Gender mainstreaming and becoming European:
At the intersection of Polish and EU gender discourses

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I. Introduction
My research is focused on Poland’s accession to the European Union, the negotiations for which began in 1997 and culminated in 2004. Poland’s accession to the EU imposed both a new institutional context within which the formal/legal aspects of national identity must be constituted, and introduced a new strand into the already complex braid of intersecting elements that constitute national subjects. European integration, or "becoming European," entails a cultural dimension of transformation that is not only undertheorized in the existing literature, but is also downplayed in the policy environment itself. The transfer of gender equality policy from the EU to member states is a case in point.

Issues of gender and women’s rights have proven contentious not only between Poland and the EU, but have long been a source of intranational conflict—within the Solidarity Movement and before. During the accession process, women’s issues, particularly gender equality and abortion, were subjects of pitched public contestation. Accession hastened a confrontation between EU norms and Polish social space; the prospect of membership introduced new rhetorical possibilities for talking about gender in Poland that were either inconceivable or infeasible within the conceptual frames available to Poles prior to 1989. The target of my analysis, therefore, is the struggle over how Polish sovereignty and national identity are (re)constituted in the context of the process of transposing EU social policies concerning gender, and how as a result gender becomes a nexus of symbolic conflict.

Poland successfully managed policy transposition or transfer in myriad areas, areas arguably far more complex, invasive, disruptive, or challenging to national autonomy and internal control than gender equality policy. So why should gender policy be any different from any other kind of policy? Why would gender policy provoke more active resistance than policies concerning national control of the military or immigration? Complexity alone does not answer the question. Instead, I would argue that gender equality policy is actively resisted in both its transposition and its implementation for two main reasons: 1) gender is integral to national sovereignty, and to discourses of Polish national identity—therefore, certain traditionalist factions in Poland have been able to mobilize support for their efforts to thwart extra-national attempts to redefine the gender status quo; 2) because the EU itself has neither a clear strategy of implementation nor a strong idea of the outcomes it seeks to produce, there is space for resistance and almost no cost to doing so.

Gender is not the only lens available to use as a means of focusing in on these larger, more generalized, issues. However, the debates and activism surrounding women’s rights and gender equality are a particular instance of how Polishness is contested as a direct result of the

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accession process. In Polish feminists’ adoption of EU discourses of gender mainstreaming\(^2\) and gender equality, there is a strong example of both a direct challenge to traditionalist discourses of Polishness, and a direct appeal to Europe and Europeanness as an alternative. The debates about gender and women’s role in society that emerged highlight both the centrality of gender to the construction of Polish national identity, and the ways in which national identity and sovereignty are defended against the perceived encroachment of supranationalism.

**II. Joining the EU and the Transfer Paradigm**

One of the most active areas of scholarship in EU studies at present concerns the 2004 (and the much smaller 2007) Eastern Enlargement, and seeks to address questions about why the post-socialist states sought to join the EU and why the EU was interested in enlargement. Rationalist theories of expansion have tended to dominate the field, particularly a specific sub-branch called “club theory”\(^3\), although constructivist (or sociological) approaches are gaining acceptance. These approaches explain enlargement in terms of norms, values, and institutions, rather than through individual state preference or material interests. From this perspective, international organizations are more determined by standards of legitimacy than by utilitarian or instrumentalist demands and are treated as autonomous actors who are both shaped by, and shapers of, identities and interests (Katzenstein 1996; Schimmelfennig 2003).

\(^2\) Gender mainstreaming governs EU policy regarding equality between women and men. It “takes a comprehensive approach... the key objective is to eliminate inequalities and promote gender equality throughout the European Community in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty (gender mainstreaming) as well as Article 141 (equality between women and men in matters of employment and occupation) and Article 13 (sex discrimination within and outside the workplace).”


