Market Correctives, Market Palliatives and the
New Politics of European Economic and Regional Development

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Abstract

The New Economy and the interests of more advanced EU Member states dominate current thinking on EU and national level economic and regional policy goals. European integration thus drives a political economy of regionalism that—far more than traditional divisions between labor and capital—defines the principal economic players in the New Europe. The New Economy drives a radical shift in EU policy from cohesion or redistribution toward innovation promotion, affecting both distributional struggles and policy approaches at the EU, national and subnational levels. Shifting strategies pose significant challenges at the national and subnational levels with important implications for future EU economic and regional development policy goals. The increasing concentration of funding on less advanced economies is eroding the policy’s traditional support basis and, ironically, diminishing its original intent and purpose.

Keywords: European integration, regionalism, New Europe, regional development, economic interests, Central and Eastern Europe.

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Though many argue that an ‘ever closer’ and ‘undivided’ Europe lies at the heart of the European Union (EU), many authors ignore the more deeply rooted elements of interest divergence at the heart of policy-making in the New Europe. Interest divergence is evident on many levels of EU policy making, from the terms of the Eastern Accession, to competition policy, to environmental protection. In particular however, the Lisbon Agenda and the Sapir Report have launched a debate that may forever change the face of EU regional policy. As argued herein, greater economic integration in the European marketplace increasingly places the more and less advanced national governments and national and subnational regional entities at odds with each other.

Two questions motivate this article. The first is what factors best explain interest divergence over the EU’s regional development goals. I argue that current EU regional development and national-level economic policy reforms should be seen in the context of the increasingly regional dimension of economic development as expressed in New Economy models. New Economy models emphasize the importance of both national and sub-national regions in economic development, the growing role of the knowledge-based economy and the importance of external increasing returns in structuring economic and geographic (or territorial) behavior. These developments have had a profound influence both on economic policy-making and distributional struggles across and within states. Thus considerable debate has arisen in particular over both the possible re-nationalization of public spending, as well as political decentralization vs. state-centered control and the appropriate use and targets of EU-funding.

Second I ask what this means for the future of EU regional policy goals and in particular the interests of less developed economies in the European Union. Though the Sapir Report did not envision the elimination of regional policy—the report recommends regional funding be “concentrated” on the less developed states (European Commission, 2003: 6)—the question raised is ultimately how to shift EU spending from redistributive to more productive and innovation-oriented policy goals. Though one can question the specifically redistributive content of previous EU regional policy, the persistence with

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2 The references here are of course to Dinan (2005) and Vachudova (2006). Similar grand design views are expressed by Kopstein and Reilly (2006).
3 See Ellison (forthcoming, 2006a, and 2006b).
5 See Dunford (2005: 977), Hall (2005: 970). Indeed many have argued that the functional-redistributional content of the SCF’s is overwhelmed by distributional politics. Some see the SCF as side-payments in order to secure support for deeper integration (Carrubba, 1997; Lange, 1993; Marks, 1992). Moreover, the quite
which the Directorate General for Regional Policy (DGRegio) has insisted upon the compatibility of Lisbon and Regional Policy goals suggests the divide between divergent developmental aims. As argued herein, the goal of achieving a productive and innovation-oriented economy is at odds with the goals of cohesion and redistribution.

For the less advanced regions of Europe—in particular sub-national regions in the NMS’s—equity vs. efficiency tradeoffs (Martin, 1999) threaten the well-established tradition of promoting economic and social cohesion. The more the EU broadens its membership base to a wide range of less developed economies, the more competing and contradictory claims on EU resources emerge. The consequence of EU enlargement across countries of increasing economic disparity is the concentration of EU SCF’s on an increasingly select group of states. As fewer and fewer advanced core states benefit from the SCF’s, the more the policy’s support base is gradually eroded. As the EU continues to grow in size, the potential result is the withering away of its redistributional mechanisms.

This article has implications for a broad range of literature. For one, it suggests intergovernmental models of European integration provide a first best explanation of the EU political process. States and the interests of actors within (not across) states describe the principal groundwork of EU decision-making. Second, it suggests European economic integration and its broad impact on the increasingly regional and subnational dimension of economic development promotes a broad scale redefinition of the principal economic actors and may encourage us to redefine how we think about “economic interests”. Rather than defining these in terms of the factors of production—i.e. labor and capital—New Economy models emphasize the territorial dimension of interests and their expression through national, subnational regional and even supranational actors.

This article proceeds as follows. The first section provides an overview of the factors explaining the general paradigm shift in EU economic and regional development policy. The second section briefly outlines the structure of interests resulting from the New Economic model. The third section analyzes the impact of this shift on the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective. A brief discussion and conclusions follow.

**Paradigm Shift? Cohesion, Redistribution and Innovation Promotion**

Resource struggles (in particular over capital) and re-distributional struggles (in particular over fiscal expenditure) are destined to remain strongly intertwined with future debates and policy-making struggles in the New Europe. Though politically difficult to achieve, textbook analyses of international trade suggest the costs of economic adjustment are easily overcome by redistributive transfers from winners to losers.
(Rogowski, 1989). Though EU redistribational tools could have dampened the blow of economic adjustment in the 10 New Member States (NMS)—in particular in the early years of accession and enlargement—far more has been done to protect Western markets, and increase the burden on Central and East European economies (Ellison, 2006b).

