Pragmatic power Europe: Responding to an emerging multipolar world
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Introduction
This paper presents a reconceptualisation of the European Union (EU) as that of pragmatic power Europe. It suggests that the emergence of a multipolar world presents a critical opportunity to re-frame our expectations and understandings of the EU as a power in the world. Enabling us to look at the EU through the lenses of both ‘what it is’ and, crucially, ‘what it can do’ relative to the position and preferences of others, pragmatic power Europe presents a broad based methodology for considering EU attitude, behaviour, the tactics it employs, and the power resources it utilises, in order to respond to the complexity, uncertainty and heterogeneity of preferences, and positions, at play in today’s multipolar world order.

Challenging arguments that present the EU as either a power at a particular advantage in a multipolar world (K.E. Smith, 2013; McCormick, 2013; Moravcsik, 2010; Jørgensen, 2009; Elgström & Strömvik, 2005), or a power in decline in the face of the emerging economies (Webber, 2014; M. Smith, 2013; Fischer, 2010; Whitman, 2010), this paper suggests that the EU has in fact begun to pragmatically re-strategise, re-position, and re-act to the realities of an emerging multipolar world, and particularly within the context of global governance. This has been achieved through the moderation of its normative aspirations, the adoption of reactive as well as proactive forms of negotiation behaviour, by making use of its multiple power resources as well as multiple venues in exercising them, and by better taking into account the preference structures of others. Drawing therefore upon pragmatism as a concept of analysis, and considered in the context of EU positioning and performance relative to other major players, this paper shall reflect upon the need to go beyond the ‘Power Europe’ debates as was – with their particular focus upon the EU’s differences as a global power, and which stress the EU’s normative identity and endeavour to be a ‘force for

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good’ in the world (Manners, 2008) – to instead recast the EU as a power and ‘pole’ capable of responding both practically and realistically to the world at large.

In presenting this case the paper is broken down as follows. In section one the emergence of a multipolar system and its implications are briefly elaborated. Section two then considers the literature on the EU’s global role thus far, with a particular focus upon the Power Europe debates and the assumptions that have been drawn over the EU’s response to new powers. In section three a framework for conceptualising the EU as pragmatic power Europe is outlined. Expanding upon initial works by Steve Woods on ‘Pragmatic Power EUrope’ (2011), and drawing also upon the literature addressing role theory, performance and international negotiation, this section details pragmatism as a concept of specific utility both in capturing the EU’s positioning as a global power and in consideration of its external performance. In section four pragmatic power Europe is then considered in practice with reflections on the EU’s changing role within the specific context of global trade governance. The paper is then concluded with a look ahead to the development of pragmatic power Europe as a possible research agenda.

The emergence of a multipolar world

The turn of the 21st century has brought with it an emerging multipolarity in the international system whereby multiple centres of power, or ‘poles’ exist (Young, 2010, 3). Whilst debate prevails over the EU’s particular classification as a ‘pole’ in today’s multipolar system (i.e. Santander, 2014, K.E. Smith, 2013; McCormick, 2013; Gowan, 2012; Moravscik, 2010; Posen, 2009, Buzan, 2004), conventional wisdom nevertheless holds that the major powers, and more pertinently the major economic powers, at work in the international system today include the United States and the EU, as current global economic leaders, alongside the rising powers, advanced developing nations, China, India and Brazil (NIC; 2012; Wade, 2011; Held, 2010; Young, 2010).

The emergence of a multipolar system has had several implications for the behaviour of states and other actors in the international system. For realists, multipolarity is believed to create both heightened competition and uncertainty between states (Mearsheimer, 2007, 79, Layne, 1993). This is particularly found in the increasing efforts by rising powers to enhance their own control over the external environment by developing footholds in international organisations (Gilpin, 1981, 94-5; Layne, 1993, 11), and resulting in competing efforts by established and emerging powers to set the terms of global governance (Jacoby & Meunier, 2010, 309). From the liberal perspective multipolarity creates new dynamics for interstate
bargaining in international institutions (Moravcsik, 2010). Competition and uncertainty may however be managed by the mitigating influence of international institutions and the fact that multilateral outcomes tend to produce win-win scenarios for all parties (Keohane, 1986, 194; Moravcsik, 2010, 172). From the constructivist perspective multipolarity establishes new great power hierarchies, with new major powers prevalent amongst the top tier of negotiators within systems of global governance (Lake, 2013; Scott, 2013).

A common understanding, highlighted by theorists from across the political spectrum, is that multipolarity creates a greater need for state interactions within a multilateral context (Wade, 2011, 353; Held, 2010, 185-6; Posen, 2009, 350; Grevi, 2009, 23). Within a multipolar system however multilateralism does also become increasingly more complex. As Wade (2011) suggests, a ‘multilateral governance dilemma’ may be expected within a multipolar world; whereby states seek policy coordination but where the heterogeneity of interests, and the increase in major powers involved in core circles of decision-making, makes it increasingly difficult to find and sustain a consensus.

