Developments on the ground have provided a powerful reality check for research on European integration.¹ Harold Macmillan’s response to a question about his greatest challenge in office: “Events, dear boy, events,” applies with special force to research on Europe. As the character of the European Union has changed, so has our understanding of it.

One might say that the object of research is unidentified and travels at great velocity. The EU is unidentified in that it escapes labels, such as nation, state, empire, region, federation, that form the conventional toolkit of political science. European integration challenges the long-standing division in political science between politics within countries—where justice, equality, freedom, and the rule of law are appropriate concepts, where executives, parliaments, and courts authoritatively legislate and arbitrate, and where interest groups and political parties intermediate interests—and politics among countries, where national governments express national preferences, and where relative economic or coercive power, arguably moderated by institutional and normative commitments, determine outcomes. Perhaps no field has spawned so much conceptual innovation as European integration; no field is so uncertain about what it is that needs to be explained.

Moreover, the EU travels at great velocity. The speed of institutional change is undeniable: the creation of a supranational authority regulating coal & steel, and the extension of its authority to capital mobility, food processors and educational exchange; the creation of a continental parliament, its direct election, and its veto power over a growing swathe of EU legislation; the creation of a monetary union . . . Over the space of thirty-four years, the polity has increased two-and-one-half times in population from 190 million to 493 million, and in the process has come to encompass a continent.² Has anything this big been subject to such rapid change in so short a period? The answer is, of course, yes. Wars have transformed and destroyed massive political units in glimpses of historical time. What is distinctive about European integration is that the transformation has been deliberative; it has taken place in the absence of the coercion that has shaped and reshaped empires in the past. In the pantheon of deliberative regime change, the EU is unparalleled in its breadth and speed.

¹ West European Politics was born when the European Community, the European Union’s predecessor, turned twenty. European integration dominated WEP’s inaugural issue. Ralf Dahrendorf wrote a lead article on European-American relations; Altiero Spinelli outlined the EC’s institutions; Wyn Grant tackled British lobbying in the EC. But the journal’s first issue was its high point for the study of the EC. Over the next two decades, few articles on EC topics were published in WEP, or elsewhere. Not until 1995 did European integration re-emerge in the journal, with a special issue, edited by Jack Hayward, on “The Crisis of Representation in Europe.” In the past half-decade, European integration has figured in around 30 percent of the articles appearing in WEP.

² Extrapolation is an accident-prone sport for social scientists, but popular notwithstanding. Extrapolation leads one to predict that the EU will encompass 3,188,000,000 people by 2107, and will cover the globe by the end of the next century!
John Keeler (2005) identifies three eras in the development of EC/EU studies, and each corresponds with major shifts on the ground: the launch era, opened by the implementation of the Treaty of Rome and shaped theoretically by debates between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists; the doldrums era, a period of stagnation after the “empty chair crisis” that induced scholars to turn away from grand theorizing; and the renaissance/boom era, when rapid integration following the Single European Act (1986) revitalized grand theorizing and led to unprecedented diversification of EU studies.

The first WEP issue echoed the disappointment of the doldrums era. Ralf Dahrendorf observed bluntly that, “After many years of progress in European unification, this process has now come to a halt.” The ardent federalist, Altiero Spinelli, labeled his article “Reflections on the institutional crisis in the EC.” When WEP—and political science—returned to European integration, the scholarly debate had changed. The purpose of this article is to sketch this change by means of a running commentary on three substantive debates that currently help frame the field of EU studies.

AT THE MARGINS

Europe has served as the laboratory for comparative research on democratic politics for the simple reason that most advanced industrial democracies are European. Researchers who wish to compare the authoritative institutions, public policies, party systems, and political economies of capitalist democracies are drawn to Europe. The study of regional integration in Europe began in this genre as a distinctly comparative-historical enterprise. Ernst Haas (1958, 1961) examined the various forms of regional integration that were emerging in postwar Europe, including the Nordic Council, the Council of Europe, NATO, the Western European Union, and the European Coal and Steel Community. Haas’ study (1964) of global forms of integration, such as the International Labour Organization, had a strong influence on the formulation of neofunctionalism. Karl Deutsch, another intellectual parent of regional integration studies, compared the creation of the European Community to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, multi-national states, such as Britain, Switzerland or Italy, and international organizations, such as NATO (Deutsch et al. 1957). Philippe Schmitter (1970) elaborated this comparative framework and took it to Latin America, and Joseph Nye (1968) sought to apply it to other parts of the world.

Events dealt a blow to this approach. By the end of the 1960s, efforts at regional integration outside Europe had regressed. The collapse of Bretton Woods ushered in a decade of national protectionism. At the same time, the resilience of European integration—despite the perception that it was in “institutional crisis” (Spinelli) and had “come to a halt” (Dahrendorf)—highlighted the contrast between this enterprise and faltering integration elsewhere. The European Community stayed put, enlarged its membership, and in certain respects deepened.

One price of apparent stagnation was to induce comparativists and international relations scholars to exit the field. Of the ten contributors to the standard work on theorizing regional integration (Lindberg and Scheingold eds, 1971), only one, Donald
Puchala, was still writing on the subject in the early 1980s (Schmitter 2005). Ernst Haas (1975) announced the obsolescence of regional integration theory, and began to study learning in transnational epistemic communities. Karl Deutsch turned to issues of security and modelling. Philippe Schmitter went on to discover neocorporatism, a distinctly national phenomenon.

