Fusing Security and Development: Just another Euro-platitude?

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Abstract

The EU has increasingly committed itself to fusing security and development. Developmental approaches to security are routinely seen as integral to the EU’s distinctive foreign policy identity. This paper finds, however, that much work remains to be done to implement this commitment. Few in the EU would doubt that development and security go hand in hand, but differences abound over what this implies for the allocation of finite resources and the nature of diplomatic engagements.
FUSING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT:
JUST ANOTHER EURO-PLATITUDE?

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Introduction

The European Union has routinely and increasingly asserted that it pursues security and development as mutually-enhancing policy objectives. Developmental approaches to security have long been seen as integral to the EU’s distinctive international identity. Now this appears to be backed up by firmer policy commitments and new instruments. European policy-makers proclaim a two-way link between development and security to be an increasingly core tenet of EU foreign policy. They insist that this defines European strategies in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and more broadly within interventions such as that undertaken in Afghanistan. The link occupies centre stage within the EU’s seminal Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) commitments and is ostensibly integral to the generic design of European policies towards ‘fragile states’.

While widely praised, this rhetorical commitment to link development and security is in itself unremarkable: would anyone contend that insecurity and raging conflict were good for development, or conversely that poverty was good for conflict mitigation? The pertinent issue is whether it has actually changed anything in terms of policy. Has development policy become more security-sensitive? Has security policy incorporated concrete development components? Or is this strand of PCD simply a question of assuming that anything beneficial for development is good for security, and vice versa?

This paper reveals that the EU has made some modest progress towards according concrete substance to the security-development link. In particular, an increased focus on supporting governance reforms acts as a potential link between security and development objectives within several layers of European policies. However, what the link means in practice is still contested. Few in the EU would doubt that security and development go together; but differences abound over what this implies for the allocation of finite resources and the nature of diplomatic engagements.

The EU still has no clearly thought-out vision of the balance or direction of causality between these two policy goals, but rather an ad hoc approach based on the rather easy assumption that ‘all good things go together’. Indeed, some basic differences have emerged over where the boundary now lies between ‘development’ and ‘security’ policies. The evidence from European policies suggests that development and security can be both complementary and oppositional. A precarious balance, and some tension, exists between the notion of security-informed development, on the one hand, and development-mediated security, on the other hand.

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1 Although it might be cautioned that it is easy to overstate the correlation between levels of development and security: Ivory Coast was one of Africa’s richest states prior to descending into bloody conflict; suicide bombers emerge from middle-income countries and backgrounds.
1. The security-development commitment

The European Security Strategy (ESS) includes a focus on traditional security issues – the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the need for tighter control of the movement and financing of transnational criminal networks, and counter-terrorist cooperation with security forces in developing states. Its central thesis, however, is built around a three-way linkage between security, development and governance reform. This conjoins the development-security linkage that had gradually emerged within conflict prevention policies with the development-governance linkage that had taken shape within development policy forums.

The three-way linkage is reflected in what have become some of the ESS’s most widely quoted assertions, namely that:

- “poverty and disease…give rise to pressing security concerns”;
- “Security is the first condition of development”;
- there is a security imperative in addressing the fact that “sub-Saharan Africa is poorer today than it was 10 years ago”;
- “development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform”.2

Debates were taken a step further by the Commission’s proposals on Policy Coherence for Development, forwarded in April 2005. These suggested that “Non-development policies should respect development policy objectives and development cooperation should, where possible, also contribute to reaching the objectives of other EU policies”. The issue at stake was to look beyond “the frontiers of development cooperation, and consider the challenge of how non-aid policies can assist developing countries in attaining the Millennium Development Goals”. The notion of ‘multi-sector stock-taking’ became a leitmotif in Brussels security circles, reflecting the interest in ascertaining what was being done to affect the development-security linkages propounded in the ESS in different parts of the EU policy-making community.3

Commitments were given firmer standing through the European Consensus on Development, agreed in 2006 as the first common set of guidelines for European development policies. The Consensus reiterates a conviction in the two-way linkage between security and development: development is said to be necessary for security; security necessary for development. The security-development link will be promoted, it is claimed, both in crisis management and in post-crisis contexts. The EU commits itself to making sure that poverty eradication policies incorporate a conflict-prevention focus, and to promoting “linkages between emergency aid, rehabilitation and long-term development”. In line with the overarching PCD maxim, it is to be ensured that all security policies impact positively on development policies and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. The Consensus affirms that “insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs. Security and development are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries”. Development efforts are also presented as the means to tackle crime, energy security and environmental degradation.

The key link between development and security is judged to lie in support for democratic governance, which is stipulated as “fundamental for poverty reduction” and whose absence is part of the “root causes of violent conflict”. The fragility of developing, conflict-prone states is

to be addressed “through governance reforms, the rule of law, anti-corruption measures and the building of viable state institutions.” At the December 2006 European Council, EU member states agreed to have their own national policies monitored with respect to all such linkages. And, with the governance agenda in mind, in early 2007 the principle of donors focusing on their respective areas of ‘comparative advantage’ was enshrined in a new EU Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour in Development Policy.

Although their logic seems unequivocal, these various commitments do not fully specify the complexities of the development-security link or give many clues on how this is to be articulated in practice. The Consensus contains many obvious diplomatic fudges. A caveat is added that such linkages will only be pursued “fully respecting individual Member States’ priorities in development assistance”. The Consensus has an “all things to all men” feel to it, and fails to specify outcomes where difficult choices or trade-offs are inevitable. Poverty reduction is said to remain the absolute priority in allocating resources; but ‘fragile states’ are also to be given ‘particular attention’, as are a wider set of middle-income countries (MICs).

It is impossible to ascertain much from the EU’s formal commitments and policy statements on the key questions of prioritisation and sequencing of linkages. The least developed countries (LDCs) are said to be the priority, but so are MICs; poverty reduction is said to be the overarching priority, but so is conflict resolution; pressing authoritarian regimes for democratic governance is said to be the priority but so is ‘local ownership’ on the part of southern governments (presumably including those actively resisting democratisation). It is asserted that “Development cooperation is one major element of a wider set of external relations, all of which are…mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other” – as if trade-offs would never be required. This mirrors a broader argument that the EU has developed such an all-inclusive, everything-is-related-to-everything concept of ‘security’ that clear operationalisation becomes increasingly difficult.

