

# **European Norms or Clichés? Why Hermeneutics Matters**

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## **Abstract**

Scholars of normative power Europe (NPE) have successfully demonstrated how the European Union has gradually emerged as a changer of norms in the international system. But more work is needed also to understand the principles of action that reorganized the relationships among Europeans themselves and made NPE possible. This essay argues for a hermeneutical approach that draws from Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor and Hannah Arendt. By taking seriously the self-understanding of those whose political lives it seeks to explain, hermeneutics renews the understanding of concepts and practices, such as European reconciliation(s), community and reunification that otherwise too easily morph into meaningless slogans. Confronting the words and deeds of European founders (at the elite and popular level) with the reflections of post WWII thinkers such as Arendt, Isaiah Berlin, Karl Jaspers and Jürgen Habermas can yield important insights. The empirical work relies on memoirs and autobiographies, 70 long interviews, treaty and policy texts (1950 – 2005).

## ***Introduction***

*Note to the reader: This essay constitutes the draft of the first of two chapters attached to the book proposal I am completing on the ethical politics of European integration. I included here some of the evidence, which comes in the second chapter, to make the argument more persuasive. But this gives a “certain breathless” quality to the essay and I am aware that a number of points (from the literature review to my “principles of action”) deserve more development. Nevertheless I hope that you will find this essay thought provoking.*

My work is an attempt to “retrieve” the ethical and political impulses behind the fifty year-old European integration process by interpreting philosophically the words and actions of some its founders.<sup>i</sup> This approach, which is quite common in the study of American political roots, may seem less applicable to European integration, which is often described as a technocratic enterprise.<sup>ii</sup> Yet repeatedly policies have been implemented which are questionable from the narrow point of view of economic self-interest or national power politics. This is not to say that European integration is a purely idealistic project or that instrumental and strategic considerations have not played a crucial role. Ethical commitments by themselves do not explain political action and political outcomes, if anyone was foolhardy enough to assert such a proposition after Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. But much of the scholarship on European integration tends to overlook the ethical stands required from the political actors involved

in the process, or what Hannah Arendt would call their “political principles and practices.”<sup>iii</sup>

The fact that former enemy nations could pool the production and marketing of coal and steel in the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) only six years after the end of a murderous conflict is often taken for granted or justified by economic calculations.<sup>iv</sup> Such accounts do not explain adequately how participants in the European founding dealt with their historical memories of war, invasion and mutual exploitation, and how they could trust one another enough to put their war industries under a common authority with no hegemonic power mediating conflicts. As a result, the much-touted “European reconciliation” remains a concept, devoid of concreteness and with little apparent relevance to current conflicts. Neither has there been enough attention paid to how European Founders understood community, a word laden with emotional and affective connotations that they chose very deliberately to name their highly technocratic enterprise. Revisiting the negotiations of the European Economic Community helps shed light on the conceptual break with an ancient understanding of political power that was effected rather unselfconsciously at the time: it was to be “action in concert” rather than domination over the other. Finally, I suggest that the Hegelian concept of recognition might be a more useful lens to interpret the meaning of the accession to the EU of 12 new Member States since 2004 than the concepts of enlargement, reunification or, worst, “absorption.”

Exploring the ethical politics of European integration is important for scholarly purposes, but it matters also politically. Voluntary associations such as the EU rest on a sense of common identity formed around ideals and traditions, as well as on material and

security interests. But many EU citizens, and even some of their leaders, express confusion as to what this common tradition might be.<sup>v</sup> The heated debates leading to the French and Dutch rejections of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe illustrate this lack of common understanding. Moreover, scholars and public figures engaged in conflict-resolution efforts often cite European integration as a model to follow.<sup>vi</sup> But what is to be emulated? Specific economic policies and legal arrangements may not be transferable. However, issues of trust and truth-telling, of personal and collective accountability for past deeds, of the tension between economic and political imperatives are not unique to the European context. Focusing on the self-understanding of important actors in the process can help illuminate a more hidden yet vital factor for the success of the enterprise. As Andrew Moravcsik writes, it is important to “generalize” the European experience because, “By subsuming European integration wherever possible under general theories, rather than treating it as *sui generis*, we invite outsiders to treat its lessons as relevant to their own experience.”<sup>vii</sup> Moravcsik concludes that the European experience fits the Liberal rather than the Realist view of International Relations because it has been driven primarily by the “commercial interests” of the nation-states involved. My point of view is different. I interpret the European “experience” as a political theorist, and I assume that commercial interests, however important, are too simple an explanation for this complex phenomenon.<sup>viii</sup>

This is, in any case, less a work of explanation than a work of memory and interpretation. As Paul Ricoeur reminds us, founding stories help ground the political community. Those narratives, that may consist in fictional or historical accounts, remain open for rectification and retelling as the debates on the meaning of the French

Revolution or the German *Historikerstreit* demonstrate.<sup>ix</sup> What is striking in the case of European integration is that the accounts are almost entirely missing. Where are the “stories” of the Coal and Steel community or the Treaty of Maastricht or the enlargements? There is little memory although there is history. What is the difference? For Ricoeur, the work of memory is an “ambition,” an attempt to be “faithful to the past,” an action-oriented responsibility of citizenship, whereas history, the task of professional historians, aims at truth. Both are needed, and what links them is the testimony of those who can say, “I was there! Believe me or not. And if you do not believe me, ask someone else!”<sup>x</sup> Ricoeur wishes for a “happy memory,” that is a memory reconciled to the tragic roots of all political foundings, which are born out violence. Such a memory is a hard-won gift, granted to those who have done the work of mourning – of imputability when necessary - and moved beyond melancholia, a paralyzing denial of loss, which Freud analyzed in *Mourning and Melancholia*. This is what makes the “capable human being.” So we may ask: could the lack of European memory be due partly to an all too successful exorcism of the past?<sup>xi</sup> I leave the question open; the need for European memory(ies), constitutive of identity, remains.

There is, of course, no direct access to identity for any subject, singular or collective. The road from self to self is through the other and never reaches the Hegelian promised land. “To interpret meaning is, for Ricoeur, to arrive in the middle of an exchange which has already begun and in which we seek to orient ourselves in order to make new sense of it.” This exchange takes place “in the midst of various long intersubjective relations, mediated by various social institutions groups, nations and cultural traditions:” it leads the individual to a kind of “second *naïveté*,” propitious for

action, yet self-reflective.<sup>xii</sup> So, how to interpret (or “generalize”) the European experience in a manner respectful of the intents of its initiators, yet analytical and critical? Twentieth century political thinkers who took seriously the challenge of rebuilding a world in ruins have created some of the “long intersubjective relations,” in the midst of which hermeneutics can deploy its best effects. Hannah Arendt’s reflections on natality, plurality, forgiveness and promise, and the responses of Arendtian scholars provide me with my main interpretative categories.<sup>xiii</sup> I also draw from Isaiah Berlin’s discussion of pluralism, Karl Jaspers’ exploration of collective responsibility, Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics, Charles Taylor’s recognition and István Bibó’s reflections on the cultures of shame and responsibility.

Ricoeur insists, “All memory is of the past.”<sup>xiv</sup> Isn’t this rather obvious? Ricoeur’s concern is that the hard work of recollecting the past must be kept carefully separate from experiencing the present or expecting the future. Go to the past to understand the past, he tells us. This is less a temporal than a psychological distinction, an attempt to keep interpretations of the past “faithful to the past” (as lived experiences), as undistorted by current sensations and/or anticipations of the future as possible. Memoirs, essays and interviews of European leaders and citizens abound and constitute a rich source of information regarding the European common past. Self-reflection has not been lacking either, but due to the controversial nature of integration politics, it has often been considered a type of propaganda, which should only concern proponents of integration politics. But for interpretive work, which seeks to discover the meaning of practices in specific social contexts, identity has everything to do with self-interpretation. As Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor argues, a crucial feature of human agency “is

that we cannot do without some orientation to the good, that we essentially are. . .where we stand on this.”<sup>xv</sup> This is why it seems appropriate to study how European initiators understood their work and purposes. I propose to interpret their “speech and deeds” as texts of political theory, an old tradition in nation-states.

