Understanding the European Union as a global political actor:

Theory, practice, and impact

Roy H. Ginsberg
Skidmore College
rginsber@skidmore.edu

Michael E. Smith
University of St Andrews
mesmith@st-andrews.ac.uk

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The EU today is one of the most unusual and widest-ranging political actors in the international system. Since the 1950s, this capacity has gradually expanded to encompass foreign policy initiatives towards nearly every corner of the globe, using a range of foreign policy tools: diplomatic, economic, and now limited military operations. This capacity, however, was neither included in the original Treaty of Rome, nor was it expected by many knowledgeable observers of European integration. On both sides of the functional-intergovernmental spectrum we find skepticism about the EU’s prospects as a global actor: Ernst Haas (1961) explicitly excluded foreign and security policy from his neo-functional logic of regional integration, which stresses spillover processes in socio-economic affairs, while Stanley Hoffmann (2000) argued that political cooperation in the EU would remain very difficult owing to concerns over national sovereignty. Even after the Cold War, when the EU continued to expand its foreign policy cooperation, many observers (particularly those influenced by realism) made somewhat outlandish predictions that Germany would attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, that the EU (and even NATO) would deteriorate, and that the EU would never be able to organize its own security/defense cooperation (Mearsheimer 1991; Waltz 1993; Art 1996; Gordon 1997-98). Others with little or no experience with European integration studies, such as Robert Kagan (2003), argued that the EU has secured its own corner of the world through economic integration and it can now simply enjoy the fruits of its efforts while the U.S. continues to play the tough role of world policeman.

Whether ignoring or belittling the EU as a global actor, these predictions turned out to be incorrect. While the EU certainly has had its share of difficulties, setbacks, and failures in the area of foreign policy, the same holds true of any other global actor, including the U.S. And in the face of such skepticism the EU has engaged in a continual process of institutional growth in
this domain, produced regular foreign policy “outputs,” and positively influenced various global problems. The EU’s shift in terminology from “external relations” to “foreign/security policy” since the 1990s also speaks volumes about the change in the EU members’ own understanding of, and preference for, the EU’s role in the world. Usage of the term “European foreign policy” (EFP), which is now becoming commonplace, denotes all of the global behaviors of the EU: the foreign economic policy and diplomacy of pillar one (the European Community or EC); the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of pillar two, and the police cooperation and anti-crime/anti-terror work of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in pillar three.

This chapter analyzes EFP to better understand why the EU defied the predictions of many skeptics and grew into a true global political actor rather than remaining a regional economic power. Specifically, it examines two related strands of research into this topic: first, the gradual emergence of the EU’s institutional capacities in this realm despite their conspicuous absence in the Treaty of Rome; and second, the extent to which the EU actually influences non-member states and other actors, thus helping to narrow the so-called “capability-expectations gap” in EFP posited by Christopher Hill (1993). We are particularly interested in how historical institutionalist theory sheds light on the growth of EFP as a process of increasingly coherent and centralized – though not necessarily supranational – international cooperation, involving both EU member states and EU institutional actors (chiefly the Commission). Institutional theory is also helpful in illuminating why and how EU member states have exploited economics and politics of scale in the conduct of their foreign/security policies under conditions of regional interdependence, globalization, and transatlantic competition.
Overall, we argue that the EU’s status as a global actor cannot be fully understood by orthodox theories of international relations (whether realist or liberal), as the EU’s wide-ranging activities are not merely a response to either the stimuli of power/threats or the more instrumental prerogatives of either functional regime theory or supranational integration theory. However, nor is the EU wholly sui generis in possessing this capacity: its institutions and policies may yield useful lessons for other troubled areas of the globe. In fact, the EU’s deliberate efforts to “export” its novel techniques of political cooperation, global governance, and regional integration comprise one of its most important foreign policies. A more complete understanding of these dynamics may offer useful lessons about alternative ways to maintain regional and global order.

