

heirs

history of european integration research society

European Voices: Actors and Witnesses Of European Integration

**Proceedings
Of
HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium
2007**

“EUROPEAN VOICES: ACTORS AND WITNESSES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION”

Third HEIRS Colloquium
Department of International History and Politics, GIIS, Geneva
March 16-17, 2007

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Introduction - Taking a closer look at Non-state actors: Challenges Ahead

Sophie Huber & Katrin Milzow

The following papers are the result of a graduate conference held at Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in March 2007. The conference was an initiative of the History of European Integration Research Society (HEIRS), an informal network of young researchers (Ph.D. and Post-doc) created in the fall of 2004. It was the network's third annual conference, hosted by the Department of International History and Politics of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.

Participants came from universities in eight European countries (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the USA and Switzerland). The conference also welcomed Profs. Anne Deighton and Antonio Varsori, both members of the *European Liaison Committee of Historians*, as well as Prof. Francis Cheneval from the University of Zurich and Prof. Pierre du Bois[†] from the Graduate Institute. Dr. Gilles Grin from the *Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe* also joined the colloquium. To all participants, we are very grateful for their keen interest and insightful contributions. We are very sad that Prof. Pierre du Bois, who died very suddenly during the summer, will not be able to witness the completion of this project. We are deeply grateful for the enthusiastic support he gave us at the time.

We would also like express our gratitude to Professor Andre Liebich, who from the very inception of our project supported the conference and this publication. Without his enlightening advice and his steady support in administrative procedures this endeavour would not have been possible. We also extend our thanks to Professors Bruno Arcidiacono and Gopalan Balachandran, Heads of the Department of International History and Politics, as well as to Professor Philippe Burrin, Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

The conference was organised with the kind support of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, the Europaeum, the *Académie suisse des sciences humaines et sociales* (ASSH) and the *Swiss National Science Foundation* (FNSRS). We are very grateful to all these institutions.

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This collection of papers aims to shed further light on the role of non-state actors within the European integration process. Current historiography on the process that led to the creation of the three European Communities widely acknowledges the role played by states, as well as by some of their major political leaders, diplomats, and civil servants (among them Monnet, Schuman, de Gasperi, Adenauer, and Bevin). Less attention has, however, been given to non-state actors, to their visions of Europe, their stakes in the integration process, and the means at their disposal to voice their opinions and influence the process of European unification. Taking a closer look at these non-state actors entails both opportunities and challenges, historiographical as well as methodological.

Historians' training has tended to push them to focus their search for primary sources on documents found in national archives as the most reliable and relevant basis for their work. This might explain why the historiography of European integration takes its roots only in the late 1970s with the opening of the US archives, followed in the early 1980s with the opening of European archives, with works such as Pierre Gerbet's textbook *La construction de l'Europe*

first published in 1983.¹ The first generations of researchers focused on the very early years of European integration, more specifically on the role of the nation states, where the archives originated². Even first attempts at studying European institutions, such as the work conducted by members of the *European Liaison Committee of Historians* from 1982³, focused primarily on the strategies and policies of nation states within those institutions. This pioneer work enabled researchers to fine-tune their understanding of the role of nation states in the overall process of European integration.

The concentration on archival sources has led many historians to follow the calendar of the opening of collections. On the one hand, this has led to a constant renewal of research topics as new archival material was made available. But on the other hand it led scholars to explore only a narrow time-span of the EU's history, in order to consider always new materials⁴ unveiling states' perspectives on European integration. Only in the 1990s did historians of European integration begin to reflect on their own work. In search of new avenues of analysis⁵, they began to consider a wider time-span and a broader range of actors. Historical accounts of European institutions began with Raymond Poidevin's history of the High Authority, published in 1993⁶. It is, however, interesting to note that the Liaison Committee's major project on the history of the European Commission was launched only in the early 2000s⁷.

Also as of the mid-1990s, a greater openness to disciplines other than history encouraged scholars to focus on issues and policies which implied a closer look at their broader domestic, European and international contexts. A closer look at specific European policies, such as agricultural or social policy, can't but take into account the role of non-state actors⁸. In this context, diplomatic, and even economic history, was no longer sufficient to shed light on developments of European politics.

A newer generation of historians of European integration feels less compelled to tackle new events and time periods and is increasingly willing to shift their focus away from nation states. Researchers once more look back at the earlier stages of European integration now focussing on actors such as trade unions and employer associations, lobbies, foreign investors, NGOs, pro-European movements, political parties, European civil servants and public opinion. In this respect, the volumes edited from the early 2000s by Elisabeth du Réau and Robert Frank, by Gérard Bossuat, or by Antonio Varsori offer an overview of current research⁹.

¹ Gerbet, Pierre 1983, *La construction de l'Europe*, Paris, Imprimerie nationale.

² Varsori, Antonio 2001, "La storiografia sull' integrazione europea" *Europa-Europe*, Vol.10, No 1, pp. 69-93

³ See <http://www.restena.lu/lcd/cere/uk/groupe/glinfouk.html>

⁴ The *Liaison Committee* itself acknowledges this tendency. See Deighton, Anne & Alan Milward 1999, "Introduction" in Deighton, Anne & Alan Milward (eds) 1999, *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957-1963*, Brussels, Bruylant, p. 11

⁵ This tendency to strive for new approaches to the study European integration is clearly perceptible in the works by Bossuat, Gérard 2003, «Avant-propos» in Bossuat, Gérard (dir.) 2003, *Inventer l'Europe, Histoire nouvelle des groupes d'influence et des acteurs de l'unité européenne*, Brussels, P.IE. Peter Lang, p. 17 ; Deighton, Anne, *op. cit.*, p. 11 ; Varsori, Antonio 2006, "Introduction", in Varsori, Antonio (ed.) 2006, *Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957 – 1972*, Brussels, Bruylant, p. 10

⁶ Poidevin, Raymond & Dirk Spiereburg 1993, *Histoire de la Haute autorité de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier: une expérience supranationale*, Brussels, Bruylant; see also Loth, Wilfried & William Wallace & Wolfgang Wessels, *Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?*, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 2006

⁷ site web

⁸ Varsori, Antonio 2004, "Introduction", in Varsori, Antonio (ed.) 2004, *Towards a history of vocational education and training (VET) in Europe in a comparative perspective*, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, p. 8

⁹ Du Réau, Elisabeth & Frank Robert (dir.), *Dynamiques européennes, Nouvel espace, Nouveaux acteurs 1969-1981*, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne; Bossuat, Gérard (dir.), *op. cit.*, Varsori, Antonio (ed.) 2006, *Inside the European Community, op. cit.*

The present collection of papers aspires to build on this work, while also hoping to foster the dialogue between historians and scholars from other disciplines in the area of social science, especially political science, political sociology and law. The papers illustrate how focusing on non-state actors opens interesting lines of analysis to complement more traditional approaches to the history of European integration.

For one, a consideration of non-state actors reopens the debate on what are to be considered appropriate primary sources on which to base a historical argument. The use of private sources, such as the collections of trade unions, pro-European movements or even individuals - many which are available at the European University Institute in Florence - allow researchers to consider a variety of documents such as unpublished memoirs, personal notes and annotations, collections of selected newspaper extracts, private correspondence, minutes of meetings and personal notes on the basis of which the former were prepared, lists of members and participants, or even financial statements.

Other materials, such as public opinion polls, press reviews, speeches and interviews, statistics, and European institutions' official documents (Commission papers, Council conclusions, Parliament reports and resolutions) complement archival sources. They also enable analyses to explore time spans extending beyond the time periods opened up by the thirty year rule.

It is interesting to note that in the early stages of European integration actors and witnesses of integration frequently overlapped. This raises the question of how to consider the work of contemporary historians, as secondary literature or as primary sources bearing witness to the spirit of the time¹⁰.

Besides, focussing on non-state actors allows for multiple perspectives on a single event, leading to more nuanced and less linear accounts of European integration. Early historians' focus on national and institutional sources may have contributed to teleological biases in their work. When enlarging the pool of actors considered, voices opposing the European process cannot be ignored. Critical points of view add to the depth of narratives of European integration, revealing the complexity of the process and the political and ideological battles it entailed. Such 'thick' descriptions underline the contingency characterising the European process at each step of its development.

The consideration of non-state actors also points to the grey area dividing institutional approaches to European integration from intellectual history approaches. The question whether one should write a history of the European Union as a political and institutional process, or a history of the ideas informing the European integration process, can be partly overcome by focussing on non-state actors. Indeed, exploring the contributions of non-state actors at various steps of the European integration process may unveil ideological debates behind policy progresses and setbacks. As a result, the analysis will include the study of ideas that may not have resulted in any specific institutional progress. Besides bridging the gap between the history of the idea of Europe and the institutional history of the process of European integration, the consideration of non-state actors again underlines the contingency of the development of European integration.

Lastly, the study of trade-unions, political parties, interest groups, or intellectuals among others, encourages the importation of conceptual tools such as identities, socialisation, networks or the public sphere from other disciplines, so that it allows for enriching cross-fertilisations¹¹. Building on other disciplines often improves the researcher's grasp of complex legal, social and economic issues informing historical events. Social sciences also may enable the researchers to consider a greater body of material and to cover wider time spans. Encouraging historians to

¹⁰ Deighton, Anne, "Europe at Fifty", Keynote Speech, HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium, Geneva, March 2007

¹¹ The very interest in non-state actors may also have arisen from pioneering research conducted in other disciplines, especially law and the social sciences.

bridge the gap between snapshot studies and the wider context¹², this provides one example of the ways in which interdisciplinarity may enrich historical analysis.

If the inclusion of non-state actors into the analysis of the history of European integration implies a number of important advantages, each of these also entails difficulties and pitfalls.

To start with, returning to sources, one may wonder whether documents coming from non-state actors can be considered as appropriate, relevant, and reliable as the records compiled by national or European institutions. In particular, one should be aware that private collections may be incomplete due to a lack of archival experience within those private actors. Thus the researcher may be left wondering whether a document he has found is representative or what place it might have occupied in an original collection. Such drawbacks can be overcome by also looking into official records.

The question of the reliability of primary sources is all the more acute for materials younger than thirty years, where official sources, against which to cross-reference a piece of information, are scarce. As a result studies of more recent events tend to adopt alternative research designs, which may be inspired by interdisciplinary approaches.

Concerns about the cross-referencing of various collections produced by non-state actors often lead to logistical difficulties related to multi-archival research. In particular, the multiplication of application procedures, mobility, financial resources, language proficiency, and time constraints are an issue. The study of non-state actors, however, often implies such multi-archival research; all the more so as domestic non-state actors have a tendency to compare themselves to their European counterparts and/or to create federations or other common entities at the European level.

The frequently interdisciplinary nature of the study of non-state actors furthermore raises problems of theoretical and methodological soundness. The combination of historical approaches and other disciplines, in particular political science, has triggered controversial debates within the community of historians of the European integration process. Many critiques of interdisciplinary approaches point out, that historians who draw on other disciplines in which they are not primarily schooled are more prone to methodological mistakes. Here, teams composed of scientists of different backgrounds and experiences may help move the historical discipline forward.

* * *

The following papers illustrate the ways in which the twin themes of non-state actors and interdisciplinarity combine to fruitfully inform the study of European integration.

The paper by Paolo Orlando Ferrara traces ideas elaborated and launched by non-state actors which surround more specific institutional and legal controversies. In particular, Ferrara considers the Vatican Jesuit Journal *La Civiltà Cattolica*'s contribution to the immediate post-war debate on European integration.

A further series of papers by Hitoshi Suzuki, Philip Robert Bajon and Mariëlla Smids consider the more active participation of non-state actors at various stages of European construction. Suzuki looks into the strategies followed by labour unions to secure participation in the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community. Bajon sheds additional light on the Empty Chair Crisis by emphasising the role of agricultural interest groups and civil servants at the national and European level, as well as wider domestic pressures generated by electoral constraints and media attention. Smids analyses the evolving role played by the European Commission in the first rounds of enlargement negotiations conducted between 1961 and 1972.

¹² Deighton, Anne, "Europe at Fifty", Keynote Speech, HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium, Geneva, March 2007

The last four papers focus on the increased acknowledgement of the role played by non-actors, more specifically voices emerging from the general public. Alexander Rheinfeldt illustrates how the Commission very early on recognized the significant part youth might play in promoting and legitimising the process of integration and in securing its continuation. Cristina Blanco Sío-López presents an at times conflicting dialogue between the general public and the Commission, which can't but take into account criticism expressed regarding the pace and shape of the EU's eastern enlargement. Axel Marion wonders whether the public, led by intellectual elites, has begun to match or even supersede the role played by national and European official actors in gearing the process of European integration. Jan-Henrik Meyer builds on Habermas' concept of a European public sphere and the shape it would have to take to best support the European process. Through an analysis of key European newspapers' coverage of the 1991 Maastricht summit, he wonders whether such a European public sphere may indeed be developing.

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The Italian Jesuit journal *La Civiltà Cattolica* and the transformation of Europe from post-WWII reconstruction to the creation of the Council of Europe (1945-1949)

Paolo Orlando Ferrara

Introduction

The new international context that took place after World War II signaled a turning point in the evolution of international relations as it interrupted the millenary prevalence of European powers over the globe and shifted the axis of balance towards the USA and the USSR. Even those European states that had played a part in the war on the side of the Allied forces lost their appealing status as economic and political world leaders and suffered the consequences of the upcoming general mentality that was pushing for the acquisition of autonomy and the increase of liberties for their former colonies; therefore, France and the UK started a new phase of their history in which their capacity to influence world policy was not as relevant as it had been previously. At the same time, Italy tried –although unsuccessfully– to be invited to the roundtable of the influential countries so as to recover from what the winners perceived as a too quick “stop-and-go” in its foreign policy when it suddenly moved from the Nazi-led Axis to the liberal-communist military Alliance.

Nonetheless, the main concern of the Italian people did not center on pretending to remain the heir of that political giant that it happened to be a few centuries earlier, in line with the national rhetoric of the inter-war period. In modern times, the country had to provide, inevitably with the help of foreign powers, for its economic reconstruction and for the political stabilization and appeasement of a people who were manifestly divided due to strong ideological contrapositions. In addition, the stereotypical divide between North and South, or even the split of the country into three, which has become an object of common wisdom after Bagnasco’s studies of the highly heterogeneous parts of the territory,¹ dramatically undermined the rhetorical idea of a fully completed process of national unification. Material as well as cultural reasons for fragmentation contributed thus to separate regions and social classes.

In this context, a part of the country raised its voice to speak against the environment that was generated by the ashes of Fascism and the end of the war. Catholics indeed expressed their outspoken disapproval of any form of social desegregation that could be imputed to either geographical or class divides, cleavages that were mainly exalted by left-wing interpretations,² in line with that ontology of the State and society that the theories of natural law celebrated. Therefore, because they were politically committed to halting all ideologies that denied validity to an inter-class social doctrine both domestically and internationally, Catholics also fought an intellectual battle to affirm that particular Weltanschauung that overcame the principle of the inevitable clash between separate social groups and countries depending on a conception of life defined as a Darwinian permanent struggle –ultimately classifiable as an exclusive interpretation of social relations, or the affirmation of a logic of exclusion– and affirmed an inclusive system of human interactions.

* I would like to thank Ms Diana De Vito for her kind support in proofreading this paper.

¹ Bagnasco A., 1977, *Le tre Italie*, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 50-66. The author has underlined how post-WWII represented the turning point in the history of the country in relation to the multi-level development analysis.

² Left-wing interpretations of the post-WWII Italian history are generally centered on the idea of the conflict between capitalistic and socialist models of production and social relations and the triumph of the former over the latter. As an example, see Luperini R., 1971, *Gli intellettuali di sinistra e l'ideologia della ricostruzione nel dopoguerra*, Edizioni di Ideologie, Roma, pp. 9-13.

For this reason, an eminent part in the Italian intellectual scenario was played by the Jesuit writers of *La Civiltà Cattolica*, who represented a traditional instrument for defending the Catholic Church. Created in 1850 in the midst of the Risorgimento wars that opposed the upcoming lay Italy to the theocratic country of the Holy See, this journal was guided by the goal of defending Catholicism and the Church's institutions against its enemies by making use of the "power of the words." Ideologically speaking, socialism as well as liberalism thus became the alternative targets of this journal's struggle. A century later, however, the situation had deeply changed: the Holy See had diplomatically recognized the Italian State after the Concordato signed on 11 February 1929, and liberalism had been tolerated –although not fully integrated into the doctrine– basically as a consequence of the harsh opposition to Marxist thought, both in the forms of socialism and communism. The development of the idea of Europe that characterized the second half of the 1940s was therefore clearly conditioned by this scenario in which the Church aimed at denying the legitimacy of Eastern socialist governments. Yet, the pursuit of this primary goal did not imply an absolute conformation of Catholic political thought to liberal ideals promoted by Washington, as this paper aims to show by presenting three different moments in the history of Europe from post-war reconstruction to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Council of Europe in 1949. Mainly following the reasoning of the most eminent Jesuit writer appointed to discuss supranational political issues and international law, Antonio Messineo, the idea of Europe that was presented seemed to be much less subordinate to Washington's projects than a part of the literature has suggested and more conformed to autonomous Catholic projects of cultural "spiritualization" of European democracies.

An intellectual *ancilla ecclesiae* for the affirmation of the Catholic *Weltanschauung*: the "conversion" to democracy of *La Civiltà Cattolica* in post-WWII

The Jesuit journal that most prestigiously defended the Church's vision of the world after 1945, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, was constituted of a "board of writers" directed by Giacomo Martegani which, due to the firm reactions to the left-conciliatory positions that even clergy intellectuals were assuming at that time, was often accused of aiming at the pursuit of reactionary political projects that nostalgically looked backwards at theories based on affirming concepts of social order and political stability more than promoting a new democratic culture, in continuity with the conservative line of the previous decades.³ Indeed, going back to the articles published in the early 1940s, the concept of democracy did not appear as an unquestioned principle. In the Italian case, the principle had been occasionally related with the risks that this new conception of the relations between rulers and the electoral body could generate. On one hand, the Jesuit authors warned against any possible deviation from the "natural norms" of behavior that the totalitarian experience had caused. On the other hand, though, they stressed the fact that many citizens who had never been taught to be actively involved in processes of civic participation, as was the case of the Italian people, for instance, could not be suddenly requested to express their preferences for the country's management. Consequently, there was a need for imposing limits to a superficial and insufficiently elaborated application of democratic processes to the country. At that time, when Italy was about to realize the transition from Monarchy to Republic,⁴ the writers even advised their readers not to contribute to the possible destabilization that such a process could determine, if it was not pursued gradually.⁵

³ Taradel, R. & Raggi, B. 2000, *La segregazione amichevole. La Civiltà Cattolica e la questione ebraica, 1850-1945*, Editori Riuniti, Roma.

⁴ For the centrality of the issue according to *La Civiltà Cattolica*, see Sale G., 2003, *Dalla monarchia alla repubblica. Santa Sede, cattolici italiani e referendum (1943-1946)*, Jaca Book, Milano.

⁵ Oddone A., 1944, 'Il pensiero cattolico sulle forme di governo', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 377.

Against this background, the cultural paradigm followed by Catholics had nonetheless significantly changed and seemed to be dynamically adaptable to the new circumstances. If compared to the Church's long history of skepticism towards democracy,⁶ the speeches of Pope Pius XII when the winds of war were blowing favorably to the Allies and Italy's Fascist collapse was completing its descending parabola, literally gave the Vatican beneplacit to the incoming political leaders to fulfill the country with democratic contents.⁷ In this sense, the new domestic system as well as the developing international order could become safer if they were built over liberal-democratic models, but this cultural shift did not correspond to a full acceptance of the values that were proposed by that political system, as we have already seen. It mostly depended on the recognition of the logic of the "lesser evil." If the right-wing totalitarian regimes had terminated their historical cycle, and the only available options were now represented either by the circulation of liberal ideals or by the spreading of revolutionary Marxist thought on a larger scale, then the former ideology had to be welcomed as the less dangerous alternative at that time. In other words, the Church followed the traditional distinction between thesis and hypothesis that was the key instrument to maintain doctrinal integrity and apply it depending on the historical contingencies that each epoch imposed on Catholics.⁸ To a certain extent, the "provisory morals" proposed by French philosopher Descartes seemed to reappear in the words of the Jesuits.⁹

According to different historiographic interpretations, two alternative understandings of the relations between Church and State and two rational explanations of the international relations in post-WWII are at stake. On one hand, Antonio Acerbi and Giuseppe Vedovato explained the policy of Pope Pius XII towards the USA and liberal thought as a global rethinking of Catholic political culture. In this sense, Pius XII would pave the way for the transformations that his successors, John XXIII and Paul VI, introduced in the sixties and seventies. Accordingly, the Pontiff succeeded in completing a "synthesis between democracy and the common good"¹⁰ and facilitated the Church's distancing from the ambiguous giro di walzer ("flirting dance") that marked its policy towards the authoritarian regimes in Italy, Germany and Austria. With the Christmas radio messages on democracy read in 1944, the Church definitely reconciled with that particular political philosophy.¹¹ On the contrary, Guido Verucci has been reluctant to accept the idea of a new political course with Pacelli¹² and has underlined the ideological

⁶ For an analysis of the Meeting held in Molveno and the encyclical *Pascendi*, see Scoppola P., 1961, *Crisi modernista e rinnovamento cattolico in Italia*, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 221-260. For the creation of the Christian Democratic movement by Romolo Murri and his political culture, see the anthology edited by Tedeschi L., 1966, *I pionieri della D.C. (1896-1906)*, Il Saggiatore, Milano, pp. 399-494.

⁷ Board of the writers, 'Radiomessaggio natalizio di Pio XII ai popoli del mondo intero', *Civ. Cat.*, 1945, vol. I, pp. 3-14.

⁸ This distinction was elaborated after the *Syllabus* in 1864 by *La Civiltà Cattolica*. For an overview, see Felice F., 'The ethical foundation of the market economy. Reflection on Economic Personalism in the Thought of Luigi Sturzo', [Online], available at <http://mises.com/journals/scholar/felici.pdf>, p. 13.

⁹ Descartes explained the idea of a "provisory morals" through the analogy of the people that have to build up a new house, and start collecting refined materials and famous architects; nonetheless, they first need a temporary place to live in, while waiting for the "house of their dreams". Similarly, the Jesuit writers supported in the long run a deep change of social structures in the direction of Catholic societies, but in the short run they had to feel safe in the contingent "temporary house". For Descartes' quotation, see Lepenies W., 1998, *Ascesa e declino degli intellettuali*, Laterza, Roma, Bari, p. 26.

¹⁰ Acerbi A., 1985, *Pio XII e l'ideologia dell'Occidente*, in A. Riccardi (ed.), *Pio XII*, Laterza, Roma, Bari, pp. 149-178; Vedovato G., 2005, 'La Chiesa, il totalitarismo, la democrazia tra storia e presente', *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, vol. 4, pp. 642-643. My translation.

¹¹ Board of the writers, 'Radiomessaggio natalizio di Pio XII ai popoli del mondo intero', cit.

¹² Verucci G., 1988, *La Chiesa nella società contemporanea. Dal primo dopoguerra al Concilio Vaticano II*, Laterza, Roma, Bari, pp. 201-203.

support given by the Holy See to the authoritarian regimes, not only in the pre-war period, but also after its official statements in favor of the democratic institutions.

From the combination of the two opposing arguments, what can be stated is the new role exerted by the Catholic Church that finally adopted the concept of democracy and accepted the European democratic systems in a historical moment in which ideological sponsorships of despotic regimes would have been simply anachronistic. Nevertheless, democracy could not be appreciated *per se*, as *La Civiltà Cattolica*, with the contribution of scholars like Angelo Brucculeri, Andrea Oddone, and Antonio Messineo, or clearly stated even in relation to the intra-European system of relations that took place in the 1940s through the development of economic, military and political international organizations created from 1945 to 1949.

The Jesuit celebration of Europe as a “third force” to balance the two super-powers

In such a context, the bipolar system that was about to emerge in virtue of the preeminence of two states that were basically built over laic rules, the constitutionally tolerant and pluralist USA and the materialistic USSR, could not be accepted by the journal's group of Catholic radicals. Strains of disapproval for the new international system ran through Antonio Messineo's articles for the first two years after the end of war. The international system that the former allied countries were generating was blamed for its lack of recognition of any principle that the two super-powers had previously announced when the circumstances encouraged them to make use of that rhetoric. Both countries thus received the moral condemnation of the Jesuit writer for the way in which they were conducting bilateral relations with other states in spite of the apparent willingness that they had showed to generate a multilateral system through the United Nations Organization.¹³ Nonetheless, examination of the roles played individually by Washington and Moscow allowed readers to easily understand how the two super-powers were not considered equivalent by the Jesuits.

According to Messineo, a Russian-American pure *voluntas* to pursue their own particular objectives balanced by an idealistic pursuit of the general interest of the other nations was lacking totally. This led the USA, UK, and USSR to implement a clear strategy of maintenance of a hegemonic stance, that from time to time reached even imperialistic tones:

It was a long time since everybody could understand how the official declarations of disinterested actions were just a camouflage that covered traditional and new forms of imperialism.¹⁴

The principles that had been proclaimed on the Western side by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August, 1941, subsequently included into the Atlantic Charter on 1 January 1942, had been completely betrayed and repudiated in a very few years, once the war had turned favorably to the same States that had proposed that act.¹⁵ The application of those principles had totally failed, and so did the will of the parties to bind their political choices with that declaration. Against their self-defensive

¹³ *La Civiltà Cattolica* constantly described the UN as unsuccessful as its predecessor – the League of Nations – had been: Messineo A., 1945, 'Il naufragio della Carta Atlantica', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 283-291; id., 1945, 'Il piano di Dumbarton Oaks e la sicurezza internazionale', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 15-24; id., 1947, 'La seconda assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 97-105.

¹⁴ Messineo A., 1945, 'Il convegno dei Cinque', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, p. 72. My translation.

¹⁵ Even more than the two super-powers that mainly drew the post-war system, the position of the UK was depicted by *La Civiltà Cattolica* as the most betraying policy towards the rest of Europe. This idea accompanied the journal for the whole Forties: Messineo A., 1948, 'L'Europa alla svolta del suo destino', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, p. 227. For the Vatican diffidence towards the Allies' attitude, see Formigoni G., 1996, 'La democrazia cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale (1943-1953)', *Il Mulino*, Bologna, p. 88, note 21.

positions, the Jesuit writer mentioned two motives of validity of the declaration: first, the act had been signed by a large group of countries that had thus shown their firm intention to develop national policies aimed at building an international community, and not only a system of selfish states. Second, and even more important in terms of international law, concrete development had followed that declaration and had been incorporated into bilateral treaties, whose obligatory character could not be questioned.¹⁶ The Anglo-Russian Treaty, signed on 26 May 1942, and the American-Russian act, stipulated on 11 June 1944, reflected indeed the same “Atlantic spirit,” and were now expected to be put in practice.

In such a disappointing international context, the margins for European countries to affirm the recognition of their rights to prosper autonomously and freely in front of the super-powers were not particularly high. On one hand, the “Hobbesian Leviathan” found full application in the behavior of Russian authorities. On the other, the *homo homini lupus* principle was supported by policies pursued by the two liberal war winners. The case of Italy’s post-war peace treaty was an exhaustive demonstration of promises and rights that had been denied.¹⁷ As a result, the destiny of continental Europe could be represented by a sunset in which black clouds were appearing at the horizon. For *La Civiltà Cattolica*, the meaning of the East-West pressures on Europe in order to contribute to the complete liberation of the continent seemed to be now unveiled:

If on the territories that are militarily occupied by the Anglo-American troops both true liberty and autonomy are nothing but dreams, under the pretense of carrying on simple monitoring operations apparently conducted in a soft and human way, but in reality with rigid and occasionally even harsh methods, the fate of the populations held under Russian control will be easily imaginable.¹⁸

The evil that was depressing Europe was traditionally a policy built on the use of force, instead of a truly democratic attitude. If the super-powers aspired at becoming truly democratic, in fact, they had to respect (and not only, when it was the case, tolerate) European Christian roots.¹⁹

Put differently, the ultimate word in policy-making processes ought not to be given to the *fait accompli*, that is to say to the prevalence of the use of force instead of recurring to the power of law. In fact, even though a particular course of events had come into reality, the historical development of human relations did not constitute a justification or legitimacy for any event; on the contrary, the evolution of the European post-war reorganization needed to be sifted on the basis of its conformity to legality. Nonetheless, legality and politics did not always coincide,

¹⁶ Messineo A., 1945, ‘Il naufragio della Carta Atlantica’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 283-291. According to the writer, declarations ought to be considered always as forms of moral obligations by the signatory parties, in line with Catholic principles, and not only as vague preambles without any substance.

¹⁷ The series of articles concerning the treatment that was reserved to Italy by all the super-powers, and its exemplarity for the destiny of the whole Europe, was astonishing: Messineo A., 1946, ‘La Conferenza di Parigi’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 369-378; id., 1946, ‘I trattati di pace. Diktat o contratto?’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 401-410; id., 1947, ‘I trattati di pace nella dottrina giuridica contemporanea’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 279-289; id., 1947, ‘Pace senza giustizia’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 353-358; id., 1947, ‘La validità dei trattati di pace’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 317-327; id., 1947, ‘La teoria contrattuale dei trattati e la loro validità’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 514-525; id., 1946, ‘La ratifica del Trattato di Pace con l’Italia’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 3-11; id., 1947, ‘Restituzione e riparazioni nella condizione di una pace giusta’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 193-203; id., 1946, ‘Per una pace vera e duratura’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 486-495; id., 1947, ‘Sanzioni e sicurezza nella stipulazione di una pace giusta’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 3-14; id., 1946, ‘L’Italia e il mondo coloniale’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 385-395.

¹⁸ Messineo A., 1945, ‘Le incognite della ricostruzione europea’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, p. 5. My translation.

¹⁹ Brucculeri A., 1945, ‘Dalla guerra alla pace’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 269-277.

according to Catholic doctrine. As Messineo pointed out, policies could be regarded as legal if and only if they referred to the supremacy of Natural Law and to God's will, as all Catholic intellectuals accurately knew following pontifical teachings²⁰ and the philosophical arguments of the theoretician Jacques Maritain.²¹ Politics was not only a concern for the elites in charge of making political decisions, either in its domestic or in its international dimension, but it concerned everybody (partly as the heritage of the recently revitalized culture of intellectuals' engagement, partly as the product of Catholic commitment in social and political matters),²² and the Church, in particular, had the duty of filtering any by-product of human activities by verifying its compliance to the doctrine. Since it was undeniable that Western traditions had evolved along Christian roots, the Church not only could, but had to watch out for European integrity.²³ In the period immediately after the end of war, the Anglo-American liberals did not represent for Messineo and the other writers of the *Collegio degli Scrittori* the most appropriate answer to the crisis of civilization that modern times caused, having undermined Christian traditions and values. Nonetheless, things were going to change quickly. The East-West divide happened to become harsher, the issue of "impeded dioceses" in the Eastern countries totalized the attention of Catholic journalists, and *La Civiltà Cattolica* introduced a new editorial line in the discussion of international politics issues. Between the two systems, the "Latin Europe" had to make a choice, and this could not be alternative to the support given to Western coalitions against communist regimes. At the time of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Jesuit opinion-leaders expressed their unequivocal support to the idea of a joint Western reply to the threats coming from the other side of the "iron curtain."

The creation of the two blocs and the Journal's acceptance of Cold War logic after the Truman Doctrine

Accordingly, the political analysis of *La Civiltà Cattolica* changed significantly in 1947 as the Catholic Church started to follow completely new orientations in international politics. The criticisms towards both the leading systems and the welcoming of a common European foreign policy based on the principles of neutrality and equidistance from the competing super-powers, a policy that the Jesuits wished to see established since 1945, shifted towards a firm support for American projects aimed to stop what was now regarded as the aggressive and offensive policy of the USSR. The overall construction of the "European castle," in a certain sense, fitted with this paradigm. This does not imply that the Jesuits were ideally satisfied with the new organization of the international community; nevertheless, they regarded skeptically any conciliatory proposal coming from Soviet authorities and rejected them as manifest proofs of the way in which Moscow pretended to bridge the blocs so as to generate the conviction that the contraposition depended on the policy decided by the other side of the "battlefield." The Church's goal of keeping an equidistant approach thus was already abandoned since 1947. The contraposition between the two blocs and their models of civilizations became from this

²⁰ Pius XII, 1949, 'Discorso ai giuristi cattolici', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 413-417; id., 'Discorso alla Sacra Rota', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 520-523. See also Messineo A., 1949, 'Il diritto naturale nella dottrina di Francesco Suarez', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 270-282; Lener S., 1950, 'La certezza del diritto, il diritto naturale e il magistero della Chiesa cattolica', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 400-414.

²¹ Maritain J., 1981, 'I diritti della persona umana', in *La conquista della libertà. Antologia del pensiero etico-politico*, P. Viotto (ed.), La Scuola, Brescia, pp. 109-115.

²² An Italian historian, Walter Crivellin, has underlined this attitude in the inter-war period by analyzing "the culture of engagement" of French Dominicans through the journals "La Vie Intellectuelle", "La Vie Spirituelle" e "Sept". See Crivellin E. W., 1984, 'Cattolici francesi e fascismo italiano. «La Vie Intellectuelle» (1928-1939)', Franco Angeli, Milano, p. 15.

²³ Lener S., 1948, 'Il Bolscevismo e l'essenza cristiana degli ordinamenti occidentali', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 588-601.

moment onward the main issue at stake. At that time, East Europe's destiny was considered by Pope Pacelli and the Jesuit writers of the Journal as forcefully compromised; even if we accept the thesis according to which the Pope had tried until then not to over-stretch the divergences between East and West up to the point of friction, the judgment of *La Civiltà Cattolica* concerning the status of the "Church of silence" two years after the end of war did not leave room for any uncertainty about the Church's total condemnation of the way in which communist authorities were conducting relations between Church and State.

Although for the rest of the year the Journal's articles devoted to the analysis of international relations between the two super-powers were quite rare (one of the preferred themes still being the unfair treatment reserved by the war's victors toward Italy and Germany), the space accorded to the evolution of Europe's policies in relation to the deterioration of the international crisis within the notes of "Cronaca Contemporanea" conspicuously increased. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in particular were given high rank among the topics presented to their readers. In addition, a stronger emphasis on the important presence of the USA as a shelter against Russian maneuvering recurred in the notes.

The internecine wars in Greece and Turkey, Italy's and France's political uncertainties, all the minor and major areas of crisis (Germany before the others) made clear that some forms of protection and *guarentigie* ("guarantees") had to be pursued. The only available option was then constituted by the US. The messages that Pope Pacelli and US President Truman exchanged reciprocally strengthened their cultural and political alliance.²⁴ Therefore, even the American inquiry of liberty before any other value, that had not fully received Catholic approval so far, reached the status of a highly desirable objective:

Great Britain cannot continue to protect Greece after 31 March, and the United Nations Organization, due to the urgency of the situation, is unable to furnish aid as it would be necessary. Turkey too, even though characterized by a different situation, has to be helped to accelerate its way to the country's modernization and to secure its own national sovereignty, the defense of which is necessary for the maintenance of a stable order all over the Middle East. Among the main goals of the USA, the creation of domestic and international conditions for the implementation of free systems gets the priority.²⁵

The Truman Doctrine, proclaimed on 12 March, was now perceived in a totally different way compared to the criticisms that "American imperialism" had received a year earlier. In addition, when Marshall, on 5 June, pronounced his popular speech at Harvard sponsoring US financial aid to realize the project of European reconstruction by supporting continental integrity and the harmonic development of the whole region, the importance of international cooperation for European recovery was generally recognized by Messineo and the other writers. Yet some remarks could not be abandoned: financial and capital aid from liberal countries, starting from the USA, were needed, and liberal measures had to be gradually introduced in Italy and elsewhere. Still, liberalism and libertarianism had not to be regarded as the panacea nor had to be uncritically imitated.²⁶ Specifically in relation to the Marshall Plan –it was specified by the economist of the Journal, De Marco– American support for Europe had to be counterbalanced

²⁴ Messineo A., 1947, 'Per una pace vera e duratura', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 485-495. For the whole text, 'Scambio di messaggi tra S.S. Pio XII e S.E. Harry Truman', 1947, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 481-485.

