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## Report

# REPORT ON DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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## **Report**

# **DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

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## ***1. Overview: European Union democracy assistance since the Arab uprisings***

Since the Arab uprisings of 2011, European Union (EU) assistance has nominally targeted more resources to supporting democracy movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This reflects the failure of previous approaches, as the two documents reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2011 acknowledge,<sup>1</sup> as well as a stronger focus on democracy and human rights through the Strategic Guidelines on Human Rights of 2012 and the two accompanying Action Plans.<sup>2</sup> Resources earmarked for supporting civil society have been increased, the budget for the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has been beefed up, and the strengthened EU Delegations have become more empowered to reach out to groups at the local grass-roots level behind democracy activities. The European Endowment for Democracy (EED) was created with the mandate to support individuals and organizations in neighbouring countries that work for democracy. The EU has better equipped itself institutionally, financially and conceptually, by strengthening its bottom-up grass-roots approach to democracy support. Whether this translates into a more effective strategy for democracy support, however, is questionable.

The immediate aftermath of the Arab uprisings saw an international rush to make greater commitments to support democratic transformation and civil society, reflected in the ways in which EU external assistance was planned. Several factors made this shift hard to apply. Analysing the figures highlights discrepancies between commitments and disbursements, due to various problems in absorption capacity and/or the difficulties of governance in transition countries, as well as dramatic political changes and descents into violence, such as in Egypt. On the EU side, the ‘more for more’ mantra and the consequent creation of specific funds to reward good governance reform (such as the Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth [SPRING] in 2011-2013, Umbrella funds thereafter), translated in an opaque application. Morocco and Tunisia both benefited from such funds, despite quite different patterns of transformation, while they were *de facto* postponed for Egypt, yet without making explicit the link to the deteriorating situation there. Eventually, the EUR 90 million was used to support a World Food Programme to feed children in schools – far from the SPRING governance objectives.

Once the Sisi presidency in Egypt managed to impose a form of stability (through repression) in the country, bilateral assistance resumed on a similar level to the pre-2011 period, without the additional funding for good governance. Finally, competing priorities became evident as instability increased in the MENA region, due to the escalating Syrian war. The containment of population movements from Syria, its neighbouring countries where many refugees had fled, Afghanistan, Iraq and other unstable Sub-Saharan countries managed to mobilize far greater funds than anything so far targeting political reform and conflict prevention.

### ***1.a Putting money where the EU's mouth is***

Financial commitments for good governance, rule of law and democracy assistance specifically under the ENP have grown since 2009, and especially since the 2011 review, representing overall about 18 per cent of total funding (compared to an average of 10 per cent of European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument funds during 2007-2013). Since 2012, direct budget support is ostensibly more

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<sup>1</sup> ENP Reviews of March 2011 and May 2011

<sup>2</sup> Council of the European Union (2012), EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf); JOIN (2015) 16 Final, Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019): "Keeping Human Rights at the Heart of the EU Agenda", [https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/joint\\_communication\\_on\\_human\\_rights\\_and\\_democracy\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/joint_communication_on_human_rights_and_democracy_en.pdf)

targeted at and conditional on human rights standards. Overall, ENP funding stayed at the same level as 2007-2013, representing 28 per cent of the EU's total budget for external relations and foreign policy. That is, in troubled economic times, the European neighbourhood was *not* the object of a reduction in resources compared to budgets in other policy areas.

The EU budget has allocated EUR 15.4 billion for 2014-2020 for all the 16 countries surrounding it. This is now being boosted by additional funds targeted at containing the influx of refugees that began in 2015. Indeed, a comparison between what has been allocated to political reform in the EU's neighbouring countries and what has been mobilized to contain population movements towards Europe gives an indication of the relative weight that the EU attributes to its single priorities in the European neighbourhood. The recent influx of refugees has produced a notable increase in EU external funding.<sup>3</sup> A total of over EUR 9.2 billion (USD 9.8 billion) has been made available from the EU budget for 2015–2016 to control the arrival of refugees and shut down trafficking networks. EU member states have promised an extra EUR 200 million for multilateral agencies, such as the World Food Program and the UN Refugee Agency to care for refugees within the Middle East.

The EU's Madad Fund for Syrian refugees<sup>4</sup> will provide EUR 1 billion, half of which is to come from the European Commission and half from EU member states. Starting with EUR 23 million in late 2014, the Madad Fund<sup>5</sup> has increased to almost 40 times its original size since the wave of refugees hit Europe in 2015. The fund's projects are currently focused on providing refugees with employment opportunities and education in the host communities in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq.

The more significant amounts of money that the EU and its member states are discussing for containment measures are striking: EUR 3 billion for Turkey to manage refugee camps was pledged in 2015, with the promise of a further EUR 3 billion by the end of 2018;<sup>6</sup> EUR 1.8 billion for the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa;<sup>7</sup> funds to set up a European border and coastguard system<sup>8</sup> and deploy rapid border intervention teams<sup>9</sup> to deal with emergency situations on the EU's external frontiers; and money for Frontex, the EU's border agency, to employ extra guards to control refugee movements.