Ever since the early constitutional debates between the Federalists and anti-Federalists, Americans have been articulating a political tradition grounded in the words and deeds of the Republic’s founders. This is Arendt’s approach in *On Revolution*, a controversial phenomenological comparison of the French and American Revolutions that takes as its starting point the change in meaning of words – revolution, power, authority – “not because conceptual language reveals the phenomenon in any straightforward way, but because, as Heidegger maintained, words carry the record of past perceptions, true or untrue, revelatory or distorting.” Many critics have noted the somewhat “fabled” character of Arendt’s rendition of the American Revolution. But Elisabeth Young-Bruehl argues that Arendt was not writing a history or distinguishing types of revolution, rather she wanted to “present an ideal for practice.”<sup>xvi</sup>

Ricoeur is more willing to concede that political action rarely attains its initial purpose than Arendt in *On Revolution*. His hermeneutical treatment of memory, history and imagination traces a middle course between the thickets of uncritical memory and the wasteland of a hermeneutics of suspicion. Mourning confronts you with the concreteness of life. After her experience of Nazism, Arendt will deliberately turn away from philosophy to articulate a political theory that meets the requirements of action in times of crisis, from totalitarianism to the Vietnam War.<sup>xvii</sup> Following a great personal loss, Paul Ricoeur responds to tragedy with a renewed focus on *phronesis*, that form of



prudential judgment that make man capable to act. As Philippe de Schoutheete notes, emphasis on common action rather than common culture shaped the European founders' first initiatives.<sup>xviii</sup> Like Arendt and Ricoeur – albeit in a very different manner - they are moved by an urgency borne out of tragedy, and this may explain some of the affinities between thinkers and actors, which I hope to make apparent.

In the past decade, normative inquiries on European integration have multiplied. In the next section I discuss briefly some of the most thought-provoking exemplars to explain what a work of memory may add to these inquiries. In the second half of this paper, I return to Arendt and Ricoeur to justify my own emphasis on “principles of action” and I tell a few “stories” of these principles at work. I conclude by critiquing some of the clichés of European integration. I include an appendix on methodology with my 1999 questionnaire.

### ***European identity and “Visions of the Good:” Scholarly Responses***

In spite of its predictive aspirations, the study of political phenomena tends to reflect change rather than precede it. The “positivist” paradigms of neo-functionalism and liberalism in the Anglo-Saxon world, and legal studies on the European continent, largely shaped the field of European integration studies until the end of the twentieth century. But the democratization of decision-making processes with their many fractious referenda, and the transformation of American foreign policy after 9/11, have made the exploration of questions of public ethics and political identity more urgent, prompting also much self-reflection on methodological commitments by scholars of the EU.<sup>xix</sup>

Some of the first scholars to ponder European citizens' disorientation and disaffection concluded that "shared values" could give European citizens a sense of their common identity.<sup>xx</sup> So did political leaders although few would call today for a "soul for Europe."<sup>xxi</sup> German historian Wolfgang Schmale argues that Europe suffers from a "myth deficit:" it has never articulated its goals clearly in a way which could enlist the allegiance of citizens. Daniela Obradovic defines the missing myth as a set of symbolic values "through which people share an idea of origin, continuity, historical memories, collective remembrance, common heritage and tradition as well as a common destiny."<sup>xxii</sup> The word myth, however, carries some dark connotations; too often a myth served to seduce people into foolish collective adventures. This is why I prefer here the Arendtian word "principle" and I will return to this later.

In *Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective*, Stefan Elbe critiques brilliantly the various attempts to articulate a new ethos for Europe, which he sees as so many straight jackets or "ascetic ideals." From a Nietzschean perspective, Europeanization would not manifest itself primarily through an institution or a political project. Instead, we should look for Nietzsche's "good Europeans," autonomous human beings who experiment with "new dispositions toward existence." The stress on action rather than rigid ideals is well taken, but there is an "enigmatic" character to the good Europeans' free thoughts, which disquiets.<sup>xxiii</sup> Isn't Elbe asking too little from political actors? Personal autonomy could give play to nationalistic impulses just as much as transcending them. There is a certain emptiness to freedom talk that calls for more substantive commitments. But what are the standards of normative assessment for a project whose major actors affirm that, "there is

no fixed list of European values. There is no ‘finality’ to the process of European integration. Europe is simply of the future”?<sup>xxiv</sup> The author exploring reality may eschew distinctions between true and false, “something can be both true and false,” but, as Harold Pinter writes, the citizen who must act cannot.<sup>xxv</sup> Paradoxically, the other dilemma of a very open-ended value talk is that it lends itself to a moral perfectionism that may require too much from political actors instead of too little. Jacques Derrida’s list of the nine duties involved in “what is proper for Europe...as a heading for the universal essence of humanity” and its “double contradictory imperatives” is an exhaustive and somewhat intimidating enumeration of contradictory ideals to any person minimally aware of human frailties (difference and universality, accepting the alterity of foreigners and integrating them, etc.).<sup>xxvi</sup>

How then to skirt the obstacles of relativism and excessive idealism that may paralyze action rather than prod it? One way is to study normative issues more empirically. Ian Manners who coined the term Normative Power Europe (NPE) backs his argument on the EU’s capacity to set international norms by non-violent means by reviewing EU advocacy of the abolition of the death penalty across the globe.<sup>xxvii</sup> The divergent contributions to the 2006 special issue on European foreign policy in *The Journal of European Public Policy* are evidence of a broadening critical debate on NPE although my brief summary cannot do justice to it: Federica Bicchì critiques the EU Mediterranean policies as “unreflexively Eurocentric,” and Adrian Hyde-Price dismisses the notion of European Normative Power from a “realist” standpoint. In the bipolar international system during the Cold War, the EEC never constituted a new form of

civilian power, but it was merely a vehicle for cooperation on limited “second order issues.” For her part, Helene Sjursten queries whether the absence of armed force suffices to render EU normative power non-hegemonic. But Erik Oddvar Eriksen assumes that international law, like domestic law, must be backed by some coercive means such as sanctions; so force need not mean hegemony. Michael Smith concludes that there is today a “co-constitutive” relationship between the internal development of European foreign policy (EFP) and the broader development of international issues and structures; he also warns against the putative danger of EFP becoming overly self-absorbed; there is no way out of the messiness of international responsibilities.<sup>xxviii</sup>

But, even if the EU acts like a normative power in the international sphere, this will not necessarily generate a stronger sense of shared identity among its citizens. It is notoriously difficult to “democratize” foreign policy - Manners acknowledges that the EU drive to abolish the death penalty across the globe came from elite decisions with little involvement or interest on the part of EU public opinion.<sup>xxix</sup> While NPE focuses on the norms shaping the outreach of the EU, it tends to bracket the source of these motivations as the black box of EU studies. That agreement on basic norms within the EU is taken for granted by some of the scholars of NPE is perfectly justifiable, given the wide adherence to the Copenhagen criteria as benchmarks for accession and membership. But the connection between national and European identity remains an important topic for research.

This is a challenge, which Glyn Morgan takes on boldly in *The Idea of a European Superstate* by arguing that the “international ramifications” of the arguments

between eurosceptics, federalists and postsovereignists are too rarely discussed: they could help the European peoples decide whether they want to take on a common European *project*, and, if yes, what kind. Concerns for individual and national security carry logical and normative force whereas arguments of economic efficiency may be too hard to grasp and fail the democratic standard of justification of “accessibility” (the argument must be understandable to the average citizen); arguments of social welfare fail the standard of publicity and sufficiency (there is no guarantee that the EU may protect its citizens better from ill-effect of globalization than the nation-state). In a world where the United States, China and Russia will continue to guard jealously their sovereignty, only Europe can balance other superpowers by becoming a superstate (in effect a federal polity), which protects its external sovereignty by reinforcing its “internal sovereignty.” Though the federal option may seem a pipe-dream, Morgan considers the “security-based argument” the most “plausible” and the only one that might convince people that they need a European level of government. This pragmatic approach leaves concerns of shared identity in the background. However, if European institutions prove their efficacy, Morgan sees no reason why peoples who shifted the horizon of their loyalties from the local to the national, could not again accept new and more all-encompassing forms of political membership.<sup>xxx</sup>

Moral theory in the Western tradition has often combined two approaches, one modeled on law, with categorical demands at its center, and the other based on precepts for living the good life with prudence and fortitude.<sup>xxxi</sup> In many respects, Morgan’s argument follows the first model. Like Charles R. Beitz, Peter Singer, Onora O’Neill, or

Michael Walzer, he looks for general principles on the basis of which to discuss important issues, here a standard for democratic justification, which is the security argument.<sup>xxxii</sup> Jürgen Habermas' constitutional patriotism combines both approaches: a set of clearly defined principles backed by law and the idea that the modern democratic state rests on the *supportive spirit* of citizens oriented toward the common good. This probably inspired the authors of the Preamble to the Constitution for Europe who worked painstakingly on the common values defining the EU's collective identity.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

Current events suggest, however, that utilitarian justifications, constitutional reforms and abstract moral arguments are not enough to motivate citizens to participate. As Aristotle wrote long ago, citizens need to practice the kind of virtue and rationality appropriate to the maintenance of the particular kind of constitution under which they live.<sup>xxxiv</sup> This form of rationality requires an "understanding" of the original ethical commitments underpinning a political enterprise. Arendt's definition of understanding is "to try to be at home in the world." Understanding leads to "meaning."<sup>xxxv</sup> As a political theorist, I would like to shed some "understanding," on the process of European integration. Arendt shied away from general moral principles, which would limit human natality (or creativity), and plurality (or diversity). For her there were no prepolitically formed values, no ultimate truth, and no "invisible hand" of history. Rather than starting from general principles, she took a historical approach and reflected on the lessons to be drawn from a lived human experience: the Holocaust, Stalinism, the French Revolution, and the American Revolution. Here men have acted; what can we understand? What is the "meaning" of their action? This approach seems especially well suited to a reflection

on the European integration process. The whole process came out of a determined commitment to create a different future for Europe. The enterprise was, and still is, an experiment.

