Abstract
This paper analyses how EU civil protection is translated (both in a linguistic/conceptual sense and in an organisational sense) in the Nordic states. The analysis builds on interviews with civil servants and illustrates how European crisis management capacities are created. Doing so it also contributes to the debate about Europeanization and how it can be studied. The paper shows that the creation of European crisis management capacities (in a wide sense) leads to Europeanization, which involves a translation process where linguistic/conceptual translation and organisational change are intertwined, and where differing national traditions affect the process.
**Introduction**

There is an ongoing debate in the EU studies field about Europeanization, this debate concerns both what Europeanization is and how it should be studied. For any student interested in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) this debate is especially interesting. The European Security and Defence Policy is in a political sense a tool for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and as such it deals with the creation of EU crisis management capacities. The development of the ESDP poses an interesting theoretical challenge to researchers because capacities created in the area of crisis management do not belong to the EU itself, they are national capacities that are made available for the EU. This means that an analysis of how such capacities are created need to take developments both on the European level and on domestic levels into consideration. Therefore, the relationship between the EU and the domestic levels becomes important. This paper proposes a Europeanization perspective to analyse development of EU crisis management capacities.

Europeanization is in this paper defined as changes in the relationship between European and domestic levels. In order to analyse changes in that relationship, the analytical tool used is the concept of translation, originally borrowed from new institutional organisation theory. The empirical example used here is that of civil protection. Civil protection is only a very small (and strictly speaking so far only a theoretical) part of the ESDP, but the analytical framework used is assumed to be well suited to investigate the developments of other civilian and military aspects of the ESDP as well. Some suggestions for further research into the ESDP using this theoretical framework are discussed at the end of the paper. The research question to be answered in this paper is how civil protection is translated (both in a conceptual and in an organisational sense) in the Nordic states. Answering this question fulfils the twofold purpose of illustrating how European crisis management capacities are created, and contributing to the debate about Europeanization and how it can be studied.

It is here important to recognise that when Europeanization is defined as changes in the relationship between European and domestic policy, this means that it is a dual process. Even if we want to investigate domestic changes, this does not mean that we assume that the impulse of these changes is clear and “given” by the EU, obviously the member states are part of the process to create EU policy. This paper focuses on analysing changes on two levels: a linguistic/conceptual, and an organisational. These levels are important because they affect what kind of resources member states make available, and thus the character of EU crisis management capacities.

In EU lingo, civil protection is the kind of protection that primarily is needed in order to protect the population (in the EU or outside the EU) in case of a disaster (natural or man-made). Other activities undertaken as a part of the ESDP are in EU lingo referred to as civilian crisis management, and generally undertaken as a response
to a crisis situation caused by some kind of political crisis. The countries studied here are the Nordic states, and rationale behind the choice to study the Nordic states is that these states have some basic socio-economic and historical similarities, whereas their formal membership in the EU differs.

Of special importance for the choice to focus this paper on the Nordic states is the idea of civil defence, an idea that before the end of the cold war was an important part of a concept of ‘total’ defence used by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In the tradition of total defence, civil defence as a concept encompassed all activities needed to safeguard the population that were not of a military character. As pointed out by Bailes (2006: 26) the Nordic countries in the early 21st century present an interesting paradox, they have drawn closer in the military sphere where their formal alignment differ but they have not drawn so much closer on softer policy topics where they traditionally have had similar values. The bigger Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) have all experienced some extent of Europeanization of their more general security approaches in the 1990s. Even so, earlier research has shown that their attitudes have differed concerning increased integration in the area of European security policy more broadly (Rieker 2003).

Denmark does not fully take part of the ESDP (it does not take part in the EU decision making in the ESDP but has been present in several of the ESDP missions). That also non-members of the EU have to cope with challenges of the European integration has been shown in previous research (e.g Soetendorp & Hanf 1998, Rieker 2003) and it will be further demonstrated in this paper. Despite refuting EU membership, Norway and Iceland are formally part of EU’s civil protection mechanism through EFTA, and Norway participates in the Nordic EU Battle Group. Membership in the military alliance Nato also differs between the Nordic countries, where Denmark is the only Nordic EU member that is also a member of Nato. Norway is a member of Nato and Iceland is not only a member of that organisation but also has its own defence agreement with the United States.

The basis for the analysis in this paper is interviews made with civil servants working with civil protection at ministries and authorities in the Nordic states. In order to highlight the changes in the relationship between the EU and its member states interviews have been made with the civil servants that work with, or in relation to, two relevant EU bodies: the Council working party on civil protection – PROCIV, and the committee dealing with the civilian aspects of crisis management – CIVCOM. CIVCOM works only to a very limited extent with civil protection issues, but some of the aspects dealt with there are part of a more general development. However, it should be remembered that the work in PROCIV is more relevant for this paper, and the interviews with civil servants working in CIVCOM have only been used here when their statements have had relevance for the civil protection area. A few civil servants in the Commission and the Council have also been interviewed.
The interviews have all been semi-structured where the informants have been encouraged to elaborate on the questions asked. Both when it comes to the informants and the interview questions, a “snowball method” has been used. This means that when finding informants one person has been asked who else should be interviewed and so on. When it comes to the questions asked they were originally extracted from the theoretical framework, and especially the Europeanization concept. Then more questions have been added over time in order to highlight information that was given in some of the early interviews and that was deemed interesting for the general framework of the paper. In total 27 interviews with 34 persons have been made, and for this paper 17 of those interviews have been used. In addition to interviews, this paper to a limited extent also builds on relevant printed primary sources (EU documents, national bills and laws). It also uses secondary sources (mainly academic literature and articles of importance for the analytical concepts used, and papers in which additional information on the empirical state of the art has been found).