\(^3\) Rationalist theories, whether they are of international relations or international institutions origins, are based on the premises of individualism, state-centrism, materialism, egoism, and instrumentalism. In rationalist theories international organizations are conceptualized as instrumental associations that exist to help individual states better pursue their own goals; these organizations are not purposive or autonomous actors, therefore international organizations are merely self-enforcing associations based upon individual state interests. Club theory was developed to address the problem of organizational size and is a variation on the theory of public goods. If an organization provides pure public goods (goods that are indivisible, non-excludable, and non-competitive) the size of the organization is unproblematic. Most public organizations, in reality, deal in impure public goods (ones that are excludable, partially divisible, and rival). When impure public goods are involved, the size of membership becomes important. Beginning with the assumption that a given organization deals in impure public goods, the theory of clubs seeks to determine the optimal membership size. According to Buchanan (1965), as long as each member state can expect a positive net benefit from expansion and each aspiring state can expect a positive net benefit from joining, then the organization should expand.
Emergent from constructivist theories, recent scholarship argues that enlargement can be attributed to the CEE's (Central Eastern European countries) effective use of "rhetorical action": *the CEE governments ...based their claims for enlargement on the collective identity and the constitutive liberal values and norms of the community organizations to which the member states had subscribed. They exposed the inconsistency between the organizations' [i.e. the EU] reluctance to enlarge, on the one hand, and their membership rules, past rhetorical commitments to a pan-European democratic community and past treatment of outsider states, on the other. Their goal was to shame the reticent member states into complying with the community rules..." (emphasis in the original, Schimmelfennig 2003: 5)

Rhetorical action is premised on the notion that there is some foundational normative dimension to both the EU itself, and the CEE's claim to membership in it.

This claim to a shared normativity, in the form of a commitment to liberal political, social, and economic values, also shapes state and EU action through the policy formation and transposition phases. An extensive literature has emerged that attempts to explain exactly how the CEE states "become European" through the accession process, primarily through their adoption of the *acquis*. The process of institutionalizing the *acquis communautaire*\(^4\) happens on two levels: first on the level of emulating the EU as a set of rules; the second, as assuming the identity of a member of a purposive community (Hall and Taylor 1996; Jacoby 2004; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 2001). Policy transfer in the enlargement context is basically defined as "a process by which ideas, policy, administrative arrangements or institutions in one political setting influence policy development in another political setting, mediated by the institution system of the EU." (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).

That the policy transfer process would have an homogenizing effect perhaps comes as no surprise. The concept of "isomorphism," popularized by DiMaggio and Powell, is defined as "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions." (1983: 149) They split isomorphism into two types—competitive and institutional—where the former arises as a result of participation in markets and reflects economic fitness, and the latter which is a function of competition for political power, legitimacy, and is an index of social fitness. They further disaggregate institutional isomorphism into three types (coercive, mimetic, and normative) and go on to predict varying degrees of isomorphism based on positions within a larger "organizational field," such that external relations often structure action more so than real or perceived returns do. According to their hypotheses, an organization will often adopt strategies and/or structures that sacrifice efficiency for legitimacy or status. Policy transfer, therefore, can be understood as an

\(^4\) *The acquis communautaire, or Community heritage, is the entire body of laws, policies and practices which have at any given time evolved in the EU. The term had been current in European circles for some years before it made its first formal appearance in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, under which it became an explicit objective of the Union 'to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it'. Thus the concept lies at the heart of the ratchet process of European integration, since it commits the member states to accept all previous and future centralising measures and implicitly rules out any repatriation of powers." (taken from *A Concise Encyclopedia of the European Union*, http://www.euro-know.org/dictionary/a.html)
isomorphic mechanism that gradually brings the CEE states into harmony with the established members of the EU. What remains to be explained, then, is how transfer itself works.

Different terminologies and typologies have been suggested to describe how the policy transfer process works. It has been referred to as copying, emulation, diffusion, borrowing, learning, persuasion, coordination, and influence (Bulmer and Padgett 2004; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Jacoby 2004; Radaelli 2003). Regardless of the terminology employed, all of these schemas recognize that would-be member states must adopt policy as a condition of accession or of ongoing assistance/support, and that there exists a link between the type of governance involved and the resultant means of policy transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) typify these means as emulation, synthesis, influence, and abortive types of policy transfer. Emulation is the strongest, and consists of borrowing or copying policy intact from another source. Synthesis can occur under either hierarchical or negotiated governance, and involves combining policy elements from two or more sources. Influence is a weak form of transfer, where policy scripts from outside sources serve merely as examples but not blueprints. Finally, abortive transfer is where a would-be transfer is blocked by domestic actors.