Criticism of the significance of European integration gained ground. First-generation students of European integration led the attack (Hoffmann 1966; Inglehart 1967). The shift away from European integration coincided with the proliferation of efforts to collect crossnational data on public opinion and public policy. A small group of scholars (and practitioners), most of them committed to the idea of Europe, kept the field on the map. But the study of the European Community became a backwater of international relations, and European integration was regarded as a peripheral, one-off, phenomenon.3

Neofunctionalism was the only credible research programme until the early 1970s. While it generated a stream of empirical research, it also began to sprout findings and auxiliary hypotheses that looked suspiciously—in Imre Lakatos’ (1970) terms—like a “degenerating problem shift”. Neofunctionalism imploded under the weight of its own complexity, as much, or perhaps more than as a result of competition with a rival theory. Subsequently, grand theorizing took a back seat to an implicit intergovernmentalism.

In March 1982, the Economist featured on its cover a tombstone with the words “EEC: born March 25th, 1957, moribund March 25th, 1982, capax imperii nisi imperasset”.4 The problem was not that the Community had swum far from shore into deeper and more challenging waters (to use Stanley Hoffmann’s metaphor5), but that it was incapable of making progress on the basic commitment of the treaty of Rome—to remove barriers to trade. In the early 1980s it became clear that the elimination of the national veto was not merely a fantasy in the minds of European federalists to be quashed by practical men, like President de Gaulle, who understood the realities of national identity and power. On the contrary, the national veto allowed governments to avoid confrontation with domestic rent seekers who took advantage of the vagueness of the treaty of Rome to reap state aid, receive non-competitive public procurement contracts (rife in transport, energy, and telecoms), and sit comfortably behind national

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3 See also Caporaso and Keeler (1995), and Niedermayer and Sinnott (1995: 12), who state that “integration theory suffered near fatal asphyxia in the Euro-stagnation of the late 1970s.” However, Markus Jachtenfuchs (2001) points out that research in the 1970s and 1980s was going strong in the subfields of public opinion, political parties and elections, and EU policy making.

4 “Capable of power until it tried to wield it”.

5 “... the limits of the functional method: its very (if relative) success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more—like swimmers whose skill at moving quickly away from the shore suddenly brings them to the point where the waters are stormiest and deepest, at a time when fatigue is setting in, and none of the questions about the ultimate goal, direction, and length of swim has been answered” (Hoffmann 1966: 886.)
product rules designed to keep foreign competition at bay. Defenders of national sovereignty, including prime minister Thatcher, came to realize that some form of majority voting was necessary, as a practical matter, to achieve market integration. Political scientists renewed their acquaintance with a European Community led by an activist Commission President, Jacques Delors, with an ambitious legislative plan eliminating non-tariff barriers, empowering the European Parliament, and introducing a dose of majoritarianism in the Council of Ministers in place of the reassuring norm of consensus.

THE RECASTING OF EUROPE—AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF IT
Since the late-1980s, European integration has pried open previously decomposed national containers. How it has done so, and what the implications are for politics and society in Europe is the subject of lively intellectual debate. We review three of these debates, each of which has motivated major research programmes. Events have attracted some seasoned scholars and many novices, especially from comparative politics, to EU studies like bees to a honey pot. Renewed comparativist fascination with European integration is arguably the most significant development in the field since the doldrums of the 1970s.

Dispersion of authority or central state domination?
The Single European Act reopened the debate about decision making in Europe. National governments had agreed to a treaty that imposed supermajoritarian decision making in the Council of Ministers on market legislation and allowed European Parliament to pass amendments into law unless overridden by unanimous opposition in the Council. So instead of explaining why national sovereignty was immovable, researchers had to grapple with the question of why it had eroded.

The opening shot was fired by Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman in a 1989 *World Politics* article that re-established the plausibility of neofunctionalism. The single market reform, they argued, was a response to exogenous international shocks—the decline of American hegemony and the economic rise of Japan—which threatened to further diminish European competitiveness. Sandholtz and Zysman note that “any explanation of the choice of Europe and its evolution must focus on the actors—the leadership in the institutions of the European Community, in segments of the executive branch of the national governments, and in the business community (principally the heads of the largest companies)” (1989: 108). Rather than providing a blow by blow analysis of decision making, they analyzed how the views of these actors came to converge, and in particular, why national Keynesian policies were perceived as insufficient. The initiative, Sandholtz and Zysman argue, was taken by supranational entrepreneurs and transnational firms, often working against the inertia of national governments (see also Cowles Green 1995). They recognized that in the 1980s, “The Community remains a bargain among governments.” But national governments had shifted to the center-right, and those that were socialist, including the Mitterrand presidency in France, were tamed by experience with capital flight: “National
governments—particularly the French—have begun to approach old problems in new ways and to make choices that are often unexpected. The Commission itself is an entrenched, self-interested advocate of further integration, so its position is no surprise. The multinationals are faced with sharply changed market conditions, and their concerns and reactions are not unexpected. The initiatives came from the EC, but they caught hold because the nature of the domestic political context had shifted” (1989: 108).