**Civil protection and civilian crisis management in the EU**

In order to analyse Europeanization in the area of civil protection we need to understand more specifically what civil protection in the EU is. Civil protection can theoretically be undertaken both outside and inside the EU. Civil protection as an area for co-operation within the European Community was brought up at a ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1985. This led to the adoption of six resolutions between 1985 and 1994. These established “operational instruments dealing with the preparedness of those involved in civil protection and the response in the event of a disaster, based on the subsidiarity principle laid down in the Maastricht Treaty” (Vincent 2002: 2). There is no special title in the treaties on civil protection, it is mentioned in Article 3 in the Rome Treaty (the reason why it belongs to the first pillar). At the same time all activities and decisions have to be made under Article 308 in the Amsterdam treaty, which means that all decisions are taken in consensus. PROCIV, the Council Working Party is a legislative Working Party, which takes the important decisions, and it is within this working party that negotiations on proposals from the Commission on civil protection take place. Before a decision is taken by the Council Coreper needs to accept the decision and most of the time it is the ministers in the constellation of Justice and Home Affairs that take these decisions (Jönsson & Jarlsvik 2005: 53-54).

An important instrument of EU Civil Protection is the Community Mechanism which was established on 23 October 2001. The Mechanism increased the activity in the civil protection area and presently the PROCIV has meetings more than once a month, whereas in the beginning of the 1990s there were only a couple of meetings a year (F1). The Mechanism is mobilised through the Commission DG Environment’s Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Requests to the MIC are made by the country that asks for assistance, and can be called upon for natural disasters, man-made or industry disasters and accidents, and the assistance is worldwide. According to the
Commission's web-site there were 14 requests for assistance in 2005 only. Examples of when the mechanism has been used are the Prestige accident (2002); earthquakes in Algeria (2003), Iran (2003/4/5), Morocco (2004) and Pakistan (2005). It was also used in the Tsunami in South Asia (2004/2005), in the forest fires in Portugal (2003/2004/2005), in floods in Romania and Bulgaria (2005), and in the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the USA (2005). The Mechanism can also be used as a part of the ESDP, although that has not happened yet. (Commission 2006; Boin et al 2005, Appendix p. 54-57; Jönsson & Jarlsvik 2005: 32-33).

It should here be pointed out that what in the Nordic countries quite often is called “crisis management” in the EU is seen to consist of the elements civil protection and civilian crisis management. Civilian crisis management takes place outside EU, either as part of the ESDP or as a Commission activity. Civilian crisis management within the ESDP has been specified in four priority areas: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection; but new areas such as monitoring have been added over time. When it comes to civilian capabilities within the ESDP personnel from the member states are generally civil servants (Boin et al 2005, Annex p.44, 56; Gourlay 2004: 413-414). The activities undertaken by the Commission in civilian crisis management mainly “relate to provision of humanitarian assistance, through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) or the provision of longer-term technical assistance and aid for institution-building and post conflict reconstruction efforts” (Gourlay 2004:406). The Commission is also involved in pre-crisis, conflict prevention activities such as human rights monitoring and democracy and human rights programmes. These activities are typically implemented by international organisations (e.g. the UN or the OSCE) or non-governmental organisations (Gourlay 2004: 415-416).

**The Europeanization perspective**

As pointed out by Featherstone (2003) Europeanization has become an increasingly popular phenomenon to study since the end of the 1990s. The bulk of these studies investigates the Europeanization of policy areas related to the EU’s first pillar, only a few studies are to be found on policy areas in the second and third pillar. The Europeanization studies tradition is heterogeneous, different authors’ have differed somewhat on what it is that is being Europeanized, but roughly speaking three different foci, or three conceptualisations of Europeanization, can be found in the definitions. The first conceptualisation has emphasised the creation or use of European political institutions (e.g. Goldmann 2000, Green Cowles et al 2001, and Börzel 2002). The second conceptualisation has emphasised change in domestic politics (e.g. Sidenius 1999, Miles 2000, and Radaelli 2003) due to European integration; whereas a third conceptualisation has emphasised the relationship between the national and the
The second conceptualisation of Europeanization, where Europeanization is seen as changes in domestic politics due to European integration has been most popular. This has meant that research on Europeanization generally has been carried out with a top-down approach, where the thought arrow between the European level and the domestic level has gone from the former to the latter, and not vice versa (e.g. Green Cowles et al 2001; Radaelli 2003). This has led to an emerging consensus that Europeanization should be defined as the effect of the EU on the member states (their polity, politics and policy) (Haverland 2005).

