Overcoming the Clash of Civilizations: EU Peace Strategies for Balkan Ethno-Sectarian Nationalist Conflicts

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Introduction

This study focuses on trends in relationships between Serb and Bulgarian ethno-sectarian majorities and their respective, Muslim minorities within a dynamic international systemic context. It does not focus on the Kosovar and ethnic Albanian national minority case more broadly throughout the Balkans, partly because Kosovo has already achieved de facto and will soon achieve de jure separation from Serbia, and partly because of space limitations. More attention is on the Bulgarian case as an example of relatively successful conflict resolution. For comparison purposes, the Serbian case is the Sandzak, a historic region straddling Serbia and Montenegro which is home to a concentration of Slavophone Muslims. Serbian nationalism meanwhile continues to suffer setbacks along with the post Cold War decline of intensity of Great Power willingness to support it as an ally in Southeastern Europe. After the separation of Montenegro from the confederation of Serbia and Montenegro, and the imminent separation secession of Kosovo, the Sandzak region, along with the Presovo valley with its ethnic Albanian population, is most likely to be one within Serbia, together with Voivodina, to witness more demands for autonomy, if not outright secession to join Bosnia. Whereas Voivodina’s largest ethnic minority consists of Hungarians, the Muslims of the historic region of Sandzak (part of which lies in now-independent Montenegro) has an ethno-sectarian concentration of “Bosniaks.” They tend to self-identify with the neighboring Bosniaks with their capital in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the point that their preferred name is “Bosniak.”

The fact that continuing international military intervention is the primary mechanism by which to prevent most if not all of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling under the control of Belgrade and Zagreb serves as a tempering factor against a strengthening of Bosniak nationalism in the Sandzak. Indeed, a comparatively weak capability to establish a sovereign Bosniak state relative to greater Croat and Serb nationalist aspirations has been an inhibiting factor in the development and expression of Bosniak nationalism overall. Consequently, in the early 1990s, Bosniak strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized attracting international intervention to create a political environment to avoid submission to Serb or Croat sovereignty. Bosniak self-expression lacks the requisite capability due partly to Bosniak dispersed regional demographic distribution to allow for genuine Bosniak sovereignty. The Bosniak primary intensity identity community therefore must remain dependent and ultimately subservient to the jurisdiction of the state agents of the international community in order not to fall under Croat or Serb control. Cottam and Cottam therefore describe Bosniak identity politics in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as seeking subnational self-expression. This subnational self-expression movement arguably continues among the Bosniaks of Serbia’s Sandzak. One would therefore expect that in Serbia proper, the Sandzak Bosniaks who identify at a primary intensity

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level with the Slavophone Serb Muslim community will continue a similar strategy of seeking international protection from Serb nationalism. Meanwhile, the Montenegrans in the part of historic Sandzak in Montenegro arguably have little to fear from the prospect of Montenegrans' nationalism. Montenegrans' self-determination is itself dependent on maintaining benign relations with NATO member great powers to gain the prosperity benefits of EU integration for a state with a total population of approximately 700,000. Along with the relative absence of perception of threat, Bosniaks of Montenegrans Sandzak also can look forward to the social mobility and social creativity options available through Euro-Atlantic economic and political integration of a stable Montenegro.

The US and its allies had been following a relatively low cost (for NATO) stabilization strategy with regard to the states of the former Yugoslavia, focusing on stabilizing these new independent states within their existing, Tito-era republic boundaries. Conveniently, European Union integration would arguably be a plausible high-level tactical component for such a stabilization strategy. The international community has lacked the intensity of commitment necessary to confront the difficult task of addressing and reconciling the overlapping and conflicting national self-determination demands of the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats and ethnic Albanians before the outbreak of warfare. As the escalating mass violence itself generates broader international political crises, then the international community has accommodated these demands, initially on the basis of particular historical relationships, i.e. Austria, German and Italian sympathy for Slovene and Croat national self-determination vis-a-vis Belgrade. As NATO turned against Milosevic’s Serbia, Kosovan nationalism gained the consequent political benefits of being another, eventually NATO-allied adversary of Milosevic. Hence, subsequent developments have led to the present situation in which Kosovo with the support of the international community will become independent. Meanwhile, Serb irredentist demands for unification with Serbs outside of the boundaries of the Republic of Serbia, which are a legacy of the Titoist regime, remain anathema according to the international community vis-à-vis Bosnia, for example. This impasse for Serb nationalism will continue at least until Serbia succeeds in generating more influence among the most influential Contact Group members (Russia, US, UK, Germany, France, Italy). Russian President Vladimir Putin has made assertive statements against the secession of Kosovo, arguing that it will set a precedent for international resolution of other secessionist disputes, such as in Cyprus and in Georgia. Yet, Russia in 2003 withdrew all of its forces from the Balkans with the exception of Moldova. In fact, Russia (and China) has at times indicated that it will acquiesce to the separation of Kosovo from Serbia, albeit it expects an appropriate trade-off for accepting this outcome.

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3 Cottam and Cottam, p. 264.
4 Cottam and Cottam, p. 265.
5 BBC Monitoring Service, “Putin's annual news conference for international journalists - full text” Source: RTR Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 0900 gmt 31 Jan 06, BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Feb 01, 2006 at http://search.ft.com/search/articles.html on 20.2.06.
The lack of coherent administrative borders for historic, ethnically-concentrated regions as well as restrictions on electoral democracy have been significant factors in explaining why Bulgarian Turkish nationalism and Bosniak nationalism among the Sandzak Muslims have not been a primary intensity communal political motivation for these two “minority” groups. Evidently with the aim of preventing or weakening any Sandzak national identity claims, the Yugoslav authorities divided historic Sandzak among Montenegro and Serbia. The Serb authorities have further gerrymandered and weakened Sandzak Bosniak political influence by allocating its part of Sandzak’s municipalities among administrative regional “okruzi” with illogical geographic borders in order to dilute Boszniak political influence in policy making. In the case of the Bulgarian Turks, the Bulgarian central government has refused to allow administrative gubernatorial districts to select governors through direct elections. As in the Sandzak, local electoral mechanisms determine Bulgarian mayors and city council composition. The Bulgarian authorities have refrained from accepting proposals from the Council of Europe recommending the direct election of the regional council for each of the 28 districts into which constitutional reforms divided Bulgaria in 1995. The current law on local self-government has the central government appoint the governor for each of these 28 districts. Since 1999, this governor then chairs a regional development council consisting of the elected mayor of each municipal district plus one municipal assembly member.

The Post Milosievic International Systemic Context: Euro-Atlantic Integration

Balkan nationalisms continue to be a challenge to current trends in the development of the ESDP as part of a peace strategy in the light of the perceived international community failure to prevent the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia. Recognizing national self-determination as a human right for communities aspiring for national sovereignty should be part of the formulation of a peace strategy for Europe and elsewhere. One highlight of the June 2001 Gothenburg European Council (in the midst of successful international intervention to prevent full-scale civil war in Macedonia) was the formal approval of the “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts,” with its focus on preventive diplomacy including the integration of civilian and military functions under the evolving European Security and Defence Policy. Conflict prevention was a prominent theme in the formal statements of European Council conclusions, as well as in the proposals at the later EU Constitutional Convention. Implementation of the “rule of law” in conflict-vulnerable areas is part of the mantra of the prerequisites for conflict prevention, next to prevention of human rights abuses. The June 2001 Gothenburg European Council’s “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts” elaborated on the SF/HR’s report for the December 2000 Nice Council, emphasizing that conflict prevention is an essential part of the ESDP:

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3. Conflict prevention calls for a co-operative approach to facilitate peaceful solutions to disputes and implies addressing the root-causes of conflicts. It is an important element of all aspects of the external relations of the European Union. The development of ESDP has, since the outset, been intended to strengthen the EU’s capacity for action in the crucial field of conflict prevention.  

The “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts” is a peace strategy through a diplomacy of human rights (broadly understood):

The international community has a political and moral responsibility to act to avoid the human suffering and the destruction of resources caused by violent conflicts. The European Union is a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development. The process of enlargement will extend this community of peace and progress to a wider circle of European states.

The Swedish Presidency’s report to the Gothenburg European Council on the ESDP emphasizes imposition of the “rule of law” to prevent violent conflict through human rights support:

I. RULE OF LAW
2. The EU attaches great importance to the strengthening of the rule of law as a tool for both conflict prevention and crisis management. Experience shows that strengthening the rule of law is a pre-condition for consolidation of peace and security. International efforts to strengthen, and where necessary re-establish, credible local police forces cannot be fully successful if the police are not complemented by a functioning judicial and penal system.

Despite the comparative success in avoiding violent ethnic conflict since 1990 in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Turks also have a range of grievances stemming from historical, systematic marginalization including the critical absence of their high-or mid-level representation in the Bulgarian military, internal security and diplomatic service. Strengthening overall EU capabilities includes a focus on building a judicial and enforcement capacity:

6. […] In such a situation, the re-establishment of local judicial and penal systems should be initiated as soon as possible. While rule of law missions would usually

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11 “Presidency Report.”
12 “Presidency Report.”
be deployed as a complement to a police component, they could also be undertaken without such a component. In any given mission, rapid build-up of local capacity and subsequent hand-over to local ownership is essential.\textsuperscript{13}

The authority of the state will have legitimacy, i.e. “local ownership,” to the extent to which a peace strategy is successful in promoting a prevailing view among the different ethno-sectarian groups within the territorial community of the state that the authorities are representative of and accountable to their respective communal identity values. From the perspective of the broader international system in the form of the United Nations, in order to create this “culture of peace,” the source of it in political perceptions and their relationship to attitudes and values requires explication.\textsuperscript{14} The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has taken up the issue of formulating the content of promoting a “culture of peace” from the perspective of international law within the UN system.\textsuperscript{15} From a political psychological perspective, a critical prerequisite for the establishment of a “culture of peace,” at a societal level requires the establishment of a primary allegiance with the territorial community whose boundaries correspond with the boundaries of the state. A mismatch between primary ethnic and religious identities and existing territorial boundaries has been a primary context for the emergence of violent nationalist conflict in the Balkans and elsewhere. Indeed, promotion of this “good” form of territorial status quo nationalism so that the typical citizen perceived all ethnic groups as a legitimate part of the citizenry of the state is a theme in much of the policy analysis literature focusing on the peaceful resolution of conflict in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{16} The model typically is the ideal-typical American one; America from this perspective provides examples of inclusive, good, “civic” nationalism which uses liberal political and economic values to overcome ethnic, racial, and religious divisions to incorporate all groups as loyal citizens.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, ideally, in the

\textsuperscript{13} “Presidency Report.”


\textsuperscript{17} Project on Ethnic Relations, The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience, 29-30 June and 18 December 2001, Sofia, Bulgaria, p. 1, at http://www.per-usa.org on 9.6.06. Note that this report also highlights that a purposive, regionally-unique decision by the Bulgarian Turkish minority
context of Euro-Atlantic integration, the leadership of the different ethnic groups within the state increasingly should seek political legitimation via their respective constituencies through recognition and confirmation of the policies of each other while striving cooperatively to implement regionally European Union standards. Nevertheless, with the continuing disintegration of Yugoslavia, clearly, the identification of the state as representing the ethnic cultural majority community and minorities as, at best, guests indicates that ethno-sectarian identifications remain paramount. Promotion of a primary intensity attachment with their respective state territorial communities among the different ethnic groups comprising the “national” political communities of the Balkans remains a challenge. It will likely not succeed in some, just as it did not succeed despite 40 years of policy efforts to do so in Tito’s Yugoslavia. It also failed after 70 years of brutal Communist assimilation policy in the USSR as well.