As such the emergence of a multipolar world places renewed emphasis onto the strategies and behaviour of all of the major powers within the international system. With new great power hierarchies emerging, it is expected that new behavioural constraints, reputational concerns, potential norm competition, and changing conceptions of ‘appropriate behaviour’ will emerge; and not least for the established powers – the EU and United States - who have been required to adapt their previous patterns of behaviour to take into consideration new players. Multipolarity thus generates considerable challenges for the EU as an established, yet somewhat unique, pole in today’s world. It does however, also generate new opportunities for the EU to redefine its attitude towards others in the international system, to reconceptualise its strategic orientation and preferences, and to adapt its behaviour in order to achieve its preferred outcomes.

**Conceptualising the EU’s global role: The ‘Power Europe’ debates**

The changes that have taken place within the international system since the turn of the 21st century have been presented from sharply contrasting perspectives by those interested in the EU’s global role. On the one hand, the EU's uniqueness as a polity and its ‘difference’ as a global power has been portrayed as a particular advantage in multilateral settings where multiple powers come together to find common solutions (K.E. Smith, 2013, 116; McCormick, 2013, 164; Moravcsik, 2010, 166-167; Jørgensen, 2009; Elgström & Strömvik, 2005). As an actor believed to have ‘multilateral genes’ (Jorgensen, 2009, 189) and a ‘coordination reflex’ (Whitman, 2010, 27) expectations follow that the EU has not only the
willingness to be a global ‘leader’ within today’s systems of global governance (Forsberg, 2011; Falkner, 2007; van den Hoven, 2004), but that it’s appropriate behaviour – often identified with norm entrepreneurship, the setting of ambitious targets for others to follow, and of coming up with policy solutions (i.e. Falkner, 2007; van den Hoven, 2004) - positions the EU to be ‘a force for good’ in the world (Manners 2008, 59). From these accounts the EU is presented as a ‘model for the future’ (Lake, 2013, 567); a power capable of showcasing the added value of compromise and consensus between states in a complex world.

Further colouring this perspective has been the considerable effort exerted by scholars in defining the EU as a particular type of ‘Power Europe’ in the world. Since the early 1970s a series of distinctive conceptual frameworks have developed which have conceptualised the EU as a ‘Civilian Power Europe’ (Duchene, 1972, Whitman, 1998), a ‘Normative Power Europe’ (Manners, 2002; Diez & Manners, 2014) and even an ‘Ethical Power Europe’ (Aggestam, 2008). In these conceptualisations special emphasis is placed again upon the EU’s ‘difference’ as a global actor (Diez, 2014; Manners & Whitman, 2003), in which the EU is seen to position itself as a power beyond power (Cooper, 2003) - one that pursues civilian and positive forms of influence in order to persuade others to want what it wants, and to set the standard in the pursuit and spread of normative values. Such conceptualisations have moreover been supplemented at times by the EU’s own policy rhetoric in which it has positioned itself to take on ‘responsibility for building a better world’ (Council, 2003). A common tendency within these ‘Power Europe’ conceptualisations has been to focus on what the EU ‘is’ and it’s seemingly ‘different’ identity from traditional conceptions of great power.

Other more recent conceptualisations have however, sought to move beyond ‘what the EU is’ to focus more deliberately on ‘what the EU does’ and the influence it can wield in its external relations. Damro (2012, 682) for example argues that:

‘While the identity of the EU may have normative and/or other characteristics, it is fundamentally a large single market with significant institutional features and competing interest groups’.

He goes on to state the case for the EU as a ‘market power Europe’ whereby it, ‘exercises its power through the externalization of economic and social market-related policies and regulatory measures’ (Damro, 2012, 682). Others have further stressed the EU’s impressive capacity to exercise ‘regulatory power’ (Young, forthcoming), or ‘functionalist power’ (Lavenex, 2014). A burgeoning body of literature has further complemented this line of
enquiry by engaging in the analysis and explanation of EU international effectiveness and performance and its capacity to ‘play the game’ (Underdal, 1983) in order to achieve its objectives in international affairs (Dee, forthcoming, 2015; da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Niemann & Bretherton, 2013; Jorgensen et al. 2011).

And yet, a further line of debate has seen the EU addressed not as a power at any particular advantage in an emerging multipolar world, but rather as a ‘Declining Power Europe’ (Webber, 2014, see also M. Smith, 2013; Fischer, 2010; Grevi, 2009, 37). Seen to lack the capability and political will of a traditional great power (Posen, 2006), and to have ‘stood aside’ from the changing balance of power (Whitman, 2010), concerns are further raised of the EU’s weakening due to the global recession and corresponding Eurozone crisis (Allen & Smith, 2012, 171-175). From this perspective the EU has been portrayed as a power suffering, ‘confusion in the face of the growing power and influence’ of the emerging economies (Whitman, 2010, 28), and with its abilities ‘to deliver in a world of great powers’ increasingly being brought into question (Grevi, 2009, 37).