I. Theorizing the EU as a global actor

While the EU’s pursuit of a global political role inspires a number of interesting research questions (for overviews see Smith 2003; Hill and Smith 2005), this subject is most usefully divided into two essential areas: the internal dimensions of EFP (including institution-building, policy-making, and the influence of EFP on EU member states) and the external dimensions of EFP (particularly its impact on specific problems outside the EU itself). One major mistake made by EFP skeptics is their tendency to focus almost exclusively on the latter issue without appreciating fully the former. Indeed, it can be argued that EFP primarily serves internal functions, particularly if one includes the enlargement process in the analysis. At a minimum, these include: 1) confidence-building among EU member states; 2) defining EFP as a distinct multilateral issue-area (rather than as a unilateral right) related to the pursuit of European integration; 3) creating common viewpoints and analyses, or the so-called “communauté de vue”
posed by de Schoutheete de Tervarent (1980), as a frame of reference on key issues; and 4) preventing disputes over foreign policy from adversely affecting other areas of European integration (the damage-limitation function). These processes help explain the EU’s persistent pursuit of, and desire for, foreign/security cooperation despite its supposed failures in certain cases.

For those who are primarily concerned with the EU’s external impact, a second major problem of analysis involves the difficulty of choosing an appropriate frame of reference for evaluating EFP. Observers often fall into analytical traps along two dimensions: how to define the EU itself as a global actor, and whether to compare the EU to other powerful actors in world politics. Regarding the former dimension of EFP, it is unproductive to define the EU solely as a functional regime, an international organization, an alliance, a collective security arrangement, or as a “supranational state.” Although the EU shares some attributes of all of these political entities, in the realm of foreign/security policy it is best appreciated as a highly institutionalized multilateral forum for encouraging regular international cooperation on foreign policy issues among independent states. There is where both functionalists and intergovernmentalists err in their interpretations: EFP is not a distinct issue-area amenable to functional spillover processes, so it operates according to different logics of both intergovernmental and transgovernmental integration. Specifically, formal EFP institutional reforms are often codified through intergovernmental conferences, yet many of those innovations are in fact a result of intensive communication, socialization, and learning-by-doing among lower-level diplomats who make EFP on a daily basis.

However, intergovernmentalists make the additional mistake of underestimating the highly institutionalized nature of EFP, not only in terms of managing common external problems
through a “politics of scale” (Ginsberg 1989) but, more importantly, also in terms of helping to influence national preference formation to make such international cooperation more likely (Smith 2004a; Smith 2004b). This latter tendency is a direct result of the internal functions of EFP noted above. And regarding whether to measure the EU’s influence only by reference to the roles of other important actors (particularly the U.S. but also NATO and even individual EU member states), EFP skeptics make the mistake of assuming that global influence is a zero-sum game: U.S. influence will “crowd out” any possible independent role for the EU. It is also important to note that a “common” foreign and security policy does not mean a single foreign policy like that of a state. EFP activities constitute the foreign policy framework or *acquis politique* of the EU, but EFP can never be as complete as that of a state; it lacks the legal sovereignty claimed by states and the EU, unlike states, is not responsible to a single electorate.

A third mistake observers of EFP sometimes make is to conceptualize power quite narrowly in terms of the primacy of military force. Most realists argue that the EU will not “matter” as a global actor until it possesses such an independent force and makes use of it to achieve certain aims. Even with such a force, the EU is then measured against other military actors (namely the U.S. and NATO). Without neglecting the utility of military force in certain situations, a more complete understanding of the EU as a global actor would recognize: first, the virtues of alternative forms of power, including both economic power and so-called “soft”, “civilian”, “ethical” or “normative” power (Manners 2002; Manners 2006; Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006; Sjursen 2006); and second, the limits of military power in handling complex security problems. The EU does possess a strong power of attraction and does attempt to lead by example rather than force its values on other through threats of military force (see, for example, Mary Farrell’s chapter on regionalism in this volume). However, unlike the case just a few years
ago, the EU now has recourse to military means, as a last resort, to defend its values and principles in the conduct of its foreign policies and in the service of humanitarian, peacekeeping, and other defensive security operations. In doing so, EFP deliberately attempts to create synergies between the traditional economic diplomacy and foreign aid policies of the EC and its growing competencies in the forms of the CFSP (since 1993) and the ESDP (since 1999).

Although problems of cohesion still exist, they are not terribly different from similar problems confronting other complex international actors (including the U.S., which has multiple sources of foreign policy). Moreover, the EU is mitigating these problems through both institutional reforms and common strategic plans. The EU Security Strategy document of 2003 and related initiatives (such as the European Neighborhood Policy; see Weber, Smith and Baun forthcoming) clearly have started to crystallize EFP strategically in terms of the EU’s appropriate global political role, one often in opposition to that of the U.S.