But, how should we account for changes in domestic policy that make increased integration possible (Britz, 2004)? If European integration can result in domestic changes, can domestic changes result in European integration? As pointed out by Howell: “if the domestic level initiates change in the EU and affects European integration, then the variables are reversed” (2002: 2). This issue becomes especially important in policy areas related to crisis management, because the capacities that are created belong to the member states and not to the EU. Hence the relationship between the member states and the EU when such capacities are created becomes very important. One way of solving this problem is to think of the Europeanization arrow between the European level and the domestic level as a double arrow. Therefore Europeanization is defined as changes in the relationship between European and domestic policy processes, rather than as the domestic changes themselves. One important point here is timing; it is not that integration takes place first (e.g. EU policies are created) and then domestic policies are changed. Instead, the increased integration and domestic changes take place in parallel and affect each other (c.f. Andersen 2004: 18-19). Mörth (2003: 160) argues that “the European and domestic levels are mutually constitutive and […] they cannot be studied as separate processes” (2003: 173). This is not a strange thought if it is assumed that policymaking in a European context is similar to policymaking elsewhere, where earlier research has shown that policy making is not rational in a sense that policy makers define goals clearly, set the levels of achievement in order to satisfy these goals, and then go through the alternatives that might achieve the goals; but that there rather are streams of problems, policies (solutions) and politics that float round and are coupled at critical junctures (Kingdon 1995). The question of ‘when’ Europeanization takes place is also complicated by the temporal aspects of the European integration process where European governance transforms political planning horizons (Ekengren 2002).

Therefore, an important analytical focus is how Europeanization takes place, how the relationship between domestic and European policy processes changes (c.f. Mörth 2003: 160). This also means that Europeanization becomes a contextual factor for
certain domestic developments, it might not explain a certain development, nor is it possible with the research design applied here to measure the relative weight of Europeanization and other processes of change. The fact that Europeanization is differential and that its effects varies between countries and policy sectors has been shown by several authors (e.g. Héritier et al 2001; Green Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel & Risse 2003), but there is no consensus on how Europeanization takes place.

In order to investigate how Europeanization takes place, the double arrow symbolising the changes in the relationship between European and domestic policy processes in this paper is analysed using the theoretical concept of translation. Translation is a concept that has been borrowed from new institutional organisation theory. Earlier studies of organisational change have shown that it consists of interpretation, translation, and editing, where similarity in changes in policy, law and organisation not necessarily is the result (Mörth 2003; Mörth & Britz 2004: 962). The concept of translation involves viewing change as a socially constructed process that cannot be perfect. Ideas and their interpretation change as they are created and recreated, imitation and innovation are interwoven (Forsell 1992:198; Fernler 1996). Law and Callon (1992) exemplify the process of how ideas change through describing how a new model of an aircraft was an edited version of the old version, rather than a development of the older version. The edited model was, in contrast to a development, not only of a pure technical character but the result of compromises among different actors. This also means that the old context is important for the translation process, Verron for example (1999) has shown that translation can be seen as combining something new within the old context and that successful introduction of a new phenomenon requires knowledge of the environment in which it is introduced.

This paper discusses translation on two levels, the conceptual (or linguistic/conceptual level), and the organisational level. The conceptual level is not totally different from what Radaelli & Schmidt discuss as a ‘transformative discourse’ (2004)). It should not be taken for granted that a phenomenon in the European policy process is possible to translate straight into a domestic vocabulary. The interviews made for the study have been analysed using content analysis where information has been looked for that give input to the concept of translation (both linguistic/conceptual issues and organisational changes). The importance of earlier experiences for how the new policy development is seen will also be analysed.
Translation: changes on two analytical levels

The first level of analysis: linguistic/conceptual translation

The EU

Many of the civil servants have pointed out that there is actually no clear definition of civil protection in the EU. The Community policy in this area has also changed a lot over time. Before Sweden and Finland joined the EU in 1995, EU civil protection issues were primarily targeted against the Mediterranean countries and natural disasters that might happen there. Since then it has been widened to include for example fires and preventive measures. One of the Swedish civil servants pointed out that many say that the civil protection concept has been widened because a number of issues are discussed in PROCIV, but it might be that the agenda in PROCIV is changing rather than the concept itself. Civil protection is not defined and all countries have their own definitions. Sometimes there is no other Council working party that is suitable for a certain issue, which then is discussed in PROCIV. The Commission committee for civil protection is still the body responsible to support the commission in is work to implement and evaluate the Council decisions for the Action programme and the community Mechanism (F1, S2).

The terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London have brought the management of terrorist attacks on to the agenda. This has affected the development of the civil protection area, which in turn affects the activities in the action programme and the community mechanism. Exercises are now often created from the point of view of terrorism and NBC (F1, S2). One Danish civil servant also points out that from a member state perspective the complexity can be seen as both good and bad. It might be problematic when it comes to co-operation and some member states’ definition differs from others, which might result in a disagreement on what should be included or which authority should do what with what kind of means. But at the same time a common definition of civil protection would affect the member states more and probably force them to change their legislation (D3).