Jacoby (2004), using slightly different terminology, derives a similar typology, although one which pays considerably more attention to choices made at the domestic level. There are several modes of emulation, each with a different causal relationship to outcomes. In his first typology, Jacoby juxtaposes degree of faithfulness with degree of voluntarism. The degree of voluntarism is typically established by the external power, in this case the EU. The degree of faithfulness is determined by the local CEE government. Jacoby hypothesizes that where the EU applies low amounts of pressure, CEE policy elites will either replicate EU models (what he calls "copies") or they will approximately emulate EU models ("templates"). However, if EU pressure is high, CEE policy elites will literally transpose EU law in order to meet criteria, or they will innovate some localized policy in order to meet minimum EU thresholds. Unlike Bulmer and Padgett (2004), who argue that transfer potential depends largely upon the authority wielded by supranational institutions, the density of rules, and the availability of either sanctions or incentives, Jacoby argues that the local context itself is crucial in determining which mode of emulation is pursued; or, why emulation is even pursued over local innovation.

Yet emulation is only half the story, because just as there is variation in modes of emulation, there is also variation amongst outcomes. Adopting Western models does not ensure different results on the other side of the process—in some cases emulation has been seen to contribute to "politics as usual." To explore the range of outcomes Jacoby has developed another typology that juxtaposes the density of rules with the density of actors within the policy context. The density of rules is a reflection of EU demands in a given policy area, and the density of actors refers to primarily internal players—whether policymakers or civil society actors—and their degree of organization and influence. According to this table, where IOs (international organizations) exert strong pressure on well organized actors, open struggle results. However, low pressure leads to a more relaxed learning through emulation. Scaffolding provides a regulatory or institutional framework around which previously unorganized interests can
coalesce. And where there are no previously organized interests and relatively light EU requirements, isolated pioneers can "homestead" local innovations rather than employ emulation.

There are more similarities than differences between Dolowitz and Marsh's, Bulmer and Padgett's, and Jacoby's typologies. All make strong arguments for both institutional contexts, the density of regulation or legislation, and the intensity of involved actors. What is lacking from them all is any serious treatment of what difference the level at which policy is operating, or how the substance of a policy, determines how it is or is not transferred. The policy transfer literature is highly structural and procedural; it treats the substantive nature of policy as fungible. Given this, there is almost no attempt to apply these precepts to either metapolicy or social policy. Bulmer and Padgett do attempt to address social policy in one of their empirical examples, citing specifically the sex equality provision under Article 141 TEC on equal pay for equal work and associated work-related rights: "On health and safety, women's employment rights and maternity benefits, national authorities have had to adjust domestic policy in line with supranational provision. All this in a policy area where member governments have been reluctant to give up their powers" (2004: 113). These are not, I would argue, social policies at all. Rather, they are instances of unfair labor practices and occupational health standards that have a gendered component.

The authors have indicated that this is a policy area in which national actors are loath to cede power, yet they do not say why nor do they directly address the implicit link between gender and state sovereignty indicated by their own observations. That accession countries would be less resistant to complying with NATO requirements for civilian control of the military and mandatory annual spending programs than to restructuring maternity benefits to match the EU model requires additional explanation. As others have suggested (Hochstetler, Clark, and Friedman 2000; Litfin 1997), a more nuanced understanding of sovereignty is needed in order to understand the compromises that nations make in the international arena.

There are many definitions of state sovereignty, but one element common to them is the idea of supreme authority within a territory. The EU at once supports and challenges this foundational principle: it supports states by continuing to recognize national boundaries and through the mechanism of subsidiarity; and it challenges states by prioritizing EU over national law and policy. Even in those areas where it seems as though the EU has effectively superseded the state, it is still only the sovereign state that has sufficient authority, resources, and control to implement and enforce EU law. Litfin(1997) argues, in her discussion of transnational

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5 "The subsidiarity principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made as to whether action at Community level is justified in the light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. It is closely bound up with the principles of proportionality and necessity, which require that any action by the Union should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty." (Europa Glossary: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm)
environmental policy, that state sovereignty is not actually being eroded; rather, states are engaging in what she calls "sovereignty bargains." By disaggregating sovereignty into its constituent parts—autonomy, internal control, and legitimacy—it becomes apparent that states, for example, make concessions in autonomy in order to bolster or enhance their legitimacy.