²⁵ 'Cronaca Contemporanea', 1947, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 94-95. My translation.

²⁶ Barbera M., 1945, 'Liberalismo illiberale e democrazia non democratica', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 56-60; Oddone A., 1945, 'Libertà moderne', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 73-82; id., 1945, 'La Chiesa e la libertà civile', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 291-301; id., 1946, 'La libertà politica nel pensiero cattolico', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 97-104; id., 1946, 'La libertà morale di coscienza', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 14-21; id., 1946, 'Diversi aspetti del liberalismo in materia religiosa', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 153-161; Brucculeri A., 1945, 'Democrazia e morale', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 369-377; id., 1946, 'La giusta società', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 37-41; Messineo A., 1951, 'Democrazia e libertà religiosa', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 126-137.

by European capacity to re-organize the national economic systems autonomously, limiting all conditionalities that the external donors could put on them:

Though it is truly undeniable that the criteria established by the USA to distribute economic aids for reconstruction imply for the recipient governments such renounces to their liberty of action to highly increment US influence, which could be even labeled as interference, on their economic policies, at both the national and international levels. This could even make people think that the elusion of Russian political and economic militarism undermines the full economic independence of European countries, as a consequence of the duties imposed on them by the American government.²⁷

The optimal organization of the continent was thus represented by a cooperative system in which the states developed positive partnerships with the US, but at the same time they posed a barrier to the influence exerted by Washington on their domestic issues.²⁸ In this way, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that was created in order to plan the distribution of aid among the sixteen member countries and to negotiate the progressive liberalization of the markets had to put a limit to the American manifest economic superiority. This thinking would then remain unchanged until the creation of the European Economic Community, as Messineo would affirm during a conference eight years after the Marshall Plan launching:

Between two large areas and a less efficient third one like the British Empire, only the creation of a new [European] area, economically and politically united, can be successful and influential in international politics.²⁹

The necessity of developing military alliances at the regional level during the Cold War climax: from the Brussels Treaty to NATO

The contrasting sentiments that the Jesuit writers expressed in relation to the USA, whom they conceived as strategically necessary to contain the Russian menace but culturally not in line with Catholic social doctrine and therefore not imitable for their world conception, were analogously exhibited with respect to the conviction that Europe had to develop its own system of autonomous military alliances. On the one hand, in fact, the traditional promotion of a culture of peace and international cooperation was reflected through the speeches of the Pontiff and the articles of the Jesuits.³⁰ Nonetheless, on the other hand, the writers of *La Civiltà Cattolica* maintained a pragmatic attitude and accepted as an inevitable destiny the incoming creation of well integrated continental organizations aimed at preventing any potential offensive attempted by the Eastern neighbors. The stipulation of the Brussels Treaty in 1948 among five European countries that had jointly experienced the hardship of the war on the same front (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) led to the creation of the Western Union alliance; this organization, together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose signature followed one year later, received the “spiritual legitimacy” by the Jesuit intellectuals due to their function as pre-emptive measures to protect the Catholic Church at the time in which its millenary certainty of an “eternal presence” had been seriously undermined by Marxist wars on religion.³¹ Even though these alliances did not give an answer

²⁷ De Marco A., 1948, ‘Piano Marshall e orientamenti politici europei’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, p. 125.

²⁸ Messineo A., 1946, ‘I paradossi della politica internazionale’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, p. 5.

²⁹ Messineo A., 1957, ‘Evoluzione politico-sociale dell’Europa contemporanea’, in *Le basi culturali dell’unità europea, Atti del primo incontro internazionale dell’Istituto Internazionale Studi Superiori “Antonio Rosmini”, 10-20 settembre 1956*, Athesia, Bolzano, p. 125.

³⁰ ‘Radiomessaggio natalizio di S. S. Pio XII sulla sicurezza e il perfezionamento della pace’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 113-124. See also note 7 of this paper.

³¹ Lener S., 1949, ‘Crisi e degenerazione del bolscevismo russo’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 275-286; Tyszkiewicz S., ‘L’ateismo militante sovietico e il Papato’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 593-603.

to the Christian Churches anxiety for the increase of an anti- and a-religious spirit within the Western members, they were indeed helpful in deterring communist countries from extending their influence beyond the limits of the “iron curtain”.

Among the key factors that pushed the Jesuit writers to “consecrate” the Western Europe and trans-Atlantic organizations in 1948-1949, the deterioration of the situation of the Catholic Church under communist rule assumed a central place. The case of Magyar clergyman Mindszenty stood at the pinnacle of this conflict between spiritual and temporal powers. From the very first moment in which the Primate had been appointed on 8 September 1945,³² he had appeared as a clergyman characterized by an intransigent tendency to oppose not only communism and Marxist ideologies, but also republican and democratic cultures. Shortly after the Hungarian Republic was proclaimed on 1 February 1946, the Primate exasperated his critical tones against the government, in particular following the electoral triumph of a coalition led by the Communist Party in the summer 1947. From that moment onward, he thought that any form of conciliation with that government would not be considered as acceptable among the options of the Hungarian Church.³³ The idea that the church could become a bridge between East and West, an idea that was still present even among a minority of Catholics in the country, completely vanished. As a reaction, the national authorities engaged him as the symbol of the Church’s rejection of the principle of non- involvement in political issues; the escalation of this conflict between Church and State led finally to his condemnation and imprisonment on 27 December 1948.³⁴ His imprisonment reverberated through the pages of every Catholic journal, and *La Civiltà Cattolica* devoted great importance to what it depicted as his “martyrdom.” Together with the situation of the Church in Hungary, all other national Churches in Eastern Europe were thus presented as “impeded” and persecuted.³⁵

Not surprisingly, the Catholic Church therefore took a clear stance in the highly debated issue of security on the international scale. As the Pontiff admitted during a speech he held in January 1949, only four years after the end of the previous devastating war, peace happened to be again undermined by international tensions. According to Pius XII, both super-powers were making a contribution toward the establishment of peaceful relations among the nations difficult

³² After the replacement of Cardinal Seredi with Mindszenty, who was then the bishop of Veszprem, a clear shift in the political culture of the Catholic Church towards the Hungarian State derived, becoming more antagonistic: Kent P. C., 2002, ‘The lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII’, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, pp. 208-209.

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ For the Catholic narration of this case, see Boer N., 1950, ‘Il cardinale Mindszenty’, Garzanti, Milano. The persecution –that is the “formula” through which the Catholic press presented the legal case to its audience– is also described by ‘Cronaca Contemporanea’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 327-333; for the arrest, *id.*, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 215-222; for the process, *id.*, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 563-567. For the overall persecution/religious policy towards the Catholic Church in Hungary in this period, *ibid.*, pp. 585-600.

³⁵ For the period 1946-1953, see de Vries G., 1946, ‘La Chiesa Russa sotto il regime sovietico’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 173-185; Migliorati V., 1946, ‘La persecuzione religiosa in Jugoslavia’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 318-324; Brucculeri A., 1948, ‘La libertà religiosa nell’Unione Sovietica’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. IV, pp. 633-634; Lener S., 1949, ‘Lo scisma jugoslavo e il difficile assestamento del blocco orientale’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 297-313; Cavalli F., 1949, ‘Chiesa cattolica e governo comunista in Cecoslovacchia’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 239-254; *id.*, 1950, ‘Caratteristiche della lotta contro la Chiesa in Cecoslovacchia’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 121-136; *id.*, 1951, ‘Il dramma di un popolo: la bolscevizzazione dell’Ungheria’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 60-73; Cavalli F., 1951, ‘Sviluppi della tattica comunista contro la Chiesa cattolica in Cecoslovacchia’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 481-494; de Echalar P., 1951, ‘Il comunismo contro il cristianesimo in Cina’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 28-39; Cavalli F., 1953, ‘Persecuzione religiosa nella Repubblica Popolare Bulgara’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, pp. 138-152. In addition, see Cavalli F., 1950, ‘Governo comunista e Chiesa cattolica in Cecoslovacchia’, *La Civiltà Cattolica*, Roma.

to reach.³⁶ Yet, full responsibility for the troublesome developments of international relations were attributed by the Church to the USSR through the voices of Messineo and the other “microphones of God,”³⁷ who described the Soviets as those responsible for the annihilation of the role of the UN by rendering the exercise of its competencies impossible to pursue. Compared to the balanced attribution of responsibility to the two super-powers that had characterized the early post-war phase, the Catholic sponsoring of the West field was now manifest:

Once the dream of creating an international system of collective security through the activities of the UN was over, as a consequence of Russia’s annihilation of any international body belonging to its galaxy, Western countries decided to organize themselves through a system of regional pacts; they seem finally able to face the situation, even though they cause the inevitable Russian resentment.³⁸

In such a troubling context, Messineo and the other writers of the Journal pushed the European nations to get involved in a search for unity, due to the fact that only if they accepted to function as a single actor they would have been able to counter the threat. On the contrary, though, there were governments that seemed to be unable to fully understand the challenges of their times, and continued to elaborate schemes of foreign policies that the Jesuit considered simply inapplicable to the new reality. Among these nations, *La Civiltà Cattolica* persistently blamed the United Kingdom for its policy of “splendid isolation” that prevented national politicians from fully integrating the country with the continental Europe. In the course of 1949, the British anachronistic philosophy of keeping its distance from its partners could be verified in relation to two different situations: first, when the five partners of the Western Union studied the possibility of fostering the evolution of that military alliance transforming it into a political organization that could pave the way to the creation of a European Union;³⁹ then, a few weeks later, during the preparatory works to the signature of the Atlantic Pact which was finalized on 4 April 1949, when British diplomats showed reluctance to support the widespread enlargement of the organization:

If the British government stopped to be mainly concerned with the project of letting the other countries see as a munificent concession any form of British involvement in international affairs, the Pact could be extended to include all the other nations which are threatened by communism. Four years after the end of the conflict it is indeed clear that when communism comes to power, there are neither UN Charters, nor Treaties of Peace or governmental protests that can exclude this threat.⁴⁰

By the end of the 1940s, the European frame that the Jesuit community had in mind took a well defined form: a compact economic ensemble, politically homogeneous and compatible with Catholic teachings, and able to provide security for its inhabitants through intra-continental and Atlantic collaboration. In addition, Messineo contemplated a last dimension to increase the level of homogeneity: European legal harmonization through the establishment of a regional organization that could be able to propose the elaboration of norms that set common standards

³⁶ Pius XII, 1949, ‘Radiomessaggio natalizio di S.S. Pio XII sulla sicurezza e il perfezionamento della pace’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, p. 119.

³⁷ This is the label that an Italian scholar, Giancarlo Zizola, attributes to a well-known Jesuit who wrote on *La Civiltà Cattolica* in the post-WWII period, Riccardo Lombardi: Zizola G., 1990, ‘Il microfono di Dio. Pio XII, padre Lombardi e I cattolici italiani’, A. Mondadori, Milano. In particular, see the narration of Lombardi’s crusade against Marxist thought in post-WWII, pp. 59-61. See also Lombardi R., 1945, ‘Una “mano tesa” minacciosa. A proposito del discorso di Togliatti’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 147-159.

³⁸ ‘Cronaca Contemporanea’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, p. 456. My translation.

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ ‘Cronaca Contemporanea’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, p. 698. My translation.

to every member country and fixed therefore a minor common denominator to the whole continent. An answer to this exigency was given in 1949, when the ten signatory parties gave birth to the Council of Europe, the institution aimed at fulfilling the convergence of the national legal cultures of the continent, with a particular focus on the safeguard of the human rights.⁴¹

Messineo and the pursuit of a common legal culture oriented to the defense of the human person: the creation of the Council of Europe

The fourth and last dimension that the process of European integration was called for concerned the promotion of philosophical and juridical means aimed at fostering the respect of humanity independently from the situation in which it happened to exist. The “culture of the human person” became a Catholic philosophical and theological leitmotiv that had been revitalized in the course of the 1930s and 1940s thanks to the fortune acquired by the essays of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain. His most renowned work, *humanisme intégral*, had launched the season of the *révolution personnelle* that would have a strong impact in Italy and in the rest of Europe.⁴² Messineo, likewise, was significantly interested in the teachings of the French scholar, even though he would reject his positions and hardly contrast his doctrine later in the 1950s, accusing the author of elaborating a philosophical system that misled believers from the true doctrine and opened the door to the spreading of naturalistic forms of thought.⁴³ Yet in post-WWII times, a perfect entente was still prevailing between Messineo and Maritain, and both writers supported at the same pace the involvement of the international community in view of the recognition of those rights naturally belonging to the human person, in line with Thomistic thought.

On an international arena, the first serious attempts at catalyzing the attention of policy-makers to this issue was conceived in 1948, when the international Declaration of Human Rights was delivered under the aegis of the UN.⁴⁴ Messineo underlined the importance of this act as the most articulated chart that listed the rights that all human persons were entitled to despite any pretense of the States to emphasize their role as the primary sources for the existence of the same rights. In other words, the recognition of the existence of human rights as something that preceded the formalization made by the States through official laws and statements represented for the Jesuit an important step towards the true emancipation of the individuals, particularly after decades of hegemonic prevalence of public authorities over the citizens. Nevertheless, the deficiencies of the act far exceeded its virtues; most of all, the blame was put on the vagueness of both the preamble and the thirty articles it was composed of, vagueness that Messineo imputed to Russia’s willingness to erase the document’s value and render the words rhetorically vain:

Beside the abstract forms that have been used and the evident incoherence that emerged from the whole debate, guided by the intention of satisfying the Russian friend (though it has not even approved the act), the UN Assembly would have reached much concrete results could it promote the respect of the famous four liberties applied to the Atlantic Chart, instead of recurring to very broad principles.⁴⁵

⁴¹ The States parties to the organizations were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. See Judt T., 2005, ‘Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945’, Penguin Books, London, p. 155.

⁴² Maritain J., 1936, ‘Humanisme integral: problèmes temporels et spirituelle d’une nouvelle chrétienté’, Aubier, Paris, 1936.

⁴³ Durand J.-D., 2006, ‘La Civiltà Cattolica contro Jacques Maritain’, in *Enne effe: rivista pentasettimanale di politica e cultura*, no. 1-2.

⁴⁴ Published by the UNESCO a year later, the declaration was a heated issue within the “ideological conflict” of the time. See Passerin d’Entreves E., 1954, ‘La dottrina del diritto naturale’, Edizioni di Comunità, Milano, p. 156, note 2.

⁴⁵ ‘Cronaca Contemporanea’, *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, p. 108.

To summarize, three main factors impoverished the Declaration: first, the whole frame still reflected a liberal conception of human rights, instead of referring to Natural Law; second, rhetoric impregnated the general structure, so that the legislators' main concern seemed to be represented by the search of accords on the empty words more than on their willingness to effectively produce concrete results for the individuals' lives; third, as a consequence of the latter issue, States did not find consensus on attributing any applicable validity to this act, as it was conceived as a recommendation and not as a directive.⁴⁶ Therefore, Messineo concluded that the implementation of its principles through concrete acts on a regional scale became the only viable answer to fulfill this gap.

The Council of Europe was purposely interpreted with regard to this goal. Signed on 5 May 1949, the act through which the Council was established followed an intergovernmental approach and structured the organization into two main bodies: the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly. The former organ, in charge of voting recommendations on a majority rule, was composed of national delegates chosen on the basis of national laws.⁴⁷ It did not concern questions relating to the national defense (that constituted still part of the prerogatives of the Western Union) nor economic integration (belonging to the competencies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), but strictly focused on legal issues. To a closer inspection, it reflected the Jesuit expectations of what an international organization had to do in relation to the human person in merit to four points: first, it fostered the idea that individuals could be entitled to being considered as subjects of international law, at the expense of the traditional conception of the States' absolute preeminence over their citizens; second, it showed a strong attention to the problems of the national minorities that had been at the center of Messineo's studies since the early 1940s;⁴⁸ third, it undermined the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the States; finally, it grounded the idea that the *ius gentium* could be affirmed, following the lessons of the ancient Jesuit scholars such as Vitoria and Suarez. In November 1950, when the "European Convention on Human Rights" was signed, Messineo would receive thus the confirmation of the appreciable efforts invested in the process of European integration.⁴⁹

Conclusions

Although trying to synthesize in a few pages a multifaceted phenomenon such as the process of European integration is a difficult task, filtering it through the lens of a prestigious Jesuit journal with regard to the interpretation of an eminent scholar à la Messineo, at least three principles that grounded the continental attempts of building supranational institutions can still be extrapolated from the articles and notes of contemporary history which appeared in the Journal.

First, a "Europe of the nations" went far beyond any simple idea of harmonization of the national policies of all European States. From this moment, a firm banishment of nationalistic policies became the prerogative of Catholic analysis concerning international politics, partially in contrast with what had been presented in the previous decades, when the principle of nationality had been highly taken into consideration. In the post-war international arena, on the contrary, there was enough room to get rid of past ambiguities so that all Christian countries

⁴⁶ Messineo A., 1949, 'La Dichiarazione internazionale dei Diritti dell'Uomo', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, pp. 380-392.

⁴⁷ 'Cronaca Contemporanea', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. II, p. 478.

⁴⁸ See the articles gathered in the monograph of Messineo A., 1944, 'I diritti della persona', Raggio, Roma; id., 1946, 'Il problema delle minoranze nazionali', *Civiltà Cattolica*, Roma.

⁴⁹ Messineo A., 1960, 'In difesa della persona umana', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. III, pp. 249-260.

were newly invited to spread the principle of solidarity beyond national boundaries. Yet, the nations could never be abandoned as means that incomparably marked peoples' personalities:

Respect and safeguard of nationalities have never constituted a problem for the Church, either on a theoretical or on a practical ground... [The Church] has recently condemned political nationalism, because it contradicts the law of solidarity and the precept of universal charity, but it never depreciated nationalities in themselves, as they have been regarded as a natural, human value, a precious element of the general order and harmony of the universe, whose last source lies in God.⁵⁰

In line with the combined principles of solidarity and nationalities' safeguards, we can find in Messineo's articles the antecedents of what would then become the key words of Europe as defined by the first Communities' institutions: the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that are still regarded as inalienable, seemed to be aligned to Messineo's basic idea that, on one hand, States could not be so blind as to limit their policies on a restrictive range and were thus encouraged to pursue objectives that excluded forms of collaboration with their neighbors. Yet, on the other hand, Messineo anticipated the fear that the directional centers could be built far from those that were subject to their decisions, and called for gradual and balanced forms of policy transfers from the "peripheries" to the center.

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⁵⁰ id., 1946, 'La Chiesa e le nazionalità', *Civ. Cat.*, vol. I, p. 269. My translation.

Trade Unions' first European Network under the ECSC: Decartelisation Policy and Trade Unions' Response from a German Perspective 1950-1955

Hitoshi Suzuki

Introduction

Considerable amount of historiography of European integration has described the history of integration as a process of clashes and compromises of national interests.¹ Accordingly, since it mainly focused on national interests, most of the works focused on nation state government and the role it played in the history of European integration. While there is little doubt that integration started from and mainly served for national interests of its Member States, not much is known about the role played by various groups which were also deeply involved in the process. Some works have been done on the role played by management groups and industrialists,² who mainly cooperated with their national authorities, hence serving for national interests as well as their own business interests. Historiography lacks almost completely, however, on their counterpart, the trade unions.³ It is the aim of this article to look into the indispensable role the trade unions played in the first days of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the impact they had on the development of European integration.

Current works on trade unions have mainly focused on domestic issues of the unions, mainly those of wage bargaining and institutional structures of industrial relations. The very few works which took a brief look into international trade union organisations were descriptions and sketches of the secretariat of such organisations and its functions,⁴ and did not analyse the role played by the trade unions in European integration. This article will describe how the trade unions in the six Member States defined and coordinated their common interests at the European level and how they influenced the decision-making process of the ECSC. In order to avoid a fragmented collection of research of all six countries, the German trade unions and the international trade union organisations will be mainly looked into. The time period spans from

¹ Wilfried Loth (ed.), *Crises and Compromises: the European Project 1963-1969*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001; Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State (2.ed)*, Routledge, London, 2000; Anne Deighton, Alan S. Milward (eds), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: the European Economic Community 1957-1963*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999; Dirk Spierenburg, Raymond Poidevin, *The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1994; Klaus Schwabe (Hrsg.), *Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950/51*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1988.

² Andreas Wilkens (eds), *Le Plan Schuman dans l'Histoire: Intérêts nationaux et projet européen*, Établissements Émile Bruylant, Brussels, 2004; Paul-H. Claeys, Corinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, Pascaline Winand (eds), *Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration*, European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 1998; Justin Greenwood, Mark Aspinwall (eds), *Collective Action in the European Union*, Routledge, London / New York, 1998; Keith Middlemas, *Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of the European Union 1973-95*, Fontana Press, London, 1995.

³ Trade unions hardly appear in widely read textbooks of European integration, such as Helen Wallace, William Wallace (eds), *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 5.ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. Trade unions are merely described in the chapter of the social policy of the EU, though not described as a major actor in the issue. The chapter emphasises instead the role played by the European Court of Justice and the worldwide trend of market economy.

⁴ For some exceptions which looked into the role played by the trade unions, see Werner Bühner, "Les syndicats ouest-allemands et le Plan Schuman," in Wilkens (eds), *Le Plan Schuman dans l'Histoire*, 2004; Werner Link, "Building Coalitions: Non-governmental German-American Linkages" in, Charles S. Maier, Günter Bischof (eds), *The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program*, Berg Publishers, New York / Oxford, 1991; Michael Fichter, "HICOG and the Unions in West Germany," in, Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, Alex Frohn, Hermann-Josef Rupieper (eds), *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955*, German Historical Institute, Washington D.C., 1993.

April 1950 to May 1955, focusing on the negotiation process of the Schuman Plan and the first Presidency of the High Authority under Jean Monnet. Archival materials from Germany and the U.S., and those of Jean Monnet and the European Communities have been consulted.

It is the conclusion of this article that the trade unions, namely due to efforts made by the German unions, were successful in sending their people into the High Authority, and that this accomplishment of direct participation made it possible for the unions to halt Monnet's decartelisation policy. Though the national governments and the industrialists also raised the same claims, it was only after trade unions' persuasion that the High Authority changed its policy. The direct participation of trade unions in the High Authority and its accomplishment to halt decartelisation were both achieved by the European wide network of the trade unions, in which the German unions played a crucial role. The unions from the six Member States not only "lobbied" the High Authority as an outsider but also influenced its decision-making process as an insider, a story which explains the first case of trade union members becoming Eurocrats in Luxembourg. The term "network" in this article is used in the sense that the unions utilised several international trade union organisations simultaneously in order to influence the High Authority, and invented liaison officers to coordinate the simultaneous use of their organisations.

How and why were the trade unions able to represent themselves in the Schuman Plan negotiations and the High Authority? The following three chapters will look into trade unions' negotiation efforts in chronological order, hence showing the development of the trade union network.⁵ The first chapter will focus on the Schuman Plan negotiations, in which the trade unions defined their common position to support the Schuman Plan. The European Regional Office (ERO) of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was mainly used in this period. The second chapter looks into the process of how the unions sent their representatives into the High Authority. This was achieved by persuading the Member States' governments to include trade union members into the national delegations who were sent to the High Authority. In this phase, besides the ERO of the ICFTU, the newly launched Committee of 21 was also utilised in order to define and coordinate trade union common interest at the European level. The third chapter will look into the negotiations between the High Authority and the trade unions in the debates about decartelisation policy. Negotiation by the unions was supported and sustained by both the trade union representatives sent into the High Authority and the *Bureau de Liaison*, which the unions established in Luxembourg. The *Bureau* was in charge of collecting information from the High Authority and coordinating the activities of the ERO and the Committee of 21. In this way the unions were able to unify their voices on the issue, even in cases in which their claims did not agree with their country's national interests.

1. The Schuman Plan negotiations

On 9 May 1950, the Schuman Plan was presented by Robert Schuman late in the afternoon at the *Salon de l'Horloge* of the *Quai d'Orsay*. The Schuman Plan proposed to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common High Authority. The aim was to set up a common foundation for economic development. The task of the High Authority was to secure the modernisation of production and to improve its quality. The Plan stated that such

⁵ The trade unions launched their first European network (International Trade Union Committee for the Ruhr) in response to the launch of the International Ruhr Authority in 1949. The Committee was launched before the ICFTU was launched in December 1949, and became the origin of the trade union network discussed in this paper. For further details see, Hitoshi Suzuki, *Digging for European Unity: the Role Played by the Trade Unions in the Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community from a German Perspective 1950-1955*, PhD Thesis, Department of History and Civilization, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, to be defended in December 2007.

accomplishments would contribute to the rising of living standards of workers and promote peaceful achievements. The Authority was to equalise and improve the living condition of workers, a goal which trade unionism had always aimed to achieve. The High Authority was to consist of “independent persons,” who would be autonomous from the national governments and be provided equal representation. This was the niche where the trade unions found possibility to participate in the High Authority.

Contrary to the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) decided to support the Schuman Plan, as they had supported the Marshall Plan. The reason was that the DGB supported the idea of free economy, and saw the Schuman Plan as a necessary solution to reconstruct the European economy. The leaders of the DGB were against the postponement of abolishing Allied regulations, and were also against the International Ruhr Authority where the German delegates were not treated equally.⁶ In their sense, if any decisions concerning the German heavy industry were made, which would directly affect the living standards of the German workers, the German unions must be present at such decision-making process. This idea of *Mitbestimmung* (co-determination) was the core of the German trade unions since the Weimar Republic.⁷ If a new European organisation was launched by the Schuman Plan, trade union representatives were to be sent into its decision-making process.

The DGB sent their attaché to the Schuman Plan negotiations held in Paris. Hans vom Hoff, the Federal executive of the DGB, and Franz Grosse, a specialist working for the German coalminers’ union (*IG Bergbau*), participated in the negotiations.⁸ It was mainly vom Hoff who reported the proceedings of the Paris negotiations to the Federal executive meetings of the DGB. The DGB collected information of the negotiations independently from the SPD. This helped the DGB articulate more realistic standpoints than the SPD. The Social Democratic trade unions in other European countries also joined the DGB in supporting the Schuman Plan, and the ICFTU declared its full support for the Schuman Plan at the Economic Committee of the United Nations on 12 June 1950.⁹

The DGB leaders were, however, not unified in their opinion of whether to continue their close commitment to the Schuman Plan negotiations or not. At the Federal executive meeting on 18 and 19 July 1950, fears were raised that the participation in the negotiations might lead to close cooperation with the cartels and industrialists.¹⁰ Hans vom Hoff argued back that the unions should make every effort possible to participate in the negotiations in order to confront the industrialists and to control the political decisions concerning heavy industry.

Hans vom Hoff was, however, not supporting the Schuman Plan full-heartedly. According to his remarks made during interviews in Paris on 26 and 27 September 1950, vom Hoff’s concern was that the future economic difficulties the Schuman Plan would face were not discussed thoroughly enough at the Paris negotiations.¹¹ While he supported the political idea of

⁶ HICOG Staff Conference of 4 April 1950, File 250/68/10/2, Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference Meetings, Office Executive Secretary, Records of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner, Record Group 466, NARA.

⁷ For the idea of *Mitbestimmung* see, (Hrsg.) im Auftrage des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes von Fritz Naphtali, *Wirtschaftsdemokratie –Ihr Wesen, Weg und Ziel*, Verlagsgesellschaft des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, Berlin, 1928. Further analysis of the idea and its development see, Bo Stråth, *The Organisation of Labour Markets: Modernity, Culture and Governance in Germany, Sweden, Britain and Japan*, Routledge, London, 1996; Peter Hubsch, “DGB Economic Policy with Particular Reference to the British Zone 1945-49,” in, Ian D. Turner (ed.), *Reconstruction in Post-war Germany; British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones 1945-1955*, Berg Publishers, Oxford, 1989.

⁸ DGB-Archiv, Best. 21.1, 1, 17./18.7.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.

⁹ AMG 1/5/6.

¹⁰ DGB-Archiv, Best. 21.1, 1, 17./18.7.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.

¹¹ Interview answered by Hans vom Hoff in Paris. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 26./27.9.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.

the Schuman Plan, vom Hoff was concerned with the rise of German coal prices after the ECSC started operation. The economic cost for Germany to join the Schuman Plan was too high. If inflation was caused by the ECSC, the living standards of German workers would drop. Hans Böckler, who was the first Chairman of the DGB and was most keen in supporting the Schuman Plan, stressed that the German unions must support European integration, whatever the costs were.¹² Vom Hoff carefully added to Böckler's remark and stated that the German trade unions alone should not pay the costs of the new European institution. Vom Hoff's obvious concern was price rise in Germany, and therefore was trying to solve the problem by direct participation, *Mitbestimmung*, in the Paris negotiations.

Jean Monnet's exact idea on interest group participation has not been well known. According to Hans vom Hoff's report, Monnet was determined not to allow any interest group participation in the decision-making process of the new European institutions.¹³ This did not merely mean the industrialists and business groups but also the trade unions. Hans vom Hoff discussed the issue with his European colleagues of the ICFTU in late September 1950. He and his colleagues agreed that they could not agree with Monnet's idea of excluding trade unions from the decision-making process. They agreed that the unions must participate in the High Authority, and that they would make joint efforts to convince Monnet.¹⁴

In order to discuss the issue, an executive meeting of the ICFTU was held from 9 to 11 November 1950.¹⁵ The trade unions from the six European countries agreed upon four points concerning the Schuman Plan and the Paris negotiations. The first was that the unions should continue coordinating their efforts in order to include their members into the governmental delegations. The second was to send an ICFTU delegate into the new European institution. The third was that the Secretary Generals of the ICFTU would prepare the list of candidates to send to the High Authority. The fourth was that all representatives from the international trade union organisations should be elected, according to the number of membership of each union. This meant that the German unions would be represented most.

In December 1950, the Schuman Plan negotiations were entering into the most difficult phase, because decartelisation of the German heavy industry became the central issue. The German trade union leaders were disappointed by the negotiations because Germany was forced to admit decartelisation. The coal cartels were seen by the German unions as a stabiliser, not only for the German coal market but for the German economy as a whole. The cartels were indispensable for securing the employment of the German coalminers. This view was stated at the Federal executive meeting of the DGB on 11 and 12 March 1951.¹⁶ Contrary to the views of the unions, the American Allied High Commissioner John McCloy warned the German union leaders that the German coal cartels should be dismantled, because the French steel cartels were also scheduled to be decartelised. The German unions argued back that the French and German organisations were two different issues, because the German cartels functioned as a basis of economy. The German unions were trying to define the German coal sales organisation, not as a private cartel acting solely on its own interests, but as a public organisation with a character of stabilising the German economy.

Facing a firm tone of opposing any form of decartelisation, McCloy discussed the issue with Jean Monnet. His conclusion did not change, nor that of Monnet's. Monnet refused to

¹² DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 26./27.9.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.

¹³ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 26./27.9.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses. The date of Monnet's statement is not stated in the document.

¹⁴ Report by Hans vom Hoff to members of the *Bundesausschuss* of the DGB. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 26./27.9.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.

¹⁵ Report of the ERO meeting of the ICFTU held in Brussels from 29 to 31 January 1951. The report was prepared by Gust de Muynck, a Belgian trade union leader and the Under Secretary General of the ICFTU. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 60, 29.-31.1.1951.

¹⁶ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 11./12.3.1951, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes.

include the admission of cartels into the Treaty articles, and merely admitted a transition period of decartelisation. The German union leaders saw this method as meaningless, because the German cartels would face decartelisation after the transition period ended. Hans vom Hoff, together with Walter Freitag and Heinrich Imig from the German coal and steel unions, met Adenauer and stressed that the unions were against the solution. Vom Hoff made it clear that whether the German unions supported or opposed the Schuman Plan would depend on decartelisation. Considering the social consequence of decartelisation, which was the sudden mass unemployment of the coalminers, decartelisation was not acceptable for the unions. This view was firmly backed up by August Schmidt, the Chairman of the *IG Bergbau*. He stated that the *IG Bergbau* could not support the Schuman Plan, should the article on decartelisation remain intact.¹⁷ In the end, the Paris negotiations were concluded by McCloy, who forced Adenauer to admit decartelisation. The articles of the Paris Treaty, however, eventually did not provide the High Authority with real power in this matter. Details of the policy were to be decided after the High Authority initiated its operation in Luxembourg, and therefore the unions had to continue their efforts to gain representation. The Paris Treaty was signed by the six countries on 18 April 1951.

What was the view of the German trade unions on cartels? Heinz Potthoff, who was an economist working for the DGB and soon became one of the two German delegates to the High Authority, explained his view in his book published in 1964.¹⁸ Potthoff's book summarised a view widely shared among the German union leaders. Potthoff saw the cartels in terms of securing the current employment of the workers. He had a two-fold definition of what were harmful cartels and what were positive ones. What he considered to be harmful cartels were those typical in the inter-war period, which stopped the flow of goods and capitals with national barriers. Such protectionist methods would reduce trade and investment between the European countries, and would therefore keep the living standards of the workers low. On the other hand, what Potthoff considered as positive cartels were those which would promote the flow of goods and capitals under an international framework, thus boosting trade and investment among the European countries. The boosted economy would help improve the living standards of the workers. If cartels would increase trade and also sustain current employment, the trade unions would support it. While Potthoff preferred to maximise the flexibility of goods and capitals on one hand, he carefully excluded labour market flexibility on the other. The coal cartels were indispensable in order to secure the latter. If mass unemployment were to occur in one of the key energy sectors, the confusion would expand to all the other sectors.¹⁹ It would end up in social unrest throughout the country and repeat the tragedy after 1929.

2. The nomination of the High Authority members and the development of the trade union network

Shortly before the Paris Treaty was signed, the trade unions of the six European countries negotiated who they would nominate as their representatives in the High Authority and the Consultative Committee of the ECSC. Since the number of seats available was modest, each country insisted on their own members being represented. The negotiation among the unions reflected the clashes of national interests of the Paris negotiations.

As the previous chapter showed, the first meeting of the unions was held in late September 1950. At this point, the issue was whether the unions would be able to participate in

¹⁷ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 11./12.3.1951, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes.

¹⁸ Heinz Potthoff, *Vom Besatzungsstaat zur europäischen Gemeinschaft*, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschichte, Hannover, 1964, pp.28-36.

¹⁹ Spierenburg, Poidevin, *History of the High Authority*, p.96.

the new European institution or not, and how to persuade Jean Monnet of the necessity of trade union representation. In early 1951, however, the debates were advanced and became a concrete issue of how Social Democratic unions should cooperate with the Christian unions in order to jointly participate in the new European institutions.²⁰ A meeting of the ERO was held in Brussels from 29 to 31 January 1951.²¹ The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) proposed a joint conference with the ICFTU. The IFCTU's aim was to reach an agreement with the ICFTU in order to send their members into the new European institutions. The opportunity of participation which the ICFTU unions secured for themselves was now requested by the Christian unions to be shared with. After discussing the issue at the ERO meeting, the sub committee of the ICFTU agreed to accept the proposal of the IFCTU.

Joint meetings between the ICFTU and the IFCTU were held on 28 December 1950 and 4 January 1951.²² During the meetings, both Internationals agreed upon their burden sharing in the new European institutions. It was decided that the ICFTU would send their members to the High Authority, and the IFCTU would send their member to the Court of Justice.²³ The ICFTU was to consult the IFCTU before they officially declared their candidates. In this way, the candidacy became a joint proposal of the ICFTU and the IFCTU. It was also decided that the 15 seats provided for the trade unions in the Consultative Committee would be divided between the two Internationals. The ICFTU would send 11 members, while the IFCTU 4 members.

While the ERO meeting was held in January 1951, a crucial agreement was reached at the Paris negotiations. It was decided that the ICFTU would propose a list of candidates of their members to be sent to the European institutions, and the governments of the six countries would name their national delegates from this list. In other words, the ICFTU unions had won the right to name their delegate to the High Authority. It was also reported that the functions of the Consultative Committee were expanded. The High Authority would not be able to make important decisions before consulting the Committee. It was highly crucial for the unions that this procedure was made obligatory. Whatever crucial information for the unions, be it the rationalisation of the heavy industry or the reallocation of large firms, which would immediately affect the employment of the workers, would be first reported to the Consultative Committee. Receiving such information would strengthen the bargaining power of the unions. It would have been the best solution for the unions if the Consultative Committee were armed with real power, though the guarantee of obtaining crucial information from the Committee was a positive enough achievement for the unions. Lobbying and negotiation could be carried out through other methods and channels, and, needless to say, the solution to send trade union representatives directly to the High Authority was one of the most effective methods. The fact that the Consultative Committee lacked real power to influence the High Authority was not a serious problem for the unions.