Denmark

The EU focus on civil protection has meant that there has been an increased focus in Denmark on the concept civilbeskyttelse. This is the concept that in Denmark was used before civil defence started to be used as part of the concept of total defence, and according to one of the civil servants this concept is being used more and more in a Danish context². The concept of civil protection is slowly introducing itself to the Danish preparedness language, and one civil servant stated that this probably will

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² Even though one of the civil servants interviewed stated that there was no good translation of the concept into Danish.
continue and when the time comes for changing the name of DEMA, the word civil beskyttelse would surely be used in some way. The Danish tradition of total defence means that there is no clear definition of civil protection, it is not only thought of as rescue services or preparation for big accidents, but includes many security aspects and consequently many authorities are involved in the area. Neither the Danish Emergency Management Agency nor the MoD are the principal agents, but the municipalities who are in charge of fire brigades, rescue services, and the police. Whereas the EU tends to keep the work in PROCIV and CIVOM apart, the Danes see civil protection as the immediate response to an incident, whereas build up or relief focus would be crisis management. The DEMA is involved in operations as long as they relate to a humanitarian aspect. According to one Danish civil servant both the earthquake in Pakistan and the tsunami in 2004 made it clear that there is a need for a coherent approach (D2, D3, D4).

On the concept of civil protection one civil servant pointed out that it has developed over time and that the civil protection concept dealt with in the MoD probably differed from the one dealt with when the issue belonged to the MoI (D4). (C.f. the next section.) Another civil servant stated that the concept contains both health preparedness and emergency management, which was reflected in the co-ordination between the MoI/MoD and the regions/DEMA. Yet another civil servant stated that as a consequence of the all-hazard approach, and a global assessment of threats, the whole preparedness field is becoming more integrated. One Danish example is that civil protection and the fire services used to be separate (with different “parent” ministries) whereas these days a unified preparedness and civil protection for the whole society is sought for. According to this civil servant the development is more related to global developments than to specific EU policies (or policies from any other organisation for that matter)(D1).

**Finland**

Civil protection is a quite new concept for Finland and one civil servant stated that before the EU membership, when Finland was a member of EFTA, they made their own decision on what civil protection was. The solution became to take it as an umbrella concept for rescue services and civil defence because both these areas were under the same department in the ministry (F1). Even so, there have been difficulties to translate the concept civil protection into Finnish, something that is true also for the civilian crisis management that is part of the ESDP “we have difficulties to translate them without interpretation, without a clear way that supports everyone’s previous understanding” (F2). When civil protection is translated into Finnish it is called pelastustoimi. Pelastus means rescue, which gives the impression that civil protection is about rescue services when it usually means much more. The English name of the department at the MoI that is in charge of fire, rescue and emergency issues, is “Rescue services department”. Pelastus (rescue) is also part of the Finnish name for the college
for fire fighters, paramedics, and senior officials in the fire departments, but in English it is called Emergency Services College.

One civil servant stated that there are also discrepancies in the way work done by the rescue services, and activities included in civil protection are seen. People who work with rescue or emergency issues most of the time aim at saving lives in disasters and accidents, they think in very short time units: seconds, minutes, hours, days – at the most. This is sometimes different from what is meant with civil protection in the EU (and it is definitely different from what most of the time is meant by crisis management, where the aim is to build societies rather than immediately saving somebody’s life). For example the UK Presidency explained civil protection to be for example refugees and refuge camps, humanitarian aid, logistical help. If Finland then see civil protection as related to the fire department it gives a narrow understanding of what it is about. In 2000 it was decided that civil protection should belong to the MoI and the rescue services department, but since then there has been quite extensive conceptual development in international organisations. This means that much of the scope of the area falls outside the department where it was put in 2000. This also means that the national mechanisms to respond to a crisis are developed on a bureaucratic basis (F2).

**Iceland**

The Icelandic word *varnir* means both defence and protection. The English translation of this word in the concept Civil Defence has been changed to Civil Protection quite recently. One of the civil servants interviewed has tried to find out the reason for this and found that several developments were behind this change. One was that it was a political issue to distance the civilian sector from the military sector, another that there now is a bigger emphasis on daily emergencies than before. The third reason was that Nato started to emphasise civil defence more, and trying to squeeze themselves into civilian police missions for example in Bosnia. This was interpreted as the military knocking on the civilian crisis management back door. All these developments led to a discussion in 2005 where the translation changed from civil defence to civil protection (I3).

**Norway**

In Norway civil protection is defined more as societal security (*samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap*) than as rescue services. Within the civil protection work the focus was earlier on rescue services, but now the focus increasingly has become strategic resources (N).