A fourth mistake evidenced in much conventional wisdom about the EU involves the too-narrow definition of political impact, which often follows from the use of a too-narrow definition of power resources above. Measuring impact only or primarily in terms of a response to threats of violence greatly underestimates the EU’s external power. Adopting a wider range of measures allows one to appreciate both direct and indirect types of impact, the general roles played by the EU at the global level (Allen and Smith 1996; Elgström and Smith 2006), and the EU’s impact on specific issues/problems (Ginsberg 2001). One might also consider the use of counterfactuals to judge the EU’s actual impact: how might the absence of EU involvement with a certain global problem have influenced the outcome? We shall return to this question of EU impact later in the chapter.
II. Process: The Institutional Dimension of EFP

To address some of these analytical problems, and to better understand the EU’s actual status as a global power, we offer an institutional argument. Indeed, the criticisms made by EFP skeptics can often be attributed to an under-appreciation of institutional processes relative to other factors, such as material power. As suggested above, the EU’s tendency to strike a balance between intergovernmental and supranational approaches to EFP was much less a conscious decision than a result of various factors that gradually led EU member states to break a deadlock between these competing visions. Although EFP initially centered on a weak intergovernmental forum in the form of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s, over time it became far more institutionalized and more closely attached to other aspects of European integration, both functional and institutional. The institutionalization of EFP involved both informal and formal rules, and most often took place outside of the high-level Intergovernmental Conferences (i.e., treaty negotiations) that attract so much attention by intergovernmental theorists. In other words, socialization processes and learning by doing by lower-level officials were more responsible for EFP institutional changes than high-level bargains among heads of state or government.

Thus, as EFP involves a wide variety of institutional elements to realize its ambitions, ranging from intergovernmental bargaining to transgovernmental relations to supranational implementation, we must be aware of multiple sources of institutional growth. Such growth directly affects policy cooperation, even in sensitive domains such as foreign policy. This cooperation in turn increases the EU’s overall political impact/influence in world policy in conjunction with other factors often outside the EU’s control. Finally, feedback mechanisms lead back to debates over institutional reforms in the EU, most recently in the form of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Although the Constitutional Treaty is currently stalled, we
argue that the EU is in fact operationalizing some of its foreign policy provisions in order to maintain some momentum of reform. The Constitution would have instituted key improvements in EFP making and implementation, but some of these improvements merely codified existing practices while others will likely be instituted by actions on the ground in the absence of a new Treaty. We also note that despite the French and Dutch rejections of the Treaty, European public opinion overall still exhibits strong support for both the CFSP and the ESDP, both of which would have been strengthened by the Treaty.

In terms of institutional growth, EFP has evolved over four general phases of development following the collapse of EDC in 1954. In phase one (1958-1970), the EC began using its economic and diplomatic instruments to project its foreign commercial and political interests. In phase two (1970-1993), the member states introduced and developed EPC as a weak intergovernmental forum for foreign policy coordination outside the Treaty framework in order to better address external demands on the EC and to help harmonize the foreign policies of its member states. The Single European Act linked EPC to the EC Treaty framework and added international security to the EPC’s remit in 1987. In phase three (1993-1999), EPC was superseded by CFSP, and although established as an intergovernmental pillar of the new three-pillar EU, informal reforms to CFSP through the 1990s helped it deal with the aftermath of diplomatic defeats in former Yugoslavia. In phase four (1999-present), the EU is executing its ESDP component to strengthen the CFSP, deploying military and civilian personnel abroad in support of peacekeeping and other security operations, and slowing narrowing the gap between the rhetoric of international security action and shortfalls in the member states’ capabilities to deploy force abroad. In 1999 the EU declared a Headline Goal to develop the capability to deploy up to 60,000 troops for the so-called Petersburg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement). This nascent “Eurocorps” was later re-tooled into a Rapid Response Force with contributions from nearly all EU member states. The EU also appointed Javier Solana as the new CFSP High Representative to give a voice and face to its foreign policy.