The broad commitment to ensure coherence between development and security in fact incorporates two very different sets of policy issues, which reflect different strands of what is understood by ‘security’. One set of issues relates to instability, conflict and insecurity within developing states themselves, and the problems these pose for economic development. Another issue relates to the EU’s own security concerns and the way these are to be assuaged, it is claimed, by enhanced development efforts. Both of these strands are present within the Consensus and other PCD commitments. The need is stipulated to address conflict and state fragility in developing states. But it is also observed that development should contribute to broader EU security aims. The second strand remains more contested, more slippery in conceptual terms, and the root of NGO and development networks’ fears over ‘securitisation’. The policy statements issued so far certainly conflate the two strands in places in a way that militates against clarity.

Hence, in what appears to be a set of fairly straightforward commitments, there is actually a twin dynamic present. In terms of conflict prevention/resolution, the assertion is of a firm causal

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5 For an analysis of which, see Nils-Sjard Schulz, “Division of labour among European donors: allotting the pie or committing to effectiveness?”, FRIDE Comment, March 2007 (www.fride.org).

6 Council of the European Union et al. European Consensus, op. cit, p. 5, 10 and 11.

connection between better security engagements and the effectiveness of development efforts. But in terms of the wider security agenda, PCD appears to be more of a conceptual battleground pitching the development and security communities against each other. For the development community, this is about constraining EU approaches to security and the incipient European Security and Defence Programme (ESDP) to ensure that these do not undermine development. For the security community it is about facilitating a more (and necessarily, in its view) politicised set of EU external relations. The security-development nexus remains an uneasy mix of mutually enhancing connection; reaction by some to ESDP; and contrasting reaction by others to a changed strategic environment.

2. Conflict resolution and crisis response

Assessing the issue of coherence in respect of instances of open conflict invites the question of whether the two-way linkage between development and security policies has produced any notable policy changes. This can be examined across each direction of the security-development link:

- First, have development commitments increased in fragile states and been deployed as part of a conflict resolution strategy? The basic philosophy has been ritually repeated of ‘more effort on development is needed for security’. But has this been put into practice?
- Second, and in the inverse direction, has EU security engagement backed up development aims? Has development funding become more security-aware and dovetailed more tightly to specific peace support imperatives?

The evidence does not allow entirely positive responses to either set of questions.

2.1 Development-mediated security

Experts argue that the EU is still not good at coherently and smoothly making the transition from short-term crisis response instruments to long-term development instruments, deployed specifically and in sizeable fashion specifically as a follow-up to security engagement. It is commonly suggested that the EU is still at an early stage in making development assistance ‘conflict sensitive’. Diplomats lament that the 2006 ‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development’ communication has produced little concrete change. An April 2007 European Parliament report complained that the poverty dimension of security is still neglected in practice at the EU level.

Brussels policy-makers lament that very little expertise on conflict exists within development policy-making circles. The Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit set up in the European Commission in 2001 admits to having gained no real handle on development issues. Policy-makers lament that the general positing of a mutually-enhancing link between security and development in conflict resolution strategies has not been developed sufficiently in detail to

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provide meaningful operational guidance to development officers charged with allocating finite resources.

Officials admit that security-relevant input into country-level development aid programming remains negligible. The disconnect with trade-related aspects of development policy also persists: attempts floundered, for instance, to incorporate conflict-sensitive variation into the EU’s GSP system of trade preferences. Crucially, internal EU debates have focused far more on the military-civilian relationship than on the broader development-security link.

Many in Brussels express concern that, far from providing greater impetus to development efforts, new military decision-making structures have taken shape as a separate and competing set of institutions. ESDP officials admit that little thought has yet gone into the way that EU missions relate to longer-term development processes. The Police Unit in the Council Secretariat has few systematic links with aspects of civilian crisis management run through other EU institutional structures. Officials acknowledge that decisions are taken militarily on ESDP missions, and only then are development, governance or security sector reform (SSR) experts consulted as a secondary concern – rather than these latter being integral to conflict-resolution planning itself.

This means that traditional security deliberations still cut across the effective use of development funding, rather than boosting the latter. For example, discussions on the EU’s code of conduct on arms transfers (that take place within the working group COARM) have not benefited from linkage to development policy input; the limited progress in tightening up the code of conduct is still cited by many as evidence of the hollowness of security-development coherence.

At the national level, significant variation remains in harnessing development resources to conflict-resolution objectives. The Netherlands has merged its development agency into the foreign ministry, in part to facilitate a more strategic deployment of Dutch assistance. In 2006, the Netherlands created an inter-ministerial ‘pool’ for security sector support, incorporating both military and development officials. These moves have engendered some backlash, with two of the three current parties in the Dutch governing coalition critical of the mixing of development and military funding, in particular with regard to the Netherlands’ involvement in Afghanistan. In France the development directorate is similarly embedded within the Quai d’Orsay. In sharp contrast, Germany’s development agencies (both the BMZ and GTZ) fiercely defend their autonomy from the Auswärtiges Amt; EU diplomats revealed that during the German 2007 presidency this meant that African issues were led through a strongly development perspective, making coordination at the EU level harder in this period on the nominal linkage to security.

The UK has pioneered a formal set of policy-making linkages through its two Conflict Prevention Pools, designed to encourage joint Foreign Office-DfID-Ministry of Defence programmes. A similar inter-ministerial Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PRU) was created in 2005. Between 2001 and 2006 the share of UK development aid going to ‘fragile states’ increased from 17 to 33%. However, assessments differ of how effective the Pools have been; doubts remain over whether they have in practice enhanced an investment in development-sensitive conflict mitigation or simply provided the three ministries with funds through which to finance whatever policies they were each individually already funding. One critic argues that inter-ministerial rivalry has diluted the work of the PRU to the provision of advisory capacity in

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conflict contexts. Significantly, the creation of similar collective structures at the EU level, within which security, development and diplomatic strands of the Brussels policy-making machinery would be tasked with designing more ‘joined-up’ initiatives, has not been judged possible.

2.2 Security-informed development

Conversely, some improvements have been introduced to render development funding more security-aware. This can be seen across both long-term policies of conflict prevention and new funding for immediate crisis response.