These amounts massively outweigh aid dedicated to anything related to political reform. Even before the current crisis, European aid was already shifting towards a humanitarian focus and away from more politically focused aid projects. With so much funding now going to a combination of counterterrorism co-operation and humanitarian relief, the EU is even more stretched due to its support for long-term reform projects in the MENA region.

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<sup>3</sup> European Commission (2015), Questions and Answers: Additional Funding to Address the Refugee Crisis – Fact Sheet, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-15-5730\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5730_en.htm)

<sup>4</sup> European Commission (2015), Managing the Refugee Crisis: Immediate Operational, Budgetary and Legal Measures under the European Agenda on Migration – Press Release, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-15-5700\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm)

<sup>5</sup> European Commission (2015), European Commission and Italy Launch First Ever EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis – Press Release, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-14-2664\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2664_en.htm)

<sup>6</sup> European Commission (2015), EU-Turkey Cooperation: A €3 Billion Refugee Facility for Turkey – Press Release, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-15-6162\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6162_en.htm); [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-16-1221\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1221_en.htm)

<sup>7</sup> European Commission (2015), A European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Fact Sheet, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-15-6056\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6056_en.htm)

<sup>8</sup> European Commission (2015), Managing the Refugee Crisis: Immediate Operational, Budgetary and Legal Measures under the European Agenda on Migration – Press Release, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-15-5700\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm)

<sup>9</sup> Council of the European Union (2015), Conclusions of the Council of the EU and of the Member States Meeting within the Council on Counter-Terrorism, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/11/40802205351\\_en\\_635836435200000000.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/11/40802205351_en_635836435200000000.pdf)

Compared with the more than EUR 9.2 billion for addressing the refugee crisis, the sums that member states and EU institutions allocate to underlying governance reform or conflict prevention in the Middle East are tiny – a few hundred million euros, mainly from a handful of bigger donors.

### *1.b The recipients: Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt*

Some recipient states have benefitted from additional funds; others have not. EU aid towards Tunisia and Morocco has significantly increased since 2011, despite the fact that the two countries have taken very different reform trajectories. Tunisians overthrew their authoritarian regime, initiating a complicated constitutional review process and creating a new, albeit fragile, democracy. Morocco has initiated some reform processes, while avoiding regime change. Yet, EU assistance has followed a similar trend in the two countries.

Tunisia has received EUR 1 billion since 2011 with a focus on support for transition, socio-economic development and its regions, especially the most disadvantaged ones. Security has entered into the focus too, with EUR 23 million spent in 2015 to address the country's security challenges in a troubled region. In addition, SPRING and, subsequently, the Umbrella funds have topped up bilateral funds on a conditional basis. Democracy assistance has risen in Tunisia, with a focus on civil society and channelled through multiple budget lines and initiatives. Among these is the Civil Society Facility (CSF), the EIDHR, and a new approach that entails continuous calls for proposals for local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which has helped create the civil society platform, Jamaity.

Morocco has received large amounts of financial assistance through bilateral channels in the last five years with a total allocation of EUR 1,431.1 million between 2011 and 2013 and EUR 218 million in 2014 through a mix of support from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), beefed up by the SPRING programme, which was designed to support transitioning countries. This assistance was particularly concentrated on sectoral reform (mainly the social sector) and support for public institutions. The amounts of assistance for mobility programmes also grew. In the 2014 bilateral package, EUR 70 million was envisaged for governance, the rule of law and mobility (after the Mobility Partnership was signed in 2013). The amounts of aid spent overall reflect the positive EU evaluation of Morocco's reform, at least in the regional context, despite specific tensions. Reform has focused on the judiciary, good governance, social inclusion, gender equality, human development, education and training. The EU has set out some benchmarks, such as the adoption of reforming laws, adherence to the national action plan, human resources in the public sector and coordination among institutions. Civil society, which remains stifled in Morocco, is addressed through the EIDHR, but is not included among the criteria for evaluating political reform.

