Ideological Factors in Party Alignments on the EU: 
A Comparison of Three Cases

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Abstract

This paper adopts a qualitative approach to describing and analysing party ideological and policy alignments towards EU integration. The focus is on three conservative parties which share broadly similar topographical locations on the centre-right in their respective countries. The cases of the Conservative party in the UK, the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire in France and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość in Poland are compared here, using a range of sources internal and external to the parties. While ideology and policy do not exist in a vacuum, but in constant interplay with a broad range of institutional and contextual factors, these other variables are largely bracketed out for present purposes in order to concentrate on the ideological and policy dimensions in their own right. In this meso-level analysis the focus is on the relationship between core ideological values, ideologically coloured understandings of national and international environments, general posture towards EU integration, and positions on specific institutions, processes or policies. It is argued that the degree of variation between the parties revealed even at this intermediate level of detail is a useful counterbalance to the inevitably reductive categorisations and generalisations drawn in macro-level comparative studies.
Introduction

This paper forms part of a larger, ongoing, comparative research project focused on ideological variation within and between party families in relation to EU integration. It therefore involves synchronic and diachronic study of the evolving structure and content of party ideologies, on the one hand, and analysis of the non-ideological factors which influence ideological configurations over time, on the other. The EU poses a multi-faceted challenge to parties as regards ideology. Superimposed on its individual member states, and depending on the aspect considered, the EU is the people of Europe, or a civilizational project for peace, prosperity and social harmony, but it is also a set of institutions and procedures of government and administration, and a set of policies straddling a wide range of sectors. While it is possible to make relatively objective assessments of particular features of the EU and its operations, the intricate, intertwined processes involved in European integration, as well as the imponderables involved in hypothesizing alternatives to integration or even of predicting its future course, mean that the overall costs and benefits are not calculable by objective measurement. Political debate on the issue is therefore coloured particularly heavily by ideology. This has been especially evident since the early 1990s, not only because the Treaty of European Union marked a major step-change in integration, but also because the EU’s role and status in the world have been, and are still being, transformed within the global reconfiguration of power since the end of the Cold War. It is not surprising that, besides engendering ideologically marked arguments for or against particular features of the EU, or even against the whole principle of EU integration, the question of Europe’s future has generated a rich mythology, both in the popular sense of false stories about the EU, and in the more technical sense of ideologically marked narratives of past, present or predicted events.

However, while the fact that the EU is a hybrid, multi-level, unfinished construction invites ideological appropriation, it also poses difficult challenges to that purpose. It is extremely malleable. It is open to widely differing interpretations within as well as between different ideological currents. Thus, there are characteristic areas of difference between left-wing and right-wing perspectives, as well as differences within the broad left and the broad right. Furthermore, different national traditions and contexts generate further variations of focus or emphasis. What parties and pressure groups see the EU as being and what they want it to be are positive or negative projections of values and preferences which they consider necessary or desirable for their own domestic society, although they may also believe in principle that those values and preferences are universalisable. The salience of the EU, or different aspects of it, in the ideological discourse of parties or other groups is itself extremely variable. Some parties, pressure groups and think tanks have substantial bodies of theoretical literature setting out arguments produced by intellectuals and other would-be opinion-formers inside or outside the organization. Others devote less attention to theory. Thus, there is variation of weight and focus as well as of ideological perspective and perception.

This paper adopts a qualitative approach to describing and analysing party ideological and policy alignments towards EU integration. The focus is on three conservative parties which share broadly similar topographical locations on the centre-right in their respective countries. Following Klaus von Beyme’s (1985) typology, two of the parties would normally be classed as belonging to the West European conservative family. The third party operates in a Central European country but approximates to a conservative Christian democrat party in West European categorisation. The cases of the Conservative party in the UK, the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) in France and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) in Poland are compared here, using a range of primary and secondary sources. While ideology and policy
do not exist in a vacuum, but in constant interplay with a broad range of institutional and contextual factors, these other variables are largely bracketed out for present purposes in order to concentrate on the ideological and policy dimensions in their own right. In this meso-level analysis the focus is on the relationship between core ideological values, ideologically coloured understandings of national and international environments, general posture towards EU integration, and positions on specific institutions, processes or policies. The main questions are these. How do apparently similar parties conceptualise widely differing positions towards the EU in general or specific policy areas in the EU’s ambit? To what extent are positions on the EU consistent with each other and parties’ core ideological beliefs? What is the extent of variation between the positions of the different parties or different factions within those parties, and to what extent are they similar, even if they have been reached by different ideological routes? It is argued in conclusion that the degree of variation between the parties/factions revealed even at this intermediate level of detail is a useful counterbalance to the inevitably reductive categorisations and generalisations drawn in macro-level comparative studies.

**Questions of typology and methodology**

There is now an extensive literature on the party politics of Euroscepticism, either comparative or focused on single states. A further range of literature views the dynamics of party positioning on EU integration more broadly, correlating support or opposition with membership of party families. A third, more diffuse body of literature analyses the degree and kinds of Europeanisation of national parties, in terms of the effects of the EU environment on party programmes, inter- and intra-party competition, party organization, and a range of other factors. These studies contain important insights which are largely complementary to each other. The literature on Euroscepticism has generated significant theoretical contributions as well as a large corpus of empirical studies. Its limitation is that it tends to isolate opposition to integration from support for it, despite the fact that most groups described as Eurosceptical do not have simple positions but complex mixtures which include support for some aspects of integration. The literature on broader alignments avoids the latter limitation and offers valuable cross-national research into the use of party families in relation to ideological cleavages in order to model variation in orientations towards the EU within and between member states. These macro-level studies inevitably rely heavily on quantitative or quasi-quantitative models of positions and motivations to produce results covering multiple party families across large numbers of countries. Although variation within party families is not ignored, there is little consideration of intra-party factions and ideology is reduced to sets of policy statements. Finally, the diverse literature on Europeanisation – following various interpretations of the concept – has yielded some interesting theoretical work (e.g., Hix and Goetz 2000; Mair 2000; Ladrech 2002) as well as single-state or comparative studies of the impact of EU integration on political parties with regard to a range of different criteria, such as the salience of the EU in policy platforms over time, party identity, strategy and organization, or the role of party leaders (e.g., Batory and Sitter 2004; Bomberg 2002; Ishiyama 2006; Kritzinger, Catavorta and Chari 2004; Pennings 2006). The present paper benefits from that literature but does not directly contribute to it.

Given that the label of Euroscepticism is a catch-all term used in popular discourse and the media as well as politics to cover negative attitudes to the EU, academic analysts have produced typologies to sharpen the applications of the word for more technical use. Some of these typologies have been more or less ad hoc sets of categories covering selected aspects of the phenomenon (for example, Harmsen 2007; Sørensen 2004; Tiersky 2001), while others
have had a more substantial theoretical basis. The most influential of the theoretical schemes has been the one which shows greatest apparent simplicity. Applied to the comparative study of European political parties, the conceptualisation used by Paul Taggart (1998) and refined in his collaborative work with Aleks Szczerbiak (2001, 2002, 2004) distinguishes between hard and soft versions of Euroscepticism. In its most recent formulation, the notion of hard Euroscepticism covers principled objections to the EU and European integration, such that the hard Eurosceptical party in a Member State would advocate withdrawal or in a candidate state would oppose accession. Alternatively, a party may advocate policies so far at variance with those of the EU as currently conceived that they are tantamount to opposing the whole project. Equally, a posture which articulates conditional support for membership on such demanding terms that they are unlikely to be fulfilled, is taken to be implicitly demanding withdrawal and is therefore categorised as hard. Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, does not involve principled objection to membership or to EU integration, but qualified opposition based on concerns about one or more policy areas. This may occur, for example, because the current direction of integration in the given policy area(s) is interpreted as being contrary to the national interest.

Taggart’s and Szczerbiak’s model is undoubtedly valuable. They themselves have applied it in refined and interesting ways (for instance, Szczerbiak 2002). Other researchers have also used it, with or without qualification, in analyses of party-based Euroscepticism (for example, Lees 2002; and chapters in the forthcoming collection, Taggart and Szczerbiak 2007). Nevertheless, while developing a voluminous system of categories to capture every nuance of party positions would be excessive, a straightforward binary division based on metaphorical hardness and softness is arguably too loose and impressionistic. For example, the hard category blurs the important distinction between groups which argue that their country should be (more or less) outside the EU and those which argue for a return to the status quo ante of treaty provisions which pertained prior to some modification which the groups find unacceptable. It does not follow that the latter will join the former if their campaign for revision fails. The definition also truncates analysis by sealing off Euroscepticism from positions reflecting varying degrees of support for the EU in its present form and/or its current direction of development. In particular, this raises problems in handling the concept of soft Euroscepticism, because there is scarcely any political party which does not object to some feature of the EU as presently constituted. How is the distinction to be made between soft Euroscepticism and a constructive policy of campaigning to improve the EU? This is a particularly pertinent question, because parties frequently shift their positions over time without necessarily acknowledging the fact, as they face the dilemmas of balancing electoral appeal and inter-party competition or alliance with intra-party concerns and the need to keep grass-roots activists on board (for an example, see Daniels 1998 on the British Labour Party).

Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (2002) criticise Taggart and Szczerbiak’s model on the ground that it does not pay attention to the ideological dimension of party positions towards the EU. Kopecky and Mudde outline four categories to cover pro- as well as anti-EU parties, based on two contrasting sets of positions. On the ideological plane Europhiles are taken to be those who are committed to the ideas of integration underlying the EU, whereas Europhobes are not. Europhiles are therefore still Europhile, even if they object to particular aspects of the EU. On the strategic plane, EU-optimists broadly accept the way in which the EU is developing in practice, whereas EU-pessimists do not. From this it follows that parties can be divided under four headings, with their accompanying labels. Euroenthusiasts combine Europhile ideological dispositions with EU-optimist strategic positions on the ground that there is an acceptable degree of correspondence between the ideal and the emerging reality.
Eurorealists, on the other hand, combine Europhile ideological orientations with EU-pessimism, since they perceive the EU as failing to enact their conception of what integration should be. A third set are labelled Eurocynics to capture the fact that they do not believe in the integrationist ideal but see potential gain in involvement in the EU anyway. Finally, Eurosceptics are those who do not believe in the ideal of European integration or in the benefits of belonging to the EU.