The EU obviously plays an important role in post-Milosievic efforts to engage in state building in Southeast Europe. It thereby serves to reinforce the stabilization approach of the international community to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. The prospect of the relative individual and group opportunities for utilitarian gain from European integration are an influential factor motivating actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who would rather not cooperate, to do so. The current unwillingness of Belgrade and Zagreb actively to encourage their Bosnian ethno-sectarian compatriots to aspire towards unification with their respective patron states is certainly a critical factor motivating this cooperation. Similarly, this same combination of positive and negative incentives from the international community will also encourage the Bosniaks of Sandzak to cooperate with Belgrade to achieve progress towards European Union integration to the extent that it appears feasible. According to a scenario of renewed violent conflict regarding the separation of Kosovo and the unification of Republika Srpska with Serbia, and European Union integration no longer appearing feasible, then an upsurge in the nationalist components of Sandzak Bosnian identity should be more likely, i.e. an increase in pan-Islamic appeals.

Parallels here might be found in the intensely violent conflict in Chechnya, with Chechen nationalism having acquired an Islamist element, partly as a consequence of a Chechen search for support to counteract the Russian comparative power advantage.

leadership to choose an integrationist path is a critical factor for the lack of violent ethnic communal conflict in Bulgaria, although it does state that structural factors may also play a part (pp. 2, 11, 12, 19).

The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience, p. 12


Serb nationalism is apparently becoming more salient in the Serb policy making process along with the continuing challenges to Serb nationalism in the form of the loss of Montenegro and the impending separation of Kosovo. See for example Daniel Dombey and Neil MacDonald, “Tensions with Serbs raise fears over links with EU,” Financial Times, 19.6.06 at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/b6a42060-f12f-11da-84f3-0000779e2340.html on 26.6.06.

The claim that the Chechen insurgency began as an independence movement but acquired a
Balkan State-Level Context In a Dynamic International Environment

The cyclical history of violent abuse of the Turkish and Muslim minority in Bulgaria is well-documented. Consequently, from the perspective of nationalism in relation to conflict, the analyst confronts a mystery: Bulgaria should not be as peaceful has it has been since 1989. Stereotypical portrayals of Muslim minorities as prone to militant Islamist influence in the post 11 September 2001 international systemic environment should be in evidence in the media. Moreover, the lack of strong Bulgarian nationalist assimilationist or expulsive policies towards the Turkish and Muslim minority is surprising. Reciprocally, more evidence at least for Bulgarian Turkish nationalist mass behavior should also be present in Bulgaria. Yet, using the search function on the 3-year database at FT.com which includes BBC monitoring service reports, with the keywords “Bulgaria” and “Wahhabi,” only one article emerged from the BBC monitoring service. This 2004 article was rather one from Serbia, claiming among other things, that two al-Qaeda operatives had set up a cell in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. Nothing emerged from the BBC monitoring service’s coverage of the Bulgarian media. Western media note that Bulgarian media regularly claims a rise Salafist/Wahhabi education activity in Bulgaria but these reports appear to be sensationalist or reflect leadership faction power struggles. Claims of a significant popular following in Bulgaria do not have corroboration from Western or Bulgarian security services or external independent observers.

In the Balkans, Muslim minorities have undergone the political awareness change process within the context of ethnic nation state formation, albeit with the cultural community including sectarian community boundaries as a component. As predominates in Southeastern Europe, “Muslim” or “Turk” has therefore come to define an ethno-sectarian minority. Most [but not all, e.g. the Roma (Gypsies)] of the comparatively large minorities have an ethnic motherland/nation


See, for example, Risto Karajkov, “The Young and the Old: Radical Islam Takes Root in the Balkans,” May 3, 2006, http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/2335.cfm, on 9.5.07, reprinting this article from Transitions Online (www.tol.cz) which highlights, as in Macedonia, that charges of Wahhabism reflect factional leadership struggles without having a significant following among the Muslim mass public.

Observers note that the initial phase of the Communist era (until 1958) witnessed the authorities adopting a comparatively liberal and supportive policy direction towards the Turkish Muslim minority, devoting resources to schools, libraries, newspapers and university education which previous regimes had not permitted. The result was to succeed in co-opting and integrating much of what became the Communist-era elite among this minority into the political identity of Socialist Bulgaria Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Turks of Bulgaria,” December 1999, p. 17 at www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria-turks.doc on 20.6.06.)
state to which they look for political support.\textsuperscript{25} The same holds true for Bulgarian Turks; a consensus apparently exists within the academic community that the prevailing view among Bulgarian Turks historically and presently includes an intense self-identification with Turkey as the motherland state.\textsuperscript{26} This identification with a regional patron state has not historically prevented intercommunal violence which has approached genocidal levels at times.\textsuperscript{27} It does, however, create a local political context which has not initially been favorable for pan-Islamism among ethnic minorities instead of pan-Turanism. On the other hand, to the extent that ethnic secular elites among Muslim minorities fail to deliver on these community self-expression demands, allowing the dysfunctional and intolerable political limbo to continue in places like Kosovo and the Sandzak, then pan-Islamism may become more attractive as a means by which to draw upon transnational resources to mobilize the leverage necessary to change the status quo.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} The International Crisis Group agreed to use the term “Bosniaks” for the Slavic Muslims of the Sandzak (Novi Pazar) region of Serbia, thereby implying that the Slavic Muslims of Serbia are indeed a national minority in that they have a national patron state in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina (International Crisis Group, “Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten,” Europe Report N°162 – 8 April 2005 at www.crisisgroup.org on 3 June 2006). The implication that Bosnia-Herzegovina is the national state of Slavic Muslims neighboring Serbs arguably reinforces the political attitude that the states of the Balkans serve to represent ethno-sectarian groups, obstructing the development of institutionally-focused, more inclusive community identifications, which is supposedly is the major task confronting post-Dayton, multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the Republic of Macedonia.

\textsuperscript{26} Nuray Ekici, “The Diaspora of the Turks of Bulgaria in Turkey,” (Berlin: European Migration Centre), p. 8 at www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj41_pdf/ekici.pdf on 20.6.06. Ekici cites Dr. Antonina Zhelyazkova’s work here, as well as notes that rhetorically at least, the Turkish government has declared itself to be the homeland of the Turkish Muslim minorities of the Balkans and to which they should emigrate (pp. 12-13). Mutafchieva highlights (p. 27, 32) that Kemalism had a strong appeal for the Turks of Bulgaria which Ankara promoted, which the Bulgarian authorities in the interwar period countered by promoting Islamic values: Prof. Vera Mutafchieva, “The Turk, the Jew and the Gypsy,” in Antonina Zhelyazkova et al, Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria (Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations Foundation, 1994).

\textsuperscript{27} Andrey Ivanov, “Minority Nationalism in the Balkans: the Bulgarian Case,” Institute for Market Economics, p. 3 at http://ime-bg.org/pdf_docs/papers/minority.pdf on 21.6.06. The Institute for Market Economics is a prestigious, Western-funded policy analysis organization in Sofia, Bulgaria.

In the mass politics era, instances of intense ethno-sectarian conflict had occurred in Bulgaria beginning in the nineteenth century. Bulgarian Turks had Turkey as a “mother country” with which to identify, and refugees fled there, rather than to other parts of Bulgaria. In Bosnia, the intermixture of groups, together with the fact that Bosnian Muslims were Slavic whose identification with Turkey was historical (the Ottoman Empire), rather than current, meant that this conflict mitigation valve of escape to the national mother country was not as readily an option; the Bosnian Muslims had no other home other than their own country.

Unlike in the past, the ethnic Bulgarian majority today comparatively tends not to view the Turks of Bulgaria as an intense challenge to Bulgarian national values, including national irredentist unity, or at least not anywhere near as intensely as the Serbs viewed Croats and Muslims as a challenge. Internal republic boundaries becoming international boundaries has not been a perceived challenge which Bulgaria faces in relation to its own national interests and aspirations. Those aspirations, to the extent that they exist, still focus on Macedonia if they focus anywhere. In this sense, then, Bulgaria is more likely to have a complex view of Greater Albanian aspirations since many view it as a challenge to the integrity of Macedonia. At the same time, Bulgarians worry about the “demonstration effect” of Kosovo secession on Bulgaria’s Turks, but as long as Ankara does not encourage or support Turkish secessionist aspirations, then the Bulgarian Turks cannot have any hope of succeeding in any such aspirations. In this sense, then, Bulgarian Turkish identity self-expression is likely to be in the subnational category. A combination of shared sovereignty and utilitarian integration strategies are therefore more likely to be successful in integrating the Turks resident in the state of Bulgaria into a political community whose evolution is likely to be in the direction of creation a new culture. 29 In other words, for the state of Bulgaria sustainably to develop, the core community culture for it should evolve to create a third, amalgamated culture. Meanwhile, while not seeking political autonomy, Bulgarian Turk self-expression occurs within the framework of a utilitarian integration strategy within an EU-focused Bulgaria, with the de facto Bulgarian Turkish “Movement for Rights and Freedoms” (MRF) providing political party representation to the Bulgarian Turks. 30

The negative and romantic stereotype components of Bulgaria self-identity have the Turks and their religion as the essential “other.” It has become the “other” ethno-sectarian group against which Bulgarian national identity community struggled politically and at great cost to gain national self-determination. Many decades of national education policy and historiography have propagated the theme of the 500-year “Ottoman Yoke.” Meanwhile, historically it has accompanied periodic violent efforts at expulsion or assimilation which have reinforced this negative image. 31 This stereotypical national identification of self in opposition to the political power of the Turks has been part of the early familial and formal educational socialization process producing generations of Bulgarian citizens. At the same time, centuries of cohabitation on the Balkan peninsula have also produced interpersonal cultural features which promote

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29 Cottam and Cottam, pp. 267-75.
31 The typical Bulgarian term which emerges in conversations with this writer is “Turskoto robstvo,” which should translate as the “Turkish slavery” or the “Turkish enslavement,” but the standard English translation or term has become the “Ottoman Yoke.”
peaceful coexistence. These statements apply not only to ethnic groups on Bulgarian territory, but throughout the Balkans.\textsuperscript{32}

In years past, international attention had been turned to Bulgaria as a possible scene for violent communal conflict due to the most recent episode of state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing in the 1980s, beginning in 1986 and ending with the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989. USSR Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev launched “perestroika” [restructuring] and eventually ended the USSR’s vast economic subsidies to its client regimes in Eastern Europe. Predominantly in the form of cheap fossil fuel supplies, the end of these subsidies intensified greatly the economic and political crises of the Brezhnev “stagnation” period throughout Warsaw Pact states and helped set the stage for their eventual collapse.

An appreciation of Bulgaria’s very close association with the USSR hegemon even by Warsaw Treaty Organization standards is essential.\textsuperscript{33} It is critical to understanding Bulgarian political behavior during the Communist period, and therefore after the Communist period as well. Bulgaria’s reputation as the closest ally of the USSR is one which appears to have a general consensus as being true. It is also one which the Soviet leadership, and later the Russian leadership, also viewed as true.\textsuperscript{34} The Bulgarian Communist authorities transferred most closely and most enthusiastically to Bulgaria the public policy initiatives of the Soviet regime. With regard to minority policies, the Bulgarian Marxist-Leninist regime justified forced assimilation of minorities as a stage in the creation of worldwide proletariat. It would make the Bulgarian Turks (and the other minorities as well) into the next-stage, Bulgarian proto-version of the future, universal New Socialist Man. In reality, as Maria Koinova notes, “Communist nationalism” came to replace “Communist internationalism” following the death of Stalin in 1953 and

\textsuperscript{32} See Antonina Zhelyazkova et al, Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria (Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations Foundation, 1994), e.g. p. XV and Prof. Vera Mutafchieva, “The Turk, the Jew and the Gypsy,” (in same), p. 23.