Competition between states over scarce resources—in particular capital, labor and EU redistribational funding (e.g. the SCF’s and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP))—motivates the attempt to retain the more tangible financial advantage states receive from EU membership and to reduce potential losses. The institutional structure of the European Union however may reinforce the position of large, economically more advanced states over smaller, less advanced states, thus making it possible for the larger and more economically advanced states to reap more of the rewards while the smaller and economically less advanced states bear a greater share of the burden of economic adjustment. The coincidence of political and economic power may lead to less than favorable outcomes for smaller and—in particular—less advanced EU Members states and regions.  

The intergovernmental literature has long implied—though seldom investigated in adequate detail—the likelihood that the gains from European integration are uneven. Given variation in the relative economic and political power of states, policy outcomes presumably reflect that dynamic. In the aggregate, while all states are expected to gain from European integration, some states may gain more than others. Side-payments are typically conceived as the mechanism by which more powerful states have been able to buy-off or compensate losers from economic integration (Lange, 1993; Marks, 1992). However, uncertainty and the substitution of perceived for real gains greatly increases the potential range of variation in policy outcomes, suggesting that states may inaccurately predict the benefits of European integration and lose not only on individual features but also in the aggregate (Ellison, 2006b; Ellison and Hussain, 2003).

New Economy models designate the mix of endogenous growth and economic geography models popularized in particular by Romer (1994), Krugman (1991) and Lucas (1990). External increasing returns10 derive from the geographic clustering of firms. Economic geography models in particular highlight the territorial nature of localized factors generating technological progress. Territorial effects arise both from local spillovers generated by the geographic concentration of economic activity, as well as from factors limiting the potential geographic range over which knowledge or technological progress is spread (see Leamer and Storper, 2001; Scott, 2000; Martin, 1999; Storper, 1992). Theoretical controversy remains over what specific factors ultimately drive external increasing returns, ranging from the Marshallian effects realted

8 Since smaller states are often seen as winners in the EU context, this may surprise some observers. As more trade dependent states they gain from market integration with their fellow EU Member States and their weighted qualified majority voting power—relative at least to their population shares in the EU—in the Council of Ministers has traditionally been greater. Such arguments however ignore both the role of blocking minorities (more easily manipulated by the larger states) and the population rule introduced with the Nice Treaty—which again greatly strengthened the political weight of the larger states.

9 I adopt Krugman’s (1991) language and distinguish in particular between increasing returns resulting from firm-level economies of scale and external increasing returns generated by the geographic concentration of economic activity. The implications of the latter are the focus of this analysis.
variation in the size of the available labor pool (Krugman, 1991), to informal informational exchanges (Leamer and Storper, 2001; Scott, 2000; Storper, 1992;) to variation in the level and share of human capital (Lucas, 1990; Romer, 1994). Empirical evidence suggests that regional variation in levels of economic development, in particular at the subnational level, is best explained by New Economy type models (Martin, 1999; see also Sala-I-Martin, 2002 and Quah, 1996).

For the purposes of this article, New Economy models cast new light both on the forces driving economic growth and development and on their territorial impact. Observations from this literature have repercussions both for theorizing about the shape and substance of EU, national and subnational-level regional policy tools and goals,11 as well as the institutional framework within which they are formulated. A principal contribution of the New Economy Models is to question the linkage between regional development policy and the nature and structure of the factors promoting economic growth and development (Martin, 1999). Theories of economic geography and endogenous growth promote increasing attention to regional clustering and the promotion of regional, geographically-localized spillovers. In doing so, they have two potentially detrimental implications for conventional regional development policies. First, they focus attention on pre-existing geographic concentrations of economic activity—in particular regions that are more economically advanced. And second, by promoting innovation-promotion oriented policies, they draw attention away from redistributive-type policies.

The nature and structure of European, macro-level and regional development goals has undergone considerable revision in the past two decades. European economic policy goals have exhibited a gradual shift away from their previous sectoral structure and direct redistribution (e.g. subsidies to firms and the support of declining industries, income support and the like). Emphasis is now placed on more horizontal forms of assistance with broad application, in particular on the role of physical and human capital (or infrastructure, R&D, training and education).12 Reform of EU regional development goals follows in the footsteps of these economic policy reforms. Intentionally or not, the Sapir Report dealt a considerable blow to previous regional policy initiatives. Since that time, DGRegio appears pinned between the competing agendas of regional development and the onslaught of growth and competitiveness and Lisbon Agenda policy orientations.

Though the radical shift in development strategies and goals is perhaps only moderately perceptible, what is being questioned is the long tradition of EU and national level policy orientations focusing resources on agriculture, declining industries and lagging regions.13 As many argue, if Europe is to become more competitive, it must shift more resources to more competitive economic activities. Following Streeck (1999), this is part of a more generalizable phenomenon occurring at the level of the state as well. Streeck emphasizes the current national government practice of promoting productive assets (physical and human capital, education, R&D, infrastructure, etc.) at the expense of redistributional spending (transfer payments, unemployment insurance and other

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11 See in particular Bachtler and Wishlade (2005), Martin (2003), and Baldwin and Martin (2004).
12 Early discussion of the shift toward horizontal measures can be found in “Industrial Policy in an Open and Competitive Environment: Guidelines for a Community Approach” (COM(90) 556) and “An Industrial Competitiveness Policy for the EU” (COM(94) 319 final).
13 This point is clear from the Sapir report (European Commission, 2003: 79, 126).
forms of income maintenance). Competitiveness concerns drive a broad re-orientation of economic management strategies. Moreover, this phenomenon is occurring at both the supranational EU, national and subnational level of policy-making.