### ***Imagination and “Principles of Action”***

There are affinities between memory and imagination, two mental capacities which both void absence and distance; therefore imagination has a visualizing function worth celebrating: it gives “something to be seen,”<sup>xxxvi</sup> even if it can also mislead to the fanciful or mythical. In *On Revolution* Hannah Arendt traces back the “tradition” of the American Revolution to the “principles” and “practices” of the Founding Fathers - “public freedom, public happiness, public spirit.” She celebrates an ethical politics of participation and wants us to remember its “heroes,” as she calls those who had the courage to insert themselves into the public world. But Arendt did not invent the idea of a political regime’s principles of action. She borrows it from Montesquieu who outlined the “principles” inherent in each constitutional order in *The Spirit of the Laws*: love of country and equality, or “virtue,” in republics; honor in monarchies; moderation in aristocracies; and fear and suspicion in tyrannies. Montesquieu’s political principles are what make each specific government “act,” not moral virtues or Christian absolutes.<sup>xxxvii</sup> This account constitutes a powerful act of imagination; indeed, who has ever seen or quantified such principles? Yet it makes sense to think that a tyranny whose people stopped fearing might crumble. As Berlin notes, Montesquieu’s “central notion” is that “individuals and states decay when they contravene the rules of their particular ‘inner’ constitution.”

Undoubtedly Arendt shares this conviction, hence her concern for “lost treasures” although she thought Montesquieu’s list of principles “pitifully inadequate” to account for the “rich diversity” of people sharing a common life on earth.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

Arendt bemoaned the fact that “...an allegedly purely theoretical interest in political issues has not been the ‘genius’ of American history, but on the contrary, the chief reason the American Revolution has remained sterile in terms of world politics.” Men of action and men of thought had parted company and Arendt feared that people lacking political concepts (or the remembrance of their “principles of action”) would tend to rely on far-fetched ideas, which had little relation to the reality of their life. The American ethics of public participation had become like a “lost treasure,” displaced by civic apathy and consumerism, and state drive for security and stability at all costs.<sup>xxxix</sup> The political theorist’s imagination does play a part in the selection of facts. Arendt’s nostalgic story of the American founding is controversial not so much for what it says, but for what it does not say, about slavery and the American Indians’ demise especially. Yet her account motivated American students to take action in the 1960s. Margaret Canovan reminds us that Arendt, like Heidegger, had an idiosyncratic way of using words, “Principles are not abstract but they are extremely general, inspiring actions without prescribing them. They relate to the manner in which people act, and particularly to the way they *begin* to act, the *principium* that establishes the principle of later action.”<sup>xl</sup>

Montesquieu and Arendt’s “principles” provide me with a creative way to theorize the European founding’s mindsets. These have affinities with practices familiar to most people in daily life, but they have relevance also for public life. Like the



American Revolution, the last fifty-seven years of European integration can be thought of as a founding, although it did not occur all “at once” or “according to a single plan” and I detect three European principles of action: reconciliation, power as action in concert, and recognition of the other. Such “principles” are more often implied than articulated; and when they are expressed in preambles to the treaties and in governmental declarations, it is in a language that does not excite the enthusiasm of citizens. The 1950 Schuman Declaration that proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) may be an exception in this regard, and it mentions all three principles. Reconciliation: “the age-old opposition of France and Germany” and “its sanguinary divisions” must be eliminated; Power as action in concert: “the solidarity in production” (of coal and steel) and the creation of a new “High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries” will be the key to future economic prosperity and security for Europe; Recognition of the other: the “organization” is “open to the participation of the other countries of Europe” without distinction.<sup>xli</sup> Isaiah Berlin suggests that Montesquieu conceived his principles as “tentative,” rather like “hypotheses.”<sup>xlii</sup> It is with this understanding that I discuss the “principles,” which have moved the European integration process forward. What follows is a brief summary of my analysis of the European principles of action, which I develop at much greater length in my forthcoming book.

## *The Lost Treasure of European Integration*

### *The principle of reconciliation* (chapter 2)

Reconciliation, so often invoked, is misunderstood perhaps because of its complexity. It first deployed its effects in the highly technical Treaty of Paris on the ECSC (1951). Karl Jaspers (on the question of guilt) and Arendt provide rich theoretical resources to interpret its five constituting practices: breaking with the culture of blame forgiving, promising, a fair reorganization of the economic relations between the parties, and the benevolent involvement of an external political power together. Shocked by the ease with which “good” Germans had shed their Christian values under Nazi rule, Arendt stressed action rather than reconciliation.<sup>xliii</sup> But, with hard-headed-realism, she understood the unpredictable and irreversible consequences of human initiative and proposed her own “remedies:” forgiving and promising.<sup>xliv</sup> Forgiveness, which is not a feeling, but a political capacity, restores the ability to act anew, unconditioned by the past. With the faculty of promising, people create “islands of certainty” which allow them to treat the future as if it were the present. Their promises are almost always written: “laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances.”<sup>xlv</sup>

Arendt supported the European Resistance’s post-War II plans for a Germany reintegrated in a federal Europe. But the Schuman Declaration surprised everyone by proposing a treaty with a program of economic and social development for the coal and steel industries and their workers, and common institutions. The French initiative can be interpreted as an act of forgiveness, a radically new proposal to relaunch “action in concert,” and a promise. It broke with the culture of blame, which justified the permanent

exclusion of wrongdoers from new political communities. There was not one word of reproach in the Declaration, simply the acknowledgment that France's twenty-year long effort to promote peace and a unified Europe did not succeed. And "we had war." Some Frenchmen acknowledged publicly the historical wounds that their country had inflicted upon Germany. Jacques Maritain mentioned the Treaty of Versailles, Robert Schuman Napoleon's imperialistic wars, which in turn "aroused 19<sup>th</sup> c German imperialism."<sup>xlvi</sup> Few of their fellow citizens endorsed these views, which did not negate German guilt and responsibility for WWII. But it made it psychologically and politically feasible to include the perpetrator on equal footing in 1950. For his part, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer committed his government to a politics of reparations: between 1949 and 2000 the Federal Republic of Germany paid \$70 billion to war victims in Europe and the state of Israel.<sup>xlvii</sup> Forgiveness is controversial both in theory and in practice. For Noam J. Zohar, however, the interpersonal process of forgiveness can take place in international relations because "the state functions as a vehicle for action of a human collective." Peter Digeser argues that if states can grant collective forgiveness, this would transform the nature of the international system, precisely the aim pursued by the founders of the ECSC.<sup>xlviii</sup>

But it is important to note with Lily Gardner Feldman that, beside a "break with age-old national animosities," successful reconciliation policies also rest on a "pragmatic" component, which includes programs of economic and political cooperation to serve state interests, "security and prosperity."<sup>xliv</sup> Assessments of the economic benefits of the ECSC vary. Some call it a success because production and trade in coal and steel increased considerably among the six partners; others a failure because it did not succeed in dismantling the German steel cartel and in liberalizing trade in coal and

steel fully. But scholars agree that even if “the ECSC actually delivered on only one of its promises,” it was “the most important one: it advanced the integration process” and “substituted for a peace treaty with Germany.”<sup>l</sup> Moreover, by creating a public space where German and French actors could relate on equal terms, the treaty facilitated the resolution of the thorny issues of the Ruhr status and of the French annexation of the Saar territory.