The 9th European Development Fund (EDF) makes formal provision for ODA to support conflict mitigation initiatives. And funds have been forthcoming for standard conflict resolution activities in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone. One of the Commission’s largest projects in recent years was a €20 million Rehabilitation programme in Northern Uganda. Crucially, the €250 million African Peace Facility (APF) was agreed for 2004-07, to coalesce conflict-related funding out of the EDF. Agreement on Article 11 of the Cotonou accords, which provides a legal base for such conflict funding from the EDF, is routinely listed by diplomats as one of the main achievements in the development-security linkage – this a provision that one policy-maker suggests “nobody would have agreed to five years previously”.

Under the 10th EDF it has been agreed to allocate an increased €300 million to the APF for 2008-10. From 2007, the new Stability Instrument widens the scope for this type of funding, additional to the EDF. Particularly notable increases have been forthcoming in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) funding. In May 2007 commitment was made to speed progress in ongoing discussions on the ‘EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’, launched in June 2006. The EU has proposed to develop the French RECAMP military capacity-building programme into an EU instrument, and to harness this for enhanced support and training for the African Standby Force.

The civilian Rapid Reaction Mechanism, introduced on the back of the ESDP, includes provision for the deployment of police, legal and civil administration experts. New ‘task forces’ set up for the Balkans and the Great Lakes incorporated all institutional sites working on these regions – giving development experts a role alongside democracy and human rights officers, conflict management sections, security experts and those responsible for economic policy. Some observers suggest that the Commission’s development directorate has begun to engage with conflict resolution if only in part to safeguard its own influence as the ‘fragile states’ agenda has gained prominence in other parts of the Brussels institutional machinery.

Overall, however, it is difficult to judge the scale of conflict-mitigation activity as precise figures are not collated on how much of the Commission’s various mainstream geographical aid budgets go to conflict resolution and peace support operations. One expert argues that the fact that such amounts have not been identified itself casts doubt on development-security coherence.

The APF has in practice been used as an operational fund to support the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur and not as an initiative for longer-term capacity-building, as was originally

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stated. Outside Commission funding, the limited size of CFSP and ESDP budgets remains a perennial fixture of Brussels debates. With the CFSP high representative’s unit operating on a shoestring, security interventions often have to be cobbled together through ad hoc national contributions. This is something the Council has been keen to use the PCD commitments to rectify, but has so far not succeeded in doing.

While ESDP missions have proliferated, the proclaimed security-development linkage does not appear significantly to have increased the EU’s political will to undertake large scale, combat military interventions in conflict situations. The Consensus on Development insists that the EU ‘cannot stand by’ as conflict rages, in part because this undermines its development efforts. But, in practice ‘standing by’ remains a European proclivity. If many critics feared that the commitment to coherence between security and development would be used as a banner under which a far-reaching militarisation of EU foreign policy would occur, to date these concerns have not proven justified.

The EU has instead limited itself to supporting ‘multilateral subsidiarity’, through support for the interventions of other organisations, particularly the African Union in the cases of Somalia and Sudan. In respect of the latter, the scale of the EU contribution is anyway extremely modest relative to the scale of AU-UN mission that would be required to have a significant bearing on the conflict in Darfur. The – at this time of writing, prospective – deployment of an EU border mission to Chad will have a greater, indirect bearing on the Darfur crisis, in effect Europeanising existing French military activities in Chad.

Under the ESDP, the EU is now moving to create new ‘Battlegroups’, rapidly deployable and mobile forces. But it remains to be seen how these will be deployed. Policy-makers agree that these actually provide negligible additional capacity. At present only two Battlegroups are likely to be deployable simultaneously. For some states the commitment amounts to little more than repackaging existing capacity. The Battlegroups do not address the EU’s most acute weakness, namely in strategic airlift. One judgement is that the nature and scale of the Battlegroups means that these can only be useful for basic crisis-moment protection (of airports, European citizens, etc.) and do not offer the prospect of being integrated into longer-term rebuilding and development efforts. Experts lament that rather than being used as a de facto strategic reserve to help sustain long-term peace-building strategies, the Battlegroups have so far been seen as useful for one-off crisis response. The European Gendarmerie agreed upon by five EU member states in 2004 has still not undertaken a single operation. One serving minister laments that European security capacities still lag behind its development efforts and that in this sense “little headway has been made on the practicalities” of linking security and development policies.

In sum, in both directions of the development-security link, progress and tangible policy changes have been relatively limited. Indeed, interviews with policy-makers reveal that as this link has been placed increasingly at the centre of EU foreign policy it has engendered notable discrepancies over basic definitions of what constitutes ‘development’ and what constitutes ‘security’.

At one level, this is said to be the very point of PCD: namely, that assessment begins to focus on the overall merged commitment to development-and-security, rather than on which individual

policy measures are categorised under which of these objectives. Some practitioners point out that it is neither surprising nor necessarily undesirable that security players remain focused on shorter timeframes and episodic interventions, while development players look to longer-term processes of change: a mixture of these two approaches is properly required in many conflict scenarios. Moreover, it is significant that the development and security communities are at least talking to each other about merged approaches, when previously such would have been anathema to both sets of actors.

Nevertheless, such putative merging has unleashed some basic contentions. For example, some policy-makers and experts insist that the EU’s African Peace Facility contribution represents the boosted development-oriented component of security policy; others see it as a security deviation of development funds. Such contention exists both between and within different member states.

Some go as far as suggesting that in these contested definitions there is no honest grappling at all with the vexed challenge of how genuinely to fuse development and security. Rather, all talk of ‘coherence’ is seen as in its very essence driven by each part of the EU policy-making machinery simply seeking to obtain greater power and resources. One practitioner observes that each part of the multi-layered EU machinery seeks to utilise each new and supposedly ‘joined up’ bureaucratic initiative as a means of simply boosting its own ‘traditional way of doing things’.

This dynamic has been seen in some very concrete instances. While the Stability Instrument would appear formally to provide a widened remit for political funding, a series of legal battles has ensued between the Council and the Commission over exactly what type of funding is permitted and under whose control – the Commission accusing the Council of a political grab for ‘its’ development funds, the Council objecting to the Commission gaining competence in peace support funding of certain types. One recent example was over funding for an Ecowas small arms programme funded from the Council; the Commission argued that the Council could not authorise this as it constituted a ‘development’ matter and took the Council to court. One policy-maker admitted that these turf battles often make a mockery of PCD in practice, “overshadowing debates on the substance of what coherence really means”. Sceptics also point out that the Stability Instrument simply coalesces a range of existing security-related funding and repackages such support without any significant overall increase in money.