Kopecky and Mudde were right to argue that the question of how ideology interacts with strategy in the producing and modifying policy positions had not been sufficiently explored by Taggart and Szczerbiak — who subsequently acknowledged that it was an area needing further research (2002: 28). It enabled Kopecky and Mudde to explore the interplay between the two dimensions of motivation, leading them to conclude on the basis of evidence from across East Central Europe that ideology plays the main role (2002: 319). However, while their model has the advantage of distinguishing between the two types of input and packaging them together to produce a more sophisticated set of classifications than the soft/hard model, it has the disadvantage of treating ideology reductively, as if it could be encapsulated in a binary opposition between Europhile commitment to, or Europhobic antagonism towards, an ideal of European integration. Of course, the two authors acknowledge that there can be many different conceptions of what integration should entail, but the enormous variation and fluidity within and between ideological currents limits the usefulness of the categorisation. The model also gives rise to a problem of nomenclature. When Kopecky and Mudde argue that it is perverse to throw together under the label of Euroscepticism parties which fundamentally favour some form of integration alongside nationalists who do not, they are right, but part of the problem is with the label itself, since it blurs the distinction between the EU (a specific, developing system of institutions, policies and practices) and Europe (as a geographically situated set of peoples grouped in states). It would be worth removing the semantic confusion. No significant political party, even of extreme right-wing nationalists, admits to being hostile to Europe and Europeans in general. The principle of international co-operation between European countries is always supported in some form or other as an alternative to the EU. The problem could be resolved by emphasising that Euroscepticism means EU-scepticism. However, Kopecky and Mudde confuse the issue further when they retain the label of Euroscepticism for one of their categories, thereby giving rise to an (unaddressed) distinction between Euroscepticism in a general sense and Euroscepticism in a particular sense.

Jan Rovny (2004) has outlined a more streamlined synthesis of the Szczerbiak/Taggart and the Kopecky/Mudde models, potentially scaling party alignments along the two axes of ‘magnitude’ (between soft/hard Euroscepticism) and ‘motivations’ (balance of ideology/strategy). This model combines simplicity with flexibility and avoids the proliferation of jargon. It is intended to be applicable to quantitative empirical research and Rovny observes that it could be adapted to include support for as well as opposition to the EU. There is nothing wrong with this as long as one accepts the limitations of quantitative approaches as the price that has to be paid for being able to compare the positions of large numbers of political parties across all or many of the EU’s member states. That type of methodology is characteristic of a further body of literature which focuses on positive as well as negative party alignments towards the EU but does not normally concern itself with typology because it is using a framework in which the categories are already supplied. The theoretical standpoint adopted in this work relies heavily on the institutional approach to party ideology associated with Klaus von Beyme’s (1985) notion of party families. Whereas the competitive model of parties emphasises their capacity to adapt and adopt ideological positions in the
light of the values, opinions and attitudes of their target electorates, the party family approach emphasises the extent to which parties are institutional bearers of ideological traditions transmitted over time. On the latter view parties are, of course, capable of adaptation in varying degrees in the light of changing internal and external circumstances, but it is noted that those circumstances are themselves interpreted in the light of the party’s ideological history. When translated into questions of alignment towards the EU, this approach gives rise to interesting analyses of the challenges which the EU presents to parties, because, as Simon Hix (1999: 78) remarks, ‘parties are constrained by the fact that their ideological identikit has been defined within the two-dimensional structure of the Left-Right, and not within the two- or three-dimensional structure of EU politics’. Particularly valuable work has been done in this area by Hix, either alone (e.g., 1999, 2005) or with others (e.g., Hix and Lord 1997; Gabel and Hix 2002), and by Gary Marks, Carole Wilson, Liesbet Hooghe with others (e.g., Marks and Wilson 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002). Thus, for example, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) have argued persuasively that left/right divisions over domestic politics — in terms of social democracy versus free markets, or of libertarian, open, participationist values versus traditional, authoritarian nationalist — influence support for or opposition to integration in a linear fashion. In their words: ‘By disaggregating European integration into component policies, a detailed, explicable pattern of support and opposition comes into view. The programmatic convictions that constrain party positioning in domestic political arenas also constrain party positioning on European integration’ (984).

Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) have argued that party alignments on the EU can be analysed on two axes: the traditional left-right axis of support for greater or lesser government regulation of market outcomes, on the one hand, and on the other hand, a new politics axis ranging from green/alternative/libertarian positions (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist positions (TAN). This is a particularly useful approach, because it allows the research to capture variation in positions by different sets of policy sectors. That is to say, by focusing on environmental policy, cohesion policy and employment policy, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson show that location on the left-right socio-economic axis has an important effect on positions regarding the EU in terms of neoliberalism versus regulated capitalism. On this axis parties on the extreme left and right tend to be significantly more Eurosceptical than those closer to the centre. However, the more important finding is that the GAL-TAN dimension influences party positions on overall support for or opposition to EU integration as well as on particular aspects, including asylum/immigration, environmental policy and increasing the powers of the European Parliament. Here, the association is strongest at the TAN end, which reflects the importance of nationalism for parties of the hard right. The article points to a range of other research questions concerning the possible ways in which questions of EU integration affect domestic party competition, including the issue of whether they will raise the question of national sovereignty as a key factor in national politics.

Quantitative approaches operate on the level of broad generality. In this paper we adopt a qualitative approach to look more closely at a limited range of cases in a relatively detailed way. Given the diversity of party positions, and the fact that those of any one party are not necessarily consistent across different policy sectors, it is useful to have a conventional vocabulary corresponding to a typology for categorising group positions towards the EU in general and towards any aspect of it. We propose in Table 1 an alternative typology of group positions towards the EU. The purpose is to allow somewhat tighter specification of positions than Szczerbiak’s and Taggart’s binary classification or Kopecky’s and Mudde’s double binary model, but without excessive proliferation of categories. It produces a simple set of
categories based on degree of support for or opposition to EU integration in general or some specified aspect(s) of it. In principle it could be a numerical scale, but this would imply a precise quantitative measure of positional locations, whereas inferences in this area are necessarily approximate. Instead we have chosen to use conventional labels which are more or less commonplace in political discourse, hence quasi-natural to use, preferable to clumsy neologisms and to tainted terms such as Euroscepticism or pro-European, which have been used as weapons in public controversy. The labels add a descriptive dimension to the categorisations but without doing too much violence to the basis of division. The terms are, as far as possible, value-neutral to avoid unintentional importation of ideological assumptions into analytical judgments based on the categories.

Table 1: Categories of EU Alignments
(on EU in general or some specified aspect(s) of it)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximalist</td>
<td>pushing integration as far and as fast as is feasible towards the practical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>realisation of a chosen model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>endorsing advance of integration, subject to remedying the deficiencies of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>what has already been achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradualist</td>
<td>accepting some advance of integration, as long as it is slow and piecemeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimalist</td>
<td>accepting the status quo, but wanting to limit further integration as far as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>wanting to return to an earlier state, usually before a treaty revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejectionist</td>
<td>outright refusal of integration, coupled to opposition to participation</td>
</tr>
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It is a thin typology. The categories are not intended to convey any suggestion of a specific content to the positions described, beyond basic stances towards the EU. The categories can be used singly or in combination (for example, a party might be revisionist or even rejectionist with regard to EMU in its current form but reformist in its overall posture). The categories imply nothing about the route by which any group or individual might have reached them, whether from the left or the right, and there is no presumption as to ideological orientation, strategic calculations or tactical manoeuvres. This is not because we consider ideology and strategy to be unimportant. On the contrary, they are too important to be reduced to a simple typology, still less to a typology which mixes them together. Further specification in these areas requires different levels of analysis. What can be done with the typology is to map positions of parties or other groups and to give shorthand summaries of what they are. The importance of establishing categories for both negative and positive positions arises in part from the fact that parties often shift their positions over time. Clearly an abrupt transition from overall EU-rejectionism to overall EU-maximalism would be the most unlikely for both ideological and practical reasons, but no change between any one type of position and any other is absolutely inconceivable: for example, moves from revisionism or even rejectionism to reformism are commonplace (think of the Labour Party in Britain since the early 1980s), or movement in the reverse direction (think of the Front National in France since the late 1980s, moving from reformism via revisionism to rejectionism).
Contrary to the assertion that they are too fine-grained to be easily operationalised (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003: 7), the categories are not difficult to use on condition that the parties or other groups under investigation are researched in sufficient depth and that due account is taken of the fact that their positions are usually complex, rather than simple (for examples in France, see Flood 2005; Milner 2004).

For purposes of examining the ideologies of political parties or of factions within them, we are working with the neutral, inclusive conception of ideology, according to which ideologies are ‘sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order’, as Martin Seliger defines them in his classic study (1976: 14). Ideologies are not owned by political parties or other groups but are merely represented by them. Michael Freeden (2003: 78) puts it this way: ‘Ideologies are rarely formulated by political parties. The function of parties in relation to ideologies is to present them in immediately consumable form and to disseminate them with optimal efficiency’. Ideologies are also shared and propagated nationally and internationally in diverse variants with differing degrees of sophistication, coherence and commitment by the wider publics whose support parties seek. Party manifestos and similarly programmatic statements are themselves merely the tip of the ideological iceberg even in relation to the limited, but still extensive range of variant beliefs, values and attitudes within a single party. Policy positions represent the interface between ideology and political practice, where sets of fundamental assumptions (about human beings and society), normative values, core beliefs and principles of action engage with instrumental considerations of feasibility and marketability within a structure of institutional and contextual opportunities and constraints.