III. Level: Gender Mainstreaming as Metapolicy
Gender mainstreaming reflects a shift from “women-focused” approaches that seek to help women adapt to established norms and values. The latter approach, even as manifested in radical policies of positive discrimination, has focused on removing barriers rather than addressing the gendered nature of organizations and institutions. Conversely, mainstreaming acknowledges the foundational role of gender in social life, and proceeding from this recognition, seeks to reconceptualize social institutions such that they do not privilege any gender over another. The systemic nature of gender mainstreaming is its distinguishing feature, and it starkly differentiates it from the equal opportunity and anti-discrimination approach prevalent prior to the 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing.

Following the work of Dror (1968) and Johnson and Heilman (1987), it is fruitful to think about gender mainstreaming as "metapolicy," or "policy about how policy should be made" that is "derived from assessing the fit between some posited fundamental value and the state of affairs in the real world" (1987: 470). Gender equality is an ideal, and through the vehicle of gender mainstreaming is expressly intended to be distributed across many other policy areas and government institutions. Dror calls this "suboptimization," or dividing policymaking into parts with separate organizational structures that specialize in different areas. There are risks involved with suboptimization, however, for if the subpolicies themselves are not properly designed and implemented, the over-arching objective is not likely to be realized. Gender mainstreaming as metapolicy transcends discrete institutions or regulatory bodies; therefore, without a body coordinating the implementation and deployment of suboptimized policy at the level of the particular, the possibility of gender equality succeeding as a metapolicy is slim.

Why might this be a particular problem for the transfer of gender equality policy within the EU? Two reasons: First, the EU as the source of gender equality policy is unclear about either an implementation strategy or the desired outcomes. How is gender equality to be measured? What institutions must be in place to mainstream gender? Second, in contexts where such metapolicy challenges deep-seated local cultural norms, decision-makers might choose to suboptimize in ways that render the entire initiative ineffectual. Existing models of policy transfer have difficulties distinguishing between both metapolicy and standard policy, and between social policy and structural policy.
IV. Substance: Gender and the Social Order

Considering culture is crucial to our ability to understand innovation, contention, and rebellion surrounding the policy transfer process. Issues of national identity (and its constituent elements of religion, gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity) are germane to the transfer process because policy decisions are made in a context where such identifications influence how decisions get made. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Poland.

In their study of sovereignty bargaining at three UN world conferences, Hochstetler, Clark, and Friedman(2000) identified that conflict over sovereignty claims occurs in the three areas of economics, national values, and monitoring mechanisms. As the authors noted: "In the bargaining process, state elites clung as tightly to social and cultural practices as to economic models or even models of military security...social and cultural values were used in conference rhetoric as masks or vessels of state power in ways that military and economic self-sufficiency once were. The prominence of sovereignty rhetoric applied to values suggests that states attribute more to [value] sovereignty than coercive power or economic independence"(2000: 612). They found at both the Vienna (human rights) and Beijing (women) conferences that one of the main claims being made at the state level was for autonomy in preserving national values in the face of universal rights campaigns and discourses.

Polish citizenship is understood to be—by Poles—an expression of Polish national membership and identity (Zubrzycki 2001). This national identity is strongly gendered and encoded with normative expectations concerning the proper role and function of women and men (as opposed to an ostensibly gender-neutral citizen) in Poland6 (Fuszara 1993; Graff 2005; Titkow 1993; Watson 1993). Additionally, as several scholars of gender and nationalism have argued, nationalists seek to control reproduction and the structure of the family to naturalize hierarchy both within, and beyond, the family (Gal and Kligman 2000a; Gal and Kligman 2000b; Verdery 1996; Verdery 1998; Yuval-Davis 1997). Women become important as metaphors of the nation, and are consequently seen as enemies of the nation when they seek to challenge either hierarchy or their position within it (Eglitis 2002; McClintock 1991).