Finally, international reconciliations frequently involve a benevolent external power (or hegemon), willing and able to guarantee the security of the parties. Winning the peace hinges on winning the war, yet it is a different project. It may be argued that the US acted more like a guardian angel than a hegemon in 1947 when it offered the Marshall Plan and supported the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The Marshall Plan was structured so as to encourage and stimulate European reconciliation and cooperation: the US insisted on an international conference chaired by a European, which would draw up the plans for dividing up and investing the funds.<sup>li</sup> In the fall of 1949, in another act of trust, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson turned to French foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman for ideas on the policies that should be adopted toward Germany. After eight months, the French government finally came up with the Schuman Declaration thanks to a proposal of French Planning Commissioner Jean Monnet. Later the US made the first sizable loan to the ECSC, \$100 million at the favorable rate of 3.7%.<sup>lii</sup>

The principle of reconciliation rarely leads to an end state. Once the cornerstone of European integration, the French-German reconciliation is no longer an isolated example. Since 1989 there have been official reconciliation processes between Germany

and Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic and Hungary and Romania; Greece and Turkey have initiated steps toward a rapprochement.<sup>liii</sup> Partly because of the success of its reconciliatory processes, the EU was capable to become one of the new “hegemons” in the Balkans. With the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, it promised that the question of the final status of Kosovo (full-fledged or “conditional” independence) would be decided in 2005, a thorny issue, which has yet to be adjudicated to the satisfaction of all parties. Have the EU and its representatives drawn enough from their “treasure” of reconciliatory practices, from forgiving and promising and their experience of “rational” collaborations around common interests, to encourage path-breaking initiatives on the part of Serbia and Kosovo’s actors? In 2000 former EU Commission President Jacques Delors urged EU leaders to draw from their “treasure” and “find in the Balkans, on both sides...the men or the women on whom we could lean to face the principle of forgiveness and develop together a promise, of course, with the support of nearby regions such as Bulgaria and Romania among others.”<sup>liv</sup> When I asked whether the tradition of European reconciliations could impact favorably the relationship of Greece with Turkey, I raised eyebrows in Brussels and Paris in 1999: the situation seemed really too different. But four years later comparisons of the impact of European integration on the French-German and the Greek-Turkish relationships no longer seemed far-fetched.<sup>lv</sup>

***The principle of power as action in concert*** (chapter 3)

There is more to winning the peace than reconciliation. With the elimination of violent conflicts comes the affirmation of a common destiny. The early European actors

launched a daring reconceptualization of power, which the treaties they negotiated were meant to symbolize. It was to be “action in concert” rather than domination over the other. But isn’t this a privilege reserved to countries that have lost the capacity to impose their will? This is Robert Kagan’s argument. While expressing repeatedly his admiration for the new European politics of peace, “a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration- on both sides of the Atlantic,” Kagan argues that Europeans could step out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian “paradise” of international law only thanks to the military protection of the United States.<sup>lvi</sup> Few Europeans would dispute Kagan’s point that the European Union must develop a more effective and responsible Common Defense Policy<sup>lvii</sup> But Arendt contributes to a renewed understanding of European power. She defines power as an “organized solidarity,” binding partners on a basis of equality and mutuality, not as violence or force. “To an astonishing degree independent of material factors, either of numbers or means,” power is both invincible and fragile; it “springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse.”<sup>lviii</sup> If the European “paradise” was established under US military protection, the principle of power as action in concert kept it from lapsing into a mere footnote in history books.

Among political actors, the apprenticeship of power as action in concert surprised, even alienated. The negotiations on the ECSC had hardly started at the Quai d’Orsay in Paris on June 20, 1950 when the French delegates Monnet, Étienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri started arguing with one another. This went on for several days. Dirk Spierenburg, head of the Dutch delegation, confided to his assistant Max Kohnstamm: “I am going crazy.

How can I defend the Dutch interest when these idiots do not even know what the French interest is?”<sup>lix</sup> But Kohnstamm was delighted: “This was totally different from the bilateral negotiations we were all used to. Monnet broke through our habits to start something that was not a negotiation, but a common search for solutions.” Robert Marjolin, a French economist who was the senior civil servant representing France during the negotiations of the European Economic Community (EEC) and a member of the first EEC Commission, called the ECSC a “school” where the six began learning to work together on a basis of equality.<sup>lx</sup>

The 1955-57 negotiations on the European Economic Community constitute a case study of power as action in concert. Thanks to seventeen long interviews of the main negotiators in 1984, memoirs and essays, we have the story behind the story. These documents divulge what official declarations, memoranda and treaties never could reveal: how individual political actors changed their own minds, how they persuaded others to change their minds in order to pursue these diverse “inter-ests, which lie between people and therefore can relate and bind them together.”<sup>lxi</sup> It is part of the interpretative theorist’s task to expose lacunae and contradictions in the actors’ recollections. Other authoritative accounts confirm and complete rather than contradict the facts (though not necessarily the interpretations) evoked by the interviewees, whose humorous and often self-deprecating tales do not hide quirky behaviors and occasional pettiness.<sup>lxii</sup>

Assuredly, accords on the EEC and Euratom could not have been negotiated and implemented if they had not corresponded to the fulfillment of national interests and had not been approved, at least tacitly, by popular opinion. Circumstances also played their role. The Crisis of Suez and the Hungarian revolution of October 1956 convinced the

negotiators, the French in particular, that they could not go it alone anymore and that protectionist policies must be altered. But even if securing material benefits for large social groups had been the sole aim of policy-makers, there was little unanimity, especially in France, as to what such policies should be.<sup>lxiii</sup> Furthermore the psychological obstacles on the road to such accords among the six were enormous. People do not always act in their own best interests.

European power, like a heavy door, turns on three hinges, the institutions, the calendar with its deadlines, and the initiative of political actors. Agreement is much more difficult to reach when hundreds or thousands of actors are involved in negotiating what Kalypso Nicolaïdis calls a “community of projects.” This is all the more reason to remember that the original communities were founded on the conviction that to master national destinies is to act in concert. Embracing this new kind of power is not for the faint of heart, nor is it an exercise in private virtue. To its inhabitants the “paradise” feels more often like a purgatory.<sup>lxiv</sup>

***The principle of recognition*** (chapter 4)

Without recognition of the other, the European Union (before 1992 the European Communities) could not have “enlarged” from six to twenty-seven Member States in thirty years. The Treaties of Rome’s signatories called “upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts.”<sup>lxv</sup> The major contemporary theorist of recognition, Charles Taylor, analyzes from his standpoint as a bilingual Quebecois deeply engaged in Canadian politics and as a scholar of Hegel the process of interactions, which facilitates the coming together of parties previously opposed (or merely disconnected).



The new association, far from abolishing the parties, helps them toward a higher stage of individual and collective self-realization. This is the goal, if not the reality, of EU enlargement, a neologism for the peaceful expansion of a “union” of democratic nation-states, driven not by a pre-established plan, but by the requests of outsiders to join.

In a world where social and international hierarchies have collapsed among individuals and groups - this is the case of the European continent - the shaping of identity does not follow automatically or exclusively from one’s status at birth, but it depends also on a dialogue of recognition among equals. Taylor argues that contemporary individuals and collectivities are torn between two impulses. The first is “the search of authenticity,” their specific and unique calling, which recognition by the other supports (whereas the refusal to grant recognition can have severe psychological and political consequences). The second impulse is instrumental rationality, which prizes efficacy and productivity over all else, even at the cost of shared tradition.<sup>lxvi</sup> The successive enlargements represent both a rational effort to modernize Europe and the vocation to create a new European order open to all. But in this ceaselessly changing EU, Member States, Candidate States and their citizens experience rude challenges to their sense of identity. In this context, institutions and policies matter: they embody the granting (or withdrawal) of recognition so necessary to the self-realization of the community members.<sup>lxvii</sup> Certain EU policies, such as the programs of economic and social cohesion, and institutional arrangements (the rotating presidency) have facilitated mutual recognition among Member States, which is predicated on the equality of treatment and status and a continuous flow of verbal, political and economic exchanges.

Dialogues of recognition, which can only succeed among equals, require a horizon of shared values according to Taylor. In the EU since 1993 the Copenhagen criteria for accession have constituted this horizon: democratic rights, a functioning market economy, and the *acquis communautaire*.<sup>lxviii</sup> The European Council decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. This process has advanced by fits and starts. Meanwhile Croatia and Macedonia have also become official Candidate Countries. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia “including Kosovo” are all “potential candidate countries.”<sup>lxix</sup> Faced with some 90.000 pages of *acquis communautaire* and 27 interlocutors, is there any possibility for the Candidate Countries (actual and potential) to experience the give and take of the dialogue of recognition? Are the Member States open to the possibility that this dialogue will transform them also?