Between 2000 and 2004, a wide range of ESDP support institutions were created within the EU (including a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and Staff, a Planning Unit, a Situation Center for ESDP, and a European Defense Agency), while arrangements for cooperation were created with NATO. A new Headline Goal committed the member states to introduce 13 EU battlegroups by 2010; 18 are currently scheduled, thus exceeding that goal. A battlegroup is a form of rapid response: a combined-arms, battalion-sized, high-readiness force package of 1500 troops reinforced with combat support elements, including relevant air and naval capabilities, which can be launched on the ground within ten days after the EU decides to act. All of these arrangements, including the EU’s *de facto* “absorption” of the Western European Union and now-regular meetings of EU defense ministers, were practically unthinkable less than a decade ago, for both EU skeptics and EU officials.

In light of these major changes, the CFSP High Representative Solana released the EU’s first-ever *European Security Strategy Paper* in December 2003. This paper identified the major threats to EU security (terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflict, state failure, and organized crime); emphasized that European security must first be enhanced in its own neighborhood by stabilizing the Balkans and extending cooperation and security to the east and south, with a focus on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and articulated the principle of “effective multilateralism” as the cornerstone of EU foreign policy. Following release of the EU Security Strategy document, the EU has extended the range of its crisis management activities to
include joint disarmament operations, financial/technical support for nonmember states engaged in counterterrorism, and security sector reform (see below). With the Madrid bombing in 2004, the EU now includes anticrime/antiterrorism in the work of the ESDP and has appointed a counter-terrorism “tsar” to assist such cooperation among EU member states. These activities build upon longstanding EU security initiatives regarding issues such as non-proliferation, controls on dual-use technologies, organized crime, and anti-personnel landmines. Moreover, all of these efforts are increasingly linked to internal “soft security” EU policies, particularly those involving Justice and Home Affairs (such border security, immigration/asylum policy, and anti-crime efforts), a trend that makes it even more difficult to treat CFSP/ESDP as purely intergovernmental in practice and external in orientation (Occhipinti 2003; 2005).

III. Outcomes: The Impact Dimension of EFP

As an international political actor, the EU is too often dismissed by scholars who assume a group of states cannot have common foreign/security policies or these policies cannot be effective. In truth, the EU engages in a full range of foreign policy activities that cannot be easily distinguished from similar state behaviors. We argue that processes of institutional development directly result in greater foreign/security policy cooperation among EU member states, and therefore contribute to the EU’s impact on important global problems. The connection between the gradual expansion of both institutional mechanisms and EU foreign policy actions since the 1960s has been well-documented in the literature (Ginsberg 1989; Smith 2003) and we need not examine it here in great detail. It need only be mentioned that EU foreign policy actions today cover virtually all major areas of globe, and deal with a much wider range of topics, than was the case during the formative years of EPC. Similarly, the EU has expanded the
range of policy tools it can bring to bear on these issues, most recently in the form of crisis
management teams involving a military component. These new tools are increasingly linked to
other EU policy domains, making the entire EFP enterprise far more complex, even while the EU
(mainly in the form of the Commission) attempts to improve the coherence of these activities
through the creation of comprehensive strategy plans and tools (such as the European Security
Strategy and the European Neighborhood Policy), a unique activity for a regional international
organization.

The question of impact is far more complicated. Here we focus on external political
impact across security issues and regions and countries, as this question receives most of the
attention by EFP skeptics. The EU’s influence on global economic issues, such as WTO
negotiations or on anti-trust questions, is uncontested, as is its commitment to humanitarian
assistance, environmental cooperation, and development aid (the EU with its member states is
the world’s largest aid donor). And the EU’s ability to influence the foreign policy practices and
preferences of its own member states (and potential member states) in line with the argument
made above has also been demonstrated in the literature on EFP (Hill 1996; Manners and
Whitman 2000; Smith 2004a; Smith 2004b). In continuing to institutionalize EFP, the EU still
attempts to assert and defend a value set that is uniquely and indigenously European: conflict
prevention and resolution, interstate political reconciliation and regional problem-solving
through economic integration, the protection of human and minority rights, environmental and
social protection, and respect for the rule of law. In this sense EFP is a mirror reflection of the
intense multilateral cooperation that occurs among the EU member states themselves.