With such conflicting expectations of the EU’s response to an emerging multipolarity, and with a plethora of ‘Power Europe’ concepts to now choose from, chartering a clear course for understanding the EU’s power and influence in today’s world appears somewhat complex. And yet these conflicting accounts present a useful starting point. For the one, focus is principally given to ‘what the EU is’ – the EU is a different type of power, a ‘force for good’, a unique power best capable of navigating the complexities of a multipolar world. For the other the focus is on ‘what the EU does’ – the EU exercises market power, regulatory power, functionalist power - or for some ‘does not do’ in being a power overwhelmed in the face of the emerging economies. In reality each of these perspectives is in part accurate, and in part missing a wider truth. As Woods (2011, 243) argues, ‘conceptions of EUrope…are not invalid but delimited. EUrope is quasi all of these and none of them entirely’. As this would suggest, conceptualising the EU as a power (or indeed any power) requires consideration of both of what it is – its attitude to power, its strategic orientation and its positioning towards others – and what it does – its behaviour towards others, how and when it acts and reacts, the tactics it employs, the power resources it employs and the forums it uses. Critically still it requires elasticity and eclecticism in broadening our scope of enquiry. As it is here suggested, it requires a dose of pragmatism.

**Pragmatic power Europe: a framework of analysis**

Pragmatism began life as an American philosophical movement in the 1880s associated with, ‘the doctrine that truth consists not in correspondence with the facts but in successful
coherence with experience’ (Little, 2009, xiii). From the late nineteenth to mid twentieth
centuries ‘classical’ pragmatism was to become the monopoly principally of the United
States with key thinkers including James Pierce, William James and John Dewey who
espoused the utility of science as practice and pronounced that ‘theories thus become
instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest’ (James, 1907, cited in Bauer &
Brighi, 2009, 4). Pragmatism is however, not a theory, nor is it a school of thought.
Colloquially pragmatism is a term that tends to be equated with a concern for expediency
rather than principles (Woods, 2011, 244; Bauer & Brighi, 2009, 3). Important to note
however, is that pragmatism does not presume an absence of morality, or a preference for
the status quo (Bauer & Brighi, 2009, 168).

Instead pragmatism can be understood as an attitude whereby actions are guided, ‘not by a
priori principles, but primarily by an assessment of the actual constraints and opportunities of
a given context’ (Baert, 2009, 48). As such there is recognised to be ‘progressive potential’
with pragmatism (Bauer & Brighi, 2009, 176), thus allowing an actor to pursue a reformist or
principled agenda, but which sees this within the constraints of the known environment.
Critically, pragmatism is also a concept that takes into account, ‘the distinctiveness and
irreducibility of the Other’ (Baert, 2009, 55). It recognises the reality and practice of trying to
impose one’s own principles on others and, ‘denounces a large proportion of Western
thought and literary criticism for not engaging sufficiently with different cultures, and for
imposing their own dichotomies on what is, by all accounts, a radically different cultural
landscape’ (Baert, 2009, 55). More than this, rather than being seen as a philosophy where
‘anything goes’, pragmatism in fact invites us, ‘to take disciplinary boundaries less seriously,
dispense with scholasticism, and engage in a kind of eclectic inquiry, which… puts a
premium on creativity, reflexivity, and imagination’ (Bauer & Brighi, 2009, 2).

Pragmatism is concerned therefore with ‘acting’ (Kratochwil, 2009, 20) and thus has several
utilities when applied to the study of international relations, the exercise of power, and the
EU. In 2011 Cooperation and Conflict published a paper entitled ‘Pragmatic Power EUrOpe’
by author Steve Woods. In this article Woods puts forward the case for utilising pragmatism
in ‘deciphering what EUrope does and might be, and a guide for decision-makers’ (Woods,
2011, 245). In defining the term Woods states that:

“As a method of political practice, pragmatism is flexible, prudent, sometimes
innovative, sometimes opportune…It is oriented to achieving, from the perspective of

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2 Woods uses the term ‘EUrope’ to identify the merging of analysis of the EU with older forms of
analysis focused on Europe
the practitioner, ‘optimal results’…A principle virtue of philosophical pragmatism is its employment of techniques or choices most applicable to a situation” (Woods, 2011, 244)

In this paper Woods presents his case for conceptualising the EU as being a pragmatic power by drawing on examples from the EU’s relations with Russia and China. In it he suggests that the EU may display normative or even ethical instincts and features in its foreign policy, but self-interest, and the self-interest of EU Member States particularly, are crucial characteristics of EU external relations (Woods, 2011, 256). He goes on to state that the EU - and its Member States especially - have a notably pragmatic attitude towards foreign policy and thus will strive to achieve optimal results for their preferred interests even if this is at the expense of wider collective normative principles as set out in the EU’s strategic rhetoric. What remains less clear from Wood’s account however, is how pragmatism may explicitly be conceived as an attitude, enacted as a form of behaviour, or exercised as a power resource. Further framing of the concept of pragmatism and its utility in analysis of the EU is therefore required.