\textsuperscript{33} For a 1995 polemic during the Socialist (post-Communist) Zhan Videnov government, lamenting the Bulgarian intelligentsia’s weak sense of national identity as the Videnov government’s unwillingness to apply to join NATO illustrated, see Prof. Dr. Georgi Fotev, “Bulgaria and The European Humanity.” Democratsia, p. 9. Democratsia was the UDF party paper, and Fotev is a prestigious sociologist who is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the American University in Bulgaria.

\textsuperscript{34} See, for example, media reports over Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s public comment that Bulgaria may be a potential candidate to join a new, post-Soviet “quadrilateral community” integration agreement between Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The Bulgarian President and UDF leader Zhelu Zhelev and the Socialist Party government of Zhan Videnov formally rejected Boris Yeltsin’s public invitation and protested against his presumption, while demonstrations occurred in Sofia against Yeltsin’s comment: Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 8 April 1996, “Bulgaria Will Present a Note to Russia on President Yeltsin’s Statement,” at http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-04/apr08.bta on 1.6.06; 9 April 1996, “Bulgarian Ambassador in Russia Delivers Verbal Note,” at http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-04/apr09.bta on 1.6.06 and OMRI Daily Digest, No. 70, 9 April 1996, “Southeastern Europe: Bulgarian Political Roundup,” at www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-04/apr09.omri on 1.6.06.
Khrushchev’s denunciation of him in 1956. These minorities were under pressure to become socialist Bulgarian citizens.

Soviet perestroika was a blow to the economic element of the Bulgarian Communist authorities’ domestic control strategy. In the late 1980s, they attempted to compensate vainly but brutally by appealing to Bulgarian nationalism. The Bulgarian Communist authorities manipulated again the historiographic theme of the “Ottoman Yoke.” Specifically, they claimed to rectify the crime of the Muslim Turks forcing themselves and their religion on the once-great late medieval Orthodox Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian communist government’s “vizrozditelen” (regeneration) process aimed to force the Bulgarian Turkish minority in the country to change their names to their Bulgarian Orthodox corresponding forms. They used lists of names which the Bulgarian Communist-state experts sanctioned. The claim was that the Turks of Bulgaria were basically genetically Bulgarian but they had assimilated into the Turkish culture and religion due to Ottoman imperialism. They had forgotten that they were Bulgarians during a “Turkification” process involving 500 years of Ottoman domination, beginning with their conversion to Islam. The Communist authorities’ claim to represent the Bulgarian ethno-sectarian national community reflected a tendency throughout the Balkans in the late 1980s. The “regeneration” process would rectify this supposed Ottoman crime against these Bulgarian families whom Ottoman imperialism had torn from the bosom of their Bulgarian ethno-sectarian national community. It would return the members of this stereotypically distrusted and despised Ottoman-legacy minority to its progressive, communist-era core community. It would also defend the Bulgarian nation more broadly against the possibility of Turkish irredentism. The Bulgarian authorities as the closest ideological ally of the Soviet Union sought to hasten the

36 Volin Siderov, leader of the xenophobic, “Attack” party which received 8.5% of the votes in 2005 national parliamentary elections, regularly declares his opposition to the policies of the authorities whom he claims serve the “Gypsification” and “Turkification” of Bulgaria through unacceptable accommodation of these minorities in what should be the state of the Bulgarian ethnos. Siderov charges the European Union and the US as imposing these policies on Bulgaria as part of their effort to control and solidify Bulgaria’s separation from Russia, the traditional ally and Great Power liberator of Bulgaria from the Ottomans in 1878, in order to exploit Bulgaria politically and economically (Miglena Kichukova, “The Leader of the Attack Party,” unpublished senior thesis paper, American University in Bulgaria, May 2006).
37 At approximately the same time, the Kurdish Workers’ Party started its armed resistance against the Turkish regime leading to violence that led to approximately 36,000 deaths and the destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages in southeast Turkey. The Turkish authorities until this time had also denied that the Kurds were a minority, describing them as “mountain Turks” who had lost their Turkish identity through geographic isolation from their cosmopolitan brethren in western Turkey. Note that comparable justifications emerged for genocidal-assimilationist policies had been adopted at various points in Yugoslavia during World War II against the Bosnian Muslims, with both Croat and Serb authorities proclaiming that the Bosniaks were Serbs or Croats who had converted to Islam during the Ottoman period and by Greeks against Macedonians (Mutafchieva, esp. p. 37).
eventual disappearance of ethnicity as a legacy of bourgeois false consciousness. The Gorbachev regime soon aborted this Soviet approach to ethnicity and nationality with its assumption of their eventual withering away. The Bulgarian Communist authorities desperately continued to pursue it to compensate for the danger of political instability due to economic decline. Estimates are that between 500 to 1,500 people died in the violent clashes between resisters and police forces which had surrounded Turkish villages and forced their inhabitants to sign legal documents changing their names. Failure to obey would result minimally in institutional coercion such as an inability to access bank accounts, draw pensions, and register marriages. Thousands of Bulgarian Turks were arrested and sent to labor camps for resisting prior to 1989.

The liberalizing European regional context and cut-off of Soviet subsidies and support for their Communist client regimes hastened the bourgeoning national economic and political crises in the Warsaw Pact member states. As both internal turmoil and international protests grew, towards the end of the 1980s, Bulgarian Communist leader Todor Zhivkov decided to allow Bulgarian Turks to leave the country. 350,000 people out of a total population of 9 million then fled or were expelled to Turkey in 1989. It was as an accommodation to the growing economic, social and political crises which the forced name change policy was causing, leaving behind their expropriated property, as well family members. To legitimate the policy in the European context of the rapidly disintegrating Cold War, the Bulgarian Communist leadership decided in 1989 to give Bulgarian passports with exit visas to the Bulgarian Turks. The so-called “Grand Excursion” lead to hundreds of thousands leaving Bulgaria, as well as contributing to the collapse of the regime itself.

38 See The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience, p. 8 as well as Vera Mutafchieva (Ibid.) and Gerald W. Creed, “The Bases of Bulgaria’s Ethnic Policies,” The Anthropology of East Europe Review: Newsletter of the East European Anthropology Group, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 1990, at http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer9_2.html 19.6.06. Some Bulgarian elites claim that the Bulgarian Communist Party launched the “regeneration” process without Moscow’s approval while the extended transition from Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko and finally to Gorbachev diverted Soviet attention from the BCP’s own initiative, extending a parallel policy of repeatedly and forcibly changing the names of another Bulgarian minority, the Pomaks, who are Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, during 1912-1982. 39 Mongabay.com, “Bulgaria—Society,” at http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/bulgaria/SOCIETY.html on 19.6.06. 40 Peter Stamatov, “The Making of a “Bad” Public: Ethnonational Mobilization in Post-Communist Bulgaria,” p. 10, at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW1/GSW1/12%20Stamatov.pdf on 20.6.06. In a footnote citing other scholarship, Stamatov notes that the 1989 exodus was the latest in a cycle push-pull migration of Bulgarian Turks out of Bulgaria: “The stream of Turks emigrating to Turkey has never ceased since the creation of the modern Bulgarian state.” 41 Ali Eminov, “Nationality Policy in the USSR and in Bulgaria: Some Observations,” The Anthropology of East Europe Review: Newsletter of the East European Anthropology Group, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 1990, at http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer9_2.html 19.6.06. Observers note that the departure of hundreds of thousands of people from agricultural areas depleted the labor force and contributed to the growing macroeconomic crisis, even while, as with previous forced migrations, allowing the expropriation and confiscation of large amounts of
The Turkish government, claiming it was unable to cope with the refugee flow, noted that
demonstrations were occurring in Turkey demanding military intervention to protect the
Bulgarian Turks. Yet, military intervention was never seriously contemplated. With the end of
the Communist regime, one of the first acts of the Bulgarian authorities was to revoke the forced
name change, despite demonstrations among some Bulgarian population centers opposing the
reval of the policy. Some 100,000-150,000 of this 350,000 returned to Bulgaria in 1989-90
detail records for this time are sketchy). In 1994, those remaining in Turkey acquired the
right to maintain or regain their Bulgarian citizenship together with their Turkish citizenship, and
they have the right to vote in Bulgarian elections. The Bulgarian media covers the regular
visits of Bulgarian national political figures to the city of Bursa in Turkey to court this Bulgarian
Turkish diaspora vote.

In the 1980s, a number of terrorist attacks occurred in response to the forced assimilation
policy, including detonation of bombs in public spaces. Bulgarian Turkish leaders such as
Ahmed Dogan would spend time in jail due to their resistance. Dogan, a former university
professor of philosophy, would emerge in 1990 to form the “Movement for Rights and
Freedoms,” a de facto ethnic Turkish party. The more militant Adem Kenan emerged within
Dogan’s organization. Kenan would later politically marginalize himself by advocating national
minority recognition and federal status for the Turkish minority. Dogan would follow a more
utilitarian strategy for integration of the Turkish minority in the democratic Bulgarian state while
maintaining his own leadership of this community.

This violent episode occurring at the end of the Zhivkov regime, however, was the latest
in a periodic cycle of violent conflicts in the country since independence and expansion of the
Bulgarian state beginning in 1878. These episodes corresponded typically with periods of
intense international conflict or change. They began with the Bulgarian independence struggle,
then emerged again with the Balkans Wars (1912-13), World War I (1914-18) and its immediate
aftermath. They also occurred during the most intense periods of the Cold War, and most
recently with the disintegration of the Cold War. Koinova cites scholarship noting that from the
time of the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality of Bulgaria in 1885 to 1944,

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44 Ekici, pp. 3-4.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bg0233) on 20.6.06, which
notes “Although guilt was never established, the terrorist acts aroused ethnic feeling that
supported the Bulgarization campaign.” George Shanduorkov, “Terrorism in Bulgaria,”
Prehospital Disaster Medicine, 2003, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 66–70, at http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu
on 20.6.06.
46 Rossen V. Vassilev, “Post-Communist Bulgaria’s Ethnopolitics,” The Global Review of
Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 2, December 2001, p. 46 at
http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_1/issue_2/vassilev.PDF on 28.6.06
and Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, “Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria,” (Berlin:
European Migration Centre), p. 32 at http://www.emz-
berlin.de/projekte_e/pj41_pdf/Marushiakova.pdf on 28.6.06.
Bulgarian state policy towards toleration of practice and reproduction of minority culture and religion was inconsistent. Ethno-nationalist conflicts in Bulgaria were notably absent during World War II while the conservative royal authoritarian regime enforced domestic stability while a nominal ally of the Axis to avoid the fate of fascist-occupied Greece and Yugoslavia. The coming of Communist power and the intensification of the Cold War saw the Peoples’ Republic of Bulgaria as an eventual Warsaw Pact member sharing a common border with Greece and Turkey, states with US-allied regimes which soon joined NATO. Another out of what would be a total of 11 emigration waves of Turkish and Muslim emigration out of Bulgaria occurred along with institutionalization of Marxist-Leninist economic and political structures in the 1950s. A period of forced name changes of the Bulgarian Slavophone Muslim (“Pomak”) minority in the early and mid-1970s détente period set the stage for a repeat of this process on a larger scale 15 years’ later with the coming of perestroika and glasnost. Both latter episodes occurred concomitantly with international political systemic changes disrupting the control mechanisms of the most closely pro-Soviet, Communist Bulgarian domestic regimes. They typically reacted by seeking nationalist legitimacy through targeting perceived remnants of Ottoman domination and oppression.