After struggles of negotiation which lasted nearly a year, the Paris Treaty was finally signed by the six governments on 18 April 1951. Facing the ratification debates, the claims of the German trade unions were clear. At the Federal executive meeting on 7 May, Hans vom Hoff reported to his colleagues that the most crucial claims of the DGB, those concerning the German coal cartels and the functions of the Consultative Committee, were fully accepted.²⁴ He pointed out that the High Authority would not be able to make any crucial decisions without their pre-consultation to the Consultative Committee. Vom Hoff emphasised his efforts as the

²⁰ Letter from the IFCTU to the ICFTU, 2 December 1950, cited in, DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 60, 29.-31.1.1951.

²¹ Report prepared by Gust de Muynck. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 60, 29.-31.1.1951.

²² De Muynck's report writes 28 December 1949, though was probably 1950. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 60, 29.-31.1.1951.

²³ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 60, 29.-31.1.1951.

²⁴ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 7.5.1951, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes.

DGB attaché, pointing out that the German industrialists and the *Bund* administrations evaluated the German unions as giving a decisive impact in shaping the Treaty, so that it agreed with German national interests.

Franz Grosse from the *IG Bergbau* added to the discussion and reported that the American Allied High Commission repeatedly emphasised the necessity of dismantling the German coal cartels. It was especially Robert Bowie, McCloy's adviser in Germany and a specialist of anti-cartel laws, who stressed this view. In his opinion, the German cartels held too much centralised power. The *IG Bergbau* protested against this opinion and called for help from the American coalminers' union, which lobbied the State Department.²⁵ Due to this successful lobbying, McCloy's attitude eased somewhat. The High Commission stated that the abolishment of the German cartels would be suspended. McCloy, however, was not satisfied with the compromise he made with the German unions, and bitterly criticised the personal attitudes of August Schmidt and Hans vom Hoff.²⁶

While the majority of the DGB leaders were pro-Europe, there existed voices among the leaders who showed pessimism and hesitation against integration. Such views came from the fear that the Schuman Plan would cause unemployment and poverty in the Ruhr.²⁷ The unions would be blamed for their cooperation for the Schuman Plan. What was more, if the living standards were to drop, it would provide the possibility of the communists collecting support from the workers in the Ruhr. There were also differences in opinion among the pro-European leaders. Franz Grosse proposed an international control of the Ruhr and called for a European-wide socialisation of the coal industry.²⁸ This meant that the coal industry of all six countries would be placed under the leadership of the High Authority, or more specifically, of Jean Monnet. There was a split among the pro-Europeans in respect of how the coal and steel industry should be organised under the new European institution. The majority of the DGB leaders preferred private ownership.

Georg Reuter, one of the Federal executives of the DGB, spoke for the pro-Europeans and emphasised the efforts made by the union leaders which enabled trade union participation in the Paris negotiations.²⁹ He also pointed out Hans vom Hoff's successful efforts to act as a liaison between the DGB and the ICFTU's sub-committee in charge of the Schuman Plan. Reuter reported that the sub-committee had discussed the issue of who to send to the High Authority as the trade union delegate from the ICFTU. The DGB intended to send Heinrich Deist and Franz Grosse from the DGB to the new European institution.

After hours of discussion, it became clear that a joint will was shared among the German union leaders. There was no other solution than the Schuman Plan that would enable Germany to stay in the international free economy. If the German unions did not cooperate with the Schuman Plan, the Allied restrictions imposed on the German economy would remain, and this would hinder the reconstruction of Germany.³⁰ The pro-Europeans took command of the debate, and a resolution prepared by Hans vom Hoff was adopted.³¹ The resolution stated that the DGB would support the Schuman Plan, though under certain conditions. The Allied regulations should be abolished before the ratification of the Paris Treaty. Accordingly, the new European institution should adjust the coal demand in a way which would fulfill the demand of the German economy. Furthermore, Allied regulations of steel production should be abolished, and German economic reconstruction must be guaranteed. Given that such conditions be taken

²⁵ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 7.5.1951, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes.

²⁶ Letter from McCloy to Adenauer on 27 August 1951, cited in, DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 7.5.1951, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes.

²⁷ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 7.5.1951, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes.

²⁸ "Westfälische Rundschau" 30 March 1951. AMG 20/7/14.

²⁹ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 7.5.1951, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.

³⁰ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 7.5.1951, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.

³¹ DGB's resolution of the Schuman Plan adopted on 7 May 1951. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 7.5.1951, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses. Also in AMH 6/3/66.

into account, the DGB would support the Schuman Plan. A sentence stating that the unions would not intervene into the *Bundestag*'s debates was deleted from the resolution. The resolution was adopted with only one vote against.

The resolution pointed out four crucial points.³² The first was to settle a reasonable regulation on the coal sales. The second was the abolishment of production regulations. The third was to recover the production of the German heavy industry. The fourth was the re-organisation of the German heavy industry. The German unions also stressed the significance of investment for the German coal industry. They stated that their demands were not met sufficiently by the Schuman Plan, and that they should therefore influence the policy of the new Community.

Adenauer's intention to name one of the German delegates from the DGB was first reported to the Federal executive meeting of the DGB on 7 May 1951, shortly before the ratification debates started in the *Bundestag*.³³ Theodor Blank, who was one of the State Secretaries, informed Georg Reuter, who in turn reported this to the Federal executives of the DGB. The German union leaders decided who to recommend on 23 January 1952, twelve days after the ratification of the Paris Treaty. The DGB decided to recommend Heinrich Deist.³⁴

The first German delegate to the High Authority was named by the Federal government at a cabinet meeting on 16 June 1952. This was before the DGB recommended Deist to Adenauer. The cabinet members agreed to name Franz Etzel. He was the cabinet attaché sent to the Schuman Plan negotiations, and was reporting the everyday progress of the negotiations to the cabinet. There were few objections among the cabinet members. Etzel had close ties with the industrialists in the Ruhr and mostly spoke for their interests.

On 10 April, the German industrialists of the coal industry wrote to Adenauer personally in order to recommend their man as the second delegate.³⁵ The letter from the *Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung* claimed that they were personally informed by Etzel of his appointment as the first German delegate, and that the second delegate was not yet chosen. The industrialists, together with the *IG Bergbau*, recommended Franz Grosse from the *IG Bergbau*.³⁶ The letter claimed that the recommendation of Grosse was confirmed and welcomed by Etzel himself, stating that the collaboration of the two delegates would work well in the High Authority. The joint recommendation from the coal industry was sent to the cabinet, even before the DGB executives officially recommended Deist as their formal candidate. The recommendation was ignored by the government.

Adenauer, facing the DGB's recommendation of Heinrich Deist, reacted positively, though with some hesitation. The cabinet members disagreed with the DGB's recommendation, claiming that Deist had had relations with the Nazi regime since 1937.³⁷ This was confirmed by Deist himself, who therefore renounced his candidacy.³⁸ The German union leaders, however, insisted on recommending Deist. Since they once took a vote to recommend Deist, they were not able to put down their request easily. On 16 July, however, the DGB leaders started to show a change in their attitude. While confirming their recommendation of Deist, the letter also stated at the end that Heinz Potthoff could be recommended as an alternative.³⁹ Potthoff was to be

³² AMH 6/3/66.

³³ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 7.5.1951, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes.

³⁴ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 439, 23.1.1952, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.

³⁵ BA, B 136/1243, Bundeskanzleramt.

³⁶ The Chairman of the IG Bergbau, August Schmidt, refused to admit free hand of Grosse's on coal issues handled by the High Authority. BA, B 136/1243, Bundeskanzleramt. The leaders of the IG Bergbau were split in opinion.

³⁷ BA, B 136/1243, Bundeskanzleramt. Also in, DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 30.7.1952, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes.

³⁸ BA, B 136/1243, Bundeskanzleramt.

³⁹ Letter from Christian Fette (Chairman of the DGB) to Adenauer, 16 July 1952. BA, B 136/1243, Bundeskanzleramt.

named, however, only when other governments refused the nomination of Deist. Given a nice hint of what to do, this was precisely what Adenauer did.

Adenauer held a personal conversation with Robert Schuman on the issue,⁴⁰ in which Schuman spoke against the nomination of Deist. Schuman more preferred the nomination of Heinz Potthoff as the second German delegate. By receiving precisely the right reaction from Schuman, Adenauer wrote to Fette that the DGB's proposal was opposed by the French Foreign Minister, and that he could not insist on nominating Deist under opposition from another country. Adenauer showed his "reluctance" to the decision, bitterly complaining that the decision would not agree with German national interests, nor with Deist's personal interests. Adenauer used Schuman in order to remove Deist from the list and to nominate Potthoff instead.⁴¹

The DGB still insisted on recommending Deist, and took a resolution once more in order to confirm their decision. The union leaders sharply criticised Adenauer's attitude of using foreign actors as an excuse to reject the DGB's recommendation. There was, however, not enough time left for the DGB. If the DGB failed in raising a candidate, be it Deist or Potthoff, the cabinet would not further consider trade union participation, and the unions would lose their chance of sending someone to the High Authority. Moreover, the union leaders were not against recommending Potthoff. Potthoff already had experience as the German delegate in the International Ruhr Authority. He was to resign from his post and to participate in any possible position in the ECSC. The Federal executives reached a consensus on recommending Potthoff. Shortly after Franz Etzel was officially named in the *Bundestag* on 16 July, Potthoff was also named as the German delegate. Only two weeks after, the High Authority came to power in Luxembourg.

Heinz Potthoff studied economics in Switzerland during the Second World War and was called "the planning department trade unionist."⁴² He was sent to the High Authority as a counterpart of Franz Etzel. Potthoff was a member of the working group of labour of the High Authority under the leadership of Paul Finet, a top leader of the Belgian unions and was the first Chairman of the ICFTU. While Finet kept a modest view on the expansion of ECSC's social policy,⁴³ Potthoff was active in this respect. He made use of every chance to maximise the interests of the unions. He often appeared as the trade unions' spokesman, though it must also be noted that Potthoff was not merely a spokesman of the unions, but also acted as the spokesman of the High Authority when he was back in the trade union camps. His role to explain the merits and the everyday activities of the High Authority was crucial for the unions. It was significant for the High Authority in order to convince the unions of the significance of their policies. Potthoff was working for both sides, hence being needed by both sides.

An early example of Heinz Potthoff's task to convince the unions of the significance of the ECSC was the Federal conference of the DGB, held in Berlin from 13 to 17 October 1952. It was one of the most significant conferences where the Chairman of the DGB was changed from Christian Fette to Walter Freitag. Freitag was known as a nationalist leader, and his replacement

⁴⁰ Letter from Adenauer to Fette, 25 July 1952. BA, B 136/1243, Bundeskanzleramt.

⁴¹ The SPD, who was against the Schuman Plan and kept distance from the DGB, suspected that Adenauer chose Potthoff. Walter Dörrich, Klaus Schönhoven, *Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert*, Bund 11: Josef Kaiser, *Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1949-1956*, Bund-Verlag, Köln, 1996, Dokument 50, 30.7.1952, pp.360-362.

⁴² On Potthoff's person carrier and his role in the High Authority see, Spierenburg, Poidevin, *The History of the High Authority*, p.53.

⁴³ Finet called for trade union support for the ECSC from all Member States. In his speeches on 1 May 1953 in Luxembourg and 8 October 1953 in the Hague, Finet emphasised that improving productivity by free competition and the creation of an economic area would contribute to stabilise employment and would raise the standard of living. He did not, however, call for support to expand the power of the High Authority in social policy. CEAB 2, No. 759.

of Fette, who supported the Schuman Plan, meant that the DGB might retreat from supporting the ECSC.

Among the invited guests from the international organisations and international trade union organisations, Potthoff was invited as the official representative of the High Authority. On 6 October, Potthoff consulted Jean Monnet about his attendance.⁴⁴ One week before the conference, he wrote to Monnet that his participation as a formal representative of the High Authority would give a good image of the Authority to the DGB member unions. Potthoff asked Monnet whether he should give his speech in the name of the High Authority or merely personally. This proposal was approved by Monnet, and Potthoff gave his speech on behalf of the High Authority.

Potthoff gave his speech on the first day of the conference.⁴⁵ Following his blessings for the Federal conference, Potthoff explained the significance of participating in the ECSC, explaining in particular that the union members would participate in the Consultative Committee. Potthoff then pointed out the goals of the ECSC as the expansion of demand and the improvement of living standards. He stressed that such aims should be accomplished in order to counter the production of the United States and the East. Potthoff stressed the significance of investment for the coal and steel industry, while showing caution and hesitation against the High Authority's initiative in coal policy. He pointed out that policies of competition, merger, price adjustment, tariff and transportation costs would require close watch by the unions. To sum up his points, Potthoff stated that he would make negotiation efforts in the High Authority based on the interest of the German unions, and that economic progress and welfare of human beings relied heavily on practicing *Mitbestimmung* in the High Authority. To end his speech, Potthoff gave his best wishes to the success of the Federal conference, in a way which would make the DGB feel a part of a unified Europe.

Potthoff's speech could be seen as a mixture between his task of being a trade union representative speaking for the interest of the unions on one hand, and his task of making the High Authority function smoothly on the other hand. Potthoff was acting for both sides. His speech was mainly based on the viewpoint of the High Authority, hence carefully explaining its merits and significance to the unions. His speech also included, however, his promise to exercise *Mitbestimmung* at the High Authority as a trade union representative.

One example of Heinz Potthoff's task in other Member States was to act as a liaison between the High Authority and the trade unions, which lacked information about the ECSC. Potthoff provided such information for the unions. The unions felt that they were kept out from the ECSC and complained bitterly. A critical article appeared in a trade union journal in Luxembourg, written by Antoine Krier, a leader of the Luxembourg unions.⁴⁶ Krier listed up the commissions and sub-commissions set up under the High Authority, hence pointing out that almost all personnel of the commissions excluded the unions, and that the unions were not consulted before the personnel was nominated.

While he was right to point out that the trade unions were not represented enough, Krier's article included a serious mistake. His article introduced the commission in charge of supply and demand, where Heinz Potthoff was the Chairman. Krier, however, did not introduce Potthoff as a trade union member. Potthoff had to correct the information and informed Krier of all the trade union representatives in the commissions. Potthoff also informed Monnet and sent Krier's article to him, pointing out that the unions were disappointed with their lack of representation.⁴⁷ Potthoff's task was to provide the unions with information in order to enable their activity at the European level. By doing so, Potthoff was also acting in the interest of the

⁴⁴ Letter from Potthoff to Monnet, 6 October 1952. AMH 6/3/62.

⁴⁵ DGB, *Protokoll: 2. ordentlicher Bundeskongress, Berlin, 13. bis 17. Oktober 1952*, pp.34-36.

⁴⁶ Antoine Krier, "Die Hohe Behörde," LAV (Letzeburger Arbechter-Verband), *Arbecht*, 25 October 1952.

⁴⁷ Letter from Potthoff to Monnet, 24 October 1952, AMH 6/8/7.

High Authority in order to secure its everyday activity. His task was to gather information from the trade unions' side, to correct the misunderstandings, and report it to Jean Monnet. This was crucial for the successful launch of the High Authority. It must also be noted that Antoine Krier soon became one of the key person of the European trade union network, because he became a core member of the *Bureau de Liaison*.

3. Opposing the High Authority's decartelisation policy of the *Gemeinschaftsorganisation Ruhrkohle GmbH* (GEORG)

3.1. The Committee of 21

As the previous chapters showed, the trade unions of the ECSC Member States constructed a unified European front by using the ERO of the ICFTU. Issues such as the nomination of union members to the High Authority were discussed. Besides the ERO, the unions launched a European trade union organisation, the Committee of 21, which was specialised in coal and steel issues. The ERO covered all industry sectors and was not specialised enough in coal and steel industry.

The first and almost only thorough review of the activities of the Committee of 21 was done by Ernst Haas.⁴⁸ Haas characterised the decision-making process of the Committee as those similar to diplomatic negotiations where decisions were made by unanimity. Haas argued that a European wide consensus among the trade unions existed on the issue of harmonising working standards, while there was no consensus on the coal cartel issue. This conclusion requires revision, because the unions did build a consensus on the coal cartel issue, while merely stated vague and meaningless statements on harmonisation. Haas was right, however, when he concluded that the German unions obtained a veto in the Committee. The German unions were the most influential among all the member unions, thanks to their financial contribution and their outstanding number of membership.⁴⁹

3.2. The *Bureau de Liaison*

The question of how the trade unions should share the burden between the ERO and the Committee of 21 was solved by yet another trade union organisation. The unions, apart from launching the Committee of 21, also set up a liaison organisation in order to coordinate trade union activity between the ERO and the Committee of 21. The organisation was called the *Bureau de Liaison*, and was placed in Luxembourg where the High Authority was also operating. The *Bureau* was situated in *Rue Dicks*. The *Bureau* was in charge of collecting information from the High Authority and other ECSC institutions, and circulating the information to the unions of the six Member States. The significant function of the *Bureau* was to adjust and set the agenda of international trade union conferences where European wide issues of coal and steel were discussed. The *Bureau de Liaison* was able to carry out its task, based on an agreement between the High Authority that it was obligatory for the latter to send every record, report or minutes to the *Bureau*.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stevens & Sons, London, 1958, pp.355-389.

⁴⁹ For example, the first year budget of the *Bureau de Liaison* was 4,000,000 Francs. Three million was paid by the Germans and one million by the Belgians, the latter joint by the French and the Italians. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 91, 5.12.1953.

⁵⁰ Letter from Jakob Oldenbroek (*Bureau de Liaison*), who was a Dutch trade union leader and was the Secretary General of the ICFTU, headed to members of the Committee of 21, DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 72, 21.4.1954.

3.3. Unifying trade union voices and putting pressure on the High Authority

The High Authority first announced its intention to dismantle coal cartels in June 1953. The High Authority first targeted the largest coal sales cartels in the Community, the *Gemeinschaftsorganisation Ruhrkohle GmbH* (GEORG) in the Ruhr. In order to counter this decision, the European trade unions discussed the issue at the Committee of 21 and its executive meeting. Paul Finet and Heinz Potthoff, members of the High Authority, were invited to such meetings as “private” guests. They reported the recent activities and debates in the High Authority, and gave advices and personal opinions for the next step of action.

In order to discuss current issues of the ECSC in further detail, the trade unions held an international conference in Luxembourg from 16 to 18 March 1954. The agenda and schedule of the meeting was settled by the *Bureau de Liaison*. At the conference, the unions agreed on launching research committees on ECSC related issues.⁵¹ Those were committees on cartel, price, investment and free movement of labour. The committees were organised under the Committee of 21. The aim of launching the committees was to find trade union common interests at the European level. The German unions made use of such committees to present their views on cartels.

The German trade unions relied on Potthoff in defining their strategies. He was not merely a trade union spokesman in the High Authority but was also a guide for the unions to define their opinions. Potthoff provided detailed information for the unions and suggested possible options. At the Federal executive meeting of the DGB held on 8 July 1954, Potthoff pointed out the crucial arguments in the High Authority concerning the coal cartel policy.⁵² Those were three points. The first was whether free competition existed in the coal industry or not. The second was whether the production of coal required further flexibility. The third was whether the problem of marginal coalmines could be solved or not. All three points were closely related to the question of employment of miners. Potthoff pointed out that these questions depended on decisions made at the Consultative Committee, because the High Authority was to send its proposal to the Consultative Committee and ask for its opinion. This meant that the High Authority would not be able to make any decision against the will of the members of the Consultative Committee.

The *IG Bergbau* immediately made use of Potthoff’s advice. The *IG Bergbau* issued a research report of the German coal cartels and submitted the report to the research committee of cartels under the Committee of 21.⁵³ They aimed to make their claims clear in opposing dismantlement of the coal cartels, hoping that their claim would be taken to the Consultative Committee by the Committee of 21. After reviewing the history of German coal cartels since 1893, the report explained the functions and structures of the GEORG. It stressed that the GEORG was not a cartel controlling the distribution of coal, but was merely controlling the demand for coal. The report raised the French cartels as a counterexample, claiming that the French cartels controlled both supply and demand, and therefore should be criticised as being the “real” cartels. The report explained the world wide structural change in energy markets, and stressed that the dismantlement of the GEORG must be followed by sufficient compensation. The report requested the High Authority to take cautious action in this matter.

The claims of the *IG Bergbau* were clear. They started to admit the reform of the GEORG, though strongly requested that current employment of the miners must be secured. This was the precondition to admit any reform. The report repeatedly stressed the historical

⁵¹ Report by Antoine Kreir (*Bureau de Liaison*), DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 72, 4.8.1954.

⁵² DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 529, 8.7.1954.

⁵³ “Bericht der Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau an den Ausschuss für Kartelle und Zusammenschlüsse, innerhalb des 21er Ausschusses der Gewerkschaften” DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 91, 28.8.1954.

development of the coal cartels and its functions of securing employment. It also stressed that the German trade union idea of *Mitbestimmung* should be respected in every reform process of the GEORG. The report was circulated by the *Bureau de Liaison* to the other member unions in Europe and the international organisations of trade unions.

After receiving the *IG Bergbau*'s report, the trade unions of the six Member States held an international trade union conference. The conference was organised under the ERO and took place from 28 to 30 September 1954. The main issue was the coal cartel. The unions supported the view of the *IG Bergbau* and confirmed that unity among the unions was necessary at the European level.⁵⁴ The unions agreed that the cartel issue was the most significant one, and that compensation for unemployment was strongly required for any kind of reform of the cartels. Compensation meant to launch an institution that would take over the functions of the cartels in order to maintain employment.

The executive meeting of the Committee of 21 confirmed the conclusions of the international trade union conference. The executive meeting was held on 20 December 1954. Arthur Gially, a Belgian union leader, stressed to his colleagues that the unions should not insist on national interests, but should call for an international policy at the European level. Gially's opinion was agreed by his colleagues, and the executive meeting adopted a resolution. It was decided that the Committee of 21 would propose a resolution to the Consultative Committee of the ECSC, where a resolution of coal cartels would be adopted. The resolution was to firmly reflect the claims of the unions, which was to keep the cartels intact in order to protect employment. The unions of the six Member States sought to receive international and official acknowledgement of their claims.

The trade unions were successful in putting pressure on the High Authority. The High Authority respected the opinions raised in the Consultative Committee and postponed decartelisation. According to Potthoff's report, the lobbying by the unions had been thoroughly successful, and the dismantlement of cartels would never take place without trade union approval.⁵⁵ The reason was, according to Potthoff, that the unions had sent their representatives to all institutions of the ECSC, not only to the High Authority but also to the Consultative Committee, the Common Assembly, the Council of Ministers and numerous Committees settled under the High Authority. Potthoff, being quite proud of such achievements, announced that the German trade union idea of *Mitbestimmung* had now received international recognition.⁵⁶ His aim was to achieve direct participation in the High Authority and to influence its decision-making process based on the interests of the unions. Now he was able to proudly announce his achievements. The trade unions of the six countries, as their next step of trade unionism at the European level, expanded their activities of their European network in 1956 and supported the Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe, firmly supporting the idea of Euratom.⁵⁷

Conclusion

⁵⁴ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 95, 28./30.9.1954.

⁵⁵ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 529, 8.7.1954.

⁵⁶ Walter Freitag, Chairman of the DGB, wrote to Potthoff on 21 June 1954 and informed that the report would be taken to the Bundesvorstand meeting of the DGB. Letter from Walter Freitag to Heinz Potthoff, DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 2332, 21.6.1954. The report was presented at the Federal executive meeting on 8 July.

⁵⁷ For further details see, Hitoshi Suzuki, *Digging for European Unity*, PhD Thesis, EUI (to be defended in December 2007).

What were the implications that the trade unions were able to directly participate in European integration? The working group of the Committee of 21 summarised this point as follows: the purpose of trade unionism under the ECSC was to prepare and coordinate trade union activity under the framework of the ECSC, and to make this process into a permanent one.⁵⁸ It would be right to conclude that the unions did succeed in this aim in the case of coal cartels. The unions were successful in constructing a network at the European level, which enabled them to define and coordinate trade unions' common interests. The Committee of 21 and the ERO of the ICFTU functioned as organisations which hosted international trade union conferences. The liaison between the unions at the European level played an indispensable role in enabling the Committee of 21 and the ERO to function in this way. The *Bureau de Liaison* played an important role in coordinating the burden sharing between the Committee of 21 and the ERO. As a consequence, the trade unions successfully secured their interests of halting the decartelisation policy of the High Authority.

Trade unions' direct participation in the High Authority had an impact on the Authority's decision-making process. The High Authority was not able to carry out policies which the trade unions seriously opposed. Decartelisation was not carried out under Jean Monnet's Presidency, which was contrary to the articles of the Paris Treaty. The industrialists and national governments also claimed the same, but were not able to change the decision of the High Authority alone. It was only after trade unions' successful "lobbying" that the High Authority decided to postpone decartelisation. The unions saw the cartels as an institutional stabiliser for securing employment. The German union leaders had the intention to practice the German idea of *Mitbestimmung* in the ECSC institutions in order to counter the decartelisation policy, and made full use of their representation in the High Authority. Heinz Potthoff played a crucial role for the unions to influence the High Authority. On the other hand, Potthoff also contributed for the High Authority by warning the claims and complaints raised by the unions. This helped the successful launch of the new High Authority.

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⁵⁸ DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 91, 21.3.1955.

The Empty Chair Crisis 1965: European Crisis Management by State and Non-State Actors

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This paper deals with the Common Market Crisis of 1965/66 and the French policy of the Empty Chair. Since the historical background and the technical aspects of the Empty Chair Crisis are well known, this article focuses on the outbreak of the crisis, the multilateral crisis management and the influence of non-state actors.¹

The Empty Chair Crisis: Statesmen, Institutions, and “European Voices”

Different schools of interpretation have been developed in explaining the Empty Chair. A minority of interpreters draws the extreme conclusion that French foreign policy in the Empty Chair was essentially determined by agricultural and commercial interests² or by de Gaulle’s desire to establish a strong foreign policy profile vis-à-vis Moscow³. In this view, institutional aspects are of minor importance. However, a majority of observers are divided between those who emphasize the importance of economic, financial and domestic interests in the construction of the crisis and those who maintain that constitutional questions related to the European institutions and the design of the European Union were of major relevance. Yet, there is no dispute among the observers about the fact that the Empty Chair Crisis was dominated by state and supranational actors. The crisis was the work of national and supranational statesmen, diplomats and bureaucrats. Thus, the decisive role of particular personalities cannot be neglected, although the outbreak of the crisis was at least partly due to “contextual developments” and broader trends in international politics.⁴

Because most standard accounts of the crisis strongly focus on the state actors’ role, the following analysis examines the non-state actors’ influence on the outbreak of the crisis and on the state actors’ crisis management. Which influence did the European movement have on Hallstein’s proposal package? In which way were the leading diplomats under domestic pressure, created by lobbies and “European Voices” at their respective “Home Front”? To which degree did the dominating personalities and bureaucrats on the French side listen to state and non-state actors when the crisis escalated? The intention of this article is to highlight those aspects of the crisis, in which the Empty Chair was influenced by non-state actors.

¹ For a general account of the Empty Chair Crisis see Newhouse, John, *Collision in Brussels. The Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965*, New York, Norton, 1967; Loth, Wilfried (ed.), *Crises and Compromises. The European Project 1963-1969* (Veröffentlichungen der Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Volume 8), Brussels/Baden-Baden, Bruylant/Nomos, 2001; Palayret, Jean-Marie/Wallace, Helen/Winand, Pascaline (eds.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On*, Brussels, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006; Ludlow, Piers, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge* (Cold War History, Volume 9), London, Routledge, 2006.

² Moravcsik, Andrew, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1998, chapter 3, particularly p. 177.

³ Many German officials at the time of the Empty Chair shared this view, see von der Groeben, Hans, *Aufbaujahre der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Das Ringen um den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union (1958-1966)*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1982, p. 277; this was confirmed by Klaus Meyer, Deputy Head of the Hallstein Cabinet, in an interview with the author on 12 January 2006 in Bonn.

⁴ Ludlow, *Crises*, 2006, pp. 49-52.

European Parliament Power, “Federalist Voices”, and Walter Hallstein

The European Commission’s proposal package, worked out by the cabinets of Commission President Hallstein and of Agricultural Commissioner Mansholt, played a major role in triggering the Empty Chair Crisis. The delicate question of European Parliament authority was central within Hallstein’s conception of European integration, and it was in this delicate question that “European Voices” played an important role.

The Commission proposal package reflected Hallstein’s personal political calculation concerning French politics: The French Presidential Elections, the approaching NATO-Crisis and the obvious irreversible integration of the French economy into the Common Market all suggested that the CAP-negotiations of 1965 would be the appropriate occasion on which pressure could be exerted on Paris to pay an institutional price. But the Commission President was also encouraged by his conviction that “*democratic logic*” demanded parliamentary control over budgetary resources.⁵ Hallstein’s proposals of March 1965 were therefore designed to justify institutional change: The handing over from 1967 onwards of agricultural levies and customs duties to the Community (as proposed by Hallstein) would produce budgetary resources that were supposed to be controlled by the European Parliament. Therefore, if national parliaments were increasingly deprived of their budgetary competences, the European Parliament’s role in the budgetary procedure needed to be strengthened.

When linking the CAP to the European Parliament-question, Hallstein was encouraged by numerous “voices” from the six Common Market-countries, favouring the enlargement of European Parliament authority. The European Parliament was not satisfied with its embryonic role in the Rome Treaty and, since 1960, tried to expand its prerogatives by demanding direct election of its members, legislative powers, and real participation in the budgetary procedure.⁶ Three important Strasburg reports between 1962 and 1964 requested greater influence on the Community’s budget, finally culminating in the “Martino Report” of early 1965.⁷ The demand for a greater budgetary role of the Strasburg Assembly was particularly advanced during the discussion about the fusion of the executives and accepted by all member-countries but France. European lobby groups like the Jean Monnet Action Committee spread their propaganda for the democratisation of the Communities as well. For example, after the Action Committee had demanded the strengthening of the Strasburg Assembly on its May 1965 session in Berlin, the German government was under pressure by the socialist opposition, because members of the governing parties (CDU/FDP) had signed the Committee’s petition as well.⁸ Hallstein personally appreciated the European Parliament as “*a particularly useful forum for the formation and crystallization of the public opinion in European affairs*”⁹, as he explained to de Gaulle not long before the outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis. This suggests that he was also particularly sensitive to the public demand that “something should be done” for the European Parliament.

⁵ Hallstein before the European Parliament on 11 Mai 1965, in: Hallstein, Walter, *Europäische Reden*, Stuttgart, DVA, 1979, pp. 560-569.

⁶ Groeben, *Aufbaujahre*, 1982, pp. 250-261.

⁷ Hallstein was inspired by the „Deringer Report“ (October 1962), the „Furler Report“ (June 1963) and the „Vals Report“ (Mai 1964), as he explained before the European Parliament on 11 Mai 1965, in: Hallstein, *Reden*, 1979, p. 567; for the „Martino Report“ see Siegler, Heinrich, *Europäische Politische Einigung 1949-1968*, Bonn/Wien/Zurich, Siegler&Co, 1968, document 171: Adoption of the Martino-Report, 10 February 1965, document 178: Plenary Session about Martino-Report, 22/26 March 1965.

⁸ German Parliamentary Archives Berlin, 3001, 4th Legislative Period, Session 185, 20 Mai 1965, speech of Käthe Stobel (SPD); Siegler, *Einigung*, 1968, document 182: Declaration of the Action Committee, 9 Mai 1965.

⁹ Hallstein before German managers at Baden-Baden („*Unternehmergespräch*“) on 21 October 1965, in: Hallstein, *Reden*, 1979, pp. 605-616 [translation by P.B.].

Some national parliaments played a decisive role, because the handing over of agricultural levies and customs duties from a member-state to the Community required ratification, which offered them an opportunity to exert pressure on their governments. The Dutch, German and Italian parliaments were much in favour of greater competences for their European equivalent and referred to the public opinion in their countries to justify their demands.

The European Parliament thus became central in the conception of Walter Hallstein. In 1964 and the first months of 1965, Hallstein himself talked very openly to the French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, to General de Gaulle and to the French Permanent Representative Jean-Marc Boegner, about the necessity of French concessions concerning the European Parliament. Obviously, he gained the impression that de Gaulle was not categorically opposed, which provided essential momentum and encouragement for the Commission President to go ahead with his proposal package in the spring 1965. Hallstein claimed as well that from January 1965 onwards he frequently warned the French Permanent Representative Boegner, who visited Hallstein regularly: “[...] *think of those parliamentarian things* [...]”.¹⁰ Hallstein apparently concluded that parliamentary pressure and public opinion had sufficiently altered the French government’s opinion and that the enlargement of European Parliament authority may eventually be included in the Commission proposal package.

Negotiations under domestic pressure

Not only statesmen were involved in the outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis. The strained political situation within the Common Market-countries in 1965 and the hardening of official negotiating positions in the Council deliberations of May and June 1965 were also due to the influence of lobbies, media, and public opinion. Particularly in the key-countries France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, domestic pressure left the governments with little manoeuvring space in the Brussels’ negotiations. The leading statesmen and diplomats acting on the Common Market-stage were thus obliged to secure national advantages out of the Common Market and to disregard the so-called “community spirit” if necessary. As a result, the CAP-negotiations were complicated by a difficult constellation of partly conflicting national interests, particularly in the fields of economy and finance, but also regarding the European Parliament. Paris, of course, was under high pressure of its agrarian lobby to secure the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy after the crucial grain price decision of December 1964. The past French negotiating successes in the Common Agricultural Policy and the enormous benefits that Paris took out of the Agricultural Market only reinforced French concerns that the Common Agricultural Policy might at least partly be revised by the five Common Market-partners. French diplomats therefore entered the negotiations determined to receive a five year agricultural settlement and to object the premature creation of budgetary resources, which would serve as justification for institutional change.¹¹

Bonn’s negotiating behaviour was influenced by domestic concerns as well, because General Elections were going to be held in September 1965. German statesmen and diplomats had the overall impression that their European objectives and sacrifices were not sufficiently appreciated by the French, a view that was supported not only by large parts of the media¹² but also by the agricultural lobby, *Deutscher Bauernverband*,¹³ and by the Federation of German

¹⁰ Hallstein before German managers at Baden-Baden (*Unternehmergegespräch*), 21 October 1965, in: Hallstein, *Reden*, 1979, pp. 605-616.

¹¹ Ludlow, *Crises*, 2006, pp. 52-58.

¹² The *Bundespressarchiv Berlin* provides an endless list of German press articles from 1964 and 1965, in which French concessions to the five EEC-partners are ultimately demanded.

¹³ For the influence of the DBV see Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen, “Creating the Common Agricultural Policy. Story of Cereals Prices”, in: Loth, *Crises*, 2001, pp. 131-154; Newhouse, *Collision*, 1967, p. 45.

Industry, *Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie*.¹⁴ In April 1963, Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder introduced the conception of “synchronization” of community work in order to come to a more balanced and reciprocal European agenda.¹⁵ From a German point of view, this meant that efforts should be made to implement the customs union, tax harmonization, the commercial policy and the energy policy. The successful negotiation of the Kennedy Round was also one of the major concerns of the German government. Apart from those commercial interests the Erhard government particularly desired the revival of the European Political Union in order to gain some foreign policy profile before the German General Elections in September 1965.¹⁶ After major German sacrifices in the grain price decision of December 1964, the Germans felt they were entitled to French concessions. The French-German summit at Rambouillet in January 1965 actually gave them the impression that General de Gaulle would allow the revival of the Political Union. However, the idea of holding a conference of the head of states collapsed when France renounced its participation in April. This left the Germans and Italians feeling betrayed by the French. The financing of the CAP then crystallized the idea of synchronised community development: Would the French once again achieve a financial agreement without paying a price in the form of economic or even institutional concessions?¹⁷ Two important actors on the German side were particularly influenced by electoral considerations. First, in 1964-1965 the German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder adopted, contrary to his personal “Atlantic” convictions, a pro-European pose in order to calm the critics of his policy and to improve his chances in the forthcoming elections.¹⁸ For this reason, Schröder insisted on the strengthening of the Strasburg Assembly in the negotiations before the Empty Chair, which was seen as “sabotage” by the French.¹⁹ Secondly, the German Liberals (FDP), at the time Erhard’s coalition partner, feared not to be elected into the “*Bundestag*” in September 1965 and put pressure on the Erhard government not to appear too conciliatory towards the French before the General Elections.²⁰ Therefore, they caused a substantial hardening of the German position. The Italian government as well found itself in an uncomfortable situation, pressurized by agricultural lobbies, because Italian agriculture had not been sufficiently covered by the agreements of the early CAP. Since Italy had recently become a net importer of agricultural goods, Rome had to pay a high price to Brussels by way of its contribution without receiving much in return. The Italian delegation was thus under domestic pressure and consequently wanted to limit the duration of the financial settlement and to re-evaluate the situation after a year or two. Rome likewise desired a new political dynamic within the Community and

¹⁴ Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B136 2590, Memorandum of Federation of German Industry (BDI): *12-Punkte-Programm zur Integration*, 21 January 1965.