**Sweden**

There is no straightforward translation of the concept civil protection into Swedish. It would be possible to use the term *civilt skydd* but in general Swedes would not know
the meaning of that. In Sweden civil protection was earlier translated into rescue services, which was not always that useful. According to the Swedish law the concept of rescue services is much narrower than what is included in the civil protection community mechanism, and in the community mechanism there is really no limit to what might activate it. According to Swedish law the necessity to provide people with generators in case of a long-term power cut would not be rescue service, but it would definitely be civil protection. Other translations have been discussed, such as protection and preparedness (skydd & beredskap) and protection and security (skydd & säkerhet). One of the civil servants pointed out that the translation of civil protection causes difficulties for Sweden primarily because of the way in which our agencies, The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) are organised. Especially SEMA uses the concept of protection and preparedness rather than rescue services because it thinks rescue services lead the thoughts in the wrong direction. There might be conflicts because it is not obvious where an issue should belong and who should pay for it (S2, S3, S4,).

**The second level of analysis: organisational translation**

**Denmark**

The Danish Total Defence is a comprehensive concept that consists of a co-operation between different organisations such as the armed forces, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) and the police; but also of the concepts Rescue preparedness and Civil preparedness. Civil preparedness is a planning concept, which aims at ensuring that resources of civil society are used so it benefits Total Defence. Ministries are responsible for Civil preparedness planning in their own area. The principle here is that whoever is responsible under normal circumstances also is responsible in times of crisis (and responsible to prepare for crisis) (CEP Handbook 2003:52-55). Since the 1950s Denmark has provided resources in order to build up capacities which are to be used internationally. Historically the focus was on natural disasters, but the debut for international civil protection missions came in the 1990s when the EU asked Denmark to participate in ECHO missions on the Balkans, where Denmark stayed for some three years during the war between 1992-1995. Thereafter, Denmark has significantly expanded its international capacity (D1).

In 2004 both the unit responsible for civil protection in the Ministry of Interior and the responsibility for the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) were transferred to the Ministry of Defence. In 2003 a Danish ambassador had presented a paper where two main tasks were identified for the Danish defence: international missions, and the assistance of Danish civil authorities in case of a big emergency. The current threat picture makes it difficult to separate military and civilian threats from each other. The transfer of this more civilian policy area to the MoD was in line with the Danish concept of total defence. It was also stated that the transfer was a way for
the government to show that civil protection is a prioritised policy area, the MoD is a much more internationally oriented ministry than the MoI (which has the over all responsibility for preparedness issues) (D1, D3).

In addition the transfer seems to have increased the contacts between the DEMA and the ministry. One of the civil servants point out that the co-operation between the MoI and DEMA was not that tight, exemplifying with the information that was given to the ministry before DEMA sent people on international missions. After the transfer the MoD would know of such activity before it happened, whereas when DEMA belonged to the MoI the ministry might have been acknowledged afterwards.

None of the Danish civil servants said that the action programme or the community mechanism had changed Danish policies or administrative structures. But it seems as if there has been a change of priorities. It was also pointed out that the civil protection unit can focus better on the EU after the transfer from the MoI to the MoD. But here the Danish opt-out from the military parts of the ESDP is affecting how civil protection is dealt with, especially on a political level (D3). It was also pointed out that the transfer gave Denmark the possibility to be up to date and have experience without participating in the military co-operation because Denmark has military assets in the EU as resources for civil protection (in line with the Edinborough agreement) (D2).

The Danish transfer of civil protection from the MoI to the MoD was stated to be similar to the development on an EU-level and therefore to make it easy for Denmark to participate in the creation of civil protection capacities in the EU (D3). When it comes to the Danish relationship to the EU the fact that the public sector in Denmark is decentralised, makes it problematic for the Danish state to include assets in an international database because these assets might be regional properties. On the other hand increased co-ordination was pointed out as desirable and the DEMA was foreseen to play a greater role in the Danish context as a link between the Community civil protection mechanism and Danish ministries and public administration (D5).

Finland

The Finnish concept of total or comprehensive defence means that in addition to the military defence there are four other main sectors to the defence: civilian defence, economic defence, defence information, and maintenance of public order and security. The Emergency Power Acts lay down the provisions on general preparedness for a state of emergency which says that authorities should be prepared to continue their duties even during a state of emergency. The government and their ministries are the highest level that prepares for crisis management within their respective areas. Often the Permanent Secretary of a ministry is also its Chief of Preparedness. At regional and local level the State Provincial Offices and the municipalities carry out organisation of co-operation between regional administrations and the Military Commands, and the duties of civil emergency planning and organisation respectively (CEP Handbook 2003: 64-65).
In the Ministry of Interior there is a Department of Rescue Services that is responsible for rescue activities and protection of the population. Rescue services are organised and co-ordinated regionally. Fire brigades (both professional and voluntary) in co-operation with assisting authorities and voluntary organisations are the ones who carry out rescue activities. There is also an organisation for international rescue operations, the Finn Rescue Force, consisting of some 200 persons based on the fire brigades in the largest cities. The Finn Rescue Force can mobilise a group of experts in 2-24 hours and a rescue unit in 1-3 days (CEP Handbook 2003: 65). The Rescue Department consists of four units, one of these is the unit of international relations where four people work. (There is also a department for civilian crisis management, that deals with ESDP.) The unit was established in the beginning of 2005 and should deal with all international activities and organisations: the EU, UN, Nato, OSCE, as well as Nordic, bilateral and multilateral co-operations. This means that the unit not only deals with civil protection that is part of the community mechanism but also would deal with it if there were a civil protection mission as part of the ESDP. Therefore, civil protection issues that are dealt with in CIVCOM are prepared there (F1, F2, F3).