3. Country examples

While in-depth country case studies lie beyond the scope of this paper, some of the shortcomings outlined can be briefly illustrated by reference to some examples of concrete conflict scenarios.

Sierra Leone shows the lack of linkages in both directions. European security engagement has been limited. In 2000, the UK asked for troop contributions from other European states: none was forthcoming. European governments have declined to add to UK and Commission funding in the aftermath of Sierra Leone’s civil conflict. After the 2002 elections and the formal cessation of conflict, on a per capita basis Sierra Leone came to receive more generous UK aid allocations than any other African country. But the only other European donor making available non-negligible amounts of funding to Sierra Leone – the world’s poorest state – was the European Commission. London has lamented the lack of commitment from its European

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partners. Conversely, from the perspective of the Commission and some other states, the UK is seen as having shown little interest in consulting or sharing information on Sierra Leone.

A similar pattern has been witnessed in the Ivory Coast. The Commission released a €250 million aid package to the Ivory Coast in the middle of this country’s conflict, but no other donor has given strong backing to French and Commission engagement. In 2005, France allocated Ivory Coast €70 million, Germany apportioned €13 million, but no other European government offered more than €4 million. One diplomat observed that the EU has played a “limited role” in this case, precisely because of French bilateral involvement. Moreover, British policy in Sierra Leone exhibits notable differences to French policy in Ivory Coast, the latter more focused on supposedly balanced elite mediation.

In Rwanda, the UK and France have pursued almost diametrically opposed approaches to development in a post-conflict scenario. UK (and Dutch) aid increased as the French cut assistance. Diplomatic relations between France and Rwanda were broken in 2006, after a French court opened proceedings related to the 1994 genocide. France even pushed for Commission aid to Rwanda to be wound up. Nigeria is perhaps an even-more striking example of a development effort failing to intensify as conflict has deepened. UK bilateral aid has increased and in the summer of 2005 the UK pushed successfully for Nigeria to be offered the biggest-ever debt relief package. But Nigeria remains the lowest per capita recipient of EU aid in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

Some experts and diplomats insist that European policy in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides a more positive case of development-security linkage. One favourable appraisal argues that the EU has confounded critics and proved that Operation Artemis – the EDSP mission that helped stabilise Bunia in eastern DRC in 2003 – was far from a one-off operation. Artemis kick-started a new development cooperation commitment and especially a new focus on police training within which the Council and Commission merged their respective approaches to security sector cooperation. A €200 million package of development and institution-building aid was introduced shortly after Operation Artemis. A second mission was deployed for the 2006 elections to help protect UN observers. However, critics lament that the EU’s efforts in assisting economic regeneration have remained modest. Of course, Artemis did not succeed in creating conditions for sustainable peace, and instability has persisted in the DRC. Critics charge the EU with a “failure to better link military crisis management with wider peace-building” in the DRC. In practice, there has been little joint planning between security and development activities. The 2006 mission was withdrawn even before it was clear what would happen politically after the elections.

Of course, in Sudan the EU has declined directly to intervene. This contrasts with French direct military support to the governments in Chad and Central African Republic against Sudanese-backed rebels – as indicated, it is this military assistance that is currently in the process of being Europeanised. Rather the EU has provided financial support and training for the African Union. Overall EU aid to Sudan has quadrupled since 2003. But little political pressure has been

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exerted on the Sudanese government to rein in the Janjaweed militia. Indeed, the stronger criticism sometimes appears to have been aimed at the rebel factions that did not sign up to the Darfur peace agreement. By 2007, Tony Blair appeared to be the only European leader advocating significantly more punitive pressure against the Sudanese government and a no-fly zone – although in September new French president Nicolas Sarkozy also promised a firmer line from France. The European Parliament has been viscerally critical of the EU’s weakness in Darfur. The peace agreement has not unlocked a big investment in long term development and institution-building. Persistent violence has rendered redundant the €300 million aid package the EU had agreed after the 2004 peace deal. Crucially, the peace deal shared out power but did not address underlying governance reform, and in fact was accompanied by additional restrictions on NGOs’ ability to receive Western development funds. Some EU donors have rather focused on providing assistance for rebel groups, to induce them to sign the peace accords, but this cooperation has not proceeded smoothly.

Outside Africa, improvements in the security-development linkage look even more limited. In the Palestinian Occupied Territories the EU has been the largest funder of development projects for many years, but since 2000 has switched to short-term emergency relief, with long-term development projects suffering in consequence. Since the January 2006 election of Hamas, funding has only formally been permitted for short-term emergency relief through the Temporary International Mechanism. While development programmes have withered, the EU’s two security engagements in the Occupied Territories – a police programme and a border mission at the Refah crossing – have also ground to a halt.

The majority European contribution to the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon has been widely hailed as a more successful security deployment. But, interestingly, the French government insisted that this formally UN mission would be run under a European Force Commander on the ground and a European-dominated Strategic Cell in New York. UNIFIL II has in this way been kept institutionally separate from the UN agencies in Lebanon working on development and longer-term capacity-building. Whatever UNIFIL II’s virtues, the European input to its operational procedures has expressly and formally divided security and development components rather than united them.

For well known geopolitical/transatlantic reasons, Iraq is a case where most in the EU have declined to assist economic regeneration efforts in pursuit of conflict mitigation. Since 2003 representatives of the Commission and European governments not part of the US-led coalition have strongly rejected the line that ‘development assistance is needed to mitigate the conflict’ in favour of the position that ‘security is needed before we invest in development assistance’. Even where increased aid allocations have been agreed since 2005, most of these remain unspent in practice. New aid commitments now in the pipeline, combined with an apparent willingness of the new French government to re-engage in Iraq, could soon warrant a different assessment of this case. But serious doubts remain that European governments will want to contribute troops to any multilateral force agreed to plug the ‘security capabilities gap’ as and when US forces are drawn down.