¹⁵ Oppelland, Torsten, *Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989). Politik zwischen Staat, Partei und Konfession*, Düsseldorf, Droste, 2002, pp. 548-554.

¹⁶ Concerning Erhard’s initiative for European Political Union see Germond, Carine, “Les projets d’Union politique de l’année 1964”, in: Loth, *Crises*, 2001, pp. 109-130; Hallstein opposed Erhard’s urgent call for Political Union because he feared a French-German initiative that might exclude the Commission and threaten the integration process; see Siegler, *Einigung*, 1968, document 167: Press conference by Hallstein, 25 January 1965.

¹⁷ Ludlow, Nicolas Piers, “Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966”, in: *Contemporary European History* 8/1(March 1999), pp. 231-248 analyses French dominance, mounting frustration among France’s partners and the “quid pro quo”-aspect of the CAP-negotiations.

¹⁸ Oppelland, *Schröder*, 2002, pp. 627-633.

¹⁹ Newhouse, *Collision*, 1967, pp. 114-118.

²⁰ Newhouse, *Collision*, 1967, p. 99 ; Osterheld, Horst, *Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard 1963-1966. Ein dokumentarischer Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt*, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1992, p. 209.

supported the Commission proposals insofar as they strengthened the institutions, namely the European Parliament.²¹

The influence of non-state actors on Dutch foreign policy in the outbreak of the empty chair is striking. Federalist ideas and the Atlantic orientation of Dutch foreign policy were widely accepted in the Dutch population. In February 1965, thirty-eight Dutch private personalities addressed an open letter to Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, in which they insisted on continuing the European integration process and the Atlantic orientation of Dutch foreign policy.²² The General de Gaulle's rejection of a revival of the Political Union might have been a reaction to that open letter. Anyway, when de Gaulle disparaged politicians who talked about supranationality as "*Jean-Foutre*"²³ in June 1965, the Dutch *classe politique* was horrified and the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament formally obliged the government to secure the strengthening of the Strasburg Assembly in the Council at the end of June.²⁴ Dutch non-state actors were obviously involved in this escalation of Franco-Dutch relations. Although Luns was personally inclined to compromise on the Parliament-question, the Dutch delegation had no choice in the Council at the end of June but to insist on the enlargement of European Parliament-power, so that Paris later blamed The Hague for having provoked the Council-deadlock.²⁵

In the Council of June 1965, the economic, financial and domestic problems mentioned above added to the existing institutional conflict and created a blockade, which de Gaulle felt invited to exploit by starting his empty chair politics.

The *Quai d'Orsay* between Grain and *Grandeur*

When the French administration, including the *Quai d'Orsay*, the Finance Ministry and the SGCI (*S cretariat G n ral du Comit  Interminist riel*), was dealing with the Commission proposal package and all related CAP-matters in spring 1965, the French Foreign Ministry had to harmonise the demands of French farmers with the guidelines of Gaullist European policy, including the General de Gaulle's obsession with French sovereignty. The French diplomats thus had to secure the maximum financial advantage for French agriculture while avoiding to pay an institutional price that would be unacceptable to General de Gaulle. *Quai d'Orsay*-Director of Economic Affairs Olivier Wormser revealed the concrete French plan when he openly explained to German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schr der on 24 May 1965:

*"En ce qui concerne le r le de l'Assembl e Europ enne, l'id e fran aise est qu'il conviendrait de **construire un syst me** qui, tant pour les recettes que pour les d penses, n'exigerait pas une intervention plus accentu e de cette Assembl e."*²⁶

²¹ Varsori, Antonio, "The Economy First? Italy and the Empty Chair Crisis (1965-66)", in: Palayret/Wallace/Winand, *Visions, Votes and Vetoes*, 2006, pp. 100-102; Ludlow, *Crises*, 2006, pp. 61-64.

²² Politisches Archiv des Auswrtigen Amtes Berlin (hereafter PAAA), B20 1152, telegramm Berger (The Hague) to AA, 3 March 1965.

²³ Siegler, *Einigung*, 1968, document 185: General de Gaulle's speech on a barbecue for MPs, 10 June 1965.

²⁴ PAAA, B20 1320, telegram Obermayer (The Hague) to AA, 14 and 18 June 1965.

²⁵ Harryvan, Anjo G., "A Successful Defence of the Communitarian Model? The Netherlands and the Empty Chair Crisis", in Palayret/Wallace/Winand, *Visions, Votes and Vetoes*, 2006, pp. 132-136; Newhouse, *Collision in Brussels*, 1967, pp. 61, 71-73; Ludlow, *Crises*, 2006, pp. 64-65.

²⁶ Archives Diplomatiques Fran aises (hereafter AD), CE-DE, 1197, records of conversation Couve-Schr der on 24 May 1965, 31 May 1965 (bold types are mine).

The primary objective for the French services was thus to find a technical formula that would be advantageous to French farmers and at the same time neutralize the Commission's political ambitions. In this chapter, the influence of the French farmers on the *Quai d'Orsay*-tactics shall be examined.

With respect to its farm lobby, Paris had to secure the normal functioning of the CAP with all its benefits to French agriculture. France had a financial interest in centralising the agricultural levies as early as 1967, because the Agricultural Fund would then largely be financed by the agricultural net-importers, Germany in particular, whereas the French contribution would be minimised. Yet, the creation of financial resources from agricultural levies inevitably encouraged the discussion about the strengthening of the Strasbourg Assembly, which was not appreciated by General de Gaulle. In order to avoid the premature creation of budgetary resources, the *Quai d'Orsay* worked out and advanced the conception of an "equalization fund" ("*caisse de péréquation*"). According to that conception, the customs duties would not create resources but be subject to a division among member-states.²⁷

However, when Paris approached the CAP-negotiations of June 1965 and the political situation became more strained, institutional calculations became more important for the *Quai d'Orsay* than the short-term interests of French farmers. In mid-June, the French administration abandoned its former negotiating position that the agricultural levies should be collectivized in 1967 in order to put pressure on the partners to drop their demands concerning the enlargement of European Parliament-authority. In April 1965, the French Ministry of Finance had already clearly identified the collectivization of the customs duties as the key issue of the Commission proposal package and also pointed out that Paris was in a bad tactical position as long as it remained *demandeur* for the collectivization of the agricultural levies.²⁸ As mentioned above, Paris wished for the centralisation of the agricultural levies by 1967. However, the collectivisation of agricultural levies would economically and politically justify the same scheme for the customs duties and would therefore encourage the enlargement of European Parliament authority. In mid-June, Paris sacrificed strong economic interests in order to discharge diplomatic ballast and to eliminate the whole complex of budgetary resources and European Parliament authority from the Council agenda.²⁹ After the French *coup*, Ambassador Boegner reported to Paris not without satisfaction:

"Il convient de noter que le choix du 1^{er} Juillet 1967 comme date d'entrée en vigueur du régime unique pour tous les produits constituait la clé de voûte de tout le système élaboré par la Commission, tant pour le règlement financier proprement dit que pour l'affectation progressive des droits de douane à la Communauté et pour le renforcement des attributions de l'Assemblée. Le rejet de ce postulat avait en outre pour conséquence de porter un coup sérieux à la thèse

²⁷ Centre des Archives Contemporaines Fontainebleau (hereafter CAC), 4733, SGCI note *Proposition financière de la Commission Economique Européenne*, 27 April 1965 (the French negotiating position for May and June, P.B.); Newhouse, *Collision*, 1967, pp. 76, 102.

²⁸ CAC, 5555, *Règlement financier et propositions annexes*, 22 April 1965; although taking a friendly and compromising position on the Commission proposals as a whole, the Finance Ministry stated about the collectivization of the customs duties: "*D'un point de vue strictement financier, les propositions de la Commission sont à notre avantage. [...] D'un point de vue politique, elles peuvent être jugées inacceptables.*"; the Ministry clearly pointed out the dangers of the French position of *demandeur* for the collectivization of the agricultural levies.

²⁹ This is openly admitted in AD, CE-DE, 1198, note (probably by Brunet) concerning financial settlement, 21 June 1965 and in AD, CE-DE, 1111, note *Nature et conséquences de la proposition française [...]*, 18 June 1965 that stated: "*L'ajournement de l'affectation des prélèvements comme ressources propres à la Communauté repousse d'autant la solution du problème que posent les attributions de l'Assemblée de Strassbourg.*"

*défendue par les Hollandais et par les Italiens et selon laquelle les propositions de la Commission devaient être considérées comme un ensemble cohérent et indissociable.*³⁰

Because the French farmers' interests were threatened by this French tactical retreat, other ways had to be looked for to secure the French farmers' financial benefits from the CAP. The French administration was quick to advance a highly complicated formula under which the Agricultural Fund would be financed by the agricultural net-importers even without the agricultural levies to be collectivized. The *Quai d'Orsay*, particularly in June 1965, claimed that the member states' contributions be based during the transitional period on a double-key, *clé déformante*, which would burden the net-importer of agricultural goods from outside the Community.³¹ The proposed system would have anticipated the financial advantages that France could otherwise enjoy only after the collectivization of the agricultural levies and therefore helped Paris to avoid the position of *demandeur* for the agricultural levies to be devolved to the Community in the near future, which would have resulted in demands for institutional consequences.³²

The Élysée, Domestic Resistance, and Reluctant Bureaucrats

The pro-European voices in French agriculture and industry did not only have direct influence on the planning of the *Quai d'Orsay* officials, but also on de Gaulle himself. A close look at the policy line of the *Élysée* reveals that de Gaulle approached and triggered the crisis with an ambitious programme, that he was then confronted with fierce resistance to his Empty Chair politics and that he finally had to listen to a "chorus" of French pro-European voices demanding France's return to the negotiating table. Although the increasing weakness of France's negotiating position was no secret to the informed contemporary observer³³, some details may still be added to reveal the degree of de Gaulle's isolation and vulnerability. The resulting image of French weakness serves to question the plausibility of de Gaulle's ambitious program during the Empty Chair Crisis and suggests that it was not only about majority voting or Commission-behaviour but also a traditional power-struggle about leadership.

In his record of French politics under Charles de Gaulle, Alain Peyrefitte suggests a concerted French strategy of blockade clearly focussing on Treaty revision and on disciplinary action against or removal of the Commission.³⁴ This is confirmed by the public declarations of de Gaulle and Couve.³⁵

The question whether the spiritual father of the Empty Chair tactics was to be found in the *Élysée* or at the top of the *Quai d'Orsay* cannot be clearly answered. In reaction to the Commission-initiative the General proposed "*putting to sleep*" the Common Market in the French Council of 14 April 1965.³⁶ However, Couve claimed that he himself took the initiative and suggested a blockade as a tactical measure to de Gaulle as early as May 1965.³⁷ In any case,

³⁰ AD, CE-DE, 1111, telegram 711/35 Boegner to French Foreign Ministry, 16 June 1965 (bold types are mine).

³¹ AD, CE-DE, 1198, note *règlement financier*, 8 June 1965; AD, CE-DE, 1198, records of conversation Wormser-Lahr, 11 June 1965.

³² AD, CE-DE, 1111, telegram 711/35 Boegner to French Foreign Ministry, 16 June 1965.

³³ For example Newhouse, *Collision*, 1967, pp. 141-150.

³⁴ Peyrefitte, Alain, *C'était de Gaulle* (one volume only), Paris, Gallimard, 2002, 1955 p.

³⁵ Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, 2002, p. 890: "*Nous obtiendrons : que la Commission soit totalement liquidée ; qu'on s'engage à ne plus parler de supranationalité et notamment de vote à la majorité ; et qu'enfin, nos partenaires acceptent le règlement financier tel que nous l'envisagions.*" (de Gaulle on 21 July 1965, P.B.).

³⁶ Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, 2002, p. 878.

³⁷ Interview Maurice Couve de Murville, 16 December 1988, Institut Charles de Gaulle Paris; Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle et Son Siècle* (Volume V: *L'Europe*), Paris, Plon, 1992, p. 110 (hereafter

the decision to carry out the plan was taken by de Gaulle on 1 July 1965 and buttressed by wild attacks on what he called “[...] *toute cette maffia de supranationalistes, qu’ils soient commissaires, parlementaires ou fonctionnaires*”.³⁸ Seven days later the French cabinet confirmed that strategy and the objectives of Treaty revision and Commission replacement.³⁹ After another two weeks de Gaulle revealed in private to Peyrefitte that his strategy went far beyond a simple revision and ambitiously aimed at changing the face of Europe and coming back to the Fouchet plan-conception of European cooperation.⁴⁰

Likewise, it remains controversial whether qualified majority voting played a major or a minor role in the French management of the Empty Chair. De Gaulle’s press conference of 9 September 1965 seemed to confirm that qualified majority voting was the General’s main concern. However, internal French documents⁴¹ and the assurances of France’s partners⁴² might suggest that neither Paris nor its partners expected a ruthless execution of majority voting after January 1966 in the case of important national interests. Those documents may be seen as an argument for trivializing the importance normally conceded to qualified majority voting in the Empty Chair. However, other more alarming opinions existed within the French administration.⁴³ Moreover, it seems doubtful that those moderated opinions actually had the effect of calming the General de Gaulle on the issue of majority voting. His personal style of governance makes it unlikely that policy proposals of the French administration had a significant bearing on his handling of the Empty Chair. It rather appears that de Gaulle feared that much of what had been achieved in the framework of the CAP could be subject to revision after the introduction of qualified majority voting in January 1966.⁴⁴

Alain Peyrefitte’s chronological report about the ambitious Gaullist programme of how to manage the Empty Chair and what to achieve by the Empty Chair tactics, contrasts with the increasing weakness of General de Gaulle’s foreign policy line. The French position in this power struggle gradually deteriorated, when the political context rapidly changed in the second half of 1965. The re-election of the Christian-Democratic German Government in September and the confirmation of Gerhard Schröder as Foreign Minister substantially reinforced the German position, so that Bonn could take the lead in the struggle against de Gaulle. Within the Common Market, the October-Council produced the *bloc des cinq* of France’s five partners, resisting French attempts for bilateral arrangements. On the transatlantic level, the approaching NATO-crisis further restricted de Gaulle’s scope for manoeuvre on the Common Market stage. However, the most dangerous resistance to the General’s Empty Chair tactics came from French

DGSS V) where Couve de Murville claimed: “*C’est dans ces conditions que j’ai moi-même, ce n’est pas le général de Gaulle qui en a pris l’initiative, j’ai moi-même proposé au général de Gaulle de faire en quelque sorte la grève pendant un certain temps [...]*”; Kramer, Esther, *Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und Wandel in den Verhandlungen über eine politische Union 1958-1970*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003, p. 196, note 125 presents contrary evidence suggesting that Couve was not even basically informed about the General’s intentions in July.

³⁸ Peyrefitte, *C’était de Gaulle*, 2002, pp. 886-887.

³⁹ Peyrefitte, *C’était de Gaulle*, 2002, pp. 888-889.

⁴⁰ Peyrefitte, *C’était de Gaulle*, 2002, p. 891.

⁴¹ Newhouse, *Collision*, p. 67 reports that de Gaulle had asked for an SGCI-statement on the consequences of majority voting in January 1965 and had received a reassuring response; Pompidou was not afraid of majority voting, see AAPD 1965, document 339.

⁴² See for example Schröder’s declaration (*Runderlaß*) on 27 September 1965, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1965, München, Oldenburg, 1996, document 369.

⁴³ AD, CE-DE, 1111, note *Proposition relatives à la modification des pouvoirs de l’Assemblée* (probably by Brunet), 10 May 1965.

⁴⁴ Peyrefitte, *C’était de Gaulle*, 2002, p. 891: “*Ce qu’il faut liquider par-dessus tout, c’est ce vote à la majorité. La France ne peut pas accepter qu’il puisse tout remettre en cause.*” and p. 892: “*À la faveur de la crise agricole, je veux écarter la disposition, qui est dans le traité de Rome, en vertu de laquelle, pas plus tard que le 1^{er} janvier prochain, les décisions sont prises à la majorité.*”; see also de Gaulle’s press conference on 9 September 1965, in: de Gaulle, Charles, *Discours et Messages* (Volume IV, *Pour l’effort*), Paris, Plon, 1970, pp. 372-392.

domestic policy: The Federation of French Industry (*Conseil National du Patronat Français*) issued a clear statement to the French government about the need to resolve the crisis as quickly as possible and to complete the customs union without delay.⁴⁵ France's four great farming organisations as well as Jean Monnet's Action Committee forcefully responded to the Empty Chair politics with numerous critical statements, white papers and finally with the advice to vote against de Gaulle.⁴⁶ French agricultural and industrial lobbies thus reflected the dependence of French agriculture and economy on the Common Market. The problems that de Gaulle faced during the first ballot of the Presidential Elections clearly revealed the limits of the General's foreign policy line.⁴⁷

Furthermore, a close look at the French administration reveals that de Gaulle lacked the support of his own bureaucrats. *Quai d'Orsay*, Finances Ministry, SGCI and French EC-officials frequently pointed out to de Gaulle and his collaborators the importance of the Common Market for France's economy and prosperity.⁴⁸ Furthermore, French bureaucrats never seriously discussed or prepared the revision of the Treaty or the departure of France from the Common Market.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Couve officially maintained the illusion that France was determined to force the Five into a Fouchet-styled Europe when he demanded "*revision d'ensemble*" of the Treaty before the National Assembly on 20 October 1965.

The resulting image of de Gaulle's isolation and weakness suggests that his Empty Chair politics was an increasingly tactical campaign in the power struggle and the "war of nerves"⁵⁰ against the Commission and the Five. German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger later described the General's foreign policy as "*magic and thunder*"⁵¹ and this may apply to the Empty Chair as well. Considering the international and domestic pressure as well as the resistance of the French diplomatic elite, it was probably his presidential *prestige* that prevented de Gaulle from giving up the Empty Chair tactics before the Presidential Elections of December 1965.

Conclusion

Although the Empty Chair Crisis was dominated by diplomats and bureaucrats, non-state actors played a role in the outbreak and management of the crisis.

When issuing his proposal package including the enlargement of European Parliament authority, Hallstein acted according to his federalist and democratic convictions, but he also took into consideration parliamentary pressure and public opinion, demanding that "something" should be done for the Strasbourg Assembly. Particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, non-state actors raised their "voices" to demand "synchronisation" of the Community-agenda and "strengthening" of the Strasbourg Assembly and therefore contributed to the built-up of domestic pressure, which the leading statesmen and diplomats were unable to control in the Council at the

⁴⁵ Newhouse, *Collision*, 1967, pp. 125, 147.

⁴⁶ Newhouse, *Collision*, 1967, pp. 146-147.

⁴⁷ Newhouse, *Collision*, 1967, pp. 149-150.

⁴⁸ AD, CE-DE, 1116, a number of SGCI-notes under the title *Bilan et situation des Communautés européennes*, 1 and 4 October 1965.

⁴⁹ The *Quai d'Orsay* files available in 2006 do not contain any evidence suggesting that Paris seriously prepared the French departure from the Common Market.

⁵⁰ De Gaulle was playing for time ("*La situation politique est incertaine pour l'Allemagne, l'Italie, la Belgique et même la Hollande*"), and he aimed at shocking the Five ("*Que nos partenaires s'interrogent ! Il faut les plonger dans l'épouvante.*" and "*Il faut angoisser tout le monde. C'est la meilleure manière de réduire nos adversaires. S'ils n'ont pas peur, [...] alors nous n'y arriverons pas*" and "*Pour le moment, agir, c'est laisser la chaise vide, c'est plonger les partenaires dans l'angoisse*"), for all citations see Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, 2002, pp. 888-889 and 897.

⁵¹ See Buchstab, Günther, "Zwischen Zauber und Donner. Die CDU/CSU und de Gaulle", in Wilfried Loth/ Robert Picht (eds.), *De Gaulle Deutschland und Europa*, Opladen, Leske u. Budrich, 1991, p. 100.

end of June 1965. Last but not least, French agricultural and industrial lobbies did not only have a decisive influence on the shape of the *Quai d'Orsay*-tactics before the crisis, but they also played an important role in the resistance against de Gaulle's line. The domestic pressure exerted by French farmers, industrialists and diplomats was such that only the Presidential Elections in December 1965 prevented de Gaulle from putting an end to the Empty Chair tactics much earlier than January 1966.

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The role of the European Commission in the first enlargement process. The agriculture negotiations between 1961-63 and 1970-72

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This paper examines the extent to which the role of the European Commission changed during the first enlargement process, by comparing the negotiations between 1961-63 and 1970-72. More specifically, this paper explores whether there is a divergence between the Commission's formal mandate, as stated in the Treaty and the negotiation framework established by the Council at the start of each enlargement process, and the development of the Commission's actual role.

Formally, the Commission's mandate in the enlargement process did not change over time. According to article 237 of the Treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) the Commission advises the Council to take a unanimous decision to open the enlargement negotiations.¹ In practice, however, over time the Commission seems to have made increasing use of its opportunity to influence the strategy and the content of the enlargement negotiations.

Though many studies on European enlargement allude to the Commission's role, it is seldom the central focus of analysis.² Some scholars have focused mainly on member states' bargaining and the effects of enlargement on European institutions (Bange 2000; Moravcsik & Vaduchova 2003). Others have addressed enlargement from the perspective of the applicant states' politics (Ludlow 1997; Rasmussen 2005). A third group of scholars has focused on the constitutive role of European culture, explaining why the Community decided to enlarge, and on the Europeanization effects on the domestic politics of the member states and applicant states (Fierke & Wiener 1999; Schimmelfennig 2002; Sedelmeier 2000).

In the first section of this paper hypotheses are formulated on the conditions under which the Commission's actual role is reinforced over time. This is grounded in the historical-institutionalist account of path dependency. A process is path dependent if initial moves in a certain direction encourage further moves in that same direction, excluding alternatives that were once available. The expectation is that the Commission will play an increasingly influential role in the accession negotiations, by using the room for manoeuvre that is available in the formal enlargement procedure to initiate policy solutions, thereby steering the course of the negotiation process.

The second section contains the findings and analysis. A distinction is made between two phases. In the creation phase the definition of the enlargement procedure, including the degree of room for interpretation, as the outcome of bargaining among the member state governments is examined. In the operation phase the emphasis is on how the way the enlargement procedure was initially defined and specified by the Council decisions of 1961 and 1970 affected the Commission's actual role in the enlargement negotiations of 1961-63 and 1970-72. This is illustrated with the case of the transitional arrangements in agriculture negotiations, which were among the most important and contentious issues. In the conclusion the implications of the Commission's role in the first enlargement and the need for further research will be discussed.

A historical-institutionalist framework

Accounts of how institutional procedures affect political outcomes can be found in the new institutionalist research agenda. This paper follows the distinction between a rational-choice, sociological and historical variant (Hall and Taylor 1996).

¹ Treaty establishing the EEC, article 237.

² Exceptions are: Ludlow 1996 and 2005.

Starting from a methodological individualist viewpoint, rational-choice institutionalists assign a regulative or constraining role to institutions. Institutions are defined as formal and informal rules and procedures that impose constraints on the self-interested behaviour of actors (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000). Since institutions do not change national preferences, their effects and developments are, however, largely controllable. Noteworthy in this respect is the principal-agent literature on member states' delegation of discretion to supranational actors. Pollack (1997), for example, has argued that, though the Commission may possess a considerable degree of autonomy, based on an information advantage, member state governments remain capable of correcting the Commission in case of deviating preferences.

At the other extreme stands the sociological-institutionalist variant, which defines institutions as norms, rules and cultures that shape actors' identities (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000). Based on a holistic ontology, advocates of this approach focus on how European norms, rules and culture shape member states' identities. The underlying 'logic of appropriateness' leaves no room for institutional choice or control over European institutional effects. One way of studying institutional effects is by depicting them in terms of social learning. According to Hall (1993) this occurs when actors gain knowledge by giving meaning to past experiences and new information and apply this knowledge to their subsequent actions.

A middle course between these two extremes is taken by historical institutionalists. They assign an intervening and normative role to institutions, which comprise formal and informal rules, procedures, routines, norms and conventions (Hall & Taylor 1996). Actors have decisive moments in which they establish institutions, thereby pursuing their objective interests, modified by learning and historically constructed ideologies. At the same time, however, institutions shape actors' goals and strategies and affect the distribution of power between organized interests. Central to this approach is the notion of path dependency. Focusing on institutional effects over time, Pierson (1996) has argued that institutional creations develop in unintended ways due to initiatives of supranational or domestic actors and, more importantly, that member state governments are unable to reverse these institutional developments.

Historical institutionalism is expected to provide the most useful framework for explaining the reinforcement of the Commission's role in the enlargement process, bridging the actor versus culture centeredness of the rational and sociological perspectives respectively. This implies, on the one hand, a focus on the self-interestedness of the Commission and the Council at European level, wishing to exert their influence over the enlargement process. On the other hand, the focus is on the influence of the institutionalised European context, which is marked by a continuous process of geographical extension and policy integration, on the ideas, preferences and capabilities of Council members and the Commission's internal organization. Further, the application of historical institutionalism means a focus on enlargement as a long-term process, linking between the different accession negotiations over time.

Following the comparison of these three approaches of path dependency, this section will expound a historical-institutionalist framework that distinguishes between a creation and an operation phase.³ The first condition for a reinforcement of the Commission's influence lies in the definition of the enlargement procedure. Based on the premise that actors' negotiation positions are not only based on distributive concerns, but also on ideology (Vanberg & Buchanan 1989), the claim is that the nature of conflicting interests affects the flexibility of the enlargement procedure. Since member states find it more difficult to compromise on their beliefs, divergent ideological ideas on the appropriate role of the Commission in the general functioning of the Community are expected to result in a less well-defined mandate of the Commission in the specific case of the enlargement procedure, with more room for interpretation in comparison to a calculation-driven outcome.

³ Based on: Lindner and Rittberger 2003, p.445-473.

H1: The more the conflicting preferences of the member state governments are dominated by ideology rather than distributive concerns, the larger the potential room for interpretation in the enlargement procedure and the larger the potential room for manoeuvre of the Commission.

The point here is that the outcome of interstate bargaining is assumed not to be optimal because of the role that ideology plays in the preferences of the member state governments. By taking into account of not only materialist concerns, but also historically shaped ideologies, historical institutionalism provides for the possibility that the Commission will play a more influential role as a broker of the encompassing European interests in the actual enlargement process.

This is pitted against the rational-choice approach which assumes that the enlargement procedure is an efficient equilibrium outcome of the cost-benefit calculations about materialist economic and security interests of national governments. From this perspective member states are capable of clearly demarcating the Commission's mandate in the enlargement procedure. Accordingly, the Commission's role is that of a bureaucracy that facilitates member states' negotiations by coordinating rather than transcending national interests (Moravcsik 1998).

During the operation phase the emphasis is on whether, as a consequence of the potential room for interpretation in the enlargement procedure, the encompassing European interests, embodied by the Commission, rather than the national interests, continue to prevail. Concretely, the focus is on explaining the emergence and persistence of the gap between the formally delegated tasks and the actual role of the Commission.

Two sets of conditions are distinguished. The first set focuses on the conditions under which the Commission will be able to extend its influence. The second set focuses on the conditions under which the member states collectively, in the Council, are constrained in their control over the enlargement process. This implies the testing of the opposite explanations of the Commission as a quasi-autonomous policy entrepreneur versus the Commission as a bureaucracy, whose discretion depends on delegation by the member states. In both explanations the interaction over time between the internal organization of the Commission and Council and the European institutional context is central.

The first factor for the Commission as a policy entrepreneur is that the Commission must be willing to exert influence on the enlargement process. The capacity to do so is expected to depend on the Commission's autonomy and expertise. Autonomy relates to the cohesiveness of the Commission's internal organizational structure and ideas about enlargement. Expertise is connected with the complexity of the policy issues in the accession negotiations. A final factor is the learning effect of the enlargement process on the Commission. The Commission is assumed to signal opportunities to exploit the room for manoeuvre in the formal procedure, by using its experience with previous enlargement processes.⁴ Also the complexity of the policy issues, requiring technical proficiency, encourages the Commission to draw on previous experiences.

H2: The stronger the Commission's preference to influence the enlargement process, the more internally united the Commission's organization, the more complex the policy issues in the accession negotiations and the more the Commission learns from experiences in previous enlargements and policy processes, the more likely it is to influence the course of the enlargement process.

The notion of learning is derived from the sociological institutionalist perspective. However, in contrast to the constitutive influence of European culture, the conceptualisation of learning as used in this historical institutionalist framework leaves room for a certain degree of institutional

⁴ Based on the idea that the Commission exploits opportunities to couple problems, policies and politics not only to upgrade the common European interests, but also to pursue its own interests, in Kingdon 1984, p. 190-193.

choice. The knowledge gained from past experiences shapes, rather than constitutes, the Commission's internal views on enlargement. and, subsequently, its internal organizational rules and procedures. The assumption is that the Commission's views are also influenced by the personal interests, contacts and expertise of its members and internal organization, as well as the particular demands of the member state governments and candidate states in the enlargement process.

The factor for an increasing role of the Commission as a bureaucracy, lies in the capabilities of the member states governments in the accession negotiations. The expectation is that, due to the development of common policies in the fields of the customs union and agriculture 1960s, the accession negotiations will become increasingly complex, which will provide member state governments an incentive to rely more on the Commission's coordination and technical expertise. Facing a larger number of negotiation issues, the potential chance of divergence, both among the member states in defining a common positions and in the negotiations with the candidate states, is expected to be increased.

H3: The more complex the European Community is, the more (likely) the capability of the member states to fully control the enlargement process decreases and the incentive for the member states to delegate responsibilities to the Commission increases.

The notion of delegation is derived from rational-choice delegation literature. In contrast to the rational-choice focus on the control mechanisms that member states have at their disposal to correct unintended interpretations of the enlargement procedure (Pollack 1997), historical institutionalism emphasizes the coordination problems of the short-sighted member states while negotiating a change in the Commission's mandate, thereby also hindered by the adaptive expectations generated by the Commission's actual role in the enlargement process (Pierson 2004).

The creation of the enlargement procedure

In the 1956-57 negotiations that set up the EEC, the question of the Commission's mandate in the enlargement procedure was closely related to the role of the institutions in general. Divergence on this issue dated back to the decision on the opening of the negotiations on the EEC. At the one extreme was the Dutch policy for general supranational European integration, driven by the ideal of enhancing European prosperity. (Harryvan and Kersten 1989) At the other extreme stood the French preference for intergovernmental cooperation in certain, notably security related, sectors as the maximum attainable. (Gerbet 1989) In between these two extremes were the Belgian plea for sectoral integration coordinated by a supranational institution, as a more cautious and realist alternative to the Dutch position (Dumoulin 1999), and the German position which had developed into a positive stand on general economic integration, but which was reluctant to mention any federalist elements, due to internal divergence (Küsters 1989). Unlike the ideological arguments of the adherents to European integration, the French position seemed to be mainly driven by calculative self-interest. The domestic opposition to the earlier proposed supranational ECSC and EDC seemed to be explanatory. In the mid-1950s, the initiatives of the federalist forces was successful to the extent that they managed to table their ideas on the European agenda in Messina on 1-2 June 1955. The anti-federalist voices were, however, visible in the execution of this agenda, by the intergovernmental Spaak Committee, which received the restricted mandate to produce a non-binding report on the feasibility of the common market.⁵

When the EEC negotiations started on 25 June 1956, disagreement among the national delegations on the principles underlying the articles about the institutions were prevalent. Whereas some delegations, notably the Dutch, emphasized the need for the Commission's role as

⁵ Central Archives of the Council of the EU (CACEU), CM3/NEGO 1, MAE/SEC 13/4.

initiator, the French delegation stressed the weight of the Council, based on the deep scepticism about the interference of the Community in the member states' domestic arenas.⁶ The fundamental difference of opinion on the transfer of sovereignty to the Community resulted in disillusionment among participants towards the end of the negotiations. The conclusion was that, in order to finalize the Treaty project, there was a need for a functional and pragmatic approach, instead of an ideological one.⁷ From this it becomes clear that ideological interests were too divergent to be compromised.

The intergovernmental conference in Rome resulted in two Treaty articles on the Commission's mandate. With regard to policy integration the Commission's functions would be to guard the application of the Treaty provisions, to formulate recommendations on the content of the Treaty, to have its own decision-making power and participate in the decision making of the Council and Parliament, and to exercise the power of implementation.⁸ Regarding the enlargement of the Community the Commission's mandate was restricted to advising the Council. Article 237 stated that '[A]ny European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council whose decision, after the opinion of the Commission has been obtained, shall be unanimous thereon'.⁹

The ideological differences on the role of the institutions in the European integration project and the brief and general wording of the enlargement procedure seem to confirm the likeliness of the occurrence of future interpretation difficulties. The true scope for interpretation and the subsequent room for manoeuvre for the Commission would only become clear in the actual enlargement process. The opening of the negotiations in 1961 and 1970 would be preceded by long debates on the exact division of competences among the Commission and the member states. This would even provoke the Commission to express its supposition that article 237 was deliberately created in a vague way.

The specification of the formal enlargement procedure in 1961

Discussions on the division of competences in the enlargement procedure were resumed after the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, and Denmark made their membership requests in July/August 1961. The contextual setting of these discussions had changed as a result of the entry into force of the institutional framework of the EEC and the subsequent policy developments. In the field of agriculture the first impetus to the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were given by the Commission's initiatives to organize the intergovernmental Conference of Stresa in July 1958 and to present policy proposals to the Council in 1959 and 1960. Further, a Special Committee for Agriculture was established in July 1960, which was composed of the national Ministers of Agriculture, under chairmanship of the Commissioner for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt. In January 1962, after the first agricultural marathon, the basic principles for a common agricultural policy were agreed on.

With regard to the autonomy of the member states in the enlargement procedure, the choice was between multilateral negotiations, in which each member state would engage independently with the applicants, and bilateral negotiations, in which member states would coordinate their positions. Whereas France and the Benelux countries argued for a flexible multilateral approach, Germany and Italy preferred bilateral negotiations to prevent the national representatives from defending conflicting positions.¹⁰ The latter position was supported by the

⁶ Historical Archives of the EU (HAEU), CM3/NEGO 257, Réunion des chefs de délégation (1957).

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ Treaty establishing the EEC, article 155.

⁹ Ibidem, article 237.

¹⁰ Archief Buitenlandse Zaken (ABZ), 996.0 EEG/439, Ter informatie van de ministerraad (12.09.1961).