Mutafchieva makes the same claim: periods of relatively peaceful coexistence have broken down in Bulgaria along with increasing tensions and disruptions in the international political status quo. However, the validity of this claim is controversial. As noted, in the postwar era, the Bulgarian authorities attempted forcibly to change the names of the Bulgarian Slavophone Muslims, the so-called “Pomaks,” in the mid-1970s. According to Andrey Ivanov, the violent civil conflicts in Cyprus and Lebanon at this time, with their essential international dimension, were a “point of departure” by the Bulgarian Communist authorities in projecting scenarios of potential minority attempts at secession. Forced assimilation of the Pomaks was therefore an attempt to circumvent a potential international as well as domestic threat. One might claim the US-USSR “détente” era as a disruption to the international systemic status quo; the declining intensity of great power conflict loosened the reins of control over their respective

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47 Koinova, p. 4.
48 Nuray Ekici, “The Diaspora of the Turks of Bulgaria in Turkey,” (Berlin: European Migration Centre), pp. 1-2 at www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj41_pdf/ekici.pdf on 20.6.06. Antonina Zhelyazkova, director of the high-profile International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations in Sofia, notes that migrations across the Balkans, east-west and north-south starting in the late medieval period, were relatively more frequent than in other regions of Europe with the Balkans as the border scene for conflict among the various empires: Antonina Zhelyazkova, “The Islamic Communities on the Balkans, and the complexes of the Balkan historiographers,” Kultura, 12 July 1996, p. 11. Zhelyazkova also notes that Islam on the Balkans blended with rather than effaced pre-existing clan, pagan, and Christian group traditions, thereby maintaining a strong cultural differentiation among the self-perceived identities of the different Muslim communities which did emerge, which was sufficiently significant for the Sublime Porte to differentiate in both the trust and in the obligations it placed among the different Balkan Muslim communities, e.g. Gypsy Muslims still paid the poll tax, and the Ottoman authorities were more prone to distrust the loyalty of Albanian Muslims as prospective administrators.
49 Mutafchieva, p. 30.
50 Ivanov, p. 9.
allies. Yet, this argument has a propensity to emerge ex post facto; one can readily find changes in the international systemic environment which correspond with nationalist political mobilization and conflict. While both international systemic and individual level components are always present and always essential for a full explanation of a nationalist conflict, state-level factors are also essential, even paramount. In other words, this category of factors includes the “public opinion” environment which reacts and responds to changes both at the international systemic level and structural-institutional challenges which individual leaders and political groups exploit.

**Individual-level factors: the role of ideology**

Political strategies develop in response to interaction with the political environment, and communal nationalistic values are an essential feature of the Balkan political environment today. Alexander Kolev finds that the main variable explaining the lack of violent nationalist conflict in transition Bulgaria unlike in other Balkan states was due to ideology. Specifically, he finds a critical variable to be that the anti-Communist opposition in Bulgaria was explicitly anti-nationalist. The opposition’s unwillingness to use romantic, anti-Turkish/Muslim symbols to mobilize support derived from the exploitation of Bulgarian nationalist sentiments by the Communist ruling elite of the declining Marxist-Leninist regime. One prominent Bulgarian intellectual noted that the “regeneration” policy appeared absurd to the liberal intelligentsia in Bulgaria, as its logic included changing not only the names of the living, but also the names of the dead, with the authorities tracing back genealogies as far back as records would permit.

Other analysts have noted that this consensus on not exploiting nationalist tensions had emerged among the top levels of the new reformist, former Communist/now Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) emerging counter elite. The evident isolation of Bulgaria from any western allies while the Soviet mentor-patron was on the route to its own disintegration was critical. Bulgaria had a potentially hostile Turkey as a powerful NATO member on its borders. This fact further underlined the explosiveness of attempting to exploit Bulgarian romantic national anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim stereotypes. Nevertheless, regional, BSP elites in Razgrad and other cities organized demonstrations against reversing the forced name changes. Yet, at the national level, a tacit consensus quickly emerged among the BSP, UDF and MRF around democratization within parameters forbidding use of anti-minority appeals. In the words of one Western analyst of the peaceful Bulgarian transition, democracy “made sense.” It was the means by which to guarantee mutual security among elite factions in the midst of diversity. Democratization was the way by which the different parties and ethnic

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51 Alexander Kolev, “Why Bulgaria Remained Peaceful and How This Helps Us Understand Nationalist Conflict in Post-Communist Eastern Europe,” (23.05.06 at http://socsci2.ucsd.edu/~aronatas/scrretreat/Kolev.Alex.doc)

52 Evgenyi Dainov, Director, Center for Social Practices, New Bulgarian University, “European Economies in Transition” Faculty Development in International Business’ seminar, International Business Center, Katz Graduate School of Business University of Pittsburgh, organizer, on 25 May 2006, at the Elieff Center, American University in Bulgaria, funded by US Department of Education.

groups developed a political means to coexist, and it appeared to be the only option.\textsuperscript{54} Since 1990, the MRF has continued to play a role as coalition balancer and power broker in an excellent East European variant of Donald Horowitz’s ideal-typical model for peaceful ethnic conflict management. The Bulgarian ethnic majority electorate divides its support among multiple parties while a united minority party plays the role of necessary governing party coalition member and balancer.\textsuperscript{55} In fact, the MRF has played this role for so long that among some observers, this fact is circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy among the former Communist ruling elite to create a political actor which would weaken the Bulgarian societal opposition to the comparatively well-disciplined and well-funded Bulgarian Socialist Party.\textsuperscript{56}

By way of comparison, in socialist Yugoslavia, liberal democratic elites were competing with authoritarians and radicals to appeal to the nationalist sentiments of the public in democratizing Yugoslavia. Milosievic and his coalition allies among the nationalists and communist-era elite succeeded in marginalizing the liberal wing of his party before then proceeding to mobilize his coalition to seize control over Kosovo, Montenegro and Voivodina.\textsuperscript{57}

Indeed, the pro-change intelligentsia play a critical role in determining the likelihood of a nationalistic behavior by a political system.\textsuperscript{58} Individuals do make a difference. Elaboration on the issue of why were nationalist issues not on the Bulgarian political agenda in motivating the revolutionary changes against a perceived, Quisling regime, unlike in the Serbian case, is necessary. As Kolev himself alludes, the international systemic factor has also to be a critical element here differentiating the Serb and Bulgarian cases.\textsuperscript{59} In short, the comparatively

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} See Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Melone also views the Movement for Rights and Freedoms as playing a mediating role in Bulgarian politics between the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces in the early 1990s thereby mitigating ethnic tensions in the country (p. 218).
\item \textsuperscript{56} Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE), “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Turks of Bulgaria,” December 1999, p. 17 at www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria-turks.doc on 20.6.06 and conversations with Bulgarian AUBG students. Perhaps disturbingly, conspiracy theories, including among the most colorful and bizarre including the familiar Freemasons, Illuminati and Bildebergers, have become quite well-known in Bulgaria, paralleling their popularity long noted in Serbia and Russia: e.g. this writer has in his possession from a Bulgarian AUBG student a pirated Russian translation of Dr. John Coleman, The Committee of 300: The Secret World Government (Moscow: Vityaz, 2000) [Presumably, the Russian version of Conspirator's Hierarchy : The Committee of 300].
\item \textsuperscript{57} Cottam and Cottam, pp. 219-20. Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (Penguin, 1997), provide an excellent description of Milosievic’s political maneuvering.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Cottam and Cottam, p. 34.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Kolev, p. 15, in footnote 15 citing Rogers Brubaker, (quoting Kolev here): “Rogers Brubaker’s “… model for conceptualizing nationalist conflict in Eastern Europe in terms of a dynamic relationship among “nationalizing states”, “national minorities” and the “external homelands” of these minorities. Brubaker (1996:67-69) emphasizes that the elements of this triad should not be taken as unitary actors but as “fields”, each composed of a variety of (often competing) stances
\end{itemize}
moderate behavior of Turkey has to be a critical factor in explaining why the existing Bulgarian “powder keg” of ethnic conflict has not ignited. A satisfactory explanation for Bulgaria’s relative peace cannot be found in Bulgaria alone. As in the US or in any state, radical nationalist political entrepreneurs are always present, so the issue is why have they not gained more popular support.

Milosevic and his cohort saw both a personal power and a national irredentist communal opportunity. In their stereotypical view of their prospective adversaries and the international situation, the international community was essentially not intensely interested or committed to intervening seriously in the Balkans to prevent Serbia redressing on its own nationalist grievances left from Tito’s Communist Yugoslav republic borders. These borders, decided by Tito during World War II, placed large Serb concentrations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina among intermixed populations. Milosevic’s Serbia moved forcefully to change the territorial and political status quo. Meanwhile, in response to the Serb mobilization, radical nationalist forces subsequently gathered strength throughout the disintegrating Communist Yugoslav federation. Mutual perceptions of opportunity for national self-determination overlay this initial perception of threat from Belgrade. The result was a violent conflict spiral through mutually belligerent violent policies that confirmed and reinforced perceptions of threat and affective collective rage among many Croats, Bosniaks, Kosovars and Serbs. Collective memories of genocidal attacks in the twentieth century and before set the stage for this conflict spiral.

Kolev writes in explaining his focus on Bulgaria, “Interestingly, the mutually reinforcing character of nationalist and anti-Communist tendencies (although well-understood by the observers of the Yugoslav case) has not, to my knowledge, been conceptualized as a factor that should be explored in the context of other post-Communist countries.” Here, Kolev’s definition of nationalism appears to be as an ethno-chauvinist ideology. This study in this paper, however, views it as communal political sovereignty value for the members of a primary and terminal self-identity community. Nationalism is not an ideology (although it can be part of an ideology). By definition, a nationalistic actor through behavior demonstrates an intense commitment to this value to the point that this motivation shapes its political perceptions and behavior patterns sufficiently to differentiate its behavior from non-nationalistic actors. Nationalistic actors are more prone, to see the political environment in terms of threats and opportunities, to stereotype the sources of those perceived threats and opportunities, and to overestimate their own relative capabilities.

Continuing to focus on nationalism as ideology, Kolev reiterates,

I believe though that if we are looking for a factor explaining the presence or absence of nationalist conflict (and possibly, as a result of it, violence) in the different countries of post-Communist Eastern Europe, it is not how threatened the Communist elite was and how easy it could manipulate society, but rather whether the anti-Communists were nationalist or not, and thus whether they tended to define political conflict in non-ethnic terms and to cooperate with the ethnic minorities or not. The stances of minorities’ leaderships were also highly important, but they were often conditioned, in addition to influences coming from

and interests, and that how a given nationalist conflict would play itself out depends both on relationships among the fields and on relationships within each field.”

60 Kolev, p. 14.
the minorities’ external homelands, by the openness of the anti-Communist parties towards cooperation across ethnic lines, which had an effect on the policies of the external homelands too.\textsuperscript{61}

Although Kolev highlights in his paper the refusal of the Bulgarian opposition focusing on the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) to work with explicitly nationalistic parties, the UDF was not averse to using anti-Turkish symbols in its own, later campaigns after 1990. UDF hostility to the de facto Turkish minority party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), stemmed partly from the latter’s 1992 withdrawal from and collapse of the UDF-led coalition government that replaced the Bulgarian Socialist (previously Communist) Party government in 1991. An ineffective “government of experts” acted as caretaker until the 1994 national parliamentary elections which again brought the Bulgarian Socialist Party back into power. It fell in early 1997 in the midst of hyperinflation due to lack of economic reform, leading to early elections.\textsuperscript{62} Ivan Kostov of the UDF then emerged as Prime Minister, a position which he held until 2001. In the 2000 municipal elections campaign, Ivan Kostov made the following statement:

\textit{Interviewer: There are two political versions about the negotiations with the EU - one is that the things we have to sacrifice are still to come - and the other that we've already paid what we had to and our standard of living will improve. Which one do you consider right?}

Kostov: If we limit the question to its economic side, the second thesis is more correct. That is, we've already paid for the liberalization of prices and should expect things only to improve. But if we consider all the problems that appear on our way to Europe, it looks as though there are still challenges to come. What does the price entail? It's good that we already know what we want - one or two things that a great majority demands. But do we have the strength to point out what the price is? Now we have to say what we don't want to be, what we want to leave out of Europe. Hard thing. We want to leave a part of our morality, a part of our oriental nature. This is not an easy thing. From this point of view, there are still a lot of things we have to sacrifice.\textsuperscript{63} (underline emphasis the author’s)

As living embodiments of this “oriental” legacy, such statements might well strike a Bulgarian Turk or Muslim as insulting.