The common feature of these three European principles of action is that they engage the Other - sometimes a rival or an enigma, never an enemy - on the basis of mutuality, with a view to common long-term interests and the willingness to enter binding commitments. Reconciliation, power as action in concert and recognition of the other need not inspire every policy. They should rather be considered as a logical necessity inscribed in the psychology of the citizens and their representatives if the community is to last. The expansion of direct democracy in the EU calls for more civic involvement, on a knowledgeable basis. This constitutes a formidable pedagogical challenge, which has yet to be met adequately by EU leaders in spite of the respected Commission vice-president in charge of communication strategy Margot Wallström’s repeated calls for action.<sup>lxx</sup> Yet numerous grassroots groups moved the reconciliatory process after WWII; since 1989, beside politicians and bureaucrats, academics, students,

workers and journalists have engaged in the dialogue of recognition across borders.<sup>lxxi</sup> Provided with enough evidence, many more EU citizens might identify with the core practices of the European “treasure.”

### *Testimonies*

Who remembers? For Arendt the founding of new political communities is an exciting but ephemeral time of “natality.” With a matchless appreciation for the uniqueness of each individual actor, as she calls those who have the courage to insert themselves into the human world, she describes the “heroes” as the subjects of stories which eventually form the “storybook of mankind.”<sup>lxxii</sup> The meaning of the story can never be told by the agent, who reveals himself in action but cannot decipher its meaning; it “is revealed only when the action itself has come to an end and become a story susceptible to narration.”<sup>lxxiii</sup> Storytelling is one form of thinking that does not trump acting. It allows political actors to share with others their understanding of an experience, thus making themselves “at home in the world among others” and renewing possibilities for action in concert. Selection of facts is the historian’s prerogative. What matters is that the story be probable and possible. Ricoeur writes of the “plausibility” of the testimony.<sup>lxxiv</sup>

As I “retrieve” European ideals from the memoirs, essays and interviews of European Founders and their successors, I am well aware that such works are always in part self-justificatory acts. But writings by major political actors may provide us with some of the most politically salient contemporary political theory. This is, of course,

nothing new. Men of action, such as Machiavelli, Locke, Burke, and Tocqueville used the pen to comment on the conduct of public affairs. But European founders did not reflect at length on their motivations. So it is up to the historian of political thought to interpret the meanings of their words and deeds.<sup>lxxv</sup> In this work I recall certain “stories” about European integration told by political actors in interviews, memoirs and autobiographies, and by biographers and historians of European integration. This allows me to retrieve how these actors understood and justified their political actions, but also, using “the backward glance of the historian,” to bring my own interpretations of these stories and to confront them with the views of contemporary actors of European integration.<sup>lxxvi</sup> No doubt there is a certain *naiveté* in doing so. Moreover, should we not be done with any account that reminds us even remotely Hegel’s “world-historical figures?” Political scientists have been reluctant to focus on leadership, a concept not easily quantifiable and which can lead to oversimplified interpretations of politics as being driven by “great men.” But historically political foundings seem to result from action by small groups of initiators. I define leadership here as the capacity to initiate political action; and although many of the political actors featured in this work are elected politicians or senior administrators, others are actively engaged citizens. As Ricoeur writes, “To put it bluntly, we have nothing better than memory to signify that something has taken place, has occurred, has happened *before* we declare that we remember....testimony constitutes the fundamental transitional structure between memory and history.”<sup>lxxvii</sup>

Memory can torment or prompt to action, and most often it does both. The hermeneutical circle starts from the memories of witnesses, progresses through history whose methods challenge the veracity of these testimonies and circles back to memory,

now an “educated memory illuminated by historiography.” Representations of the past constitute a symbolic universe, which contribute to the creation of social bonds that eventually become like a *habitus* or *sensus communis*. The dangers of an “instructed” (or indoctrinated) memory – that turns into an ideology serving the established order - always lurks, but history, by casting suspicion over every testimony, can act as much as a poison as a remedy. It asks for documentary proofs, but also opens up “spaces of controversy within which several testimonies and several witnesses found themselves confronted with one another.” Ultimately much rests upon the witness who must also be willing to say repeatedly: “I was there, I can attest to this.” Repetition marks the trustworthy witness, transforming testimony into a form of “promise-making.” It makes the “capable man” according to Ricoeur. <sup>lxxviii</sup>

But two challenges arise: the first concerns these “limit experiences,” of which it is almost impossible to testify. How to speak of Auschwitz’ gas chambers? The second is just as daunting (and not necessarily separate): what about the witnesses who “never encounter an audience capable of listening to them or hearing what they have to say?”<sup>lxxix</sup> Limit experiences escape “ordinary understanding.” In the Westphalian system of nations-states, negotiating agreements with a view to a federal Europe and to the abolition of war was hardly a limit experience. Yet it was new, perhaps even “extraordinary,” but did the negotiators want an audience beyond their peers? It does not seem to have crossed their minds beyond the well-rehearsed process of parliamentary approval. Of course, foreign policy decisions never depended on popular approval. The growing recourse to referenda on European issues is a recent innovation, which makes testimonies on European integration more important since they could help civic

“understanding.” However, if testimonies are to help constitute the social bond, the main question is their veracity. Can they be trusted?

The question of trustworthiness is a core issue in democratic politics. I switch in last third of my book from an essentially retrospective mode of theorizing to a more prescriptive mode to reflect on the principles of “truth-telling” and “thoughtfulness.” Although this may sound like pie in the sky, there are “stories” to be told of these principles at work. In Chapter 5 on the democratic deficit in the EU, and especially its cognitive and participatory dimensions, I argue that “truth-telling” (of the leaders) must encounter “right-speaking” (by the people) to shape European democratic politics. I examine whether the founding of the EU satisfied or, on the contrary, failed the test of Habermas’ discourse ethics and to what extent the European Parliament has become a “communication community.” In chapter 6, I focus on another challenge brought about by democratization to argue that the lack of persuasive speech about European integration masks another more fundamental problem: thoughtlessness. At the dawn of the 21st century the EU could easily fall victim to its own success by undertaking too many new programs without enough consideration. As its stability seems endangered by the very dynamism of the processes it starts, only more deeply reflective politics will allow leaders and citizens to make themselves at home in the world. Although Monnet was hardly introspective, he took pains to outline his method for thinking the new in his *Memoirs*; and there are other testimonies of the principle of thoughtfulness.<sup>lxxx</sup> Arendt stressed action in times of crisis, but she reemphasized the importance of judgment (or *phronesis*) for politics at the end of her life. Judgment - to Arendt - was not only about rational mental operations, but more like Kant’s silent sense, which in “practical and

moral matters” does not judge, but tells you “what to do, what not to do.” Only an “understanding heart,” – Arendt called it also “imagination” or the capacity to think from a diversity of points of view – “not mere reflection or mere feeling, makes it bearable for us to live with other people, strangers forever, in the same world, and makes it possible for them to bear with us.” (The French translation “coeurs intelligents” is perhaps more evocative).<sup>lxxxix</sup> The problem with the “good Germans” under Nazism is that they did not think through their “values,” but answered to “stock phrases” and “conventional standardized codes of expression and conduct,” which “have the socially recognized functions of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claims on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence.”<sup>lxxxii</sup>

### ***Norms or Clichés?***

As time passes, principles of action may form a “tradition.” Yet, if they are not remembered “faithfully,” their concreteness fades from memory and they stop inspiring thoughtful action. In times of crisis, the political consequences are grave. Only clichés remain: trite, stereotyped expressions that have lost their originality and impact by long overuse, (a form of “abuse,” which need not negate their original use). Since the end of the Cold War, reconciliation has become the new mantra of European integration. The EU’s first stated “objective” in the 2004 Constitution for Europe is to “promote peace, its values” that follows the Preamble’s open acknowledgment of “bitter experiences” and “former divisions.” Unfortunately nowhere is peace defined, and the Constitution is not a citizen-friendly handbook for its promotion. Even in France, there is little memory about

Europe as a peace enterprise. Étienne Balibar describes the European Communities as “essentially the by-product, and part of the mechanism, of the Cold War.”<sup>lxxxiii</sup> And Jacques Attali calls the ECSC “easy to conceive and to implement;” this is surprising given the irreversible consequences of action: during the Occupation, the Germans extracted the equivalent of 48% of the French 1939 GNP in annual payments; 200,000 French men and women did not return from Germany after the war ended.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> But André Glucksmann expresses a widely shared puzzlement regarding the Founding Father’s motivations: they acted in deafening “silence,” without explanation, and built the new Europe on “tangible” foundations such as the productivity index, trade, and investment. Meanwhile, the reconciliation, “so often celebrated,” has yet to be thought through.<sup>lxxxv</sup>

How is it that highly trained French public figures such as Catherine Lalumière and Elizabeth Guigou discovered the reconciliatory ethos of European integration only after joining the Mitterrand presidency?<sup>lxxxvi</sup> French economist Jean Fourastié stresses that there was never any philosophical conversations around Monnet with whom he worked closely. He was a man focused on action, with no time to waste on abstract debates. “There was also this notion that we were a very diverse group of men; among us some were believers, others not; some loved philosophy, others not. Monnet wanted to keep us all on the same level, without tackling complex, difficult problems about which people have deep differences. I have the impression that he wanted to limit himself, at least with us, to political, administrative and economic problems, which was already a considerable undertaking. . . He behaved with us as a man very conscious of the tragic side of the human condition . . . The point was to try, starting from these tensions between men . . . to limit the dramatic, disorderly character of life.”<sup>lxxxvii</sup> Was Monnet’s



reticence a way to deflect painful memories, with the unforeseen result that it would also deflect the mourning that Ricoeur associates with faithfulness to the past? I pose a question, which Monnet will not answer, but which concerns contemporary Europeans as well.