The specifically regional character of this shifting policy orientation is less obvious. Yet New Economy models prompt a comparatively radical rethinking in particular of the compatibility of national and sub-national regional policy goals. These models have focused attention both on the importance of agglomeration economies and their clustering of economic activity, as well as on the importance of regions insofar as such clustering tends to exhibit a particularly regional character. One should however confuse (as some of the literature appears to do) the focus on the regional clusters of economic activity with the previous focus on regional policy and regional development in the less advanced regions of Europe. The New Economy model is focused on promoting dynamic regional growth—in particular in regions exhibiting a positive propensity to support such growth—while the other is more clearly focused on an attempt to reverse patterns of economic decline. The outcome is likely to be an increasing degree of competition between growth promoting and cohesion inducing public policy goals or, as phrased at the outset of this article, between innovation-oriented and redistributive policy goals. Moreover, this competition exhibits a decidedly territorial character.

The prospects of Europe’s less developed regions are further frustrated by significant regional variation in long-term levels of economic development. Repeated failures to turn some regions around (e.g. the Italian Mezzogiorno and East Germany), propel many to ask why EU or national level resources should be allocated to policies that do not always bear fruit.\(^\text{14}\) A number of authors thus point to equity vs. efficiency trade-offs with respect to national and regional economic policy goals (Brakman et al, 2005; Lackenbauer, 2004; Bachtler et al, 2003; Martin, 1999). In their view, if agglomeration is crucial to the nature and character of economic development, then transferring resources to less developed regions is likely to slow the rate of economic development in advanced regions and accordingly may—by diverting valuable resources—fail to achieve their desired effect in less advanced regions.

Revising policy approaches directed toward less developed regions or reducing government intervention in regions on the decline are likely outcomes of such observations. In fact, promoting growth in the more developed regions is often seen as the key to promoting growth in the less advanced regions (see Brakman et al, 2005; Scott, 2000). As Scott argues, “geo-economic space” is made up of a “central nucleus” and a “hinterland” of variable size (2000: 48). Implicit is the notion that the welfare of more remote regions—though excruciatingly unclear where such regions begin and end\(^\text{15}\)—is dependent upon and pulled along by the welfare of the core regions. In this regard, New Economy models disadvantage redistributive policy and favor more targeted and potentially more supply-side oriented policies focused on the development of human and

\(^\text{14}\) For recent overviews of the literature on the relative success of regional policy, see Jouen (2005: Annex) and Funck and Pizzati (2003).

\(^\text{15}\) One way of thinking about this problem is to ask how it fits the European case which Scott does not directly address. For example, should one think of central nuclei and a hinterland at the national, subnational or European level? The relevant unit of analysis here is of course terribly important in terms of its policy implications.
physical capital (education, R&D and infrastructure), potentially diminishing the regional cohesion and redistributive content of development policies.

Efficiency motives provide strong incentives for both national governments and regions to exercise greater control over economic development strategies. For national governments, both EU-based and national-level regional development strategies—in particular those focused on cohesion and redistribution—potentially drain resources away from more advanced states and regions. While all states are broadly similar in this regard, the level of economic development across states generates variation in policy interests. For more advanced states, such observations drive an interest in promoting Lisbon-type objectives over more traditional forms of regional development. Lisbon-type objectives, however, embody implicit challenges, both to the interests of less developed states and regions and to the future of regional policy more generally.

For less advanced states, regional development policies may be preferable over Lisbon-type goals where this implies a greater concentration of funding on less developed states. In the domestic arena however, the specifically regional focus of regional development strategies may potentially draw resources away from emerging economic clusters and upset the fine balance between regional and national level economic restructuring and development. If resources are ultimately diverted away from policies promoting economic development, national governments will eventually favor agglomeration promoting policies over regionally defined strategies. Thus less advanced states are faced with significant equity vs. efficiency tradeoffs and are torn between the objectives of cohesion/redistribution and innovation promotion.

Many define the principal economic actors with reference either to the factors of production (labor and capital), or to conventional trade models (abundant and scarce factors), or with reference to the fortunes of declining and rising economic sectors. Still others construe the major European political-economic debates in terms of the decline of coordinated market economies, in particular in the framework of globalization and European integration (Hooghe, 1998; Streeck and Schmitter, 1991; Streeck, 1999). This article argues that the future politics of Europe is likely to be defined by the politics of European, national and subnational regionalism. The above described paradigm shift drives the re-orientation of economic policy from redistribution to innovation promotion. Regionalism—driven by globalization more generally and European integration in particular—favors a new set of actors defined along a center-periphery dimension. More traditional actors—e.g. labor—are compromised by the contradictions between the supranational character of European integration (or globalization) and by the state-centric structure of European industrial relations systems (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991).

The rise of knowledge as a factor in production (Gilpin, 2001) reinvigorates the “market corrective” role of states, subnational regions and even supranational actors like the EU, pushing them into the role of economic actors. Remaining agnostic regarding

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16 For a detailed discussion of the variety of economic actors arising from the assumptions of various economic models, see Alt et al. (1996).