\textsuperscript{61} Kolev, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{62} For a late 1996 and early 1997 reports on the building economic crisis, which led to the resignation of the Zhan Videnov government and the rise of the Ivan Kostov government, see the reports by Jane Perlez of The New York Times at \url{http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/bulgaria/index.html?offset=150}&\&inline=nyt-geo on 1.6.06. Perlez repeats the standard view that “… Bulgaria, which was one of the most obedient of the Soviet satellites with one of the best-educated work forces, has been perhaps the worst-managed and one of the most corrupt countries during the six-year post-Communist era in Central and Eastern Europe,” “Looted by Its Own Officials, Bulgaria Faces the Day of Economic Reckoning,” \textit{New York Times}, October 28, 1996, at \url{http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0913F73C5D0C7B8EDDA90994DE494D81}&n=Top%2fNews%2fWorld%2fCountries%20and%20Territories%2fBulgaria on 1.6.06.
\textsuperscript{63} “Ivan Kostov: Now is the Right Time to Invest in Property,” \textit{Demokratsia}, 4 January 2000, p. 21, translation by author.
Meanwhile, according to Kolev, the Turkish government has favored Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the MRF, and refused to cooperate with more radical Turkish figures such as Adem Kenan, a former colleague of Dogan. Claiming that Dogan had forsaken the interests of the Bulgarian Turks in favor of political power, Kenan broke with him and formed his own unregistered party, the Democratic Party of the Turks in Bulgaria. Kenan’s rhetoric turned to Turkish nationalism and he has continued to make radical and demagogic public statements which have attracted the legal attention of the Bulgarian state prosecutor:

Kenan insulted ethnic Bulgarians, calling them "former slaves" and saying that the "Turks, who, as an imperial nation, dominated for 500 years, are offended to have to integrate with their former slaves". Bulgaria was under Ottoman rule for nearly five centuries, from 1396 until 1878. Interviewed later by the 168 Chasa weekly, he declared himself in favour of a federation and referred to ethnic Bulgarians as "mules". The regional prosecutor said his office has collected sufficient evidence warranting criminal proceedings against Kenan. A month ago, a court in Shumen sentenced Kenan to pay a 600 leva (307 euros) fine for offending Bulgarians by calling them a "nation of freaks" in an interview he had given in 2005.  

Kenan has been in the news again partly as a foil for the xenophobic platform of Volin Siderov and his insurgent, “Attack” party which exploded on the Bulgarian political scene in 2005. Kenan has been in the Bulgarian National Assembly, including the Grand National Assembly which wrote and adopted the July 1991 Bulgarian Constitution, and later, during the regular National Assembly in 1995-97. He formally split with Dogan in 1992 over the constitution which he rejects because it does not include federalism and autonomy for the Turkish regions. The MRF, almost perennially in a governing coalition or in negotiations to join one, remains virtually the sole representative of the Bulgarian Turks in the national Bulgarian political process. Dogan himself has won accolades from the European press: “Those who doubt that Islam and Europe can cohabit were not in Sofia this week. There Ahmed Dogan, leader of Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority and probably the continent's most successful Muslim politician, celebrated the 15th anniversary of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the pro-business party he founded.”  

In sum, in Bulgaria ethno-chauvinist ideology among the ruling elite has been relatively absent, but it does show a potential to move in this direction in the midst of electoral competition. Suspicions are present. One MRF representative asserted in 2002 that the UDF “covertly promoted the perception” that representation of Turks in the internal and external security services will lead to a “Macedonia-type” situation in Bulgaria. Kolev notes that nationalistic political entrepreneurs are publicly active in Bulgaria although until recently they

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65 Marushiakova, p. 29.
67 See The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience, pp. 3, 7, and especially p. 18.
have been marginal political actors. Kolev claims that the dissidents leading the opposition to the Communists, later Socialists, were so uniformly disillusioned by the tyranny of the Zhivkov regime that all major political tendencies, nationalist or not, were first and foremost anti-Communist. They opposed a regime which had attempted and failed to exploit what were in effect ethnic cleansing policies in the name of Bulgarian nationalism. In a word, in the view of the Bulgarian public, the Communist experience had for years completely delegitimized nationalism as part of a Bulgarian legitimation ideology. Rejection of their policies overwhelmed the appeal of traditional stereotypical images pervasive in Bulgarian national perceptions which are anti-Turkish. Ironically, then, as Kolev notes, the transition to democracy in Bulgaria was the catalyst for defusing nationalist conflict in Bulgaria.  

The fact that Bulgarian concerns were focusing on severe economic difficulties of the late 1980s is important but not sufficient for explaining the absence of Bulgarian nationalism in the policy making process since 1990. Comparatively, Serbia’s macroeconomic performance has been one of impoverishment of much of the population since 1990. The Yugoslav economy had a decades-long history of sending guest workers abroad and integration with the western political economy. The Bulgarian economy was much more dependent upon the USSR. Consequently, the comparatively insulated Bulgarian economy experienced much greater difficulty in the late 1980s in adapting to the end of Soviet subsidies. Food literally was not available in 1989-90. Animal herds on collective farms disappeared as people pilfered and slaughtered the livestock for food.

In contrast to Bulgaria, the Communist regime in Tito’s Yugoslavia acknowledged nationality while suppressing ethno-chauvinist nationalism under the slogan, “brotherhood and unity.” The symbols of ethno-sectarian nationalism would be a legitimation mechanism for a political entrepreneur, such as Milosievic, thereby undermining Yugoslav identity. The nationalist grievances which Milosievic exploited, however, were not grievances which Milosievic himself created and implanted in the mind of the mass Serb public. These grievances derived from the nature of the control system which characterized Tito’s Yugoslavia. A critical component of this control system was politically weakening a disproportionately powerful national constituent community of Yugoslavia, the Serbs. Giving Kosovo and Voivodina republic status in all but name, including a right to a vote equal to Serbia’s on the Federal State Council, was necessary to placate the suspicions of the other, smaller nations of Yugoslavia. Yet, it also set the stage for the emergence of Serb national grievances. From the typical perspective of Serb nationalists, division and separation from Serbia of Kosovo in particular was a crime against the Serb nation. As a central part of the Serb symbolic national identity, it was readily and inevitably a theme for manipulation by a new, emerging elite challenging the decaying, post-Tito, bureaucratic, communist order.

For Bulgaria, by contrast, the issue of “Bulgaria irredenta” was one which had not been an issue since the 1950s. The Bulgarian “national ideals” since 1878 had focused on rejoining to Bulgaria those lands which the international system had taken from control by the Bulgarian state. Russian liberation of Bulgaria had led Bulgaria to control what is Macedonia and Greek Thrace today under the terms of the San Stefano peace treaty ending the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. The other European great powers had sought the preservation of the disintegrating

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68 Kolev, p. 29.
69 Conversations with Bulgarian staff at the American University in Bulgaria.
70 Cottam and Cottam, pp. 219-20.
Ottoman empire to contain Russian expansion at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. They demanded that Russia as the intervening power on behalf of the Orthodox Balkan peoples against Ottoman rule accept a drastic reduction in the size and status of its new Bulgarian ally or face war. Later, Bulgarian foreign policy succeeded in annexing much of Rumelia as part of a sovereign kingdom relatively soon, but the Ottoman empire remained in control of historic Macedonia. The first Balkan war of 1912 saw Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece ally to drive Ottoman Turkey out of the Balkans with the exception of a small territory in eastern Rumelia. Almost immediately, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece went to war over the division of the territories from which they had just expelled Ottoman control. Turkey now allied with Greece against Bulgaria. Bulgaria ended up annexing approximately 15% of historic Macedonia in the Pirin mountain region (the site of the American University in Bulgaria), but most remained in the hands of Greece and particularly Serbia. International pressures during World War I and II caused Bulgaria to enter into conflict with Serbia and Greece over these territories. Consequently, Bulgaria allied successively with the central and axis powers against the French and British allies of Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria, then, was also a nominal ally of the Turkish Ottoman empire in World War I, while in World War II, Bulgaria challenged Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity along with the various nationalistic forces which opposed Belgrade’s control. The coming of Communist power to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia saw the brutal suppression of all political actors openly advocating ethno-nationalist programs, mimicking Stalin’s violent, systematic repression of actual and suspected advocates of nationalism in the USSR in the 1930s. The USSR had pressured the Bulgarian communist leadership to recognize the population of the Pirin Macedonian region of Bulgaria as Macedonians, depending upon the state of relations between Belgrade and Moscow. By the early 1960s, this pressure had stopped.  

The upshot is that since 1912, the nationalist components of Bulgarian foreign policy predominantly focused on a challenge from Belgrade, the capital of another Slavic Orthodox nation, and not Turkey. After the Second World War, Soviet and American control over their respective NATO and Warsaw Pact allies made a likelihood of direct conflict between Turkey and Bulgaria unlikely. The greatest likelihood of violent international conflict in the European territories of the former Ottoman Empire was rather between two NATO members, Greece and Turkey. As noted above, Turkey’s invasion of northern Cyprus would stir Bulgarian nationalist sentiment regarding the possibility of a similar Turkish move into Haskovo, Kurdzhali and Momchilgrad. These towns are in the Rhodopi mountain region, close to the border with Turkey, which Bulgaria annexed during the Balkan wars and have a Turkish population concentration.

Socialist Yugoslavia became the main trading partner with Communist Bulgaria. Despite periodic concerns in Washington that Moscow might attempt forcibly to install a pro-Soviet regime in avowedly non-aligned Belgrade, relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were cooperative. Later, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, democratic Bulgaria was the first state to recognize the newly independent state of Macedonia. UDF leader Philip Dimitrov was the prime minister of Bulgaria at this time, acting in accordance with his own ideological predispositions. Clearly Bulgaria, which was in the midst of an economic depression and

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believing itself to be without strong allies in pursuit of an irredentist policy, would not engage in international aggression.

In sum, the international political environment has not encouraged Bulgarian or Turkish nationalism in the direction of perceiving an opportunity to redraw the boundaries in Southeastern Europe. Consequently, the latent anti-Turkish stereotypical components of Bulgarian nationalism have not received encouragement through an intentional or unintentional presentation of an opportunity to Bulgaria by the Great Powers. One should note that this latent anti-Turkish suspicion is not insignificant. The Bulgarian mass media in the 1990s had periodically broadcast television programs which highlighted the changing ethnic population demographics in the Rhodopi due to the higher ethnic Turkish birthrate and the migration of ethnic Bulgarians to urban centers. This writer recalls in 1999 during the NATO air assault on Yugoslavia in the midst of the escalating conflict between Serb and Kosovar national movements that Bulgarians were overwhelmingly opposed to the NATO attack. Individuals spontaneously raised their concern that Kosovo independence through violent resistance would inspire by way of its political success a similar movement in Kurzhal, the city populated predominantly by ethnic Turks in the Rhodopi mountain region of Bulgaria which has a majority Turkish population. Following the Bulgarian ratification of the Convention on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities in 1999 under the UDF government of Ivan Kostov, Bulgarian state television began a weekly broadcast of news and information in Turkish (with Bulgarian subtitles) which has continued to generate controversy.