In Afghanistan policy-makers lament how slow the EU has been in ramping up its development efforts on the back of military presence; ‘fighting the Taliban’ has in practice not smoothly led into ‘hearts and minds’ civilian initiatives. Belying their name, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed in Afghanistan in practice continue to be more involved in security than reconstruction. NGOs accuse European involvement in the PRTs of leading to a short-term

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approach that runs against basic development principles. It took the Council five years to send a police mission to Kabul, and this then amounted only to a modest 160 officers. Work on the judicial system, lead initially by Italy then the Commission, has been lacklustre. Amidst domestic sensitivity, governments in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain have either indicated an intention to scale back operations in Afghanistan or refused to loosen operating restrictions on their troops. (Conversely, statements from Nicolas Sarkozy indicate a possible change of direction in French policy in favour of boosting France’s troop deployment in Afghanistan.

Significantly, it is in the Balkans that really significant amounts of Commission regeneration funding have been forthcoming as accompaniment to security engagement. While the EU has (belatedly, perhaps) invested heavily in a comprehensive range of economic and social initiatives in the Balkans, this should be seen more as a showcase for ‘integration into EU structures as conflict mitigation’ rather than ‘development as conflict mitigation’ in the strictest sense. The largest share of European aid in the Balkans is designed to help states comply with their commitments under the Stabilisation and Association process to harmonise a vast array of legislation with the EU acquis. Development NGOs have been critical of this focus on the Balkans, arguing that it provides evidence that the security-development link is essentially about diverting poverty relief into support for Western strategic objectives in middle-income states.

4. The wider security agenda

Beyond the matter of discreet conflict interventions is the question of whether overarching approaches to EU security have become more development-sensitive and helped unlock greater effort and resources for economic modernisation. In a formal sense, there would seem much positive change to report on this issue.

European governments and diplomats have constantly claimed that the lesson they took from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was that the underlying roots of terrorism and international instability lay in economic and political under-development. Security threats have increasingly been seen as deriving from shortfalls in ‘human security’. While many European governments have made such a link rhetorically since the mid-1990s, in the wake of 9/11 the focus on implementing such logic has been strengthened, and states previously adhering to more traditional containment-oriented security approaches appear to have shifted positions.

EU foreign policy high representative Javier Solana suggests that even if development and reform cannot be expected immediately to assuage the most implacable of terrorists, the latter have been “nourished by a pool of disaffection” engendered by prevailing social and economic conditions. At this level, EU efforts to develop more holistic and effective security policies in the wake of 9/11 offer significant potential for development aims. The prospect arises of security concerns unlocking additional resources for development and of the development community gaining purchase over broader foreign policies. One example of where counter-terrorist concerns have led to significant increases in development funding is Pakistan.

However, even if such new security thinking and concerns have helped unlock a commitment to increased development aid, some in the EU do not welcome this. Doubts arise to the extent that such resources are not tightly targeted on the poorest developing states but include increased commitments to middle income states where security issues are at stake. If 9/11 and its aftermath have reinforced some development efforts in the Middle East, this is welcomed and pressed forward by some development ministries (the French and Spanish) but viewed critically by others (DfID): the former see this as the archetypal way in which security and development

should indeed merge, the latter see it as one element of a worrying prevalence of security over development.

There has been no mass diversion of aid resources away from the poorest states to the new strategic front-line of the Middle East; by far the biggest share of promised increases in European ODA have been ring-fenced for Africa (although the latter’s share of EU aid has decreased slightly in recent years). However, some increases in resources have undoubtedly reflected approaches to security that have little to do with development, and could be interpreted as diverting resources away from development aid. This applies particularly to significant new allocations for controls against illegal migration; new programmes of technical assistance for anti-terrorist cooperation with developing countries; and costly new security patrol initiatives, especially in the Mediterranean. In 2005 the European Parliament took the Commission to court in relation to the use of development funds for border management in the Philippines (a case that still has to be decided). The Commission’s recent proposals suggest that ‘dialogue between cultures’ should be supported as part of the security-development link – this is the type of agenda-expansion that clearly feeds sceptics’ fears of resources being diverted into strategically-motivated initiatives that have no discernible utility for the success of EU development policy.

The emergence of security-linked conditionality also risks cutting across development priorities. New anti-terrorism clauses have been included in third country agreements and have held up a number of deals. And of course WMD-related conditionality has increasingly dominated in states such as Syria, Libya and Iran, blocking or even reversing EU development engagements. New provisions have been introduced for taking action against states not cooperating on illegal immigration – even if France and Sweden blocked a clause expressly providing for the complete suspension of aid and trade in such circumstances. Partner states have also been pressed to agree extended ‘readmission agreements’. During his time as EU counter-terrorist coordinator, Gijs De Vries was accused by both security and development circles of having focused only on a narrow set of justice and home affairs issues. The EU’s ‘softness’ on the Sudanese government at least in part reflects a desire to maintain counter-terrorist cooperation with a key information source on Al Qaeda.

Many diplomats complain that EU institutional balances have changed to the disadvantage of the development community. The European Foreign Minister and European External Action Service were clearly ideas driven by security concerns: while these initiatives are nominally designed to increase coherence between diplomacy and development policy, there are concerns in Brussels that their effect may be to restrict the role of the development community as an autonomous area of policy influence. After the June 2007 deal on a watered-down reform treaty, many in the development community still fret that the new, single European foreign policy chief is a ruse on the part of national leaders for ensuring a more strategically-directed use of the aid resources managed by the Commission. This fear is compounded by the judgement that by nature Javier Solana in practice has tilted far more towards crisis diplomacy and mediation with leaders than long-term reform issues.

While the ESS and member states’ national security strategies have come to expect much more of development assistance, they have given the development policy-making community insufficient input into the elaboration of such policies. In Brussels, the ESS is recognised to be, in the words of one diplomat, ‘Solana’s baby’, an initiative from which the Commission deliberately “stepped back”. In this sense, many development policy-makers even judge the ESS to represent a reversal of the ‘gains’ made in the 2001 Gothenburg crisis management

30 Policy Coherence, op. cit, p. 11.
31 For all this see, Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003.
FUSING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: JUST ANOTHER EURO-PLATITUDE?

initiative, which had moved towards greater development input. The effective demise of an autonomous Development Council is seen as having further weakened development input into strategic deliberations. A common judgement in Brussels is that Development Commissioner Poul Nielson was progressively excluded from policy deliberations after the September 11 attacks and that, despite cultivating a higher profile, his successor Louis Michel has failed to reverse this trend.

