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The Finnish EU Presidency – Taking Stock

Teija Tiilikainen

THIS ESSAY OFFERS AN ASSESSMENT of the Finnish European Union (EU) Presidency, which took place in the second half of 2006. It focuses on the various strategies and goals that it sought to achieve and offers an analysis of its success.

In the fall of 2006 Finland took on the EU Presidency for the second time (the first having been in 1999). The 2006 Presidency came at a very challenging period in the political development of the European Union. The EU's latest and most comprehensive treaty reform – the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – was still a pending issue. Its rejection by a majority of the French and Dutch voters in their national referendums on the topic in the spring of 2005 had changed dramatically the political atmosphere in the EU and increased ambiguities about the Union's capacity to adjust to further enlargements. At the beginning of the Finnish Presidency it was still unclear if a treaty reform would be politically possible and if so, which form it would take.

Negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU had been going on since late 2005 with varying success. Support for Turkish membership was decreasing in many EU countries due to the heavy politicization of the issue. The disagreement on the conditions of the protocol of the Ankara agreement, which the EU demanded Turkey fulfill, furthermore aggravated the situation. The EU's relations with Russia and the advancing of the Union's dialogue with Asian countries in the form of an ASEM summit (Asian-Europe Meeting) were other issues in the EU's external relations which would demand special attention during the Finnish Presidency.

In a detailed Presidency agenda, approved just before the start of the Presidency in July, the Finnish government stressed an number of goals, such as the promotion of the EU's competitiveness. Furthermore, the adoption of a services directive was considered a high priority; another related priority was the completion of the EU's innovation policy. The EU's role in curbing climate change was emphasized as another key issue. The Finnish Presidency was seen to enable an advancing of the issue both in the framework of the United Nations (UN) and ASEM, the comprehensive dialogue between EU and a number of Asian countries. The further development of the Union's area of freedom, security and justice – referring to cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs – was a third major goal on the Presidency agenda.

On the eve of the Finnish Presidency the EU had repeatedly been criticized for a lack of political leadership. The electoral schedules in the Member States of the EU implied that there would be no change in this regard during the six months of the Finnish Presidency. The traditional Franco-German axis was ineffective due to the pending French elections. The German government was unable to perform a leadership role because the two main governing parties in its broad coalition had different policy objectives on many key issues of integration (such as enlargement and the common defense policy). Finally, the United Kingdom was heading towards a change of prime minister.

After the 2003 general elections Finland had been governed by a coalition formed by the rural Centre Party, the Social Democrat Party and the Swedish Peoples' Party (junior partner in the coalition). The Finnish governments had usually adopted a very positive policy stance towards integration and towards both a deepening and enlargement of the EU. The leading party of the coalition at the time, the Centre Party, is, however, the most reserved of the main Finnish parties. Its main constituency consists of farmers and rural population, which are of all Finns the most critical towards the EU. When it came into office the Centre Party adapted itself by and large to the more Euro-enthusiastic EU policy of previous governments. The general elections of March 2007 were not foreseen to affect the political agenda of the Finnish presidency despite the closeness in date to the start of the presidency. The Presidency would be treated as a national project; ruling parties restrain themselves from making it an object of domestic politics.

The Challenges in the EU's External Relations

The Finnish EU Presidency of 2006, which was anticipated to become a transition Presidency in many respects will, however, secure a place in the Union's history at least because of challenges it faced regarding EU external relations. The Finnish term of office immediately found itself caught in the crossfire caused by the war in Lebanon. Military hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah started during the second week

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EUSA Review

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European Union Studies Association ®
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
Web www.eustudies.org ®
E-mail eusa@pitt.edu
Telephone 412.648.7635

From the Chair

John T.S. Keeler

CAST YOUR BALLOT!

All current EUSA members will receive in this issue the ballot for the election of new members to the EUSA Executive Committee (ExCom). The ballot will include all of the individuals nominated who are deemed eligible to serve, i.e., current members of EUSA who have not already served eight years total on the ExCom. Please take the time to read over the nominee's profiles, and send your completed ballots to the EUSA office by the deadline of April 2, 2007.

Four seats on the ExCom are open during this election, as Grainne De Burca, Virginie Giraudon, Sophie Meunier and I have reached the end of our four-year terms. The four new ExCom members, whose terms will end in 2011, will serve along with continuing members Liesbet Hooghe, Frank Schimmelfennig and Amy Verdun, whose terms end in 2009. Election results will be announced in March and the four new ExCom members will take office on May 20, 2007 at the EUSA Conference in Montreal. When the ExCom meets on May 20, the members will elect a new EUSA Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary and Treasurer.

The members of the ExCom normally meet in person only once per year, along with Executive Director Joe Figliulo, but they deal with dozens of issues throughout the year and communicate frequently via email. The duties of the ExCom include managing the budget, producing the newsletter, organizing award committees and conference program committee, selecting future conference venues, and choosing the recipients of the Lifetime Contribution Award. The future of EUSA hinges on the willingness of our colleagues to present themselves for election and, ultimately, on the choices that our most devoted members—from more than thirty countries around the world—make when they submit their ballots. Please cast your ballots—and consider "running" for ExCom next time if you have not done so already.

John T.S. Keeler
University of Washington (Seattle)

of the Finnish presidency. Many had high expectations of the EU, which was seen to have a better starting point to resolve the crisis than the US due to the more neutral profile it was perceived to have in the eyes of the conflicting parties. The Presidency tried to ensure the EU's unity despite the conflicting loyalties of the various member states. The Union remained unified in contrast to what had happened in the context of the Iraq crisis a few years earlier. EU members supported the resolution of the UN Security Council demanding an immediate cessation of the hostilities and authorizing the deployment of a UN mandated international force. Finally individual EU members deployed a major part of the international force whose full size was planned to 15000 troops. Criticism on the Finnish Presidency during the crisis mainly came from the French political leadership who c` months. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was one of the fields which seemed to be least affected by the atmosphere of the constitutional crisis. The EU's headline goal in military crisis management had been adopted at the Helsinki European Council during the previous Finnish Presidency in 1999 and in the same context the concept of civilian crisis management had been launched. During the second Finnish Presidency the EU had ten operations under its leadership – a major part of which were civilian operations. The EU's military operation in Congo was completed successfully and the Council could conclude that it had played an important role in the transition period of the country including that Congo held its first democratic elections in forty years. The civilian operation in the Indonesian Aceh was also considered to have been successfully completed as local elections had been conducted peacefully in the region.

Though already confronted with a full agenda in the ESDP quite few new dossiers opened up at this time. The main task of the Presidency was to keep the processes on track. Important steps were, however, taken in the review processes of both military and civilian resources. Regarding developments in the military area, the EU's first force catalogue including also a qualitative assessment of the forces was adopted. The Union's new rapid reaction battle groups, which were declared operative from the beginning of 2007, formed one of these new qualitative achievements in the Union's capabilities. The rapid reaction system was based on two battle groups of 1500 troops each being on standby for six months. The Finnish Presidency was focusing in particular on the improvement of coordination of the civilian and military activities both in the area of planning of EU operations and activities in the field.

As an EU member with the longest common border with Russia, Finland has raised the EU-Russia relations now twice as needing to be among the key priorities of its EU Presidency. During the 1999 Presidency these relations were troubled by the war in Chechnya, which finally led to the EU posing sanctions on Russia. In 2006 the main agenda point was formed by the negotiations on a new EU-Russia agreement as the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) would expire at the end of 2007. The PCA forms the key framework for cooperation between the EU and Russia and it also establishes the forms of meetings between the parties and the entire institutional set up of these relations. Finland planned to achieve an agreement on the negotiating mandate among the EU members so that negotiations with Russia could have been opened in the EU-Russia summit in November.

The general atmosphere in the EU-Russia relations was, however, first affected by the Russian policy on Georgia. Russia was largely seen as having overreacted when it posed economic and financial sanctions on Georgia as a result of a spy incident. The political sensitivity of relations with Russia had grown in the EU along with the growing awareness of the Union's dependency on Russian energy and the deteriorating human rights situation in Russia. The EU had tried to get access for European companies to the Russian energy markets and was annoyed when Russia did not ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, which would have opened its markets. The Finnish Presidency tried to launch a constructive dialogue with Russia, which in the last place would also have led to an agreement on the issues of energy supply. The invitation of the Russian president Vladimir Putin to the extraordinary European Council meeting in Lahti in October was given a controversial reception among the EU members. Finally it was Poland that was driven into an open dispute with Russia due to the Russian ban on meat imports from Poland. As a counter-measure, Poland decided to veto the launch of the EU-Russian negotiations on the new partnership agreement.

The failure to launch negotiations was not in practical terms fatal for EU-Russia relations as the old treaty would still remain in force and provide the relationship with the necessary legal foundation. At a more basic level it was, however, a great backlash as it made evident the complexities in the current EU-Russia relations. The Finnish Presidency was very disappointed about the developments as it now was the second time a Finnish Presidency ended with a negative outlook in these relations.

The EU's relations with Asia were promoted during the Finnish Presidency in the form of an ASEM summit. This tenth ASEM summit was crucial to the entire ASEM dialogue among the twenty-five EU members and thirteen Asian countries as it was to assess the future directions of the dialogue including also its geographical enlargement. The Helsinki summit agreed on the new foci of the dialogue and on the development of its working methods. Bulgaria and Romania were welcomed to the dialogue as new EU members and India, Mongolia, Pakistan and the ASEAN secretariat from the Asian side. The issue of Burma, whose participation in the ASEM dialogue many EU states questioned because of the human rights policy of its military government, had created serious tensions in the dialogue before the Helsinki summit. The summit, finally, was not largely affected by the problem and the leaders formulated some guidelines concerning the improvement of the Burmese situation.