Following a common pattern throughout post-Communist Eastern Europe, Kostov and the UDF lost control of the parliamentary majority in the following June 2001 parliamentary elections. The former king, Simeon Saxecoburgotski, announced literally only weeks before the 2001 elections that he was a candidate to be prime minister as leader of his party, “National Movement of Simeon the II” (NMSII), winning 50% of the seats in parliament. The majority coalition again included Ahmed Dogan’s Movement for Rights and Freedoms. By the 2005 parliamentary elections, the UDF had disintegrated amid leadership as well as policy disputes, and the BSP is today the largest party in the governing coalition which includes again the MRF and NMSII. The disintegration of the UDF as the vehicle for demands for change has opened up avenues for the exploitation of Bulgarian nationalist sentiments, with the surprise emergence of Volin Siderov’s xenophobic “Attack” party winning 8.5% of the votes. Siderov had previously been the chief editor of the UDF’s daily party newspaper, Democratsia (Democracy).

As Marshall and Gurr note, with the decline and disintegration of the Cold War, international systemic constraints on nationalist mobilization have decreased, along with overall decrease in support for authoritarian client regimes by their respective superpower patrons and

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72 The author has a video recording of one such broadcast in his possession. Prime Minister Ivan Kostov decided to support NATO policy towards Belgrade in 1999, two years after Bulgaria submitted its application to join NATO.

73 Ironically, in 2001 after the 1999 NATO air war against Serbia over Kosovo and the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 Bulgarian public opinion surveys witnessed an increase in support for Bulgaria’s joining NATO in the run up to Bulgaria joining, with the assumption prevalent that NATO membership would be a protection against “extremism” and “terrorism” among Bulgaria’s own minority populations: “BULGARIA: More 11% of Bulgarians Want Bulgaria to Become a NATO Member,” [sic] 22.10.01, (reporting the 11% increase from the year previously) at http://www.seeurope.net/en/Story.php?StoryID=17430&LangID=1 on 6.6.06.
their allies.\textsuperscript{74} State and elite factors thus potentially have more impact in the polity. In Bulgaria, the 2005 national parliamentary elections saw an increase in ethnic mobilization around the issue of supposedly excessive minority political representation in the policy making process. The emergence of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is of course feasible within the framework of the liberal regime in Bulgaria since 1989. Its continuous role as a current or prospective coalition partner has helped satisfy the utilitarian demands and aspirations of Bulgarian Turks, lessening prospective support for more militant Turkish nationalist actors. Yunal Lutfi, deputy speaker of Bulgarian National Assembly, and deputy chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which is currently part of the three-party government coalition, noted

\begin{quote}
It [the status of the Bulgarian Turks (BD)] was discussed [in a meeting with visiting Turkish President Ahmet Sezer (BD)], in the context of the rapid pace of integration in terms of the Bulgarian Turks' participation at all levels of government. As I said already, our two ministers also attended the meeting, three ministers, I mean. What we told the president actually was that about 5,000 ethnic Turks are participating in the national administration in all ministries as well as at the level of the provincial and municipal administrations. There has never been anything like this before. We also have 34 deputies. In this context, we have no reason at all to tell the Turkish president that there is any discrimination against the Turkish minority or that it is being deprived of its rights.\textsuperscript{75}
\end{quote}

MPs belonging to this same party have warned in February 2006 against ethnic Turkish nongovernmental organizations in Bulgaria from undertaking measures which are potentially provocative in the view of the Bulgarian ethnic majority in the light of Bulgaria’s successful EU accession effort.\textsuperscript{76} According to the BBC Monitoring service, Lyutvi Mestan was protesting against a two-month old petition drive under the leadership of Menderes Kungyun, chairman of “National Turkish Unity.” The petition demands “the official recognition of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria,” as well as “the opening of a

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Andrey Ivanov claims that nationalism is an elitist phenomenon in that elites use it to mobilize supporters (p. 3). In response to this elite manipulation, the international and national political context has to be ripe to allow what would otherwise be intense but dormant mass public communal nationalistic values, if intense, to become sufficiently salient to supercede other political values/motivations, such as economic ones [Richard W. Cottam, \textit{Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study} (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977)].

\textsuperscript{75} BBC Monitoring Service, “Bulgarian ethnic Turk official views meeting with Turkish president,” BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Feb 23, 2006, Source: Bulgarian news agency BTA monitoring service website, Sofia in Bulgarian 23 Feb 06, at http://search.ft.com/search/articles.html on 29.5.06.

\textsuperscript{76} BBC Monitoring Service, “Bulgaria: Turkish ethnic party issues warning over "brazen provocation”", 'BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Feb 22, 2006, Text of report in English by the Bulgarian news agency BTA, at http://search.ft.com/search/articles.html on 29.5.06.”
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Turkish state university, the abolition of the constitutional ban on the establishment of ethnic parties, the introduction of study of the Turkish language for all Bulgarian citizens who identify themselves as Turks, and the opening of a Turkish-language broadcasts directorate at Bulgarian National Radio and TV.” Another Bulgarian Turkish nongovernmental organization, Millyet-Trakya [“the Millet of Thrace”], is organizing the signature drive, providing fifty “coordinators.” Mestan warned that this petition risked polarizing Bulgarian public opinion and therefore threatened to undermine Bulgaria’s EU accession drive.77

The comparative absence of ethno-nationalistic policy patterns among Bulgarian foreign and domestic policies until the June 2005 elections has had a supportive international environment. At least as much credence must be found among the relative dearth of propitious Bulgarian and Turkish state-level trends and factors which would otherwise interact with the disintegration of the bipolar Cold War system. Specifically, Turkey has never played with regard to the Turks of Bulgaria the attraction role of Milosievic’s Serbia with regard to the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At times, Kolev slips back into individual reification by claiming the Milosievic’s “masterful” manipulation of nationalist sentiments allowed him to reconstitute the Serbian Communist party. He incorporated nationalism in it and circumvented the more nationalistic parties. This explanation should note that Milosievic began his national career representing a Belgrade-based bureaucracy. Milosievic claimed initially he was leading an “anti-bureaucratic” revolution on behalf of Serb rights. By acting to change the constitutional framework of Yugoslavia to redress what the Serbs perceived as injustices his manipulation had a veneer of status quo legality. The upshot is that the existing institutional political and economic structures and interests which Milosievic successfully brought into his ruling coalition also had to be placated. They would legitimate and support these policy outcomes so as to achieve predominance by a Serb political entrepreneur seeking primarily personal power.78 In a word, if Milosievic had not appeared on the scene to add Serb nationalism to this ruling bureaucratic coalition of interests, then someone else surely would have done so. Milosievic rose successfully because he was not an “outsider,” but rather, a creature of these institutional interests.

Political elites have always been present on the Bulgarian political scene who attempted to mobilize the Bulgarian public behind an explicitly nationalist program.79 Part of the explanation, then, as to why Bulgaria has not been the scene or more violence also has to lie in the fact that Turkey, unlike Milosievic’s Serbia, did not encourage Bulgarian Turks to look to

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77 “Bulgaria: Turkish ethnic party issues warning over "brazen provocation".”
78 e.g. Kolev, p. 42.
79 One group that for a time met the 4% parliamentary entrance threshold was the “Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization” (IMRO), a name appealing to Bulgarian nationalist claims on Macedonia. The party faded from the political scene by the end of the 1990s, despite an alliance with another nationalist party, “St. George’s Day,” led by the son of a prominent literary figure in postwar Bulgaria, Luben Dilov. Bulgarians referred to a Ross Perot-type figure, George Ganchev, leader of his “Bulgarian Business Block” as their “Vladimir Zhirinovsky,” and who sat in parliament until 2001. Emerging on the scene is the colorful current mayor of Sofia, Boiko Borissov, previously a high interior ministry official who has had some success in fighting organized crime, and whom one journalist described as Bulgaria’s political counterpart to Arnold Schwarzenegger.
Ankara as a source of political succor, not to mention separation. Ankara’s foreign policy during the “regeneration” process was comparatively quite passive, limiting itself to some movement of military units to the border, while raising the issue in international forums. However, with the Cold War division of Europe still a factor in 1989, few could seriously believe that Turkey would risk a military conflict with the USSR (not to mention Bulgaria) over the fate of Turkish minorities in Bulgaria. Meanwhile, the non-nation state of Turkey faced its own Kurdish rebellion in the southeast, suppressing the rise of political Islamism, and entering the EU. US and Western interests also coincided with the Turkish authorities’ aims in this regard. The upshot is that perceived relative capability is essential as a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for nationalistic behavior. Bosnian Serb nationalists could readily assume and expect that Belgrade would assist them with arms and material, which it did, although Belgrade would never formally invade to annex part or all of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia.

The Future of the Balkans as the EU-declared Test Case for Preventative Diplomacy

This study assumes that the desirable “state-building” perception among the attentive public that the central sovereign political authority is neutral and thereby dispenses justice without bias towards different ethno-religious groups will not prevail in a multinational state, in the Balkans or elsewhere. Irredentist tendencies among neighboring, diaspora components of Balkan nation-states (Serbs, Albanians, Croats) in Bosnia and elsewhere will tend towards collective prevailing views that the governing international (UN/NATO/EU) mandate authorities have a bias against them in favor of “the other.” The international mandate authorities will therefore face the dilemma of relying on fundamentally anti-democratic, authoritarian political mechanisms to maintain the political status quo in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Communities having submarginal capability for national self-determination (Macedonians, Bosniaks) will accept the international mandate for protection.

Some analysts claim that the legislative arena is the centerpiece of the parliamentary democracy. Implementation of legislation in the form of law, or the lack of it, however, is very likely to be the source of perceived oppression that generates grass roots social resistance movements that can result in violence. Implementation implies ultimately the state using its authority, including its coercive power, to enforce the perceived will of the community. In the current prevailing system of world norms, national constitutions typically proclaim their commitment to basic human rights. The foundational international legal instruments for global commitment to these ideals are the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and its subsequent binding multilateral international legal treaties, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, on the one hand, and Social and Economic Rights, on the other hand.

80 Cottam and Cottam note that a formula which usually best serves the interests of conflict avoidance in cases in which aspiring national communities are territorially homogeneous in a non-nation state which incorporates one or several aspiring national communities which have the capability to achieve independence would grant those aspiring national communities the right of national self-determination. These aspiring national communities are unlikely to accommodate efforts to attract a first-intensity attachment to the territorial community as long as these communities perceive a real option for independence (p. 266).

81 Melone, p. 188.

82 Sune Skadegaard Thorsen, Attorney at Law and Annemarie Meisling, Assistant Attorney at Law, “Perspectives on the UN Draft Norms,” unpublished paper, Submitted for the IBA/AIJA
an increasingly complex public policy reality, implementation is increasingly important. A worldwide phenomenon is the increasing conversion of political issues into judicial questions as a method of conflict resolution. In 2000, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court ruled by a majority of one that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms was not an illegal party. According to the Bulgarian Constitution, ethnic or religiously-based parties are forbidden. The Movement for Rights of Freedoms is the de facto Turkish minority party but of course its name does not indicate it as such. Nevertheless, Volin Siderov and the Attack party have made the role of the MRF in the governing coalition as a balancer its main platform. Siderov claims that the presence of the MRF in the government serves to satisfy the demands of the EU and the US which has imperialistic ambitions towards the Middle East through reliance upon Turkey. Consequently, Bulgaria’s national interest including its ethnic Bulgarian identity are at risk of sacrifice in order to promote US interests in the Middle East.

The EU’s ESDP commitment to conflict prevention satisfies the tactical requirement to coordinate national government policies. As Cottam and Cottam explain, unilateral conflict intervention will be more vulnerable to the perception emerging among the target population and government that expressions of universal human rights justifications are a guise. Coordination ideally diminishes the ability of the target to play one foreign office against another, for example, on questions of commercial advantage. Thereby, considerable reduction of the bargaining position of the target regarding the initiator should occur as a consequence. Even in this case, however, a common EU position while differentiating among the different former Yugoslav nations risks intensifying in-group and out-group differentiation. To the extent that EU membership is supposedly associated with being “European” and therefore, “civilized,” it may serve to intensify social competition. As in the current case of Montenegro, secession may appear as the fast track to “joining Europe.” The appeal of the opportunity to “join Europe” by separating from Serbia was arguably a factor increasing May 2006 referendum support for Montenegrans separation.