Whatever the extent to which the motives, agendas and strategies of political elites can be analysed in instrumental terms, they still have to account for themselves to grass-roots activists, to electors, to each other and to themselves in terms of values and convictions which are ideological in nature. Ideology is not mere window-dressing. It is essential to the meanings which actors and observers ascribe to political action (Freeden 2003; Thompson 1984; Vincent 1995). It feeds on normative theorisation about politics, society and human nature. Political parties and other groups derive much of their sense of themselves as communities from their shared ideological convictions. Since ideologies involve sets of values, beliefs and attitudes, they also constitute cognitive frameworks which colour perceptions of political issues and events. They present themselves discursively not only in the form of arguments and descriptions or definitions of political phenomena but also in the form of narrative accounts of past, present or predicted events. This mode of ideological reproduction is a normal, everyday occurrence, found in any form of political communication, from the most ephemeral conversation or piece of journalism to the weightiest tome of political philosophy. Over time, some stories acquire an authority and legitimacy in the culture of a political group that they can reasonably be called myths and serve important functions in the transmission of shared meanings and sense of common identity within the group (Flood 2002a, 2002b).

**Three parties of the mainstream centre-right**

Our purpose, then, is to compare the ideological and policy orientations of three mainstream, centre-right parties towards EU integration. Of the three parties, the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) in France, the Conservative Party in Britain, and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) in Poland, the first one competes within one of the founding member
states of the EU, the second within a state which acceded in the 1973 enlargement, and the latter in a state forming part of the ex-Communist, Central and East European group which joined in 2005. The Conservative Party has a long history, with its origins in the Tory Party of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before its adoption of the title of Conservative in the 1830s. The UMP dates only from 2002 when the Gaullist RPR (with antecedents dating back to the RPF founded by Charles de Gaulle in 1947) joined with elements of the UDF (itself a confederation formed in 1978 from small parties with diverse origins, one dating back to the nineteenth century, but most established at various junctures in the period since the Second World War) with which it had often formed electoral coalitions in the past (on the organization of the UMP, see Cordell 2005; Haegel 2004). PiS was founded in 2001 from elements of the AWS, the party formed in 1996 as an outgrowth of the Solidarity movement which had resisted the communist regime in the 1980s. Relative to their length of history, all three parties have been successful in gaining power to form governments, and two of the three, UMP and PiS currently govern their respective countries – the UMP on its own and PiS in coalition with the ultra-conservative Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) and the agrarian populist Samoobrona. The Conservatives operate in what used to be called a two-and-a-half party party system coupled with a simple plurality, ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system for UK-wide elections (except for European elections, where PR has allowed multiparty representation), but multiparty systems with PR electoral provisions for the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish assemblies. The UMP operates within France’s multiparty system based on the two ballot electoral system using first-past-the-post for presidential, parliamentary and cantonal elections, with PR for the rest. PiS is also located in a multiparty system coupled with PR (constrained since 1993 by 5% threshold for parties and 8% for alliances).

In terms of broad-brush attitudes with regard to the EU, the British Conservatives and the French UMP are both internally divided, whereas the Polish PiS is more or less united. There is a spectrum of postures within the Conservative Party. Indeed, as commentators have pointed out, the very broad scope of EU development has generated and sustained a damaging degree of factionalism within the party since the later 1980s (Turner 2000; Geddes 2005; Usherwood 2002), coinciding with and contributing to the shift in emphasis from vote-seeking to policy-seeking behaviour, to use Steven Wolinetz’s (2002) categories. It also contributed to public perceptions of the party as divided and out-of-touch with ordinary people’s concerns, which in turn contributed to keeping the Conservatives out of power following the elections of 1997, 2001 and 2005 – although the drive to restore the party’s electoral fortunes has led to efforts to downplay the issue (Bale 2006). The spectrum of Conservative divisions on EU integration can be subdivided and cross-tabulated with ideological positions on domestic issues in varying degrees according to level of detail. The Conservative Party has always been a broad church. It is the heir to rich and varied ideological traditions which have given rise to at least three major tendencies within the party in the post-war period. These tendencies can be labelled progressivist, traditionalist and individualist (Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson, 1994). On the left, the progressivist, one-nation tendency, which considers itself heir to the Disraelian spirit of social reform, was closely associated with post-war acceptance of Keynesian management of the mixed economy and the welfare state. Although it nowadays espouses more free-market approaches to the economy, it retains its characteristic concern for social cohesion and support for the less well off. This tendency, which increasingly lost its dominance within the party from the early 1970s onwards, includes those who have given pragmatic, or even discretely enthusiastic support to British participation in European integration. Thus, the membership of the Tory Reform Group, traditional home for the one-nation Tories, overlaps significantly
with that of the Conservative Group for Europe, the Tory Europe Network as well as linking with other national or transnational bodies (including the EPP in the European Parliament, and its European Ideas Network) supporting the extension of EU integration, as long as it is gradual and in acceptable directions.

Of the other two tendencies, the traditionalist current is heir to the reactionary, nationalist strand of thought which looks back nostalgically to the days of empire and to the idea of Britain as a great power with global interests and responsibilities. This was the tendency on the hard, authoritarian right of the party which denounced decolonisation as a sell-out, defended the white separatist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, objected to coloured immigration to Britain, defended hard-line Unionism in Northern Ireland, fulminated against the socialists and deviants who were undermining the British nation from within, and opposed British membership of the EEC. This current despised the social-conservative compromises adopted by Macmillan and Heath. By the late 1970s the old-style nationalists were largely fused with the third major tendency in the party, namely the rising Thatcherite neo-conservatives who, in any case, combined the individualist commitment to economic neo-liberalism with respect for strong, if limited government and robust nationalism, albeit more pragmatic on Europe than some would have liked, the broad majority in the centre showing a Euroscepticism which nevertheless accepts British membership, however grudgingly, while the more militant Eurosceptics, often associated with organizations such as the Bruges Group or the European Foundation are decidedly equivocal, and the Europhobic hard right, linked to groups such as Cornerstone, the Monday Club or the Swinton Circle, explicitly or implicitly favours British withdrawal and overlaps in this regard with the position of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as well as a swarm of anti-EU pressure groups or think-tanks. Thus, for example, MPs Philip Davies, Douglas Carswell, Philip Hollobone, Bob Spink, Ann Winterton and Sir Nicholas Winterton signed a letter in the *Daily Telegraph* on 18 July 2006 in support of the Better Off Out campaign.

Although the UMP is also divided on the question of EU integration, this is to a lesser degree than the British Conservatives. The centre of gravity in the party is far closer to the Europositive end of the spectrum than that of the Conservatives. Historically the UDF has been a pro-EU formation and although an anti-TEU faction emerged at the time of Maastricht, the split which led to the creation of the Mouvement pour la France (MPF) under the leadership of Philippe de Villiers largely purged it of Eurosceptics. The Gaullist party, under its various successive labels had been more ambivalent and subject to internal tensions in this area. The TEU referendum of 1992 had highlighted division in the party, leading to Charles Pasqua’s episodic attempts to form a party claiming fidelity to Charles de Gaulle’s own intergovernmentalist conception of the European entity (Flood 2005). Whereas the large majority of the UMP rallied behind its strongly pro-EU official candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, for the 2007 presidential election, the legacy of division remained in the form of the association, Debout la France (DIF) led by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, who left the party in 2006/7 and would have stood as a candidate in the presidential election as a rival to Sarkozy, if he had been able to get the necessary signatures of 500 public office-holders to nominate him.

As for Poland’s PiS, the party is not factionalised. There are said to be tensions within the party leadership centring on Marek Jurek, Vice-President of PiS, but this is on the domestic issue of anti-abortion legislation, not on the EU. The party’s broad stance on the EU is Eurosceptical but not Europhobic. It does not threaten to leave the EU but it argues for a form of union which differs significantly from the model of increasingly supranational governance.
which the logic of integration has followed thus far (for comparative analysis of Euroscepticism in CEE countries, see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004, and on the Polish political environment, Szczerbiak 2002, 2006). The fact that Poland is a new member state from the former Soviet block, with considerably smaller population and wealth than France or Britain, naturally gives PiS a different perspective in a range of policy areas as compared with the conservative parties in the prosperous, longer-standing West European member states which carry heavier weight within the EU. Equally, the importance of Catholicism, which had provided vital underpinning of the movement of resistance against communism and aspiration to national liberation in the Solidarity movement gives a distinctive difference.

**Common ground among Eurosceptics/Europhobes**

The policy positions of the mainstream and the right wing of the British Conservative Party can be summarised as broadly revisionist and rejectionist respectively, while that of the Party’s left wing can be termed reformist and gradualist. Within the UMP, the position of the mainstream is reformist, whereas that of the republican wing is predominantly revisionist. The Polish PiS is broadly united in a predominantly revisionist stance. We will deal with the Eurosceptical and Europhobic currents first. Notwithstanding differences of policy between different groupings, many arguments against the current development of the EU are approximately shared by all. The most common of these can be summarised as follows:

1. The EU is on the way to being a centralised superstate, absorbing the national sovereignty of its member states. This is an outdated and unacceptable goal. There are disastrous consequences when diverse peoples are artificially bound together too tightly without adequate expression of their national identities and aspirations.

2. The EU is undemocratic, bureaucratic, inefficient and largely unaccountable to the peoples of its member states but democratising it by increasing the powers of the European Parliament is not the answer since that involves further transfer of sovereignty to a remote body having little connection with the citizens.

3. The project for European Monetary Union and the European Central Bank in their present form is not only economically unsuccessful – leading to slow growth and high unemployment – but it further consolidates the movement towards a centralised political system by effectively removing member states’ control of their own finances and their own national economies.

4. It is unacceptable that European laws should have primacy over national laws. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has far too much power to reinterpret the treaties and other European legal instruments in a federalist direction.

5. To base a Common Foreign Policy (CFP) on Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) would be unacceptable and could only lead to division, given the vital national interests and the lives of nationals of member states involved in these fields. It is no less undesirable to construct an integrated EU defence and security system when NATO already provides an adequate structure for that purpose.