Although reconciliatory processes in the Balkans could yet become a new chapter in the European storybook, as Delors asserts, the sarcastic film of Sarajevo-born director Pjer Zalica, *Fuse*, mocks the reconciliatory pretenses of European bureaucrats. This is the story of Tesanj, a small Bosnian-Croatian town on the Serbian border with a mixed population who decides to mimic reconciliation to lure international capital with the approaching visit of President Clinton. The deception seems one project Tesanj's divided communities can agree on. At one point the elegantly middle-aged German fire brigade officer, who represents the international community, pats patronizingly the knee of the clever (and crooked) Bosnian town mayor – and tells him, “We reconciled, we have confidence in you, you can do it too” - with no apparent sympathy for the mixture of humiliation and determination in his interlocutor; this is a top down relationship which only shared experiences of defeat, guilt and recovery might help equalize.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Reconciliation turns into a moneymaking enterprise, high salaries for international bureaucrats and subsidies for the assisted, whereas its original intent was equalizing and rooted in the divided communities. Could a European memory, “faithful to the past,” express more self-reflection and acknowledgment of one's responsibility, and forgiveness and promise around common economic interests?

Faithfulness to the past would note also that the European reconciliation(s) did not originate with the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, as it is often argued, but with the treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951. Why should this matter? Because the process was from the start multilateral rather than bilateral; small countries played a vital role, providing ideas, venues and leadership; state interests were always considered legitimate, yet negotiable. The idea of a French-German consortium (with Britain for good measure) with special claim to leadership is contrary to the original impulses of European integration.

The much-vilified “Monnet method” has become another cliché to describe the technocratic processes, which bind the community’s participants in the straight jacket of economic interest with little sense of democratic accountability. This to overlook the facts, for instance that Monnet’s Pleven Plan in 1952 proposed a European Defense Community with a Political Community and European representative institutions. Monnet was genuinely dismayed when the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty on the Defense Community in 1954. The neo-functionalist turn is really taken in 1955 with the negotiations on the European Economic Community, a project, which initially Monnet did not support. He favored the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), atomic energy being like coal and steel a vital and strategic resource, whose common management would teach the partners once again to rethink their national interests in terms of the common interest. Euratom would allow the Europeans to stand on their own feet, more independently from the two superpowers, which was a constant preoccupation of Monnet in spite of its many friendships and collegial relations in the US. The demise of the European Political Community was due to a national decision by

the French. In fact, there is another “European method” that might deserve more examination. Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev argues that the challenge in 2007 is “simple:” to find again a story, a “true fiction” to tell the European peoples. For Krastev, who is not well-disposed toward the federalist ideal because the new Member States have just regained their sovereignty, the challenge is to reinvent Europe around the impact it could have on the “march of the world” in an age of globalization. For this, European elites should first admit that after creating the EU, they pushed it “into the ditch” by blaming it for all political ills. “We are paying today for making of Europe a scapegoat. Refounding Europe demands an admission of guilt.”<sup>lxxxix</sup> But why not address the past not only as a Debt, which induces guilt, but also as the common legacy? Monnet and Schuman had conceived of the ESCS as “a contribution to world peace.” In a different vein, this is a “European tradition” that scholars of NEP want to maintain and expand as does Krastev.

“Reunification” is another term that sounds persuasive until one acknowledges that Europe was really never unified, but split for over 1500 years between powerful empires and large and small states. Because of the constraining nature of the accession process, reunification and “enlargement” become all too easily code words for Western dominance. Faithfulness to the past, what would it mean in this case? In Western Europe, perhaps remembering the profound indifference of many toward their fellow Europeans on the other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War?<sup>xc</sup> And in Central and Eastern Europe? These questions are important to explore. Taylor’s concept of recognition, which designs a process whereby unequal parties can learn, through a tough dialogue, to identity

with each other and to engage in transformation, seems especially relevant to the Europe of 27 or more.

What a work gains in breadth, it may lose in depth. Looking back at fifty-six years of European integration I am well aware that much work remains to be done to delineate the “principles” at the heart of the European project and that other interpretations are quite possible. The work of articulation is never over. As Taylor writes, the question of identity is open-ended, not given once for all, a quest as much as a state of being. What matters is the “direction” in which we move. For Arendt understanding was “unending and therefore cannot produce final results” But this never stopped her quest, nor should it stop ours.<sup>xci</sup>

## *Appendix*

For empirical evidence, I rely on essays, memoirs and long interviews. My account of the negotiations of the Treaties of Rome is based primarily on 17 in-depth interviews of the main negotiators, conducted by two Italian social scientists, Maria Grazia Melchionni and Roberto Ducci in 1984. Research on the contemporary state of the European tradition required widening the number of interviewees. In this case, I chose to interview primarily members of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2005. The 32 members of the European Parliament from 15 Member States whom I interviewed in 1999 represented fairly well the spread between the right and the left, age and gender. I interviewed eleven other MEPs in 2002 and 2005 as well as diplomats from The Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia. I do not argue that I have a “representative” sample of the EU initiators’ views on the “European tradition,” but rather what Joseph A. Maxwell calls a “purposeful” or “criterion-based” sample.<sup>xcii</sup> This is a methodological strategy in which particular settings, persons, or events are selected deliberately in order to provide important information that cannot be obtained as well from other choices (ibid.). MEPs must explain and develop the “European tradition” with their electors, and to know their mind on issues seemed particularly relevant. I also interviewed Jacques Delors twice, had extensive conversations with three close associates of Jean Monnet, three senior level Commission officials and one senior legal expert. Finally I had many conversations on these matters with citizens from EU Member States and candidate countries 1999-2005. To complete this book I am planning more interviews at the European Parliament,

especially with MEPs. from the twelve new Member States. I would like also to enrich my theoretical framework by drawing from one or more Eastern or Central European thinkers. I mentioned István Bibó' in this essay; there are many others, of course, and I welcome suggestions. One my current references is Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, *Esprits d'Europe: Autour de Czeslaw Milosz, Jan Patocka, István Bibó* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2005), Below find the 1999 questionnaire. I used thoroughly revised questionnaires in 2002 and 2005.

### ***1999 Questionnaire***

- 1) Do you think that European integration remains a peacemaking project; where do enlargement and regionalization fit in this context?
- 2) Jacques Delors would like enlargement pushed back until the EMU is well in place; Timothy Gorton Ash thinks it should be a speedy process for the sake of peace; how would you arbitrate this debate?
- 3) The German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt writes that a political community rests on the human capacity for speech and action, but also on the ability to promise and forgive; it seems clear that promise and forgiveness played a role in the early years of European integration. Do you agree; is this role still needed today?
- 4) Many criticize the process of European integration for its elitist aspect? Do you agree? What is the role of the citizen in the enlargement program?
- 5) The European Community remains the main pillar of the EU. How do you define a political community; is this definition applicable to the EU? What are the respective roles of the regions, the EU administration and the nation states in this community?
- 6) How do you visualize an “enlarged” EU? New members are asked to undergo significant changes, but how will these new members change the EU? Are the people of the EU, and especially of your country, aware of the possible need to change in order to enlarge?
- 7) The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas is a partisan of “constitutional patriotism:” Europeans will learn to act and feel as such by accepting the rule of law and common institutions. In contrast, Charles Taylor thinks the citizen needs to develop an affective

attachment to the homeland, out of a common history, myths, and traditions. What do you think, especially in the light of the experience of your country with the EU?

### Notes

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<sup>i</sup> Charles Taylor calls his monumental study of the formation of modern identity, *Sources of the Self*, an “essay in retrieval.” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 10. My attempt at “retrieval” is much less ambitious than Taylor’s: it bears only on sixty years of history and a comparatively limited number of political thinkers and actors. See also Catherine Guisan, *Un sens à l’Europe. Gagner la paix (1950-2003)* Paris: Odile Jacob 2003.