Iceland

Iceland has a tradition of civil defence that goes back to the occupation of Iceland in World War II. The present Civil Protection System in Iceland is based on a law from 1962, which originally was written during the Cold War with the purpose to protect the public from a military attack. This law was based on experiences in Denmark and Sweden. In 1967 the law was amended so it could be used to protect the public from natural disasters and other disasters. The National Civil Defence of Iceland, which was introduced by the law on Civil Defence, belonged to the Ministry of Justice. When developing its civil protection system Iceland received help from the UN that sent a specialist in 1970 to help developing civil defence plans, and the first plan was ready in 1972. In 2003 the National Civil Defence was abolished and all its tasks and responsibilities were transferred to the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police. In a crisis the chief of the police is in charge and can use resources from fire brigades and rescue services (I1, I3).

Iceland has been part of the EU’s civil protection mechanism since 2001. Iceland has said that it can participate with experts from rescue services, earth quake advisors, and people specialised in crisis management. However, there is no system for participation and no list of resources has been given to the EU (I3). Iceland has 6-8 years of experience in international search and rescue work, and usually goes on international missions on a request from the UN. The Icelandic rescue service is an independent organisation, a voluntary rescue service which means that when they work in Iceland they are generally not paid. When they go abroad however they go on an agreement with the MFA, and then they become a paid government team. The MFA
takes the decision on whether a team should be sent off or not because they are in charge of the budget for transportation (I2).

Since 2003 Iceland has attended the Commission’s committee meetings on civil protection on a regular basis, and here several ministries are involved in the work. In 2006 however, the work in the EU on civil protection has is not prioritised. One of the Icelandic civil servants pointed out that the work in the EU is important because the ideas from the EU often are integrated nationally. Here Iceland should participate in training and exercises as much as possible, and Iceland could also provide location for exercises. To co-operate with other countries was stated to be a cheap way to develop this area (I3).

**Norway**

Civil protection is (as Civil Emergency Planning) part of the wider concept of Total defence in Norway. Here a guiding principle is that responsibility under normal circumstances also means responsibility for emergency preparedness. This relates to all levels, but on governmental level each ministry is responsible for emergency planning and crisis management within their particular sectors. The Ministry of Justice and Police has the overall responsibility for sector co-ordination. The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB, Direktoratet for samfundssikkerhet og beredskap,) sorts under the Ministry of Justice and Police and is responsible for the Civil Defence, National Centre for Education in Societal Security (samfounnssikkerhet og beredskap) and for the Norwegian School for Fire Brigades. DSB has a unit for international co-operation where five civil servants work. They are the Norwegian representatives in the EU’s civil protection mechanism and in the action programme and in Nato’s Skepsis co-operation (CEP Handbook 2003: 126-130; DSB 2006, N).

The EFTA countries participate in EU’s civil protection mechanism and the action programme. They participate in the Commission’s committee on civil protection but not in PROCIV. For the EFTA countries this means that they do not participate in the development of civil protection in the EU because much of that work takes place in PROCIV. This means that Norway participates in the EU work on civil protection when the Commission wants it to participate, and that depends on how EU’s Treaties are interpreted. EFTA has its own working group for civil protection where Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland are active. They also invite the EU to this working group when that is considered necessary. As mentioned above, Iceland didnot prioritise EU-related work in 2006, which means that the working group has had a low degree of activity lately. The fact that Norway is not a member of the EU, and that a lot of the development within the civil protection area takes place in Council bodies and not in Commission bodies, means that the extent to which the Norwegians can push for development in the EU’s development of the civil protection area is limited (N).

Two issues have been important nationally. The first is a revision of the possibility to contribute to international missions, and the second is the work on the
'host-nation problem', where the possibilities to receive help are discussed. When it comes to the issue of Norway as a host-nation, Norway has not experienced many of the kind of crises that have affected other countries in Europe, this means that the EU becomes a source for lessons learned. From a Norwegian perspective international co-operation strengthens national preparedness (N).

Sweden

The Swedish Total Defence concept includes military defence and civil defence. It primarily relates to wartime, with the idea that modern warfare is total, which requires a total defence. The civil defence part of the total defence includes all non-military functions in society that are needed in wartime. However, civil defence also relates to peacetime when it includes activities that enhance the ability to resist an armed attack. In peacetime, the concept of Protection and Preparedness against Major Emergencies during Peacetime is important for the work to avoid, and prepare for, major emergencies in peacetime. It is the Ministry of Defence that has the overall responsibility for civil protection. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) are the two authorities that primarily work with civil protection issues and they both sort under the MoD. SEMA has a co-ordination role and is supposed to activate and support activities in other authorities that help reduce vulnerability and increase emergency management capacity. Planning and allocation of resources for both peacetime emergency preparedness, and for civil defence, is organised into six areas of which protection, rescue and care, is one (CEP Handbook 2003: 168-172).