17 The term paradigm shift may in some senses be inappropriate for economic development processes that, to some extent, have always been the rule. The way in which some economists and governments think about these economic processes has however undergone a significant shift.
arguments about the advantages of state interventionism, there is less controversy over whether states are increasingly engaged in the role of investing in “productive assets”, adding “value” and creating the framework for the production of knowledge or innovation promotion. While competitiveness is the new mantra, it is wielded by states as well as national and subnational regional economic actors (firms and even labor).

Important caveats to the New Economy approach exist. For one, faster economic growth in Europe’s peripheries appears as a potential contradiction to New Economy models and provides some support for neoclassical approaches. Slow growth in Europe’s core has been one of the driving forces behind the interest in re-orienting European policy approaches toward the Lisbon agenda. While it is beyond the parameters of this article to respond adequately to this debate, even some of the more avid and astute proponents of New Economy approaches provide occasionally contradictory data with surprisingly little commentary. Martin, for example, builds an argument around the New Economy approach but then provides data to suggest that the peripheries grew more rapidly over the period 1995-1999 (2003: 22). Moreover, in recent years, the less advanced NMS’s have tended to grow more rapidly than the more advanced OMS’s. Such findings are of course potentially inconsistent with New Economy models.

Although less advanced regions are occasionally assumed to benefit less from economic integration and EU membership—in particular in the New Economy, core-periphery framework—the evidence to support this claim is mixed. Hooghe and Keating, for example, voice a degree of skepticism about the core-periphery model (1994: 369). Such findings generate uncertainty in the calculation of the likely winners and losers from the process of economic integration and EU membership. Moreover, some countries and regions have met with more success than others, suggesting that other factors also play a role—e.g. the specific institutional features of individual countries and regions. Variation in the economic success of Irish, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek regions, for example, is difficult to explain only on the basis of EU-funding.

A thorough reorientation of European economic and regional development policy is however less likely in the near future. Policy reform is mediated by the slowly changing structure of EU regional development constituencies and the interests and relative power of national governments. The longevity of EU regional development policies is presumably a function of the relative disparities in economic development across the EU member states (the greater the economic disparities, the more likely such policies will be short-lived), of the relative policy inertia affecting EU redistributive policies and of the degree to which various actors are favored by the EU institutional decision-making structure. This notwithstanding, significant changes in the distributional structure of EU spending parallel the EU’s enlargement toward Central and Eastern Europe, significantly impacting the fortunes of less developed states and regions. The following sections detail the politics of EU regional policy reform and the outcomes of the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 SCF Financial Perspectives.

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18 Krugman (1987) in particular criticizes the ability of states to intervene effectively.
19 Martin does argue that while there is economic convergence across states, there is economic divergence across Europe’s regions. However he essentially neglects the larger question of what explains convergence across the states of Europe.
The Politics of Regional Policy Reform

Much of the debate over economic and regional policy in the EU is in part driven by a desire to find ways of promoting national, supranational and subnational economic development objectives in Europe when the lion’s share of EU funding is devoted to agricultural (i.e. sectoral) and regional targets. Though this article cannot adequately address the shape of interests at the subnational level (see Ellison, 2007), it does examine the emergence of strong challenges to EU regional policy and their impact on national and supranational level EU politics. In particular, this section argues that the interest and role of national governments is central to understanding the evolving shape of EU regional policy.

Slow economic growth in the advanced core of Europe has inspired considerable interest in a focus on government strategies that are more likely to reinvigorate existing patterns of economic growth and development. Moreover, previous projects intended to kick start European economic growth—in particular the Single Market program and the project of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)—no longer occupy the center stage of the EU’s agenda. Further, the constraints of EMU, the convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact—in particular in the absence of a more fully-developed EU fiscal tool—presumably lead the more advanced EU member states to seek alternative measures for funding regional development.

But presumably the enlargement has most strongly propelled debates on the relative value of EU regional vs. national level economic and regional development policy. The progressive concentration of EU resources on a significant number of less developed economies has disrupted an otherwise finely crafted compromise between more and less advanced EU Member states. The Eastern enlargement’s statistical effect has resulted in the loss of structural and cohesion fund eligibility in most of the former cohesion and other old EU Member states—one of the principal causes of renewed debate. The Lisbon Agenda in particular began to re-orient the EU’s focus toward national and supranational-level policy frameworks with potentially growth promoting or efficiency enhancing features and to re-direct it away from regional policies that have a more redistributional or cohesion producing character—correcting in particular for regional disparities.

The mix of these pressures creates strong incentives for states to pursue quite different strategies of regional development. Rather than transfer resources to the less advanced NMS’s, many of which are already growing at a good clip, political expedience—in particular with respect to the domestic political context—suggests it is wiser to find ways to fund rapid innovation and technological change in the domestic framework. In important ways, this is precisely what the more advanced states have done. Given the failure to shift a significant amount of EU spending over to the Lisbon Agenda (and thus presumably away from the SCF’s) the more advanced states in particular have

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20 The “statistical effect” refers to the former beneficiaries of the structural and cohesion funds who are currently being pushed above the 75% and 90% eligibility barriers due to the inclusion of a significantly large number of less developed economies in the EU’s average GDP per capita.
lobbied to reduce overall EU spending.\textsuperscript{21} Moreover, at the domestic level, individual states have begun to overhaul their regional spending priorities and to revise their thinking on the advantages of EU level spending.\textsuperscript{22}

For the more advanced states, the Lisbon goals represent a mechanism for re-orienting EU-level spending priorities and thereby re-directing some of their focus to the more advanced states. An emphasis on Lisbon-type goals is likely to mean the NMS’s must share more of the EU’s resources with the more advanced states. While the Sapir Report did not explicitly propose more resources be dedicated to the more advanced states, early versions of the revised 2007-2013 Framework Perspective in particular provided for a significant shift in spending toward the strategies of growth and competitiveness (Jouen, 2005: 11).