As was detailed in the previous section, the emergence of a multipolar world order creates greater complexity and uncertainty for states, as well as establishing new great power hierarchies in systems of global governance. Global governance in this context is defined as, ‘governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers’ (Finkelstein, 1995, 369). International institutions are particularly identified as critical forums for global governance; providing multilateral venues for the interaction of and negotiation between all states, and particularly the major powers, within the international system. In this way global governance, and more specifically multilateral negotiation within international institutions, provides a useful framework for understanding the EU’s response to other powers in the international system, and an important point of departure in considering pragmatic power Europe.

More than this, with new powers rising to the fore in global governance, a renewed emphasis must be placed upon the strategies, preferences and roles that all of the major powers play, or seek to play, in their international affairs. According to Elgström & Smith (2006, 5), an actor’s role refers to:

'[P]atterns of expected or appropriate behaviour. Roles are determined both by an actor’s own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role prescriptions, of other actors'.
Recognising that an actor may take on multiple roles in an international negotiation environment, and that change to the global distribution of power may result in increased role uncertainty and competition (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014, 78), how an actor chooses to position itself relative to others may be associated with, ‘perceived responsibilities and obligations in foreign policy and includes policy-makers’ perceptions of what functions their state should perform in the international system’ (Ahnlid & Elgström, 2014, 78). How that actor then performs – that is, the ‘patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour’, or more generally, the actions that it undertakes in its role – sheds important insights on its response to others and its navigation of the political dynamics at play within the international system.

What this in turn suggests is that pragmatism may be identified in two ways. First, pragmatism is a political attitude leading to a particular strategic orientation of how an actor should perform. To think pragmatically therefore, is to consider the world through the lenses of practicality, reality, and through the development of a common sense approach that takes into consideration the preference structures of others. This is identify as ‘pragmatic positioning’. Second, pragmatism is a particular behavioural characteristic or set of characteristics. To act pragmatically is to utilise the best modes of output, drawing on the most effective tactics and power resources in order to achieve optimal results. This may be identified as ‘pragmatic performance’.

**Pragmatic Positioning**

Pragmatic positioning relates to the EU’s attitude towards foreign policy and is concerned with the EU’s overall strategic orientation, its ambitions to achieve specific policy objectives, and how its preference structures relate to other major powers (see also Dee, forthcoming; Jørgensen et al. 2011; Elgström & Stromvik, 2005). With regards to strategic orientation, as Ahnlid & Elgström (2014, 79) elaborate, a negotiator may be, ‘a supporter of the present system…a revisionist actor [or]…a shirker, an actor that avoids responsibilities and obligations’. In the case of the EU this is particularly relevant. The EU’s strategic orientation, or more specifically, its strategic aspiration, as a global actor has long been associated with that of a ‘different’ or ‘distinctive’ identity (see Young, 2007, 789; M. Smith, 2007, 532; Manners & Whitman, 2003; van den Hoven, 2004; Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002); and as one that prefers civilian and positive forms of influence in order to persuade others to want what it wants. Within the context of global governance this has further been identified with the EU setting itself apart as a leader, setting ambitious standards for peace and prosperity for others to then follow (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, 912; Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002).
However, the EU must also be recognised as a rational actor who seeks to enhance its position and pursue its interests within the international system. Pragmatic positioning therefore draws attention towards the EU’s specific interests and objectives relative to the preference structures and ‘red-lines’ of others. This is important because, whilst Normative Power Europe proponents would suggest that the EU’s ‘difference’ from others is what sets it apart as an influential global actor (i.e. Manners, 2002; Manners & Whitman, 2003; Diez & Manners, 2014), it must also be assumed that the more ambitious the EU is in making demands of others, the harder it must then try to lead, push, or persuade others to follow its lead. Pragmatic positioning therefore is found where the EU balances its ambitions to ‘take on responsibility for building the better world’ with the reality of what others are also asking for and the feasibility of actually achieving its own preferred outcome.