Commission, as a means of accentuating the role of the Community instead of the member states.¹¹

The question of the Commission's mandate was more complicated. The first point of divergence concerned the judicial basis. The French and Dutch delegations argued for upholding the restricted judicial basis of article 237. The practical implementation of this article should be determined on a case-by-case basis, without creating permanent or detailed rules that could set a precedent. The strictness of the position of the Dutch was remarkable given their support for a supranational organization of the European integration project in general. This view was contested by the other member states and the Commission. Their argument was to allow the Commission to have a more extended role based on article 155, acknowledging that the member states were no longer in charge of every policy field. The Belgian delegation specifically referred to the Commission's right of proposal, while Germany put forward the judicial grounds for an involvement of the Commission in the negotiations with the applicants.¹²

The second point of disagreement concerned the practical role of the Commission. All member states, except France, agreed that the Commission should have a substantial advisory role, participate on all levels of the negotiations, and have the right to speak and coordinate the member states' positions and the negotiations.¹³ The exact interpretation of these tasks remained, however, contentious. While Germany did not exclude the option that the Commission could act as spokesperson for the Six and negotiate certain policy issues, the Dutch delegation was against having the Commission as an additional party at the Conference table.¹⁴ The Commission saw its preferences largely represented by the Five. In addition, the Commission proposed, in line with the German delegation, to be entrusted with the role of spokesperson of the Community.¹⁵ The French delegation expressed its hesitations regarding the proposed mandate. First, it preferred to reserve the right to decide on the desirability of a Commission opinion to the Accession Conference. Second, it argued for preserving the option of having exclusively intergovernmental meetings. Third, while recognizing the benefits of using the Commission's expertise, it was cautious about involving the Commission in the negotiations. The French ambassador, however, did not exclude the possibility that a member of the Commission would chair a Council working group or intervene in specific policy negotiations with the candidate countries.¹⁶

Following these discussions and focusing on the British candidature, the Council decided in its meeting of 25-27 September 1961 that within the framework of article 237 the negotiations would be held on a multilateral basis between the six member states of the Community and the UK, wherein the Six would present as many common positions as possible. The Commission's role would be to, first, participate in the coordination among the Six and, second, to coordinate and participate in the Accession Conference as the advisor of the Six with the right of speech.¹⁷

The Commission's role in the enlargement process of 1961-63

In October 1961 the enlargement negotiations were opened as a 'Conference between Members States of the European Communities and other States which have applied for membership of the Communities'. Unlike the formal enlargement procedure, the Commission did not issue an official opinion. In reaction to a request of the Council, the Commission stated that

¹¹ Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC), BAC 25/1980, COM(61) PV 156 (07.09.1961).

¹² HAEU, SGCI 11521, 52ème session du Conseil (25-27.09.1961).

¹³ ABZ, 996.0 EEG/439, Ter informatie.

¹⁴ ABZ, 996.0 EEG/439, Verslag interne vergadering comité van pv's (23.08.1961).

¹⁵ HAEC, BAC 25/1980, COM(61) PV 156.

¹⁶ HAEU, SGCI 11521, Problèmes soulevés par les démarches effectuées en vue d'une adhésion (20.09.1961).

¹⁷ HAEU, SGCI 11521, 52ème session du Conseil.

its advice would depend on the course of the negotiations, when it would have more information about the member state governments' positions and the British problems.¹⁸ The Commission described the British application as a turning point in post-War European politics, but also stressed the difficulties of the future negotiations. Despite its support for opening the negotiations, the Commission clearly prioritized a further deepening of integration, notably the development of the CAP.

The reserved attitude of the Commission regarding the British accession was obvious in the formulation of the enlargement strategy.¹⁹ The main principle was that the applicant states accepted the Treaty. The precise interpretation of this principle, however, was a point of discussion, with the Netherlands taking a flexible stand, while France and the Commission argued for a strict Treaty application that would allow only for limited and temporal exceptions. With regard to the order of the negotiations the Commission's president, Walter Hallstein, pled for an inductive method, reaching first agreement on the whole set of problems, before entering into discussions about the specifics. In this way the common goals would be accentuated instead of the different national interests.²⁰ In the first Ministerial meetings in November 1961, the Six stated that the negotiations would not allow any modification of the tenor and spirit of the Treaty and that problems should be solved only by transitional arrangements, entailing limited and temporal exceptions.²¹

The reserved attitude towards enlargement was also apparent in the onerous process of defining a Community position on transitional periods in agriculture. Following the general positions at the start of the accession negotiation, the Community positions on the specific policy sectors were formulated in the course of the negotiations, based on a fact-finding mission of the Commission that analysed the compatibility of the applicant states' policies with the EEC and in reaction to the applicants' requests. In January 1962 the British position on agriculture was explained for the first time. It was a premature standpoint in which the British delegation requested an alteration of the Community's agricultural system and a lengthening of the transitional period from 7,5 to 12 years.²² This was met with astonishment in the Commission by Mansholt, and Jean-François Deniau, head of the enlargement delegation, who suggested a short transitional period of 3-4 years.²³

In the second Ministerial meeting in February prospects for a compromise grew dim with the positions of the UK and the Six at two extremes.²⁴ The UK declared itself ready to accept the CAP objectives, but it stressed the need for special and differentiated transitional periods. This was motivated by, first, the different nature of the British agricultural system. British agriculture depended largely on imports from the Commonwealth and its small agricultural sector was supported on the income side by deficiency payments instead of the price side, which was the principle in the Community. Second, the British request stemmed from a sense of inequality because of the extra years the Six would have in adapting their agricultural markets until the establishment of the common market for agriculture in 1970. The Six reacted in a reserved way to the British demands and maintained the objective of a simultaneous establishment of the market for agriculture. The Six were not prepared to go beyond a transitional period of at most 7.5 years for certain products. Based on a study of the Commission, the Six argued that the British system did not fundamentally differ from the Community system and hence would face the same difficulties as the Six in adopting the CAP. Further, the Treaty and the CAP regulations would

¹⁸ 'Verzoek om toetreding', *Bulletin van de EEG* 4/9-10 (1961), p. 19.

¹⁹ See HAEU, MK 20, Conversations concernant l'affaire anglaise (13.02.1962).

²⁰ ABZ, 996.0 EEG/382, Déclaration Hallstein (08.11.1961).

²¹ HAEC, BAC 25/1980 1191, DK/M/1/61 (07.12.1961).

²² ABZ, 913.1 EEG/6374, De stand van de onderhandelingen tussen Engeland en de EEG (1962).

²³ HAEU, MK 20, Conversation avec Deniau (02.03.1962).

²⁴ HAEU, MK 20, Note (30.03.1962).

offer sufficient space to compensate disadvantageous consequences for British agriculture. Finally, awarding special transitional periods was deemed to complicate the British participation in the Community institutions after the accession.²⁵ Following the strategy to save the most difficult issues for last, the agricultural question was taken off the negotiation agenda at the beginning of March.

In the meantime the Six were everything but unified on the transitional arrangements in agriculture. The Commission tried to coordinate a common position by analyzing policy problems and chairing the national ministers in the Special Committee for Agriculture. However, it did not manage to soften the divisions, due to its own inflexible stand, which was commensurate with the French position. The problem of coordinating a common position endured until the end of the first enlargement process.²⁶

The lack of unity among the member state governments and the French insistence on presenting a strictly coordinated position paralyzed the Accession Conference with the UK. The minutes of deputy meetings in April indicate that no serious discussion took place due to a lack of instructions from the Ministerial level.²⁷ The Commission intervened by setting a limit on the duration of the negotiations and encouraging the presentation of concrete policy proposals by the deputies and the British delegation in the Ministerial meeting of 8-9 May. The idea was that once the positions of both sides became clear, negotiations, facilitated by a possible package-deal proposal of the Commission, could take place in a Ministerial meeting at the end of May.²⁸ Attempts to find compromises on principal issues, however, failed and the Commission decided not to present any compromise proposals.

Between June and October little progress was made in the negotiations and contacts between the Six and the UK were undertaken on a bilateral basis outside the Accession Conference. The first real negotiations on agriculture were only to take place in the 12th Ministerial meeting of 25-27 October 1962. Again, no progress regarding the length of the transitional periods was achieved. The only room for compromise consisted of the decision that after January 1966 the Commission would have the mandate to make proposals, to be adopted by the Council with qualified majority, on certain aspects of the British policy adaptation that required exceeding the deadline of 31 December 1969.²⁹

With regard to the first formal task of coordination among the Six, the Commission's actual role can be assessed as both positive and negative. On the one hand, the Commission's preference for a strict acceptance of the Treaty and a strategy to first reach agreement on the whole set of problems, before entering in discussions about the specifics, was reflected in the member states' definition of the modalities of the negotiations. On the other hand, the Commission's plea for a short transitional period in agriculture of 3-4 years and the fact that it did not issue an official opinion complicated, rather than softened, the divergence among the Six and the definition of a Community position.

This affected the Commission's second formal task of participating in and coordinating the Accession Conference. The divisions among the Six and the subsequent deadlock in the Conference, on the one hand, gave the Commission little opportunity to play a leading role since there was no ground for real negotiations. This is apparent in the Commission's reluctance to present package-deal proposals. On the other hand, the Commission used the deadlock in the negotiations to play an extended role, for example, by not only acting as advisor of the Six, but also by advising the British delegation on how to formulate concrete policy proposals in the Ministerial meetings. Further, the lack of progress in the negotiations forced the Six to relinquish

²⁵ ABZ, 913.1 EEG/6374, Onderhandelingen met het VK (12.04.1962).

²⁶ ABZ, 996.0 EEG/392, Nota aan "heer de Staatssecretaris" (23.10.1962).

²⁷ ABZ, 913.1 EEG/6374, Rapport van het Comité van suppleants (19.04.1962).

²⁸ ABZ, 913.1 EEG/6374, Verslag vergadering Coördinatie commissie (25.04.1962).

²⁹ ABZ, 996.0 EEG/392, Nota.

some control and delegate more responsibilities to the Commission, for example, to initiate exceptional transitional arrangements for specific British adaptation problems. An assessment of the Commission's actual role in the first enlargement process leads to the conclusion that it contained certain entrepreneurial aspects that were not foreseen in its mandate of 1961.

Following this conclusion the question is: To what extent were the conditions for the Commission's influence present? At the level of the Commission's organization, the preference regarding its own role, its organizational coherence and its expertise provide a mixed picture. First, from the specification of the Commission's mandate in 1961 it becomes clear that the final outcome did not conform entirely to the Commission's own preferences. This was a potential source for exploiting every available room for manoeuvre. However, internal views on what kind of role to play diverged. The pleas of Hallstein and Mansholt for political leadership met with resistance by others, notably by the French commissioner for External Relations, Robert Marjolin, who defended the centrality of the member states.³⁰

Second, the Commission's work on enlargement was not centrally directed. A working group consisting of the president and four commissioners, assisted by a task force of officials from different Directorates General (DG), was in charge.³¹ Although the Commission's organization contained leading figures such as Hallstein, Deniau and Mansholt, several documents indicate the presence of internal coordination problems, including the limited communication with the Commission's delegation in London.³²

Third, despite the relatively small size of the *acquis*, the agricultural negotiations already contained technicalities for which the member state governments depended on the Commission. This was due to the Commission's initiatives in developing the CAP. An indication of the importance of the Commission's expertise was Mansholt's chairmanship of the Special Committee for Agriculture.³³

At the level of the member state governments, the effects of the early state of European integration on their incentives and capabilities to control the enlargement process were mixed. On the one hand, the lack of experience with the working of supranational institutions provided an incentive for the national governments to control the process. This is obvious in, first, the title of the conference; second, the monitoring of the Commission's participation in the negotiations by monthly meetings with the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and the deliberations with national governments; and, third, the fact that the Six didn't always sufficiently inform the Commission about the national policy stances as well as procedural questions.

On the other hand, the member state governments' capabilities to control the enlargement process were restricted as a result of coordination difficulties. This was due to the absence of a chairperson who could soften the ideological and practical divergence on the desirability of enlargement, the conditions for accession and the modalities of the negotiations. Features of the process that illustrate this were the long internal deliberations among the Six, which led to British demands for longer and more frequent meetings, and the attempts to improve the coordination among the Six by separating meetings on the same agricultural questions of the Council from the Ministerial meetings with the candidate countries.³⁴

The redefinition of the formal enlargement procedure in 1970

³⁰ Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe (FJME), Interview Professeur Robert Ernest Marjolin (24.09.1984).

³¹ HAEC, BAC 25/1980, COM(61) PV 160 (09.1961).

³² HAEU, EN 1243, Note à l'attention de M. Deniau (12.01.1962).

³³ HAEC, BAC 25/1980, COM(60) PV 114 (27.07.1960).

³⁴ ABZ, 966.412 EEG/1148, 74e vergadering van de Raad van Ministers (28-30.06.1962).

The establishment of the negotiation framework in 1970 took place in a slightly different context. Experience had been gained from the first enlargement negotiations, which broke down after the French veto in January 1963, and policy and institutional developments had taken place. The agricultural marathons in December 1962 and 1963 led to the establishment of provisions for a number of agricultural products and a Council decision on common prices for cereals. The Commission's attempt to link the financing of the agricultural policy to the creation of resources specific to the Community was a source of contention among the Six. The French disagreement with the expansion of the agricultural policy and the Commission's role culminated in the empty chair crisis of 1965. The agreement on the common agricultural policy and a preliminary financial regulation in 1966 left the Commission's ambitions aside and didn't mention the Community's own resources. By contrast, the Commission's memorandum on agricultural reform in 1968, the so-called Mansholt plan, was to become the foundation of the Community's agricultural system. At the institutional level, the empty chair crisis paved the way for the Luxembourg agreement in 1966, which strengthened national control over the European decision-making process. Trust in the European integration project was renewed at the Hague summit in 1969. Based on the three principles of completing, deepening and widening the further course of the Community was laid out and an impetus was given to the resumption of the enlargement process.

The renewal of the requests for membership in 1967 provoked long discussions on the division of competences between the member states and the Community institutions, notably the Commission's mandate. The French insistence on a purely technical role for the Commission was countered by the Belgian delegation and the Commission, which suggested conducting the negotiations along the lines of trade negotiations in the Kennedy round. Accordingly, in the first phase the Commission would negotiate on behalf of the Community with regard to all problems posed by the common policies already in operation or in the course of elaboration. After a successful conclusion of this phase, the member states would conduct the second phase in which the general political problems resulting from the enlargement, as well as institutional problems and adjustments to the Treaties could be discussed.

In a meeting of 8-9 June 1970, at the start of the second round of negotiations, the Council redefined the principles of the enlargement procedure. The negotiations would be conducted according to a uniform procedure. The point of departure was the Community rather than the member states, which implied that negotiations were conducted on a bilateral basis. This meant a larger role for the Council, which would determine the common position of the Communities and whose Presidency would chair the Accession Conference with the applicant states and hold up the common position. The Commission's mandate was restricted to, first, contributing to the drafting of the Community position by analysing and making proposals on the problems posed by the accession negotiations. Second, the Commission would present and explain the common position at the request of the Council. Third, the Commission would participate in the negotiations by seeking, in liaison with the applicants, possible solutions to problems that would arise during the negotiations.³⁵

The specification of the enlargement procedure can be seen as the result of a two-fold effect of the preceding enlargement negotiations. On the one hand, the procedure reflects a certain degree of institutionalisation of the Commission's actual role. An illustration of this is the increased focus on the Commission's expertise in analysing and solving policy problems and mediating between the Six and the applicants. At the same time, the more precise definition of the procedure and the organization of the enlargement negotiations embody a formalisation of the Accession Conference, with less opportunities for the Commission to intervene.

³⁵ HAEU, GJLA 110, Note approuvée par le Conseil (8-9.06.1970).

The Commission's role in the enlargement process of 1970-72

In June 1970 the negotiations were opened as a 'Conference between the Communities and the States which have applied for membership of the Communities'. This was based on three official opinions of the Commission. In September 1967 the Commission recommended the opening of the negotiations 'in the most appropriate forms', taking into account the problems of the applicants and the necessary arrangements to ensure the cohesion and dynamism of the enlarged Community.³⁶ Problems existed notably in the field of agriculture, for which the Commission expected the negotiations to be long and difficult. The cautious wording of the opinion was a source of dispute among the Six about the conceptions of 'negotiations' and 'transitional periods' and, eventually, was rejected by France.³⁷ In April 1968 the Commission published a second opinion in which the member state governments' proposals concerning specific policy problems were considered and points of agreement were identified.³⁸ In July 1969 the Commission reviewed its first opinion. As in 1967, it recommended opening the negotiations. However, this time it was accompanied by the words 'as soon as possible'.³⁹ In its chapter on agriculture the Commission stated the positive implication of the CAP reform that was initiated in the meantime. This would facilitate the adaptation of the applicants to the EEC system.

Compared to the previous process, the prospect of enlargement was perceived more positively in the Community. Instead of complicating further policy integration, widening and deepening were increasingly considered to be two sides of the same coin. Based on frequent deliberations in Coreper in the first three months of 1970 and a Commission communication on transitional periods, the modalities of the negotiations were established. These were explained at the opening session of the negotiations on 30 June 1970 by the acting President of the Community, Pierre Harmel. Accordingly, the applicant states should accept the treaties and their political objectives; problems should be solved by the establishment of transitional measures, rather than changes of the existing rules; as a guideline, transitional measures should ensure reciprocal advantages for all parties; and, though their duration could vary according to the policy field, it should be the same for all applicants.⁴⁰

Following the Commission's insistence on prioritizing procedural questions, the agenda at the start of the Accession Conference was dominated by the organization and procedure of the negotiations and transitional arrangements.⁴¹ In November 1970 the Commission issued a global report on transitional arrangements in agriculture, in which it argued for parallel transitional periods of five years for both industrial and agricultural products; an immediate application of the CAP mechanisms and Community preference from the outset of the transitional periods; a gradual price adaptation in phases as the main element of the arrangements; and import levies and export restitution as a way to compensate price differences in the adaptation phase, financed by the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.⁴² Though the Council members were still not unified on the flexibility of the application of the Community preference, the majority supported the Commission's ideas and the report became a guideline for the common position. The only aspects that would be open for negotiation were the rhythm and the percentages of the adaptation phases.

The first six months of the negotiations formed an explorative phase. In the first Ministerial meeting with the UK on 21 July 1970 procedural arrangements were made. While the Commission was invited to study the data supplied by the UK during its fact-finding mission, the

³⁶ HAEC, BAC 7/1973 40-42, COM(67)750 (29.09.1967).

³⁷ HAEU, EM 170, 29e réunion de la Commission (13.03.1968).

³⁸ HAEC, BAC 7/1973 40-42, COM(68) 210 (02.04.1968).

³⁹ HAEC, BAC 7/1973 40-42, COM(69)1000 (01.10.1969).

⁴⁰ HAEU, EM 178, Exposé de Pierre Harmel (30.06.1970).

⁴¹ HAEU, EN 113, SEC(69) 4733 (11.12.1969).

⁴² HAEU, SGCI 12113, Session du Conseil du 23 novembre (21.11.1970).

member state governments clarified that it should do so as a servant of the Six and not of the Conference as a whole (O'Neill 2000). This, together with the Commission's tactic not to reveal its positions on transitional arrangements until the start of the actual negotiations, contributed to the rather technocratic image of the Commission at the start.⁴³

In the Ministerial meetings of October and December the positions of the candidate countries and the Community on transitional periods in agriculture were exchanged. The practice was continued of the applicants presenting their positions first, in order for the Six to be able to streamline their national positions in a common response. The Community stressed that all policy questions should be settled by single transitional periods. However, in individual cases, it was prepared to take a more flexible stance. The Commission's plea for granting special derogations to Norway, given its special problems in adopting the CAP, was for example developed. ?

Progress in the Accession Conference was intensified when, in December, agreement was recorded on the basic principles of the transitional arrangements. This was largely due to the adjustment by the UK, which was most demanding in this respect, of its old demands for different periods for industrial and agricultural products of 3 and 6 years respectively, and the acceptance of the Community position of a single period of 5 years. From January 1971 onwards, the negotiations entered a decisive phase. During this phase the Commission's mandate to be consulted by the candidate countries about the technical issues was extended, thereby making the Commission also a servant of the Conference. In addition, the Commission was to initiate not only technical adaptations of existing secondary rules, but also Council decisions and regulations in the post-enlargement period.⁴⁴ In preparing the crucial Conference meeting in May, the Commission acted as a catalyst by presenting definitive policy packages and by softening the still existing French mistrust towards the UK and, at the same time, convincing the UK of its agricultural proposals. According to several reports, the breakthrough in the Accession Conference was due to these informal negotiations. Source? A final agreement on transitional periods with the UK, Ireland and Denmark was reached in the Ministerial meetings of May and June.

An assessment of the Commission's role in the enlargement negotiations between 1970-72 involves the question of which of the underlying factors for the specification of the enlargement procedure holds: an institutionalization of the actual opportunities for the Commission to influence the negotiation process, or a formalization of the process in order to reduce the Commission's opportunities and strengthen the control of the member state governments.

With regard to the first task of coordination among the Six, the Commission played a larger role compared to the 1961-1963 negotiations. First, the Commission issued three official opinions that proved to be a driving force behind the Council's decision to open the negotiations. Second, with its communication on transitional period in March 1970, the Commission contributed to reaching agreement among the member state governments on the modalities of the negotiations. Third, the Commission was more actively involved in contributing to the drafting of the Community position. Its global report on transitional periods in agriculture of November 1970, for example, became the guideline for the Community position.

With regard to the Commission's task of coordinating and participating in the negotiations two observations can be made. At an official level, in the Accession Conference, the Commission was less visible than it had previously been. Due to the appointment of one spokesman on all levels of the negotiations, the Commission's opportunities to intervene in the Conference were reduced, which in turn resulted in less incentive to show up on the commissioners' side (O'Neill 2000).

⁴³ HAEU, FMM 41, La négociation anglaise (28.10.1970).

⁴⁴ 'Uitbreiding en buitenlandse betrekkingen van de Gemeenschap', *Bulletin van de EG* 4/5 (1971), p.98-100.

At an informal level, however, the Commission more actively gave direction to the negotiations. The enlargement condition that acceding countries should accept the *acquis* implied that the negotiations were dominated by technical discussions on transitional arrangements. Together with the increased size of the *acquis*, as a consequence of the policy developments since 1963, this led to an increasing reliance on the Commission's expertise in solving policy problems in screening the candidate countries in their adaptation to the Community rules and the subsequent policy negotiations with the Six.

In sum, when looking at the possible effects of the specification of the enlargement procedure on the actual enlargement process, the conclusion is that the Commission's role in the agricultural negotiations seems to have become more decisive. The effect of a restriction of the Commission's formal opportunities seems to have been offset by a reinforcement of the Commission's role at an informal level. In other words, the actual enlargement process reflects an institutionalisation of the Commission's influence rather than a reversal.

To what extent can the reinforced role of the Commission be explained by the initiatives of the Commission, acting as a quasi-autonomous actor, or the changed capabilities and incentives of the member state governments? Compared to the enlargement negotiations of 1961-63 the Commission gave more priority to enlargement and was more unified on what kind of role to play. This was due to the general political consensus about the necessity of enlargement and the perception that widening and deepening were two sides of the same coin. Another difference with the previous negotiations was that the Commission took a more technical and less political approach. This, however, did not imply that it wanted to exert less influence. Assuming a more technical role seems to have been a tactical choice. This can be illustrated by the Secretary General's call to concentrate on the formulation of the Community's policy position rather than obtaining the political role of spokesman, based on the experience that the common position was more decisive for the course of the negotiations.⁴⁵ Further, the Commission's representatives actively promoted the Commission's competences whenever its mandate was subject to discussion in Coreper or the Council. They did so by referring to the communitarian nature of the EEC and linking enlargement and policy integration, thereby underlining the Commission's right of initiative.

Second, several attempts were undertaken to strengthen the organizational coherence after the merger of the executives of the three Communities in 1967. At College level coordination was improved by charging one Commissioner, instead of a group, with the accession negotiations. This task was entrusted to Deniau, who was assisted by a working group that operated independently of DG Enlargement. Further, precise rules were established concerning the lines of communication within the Commission, the representation of the Commission's position in Coreper and its cooperation with the applicant states. Finally, the Commission's work on the enlargement process was facilitated by the creation of new instruments, such as the questionnaires as a way to gather information from the applicants. These efforts, however, did not automatically culminate in a more coherent internal organization. Disputes about the division of competences, for example between the Secretary General and the enlargement delegation, and coordination problems between the different DGs and with the Commission's delegation in London continued to exist.

Third, as a consequence of the policy developments, the agricultural negotiations increasingly contained technicalities for which the member states depended on the Commission. This effect was strengthened by the Commission's technical approach, which enhanced the division of labour between the Commission and the Council members. An illustration of this is Deniau's remark that the Commission's policy proposals were usually adopted in the Council without further discussion, thereby relying on the Commission reports and the deliberations in

⁴⁵ FJME, AMK C 33/4/245, Conversation avec Emile Noel (27.02.1971).

Coreper.⁴⁶ In sum, the conditions for a reinforcement of the Commission's role by acting as a policy entrepreneur that had learned from its experiences in the previous enlargement process seem to be present.

At the level of the Council, the growing complexity of the European policies had a twofold effect on the member state governments' capabilities and incentives to control the enlargement process. On the one hand, the Council members were better organized and more unified on the necessity of enlargement. Following the decision to conduct the negotiations on a bilateral basis in 1970 the pre-coordination among the member states to fine-tune the national positions was improved and a chairperson was appointed to set the agenda and speak for the Community.

On the other hand, the achievement of a stronger cohesion in the Council increased the incentive to delegate more responsibilities to the Commission in the coordination a common position. Further, due to the slow progress of the Conference and the complaints of the applicants about its work method, the member states felt compelled to also delegate extended responsibilities to the Commission in the negotiations with the applicants. The Council deliberations about the Commission's fact-finding mission, in which the French expressed the fear that this would become a form of problem-solving and pre-negotiation, reveal that the member states lost more control than some of them desired.⁴⁷

At the level of the member states, the conditions for a reinforcement of the Commission's role were also fulfilled. Despite the fact that the Council members had learned from the previous enlargement negotiations and improved their national coordination and the organization of the Accession Conference, the growing policy complexity resulted in more reliance on the Commission's expertise and incentives to delegate more tasks.

Conclusion

The findings in this paper suggest that, despite the decreased room for interpretation in the definition of the enlargement procedure, the Commission's actual role in the first enlargement round has increased. In contrast to the rational institutionalist expectation that this is due to a delegation of power by the member state governments, this paper argues that the ideological nature of the conflicting national interests and the autonomy of the Commission as a learning organization are important explanatory factors as well.

Future research should further examine whether the observed path dependency of the Commission's role in the first enlargement round also holds for the next enlargement rounds. This refers, for example, to the sunk costs of institutional developments that have started in the 1970-72 accession negotiations, such as the changed ideas about the relation between deepening and widening, the emphasis on the Community instead of the member states and the extended mandate of the Commission in initiating policy solutions and advising the Accession Conference as a whole.

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⁴⁷ HAEU, SGCI 12113, Télégramme de la Délégation Française (23.07.1971).

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Promoting a Knowledge of Europe: The Youth and European Integration

Alexander Reinfeldt

Introductory Remarks

On March 24-25, 2007, 50 years after the signing of the Rome Treaties and in parallel with the European Council in Berlin, the “*first ever EU Youth Summit*” was held in Rome under the heading ‘Your Europe – Your Future’ – assembling about 200 young people from all EU member states. The summit was organized by the European Commission and the European Parliament (in cooperation with the European Youth Forum). Its aim was to find answers to the question what the youth wants the EU to be in future.¹ The results of the discussions were delivered to representatives of the EU institutions, even though the final declaration could not be submitted directly to the Heads of State and Government in Berlin.²

The gathering in Rome is only one of numerous events aiming at the involvement of the youth in EU affairs in 2007.³ As the Eurobarometer on “The Future of Europe” (published in May 2006) reveals, young people are among those less interested in European political matters.⁴ On the other hand, the younger the respondents, the more they tend to consider their respective countries’ EU membership a good thing⁵ and to be optimistic about the future EU development.⁶ But knowledge of European issues among young people is rather under-developed – in times when developments on the European level become increasingly important for their everyday life.⁷

Broadly describing the lifetime between childhood and adulthood, ‘youth’ as a category is far from being clear-cut in socio-historical discourses.⁸ In modern times, the early youth period is generally equated with personality development and sexual maturation, the later youth period with occupational choice and assuming social and political responsibility.⁹ In this respect, Jan

¹ See http://www.europa.eu/50/news/article/070118_en.htm and <http://www.youthforum.org/youthsummit.htm>.

² Deutsches Nationalkomitee für internationale Jugendarbeit: Presidency News Flash. Newsletter on the German EU Presidency, 02/2007, p. 1-3, available online http://www.dbjr.de/uploadfiles/17_1811_Presidency%20Youth%20Flash%2002-2007.pdf

³ Cf. for further events concerning young people inter alia http://www.europa.eu/50/types/young_people/index_en.htm.

⁴ Special Eurobarometer 251, Wave 65.1: “The Future of Europe”, available online http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_251_en.pdf, p. 14.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 27. See also Standard Eurobarometer 66, Autumn 2006: First Results, available online http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/ebb66_highlights_en.pdf, p. 11.

⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 66, Autumn 2006: First Results, available online http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/ebb66_highlights_en.pdf, p. 21.

⁷ Cf. Stefan Rappenglück, 2006, “Jugend in der Europäischen Union”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* vol.47, p. 3.

⁸ It should be mentioned here that sociological youth studies do not refer any longer to ‘the’ youth as a socially differentiated group or accurately definable phase in life between childhood and adulthood; cf. Werner Weidenfeld/Melanie Piepenschneider, 1990, *Junge Generation und Europäische Einigung. Einstellungen – Wünsche – Perspektiven*, Bonn, p. 9.

⁹ Especially in the period under consideration here, the youth (or parts of it) were politically very active; for a social history of the youth in Europe see John R. Gillis, 1974, *Youth and History. Tradition and Change in European Age Relations 1770-Present*, New York/London; Michael Mitterauer, 1986, *Sozialgeschichte der Jugend*, Frankfurt/Main.

W. van Deth alludes to the assumption that attitudes and skills acquired in childhood and youth tend to be formative and long-lasting, whereas it is a contentious issue which factors – family, school, ‘peer groups’, mass media etc. – are predominantly decisive for the political socialisation of young people.¹⁰ One of the main purposes in the process of ‘political socialisation’ in democratic societies is to develop deliberate political attitudes and the ability to be critical on the basis of a general acceptance of the political system.¹¹ Hence, it seems to be both promising and necessary to address the youth in terms of European integration issues.

In the early 1990s, Werner Weidenfeld and Melanie Piepenschneider described the relation between the youth and European unification as follows: “*Die Zukunft Europas wird wesentlich davon abhängen, ob es gelingt, die heranwachsende Generation auf ein Leben in diesen übernationalen Strukturen vorzubereiten und dafür ihr aktives Interesse zu wecken.*”¹² Hence, according to Weidenfeld and Piepenschneider the ‘future of Europe’ depends not only on preparing the youth for living in supranational structures but on arousing their ‘active interest’ in it. According to them, any new generation will question the ‘architecture’ of international arrangements in Europe anew and draw its own conclusions.¹³

The European institutions seem to be fully aware that the attitudes of the youth towards the EU do matter given their manifold undertakings to get in contact with young people in Europe and to find out about their attitudes. But since when were the European institutions interested in the youth? What was considered to be the role of the youth in the process of European integration? And what has been done to address young people and to involve them in the EC/EU development since the early 1950s?

This contribution, based on recent multi-archival research, will deal with these questions by outlining a specific field of EC/EU-citizen relations: the information policies of the Commission of the European Communities and its predecessors, i.e. the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Commissions of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom, from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. In this respect, the efforts of organizations close to the European Movement – efforts with the aim to influence the thinking of young people about European co-operation and integration – will be taken into consideration, too. Referring, for instance, to the British case, it can be found that pro-European youth movements in the early 1950s – when the European Movement in Britain was paralyzed and the press and information machinery of the ECSC not yet entirely established – were the only organizations capable of actively promoting the idea of European unification and of serving as intermediaries between the Community institutions and the public in general. Hence, attention will be directed to the relations between these supranational and non-governmental actors to highlight their role in the process of European unification.¹⁴

¹⁰ Jan W. van Deth, 2005, “Kinder und Politik”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* vol.41, p. 4f. For the concept of ‘political socialisation’ in general cf. Hans-Peter Kuhn, 2000, *Mediennutzung und politische Sozialisation. Eine empirische Studie zum Zusammenhang zwischen Mediennutzung und politischer Identitätsbildung im Jugendalter*, Opladen.

¹¹ Rainer Watermann, 2005, “Politische Sozialisation von Kindern und Jugendlichen”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* vol.41, p. 16.

¹² Weidenfeld/Piepenschneider, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

¹³ *Ibidem*. For a more recent account of the ambivalent and complex relation between the youth and the EU cf. Barbara Tham, 2004, “EU-Politik und die Partizipation Jugendlicher”, in: Forschungsgruppe Jugend und Europa (ed.) *Das junge Europa. Plädoyer für eine wirksame Jugendpartizipation*, München, p. 19-34.

¹⁴ The political communication of the actors involved in the process of European integration has been largely neglected in the historiography on European integration so far. This neglect corresponds with the general political disregard for public participation in the first decades of European integration – disregard which initially was seen as a prerequisite for its functioning and progress. In accordance with the then

The Communities' Information Policies and the Youth

According to Weidenfeld and Piepenschneider “*Bereits die Gründungsväter der Europäischen Gemeinschaft beschworen die Bedeutung des Engagements der jungen Generation für ein geeintes Europa.*”¹⁵ And the ‘founding fathers’ deservedly did so, since those euro-enthusiastic young people after the Second World War, tearing down barriers and boundary-posts were rather a small active minority committed to a specific idea albeit with considerable (publicity) effect on the broader public.¹⁶

Hence, since the founding of the respective European Communities their ‘executives’¹⁷ have been interested in the information of the public in the member states as well as in third countries. As early as 1952, the High Authority of the ECSC began to set up a press and information apparatus in Luxembourg, which was soon completed with exterior press and information offices in several European capitals. This information machinery became the nucleus of the ‘common press and information service’ of the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom and, after the merger of the three ‘executives’ in 1967, of the Commission’s Directorate General for press and information.

Essentially, the information policies – in third countries as well as in the member states – were intended to present the structure and the aims of the Communities, to explain the general decision-making process as well as specific decisions, and to establish a ‘*dialogue permanent*’¹⁸ with the public to make the Communities and its institutions known. All this was to acquire reputation and to mobilize support for the Communities and the process of European integration, and thereby to secure their existence and further development.¹⁹

prevailing neo-functional theory of political integration, public opinion seemed to be largely irrelevant; cf. Frank Brettschneider/Jan van Deth/Edeltraud Roller (eds.), 2003, *Europäische Integration in der öffentlichen Meinung*, Opladen. Only recently, given the increasing politicization and democratization of the integration process since the 1990s, political actors and researchers begin to recognize public opinion as a factor of fundamental importance for European integration and foreign policies; cf., for example, Gabriele Clemens, 2004, “Werben für Europa. Öffentlichkeitsarbeit für den europäischen Integrationsprozess am Beispiel des Films ‘Das Bankett der Schmuggler’”, in: Mareike König/Matthias Schulz (eds.) *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung, 1949-2000. Politische Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und internationale Erfahrungen*, Stuttgart, p. 311-326.

¹⁵ Weidenfeld/Piepenschneider, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

¹⁷ It is arguable whether the term ‘executive’ is appropriate for the European Commission and its predecessors: first, because the High Authority, the EEC and Euratom Commissions and the merged Commission of the European Communities cannot be described as mere ‘executives’ for they each have their specific part in what might be called the ‘European supranational governance’; second, their respective responsibilities allotted by the founding treaties differ considerably from each other. For heuristic reasons, though, the term ‘executives’ will be used in this contribution as a generic term for the Commission and its predecessors.

¹⁸ BAC (Bruxelles Archives Commission) 173/1995/232: Orientations sur la Politique d’Information de la Commission pour 1970, 19.06.1969, Annexe: Information dans les pays tiers.

¹⁹ These topics will be set out in more detail in the author’s forthcoming PhD thesis on *Öffentlichkeitsarbeit für den europäischen Integrationsprozess. Der Fall Großbritannien (1952-1972)* [working title]; see also Alexander Reinfeldt, 2007, “British public opinion and European integration. Supranational and governmental information policies in Britain (1952-1973)”, in: Marie-Thérèse Bitsch/Wilfried Loth/Charles Barthel (eds.) *Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne*, Bruxelles, p. 107-122.