Sandholtz and Zysman eschewed causal models, and their interpretation had so many moving parts that it was almost immune to disconfirmation. James Caporaso, Wayne Sandholtz, and Alec Stone Sweet and went on to hone neofunctionalist theory by elaborating a dynamic model in which a) societal groups press for reforms to lower cross-border transaction costs, b) governments respond by establishing supranational institutions for this purpose, and c) societal groups increase cross-border interactions and press for further reform. This line of thinking combines Karl Deutsch’s insight that socio-economic transactions are a source of political reform and Douglass North’s idea that economic organizations press for institutions that lower the cost of their transactions. A powerful disconfirmable implication is that the demand for supranationalism will vary across groups in line with the density of their cross-border transactions, a pattern that has been confirmed in several empirical studies (Fliqstein forthcoming; Sandholtz 1996; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet eds. 1998). The theory placed the self-evident monopoly of national governments in the treaty process within a simple and powerful model of societal pressure. National governments negotiate and sign the treaties, but they are subject to dynamic pressures that shape their choice.

The revival of neofunctionalist theory also highlighted the role of the European Court of Justice in lowering the transaction costs of international economic exchange. The demand for supranational governance on the part of firms engaging in trade could be measured across time, across countries, and across sectors by the number of references for a preliminary ruling by the Court (that is, allegations by private litigants that a state is flouting EU trade law). The empirics confirmed the expectation that the greater the density of trade among EU countries and within a sector, the greater the demand for transnational dispute settlement (Caporaso 2006; Chicowski 2004; Conant 2006; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998). Economic exchange gives rise to disputes and these are settled by private litigants, national judges, and the European Court of Justice so as to strengthen and constitutionalize EU law. In the process, a supranational polity was emerging behind the backs of national states.

The intergovernmentalist response to revised neofunctionalism was that national governments retain control—individually, as well as collectively—by means of their monopoly over treaty making. Initially, the main exponent of this approach, Andrew Moravcsik, argued that collective EU decision making actually preserves, or even enhances, state control because national governments will only participate insofar as “policy coordination increases their control over domestic policy outcomes, permitting them to achieve goals that would not otherwise be possible” (1993: 485; see also Milward 1992). A weakness of this argument is that it conflates the ability to control
others with ability to achieve goals. Consequently, it does not allow meaningful statements about situations where an actor’s best strategy for achieving a goal is to cede control to others. In later work, Moravcsik (1998) dropped this notion of control for a straightforward rationalist argument that member states make informed trade-offs between anticipated economic benefits through cooperation while minimizing the loss of national control. That is to say, member states are both aware of, and capable of forestalling, undesirable transfers of authority to European institutions. While the later Moravcsik no longer denied the possibility that national governments could lose control, he anticipated such losses to be minimal and deliberate.

The debate between neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism was interlaced with a discussion about the nature of the beast (Risse 1996), and by implication, about the appropriate categories of analysis (Hix 1994, 1996; Hurrell and Menon 1996). Is European integration best conceived as a means for coping with international interdependence or is more to be gained from analyzing the European Union as a federal polity? Should one use the language of international relations, or the language of comparative politics? Two edited volumes published in the early 1990s—one edited by international relations scholars Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (1991), and one by comparativist Alberta Sbragia (1992)—staked out contrasting positions. It is indicative of the changing times that two of the three editors of these volumes had not previously published on European integration. In the introduction to the Keohane/Hoffmann volume, Keohane admits he had been “paying little attention to current events in the European Community” and needed to tool up before he could co-chair a graduate seminar on European integration, where the foundation for the volume was laid (1991: vii). While Alberta Sbragia had written her Ph.D. on Italian politics under supervision of EC scholar of the first hour Leon Lindberg, she had never published on European integration when she was approached by the Brookings Institution to bring together a group of comparativists to analyze the European Community. Both projects viewed the European community uninhibited by conventional theoretical lenses, though the editors were wise to employ as sounding boards policy makers, such as Peter Ludlow, Federico Mancini, and Shirley Williams, and respected EC scholars, such as Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Wolfgang Wessels. Over the following decade, both books were compulsory reading for aspiring EC scholars.

To understand Europe’s jurisdictional architecture, scholars borrowed ideas from comparative politics (Caporaso 1996; Heritier 1996; Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Marks and McAdam 1996; Majone 1994; Peterson 1995; Pierson 1996; Pollack 1995; Sbragia 1993; Tarrow 1995; Tsebelis 1994). Fritz Scharpf was one of the first to do so in an influential article, published in 1988, in which he drew on his prior analysis of German

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6 The authors appeared to live by the wisdom that “creativity may consist in considering well-known and even apparently trivial empirical observations in a new substantive context, in which they then turn out to allow for interesting answers to questions that never before had been asked before about them” (Streeck 2006: 7.)
federalism to show how divergent national interests under EU membership could lead
to a joint decision trap, preventing national governments from making policy while
blocking the European Union from taking joint decisions. Scharpf avoided taking a
position on whether the EU was a state or an international organization because he
preferred to use analytical categories that are not specific to international relations,
comparative politics, or EU studies. However, his analysis directly challenged the core
tenet of intergovernmentalism, that national governments control policy outcomes.

By the late 1990s, the debate on Europe’s jurisdictional architecture appeared
settled in favor of the view that European integration had transformed a network of
sovereign national states into a system of multilevel governance (Bache and Flinders
2004; Benz 2003; Kohler-Koch and Eising eds. 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2001;
Jachtenfuchs 2001; Marks et al. 1996; Scharpf 1997). Even advocates of the staying
power of national governments have come to accept that a “multilevel governance
system [is] prevailing in Europe” (Moravcsik 2004: 356).