Polish feminist Agnieszka Graff has argued that in fact much of Poland’s anxiety over joining Europe are in fact sublimated into anxieties, and contention over, gender relations. As she suggests,

"The consoling narrative about an orderly past, a present crisis and an imminent restoration of order in the realm of gender relations is a displaced narrative about collective identity: an effort to dispel, or contain, collective ambivalence and anxiety concerning European integration and globalization, and the resulting diminution of Poland’s autonomy as a nation-state a mere decade and a half after this autonomy was restored." (2005: 3)

Gender remains an area where it possible to resist EU influence. And because gender is so deeply implicated in nationalism, to preserve the one is, in effect, to preserve the other.

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6 "New leader vows to guard Polish 'morals,' inaugural speech takes jabs at EU values" International Herald Tribune 7/20/06
Accession became a bargain, in that Poland could in fact join the EU while at the same time retain its “true (i.e. patriarchal) identity. Anxiety about history was dissolved by means of a supposedly timeless truth about gender” (Graff 2005: 9).

The contention surrounding gender and Polish national identity has an impact on policy formation. It is important to recognize that policies will be perceived to have various effects on things like gender, religion, sexuality, and race/ethnicity, all of which are considered vital to national identity. As such, policy substance very much needs to be taken seriously when determining how (or if) policy will be transferred or how efficacious that policy that may prove to be. Sovereignty, although conceptualized as the formal/legal power of states, often specifically in contrast to other states, also includes symbolic and cultural dimensions, particularly as relates to determining "insiders" versus "outsiders" (Durkheim and Fields 1995). In Poland's case, regarding the contestations over gender equality policy, it becomes clear how issues of identity and belonging become central to explaining how reforms are ultimately accepted (or rejected) and implemented.

V. Gender Mainstreaming in Poland
In transposing EU soft policy on gender equality into a national office, the Office of the Plenipotentiary for the Equal States of Women and Men, designated to pursuing those goals domestically, Poland was essentially making a voluntaristic gesture towards joining the EU culturally as well as economically. That Poland established a gender equality office in 2001 may be as much a result of political circumstance (e.g. SLD’s electoral victory that year) as of strategic rationality amongst Polish policymakers seeking either to appease EU elites or keep pace with others in the pre-accession cohort. Within months of formal accession in 2004, and following swiftly on the heels of a rightist electoral win giving PiS control of both parliament and the presidency in 2005, the office was dissolved. Why, in this relatively unconstrained soft

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7 Soft policy, or soft law, refers to policies or laws which are open to interpretation by the member states. In contrast to regulations requiring member states to adopt a uniform version of EU Law (and implement it uniformly as well), EU Directives are non-regulatory, although binding policy-making instruments, that encourage harmonization among member states by setting minimum standards or thresholds, leaving to the member states a certain amount of self-determination. (Complying With Europe: EU Harmonization And Soft Law In The Member States, by Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib, Miriam Hartlapp and Simone Leiber. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.)

8 SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) is the Democratic Left Alliance, a coalition of social democrats, labor unionists, and later on, the Polish Peasant Party, that took control of the Polish Sejm in 2001.

9 Renne (1997) and Ascady (1998) have both written studies about how Slovenia and Hungary, respectively, established parliamentary commissions for women and other governmental offices in an effort to make themselves more attractive to the EU. While I have not yet found such a study on Poland, it is not unreasonable to assume that early actions on this front were motivated by similar goals.

10 PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) is the right-leaning Law and Justice party. After forming a coalition with other conservative/right-wing coalitions, PiS took control of both Parliament and the Presidency of Poland in 2005.
policy environment, did the Polish government decide to close the Office of the Plenipotentiary? Would it not have been just as easy to leave the office open while still stripping it of power, or replacing the SLD-appointed Plenipotentiary (Magdalena Środa) with a PiS appointee who shared the leadership’s agenda, rather than face the EU’s opprobrium?