We have summarised these positions in their most abstract, general form. Sometimes they are presented in this way in the discourse of Eurosceptical politicians and publicists. But they are more often stated in terms of one of the respective countries national interests. Britain’s
sovereignty, Britain’s autonomy, Britain’s identity, Britain’s role in the world: these are the concerns which stir British Eurosceptics of the right, and similar assertions are made by their French or Polish counterparts about their own countries. That is to say, these are essentially discourses of nationalism. If we consider them in terms of the classic (though not unproblematic), ideal-typical distinction between a more open, voluntarist, civic nationalism and a more closed, organicist, ethnic nationalism (see, e.g., Smith 2001: 39-42; Spencer and Wollman 2002: 101-5), all of these parties and factions exhibit elements of both types, but the positioning of the British Conservatives – especially their right wing – and the Polish PiS is markedly closer to the ethnic pole than the civic, whereas that of the republican wing of the UMP is closer to the civic pole (unlike the Front National further to its right). The civic and the ethnic nationalist dimensions are present in the defensive preoccupation with the importance and the preservation of national particularity – political, economic, social, cultural – which is taken to be threatened by the EU in its pursuit of homogenisation, the elimination of differences rather than respect for autonomy and diversity.

Patterns of similarity and difference among Eurosceptics/Europhobes

(i) British Conservatives

The British Conservative mainstream can be described summarily as holding a minimalist/revisionist position on EU integration in general, which is to say, a general view that EU integration has already gone too far in some respects and that any further integration in almost all areas should be minimised as far as possible (see tables 2 and 3 in Appendix). The stance was captured bluntly in Party’s manifesto for the 2005 national election: ‘We will settle our relationship with the European Union by bringing powers back from Brussels to Britain’ (Conservative Party 2005: 1). The overall stance of many on the right wing of the party is rejectionist: the assumption is that Britain cannot hope to see the creation of a radically revised EU, so it would be better to negotiate withdrawal (e.g., Helmer n.d.). To summarise the core values of the British national variants of any broad, historically long-lived ideological tradition is obviously problematic. Nevertheless, there is sufficient commonality in the accounts by exponents of, and commentators on, the current of thought which can be labelled traditional conservatism (see, for example, Eccleshall 2001; Freeden 1996; Heywood 2003, Hickson 2005), which can be stated as follows.

- The fallibility of human nature.
- The inevitability and/or desirability of inequality.
- Strong government, hierarchy, acceptance of subordination.
- Law and order.
- Social stability, continuity, transmission.
- Prosperity and private ownership of property
- Glory of the free, island nation, its imperial history and post-imperial legacy.

Beyond this schematisation, it is worth recalling that British conservatives have been influenced by aspects of liberal thought in different ways and to varying degrees. The version which is particularly relevant here – the ‘New Enlightenment’ as two of its exponents described it, with no sense of irony, in the heyday of enthusiasm (Graham and Clarke 1986) – is the injection of neoliberal theory of free market capitalism not merely in the economic sphere, with the rolling back of the state through denationalisation and deregulation, but in the wider political, social, and cultural domains under Margaret Thatcher, John Major (followed, arguably, by Tony Blair and New Labour) and David Cameron. That is to say, the
dynamic conception of the rational self-interested individual as producer and consumer of goods and services extends into the operation of politics with new approaches to selling policies to electors, new ways of representing social relationships in terms of transactions, new understandings of culture as a consumer issue rather than a question of inculcation by elites. Notwithstanding the ideological and personal tensions which the amalgam of old and new values engendered in the Conservative Party as the neoliberal doctrine spread from the right across the mainstream, the self-confidence bred by the relative practical success of the model, as perceived by its supporters, and the affinity shared with developments in the US during the same period helped to reinforce the nationalism which viewed the European Community, then the EU, as an increasingly intrusive and cumbersome entity which embodied the deficiencies of Continental Europe, as opposed to the sturdy qualities of the British.

In the British Conservative case the EU is seen as a structure within which the motive forces are disposed in such a way that the marginal geographical location of the UK in relation to the centre will necessarily be mirrored by the relegation of the UK to a marginal position in the EU’s principal spheres of activity. Marginality in this sense means a twofold process of erosion of wellbeing. As the EU continues its integration, it absorbs British sovereignty by drawing powers of decision and implementation into its central bodies. It demands massive financial contributions. It threatens to drain off what remains of Britain’s economic and cultural autonomy. This, then, is a process of absorption. Its corollary is the process of swamping, which can occur in various ways. The central apparatus of control deluges the marginal territory with laws and regulations. In the arguments of Eurosceptics and Europhobes the principle of free movement of persons, coupled with lax approaches to immigration and asylum, opens up terrifying prospects of vast influxes of impoverished foreigners eager to batten onto our welfare system and our already saturated employment markets. For some extreme right-wingers, as we shall see later, even the principle of the free market in goods and services is an intolerable threat to Britain.

However, in the eyes of Eurosceptics Britain need not be marginalised in this way. It may be on the edge of the EU in both a literal and a figurative sense, but the EU is only one among many sets of states in the international system. Britain can be understood as being drawn outwards towards the non-European world. This has at least two important aspects. In relation to the countries of its own former empire, Britain is not so much the edge of Europe, but the centre of the network of diplomatic, economic and cultural relationships. It can even be fondly imagined by some Eurosceptics that in a symbolic sense Britain remains the hub of the English-speaking world. Another way of looking at the position is to see Britain in its place as a privileged intermediary between Europe and the USA, now the undisputed power centre of the planet, which bestows a form of centrality by proxy on the go-between. Thirdly, Britain can capitalise on its outer/inner interface with continental Europe in order to attract inward investment from non-Europe so that the function of surrogate producer allows the UK to shift the axis of Europe in its favour. All of these positional and dispositional factors lead to the Eurosceptical idea that Britain should retain a more autonomous relationship with the EU, and fight for reform of the latter in an intergovernmentalist direction, so that it can control the balance between Britain’s inward exchanges and its outward exchanges, while the Europhobic idea is that the EU is unreformable, so Britain would be better off outside it in some form of looser trading arrangement without the other dimensions.

It has often been pointed out that there is a central tension within contemporary British Conservative thought. On the one hand, there is the neo-liberal appeal to acquisitive
individualism, aggressive voluntarism, competition, and acceptance of inevitable economic inequality within a free market system which allegedly delivers far greater prosperity than its corporatist or socialist rivals. On the other hand, there is the communitarian appeal to traditional moral values and to obedient respect for law, order, and authority in other spheres. Whether or not these two sets of imperatives can be combined coherently in logic or in practice, both are considered necessary to provide a stable, cohesive but economically dynamic social environment (Levitas, 1986; King, 1987; Hayes, 1994). Both sets of beliefs feed into Euroscepticism. On the one hand, in the economic and social spheres Conservative Eurosceptics are repelled by what they regard as the interventionist, broadly social-democratic ethos of the EU, with its statist concern for regulation and harmonisation, its interference in markets via the CAP and other devices, its redistributive uses of funds from budgetary contributions, its economic committees and its encouragement of corporatism, or its interest in employment security, benefits and entitlements of workers. All of these tendencies are perceived as not only detracting from economic competitiveness, but as also feeding the infernal cycle of the dependency culture whereby member states, regions, and interest groups of all sorts become accustomed to relying on the central institutions of the European Union for direction and support. These are provided at the price of increased levies from member states, which in turn depend more heavily on the Union and less on their individual resources.

On the other hand, the EU’s supranational aspects also offend against the Conservatives’ attachment to traditional values and norms, because these norms are taken to be specific to British culture. They have to be inculcated by family, schooling and by national authorities if they are to have any real meaning. They are not universalistic abstractions, but practices which emerge from and feed back into a native culture which is the product of the cumulative processes of a particular national history. Conservative Eurosceptics assume that the EU cannot provide this type of framework, since it does not embody a common culture or appropriate values, yet its practice and its rhetoric point towards an abstract, homogenising conception of European society tinged with residual socio-economic egalitarianism. More generally, Conservative Eurosceptics hold that the EU substitutes arcane formal procedures and bureaucratic regulation for the informal, interpersonal networks of communication which sustain social bonds. In these respects, therefore, the EU is inimical to the survival of Britain as a national community, just as it also undermines British sovereignty in the political, the economic and the juridical spheres. Beyond this, of course, lies the wider affront to Conservative post-imperial nationalism through the EU’s aspiration to incorporate foreign and defence policy increasingly under its auspices, thus depriving Britain of the opportunity to play a distinctive international role by virtue of the accumulated wisdom born of its uniquely rich historical experience. Groups, such as Cornerstone, on the right wing of the Party share these preoccupations even more intensely (see, e.g., Cornerstone 2005), especially in their perception of the need for assertive national government and the restoration of social order under traditional moral values deemed characteristic of British nationhood, coupled with vigorous capitalism in the economic sphere.

(ii) French UMP republicans/sovereignists

The Eurosceptical UMP minority holds predominantly revisionist positions on the main aspects of EU integration (see tables 2 and 4). These fit more or less coherently with the core values of traditional Gaullism. Since Gaullism was and is a modern, complex, hybrid ideology embracing elements of several earlier traditions, including republicanism, liberalism, Bonapartism and traditionalism (see Fysh 1996; Hazareesingh 1994; Knapp 1994) it is
sufficiently compendious, ambiguous and open to flexible interpretation for Gaullist politicians to work with Christian democrats, free-market neoliberals and other groups on the centre-right in France. The key features are as follows:

- Authority, strong personal leadership, strong state.
- Democratic legitimacy and separation of powers.
- Mixed economy, interventionism.
- Social solidarity and (limited) worker participation.
- Secular public sphere but respect for the Church.
- National grandeur and rayonnement, including post-imperial ties with Francophone countries.
- Independent foreign policy, with ‘between East and West’ alignment.

Eurosceptical Gaullists would argue that they are more faithful to the ideas of the founder than their more EU-integrationist colleagues. While sharing a number of positions with the British Conservatives as regards the alleged failings of the EU, the UMP republicans in DLR are significantly less radical than those of the Tory Europhobes. There is no suggestion that France should withdraw from the EU if it cannot persuade its partners to revise the treaties in the required direction. Equally, the sense of being to some extent outside Europe is not shared even with the more moderate British Conservative Eurosceptics. On the contrary, there is a strong emphasis on France being a key part of Europe, sustaining a European identity, maintaining a close relationship with other member states of the EU, but doing so within a confederal, intergovernmental framework with sufficient flexibility to enable each member state to proceed at its own pace according to its own choices of areas for closer or less close co-operation. In this regard the DLR supporters claim to be faithful to the legacy of Charles de Gaulle, who had never favoured the creation of a supranationally governed superstate.