The Controversial Processes of Deepening and Enlargement

During the previous Finnish Presidency of the EU, in 1999, the EU enlargement had been still relatively uncontroversial. At that time, the Finnish presidency was openly celebrated as it resulted in an agreement on the Turkish candidate status and on the opening of membership negotiations with those Central and East European candidates, which were not yet negotiating for accession.

Seven years later the political atmosphere was entirely different. The EU's decision to leave unchanged the time-table concerning Bulgarian and Romanian EU memberships attracted a lot of criticism. The European Commission had in its monitoring report recommended the original timetable even if it confirmed that the two countries did not fulfill all the criteria posed on them. In many member states as well as in the European Parliament the recommendation drew criticism also because it was seen to send the wrong signal to the other applicant countries. During the Finnish Presidency the EU was also set to agree on the general guidelines for future enlargement. A need for such guidelines had emerged as the thinking concerning EU enlargement had changed considerably in many member states in recent years. The conclusions of the Finnish Presidency suggest that the EU will slow down the pace of enlargement in the coming years. The EU leaders stressed their commitment to the ongoing accession negotiations. At the same time they put stronger emphasis on the conditionality of accession and stressed the need for the EU to have the capacity to integrate new members – which reflects an increasing cautiousness regarding further enlargement on the part of the EU.

The backlash in the Turkish accession negotiations did not come as a surprise to the Finnish Presidency. Nevertheless, it put the diplomatic skills of Finland to the test. It was well-known, already before the Presidency, that Turkey had not fulfilled the conditions imposed on it by the EU concerning the opening of Turkish harbors and airports to Cypriot vessels. Turkey had refused to do provide access to Cypriots as long as the northern part of Cyprus, occupied by Turkey since 1974, would remain economically isolated. Finland tried to find a compromise to the conflict which would avoid the breaking of the Turkish accession negotiations. The task was essentially challenged by the fact that all the member states of the EU were not equally committed to Turkish membership. Thus, the support given to the Finnish compromise-building efforts varied.

The result of the diplomatic process has been declared as an achievement of the Presidency's compromise-building efforts as the Presidency succeeded in keeping the member states together and agreeing on a common policy. This policy implied a partial freezing of accession negotiations with Turkey. The result cannot, of course, be seen in such positive terms with respect to the overall goal of Turkish membership. Already the partial freezing of negotiations can be seen to have a negative impact on the attitudes towards the Turkish membership both in Turkey and the EU. However, it is questionable to what extent the Finnish Presidency can be held responsible for having been unable to resolve the conflict on Cyprus. The approaching elections in Turkey as well as the controversy of Turkey's accession in EU member states reduced the window of opportunity to find a compromise.

Enlargement fatigue was clearly linked with the EU's inability to complete the treaty reform which was started in the form of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereafter 'Constitutional Treaty'). From the outset, however, Finland was not expected to play a major role in trying to move forward the adoption of a Constitutional Treaty. The electoral schedule in France and the Netherlands, in which parliamentary (and in France presidential) elections were initially scheduled for the spring 2007[1], transferred the main focus of the project to the subsequent German Presidency. The Finnish Presidency was, however, commissioned to conduct detailed consultations with the member states so as to prepare an assessment of the situation for the incoming German Presidency. The exercise was completed, but the assessment remained entirely confidential and information about its key findings did not reach a larger public.

In parallel with the Finnish consultations many European leaders, however, expressed publicly their own opinion about the future of the Constitutional Treaty. Two lines of thinking clearly emerged the first of which being promoted by for instance the German chancellor Angela Merkel. This line of thought, which gained support from many member states which had ratified the Constitutional Treaty, was based on the idea that as far as possible one should leave the original Constitutional Treaty unchanged and integrate the criticism of it to its text in the form of minor amendments.

Another line of thinking was launched by the French minister and presidential candidate Nicholas Sarkozy. He suggested that a smaller treaty, a mini-treaty, should be adopted and ratified already before the 2009 European Parliament elections. This mini-treaty would include only the most important provisions of the Constitutional Treaty. Sarkozy had mainly those institutional provisions in mind, which France had been most pleased with in the treaty negotiations. The Italian minister of foreign affairs, Massimo D'Alema supported Sarkozy's proposal trying, at the same time, to develop it into a direction which would increase its acceptability among other member states. His list of items to be included in the core-treaty, as he called it, was longer that of Sarkozy's. It included things important to Germany such as the Charter on Fundamental Rights.

With many ideas floating around the Finnish Presidency stuck to the formal role given to it; it kept a low profile regarding how to solve the constitutional crisis and kept to being involved in the informal debate. During the Presidency, the Finnish Parliament, however, did approve without any difficulty the Constitutional Treaty. Thus, Finland became the sixteenth EU member to ratify the Constitutional Treaty.

The EU's Legislative Agenda

There were both achievements and failures among major legislative processes in the EU during the Finnish Presidency. Finland had put the Union's competitiveness as one of the key goals of its Presidency. Choosing this goal may not be too surprising as the Finnish performance had been evaluated positively in terms of the criteria established for the Lisbon strategy. The services directive formed the major piece of legislation to be adopted in this field at this time. The directive, which would create an open market of services in the EU and define also its key premises and limitations, had created controversies among the member states as well as among other public actors. The main content of the directive – including a confirmation of those fields of services that would be excluded from its scope – had finally been adopted already during the Austrian Presidency. Thus the role of the Finnish Presidency was to safeguard the final deal.

Another lengthy legislative process which was successfully completed during the Finnish Presidency is the EU's chemicals regulation (REACH) (see Smith 2006). The regulation establishes a system of evaluation, authorization and restriction of chemicals in the EU. The details of the system caused controversies among the member states, environmental actors as well as the chemicals industry. The Finnish Presidency succeeded in finding a compromise on the issue that was acceptable to the three legislative bodies of the EU, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. From a Finnish point of view there was an extra asset linked to the completion of the project as the chemicals agency established by the regulation will be placed in Helsinki.

Finland failed to reach an agreement on another important piece of EU legislation, namely, on the working time directive. It was question of a revision of the directive which would have enabled exceptions to be made from its provisions it under certain clearly defined circumstances. Most member states have not yet amended their legislation to correspond with the rulings of the European Court of Justice because adherence to the decision may endanger the provision of medical care and introduce significant budgetary effects. The Finnish Presidency had developed a proposal for a compromise which had the support of the UK and Germany but which failed to obtain the support of France. The inability to amend the directive will lead to further court cases in many member states.

The EU's justice and home affairs was one of those policy-fields where Finland intended to advance common policies in a more comprehensive manner. Finland planned first to use the possibility provided by the existing treaties to move parts of the policy-field under the majority rule as unanimity has been blocking important achievements in the field. Other areas of interest were to develop an EU border control system, a common immigration policy and improving the exchange of information between law-enforcement and judicial authorities. The policy field did not, in general, gain much depth during the Finnish Presidency even if minor steps were taken on many issues. The effort to move parts of the policy field under the majority rule failed as this was opposed, among others, by Germany and the UK. The Finnish government has counted this lack of progress on this issue as one of the major failures of the Presidency. Nevertheless, in this area some progress was made as well: a decision was reached on the establishment of the European Fundamental Rights Agency which is to be set up in Vienna. Furthermore, the enlargement of the Schengen area of free movement of people was also agreed upon; an arrangement was negotiated which enables the lifting of internal border controls at the new member states' land borders by the end of 2007 and at their airports by early 2008.

The Presidency's Relations with other EU institutions

The rotating Presidency forms only a part of the EU's overall leadership. Functioning relations with other institutions like the Commission, the European Parliament and currently also the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are of utmost importance. In recent years, the EU's external relations have formed one field where the division of labor between the key institutions – the Council and the Commission – has been ambiguous and which therefore has suffered from a constant power struggle between them. The rotating Council Presidency is frequently confronted with this situation.

Also during the Finnish Presidency the tensions between the two institutions affected the everyday leadership of the Union's external relations. Cooperation in the Council framework, between the Presidency and the High Representative of the CFSP, Mr Javier Solana, by contrast, functioned well. The Union's overloaded external relations agenda employed both actors. Thus, in many cases a natural division of labor emerged. Mandated by the EU's Council Mr Solana was still involved in the talks on Iran when the crisis in Lebanon exploded. The Finnish Presidency took the lead on this crisis on behalf of the Union.

The conduct of the EU's enlargement was clearly affected by the fact that the Commissioner responsible for enlargement was a Finn, Mr Olli Rehn. Mr Rehn has his roots in the rural Centre Party, i.e. the leading cabinet party during the Finnish presidency. The interaction between the two institutions seemed to be uncomplicated, at least at the top level, and no larger frictions appeared between the positions of the Commission and the Council on this issue. The Commission and the Finnish Presidency supported each other on many other high profile issues such as that of increasing majority voting in matters of justice and home affairs.

There was, however, a major conflict between the Finnish Presidency and the two other institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament, at the end of the Finnish Presidency. The conflict dealt with the EU's budget for the year 2007 because the Presidency had proposed reductions on the Commission's administrative costs. The proposal had received heavy opposition both from the Commission and from a number of member states, which delayed the budgetary procedure. Finally, Finland had to give up its position which subsequently led to the approval of the budget.