<sup>ii</sup> The Philadelphia Convention and the work of the American Founding Fathers have inspired lively commentaries for over two hundred years. See, for instance, Sheldon Wolin, *The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989).

<sup>iii</sup> Neil Nugent writes that the “‘idealistic’ interpretation no longer finds much favor,” in *The Government and Politics of the European Union* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 10. But some excellent studies on the “ideals” of European integration began to appear at the turn of the century. See *inter alia*, Joseph H.H. Weiler, *The Constitution of Europe: “Do the new clothes have an emperor?” and other essays on European integration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), especially chapters 7 and 10; Thomas Banchoff and Mitchell P. Smith, eds. *Legitimacy and the European Union* (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), especially chapter 4; Elizabeth Pond, *The Rebirth of Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, eds. *Democracy in the European Union. Integration through deliberation?* (London, New York: Routledge, 2000)

<sup>iv</sup> Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) and Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>v</sup> Some, like former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzáles, admit their inability to define the European project. He writes of the 1992 Maastricht treaty, which transformed the European Communities into the European Union and which he helped negotiate:

“We needed to define what it is, or no one would understand us. Hence, like curious children who question their parents, we asked ourselves, the forefathers of the invention: What is this? Imagine the difficulties we encountered when EU advocates, Euroskeptics, and other political fauna from 12 countries attempted to define the new creation. Finally, we decided that the European Union is a *union of peoples*. Exhausted by the effort, we had to hush the questioning child because we were having difficulties finding the answer to the next question: What do we mean by a union of peoples?” Felipe Gonzáles, “Europe Union and Globalization.” *Foreign Policy*, 1999, 115: 28-42, 31.

<sup>vi</sup> See, *inter alia*, Tozun Bahcheli, Theodore A. Couloumbis and Patricia Carley, *Greek-*

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*Turkish Relations and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997). Bahcheli, Coulumbis and Carley compare the divisions between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus to the former Franco-German antagonisms and draw hope from the Franco-German reconciliation for a similar resolution in Cyprus. Also Christopher Piening, *Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs* (London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997). Piening documents how plans for economic integration and peace making in Latin America have been inspired by European integration.

More recently, Fred Dallmayr, *Peace Talks – who will listen?* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 216; Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh, “Burdens of the Past: Overcoming History, the Politics of Identity and Nationalism in Asia,” *Global Asia* (2)1, Spring 2007, 32-48.

<sup>vii</sup> Moravcsik, *The Choice*, 500.

<sup>viii</sup> Jacques-René Rabier, an early companion of Jean Monnet and the “inventor” of the Euro-barometer, warned me against “monocausal” explanations of the European integration process and his advice is well taken (Interview with author 1999).

<sup>ix</sup> Richard Kearney, *On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva* (Aldershot, England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 104.

<sup>x</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 497. See also 163-4 and 55,

<sup>xi</sup> Ricoeur, *Memory*, 21, 82, 148 and 460.

Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida wonder whether “the most significant historical achievements of Europe forfeited their identity-forming power precisely through the fact of their worldwide success.” Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe,” in Daniel Levy, Max Pensky. John Torpey, eds., *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe* (London and New York: Verso, 2005), 8.

<sup>xii</sup> Richard Kearney, *On Paul Ricoeur*, 5 and 4.

François Dosse, *Paul Ricoeur: Les sens d’une vie* (Paris: La Découverte, 1997), 626.

<sup>xiii</sup> Hannah Arendt has attracted the attention of many excellent scholars. Here I draw primarily from the commentaries of Margaret Canovan, Mary G. Dietz, Melvyn A. Hill, Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, George Kateb, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin and Elizabeth Young-Bruehl.

<sup>xiv</sup> Ricoeur, *Memory*, 2004, 21.

<sup>xv</sup> Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 33.

<sup>xvi</sup> Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World* (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 405. Bernard Crick of London University who admitted being embarrassed by Arendt’s admiration of the Founding Fathers, offered an explanation: “Every German American does it once in gratitude.” *Ibid.*, 403.

<sup>xvii</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Essays in Understanding 1930-1954: Formation, Exile and Totalitarianism*, Ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 11.

<sup>xviii</sup> Philippe de Schouteete, *The Case for Europe: Unity, Diversity and Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). See chapter 1 “Concept and Action.”

<sup>xix</sup> See, inter alia, on democratic theory, Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, eds., *Democracy in the European Union: Integration Theory Through Deliberation?* (London



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and New York: Routledge, 2000); Larry Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Stefan Elbe, *Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); Glyn Morgan, *The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005).

For methodological studies, see Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds. *European Integration Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne, eds, *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies* (Basingstoke, UK, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Most textbooks on the EU published in the English language in the last 5 years include a chapter on methodological approaches, which is new.

<sup>xx</sup> Brigid Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1996, 34(1):81-102; Daniela Obradovic, “Policy Legitimacy and the European Union.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1996, 34(2):191-221; Dominique Wolton, *La dernière utopie* (Paris: Flammarion, 1993).

<sup>xxi</sup> In a 1999 speech in Strasbourg Cathedral former Commission President Jacques Delors called on his audience to give a “soul to Europe” which he equated with “meaning,” and “spiritual strength.” Jacques Delors, “Esprit évangélique et construction européenne,” Cathedral of Strasbourg, December 7, 1999. <http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr>. Also, Jacques Delors, *L'Europe tragique et magnifique. Les grands enjeux européens* (Paris: Editions Saint-Simon, 2006).

Romano Prodi used similar language when he accepted his appointment as new Commission President by the European Council in April 1999. He declared to the *Financial Times* his “hope” that during his presidency “the EU will begin to develop . . . a common European soul. For that you need a very high, top level commission, not in terms of bureaucracy, but in terms of common feeling and understanding of what is happening.” Prodi compared the common European soul to “a common will.” Peter Norman, Lionel Barber, James Blitz, “In search of a soul for Europe,” *Financial Times*, Week-end September 30/October 1, 2000.

<sup>xxii</sup> Obradovic, “Policy Legitimacy,” 191.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Stefan Elbe, *Europe*, 107 and 121.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Romano Prodi’s Reflection Group on ‘The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe’ cited by Ian Manners in “European Union, normative power and ethical foreign policy,” *Ethical Review* (?), 2006, 129.

<sup>xxv</sup> Harold Pinter, *Art, Truth and Politics*, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, December 7, 2005 <<http://Nobelprize.org>> Downloaded March 26, 2007.

<sup>xxvi</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 48 and 76-89. See also Ian Manners, “European Union, normative power and ethical foreign policy,” 127.

<sup>xxvii</sup> The successful drive by the EU to promote the abolition of the death penalty constitutes the empirical evidence of a power that diffuses norms not by force but through a process of contagion, informational and procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filtering. Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), (2002): 235-58, 245 and 251.

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<sup>xxviii</sup> Frederica Bicchì, Adrian Hyde-Price, Helene Sjørnsen, Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Michael Smith in Helene Sjørnsen, guest editor (2006) "What Kind of Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13 (2), (2006): 169-327.

<sup>xxix</sup> Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 251.

<sup>xxx</sup> Morgan, *The Idea*, 142, 161-2, 164, 169.

<sup>xxxi</sup> I am indebted for this distinction to John Gray, "Are We Born Moral?" *The New York Review of Books*, May 10, 2007, 26-28.

<sup>xxxii</sup> The moral viewpoints invoked may vary greatly, be they rule-oriented or consequences-oriented, but ultimately they must be articulated clearly for moral reasoning to take place. See Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon and A. John Simmons, *International Ethics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law*, Trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996,) 496 and 499.

For the text of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, see

[http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index_en.htm).

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, Trans. Ernest Barker (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).

<sup>xxxv</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Essays in Understanding. 1930-1954*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), 308.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> Ricoeur, *Memory*, 52.

Arendt writes of imagination that it is "the only inner compass we have." Far from being irrational it enables us to see things in their proper perspective, from far enough to be without prejudice, but close enough "as though it were our own affair." Arendt, *Essays*, 323.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Charles de Secondat. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Trans. Anne M. Cohler Basia, Carolyn Miller, Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 21.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Isaiah Berlin, *Against the Current* (New York: The Viking Press, 1980), 141.

Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1978), vol. II, 201-202.

Arendt also writes of the "lost treasures" of the European Resistance, and of the French and Hungarian Revolutions, a loss which "was consummated by oblivion, by a failure of memory which befell not only the heirs but, as it were, the actors, the witnesses, those who for a fleeting moment had held the treasure in the palms of their hands." *Between Past and Future* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 6.