On specific policy issues there are other areas of difference. Although most of these are matters of emphasis rather than contradiction, there is an exception. This arises from what Bertrand Benoit (1997) has defined as the French social-nationalist ideological tradition. That is on the issue of EU trade policy, which is also linked to the domestic question of socio-economic malfunction within France. The French Gaullist Eurosceptics link their objections to EU trade policy to concerns over its effects on the domestic economies of member states and to the social consequences flowing from them. They accuse the EU of having betrayed the societies of its member states by embracing free-trade dogma, enshrined in the TEU itself, then in the GATT agreement of 1994, with its subsequent updates under the WTO, and applying them more rigorously than major trading partners outside Europe. The US and Japan are charged with operating covert protectionist policies, while the EU is opening its markets to all comers. India and China are accused of dumping the products of cheap labour on the European market. Consequently, it is claimed, France’s economy is exposed to the full effects of globalisation, relocation of firms and contracting out of production in search of cheap labour sources, while being subjected to unfair competition by those who have not opened their markets to the same degree. These processes have in turn put further strain on the fabric of French society. Thus, far from sharing the enthusiasm of British Conservatives for unrestricted free trade, Gaullist Eurosceptics have shown a time-honoured reflex of French politicians to espouse protectionism during periods of major economic adjustment, although the EU, rather than France alone, is now the economic area to be protected by the restoration of Community Preference for agriculture, at least, and potentially for other sectors of the economy. In this sense, nationalism does not lead to autarchy any more than it does to globalisation, but to an expression of European solidarity in face of external threat.
Nor do the UMP republicans share the British Conservatives’ devotion to neoliberal recipes deregulation, privatizations, roll-back of the welfare state, and the introduction of flexible labour markets as opposed to EU’s interventionist meddling. French Eurosceptics show far more concern with the social damage caused by persistently high levels of unemployment, reduced social mobility, exclusion and segregation of sections of the population, the development of ungovernable urban ghettos, rural depopulation, and a range of other problems leading to a general climate of malaise and rising public contempt for the institutions of the state. Although the mainstream right in France had embraced the vogue for neo-liberalism by the 1980s, they had not done so on the same terms or as steadfastly as their British counterparts (Berger, 1987; Godin, 1996). After the brief experiment in 1986-88, the party had adopted a more nuanced stance on the role of the state and had chosen not to identify itself with what it represented as the Anglo-American model of neoliberal economic governance. In the 1990s leading Gaullist Eurosceptics, such as Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin, who represented themselves as guardians of the true legacy of Gaullism, remained committed to a hybrid, interventionist, and corporatist approach to economic management and planning under the auspices of the strong state (Baudouin, 1990; Fysh, 1997). This translates into a critique of the ECB and the Stability Pact underpinning the Eurozone as an institutional and quasi-constitutional straitjacket on economic policy, which condemns the EU to slow growth and high unemployment.

It is worth noting that on the issues of immigration and asylum the degree of convergence has increased over the last ten years. While the Conservatives held power in Britain under Thatcher, then Major, the hard-line policies and even tougher discourse of successive Home Secretaries conveyed the impression that immigration was largely under control, and in doing this they successfully marginalized the extreme right. While demanding eternal vigilance against backsliding or ceding sovereignty to the EU in this area, the Conservatives claimed to be watchful, and their claim was widely accepted. However, after New Labour took power in 1997, the immigration and asylum issues gradually climbed back up the domestic political agenda, with Conservative Eurosceptics not only accusing the British government of ineffectual policing of the country’s frontiers, but also portraying the EU’s porous frontiers and tacit encouragement of transcontinental transit as a conduit for spurious asylum-seekers and would-be illegal immigrants to try to settle in the UK. Conservative critics of the EU shared common ground with French Eurosceptics who attacked the alleged deficiencies of the EU in relation to immigration and asylum under the Schengen regime and the transfer of immigration/asylum under the First Pillar from 2004. Gaullist Eurosceptics in the DIR argue for immigration to be replaced under national control so that inflows can be regulated and monitored effectively, with interstate agreements within the EU to prevent wholesale regularisations of illegal immigrants which could pave the way for attempted movement of large numbers across the borders of neighbouring countries.

The fields of defence and security also show a difference of angle to the British standpoint. Although the extreme right in Britain is anti-American and tends towards isolationism, or dreams of alliances with countries of the white Commonwealth, most British Eurosceptics are staunchly wedded to NATO as the principal organization for defence. This not only fits with their commitment to intergovernmental bodies, but also with their wider political and cultural Atlanticism, captured in the notion of the ‘special relationship’, however one-sided that may be in reality: they take vicarious pride in American achievements and welcome the international dominance of the English language which flows from American power. They accept that the EU may have to take on more responsibility for Europe’s defence, but in no
sense do they see it as a full substitute for or rival to NATO. French Eurosceptics have less attachment to NATO and are generally worried by what they see as a pervasive American military, political, economic, cultural and linguistic hegemony which has increased rather than decreased with the end of the Cold War. The alternative advocated by Eurosceptical Gaullists is not for a supranational EU competence in matters of defence and security but for intergovernmental co-operation in arms production and procurement, coupled with a multilateral alliance which would aim to replace NATO in due course (on Gaullist foreign policy, see Van Herpen 2004).

Finally, the French approach differs from the British insofar as French critics of the EU in its existing and projected forms show greater willingness to sketch the alternative shape which it ought to take. Leaving aside cultural stereotypes about British empiricism and French rationalism, this can be explained by the underlying difference of perspective mentioned earlier. The defensively separatist British approach emphasises what the Conservatives would try to do to unwind large sectors of policy – reject the Constitution, reject the Social Chapter, refuse the Euro, reject the CAP and CFP, deregulate wherever possible, systematic review of the *acquis communautaire* with a view to repatriating powers to the member states, restrict EU defence co-operation to action within NATO, etc. The 2004 manifesto for the EP elections was fittingly called *Putting Britain First*, and although it attempts a constructive tone here and there, the impression is overwhelmingly negative (Conservative Party 2004 and see Conservative Party 1999). Most of the main sections ended with a sub-section entitled ‘New threats from the EU Constitution’. However, whereas the British see their own country as being apart from Continental Europe, and only reluctantly involved with the EU by force of necessity (moderates and revisionists) or continuing error (rejectionists), the French consider themselves profoundly European. The idea of Europe, the whole of Europe, as a common history, a shared culture and a source of civilized values holds no less powerful an appeal to French Eurosceptics than it does to French Europhiles. However, the type of Europe for which they argue is one centred on the European Council and the Council of Ministers, voting by unanimity. These bodies would be flanked by a Parliament with a second chamber comprising representatives of national parliaments with the power to override the lower chamber in the co-decision-making process. The Commission would be a civil service made up of national civil servants on secondment. The function of the ECJ would be restricted and it would be surmounted by a court of appeal staffed by national judges to prevent it from federalist excesses. The ECB would be overseen by the Council of Ministers to ensure that it fulfilled its duty to promote economic growth. The borders of the Union would be those of Europe, and would exclude non-European states, such as Turkey, but offer partnership agreements instead. In the cultural sphere the enrichment of the whole would be achieved by the promotion of the diverse languages and traditions of the member states, as well as all manner of exchanges.

*Polish PiS*

Poland’s PiS holds predominantly revisionist positions on the major planks of EU integration (see tables 2 and 5). It shows a pattern of similarities and differences which cuts between the British and the French forms of Euroscepticism. As far as we have been able to establish, the party has not produced a volume of theoretical or policy literature or speeches comparable to those of the Conservatives and their surrounding think-tanks or the UMP republicans with their own links to allied think tanks and political associations. However, it did produce two relatively extensive programmatic documents (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 2005a, 2005b) during the period before the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections. These, plus transcripts of
interventions by PiS MEPs in the European Parliament constitute our primary sources. Its core values can be summarised as follows:

- Traditional Catholic conception of human nature
- Attachment to Catholic beliefs, institutions and practices
- Moral order centred on traditional family as core unit of society
- Strong state, strong leadership, law and order
- Social solidarity underpinned by state
- Support for business and traditional agriculture
- Preservation of national culture
- National independence, buttressed by strong defence
- Ideal of Christian Europe

Religion and historical memory, combined with geographical location and demography, contribute to giving the discourse of the PiS a distinctive tonality and content in comparison with the British and French Eurosceptical groupings. Unlike the Conservatives and the UMP, PiS places Catholicism prominently in its statements of principle and policy. The party articulates an ethno-religious form of nationalism which leans heavily on a political mythology (in the technical sense mentioned earlier) identifying Polishness with Catholicism as the nation’s essence throughout its history and the force underlying collective rebirth after the defeat of communism. By extension, the PiS holds up the ideal of a Catholic Poland in a Christian Europe. However, this immediately presents a problem, because the ethos of the EU is secular. The party wants to see the EU establish a system of explicit Christian reference in its representation of itself on the ground that Christianity is the foundation of European identity. The omission of Christian reference in the draft Constitution was one of the reasons for the PiS to find it objectionable. Furthermore, aspects of the EU’s legal and policy stance run against PiS’s traditional, Catholic moral principles with regard to the primacy of the family and the unacceptability of liberal tolerance, or even endorsement, of civil partnerships, abortion, homosexual rights and other forms of what the PiS considers deviant licentiousness in contrast to the EU understanding of equality and anti-discrimination principles. These factors also clash with the aim of the PiS to pursue a natalist policy within Poland based around support for the family to contribute to the fight against demographic decline through low birth/death ratios and emigration. Moreover, on the law and order agenda, the EU gives further liberal affront to the PiS’s own preference for restoration of the death penalty.