ESDP has brought with it a change in the general flavour of EU policy-making, with a power shift towards the Council and away from the Commission. Some member states and the development policy community have been critical of the fact that no more than very informal and sporadic consultation has been set up between the new ESDP machinery, on the one hand, and development policy forums and the Commission desks running existing third country policy initiatives, on the other hand. Commission officials lament a weakening of ‘civilian hold’ over EU security policy and judge ESDP/ESS to be less a boost to their own work than a “potential device for incoherente”.

Those perceiving civil society engagement to be integral to the EU’s civilian power model have viewed with concern ESDP’s apparent heralding of a less open decision-making process. There has been a shift of power towards security officials seconded from national capitals with no EU experience and little knowledge or appreciation of the approaches pursued through the Commission.

In the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), counter-terrorism has assumed priority status, with little engagement from this body on development and governance issues. As one Council official put it, “PSC likes to resolve things…[It is] not interested in long-term processes”. Debate has, for example, ensued within the PSC over expanding the scope of Petersberg tasks to include new funding allocations for ‘homeland security’. Observers highlight that the PSC, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Politico-Military Working Group of the General Affairs Council (PMG) have expressed minimal interest in or awareness of development issues.

Geographical desk officers and in-country diplomats have also been reluctant to let a new ‘development and democracy’ focus impede security engagement with autocratic regimes.

The NGO development community has criticised what it judges to be the disingenuous use of conditionality, undermining engagement with the poorest sectors of society and the increasing tendency for aid to be channelled through, or in close association with, militaries. Most academic analysis has similarly admonished the EU for stretching the security-development link too far, in an effort to prioritise counter-terrorist and WMD aims that are not of primary relevance to Africa and sit uneasily with the EU’s traditional development actor identity.

Unsurprisingly, Council officials see the persistence of divergent perspectives in a rather different light. They lament the fact that the development perspective is still too dominant in the EU’s external identity; that the Commission still ‘pours millions’ into development projects without any idea of their security impact; that there has been no effort to ‘educate’ development experts in security challenges; that talk of ‘tailoring’ regional development programmes to

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security imperatives has produced no concrete results; and that the continuing inefficiency of Commission aid dispersal drastically undermines its security utility.

5. Governance: The link in the chain?

Arguably, the most striking point of confluence between security and development objectives is to be found in an evolution of the governance agenda. For many years, development ministries have supported governance reform as a means of improving the effectiveness of pro-poor development. The EU’s security discourse has now come to make strikingly similar links between governance reform and strategic interests. Political liberalisation and better respect for human rights are said to be key to addressing the causes of international terrorism and ‘soft’ security concerns perceived to be a threat to Western countries. While a comprehensive survey of European support for democratic governance is beyond the scope of this paper, three basic points can be made in its relation to the security-development nexus.

1) First, at least some increases in assistance for democratic governance have been forthcoming linked to conflict resolution commitments. The Commission’s 2001 conflict prevention strategy stressed a priority focus on good governance, the rule of law and ‘political inclusion’. The EU’s new Strategy for Africa includes a Governance Initiative and an EU-Africa Forum on Human Rights. Most crucially, €2.7 billion of the 10th EDF (out of a total €22 billion for 2008-13) have been set aside to be allocated as reward for those ACP states committed to cooperating with the EU on governance reforms.

A common attempt to link governance elements into security policies can be seen across a plethora of different instruments. The budget for the Rapid Reaction Mechanism has gradually increased to over €30 million a year. The new Stability Instrument’s remit is based around a similar series of conflict-governance linkages. The ESDP rule of law missions in Georgia and Iraq pay perhaps the most direct testament to the perceived importance of governance issues within security engagements. In February 2007, a new EU police reform mission was agreed for Afghanistan.

New resources have been made available from the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) – this budget rising from €100 million before 9/11 to €132 million for 2004. The 2002-05 EIDHR strategy was predicated on a far tighter link to conflict-related challenges. Of the 29 newly identified ‘target’ countries for democracy and human rights funding between 2002 and 2005, all but six were ‘conflict states’. The follow-on ‘EIDHRII’ will now increase, albeit modestly, such funding during the period 2008-13.

The issue of Security Sector Reform is where the link between the governance, security and development agendas is seen most strikingly, especially though new SSR activities in Africa. By mid-2007, 26 African countries were receiving EU SSR funding. For example, the EU has moved towards taking the lead role on police and defence reform in the DRC. New EU SSR strategies were agreed by the Council in 2005 and by the Commission in 2006. Within the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the Commission and a number of EU member states have led new discussions on incorporating security sector assistance into development aid profiles. SSR aid has been presented as one of the most crucial concrete means of implementing the more holistic approach to security. The argument has been that security cooperation has moved away from traditional defence diplomacy to incorporate a focus that

enables engagement with militaries to improve ‘security governance’. The UK’s SSR strategy was elaborated jointly by the MoD, the FCO and DfID. It is this type of mid-level focus – distinct from both purely soft power and traditional concepts of hard power – that policy-makers commonly see as coming to embody a ‘European security identity’.

More broadly, in May 2007 DfID launched a new strategy on ‘Governance, Development and Democratic Politics’, predicated upon a more explicit commitment to democracy support than hitherto. DfID opened a new Governance and Transparency Fund in February 2007, worth 100 million pounds (€160 million) over 5 years, to go to civil society, media, unions and parliaments in developing states, all with the aim of linking citizens and the state. Aid expenditure is now to be based around a Country Governance Analysis carried out for each recipient state. The new strategy insisted that DfID was now more involved than previously with the FCO and MoD in devising strategies towards violent conflict, and that the Conflict Prevention Pools had begun to fund democratic reform projects in conflict situations – media projects in Uganda, political parties in Nepal, for example. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit has already funded institution-strengthening projects in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. An intra-Whitehall Africa Capacity-Building Initiative has been set up to coordinate governance assistance.38

The DfID-devised Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is perhaps the most concrete initiative that seeks to give substance to the governance-conflict link, in line with recognition that the lack of transparency in the management of energy resources is a frequent trigger to conflict. Support for the EITI in the Niger Delta is presented by the UK as one its main links between development and security, for example.