The less developed NMS’s, on the other hand, are likely to favor SCF funding over support for the Lisbon strategy. Elements of the Lisbon Agenda may help the CEEC’s to firm up ties in particular between domestic and foreign firms and to further promote the development of innovation-oriented economies (Ellison, forthcoming). On the one hand, they would like to develop greater potential for increasing return’s industries. As intended by the Lisbon Agenda, the promotion of R&D and education are key means of achieving this goal. On the other hand, the NMS’s face diverse sets of interests. Less advanced or declining regions may require more traditional forms of support. While the modernization of infrastructure and the improvement of skill levels may prove helpful in these regions, the promotion of R&D may prove less valuable. Moreover, targeted investment promotion strategies intended to boost overall levels of (foreign) investment—now significantly constrained by EU competition and regional policy (ibid)—may prove more fruitful.\textsuperscript{23} As Ellison (forthcoming) finds, the regional development strategies pursued in the EU’s former “cohesion” countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) were predominantly vertical as opposed to horizontal in character.

The Commission’s 2007-2013 Financial Perspective SCF guidelines originally distinguished between the usefulness of Lisbon-type strategies for the CEEC’s and the OMS’s. While these guidelines urged states to earmark 60-75% of structural fund spending for Lisbon-compatible goals, this criterion originally did not apply to the NMS’s.\textsuperscript{24} However, the final version of the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective required all states to pursue Lisbon-type goals.\textsuperscript{25} As Jouen notes, the overlap between the use of SCF-funding and the Lisbon Agenda is strongest in the more advanced regions, while lagging regions tend to employ more diverse strategies of economic development (2005: 7).

\textsuperscript{21} The single most important document in this regard is the Joint Letter signed by the UK, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden that proposed the imposition of this 1\% ceiling on EU expenditure (December 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2003).
\textsuperscript{22} The UK’s vision of future EU regional policy is expressed in A Modern Regional Policy for the United Kingdom and recommends both concentrated EU regional policy spending on the least advanced states along with a re-nationalization of regional policy for the more advanced states (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003: 25-8). For a critical approach to the UK case, see Fothergill (2005).
\textsuperscript{23} Ironically, even some advanced states would prefer to have more leeway to pursue investment promotion strategies. See www.Euractiv.com: “German Government Says it Knows Best what is Good for Growth” (April 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2006).
\textsuperscript{24} See COM (2004) 487 final.
\textsuperscript{25} See www.Euractiv.com: “Structural Funds get Lisbon Makeover” (July, 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2006).
The 2007-2013 Framework Perspective in Context

Concluded every seven years, the EU’s multi-annual Framework Perspectives govern the distribution of EU funds across the Member states. The following discusses the conclusion of the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective in the context of previous Framework Perspectives and the economic development interests of the NMS’s. The following analyzes the degree to which distributional struggles related to innovation promotion as opposed to cohesion/redistribution have pervaded the formulation and conclusion of the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective. The development interests of the more advanced states had a profound impact on the EU’s distribution of resources and had a significantly negative impact on the share of resources made distributed to the NMS’s.

The EU’s multi-annual Framework Perspectives continue to be governed by unanimity. Thus any of the NMS’s theoretically have the right to block decisions failing to meet with their expectations. However the same is also true for the more advanced states. While each Member state is in theory granted equal veto power, the relative voting power of individual Member states is not necessarily one-to-one. States with more to lose from failed agreements (as from threats of exclusion) are more likely to make greater concessions. Nor do the CEEC’s as a potential voting bloc constitute a force that could stop policy proposals in other areas of EU policy regulated by qualified majority voting (QMV). While it is beyond the parameters of this essay to discuss the issue of voting weights and relative power in more detail, an analysis of the conclusion of the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective provides an indication of the relative ability of the CEEC’s to pursue their interests in the New Europe.

The initial Commission proposal for SCF expenditure published in February 2004 was reasonably generous and went some way toward meeting CEE demands for equal treatment. A far greater share of spending was to be concentrated on the less developed economies and the Commission had proposed a 31% increase in overall SCF spending over the entire period (see Table I below; also Bachtler and Wishlade, 2005: 6). By the conclusion of the December 2005 Summit under the UK presidency, this amount was almost cut in half. One of the principal reasons was insistence from the net contributor states on restricting the total level of EU expenditure to approximately 1% of EU GNI. Given the unwillingness, in particular of France, to allow further significant reductions in the CAP expenditure, a good share of the cuts came out of the Structural and Cohesion Fund category.