Whereas the British Conservatives cherish a rich political mythology relating to Britain’s history as a free island nation which successfully pursued its maritime, imperial destiny across the world outside Europe, and UMP republicans cherish both the long-term past as a great continental power reaching out across Europe as well as outside it, and in a new form as a significant international actor on lines set by De Gaulle, the PiS has its own complex sense of Poland’s historical legacy as a country at the heart of Europe, once a powerful actor (and at times a leader of Catholic powers against the Ottomans) but later partitioned by its larger neighbours to the East and West, liberated for a brief time in the early twentieth century only to be overrun again by Germany then absorbed into the Soviet block, the recent dissolution of which allowed national independence and accession to the EU. Thus, although the PiS, like the UMP republicans, does not share the gut anti-Europeanism of Conservative Eurosceptics and Europhobes, it is understandably emphatic on the subject of national independence. Hence, it is strongly in favour of intergovernmentalism and opposed to transfer of further competences to supranational level. It rejects the primacy of EU law over national law. It has argued for preserving unanimity for all treaty changes. It wanted rejection of the draft
Consititution: instead, it wanted to see the European Council, the Council of Ministers and national parliaments being the main decision-makers, with a commitment to respect national sovereignty. Similarly, its support for the further development of Common Foreign and Security Policy is conditional on the policy being based on intergovernmental principles, hence national veto, clear recognition of NATO as the main guarantor of security, which the PiS would wish to see extended eastwards, especially to the Ukraine as a barrier against Russian expansion (in addition, Poland would seek to strengthen its own bilateral relations with the US). In short, the PiS shares many concerns with the UMP but is absolutely not inclined to support a European defence alliance supplanting NATO or any policy resembling a revival of the Gaullian between-East-and-West, semi-neutralist posture. On the other hand, Turkey’s place in NATO evidently does not outweigh the view that this is not a European country, because it is not Christian.

Still, although the PiS is revisionist or even rejectionist in a range of policy areas, its stance is not uniformly resistant, especially where ideology and policy coincide fairly directly with national self-interest. While it does not favour Polish participation in EMU, let alone tax harmonisation, it does not object uniformly to the interventionist side of EU economic policy. The PiS is not a neoliberal party like the Conservatives in this area. Its version of social Catholicism locates it closer to the UMP Eurosceptics who support France’s mixed economic model. On the contrary, just as the PiS came to government in Poland with a socio-economic commitment to extensive support for families, young people, job creation, small businesses, agriculture, pensions, housing and infrastructure, so too it has argued for maintaining and preferably increasing the EU budget level, sustaining or increasing structural and cohesion funds as well as a stronger CAP and the application of community preference to protect the internal market, especially in agricultural products.

Europhiles

The positions of the Conservative left and the UMP mainstream can be summarised and compared more briefly since they are closer to acceptance of the present state of the EU’s development and to the broad direction in which it appears to be heading for the future.

(i) British Conservatives

Alongside the patrician, paternalistic version of conservatism which saw the promotion of social cohesion in terms of the duties of stewardship and compassion incumbent on those of high station, more modern versions of one-nation Toryism in the twentieth century absorbed some of the more philosophically optimistic values of modern social liberalism, with its emphasis on support for the poorer sections of society to reduce structural disadvantages which impeded the expression of merit and ability. This went with a set of attitudes which were more open to change, democratisation, extension of political and social rights as long as they were carefully managed. In the Thatcher and Major periods of government they acquiesced in, and to a considerable degree converted to the promotion of market solutions to revitalise the economy, but were distressed by some of the more brutal social and cultural consequences, and remained concerned by the need to sustain social cohesion. Ironically, some aspect’s of Tony Blair’s and Gordon Brown’s New Labour project in government corresponded to the type of socio-economic model of balance between neoliberal capitalism, relatively light taxation and support for strong public services broadly corresponded to their own preferences, and David Cameron’s move to recapture the centre ground for the Conservatives points to a swing of the party leadership in their direction. One area in which
they do not coincide with Cameron is on the question of Europe. Although Cameron and the Shadow Foreign Secretary, William Hague (himself a former Eurosceptical leader of the Party), show signs of rowing back from hardline Eurosceptical positions and perhaps from pulling the Conservative MEPs out of the excessively pro-integration EPP-ED group in the European Parliament, as he had promised in the past.

As a minority in the party, Europhile Conservatives have maintained a relatively low profile in recent years but that has not signified an ideological retreat from Europe or an abandonment of integrationist policy positions. Given the Eurosceptical climate of their party, they are always at pains to emphasise that they are driven by concern for the national interest, but they argue that defence of Britain’s interest is not incompatible with pooling of sovereignty where appropriate. Quentin Davies MP, chairman of the Conservative Group for Europe (CGE) summarises the stance on the Group’s website: ‘CGE exists to promote Britain’s vigorous and purposeful membership of the European Union and a Europe built on Conservative principles of an open market, individual and business opportunity and a responsible engagement in world affairs. It believes in a hard-headed defence of British interests in Europe as a committed player’ (http://www.cge.org.uk). They argue for continuing liberalisation and deregulation of the SEM and they share with their British Eurosceptical colleagues a desire to see the EU opened alongside others to the reduction of tariff and other barriers to global free trade. At the same time many, such as former ministers Kenneth Clark, Leon Brittan and Ian Taylor, accept the principle of EMU and believe it would be advantageous in the long run for Britain to enter the Eurozone (see, e.g., Brittan 2003). In keeping with their belief in the need for a social safety net to counterbalance the negative effects of neoliberal capitalism, they accept the need for common minimum standards of social protection across the EU and did not object to the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the proposed EU Constitution. Furthermore, in terms of the government of the EU, their acceptance of the need for greater democracy, transparency and accountability in the interest of strengthening legitimacy led to broad acceptance of the political provisions set out in the Constitution but argued for a stronger role for national parliaments (e.g., Clarke 2003). Their delicate balancing act between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism includes support for further integration in the field of Justice and Home Affairs to fight transborder crime, though they show no inclination to surrender Britain’s opt-out from Schengen on the sensitive issue of immigration control. They favour strengthening of Foreign and Security Policy. They endorse the idea of an EU Foreign Minister and of a European Defence Agency. However, they argue for decision-making on an intergovernmental, not a supranational basis, and insist that NATO remains the cornerstone of European defence. They are in favour of further enlargement, including Turkish membership. In short, Conservative Europhiles, like most other centre-right, pro-EU parties or factions, see the EU as moving, albeit haltingly and with deviations from the route, in broadly the right direction. They are partisans of constructive reform aiming at flexible balance between national, international and supranational objectives and prerogatives, centred on the principles of moderated free-market capitalism and liberal democracy. They remain a minority in the Party, but it may be that David Cameron’s determination to lead the Conservatives back to the centre ground will also lead him to bring the Europhiles back in from the cold.
(ii) French UMP mainstream

Although the positions of Gaullists have not been entirely consistent in the past (Shields 1996), the evolution of the majority of the RPR since the TEU has been towards those of its former UDF allies, with whom it now forms the UMP. Like the Conservative left, its general position is reformist, but somewhat less gradualist if the rhetoric is to be believed (see Charter of Values at http://www.u-m-p.org/site/index.php/ump/l_ump/nos_valeurs). Given the greater sympathy in France for the idea of Europe in some form or other, and the fact that France is in fact, more integrated in the EU in important respects than Britain is – as a member of the Eurozone and a participant in Schengen – the UMP is not obliged to be as cautious in its language as the Conservative minority in Britain, on condition that it proclaims its determination to contribute to the leadership of a European Union compatible with French national interests. This does not mean, therefore, an unabashed, maximalist EU-federalism, but a selective approach to the transfer of competences from intergovernmental to supranational levels. France’s recently elected President from the UMP, Nicolas Sarkozy, declares himself a fervent supporter of the EU, but that obviously does not mean deserting the Gaullist preoccupation with French autonomy or France’s position as an international actor with its own particular positions (see, e.g., Sarkozy 2007a). Even so, in terms of stated objectives, the UMP mainstream is considerably further down the road of integration than the British Conservative left (see, e.g., Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 2005).

The major institutional and policy areas in which the UMP differs noticeably from the Conservative pro-EU faction in Britain are on EMU, economic policy and external trade, foreign policy/defence, and enlargement. That is quite a substantial list. Whereas the British are content to see liberalisation of the SEM and reform of the CAP and CFP in a liberalising spirit, the UMP mainstream – which still favours a more interventionist stance on the domestic economy and maintenance of a stronger welfare system than the British – defends the CAP in particular and more generally argues for a European economic and monetary government to drive economic growth and employment, while applying selective protectionism under the heading of Community Preference to EU external trade relations in order to curb what the UMP considers unfair dumping of products and the expatriation of jobs to countries with cheap labour costs. Globalisation for the UMP has a somewhat similar status to the EU for Conservative Eurosceptics – as an external force with which France cannot avoid being involved but which threatens both to swamp and absorb. One of Sarkozy’s electoral planks was the principle: ‘L’Europe doit protéger dans la mondialisation’ (Sarkozy 2007b; Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 2006). Similarly, on the question of enlargement the UMP has a more closed conception of the EU than the British Conservatives. It is against further enlargement for the time being, and is particularly opposed to Turkish membership on economic and cultural grounds. It favours a partnership agreement of a type which would also be offered for negotiation with countries of Eastern Europe, Russia and Mediterranean states. Unlike the Conservatives, the UMP supports further integration of the Schengen zone with common policies on inflows, asylum, an EU frontier police and a single consular service, while in Justice and Home Affairs it calls for an EU prosecution service and common penal rules to fight organized crime. Furthermore, although it shares the Conservatives’ support for the political dimension of the draft EU Constitution, subject to respect for the principle of subsidiarity and to increased powers for the EP and for national parliaments, it is much stronger on the principle of extending QMV and the co-decision procedure. It is also stronger on the development of an integrated Foreign and Defence Policy presided over by a Foreign Minister with full diplomatic representation to make the EU a real force as an international actor. It remains somewhat unclear where the UMP stands on the
future of the EU-NATO relationship, but as far as France’s own independent nuclear deterrent and general defence capability are concerned, the UMP is determined to maintain spending with a view to enabling France to weigh as an international actor in its own right and as an influence on the French-speaking world. Finally, for present purposes, it is worth noting that the UMP places far greater emphasis than the Conservative left on the cultural sphere, where the traditional, exceptionalist attachment to the notion of rayonnement couples with heavy support for an active EU cultural policy of encouragement to exchanges and collaborative ventures in the arts.