<sup>xxxix</sup> Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 221, 220, 219.

<sup>xl</sup> Margaret Canovan, *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 172-173.

<sup>xli</sup> The Schuman Declaration in Pascal Fontaine, *A new idea for Europe: The Schuman Declaration-1950-2000* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000), 36-37.

<sup>xlii</sup> Berlin, *Against the Current*, 138.

<sup>xliii</sup> Hannah Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," *Social Research* 61, no 4 (1994): 740.

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- <sup>xliv</sup> For Arendt's endorsement of the Resistance's proposals on Germany, see *Essays in Understanding*, 114-120.
- <sup>xlv</sup> On forgiving and promising, see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 236-247 and Arendt, *On Revolution*, 164.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> Jacques Maritain, *L'Europe et l'idée fédérale* (Paris: Éditions Mame, 1993), 34; Robert Schuman, *Pour l'Europe* (Paris: Éditions Nagel, 1964), 89.
- <sup>xlvii</sup> Donald W. Shriver Jr., *An Ethic for Enemies* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 89.
- <sup>xlviii</sup> Noam J. Zohar, "Reconciliation and Forgiveness: On Amnesty, Reconciliation and Blood guilt," Paper presented at the 1996 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco; Peter Digeser, "Vicarious Forgiveness and Collective Responsibility: Who has the Authority to Forgive?" Paper presented at the 1996 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco.
- <sup>xlix</sup> Lily Gardner Feldman, "Reconciliation and legitimacy: foreign relations and enlargement of the European Union," in Banchoff and Mitchell, *Legitimacy and the European Union*, 70.
- <sup>l</sup> John Gillingham, "Jean Monnet and the ECSC: a Preliminary Appraisal," Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, eds., *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991), 156.
- <sup>li</sup> This is the opinion of several European statesmen. See, for instance, Paul-Henri Spaak, *The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-1966*, Trans. Henry Fox (Boston: Little Brown, 1972), 191-195; and Robert Marjolin, *Architect of European Unity. Memoirs 1911-1986*. Trans. William Hall (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), 282.
- <sup>lii</sup> Schuman agonized without finding an answer and the US administration waited. Meanwhile the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb, China became communist and tension rose on the Korean Peninsula. Éric Roussel, *Jean Monnet 1888-1979* (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 519.
- <sup>liii</sup> Elizabeth Pond describes the "miracle of the present chain reaction of reconciliation in Europe" in *The Rebirth of Europe*, 10-19.
- <sup>liv</sup> Jacques Delors, "Europartenaies," Paris, January 13, 2000. <<http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr>>. Downloaded February 15, 2000.
- <sup>lv</sup> Guisan, *Un sens à l'Europe*, 26-27; Daniel Vernet, "L'Europe, médiatrice entre Grecs and Turcs," *Le Monde*, Sunday June 22, 2003.
- <sup>lvi</sup> Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 97 and 75.
- <sup>lvii</sup> Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article 1-41, "Specific provisions relating to the common security and defence policy" could mark another milestone in the development of common enterprises.
- <sup>lviii</sup> Arendt, *Human Condition*, 200.
- <sup>lix</sup> Interview of Max Kohnstamm by Maria Grazia Melchionni and Roberto Ducci, (Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, 1984).
- <sup>lx</sup> Max Kohnstamm, *ibid.*

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Robert Marjolin, *Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 1911-1986*, Trans. William Hall (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), 274.

<sup>lxi</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 182.

<sup>lxii</sup> See especially Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* and Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*.

<sup>lxiii</sup> Alan Milward underlines this point in Alan Milward, Frances M.B. Lynch, Ruggero Ranieri, Frederico Romero and Vibeke Sørensen, *The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory 1945-1992* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 185-191.

<sup>lxiv</sup> Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "We, the Peoples of Europe...", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 83, no 6 (November/December 2004): 102.

The Rome Treaties were signed for an "unlimited" duration. Article 1-60 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe proposes a significant change by setting up a procedure of voluntary withdrawal from the EU for any member state wishing to do so. Is this wise? All will depend on how member states interpret article 1-5 of the Constitution, which enjoins them to practice "sincere cooperation" with each other "in full mutual respect."

<sup>lxv</sup> Preamble of the Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.

<sup>lxvi</sup> Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

<sup>lxvii</sup> "For from Hegel's principle that there can be no disembodied spiritual life it follows that he cannot accept a definition of freedom like that of the Stoics, which sees it as an inner condition of man unaffected by his external fate. . . . Freedom is only real (*wirklich*) when expressed in a form of life; and since man cannot live on his own, this must be a collective form of life." Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 51.

<sup>lxviii</sup> The *acquis communautaire* is the large body of laws and implementing legislation adopted by the EU since 1950, which sets ever more constraining terms over accession negotiations.

<sup>lxix</sup> <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.htm>>

<sup>lxx</sup> Tobias Buck, "Most EU citizens ignorant on new treaty," *Financial Times*, Week-end January 29-30, 2005.

<sup>lxxi</sup> For "stories" of grass roots involvement and public support for the European reconciliations, see Guisan 2003, 52-59, 78-83 and 184-186; Edward Luttwak, "Franco-German Reconciliation: The Overlooked Role of the Moral Re-Armament Movement," in *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University OPress, 1994), 37-63; and Lily Gardner Feldman, Banchoff and Smith, *Legitimacy and the European Union*, 66-90.

<sup>lxxii</sup> Arendt, *Human Condition*, 176, 187, 184.

<sup>lxxiii</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), 21.

Charles Taylor also believes that we reveal ourselves in our stories; "Making sense of my present action . . . requires a narrative understanding of my life, a sense of what I have become which can only be given in a story." Taylor, *Sources*, 48.

- <sup>lxxiv</sup> Melvyn A. Hill, *Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1979), 290 and 298.
- Ricoeur, *Memory*, note 24, 531.
- Arendt's stories did not always score very high for accuracy. Margaret Canovan finds the story told in *On Totalitarianism* "something of an embarrassment: a brilliant, ambitious and highly questionable interpretation.... But it reveals insights from which we can learn even if the story lacks persuasiveness." Canovan, *Arendt*, 279 and 280.
- <sup>lxxv</sup> Weiler compares the founding of Europe to the Israeli Covenant with God where theorizing of the action followed action. This is what he calls, "We will do and we will hearken." Weiler, *The Constitution*, 5.
- <sup>lxxvi</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 192,
- <sup>lxxvii</sup> Ricoeur, *Memory*, 21.
- <sup>lxxviii</sup> *Ibid.*, 145,163,181,164,165, 166,
- <sup>lxxix</sup> *Ibid.*, 166.
- <sup>lxxx</sup> Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, Trans. Richard Mayne (New York: Doubleday, 1978), 288-289.
- <sup>lxxxi</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Essays*, 322.
- Hannah Arendt, *La philosophie de l'existence et autres essais*, Trans. Michelle-Irène Brudny de Launay (Paris: Editions Payot & Rivages, 2000), 215.
- <sup>lxxxii</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1978), Vol. I, 4.
- <sup>lxxxiii</sup> Étienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene* (London and New York: Verso, 2002), 80-81.
- <sup>lxxxiv</sup> Jacques Attali, *Europe(s)* (Paris: Fayard. 1994), 10. For a description of the damages, which German occupation inflicted upon France, see Raymond Poidevin et Jacques Bariéty, *Les Relations franco-allemandes 1815-1975* (Paris: Collin, 1977), 316-319.
- All citations from French texts are translated by the author, unless otherwise indicated.
- <sup>lxxxv</sup> André Glucksmann, *Le Bien et le Mal: Lettres immorales d'Allemagne et de France* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1997), 32 and 19.
- <sup>lxxxvi</sup> Guisan, *Un sens*, 14-15.
- <sup>lxxxvii</sup> Fourastié interview with Antoine Marès (Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet, 1981).
- <sup>lxxxviii</sup> Pjer Zalica, *Fuse (Gori vatra)*. I saw this remarkable film during the Global Lens Festival at the Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, October 1, 2005.
- <sup>lxxxix</sup> Ivan Krastev, "Il faut avoir le courage d'enterrer le rêve federaliste européen," *Le Temps*, Friday March 23, 2007.
- <sup>xc</sup> This is a point made by Dominique Wolton in Jacques Delors, *L'unité d'un homme: Entretiens avec Dominique Wolton* (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1994), 261.
- <sup>xci</sup> Taylor, *Sources*, 34 and 47: Arendt, *Essays*, 308.
- <sup>xcii</sup> Joseph A. Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach* (Thousand Oaks, London, new Dehli: Sage Publications, 1996), 70.