Conclusions

The EU's political system has reached a turning point. Thus far the Union's political schedule has essentially been structured through its key intergovernmental element, i.e. the Council Presidency. In addition to the purely technical functions like arrangement and conduct of meetings the Presidencies have left their mark on the Union's final agenda and its political processes and decision-making. The Presidency's role has also been visible in the EU's external relations, where the Presidency has been one of the key bodies representing the Union. It has developed a common policy together with the Commission and since 1999 also with the High Representative of the CFSP. Due to these roles the Presidency is seen to have become a key player in the assessment of the EU's political proceedings and achievements. Each Presidency is now being assessed on its merit in moving forward the EU external relations agenda.

An assessment of the EU's functioning on the basis of Presidencies becomes, however, more and more difficult. Presidencies have already for a while reflected the reinforcement of the other leadership structure, i.e. the supranational, or federal system of democracy. Even though the Council is still an important institution in the EU's political system, its role is clearly bounded by the strengthening contours of EU level parliamentarianism. This implies that the EU's political agenda as well as the success of its political processes and decision-making are increasingly dependent on other factors than the qualities of a Presidency. One could argue that currently Presidencies are both praised and blamed for many things for which they do not carry the key responsibility.

If assessed on these terms one can safely conclude that the second Finnish EU Presidency was more successful than the first, as it focused more on pragmatic objectives. This time Finland concentrated its efforts on the management of the agenda – largely inherited from the Austrian Presidency – instead of fostering its own profile in the Union's political processes. The second Presidency showed that the Union's external relations currently is the area in which the Presidency can still offer real leadership. Finland coped with this challenge relatively well. The first Presidency of 1999 without doubt had a higher profile which was needed to establish the Finnish identity on the EU scene.

Notes

[1] After the Dutch government fell, early elections were called, and were held in November 2006.

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Teija Tiilikainen *is the Director of the University of Helsinki Network for European Studies. Email:teija. tiilikainen @helsinki.fi*

THE YEAR OF THE EURO

The Cultural, Social, and Political Import of Europe's Common Currency

Edited by Robert M. Fishman and Anthony M. Messina



The Year of the Euro examines the wide-ranging importance of Europe's new single currency beyond its impact on financial markets and the economy itself. On January 1, 2002, when the new currency began to circulate in the twelve participating member states of the European Union, the long move toward a supranational European framework for trade and institutions finally entered the fabric of daily life for hundreds of millions of citizens. The contributing authors to this highly readable and interdisciplinary volume offer a variety of perspectives on this extraordinary episode in currency change and European convergence. The book's essays offer the assessments of leading scholars of European affairs—from the fields of history, political science, sociology, and law—as to whether the new common currency will reshape the continent's cultures, societies and political systems and, if so, in what ways. The discussions and debates found in these pages will inform those, within and outside academia, who are interested in the future of Europe and in the meaning of national currencies. The volume is also suitable for classroom use in courses on the European Union, cultural and economic sociology, comparative politics, and contemporary Europe.

Robert M. Fishman is professor of sociology and a fellow of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Anthony M. Messina is associate professor of political science and a fellow of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

CONTRIBUTORS: Jacques E. C. Hymans, John Merriman, Thomas Risse, Robert M. Fishman, Mabel Berezin, Christopher Anderson, Anthony M. Messina, Jane Jenson, Philippe Pochet, Layna Mosley, George Ross, Andrew Martin, Julia Lopez, and Philippe Schmitter.

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EUSA Teaching the EU Interest Section Essay

Evaluating and assessing co-curricular simulations

Rebecca Jones

Assessment of learning outcomes and evaluation of teaching methods are necessary in order to ensure that students are learning the lessons that faculty believe they are conveying. Preparing for assessments connected with accreditation processes requires faculty to focus on many issues, such as what lessons we are attempting to convey, what we hope students will take from our classes, and whether we accomplished those goals. End-of-term evaluations and assessments help faculty determine the success of their teaching methods and determine whether or not they have reached their goals in a given class. When classes include a simulation, or the simulation is a stand-alone activity, the questions increase. Is the simulation actually teaching the students, or is it simply time off from the classroom? How can faculty organize a simulation in order to achieve the intended goals? Do the students really understand the goals of the simulation? During the simulation, how do you keep students on target?

Assessment surveys are meant to answer these questions and provide a quantitative record. Quantitative data on the effectiveness of various pedagogical methods allows faculty to make adjustments to classes over time and regular assessment of student learning outcomes allows for the collection of hard data in order to show the effectiveness of teaching techniques and activities. Faculty members have many reasons for wanting to accurately evaluate non-traditional pedagogical methods such as simulations (aside from making sure we get good evaluations for tenure purposes). For one thing, simulations are non-traditional, so we want to be able to determine if the lessons intended to be taught were in fact the lessons learned. Another reason for wanting some objective form of evaluation is to determine whether, in addition to learning the material, the students actually gained from the experience on a personal level. A large percentage of the literature on simulations is concerned with presenting evidence regarding to the usefulness of simulations for engaging students in the material and in a variety of learning processes, or with discussions regarding how to structure a simulation to insure it covers the desired material. In his review of the literature on simulation games, Dorn (1989) suggests that evaluation results are mixed at best. "The evidence is frequently ambiguous and ranges from enthusiastic, impressionistic, and subjective reports to objective data and analysis" (Dorn 1989, 6). There is very little discussion in the literature regarding the creation of accurate assessment tools for simulations in general or for evaluating simulations that take place as an extra-curricular activity away from campus.

Over the last 25 years or so, simulations have become accepted as a valid pedagogical tool. Proponents of simulations have argued that experiential learning is more effective for teaching students both facts and theories and requires students "to analyze specific situations, reflect on their observations, confront problems, and develop their own ideas" (Shellman 2001). According to Greenblat, simulations allow students to experience "environments similar to those they might not face until much later in life or might never directly experience" (Greenblat 1973, 65). Sociology and political science faculty have been more receptive to the idea of using simulations in the classroom and the subject matter in those classes tends to be more suited for simulations. In introductory American politics classes, for example, simulations can be used to understand the workings of Congressional committees, budget planning, and the writing and passing of bills (Ciliotta-Rubery and Levy 2000). Introductory comparative politics classes can include simulations on proportional representation and coalition-building (Shellman 2001) and cabinet formation (Kaarbo and Lantis 1997).

When designing and using simulations, faculty are hoping to achieve a number of goals. First, simulations are used in order to find a method for delivering subject knowledge (i.e. facts, theories) in such a way that students will retain the information. Faculty members also use simulations in order to motivate students to participate more in class. Finally, simulations are seen as a way to show students, through experience, how institutional processes such as making laws or implementing policies, function in their particular field of study.

Following Greenblat (1973), Szafran and Mandolini (1980) list five areas of evaluation that have been found to support the use of simulations as teaching tools: (1) motivation and interest, (2) cognitive learning, (3) affective learning, (4) student interaction patterns, and (5) gaining an overall assessment of the simulation. Szafran and Mandolini examine the literature to date (1980) to determine if Greenblat's characterization of the benefits of simulations holds. The focus of both articles is on the types of learning methods involved, and the more general benefits (life-learning) to the students.

Greenblat (1973) argued that simulations spur motivation and interest because participation in the simulation is interesting, it increases student interest in the topic as well as the course, and finally participation in simulations increases interest in, and enthusiasm for, learning in general. Cognitive learning is enhanced through the factual information gained, putting into use concepts such as negotiation, organization, and power, and through learning the actual processes and "real world" structures that must be navigated in order to successfully complete the simulation. In addition, cognitive learning is supported through an increased ability to identify elements of a problem, learning decision-making skills, and employing winning strategies (Greenblat 1973).

The third area of interest to evaluators of simulations is affective learning. Here, Greenblat argued that participation in simulations changes the perspectives of students; survey responses indicated an increase in empathy for others and increased insight into the issues confronted by decision makers (Greenblat 1973). Students also show an increased self-awareness and a greater sense of their own capabilities and efficacy. The fourth area where evaluations help to uncover what might be termed the "side-effects of simulations," is in changes in students' interaction patterns. Student-teacher relationships improve; students and teachers are more relaxed around one another; and the exchange of information becomes less hierarchical. Students also gain greater insights and knowledge about their fellow students (Greenblat 1973).

The final area examined by Szafran and Mandolini (1980) is overall assessment of the simulation. They did find that the literature generally supported Greenblat's contentions and that simulations were considered a useful, legitimate, and stimulating means for conveying information and experiences to students. Szafran and Mandolini (1980) also found that the literature did not explicitly discuss overall reactions to simulations, but rather assumed that participants would "endorse the overall experience and recommend its future use" (Szafran and Mandolini 1980, 24).

Subsequent discussions and evaluations of simulations (Steck, Buonanno and Eagles 1996; Ciliotta-Rubery and Levy 2000; Ip and Lisner 2001; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Galatas 2006; Shellman 2001) found that students generally enjoyed their experiences with simulations, felt that they learned more than they expected and more than they would in a traditional classroom setting, and would repeat the experience. These findings, while useful and valuable, still do not help to determine whether or not students actually achieved the expected learning outcomes beyond the factual and process-oriented outcomes. In other words, students do show marked improvement in engaging and understanding the material, but the literature does not discuss affective learning or changes in patterns of student interaction mentioned by Greenblat (1973) and Szafran and Mandolini (1980).