The Communities' information policies were mainly elite-oriented, aiming at politicians and political groups, trade unions, economic and business organizations, the media and academic circles.²⁰ Aside from this, informing 'the youth' was a preoccupation of the European 'executives'. A budgetary draft concerning the High Authority's information efforts in 1956/57 states: "*Die Information der Schüler und Studierenden über die Gemeinschaft bildet Gegenstand besonderer Aufmerksamkeit seitens der Informationsstelle; es wurde ein besonderes Informationsprogramm dafür aufgestellt.*"²¹ Information work in this field comprised research grants (in co-operation with the Council of Europe), contacts with universities, primary and secondary schools, technical and commercial schools etc. were established; *colloquia* were organized for pedagogues, educational publishers, university professors, school inspectors, schoolmasters or teachers, and information material like working papers, maps, wall charts, filmstrips (statues) and other sources were made available for integration into the *curricula*.²² According to Georges Berthoin from the High Authority's press and information service these and other efforts – on the whole notably successful – served the purpose "*den Lehrkräften eine Kenntnis der Montanunion zu vermitteln und ihnen behilflich zu sein, diese Kenntnisse weiter zu verbreiten.*"²³ For example, schemes of courses on the ECSC have been developed.²⁴

Information in the youth field comprised two distinct, but complementary sectors: the information in university milieus on the one hand, and the information of youth milieus in general (and adult education) on the other hand. The information in university milieus comprised higher education whereas the information of youth milieus in general comprised pedagogic and educational organizations as a whole (extracurricular education, youth movements, advanced vocational training – and adult education).²⁵

The policies pursued in this field of information had the objective to respond to demands for documentation and information from professors, students, educators and teachers etc., and, if necessary, to arouse such demands "*de façon que tous ceux qui exercent une influence sur ces milieux soient eux-mêmes aussi bien informés que possible des réalités communautaires et puissent contribuer à former ceux dont ils ont la charge, notamment les jeunes générations, aux responsabilités qui sont ou seront les leurs dans une Europe unie.*"²⁶

²⁰ Cf. EGKS/Hohe Behörde: Fünfter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft (9. April 1956 – 13. April 1957), [Luxemburg] 1957, p. 53ff.; CEAB (Commission des Communautés Européennes Archives Bruxelles) 1/940 (Microfiche): Note sur l'organisation du Service d'Information de la Haute Autorité, 10.06.1954.

²¹ CEAB 13/117 (Microfiche): Voranschlag fuer die Ausgaben der Informationsstelle im Rechnungsjahr 1956/57, 18.01.1956.

²² See, for example, EGKS/Hohe Behörde: Fünfter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft (9. April 1956 – 13. April 1957), [Luxemburg] 1957, p. 56f. All this is not to be confused with 'educational policy' on the Community level, on this cf. Tobias Theiler, 2005, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, Manchester/New York, p. 113-146. See also Antonio Varsori (ed.), 2004, *The development of VET in the context of the construction of the EC/EU and the role of Cedefop*, Luxembourg [Towards a history of vocational education and training (VET) in Europe in a comparative perspective, Proceedings of the first international conference on the history of vocational education and training (VET) in Europe in a comparative perspective (Florence, 11-12 October 2002), Luxembourg, 2004, Vol. 2].

²³ CEAB 13/69 (Microfiche): Georges Berthoin: Die Montanunion im Unterricht (Tätigkeitsbilanz), 19.10.1955.

²⁴ Cf. CEAB 1/94 (Microfiche): Schéma d'un cours sur la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, *undated* [1955].

²⁵ BAC (Bruxelles Archives Commission) 51/1986/575: Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Avant-Projet de Programme d'Activité pour 1967, 31.01.1967.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

In accordance with a decision of the European Parliament in November 1959, in subsequent years the Communities' information service had special funds at its disposal, "*um die Unterrichtung der Öffentlichkeit über europäische Fragen und im besonderen die Ausbildung der Jugend im europäischen Geist zu fördern.*"²⁷ To this end, arrangements were made with various European informational and educational institutions.²⁸

The information efforts towards the youth and educational milieus developed in three main directions: the production of educational material (geographic maps, slides and publications); intensified co-operation with governmental services, especially those responsible for civic education in the member states; and the realization of conferences for and with various educational organizations.²⁹

It became increasingly clear, that informing the youth on European integration issues, too, meant to concentrate on '*minorités agissantes*', reflecting the generally elite-oriented approach of the Communities' information policies. In the information programme for 1961 it states: "*Il est indéniable qu'une proportion considérable de la jeunesse dans les divers pays ignore à peu près tout de l'existence et des responsabilités des Communautés, et s'en désintéresse, de même qu'elle se désintéresse du fonctionnement des institutions politiques nationales ou de celui des autres organisations internationales.*"³⁰ Despite the additional funds of 15 millions FB (francs belges) for the information of the youth, given the limited funds available for information – not only in this field – "[u]ne '*conscience civique européenne engagée*' ne peut être créée et développée [...] qu'au sein des '*minorités agissantes*' qui existent chez les jeunes comme chez les adultes, à l'intérieur des divers groupes sociaux (jeunes étudiants, ruraux, ouvriers)."³¹ It was these '*minorités agissantes*', organized in professional, trade unionist, political or confessional associations, that the 'executives' counted on '*pour sensibiliser toute l'opinion jeune.*' For an effective information work, arousing lasting interest in European integration, it was considered to be necessary to "*susciter l'intérêt actif et engagé des futurs citoyens en les intéressant [original emphasis] aux aspects du travail des Communautés qui auront des incidences directes sur leur vie*"³². Hence, emphasis was also put on the exchange of ideas and concerns on an international level, i.e. on encounters of the European youth: "*Une large part doit donc être faite dans le programme 'd'information de la jeunesse' aux activités susceptibles de créer une coopération durable entre organisations des six pays, dans l'étude des problèmes concrets posés par le processus d'intégration et intéressant les jeunes générations.*"³³

Concerning the '*information universitaire*' the declared objective of the respective efforts – i.e. making available necessary information and funds – was to lay the foundations for a '*coopération culturelle européenne de forme communautaire*' by reinforcing co-operation between researchers and institutions and, thus, promoting multi-disciplinary research on questions of European integration.³⁴ Additionally, those responsible for the Communities' information policies were interested in the '*information universitaire*', "*car la consécration par l'université du processus d'intégration et des institutions qui le régissent a pour effet de créer une sorte de lé-*

²⁷ EGKS/Hohe Behörde: Neunter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft (1. Februar 1960 – 31. Januar 1961), Luxemburg 1961, p. 60.

²⁸ *Ibidem.*

²⁹ CEAB 2/2345 (Microfiche): CEE/Commission: Mémoire sur la politique des Communautés en matière d'information à l'attention des Conseils, 26.06.1963.

³⁰ CEAB 13/360 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Programmes d'Activité pour 1961, 18.01.1961.

³¹ *Ibidem.*

³² *Ibidem.*

³³ *Ibidem.*

³⁴ Cf. CEAB 2/2344 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Programmes d'Activités pour 1963 (Document de travail), 26.02.1963.

*ginitimité dans un milieu important et influent de nos sociétés, et contribue à influencer les jeunes générations à un moment décisif de leur formation intellectuelle et de leur orientation socio-professionnelle.*³⁵

Since the mid-1960s, information work in the educational field (university circles, youth organisations and institutions for adult education) has increasingly become the focal point of the Communities' information policies.³⁶ This found its institutional expression in the course of the re-structuring of the Directorate General for press and information in the early 1970s when information-oriented 'youth work – adult education and higher education' together with the division for trade unionist information and the press and information offices were directly put in charge of the Director General.³⁷

This was partly due to the fact that meanwhile “*une génération de jeunes, âgés de seize à vingt-cinq ans, pour qui la Communauté européenne est une réalité aussi vieille que leur premier souvenir*”³⁸, had grown up and reached responsible positions. Hence, in an information programme for 1965 it says: “*Il convient donc [...] d'axer notre effort d'information et de formation sur la génération montante, notamment sur les jeunes universitaires et les étudiants, mais aussi sur les jeunes patrons, les jeunes ouvriers, les jeunes agriculteurs, et plus généralement sur les jeunes citoyens [original emphasis], en mettant en lumière – sans propagande et de façon très concrète – le dynamisme et l'irréversibilité du processus d'intégration*”³⁹.

Information efforts in university milieus should not only adapt higher education (in the member states) to the consequences of European integration for the transformation of national economies. In an information programme for 1967 a parallel was drawn with the role of European universities in the formation of European nation-states. This was not set out in detail, but it was intended to get contemporary universities to “*jouer un rôle analogue dans la formation de l'unité européenne, tant par l'adaptation de l'enseignement proprement dit (programmes en cours) que par la recherche et par les échanges d'idées, de professeurs et d'étudiants.*”⁴⁰

Those responsible for the Communities' information work also regarded those points of the final communiqué of the Hague Summit in 1969 referring to the participation of the youth⁴¹ as a confirmation of their approach in this field: “*Cette prise de position est une légitimation de l'action poursuivie depuis 1960 par la Commission dans ce domaine. Non seulement elle en souligne la finalité: un avenir assuré des initiatives communautaires, mais elle en définit l'inspiration essentielle: il s'agit d'associer les jeunes générations aux actions de création et de*

³⁵ CEAB 2/2909 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Programme d'Activité pour 1965, *undated*.

³⁶ Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft/Kommission: Zehnter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft (1. April 1966 – 31. März 1967), [Brüssel] 1967, p. 403.

³⁷ EGKS-EWG-EAG/Kommission: Fünfter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaften 1971, Brüssel/Luxemburg 1972, p. 472f.

³⁸ CEAB 2/2909 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Programme d'Activité pour 1965, *undated*.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ BAC 51/1986/575: Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Avant-Projet de Programme d'Activité pour 1967, 31.01.1967.

⁴¹ Schlußkommuniqué der Konferenz [der Staats- und Regierungschefs der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften in Den Haag] (2. Dezember 1969), in: Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nr. 1, 1970, p. 17: “*16. Den hier beschlossenen Maßnahmen für die schöpferische Gestaltung und das Wachstum Europas steht eine größere Zukunft offen, wenn die Jugend daran engen Anteil hat; dieses Anliegen haben die Regierungen beherzigt, und die Gemeinschaften werden sich dessen annehmen.*”

progrès, ce qui implique, de toute évidence, plus que la simple information, l'éducation à la participation [original emphasis]."⁴² Hence, more than ever, it was considered necessary to communicate the European project as a coherent '*projet de civilisation*' with political, economic and social implications – rather than being purely technical or economical in character.⁴³

On the whole, the European 'executives' seem to have been content with the results of the information efforts in the educational, especially in the university field: for example, due to the financial assistance of the Communities and other resources an increasing number of 'centres de documentation européenne', the development of regular courses and seminars on European issues, an increasing number of individual or collective research projects, PhD theses and the setting up of private organizations devoted to the co-ordination of research on European issues was noticed.⁴⁴

Consequently, at the end of the 1960s it was intended to slightly adapt the information strategy regarding information of the youth. In the past, information activities in this field consisted to a large extent of gatherings like '*journées d'étude*' and *colloquia* to interest those preoccupied with educational matters in European issues. In this respect, the capacities of the Communities' information service were exhausted, particularly as the demands for information became increasingly specialized. Thus, in future the main effort should be to produce and to disseminate publications responding to the particular needs of teachers and educators – such as the publication *Nouvelles Universitaires Européennes* in France for the '*information universitaire*';⁴⁵ audio-visual documentation, for example in school programmes, was another means in this respect.

In 1968, a first enquiry was made about the attitudes and focal interests of the youth. The enquiry had the objective "*de mieux connaître les attitudes et centres d'intérêt des jeunes en vue d'une meilleure orientation des actions d'information et de formation européenne.*"⁴⁶ Furthermore, according to Jacques-René Rabier, then director (general) in the Commission's Directorate General for press and information, a colloque on 'the youth and Europe' was arranged

⁴² BAC 1/1980/27: Direction Générale de la Presse et de l'Information: Projet de Programme d'Activité pour 1970, *undated*. Interestingly enough, Barbara Tham (*op.cit.*, p. 26) points to increasing attempts of the EU since the 1990s to involve young Europeans in the discussions on the way of shaping Europe, "*da sie es sind, die von diesen Entscheidungen in Zukunft am meisten betroffen sein werden und diese Entscheidungen auch umsetzen und verwirklichen müssen.*" Even though Tham further remarks that young people were thus meant to assume "*eine aktive Rolle als handelnder Akteur in der europäischen Zivilgesellschaft*", they seemingly were not meant to take these decisions as Europe's future political actors and decision-makers. This aspect should not be overemphasized here, but the justifications for the Communities' efforts to involve the youth in the 1950s and 1960s seem to have accentuated this future role of young people more explicitly. This points to the above-mentioned rather elite-oriented approach to 'the youth' in the early period of European integration.

⁴³ A crucial project for 1970 was the planned international 'Colloque des organisations de jeunesse'; cf. BAC 1/1980/27: Direction Générale de la Presse et de l'Information: Projet de Programme d'Activité pour 1970, *undated*.

⁴⁴ Cf. BAC 51/1986/575: Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Avant-Projet de Programme d'Activité pour 1967, 31.01.1967; CEAB 12/1076 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Programme d'Activité pour 1966, *undated*.

⁴⁵ BAC 1/1980/26: Service de Presse et d'Information des Communautés Européennes: Projet de Programme d'Activité pour 1968, *undated*. The plurilingual monthly bulletin *Nouvelles Universitaires Européennes* offered university milieus an overall view of the developments on a Community level regarding courses and studies on Community issues as well as on the respective activities of the Communities' institutions; cf. on this BAC 1/1980/28: Commission des Communautés Européennes: Programme d'Activité d'Information pour 1971, 02.04.1971.

⁴⁶ BAC 1/1980/26: Projet de Programme d'Action pour la Direction Générale de la Presse et de l'Information pour l'Année 1969, *undated*.

gathering young people organized in various political, cultural or religious organizations to let them discuss their ideas of Europe; as Rabier recalls: “*Les délégués étaient tout à fait libres de dire ce qu’ils pensaient et de l’Europe et de la façon dont elle se faisait. Ce qu’ils nous demandaient surtout, c’était qu’on les aide à faire une information européenne indépendante dans leurs associations: les religieux, comme les politiques et les culturels étaient soucieux de développer leurs organisations. Ils n’étaient pas d’accord sur beaucoup de choses, mais ils considéraient que l’Europe était un terrain privilégié pour défendre leurs convictions et développer leurs activités.*”⁴⁷

A clarification in a Commission document on the general orientations of the information policies, worth mentioning here, emphasizes that the Commission was not to subsidise organizations but stimulated specific activities or programmes if these were considered to promote a better understanding of the Communities’ activities and responded to needs of information.⁴⁸

The Communities, the European Movement and the Youth: Forms of Co-Operation

In this final chapter, a specific form of co-operation between the supranational ‘executives’ and branches of the European Movement, especially the European Youth Campaign (EYC), will be illustrated. It will mainly focus on the British case which, as will be seen, features some interesting elements.

In 1949, the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement (UKCEM)⁴⁹ had officially been launched. But only a few years later there was a split over the attitude towards supranational European integration. Some members, especially of the United Europe Movement (UEM), favoured a policy of pure inter-governmental co-operation, whereas other parts of the movement, above all members of Federal Union (FU), believed that the unification of the Six was in the best interests of Europe and should be encouraged.⁵⁰ The British European movement was paralyzed in these years;⁵¹ and even when the UKCEM was revived as an ‘*all-party*

⁴⁷ Entretien avec Jacques-René Rabier par Gérard Bossuat (Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Juin 1998, Jean Monnet Oral Project, Chaires Jean Monnet d’Histoire – Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne, Programme français, 1998, available online <http://www.warc.eui.eu/oh/pdf/INT609.pdf> . According to Rabier, this colloque was the precursor of the ‘European Youth Forum’.

⁴⁸ BAC 1/1980/27: Orientations sur la Politique d’Information de la Commission pour 1970 (Communication de la Commission au Conseil), 16.07.1969.

⁴⁹ The United Kingdom Council of the European Movement (UKCEM), serving as a coordinating body for pro-European movements in the UK, was officially launched at a meeting in the House of Commons on February 16, 1949. Its founding members were the United Europe Movement (UEM), the British sections of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (SMUSE), the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC) and the Federal Union (FU); cf. Clemens A. Wurm, 1988, “Great Britain: Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Discussion on European Union”, in: Walter Lipgens/Wilfried Loth (eds.) *Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. 3: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-1950*, Berlin et al., p. 638, and F.X. Rebattet, 1962, *The “European Movement” 1945-1953: a study in national and international non-governmental organisations working for European unity*, PhD Thesis, Oxford, p. 275f.; Jeremy Moon, 1985, *European Integration in British Politics 1950-1963: A Study of Issue Change*, Aldershot et al., p. 101. The United Kingdom Council of the European Movement was later renamed British Council of the European Movement (BCEM) and finally merged with ‘Britain in Europe’ in 1969.

⁵⁰ AHCE (Archives Historiques des Communautés Européennes) Dep. ME (Mouvement Européen), No 930/4: E.G. Thompson, Memorandum on the U.K. Council of the European Movement, *undated*.

⁵¹ Moon, *op.cit.*, p. 139. For the crisis of the international European Movement in the aftermath of the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC)/European Political Community (EPC) see Daniela Preda, 2006, “The Movements for European unity (1958 to 1972)”, in: Antonio Varsori (ed.) *Inside the*

organisation' in 1954⁵² it developed little activity until the 1960s.⁵³ The only organizations in Britain then working in the European field were the EYC and FU.

The European Youth Campaign had been launched in 1951 under the auspices of the European Movement with the aim “*de propager par l'éducation et l'information, l'idée de l'unité européenne parmi les jeunes.*”⁵⁴ Its creation was born of the initiative of the American Committee for United Europe (ACUE), a CIA-led organisation, and reflected the general propagandistic stand against communist youth movements in Western Europe.⁵⁵ According to Michael Fogarty, Chairman of the British Youth Organisations' Committee, the EYC was wholly educational in character; it sought only to assist existing youth movements to play their part in educating their members on the nature and problems of European co-operation. Financing for the EYC was mainly provided by the European Movement with special aid from the ACUE.⁵⁶ Hence, the EYC was meant to be ‘*purely educational*’; moreover, “*participation in it should not imply approval of the political aims of those in favour of European Union*”, but mere approval of “*more cooperation and closer ties*” in Europe.⁵⁷

However, though the EYC tended to follow the cautious and balanced European Movement's attitude towards supranational integration it pursued a policy in favour of the ECSC in its educational and information efforts. In a document from 1955 on the activities of the EYC it says: “*Faire connaître l'existence et les activités de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier auprès de la jeunesse d'Europe est l'un des buts de l'action de la C.E.J. [Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse].*”⁵⁸ According to this document, after the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) it was said to be the EYC's task ‘*à défendre la C.E.C.A.*’ (Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier): “*Il s'agit d'une part de continuer à informer les jeunes Européens de l'existence et du travail de la C.E.C.A. (Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier), et d'autre part, ce qui est encore plus important, de leur expliquer dans quelle mesure et par quel procédé l'action de la Communauté a une influence sur leurs intérêts et préoccupations quotidiens.*”⁵⁹ To this end, for example, the EYC intended to publish a brochure on the ECSC and to introduce a regular column on the ECSC in its own journals ‘*Jeune Europe*’, ‘*Jugend Europas*’ and ‘*Giovane Europa*’ respectively, “*rubrique dans laquelle seraient reprises et présentées sous une forme*

European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration, 1957-1972, Baden-Baden/Bruxelles, p. 184.

⁵² See AHCE Dep. ME, No 930/3: Constitution and objectives of the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement agreed at meeting in the House of Lords on the 18th November, 1954, Appendix A to UKCEM Min 12 (1954).

⁵³ Moon, *op.cit.*, p. 151.

⁵⁴ CEAB 3/445 (Microfiche): Activités de la Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse intéressant la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, [1955]. For the EYC see also Jean Marie Palayret, 1995, “Eduquer les jeunes à l'union: La Campagne européenne de la jeunesse 1951-1958”, *Journal of European Integration History* vol.1, N° 2, p. 47-60.

⁵⁵ Palayret, *op.cit.*, p. 47f. Cf. Hugh Wilford, 2003, *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War. Calling the Tune?*, London/Portland, p. 239f.

⁵⁶ AHCE Dep. ME, No 181/2: Preparatory Meeting of Welsh Youth Organisations, 22.04.1952. For the ACUE funding of the European Movement and the EYC see Richard J. Aldrich, 2002, *The Hidden Hand. Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, Woodstock/New York, p. 342-370, especially p. 361f.

⁵⁷ AHCE Dep. ME, No 181/1: European Youth Campaign: Meeting of Representatives of British Youth Organisations, 18.12.1951. A distinction had been made in the EYC between rather educational youth movements abstaining from ‘political’ activities and those political youth movements falling in with the general ideas of the European Movement, cf. Palayret, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

⁵⁸ CEAB 3/445 (Microfiche): Activités de la Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse intéressant la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, [1955].

⁵⁹ *Ibidem.*

mieux adaptée au grand public, les informations que la C.E.C.A. diffuse elle-même dans ses différents bulletins."⁶⁰ Interestingly enough, High Authority officials were far from enthusiastic about these and similar plans of the EYC because – given the strained financial situation of the Campaign – they suspected financial motives behind the EYC's intentions.⁶¹

Contacts between the European 'executives' and the EYC in the information field also comprised the financing of courses for individuals including stays in the headquarters of the 'executives' in Luxembourg or Brussels respectively.⁶² Regarding co-operation in the educational field, in 1958, Roy Pryce from the Communities' London press and information office proposed to the secretary of the UKCEM to jointly organize '*journées d'étude*' on the Common Market for university professors. Besides, a common project with the European Youth Campaign for '*journées d'étude*' assembling teachers from '*secondary modern schools*' should be continued. As a result of the '*journées d'étude*' in the previous year a pilot scheme was arranged in Birmingham schools. For teachers in sciences and economy from '*secondary technical schools*' similar '*journées d'étude*' were envisaged to prepare a '*programme de leçons*'.⁶³ In particular after the signing of the Rome Treaties the EYC fell in line with the supranational approach to European integration as represented by the European Communities and "*le succès de la mise en application des deux traités devenait l'objectif numéro un de la Campagne.*"⁶⁴

Concerning the British case, hence, the Communities' London press and information office not only maintained contacts with the British media and the '*milieux de l'enseignement*', but undertook common action in collaboration with the European Movement, and especially with the EYC in Britain – to an extent that those responsible for the Communities' information work in Britain considered the necessity for the services of their public relations counsellor in Britain, Alan Campbell-Johnson, to be decreasing.⁶⁵

According to Jean Marie Palayret, the co-operation between the European 'executives' and the EYC ended when the EYC was dissolved in 1959 after futile attempts to serve as an 'office d'information et d'éducation européenne' for the European Communities in response to the reduced funds from the ACUE.⁶⁶ Since then, for example, financial contributions from the Communities to various organizations in the political vicinity of the European Movement or to its branches such as the 'Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe' or the 'Nouvelles Equipes Internationales' remained a common method in the educational field (including adult education). Such funds were granted for specific operations, if necessary, subject to prior consultation of the respective Community authorities.⁶⁷

⁶⁰ *Ibidem.*

⁶¹ Cf. CEAB 3/445 (Microfiche): Note Fontaine to Renckens, 01.03.1955.

⁶² Cf., for example, CEAB 13/69 (Microfiche): Informationsstelle: Antrag auf Erhöhung der finanziellen Beihilfe für die 'Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse' (Europäische Jugendaktion), 30.11.1955.

⁶³ CEAB 13/246 (Microfiche): Programme d'Activité du Service d'Information jusqu'au 30 Juin 1959, 20.09.1958, Annexe VI: Secteur Anglo-Américain, Programme 1958-1959.

⁶⁴ Palayret, *op.cit.*, p. 57-59 (57); Palayret points out that the creation of EEC and Euratom led to a significant reduction of ACUE funds in aid of the EYC from 425,000 dollars in previous years to 300,000 dollars in 1957-1958 and 150,000 dollars in 1958/1959. According to Preda, *op.cit.*, p. 185, the European Movement as a whole increasingly sought to obtain Community funding after the Rome Treaties came into effect – with "*no small impact on the official policies of the EM [European Movement].*"

⁶⁵ CEAB 13/246 (Microfiche): Programme d'Activité du Service d'Information jusqu'au 30 Juin 1959, 20.09.1958, Annexe VI c): Note sur le Bureau de Londres.

⁶⁶ Cf. Palayret, *op.cit.*, p. 58f.

⁶⁷ Cf., for example, BAC 140/1987/40: Procès-verbal de la cinquième réunion du Conseil d'Administration du Service Commun "Presse et Information", 21.10.1960.

For the British case it has to be kept in mind that the situation in the 1960s was different from previous periods anyway, given the first British application to join the Common Market in 1961 and subsequent events. Co-operation with the British European Movement even in the youth and educational field seems to have been very cautious until final British entry. In a document on the utilisation of the funds for the information of the youth (and adult education) from January 1962 it says in this respect “*qu’aucune somme n’a été explicitement prévue pour les actions en direction des pays tiers et notamment de la Grande-Bretagne. Alors qu’en fait, l’intérêt marqué par les organisations de jeunesse de ces pays s’accroît de plus en plus.*”⁶⁸ These expectations ought to be met indirectly by enabling young people from Britain and other third countries to participate in international youth activities organised by various educational organizations or in meetings held in other countries.⁶⁹

It was the aim of this contribution to focus on some aspects of the manifold relations between ‘the youth’ and European integration by highlighting the efforts of supranational and non-governmental actors to influence the thinking of young people about European unification. As exemplified above, informing young people was a focal interest of the European ‘executives’ since the 1950s and in this field of activity co-operation with branches of the European Movement took place. However, much more research would be necessary to assess the actual impact of these efforts on youth thinking and to compare the efforts of that time with those nowadays.

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⁶⁸ CEAB 2/2116 (Microfiche): Répartition générale du crédit ‘Jeunesse et Education populaire’, 12.01.1962 in conjunction with: Utilisation du crédit ‘Jeunesse – Education populaire’.

⁶⁹ For further details cf. *ibidem*.

Towards a “Dialogued Integration”? The Overlapping Nature of Actors and Witnesses in the Eastward Enlargement Process

Cristina Blanco Sío-López

Introduction

The Eastward enlargement of the EU, usually presented as a culmination of European integration history, even constitutes, for some Commission actors, “the real end of the Cold War”. On the other hand, they also expect the citizens-witnesses to believe that the EU-25/27 is “obviously” the same Union, with the same initial objectives: to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity in the continent.

However, one fundamental difference with past enlargements lies in the need of approval by a new and progressively powerful “European voice”: the incipient European public opinion, which has been strong enough to eliminate or postpone the Constitutional Treaty. If it is true that past EC/EU enlargements have raised controversial issues in different national public opinions, the question of the definition of Europeanness and the issue of the final frontiers of the EU has been discussed as never before with the approaching of the Eastward enlargement implementation date in 2004. And the determinant fact is that it had an incomparable European-wide dimension and reaction surpassing national public opinion spheres. Hence, the need of approval by a European-wide public opinion has become essential to legitimise further enlargement, as the creation of a DG Communication and the European Commission Plan D (Democracy, Dialogue and Debate) urgently evidence. This new voice creates an overlap in the roles, power, and definition of traditionally separated actors and witnesses in the process of European integration. Furthermore, it is modifying the direction of an integration process that has changed European society without, in many cases, entailing its involvement. An economic Union can work and rely on believing elites but a growingly political Union can only survive with the support of the citizens.

Eastward enlargement implies for the EU a redefinition of its *raison d’être*, its institutions, and frontiers and this fact creates the new need of a “two-ways communication” that goes beyond informative and propagandistic campaigns. In this sense, and taking into account the increasingly influential roles of non-state actors like the media or civil society organisations in the planning and implementation of enlargement, we could even see the transition towards an urgent demand for a “dialogued integration”.

The new voices bring puzzling debates, such as those who are asking out loud whether today’s EU is not too much an answer to the concerns of the past and too little an answer to the challenges of the future¹.

This is accompanied by a temporal dissociation between the citizens and the institutions: While the first focus on contextual realities which affect their daily lives, the second ones seem to be immersed in a time of use and abuse of historical arguments to defend their political positions. And a clear example of this phenomenon is the EU Communication Strategy on Enlargement.

¹ Interview with the Representative of the Action Campaign to support and implement Plan D on behalf of the DG Communication. Strategic field: Eastward enlargement. Permanent Representation of the European Commission in Berlin, held on 10th July 2006

The new methodology underlining this document, as we will observe in the following sections, is based on a massive number of media studies and projects ordered by the Commission in order to detect, which are the fears and threats perceived by the EU public opinion, to be able to elaborate counter-myths that could offer guarantees, reasonable explanations and a relief to combat any initial reluctance.

1. The EU Communication Strategy on Enlargement and the Reactions to it: The New Determining Element of Public Opinion Perceptions

The 1st May 2004, for the first time in the history of the “Old Continent”, most European countries became, following their democratic will, equal members of the same political and economic entity. The hope of the “Return to Europe” of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) after the democratic revolutions of 1989 found then a materialisation through the accession to the European Union. For the new member states it was a revenge on history, the history inherited from “Yalta” and from the division of Europe after the Second World War. The notion of Europe was an integrant part of these countries’ cultural identity and of their attachment to so-called Western values. And it is precisely that very notion of Europe that becomes the objective of these countries after the fall of communism, constituting the main horizon of their democratic transitions. For the old EU member states, Eastward enlargement is a geopolitical ambition (to extend stability and democracy in the continent) but, above all, a major challenge for European integration, its political cohesion, and its future frontiers.

But, are we talking about the same Union? Or does the nature of the Union totally change in the post-Cold war period when its geopolitical meaning is suddenly cancelled?

In this sense, it is curious to observe how the persons in charge of bringing about the enlargement process at the Commission want to give the impression that it is obviously the same Union going through a new enlargement process and walking towards the initial objectives of the Union, to achieve peace, stability and prosperity in the continent.

The way the enlargement process was organised, with a focus on accession conditions to be fulfilled and a negotiations calendar, emphasises the impression of “just a new step” in a future-oriented process leaning towards an ignored culmination. Setting the phases of a “natural” evolution accentuates the perception of “going on as we should and need to”. But is it just the same Union in a new evolutionary phase?

There are many factors that indicate that Eastward enlargement is an unprecedented one. First of all, we could allude to the so-called “revolution of the new member states number”. Unlike former enlargements, which implied the accession of one or two new member states, Eastward enlargement includes twelve new member states: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and the islands of Malta and Cyprus in 2004², joined by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Linked to this fact there is another important difference based on the economic and political antecedents of the post-Soviet states. Besides, Eastward enlargement explicitly poses the question on the final frontiers of European integration as no other enlargement has done before. But, above all, one fundamental difference

² It is important to note that only the Greek part of Cyprus has acceded to the EU, since the referendum of the “Annan Plan” to unite both sides (Greek and Turkish) of the island before enlargement to enter as a unity has not been approved.

with past enlargements lies in the need of the approval of the European public opinion, which has never been so influential to change the direction of an integration process with was changing their lives without this entailing their involvement.

An economic Union can work and rely on believing elites but a growingly political Union can only survive with the support of the citizens. This is because a more political union challenges the existing levels of representativity within the EU institutional system and demands not only a stronger role of the European Parliament, but also more interaction with civil society actors, better and more accessible information on influential political decisions and the acting visibility of the other side of the mirror in any transparent democracy, e.g. the views and claims of the EU citizenry. Is this, therefore, a different Union? A constitutional process could have indicated the success of the vision of the EU as a political project but the weight of public opinion in the dismissal of the Constitutional Treaty sheds light on the nature of this probably new Union. It is not just “action” on behalf of politicians and civil servants which builds the integration process, but also “reaction” and reaction comes from an unheard of actor in this scenario, an actor commonly defined as European citizenry.

In sum, Eastward enlargement implies for the EU a redefinition of its *raison d'être*, its institutions and of frontiers. Enlargement poses, therefore, the question of the EU legitimacy before the peoples who compose it and entails a reformulation of the major ideas, issues and interests which shape its political identity (European solidarity, European Constitution, European security...)³.

2. The challenges of an enlarged Europe: Public opinions without a European public space?

The study of Eastward enlargement has largely emphasised the diplomatic and political strategies or juridical and economic aspects of the candidate countries. On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account the societies, the political and partisan cleavages and the role of the public opinion. The referendums on EU accession have shown the common aspiration of the peoples of the CEECs to take part in the European integration process. However, the candidate countries are not part of a homogenous block but are characterised by a diversity which will grow even more within the EU⁴. In opposition to NATO enlargement, which implies only the accession to a military institution, EU enlargement does not only involve the legislators and state administrations but also an interpenetration in the economies and societies of the candidate countries. For this reason, the success of enlargement will also depend on “intermediary bodies” like trade unions, the media, universities, the NGOs and other agents which participate in the constitution of a civil society⁵.

³Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide Report (ordered by DG ENLARGEMENT): *Impact Assessment of Calls for Proposals as implementation tools of the Enlargement Communication Strategy. Executive Summary*, 10 December 2005, pp. 2-3

⁴Speech of the former Head of the Information Unit at the DG Enlargement of the European Commission: *Enlargement of the European Union and the Role of the European Commission in this Process*, presented at the DG Enlargement of the European Commission in Brussels on the 30th of October 2001.

⁵ Personal Interview with the Deputy Head of Unit of the Information, Communication and Inter-Institutional Relations Unit at the DG Enlargement, European Commission. Brussels, 15th of January 2006

In a nutshell, Eastward enlargement obliges us to ask ourselves on the one hand, about the formation of a “European civil society”⁶ as Victor Perez Diaz did and, on the other hand, about the existence of a European public space and public opinion within the EU member states, as Jürgen Habermas⁷ maintained.

But there is still one phenomenon that needs to be explained and it is that of the reluctances of the EU public opinion to enlargement, accompanied by the occasional reluctance of some elites and the citizens of the new member states. The factors to analyse such reluctances to welcome the candidate countries (stronger than ever before in the history of the European integration) could be explained by these three factors: the step by step evolution of the enlargement process, the “normative” method of this new accession and an information deficit, linked to the absence of a trans-European debate.

2.1. The first factor: Time perceptions and the different phases of the Eastward enlargement process

The fifteen years that separate the fall of the communist system in 1989 and the access of the CEECs to the European Union in 2004 have a major consequence for the public opinions of the continent, both West and East, namely the dissociation between the democratic changes of 1989 and the European project. The “dividends of peace” were pocketed in the West as the “dividends of democracy” in the East. Besides, we should not underestimate the political cost of the fact that NATO enlargement preceded that of the EU.

In their relations with the EU, the candidate countries have known three phases which partly explain the perplexity of the CEECs’ elites and opinions at the moment of their accession to the EU. From 1989 till 1993 there is a phase of “euphoria” after the fall of the Berlin Wall during which there is a strong European aspiration in the CEECs, an authentic sympathy and a will of openness, linked to empathy, in the Western European public opinions. However, such enthusiasm is not unanimous in the realm of European politics. The Association agreement signed with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia⁸ in 1991 was vague about a future accession and was limited to a commercial agreement establishing quotas in determined sectors in which the post-Soviet countries could be competitive (textile, steel, agricultural products...). This is also the time when François Mitterrand introduces his plan of a European Confederation, which at first seduced Vaclav Havel at first. In this sense, many political figures of the time understand that the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact must imply that the post-Soviet countries come closer to the European Union in some way. Nonetheless, Mitterrand soon declares that “the accession of the CEECs to the EU could only happen after decades and decades” even if he thinks it is wiser to integrate in a “European Confederation” a Soviet Union about to break up⁹. It is then that the image of a France hostile to Eastward enlargement was born, a perception reinforced after the “no” to the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, in which the fear to

⁶ Perez Diaz, V. (1998) “La Cité européenne”, *Critique internationale*, vol.3, p. 1

⁷ Habermas, J. and Derrida, J. (2003) “Europe, plaidoyer pour une politique extérieure commune», *Libération*, 2 Juin 2003 ; Habermas, J. (2003) *L'espace public*, Paris: PUF.

⁸ Still one country in 1991.

⁹ Mitterrand, F. (1991) *Le Monde*, 14 Juin 1991. On French foreign policy in this period see Rupnik, J. (1998) “La France de François Mitterrand et les pays du Centre-Est” in Samy, C. (dir.) *Mitterrand et le sortie de la guerre froide*, Paris: PUF and also De la Serre, F. (2004) «La France et l’élargissement à l’Est de l’Union européenne », *Annuaire français des Relations internationales*, Printemps.

further enlargement (and especially to Turkey's accession) seems to have played an influential role in public opinion.