There are (almost) as many definitions of multilevel governance as there are
users of the term, but common to all is the idea that authority on a broad swathe of
issues has come to be shared across EU institutions, national, and subnational
governments. The reason for this development lies in the benefits of adjusting the scale
of governance to the scale of a collective problem. Where the externalities that arise
from a problem such as providing clean air, minimizing transaction costs of monetary
exchange, or reducing trade barriers, are transnational in scope, the most efficient level
of decision making is similarly transnational. Where the externalities are local or
regional, as for garbage collection or land-use planning, the most efficient level is
subnational. However, there is no reason to believe that functional pressures translate
directly into jurisdictional reform.

Multilevel governance in postwar Europe can be understood as a response to a
shift in policy, a shift in regime, and a shift in geopolitics. During and immediately after
World War II, authority was packaged in highly centralized states by the overriding
need to mobilize resources for war and to survive scarcity. From the late 1940s, the
policy portfolio of Western Europe came to encompass policies related to economic
growth, trade, and welfare with widely varying externalities and economies of scale.
Second, liberal democracies were established across Western Europe. Democracies
divorce competition for office from the impulse to centralize power in one’s own hands.
Whereas autocratic rulers try to centralize authority to sustain their monopoly on
power, democratic politicians face incentives to shift authority below or beyond the
central state if this enables them to provide more goods for voters. Thirdly, the

7 Many scholars have labeled the European Union a federation or a federal system (see e.g. Burgess
2000; Kelemen 2004; McKay 1999, or the contributions in Nicolaidis and Howse 2001).
8 Among the unresolved issues in the study of multilevel governance in Europe are the extent to
which non-public actors are involved in authoritative decision making, the extent to which
networking (rather than hierarchy) is present in relations among governmental actors and between
governmental and nongovernmental actors, and the extent to which authority across levels of
governance is fragmented or mutually interlocking (Bache and Flinders 2004).
geopolitical tensions that had led to war centralization and hyper-nationalism in Western Europe were transformed as the Cold War began and the United States pressed for European concertation. Rulers could focus on reducing barriers to trade in Western Europe because the nature of the coercive threats they faced had changed. National survival was aligned with, not against, European economic interdependence.9

European integration is one outcome of a broader process of authority dispersion, which stretches beneath as well as above the central state. The two processes appear to be related. The existence of an overarching market lowers the cost of regional autonomy. One of the chief constraints on regional autonomy in the past has been the fear that it would lead to small, inefficient economic units that might be denied access to former national markets. However, as rules about market access came to be determined at the European level, the meaning of decentralization changed. Economic autarky was taken out of the equation.10

Figure 1 reveals how national/EU decision making across eighteen policy areas has evolved over six treaties, as charted by Tanja Börzel.11 The breadth of integration refers to the range of policies or tasks for which the EU plays a role; the depth of integration refers to the supranational or intergovernmental character of the decision rules. There is wide variation across policy areas, as suggested in the size of the box plots representing the 5 to 95 percent range for breadth and depth. As one would expect, policies that redistribute income among individuals are handled almost exclusively within national states, whereas policies having to do with trade and market integration are handled almost exclusively at the European level. A startling fact about the pattern revealed in Figure 1 is that there is not one case where a policy has been

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9 For a perceptive analysis of the starkly different geopolitical situation in postwar Asia and its debilitating effects on regional integration, see Katzenstein (2005).

10 European integration has encouraged the presumption that authority can be broken into discrete pieces which can be allocated across multiple levels. Europe has been built piecemeal, in a series of deals pitched at the level of individual policy competencies which are treated as units of decision making to be allocated and reallocated at will. This is fundamentally different from federalism. Federal constitutions imply that sovereignty is divisible and allocate competencies across levels of government, but this is undertaken as a means to provide collective defense, protect minorities, and/or to sustain democracy against potentially incursive majorities. European integration has been a process which targets the allocation of competencies—rather than democracy—as an end in itself. One effect has been to liberate demands for subnational autonomy from the fear that political decentralization harvests economic autarky.

11 Börzel codes formal Treaty rules, to gauge the proportion of issues in a given policy field subject to EU legislation (breadth), and the extent to which decision making on an EU issue is supranational or intergovernmental (depth). She condenses her evaluations in a five-point scale for breadth, ranging from 1 (exclusive national competence for all issues in policy area) to 5 (exclusive EU competence for all issues in policy area), and a six-point scale for depth, ranging from 0 (no coordination at EU level) to 5 (supranational centralization). See Börzel (2005), 221-223. To facilitate one-to-one comparison of breadth and depth in Figure 1 we have recalibrated the 6-point scale into a five-point scale.
shifted from the European to the national level, nor is there a case where a policy that was supranational has become intergovernmental. At least up to this point in time, the development of European governance has been unidirectional.

Most policy areas that have been shifted to the European level follow a functional logic rooted in the territorial scope of their externalities. This applies to policies concerned with trade, the environment, and movement of persons. But a functional logic gets us only so far. Some policy shifts involve political side-payments. These include structural and cohesion policy and agricultural subsidies. Moreover, Europeanization does not encompass all policy areas for which there are collective functional benefits, such as defense procurement. Most of the exceptions can be explained by the distributional consequences of Europeanization and the capacity of potential losers, be they national governments or domestic interests, to block reform. While neofunctionalist accounts emphasized functional pressures, albeit mediated by political processes, intergovernmentalists highlighted the distributional impediments to international cooperation. But neither predicted the constraining impact of mass publics—a recent development which, as we discuss below, has exerted a serious drag on integration.