Galatas (2006) found that asking students to write reflection papers not only reinforced the quantitative findings, but also "allowed students to go beyond the close-ended format of the survey and to explore more fully their thoughts and perceptions of the simulation" (Galatas 2006, 149). He found that students, who at the beginning of the simulation expressed concerns regarding the potential for free-riding among their classmates, saw that the participants did indeed take their roles and the simulation quite seriously; a change in student interactions and perceptions of their fellow students was an outcome of this particular simulation. However, in discussing his simulation, Galatas (2006) emphasizes the success of the simulation in the areas of interest and motivation, cognitive learning (such as facts and processes regarding EU institutions), and overall assessment of the simulation. There is no further discussion or analysis of affective learning or changes in patterns of student interaction.

Kaarbo and Lantis (1997) and Shellman (2001) designed simulations to introduce students to concepts of comparative political institutions including coalition formation and proportional representation electoral systems. Both simulations had primary goals that were focused on motivation and interest and cognitive learning; "...students gain important insights about the complexities of the political process generally, and the coalition cabinet process specifically" (Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; 501). In their assessment of the success of the overall simulation, Kaarbo and Lantis note that their simulation "has consistently met the educational objectives of experiential learning" and point out that "students truly became engaged in the simulation and exhibited high levels of interest..." (Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; 505). Kaarbo and Lantis indicate that in open-ended questions, students mentioned improving their bargaining and communication skills, and developing better relationships with others in the class as a result of the simulation. However, the authors view these results as extra side benefits of participation in the simulation. Shellman (2001) also identifies five cognitive learning goals for his simulation of the German electoral system but does not mention improvement in interpersonal skills or relationships among students in his assessment of the simulation.

When discussing how to design an in-class simulation, Smith and Boyer (1996) emphasize the need for clearly stated goals as the first step in the design process. However, they are only concerned with interaction and motivation and cognitive learning outcomes and not with affective learning or interaction patterns. Follow-up evaluation questions center on the overall success of the simulation in terms of goals and motivations *within* the simulation. Other evaluations of simulations such as Ciliotta-Rubery and Levy (2000) also focused on motivation and interest, cognitive learning outcomes and the overall success of their simulation.

Political science classes are ripe for simulations, because simulations allow faculty to demonstrate the concepts and theories on which they are lecturing and are "predicated on pedagogy that long-term retention and use of learning are better achieved through experiential learning" (Ip and Lisner 2001). Students gain a greater understanding and appreciation for the intricacies of constitution writing if they actually sit down in a group and write a constitution. The same thing has been found with budget simulations, Congressional committee simulations, etc. (e.g. Ciliotta-Rubery and Levy 2000). Both Congressional Quarterly (CQ) and the American Political Science Association (APSA) suggest books dealing with a variety of simulations for faculty to use in their classrooms. The simulations can run from the fairly simple one day, in-class exercise, to more complex multi-day or semester-long simulations. Clearly, simulations are regarded as useful and legitimate pedagogical tools by the discipline as a whole.

The difficulty arises when faculty need to assess the learning outcomes of simulations. The usual end-of-semester course evaluations do not allow for separate evaluation of simulations or other non-traditional pedagogies. Yet, the whole point of conducting a simulation is to increase the learning outcomes for our students. How do we determine what works and what does not? Most faculty evaluating the usefulness of simulations in the classroom have asked questions of students that rank various aspects of the simulation from "useful" to "useless" or "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" (e.g. Ip and Linser 2001; Steck, Buonanno, and Eagles 1996). These types of questions can be used to quantify some aspects of learning outcomes in the simulation. In addition, Ip and Linser (2001) and Steck, Buonanno, and Eagles (1996) found that open-ended questions elicited responses that can be used to measure the utility of the simulation for students.

In the last ten years or so, setting goals for learning outcomes and creating pedagogies designed to achieve those goals have become a driving force for universities in reaccredidation processes and as tools in student recruitment. It has become necessary to create assessment tools that can accurately reflect the success of pedagogies and the achievement of expected learning outcomes. "Affective learning," as described by Greenblat (1973) and Szafran and Mandolini (1980), is achieved when students show an increased self-awareness and a greater sense of their own capacities and efficacy. The positive impact of a simulation should also be seen in changes in student interaction patterns. These patterns would include improved, more relaxed, less hierarchical student-teacher relationships, and improved relationships marked by greater insights and knowledge of their fellow students (Szafran and Mandolini 1980). The literature discussing evaluation of simulations has apparently dropped those two areas from consideration over the years. Given the renewed emphasis on these learning outcomes, faculty evaluating simulations should consider adding such questions to their evaluations. Creating a pre- and post-test research design that incorporates Greenblat's (1973) affective learning and changing patterns of student interactions as expected learning outcomes should result in a survey that will allow us to quantify those outcomes.

EuroSim

The Trans-Atlantic Consortium for European Union Studies and Simulations (TACEUSS) runs an annual, international, intercollegiate simulation on the governing processes of the European Union – known as EuroSim. This simulation switches venues between European and American locations every other year. In the past, organizers have collected survey information regarding both the effectiveness of the simulation and the response of the students (Buonanno, Steck, and Eagles, 1996). This paper is a first look at renewing the effort to collect evaluative data on EuroSim. A cross-national simulation that operates on two continents provides challenges that are not normally faced when evaluating classes and even other large simulations such as the Model UN. The first round of surveys in this phase will be distributed to students at EuroSim 2007 which will take place in April at Canisius College in Buffalo, New York. Based on previous years' anecdotal evidence, we expect to find that students not only enjoy the simulation, but that a majority are well prepared regarding the information required, participate in sophisticated debates and discussions of the relevant issues, and find depths of abilities in themselves that they do not know they possess. At the practical end of things, e.g. cognitive learning outcomes, again based on mostly anecdotal evidence, we expect to find positive results in areas covering general knowledge of the EU, an understanding of the policy-making processes of the EU, and specific knowledge of the policy area covered in a given year's EuroSim program. In addition we expect to gain more quantifiable information regarding the overall success of the simulation.

The extra-curricular nature of EuroSim combined with its cross-national, continent-hopping character makes evaluation and assessment both necessary and a challenge. EuroSim provides a framework for the partial simulation of a major EU issue and, in doing so, provides students with an inside view of the institutions and processes of the organization. It is necessary to collect data on its success in achieving its stated goals of introducing students to an international organization about which most students initially know very little. Assessment is also necessary in order to show the value of EuroSim to administrators who are always budget conscious and are usually unsure of the benefits of funding such ventures. The challenges are evident in the cross-national nature of the simulation. While the simulation is conducted in English and all the participants are required to speak English fluently, misunderstandings and miscues do occur. Any evaluation survey must be formatted and worded so as to avoid as much as possible any foreseeable problems in the interpretation of questions.

In their evaluation of the EuroSim European Union simulation, Steck, Buonanno, and Eagles (1996) designed evaluation questions that were intended to address Greenblat's (1973) third and fourth areas of evaluation. The authors also found that the most useful information came from open-ended questions. By returning to a formal evaluation of the EuroSim, we hope to discover if the specific learning outcomes that are planned are actually occurring and what and where we can improve the simulation both in the areas of learning outcomes as well as student enjoyment and participation. The first step in the process is to determine the desired learning outcomes. Accreditation processes ask for evidence, and processes to gather that evidence, showing improved student ability to work with peers, communicate both orally and in written form, apply critical thinking methods to problems, student interactions with faculty and other students, and a whole host of other broad criteria, in addition to gaining knowledge specific to their field of study.

Open-ended questions in both the pre-test and post-test phase are designed to unearth information regarding affective learning and peer interaction in addition to student motivation and interest, cognitive learning, and overall assessment of the simulation. The pre-test survey will focus primarily on student's assessment of their own level of preparation and their general disposition toward participating in such a simulation. The post-test survey will include questions that directly address the issues of affective learning and peer interactions. Questions regarding affective learning will include: Do you feel that EuroSim changed your perspective on how governments work? Do you feel that you have a greater appreciation for the pressures and stresses faced by lawmakers? Do you feel that the simulation has improved your ability to work with others? Did participation in the simulation change your relationship with your professor? How would you change your own participation in the simulation?

It is hoped that by including these questions in pre- and post-simulation surveys we can provide initial data regarding the affective learning and patterns of student interactions that are included in Greenblat's (1973) discussion of the benefits of simulations. Ip and Linser (2001) conclude that "more work is needed to find out whether a real learning-outcomes benefit has been achieved" in simulations. In the case of EuroSim in particular, quantifiable data in support of such goals will likely increase support (and funding) among deans and other administrators for non-traditional activities such as EuroSim.

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Rebecca Jones *is assistant professor of government and politics at Widener University*

EUSA EU-Latin America Caribbean Interest Section Essay

The Road to Peru: What to Expect from the Association Agreements between the EU and Latin America

Roberto Dominguez

Introduction

WHILE THE NORTH-TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY is deeply intertwined, the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Latin America, a transatlantic association as well, is trying to find formulas to revitalize their partnership. Today, the EU is the leading donor of aid in Latin America, its largest foreign investor and the second most important trade partner in the region. Nevertheless, the Forth EU-Latin America/Caribbean Summit held in Vienna in May 2006 was pervaded by an unenthusiastic atmosphere about boosting the dynamism in the bi-regional relationship. On the road to Peru 2008, site of the fifth bi-regional summit, the main target of both partners is the enhancement of the network of association and free trade agreements and strengthening the existing ones with Mexico and Chile. Will the EU and Latin America be able to reach such an objective? If that is the case, what can we expect from those association agreements?