Pragmatism recognises the preference structures and ‘anticipated minimums’ (Iklé, 1964, 192) of other negotiation partners and takes this into account in order to find some ‘zone of agreement’ that would make an outcome agreement possible (Underdal 1983). In bargaining terms, pragmatic positioning may therefore be considered where the EU, ‘seek[s] the best possible deal in negotiations; that is, to obtain the most from its opponent while conceding the least’ (Meunier, 2000, 104). The balance of power within any given negotiation context must also be an important consideration for EU pragmatic positioning (da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014), and which may be expected to result not only in the modification of EU ambitions if it meets extensive resistance from other major powers, but also in forum-shopping whereby it looks to pursue its interests in multiple forum, including multilateral, regional, plurilateral or bilateral negotiation contexts where it may be better positioned to exert influence in obtaining optimal results (Woolcock, 2010, 28).

**Pragmatic Performance**

Distinguished from pragmatic positioning is pragmatic performance. Pragmatic performance is concerned with the EU’s behavioural characteristics; that is, what the EU is doing to achieve its preferred outcomes in global governance. This is an important distinction as pragmatism, with its focus on practice and practicality, must assume that if an actor adopts a particular position that seeks to bring about some change it must then ‘do’ something in order to achieve it. To first consider the EU’s performance however, questions must arise as to who is representing the EU in its external relations. This is necessary as often the EU is considered to perform well where it is at its most ‘state-like’ and ‘speaks with one voice’ (Jørgensen & Wessel, 2011; Gstöhl, 2009; Falkner, 2007, Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). However, to associate the EU performing well solely with it speaking with one voice is to
miss the pragmatic nuances of its actual performance, not least with regards the practicalities of who is speaking, when and why. In the field of trade for example, faced with multilateral trade negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that spanned policy areas in which both the European Community and Member States held competences, the EU Member States, ‘responded pragmatically and agreed that negotiating with one voice through the Commission was in the EU’s best interest’ (Woolcock, 2010, 387).

Conversely, as increasing numbers of studies are starting to show, the EU has at times demonstrated a comparative advantage in international institutions where it has maintained cohesion but actually spread its voice and utilised the diplomatic weight, and relationships, of individual Member States to move toward a wider consensus with third countries (Macaj & Nicolaïdis, 2014; Dee, 2012; Laatikainen, 2010; K.E. Smith, 2006). Within the UN General Assembly for example the EU has showed signs of ‘burden sharing’ with its Member States in order to best spread its message and work more effectively with third countries (Laatikainen, forthcoming). Within UN based multilateral negotiations moreover cross-alignment of EU Member States in other negotiation blocs has become commonplace (Dee, 2012), and is increasingly being seen by the European External Action Service as not only complementary to the EU position, but sensible in spreading the EU voice in order to maximise effectiveness (Author interviews, 2011, 2014).

As these examples suggest, who speaks for the EU in its external relations is a pragmatic calculation and one which can further take into consideration the best use of the EU’s multiple power resources, whether that be market power – as in the case of the Commission speaking on trade - or diplomatic power, as in the case of the Member States using their own global networks of deep historical relationships with states and regions beyond Europe or in other negotiation blocs to further the EU’s voice. There is pragmatism therefore in using the EU’s ‘voice’ or ‘voices’ in order to best pursue the EU’s preferred outcomes.

Pragmatic performance goes further than the EU’s ‘voice’ however, and relates also to its broader behavioural characteristics in its relations with others. It is noted that a tendency within the literature on the EU as a global actor has been to place particular emphasis upon the EU as playing a proactive, if not always necessarily effective, role in international affairs (McCormick, 2013; Moravscik, 2010; Jørgensen, 2009; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). A proactive output is here identified where the EU actively pursues its objectives by going first, making particular demands which can set the tone for negotiations, and, where necessary, working with others to build consensus in order to
achieve, or alter, an outcome. It may therefore include such tactics as making formal proposals, offers or concessions, mediating disagreements between other, conducting diplomatic demarches to third countries, coalition-building, or through issue-linkage where the EU is particularly well placed to offer economic or market-based incentives to third countries in return for concessions elsewhere (Iklé, 1964).

The challenge with focusing only on the EU’s proactive pursuits however, is that it raises expectations of the EU’s ‘appropriate behaviour’ as always being just that, ‘appropriate’. However, as Woods (2011, 244) stresses, pragmatism allows for a variety of actions to be utilised by the EU and which may at times include inaction, delay, vagueness, and the absence of formal decision. A reactive output may therefore be the most pragmatic response that the EU can adopt in its performance and which may see it adopting unresponsive, cruising or delaying tactics in order to deter agreement on an issue it disagrees with or to buck-pass responsibility of ‘going first’ or ‘setting an example’ onto another party.

Whilst such tactics challenge traditional conceptualisations of the EU as being a ‘force for good’ in the world, and as a leading player in systems of global governance, they need not be considered wholly in the negative. Rather a pragmatic performance is assessed where the EU utilises the most suitable tactics to respond to the issue or negotiation at hand in order to achieve optimal results. In this way a broadening of what may be considered the EU’s ‘appropriate behaviour’ is encouraged and which allows for the EU to act in a variety of ways, drawing upon its multiple power resources, in order to achieve its preferred objectives.