Bilateral assistance to Egypt has followed a changeable and confused path. While the EU supported the democratic turn after the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, its assistance struggled to match commitments with disbursements. In 2011-2012, the EU met with problems related to the 'absorption capacity' of the new regime.<sup>10</sup> Egypt's failure to sign an agreement with the International Monetary Fund also had consequences for international financial assistance.<sup>11</sup> In 2011, of the EUR 144 million

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<sup>10</sup> European Court of Auditors (2013), EU Cooperation with Egypt in the Field of Governance, Special Report No. 4 (June), Luxembourg: European Union, [http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR13\\_04/SR13\\_04\\_EN.PDF](http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR13_04/SR13_04_EN.PDF)

<sup>11</sup> Danya Greenfield, Amy Hawthorne and Rosa Balfour (2013), US and EU: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts toward the Arab Transitions, Washington: Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Centre for the Middle East, [http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/US\\_EU\\_Lack\\_of\\_Strategic\\_Vision\\_Frustrated\\_Efforts\\_Toward\\_Ar](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/US_EU_Lack_of_Strategic_Vision_Frustrated_Efforts_Toward_Ar)

programmed for bilateral assistance, EUR 92 million was committed and only EUR 39.1 million was disbursed. In 2012, the EU initially programmed EUR 150 million; although it increased this to EUR 250 million, only EUR 93.2 million was disbursed. The deterioration of the political situation and the coup of June 2013 led the US to suspend its assistance. Although the EU did not make explicit use of conditionality, it first withdrew its SPRING support and then failed to meet its commitments to disbursements, in practice. In particular, in 2013, EUR 155.3 million was made available in the programming phase, but only EUR 47 million was committed and EUR 28.2 million disbursed. EU aid commitments for 2014-2015 (and the relative disbursements) suggest that the EU has reverted to business as usual with Egypt, despite the country's return to authoritarian government. Of the EUR 115 million committed to Egypt for 2014, EUR 91.1 million has already been disbursed.

EU assistance towards Egypt now focuses on very select objectives with a stronger focus on socio-economic matters, while the EUR 257 million aid package for 2014-2015 mostly envisages support for "Poverty alleviation, local socio-economic development and social protection" and "Ensuring sustainability of the development process with better management of human and natural resources". Thematic assistance for democracy and governance looks increasingly modest in scale, which is now mainly funded through multi-country initiatives, especially the EIDHR (EUR 4.7 million between 2011 and 2013) and the CSF (EUR 2.7 million between 2011 and 2013).

The 2015 ENP review provides a framework for new individual country negotiations, in which Morocco and Tunisia will be privileged partners. In light of the current situation in Egypt, it is too early to say in which direction the bilateral negotiations will go, but it is likely to focus on sectoral co-operation in areas of mutual interest, downgrading any potential democracy support or reform-oriented approach.

### *1.c Report's summary*

From the mass of statistical information we have collected, it is possible to extract five overriding conclusions. These point towards more analytical lessons for EU funding in relation to the Southern Mediterranean.

1. The EU did react to the Arab Spring with meaningful increases in aid. Criticisms that the EU did nothing to respond to the Arab Spring are unfair, nor do they tally with the empirical evidence. There have been many weak points in the EU response to the Arab Spring, but our evidence suggests that a shortage of funds was not the principal problem. Moreover, increases in aid were forthcoming relatively quickly, even if familiar disbursement problems subsequently slowed down policy development.
2. Governance aid increases are now being threatened by the switch of resources to humanitarian assistance and funds to help manage the flow of refugees into European states. Some donors are ring-fencing money to help stem the refugee influx. Political aid is not given the same degree of protection or priority. This switch of priorities is likely to last for some time. Much debate in the future will focus on the nexus between governance aid, on the one hand, and conflict policies, on the other hand – several donors have promised to increase aid for conflict prevention and resolution.

3. The channels through which EU aid is delivered remain largely the same, albeit with a modest tilt towards support for new civil society organizations. Contrary to the indications given in many policy documents, the EU has not implemented any major qualitative changes in the way in which it delivers its aid. Most of this still goes to governments, mostly still oriented towards approximation processes, while much civil society funding is *de facto* used with governments' acquiescence.
4. The EU has worked hard to tailor the conditionality it attaches to its aid. The use of conditionality has differed across different Mediterranean states. The general direction of policy is towards a lighter and more flexible use of conditionality. Indeed, where conditionality is now deployed, it is often done so in an informal or unspoken manner. That is, the EU has increasingly refrained from making open and high demands of partner countries; but when regimes engage in more repressive tactics, the EU has shown itself willing to hold back support – although aid is allocated, it is not delivered in practical terms. It remains unclear how effective this more surreptitious form of conditionality can be.
5. The EU has had to get used to *de facto* differentiation. The three cases covered in our project present differing scenarios, in which one state has made progress on reform, one has made no dramatic shift either forwards or backwards, and one state has slipped into an even more brutal authoritarianism. In the future, the differentiated experiences of democratic transitions – successful, failed and stagnant – are likely to condition EU aid far more than any common pan-Mediterranean dynamics. Our report shows that this much-commented trend is already reflected in the aid profiles that the EU has adopted in relation to different partners.