Current Challenges

The European Union has undergone profound transformations since the end of the Cold War guided by the paradox of simultaneous deepening and widening the integration process. The combination of both processes has forced the EU to revisit its priorities; the result of it is that enlargement and the close neighborhood policies are at the top of the agenda while Latin America is one of the lowest in the ranking.

On the other hand, Latin America has gone from democratic enthusiasm to institutional skepticism. In the mid-1980s, only three countries in the region had democratically elected leaders; today, only Cuba remains reluctant to adopt the basic rules of any electoral democracy. However, even though Latin America has largely adopted democratic practices such as elected civilian governments, peaceful transitions of power and basic civil liberties, scholars and political analysts, even the most conservative ones, agree on the fact that corruption, weak institutions and economic inequality, coupled with the inability of regional governments to provide basic services, are undermining the democratic consolidation in the region.

The immediate effect of the growing frustration with Washington-backed economic prescriptions and disillusion with the failure to deliver prosperity is the left turn in Latin America. From different perspectives, scholars concur with the assessment that there are at least two lefts in the region. The first is open-minded and modern; this wing is headed by Lula da Silva in Brazil and Bachelet in Chile. The second is close-minded and stridently populist; this is the case of Chavez in Venezuela. A third group is composed of recently elected leaders who are defining to lean to the modern or the strident populism; these are the cases of Ortega in Nicaragua and Morales in Bolivia. In light of these transformations, what are the effects on the relations with the European Union?

The Distant Dialogue

The region to region dialogue between the European Union and Latin America was institutionalized in 1999 when the first bi-regional summit took place in Rio de Janeiro.[1] The second summit was held in Madrid in 2002 and the third one in Guadalajara in 2004. Despite the limitations of the bi-regional dialogue, particularly the 2004 summit brought about a sense of confidence in light of the recognition of social cohesion as the top priority in the summit agenda. Nonetheless, regional transformations in Europe and Latin America were taking place and by 2006 the atmosphere in both regions was quite different: the EU was exhausted of the 2004 enlargement process and under a period of reflection after the difficulties to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, while elections in several countries in Latin America made evident the rising skepticism of free markets.

In May 2006, the fourth EU-Latin America was held in Vienna. The meeting had few positive outcomes. First, the European Commission published new communications to the Council on Latin America and the Caribbean replacing those of ten years ago. Second, the European Parliament strengthened its role and delivered its opinion in several documents about the bi-regional relationship. Third, in the context of the EU financial perspectives up to the year 2013, the EU was able to sketch concrete commitments to buttress social cohesion policies in Latin America. Fourth, for the first time, a business summit took place in parallel with the political meeting.[2] However, the general assessment of the achievements of the summits, including the most recent one, seems to be unenthusiastic even in the voice of one of its protagonist: "But we must also ask ourselves in a mood of self-examination whether we have really done everything that we might have undertaken. And there, the answer can only be a self-critical no. And so here in Vienna, we cannot have a summit of self-satisfied, empty rhetoric; this must be a working meeting where we improve our own work."[3]

Along these lines, and unlike the Guadalajara summit, signs of disagreement and irreconcilable differences were apparent during the Vienna summit and overshadowed the meager agreements. As it was said above, the political environment in Latin America eroded European enthusiasm to deepen cooperation in the context of the strategic alliance due to the emergence of populist governments and policies in the region.[4] Particularly, the Venezuelan withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations shattered one of the historical objectives of the EU in the continent: the development of integration processes in Latin America. On the other hand, in the case of Bolivia, President Evo Morales nationalized the gas sector, which affected Spanish investments in that country, while the Venezuelan government announced plans for a new tax on foreign oil firms.

In response to this challenge, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, argued that European businesses have found some obstacles in Latin America: lack of predictability of the economic setting, market access difficulties (trade and on-trade barriers), political instability, excessive red tape, customs problems, insufficient regional infrastructures, corruption and so forth. However, he straightforwardly emphasized that "On top of these obstacles, there is a worrisome new one: the tendency to understand European investment under a negative light.... Make no mistake, whether this political attitude prospers, *European businesses will not be harmed as a consequence because there are abundant investment opportunities in other regions*, and the victims will be poor people in Latin America... In order to facilitate investment and trade in Latin America and the Caribbean, we need to guarantee predictability and safety for investments..."[5]

Between Vienna and Peru, the European Commission has recommended following several strategies depending on the specific particularities of each one of the sub-regions in Latin America. In the long run, however, reaching association agreements is the most important objective for both the EU and the sub-region in Latin America (Central America, Caribbean, MERCOSUR and Andean Community of Nations).

Two Lane Traffic Negotiations: Explaining Association Agreements

How should one explain the relationship between two parties whose a) priorities, b) interest, and c) political and economic developments are different? The rhetoric of official statements emphasizes the "common" heritage of the European presence in Latin America. However, an evaluation of the European and Latin American relationship by almost any political and economic standard reflects a moderate impact of European strategies in Latin America, while the Latin American leverage in Europe is quite marginal. In other words, it would seem that as in any negotiation there is a two-way street, but the traffic is heavier in one lane than in the other.

In the case of the EU's relations towards United States, for instance, common history, legacies and above all shared challenges (security, migration, and economic growth) provide a firm and solid ground for applying theoretical assumptions such as rationalism or constructivism. However, when one shifts the attention to Latin America, one can see that the driving forces of interests and/or identities diminish and the bilateral agenda becomes less complex due to the lack of intense and deep structural links.

In this regard, the asymmetry of economic and political power and the different goals in the negotiations of the EU-LAT agenda would lead us to approach the association agreements under the premises of absolute instead of relative gains, which is a key concept in the debate between realist (of any kind) and (any variant of) liberal scholars in International Relations. While the former emphasize that policy-makers will primarily be concerned with *relative gains*; the latter argues that *absolute gains* should be the priority of any cooperation, which means that the parties will be more focused on what they can get from any negotiation, regardless of the gains and power of the other party. This framework can be helpful and useful in explaining the agreements between two parties with different political and economic leverages. [6]

Association Agreements: Why Mexico and Chile First?

On a number of criteria ranging from the size of their economies to the nature of their political evolution, there are outstanding differences between Mexico and Chile. Nonetheless, both countries have undergone a simultaneous and gradual process of a) erosion of political authoritarianism, and b) implementation of free market policies since the mid-1980s. Mexico has gone through a process of steady electoral democratization and has become on of the most open economies in Latin America since late 1980s. Chile, on the other hand, was welcomed to the family of democratic nations in the early 1990s and has made a significant progress in the normalization of the relationship between the civil and political society, on the one side, and the military class, on the other. In such processes, both countries implemented first a "perestroika" and later on in the 1990s "glasnost."

Mexico was the first and strongest candidate to launch a new generation of EU Association Agreements with Latin American countries. On the Mexican side, the following objectives were crucial in the negotiations: a) to deepen the process of economic modernization and trade liberalization, and b) to improve the conditions for Mexican exporters' access to the European market. On the European side, three reasons seem quite relevant: a) NAFTA as a catalyst for negotiations, b) ending the

EU's Main Trade Partners in Latin American Partners

Imports		Exports		Major Trade Partners	
Country	100%[1]	Country	100%[2]	Country	100%[3]
1. USA	13.9%	1. USA	23.7%	1. USA	18.0%
2. China	13.5%	2. Switzerland	7.7%	2. China	9.4%
3. Russia	9.1%	3. Russia	5.3%	3. Russia	7.3%
7. LAT.	5.5%	*4. LAT.*	5.1%	*5. LAT.*	5.3%
8. Mercosur	2.6%	*15. Mercosur*	1.9%	*9. Mercosur*	2.3%
10. Brazil	2.0%	17. México	1.6%	11. Brazil	1.8%
29. Andean Comm.	0.9%	18. Brazil	1.5%	22. Mexico	1.2%
30. Mexico	0.8%	*29. Caribbean*	0.8%	30. Caribbean	0.7%
32. Chile	0.7%	*35. Andean Comm.*	0.7%	*35 Andean Comm.*	0.8%
35. Caribbean	0.6%	39. Chile	0.4%	38. Chile	0.5%
38. Argentina	0.5%	38. Argentina	0.4%	40. Argentina	0.5%
46. Venezuela	0.3%	51. Venezuela	0.3%	49. Venezuela	0.3%

1. 1174633 Mio €=100%
2. 1061013Mio €=100%
3. 2 235 645 Mio€=100%

Source: Own Elaboration based upon EUROSTAT, DG Trade/Statistics, May 18, 2006.

discrimination in the Mexican market against European investors and exporters as a result of NAFTA, and c) the prospects of a free trade area in the Americas as proposed in the 1994 Summit of the Americas.[7]

In the case of Chile, this South American country managed to re-insert itself into the international community after years of relative isolation during the military regime and actually became a very active actor in a number of international fora.[8] Particularly in the economic realm, "Chile has distinguished itself in Latin America by its good economic performance (high growth rates, low inflation and public sector surplus). After a peaceful transition, Chile became the natural second candidate for an association agreement.

The relevance of the Association Agreements between the European Union and Mexico (2000) and the EU and Chile (2005) is based on the assumption that both agreements are significant for the EU-Latin American relationship due to two chief reasons: a) they are the first comprehensive – political, economic, and cooperation - agreements with countries in the region, and b) they set a precedent for future agreements with other countries or group of countries in the region. Certainly, the association agreements are not a solution for Latin America's problems. Instead, they complement the political and economic reforms in Mexico and Chile and their overall impact is moderate.

