mythical Europe’ emerges as the identity performance which can fully link a powerful normative frame – the myth – with the relevant Others in a new context – the neighbours. The ‘damaged’ character of the neighbours, their instability, their longing to become European, and their need for and expectations of Europe to take responsibility for them, all contribute to the emergence of a European subject fully legitimised in the exercise of the
ENP, because these afflictions of the neighbours have, so to speak already been handled by Europe once before – when they were our own.

What fundamentally alters when ‘mythical Europe’ is performed in the ENP context, is the scope of the European experience and the ‘location’ of barbarism. The performance of this identity as the ideological legitimation of integration, would entail that further integration was always necessary because only continued integration prevented the return of the past chaos and barbarism. The thrust was so to speak delivered by a continued apprehension of the success and durability of the project. One had to move forward because stopping would tempt a relapse into the horrific past. The ideological dynamics was, as formulated by Ole Wæver, driven by the opposition between continuous integration and threatening fragmentation. It was as Ole Wæver has put it the construction of a clear integration or fragmentation alternative. If however, as we have argued, fragmentation (that is, intra-European war) becomes unthinkable, the alternative can no longer retain the power to legitimate the European project. When the myth is reiterated in a foreign policy context, however, the European project can be re-legitimated not as integration, but as civilisation. The central difference is that the performance as civilisation actually closes of the internal dangers of fragmentation in Europe. The Union is not in a permanent battle to keep barbarism in Europe at bay. This nightmare has finally been completely overcome and become unimaginable. The battle against barbarism at present is now no longer a matter of integration policies, it is located in the external policies. The competence to carry out this fight – the European experience – is correspondingly upgraded (i.e. universalized) to match this new frame. The locus of the EU’s identity politics as regards the performance of a mythical European identity, has shifted to foreign policy, and this dimension is clearly present in the policy directed at our ‘sadly uncivilised’ neighbours. The project as such retains its thrust by the argument that even if the Europeans no longer long for EUnrope, the rest of the world is positively calling out for it.
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