## 2. *Financial channels*

Under the ENP:

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)

European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)

Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF)

Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)

Umbrella funds, which continue the principle of the SPRING funds, in other words of offering additional funds to good governance performers

Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA)

European Endowment for Democracy (EED)

European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX)

Twinning

European Investment Bank (EIB): Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP)

Joint initiative with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): SIGMA initiative

Joint initiative with the Council of Europe (COE): South Programme



### 3. Regional breakdown by financial instrument 2013-2015

#### 3.a Economic assistance, development and reform

Initiative	Status
<p><b>ENPI assistance: final financial disbursement overview (2011-2013)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ENPI assistance committed to the Southern European neighbourhood totalled EUR 631 million</li> <li>- Assistance to Egypt (including the SPRING programme) amounted to EUR 1,007 million</li> <li>- Assistance to Morocco (including the SPRING programme) amounted to EUR 1,431.1 million</li> <li>- Assistance to Tunisia (including the SPRING programme and additional allocations) amounted to EUR 755 million</li> </ul>
<p><b>ENI (2014-2020), replaced the ENPI for bilateral assistance</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ENI budget amounts to EUR 15.433 billion</li> <li>- In 2014, EUR 115 million was committed to Egypt</li> <li>- In 2014, EUR 218 million was committed to Morocco</li> <li>- In 2014, EUR 169 million was committed in Tunisia</li> </ul>
<p>Expansion of <b>EIB</b> lending and engagement in the MENA region</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Despite an environment of economic and administrative instability, linked to the advancing political process in some countries, EIB-FEMIP approved a total amount of almost EUR 1.7 billion, signed off 16 operations worth EUR 583 million and disbursed <b>EUR 1 billion in 2013</b>.</li> <li>- The new mandate for 2014-2020 allows the EIB to provide investment in the Mediterranean region of up to <b>EUR 9.6 billion</b> with an EU guarantee, which is complemented by <b>EUR 3 billion</b>, which the EIB can lend at its own risk across Europe's Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods during the period. (In 2014, the EIB renewed its partnership with the European Commission, through the NIF, to propose a new risk capital facility, worth up to EUR 300 million. In addition to EU budgetary resources of up to EUR 100 million, the EIB will invest alongside the EU by contributing up to EUR 200 million of the EIB's own resources to the facility.)</li> <li>- See FEMIP Annual Report for Individual Project Funding: <a href="http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/femip_annual_report_2014_en.pdf">http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/femip_annual_report_2014_en.pdf</a>.</li> <li>- FEMIP in 2015: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A total of EUR 1.4 billion in loans signed off for 12 operations and almost EUR 750 million disbursed during the year</li> <li>• Over 30% of signatures in favour of climate action in sectors including transport, energy, water and private sector credit lines</li> <li>• <b>EUR 175 million to support SMEs</b> via credit lines in <b>Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco</b></li> <li>• Contracts signed for technical assistance operations worth over EUR 11 million</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Member states replenished funding for NIF	<p>- NIF disbursements in 2011-2013 amounted to EUR 30 million in 2011, EUR 34 million in 2012 and EUR 26.5 million in 2013</p> <p>- In 2014, <b>EUR 161 million</b> was committed as a minimum allocation (baseline) of the NIF, of which the NIF South baseline allocation was EUR 107.3 million</p>
Provision of short-term macroeconomic assistance through EU MFA	<p>- Disbursement of the first tranche (EUR 100 million in loans) of MFA to Tunisia on 14 April 2015 and disbursement of the second tranche on 16 November 2015</p>