_Pragmatic power Europe in practice: The case of global trade governance_ ³

The argument presented here is that pragmatic power Europe is no new thing. To some extent the EU has demonstrated pragmatism in its foreign policy behaviour since it first began to ‘act’ in international relations. Whilst conceptualisations of the EU as Normative Power Europe suggest that normative goals drive forward the EU’s influence in the world, in fact the reality of international politics must suppose that an agenda driven by normative principles will meet resistance from others at some stage. Politics must come into play, as must questions of power, the balance of power, and the concern therefore for actual goal attainment. This is not to say that the EU has not acted normatively. Rather it is to argue that the EU’s normative pursuits, particularly during the late 1990s and early 2000s when Normative Power Europe was first conceptualised, were themselves a pragmatic response

³ For a detailed account of the EU’s pragmatic role shift in the case of the WTO please see Dee (forthcoming)
to the internal and structural conditions at play at that time. For example in the 1990s the EU signed its Treaty on European Union creating not only its Common Foreign and Security Policy but also the Single European Market. At this time moreover, the United States was considered to be having its ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer, 1990) whilst the emerging economies were still considered ‘essentially bit players’ (Baldwin, 2006). At this time within global governance the EU was thus able to play a leading role by either working closely with its partner the United States (i.e. the launch of the Doha Round in the WTO), or by presenting itself as an alternative to the United States (i.e. the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, or through its opposition over the Iraq War).

The emergence of a multipolar world order has however, made it increasingly difficult for the EU to sustain its normative distinctiveness in the face of increasingly assertive emerging economies each with very different norms and preferences. The EU 'model' is therefore far less attractive today than it was at the turn of the 21st century and which has made more rationally driven forms of pragmatism an increasing necessity for the EU in the pursuit of its international objectives.

No more clearly has the EU’s pragmatic shift in responding to an emerging multipolarity been evident as in the case of global trade governance. Within the global trading system the EU has been a prominent, if not leading power, since it first rose to prominence as the European Economic Community. The global trading system has however been a forum where the rise of the emerging economies has been most keenly felt. In the late 1990s when the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was created, and in 2001 when the Doha Development Agenda of multilateral trade negotiations was launched, the global trading system was dominated by the ‘Big Two’ – the EU and the United States. Since then the global trading system has become increasingly complex with an increasingly assertive India, Brazil and China involved in the top tier of trade negotiators, with multilateral negotiations in stalemate, and with a resultant proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral preferential trade agreements being negotiated. It is therefore within this context of global reordering that pragmatic power Europe is considered.

**A pragmatic re-positioning: From managed globalisation to Trade, Growth and World Affairs**

In 1999 the EU’s global trade strategy was based on the doctrine of ‘managed globalisation’. This strategy sought to ‘manage’ or ‘harness’ globalisation through the basic principles that international rules should be written, and obeyed, and that international organisations should have their jurisdiction extended, and their powers enhanced (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 353).
With a clear multilateralist agenda that sought the strengthening and advancement of multilateral trade disciplines to a growing WTO membership across a wider range of trade and trade-related issues (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 357-8), the EU’s strategy was not only to promote openness in global trade but ‘openness the European way’, seeking to export its own norms and standards as a ‘globalizer’ for the multilateral trading system (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, 912, 915).

Not only prioritising the WTO as the EU’s preferred regulatory forum for global trade governance, the managed globalisation strategy was, in keeping with the time, notably normative in its orientation. In particular it was to indoctrinate far greater issue-linkage between the EU’s trade policy and other ‘non-trade concerns’, including many with distinctively normative dimensions such as development, the environment, human rights and good governance (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; van den Hoven, 2004). Intending that a new multilateral trade negotiation should last no more than three years, the EU thus sought a swift, ‘comprehensive and ambitious’ round of multilateral trade negotiations (Council, 1999) that could complement not only its own trade preferences, but those of the developing world. The launch of the Doha Development Agenda, or ‘Doha Round’, in November 2001 was to mark a major victory for the EU’s managed globalisation strategy positioned the EU as the WTO’s leading, and most ambitious, actor.