The SRSA is the Swedish authority responsible for the practical work in the area of civil protection. It has an international department, which is responsible for international humanitarian missions, and to a certain extent also aid. They have a preparedness of personnel, equipment and finances. Financing for SRSA’s missions comes from the MFA via the MoD. SRSA also co-operates with SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) (S1).

As is also the case in the in the other Nordic countries, the Swedish rescue service is decentralised and primarily works on regional and municipal level. Therefore it was natural for the SRSA to be the point of contact for the EU, and the EU work mainly became a kind of add-on to what was already done. SEMA is a relatively young agency and in the latest bill on collaboration in a crisis situation (“Samverkan i Kris”) a merge of SEMA and SRSA was proposed. The civil servants interviewed seem to agree that even though this is the first bill that explicitly stated that the Swedish system should be changed in accordance with the development in the EU, the proposal to merge the two authorities had more to do with the specific Swedish circumstances rather than a pressure from the development of civil protection in the EU (S1, S2, S4, S5).

One reason that organisational change has been pushed for has to do with the relationship between the two main agencies in the area, and the other is the Tsunami.
The Swedish authorities are actively part of co-operation in the EU within their respective areas, especially within the committees for implementation of EU directives. Here the development of the civil protection area in the EU has affected the SRSA, partially because EU’s capacity has increased. When the MIC (the Monitoring and Information Centre, located at the Commission’s DG Environment) was put in place in 2000 the EU system was up to four days slower than the UN OCHA system, whereas now the difference rather is four minutes (S1, S2, S4, S5).

At the same time as the reasons for the changes proposed have Swedish origin, the work takes the EU membership and co-operation between member states into account. One civil servant also pointed out that the statement to adjust the Swedish system to the development in the EU is made despite the fact that there are no clear legal grounds on an EU-level that clarifies the role for EU in this area. In general Sweden is hesitant about increased ambitions as long as it is difficult to identify the EU added value. For Sweden a question is how to engage the right authorities and at the same time have a Swedish position in the EU (S2, S4).

The importance of experience - The International Humanitarian Partnership

The traditions of going abroad to catastrophes differ quite a lot between the EU’s member states. One Swedish civil servant stated that it is mainly Sweden, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, and the UK that have been doing this. There is a difference in the Northern and Southern EU-member states when it comes to engagement in UN-missions. The Northern countries have a long tradition to co-operate with UN’s humanitarian organisations and would like the EU to work like the UN. The idea of regional co-operation is not as established in the southern countries. They have just started to co-operate regionally and to build modules that can become a resource for the community mechanism. The different traditions are also reflected in the capacity the member states have to go abroad, and in what kind of authorities they have. The Swedish agency SRSA for example is working on international missions all the time. Many member states only go out when something really big has happened (S2, S3, S5). One important collaboration for the Nordic countries is the IHP, the International Humanitarian Partnership, where Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, the UK and the Netherlands participate. The Nordic countries and the UK have an operational co-operation whereas the Netherlands only participates on a political/financial level. IHP was initiated in the 1990s and it was intended as a support for the UNHCR and Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Within OCHA, the UN Disaster Assessment Co-ordination system has the mandate to coordinate operation on a global level, and when UNDAC calls for missions the IHP countries support it (D1).

Within the IHP framework the method used to create capacity has been to create ‘modules’. Examples of these modules are management, search and rescue, and IT and communication. The concepts of dual-use (national and international) and
interoperability (which Nato has worked on for some time) are both important for the IHP. Another characteristic is the informal character where decisions regarding the set-up of operations can be taken at a low level in the participating countries. Here a Swedish civil servant pointed out that co-operation works well because it is carried out by dedicated people, and that the IHP is an example of that. When formal aspects are activated the political dimension make things more complicated (D1, S5). There is a high degree of compatibility within the modules in the IHP, a unit from Norway and another one from Denmark can be put together to form a communications module. During the operation in Banda Ache (after the Tsunami) the IHP provided the base camp with all IHP countries participating. IHP also brings together a lot of actors in the humanitarian field (NGO’s and others) within the framework of exercises, which are held every two years. The MIC, i.e. the Commission, is also invited to these exercises in as one way of showing the Commission the module concept and how it works in practice (D1).

Sweden has tried to create a virtual supermarket where organisations that need resources can go and order what they need. This system is partially developed within the IHP module concept supported by the UN. Here the SRSA delivers to the UN even though bilateral agreements are the basis for the support. This was stated to be a kind of solution that could help make the UN more efficient. Smaller resources are stocked in Sweden but in general there are co-operation partners that deliver all over the world, the things are not generally shipped from Sweden (S1).