Figure 2 charts regional decentralization in Europe and the OECD over the past nearly six decades. The increase in regional authority has been particularly strong in the European Union. The picture is consistent with the hypothesis that democracies are conducive to multi-level governance. It also supports the idea that decentralization is less costly when it is detached from rules about market access, as is the case in the European Union. With minor exceptions, the development in Europe has been unidirectional. There are very few cases of recentralization. We seem to be witnessing an ongoing process of reform—not a series of discrete bargains.

Figures 1 and 2 give credence to the claim that the jurisdictional architecture of the European Union has become multilevel. But what does this mean for politics in Europe? How has it affected Europeans’ conceptions of their political communities? How has it influenced structures of political conflict? Over the past two decades research on Europe has engaged each of these questions.

Identity and economic interest
Political institutions that lack emotional resonance are unlikely to last. Economic interest and efficiency—the building blocks of social science research over the past thirty years—are arguably only part of the story of polity creation. Identity—emotional attachment to community—appears vital. The early theorists of European integration took identity seriously, and the topic has returned to the research agenda of Europeanists in this era of political populism.

Ernst Haas defined integration as the “process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre” (1958: 16). Karl Deutsch considered a “sense of
community” to be a key indicator of integration (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). Would Europe become a focus of identity?

Ronald Inglehart (1967, 1970) believed that generational replacement was working in this direction. The underlying process was political socialization: individuals socialized in a society where public goods are provided by supranational rather than national institutions would, Inglehart argued, develop loyalty towards supranational institutions. On the basis of his transaction theory of identity formation, Karl Deutsch disagreed. Deutsch and his collaborators found that national communication was expanding at a much faster pace than European communication. European institution building “had not been matched by any corresponding deeper integration of actual behavior” (Deutsch 1966: 355; Merritt, Russett, Dahl 2001.) When European integration appeared to grind to a halt in the 1970s, Deutsch seemed vindicated, and interest in identity as an outcome of integration withered away.

It was not until the mid-1990s, in the wake of the Maastricht Accord, that the issue of European identity resurfaced. The Maastricht Accord was a compendium of practical steps to integrate economic and monetary policy, environmental, cohesion, and social policy, and much besides. Each step was designed to enhance efficiency by centralizing decision making at the continental level, but the aggregate effect, which was unanticipated by most framers of the treaty,12 was to present citizens with a supranational polity. While scholars were debating whether or not national sovereignty was undermined, opinion leaders were debating whether or not they could tolerate a palpable authority shift to Europe.

The Maastricht Accord was negotiated by elites, but it was submitted to publics in four referendums which led to one defeat (in Denmark) and one near defeat (in France). Neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists conceived European decision making as an elite affair, but now decision making appeared to be shifting in a populist direction. Seven referendums were held on European issues in the twenty-five years prior to the Maastricht Accord; in the sixteen years following the Maastricht Accord, twenty-seven referendums have been held on European issues.13 At the very time that

12 We use the qualifier most intentionally, because some framers, including Jacques Delors and his allies in several national governments and in the European Parliament, had the ambition to use practical integration as a stepping stone to a federal Europe. Opponents of this vision were aware of this. Under the leadership of the British Conservative government, they blocked attempts to enshrine the goal of a federal Europe in the Maastricht treaty.

13 Eight referendums before Maastricht, if one includes the 1972 referendum in which Norwegian voters decided not to join the European Union; thirty-four referendums after Maastricht, if one includes a referendum on EEA membership in Liechtenstein (1992), the second Norwegian referendum against EU accession (1994), and five referendums in Switzerland (1992 on EEA membership, 2001 on EU accession negotiations, 2004 on Schengen, 2005 on freedom of movement for persons, and 2006 on the Swiss contribution to EU cohesion policy). Of those additional eight referendums, four went against the government’s recommendation of a yes-vote (Norway: 1972 and 1994; Switzerland: 1992 and 2001). Source: http://c2d.unige.ch/int/entity.php (accessed on April 30, 2007).
rulers subjected themselves to their publics, publics were inclined to withhold legitimacy.14 Governments and their allies have been defeated in six of these twenty-seven referendums.

The mobilization of mass publics has transformed the causal dynamics of European integration. Whereas elites negotiated with an eye to efficiency and distributional consequences, publics appear to be swayed by identity as well as by economic concerns. Identity is no longer an inert outcome of jurisdictional reform, as Deutsch and Haas assumed, but has arguably become a powerful constraint (Hooghe and Marks 2007).15

At first, the search for economic explanations of public opinion predominated. Public opinion surveys provided more information about occupation and income than about identity, and political science as a discipline was following economics in exploring how economic interest could explain a host of political phenomena. Researchers had systematic information about economic indicators, such as per capita GDP, rates of unemployment, and inflation, but had only vague notions about patterns of national identity. In any case, neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists shared the view that European integration was chiefly a form of market integration which affected income flows across sectors and factors. The intuition was that these distributional effects determined whether individuals supported or opposed Europe (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998; Ray 2004).