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26 Recent attempts at EU institutional reform have not altered this fact. Though the Constitutional Treaty is now moribund, it should still be considered a reflection of the possible shape of future reform.
27 While the CEEC’s constitute a “blocking minority” in an EU of 27 members, in an EU of 25 members, they were 13 votes shy of a blocking minority. Moreover, the now moribund Constitutional Treaty would have ensured that even in an EU of 27, the CEEC’s would remain many votes shy of a blocking minority.
28 See the Joint Letter (December 15th, 2003), fn. 21.
29 Though not surprising given both the relative political power of France in the European Union and historical precedent, significant French concessions on CAP reform would have gone a long way to satisfying many of the demands from developing countries at the Doha Round of talks in the WTO. More thoroughgoing WTO and EU reforms have now been postponed until 2008 or later.
The Commission’s February 2004 proposal foresaw a considerable shift in expenditure from the Structural and Cohesion fund categories to the Competitiveness, Growth and Employment category (Heading 1A). As this category corresponds most closely to Lisbon Agenda spending in the European Union, the original Financial Perspective proposal contained significantly larger potential transfers. This category would have more than doubled in size by the end of Financial Perspective 2007-2013, representing a dramatic shift in EU spending priorities. In the final version of the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective, significant reductions ultimately came out of Heading 1A. However, this was paralleled by a significant drop in overall EU expenditure from 1.24% of EU GDP to approximately 1% of EU GDP. Thus what the large, more advanced net contributor states lost in EU expenditure was recouped through reductions in EU budgetary contributions. Moreover, the December 2005 Summit contained some unusual adjustments to the EU’s Common Budget, resulting in substantial reductions of the Austrian, German, Netherlands and Swedish contributions. Thus these top four net contributor states made substantial gains from this final agreement.  

Compared to the levels over the period 2004-2006, CEEC country level SCF distributions exhibit a significant rise for the period 2007-2013. However, along with the overall downward push in total expenditure, there was a progressive upward creep in the number and size of individual allocations (special provisions and transitional arrangements) made to a broad range of OMS’s. The previous 4% of GDP threshold was lowered still further (however slightly) and a number of countries successfully wrangled additional envelopes or transitional expenditures not present in prior drafts of the agreement.

Despite resistance from the European Parliament (EP) to the final package decided in December 2005, the final terms of the Inter-Institutional Agreement signed between the Council of the European Union and the EP only added 4 billion Euros to the total package. Just over 50% of this additional amount (2.1 billion Euros) was added to the budget of Heading 1A. In this regard, an institution typically known for favoring European integration came to the defense of the OMS’s.

More telling perhaps is the juxtaposition of the final 2007-2013 Financial Perspective with its historical antecedents—in particular Delors Packages I and II. At that time, the old Cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) were able to achieve significant increases in EU SCF expenditure—in particular due to the simultaneous pursuit of important economic integration projects: the Single Market and

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30 VAT contributions set at 0.30% for other countries were reduced to 0.225% for Austria, 0.15% for Germany, and 0.10% for the Netherlands and Sweden. Further both the Netherlands and Sweden were granted total reductions in their GNI contribution of 605 and 150 million Euros respectively. See the Presidency Conclusions on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 (Doc 15915/05, CADREFIN 268, Dec. 19. 2005: 29). I am indebted to my colleague Miklos Somai for this observation. 


32 I draw here liberally from Szemlér (2005).
EMU. A similar politically opportune context is lacking for the CEEC’s. Moreover, several years of slow economic growth in Western Europe along with a greater concentration of Regional Development funds on Central and East European countries diminished Western Europe’s appetite for greater SCF expenditure.

Thus, the CEEC’s have been left with little bargaining room. While the NMS’s now enjoy full voting rights within the EU, they have not been able to achieve noteworthy concessions. Moreover, under existing voting rules, this is not likely in the future unless parallel integration projects can be leveraged for greater concessions. While the project of constitutional reform looms on the horizon, it offers little opportunity to effectively claim—as did the creation of the Single Market and EMU—that deeper integration involves high costs for the less developed economies. Thus, for the time being at least, no similar integration project of comparable magnitude is in sight.

A thumbnail regression analysis of the SCF allocations across the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 Framework Perspectives provides some methodological rigor to the above analysis. In addition to the explanatory variables adopted in Ellison (2006b)—level of economic development (pcdgp), population (pop), unemployment (un) and share of public support for European integration (pubsupp)—the following additional independent variables are tested: the number of Member states at the time the distribution is decided (numms) and a dummy variable for New and Old Member states to test for the role of region (region). The dependent variable is the total annual amount of funding an individual state is eligible to receive during the funding period. The data is analyzed using the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) method of regression.

The results of this analysis provide important insights into EU distributional politics. For one, the role of region loses significance in the 2007-2013 distribution compared to that of 2000-2006 (see Table II below). In the first period, region has a strongly negative and highly significant effect on the SCF distribution—on average OMS’s received 2.234 billion Euros more than NMS’s. As Ellison (2006b) argues, the CEEC’s were strongly disadvantaged in the first years of EU membership. This disadvantage has moderated. In the 2007-2013 period there is a slight advantage for CEEC’s—on average NMS’s receive 394 million Euros more than OMS’s—though the coefficient is neither stable nor significant. While the Commission’s proposal was the least discriminatory across states—reflected by the very small negative coefficient on the

33 See in particular Lange (1993).
34 More complete information on methodology, variable selection and data sources is provided in Annex I.
35 The explanatory variables chosen in this model were those the EU argues matter with respect to the distribution of SCF’s (the level of economic development, unemployment and the size of the affected population). In addition, following Carrubba (1997), Ellison (2006b) tests for the potential impact of declining public support for European integration on raising EU financial support.
36 For the NMS’s, the annual amount is only calculated for the years of membership (2004-2006), as opposed to 2000-2006 for the OMS’s. Since not all states are able to make full use of the available EU funds, the total amount of funding states are eligible to receive may differ from the amounts they are able to put to use.
37 The same basic caveats that applied to the analysis in Ellison (2006b) apply here. Since the unit of analysis is the country, this analysis is inadequately sensitive to regional variation—in particular in the level of economic development, unemployment and public support for European integration. While cohesion funds are granted to states, structural funds are explicitly intended for regions.
region variable and no consistency in this finding across states—the final 2007-2013 Framework Perspective tended to favor the NMS’s. The rise in funding for the NMS’s however pales in comparison to the far higher amounts given to Western states during the 2000—2006 Framework perspective.