France has introduced a Governance Strategy that includes a commitment to devise a political reform strategy specifically for ‘fragile states’.39 This suggests a hint of broader rethinking in French African policy. France has continued to move away (if haltingly, in the light of events in Ivory Coast and Chad) from its traditional bilateral military agreements in the continent, in search of a new identity for its beleaguered post-Rwanda/Zaire Africa policy. More of its aid now goes through the European Commission; more support is given for the Africanisation of military peacekeeping; and more emphasis has been placed on commercial links, especially with the big economies of Nigeria and South Africa, rather than solely on the cultural affinities of the traditional Francophone pré carré. The presidential campaigns of both Nicolas Sarkozy and Segolène Royal suggested that France needed to design a more reform-oriented African policy.40

Despite such policy evolution and new initiatives, it must also be noted that overall governance commitments remain relatively limited. Funds allocated to supporting democratic governance account for a modest proportion of overall ODA. Definitional issues in this area present difficulties, but as a general rule it can be determined that few European donors allocate more than 3 or 4% of their development aid for political-governance projects. Funding for the judicial and police strands of counter-terrorism has increased by many times more than security-derived governance funding. The EU has been admonished for investing so little in democracy and civil society strengthening in emergency contexts and for making available such funding only well

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38 DfID, Governance, op. cit.
40 Tony Chafer, From confidence to confusion: Franco-African relations in the era of globalisation, forthcoming.
into post-conflict scenarios. While analysis of ‘new’ approaches to conflict resolution routinely emphasises the commitment to move away from ‘neutral’ humanitarianism towards an engagement with political reform issues, in practice EU humanitarian aid – direct, fire-fighting emergency provision through Western and not local NGOs – has in nearly all conflict states remained of several times greater magnitude than institution-building efforts.

2) Second, it can be observed that the nature of European governance funding increasingly exhibits some measure of security concern. By far the largest share of European governance support focuses on building state institutions, in collaboration with partner governments. This is judged by policy-makers in part to reflect a desire for stabilisation through negotiated, consensual reform. This orientation is reflected also in the increasing preference for government-to-government aid and direct budgetary support; this type of aid remains many times greater than support for civil society, democratic procedures or countervailing powers against governments.

In fact, the stabilisation-related aims behind governance assistance have diluted the genuinely reformist thrust of European funding. One prominent example of this is to be found in the support frequently given to the anti-corruption drives launched by leaders. These campaigns are invariably used and misused at the behest of leaders, in fact undermining a stronger institutionalisation of anti-corruption. Tony Blair’s support for (then) president Obasanjo was one of the best examples of this. The Nigerian leader was rewarded with a debt relief package pushed strongly by the UK – even when all of Nigeria’s broader governance indicators were worsening.

Civil and political society actors in developing states most commonly criticise the EU’s governance assistance for being so heavily oriented towards government and state institutions. The Commission’s institution-building ‘indicators of achievement’ nearly all relate to strengthening the capacity and procedural efficiency of the state, not to democratic plurality. This betrays a model that often appears to be one of state-led development-and-security, rather than one aimed at encouraging meaningful political competition or dispersal of effective power. Analysts conclude that the EU still has some way to go to put in practice a concept of ‘human security’ that fully embraces human rights and individual participation in decision-making, as opposed to traditional state-oriented understandings of ‘political stability’.

One of the central strands of DfID’s 2007 Governance strategy is a stated recognition that much technical governance support for state institutions has not provided benefits to development or security aims because it has neglected a more political understanding of democratic contestation. In the future DfID will, it is claimed, strike a better balance between state capacity-building and strengthening accountability, for example through citizen participation in public expenditure controls. France’s new Governance Strategy insists that the French governance programme will also begin to move away from a purely state-oriented approach.

In practice, EU approaches to conflict resolution have continued to focus most effort at the elite level. Highly engineered power-sharing deals have most commonly been favoured, that fail fully to address the roots of instability at the local level. One example is in the Great Lakes, where a concern in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi with balancing proportions of power to different ethnic groups has, according to critics, widened social cleavages at a local level.

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these cases, such a security model has led the EU to eschew support for multi-ethnic civil society groups, which might be the best positioned to maximise development potential. In the now fashionable terminology, insufficient attention has been paid to ‘bridging capital’, with too heavy a preference for intra- rather than inter-communal civil society-building – this adversely effecting both conflict and local development dynamics.

While the SSR agenda has undoubtedly established itself more firmly as an area of concern since 9/11, in practice, assistance provided under a SSR label still includes much traditional defence diplomacy. Security cooperation incorporating good governance elements has in practice focused far more on enhancing the efficiency rather than accountability of armed forces in developing states. For example, the EU’s police mission in the DRC struggled to gain purchase on civil-military reform, as opposed to simply providing equipment and training; indeed, political corruption linked to donors’ DDR programme became so bad it was aborted. One practitioner laments that the EU has remained fixated on providing basic police assistance and training, to the detriment of looking seriously at the way in which broader security structures feed into conflict.

The ‘security sector reform’ brief has so far taken on little concrete form in trying to check militaries’ political power in, for example, the Middle East. Many of the proposals under the Commission’s new Governance communication look like fairly standard counter-terrorism programmes, with little tangible reform aspects. Diplomats and some experts are minded simply to argue that boosting overall security capacity (not only of the armed forces, but also intelligence services, the police and border guards) tends to be a precursor to the development of greater accountability. Indeed, SSR work has been the subject of increasing divergence between Commission-based development experts and the Council: the formers’ focus on the ‘parliamentary oversight’ of militaries has engendered tension with ESDP officials. Competence battles have intensified over whether security or development actors should deliver institution-building aid relevant to the security sector.

As the EU’s main focus has been on supporting African Union peacekeeping capacities, some have expressed concerns that the focus on, for example, strengthening Nigeria’s lead role in troop commitments to other African conflicts has militated against a focus on governance reform (especially of the security forces) within Nigeria itself. Some member states have wanted CFSP to gain firmer political control over these contributions to the AU. A delicate balance exists. One the one hand there is the risk of too much EU direction leading to resources being used for European security concerns and undercutting local ownership. On the other hand, there is the challenge of combining the principle of AU ownership with the negative implications that invariably result when those African militaries that are not subject to strong civilian control are unconditionally given more resources and power.