Mexico and the Association Agreement

Bilateral relations between the EU and Mexico are governed by the Economic, Political and Co-operation Agreement (Global Agreement), which was signed in Brussels on 8 December 1997 and entered into force in October 2000. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA), part of the Global Agreement, covers a broad spectrum of economic aspects and included a full liberalization of industrial products; substantial liberalization for agricultural and fisheries products; and, as regards rules of origin, a satisfactory balance between the EU's policy of harmonization and market access considerations. The FTA has also provided EU operators with access to the Mexican procurement and services markets under equivalent conditions to the ones offered to NAFTA partners. In the 5 years following the entry into force of the FTA, bilateral trade between the EU and Mexico grew by nearly 40 percent. While European exports to Mexico have risen by 30 percent, Mexican sales in Europe have grown by 19 percent. Thus, the association agreement certainly has brought new opportunities for both parties. Nevertheless, the magnitude of such opportunities is different for each party. In the Mexican case, the association agreement, and particularly the section on trade, has complemented the extensive network of free trade agreements that Mexico has concluded in the past 15 years.

As to the political sphere of the agreement, the EU has contributed to strengthening the consolidation of Mexican democracy. The deeply atavistic and orthodox views about the meaning of sovereignty in Mexico postponed any major negotiation of an association agreement in the early 1990s because of the "implications" of the Democracy Clause to Mexican sovereignty. Once such clause was accepted by the Zedillo administration, the EU supported the decision of the Mexican government to prohibit death penalty or the legitimacy of the contested electoral process in July 2006. Likewise, Mexico was one of three priority countries in Latin America for the 2002-2004 European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights. By the same token, the Association agreement facilitated the cooperation in a range of important areas such as tropical forests, NGOs, ECIP (European Community Investment Partners), ECHO (humanitarian aid), economic co-operation, demographic policies, and refugees and displaced persons.

One last element to be considered in the relationship between the EU and Mexico is the way the Joint Committee and other mechanisms of dialogue have helped to accelerate the cooperation between both parties. For instance, in the area of cooperation, both parties have intensified their efforts to reach a Horizontal Civil Aviation Agreement as well as to establish a form of cooperation in the context of the European Program for Global Navigation Services (Galileo). Likewise, both parties have discussed alternative options for assuring a follow up of the Dialogue with the Civil Society.

The Association Agreement EU-Chile

In the context of the relations with Europe, Chile followed the steps of Mexico in pursuing an Association Agreement with the EU. Unlike the Mexican case, the relationship between Chile and the EU is a more recent one. The Community Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in 1990 was the main instrument that permitted the initiation of government level contacts after the re-establishment of democracy in 1990. This agreement was replaced by the Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in 1996, which has as a final aim the establishment of a political and economic association between Chile and the European Community and its member states.[9] Indeed, the EU and Chile began these negotiations in April 2000 and the Association Agreement was signed on 18 November 2002.

The Association Agreement has been in force since 1 March 2005 and covers the main aspects of EU-Chile relations, namely, political and trade relations and co-operation. Certainly, while the elimination of customs duties is clearly a major step forward, in view of the Commission the agreements on services, market access and investment are the areas where the most important liberalization has been made.[10]

As a result of the bilateral cooperation, Chile has participated in Operation ALTHEA. In this regard, the Chilean President, Michelle Bachelet, is quite sensitive to the role of military forces in this type of operations because during her tenure as minister of defense in 2002, Bachelet modernized the armed forces and, most importantly, shifted them further away from the repressive role they played under Pinochet's regime toward an international peacekeeping one.[11]

Likewise, a recent agreement is in order to facilitate transportation cooperation between the two parties: the EU-Chile Horizontal Agreement in the field of air transport was reached and there is a firm intention to move forward with Chile's request for liberalization of services in this area.

Along the same lines of establishing bilateral institutions of cooperation, the agreement sets in motion the Association Committee on Technical level, the Association Parliamentary Committee (European Parliament and National Congress of Chile), and the Joint Consultative Committee (channeling dialogue between the Social and Economic Committee of the EU and its the Chilean counterparts).[12] Both of these institutions are an innovation in comparison to the EU-Mexico Agreement.

With regard to the trade area, it is still too early to asses the economic effects of the agreement on the Chilean economy. However, the mere expectations of the association agreement since the end of the 1990s and the economic and political stability promoted confidence in investing and trading with that country. Unlike Mexico, Chile has a high degree of dependence on primary products that makes it vulnerable to external market fluctuations. This is the main challenge for Chile. Thus, traditional activities still have an important share in the country's GDP and export structure: during the first semester of 2003, mining (predominantly copper) still represented 46 percent of total exports, while agriculture, farming, forestry and fishing products combined represented 13.02 percent. In such a context, trade with the EU represents less than one-fourth of the overall Chilean external trade: 25 percent of its exports go to the EU and 19 percent of its imports come from the EU.[13]

It is expected, nonetheless, that the specific areas covered by the trade chapter of the agreement will contribute to the diversification of the Chilean economy. It this regard, the agreement establishes a free trade area covering the progressive and reciprocal liberalization of trade in goods over a maximum transitional period of 10 years. It also establishes a free trade area in services and provides for the liberalization of investment and of current payments and capital movements. Likewise, it includes rules to facilitate trade in wines and spirits, animals and animal products, and plants, and provisions in areas such as customs and related procedures, standards and technical regulations. Another important aspect is that it provides for the reciprocal opening of government procurement markets and for the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.

In the context of the negotiations of the agreement, the cooperation offered by the EU to Chile is of the utmost relevance. Since 2000, 22 projects have been committed for a total amount of about € 7,790,000. The bulk of the funds (87 percent) committed so far have been allocated to NGO projects, 15 percent of the funds went to projects related to the European Initiative for Democracy and Human rights, and 3 percent went to a project in favor of the environment.

Similar to the Mexican experience, the political area of the agreement is significant. Having fresh memories of the recent past, the democracy clause in the agreement upholds the no-return to authoritarian practices, or at least raises the political cost if such regression takes place in the future. Thus, for Chile the respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of Law are essential elements of the Agreement.

In the field of co-operation, the association agreement explores new areas, which were not foreseen in the 1996 Framework Co-operation Agreement between the two parties. Likewise, an increased participation of civil society is suggested, and the EU and Chile will meet at regular intervals to exchange views on this topic.

Who is next?

Based on the results of the association agreements between the EU and Mexico and Chile, it could be said that such instruments should be seen not as a panacea, but as a means to strengthen the current processes of implementation of free market policies and democratization in Latin American countries. Three main characteristics will be seen in the coming association agreements. First, they will be negotiated with regions instead of individual countries; this scheme of dealing with regions has been actually implemented by the United States in the negotiation of CAFTA. Second, Central America and the Andean Community are the regions that will most likely reach association agreements with the EU. In fact, on December 6, 2006, the European Commission proposed that the EU should start negotiations for Association Agreements with Central America and the Andean Community in 2007. In order to accelerate this process, the EU granted the Central American countries 7 million Euros to consolidate their customs union.

The third trend is the creation of association agreements is that the MERCOSUR-EU negotiation will not be completed before the end of the Doha Round. It is interesting to note that although the MERCOSUR-EU negotiations started in 1999, the progress has been slow due to the economic leverage of Brazil. Likewise, an element of uncertainty is the role that Venezuela can play in the strategies of MERCOSUR. In the meantime, some business groups have estimated that the cost of lost opportunities in trade of goods alone represents $3.7 billion per year.

Conclusions

The challenge for Latin America is to make use of the free trade agreements to improve and promote sustainable economic and social development as well as equitable distribution of the benefits of the association agreements with the EU. In the case of Mexico, there is an emergent consensus among the political establishment that free trade agreements are not enough for improving the standards of living. In the case of Chile, former president Ricardo Lagos has accurately referred to this challenge and stated that while his country has followed the so-called "Washington Consensus" of free markets and deregulation, they have also tried to wed this to a network of social protection.[14]

Thus far, the evidence reflects that from the Latin American perspective the association agreements with the European Union should be negotiated under the premise that they will open windows of opportunity for investment, trade and political cooperation, but they do not substitute the domestic efforts for economic and political reforms. In fact, both countries attracted the attention of the EU once they proved that their free market reforms were moving forward and their political systems presented clear evidence of democratization.