Per capita GDP, public support and unemployment all begin to approach significance and have a strong impact on the NMS distribution of funding under the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective. In the previous period, only country size (population) appeared to have any significant impact on the distribution of funding. Oddly however, per capita GDP has the opposite effect from that predicted in the NMS’s (more advanced NMS’s received higher levels of funding). And public support has the opposite effect from that expected in the OMS’s (lower levels of support were negatively correlated with higher spending). The decision to allocate greater amounts of funding to the more advanced NMS’s may relate to their greater potential to absorb EU SCF-funding. Population remains the single most powerful explanatory variable across the NMS’s under the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective. Along with the unusually high degree of fit for the NMS regression model (93% of the variance is explained), this suggests politics continues to play much less of a role in the distribution of SCF-funding in the NMS’s than in the OMS’s or across the New and Old Member states.

The prediction that the number of Member states has a negative impact on total funding requires more attention. In the combined data, there is a positive though far from consistent or significant relationship between the number of member states and the allocation of EU funding. Adding one additional Member State adds approximately 10.6 million Euros to the total budget. However, much of the change here can be explained by the large and statistically significant increase in funding for the NMS’s between the two periods. Funding levels for the OMS’s have declined by almost the same amount relative to the number of Member states. This finding is marginally (but only marginally) commensurate with the intention of concentrating funding on the less developed states. As noted above, the increase in NMS funding pales in comparison to the dramatically preferential treatment of OMS’s under the 2000-2006 Framework Perspective. Moreover, the greatly moderated impact of per capita GDP—the coefficient in considerably smaller than in the previous period and is far from significant—under the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective suggests the OMS’s are again receiving surprisingly large shares of SCF-funding.

[Table II: Explaining Variation in SCF Funding]

Figures 1A and 1B below confirm these general suspicions. Using the distributional logic derived by the regression equation for the combined set of Member states for the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective, Figure 1A provides data on both actual and predicted SCF allocations. These predicted values and those that follow should be treated with some caution. While the goodness of fit is reasonably high when actual values for the NMS’s alone are regressed on the range of independent variables included here, it is substantially lower when considering the actual values only for the OMS’s or for all states (see the respective “adjusted r²” values in Table II).
Portugal, Spain and Sweden) received substantially more than they would have received had this logic been applied more consistently across all states. For the NMS’s the differences between the predicted and actual values are even more substantial. Apart from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the NMS’s would have received significantly larger sums.

Figure 1B is even more compelling. This figure provides data on both predicted allocations based on the logic defined by the regression equation derived from the OMS’s. In this case only five OMS’s (Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK) received more than they would have had the 2000-2006 OMS logic been consistently applied across all states. For the NMS’s, the differences between predicted and actual values are more substantial and—apart from the same three countries—the NMS’s generally would have received larger shares of SCF-funding. However, in this case, what is most striking is the overall magnitude of funding the NMS’s would have received. Based on the 2000-2006 OMS logic, total funding amounts (compare the values on the y-axis in Figures 1A and 1B) would have been approximately twice as large as those allocated according to the logic for the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective. Comparing the 2000-2006 OMS logic to actual (not predicted) figures for the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective, the NMS’s would have received approximately 4.4 times more funding and the OMS’s approximately 18.7 times less funding.

Discussion

At least four issues will presumably remain at the center of discussion in future reforms of EU redistributional politics. For one, contradictions between the redistributive, cohesion-producing and innovation promoting goals of EU regional development and national-level economic policy clearly need to be worked out. In particular, a better understanding of which policy tools work best at different levels of national and subnational regional economic development would be particularly helpful. Both policy approaches have positive features that should presumably be retained and improved.

For another, future policy efforts need to resolve or improve upon the problem of variation in and balance between the interests of more and less developed states. As suggested herein, due to the increasing degree of concentration of SCF funds, neglecting this problem may ultimately lead to the future withering away of EU SCF policy. Support for these policies—in particular in the context of slow growth in the European core economies—is likely to be eroded by domestic and national level interests in economic development in the more advanced states. However, accommodations should presumably not be made at the expense of the NMS’s.

Third, the big question at the national and EU-level remains how best to distribute available funds to the sundry interested groups and parties and what political, economic and social logic and institutional structure should govern that distribution. As suggested herein, current strategies of economic development are likely to create strong incentives to further centralize the control of EU SCF funding in the hands of central or state level governments (see also Ellison, 2007). This is likely to give rise to significant domestic/national-level struggles over the use and implementation of EU funding. Since
these funding amounts are significant, one can expect domestic national-level political battles to become more polarized.