Still, a dose of sobriety is needed when examining foreign and security policy. There are
instances (such as Rwanda, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Kosovo in the 1990s, and Iraq more
recently) when the EU was unable to act abroad given divergent interests of the member governments. EFP can work only when EU member states agree to discuss matters before forming distinct national positions of their own, and this basic rule of the system is not always respected (though it is respected far more today than in the 1970s). These shortcomings notwithstanding, if one were to focus only on when the EU failed to act when it might have, a incorrect generalization about the EU as an ineffective international political actor is perpetrated. In truth, there are many more instances, as shown below, when the EU does execute common foreign and security policies that reflect its own unique collective interest. Overall, we argue that the EU has shown more influence toward non-member states than realists predict but possibly less than one might expect based on its total economic weight and combined military capabilities. However, rather than reduce expectations in light of its limitations in world politics, the EU in fact consistently raises them while also attempting to expand its range of capabilities.

The dramatic expansion of the EU’s direct involvement in security affairs in recent years is a case in point. This activity provides some of the most compelling evidence in response to the realist dismissal of EFP. Here the rapid growth of the ESDP framework is quite surprising considering the taboo against this capacity felt by many EU member states. When it acts in international security the EU has multiple impacts: on the states who request EU security assistance, on the EU itself in terms of confidence-building, on other international security organizations when the EU cooperates with them or replaces their forces with EU forces and personnel (NATO, UN), and on non-EU members who participate in EU security actions because of complimentary interests and values. All of these impacts can been seen where the EU endeavors to act across the range of the so-called Petersburg Tasks, namely the 16 ESDP actions deployed between 2003 and 2006. These actions involve three new types of EFP initiatives:
military crisis management, police actions, and rule of law/border monitoring missions. In the rest of this section we focus on these EFP “trouble spots” and necessarily exclude the EU’s possible impact on more friendly countries, such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and many countries in Central/South America.

**Military Crisis Management**

Since 2003 the EU has taken three military crisis management operations: Operations Concordia (Macedonia), Artemis (Democratic Republic of Congo), and Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovinia, or BiH). In Macedonia, Skopje asked the EU to deploy an EU military force to help oversee implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (a ceasefire accord between the government and rebel forces cosponsored by NATO and the EU in 2001) and to succeed NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony in 2003. Concordia was an operation of 26 countries which offered 350 lightly armed personnel under EU command to patrol ethnic Albanian regions on Macedonia’s frontiers. Concordia also engaged in surveillance, reconnaissance, and other security tasks. The security situation in the country has stabilized and the EU has agreed to open up negotiations with Skopje for membership in the EU. Whereas in the past the EU had recourse only to its civilian power to assist a country in transition, the EU now has a clear capacity for security assistance. Therefore, the EU has been a more effective and influential actor in Macedonia. The EU had an impact on its own level of confidence in its first ever military operation, and on non-EU states who participated in the operation under the command of the EU. Concordia also was important to the EU-NATO relationship because it tested the “Berlin Plus” arrangements by which the EU used NATO logistical and planning assets for an ESDP operation; and to NATO as a litmus test of the EU’s ability to take action effectively that would
free up NATO forces to redeploy elsewhere. On the basis of the success of Operation Concordia, the EU launched a new police mission to Macedonia (see below).

Further afield, from June-September 2003 the EU led a military force (Operation Artemis) of 2000 troops to the unstable Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the request of the UN. The objective of the mission was to provide security and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia. EU troops worked to help displaced persons return to their homes, reopen markets, protect refugee camps, secure the airport, and ensure the safety of both civilians and UN and humanitarian aid workers. Artemis, like Concordia, had multiple impacts. It helped stabilize the region while the UN redeployed peacekeepers and thus aided the humanitarian effort in Bunia and the UN organization itself. It had a major impact on NATO and the U.S., demonstrating the willingness of the EU to take an action completely autonomously of NATO and its planning/logistics. This willingness was in direct opposition to America’s somewhat unrealistic desire to have all ESDP missions vetted by NATO (i.e., the U.S.). Artemis also was very important to internal EU confidence-building as the EU’s first military action outside Europe as well as one in a dangerous environment. Finally, the operation had impact on other countries who joined the EU mission (e.g., Brazil, South Africa, and Canada) because it gave them an opportunity to work with and expand cooperation with the EU.