By 2003 the Doha Round was however, to experience the first signs of a new found assertiveness by the emerging economies. With ongoing disagreements over the very modalities that the Doha Round negotiation agenda should adopt - along with increasing entrenchment of the diverging stances of developed versus developing nations - the Doha Round was, by July 2006, suspended. Responding to this multilateral impasse, in 2006 the EU re-evaluated its global trade strategy. With the EU’s efforts within the Doha Round proving ever more costly, and in further reaction to the United States’ own aggressive pursuit of numerous regional and bilateral preferential FTAs with key partners, the Global Europe strategy (Commission, 2006) brought a to a close the EU’s moratorium on bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements, and reopened the EU’s pursuit of its trade interests beyond the forum of the WTO. Global Europe further signalled a shift in the EU’s policy towards the emerging economies. No longer accepting their development status as reason for non-reciprocation of trade concessions within the Doha negotiations, and further recognising that the rising powers were combining their high growth with high barriers to EU exports, the EU raised its demands in expecting the emerging economies to take on greater responsibility in favouring market openness and to give Europe ‘something in return’ (Dee & Mortensen, 2014).
Launched in November 2010, the Trade Growth and World Affairs (TGWA) strategy was a further pragmatic repositioning by the EU in response to several factors. First, the economic crisis resulted in weakened demand for European products and enhanced the EU’s reliance on growth through trade, and exports particularly (Bendini, 2014). Second, projections showed that developing and emerging countries would account for nearly 60 per cent of world GDP by 2030, and with 90 per cent of world growth being generated from outside of Europe (Dee & Mortensen, 2014). The TGWA strategy thus placed priority onto securing the EU’s growth and competitiveness in a changing world, with particular emphasis on securing better access for EU products in traditional markets, whilst broadening its reach to access new markets as well. In 2013 a Commission policy communication entitled Trade, Growth, and Jobs (Commission, 2013) further honed the EU’s global trade strategy. This document set out the EU’s prioritisation of ambitious trade negotiations with advanced economies, including the United States and Japan, ‘anchoring’ the large emerging economies into the global trading system through evenly shared global responsibilities and reciprocation, and through the pursuit of a ‘realistic’ agenda within the multilateral trading system⁴.

As this reflects, in much the same way as the managed globalisation strategy was, at that time, considered a pragmatic necessity in the face of an increasingly globalised world (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010, 354), so too can the EU’s reorientation towards Global Europe, and its successor TGWA strategy, be seen as a pragmatic necessity in the face of today’s geo-politicising landscape. The EU’s formally normative and highly ambitious agenda for the Doha Round has thus been moderated to a more realistic, competitiveness-driven approach in which the EU has adopted a greater interest in reciprocation and a growing preference for pursuing its trading interests in those forums where it is most likely to achieve results. No longer pushing leadership rhetoric within the WTO, the EU today has adapted its strategic positioning to ‘strike the right balance between ambition and reality’ (Commission, 2013) and to see trade as an engine of growth and competitiveness rather than an engine specifically for extending EU normative power and preferences abroad.

**A pragmatic performance: The EU’s reactive shift in the WTO**

At the WTO’s first Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 1996 the EU was first to promote the need for a wider and deeper multilateral trade agenda. In the lead up to the WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999 the European Council was further

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⁴ It is noted that at time of writing (early 2015) the EU is again refining its global trade strategy in order to ‘take further steps to promote sustainable growth, increase investment, [and] create more and better jobs’ (Council of the European Union, 2014)
highlighting, ‘the importance of the EU playing a leading role in these negotiations’ (European Council, 1999), and had therefore begun conducting an extensive diplomatic tour des capitales of those WTO members most reluctant to agree to a new Round to garner support (Author interview, 2011; Bridges Weekly, 1999). However, when a new round failed to be launched in 1999 due to developing world, and particularly Indian, resistance, the EU was to recognise that its negotiation position was at odds with other’s preference structures and undertook a substantive shift in its outreach to better address the development issues of a new trade round (Van Den Hoven, 2004, 264). Altering its tactics to focus on what the multilateral trading system could do for developing countries, the EU was then able to persuade many more developing counties to support a new round and, by November 2001, the Doha Round was launched.

The Doha Rounds formative years were however to prove increasingly difficult for EU performance. Initially proactive in putting forward offers and making concessions, particularly over agricultural trade liberalisation, and in pushing forward negotiations in the new trade issues of investment, competition, procurement, and trade facilitation (the so-called Singapore Issues) (Young, 2011; van den Hoven, 2004), the EU was to meet with a growing resistance from an increasingly assertive group of advanced developing economies led by India and Brazil (the G-20) (Baldwin, 2006). With India particularly reticent to negotiations over the new trade issues, by 2004 the EU again modified its ambitions to remove its insistence on negotiations over trade in investment, competition and procurement (Commission, 2004). By 2005, the EU had further reached the extent of its proactivity in making offers and concessions, and was stressing to negotiation partners that it’s, ‘threshold of pain had been reached’ (WTO, 2005) and that it would concede no more on agriculture (Grant, 2007, 176).