### 3.b Migration and mobility

Initiative	Status
Expansion of expenditure due to the <b>refugee crisis</b>	<p>- EUR 4.5 billion <b>originally programmed</b> for migration and relevant external actions in 2015 and 2016:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUR 22.5 million per year for the Frontex budgets for the Triton and Poseidon Joint Operations</li> <li>• EUR1 779 million in support to member states for migration and border management under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF), with EUR 176 million for EU actions (direct actions)</li> <li>• EUR 44 million in emergency funding in 2015, courtesy of the AMIF (EUR 26.5 million) and the ISF (EUR 17.8 million), and EUR 37 million in 2016</li> <li>• EUR 2.5 billion for external assistance (Heading 4 Global Europe), including a start-up contribution to the Syria Trust Fund of EUR 38 million from the EU budget and EUR 3 million from the member states: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ EUR 295 million under the ENI</li> <li>○ EUR 66 million under the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)</li> <li>○ EUR 95 million under the Instrument contributing to Stability &amp; Peace (IcSP)</li> <li>○ EUR 277 million under the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI)</li> <li>○ EUR 1,742 million under Humanitarian Aid</li> <li>○ EUR 50 million under the Common Foreign and Security Policy for missions contributing to migratory issues.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>- EUR 1.2 billion of new measures announced <b>before the autumn</b> for 2015 and 2016:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUR 25 million per year to double the emergency funding available to member states under the AMIF</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUR 5 million per year for additional emergency funding available to member states under the ISF</li> <li>• EUR 50 million for the resettlement scheme in 2015-2016</li> <li>• EUR 71 million to triple the budgets for Frontex resources in relation to the Triton and Poseidon Joint Operations for the last seven months of 2015 and 2016</li> <li>• EUR 30 million for dairy measures in 2016 (milk for refugees) from Heading 2 (Agriculture) as part of the upcoming update of the revenue and expenditure stemming from the CAP (Amending Letter 2/2016)</li> <li>• EUR 240 million for the first relocation scheme (40,000 persons) (EUR 150 million in 2016 and EUR 90 million in 2017)</li> <li>• EUR 780 million for the second relocation scheme (120,000 persons)</li> </ul> <p>- EUR 1.7 billion announced at the end of <b>September</b> 2015 for 2015 and 2016:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Additional emergency assistance under the AMIF and the ISF (EUR100 million)</li> <li>• EUR 1.3 million in 2015 for 120 posts for the three key agencies, of which 60 posts were at Frontex, 30 at EASO and 30 Europol</li> <li>• Additional funding for the ENI (EUR 300 million) and the redeployment of other EU funds, so that the EU Trust Fund for Syria can reach at least EUR 500 million</li> <li>• An increase in the funding for humanitarian aid of EUR 200 million to help refugees immediately, notably through the UNHCR and the World Food Programme, other UN Agencies and international NGOs</li> <li>• EUR 600 million in additional commitments for Heading 3 in 2016 for increased emergency funding, increased funding for Frontex, EASO and Europol, and additional funding to help hotspot areas and member states most affected</li> <li>• A further increase in humanitarian aid by EUR 300 million in 2016 in order to help refugees' essential needs, such as food and shelter.</li> </ul> <p>- EUR 1.8 billion allocated to the Trust Fund for Africa (announced in September) for the period until 2020</p>
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	<p>This means the funds being made available to address the refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016 amount to over EUR9.2 billion.</p> <p>The European Commission also announced the possible reallocation of up to EUR 3 billion in the funding for Turkey.</p> <p>There is also a EUR 17 million payment for Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to help their neighbours tackle the migration challenge.</p>
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### 3.c Political reform, civil society and governance

Initiative	Status
Support to <b>civil society</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Between 2012 and 2013, EUR 22 million was disbursed through the CSF.</li> <li>- Some countries have taken measures to limit civil society organizations' (CSOs') activities by passing laws or introducing costly administrative procedures, such as heavy tax burdens, leading in some cases to CSOs ceasing their activities. In Egypt, CSO activity was particularly affected by such developments. Civil society developed positively and quickly in Tunisia. Work on <b><u>EU Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society</u></b> continued throughout 2014 and 2015. These Roadmaps set out a strategic framework for engagement with civil society on a country-by-country basis. EU Delegations led the process of developing the Roadmaps, working with local authorities and CSOs to identify long-term objectives on dialogue and operational support. By the end of 2014, most of these Roadmaps had been adopted by the partner countries.</li> </ul>
Expansion of the EED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In 2014, the EU granted <b>EUR 6 million</b> to the EED. In the same year, the EED received more than 1,300 requests for support and has provided support to nearly 130 democracy interest groups in the 15 countries under its mandate, including in all Southern Mediterranean countries. In total, more than EUR 7 million in support has been provided, half of which is dedicated to the Southern Mediterranean. EED currently (February 2016) allocates aid to 234 initiatives.</li> </ul>
Expansion of the EIDHR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EIDHR disbursement in 2011-2013 amounted to just under EUR 1.6 in 2011, just over EUR 2 million in 2012 and EUR 1 million in 2013.</li> <li>- The financial envelope for the implementation of the EIDHR for the period 2014-20 is EUR 1.3 billion.</li> <li>- Programmed allocations are divided according to objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Objective 1: support for human rights and human rights defenders in situations where they are most at risk (20-25%)</li> <li>o Objective 2: support for other EU human rights priorities (20-25%)</li> <li>o Objective 3: support for democracy (15-20%)</li> <li>o Objective 4: EU election observation (up to 25%)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Objective 5: Support for targeted key actors and processes, including international and regional human rights instruments and mechanisms</li> </ul>
Support for <b>capacity building</b> to strengthen government institutions	- <b>EUR 4.5 million</b> is envisaged to support the SIGMA initiative in the Southern European neighbourhood during 2014-2020.
Support for the <b>rule of law</b> through the South Programme	- The EU has continued to provide support to the COE <b>through the EUR 4.8 million</b> programme, Strengthening Democratic Reform in the Southern Mediterranean. Its second phase, Towards Strengthened Democratic Governance in the Southern Mediterranean (South Programme II), was launched in December. It will contribute to reinforce human rights, the rule of law and democracy in the Southern Mediterranean. With a <b>EUR 7 million contribution</b> (with an additional EUR 0.325 million from the COE), the new programme will run until 2017, focusing on <b>Morocco</b> (Rabat has already indicated its willingness to accede to over 50 COE conventions), <b>Tunisia</b> and Jordan, while also providing possibilities for engagement with other countries in the region. During the first phase, it already allowed the EU to react to <i>ad hoc</i> requests from Egypt and Libya to review a number of draft laws and support the electoral process.

### 3.d Programme “Spring”

<b>SPRING 2011-2012</b>	<b>EUR millions</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	<b>90</b>
Education and fight against child labour; upgrading informal areas and support for civil society	90
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>80</b>
Support to National Council and Ministerial Delegation for Human Rights	2,865
Vocational training, employment and growth	30
Agricultural Strategy Council - support services	10,135
Literacy	25
Rural health	12
<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>100</b>
Support for the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement and democratic transition	10
Top-up of the ongoing programme in support of economic recovery: "Programme d'appui á la relance"	10
Support for civil society: "Programme d'appui á la Société Civile (PASC)"	7
Support for the Justice Reform (PARJ)	25
Second phase of support for the Association Agreement and democratic transition	15
Renovation of popular neighbourhoods	33
<b>Subtotal for Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia</b>	<b>270</b>
<b>TOTAL for SPRING 2011-2012 (including Algeria, Jordan and Lebanon)</b>	<b>390</b>

<b>SPRING 2013</b>	<b>EUR millions</b>
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>48</b>
Vocational training, employment and growth	10
Agricultural Strategy Council - support services	6
Literacy	10
Institutional support to parliament	3
Support for mobility partnership	6
Top-up of existing Hakama Governance programme	13
<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>55</b>
ENPARD programme	10
Support for the Governance part of PAR3, Programme in Support of Economic Recovery, with a focus on reform and institution building	45
<b>Subtotal for Morocco and Tunisia</b>	<b>103</b>
<b>Total for SPRING 2013 (including Jordan, Lebanon and Libya)</b>	<b>150</b>

*Source: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013: Overview of Activities and Results*

### **3.e EIDHR in the entire ENP region 2011-2013 in EUR millions**

<b>Country</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	0.6	0.9	0.7
<b>Egypt</b>	2.0	1.78	1.0
<b>Israel</b>	1.2	1.2	1.2
<b>Jordan</b>	0.9	0.9	0.9
<b>Lebanon</b>	0.6	0.6	0.6
<b>Libya</b>	3.5	1.0	1.0
<b>Morocco</b>	1.2	1.0	1.0
<b>Palestine</b>	1.5	1.5	1.5
<b>Syria</b>		2.0	1.0
<b>Tunisia</b>	5.2	1.0	1.0

*Source: Statistical Annex to Progress Reports of March 2014*

### 3.f CSF South 2011-2013 in EUR millions

<b>Country</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	0.4	0.6	0.4
<b>Egypt</b>	0.6	0.9	1.2
<b>Israel</b>	0.5	0.5	0.5
<b>Jordan</b>	0.3		0.5
<b>Lebanon</b>		0.5	0.5
<b>Libya</b>		0.6	0.6
<b>Morocco</b>	1.4	0.2	0.2
<b>Palestine</b>	0.4	0.5	0.9
<b>Syria</b>			
<b>Tunisia</b>	1.4	1.0	

*Source: Statistical Annex to Progress Reports of March 2014*

## 4. Individual country breakdown by financial instrument

### 4.1) EGYPT

#### 4.1.a) ENPI allocations

Source: Statistical Annex to Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 and 2015

Although, under the National Indicative Programme **2007-2010** for Egypt, **EUR 558 million was programmed, EUR 618 million was eventually committed** for the following priorities:

Priority	Planned	Actual
Support for reform in democracy, human rights and justice	7%	6.7%
Developing competitiveness and productivity in the Egyptian Economy	40%	44.8%
Ensuring sustainability of the development process with better management of human and natural resources	53%	48.9%

	2007	2008	2009	2010
Programmed	137	139	140	142
Committed	137	149	140	192
Disbursed*	170.3	148.1	151	106.2

(in EUR millions)

\*including country-specific interregional NIF payments

Under the National Indicative Programme **2011-2013** for Egypt, **EUR 449.3 million** was programmed for the following priorities:

Priority	Planned	Actual
Support for reform in democracy, human rights and justice	11%	0%
Developing competitiveness and productivity in the Egyptian economy	42.2%	43.1%
Support for socio-economic reform and sustainable development	46.7%	56.9%

	2011	2012	2013
Programmed	144	150	155.3
Committed	92	250	47
Disbursed*	39.1	93.2	28.2

(in EUR millions)

\*including country-specific interregional NIF payment



#### 4.1.b) ENI allocations

Source: Statistical Annex to Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 and 2015

The financial allocation of the Single Support Framework **2014-15** for Egypt ranges from a **minimum of EUR 210 million to a maximum of EUR 257 million**. Egypt also participates in regional and other multi-country programmes funded under the ENI. **In 2014, EUR 115 million was committed** for bilateral assistance to Egypt.

Egypt - Single Support Framework 2014-2015

Commitments in EUR millions (rounded figures) - ENI 2014-2015

Egypt - Single Support Framework 2014-2015	2014	2015	Total
Poverty alleviation, local socio-economic development and social protection* (indicatively planned at 40%)	47.0		47.0
Governance, transparency and business environment (indicatively planned at 20%)	-		-
Quality of life and environment* (indicatively planned at 40%)	68.0		68.0
Total for Egypt 2014-2015	115.0		115.0

\* Funding in this sector is partly used through the NIF

#### 4.1.c) MFA

The European Commission was prepared to offer MFA to help Egypt meet its external financing needs following the country's revolution in 2011. No progress has been possible, however, because of Egypt's unwillingness to accept an IMF programme.

In 2011, advanced discussions ended when political instability made it difficult for Egypt's major political parties to support an IMF programme.

Discussions in late 2012 for an MFA loan worth EUR 450 million and an MFA grant worth EUR 50 million were terminated after Egypt postponed its request for IMF support.

For **CSF** and **EIDHR**, see the aforementioned global allocations.

#### 4.2) MOROCCO

##### 4.2.a) ENPI allocations

Source: Statistical Annex to Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 and 2015

Under the National Indicative Programme **2007-2010** for Morocco, **EUR 654 million** was programmed for the following priorities:

Priority	Planned	Actual*
Social sector	45.3%	44.6%
Governance and human rights	4.3%	1.1%
Institutional support	6.1%	12.5%
Economic sector	36.7%	35.1%

Environmental sector	7.6%	6.7%
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	2007	2008	2009	2010
Programmed	162	163	164	165
<i>Committed</i>	190	228.7	145	158.9
<i>Disbursed*</i>	227.5	224.9	200.7	170.1

(in EUR millions)

\* included country-specific interregional NIF payments

Under the National Indicative Programme **2011-2013** for Morocco, an amount **EUR 580.5 million** was programmed for the following:

Priority	Planned	Actual*
Social	20%	31.9%
Economic	10%	10.3%
Institutional support	40%	43.6%
Governance and human rights	15%	7.8%
Environmental	15%	6.4%

\*This does not take into account the amount allocated through the SPRING programme

	2011	2012	2013
Programmed	178.5	193.5	208.5
<i>Committed</i>	166.6	207	334.9
<i>Disbursed*</i>	151.5	110.1	84.1

(in EUR millions)

\*including country-specific interregional NIF payments

#### 4.2.b) Support for civil society, NIF and support under thematic instruments:

	2011	2012	2013
CSF	1.4	0.2	0.2
EIDHR	1.2	1.0	1.2
NIF	37.0	15.0	15.0
Migration and asylum	0.9	1.6	5.0
Non-state actors and local authorities (NSA/LA)	0.75	0.75	n/a

(in EUR millions)

Source: Statistical Annex to Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 and 2015

## 4.2.c) ENI allocations

Source: Statistical Annex to Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 and 2015

The financial allocation of the Single Support Framework **2014-17** for Morocco ranges **from a minimum of EUR 728 million to a maximum of EUR 890 million**. Morocco also participates in regional and other multi-country programmes funded under the ENI. **In 2014, EUR 218 million** was committed for bilateral assistance to Morocco.

Commitments in EUR millions (rounded figures) - ENI 2014-2017

Morocco - Single Support Framework 2014-2017	2014	2015	Total
Equitable access to basic social services (indicatively planned at 30%)	90.0		90.0
Support for democratic governance, the rule of law and mobility (indicatively planned at 25%)	70.0		70.0
Jobs and sustainable/inclusive growth* (indicatively planned at 25%)	38.0		38.0
Additional allocation from the Umbrella programme*	20.0		20.0
Complementary support for capacity development and civil society (indicatively planned at 20%)	-		-
Total for Morocco 2014-2015	218.0		218.0

\* Funding in this sector is partly used through the NIF

## 4.3) TUNISIA

### 4.3.a) ENPI allocations

Source: Statistical Annex to Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 and 2015

Under the National Indicative Programme **2007-2010** for Tunisia, **EUR 300 million** was programmed for the following priorities:

Priority	Planned	Actual
Economic governance, competitiveness and convergence with the EU	60%	41%
Improvement of graduate employability, support for employment systems and support for less favoured areas	21.7%	21.7%
Sustainable development	18.3%	37.3%

	2007	2008	2009	2010
Programmed	73	73	77	77
Committed	103	73	77	77
Disbursed	97.9	56	74.4	68.5

(in EUR millions)

Under the National Indicative Programme **2011-2013** for **Tunisia**, **EUR 240** million was initially programmed. However, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, **the NIP 2011–2013 was reviewed and an additional amount of EUR 50 million was allocated to Tunisia**. The priorities in the NIP were the following:

	2011	2012	2013
Programmed	80	80	80
<i>Committed</i>	180	130	135
<i>Disbursed</i>	114.3	145.2	80.3

(in EUR millions)

An additional **EUR 155 M** was allocated to Tunisia from the **SPRING programme**. This amount was allocated as follows:

Programme	Amount
Top-up programmes for economic recovery (PAR 1 and 3)	55
Support for the Association Agreement and Democratic Transition (Parts 1 and 2)	25
Civil society capacity building programme	7
Programme of support for the justice sector (PARJ)	25
Programme of support for the integration of popular neighbourhoods (PPIQP)	33
ENPARD	10

(in EUR millions)

#### **4.3.b) Support for civil society, NIF and support under thematic instruments:**

*Source: Statistical Annex to Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 and 2015*

	2011	2012	2013
CSF	1.4	1.0	n/a
EIHDR	5.2	1.0	1.0
NIF	0.8	n/a	15.0
NSA/LA	1.2	0.3	n/a
Instrument for Stability	2.0	0.31	n/a
Migration and asylum*	n/a	1.4	n/a

(in EUR millions)

\*Action in support of Maghreb/Mashreq children, located in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Italy

#### **4.3.c) ENI allocation**

*Source: Statistical Annex to Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014 and 2015*

The financial allocation of the Single Support Framework **2014-15** for Tunisia amounted to **EUR 234 million**, topped up by the so-called **Umbrella funds**, incentive-based mechanisms providing

additional funding by an amount of **EUR 50 million** in 2014 and **EUR 71.8 million** in 2015. Tunisia also participates in regional and other multi-country programmes funded under the ENI. **In 2014, EUR 169 million** was committed for bilateral assistance to Tunisia.

Commitments in EUR millions (rounded figures) - ENI 2014-2015

Tunisia - Single Support Framework 2014-2015	2014	2015	Total
Socio-economic reforms for inclusive growth, competitiveness and integration (indicatively planned at 40%)	106.0	114.8	220.8
Strengthening fundamental elements of democracy (indicatively planned at 15%)	35.0	29.0	64.0
Sustainable regional and local development (indicatively planned at 30%)	28.0	43.0	71.0
Support for capacity development and civil society (indicatively planned at 15%)	-		-
<b>Total for Tunisia 2014-2015</b>	<b>169.0</b>	<b>186.8</b>	<b>355.8</b>

#### 4.3.d) MFA

*Source: European Commission official website*

Upon Tunisia's request and following an *ex ante* evaluation, the European Commission proposed up to EUR 250 million in December 2013 in medium-term MFA loans. The aim of the MFA loans was to help Tunisia overcome severe economic difficulties caused by the weak external economic environment and the political transition process following its 2011 revolution. The loans were also intended to help Tunisia cover its external financing needs in 2014 and 2015, as well as encourage reforms aimed at improving the investment climate, along with fostering trade and regulatory convergence with the EU, thereby supporting the ultimate objective of creating the conditions for sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

The European Parliament and Council approved the MFA loans on 15 May 2014 and increased the amount to EUR 300 million. The Loan Facility Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding were signed between July and September 2014, then ratified by the Tunisian Parliament in March 2015. The Commission approved the disbursement of the first tranche (EUR 100 million) of the MFA loans on 14 April 2015, while the disbursement of the second tranche was made on 16 November 2015.

#### 5) Aggregate breakdown 2014-2020

The total amount agreed for the EU's external relations package is **EUR 51,419 million** over the period **2014-2020**. The European neighbourhood is also supported by some of the other instruments. The other instruments and money allocated are:

- IPA: EUR 11,699 million
- ENI: EUR 15,433 million
- DCI: EUR 19,662 million
- Partnership Instrument (PI): EUR 955 million

- IcSP): EUR 2,339 million
- EIDHR: EUR 1,333 million

Source: *EU Commission press release on the Multiannual Financial Framework*

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[FEMIP Annual Report 2014](#)

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## South Programme

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*Relevant statistical data*

## Freedom House Index

Country	Political rights		Civil liberties		Status	
	2003	2015	2003	2015	2003	2015
<b>Algeria</b>	6	6	5	5	NF	NF
<b>Egypt</b>	6	6	6	5	NF	NF
<b>Israel</b>	1	1	3	2	F	F
<b>Jordan</b>	6	6	5	5	PF	NF
<b>Lebanon</b>	6	5	5	4	NF	PF
<b>Libya</b>	7	6	7	6	NF	NF
<b>Morocco</b>	5	5	5	4	PF	PF
<b>Syria</b>	7	7	7	7	NF	NF
<b>Tunisia</b>	6	1	5	3	NF	F

*Scale: 1 (best) to 7 (worst), status: F=free, PF=partly free, NF=not free*

*Source: Freedom House*