The EU Force in BiH, Operation Althea, deploys nearly 7000 troops from 22 EU and non-EU member states under EU command since late 2004. It succeeded the NATO force there and is responsible for security throughout the country. The purpose of Althea is to ensure compliance with the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords, maintain a secure and safe environment in BiH, combat organized crime in support of local authorities, provide support for the ICTFY, contribute to defense reform, and support the UN/EU High Representative. British and Finnish
officers command EUFOR with costs to the EU in 2005 amounting to approximately €70 million. Althea is the third and largest EU military operation to date and it too has had impact on the EU and the players involved. It demonstrates the EU’s capability to take over from NATO a major security operation under to the Berlin Plus agreement. Althea is important to NATO because it freed up NATO forces to redeploy in Afghanistan. The mission is important for the EU in terms of bringing together in one country the range of EU civilian and military policy instruments as it has done in Macedonia. Typically, the EU is the largest provider of economic and humanitarian aid in the country and is working with authorities toward negotiating a future SAA that would codify institutional relations between Sarajevo and the EU. Since Althea is the result of a UN Security Council mandate, the UN system has much at stake in how well the EU conducts a military operation on its behalf. Non-EU members (Albania, Argentina, Bulgarian, Chile, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, and Turkey) participating in the mission also gain experience working with the EU. And most importantly, Althea is critical to the security and safety of BiH. Also in the region, the EU is tentatively planning to deploy a police force in Kosovo in 2007, a clear expansion of its commitment to the security of that province.

Police Actions

To date the EU has deployed four police missions abroad: BiH (2003), Macedonia (2003), DRC (2005), and the Palestinian Authority (PA) (2006). Police actions draw on a history and tradition of gendarmerie in Europe and the desire of the EU to fill a niche in international security not handled by the U.S. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH which began in 2003, succeeded the UN International Police Task Force. The purpose of the EUPM is to maintain
local stability in BiH by providing assistance to establish an effective police force, fight organize crime and corruption, strengthen police administration, monitor performance, and support a wide variety of police training, border patrol, and criminal justice support programs. Five hundred police officers from over 30 states comprise the EUPM. Clearly this mission, which complements Althea and the EU’s civilian efforts to build peace, is a critical litmus test for the EU to effectively bring to fruit in BiH the panoply of its instruments as a foreign and security policy player. EUPM was the first civilian crisis management mission to operate under the ESDP. The mission was critical to confidence-building among the EU members and institutions. EUPM had impact on UN interests because by replacing the UN police mission there it allowed its personnel to deploy elsewhere. EUPM had impact on non-EU members who participated, including eighty officers from non-EU member states.

The EU also deployed a police mission, Operation Proxima, to Macedonia at the request of Skopje as a follow-up to Concordia. Its objectives are to monitor, mentor, advise, and reform the police, help fight organized crime, promote sound policing standards, promote border management and the creation of a border police, and support a political environment conducive to facilitating the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Like other police and military missions, Proxima is important to the EU because it helps strengthen the external borders of the EU in terms of anticrime and antiterrorism measures; and it is important to Macedonia as a measure of continued support for the country’s peaceful transition and closer relationship with the EU. And regarding the Balkans in general, the EU has demonstrated a very high degree of learning-by-doing since the difficult years of the 1990s, and today it is able to use a full range of foreign/security policy instruments, the lack of which so hindered its efforts a decade ago.
Two new police missions were deployed since 2005: EUPOL-KINSHASA in the DRC and EUPOL-COPPS (Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support) in the Palestinian Territories. EUPOL-KINSHASA aims to assist the Transnational Government in the DRC to establish an effective police program. This helped to pave the way for future democratic elections in the country, which the EU will help monitor. EUPOL-COPPS, launched to help the PA establish an effective, modern, civilian police force through advising, mentoring and training police and judicial officials, consists of thirty-three unarmed personnel seconded from the EU member states with an annual budget of €6.1 million. Non-EU member states also have been invited to participate in the operation. In addition, as the world’s largest donor of aid to the PA and to Palestinian refugees through the UN, the EU not only underwrites the PA institutions, but contributes substantially to the operating budget of the PA. Without institutions of civil society taking root in the PA the Palestinians will not be in a position to negotiate with Israel for a final settlement. The EU also supports the monitoring of the Gaza-Egyptian border (see below) and is financing Israeli-Palestinian projects aimed at raising the level of tolerance among Israelis and Palestinians through education, human rights and democracy, media, and other joint projects.