As was outlined above, from 2006 the EU had responded to the changing geopolitical dynamics at work in the global trading system and repositioned itself by lifting the moratorium on bilateral preferential trade agreement. By 2007 the EU had launched trade negotiations with other regional organisations including Mercosur and ASEAN and with third countries including India. After 2008 this was further reinforced by the EU’s shift to a more reactive output within the WTO. In July 2008 at a General Council meeting of the WTO the EU was to state its agreement in principle to revised draft modalities for the Doha Round (Author interviews, 2011). However, with continued blocks being presented by India and the United States within the WTO, and with the world plummeted into global recession, whilst agreement was finally agreed on texts by December 2008 the Doha Round remained in a position of stasis with little ground made towards an outcome agreement. The stalemate
within the WTO has however provided opportunity for the EU to respond to the global crisis and more avidly pursue its bilateral trade negotiations. Whilst continuing to speak out in favour of the Doha Round and its necessary conclusion (i.e. Commission, 2013), since 2008 the EU has been much more a fly on the wall in the WTO as others negotiate around it; positioning itself as a blameless party in the stalemate preventing progress, and awaiting breakthrough from the United States and emerging economies rather than actively pushing for progress itself (Author interviews, 2011; Dee & Mortensen, 2014).

With a multilateral governance dilemma present within the WTO, since 2012 the EU has further shifted its output onto alternative forums, including its bilateral Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States, and a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) (Dee & Mortensen, 2014). With an anticipated economic benefit of €120billion to the EU economy (CEPR, 2013) the TTIP negotiations particularly represent an important boost to the EU’s growth and competitiveness. TTIP and TiSA further signify a pragmatic results-driven shift in performance for the EU with it prioritising alternative negotiation venues where it is better capable of extracting optimal results. Thus, whilst the EU continues to prioritise the WTO in its policy rhetoric (i.e. Commission, 2013), in practice it has pragmatically pursued its objectives within multiple venues and with multiple partners in order to achieve the best possible trade deals that will in turn bolster EU growth and competitiveness.

**Conclusion**

As this discussion has sought to demonstrate, the EU has demonstrated capacity to re-position, re-strategise, and re-act to the changing dynamics of an emerging multipolarity, particularly in the context of global trade governance. In so doing this paper has presented a reconceptualisation of the EU as ‘Power Europe’ in an emerging multipolar world. Important to stress is that the method here presented is not to offer a new ‘type’ of Power Europe. The ‘Power Europe’ debates thus far have made, and will continue to make, an important contribution to our understanding of the EU’s global role and the various ways that it exercises power in the world. Rather, this paper has endeavoured to make its contribution by offering a re-framing of the concept of ‘Power Europe’ that draws on the concept of pragmatism as a tool of analysis in looking at the EU’s positioning and performance relative to others in an emerging multipolar system. In particular it has reflected upon the need to consider the practicalities of the international system, the reality of what can be achieved in the context of multiple heterogeneous preference structures, and the emphasis that must be placed not only on what the EU wants or on how it tries to achieve its goals, but on what it can achieve relative to ‘others’. Pragmatic power Europe thus seeks to present a dose of
pragmatism to our understanding of both what the EU is as a power, and on how it subsequently acts as one.

This is also not to suppose that the EU always gets it right. Pragmatism after all requires innovative thinking and careful ‘assessment of the actual constraints and opportunities of a given context’ (Baert, 2009, 48) which the EU may not always achieve. However, to begin to consider the EU through the lenses of pragmatism is to present several possible avenues of further research. In particular it presents the opportunity for engaging ‘in a kind of eclectic inquiry’, as suggested by Bauer and Brighi (2009), into the EU’s external relations more broadly. Of particular interest in this regard is consideration of the EU’s ‘patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour’ both in policy-specific governance contexts and in its relations with third countries. The example drawn upon in this paper of global trade governance is perhaps the clearest example of pragmatic power Europe in practice but it must also be recognised as a seemingly ‘easy’ case for the EU with regards to its capacity to act, and its relative position of strength within the global trading system. Of interest therefore is whether these findings are also to be discovered in other policy contexts i.e. in security policy where the EU’s ‘voice’ is more critically evaluated, or in environmental policy where the EU’s normative distinctiveness has been most clearly articulated.

In pursuing such case-study-driven analysis a further utility may also be found in making greater use of discourse analysis. In the case of trade there has been a clear pragmatic shift in EU discourse towards the WTO since the turn of the 21st century which is reflected particularly in the increased use of phrases such as ‘balancing ambition with reality’ (Commission, 2013). Detailed discourse analysis of strategy documents, statements and council conclusions may especially shed interesting insights into the EU’s changing policy dynamic in responding to changing structural conditions. Above all, what this paper has sought to contribute is a reframing of expectations of the EU as a power in the world today. To take this concept forward therefore is to re-evaluate our expectations of the EU as neither a power neither at a particular advantage, nor one in decline, but rather as a power capable of thinking pragmatically about the world as it is, and acting pragmatically in its response to it.

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