By the early 2000s this conception of interest formation was challenged by research on national identity (Carey 2002; Diez Medrano 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2002). Most researchers who studied identity were inductively driven. Debate about Europe in the popular press was oriented to competing conceptions of national identity. Immigration had become a hot political issue, and populist right parties, such as the Front National and Vlaams Blok/Belang, made emotional connections between immigration and loss of national sovereignty due to European integration. Elites who viewed Europe from the standpoint of Pareto benefits seemed to miss the point. As Eichenberg and Dalton (2007: xxx) note in a recent survey of public opinion literature: “[W]hen the post-Maastricht years are included in the analysis . . . the causal dynamic of previous periods is substantially altered. Through 1991, public opinion responded

14 We seem to be living in an age when governments find it necessary to ask citizens to legitimate constitutional reform. This has been the case for EU constitutional reform, for democratic transition in former communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe, and for regional devolution (e.g. in France, Italy, Portugal, and Switzerland). In the United Kingdom, the cradle of parliamentary sovereignty, devolution for Scotland, Wales, Greater London, and the North-East has been submitted to the people.

15 Neil Fligstein builds on Haas’ and Deutsch’s interest in identity as an outcome of European integration. In his forthcoming book, Fligstein argues that Europeanization, which he defines as the “process of building European-wide social arenas where people and organizations . . . routinely interact,” has been limited to the twenty percent of the population who have benefited from crossborder transactions: managers, professionals, and other highly educated people. This finding is consistent with recent research on support for European integration.
very much in the way that the existing literature would lead us to expect: support for integration responded positively to increased trade within the EU and to improvement in economic conditions. Since Maastricht, however, these relationships have essentially disappeared.”

The theoretical underpinnings of research on identity were quite thin. In his presidential address to the American Sociological Association, Douglas Massey (2002) called for research on the interaction of emotion and rationality on the grounds that emotional responses antedated rationality in human evolution and are often causally prior in explaining social behavior. Most articles on identity refer to social identity theory which posits that group identifications shape individual self-conception and that humans have an “innate ethnocentric tendency” which leads a person to favor his or her own group over others (Brewer 1999; Druckman 2004; Tajfel 1970). Whether this tendency breeds hatred or tolerance, or something in-between, depends on answers to questions posed by political scientists. Three questions stand out. How are identities mobilized in political competition? How do multiple identities, to Europe, to nations, and to subnational communities, fit together? How are identities shaped by discourse?

Research on the first question engages the causal connection between being British or German or Dutch or Catalan and having an attitude over a particular political object. National identities do not speak for themselves in the world of politics, but must be framed (connected to a particular political object, as when a political party connects having a national identity to opposing immigration), cued (brought into play by instilling a bias, e.g. against foreign influence), or primed (made salient, e.g., when a political party highlights an identity in the context of an electoral campaign). A compelling example of framing is provided by Erica Edwards and Catherine de Vries who find that the extent to which individuals are Eurosceptic depends not only on the extent to which they see themselves as exclusively national (e.g. exclusively French and not European), but on whether this identity is framed by a populist right party. The stronger the radical right party in a country, the more intensely individuals with exclusive identities oppose European integration (Edwards and de Vries 2006).16

The second question sets out from the basic psychological insight that most individuals have multiple identities (Brewer 1993).17 Fifteen years of opinion polling reveal that most Europeans have some positive attachment to Europe and their nation,

16 De Vries and Edwards also find that radical left parties frame attitudes over Europe among individuals who feel economically insecure. This effect is less pronounced than that of populist right parties for individuals with exclusive national identity.

17 Deutsch and Haas were ambivalent on the question of whether European and national identity were mutually exclusive. Haas did not exclude the possibility that multiple overlapping sources of governance at different territorial levels would generate corresponding “tiered multiple loyalties” (Haas 1971: 31), and he argued that “shifts in the focus of loyalty need not necessarily imply the immediate repudiation of the national state or government” (Haas 1957: 14). Much depends on the meaning of the word “immediate,” but it seems fair to say that Haas—like his political alter ego, Jean Monnet—did not conceive of identity as zero-sum (Risse 2005).
alongside subnational communities (Citrin and Sides 2004; Diez Medrano and Guttiérez 2001; Marks 1999). Moreover, these identities are not necessarily zero-sum. That is to say, strong identity and pride in one’s nation does not, on average, predispose an individual against Europe (Citrin and Sides 2004). What is decisive is how identities fit together. Does an individual conceive national identity as one among a set of attachments or as an exclusive attachment? Is national identity conceived as a civic characteristic that can be acquired, or as an ethnic characteristic that is inherent?

Mass surveys of public opinion have not provided the kind of in-depth information that would allow researchers to probe these issues. Analyzing focus group discussions in a set of Welsh and Scottish communities, Richard Haesly (2001) has found that individuals in both countries see an affinity between being Welsh or Scottish and being European, but they conceive this in contrasting ways. Whereas most Welsh conceive of European identity as a marker that differentiates them from the Eurosceptic English, European-minded Scots are drawn to the pluralistic, overarching (and therefore non-British) character of Europe.

Research on multiple identities debunks the notion that European identity is homogenous across Europe, and it poses the question of how identities are shaped by discourse (Marcussen et al. 1999). How are identity frames constructed, and who does the construction?

Whereas quantitative research highlights differences among individuals and assumes that identity is malleable, qualitative research tends to highlight national differences and to assume that identities are refracted through durable patterns of discourse. Qualitative research has explored how history, and history lessons at school, party and elite discourse, and the media reinforce particular national understandings embedded in national institutions (Diez Medrano 2003; Parsons 2003; Schmidt 2007). Such frames are durable and consequential. Puzzling over why some member states have consistently been more willing to cede sovereignty on common foreign and security policy than others, Thomas Risse (2005: 303–4) argues that this is best explained by “the social constructions and collective understandings that come with federalism. . . Countries whose elites and citizens are used to the notion that sovereignty can be divided and/or shared between various levels of governance, are also more prepared to include supranational levels of governance in these understandings. Once one is prepared to accept supranationalism over intergovernmentalism in general, this might also extend into questions of war and peace. Borrowing from neofunctionalism, one could call this ideational spill-over.”