These EU police actions demonstrate a global commitment to assisting countries establish an indigenous rule of law and therefore importantly influence national and international security. The growing demand for EU police missions from foreign governments reflects the impact the EU is having and is likely to have in the near future. European gendarmerie are willing and able to lend their expertise abroad. There is also a need for EU police missions not only to address what most interests the EU - anticrime cooperation and border control - but what most interests average citizens of the recipient states: street crime. That said, the EU has an
important niche to fill in international security in ways complementary to the UN, NATO, and the United States among other international security providers (Penska 2006).

**Rule of Law and Border Patrol/Monitoring Missions**

The EU has deployed two rule of law missions, one to the Republic of Georgia in 2004 (EURJUST Themis) and one for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) in 2005. A rule of law mission is designed to provide EU assistance to third countries in transition who require assistance in establishing independent judicial systems. The Georgia mission is designed to assist the government to reform and improve the criminal justice and law enforcement systems. The EU is currently training Iraqi judges, senior police, and prison officers in managing the criminal justice system. The mission comprises 520 judges from the EU and other states and had a 2005 budget of €10 million.

In 2005 and 2006 the EU deployed four border or monitoring missions and one mission in support of African peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan. In the Aceh Monitoring Mission the EU monitors the ceasefire in Banda Aceh between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian Government. Since 2005, the EU has been supporting a ceasefire in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, following the recent tsunami devastation in the region. The goals of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) are to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement signed between the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement in 2005 in Helsinki. It includes 219 personnel from the EU, Switzerland, Norway, and five ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, and Singapore). In the EU Border Assistance Mission, the EU provides police and customs officials on the border between Moldova and Ukraine to help prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud. The EU also agreed, in response to invitations from
Israel and the PA, to dispatch a monitoring mission at the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt (EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point - EU BAM Rafah). The opening of the Rafah border crossing is an important step toward Palestinian statehood and to the MEPP. The EU mission here provides a third party presence at Rafah to monitor the PA, improve Palestinian border control and customs authorities, and contribute to the liaison between the PA, Israeli, and Egyptian authorities. The seventy staff members of the mission are mostly seconded from the EU member states, and their efforts help to assuage Israel’s legitimate security concerns about the openness of the Gaza-Egypt border-crossing. Finally, since 2004 the EU has been providing a wide range of financial, technical, and logistical support and personnel and equipment for the peacekeeping troops of the African Union (AU) in Sudan, which are in the region to oversee a ceasefire between government and rebel forces. EU military personnel also participate in the AU ceasefire commission, and the EU provided €2.1 billion in assistance to the AU in 2005.

Beyond these specific ESDP missions, the EU also has provided significant financial and political support for the post-Taliban Afghan government and the country’s postwar reconstruction. Twenty-three EU member states account for nearly two thirds of the total deployment of NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan as part of the International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). In 2004, the five-nation Eurocorps assumed command of ISAF, and the EU and its member states are the world’s largest donors to Afghan reconstruction. To bolster the Afghan Government and coordinate EU aid, the EU in 2002 opened a Commission Delegation and an EC Humanitarian Office in Kabul; in 2004 it sent an EU Special Representative to Afghanistan. In 2002, the EU expended €800 million and in 2003 €900 million in overall aid to the country. Total EU aid for reconstruction pledged for the 2004-6
period amounts to €2.2 billion, and the EU and Afghanistan envisage a formal trade and cooperation agreement once the Kabul Government is able to extend its authority over more areas of the country.

Finally, although EFP in Asia is still underdeveloped, the EU is using its considerable diplomacy, development aid, and tariff preferences in pursuit of political objectives. In the mid-1990s, the EU joined the Korean Development Organization (KEDO), a group of the United States, South Korea, and Japan committed to assisting Pyongyang to secure energy supplies in exchange for agreement not to pursue a nuclear energy program. The EU not only has granted extensive food aid but has tied that aid to agricultural market reforms. When the EU extended diplomatic recognition to North Korea in 2001, it used the occasion to engage the North Koreans in how to advance human rights and market economics in the country. And the Aceh monitoring mission noted above demonstrates the EU’s ability to move beyond mere economic engagement to facilitate security-related cooperation with the Asian region.