Concluding discussion

Bearing in mind the number of domestic and international constraints which weigh against any single party ever seeing all or even many of its positions on the EU being implemented, the material analysed in this paper relates to hypothetical aspirations, preferences and objections. Nevertheless, ideological beliefs, values, attitudes and policy positions of political parties do matter for several reasons. They underpin the shared identities of party politicians, grass-roots members and supporters in the domestic arena. They feed into party competition and government policy. They contribute to the formation of cross-national groups in the European Parliament. Across the EU, when aggregated together, they contribute to the tone and content of debate. They also enable sometimes paradoxical left-right alliances or convergences of parties which would be opposed to each other in different spheres. For purposes of analysis it is possible to isolate ideology to some extent from other variables weighing on party positions. The discursive relationship between ideology and policy constitutes a sub-system where reasoning and justification can be constructed in terms of ideologically marked reference to general principles or values, on the one hand, and ideologically marked reference to real-world events, actors and processes, on the other.

Clearly, even at the relatively superficial level of detail used in this paper, simple typologies of positions and dispositions, such as hard/soft Euroscepticism, have very limited purchase. The same is true of our own categorisation, though it offers a slightly less approximate shorthand. It is not simply a case of mapping positions, although this can be of some value as a quick, rough guide to sets of distinctive features (see tables and figures attached to this paper as work in progress). The processes of ideological reasoning whereby different parties arrive at similar or different positions are sufficiently complex to overflow the reductionism required for economical categorisation.

The content and quantitative methodology of the GAL/TAN model proposed by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson has distinct advantages over the old-fashioned qualitative exploration used in this paper. It is more hard-edged, less fuzzy and capable of covering much larger numbers of cases. It is undoubtedly valuable. However, it necessarily excludes significant detail of ideological variation (and contestation) within and between parties, which can have an important bearing on their behaviour. In the parties covered by the present paper ideology cuts across both the GAL and the TAN axes in a number of ways. The question of political control of the economy via regulation and other forms of intervention cuts across the left/right scale, and the question of nationalism, though a better fit with the TAN dimension, is vitiating by a range of other factors. Furthermore, the notion of party families is itself problematic as soon as one enters into the particularities of specific national cases, and particularly with regard to positioning in relation to a highly complex, relatively new, rapidly evolving entity such as the EU.
Some obvious caveats need to be kept in mind. Because the notions of left and right are merely conventional, topographical metaphors for scaling relative positions with only limited reference to sets of ideological values and policy positions, historical evolution, etc., it is problematic even to describe all of the parties considered here as centre-right. They all have parties further to the right of them and in gradations to their left. However, the centre does not have the same ideological and policy content. In other words, comparatively speaking, some party systems are centred further to the left or the right than others. Equally, family labels such as conservative or Christian democrat have little purchase on the real variety of party ideological and policy positions once one starts to examine them more closely, even allowing for the complicating aspect of trying to accommodate the countries of the former Soviet block.

For brevity, a number of observations are summarised below as bullet points, in no special order:

- Location, size and ideologically interpreted history interact to produce variation.
  - The ethnonationalism of the Conservative mainstream and right feeds on Britain’s island location at off the Western edge of the European continent, but it is not entirely an insular or xenophobic nationalism, and it is realistic enough to see that Britain cannot count for much in international arenas alone. The distrust of Europe is balanced by post-imperial attachment to other English-speaking former colonies, especially the US, even though the latter detached itself from the empire more than two hundred years ago. There is a strong diplomatic, economic, cultural and strategic pull outside Europe, which can be viewed as a choice to be made, but the Conservative left, with its more open, liberal, civic nationalism and its lesser obsession with British exceptionalism, resists that interpretation.
  - The UMP mainstream and republicans, to some extent inheritors of the universalistic, messianic, civic nationalism of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, as well as the history of a dominant power in Europe under the ancien régime, see it as natural that France should play a key role on the Continent as well as maintaining ties with its former colonies. It cannot control Europe but by working with Germany, it can still play a key role. The temptation to see the Anglo-American world as an economic and cultural threat or rival reinforces the desire to see the EU with a more integrated capability in all spheres, including security and defence.
  - The PiS is hemmed by contradictions. Its location on the Eastern edge of the EU leaves it exposed to the power of the former colonial power, Russia. The EU ties the other former oppressor, Germany, into a complex which offers some reassurance to Poland, but still leaves the latter exposed, hence the emphasis placed by the PiS on NATO and above all, close ties with the US, as well as resistance to any incursion on national control of defence and wariness of any challenge to intergovernmentalism in the formulation of EU foreign policy.

- Variation on political control of the economy, interventionism and redistribution relates to a range of possible factors which fit uneasily with conventional left-right divisions. There is a connection between the type of policies advocated at national level and those favoured at EU level. The moderately interventionist policies of the EU in some sectors undoubtedly offend the Conservatives of all factions, as do the
plethora of regulations, though to a lesser degree in the case of the Conservative left, which is less attracted to rolling back the British state, reducing taxes and deregulating. These same factors do not give rise to objection from the UMP, including republicans, or the PiS. On the contrary, EU interventionist policies are regarded as inadequate in some areas, such as agriculture, or community preference in external trade.

- Where religion is a significant ideological factor, it can pull in different directions. The PiS is attached to Catholicism, a universalist religion which values the idea of Christian community in Europe and elsewhere. However, the ethos of the EU is secular. Hence, there is a tension which can only be reconciled by the conversion of the EU, which is not likely to happen. There is no obvious resolution of this tension.

- Traditional morality does not absolutely require Catholicism or even any religious belief, although they tend to fit together. The collective, liberal conception of fundamental rights in the EU cuts across traditional morality and is therefore a source of objection to some aspects of integration for the PiS and for the Conservative right.

- Location, history, size and desired model of EU development bear on the question of enlargement.
  - The wish to impede development of the EU as much more than a single market plays to the Conservative mainstream and right in encouraging support for further enlargement, including Turkish accession, which is in the logic of both extending the market and of sustaining NATO. The type of Europe that is favoured by the Conservative mainstream does not require strong political, economic, religious or cultural affinity, but merely an ability to do business and provide mutual military support if strategically necessary.
  - The PiS, shares the Conservatives’ general preference for widening rather than deepening the EU, a fervently Catholic party in a country closer to Turkey and to regions formerly colonised by the Ottomans, has a very different perspective on Turkey, whose military and strategic links with the US and NATO do not outweigh the other factors in defining the party’s position.
  - The UMP mainstream and republicans may coincide with the PiS, and historical memory no doubt plays a part alongside perception of Turkey as economically backward, geographical considerations and cultural/religious factors in leading them to argue that Turkey is not part of Europe and should not be part of the EU. However, while that is enough for the UMP republicans, the UMP mainstream see the important consideration that Turkish accession, and to a lesser extent even that of other East European countries is a barrier to the deepening of political integration.

- Geography combines with demography as well as economic and cultural factors to produce variation in approaches to migration and asylum. Poland could be threatened by influxes from countries to its East, hence the concern of the PiS with EU policy towards the Eastern Wall. With minimal or negative population growth in recent years, its concern is to discourage emigration, especially by the young and educated, and to pursue natalist policies to prevent demographic meltdown, preferably with more support from the EU. Conservatives and UMP, regardless of faction, want strict immigration controls and do not have much confidence in Schengen. The difference is
that Britain has an opt-out and Franc does not. Therefore the UMP is more concerned about making Schengen work better, while the Conservatives care more about the effectiveness of their own national controls and are content to blame Schengen for leakage in Britain’s direction.

- Ideological preferences relating to national political institutions do not necessarily translate into similar preferences for the EU, as degree of commitment to EU integration affects the issue. Thus, for the Conservative mainstream and the PiS, support for parliamentary democracy at national level does not entail support for extending the powers of the EP, or for an EU government deriving from the majority in the EP. The Conservative left and the UMP mainstream do not go that far, but broadly accept the proposals in the draft Constitution, subject to a greater role for national parliaments.

Each of the sets of factors crudely summarised above is highly complex and variable in its own right. The perception of each and of the interaction between them with varying relative weight at different times in different national party contexts is coloured by core ideological beliefs. However, this does not mean that they are necessarily consistent as between their application to national level and to EU level. Since they are not definitively fixed, codified or regulated in non-totalitarian parties, they are highly malleable, especially when the history of a particular application is relatively short. In any case, it is to be expected that core beliefs – or at least their interpretation and application to policy positions – will evolve to be reconfigured and recombined in new ways.
References