Intensification of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a more tragic case of the consequences of unfortunate “European” policies regarding the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Many argue that the violent conflict intensified there due to European Community acquiescence to German demands for premature international recognition of the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia.
One danger is the reification of the so-called “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. Those Balkan groups which did view the Serbs as a source of threat are likely to have their stereotypes confirmed by the differential EU accession process. To the extent that the EU and NATO are synonymous in the typical view of a Serb or Russian nationalist, then the view of a conspiracy against the Orthodox world is more likely to receive mistaken confirmation. This danger increases as Kosovo increases the pace of its European integration policies. Kosovo’s quest for national self-determination has gained EU acquiescence in order to begin to develop and stabilize this region. Serb nationalism opposing it then appears to be an adversary of Euro-Atlantic policy aims and objectives in the Balkans. Kosovo nationalism appears to conform with EU objectives in opposition to the obstreperous Serbs. The root of the dilemma again lies in the failure of the international community to conceptualize national self-determination for all aspiring nations as a human right. This right must also extend to the Serbs. Again, the strategy of NATO and the EU is stabilization in response to irresistible changes but no redrawing of borders until the political polarization escalates to the point that division becomes unavoidable.

Note that observers continue to confirm that Bulgarian minorities have not shown themselves susceptible to inroads by al-Qa’idah Islamic militants. This fact is further evidence of the surprising lack of serious challenge to the Bulgarian state from Bulgaria’s Turkish minorities. In contrast, a theme appearing regularly in the Serb media for the attentive public is that the Serb struggle is part of a broader struggle against pan-Islamic radicalism and aggression. Media reports citing sources in the Serb military intelligence community continue this refrain that Serbia is on the frontline against pan-Islamic militancy.

For example, see BBC Monitoring Service, “Serb officials warn about Al-Qa'idah activity in Kosovo,” BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Nov 24, 2004 Excerpt from report by M.B: "Trajkovic: Haradinaj and Ceku in contact with Al-Qa'idah", published by Montenegrin newspaper Dan on 24 November 2004 at http://search.ft.com/search/articles.html on 17.6.06. Rada Trajkovic as deputy chairwoman of the Serb National Council for Northern Kosovo-Metohija claims that certain western countries have an interest in propagating an al-Qaeda presence in the Balkans, presumably to justify their political predominance of the region.

throughout the “Illyrian” lands of the Balkans.  

This claim, however, has not succeeded in persuading the US, NATO and the EU to ally with Serb nationalism. One conceptualization of the US-declared “war on terrorism” is that it is ultimately a conflict between pan-Arab and pan-Islamist political movements in the Middle East threatening American allies there. If so, then Serbia still as yet does not have much to offer as a prospective ally until and unless pan-Albanianism, Bosniak nationalism or pan-Turanism acquire a strong pan-Islamic component. Indications that such tendencies as possible are present, but these tendencies, however, do not currently challenge the Albanian, Bosniak or Turkish ethnic secular, pro-EU oriented elite.

As the International Crisis Group noted specifically in relation to a candidate area for violent ethno-sectarian conflict and secession, the Sandzak region:

Since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, Serbia has been deeply immersed in its own identity crisis and struggled to deal with areas that have an ethnically mixed population. Many problems in Sandzak -- a bad economy, low standard of living, inadequate educational and health care facilities, a dysfunctional, corrupt judiciary and civil administration, and an inept, corrupt and brutal police force – are mirrored in nearly every other municipality in the republic. But in an ethnically mixed area, dysfunctional and corrupt government becomes distorted by an ethnic lens that transforms every failure or mistake into a deliberate attack by the ruling majority against the subject minority. Sandzak is a case in point.

This danger is more or less true in the context of every case of ethnic majority-minority social competition. The question is, then, why has not more conflict been evident in Bulgaria with its large Turkish minority. Bosniak nationalism is comparatively weak, and as such, it shows a comparatively greater degree of willingness, like Macedonian political community identity self-expression, to compromise with external intervenors representing the Contact Group. A consideration of the perceived capability of the source of challenge is important for approaching the issue of stereotypical images in shaping behavior is necessary. Perhaps, as among many Bosniaks in the Sandzak, the prevailing view among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria sees itself 1) as in an inferior position relative to the ethnic majority, yet social mobility options particularly via MRF patronage in an EU-integrating Bulgaria, do appear to be available, and 2) the option of appeal to Turkey as a patron state is not plausible in their prevailing view.

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92 The International Crisis Group notes, however, that the Refah party, the predecessor to the ruling, nominally Islamist, Justice and Development party in Turkey, apparently provided financial support to the respective organizations of the Mufti of Sandzak, Muamer Zukorlic, the Mesihat Islamic Community of Sandzak (IZ), and of Sulejman Uglinin, the most prominent regional leader of the Sandzak Bosniaks, through his Democratic Action Party (using the same
exists because of the international community’s military intervention and presence, while Turkey, of course, is distant and confronts its own Kurdish minority nationalist movement. Indeed, Bosniaks in “historic Sandzak” areas within Montenegro have chosen to participate in non-ethnic parties in Montenegro and have shown little interest in cooperating with their Bosniak brethren in Serbia. In Serbia’s Sandzak area, however, Islamic clerics have increased their political influence through the 1990s concomitantly with the deepening economic and political crises in Yugoslavia until Milosevic’s departure on 5 October 2000. Partial evidence indicates that their influence continues to grow.

Integrationist Strategies: “Different but Equal” Conflict Resolution Through Identity Transformation

To develop a culture of peace, developing a community-wide primary allegiance through provision of justice is necessary. Martha L. and Richard W. Cottam conclude their work, Nationalism and Politics: The Political Behavior of Nation States (2001), with an overview of community identity-based intra-state, conflict resolution strategies. They note that the basis for a peace strategy is integration of minorities in order to generate identification with the territorial community. A plan of action for developing a population-wide first-intensity identity with the territorial community defines the essence of an integration strategy.

The formulation of an acceptable integration strategy is essential when
1) an identity groups knows that it lacks the necessary capability to become independent
2) but it also knows that, if necessary, some potential exists to try to acquire that capability. They will attempt to do so if and when its members feel that their existence as a group comes under threat.

For a group which does not identify with the territorial community of the non-nation state at the first or second-intensity level but which also understands that it lacks the capability to achieve and preserve independence, it may prefer autonomy. A gradually intensifying process of identification with the territorial community may come into motion through the option of autonomy in such a situation. By providing groups with greater capability and decisionmaking power in their region or state and competitive power in the broader country government, these forms of integration strategies address the political dimensions of a plan of action for creating a first intensity attachment with the broader territorial community. Nevertheless, failure often characterizes these efforts. Incentives for cooperation with other identity groups in the multiethnic state ultimately to produce a new, third identity would involve federal efforts to promote economic integration and to maintain the country’s defensive capabilities.

According to Cottam and Cottam, the unwillingness of a significant section of the territorial community to identity at first-intensity level with that community is the essential...
feature of a non-nation state. Once again, a plan of action for developing a population-wide first-intensity identity with the territorial community, rather than with a neighboring mother state, defines the essence of an integration strategy. An integration strategy needs to be the focus of a human rights strategy in relationship to national community self-identification. A formula which usually best serves the interests of conflict avoidance in cases in which aspiring national communities are territorially homogeneous in a non-nation state which incorporates one or several aspiring national communities which have the capability to achieve independence would grant those aspiring national communities the right of national self-determination. These aspiring national communities are unlikely to accommodate efforts to attract a first-intensity attachment to the territorial community as long as these communities perceive a real option for independence. Consequently, if and when Kosovo becomes independent, one should expect that a Macedonia with its large Albanian minority will probably have to remain under international mandate.

The psychological and political dimensions which integration strategies (say, a potentially successful one between Serbia and Bosniaks) would have to address are several. 4 factors determining difficulty of integration: 1) Relative capability; 2) Perception of cultural distance; 3) Complexity of social mobility; and 4) Perception of relative superiority/inferiority

1) In terms of the relative capability which they perceive themselves as having, identity groups in non-nation states vary greatly. Only institutional and social conditions which offer broad sovereignty just short of independence would satisfy groups which see themselves as quite close to having the necessary capability for independence. At the other end of the scale would be groups whose relative capability would be sufficiently low to offer very little prospective capability for independence. Assurances of equality with other groups rather than autonomy would be satisfactory forms of integration. Bulgaria’s Turks and Serbia’s remaining Bosniak minority in the Sandzak would perhaps be in this category as long as the option of joining a patron state appears to be unfeasible while the maintenance of their own existence as a community is not in question.

2) The distance between identity groups in culture, race, and religion determine social-creativity options. Reducing the importance of physical characteristics, religion, and culture as foci of comparison would be a requirement in states with core communities which are not yet nation-states. The opportunity to construct a third identity which the people of the territorial community commonly share may emerge through the ongoing evolution of the characteristics of the core community through importing elements of non-core group culture. Political integration, therefore, is a largely psychological process. The prerequisites for European integration may play a useful role here with the “Copenhagen Criteria” for joining the EU including legal protection for the rights of minorities.

As Cottam and Cottam note, if no core community is present, and if among the various communities the cultural, racial and religious disparity is great, then greater complexity will occur in efforts to generate a third identity. Having the public evaluate differences positively

99 Cottam and Cottam, p. 266.  
100 Cottam and Cottam, p. 266.  
101 Cottam and Cottam, p. 267.  
102 Cottam and Cottam, p. 267.  
103 Cottam and Cottam, pp. 267-69.
when they emphasize them as comparison standards would be the necessary outcome of a formula having multiple facets. Conflict avoidance can occur when social comparisons are different but equally positive. Arguably this distance is perceived to be great between the Orthodox and Turkish or Albanian or Slavic Muslim communities in the Balkans.

3) Cottam and Cottam note the complexity of social mobility. An important technique in integration and, ultimately, in the formation of a common identity is promoting mobility opportunities, which serve to break down the boundaries between groups. If groups, however, are mutually exclusive, showing extreme cultural strength as characterizing them, including linguistic uniqueness, a history with substantial relative elaboration, and institutional prerogatives in the society, then paralysis will characterize group identities. Promoting mobility among groups to decrease group identity, then, cannot occur. This situation appears more likely to apply in the Balkans regarding mutual perceptions of Muslims and non-Muslims. It does not apply to Montenegrans and Serbs. They are more likely to experience the velvet divorce which the Czechs and Slovaks exhibited. Overall, however, European integration arguably aims to create a regional market with increasingly porous borders to allow greater opportunities for greater social mobility within a culturally-diverse European public space.

4) Cottam and Cottam note that the extent to which groups perceive each other as superior or inferior is possibly most important. These judgments manifest themselves in the form of stereotypical imagery (e.g. “Turkish slavery,” “oriental nature,” Bulgaria as a “nation of freaks” and “former slaves”). Breaking these images, then, is central to a workable integration strategy if this situation inheres. The prevalence of a far more complex and nonjudgmental view would be an objective. It would replace the implicitly judgmental view which manifests a high degree of stereotyping of the community which other communities have stereotyped. The requirement of acceptance of and respect for group differences and change in expectations about other group members’ behavior relates this process to the second dimension (perceived cultural distance).