Roberto Dominguez *is Assistant Professor at Suffolk University, Boston*

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EUSA Teaching the EU Interest Section Essay

Teaching EU Studies in EU Languages: Rationale and Strategies

Michel Gueldry

GIVEN THE MULTILINGUAL NATURE of the European Union (EU) and the role that its 20 official languages and rich cultures play in shaping its institutional workings and policy outcomes, the need to teach EU studies in EU languages should be a self evident truth for U.S. academics engaged in the field. International relations (IR) and EU theories may advocate interdisciplinary approaches *within social sciences* as a way of conceptualizing and teaching contemporary international issues in a more 'scientific' manner, but it seems that only a minority of IR-EU scholars and professors integrate the language(s) of their region(s) of expertise within the teaching of their discipline. Many factors help account for the fact that in our age of increasing globalization the integration of languages with international relations in general and European Union studies in particular, still remains the exception rather than the rule in the U.S. system of higher education. Among the most obvious factors are the following:

- The traditional segmentation and specialization of academic organizations, coupled in many cases with the difficulty of developing original curricular experimentation and interdepartmental collaboration, especially when they do not immediately generate prestige or revenues for the institution,
- The historic decoupling of IR and language studies (LS) sustained by the 'law' of individual and institutional inertia, as well as the reciprocal invisibility and/or misunderstandings between IR departments and language departments,
- The concentration of most language programs on, and occasional self-absorption with, literature, cultural and postcolonial studies, paralleled by the insufficient awareness within many IR departments of language teaching as a social science with a strong theoretical and pedagogical underpinning that has much to offer IR specialists,
- The hiring policy of many IR and international policy studies (IPS) departments that play down or even overlook language competence and curriculum development expertise of candidates as a selection and hiring criteria,
- The hiring policy of the majority of language departments that give little value or even disregard candidates' expertise in contemporary history and IPS as a selection and hiring criteria,
- The hidden, unexamined but powerful assumption among many administrators, students and much of the U.S. public that because of its size and might, the U.S. does not need to adjust its culture and ways of doing business to globalization, the way every other country and culture on Earth does (with the sad exception of North Korea),
- The questioning of the usefulness of languages for a serious education, and the relegation of 'modern' languages to the category of 'foreign' languages. For instance, Spanish is not a *foreign* language, it is a *heritage* language of the United States and the Americas with an global dimension,
- The objective difficulty and additional workload presented by the integration of IR, language studies, and intercultural studies (ICC), as well as the experimental character of integrating second language (L2) acquisition with IR,
- The scarcity of rewards for educators and administrators who wish to venture into (relatively) uncharted and unorthodox pedagogical grounds,
- The paucity of structured incentives and rewards for students who may want to study IR / EU curriculum in a target language (TL), such as in a non-English-centric fashion.

Thus the rationale for integrating languages with IPS and EU studies is threefold: intellectual, programmatic, and professional. For U.S policymakers, it is a condition for efficient and productive relations with the world. For students and educators, it constitutes a key element of intellectual excellence and professional competitiveness, and for institutions, a significant addition to their reputation and marketing strategy.

Knowledge of languages and ICC represents an important feature of U.S. national security. The United States is home to all the peoples and cultures of the world and boasts the best universities in the world, yet there remains a 'language and world awareness' deficit among U.S. officials and within the general public. The terrorist attacks of 9-11 and the subsequent anguished rush to understand 'Why do they hate us?' demonstrated the US authorities' relative lack of preparation in the field of Arabic language and area studies. The subsequent fiasco over Saddam Hussein's inexistent weapons of mass destruction stands out as another worrisome failure of the U.S intelligence community, born from a lack of understanding and penetration of a key Middle Eastern country. Today, another five years later, U.S. and coalition forces engaged in Iraq sorely lack translators and interpreters and have to rely on locals whose expertise and/or allegiance are sometimes subject to question. In addition, it may be argued that for a long time the U.S. (not to mention Europe) saw the Middle East the way local Sunni rulers see it. That is to say, the

Shi'a were invisible – yet they are a tough partner/rival in Iraq and a rising force in the Greater Middle East.

A superficial examination indicates that EU languages are less central to U.S. national security, and thus less worthy of study, because no EU country challenges the U.S. the way Iraq did, the way Iran and North Korea do today, the way China might one day. However, headlines have a way of mis-shaping public perception by focusing on the crisis *du jour*. "If it bleeds, it leads." EU languages remain paramount because of the centrality for the U.S. of the EU for trade, security cooperation, global governance, international organizations, and the war against terror. Furthermore, as Turkey inches its way toward some kind of association with the EU, while serving as a key strategic U.S. ally for the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea region, and the Middle East, the Turkish language might become over time a *de facto* EU language. As marketing specialists have long recognized, "one buys in one's language but sells in the customer's language." Thus, U.S. students with a firm grasp of at least one working European language (besides English, that is) will enjoy more confidence and more opportunities for personal and professional development than their monolingual counterparts.

To be competitive in a globalized world and in the global economy, our students would be well advised to invest in an integrated, multicultural and multilingual education. In a tightened, more competitive job market, graduates who enjoy a multilingual education are better equipped for the rigors of graduate school and PhD programs, as well as internships and jobs in government, the intelligence community, journalism, education, NGOs such as the Peace Corps, international organizations, and the private sector. Given the rising cost of tuition in most U.S. colleges and graduate schools, students also seek added value for their dollars and will look closely at IR/IPS programs that offer 'more bang for their buck' through value-added courses. Also, as schools compete for the best and brightest students, an integrated curriculum that combines IR, language studies and intercultural studies stands out as more attractive and can help institutions and programs claim a niche of excellence in a competitive academic market. In addition, such institutions and programs can afford to be more selective in their admissions policy and admit students with stronger analytical and linguistic skills. The real world does not operate among conventional academic lines and canonic sub-fields of specialization, thus students who approach EU studies in an integrated manner will be able to rely on both content and language expertise while in Europe and will have an advantage if they engage in research, travel, study and internships in multilingual Brussels.

In this day and age, credible and professional IR/EU programs routinely request students to spend a semester (or year) abroad as part of their schooling, so students need to be prepared by their academic institution to use EU languages other than English if they want to function well in another environment, conduct field studies and on site interviews in the local vernacular. U.S students interested in internships, field research or a program abroad in Europe, and students interested in an academic specialization in EU studies (even if they never go to Europe) will be more credible if they can function in the language relevant to their area of specialization. Thus, depending upon the student's area of expertise and intended major, different languages will be emphasized. Danish is invaluable for Scandinavian/Nordic studies and international environment studies since the European Environmental Agency is located in Copenhagen. Dutch proves useful for legal, human rights, non proliferation and JHA studies since Europol, Eurojust, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons are all located in The Hague. French is most useful for security, JHA and counter-terrorism studies because the OECD, FATF-GAFI, EU-ISS and the CIA's multinational counterterrorist intelligence center are located in Paris, while MONEYVAL is housed within the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and Interpol is located in Lyons. German is indispensable for monetary and financial studies - the European Central Bank is based in Frankfort - and Germany is Europe's leading economic power. A good command of Italian is critical for students interested in food regulation and public health policy - the European Food Safety Authority is located in Parma - and those who plan to attend the European University Institute in Florence. A similar rationale exists for students who seek a geographical concentration. French or Spanish are key for Mediterranean studies, German for central Europe and Russian studies, and French is also very useful because of the location of major European institutions in Brussels and Strasbourg. Spanish is a must for students of IR and comparative politics who want to understand and compare the EU, NAFTA and MERCOSUR.

Another argument looks at enrollment in language and IR programs. Offering language- and content-relevant EU courses may help retain students who have completed their language requirements, and help recruit those seeking practical applications for their language skills, and looking for professionally relevant policy and business courses. Thus it may help, among other strategies, to revitalize a traditional or dormant language curriculum, and help turn around dwindling language enrollment.

Students tend to feel more competent in English and behave more assertively because it is their native tongue or, for many international students, a *lingua franca* that they mastered over time. But switching from one's first language (L1) to a second language (L2) entails a relative dispossession among learners. As language learning is tied to deeply personal issues of self confidence, self affirmation and social roles, it behooves professors to help foster a positive learning environment. In fact, while they may not recognize this fact at the beginning of their teaching career, academics who teach EU courses in English are also *de facto* language teachers to *both* their international students *and* their U.S. students. They are also *de facto* teachers of intercultural communication when they engage their students. For instance, on Europe's varying strategic and diplomatic sub-cultures, e.g., the United Kingdom's Atlanticism, France's independent streak, Germany's ambivalence toward military engagement and hard power, or Poland's tough approach to intergovernmental bargaining. Doing exactly the same work in TLs only adds to the challenge, the opportunities and, hopefully, the fun. To prepare themselves for a multilingual class, EU professors will want to familiarize themselves with key language teaching concepts, resources and standards setters, such as the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL), the AAT (American Association of Teachers of French, German, Spanish), and the Joint National Committee for Languages (JNCL), which is the umbrella site for language associations in the United States (the National Council for Languages and International Studies or NCLIS is its right arm and focuses on lobbying at the state and federal levels in favor of language policies). Also relevant is the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR), which connects all federal agencies with a professional stake in language expertise. IR departments with a focus on defense, security, and counterterrorism studies might also want to get acquainted with the CIA's Intelligence Language Institute, as well as The Defense Language Institute (DLI) and its own set of language guidelines, developed for military and intelligence personnel.

All IR departments seriously interested in language policy should be acquainted with the practices of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) at the U.S. Department of State, which has compiled approximate learning expectations for languages based on the length of time it takes to achieve Professional Speaking (S3) and Reading Proficiency (R3) in them. This classification is roughly equivalent to ACTFL "superior" level and all European Union languages belong to what ACTFL labels Category I and II languages, entailing 23-24 weeks of study (Category I), 30 weeks (German) or 44 weeks (Category II) of study to reach the ACTFL "Superior" proficiency level, at which point students are able to operate freely and competently with original documents and in a native-like environment. This is not to suggest that students who enroll in an EU class taught in target languages should reach that level, rather, these precisions are just meant as a basis for discussion when planning a EU course and defining learning objectives, testing and grading.

The following are very pragmatic in nature and offered with a view toward helping EU professors plan and teach European Union courses that integrate target languages (TL), second language (L2) acquisition and intercultural studies (ICC).