In sum, even this brief overview demonstrates the breadth of EFP activities across continents and functions. Today EFP covers the gamut of multilateral functional issues and bilateral relationships; increasingly couples or intermingles civilian and military aspects of crisis management; draws direction from the European Security Strategy Paper of 2003; and thus challenges realist assumptions that foreign policy belongs only to nation-states. Moreover, the ESDP in particular has been applied effectively across the gamut of Petersburg tasks and extended from EU’s own backyard to Africa, the Middle East, and now Asia. The ESDP allows the EU to act with both civilian and military instruments, which is what most distinguishes EU foreign policy in the early 21st century from its late 20th century origins. These early ESDP actions were designed to enhance internal EU confidence in ways similar to the early CFSP
actions in the 1990s. The EU has thus demonstrated that it can deploy force under limited circumstances, against the expectations of most EFP skeptics. While the EU still has major capabilities shortfalls in the areas such as sustainability, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence, the EU is fully aware of these problems and is taking steps to address them while also gaining valuable operational experience (i.e., learning-by-doing). The more the EU gains such experience in handling lower-level and soft international security tasks the more it will gain the confidence to take on more dangerous tasks. And although it is too soon to measure the long-term impact the EU has had in the countries where it has conducted ESDP actions, we do know that the demand for new ESDP actions is growing by the number of states who request EU action and is expanding geographically from Europe to Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and that in countries such as Macedonia and BiH the security situation has improved.

IV. Conclusion: The future of EFP

The empirical record clearly demonstrates steady growth in EFP activity and impact since the 1970s, even though skeptics continue to belittle the EU as a global political actor. In fact, our review has only scratched the surface of European diplomatic efforts, especially since we have largely excluded the EU’s traditional role in economic affairs. We have also directly linked this expansion of activity to the process of institutional growth in the EU in general and the EFP domain in particular. Although numerous endogenous and exogenous factors help explain individual EFP actions, their cumulative growth over time in terms of raw numbers, geographic/functional scope, and complexity is a result of the two-way relationship between institutional processes and cooperative behaviors on the ground.
We do not argue, however, that this process is always unidirectional or even efficient in terms of improving EFP behaviors. EFP as an institution is subject to stress like any other institution, and numerous factors (i.e., the Constitutional Treaty debate, enlargement, the Iraq war, and terrorism) have certainly stressed the system. And there is no doubt that decision-making is becoming more cumbersome with 25 or more member states. However, it is also true that the EU is unlikely to abandon its efforts in light of the foreign policy issues discussed in this chapter, as the EU is directly exposed to a wide range of problematic issues and countries, even wider perhaps than the U.S. We also suggest the EU might be better than the U.S. at managing certain problems of regional interdependence and globalization given its location, history, and institutional experience. The EU is almost certainly more effective at long-term state-building and real policing than the U.S., which may be more effective at traditional methods of war-making. Even more interesting is that the EU, rather than other institutions (OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO), has become the primary means for resolving certain global problems, first through enlargement and the single market, more recently through the CFSP/ESDP and related policies. And while elites have built the EU’s institutional architecture in this area, EU citizens themselves demonstrate consistently strong support for a greater European political role, more so even than in other core areas of European integration such as the single currency.

Regarding the future of EFP, we therefore explicitly, though cautiously, predict a steady expansion of EU influence and institutional growth. The EU will manage to address the EFP reforms provided in the Constitutional Treaty, though perhaps informally rather than legally. This includes the possibility of an EU foreign minister and diplomatic service, as well as an implicit security guarantee for EU member states. Moreover, we also expect the EU to continue its deliberate efforts to export its mechanisms of cooperation – largely involving institutional
factors and other types of soft power – through foreign policies such as the European Neighborhood Program, as detailed in Mary Farrell’s chapter in this volume. While success here will vary as always, these efforts will often directly challenge America’s own policies toward certain countries and problems, and may therefore increase rather than undermine the EU’s status and influence. Whether these efforts should be framed as explicit EU “soft balancing” against the U.S. is an open question (Pape 2005; Paul 2005), but certainly individual EU states will be tempted to increasingly challenge the U.S. and its emphasis on unilateral military intervention. The question of a “European” army with offensive capabilities will be a sensitive one in the next few years, and may create as many problems of collective action as it solves (not least in terms of its relationship to American leadership). However, the EU has confounded its skeptics many times before, and it may do so again even in the high stakes world of foreign and security policy.
Bibliography