One of the strengths of the social identity approach is that it rejects the notion that one can read off a person’s political views from her identity. The way identity bears on European integration depends on how it is framed, and it is framed in domestic political conflict.

**Conclusion: Is European integration a new political cleavage?**

In the 1980s, researchers debated whether European Union had shifted authority away from national states. When the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty made
clear that this had happened, they began to ask questions about the effect of European union on democratic politics within and across member states. Was an elite perspective sufficient to explain the course of European integration or did researchers have to pay attention to political parties and the mass public? Once again, events intervened, this time in the form of referendums and a growing recognition that major European reforms were too important to be left to political elites.

This line of inquiry reveals how much the study of Europe has changed. Out of the ashes of World War II a bold vision crystallized whereby modernity, led by scientists and technocrats, would produce prosperity and peace. This vision framed the construction of the postwar international order; it motivated economic planning across Europe and beyond—and it inspired proponents of European collaboration. European integration was conceived as a project that was going to overcome cleavages—not create one. Functionalists, like Mitrany, and neofunctionalists, like Ernst Haas, shared a belief that the economic forces they described would ultimately prevail over politics: “The end result would be a community in which interest and activity are congruent and in which politics is replaced by problem-solving” (Caporaso 1972: 27).¹⁸

Two events countered this view. The first was the French National Assembly’s rejection in 1954 of an ambitious plan to jump straight to a supranational Political Community and a Defense Community with a European army. The debate raised issues of national sovereignty and national identity similar to those that arise in contemporary discussion. The epic defeat led reformers, including Jean Monnet, to take a low politics route focussing on piecemeal economic integration while avoiding direct challenges to core national state functions. Subsequently, some scholars argued that European integration was reducible to this economic focus—without acknowledging that this was a consequence of a prior political defeat.

The second event was the Empty Chair crisis of 1966 which punctured the expectation that European integration would diminish international conflict. When Charles de Gaulle torpedoed Commission president Walter Hallstein’s plan to strengthen supranational authority, and advanced his own intergovernmentalist design for foreign policy and defense cooperation, he implicitly made the point that conflict in Europe was alive and well. As Stanley Hoffmann observed, “The nation-state is still

¹⁸ Modernization theory had several guises: industrialism (Kerr et al. 1960), structural-functionalism (Parsons 1960), and functionalism (Mitrany 1948, 1975). The core idea is “that modern societies, including their politics, were shaped by technological imperatives that left little or no choice with respect to alternative modes of social organization or, indeed, ways of life. In fact, faced with the overwhelming dictates imposed by the unrelenting progress of technology and industry, politics had mutated into rational adjustment of social practices and institutions to indisputable universal constraints, dealing with which was best left to technocratic experts trained in the parsimonious pursuit of functionalist best practice” (Streeck 2006: 3.) David Mitrany (1948) drew the radical implication that the nation-state was obsolete. Neofunctionalists like Ernst Haas were less sanguine about the demise of the national state, primarily because they thought that national governments would not go gently into that good night.
here, and the new Jerusalem has been postponed . . . Domestic differences and different worldviews mean diverging foreign policies; the involvement of the policy makers in issues among which ‘community building’ is only one has meant a deepening, not a decrease, of those divergences” (Hoffmann 1966: 863-4). Over the next three decades, EU policy making was primarily analyzed in terms of divergent national interests.

When European integration moved into domestic arenas in the 1990s, comparativists moved into European integration. They noticed that European issues infiltrated national elections and national issues infiltrated European politics. Given the stock of knowledge and techniques of comparative politics, they applied these to the European level to shed light on conflict about Europe (Cowles et al. 2001; van der Eijk and Franklin eds. 1996; Hooghe and Marks 1999; Imig and Tarrow eds. 2001; Katz and Wessels 1999).

Might European integration constitute a new political cleavage? In their classic analysis of the sources of party competition in Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan diagnose four cleavages over the past three centuries: a center—periphery, a secular—religious, an urban—rural, and finally a class cleavage (1967: 14ff; also Steenbergen and Marks 2002). A political cleavage, in Lipset’s and Rokkan’s conception, involves not merely ideological lines of conflict, but ties this to social structure (so one can predict a person’s partisanship from stable features of his social background) and organizations (e.g. trade unions which structure class conflict or churches which structure religious conflict). So the hurdle is high, particularly in light of the apparent weakening of the connection between social structure and ideology in postindustrial societies, and a consequent increase in volatility in individual voting decisions (Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984). Past cleavages were rooted in massive social change which disrupted whole populations. The hurdle is high, but not, perhaps, impossibly high.

Two recent books boldly characterize European integration as a vital element of a new cleavage arising from globalization and the erosion of national boundaries. Stefano Bartolini (2005) argues that European integration reverses a centuries-long process of national boundary construction which confined social exchanges to the nation-state. There is a crucial difference between European integration and state formation though: while state building was two-sided—replacing local and functional boundaries with national boundaries—European integration is one-sided, for it removes national boundaries without replacing them with European-wide boundaries.19 The upshot is that individuals have now many more opportunities to exit from binding authority at the national as well as European level. This creates anxiety and discontent among individuals who lack the resources for a mobility-friendly, competitive world.

Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande and their colleagues write that, “in a Rokkanean perspective, the contemporary process of ‘globalization’ or ‘denationalization’ can be conceived of as a new ‘critical juncture,’ which is likely to result in the formation of new structural cleavages, both within and between national contexts (Kriesi et al. 2006: 19). This is consistent with the observation of John Pinder, Fritz Scharpf, Wolfgang Streeck, and others, that European integration has been primarily about negative integration.
Analyzing public opinion and party positioning in six West European countries, they detect a new and powerful demarcation/integration dimension of conflict. European integration and globalization have, they argue, given rise to three kinds of competition that are generating new sets of winners and losers: competition between sheltered and unsheltered economic sectors, cultural competition between natives and immigrants, and competition between defenders of national institutions and proponents of supranational governance. The consequent conflicts cannot be absorbed in conventional left/right competition and are likely to provoke partisan realignment. Losers of globalization (and European integration) flock to parties that propose to demarcate their society against external competition; winners seek out parties that advocate integration. If mainstream parties fail to adjust, new parties arise to exploit social discontent.

These analyses emphasize the transformative effect of European integration while building on some basic conclusions of the study of Europe in domestic politics. Both highlight that Europe is a cultural as well as economic issue; both stress that conflict over Europe escapes conventional left/right competition among mainstream political parties; and both anticipate partisan re-alignment or, if mainstream parties fail to adapt, a rise in populism, particularly on the radical right.

The politicization of European integration engages only a subset of issues (Peterson 2001). The (neo)functionalist presumption that EU decision making depoliticizes issues is alive in contemporary EU research, particularly in analyses of public policy. Giandomenico Majone (1994) has conceptualized the European Union as a regulatory regime, where decisions are taken by experts and supranational officials in non-majoritarian institutions insulated from the hurly-burly of politics. Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer (1997) have emphasized the deliberative, problem-solving character of decision making in comitology. And Helen and William Wallace (2006)

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20 This line of theorizing constitutes a break with functionalist and neofunctionalist thinking, as Philippe Schmitter (2005: 268) has stressed: “[T]he real impediment to a revived neofunctionalist dynamic comes from something that Ernst Haas long anticipated, but which was so slow in coming to the European integration process. I have called it ‘politicization’. When citizens begin to pay attention to how the EU is affecting their daily lives, when political parties and large social movements begin to include ‘Europe’ in their platforms, and when politicians begin to realize that there are votes to be won or lost by addressing policy issues at the regional level, the entire low profile strategy becomes much less viable. Discrete regional officials and invisible interest representatives, in league with national civil servants, can no longer monopolize the decision-making process in Brussels (known in Euro-speak as ‘comitology’). Integration starts to generate visible ‘winners and losers’ within member states, and loses its perception of being an ‘all winners’ game. Haas had an idiosyncratic term for this. He called it ‘turbulence’ and there is no question in my mind that the regional integration process in Europe has become ‘turbulent’. It will take a major revision of his theory before anyone can make sense of its changing dynamics.”
have identified five different decision modes in EU decision making—only two of which envisage a significant role for partisan actors.

How does one square this view with the conception that European integration has become enmeshed with domestic political conflict? One possible answer is that technocratic bargaining is applicable to a constrained, perhaps shrinking, subset of EU decision making. Electoral issues set the parameters for interest and elite politics. Even a small number of politicized EU issues can cramp the style of policy makers. In a recent book, Majone (2005) observes that sixty years of functionalist spillovers manufactured by supranational and national experts and of integration by law by an activist European Court of Justice have finally hit the brick wall of public opinion: “Integration by stealth is no longer a viable strategy. The latest European elections have shown that the efficiency and legitimacy costs of the traditional approach have become so high that popular hostility to the very idea of integration is no longer a phenomenon limited to a few member states of the Union” (2005: 220.) “An increasing level of politicization of EU policy making becomes unavoidable as more and more tasks involving the use of political discretion are shifted to the European level” (2005: 36.)

We have stressed the intentionality of European integration. Europe’s elites might try to lower the heat of politicization and avoid referendums. One strategy would be to cut reform into smaller pieces that might escape referendums (Hooghe and Marks 2007). Another would be to shift decision making to agencies at arm’s length from elected politicians. We write after a decade-and-one-half of intense politicization. But we hear the owl of Minerva. European integration has a habit of throwing up events that confound its students and its practitioners. This, at least, is one trend that we can confidently extrapolate into the remainder of this century.
Figure 1: Evolution of EU authority  
(policy breadth and depth)  
(1957-2004)

Note: Breadth (1-5) estimates the extent to which the EU plays a role in a policy (1-5); Depth (1-5) estimates the supranational or intergovernmental character of the decision rules. The boxes encompass the interquartile range for 18 policies, the horizontal line is the median, and the whiskers indicate the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles. Starred policy areas are outliers, and white circles are extreme cases. Source: Börzel (2005, 221-3).
Figure 2: Evolution of Regional Authority
(average annual change)
(1950-2006)

Note: Annual change in regional authority for 35 democracies, 1950-2006, averaged by decade. Regional authority is measured as index of policy scope, taxation power, electoral representation, and power sharing in central government. Source: Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (forthcoming).
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