Steps for the *Planning* Phase of EU Course in target language (TL)

Class Planning

DO:
- Start planning early
- Coordinate and consult with language faculty, native language assistants, school of education faculty, experienced EU professors
- Learn how to direct your students to your campus language resources and facilities (language lab, accent reduction software, grammar tutor software), and native assistants
- Seek institutional support to assist curricular development
- Familiarize yourself with ACTFL language proficiency guidelines
- Familiarize yourself with basic language teaching paradigms, methods and principles (language/education faculty may contribute a reader of key terms and categories as well as sources for teaching social sciences in TL)
- Emphasize pedagogical approach, i.e., examine all aspects of the *teaching* and *learning* experience of EU class in TL
- Provide for ongoing and post-class assessment procedures
- Maybe plan for a pilot experiment with fewer, better students at first, before mainstreaming EU courses in TL and possibly expanding to other original formats (team teaching, parallel sections in different TLs with joint sessions in English or TLs, etc.)
- Determine ideal or workable (given institutional constraints) class enrollment. An EU class in TL should allow for generous student oral participation, and thus enrollment level may be typically less than a corresponding class in English
- Negotiate the cross-listing of your EU course in TL for either IPS or language credits

DON'T:
- Start planning too late, as an afterthought
- Leave it to chance, inspiration and the moment, or

rely too much on past experience
- Mechanically transpose past experience in teaching EU in English to a new EU class in TL
- Expect to somehow just 'do more of the same' in a TL. EU in TL requires a specific methodology and pedagogy
- Sacrifice content to language or vice-versa
- Work in isolation
- Expect to find the perfect balance between, or magic integration of, content acquisition and language acquisition. Teaching remains an art rather than a science and innovative curriculum, and even when buttressed by a solid pedagogical approach, retains something of an exploratory and creative dimension
- Expect optimum faculty/ group performance on first (sometimes second) trial
- Be shy about advertising this different, exciting class and recruiting your best students. Instead, coordinate with language faculty and language major advisors to advertise this language and content course

Students Assessment, Placement and Advising

DO:
- Devise adequate language placement test
- Expect a range of linguistic abilities
- Determine required linguistic abilities for EU class in TL, based on informed pedagogical goals
- Prepare thorough course description beforehand to cover all students' questions - and your own!

DON'T
- Lump together students with wide range of linguistic abilities
- Frighten students. Instead, devise a *reasonable challenge* for students, i.e., a clear set of appropriate goals and objectives, realistic assignments and performance standards, and attainable rewards

Syllabus Design

DO:
- Write syllabus and class material in the TL
- Identify relevant EU material in TL
- Anticipate some adjustment at the beginning of class depending on students' linguistic abilities, enrollment, and class dynamics
- In planning for classroom activities, provide for ample student interaction and feedback. Students need and want to speak, especially in a TL
- Reserve ample time for what you know to be difficult EU material and activities
- Tailor class activities to desired learning outcomes in content, language and ICC
- Carefully assess the respective weight/grading of 1) content acquisition, 2) skills development such as public speaking in TL and 3) development, performance of the various language skills (reading, speaking, understanding, writing) and 4) ICC

DON'T
- Plan to lecture too much or too little. Instead, plan for a variety of activities, e.g., lectures on the topic of the day, sub-group discussions on selected documents, sub-group reports to class on topics studied in groups, with or without resorting to visuals, transparencies, board, etc., open discussion, Q and A sessions, viewings of EU-related audiovisual material with discussions, native speaker guest lecturer(s), etc.

Steps for the *Teaching* Phase of EU Course in target language (TL)

Course Preparation

DO:
- Select course book, reader, and audiovisual materials with both content and language goals in mind
- Prepare list of EU and EU-related web sites, online research centers and e-data banks in English and TL
- Identify online glossaries and dictionaries for students to use
- Prepare lists of guided preparation and discussion questions connected with screened reading list
- Prepare lists of synonyms, antonyms and definitions for key EU concepts (e.g., *acquis communautaire*, subsidiarity, spill over, etc.) in TL

DON'T
- Trust glossy brochures and magic 'speak Parisian French in only 2 weeks in 10 minutes a day while you sleep' methods. Carefully assess all material in target language for their relevance for class
- Wait until it's too late. Getting books from Europe to your campus bookstore takes much more time than books published in the U.S.
- Order expensive European books. Due to unfavorable exchange rate, shipping costs and bookstore mark-up, a European book may be prohibitive. Much information may be found online for free

Class Activities

DO:
- Emphasize peer teaching: Organize research/study groups, and assign questions along with clear calendar for class reports and presentations
- Structure students group participation first around group reports and smaller presentations, then open debate, round table and contradictory debates.
- Prepare open ended oral activities in incremental fashion
- Allow 15 minutes or so at the beginning of some classes for subgroups to discuss their questions, compare notes, teach each other, and fine tune their

report to the class
- Allow 2 or 3 drafts for each home essay, to provide feedback to students on content, structures, ideas and TL. Impress on students that they become their own language tutor and learn the grammar in context
- After each exam and home essay, prepare a list of the most common mistakes students made in the TL, go over it in class or assign it as a home (individual or group) assignment. It helps students edit their second draft of home essay and improve their writing
- In class exams, some students may do well on the content and quite poorly on the language. Assign a grade for the content right away, but do provide for a second chance for TL performance: Have said students edit their own work at home, assign another grade on corrected draft and calculate the average
- Appoint a couple of students each week to take notes and vocabulary for the class (all students are still expected to take notes), have them email you the document on Fridays, edit it and go over it at the beginning of next class. 'Secretaries' will earn a grade as part of their TL acquisition
- Prepare exams featuring questions on vocabulary and on content, based on carefully edited secretaries' documents
- Pair up stronger and weaker students on non graded projects. Use native speakers who are taking your EU class

DON'T
- Believe in one chance only, especially for written take home assignment. Students need continuous support and guidance when speaking and writing in TL
- Assign reading and writing assignments that are too long or as long as you typically would in English
- Engage in long translation exercises: They are time consuming and very difficult. Prefer shorter translation exercises.
- Conduct improvised on sight translations, because they are very time consuming and can be quite frustrating. Have students prepare them at home, so as to save time and improve the quality of delivery.
- Require students to write one 30 page essay in TL : Better have them write 3 or 4 shorter essays (6 to 10 pages) with multiple drafts
- Totally exclude English from class material and activities. Students should be expected to improve in both directions: L1?L2, not just L1?L2 or L2?L1
- Limit yourself to speaking. Write abundantly on board or computer tablet, and insure that students read aloud, speak and take ample notes. This way, you will incorporate four key learning styles: aural, oral, speaking and kinesthetic, and help reduce American accent in TL

Relationship with Students

DO:
- Take into account emotional and psychological factors such as 1) individual learning styles and 2) TL anxiety performance
- Communicate in TL through email and electronic course conference, Moodle, podcasts, wikis, etc.
- Adapt your grading scale and methods. For instance, for oral presentations, students may earn two grades, one for content, structure, ideas, one for public speaking in the TL. Carefully assess grade percentage and scale, based on desired learning performance and outcomes for content acquisition, language acquisition and ICC
- Devise special provisions for TL majors, maybe in coordination with their TL advisor or language program heads

DON'T
- Expect your students to become advanced, distinguished or near-native speakers, writers, translators, interpreters, or public speakers. That is not the purpose of such EU courses. Unless your students are specializing, majoring in the TL, emphasize functionality and improvement in TL, not perfection
- Expect all linguistic skills to improve similarly. Typically, aural and technical reading skills tend to improve faster than writing. Speaking skills improvement tends to vary greatly among learners

Michel Gueldry *is Associate Professor of European Union studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, CA. He may be reached at mgueldry@miis.edu*

The EUSA Review Book Review section was omitted this issue due to space considerations but will return in the Spring issue. EUSA members interested in reviewing recent EU- related books, please contact the reviews editor:

Dr. Andrew Smith
CERVL
Sciences po Bordeaux
Domaine Universitaire
11 Allée Ausone,
Pessac 33607, France
E-mail a.smith@sciencespobordeaux.fr
Fax 56 84 43 29

Publishers should send two review copies of books directly to Dr. Smith.

EUSA Prizes

THE EUSA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE is pleased to announce the winner of the Best Paper Prize for papers presented at the 2005 conference in Austin ,Texas. The prize committee cosisted of Sophie Meunier (Princeton University), Milada vachudova (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) and Helen Wallace.

The winning paper is "The Politics of Antitrust and Merger Review in the European Union: Institutional Change and Decisions from Messina to 2004" Gabriel T. Swank (Stanford) and Tim Buthe (Duke).

The committee noted that "making competition policy, also known as anti-trust policy, is now one of the most prominent roles of the European Commission in the internal market, as well as the one most feared and contested by external actors. Yet this role was almost not acknowledged at the founding of the European Community. Swank and Buthe's excellent paper examines the puzzling question of how the EU came to acquire such broad-ranging powers over matters of competition. It explains the institutional evolution in this policy realm and accounts for variation in some of the recent merger review decisions by developing a modified neofunctionalist argument based on the tools of historical institutionalism. This paper answers a paradoxical question about a substantive policy area by offering an elegant mix of theoretical and empirical and of historical and contemporary analysis."

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INCLUDED IN THIS ISSUE of the EUSA Review is a ballot for the election of new members of the EUSA Executive Committee. Please fill out the ballot and return it to EUSA either by fax at 412.648.1168, or by mail to:

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