APPENDIX

Tables and Figures

(work in progress: summaries of party positions are extremely approximate and provisional, as are relative locations of parties in figures)
Table 2 Profiles of conservative parties (with internal currents) on EU integration, by policy sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative Europhiles (reformist/gradualist)</th>
<th>Conservative mainstream (minimalist/revisionist)</th>
<th>Conservative Europhobes (revisionist/rejectionist)</th>
<th>UMP mainstream (reformist)</th>
<th>UMP sovereignists (revisionist)</th>
<th>Law &amp; Justice (minimalist/revisionist)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sovereignty/ EU Principles</strong></td>
<td>Reformist-gradualist</td>
<td>Minimalist</td>
<td>Revisionist-rejectionist</td>
<td>Reformist (Turkish accession)</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Policy/ Defence and Security</strong></td>
<td>Reformist-gradualist</td>
<td>Minimalist</td>
<td>Revisionist-rejectionist</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Revisionist-reformist</td>
<td>Minimalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEM/Trade/ Economy</strong></td>
<td>Reformist-gradualist</td>
<td>Rejectionist (EMU, CFP) Revisionist (CAP) Reformist (SEM)</td>
<td>Reformist (SEM) Revisionist-rejectionist</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Reformist-revisionist</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration</strong></td>
<td>Reformist-gradualist</td>
<td>Minimalist Rejectionist (Schengen)</td>
<td>Revisionist-rejectionist</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>[Revisionist?]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social/Cultural Europe</strong></td>
<td>Reformist-gradualist</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>Revisionist-rejectionist</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Governance and Admin</strong></td>
<td>Reformist-gradualist</td>
<td>Reformist-revisionist</td>
<td>Revisionist-rejectionist</td>
<td>Reformist</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
<td>Revisionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Reference</strong></td>
<td>Reformist (internationalist)</td>
<td>Minimalist-revisionist (nationalist)</td>
<td>Revisionist-rejectionist (nationalist)</td>
<td>Reformist (internationalist)</td>
<td>Revisionist (sovereignist)</td>
<td>Revisionist (nationalist)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 Positions of British Conservative Party, with internal currents, by policy sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Conservative Europhiles (reformist)</th>
<th>Conservative mainstream (minimalist/revisionist)</th>
<th>Conservative Europhobes (revisionist/rejectionist)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Sovereignty/ EU Principles             | * Defend nat. interest but constraints on sovereignty can be necessary and beneficial, so pool sov. selectively  
* Democratisation, transparency, subsidiarity  
* Enlargement                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | * Defend nat. sov. and national veto on legislation (flexible treaties allowing variable geometry and enhanced co-operation)  
* Veto/require nat. referendum for major transfers of Parl’s powers or treaty revisions  
* Reject harmonization and uniform rules  
* Wider not deeper                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | * Renegotiate treaties to repatriate nat. sov., recover independence (leave if necessary)  
* Voluntary, intergov. co-operation/associate membership, not integration                                                                                                                                                  |
| Foreign Policy/ Defence and Security   | * Strengthen CFP and ESDP but stress co-operation not supranational centralisation  
* NATO to remain cornerstone with ESDI  
* Create EU Foreign Minister and Eur. Defence Agency                                                                                                                                                                               | * Reject autonomous EU defence identity outside NATO  
* Retain national veto in CFP/ESDP  
* No cession of seat to EU on UN Security Council                                                                                                                                                                           | * Recover full independence in foreign and defence policy  
* NATO as cornerstone, other alliances as necessary                                                                                                                                                                               |
| SEM/Trade/ Economy                     | * Accept EMU (+/-)  
* Liberalise SEM and some deregulation for openness and competitiveness                                                                                                                                                           | * Reject EMU  
* Reform SEM to strengthen competition laws, deregulate and open to world trade  
* Revise CAP and withdraw from CFP  
* Amend EU law to allow bilateral aid delivery                                                                                                                                                                                  | * Repeal all legislation (econ., industrial, employment, energy, environment, CAP, CFP etc.), except what is necessary to access SEM as free market                                                                                                                                 |
| Immigration/Domestic Security/JHA     | * Selective, controlled immigration but domestic remedies to demographic and employment imbalances  
* Increase integration in JHA  
* EU promote common action on terrorism                                                                                                                                                                                            | * Close co-op but retain national veto on immigration, terrorism and organized crime  
* Reject EU police, EU prosecutor or other supranational bodies                                                                                                                                                                | * Recover/retain full independence in all JHA, immigration, domestic security                                                                                                                                                       |
| Social/Cultural Europe                 | * Broadly accept Social Chapter, or at least need for social protection (they don’t seem to talk about it much) but light regulation                                                                                                                                                     | * Reject Social Chapter  
* Reject legally enforceable CFR                                                                                                                                                                                                        | * Withdraw from social chapter and all social policy, incl. health/safety  
* Repeal ECHR (seen as ideologically linked to EU)                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| EU Governance and Admin                | * EU reasonably democratic already but Council needs to be transparent  
* Stronger role for national parliaments  
* Accept Constitution  
* [Cons should stay in EPP and work with other centre-right groups]                                                                                                                                                        | * MS to share initiative of legislation  
* EP needs strong powers of scrutiny & repeal  
* Joint committees of MPs and MEPs to hold ministers to account on EU matters  
* Reject Constitution  
* [Cons should leave EPP]                                                                                                                                                                                                           | * Repatriate and intergovernmentalise powers  
* Subject EU to democratic national gov’ts and parls  
* Commission reduced to civil service function  
* Reject Constitution  
* [Cons should leave EPP]                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Ideological Reference                  | * Freedom, individual responsibility  
* National and international solidarity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | * National interest, sovereignty, independence  
* Free trade  
* Defence of the realm  
* ‘In Europe, not run by Europe’                                                                                                                                                                                                         | * Family, religion, law & order  
* National interest, sovereignty, independence  
* Free trade  
* Defence of the realm                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
Table 4 Positions of Union pour une Majorité Populaire, with internal currents, by policy sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>UMP mainstream (reformist)</th>
<th>UMP sovereignists (ex-RPR) (revisionist)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty/ EU Principles</td>
<td>• EU as power in global politics and economy</td>
<td>• Supranationalist ideologies now dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU integration compatible with nations</td>
<td>• Restore nat. sovereignty, reverse EU federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Continue polit. integration but respect democracy and subsidiarity</td>
<td>• Intergovernmental, confederal basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Against Turkish membership but for partnership alongside Medit. and E. Eur. states</td>
<td>• Variable geometry in policies and projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Enlarge only to Eur. states + partnerships with non-Eur. neighbours, incl. Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy/ Defence and Security</td>
<td>• EU as force for peace and balance in and outside Europe for multipolar world</td>
<td>• Eur. defence alliance progressively supplanting NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM/Trade/ Economy</td>
<td>• Maintain EMU (reformed)</td>
<td>• Variable geometry to take account of differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community Preference to develop SEM</td>
<td>• Co-operation on armament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Defend CAP (and Fr agriculture)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration/Domestic Security/JHA</td>
<td>• Common policies on inflows, asylum regime, EU frontier police, single consular service</td>
<td>• Reform EMU, scrap Stability Pact, policy to be set by countries with largest GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Co-ordinate intergov. initiatives in expanded core group of 5 major MS (+ Po)</td>
<td>• Restore CAP and Community preference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Create Schengen anti-terrorism space</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU prosecutor and common penal rules to fight organized crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Cultural Europe</td>
<td>• Reform Stability Pact to give social dimension (PR)</td>
<td>• Remedy demographic deficit by co-ordinated, regulated inter-state immigration policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Incorporate CFR in EU Constit. (PR)</td>
<td>• Reverse brain drain in R&amp;D</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase development aid to sending countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Governance and Admin</td>
<td>• Restore Fr influence in instits</td>
<td>• Deregulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Co-ordinate intergov. initiatives in expanded core group of 5 major MS (+ Po)</td>
<td>• Restore full range of langs in place of Eng. as common lang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase powers of EP and nat. parls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Yes to Constitution (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Reference</td>
<td>• Freedom, responsibility, solidarity</td>
<td>• Eliminate supranat. dominance (Commission, ECJ, EP, ECB), reduce QMV, restore nat. veto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nation</td>
<td>• EU Council &amp; Coun. of Mins to dominate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Internationalism and moderate supranationalism</td>
<td>• Enhance role of nat. parls, add second chamber to EP with reps of nat. parls</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Commission as civil service</td>
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<td>• No to Constitution (2005)</td>
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Table 5 Positions of Law and Justice, by policy sectors

| Sovereignty/ EU Principles | • Solidarity and intergovernmentalism, not supranationalism, hence resist further transfers of competences  
| • Revise accession treaty to restore inviolable sov. in morality and culture  
| • Widen to the East with Po. in leading role, but not deepen (and not Turkey) |
|---|---|
| Foreign Policy/ Defence and Security | • Maintain national. control  
| • Intergovernmental CFSP retaining national veto and recognising primacy of relations with US  
| • NATO as main guarantor of security (+ strengthen US-Polish bilateral relations) and extend NATO eastwards, esp. to Ukraine |
| SEM/Trade/ Economy | • Delay/reject EMU, oppose tax harmonisation  
| • Selective EU and nat. protection (esp. agric.)  
| • Maintain/raise budget level, maintain/raise structural and cohesion funds, subsidise Eastern Wall  
| • Independent national economic policy within SEM, new social deal to revive employment, housing, infrastructure |
| Immigration/Demography | • Inward migration not a salient issue since insufficient to prevent negative migration balance  
| • Discourage emigration by young and highly educated to other EU states via supportive welfare and employment policies  
| • Natalist policy to support traditional family and reverse demographic collapse, ageing population and pensions meltdown |
| Social/Cultural Europe | • Revise EU to restore Christian reference and support traditional family, natalism,  
| • Resist/revise anti-moral, anti-family legislation, actual or proposed (e.g., re mutual recognition of national laws on same-sex unions)  
| • Restore death penalty and rights of victims  
| • Defend traditional national (Catholic) culture and values |
| EU Governance and Admin | • Preserve unanimity for all EU treaty changes  
| • Resist/reverse EU centralism, hence reject Constit. (elevates EU law over national; excessive transfer of competences; weakening smaller states in decision-making; refuses Christian values as basis)  
| • Eur. Council and Council of EU should be main-decision-makers, respecting principle of nat. sov.; increase role of nat. parliaments in EU governance |
| Ideological Reference | • National independence, national interest, national greatness, national identity, patriotism  
| • Catholic Europe, Christian morality and culture  
| • Europe of nations  
| • Atlanticism, distrust of Russia and Germany |
Figure

Civic nationalism

UMP main
Conserv left

Supranat.

UMP republicans
Conserv mainstream

Intergov./None

Ethnic nationalism
PiS
Conserv right
Figure

Protection

PiS

UMP repubs

UMP main

Regulated

Deregulated

Conserv left

Conserv centre & right

Free trade
Figure

Secular or multi-faith

UMP main & republicans

Conserv left

Conserv mainstream

Liberal morality

Trad. morality

Single faith (+/-)

Conserv right

PiS