The EITI is also still fairly limited in scope. Of 27 EU member states, only the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands have signed up, with a number of states such as Spain actively resisting civil society pressure to join. A majority of member states have rejected the notion of attaching EITI-derived governance conditionality to EU development aid increases. Key producer states such as Angola have also rejected EITI – indeed EITI is most needed precisely where governments are flush with oil resources and thus assertive enough to rebuff the initiative. Moreover, EITI only covers the transparency of payments into national budgets. A government might be able to account for all payments from MNCs and MNCs to show that no bribes have been paid, but the underlying problem of patronage in the distribution of national budgets can proceed without censure. It is widely suggested that the ‘Publish what you pay’ campaign needs to be supplemented by a similar initiative on ‘Publish how you spend it.’
3) Third, despite this security-conditioning of governance assistance, overall the good governance agenda remains more tightly linked to development policy-making than to strategic deliberation. EU political aid is most commonly aimed at giving poorest sectors of society better access to decision-making. A significant proportion of new EU governance funding aims at enhancing local organisational capacity specifically in relation to the provision of essential services. The use of human rights and civil society funds to support initiatives aimed at monitoring the budgets of local governments is an increasing and distinctive priority in EU strategies.

Overall, most observers and policy-makers argue that many of the innovations linking human rights and post-conflict work to security have actually emerged from the development policy-making community. These have filtered up into the EU’s ‘security conscience’ – in contrast to the US, where an evolving strategic vision has filtered down into other domains. If one moves down from the CFSP rhetoric on human rights or on institution-building and conflict prevention, and looks at the concrete aid initiatives carried out to further these goals, the EU has openly adopted an almost apolitical approach. The focus is on social capital, local-level decision-making capacities and civil society organisation around social issues.

The feeling is still widespread that governance funding has retained its status as a relatively autonomous area of development activity, not in practice directed with strategic intent or logic. Indeed, the lack of knowledge of what exactly is being done within development and governance assistance programmes amongst security policy-makers remains striking. One common judgement in Brussels, national capitals and amongst analysts is that, rather than development funds being used in a directly political way (the initial fear of many and still the familiar NGO critique), political funds have been used in an indirectly developmental way.

Indeed, some in the EP launched a debate on how the EIDHR had developed into an initiative funding small-scale civil society projects devoid of any linkage to CFSP priorities. (One of the largest EIDHR projects after 9/11 was in Bolivia, while Egypt was excluded as a target state, for example.) These MEPs sought to bring the management of these funds back under the purview of the EP, reverting in procedural structure to the origins of the Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. The ‘development lobby’ in the EP, along with the Commission, blocked such a reform.

Moreover, the EU’s imposition of democracy-related sanctions has been sparing. There is no evidence of a massive security-driven use of punitive measures in a way that has interrupted long-term development support. Arguably, the imbalance in EU policy lies the other way around: the EU has tried to persevere with development aid, softening its political responses, even as conflict, corruption and collapsing state institutions have rendered such aid ineffective. The EP has criticised the EU for not contemplating firmer measures towards cases such as Ethiopia, Angola or Rwanda on these grounds.44

Additionally, EU institution-building efforts remain highly programmatic, and invariably does not dovetail tightly with the domestic political dynamics of partner states or comprehend well the shifting coalitions that lie at the root of conflict and instability. EIDHR funding procedures are so slow that the relevance of this initiative to moments – or the immediate aftermath – of crisis is widely questioned by local stakeholders.45

Again, the limitations that emerge from these three considerations can be witnessed in individual cases of conflict. UK engagement in Sierra Leone is often presented as a model of

44 Ibid., p. 18
integrated military-development-governance, but arguably its political reform elements have been disappointingly limited, and were (in the early- to mid-2000s) more about supporting Kabbah rather than broadening out political contestation. One expert argues that this reflects the UK’s unduly ‘statist’ approach to the conflict. Basing a governance programme around Sierra Leone’s traditional Chieftancy structures, for example, has raised many eyebrows, given the way that this largely discredited system played into the original sources of Sierra Leone’s decade of civil conflict. Public trust in the Sierra Leonean army remains low, in large part due to the latter’s political tutelage.

In the Ivory Coast, France pushed the EU into offering president Gbagbo direct budgetary support, when other EU member states were already tiring of his apparent reluctance to introduce reforms; in return other EU states insisted on strengthening governance conditionality. Governance was not identified as a priority sector for French aid. Other European donors also limited themselves to non-political work. After the postponement of elections in 2005, one EU diplomat summed up European policy with the suggestion that: “Ivory Coast needs a balance of power, not an alternance of power.”

6. Conclusion

Two questions emerge in this assessment of EU development-security linkages. First, whether these two policy areas do in fact look more ‘joined up’ than previously. Here, individual country cases demonstrate some progress, but also the limited articulation in practice of the development-security link. There are important cases where development efforts have been limited in conflict situations, and where security engagement has been limited in support of development challenges. Rather than designing genuinely merged and holistic policies, many diplomats are – in the words of one closely involved expert – still “chicken and egging” about whether development proceeds security or vice versa.

The second question is: on whose terms is the development-security link being given impetus? Differences persist between member states over what the development-security link means in terms of policy evolution. Tensions have intensified between Brussels institutions. Each institution/ministry argues that its own area of policy competence is that which is intended to be most strengthened by the ‘security-development’ leitmotif. Asked how this link is advancing, development experts bemoan the primacy of security forums, while security experts perceive an imbalanced primacy of development perspectives.

The blame for the lack of mutual comprehension lies on both sides: security experts can still be shockingly dismissive of the relevance of getting development and governance policies right; many in the development community still paint anything done in the field of security in an unremittingly negative light, as only prejudicial to their work. Views on the EU’s efforts to link development and security might be summarised by the maxim: where you stand depends on where you sit.

Approaches have undoubtedly evolved in the governance domain, seen as the vital pivot between development and security policies. A number of European donors have moved towards elaborating more comprehensive governance strategies. Significantly, while support for

democratic governance and human rights is presented as crucial for both sustainable development and security, in practice it is an area of policy implemented in a way that is more in tune with the development than with the security agenda.

More negatively, the EU risks conflating two different issues; on the one hand, the conditions of peace needed to foster economic development in poor states; and on the other hand, the question of the EU’s own security interests and how these may be enhanced through investment in development. If the EU is to attain durable ‘win-win’ linkages between development and security policies, it must now begin to invest this worthy dimension of policy coherence with greater conceptual precision.

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