Finally, the ultimate challenge in the future EU may well be the equitable and/or efficient distribution of resources between the more and less developed regions and states of Europe. The real challenge in the future Europe may be how best to manage the competing interests of regions, states and subnational regions. As this analysis suggests, the more advanced regions of Europe have very different interests in European governance than the less developed regions of Europe. Increasing economic disparity across these regions only reinforces the likely rivalry of these competing interests. The re-nationalization of economic and regional development policy—in particular in the more advanced states—provides one alternative policy proposal for the New Europe. However, the more advanced and savvy regions and states may ultimately decide not to forego the potential coordination of economic management that European integration and EU-level decision-making capacity enables.

Conclusion

Despite the inherently universalizing logic of globalization, economic space has simultaneously become smaller, more local and taken on a distinctively sub-national, regional character. As intimated more than two decades ago in a trend-setting book The Second Industrial Divide,\(^{39}\) regional structures of economic development are gradually becoming more pronounced, a phenomenon only likely to intensify as European economic and political integration progresses. More and more, EU policy is beginning to reflect this shift in economic structure. The gradual paradigm shift outlined above has led states to lobby for reform, reduce EU expenditure, limit the potential range of NMS benefits and possibly even to consider withdrawal from the Union.\(^{40}\) While the declining cohesion of coordinated market economies may explain some of this shift from redistribution to innovation promotion, a more significant share is easily encompassed by the emergence of economic regionalism and change in the strategic thinking about economic and regional policy goals.

Overcoming the costs of economic adjustment via redistributive transfers from winners to losers is rendered problematic both by thinking on the appropriate strategies to pursue in order to achieve greater levels of economic development, as well as by the institutional and political structure in which such policies are created. The large and more advanced states—most of them net contributors to the EU budget—have lobby hard both to increase the weight of Lisbon Agenda type spending and to reduce overall expenditures on the SCF.

This notwithstanding, the transition from the 2000-2006 to the 2007-2013 Framework Perspectives will benefit the NMS’s. At least for the next seven years, Central and East European states will enjoy significantly higher expenditures than during the first 3 years of EU membership (2004-2006). Due to the concentration EU SCF spending on the least advanced Member states, the NMS’s will be the principal recipients

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\(^{39}\) Piore and Sabel (1984).

\(^{40}\) This may be one way to interpret the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty.
for the upcoming framework period. Per person, these states will on average receive 237 Euros per year compared to 64 Euros per year for the OMS’s. What will happen with future framework periods is more complicated and depends both on how the European economy performs in the coming years and on how many states are able to gain membership status by 2014.

Whether the allocations will be enough to compensate the NMS for the costs of economic adjustment, provide an adequate foundation for continued economic structuring and assist them in fulfilling the requirements of compliance with the EU regulatory framework is more problematic. The financial and regulatory demands of EU membership are significant. Several of the NMS’s (and some of the OMS’s) have already been the target of the EU’s excessive budget deficit procedure. Central and East European expenditures on EU membership are high and the project of economic restructuring and adjustment is far from complete.

Distributional struggles are likely to test the limits of the New Europe for years to come. As noted at the outset, the future consequences of this general trend are difficult to predict. As with all reforms and innovations, the politics of European integration are likely to slow the process, leading to piecemeal, incremental change. On the one hand, as the EU grows in size, its characteristic policy features may gradually “wither away”, with the EU looking more and more like a trading club and less like a political union. This outcome coincides broadly with conventional speculation about the contradictions between widening and deepening. On the other hand, the alternative is that EU regional policy gradually be adapted to respond more strongly to the needs and interests of the more advanced EU Member states. Predictably, the more advanced states will either lobby hard for reform of the existing status quo, attempt to reduce the overall amount of EU expenditure, lobby to limit the future boundaries of the EU or ultimately threaten withdrawal from the union. In some ways, all four of these possible outcomes seem to be occurring, though the severity of any rupture is overstated.

Bibliography:


41 For a contrasting viewpoint, see Kopstein and Reilly (2006).


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Sources: See Annex. (\( t \)-statistics in parentheses).
Figures 1A and 1B:  
The Discrimination Gap Revisited

Actual and Predicted Annual 2007-2013 SCF Allocations  
(Based on General Logic for 2007-2013 Framework Perspective, Euros per Person)

Actual and Predicted Annual 2007-2013 SCF Allocations  
(Based on OMS Logic from 2000-2006 Framework Perspective, Euros per Person)
ANNEX:

Dependent Variable:
Total Allocation of Structural and Cohesion Funds. All data used are annual amounts derived by dividing the total allocation by the appropriate number of years. All data are in millions of Euros at 2004 prices.

- 2000-2006:

- 2004 Commission Proposal:
  - Ostensibly from the European Commission.42

- 2007-2013:

Independent Variables:
- Population: Data is for the years 2001, 2003 and 2004 (from the Eurostat online database).
- Per capita GDP: real per capita GDP at PPP’s, data for the years 2001, 2003 and 2004 (from the Eurostat online database).
- Public Support for EU membership: data is for the years 2002 (February), 2004 (February) and 2005 (Oct.-Nov.) and has been taken from the Eurobarometer (2004, 2005) and the Candidate Country Eurobarometer (2002).
- Unemployment: Data is for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (from the Eurostat online database).
- Region: NMS=1, OMS=0
- Commission: if the proposal stems from the Commission, Commission=1, “0” if the proposal derives from a final agreement between the Council of Ministers and the EP.

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42 Considerable secrecy surrounded these initial figures. The table of proposed allocations used in this analysis stems from a private secondary source and allegedly from the Commission itself. It is almost identical to a table published in Jouen (2005: 29). At the time of the proposal, the Commission disavowed the existence of any such table.