For comparison with the Muslim (Pomak), Roma (Gypsy) (but not Turkish) minority in a Bulgaria utilitarian integration strategy: usually, but not always, the appropriate integration path for those minority communities which recognize that they lack the capability to make any claim for some share of sovereignty is a utilitarian strategy. Politically, integration strategies would

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104 Cottam and Cottam, p. 267-69.
105 Cottam and Cottam, p. 267-69.
106 Cottam and Cottam, p. 267-69.
107 Cottam and Cottam, p. 267-69.
108 Representatives of the MRF have proclaimed that the MRF has adopted a successful policy of pursuing power at the local level, winning local mayoral elections in areas in which majority ethnic Turk populations are predominant, but the MRF has at times supported Bulgarian candidates in such areas if the latter candidates were preferable (The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience, p. 35). Both the MRF and its ethnic constituency have committed themselves to integration within the community which corresponds with the borders of the Bulgarian state to promote a civic identity; the MRF has succeeded even in attracting substantial ethnic Bulgarian voter support, with 10% of the votes in national parliamentary elections for the MRF coming from ethnic Bulgarians (The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience, p. 19.). The MRF doubled its parliamentary representation in the 2005 elections, indicating growing support for the MRF
have to address the particular needs, demands and alternatives regarding the capability, power, and rewards of the various groups which they have accrued within the existing political system. Cottam and Cottam cite Donald Horowitz who lists a number of typical mechanisms which state authorities have used in this portion of integration strategies. These typical mechanisms include

1) producing multiple channels for acquiring power to disperse group conflict. Consequently, these mechanisms may distribute power across institutions.

2) arrangements which promote intragroup conflict rather than intergroup conflict

3) policies which promote intergroup cooperation

4) policies which encourage cross-group alignments with their basis in interests rather than group identity.

5) policies which reduce dissatisfaction through reducing the various kinds of disparities between groups.\(^{109}\)

Psychologically, integration strategies would have to remove the incentives to rely on competition and conflict to satisfy identity needs by providing options to different identity groups in a polity for social mobility and social creativity, i.e. different but equal thinking among ethnic groups. Thus, they can move toward the development of a common third identity while not threatening the existence of the primary identity.

Conclusion: The Mysterious Absence of Bulgarian Turkish Nationalism

A sovereign state-building strategy in Bosnia was probably doomed to fail.\(^{110}\) The genocidal violence in Bosnia was the result of a multitude of factors but at their root these factors produced a dehumanizing stereotypical image of the adversary. This stereotype associated with intense affect which emerged in the course of the escalating conflict to produce policies which aimed in some conflict zones to eliminate every man, woman and child of the despised other.\(^{111}\)

The vast refugee and internally displaced person flows then destabilized local areas which had managed to maintain intercommunal cooperation to avoid fighting.\(^{112}\) Today in the Sandzak, a

among non-Turks. Ahmed Dogan proclaimed that one of his objectives was to transform the MRF into a genuinely Bulgarian national party.


\(^{110}\) Cottam and Cottam, p. 231, noting that the appeal of joining neighboring Serbia and Croatia would most likely override efforts to develop a primary allegiance among Bosnian Serbs and Croats with the fledgling, multiethnic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They focus on the Bosnian case but do not discuss the Macedonian, Kosovo, Sandzak or Bulgarian Turk cases.

\(^{111}\) Cottam and Cottam, p. 100.

\(^{112}\) Professor Veniamin Karakostanoglou noted that two-thirds of the total housing stock in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been destroyed in the Bosnian war. Professor Karakostanoglou was at the time with the Greek Helsinki Committee, and on 6 August 1997 was guest lecturer at the AUBG Southeastern European Studies Center 1997 Summer School Workshop, “The Dayton Accords: Continuity or Change in Southeastern Europe?” Laura Silber and Alan Little record the same dynamic of ethnic cleansing in one region generating internally displaced refugee flows which would destabilize and extend the conflict to other locales where ethnic community leaders had so far succeeded in cooperating to prevent the outbreak of violence, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, “Chapter 22: Beware Your Friend a Hundred-Fold: The Muslim-Croat Conflict, 1992-1994,” (Penguin, 1996), esp. pp. 292-97. Prof. Karakostanoglou noted that the Dayton Accords
replay of this tragedy is unlikely as long as the political status quo remains regarding relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community, and Serbia.

The overview in this paper implies that the perceptual environment characterizing identity of self and other in Bulgaria is also one which has the potential for genocide. Perceived cultural differences and distances, together with a historical memory (regardless of how accurate) of mutual, near genocidal attacks and imperial oppression, is such that the stereotypical components for intense communal spiral conflict are present. As to why post-1989 Bulgaria has not been more like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alexander Kolev finds that a critical part of the answer lies in the ideological commitment of the anti-Communist opposition against anti-minority nationalism. This rejection of exploitation of the anti-Turkish “card” evidently derives from the Communist authorities massive (and repeated) and brutal effort to exploit this same card, most recently in the 1980s. The economic depression into which Bulgaria fell in the late 1980s supposedly helped delegitimize these Communist elites together with their public policies. The fact that the renamed “Bulgarian Socialist Party” actually won the first free elections in Bulgaria in 1990 to control parliament, while local BSP leaders in some parts of Bulgaria were leading demonstrations against reversing the forced name-change, belies this inference. Clearly, rejection of traditional, anti-Turkish/Muslim stereotypical appeals by the opposition was important, but something even more significant must have been playing a role. This element lies apparently in Turkey, rather than in Bulgaria; Turkey does not act “nationalistically” in its foreign relations with regard to Turkish and Muslim minorities abroad, i.e. irredentism appears consistently not to be a significant Turkish foreign policy motivation. It apparently was an important motivation in Milosievic’s Yugoslavia until 1993. At that time, he decided to support the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a consequence of the increasing economic damage to Serbia as a result of international economic sanctions.

As noted above, the post-1989 Bulgarian authorities have not granted regional autonomy to regions in Bulgaria with a heavy Turkish population concentration despite Council of Europe suggestions that Bulgaria do so. Cottam and Cottam suggest that minorities with a significant degree of capability to consider secession as an option from a state in which they are clearly marginalized would tend to require a “shared sovereignty” strategy for integrating the minority and promoting resolution of the ethnic conflict. Ultimately, the synthesis of societal trends would produce through this synthesis a new cultural core community for the state, and the state would not have an ethnic basis in the current majority. In Bulgaria, municipal governments are subject to election, but the central government insists on appointing regional governors despite recommendations from the Council of Europe to allow their direct election as well.

The Bulgarian authorities have instead integrated the main representative of the Turkish minority into the government through its nearly omnipresent balancing role in forming majority coalition governments. Rather, then, Bulgaria appears to be following more the “utilitarian

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113 Cottam and Cottam provide a list of “nationalistic” political behavior patterns which nation states and core communities aspiring towards nation statehood are comparatively more likely to manifest, including a preoccupation with the “ingathering” of diaspora communities [Martha L. and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics: The Political Behavior of Nation States (Lynne Reinner, 2001), p. 13].

114 Cottam and Cottam, p. 262.
integration” approach which Cottam and Cottam suggest is likely for marginalized minorities which cannot seriously contemplate the option of secession.\textsuperscript{115} In this approach, genuinely representative leaders of the systematically underprivileged minority publicly acquire a surprising and unexpected degree of evident influence in the polity, in the view of the minority. Ahmed Dogan of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms certainly seems to have met this imperative. The cultural basis for the authority norms of the political community will evolve as in the shared sovereignty strategy, and integration of the minority in an evolving cultural community will proceed. As long as neighboring Turkey continues to act in a surprisingly passive role in comparison with other states which have proclaimed their role as patron state protector of their diaspora, the utilitarian integration strategy may be most appropriate. This historic passivity undercuts Bulgarian Turkish aspirations to demand formal constitutional modifications to the Bulgarian constitution to guarantee their self-expression through regional autonomy arrangements. The Bulgarian Turkish and Muslim community cannot look to Turkey as likely to support them in irredentist aspirations; it has not done so since the start of the process of Bulgaria’s own secession from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Today, Turkey’s role in the protection of the Bulgarian Turks extends to giving Bulgarian Turks Turkish citizenship, which they can hold alongside Bulgarian citizenship. Bulgaria’s agreement to allow dual citizenship might be understood as a form of shared sovereignty over Bulgaria’s Turks between Bulgaria and Turkey, but it is a minimalistic approach relative to the options of regional self-government through state federation.

Ironically, then, the solution to the mystery of the successful so-called “Bulgarian ethnic model” which appears frequently in the Bulgarian press must include a focus, then, on Turkey and the nature of the Turkish state. Claiming that ideological predilections explain also the absence of irredentist tendencies in Turkish foreign policy is also insufficient. Arguably, the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus might be a manifestation of such irredentism but Turkey has never annexed this section of the island. Turkey also appears willing to withdraw in return for guarantees for the protection of the ethnic Turkish community there and entry into the European Union. In other words, Turkey’s foreign policy motivations appear not to have at a primary level the pan-Turanist expansion of the influence of the Turkish political community. To the extent that these ideological predispositions exist, the source which imbues them in the Turkish elite must be a structural one.

Firstly, Turkey is not a nation state. It has a Turkish core community but a large percentage of the population is not Turkish, but Kurdish. The Turkish authorities have struggled violently with the nature of the identity of the state most recently in combating the Kurdish separatist movement. Secondly, the Turkish secular ruling elite looks to Euro-Atlantic integration to address Turkey’s foreign and domestic challenges. Kemal Ataturk’s “Westernization” policy has been critical in the formation of a modern Turkish identity, requiring peaceful relations with European and US status quo great powers.\textsuperscript{116} Consequently, arguably the Turks themselves are relatively lacking in a consensus on the essential nature of “Turkishness” today. Issues of ethnicity (Turkish, Kurd) and sectarianism (Kemalist secularism versus political Islamism, Sunni versus Alawi,) pervade the political community of Turkey. Absence of a relative elite and mass public consensus on the essential component community elements of Turkish national cultural identity would be a strong factor mitigating predispositions.

\textsuperscript{115} Cottam and Cottam, pp. 272-74.
\textsuperscript{116} Ekici, p. 14.
towards Turkish irredentism, not to mention Turkish national grandeur, as a primary foreign policy motivation. Thirdly, like with Russia, a community consensus on the historic borders of “Turkey” are relatively lacking.

Cottam and Cottam seek to explore why the disintegration of the Soviet Union was remarkably less violent with regard to the Russian minorities left in the newly independent states in comparison to the role of Serbian irredentism in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{117} Cottam and Cottam conclude that much less of a consensus existed in Russia regarding historically to where the historic boundaries of Russia extended. The most militant Russian nationalists would equate the boundaries of the Russian empire and later of the Soviet Union with the boundaries of the Russian state. Others in the Russian political ruling elite would be hard pressed to accept that Samarkhand and Baku, for example, were originally Russian cities, and the Turkic and Aryan Muslim populations in Central Asia are interlopers who settled on historic Russian lands. In the Balkans, however, Serb, Bosnian, Bulgaria, Greek, Macedonian and Croat nationalists all make historic overlapping territorial claims on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. They derive from their respective collective consensus “golden age” memories of the boundaries of their respective medieval states. The mantra that Kosovo is the “cradle” of Serb civilization is one which most Serbs would willingly accept. In contrast, a sovereignty claim to Kievan Rus in today’s Ukraine because it is critical to Russian self-identity is not likely to generate as much affective consensus among the Russian public.

A hypothesis requiring further investigation is that Turkish nationalism is struggling with the same weaknesses in explaining why Turkey has not acted more assertively with regard to the Turkish diaspora. The typical Turkish Kemalist nationalist would not likely accept that the natural, historic boundaries of Turkey correspond with the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Muslim expansion into the Balkans was clearly an expansion at the expense of other, Christian empires and states, and justified as such.

If true, then ironically, an explanation for the success of the post-1989 “Bulgarian ethnic model” has to have a critical element focusing on Turkey and its own internal communal political psychological composition, as much as it must examine Bulgaria. The ambiguous legacy of empire requires it. Such a study, moreover, would give useful insight into predicting what political behavior patterns Turkish foreign and domestic policy would display as a member of the European Union.

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