The second phase, from 1993 to 2000 would be characterised by impatience on behalf of the CEECs and mutual disappointments. With the violent break-up of the ex-Yugoslavia it was soon clear that post-communism did not imply only the triumph of liberal democracy but also a return to war and extreme nationalism, constituting challenges to which the EU did not well know how to respond. In historical terms, this is a reminder of the usual unmanageability of change and historical turning points. In 1799 Woltmann made a very interesting reflection on the real effect of turning points in History. He refers to the French Revolution, which he witnessed, but it could well be applied to other cases. He defines turning points, very interestingly, as a paradigmatic example of "progressive future" and says:

"The French Revolution was for the whole world a phenomenon that appeared to mock all historical wisdom, daily developing out of itself new phenomena which one knew less and less how to come to terms with"¹⁰.

The end of the Cold War retains the same sense of unmanageability of radical change in History, in which previous criteria, values and instruments seem not to work any more. Turning points are a time of re-invention but, till new self-definitions are created, events move faster than decisions and discourses and are not the fruit of them but the striking cause.

This was the case with the EU and the disorientated search for a solution for the Yugoslavian tragedy. Thus, it is very significant to observe that there was a turn towards the CEECs and the promotion of their future accession since that could give the positive image of history-changer and dream-fulfiller that the EU would forever lack in its intervention in Yugoslavia¹¹. Therefore we can say that the gruesome war on European soil during the nineties was the dark side of the medal that had to be hidden by the golden side, represented by the project of re-unifying the East and West of Europe. To some extent, enlargement could have won from that. And that is also why from 2005 onwards there is a high emphasis on the accession of the Balkan countries with the meaning of a pending debt for which it is not even necessary to give reasons or justifications.

In any case, from 1994 till 2000 the CEECs understand that it is time for deepening, clearly explicated by the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and that the Eastward enlargement does not seem to be such an urgent priority for the EU. These countries prepare themselves then for a long and demanding march, marked by a shifting calendar which resembles a permanent waiting room.

However, in the spring of 1998, with the opening of negotiations for five countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Estonia) the enlargement process is given a new impulse. This third phase, which goes from the Nice Treaty of 2001 to the actual entry of the ten first candidate countries in May 2004, is pervaded by a sense of pragmatism and expertise. The negotiators representing the CEECs' governments examine with the Commission officials (under the direction of Commissioner Günter Verheugen) the thirty chapters concerning the conditions for accession. In this period (also marked by the creation of the DG

¹⁰ Woltmann in Koselleck, R. (1985) *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical time*. Baskerville: MIT Press, p.281.

¹¹ Personal interview with the Director of the Directorate B in charge of Candidate Countries at the DG Enlargement of the European Commission. Brussels, 1st of December 2005.

Enlargement at the European Commission in 1999¹²) the enlargement process takes a technical turn that also affects public opinion since it starts to focus on the analysis of the advantages and drawbacks and the costs and benefits of enlargement. The cost-benefit analysis is really overwhelming in the media and in the academic literature of the period, and also very present at the EU institutions, which threatens to lose the conducting thread with the origins and objectives of the democratic changes of 1989¹³. Without an explicit redefinition of the European project and without a communication strategy focusing on the political explanation of enlargement, the EU gives the impression of being imposing a “we know what’s best for you” kind of attitude. The obvious result of such mood is a low support of the citizens within the EU member states, but also, increasingly, in the candidate countries.

2.2. The second factor: The so-called “normative method”

In the aftermath of the disappearance of the “Soviet empire” there are two available options for the EU with regard to the new states knocking on its door: The first option consists of an inclusion in the democratic European club without an actual accession, which could come eventually after long transition periods to fulfil all the necessary adaptations. Meanwhile, the CEECs would only be tied to the EU by an association partnership. The second option consists of promoting the same model as that used for Southern Europe in the eighties and for Northern Europe in the nineties, actual accession in several steps of negotiations to become a full member of the club. This will be the selected option. This model has the advantage of having been partly experimented before, of not clashing with the deepening priorities of the EU in the nineties and of taking the time to decide on the evolution of the process. Nonetheless, it will soon be clear that having to deal with countries, which were well immersed in a totally different political and economic system will need new instruments for unprecedented challenges. Also, new conditionality rules will have to be invented to manage applications and negotiations process. In any case, the creation of a new kind of conditionality is also a way of postponing accession whenever this is convenient for the EU, managing at least the timetable of the process.

The counterpart of such an evolution is that the idea of a unifying encounter of the continent has been substituted by the notion of the EU enlarging itself to charitably integrate the other side of the continent. It is a change from the idea of reinventing democracy over the ruins of totalitarianism implying a re-foundation of the European project (alluding to the “founding myth of the freedom of all peoples as the true fundament of the European project”¹⁴, as sustained by Geremek) to the priority of exporting to Eastern Europe a model of norms and institutions. Such priority, dictated by the understandable need to preserve the internal cohesion of the Union was commonly perceived by the CEECs as the oblivion of the unification priority, which should value more their possible contributions. In Geremek’s words “EU enlargement

¹² Before the creation of the DG Enlargement at the European Commission in 1999, the enlargement process was managed by the DG 1A within the External Relations DG, devoted to the relations with Central and Eastern European countries and assisted by the so-called Task Force on Enlargement.

¹³ See European Commission (2005), *Enlargement: A historic opportunity*, Brussels: BEPA and European Commission (2006), *Enlargement Two Years After*, Brussels: BEPA.

¹⁴ Geremek, B. *Conference on the Foundations of the European Project*, University of Freiburg, 23 April 2001.

policy was perceived in the CEECs as a pure assimilation of new economic and political standards”¹⁵.

In this sense, the reaction of the CEECs could be similar to that of Eastern Germany after reunification, where the feeling of annexation without valued intrinsic contributions was very strong, too. The terminology of the enlargement process also accentuates the normative character of the enterprise: “screening”, “monitoring”, “regular reports”, “adoption of the *acquis*”, and “assessment reports”¹⁶. All those terms also emphasise how performances had a one-sided judge that one must please so that the final assimilation by the bigger entity can be completed. They also suggest a feeling of being under surveillance and of deserving to be punished with postponements if the assimilation process does not fit the conditionality rules. And that was difficult to accept from countries which were under surveillance and under a demanding patron with its own conditionality to punish or reward during long decades. This is maybe one of the main motors of public opinion discontent or reluctance in the CEECs: It is difficult to enjoy a regained sovereignty when a new conditionality is limiting the directions of your recently acquired freedom.

There are also two readings of the process: The first and positive one comes from the modernising elites and the *long durée* historians who see enlargement as a necessary step of the process of modernisation of the economies and institutions of the “suburbs of Europe”¹⁷ always in search of catching up with the Western world. The Polish historian Jerzy Jedlicki calls it “the eternal return of the CEECs towards Europe”¹⁸. The Eastward enlargement of the EU will appear, under this optic as the fourth version of the modernisation of the CEECs after the Habsburgian, Prussian and communist ones. The main difference would be that this time entering the EU can be seen as a “voluntary servitude” since it is a freely consented choice to integrate in European modernity. In this sense, the EU acts as a structural power able to organise the structure of the political economy in the states of the Central-Eastern periphery. This passes through the diffusion of norms to the states and to the social actors, with an impact over the political systems, constituting “norms and nannies”¹⁹ as Ron Linden upheld when explaining the transfers and appropriations of norms in the enlargement process. Following this approach, the enlargement process will become, for political scientists, the finest example of a process of international socialisation.

The second reading of the process privileges the vision of a juridical and economic integration over a political one and represents therefore a danger for European integration. According to Vaclav Havel “Europe falls under the feet of technocracy, under normative rules and administrative procedures that make us forget the essential: the sense of a process of reunification”²⁰. The detachment between democratic change and integration process increases the impression of a hope confiscated by experts and technocrats and made unintelligible for the

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ For more details on the meanings implied by this terminology refer to Bocsey, P. (2002) “Des États sous haut surveillance”, *Le Figaro*, 17 Octobre 2002.

¹⁷ See Jedlicki, J. (2000) *The Suburbs of Europe*, Budapest: Central European University Press.

¹⁸ Jedlicki, J. (1994) “L’éternel retour de la Pologne en Europe” in Rupnik, J. (1994) *L’Autre Europe*, Paris: Seuil, pp. 28-29

¹⁹ Linden, R. (2002) *Norms and Nannies. The Impact of International Organisations on Central and Eastern Europe*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

²⁰ Rupnik, J. (2002) “Entretien avec Vaclav Havel”, *Politique Internationale*, n.98, Hiver 2002-2003, p. 21.

public opinion. This is due to the distance taken in the form of a jargon which cannot be understood by the public and which divides, therefore, EU policy-makers on the one-hand and citizens on the other, having the latter no time to decipher the isolating language of the EU institutions. Thus, increasingly, “the arguments of the euro-sceptic parties of the candidate countries become very similar to those within the EU”²¹.

2.3. The third factor: The absence of a trans-European debate in addition to a static information deficit

The complaints, misunderstandings, and reluctances of the public opinion towards Eastward enlargement are also explained by the poverty of the available information and the absence of a political explanation of enlargement. The role of the media is essential from this point of view. There was not a big interest of the media in the CEECs during the nineties and that could be considered as a good sign of political stability since as it is commonly said “no news means good news”. Hence, democracy in the CEECs goes under a process of trivialisation while media attention is concentrated in the Balkans. “Ignorance is bliss” is a statement generally made regarding the perceptions on enlargement. However, ignorance seems to generate the opposite effect, since a deficit of information linked to a deficit of support has been confirmed by numerous surveys and reports²².

On the other hand, the low support to enlargement in old and new member states could also be explained by the absence of a political debate on the meaning of enlargement and on the redefinition of the European project. And it is curious to observe how the increasing number of all sorts of exchanges and a circulation of persons between both sides of the continent are not mirrored by a debate between the intellectual and political elites of Western and Eastern Europe²³. During the eighties the contacts were more limited but the positions of the great figures of intellectual dissidence had an impact in the West. Today, there are more and more contacts but very limited exchanges of ideas. It is as if after the disappearance of the common adversary -Soviet totalitarianism- we have nothing else to tell to each other, as if the former exchange of ideas with the CEECs was a mere political instrument with a given caducity.

The result is that in fifteen years we have passed from a political view founded on democratic political values to a more technocratic approach which looks tied to the chosen method of enlargement and to the duration of the process.

²¹ See the study of Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2002) “The Party Politics of Euro-scepticism in the EU Member and Candidate States”, *SEI Working Paper*, p. 51.

²² For instance, Mocek, M. (2002) *Les gens dans l'UE ne savent pas grand-chose de nous*. Prague: MDFNES, report in which Michal Mocek confirms that only the 1% of the citizens in the EU member states consider themselves well informed about enlargement and the candidate countries and that two fifths are not interested in receiving any information on the subject.

²³ Personal Interview with the Deputy Head of Unit of the Information Unit at the Information, Communication and Inter-Institutional Relations Unit at the DG Enlargement, European Commission. Brussels, 15th of January 2006

3. Patterns of opinion towards an enlarged Europe

In the post-war period, European integration was positively legitimated by the peace guaranteed by the Franco-German reconciliation and, negatively, to stand against the threat of the Soviet block. The threat has disappeared and the Franco-German reconciliation is no more enough to guarantee peace in the continent, as it could be seen in the case of ex-Yugoslavia. Nowadays, the EU is extending eastwards and a new political identity is being searched, as well as a new legitimacy able to respond to the challenges of the new century: the challenges of European security and the redefinition of the Trans-Atlantic relation, the new challenges to European solidarity and to the European social model and the expectation of a new Constitution and a common European citizenship. Eastward enlargement has somehow become a catalyser for these three realms. During fifteen years the EU helped the transition of the CEECs and today it is the enlargement process that propels the transition of the EU. Unfortunately, the absence of a trans-European debate on EU challenges, linked to the symmetry of the fears towards enlargement and change within the EU, reinforces the reluctances toward the future of the Union. In this sense, there are many contradictory tendencies. For instance, while the old member states are afraid of the paralysis and dissolution of the Union as well as of the future of European budgetary solidarity, the new member states cry for losing their sovereignty and are afraid of being marginalised within the Union.

There is a constant paradox that helps to nuance European divisions. Therefore the analysis of public opinion can be helpful to shed light on significant convergences for the future of European integration. The main questionings which appeared with regard to enlargement in the old member states can be considered legitimate, and are also indispensable to generate a trans-European debate. It is the overlapping of three cleavages on foreign and security policy, on the notion of the need for a European Constitution and on European solidarity which could make that the so much longed for moment of the reunification of the continent (more longed for in the East than in the West of the continent though) does not coincide with fracturing lines within the EU.

The study of the public opinion in the EU shows that most of the fears are related to cleavages between the elites, usually in difficulty in the domestic arena, cleavages that are not so deeply shared by the national societies²⁴. European integration has largely progressed from the approach of the elites to the one of the perplexed and badly informed public opinion. The new fact is that national public opinions are demanding more and better information and communication on EU issues and, as the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty has also shown, they are not willing to accept the detachment between the process of European integration and the voice of the citizens.

In this framework, Eastward enlargement belongs to a series of policies rarely explained and which are formulated as long-term projects. The absence of a long-term view in national politicians, along with an “enlargement fatigue” in many old EU member states do not play in favour of a more transparent communication between the EU and the citizens.

Eastward enlargement, with its unheard of number of candidates and the geopolitical dimension of the project, could not be assimilated as just another natural integration cycle such as that of the single market or the euro. Enlargement also causes doubts and fears but could, on the contrary, provide the necessary impulse to a redefinition of the finalities of European

²⁴ Refer to Petersen, T. (2002) “Die öffentliche Meinung” in Weidenfeld, W and Wessels, W. (eds.) (2002) *Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration 2001-2002*. Berlin: Europa Union Verlag, pp. 295-296.

integration and of the legitimacy of the European project. In this sense, we could maybe speak about a European public opinion but not yet of a European public space.

At this point it is clear that Eastward enlargement is not an enlargement process as the previous ones. It marks the materialisation of a historical change marked by the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of the Cold War and of the division of Germany. It is an ambitious and admirable decision, especially from the point of view of its antecedents in European History and what it represents for the new member states.

After half a century under the communist regime, the reactions to it were featured by the revolts of Berlin in 1953, of Budapest and Poznan in 1956, of Gdansk in 1980 (which accompanied the creation of *Solidarnosc*), and culminated in the resistance movements of 1989, usually considered an *annus mirabilis*. The year 1989 is characterised by the retreat of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the round tables of Hungary and Poland preparing the road for democracy, and the fall of the toughest communist regimes in the Czech Republic, the GDR and in the Romania of Ceausescu. The peoples who are now entering the European Union are the same ones that thought their resistance contributed to put an end to the Cold War. Then there is the impression that a peaceful and liberal revolution is transforming the European landscape.

For the peoples of the CEECs the accession to the EU means the real end to the order of Yalta, inherited from WWII. For them Yalta symbolised a regime imposed against their will as well as the division of Europe. They have not participated to the order of Yalta and have been submitted with the more or less clear acquiescence of the Western world. Hence, the Eastward enlargement of the EU is seen, at the beginning of the nineties as the means of superseding the divisions of Yalta and of European history in the past century.

In this very first period of the transition Eastward enlargement was understood by the CEECs as a courageous decision imbued with an essential element of hope. It was the moment of the re-encounter for the European family but, with the approach of the accession date that enthusiasm would blur in an atmosphere of disappointment and mutual reluctances. It was as if Europe was afraid of its own courageous decisions. This fear was not so much the fruit of the concrete new member states accessing the EU but of the challenges of an enlarged Union in a new global context. At its origins, the horizon of European integration was defined by the search of a durable peace in the continent, summarised in the original premise of making war impossible at the European home place. Half a century later, pragmatism seems to prevail and the new issues are no longer formulated in so dramatic terms. In this sense, Eastward enlargement offers the chance to use the new pragmatism to make ancient divisions disappear but also, step by step to dissolve a history sustained in the fear and the hate to the Other, whoever this is.

The results of public opinion surveys regarding enlargement in the CEECs reveals what Bronislaw Geremek has defined as “a hope deficit”.²⁵ In this context, he emphasizes the role of hope in European integration as well as in politics more generally, suggesting it might serve to measure the level of democratic stability while emphasising the role of hope in European integration as well as in politics to measure the level of democratic stability.

But hope is something that could be encouraged with a good political will and it is then a lack that the EU could fill, maybe through the question of determining which could be the

²⁵ “What Next? A new Sound?”, Intervention of Bronislaw Geremek in the International Inaugural Conference of the Austrian Presidency of the EU *The Sound of Europe*, celebrated in Salzburg on the 27 and 28 January 2006.

genuine contributions of the CEECs to the EU. Whenever this question is posed to the political leaders of the CEECs, they reply that they provide the experience of resistance to totalitarianism and a different sensibility and political culture that brings a fresh attitude and a new perspective on European integration²⁶. However, especially in the opinion of the old member states they are said to provide many new problems. The political priority of the CEECs has largely focused on security, which seems to be a vital need. In the eyes of the CEECs NATO is the European alliance *par excellence*, which incarnates trans-Atlantic solidarity and the CEECs, because of the security needs of their history, continue to see the American presence in the continent as something inescapable.

Such perspective does not diminish their attachment to the European project but the CEECs' citizens, after the end of the Cold war uphold a strong European Union and solid institutions and policies, because they could ensure the material and political solidarity needed by these countries which consider themselves as having been "punished" by History.

Enlargement entails two essential dimensions for the "principle of hope" of the CEECs: First of all, they see the catching up of the CEECs with Western Europe as one of the most formidable challenges in the modern history of the continent, which is full of new positive potentialities for the whole Union. However, the public opinion of the CEECs thinks that such aspiration do not find correspondence in the reluctances and even discriminations of some old member states.

The initial EU policies oriented towards the reduction of economic disparities in the levels of prosperity within the Union are being contrasted with a reduction of a solidarity priority towards the CEECs as the document on the *Inter-institutional Agreement and the Financial Perspective 2007-2013* shows²⁷. In the eyes of the CEECs the moderation of the solidarity policies could be partly explained by the difficulties of the European economic conjuncture but that should not overshadow the need of making also the political disparities disappear between the two sides of the continent. The EU finds itself, also because of the defeat of the constitutional initiative, at the crossroads and the CEECs cannot understand that the historical change that their entry implies is not equated with challenging policies which at least acknowledge their existence²⁸.

The second dimension of the "principle of hope" in the CEECs regards the changing nature of the Union and the question of its new frontiers. The CEECs know that they are part of a dynamic process of enlargement and after May 2004 see how the accession efforts are more focused on integrating Turkey and the Balkans as soon as possible than on deepening the relations with the CEECs, making sure that their needs are being met and that their aspirations are now part of the common EU policies. One manifestation of such feeling lies in the fact that the DG Enlargement of the EU, since 2005, is focusing in the new wave of Enlargement towards Turkey and the Balkans and is not dealing so much with CEECs' issues. This is

²⁶ CEORG, *Attitudes towards EU Membership in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: High Participation in Referendum, Stable or Decreasing Support*. Published in December 2002, pp. 10-12.

²⁷ An example of that could be the discussions and decisions on the EU budget for the period 2007-2013, which were taken without nearly no considering the needs of a Union of 25 member states. See *Inter-institutional Agreement and the Financial Perspective 2007-2013*. Committee on Budgets. European Parliament. Meeting of Wednesday 11 January 2006, Brussels, BUDG/6/22765. Draft Resolution PE 367.813v01-00.

²⁸ Personal Interview with the Director General of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission. Brussels, 25th of February 2006.

naturally explained by the Commission officials²⁹ by saying that since they are members in their full right after May 2004, the CEECs do not need any special guidance or treatment within the EU institutions and particularly from the Commission. But, on the other hand, the CEECs are not so much full members since, for the first time in European integration history, they are experiencing transition periods which, in timing and conditions, are totally unprecedented and which are applied in very important fields such as the free movement of labour within the Union and environmental measures³⁰. The other Commission DGs apart from DG Enlargement declare that they have neither the time nor the resources to deal with the complexities of the CEECs' transitions periods, which should be considered a matter that requires an exclusive attention. The DG Enlargement, with the justification that they are not any more candidate countries says they are not their direct competence. Hence, the political leaders of the CEECs strongly complain about the lack of exclusive attention after their accession, which was previously considered as a major historical event. They feel that the EU, and especially the Commission, do not want to be disturbed with their complex digestion while they are under pressure to assimilate more member states in a speedy sort of fashion. At the end the CEECs governments feel that nobody is actually dealing with the particular problems of their gradual accession since most Commission DGs deal with the Union as a whole and DG Enlargement is devoted to a next wave of Enlargement which is, once again, presented as a historical opportunity³¹.

It seems as if every new generation of Europeans is forcefully being invited to answer the question of the limits of the European Union. Geographically, the fact that Turkey belongs to Europe is not so self-evident and the sole idea of sharing borders with Iran and Iraq is considered off-putting for many EU member states' public opinions. The new wave of enlargement also poses the question of EU-Russia relations and again sees Russia as the new probable "natural" border of EU. Such questions are related to the old issue of the "absorption capacity",³² which appeared for the first time in the *Conclusions of the Presidency* of the European Council of Copenhagen of 1993. In this document we can see, for the first time, a direct allusion to the need to delimitate the physical and axiological frontiers of the Union. In 1993 the Copenhagen Criteria tried to define the conditions for eventual candidates for EU accession. In 2002, the Laeken Declaration stated that the frontiers of the EU halt where democracy and human rights are not respected. But this is a very vague definition. Democracy and human rights should not better be a monopoly of Europe, but a desired characteristic of all regions of the world. Thus, the fact that they continue beyond any "European" frontier does not mean that Europe has extended its values but that other parts of the world do not differ that

²⁹ Personal interview with the Director of the Directorate B in charge of Candidate Countries at the DG Enlargement of the European Commission. Brussels, 1st of December 2005.

³⁰ For a source of comparison with previous enlargements, please, refer to *Determinant Facts and Success Stories demonstrating the benefits of Enlargement for the 25 + 2*. Report elaborated by the Information, Communication and Inter-Institutional Relations Unit of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission, Brussels, p. 12

³¹ See for instance Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (Warsaw, 22 May 2002). *Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (Warsaw, 22 May 2002) Joint Statement*. [ON-LINE]. [Riga]: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, [23.05.2005]. Available on <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/eu/news/4308/>

³² European Council of Copenhagen (21 and 22 June 1993) *Conclusions of the Presidency. Section on Enlargement, SN 180/93*. Brussels: Council of the European Communities, 1993, p. 2.

much from those principles, which they also have the right to call theirs. Where then is the axiological frontier of the EU?

Maybe it is the notion of “community” itself, which accompanies this entity since its creation. The EU is, above all, a political and economic community, a community of laws, a community of interests but, essentially a community of values and common memories. And that could be a key notion for the new member states. They became, above all, part of a community, finally acknowledged through the enlargement process. It is a community that constructed itself, historically, through the reconciliation of the interconnected memories of all its members, within a spirit of mutual solidarity and the aspiration of a shared identity based on a history of interactions that cannot be neglected.

Conclusion

The Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski raised the following question: “If we would like the EU to be not just a place for money temples and the stock exchange, but also a place where material prosperity is surrounded by art and is used to help the poor, if we want freedom of speech, which can so easily be misused to propagate lies and evil, as well as being used for inspiring works -then, what is to be done?”³³.

This question, which can be reduced to the question “Why the European Union?” continues to be replied with the standard (but still legitimate and meaningful) response “peace and prosperity”.

At the same time many voices are asking out loud whether today’s European Union is not too much an answer to the concerns of the past and too little an answer to the challenges of the future³⁴. This very important observation is the conducting thread of the EU Communication Strategy on Enlargement and the reactions to it. Since the EU Communication Strategy on Enlargement has proved to be neither efficient nor successful at the level of the EU 25 public opinion we are to pose the question³⁵ “Was it again giving more answers to the concerns of the past and little answers of the fears and expectations projected into the future?” In any case, we can observe how it recreates again the “making History claims” typical of Eastward Enlargement justifications.

In this circulation of information there is an incipient phenomenon that surpasses the intended effect of finding a professional communication and public relations system able to provide the two-way communication on European issues ideally dreamt by the so-called “Plan-D”³⁶ to put in connection the Union and the citizens. And this phenomenon, surprisingly enough

³³ Kolakowski, L in Lendvai, P. (2006) (ed.) *The Sound of Europe. International Conference of the Austrian Presidency of the EU, Salzburg, 27-28 January 2006. A Documentation*, Wien: Europäische Rundschau, p. 46. For more information and the full conference proceedings go to Austria’s EU Presidency website: www.eu2006.at

³⁴ Personal interview with the Chief Advisor of the Information, Communication and Inter-Institutional Relations Unit of the DG Enlargement at the European Commission. Brussels, 15 November 2005.

³⁵ Personal Interview with the Deputy Head of Unit of the Information, Communication and Inter-Institutional Relations Unit at the DG Enlargement, European Commission. Brussels, 15th of January 2006.

³⁶ Nowadays, we can observe an open and committed prioritisation of the EU institutions to build a solid two-ways communication bridge between the citizens and the institutions through policy actions like the creation of a DG Communication at the European Commission, initiatives such as the Commission White Paper on Communication, the European Commission Plan D (to promote Democracy, Dialogue and Debate), etc. For more information on the features and objectives of the Plan D, please, refer to

for the EU institutional actors, does not come from what they call “their communicative actions” but from a growingly trans-European network of reactions which want to make their voice heard and go from conformist witnesses to actual actors of the process. This incipient European public opinion, which is modifying the direction of an integration process that has changed European society without, in many cases, entailing its involvement, is maybe opening a new phase in the history of European Integration. We might be witnessing the new born imperative of a “dialogued integration”.

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La société civile a-t-elle pris le pouvoir symbolique dans l'UE? Essai d'analyse à travers le débat sur les frontières de l'Union

Axel Marion

La définition des frontières extérieures est aujourd'hui au cœur des débats sur l'avenir de l'Union européenne. Initié par la chute du mur de Berlin et alimenté par les élargissements successifs vers l'Est puis l'ouverture de négociations avec la Turquie, ce sujet hautement passionnel touche tout à la fois à l'identité européenne, à la conception que l'on se fait de l'Union (puissance politique ou marché commun ?) et à son rôle dans le concert international, en particulier vis-à-vis de son environnement proche.

Or, on peut constater que ce débat est aujourd'hui marqué par les acteurs non-étatiques, ou autrement dit la « société civile » (partis politiques, élites intellectuelles, médias et opinion publique) autant que par les gouvernements et les administrations nationales. Alors que ces derniers tendent à se concentrer sur les aspects techniques liés à l'accessibilité ou non d'un pays candidat (critères de Copenhague, acquis communautaire, etc.), la société civile se saisit de la question sur un plan plus fondamental, faisant appel à la pertinence politique, géopolitique, voire philosophique de tel ou tel élargissement. Cette « division des tâches » interpelle d'autant plus que la construction européenne a historiquement mis en évidence le rôle des gouvernements et hommes d'Etats, davantage que celui de la société civile¹.

Cette affirmation de la société civile ne se limite pas à la question des frontières de l'Union. Le débat autour du projet de Constitution européenne, notamment, a mis en évidence le poids des élites non-gouvernementales dans la formation des opinions publiques. L'émergence des mouvements anti-libéraux (qui se sont illustrés par exemple dans la lutte contre la directive Bolkenstein²), cumulée à l'opposition « classique » des nationalistes, a influencé en profondeur le regard porté sur l'Union européenne dans la population.

Ce constat tendrait à signifier qu'une évolution s'est opérée dans le leadership que l'on pourrait appeler « symbolique » de l'Union – c'est-à-dire les réflexions de fond sur sa forme, son avenir et son identité – celui-ci s'étant déplacé des sphères étatiques et gouvernementales vers les élites intellectuelles³, non-gouvernementales, et par le truchement des médias, vers l'opinion publique. Notre propos sera ainsi d'interroger la pertinence de cette hypothèse, en étudiant l'évolution de la question des frontières extérieures de l'Union de 1957 à aujourd'hui ainsi que le rôle comparatif des acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques dans ce débat. Nous tenterons au final de discerner si les changements paradigmatiques survenus depuis 1989 ont eu un impact notable sur leurs rapports de force symboliques.

¹ L'historiographie classique a contribué à cette situation en insistant sur le rôle des acteurs étatiques. Cette tendance est aujourd'hui en cours de révision - à l'exemple du congrès dans lequel s'inscrit cet article (« European Voices : Actors and Witnesses of European Integration », HEIRS, Genève, mars 2007)

² Directive élaborée par le Commissaire européen Bolkenstein, visant à instaurer la liberté d'établissement et de circulation des services au sein de l'Union européenne, et approuvée en 2003 par le Conseil.

³ Il ne s'agit pas ici de minimiser le rôle des intellectuels dans les premières étapes de l'intégration européenne. Voir à ce propos : Bachoud, Andrée (dir.), *Les intellectuels et l'Europe de 1945 à nos jours*, Publ. Universitaires Denis Diderot, Paris, 2000

Evolution de la problématique des frontières extérieures

La question des frontières de l'Europe n'a pas constitué un enjeu majeur durant les trois premières décennies de la construction européenne. La division de l'Europe en deux blocs antagonistes rendait par avance inutiles – ou à tout le moins anachroniques – les réflexions sur les limites « fondamentales » de l'Europe en tant qu'ensemble territorial et culturel⁴. Les gouvernants étaient bien davantage préoccupés à fonder un espace de paix et de prospérité entre pays que tout opposait jusqu'alors – sauf précisément l'identité indiscutablement européenne. Les rédacteurs du Traité de Rome ont ainsi pu se contenter d'indiquer que « *tout Etat européen peut demander à devenir membre de la Communauté*⁵ », sans donner aucune précision sur la nature de « l'eupéanité » ainsi évoquée. Par la suite, si les élargissements de 1973 au Nord et de 1981-86 au Sud ont occasionnés des débats nourris, ces derniers avaient trait à des motifs politiques (l'opposition gaulliste à la Grande-Bretagne) ou économiques (crainte de la concurrence agricole de l'Espagne et du Portugal) et non à l'identité européenne des nouveaux arrivants.

En comparaison, la question des frontières intérieures constituait un enjeu bien plus capital. La disparition progressive des frontières entre pays membres constituait un défi de taille pour des Etats-nations dont les querelles de territoires avaient précisément provoqué tant de conflits. De la défense de l'identité nationale à la protection de l'économie intérieure, les méfiances que suscitait la construction d'un espace « partagé » étaient infiniment plus présentes aux yeux des Européens que la définition des limites théoriques de cet espace.

La chute du bloc communiste, dans les années 1989-1991, va renverser complètement la problématique. Le double phénomène, simultané, de la disparition du rideau de fer (facteur géographique de division du continent) et de la victoire du modèle économique et sociétal occidental (facteur idéologique) a ouvert la voie à l'expansion de l'Union européenne à l'Est. Bien que l'élargissement effectif ait demandé près de quinze années, la perspective d'une Union étendue aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale a rapidement fait son chemin dans l'inconscient collectif européen. L'idée fondamentale selon laquelle l'Europe occidentale avait une responsabilité dans la réhabilitation économique et l'accompagnement démocratique de ces Etats – ne serait-ce que pour veiller à sa propre sécurité – était largement partagée. Au-delà de l'action d'autres organes comme le Conseil de l'Europe, l'OTAN ou l'OSCE, l'Union européenne était perçue comme l'instrument le plus abouti pour réaliser cette tâche⁶.

Cet horizon nouveau pour la construction européenne a fait surgir d'un quasi-néant la question des frontières extérieures. L'Union grandissante commençant à coïncider toujours plus avec les frontières géographiques communément admises du continent (avec évidemment de grosses exceptions et approximations), l'idée s'est progressivement installée dans les esprits que l'Europe en tant que construction institutionnelle et l'Europe en tant qu'espace géographique et culturel n'allait peut-être bientôt plus faire qu'un. Le souci de cohérence de l'ensemble, la crainte qu'en dépassant les frontières « naturelles » du continent on fasse entrer

⁴ Les fondateurs de la Communauté européenne n'en concevaient pas moins l'Europe comme un ensemble malgré le rideau de fer : on se souvient notamment de la vision gaullienne d'une Europe « de l'Atlantique à l'Oural ».

⁵ Art.237 du Traité original instituant la Communauté économique européenne.

⁶ Le principe de l'extension de la Communauté européenne aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale avait déjà été exprimé, entre autres, par Robert Schuman : « *Non seulement nous devons faire l'Europe dans l'intérêt des peuples libres, mais nous devons aussi pouvoir y accueillir les peuples de l'Europe de l'Est. Quand ceux-ci se seront libérés du pouvoir auquel ils sont assujettis à ce jour, ils nous demanderont leur adhésion et leur appui, pas uniquement moral* ». Cité in Audisio, Giuseppe et Chiara, Alberto, *Les Fondateurs de l'Europe Unie selon le projet de Jean Monnet*, Paris, Salvator, 2004

un « corps étranger » qui mette en péril le fragile équilibre européen, s'est installé dans de nombreux esprits. Le souci de définir précisément si tel ou tel Etat pouvait être ou non considéré comme européen a dès lors pris de l'ampleur, sortant du champ gouvernemental et, pour ainsi dire, « technique », pour envahir l'espace politique et citoyen.

L'affirmation de la société civile dans le processus de construction européenne

L'arrivée de cette problématique dans le débat citoyen n'est pas un hasard. Les années 1990 ont également marqué l'affirmation de la société civile et de l'opinion publique en tant qu'acteurs à part entière de la vie de l'Union, alors que leur rôle avait été plus discret lors des décennies précédentes. Le rôle déterminant joué par les gouvernants (les fameux « pères de l'Europe ») dans les premières années de la construction européenne explique certainement en partie cet état de fait. D'autre part, l'approche fonctionnaliste alors suivie, privilégiant des éléments économiques et techniques souvent abscons aux grandes questions philosophiques sur le devenir de l'Europe, ne créait pas un environnement propice aux débats de fond intéressant les citoyens. Enfin, le conflit Est-Ouest occupait bien davantage les esprits : la nécessité d'une vaste unité du « monde libre » (englobant évidemment les Etats-Unis) face au « péril rouge » relativisait aux yeux du public les enjeux du marché commun.

Les bouleversements des années 1989-1991 vont modifier cette situation en profondeur. L'ouverture de « l'espace européen » et la responsabilité nouvelle des pays d'Europe occidentale par rapport à leurs voisins orientaux a suscité, on l'a évoqué, des réflexions sur l'identité et le destin de l'Union européenne. Ces questionnements vont être renforcés par la remise en question du lien transatlantique, suite à la fin de la guerre froide et au passage à un univers multipolaire. D'autre part, entre crise économique et réapparition des mouvements nationalistes, les premiers doutes sur le bien-fondé de la construction européenne ont commencé à surgir⁷. L'Union européenne, devant se réinventer un rôle géopolitique dans un monde transformé, se substituant toujours davantage aux Etats-nations dans leur mission historique, devenait le réceptacle tout à la fois de questions, de craintes et d'ambitions nouvelles. La société civile, les médias et l'opinion publique ne pouvaient pas manquer de s'engouffrer dans ce vaste débat.

Les conditions-cadres pour cet élargissement du débat public étaient d'ailleurs de plus en plus favorables. L'apparition de votes populaires sur les sujets européens – à l'exemple du scrutin français sur le Traité de Maastricht en 1992 – a permis de susciter de vastes débats et d'amener sur la place publique les différentes visions possibles de la construction européenne. Le développement des médias, et notamment d'Internet à partir du milieu des années 1990, a également étendu les espaces possibles d'échanges et d'informations pour le grand public.

Peut-on parler d'évolution des rapports de pouvoir symbolique ?

Au vu des éléments ci-dessus, on peut donc formuler l'hypothèse d'une évolution schématique entre : 1) une Communauté européenne (1957-1989) fondée sur l'approche fonctionnaliste, peu préoccupée par la question des frontières extérieures et avec une opinion publique plutôt en retrait, et : 2) une Union européenne contemporaine, soucieuse de son identité et de son avenir politique, dont la définition des frontières extérieures est devenue un enjeu et dans laquelle la société civile et l'opinion publique ont gagné en importance.

⁷ Du moins se sont renforcés, si l'on considère que les critiques de la construction européenne ont toujours existé.