**Conclusions and future research**

When it comes to the linguistic/conceptual translation of the civil protection concept, the traditions of total defence that the Nordic states have, and of which civil defence is an important part, also affect how the civil protection concept is translated. What has become clear in this study though, is that even though all Nordic states have had an idea of civil defence as part of a total defence, there are differences in the idea of what these concepts include. In Sweden the total defence refers to a war situation, in Denmark it refers to protection and contingency planning. This shows that even quite similar countries using similar vocabulary actually speak of different phenomena. This insight might help us to explain why those working in the civil protection area in the Nordic states (with the exception of Iceland) not are certain (or do not agree) on how civil protection should be translated to their mother tongue or what should be included in the concept and its translation. (However, here it should here be remembered that this is not clear within the EU either.)

A general trend in the Nordic states is that civil protection first was interpreted relatively narrowly as rescue services or even fire brigades, whereas over time the interpretation has changed and there have been discussions in all countries studied here except of Iceland on what a suitable translation would be. When the translation changes, or is contested, the question becomes where in the national administrations
certain issues belong. Here Sweden has made an effort to solve such uncertainties by having one person who works at the Swedish representation to the EU who is in charge of sorting issues nationally. You could say that Sweden in this way has its own “translator”.

We can see here that a translation “from word to word” not has been possible, and it might not be possible in these kind of translation processes. In the linguistic translation process the concept has to undergo a negotiation of what vocabulary it should be translated into, which has consequences for where in a domestic policy process it belongs. Hence, the way that a concept, in this case civil protection, is translated is important because it has consequences for how the work within the member states is organised. This in turn affects the state’s participation in the EU development of the policy area. In this way the language aspect and the organisational aspect become intertwined in an interesting way that was illustrated in the empirical part of this paper.

Even though there is no consensus in the EU on the development of the civil protection area, it has become clear in this study that the EU activities have increased the political attention of the area. For some of the countries studied, it has meant an increased international focus of the area, and changed the expectations of where national capacities might be used. The fact that the EU has a civil protection mechanism does not only mean that Sweden might send help in times of crisis to Greece as well as to Norway (a political expectation that seems to have changed with the EU’s Solidarity Declaration). For other states the question of host-nation competence has been raised. The bigger Nordic states might actually want to use the possibility to receive help in times of crisis. As was shown in the Gudrun storm this implies that Europeanization of national structures in the area of civil protection not only means being able to help others but also to receive help, something that the Nordic states might not have been too used to think about. Here the two EU outsiders, Norway and Iceland, have been clearest in saying that the EU work is important because it makes it possible to learn from that work, and from what has happened in other countries.

What we can see here is that the relationship to other organisations and earlier experiences (both in the form of participation in concrete rescue missions, and in the form of experiences from networks such as the IHP) are very important for how the development of the area is looked upon. Many of the questions dealt with at the time of the interviews have to do with what capacities there should be in the EU, who should be the owner of these capacities, and which role the Commission should have. The Nordic states in general, and Sweden in particular, were quite hesitant when it comes to further development of EU civil protection. These countries see a conflict between the way in which they are used to work thorough the UN, and some of the ideas of how EU civil protection should be developed.
When undertaking the interviews that are the basis for this paper, it has also become clear that the threat pictures for the Nordic states differ quite extensively from each other. This is important because civil protection is part of a more general security policy, and therefore what role is given to civil protection depends on that more general security policy, which stems from the threats that are perceived as possible. Here the two extremes are Iceland and Finland. Finland still sees the territory as something that might be threatened, which means that defending the territory is taken into consideration in the general security policy and when developing capacities. For Iceland, the main threat comes from nature in the form of volcanic eruptions, or from a major accident (that might have been caused by man, directly or indirectly). Therefore, the Nordic states might serve as a good example of a more general phenomenon in Europe, where subjective threat perceptions are accepted as grounds for objective security thinking. Different European states do not necessarily share the sources of threats but they share the ideas of what needs to be safeguarded and to a certain extent also how crises should be dealt with. This means that the preparation to deal with future threats to security only encompasses the co-ordination of responses to threats, threats that differ in different parts of Europe. This is for example shown in the EU’s Solidarity Declaration, which deals with consequences of crises/threats to security without necessarily dealing with the prevention of crises.

Through answering the question of how civil protection has been translated in the Nordic states (both in a linguistic/conceptual and in an organisational sense) this paper has illustrated how European crisis management is created in the case of civil protection. In addition, it has made a suggestion of what Europeanization is – changes in the relationship between the European and domestic levels – and how that can be studied – as a translation process. The development of several concepts in the ESDP that are part of the creation of European crisis management capacities, could be analysed in a similar way as has been done with civil protection in this paper. On the military side the Battle Group concept is an obvious candidate and on the civilian side both the development of rule of law and specific capacity efforts such as the Civilian Response Teams (CRT) could be analysed. Such a broad take on the Europeanization of crisis management capacities would help us to understand some of the dynamics in this policy area. From a Europeanization perspective the comparison between the creation of civilian and military capacities would be of special value since it seems that these put different kinds of demands on the states.
References


DSB (2006) DSB official web site [www.dsb.no]


**Interviews referred to in the text.**

<table>
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<th>Area of expertise and workplace</th>
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<td>I2</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Managing director of ICE-</td>
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[^3]: One person was interviewed twice, both individually and together with another person. Therefore the total number of informants is actually one less than the addition of the column “Number of people”.

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