Poland’s actions in this area are particularly curious, given that it is the only one of the 2004 accession cohort to abandon their domestic policy initiative for gender equality. Why have these gender equality offices survived in the rest of the post-socialist accession cohort and not Poland? This question bears empirical study\(^{11}\), as there is no easy answer as to why Poland but not Hungary or Slovenia for example. But more generally, controlling gender is an important element of any nationalist project and is a central component of nationalist discourses. In Poland, the development or articulation of these discourses is partially constrained or formed in the context of the EU. External pressure from the EU to transpose social policy has put pressure on national agents to conform. I argue that in fact stripping the office of real power while allowing it to endure as a symbol of compliance would not have been enough, for it was the office’s existence as a symbol of Poland’s accommodation of European social policy and an abandonment of the sacred terrain of national self-determination, that needed to be addressed—not its potential for political efficacy. PiS took their electoral victory over SLD as a mandate from the Polish nation to defend itself from the encroachment of “European values” on “Polish tradition.”

The Office's dissolution also speaks to the weakness of the European social project in general. The EU has been largely successful in implementing and enforcing its political and economic agenda. However, there are certain areas where EU commitment itself is ambivalent or there is sufficient latitude for Poland to “rebel” or loosely interpret EU directives. Additionally, post-accession, the EU is far less able to constrain national political space and perhaps also lacks the political will to enforce the “soft law” of gender mainstreaming. Given the rigidity of transposition criteria in several core EU policy areas—most notably monetary, trade and tariff, environmental, agricultural, legal—in addition to those of NATO, concerning defense, security, and the military, there are only so many issues over which the state can assert its autonomy. These areas tend to be 1)where no pre-existing EU method or policy exists, 2)areas in which EU enforcement is lax, or 3)where EU law/policy is “soft” and there are only subjective guidelines rather than objective implementation or outcome criteria. More often than not, these areas are cultural or social, such as human and minority rights, gender equality, etc.\(^ {12}\)

\(^{11}\) This is in fact the subject of my dissertation research.  
\(^{12}\) Poland has not faced the same kind of racial/ethnic problems as have the other post-socialist accession states, so that policy area is of less salience within Poland I think it would be really interesting to see if there is some correspondence between how the other seven CEE states handle race/ethnicity issues and how Poland handles gender ones.
VI. Conclusion:
The Polish case demonstrates that states are engaged in dynamic decision making about when and how certain elements of sovereignty become more salient than others, and how bargains are struck that, while appearing to limit state autonomy or internal control produce a net effect of greater national sovereignty. By including a cultural/normative dimension that recognizes that not all policies are acted upon in the same ways because substance matters, will also greatly enrich our understanding of how and when states engage in sovereignty bargains, and which elements come into play in which circumstances. Empirically, we need a better understanding of the variation. That such variation exists, as I have discussed above, is apparent. Therefore, we need a more fully elaborated theorization of the transfer process, specifically taking into account policy substance. We must look to existing studies of policy transfer to see what they can and cannot explain so that we can begin to build more nuanced theories that are sensitive to meta- and social policy.

Given the problems as I outline them above, the aim of my dissertation is two-fold. First, my aim is to explore how national identity is defended against perceived supranational cultural encroachment, and how control over the Office of the Plenipotentiary is a means by which certain Polish actors can assert their independence from, or opposition to, EU mandates. And get away with it. Secondly, I am interested in trying to apply Jacoby's typology to the Polish case as regards the implementation of gender equality soft policy. I believe that while his typology provides a useful point of departure, ultimately it is not sufficient in explaining either the way gender equality policy was implemented the way it was, or why Poland made the particular choices it made. While Jacoby himself mentions movement between cells—for example, how policy elites sometimes move from "thresholds" to "patches" in the face of impending compliance deadlines, the model is mostly static, and does not seem to account for how the external degree of pressure of the regulatory environment can change mid-stream, nor how public opinion, social movement activism, or elections can radically alter the implementation process as it is occurring. And while this type of analysis will be beyond the scope of my dissertation project, the possible cohort effects amongst the 2004 accession states are also worthy of investigation.
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