Il est légitime de se demander si cette évolution a eu des implications sur les rapports de force entre gouvernants et société civile au sein de l'Union, et en particulier si elle a impliqué un transfert du pouvoir symbolique dans le mécanisme de la construction européenne. Par « pouvoir symbolique », nous entendons ici l'ascendant exercé par un acteur sur la conscience collective des citoyens, par opposition aux pouvoirs « effectifs » en mains des responsables politiques ou économiques. En d'autres termes, le pouvoir symbolique touche aux valeurs, à la détermination de l'opinion des personnes sur lesquelles il est exercé (équivalent, en quelque sorte, du *soft power*) et non à la gestion quotidienne des affaires de la cité (*hard power*)⁸.

La période 1957-1989, on l'a vu, semble témoigner d'une concomitance entre pouvoir symbolique et pouvoir effectif. L'idée européenne était avant tout portée par ceux-là même qui mettaient en œuvre sa réalisation : les dirigeants politiques et les administrations publiques. La synthèse de la vision et de la mise en pratique était d'autant plus probable que les objectifs fondamentaux de cette période – fonder un espace commun de paix et de prospérité économique via une approche fonctionnaliste des problèmes – coïncidaient en grande partie avec les pouvoirs effectifs des gouvernants et des Etats. La situation change après 1989, et la question des frontières extérieures en est une bonne illustration. Si l'élargissement vers les Etats d'Europe centrale et orientale a bel et bien été pensé dans les chancelleries, ses implications ont rapidement été débattues par les élites intellectuelles puis par les médias. En parallèle aux considérations économiques liées à la pauvreté de ces pays, les questions identitaires ont commencé à susciter un intense débat : « Ces pays sont certes européens au sens géographique, mais partage-t-on la même culture ? », « leur passé idéologique est-il compatibles avec nos valeurs ? », « ne vont-ils pas mettre en péril notre édifice européen ? ».

Les Etats et les gouvernants se sont rapidement trouvés empruntés face à ces questions. En effet, leurs atouts tendent à disparaître à mesure que le débat sort des cadres techniques et diplomatiques pour rentrer dans le passionnel. De même, des motifs de politique intérieure peuvent contraindre l'Etat à faire preuve d'une grande prudence⁹. Cependant, les gouvernements peuvent faire valoir certaines positions. En définissant des critères normatifs d'adhésion, les chancelleries peuvent prétendre défendre les valeurs d'égalité et de justice qui sont au cœur du projet européen, tout en assurant la stabilité du débat et la défense des intérêts de l'Union. Les dirigeants peuvent également se permettre en certaines occasions de s'affranchir de la ligne officielle en faisant connaître leur avis personnel, ce qui leur permet de peser dans le débat. Ces différents éléments, qui tous peuvent avoir un impact symbolique sur l'opinion publique, ne suffisent cependant pas à conserver aux gouvernements la maîtrise du débat. Les citoyens n'attendent pas (ou plus) des Etats les réponses concernant par exemple une définition claire des frontières extérieures de l'Union.

A l'inverse, la société civile s'est imposée comme un intervenant incontournable sur les grands enjeux européens actuels. Celle-ci comprend en substance les producteurs de concepts (intellectuels, universitaires, mais également politiciens sans charge gouvernementale), les relais (médias traditionnels et électroniques, éditeurs) et les destinataires (la population) qui donnent au final la résonance aux idées. Cet ensemble d'acteurs – à la fois complémentaires et très différents tant sur la forme que sur le fond – a pris une importance considérable dans la vie quotidienne des européens. Sur de nombreux sujets à connotation identitaire, sociétale, ou impliquant l'avenir de l'Union, comme par exemple la libre circulation des personnes, la place de l'Islam en Europe, la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune ou encore les relations avec

⁸ Nous reprenons ici les concepts développés par Joseph Nye sur le « Hard » et le « Soft » Power. Voir Nye, Joseph S., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, PublicAffairs, 2004

⁹ La présence d'une importante minorité turque en Allemagne, ou le ressentiment encore vif des Grecs vis-à-vis des Turcs conditionnent par exemple l'attitude de ces deux Etats vis-à-vis de l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union.

les Etats-Unis, les faiseurs d'opinion ont au moins autant de poids que les gouvernants. Au-delà du thème des frontières extérieures, le plus bel exemple concerne le débat sur le Traité constitutionnel en France et aux Pays-Bas. Au terme de campagnes intenses, les citoyens ont désavoué les gouvernements et les principales formations politiques, qui soutenaient le texte. Le pouvoir symbolique de la société civile est apparu ici d'autant plus fort qu'il a emporté une victoire sur le plan du pouvoir effectif, en dictant *in fine* à l'Etat sa conduite. Il semble évident que le débat sur l'adhésion de la Turquie, déjà bien présent dans les médias, suivra ce modèle et gagnera en importance ces prochaines années¹⁰.

Peut-on dès lors établir que, pour les raisons décrites ci-dessus, le pouvoir symbolique des Etats s'est amenuisé au profit de la société civile à partir du moment où certaines questions politiques, identitaires et sociétales ont gagné en importance ? En tous les cas, l'impact de l'opinion publique européenne n'est plus sous-estimé par les gouvernants¹¹. Les eurobaromètres sont des outils de travail toujours plus indispensables pour la Commission et les Etats-membres. Dans de nombreux Etats, les referenda populaires sur les sujets européens deviennent tabous, ou sont perçus à l'inverse comme des moyens de faire échouer certains projets. Les citoyens eux-mêmes revendiquent le droit d'être plus étroitement informés et impliqués dans les processus décisionnels européens¹². Et lorsque certains responsables politiques de premier plan s'en remettent à l'opinion publique pour déterminer leur vision de l'Union¹³, on ne peut qu'admettre une évolution profonde des rapports de force entre gouvernants et société civile depuis ces quinze dernières années. Si ce constat ne permet certes pas d'affirmer que le pouvoir symbolique a changé de main, il conforte cependant le sentiment que l'avenir de l'Union se construira en partenariat entre gouvernants et société civile, ou ne sera pas.

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¹⁰ Voir à ce sujet : Brodsky, Lauren, 'The role of the International Media and Public Opinion in the debate over Turkey's EU membership' in *Insight Turkey*, vol.8, no.3, July-September 2006, pp.16-27

¹¹ Jacques Chirac a par exemple admis que qu'il n'a « peut-être pas fait tout ce qu'il aurait fallu » pour éviter le non à la Constitution (in *Le Temps*, Genève, 10 mars 2007). De même, le commissaire européen Olli Rehn déclarait en janvier 2006 devant la London School of Economics : « The EU's ability to respond to its citizens must increase (...) » (in *Insight Turkey*, vol.8, n°1, January-March 2006, p.34)

¹² Voir à ce sujet : l'Eurobaromètre « Les citoyens européens et l'avenir de l'Europe », mai 2006

¹³ On peut penser entre autres à Mme Ségolène Royal, candidate à la Présidence de la République française en 2007, déclarant que sa position concernant l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union européenne était « celle des Français ».

Habermas' dream or Habermas' nightmare? A transnational, participatory European public sphere at the Maastricht European Council 1991?

Jan-Henrik Meyer

Maastricht and the European public sphere

At the Summit of Maastricht in 1991, the European Community turned itself into the European Union. In the wake of the successful Single Market Programme and against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War, European integration made a quantum leap. The projects of Economic and Monetary Union as well as Political Union had been on the Community's agenda at least since 1969. However, these proposals were never fully turned into practice. On the basis of detailed plans that had been prepared by Jacques Delors in collaboration with the heads of the Central Banks from the late 1980s onwards, EMU was agreed – with a British opt-out clause – and subsequently actually implemented (Dyson and Featherstone 1999), despite the doubts of contemporary observers (e.g. Thoma 1991) and the EC's record of failing plans.

The German government insisted on advances on Political Union. Although the EU did introduce Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), these policy areas remained within the intergovernmental second and third pillars of the EU's new temple structure. Maastricht also created European citizenship – allowing citizens from other member states to vote in local and European elections wherever they reside within the Union. Quite controversially, the new treaty introduced basic standards for workers via the Social Chapter. Also here, the new British Prime Minister John Major achieved an opt-out – not least in order to prove to his still largely Thatcherite Party that he was just as tough a negotiator as had been the Iron Lady.

Although the governments entered the elusive "subsidiarity clause" (Jachtenfuchs 1992: 281-283) into the treaty to avoid an erosion of national competences, critics expressed qualms that the EU was increasingly becoming a European "superstate". The intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) strengthened the role of the European Parliament (EP) with the introduction of the co-decision procedure. Still, increasingly there were doubts about a "democratic deficit" – a mismatch between the continued weakness of democratic control and the EU's growing decision-making powers (Dinan 2004: 245-262). In the aftermath of Maastricht, the debate on the European democratic deficit gained great momentum. Support for European integration in the polls had been declining, as epitomised by the "ratification crisis" – the Danish "No" (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Ratering 1994). A central element in the debate was the apparent lack of a societal basis on which European democracy could rest. The German constitutional court's "no demos" argument – stipulating that the absence of a "European people" imposed limits on the legitimacy European-level democracy – is but one case in point (Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995: 9-14).

In this context, critics also pointed to the lack of a *European public sphere*, which they deemed necessary for Europeans to form an informed opinion on European politics. Their central argument was that because Europe lacked common media, a common language and a common identity, a European public sphere was absent and unlikely to emerge (Grimm 1995: 294-296). At best, it was "lagging behind" Europe's political and economic integration (Gerhards 2000: 280-286). This claim has triggered a wave of research on the European public sphere that focused on specific debates in the latter half of the 1990s and the early 2000s. This research has demonstrated that with respect to media coverage on European integration, there is evidence of an emerging European public sphere – characterised by substantial relevance of European issues, and frequently also simultaneously shared agendas across borders (Kantner 2006; Steeg 2006).

This paper provides a case study on the European public sphere at the time of the Maastricht European Council, which marks the transition to greater political importance of the EC and greater public awareness of European affairs. Maastricht can safely be assumed to have

been a focal point for the European public sphere in the early 1990s. The aim of this case study is not only to show to that the summit itself was discussed in a European public sphere of the media in France, Germany and Britain. The main goal is to assess the "quality" of the European public sphere, in two respects: First, to what extent was this public sphere transnationally integrated, rather than consisting of distinct national debates? Second, to what extent was it participatory, discussing the views of actors beyond governments? In the following I will first explain the theoretical concept of the European public sphere, the normative assumptions about its democratic quality and the ways to examine transnational communication. Subsequently, I will present evidence that allows for an assessment of these criteria concerning the European public sphere at the Maastricht European Council.

Habermas' Dream: A transnational, participatory European public sphere

The European public sphere can be understood as a sphere of communication, in which European politics, i.e. the affairs of the European polity are addressed (Eder 2003: 85). The European public sphere can therefore simply defined by its contents. Communication, information and debate on European affairs are necessary to enable citizens to form their opinion on European policy-making (and polity-building). This is essentially a basic precondition for democracy at the European level, regardless whether it concerns participation in European elections, or via other avenues of participation.¹

Two normative criteria are central in evaluating the role of the European public sphere as a precondition for European democracy. First, for a European public sphere to be not only European in its contents, but also European in scope, transnational communication is key. Without transnational interaction, the European public sphere would simply consist of distinct national pillars. Communication would take place solely within the national framework, but not across the European space. A second normative criterion stems from Habermas' "discursive" concept of the public sphere. Ideally, participation should include as wide a range of citizens and societal actors as possible. It should not only be limited to governments, but involve civil society (Habermas 1995: 306).

Empirically, these two criteria that describe the quality of the European public sphere can appear in different combinations. We can systematically map them in a two-by-two matrix:

Table 1 Conceivable combinations of transnational communication and participation in the European Public Sphere

	<i>national communication</i>	<i>transnational communication</i>
<i>broad participation</i>	Domestic debate on Europe, broad participation of societal actors	Transnational debate on Europe, broad transnational participation of societal actors – Habermas' Dream
<i>narrow participation</i>	Domestic, government-dominated debate on Europe – Habermas' Nightmare	Transnational debate on Europe, dominated by governments

"Habermas' dream", namely a normatively ideal version of a European public sphere would be a public sphere that is both participatory and transnational. It would comprise a broad range of views on which opinions can be formed (Habermas 2001). Conversely, "Habermas' nightmare" would be a nationally distinct and government-dominated public sphere. Given that this case study looks at the European public sphere discussing an intergovernmental event, we can expect that journalists cover the views of their own and foreign governments, who are the bargaining partners. Hence, the expectable outcome is a transnational public sphere, still largely dominated by governments. Such a result would be located somewhere in between dream and

¹ It is also relevant for intergovernmental bargaining at the European Council, although, formally, the negotiators are accountable to national parliaments, as long as decisions are taken by unanimity.

nightmare. It would imply that there is evidence of transnational integration of the European public sphere. However, this public sphere would not be very participatory and hence democratically deficient according to the criteria of the "discursive" concept of the public sphere (Gerhards 1997, 2002).

How can these theoretical notions be studied empirically? Most research on the European public sphere has focused on the mass media, particularly newspapers, not least because it is via the media that people learn and form an opinion on the EU. Researchers have applied different indicators to demonstrate the existence, or to assess the quality of a European public sphere (Machill, Beiler and Fischer 2006; Meyer 2004, 2007b; Sift et al. 2007; Trez 2005a, b). The most basic criterion by which to measure the "magnitude" of the European public sphere is the amount of coverage on European integration. A more sophisticated criterion has been developed by Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner (2000: 315). They follow Habermas (1995: 306) in arguing that the effective formation of opinion across Europe requires that "the same issues" must be discussed "at the same time" "at similar levels of attention".² While this criterion is surely a necessary one, it is not entirely sufficient for arguing that the European public sphere is in fact a transnational one. As indicated above, the same issues could also be discussed at the same time at a similar level of attention in parallel but nationally distinct European public spheres (Steeg 2005: 27-30). Therefore, additionally we have to examine whether other actors' views and opinions are also taken into account and discussed across borders (Wimmel 2004, 2005, 2006).

The empirical basis for such an inquiry is a case study of the commentary³ on the European Council of Maastricht 1991 in British, German and French broadsheet newspapers, namely *The Guardian*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* in a two-week period around the event. The analysis of the European public sphere will proceed in three steps: First, I will assess to what extent the media coverage fulfils the basic criterion of the European public sphere, namely, to what extent the same issues receive the same level of attention. Second, I will examine, to what extent transnational interaction can be demonstrated across the media. "Transnational intermedia references" indicate that journalists take note of and even actively discuss issues presented in the media in other European countries. Comments by foreign external contributors are another mode of transnational communication. The third step of the analysis seeks to find out, whether the European public sphere at Maastricht was closer to "Habermas' dream" or to "Habermas' nightmare". Did the media discuss the actors' views across borders? This gives evidence of transnational communication. Did the media also take note of societal actors' opinions? This may serve as an indication of a participatory European public sphere.

² Translation by (Risse 2003: 1).

³ My research focuses on the analysis of commentary, because commentary not only points to what is important to discuss, but also voices an opinion on issues and actors. How influential these views are on the formation of public opinion is unclear. However, these views receive great attention by decision-makers (Pfetsch et al. 2004).

The same issues at the same time?

While the number of comment pieces that discuss the various issues at stake at Maastricht differs substantially between the newspapers, the rank order – reflecting the order of relevance – of the issues is remarkably similar, as can be taken from the subsequent table.

Table 2 Top eight most-discussed issues in the commentary on Maastricht in the respective newspapers (descending order of frequency)

GU	DT	SZ	FAZ	LM	LF
EMU	EMU	EMU	EMU	EMU	CFSP
Social Policy	CFSP	CFSP	CFSP	CFSP	EMU
CFSP	Agriculture	Social Policy	Social Policy	Institutional Reform	Institutional Reform
Institutional Reform	Social Policy	Institutional Reform	Institutional Reform	Single Market	Single Market
Agriculture	Institutional Reform	Agriculture	JHA	Enlargement	Enlargement
Enlargement	Cohesion / Regional Policy	JHA	Industrial Policy	Agriculture	Finalité
Education / Culture	Single Market	Single Market	Agriculture	Social Policy	Social Policy
JHA	JHA	Competition	Enlargement	Industrial Policy	Agriculture

The most important issues discussed are European Monetary Union (EMU) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). EMU appears most salient to the British and German newspapers. In *Le Monde* the number of comment pieces on EMU and CFSP is identical, in *Le Figaro* the difference between the two is only one article. In *The Guardian* CFSP ranks third, while Social Policy takes the second place. It is an issue on which *The Guardian's* commentators are fiercely critical of the British government. Social Policy ranks third in both of the German newspapers, but only fourth in *The Daily Telegraph*.⁴ In the French newspapers, Social Policy is apparently less relevant. It only comes seventh, after the Single Market and future enlargement. The third most frequently discussed issue for the Conservative and fiercely Eurosceptic *Daily Telegraph* is agriculture. A further issue that is highly relevant across all newspapers is institutional reform – particularly the extension of qualified majority voting and the strengthening of the European Parliament. This issue ranks third in the French newspapers, fourth in *The Guardian* and the German newspapers, and fifth in *The Daily Telegraph*.

All in all, we find that the same issues being discussed at the same time at essentially the same level of relevance – albeit within a wide margin of variance. However, is there also evidence that this debate is not only parallel but transnationally integrated, too?

Transnational interaction: intermedia references and external contributors

The most directly visible indicators of transnational interaction are *transnational intermedia references* – i.e. the mention and discussion of views from foreign media and external contributions across borders. There are two examples of transnational intermedia

⁴ However, in absolute terms, Social Policy is discussed more frequently than in the Germany newspapers.

references. In a comment criticising the German position on the crisis in Yugoslavia, *The Guardian's* editorialist Ian Traynor (1991) accuses *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of campaigning for the unilateral recognition of Croatia's and Slovenia's independence. He quotes extensively from the *FAZ*. The second reference is to a German newspaper, too. *Le Monde's* Pierre Servent (1991) cites the contemporary historian Hans Peter Schwarz from the conservative German broadsheet *Die Welt*. Servent, however, agrees with Schwarz warning not to be overly optimistic concerning the summit results.

"Comme l'écrit l'historien Hans-Peter Schwarz dans le journal allemand *Die Welt*: *Quelques gouvernements, et d'abord la commission, annoncent "le grand bond en avant" - "irréversible" - "historique - et il en sort des petits pas, qui toutefois mènent finalement loin"*.

A second avenue of transnational communication are *external contributions*, authored by fellow Europeans or other foreigners. In *The Guardian*, a Dutch and a German journalist comment on the specifically British interpretation of federalism as centralism (Joffe 1991; Joustra 1991). Similarly, Ingo Kolboom, the director of the German Council of Foreign Relations (DGAP), a German foreign policy think tank, explains to *Le Figaro's* readers the benefits of Franco-German cooperation from a German perspective (Kolboom 1991). Two of the foreign experts writing in *Le Figaro* are from Québec. Both provide a view on federalism from across the ocean (Brenner and Brenner 1991; Lemieux 1991). Not only in principle, but also in practice, transnational communication is not limited to Europe. Ties of shared culture and language – *la francophonie* or British connections with the US or the former empire – facilitate, if not even privilege, transnational communication with overseas countries. John Major (1991) directly addresses the French and the wider European public via an article on the front page of *Le Monde*.

Some of the external contributions at Maastricht revive a venerable tradition of the European Public Sphere. Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel (2002) have demonstrated that even before the creation of a European power centre, the European public sphere had served as an imaginary court of appeal. Powerless, but morally vindicated actors tended to appeal to the European public. Thus they rhetorically invoked and thereby constructed a European public sphere, even if they did not necessarily generate great resonance. Along the lines of such a tradition, the Turkish ambassador admonishes the European public not to forget about the promises of eventual EU membership (Bleda 1991). Similarly, in an open letter, an international group of intellectuals, appeal to the European summit to stop the civil war in Croatia (Berendei 1991). In fact, this time the writers may have received more resonance. Commentators from all six newspapers called upon the EC governments to take responsibility for Yugoslavia (e.g. Almaric 1991; Hort 1991).

Compared to earlier European Councils and summits⁵ there is a notable increase of direct intermedia references and particularly of foreign contributions. The transnational contributions reflect in their arguments a transnational familiarity with European partners' qualms and aspirations. Hence, they mark just the visible tip of the iceberg, while most of the transnational communication remains invisible. Hence we have to examine weaker indicators: Did commentators include and discuss the views of foreign actors?


Transnational references: Discussing foreign actors' views

Commentators discuss views voiced by different actors. To what extent they include actors from other European countries and from the European institutions can be taken from the following chart. It presents the nationality of the actor, respectively the European institution he or she belongs to. Mostly, these are government actors. That the chart presents only actors from Britain, Germany and France, reflects the great asymmetry in transnational awareness and debate. Essentially the newspapers only refer to the European Community's big three countries.

⁵ See evidence on the Summits in 1969, 1974, 1978 and 1985 in my forthcoming PhD thesis (Meyer forthcoming 2007)

Even the views of the Dutch presidency, or sizeable countries like Spain or Italy are treated so rarely that they cannot meaningfully be charted here.

Chart 1 Transnational references to most frequently addressed foreign countries and European Institutions' views in the commentary at Maastricht



Even though all newspapers focus on the views from their own country, there are differences in degree. British newspapers refer to their own national actors' views in 90 (*The Guardian*) to 80 (*The Daily Telegraph*) per cent of all comment pieces. Among the French newspapers this value is at more than 60 per cent. The value for *Süddeutsche Zeitung* is not drastically lower, at slightly under 60 per cent. Solely *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* is more transnationally oriented, devoting as many references to German as to French actors' views. Exceptionally, in *FAZ*, greater attention is given to the European Council than to any individual nation. Whereas the French and German newspapers devote more attention to the European Council, the British newspapers tend to focus on individual nations' views. The relative importance of the two other European countries differs between the newspapers. Only the German newspapers discuss French views more frequently than British ones. Among the European institutions, the European Commission receives varying attention, however, substantially more than the European Parliament. *Le Monde* devotes greatest attention to Commission views, in particular those articulated by Jacques Delors. *Le Monde* seems to admire the Commission President while *The Daily Telegraph* loathes him as the French instigator of EMU and European Social Policy.

All in all, even though the newspapers predominantly focus on their own national actors, they do discuss views of their most important European partners. However, can we also demonstrate that they actually discuss the views of other countries' actors on the same issues? This could be understood as the nearest approximation of a transnationally integrated debate, in which the views of the European partners on European issues matter.

Transnational debate: The same actors' views on the same issues?


The extent of transnational communication and of the participation of societal actors in the debate varies according to the nature of the issue. Therefore, three of the most salient issues

will be more closely examined. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), both touch upon the core of national sovereignty. By contrast, the Social Chapter concerns a socio-economic issue that is more similar to domestic policy making. For each policy area, I will show who were the core actors, whose views were being discussed. The data for each policy will be presented in two different charts. The first one covers references to governments – which accounts for the overwhelming majority of transnational references. The second one provides an insight into the presence of societal actors' views – within and across national borders.

Economic and Monetary Union


To what extent do the newspapers' commentaries take the views of other countries and of the European institutions into account in the debate? References to countries other than the ones mentioned in the following table are rare and normally not shared by more than one or two newspapers. Therefore they are not charted.

Chart 2 EMU – transnational references to national governments, the European Council and the European Commission



In line with their overall national focus, the British newspapers predominantly deal with Her Majesty's government's positions on EMU. However, while German and even more so French views find some attention in *The Guardian*, in *The Daily Telegraph* it is rather the Council as a whole and specifically the Commission, whose president – they highlight – invented the EMU scheme. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* strongly focuses on the German governments' views, attacking Chancellor Kohl's intention to "sacrifice" the D-Mark. *Süddeutsche* criticises the French government's pushing for EMU more frequently than the British government's opt-out. In line with their own opposition to EMU, the British stance seems a sensible option, possibly even an example to follow. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's* orientation is strongly transnational. Similar to *Le Figaro*, references to the national government are on par with references to the European Council and the other governments. However, both newspapers do not refer to the Commission's views. Still, *Le Monde* debates the position of the French government more frequently than the German and the British governments'. The European Council and the European Commission receive even less attention. Apart from references to national actors, non-governmental actors' views receive substantial attention, as the following chart aptly demonstrates.

Chart 3 EMU – transnational references to non-government actors (including the *Bundesbank*)




The British newspapers do not only intensely discuss their own country's parties', business' ("the City") and experts' views as well as public opinion. The stance of the German Central Bank, the *Bundesbank*, and German public opinion, that opposes EMU, seem to matter, too. The French and German newspapers are less transnationally aware. Only *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* refers to a French expert, and *Le Monde* still discusses the *Bundesbank's* views. Openness to non-government actors is limited to party views in the French and the German newspapers, apart from a national expert's view in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. So, in conclusion, we find that in discussing EMU the British newspapers are more national, but also more participatory in the views they include. The German and French newspapers contain more views from across borders, but are less open to non-governmental societal participation.

Common Foreign and Security Policy


Common Foreign and Security Policy is a policy area in which we might expect substantial transnational communication. However, we can anticipate mainly references to governments' views. High politics are clearly the prerogative of the government.

Chart 4 CFSP – transnational references to national governments, the European Council and the European Commission



The own national governments' position is not as dominant as on EMU. To be sure, *The Guardian* refers most frequently to the national governments' positions. This is also the case in *Le Figaro*. In the other newspapers, the position collectively held by the European Council is most frequently discussed – concerning the introduction of the CFSP, but also on the European role towards the conflict in Yugoslavia. *The Daily Telegraph* does not even discuss British government views more frequently than other countries', albeit both at very low level. British views come second after the EC Councils' stance in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. In *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* British views are not even discussed. French and German views are clearly more important than British ones in the French newspapers. French and German newspapers also discuss other governments' and the European Council's views more frequently than the British newspapers do.

Chart 5 CFSP – (transnational) references to non-government actors




As anticipated, societal views on foreign policy rarely appear. The newspapers refer to actors from political parties, or to experts, as does *The Daily Telegraph*. There is only one instance of a transnational reference to a societal actor, i.e. the above-mentioned intermedia reference to *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on Yugoslavia.

All in all, on CFSP, the debate of other countries' views is less extensive than expected. The newspapers' commentators focus on the European Council as a collective actor. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the French newspapers are more strongly transnationally oriented, while the British newspapers and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* devote less attention to other countries' governments' views. This is remarkably different from the debate on EMU.

The Social Chapter


The struggle on Social Policy is an "eleven to one"-affair. While most countries support the Social Chapter, the British government fiercely resists it. The main reason for this resistance is that, to the Conservative party faithful, the Social Chapter is tantamount to a revocation of Thatcherite industrial relations reform. John Major achieves an opt-out, here, too. He pompously declares victory: "Game, set and match."

Chart 6 Social chapter – transnational references to national governments, the European Council and the European Commission



Not surprisingly therefore, in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* Social Policy appears solely as a British affair. Commentators severely attack the British government for depriving their workers of equal protection. Conversely, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Social Policy is treated as a national issue and as a collective European one. This pattern is similarly found in *Le Figaro*. *Le Monde* also discusses the British governments' view as well as those of Commission President Delors, himself a trade union veteran. It was Delors who initiated Social Policy at the European level to complement the Single Market (Delors 2004: 248f, 375ff.). Delors' views are similarly discussed in the British newspapers, positively in *The Guardian* and critically in *The Daily Telegraph*. The German government's position features as a positive example in *The Guardian*. However, *The Daily Telegraph* disparages the German stance as a plot to achieve comparative advantage by driving up costs elsewhere. *The Guardian* treats the Conservative governments' Social Policy opt-out in a large number of comment pieces and with much zest.

Chart 7 Social chapter – (transnational) references to non-government actors



Consequently, The Guardian also debates Labour and Conservative party views, as well as unions' and employers' positions. Similarly, the newspaper mentions German employers' critique of European Social Policy, but equally the more positive response of the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe (UNICE). Similarly, The Daily Telegraph debates party opinions, as much as the views of experts and Labour unions. Süddeutsche Zeitung, observing the British debate, takes note of Tony Blair's – then shadow employment secretary – views on the social chapter. In Le Monde, British, French and European level unions, as well as European employers associations are discussed. Thereby, Le Monde in fact observes the debate in a European civil society (Kaelble 2004; Kocka 2007), as much as it transnationally discusses national civil societies' opinions.

All in all, Social Policy is the policy area that is – except for in *Le Figaro* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*– not only broadest in participation, but also transnational in its shared focus on British resistance to European Social Policy.

Discussion and Conclusions

We may summarise these findings, by plotting them on the transnational communication and participation grid, developed above. We can map the different newspapers' discussion of views:

Table 3 Actual combinations of transnational communication and participation in the commentary at Maastricht

	national communication		transnational communication	
<i>broad participation</i>		DT EMU: GU, Social Policy: DT	Social Policy: GU	Habermas' dream
		GU, DT CFSP:	FAZ EMU:	Social Policy: LM, SZ
		EMU: SZ	FAZ CFSP: EMU: LM	CFSP: LM EMU: LF
<i>narrow participation</i>	Habermas' nightmare	Social Policy: FAZ, LF		CFSP: SZ, LF

Apparently, the extent of transnational debate as well as the involvement of societal actors' views depends on the policy area and on the newspaper. Not unexpectedly, the debate on the CFSP is strongly transnational, but does not involve many societal actors. EMU is mainly nationally discussed in the British newspapers. The debate includes the views of a high number of societal participants, including ones from abroad. In the other newspapers, the debate of societal actors' views tends to be less important. However, the presence of views from abroad is stronger. Only *Süddeutsche Zeitung* discusses EMU mainly addressing the German national government's views, severely criticising them for giving up the *Deutsche Mark*. The findings with respect to Social Policy are most surprising. The French and German left-liberal *Le Monde* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* find themselves close to Habermas' favourite corner: Broad participation and strong transnational discussion. Given that the debate mainly concerns the stance of the British government, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* are more nationally oriented, though taking foreign views into account. On this issue, the conservative *Le Figaro* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* are closer to Habermas' nightmare: Social Policy is discussed in national terms and without taking into account societal actors.

Nevertheless, Habermas would also not be pleased finding that part of the transnational references in *The Daily Telegraph* do not conform to the standards of enlightened discourse, but are blunt accusations, playing on prejudice. This fact points to a limitation of this type of systematic quantifying analysis and the implicit assumption that transnational interaction is *per se* positive, benign and conducive to European democracy. Taking into account the views of the European partners does not always mean engaging in real debate. Often, the European "other" is employed as an argument (Schriewer et al. 1999: 167f.), rather than discussed in its own right, taking into account their actual views, rather than a stereotype (cf. Meyer forthcoming 2008).

All in all, we can conclude: At Maastricht, not only were roughly the same issues discussed, but there is also evidence of transnational interaction and communication. Occasionally, media directly discuss each others' views, explicitly quoting each other. There are a number of foreign contributions that bring about a transfer of opinions. Moreover, it emerges from the analysis of transnational references that commentators routinely and widely discuss the views of actors from across national borders. The extent of this transnational debate however differs between countries and newspapers. Particularly the British newspapers are more national in focus than the German ones, with the French newspapers taking an intermediate role. Moreover, transnational communication on Europe has many blind spots and asymmetries – the opinions of small countries as much as non-governmental actors.

The extent to which non-governmental actors appear is contingent on the issue. In the debate on socio-economic issues such as Social Policy and to some extent also on EMU, societal actors, even actors from transnational civil society, appear more frequently. Conflict seems to stimulate commentators to take into account views from other countries. The controversial British debate on Social Policy was observed elsewhere. It was considered highly relevant, because the British views impacted on the negotiations of policies in the multi-level polity. The more EU affairs have touched on socio-economic issues and provoked conflict, the more participatory and the more transnational the debate in the European public sphere has become (cf. also Meyer 2007a). Moreover, the conceivable trade-off between high-participation national debates and transnational involvement is less pronounced than expected. This means that the European public sphere could become more transnational and more participatory at the same time – approaching Habermas' Dream?

Still, there is no determinism. This study also finds that the treatment of the issues strongly depends on the newspaper and national editorial cultures (Preston and Horgan 2006). Journalists and their editors may just as well tend to "domesticate" an EU issue – e.g. Social Policy –, as they could open it up as a European question.

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**Programme of HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium held at the GHS, Geneva
March 16-17, 2007**

Friday March 16, 2007 (Room S1, Villa Barton)

9.00 – 9.30 Welcome remarks

Sophie Huber and Katrin Milzow, HEI / HEIRS
Prof. Andre Liebich, IHP Department

9.30 – 10.30 Europe at Fifty

Prof. Anne Deighton
University of Oxford

10.30 – 11.45 Panel 1: Trade Unions and the Process of European Integration

Chair: Katrin Milzow (HEI)

Nicolas Verschuere (Université Libre de Bruxelles): Les organisations syndicales des ouvriers mineurs en Belgique. De la CECA au Marché commun.

Hitoshi Suzuki (European University Institute, Florence): How Trade Unions Built their first European Network under the ECSC: Decartelisation Policy and Trade Unions' Response from a German Perspective 1950-1955.

Dr. Thomas Fetzer (European University Institute, Florence /London School of Economics): How to become Anti-European: British Trade Unions and European Integration (1961-1975).

Coffee Break

12.15 – 13.15 From the History of the Nations' European Policies to the History of European Integration?

Prof. Antonio Varsori
Università di Padova

Lunch Break

14.30 – 15.30 Panel 2: “Infra-national” and “Supra-national” Actors

Chair: Billy Davies (King's College, London)

Philip Bajon (Paris IV, Sorbonne, Paris/Duisburg – Essen Universität): The Empty Chair Crisis as an Example of European Crisis Management by State and Non-State Actors.

Mariëlla Smids (University of Groningen): The Role of the European Commission in the First Enlargement Process. A Case Study of the Common Agricultural Policy in the Accession Negotiations of 1961-1963 and 1967-1972.

15.30 – 16.45 Panel 3: Private Interests and Networks

Chairs: Brigitte Leucht (University of Portsmouth) and Katja Seidel (University of Portsmouth)

Giuseppe Martinico (Sant' Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa): Reading the Others: American Legal Scholars and the Rise of European Integration.

Helen Hartnell (UC Berkeley/Freie Universität, Berlin): Constructing a Genuine European Area of Justice: Legal Actors Between Vision and Pragmatism

Thomas Gijswijt (University of Heidelberg): The Bilderberg Group and the Rome Treaties: Transnational Elites and the Debate on European Unity in the 1950s.

Coffee Break

17.00 – 17.45 The Action Committee for the United States of Europe

Dr. Gilles Grin

Jean Monnet Foundation For Europe

Swiss Fondue Dinner at Le Restaurant des Transports (6 Bd. James Fazy)

Saturday, March 17, 2007 (Conference Room, Library)

9.00 – 10.00 The Challenge of Monetary Europe

Prof. Pierre du Bois

IUHEI

10.00 – 11.15 Panel 4: Dealing with European Public Opinion

Chair: Dr. Linda Risso (University of Reading)

Jan-Henrik Meyer (Humboldt Universität, Berlin): Habermas' Dream or Habermas' Nightmare? Transnational Communication and Societal Participation in the European Public Sphere at the Summit of Maastricht.

Alexander Reinfeldt (University of Hamburg): Promoting a Knowledge of Europe: The Youth, Public Opinion, and European Integration.

Cristina Blanco Sío-López (European University Institute, Florence): Towards a "Dialogued Integration"? The Overlapping Nature of Actors and Witnesses in the Eastward Enlargement Process.

Coffee Break

11.30 – 12.45 Panel 5: Ideas of Europe: Intellectual Voices

Chair: Sophie Huber (HEI)

Dominic Eggel (HEI): Wieland's Contribution to the Re-Conceptualization of the Idea of Europe after the French Revolution.

Paolo Orlando Ferrara (Università di Trento): The Jesuit Italian Journal “Civiltà Cattolica” and the Historical Evolution of Europe from post-WWII Reconstruction to the Creation of the Council of Europe (1945-1949).

Axel Marion (HEI): Les acteurs non-étatiques ont-ils pris le pouvoir symbolique dans l’UE? L’exemple du débat sur les frontières de l’Union.

12.45 – 13.45 L’intellectuel européen : un citoyen sans patrie ?

Prof. Francis Cheneval

University of Zurich

13.45 – 14.00 Presentation of Forthcoming HEIRS and RICHIE Events

Concluding remarks

Sophie Huber and Katrin Milzow, HEI / HEIRS

The colloquium is organised with the generous support of the following institutions:

