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EUSA REVIEW

Law in an Enlarged European Union **George A. Bermann**

IT IS COMMONLY HELD, and I think also true, that no enlargement of the European Union that has occurred to date compares in significance to the particular enlargement or sets of enlargement that are envisioned for the years that lie more or less immediately ahead. Whether viewed in terms of number of accession states, geographic expansion, population increase, linguistic diversity, or social and economic heterogeneity (both among themselves and vis-à-vis the current fifteen), this enlargement is nothing less than momentous. With this enlargement, the European Union truly crosses a threshold. The way in which the Union copes with it will be a fair indication of its capacity to handle any subsequent enlargement that I can envision, even one that might include such large Eurasian entities as Russia and Turkey.

In addressing the subject of law in an enlarged European Union, one has to recognize that enlargement's legal dimension is neither its most challenging nor even its most important. Given the immense political, economic, and social (i.e., essentially non-legal) stakes, this enlargement recalls something that European law scholars know, but have tended recently to forget as they turned their fond gaze to the European Community and the European Union over the last decade or two, namely that the law is fundamentally an instrument and not an end in itself.

We know that, notwithstanding the inspiration of Jean Monnet and the early references to eventual political developments, the European project was viewed early on in predominantly economic terms. But even to the extent that the project was always more than economic in nature, the law as such was found to be interesting chiefly insofar as it provided a framework for achieving certain prescribed economic objectives. The law was viewed, as it so often is viewed elsewhere, as purely instrumental in the sense of enabling us to produce solutions to a defined set of problems, and its efficacy was assessed chiefly by reference to its output.

This may have been most evident when all we had before us was the highly sector-specific and highly economic-objective-specific Coal and Steel Community. But even with the advent of the European Community as such, matters had not fundamentally changed. True, the enterprise was no longer sector-specific, but the Community could still fairly be characterized, and was in fact largely conceived of, as highly economic-objective-specific. What substantive policies, as such, were proclaimed paled alongside the all-important "four freedoms" (each of them

entailing the freedom of movement of a factor of production); and with the exception of gender equality, those policies were fundamentally economic in nature; arguably even the gender equality policy was couched, and in a sense conceived of, in economic terms.

Since European law was thought about chiefly as a means of attaining more or less independently defined (and largely economic) objectives, attention to law focused largely on the law that *emerged from* the Community's legislative, administrative and judicial processes rather than the law that *accounted for and explained* those processes. Without making too much of nomenclature, I recall with interest that the titles of the leading English-language casebooks tended to refer to "The Law of the European Communities" rather than "European Community Law."

While perhaps not its intention, the Single European Act profoundly changed this. Though the Act made the 1992 "internal market" initiative its centerpiece, and though that initiative was presented as little more than a "perfection" of the common market (and its four freedoms), European law from that point onward came increasingly to be viewed in non-instrumental terms, and the legal structures and processes that gave rise to legislative and adjudicatory change became as interesting as, if not more interesting than, the legislative and adjudicatory change itself. This is not a complete paradox, of course. If the 1992 program (and through it the internal market) was the centerpiece of the Single European Act, it was importantly joined to fundamental institutional change and expansion of independent Community competences. Indeed the SEA brought the most fundamental institutional change and the largest expansion of independent Community competences since the Community's very founding. It signaled a fundamental shift from the law that achieved economic integration to the law that had made that achievement possible and that might in the future make a much broader range of achievements possible.

By the time of the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam the transformation was complete. The debates in the dozen years between 1985 and 1997 were unabashedly about governance in the very largest sense. Leaving aside the utterly singular phenomenon of European Monetary Union (singular because of its enormous symbolic as well as economically integrative function), the legal debates surrounding those treaties were about things such as constitutionalism, democratic deficit, the existence or non-existence of a "demos," transparency, treaty simplifi-

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EUSA Review

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From the Chair

Martin A. Schain

WELCOME TO EUSA, THE European Union Studies Association. Our long overdue change of name confirms both the evolving progress of the European Union as well as the growth and expansion of our organization during the past few years. We are now an interdisciplinary organization of scholars from the North America, Europe and beyond, with almost 1500 members, and growing rapidly. At a time when tensions between the Government of the United States and the countries of the European Union are growing, EUSA is unique among scholarly organizations in its ability to bring together scholars from the United States and Europe to present and discuss their work, and to develop common intellectual projects.

I am honored that the EUSA Executive Committee has elected me to be their chair for the next two years. I pledge to you that I will use my skill and energy to continue and broaden the fine work that has been done by my predecessors—to attract to EUSA a larger number of scholars from the United States and the Americas who work on Europe, and to broaden the reach of EUSA among our European colleagues and those beyond Europe. During the next two years, we intend to intensify contact among scholars and practitioners by expanding our interest sections and by increasing our activities well beyond the biennial conference.

The conference this year was an exciting scholarly event. Almost 500 delegates from the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia, Japan, Taiwan and all corners of Europe, including most EU candidate countries, attended. Along with scholars, there were ten participants from agencies of the U.S. government, eleven representatives of various EU institutions, as well as representatives of European embassies and consulates in the U.S. Some of these “official” participants served on scholarly panels, while others offered comments and observations from the audience. In general, panels were well attended, including those in the last slots on the last day. This was truly a trans-Atlantic interchange of ideas. More than half of those who presented papers were from Europe. Papers on sale in the paper room sold well (no doubt a tribute to quality of the papers), and the Association was thus able to raise more than three thousand dollars for its Grants and Scholarship Fund.

As the outgoing chair of the 2001 program committee, I am deeply grateful to my colleagues on the committee, all of whom were responsible for shape and development of this conference. Their vision of a trans-Atlantic dialogue permeated all of the panels. Of course, I would like to thank Valerie Staats once again for the grace with which she approached and pursued the administration of this 2001 conference. We are also grateful to several institutions for grants or other financial support for ECSA 2001: the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington D.C., the University Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, and the European Union Center at the University of Wisconsin Madison.

In the end, ECSA 2001 was about ideas and scholarship. Therefore, it was with special pleasure that the Executive Committee awarded its

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We proudly announce that we have changed our name to the

European Union Studies Association™

By action of the 1999-2001 and 2001-2003 Executive Committees of the European Community Studies Association, in a motion adopted on 2 June 2001 in a joint meeting of the Executive Committees, reading:

“We, the 1999-2001 and 2001-2003 Executive Committees of the European Community Studies Association, by unanimous decision hereby change the name of the Association to European Union Studies Association, to better reflect our scope and purpose, and to be effective July 1, 2001. All contractual and fiscal agreements made under the former name will remain in force. The Association’s Constitution and By-Laws remain in force.”

Thoughts on the name change from the ECSA Chairs who served in the role after the EU changed its name:

“The name change was long overdue. Changing ECSA to EUSA ensures that the organization’s name reflects what it studies. Just as the EU changed its name, so must ECSA.”

— Vivien A. Schmidt, 1999-2001 ECSA Chair

“The new name brings us up to date with developments on the ground in Europe since the Maastricht Treaty. So I’m happy with this change.”

— Gary Marks, 1997-1999 ECSA Chair

“The move to acceptance of European Union Studies Association as the proper title is timely and appropriate. I welcome it completely. This shift brings into line the name of our organization and developments in European integration.”

— James A. Caporaso, 1995-1997 ECSA Chair

“The name change will be extremely useful. My students were just asking me why ECSA still uses ‘European Community.’ In fact, the ‘European Community’ never really got the interest of most Americans, while the ‘European Union’ is finally beginning to penetrate their awareness and imaginations.”

— Alberta Sbragia, 1993-1995 ECSA Chair

A few important implementation details for all EUSA members:

Our e-mail address has changed to **eusa@pitt.edu** Please update your e-mail address books and distribution lists.

Our Web site address has changed to **www.eustudies.org** Please update any hyperlinks to us on your Web sites.

Librarians please take note: Our Association publication has changed its name to ***EUSA Review***. The *EUSA Review* has a new ISSN (1535-7031), but our volume/numbering sequence has continued without interruption. This, for example, is the third issue published in our fourteenth year of producing the Association newsletter.

EUSA members: Wondering how to cite our conference or publications given our name change? Follow the principle that any reference to conference papers or pieces authored for our publications will use the name that was in use at that time, that is, ‘ECSA’ for activities up until June 30, 2001 and ‘EUSA’ for all those thereafter.

George A. Bermann / *continued from p.1*

cation, the Union's legal personality, subsidiarity and human rights. So robust and compelling was the constitutional and para-constitutional discourse that the EU was able to undergo its most recent accessions—those of Austria, Finland and Sweden—with scarcely a pause or deflection in the debate.

As regards the attention given to law, the contrast with the forthcoming enlargements is positively striking. Counter-intuitive though it may seem, the very same factors—political, economic, and social—which make this enlargement unique require that European law re-acquire its instrumental focus. European law has now once again to perform what are essentially problem-solving tasks. Put differently, the overriding legal interest of the prospective enlargement is that it calls fundamentally into question what appeared to have been a permanent shift in attention from the law emerging from European decision- and policy-making to the law shaping European decision- and policy-making.

This is not to say that legal discourse about governance in the “grand” sense is altogether behind us, far from it. The next scheduled Intergovernmental Conference—of 2004—will once again place governance in this sense at center stage; the agenda items already include some old constitutional friends (e.g., simplification of the treaties, subsidiarity, incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) as well as some new ones (e.g., whether to install a catalogue of Community competences). But now the European Union will have to make its inescapable re-commitment to the instrumental value of law at the same time that it pursues the constitutional project, whatever shape that project may have. The coincidence of these undertakings—the instrumental and the constitutional—will make each of them more difficult to carry out, as well as more difficult than in the past, when in my view one or the other of them was at all times implicitly, if not explicitly, treated as then preponderant.

As an exercise, let us consider the evidence as to whether European law is up to the task I have described. We can begin by identifying what appears to have been European law's focus during the current period lived in the shadows of enlargement. Enlargement (or rather enlargement's prospect) appears basically to have fueled two legal preoccupations. The first is whether, and if so in what time frame, the accession states can adequately embrace the corpus of existing law, the *acquis communautaire*. The second concerns the institutional modifications to the Union that are needed in order to accommodate the enlarged membership.

While these are unquestionably the right legal questions, the terms in which they have been asked fail to reflect the renewed problem-solving urgency to which I have referred.

As concerns the question whether, and if so in what time frame, the accession states can adequately embrace the *acquis communautaire*, I doubt whether it is sufficient to ask about the rate of success of the accession states in the legislative transposition of directives. Surely more must be asked and answered about the adequacy of the machinery in the accession states, at national and sub-national level, for the effective administration and enforcement of European law, questions which implicate not only domestic institutions (e.g., the efficacy of

legislatures, administrations, police, and courts), but also domestic political culture (e.g., attitudes toward corruption). While we may frame the question in simple terms (such as readiness to embrace the *acquis communautaire*), I seriously doubt that we can satisfactorily answer it in such terms. Talking about the *acquis communautaire* as such is insufficient. It is not enough to consider whether the accession states will faithfully implement what has been achieved. It is also important to consider the implications of enlargement for the *acquis communautaire* of the future, that is to say, the *acquis* in whose making (or non-making) the accession states will participate.

Turning to the question of the institutional modifications of the Union needed to accommodate an enlarged membership, I have broadly analogous misgivings. Certainly the negotiators at the Intergovernmental Conference at Nice were right to confront the challenge of integrating the representatives of the accession states in the Union's principal decision-making organs (the Council, Commission, Parliament and Court) and for re-configuring those institutions (notably the Commission) so as to avoid rendering those institutions too large or unwieldy. But there are obviously limitations to a strategy that consists of altering the per-State numbers of Ministers, Commissioners, MPs and judges. It is questionable whether that approach can adequately equip the enlarged European Union for the problem-solving era that lies ahead.

It may be revealing to consider the legal instruments that have been devised lately specifically to address the particularities of the prospective enlargement. Interestingly, some of these do take the form of institutional re-arrangements; others, however, are more properly viewed as doctrinal.

1. Qualified Majority Voting

Even in the original six-member Communities, qualified majority voting served to ensure that differences among the Member States did not completely paralyze the political process within the Council. Since the risk of political paralysis evidently increases with each enlargement, qualified majority voting evidently has continuing importance. Not surprisingly, its sphere of applications continues to grow with each enlargement; as illustrated by the Treaty of Nice. That wider use of qualified majority voting is necessary for effective political problem-solving in an enlarged Union goes without saying. Whether it is sufficient for that purpose is quite another matter.

2. Subsidiarity

While the campaign for subsidiarity was closely connected in public consciousness and discourse with concerns over excessive centralization felt in certain existing Member States (notably Denmark and the UK), it was also fueled by the prospect of an enlargement that would bring into EU membership Member States whose domestic circumstances differ mightily from one another and from the domestic circumstances of the fifteen. The prospective Member States were understandably thought to require more closely tailored solutions than the “one-size-fits-all” solution (rightly or wrongly) expected of measures emanating from Brussels. Precisely because it embraces particularity, subsidiarity was thought to respond in some measure to the realities of the EU's eastward enlargement.

Even a relative enthusiast of subsidiarity has to admit that, as a tool, it is poorly adapted to the challenges of enlargement. While subsidiarity may perfectly well suit the desires of the Member States that are capable of achieving in one way or another the objectives of a Community policy objective set in Brussels, it almost certainly has nothing to offer the Member States that lack that capacity. At most, subsidiarity in those circumstances will suggest that action be taken at the Community rather than the Member State level. It will not reveal what that action should be.

3. Enhanced Cooperation

Enhanced cooperation, or flexibility, likewise acknowledges the fact of diversity among the Member States, and its emergence is even more closely linked to the diversity expected to result from the prospective enlargement. A general flexibility regime was inaugurated at Amsterdam (and adapted at Nice) with the avowed purpose of coping with an enlarged membership that risked making it difficult, even under qualified majority voting, for the Union as a whole to pursue deeper and perhaps more adventurous integration.

But flexibility's relation to enlargement also needs to be examined more closely. At its core, enhanced cooperation is designed to protect the interests of the Member States that seek to use the Community system to achieve deeper or more far-reaching integration, not the Member States who are unable and/or unwilling to participate in that deeper or more far-reaching integration. Of course, the system does not leave reluctant or unqualified States wholly unprotected. At least until the Treaty of Nice is ratified, any State may block an exercise in closer cooperation by a subset of other States. But this is protection *from* enhanced cooperation, not protection *through* enhanced cooperation. The other guarantees that flexibility offers to reluctant or unqualified States may be reduced to broad assurances to the effect that those States (a) will not be bound by the decisions taken by enhanced cooperation, (b) will not be prevented from joining the bandwagon as soon as they are willing and able to do so, and (c) will not discover that enhanced cooperation has upset the existing *acquis communautaire*.

These are impressive guarantees, but by definition they do not address the challenge of adapting the deliberative process to the realities of enlargement. The real challenge lies in finding legislative solutions at the Community level that entail the political participation of all Member States and that bind all Member States, even while permitting differential solutions or otherwise responding to the diversity of circumstances and needs among the however-many-are-then the number of Member States. Indeed, the current flexibility regime sweeps this whole problem "under the rug" by asserting, summarily, that enhanced cooperation may not be pursued except as a "last resort," presumably meaning unless and until the ordinary legislative channels in which all the Member States participate have been exhausted.

4. Sanctions

Enlargement may not have been in the drafters' minds when they amended Article 228 (ex 171) at Maastricht to permit the Court of Justice, upon recommendation by the Commission, to

impose a monetary penalty on a Member State which fails to obey or otherwise abide by a prior judgment by the Court of Justice condemning it for a violation of that State's Community law obligations. But when they took the further step at Amsterdam of providing a sanctioning system for Member States found guilty of a serious and persistent breach of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, enlargement was very much on their minds. Though the system as such has not been used, the Community did subsequently target Austria for including Jorg Haider's Freedom Party in a government coalition, thereby appearing to embrace anti-democratic policies. The episode has unquestionably to be read as a "warning shot" to future Member States to the east.

Salutary though this treaty reform may be from the point of view of protecting democracy, human rights and the rule of law, it is by its nature limited to disrespect for those overriding values. It leaves unanswered the question of day-to-day decision-making, and more specifically the challenge of mounting for a vastly and importantly altered European Union a legislative and regulatory process, that can produce policies that (a) preserve and enhance an internal market that has been so laboriously achieved, (b) carry on the process of harmonization of national law in an ever more heterogeneous environment, (c) continue to establish and promote economic policies in the sectors where the Community has committed to have such policies, and (d) pursue an appropriate set of non-economic policies (such as environment, consumer protection and worker health and safety) under circumstances in which the Member States, by virtue of their differences, may choose to reserve the right to conduct different cost-benefit operations and exercise different tradeoffs.

5. Charter of Fundamental Rights

I certainly view the Charter of Fundamental Rights project as likewise having been pursued in large part in consideration of the EU's prospective eastward enlargement and therefore rightly counted as among the Union's legal response to enlargement. This is not to say that human rights protection did not need to be fortified throughout the Community generally, or that the Charter project would not have been pursued but for the prospect of eastward enlargement. But that prospect furnished an important impetus.

The question nevertheless remains as to how adoption of the Charter will promote the Union's meeting the positive law-making and policy-making challenges that are specific to the EU accessions that lie immediately ahead. In my judgment, adoption of the Charter does not specifically promote that objective and should not be expected to. Much like the European Human Rights Convention, the constitutional human rights traditions of the Member States, and the Court of Justice's own unwritten general principles of law, the Charter protects Europeans from human rights harm that may result from the adoption and/or implementation of European Union policies throughout the territory of the Union. It does not supply the Union's problem-solving legislative agenda or indicate the legislative and administrative means by which the core items on that agenda may most efficiently and effectively be achieved.

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Interestingly, the “big” question surrounding the Charter seems to be whether and when it will be incorporated as such in the constitutive treaties or otherwise made directly judicially enforceable by the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance. That determination will presumably affect the Charter’s effectiveness, but it will not alter the nature of the Charter’s contribution to European law and policy.

Any list of enlargement-related strategies would be incomplete without mention of redistribution of Community resources. Structural and cohesion funds can be used to bridge the economic gaps that help make task of legislating for an enlarged Union as challenging as it is. This prospect has certainly not been lost on the Union’s leadership. Raising and spending money wisely so as to produce a greater degree of harmony in the economic, political and social conditions across the Member States has been a central element from the beginning of the Union’s Agenda 2000: Prospects for Enlargement. But the Union’s arsenal of legal instruments for enlargement cannot be limited to the expenditure of money—however worthy the accession States and however worthy the projects and purposes that are envisaged, especially as the Union’s revenue-raising capacities are necessarily politically limited.

The peculiar challenge for law in an enlarged European Union will be to maintain the law’s distinctive contribution under new realities. The first step in focusing on solutions to the challenge of legislating and administering for a drastically enlarged European Union is to recognize that what has been done thus far by way of law reform in the shadow of enlargement is valuable but far from sufficient. We are re-entering an era that reminds us that the law the European Union generates, and the processes by which this occurs, are just as important and worthy of our attention as the legal architecture of Europe itself.

Editor’s note: Professor Bermann delivered these ideas as the inaugural address of the EUSA EU Law Section’s first meeting on June 2, 2001 at the ECSA Conference in Madison, Wisconsin.

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Spotlight on France in the USA

Many EUSA members focus on EU member states, inter alia. This feature gives an overview of individual EU member states’ official presences in the USA.

Important Web sites:

- Primary diplomatic Web site (in English and French): www.info-france-usa.org/
- French Trade Commission in the USA Web site: www.dree.org/usa/English/
- French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site (in French, German, and English): www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/index.html
- National Institute for Statistics and Economics Studies (INSEE), site in French and English including access to the French Census, SIRENE, and more: www.insee.fr/en/home/home_page.asp

Missions: French Embassy
4101 Reservoir Road NW
Washington, DC 20007
Tel 202.944.6000

Ten consulates: Boston, New York City, Washington, DC, Chicago, Atlanta, New Orleans, Miami, Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco

Official publications:

News from France, 8-page tabloid of short articles on news, politics, and culture from France, in English, published approximately once per month
France Magazine, 48-page quarterly periodical with in-depth features in English on contemporary French topics, with a calendar of French events in the USA

French Agency for International Investment

Four USA offices in Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, New York; Web site includes monthly e-newsletter: www.investinfrancena.org

French-American Chamber of Commerce

Non-profit organization promoting international trade between the U.S. and France www.faccdc.org

Selected scholarly resources in the USA:

- Center on the United States and France (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC) www.brook.edu/fp/cusf/center_hp.htm
- Chicago Group on Modern France (University of Chicago) www.humanities.uchicago.edu/homes/CGMF/home_page.html
- *French Politics, Culture and Society*, journal published by Berghahn Books www.berghahnbooks.com

Ireland Says No Desmond Dinan

IRELAND'S REJECTION OF THE Nice Treaty in the referendum on June 7 stunned many observers. How could Ireland, a country that benefits so much from EU membership, deny the same opportunity to other countries whose situation today resembles Ireland's not so long ago? The government harped on this in the run up to the referendum, claiming that opponents of the treaty, fearful that enlargement would rob Ireland of agricultural subsidies and structural funds, were selfish. Yet one of the government's arguments in favor of the treaty, that a "no" vote would alienate the Commission and other member states, thereby risking the flow of "Brussels money" into Ireland, showed that selfishness was not confined to the opposing side.

In fact the referendum had little or nothing to do with enlargement. This is not to say that a referendum specifically on enlargement would have passed, in Ireland or in any other member state. The EU's response to the Irish result, that enlargement would proceed regardless, suggests that the treaty itself is not imperative for enlargement. The treaty deserves to have been defeated on its merits (or demerits): it increases the complexity and opacity of legislative decision-making; leaves open the eventual composition of the Commission (one Commissioner per member state until the EU reaches twenty-seven members); and has numerous other failings.

Inevitably, few of its supporters or opponents bothered to read the treaty. Opponents opposed it for a variety of reasons, most of which had nothing to do with the treaty itself: to embarrass the government; to put the EU in its place; to defend Irish neutrality; to protect "family values." The government likes to point out that only 35 percent of the electorate voted in the referendum, a low turnout by Irish standards. But that in itself is revealing: many of those who usually vote could not be bothered going to the polls, even on a fine summer's day, because they were turned off by the EU and the Nice Treaty. Such indifference toward the EU is hardly peculiar to Ireland.

The difference between the results of the Nice referendum and the previous EU-related referendum in Ireland (on the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1998) is nonetheless striking. Then the turnout was much higher and the majority in favor an impressive 62 percent (see table below). Amsterdam contained provisions on the CFSP that generated concern in Ireland about neutrality, but not enough to defeat the treaty. Clearly, something happened in the last three years to stoke Irish resentment of the EU. Recent criticism in the EU of Ireland's taxation policy and budget undoubtedly provide part of the answer, and may help to explain the low turnout as a form of protest. Whatever its cause, the low turnout proved fatal for the treaty (the number of "no" votes was relatively unchanged in the Amsterdam and Nice referenda).

The government complained after the event that its legal obligation to explain both sides of an issue in a referendum campaign constrained its ability to get out the pro-Nice vote. Nevertheless Fianna Fail, the largest party in government, ran a lackluster campaign. This did not reflect complacency so much as ambivalence within the party on the EU. Fianna Fail contains a sizeable conservative element, in which Euroskepticism flourishes. Concerns about sovereignty, neutrality, and family values resonate among Fianna Fail's traditional supporters, especially outside the more prosperous suburbs.

The government and the EU have blown hot and cold since the referendum, alternatively scolding and appeasing the electorate. Fianna Fail has to tread carefully, for internal party reasons. At the same time the government is determined to avoid another embarrassment in the second referendum. Other member states, knowing that their own electorates are fickle, sympathize with the government's plight. Thanks to the referendum result Commission President Romano Prodi has discovered Ireland, paying a "fact finding" visit there at the end of June.

The EU will try to do in Ireland what the EC did in Denmark after Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992: assuage the concerns of enough voters to win approval, however narrow, in a second referendum. In Denmark's case this was relatively easy because much of the opposition to Maastricht focused on specific policy areas, like EMU and the CFSP. In Ireland's case opposition to Nice is much more diffuse. The EU will probably come up with an "Irish Protocol" respecting Ireland's unique identity, whatever that is. The Commission may also find a little extra money for pet Irish projects. By hook or by crook, the EU (including the Irish government) will do its utmost to get the treaty through next time round. Presuming that more people turn out to vote, the treaty will probably be ratified.

The failure of the first Nice referendum and anxiety about the second one highlights a political paradox at the heart of the EU. The EU desperately needs to become more transparent, open, accountable, and responsive to its citizens. Referenda should build trust in the EU. Yet recent experiences (Ireland's rejection of Nice; Denmark's rejection of EMU; Austria's threat to hold a referendum on sanctions; and the German government's dismissal of a suggestion that a referendum be held on enlargement) show that far from welcoming referenda as confidence building measures, the EU wants to avoid them like the plague.

Irish referenda on the EU

Year	Question	% Turnout	% Yes	% No
1973	Join the EC?	71	84	16
1987	Ratify SEA?	44	70	30
1992	Ratify Maastricht?	57	69	31
1998	Ratify Amsterdam?	56	62	38
2001	Ratify Nice?	35	54	46

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European Security: An Exercise in Bargaining? Katja Weber

THE AIR WAR IN KOSOVO pointed to a significant gap between U.S. and European military capabilities. It served as a clear reminder that, when it comes to precision-guided munitions, mobility, surveillance and reconnaissance resources, the Europeans, to this day, are unable to conduct their own military missions and remain highly dependent on U.S. specific assets. To remedy this shortcoming, in a series of summit meetings at St. Malo, Cologne, and Helsinki (December 1999), European Union (EU) members discussed how to bring about a more robust European defense dimension and, in December 1999, announced plans for the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). By 2003 the EU vowed to put in place between 50,000-60,000 troops for humanitarian, rescue, and peace-keeping missions (the so-called Petersberg tasks), that should be deployable within sixty days and last up to one year.

Reminiscent of the European Defense Community—which was conceptualized in the early 1950s yet never materialized—such a defense arrangement faces a number of challenges. First, the EU does not speak with one voice. Particularly stark differences exist between the French who seek complete autonomy over European military affairs and the British who want the ERRF to complement NATO. Second, as long as the Europeans remain highly dependent on sophisticated U.S. military equipment, they have to figure out how to keep the U.S. engaged in European security affairs. Third, since Moscow may perceive the ERRF as antagonistic (especially should the Baltic states join the EU), the Europeans have to determine how to promote greater cooperation with Russia.

What should the Europeans do? Clearly, they need to be shrewd and make progress defining their common interests. They also should rethink voting procedures in the Council of Ministers (particularly, as the European Union adds new members) and consider replacing unanimity with qualified majority—even though this will be a tough battle since in the security realm states are especially reluctant to curtail their autonomy. And, the Europeans need to be patient, i.e., avoid trying to do too much too fast. Most importantly, however, they need to set realistic goals and carefully assess the aims and strategies of others.

As Menon (2000: 9) rightly points out, “there is little theoretically informed literature” with which to make sense of recent European defense developments. Whereas he (*ibid.*) suggests that “considerable mileage [can] be gained from applying institutionalist approaches to the evolution of the EU’s defense role,” valuable lessons can also be learned from the bargaining literature. Just about every introductory textbook to International Relations stresses the importance of bargaining in achieving political goals. In situations where interests on issues diverge, Goldstein (2001: 67) for instance explains, political actors often rely on “tacit or direct communication in an attempt

to reach agreement on an exchange of value ... of tangible or intangible items that one or both parties value.” The means of leverage one actor possesses vis-à-vis another are derived from power capabilities and, typically, take the form of rewards (the promise of positive sanctions), threats (the warning to inflict damage on an item another actor values), or appeals to others’ feelings of friendship, common culture, etc. (*ibid.*).

Over the course of several centuries bargaining has become quite sophisticated so that a policymaker can utilize a variety of strategies to induce other actors to take the action(s) s/he desires. Oftentimes policymakers, for instance, begin by laying out extreme demands and then slowly make concessions in the hope of achieving their true, yet hidden, goal. Alternatively, they can make “pre-emptive concessions” in the hope of enticing the other side to accept a “middle-ground agreement” (Goldstein 2001: 72). Two further strategies that deserve mention are fractionation and linkage. Whereas the former entails “splitting up a complex issue into a number of smaller components so that progress may be sought on solvable pieces,” the latter entails combining various issues in the hope that progress in one area can be traded off against progress in another (*ibid.*).

Given that the EU seeks to obtain greater autonomy over its military affairs, strengthen its military industrial complex, and make it harder for the U.S. to block European initiatives, what should the EU do to mitigate current obstacles to greater European security and defense cooperation? Most importantly, it needs to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and carefully assess what is at stake for other actors—in particular the U.S. and Russia. The EU then needs to determine which forms of leverage promise the greatest success in achieving desired outcomes. (Space constraints prevent a thorough analysis of the main issues of contention.) Yet, as will become apparent, the Europeans are best off not to rely on a single bargaining strategy, but to employ a variety of diplomatic tools.

The U.S. clearly supports European burden-sharing efforts and views a strong Europe as contributing to global stability. Yet, at the same time, the U.S. recognizes that greater European autonomy in the security realm will weaken its control over European affairs, may divide NATO, and, as former Secretary of Defense William Cohen (2000: 26) recently lamented, may even render NATO a “relic of the past.”

Given that the Europeans, for the foreseeable future, will remain dependent on U.S. military equipment entailing specific assets (AWACS, airlift capabilities, etc.), it would be wise not to push incessantly for greater independence, since such behavior may alienate the U.S. and could lead isolationists in the U.S. Congress to cut close ties with Europe. Instead of making extreme demands that might convince the U.S. to withdraw, the Europeans should signal their willingness to compromise on issues of importance to the Americans such as the three “Ds” espoused by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. That is, the EU should think of ways to add value to NATO (by complementing rather than duplicating it; by linking the ERRF to NATO rather than decoupling it; and by including non-EU members in security negotiations rather than to discriminate against them), while strengthening its own military capabilities.

An issue linkage strategy (where compromise in one area is traded off against another) may be useful in dealing with American plans for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. In this case the United Kingdom—like most Europeans equating NMD with the abandonment of non-proliferation—might, for example, agree to host an early warning radar site needed for NMD in exchange for autonomous EU decisionmaking, yet firm EU assurances to cooperate with NATO.

When it comes to EU relations with Russia it is clear that, for the most part, Moscow favors a European military dimension since it “rids Europe of U.S. hegemony” (van Ham 2000: 25). Moreover, the EU is Russia’s largest trading partner and provides the lion’s share of technical assistance and grants. What complicates relations, however, is the issue of EU enlargement—the inclusion of former Warsaw Pact countries that may easily cause Russia to feel isolated. The accession of the Baltic states appears to be especially troubling since it would turn Kaliningrad into a Russian enclave surrounded by EU territory. Hence, rather than trying to deal with the enlargement issue as a whole, it may be in the EU’s interest to divide this complex problem into smaller segments (fractionation) and seek piecemeal solutions. For instance, the EU could grant a legally binding understanding that Kaliningrad will remain Russian. Moscow, in turn, could assure that the area will become “an open economic zone, a laboratory for EU-Russian cooperation,” rather than a “Russian military outpost against NATO” (Bordachev 2000: 2). At the same time, the EU may want to continue discussions (begun in the late 1990s) concerning the use of Russian transport planes for Petersberg tasks and, as an inducement, offer further trade concessions and/or technical assistance.

Clearly, the above can only exemplify the complex debates surrounding a new European security dimension. It shows that defense, in Menon’s words, “is worth studying in a theoretically informed manner,” and suggests that a bargaining approach may yield interesting insights. If the Europeans want to have their cake and eat it too, i.e., achieve greater autonomy in the security realm commensurate with their political and economic standing, while both keeping the U.S. engaged and maintaining amicable relations with Russia, they may benefit from imitating such diplomatic talents as Talleyrand, Metternich, or Bismarck.

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The State of the European Union (Volume 5): Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival

Oxford University Press

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Edited by Maria Green Cowles, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University, and Michael Smith, Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics, Dept. of European Studies, Loughborough University, *The State of the European Union* offers an insightful and up-to-date examination of the challenges facing the European Union. The Amsterdam treaty, monetary union, future enlargement, as well as global economic and political developments pose new risks and opportunities for EU institutions and policies. Chapters by leading scholars explore different conceptual approaches to the emerging European polity, needed reforms of European institutions, difficulties awaiting monetary union, risks of enlargement, and the resulting implications for the development of European policies.

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Publications

New and Recent EU-Related Books

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European Union Politics Vol.2, No.2, 2001, published by Sage Publications. Current issue has articles on Christianity and public support for the EU by EUSA members Brent Nelsen, James L. Guth and Cleve Fraser, the political economy of budget deficits in the EU, and divided government and international cooperation.

The Federalist Debate: Papers for Federalists in Europe and the World Year XIV, No.1 (March 2001), published by Einstein Center for International Studies, Torino, Italy. Current issue has essays on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, proposals for Europe, Flemish nationalists and Europe, et alia. In English.

CD-ROMS of the European Union, published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Most available in the 11 official EU languages. *Official Journal of the European Communities (L and C Series)*; *Community Trade Marks Bulletin*; *Eurostat Yearbook (1998/1999)*; *Panorama of EU Business 1999* (German, English, French only); et alia.

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- No.43 Michael Johnson and Jim Rollo, "EU Enlargement and Commercial Policy: Enlargement and the Making of Commercial Policy."
- No.44 Witold Orłowski and Alan Mayhew, "Impact of EU Accession on Enterprise Development and Institutional Development in ... Central and Eastern Europe."
- No.45 Adam Lazowski, "Adaptation of the Polish Legal System to European Union Law: Selected Aspects."
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2001 ECSA Prize for Lifetime Contribution to EU Studies¹

Introductory Remarks by Alberta Sbragia

Delivered at the ECSA Conference on June 1, 2001

IT IS PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE to honor Leon Lindberg here in Madison where he has spent his scholarly life teaching generations of students, including myself. Leon Lindberg's work is emblematic of the very best work carried out by the founding generation of EU studies scholars. It addressed central issues in international relations theory and viewed the process of European integration as significant for the way scholars conceptualized inter-state relations. He was one of the leading scholars of a generation that saw the process of integration as challenging some of the core assumptions of realism. He was a "young Turk" at a time when the prevailing paradigms of international relations were shaped by the experience of the balance of power politics in nineteenth century Europe.

The Europe which Leon saw emerging was not confined to a scholarly ghetto but rather represented a challenge, an opportunity, and an engagement with rigorous social science. As a student of Leon Lindberg's, I constantly saw the curiosity, the rigor, and the breadth that underpinned all his scholarly work. The European Union today is a far different entity than it was in the 1960s and those of you in the audience unfamiliar with the particulars of Leon's work in fact have been shaped by that work, whether implicitly or explicitly. A significant portion of the "mental map" that we bring to the study of the EU was drawn by Leon Lindberg. The field of EU studies owes an enormous debt to you, Leon, and I feel privileged to have this opportunity to give you this award.

The insights and rigor which Leon brought to EU studies accompanied his later work focusing on the changing political economy of the nation-state and the United States. That work, concerned with various configurations of governance, was prescient. The questions he raised about governance are now at the center of much scholarly debate within EU studies. Leon's work demonstrates so very clearly that analytic work on national systems complements work on European integration with both types of analysis being essential for understanding the ongoing transformation of Europe. His concern with governance in fact underpins many of the debates that we are having at this conference. It is with the deepest affection and respect that, on behalf of the European Community Studies Association and the broader scholarly community in both international relations and comparative politics, I give you, Leon, this ECSA Award for Lifetime Contribution to European Union Studies.

Alberta Sbragia is director of the European Union Center at the University of Pittsburgh.

1. Awarded before our name changed to European Union Studies Association on July 1, 2001.

Acceptance Remarks by Leon N. Lindberg

Delivered at the ECSA Conference on June 1, 2001

The 1999-2001 ECSA Executive Committee unanimously chose Leon N. Lindberg, Professor of Political Science Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Madison, as the 2001 Prize recipient.

MANY, MANY THANKS FOR the honor you have bestowed on me and for the kind words of Alberta Sbragia and Vivien Schmidt and the award statement. To the extent that I am deserving of all this, I must share that credit with my friend and collaborator on two volumes on the EC, Stuart Scheingold. And of course with our mentor, Ernie Haas.

I have been given the assignment to "make some acceptance remarks reflecting on European Integration scholarship and my own work—in no more than 7-10 minutes"! Anybody who knows me knows how hard this will be. Besides, I must admit that I have not followed integration theorizing or EU events very closely since I retired four years ago. When I retired I continued my career-long pattern of changing fields every decade or so, so in these four years I have devoted myself with full energy to travel, world history, archaeology, alpine gardening, and hiking in deserts and mountains.

If I had the time here I might reflect on a theme something like "Integration Theory, Comparative Capitalism in Historical Perspective, and Globalization." Such a theme would more or less track my own intellectual trajectory. My work on the EC was in the 1960s, but by 1970 Scheingold and I concluded (in *Europe's Would-Be Polity*) that the initial integration surge was spent and that changing international and domestic changes called for new theory and a much broader research agenda. So in the 1970s I devoted myself to the changing domestic and international contexts of Europe and other advanced capitalist societies (*Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism* [1975], *Politics and the Future of Industrial Society* [1976]). In the 1980s I segued into a concern with comparative public policy, specifically energy policy (*The Energy Syndrome*, 1977) and economic policy (*The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation*, 1985). In the 1980s I took up seriously my ongoing effort to critique neoclassical economic theory and to construct some sort of institutional political economy or economic sociology framework for studying "comparative capitalism" in historical perspective (*The Governance of the American Economy*, 1991). When I returned to European Community matters it was with these different interests in mind. In 1989-90, I taught a seminar with Wolfgang Streeck (then of the Sociology department at the University of Wisconsin) on "1992 and the Political Economy of Europe." In the '90s my special interests were in the character of the Single European Market project, the pros and cons of Economic and Monetary Union, and the relationship between European integration and globalization.

In retrospect I can see that after 1970 I was in fact learning from the critiques of integration theory in our own *Europe's Would-Be Polity* by such scholars as Alan Milward and former students such as Peter Cox. There were four broad criticisms.

1. Neofunctionalism and integration theory more generally were rooted in a "progressivist and naïve technocratic pluralist theory of industrialization"—an ahistorical simplification of domestic politics and economics of postwar Europe which mis-took the interlude of the 1950s and '60s for a new era (Milward).

2. Integration theory was insufficiently sensitive to the inevitable distributional consequences of continuing economic and political integration. The implicit premise was of integration as a positive-sum game—a premise which could not hold either within states or amongst states.

3. Integration theories lacked any explicit theorizing about how market agents in pursuit of profit maximization and market shares could themselves push the integration process in unanticipated directions and generate unwanted redistributive processes. On this topic I learned much from Hans Schmitt, once a colleague at Wisconsin (in Economics) and who subsequently followed a distinguished career at the IMF.

4. Integration theory had a benign view of the European and wider international role of the US in the integration process, especially between 1944-1950. Milward, Ruggie, and others have persuasively argued that the ECSC (and the EEC-Euratom, and the CAP subsequently) were policy choices designed to limit and counteract US-sponsored “universal capitalism.” This phrase is from Polanyi’s 1945 “Universal Capitalism and Regional Planning” (*London Quarterly of World Affairs*). Polanyi evoked a regionalist scenario against what he feared was going to be a new and fruitless attempt to reshape “universal capitalism”—this time under US leadership. Polanyi saw the solution to the world order problem in the end of universalism and an emerging pattern of regionalism.

If I had time, I might try to tie these themes together around three broad points. First, following Pollard, Milward, Strikwerda and other economic historians, we should see European Integration in a much broader time frame. Pollard, (*European Economic Integration, 1815-1970*) for example, saw “two great movements in the modern period of European history: economic integration and nationalism.” Between 1815 and 1870 these two movements “mostly reinforced each other.” After 1870 they “became separated,” and after 1914 and until 1945 they became totally and completely opposed to each other. “Europe as a single organic economic space disintegrated.” After World War II nationalism and economic integration “somehow have come back together again ... restoring the European economy to its naturally organized interconnectedness.”

The second point I would stress (if there were time) would be that the key to that coming together of nationalism and economic integration after 1950 was succinctly spelled out by Alan Milward in *The European Rescue of the Nation State* and *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*. Milward stresses first that by 1950 European governments had become convinced that they faced inescapable political choices—to pursue economic and welfare goals—and a new style of capitalism. These could not be a simple return to the 1930s. European nation-states needed to rapidly increase the rate of economic growth, secure full employment, modernize their economies, and pursue the ideal of “social citizenship” of an expanded welfare state. He saw these things as “coalition realities” for re-legitimizing the political systems of Europe after 30 years of economic decline since 1914. The historical point here also stressed by economic historians like Strikwerda was that “European economic integration in the 19th century had foundered on a failure to assure an acceptable distribution of benefits among states and among classes within states.” In other words, the fruits of economic liberalization have to be acceptably distributed among states *and classes* if such

economic liberalization is to survive politically.

Milward’s second argument regarding the origins of European integration was that by 1950 European national leaders had come to understand that they needed some kind of international framework of cooperation to achieve their goals and to sustain growth in investment, employment, and welfare. But this international framework could not be the kind of “universal capitalism” on offer in the late 1940s and into the 1950s from the US and the UK. The ECSC was then less an exercise in trade liberalization than an exercise in pan-European neo-mercantilism (as were the EEC, Euratom, and the CAP). What the EC founders were up to was “a limited European trade liberalization” to stimulate European industrial recovery and to counter the hegemonic project of the US. For a similar argument, see John Ruggie and his concept of “embedded liberalism” as the key to Europe’s postwar recovery.

Under this neo-mercantilist interpretation the underlying motivation and actual politics of creating the EC-EU was, *and remains*, an exercise in transferring to the European level some of the market promoting and market regulatory policies of the “European model of capitalism,” so that Europe could play the same game as other large powers, using its large economic market to leverage reciprocal trade liberalization with other countries, and to use the larger European market as a platform to nurture European forms.

My third point (if I had time) would be to point out that while all of this remained the case through the “dark days” of the 1970s and 1980s to the “relance” of the Single European Act, the late 1980s and the 1990s saw a marked shift in relative power and ideas inside Europe and outside, reflecting a renascent American (and British) neo-liberalism and a revived belief in the idea of “universal capitalism” implicit in the globalization project. The prospect is that the EU—the economic integration process—no longer has generally benign distributional consequences (among states and classes.) Consider, for example, the EMU and the adoption of neo-monetarist economic policies by the ECB and most national governments, the pressures to scale back the welfare state, the possibility that the Single European Market will lead to waves of deregulation and a weakening of the role of the state. Has the European Community/European Union become an agent for the radical deregulation of markets and a wholesale swing towards the interests of finance and capital? Does this imply that “bad capitalism” (the US-led “universal capitalist” ideal) will force out or undermine European or Rhenish-style capitalism? In these contexts, Wolfgang Streeck has argued persuasively about the implications for national systems (and the future evolution of the EU) of the emergence of an integrated European market and a less-than-integrated European polity. Is the EU today a mechanism whereby the forces of globalization penetrate the European economy,” or can it be a defense against that possibility and a context for the adaptation of the European model of capitalism?

In my view these remain some of the big questions about the process of European integration and the future of the EU. A perusal of the program of this meeting shows they are active parts of ongoing research. The prospects of enlargement will only make these things more salient. European Integration remains, as Andrew Shonfield put it long ago, “a Journey to an Unknown Destination.”

Again, my grateful thanks for this award.

Book Reviews

Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd Ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2000, 466 pp.

Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration. New York: Palgrave/St. Martin's Press, 2000, 232 pp.

IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE TWO books more unlike than these. One is a survey of the literature on integration; the other is a detailed empirical history of a key period in the formation of the European project. One is a book about scholars and ideas; the other is a book about practitioners and actions. One is a book about the art and ends of theorizing; the other is openly, even militantly, atheoretical. Despite their many differences, however, they speak to common themes and issues in the field of contemporary integration studies.

Ben Rosamond has written an extremely insightful volume about the development of integration theory; Theories of European Integration is the fourth in the "General Textbooks" line of the European Union Series published by St. Martin's Press. Rosamond opens with a cogent defense of theory building, drawing on mainstream works in social science methodology. One of the main points to come out of this discussion is that prediction—the bane of much theoretically inspired writing on Europe—is but one of many criteria by which theory can and should be judged. Rosamond also asks the reader to think about theory "in light of the context ... in which they arose and in terms of the relationship between *theories* of European integration and the *practice* of integration and EU governance" (p. 9, emphasis in original). He succeeds in keeping these and other general themes resonant in the chapters that follow.

Rosamond goes on to chart the evolving theoretical dialogue over postwar European integration. The approach is chronological; a chapter on the first generation theories of federalism, functionalism, and transactionalism is followed by separate chapters on neofunctionalism and its many critics, after which new generation theories dating from the advent of the Single European Act—in some instances, blending old wines into shiny, new bottles; in others, moving resolutely beyond traditional parameters—receive careful, nuanced attention. Rosamond caps off his stimulating *tour d'horizon* with a look at the most recent and ongoing debate within the field, one cast at an epistemological level: whether European integration is best studied with tool kits borrowed from comparative politics (the EU as nascent polity) or international relations (the EU as forum for and institutionalized expression of inter-state relations). Here, he mounts a spirited defense of the contributions and future potential of an IR-based approach.

The strengths of this volume are many. Rosamond shows no reluctance to adopt a critical perspective on individual theories and the debates among them, but his commentaries are always judicious, balanced, and put forward with an eye to the ongoing

development of theory. He also succeeds in rehabilitating neofunctionalism, not as a finished theory but as a significant, self-critical exercise in the development of theory. Here, Rosamond links the larger "real world" historical context and dominant currents in American social science to the emergence of neofunctionalism. He then shows that the most telling critiques of the approach came not from competing theoreticians but from debates internal to the neofunctionalist school. Moreover, many themes showcased in the contemporary integration literature were clearly anticipated in these intramural discussions. Given that neofunctionalism came to be used in the 1990s more as epithet than legitimate label, this is a noteworthy contribution, particularly to the intellectual development of the younger generation of EU scholars.

Readers interested in new theoretical approaches to the study of European integration will find a wealth of insight and analysis between the covers of Rosamond's book, but they will not find a new theory of integration. Anyone disappointed by this would be well advised to reread the title of this book carefully, because Rosamond adheres dutifully to the principle of truth in advertising—he sets out to accomplish a specific and very difficult task, and he succeeds admirably. Given the complexity of the subject matter, I would not recommend this book for undergraduates, with the exception of the most gifted, but it is must reading for graduate students and the general scholarly community interested in contemporary Europe.

Through no particular reason or rationale, I came to Milward's tome after reading Rosamond, which might explain why I eventually put down The European Rescue of the Nation-State feeling a little unsatisfied. Make no mistake about it—this is a classic in the field, one that advances an important and provocative thesis that must be read and understood by those who would seek to understand the origins of the postwar European project as well as the larger currents in theorizing about integration (despite the author's avowed disdain for theory!). The book's main argument is best summarized by Milward himself: "It was the fact that [the common market] rested so firmly on the economic and social foundations of post-war political change and in so doing reinforced the post-war nation-state that gave the European Economic Community its strength and marked out the Treaties of Rome as a turning point in Europe's history" (p. 223). Acting with self-awareness and from self-interest, Europe's nation-states rescued themselves with the vehicle of integration both economically and, by solving the German problem, politically. Milward looks to support his thesis with detailed empirical case studies of the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the creation of the Common Market, and the Europeanization of agriculture, as well as a separate chapter in which the independent contributions of Europe's supranationalists—Schuman, Spaak, Monnet, and others—are written off.

Milward's edgy, aggressive writing style is entertaining, and the wealth of historical material drawn from the formative decades of the European Union is an extremely valuable resource for contemporary researchers. Yet the critiques and cautions directed at the first edition still apply—in particular, one should

take care in generalizing about integration dynamics based on a study of the 1950s and early 1960s, when supranational institutions and actors were non-existent or at best embryonic—if only because the bulk of the original text has survived intact in this second edition. Essentially, the only parts of the volume to experience appreciable revisions are the last substantive chapter, which deals with Britain and the EC, as well as a new epilogue.

This gentle makeover of the first edition leads to minor yet unnecessary irritations; for example, one could conclude from the opening pages of the introduction that Jacques Delors is still President of the European Commission. More generally and more important, it results in a thought-provoking but ultimately inconclusive exercise in applying the lessons and conclusions drawn from the birth of the European project to the latest installments in the integration saga, beginning with the Single European Act and ending (with reference to the book's publication date) with preparations for the Nice summit. Are the twelve (and subsequently fifteen) members of the European Union still engaged collectively in the rescue of the nation-state? Or has the focus shifted over the past four decades to collective rescue of the collectivity?

Milward addresses these and related questions in his final, new chapter. He argues that the content of the supranational rescue formula discovered in the 1950s no longer holds, due to profound changes in domestic economic and political realities, combined with the geographical extension of the European project well beyond the boundaries of the six founding members. This carries major implications for integration, particularly in terms of the consensus and support that underpins it: "The fundamental change in the structure of nation-states and the character of their domestic economic and social policies has, by dividing the national electorates, made the EU a more divisive issue than were the European Communities of the 1950s" (p.427). At the same time, however, Milward argues that the basic logic of integration remains in force: the future development of a deeper supranational framework will depend on whether member states, responding to domestic economic and political exigencies, move to implement similar national policies that require supranational coordination and support.

This is an interesting and provocative extension of the original thesis, but it demands comprehensive treatment, both empirically and theoretically. To expect Milward to replicate his empirical analysis of the 1950s for the 1980s and 1990s is surely too much to ask. So it will fall to others to carry the torch. The first order of business in such an endeavor, however, will be to grasp the theoretical nettle, something that Milward refuses to do himself. The potential benefits for the development of the field of integration studies are clear, and the task itself is not likely to be onerous, for as Rosamond remarks of Milward and others, "Even historians are theoreticians—whether they know it or not" (p.195).

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Andrew Geddes. Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, 196 pp.

THIS IS A BOOK THAT deserves to be read and appreciated for several reasons. First, it offers a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of migration policy within the European Union, an evolution simultaneously driven by the single market goal of free movement of labor and constrained by national desires to control entry across borders. Migration, in the form of free movement, has been central to the establishment of the free market and, thus, to political and supranational policy development with the EU. The book includes a concise overview of the evolution, from the Treaty of Rome to the Amsterdam Treaty, of the legal/constitutional framework of intra-EU migration policy. Second, Andrew Geddes provides a complex analysis of the relationship between national and supranational immigration and asylum politics and policy, illustrating the horizontal dimension of strong national policy making roles along with a growing vertical dimension at the EU level of policy making. Although member states' desire for sovereign control has kept this issue area within the unanimous agreement rubric of decision-making, EU pressure to "make the market" has led to various compromises that begin to erode national sovereignty. As Geddes observes, "[t]he 'low politics' of economic interdependence seem to have spilled over into the 'high politics' of border control and state security" (p. 3). Free movement draws immigration and asylum into the integration debate. Finally, Geddes' institutionalist perspective leads to a careful delineation of the extent of the transfer of competencies from the national level of governance to the EU level. His discussion of the role of NGOs and other advocates of more flexible and inclusive immigration and asylum policies at the EU level reveals not only the limits on the extent of integration in this policy area, but also the impact that institutionalization at the European level has on how the game of politics now needs to be played in Europe. Despite the fact that immigration and asylum policy competence remain, for the most part, at the national level, "aspects of migration policy have acquired an EU resonance where they are refracted through new institutional structures that bear close relation to those in member state, but cannot be wholly analysed in such terms" (p.42).

Between 1957 and 1986 the rights of EU nationals to move freely within the EU for the purposes of work became well established within a solid European legal and institutional framework, while almost nothing was done to define EU policy competence in the area of extra-EU migration policies. The driving force for achieving free movement was economic factors related to putting the single market into place. Immigration and asylum policy were not much affected by this single market or "low politics" goal, but remained "linked to issues of high politics that were associated with state sovereignty" (p. 8). Consequently, these issues did not move easily toward positive integration, and this has remained the established pattern.

Geddes outlines the transition from informal intergovernmental cooperation in the area of immigration and asylum policy, which emerged after the SEA, to formal intergovernmental

cooperation when immigration and asylum issues were defined as part of the third (JHA) pillar in the Maastricht Treaty. With the Amsterdam Treaty, immigration and asylum policy were incorporated into the Community pillar, but they remain intergovernmental policy areas requiring unanimity in voting. The post-SEA period is crucial for establishing the “preference for intergovernmental decision-making outside of the formal treaty framework,” (p.84) creating only a limited role for the pro-integration European institutions, such as the European Parliament and the Commission. Hence, member states’ decisions in this area are made with little or no accountability, and they are generally lowest common denominator decisions. While the Schengen framework allows some of the more pro-integration states to deal with immigration and asylum policy in a more integrated way, these states are not necessarily more open to immigration or more flexible about asylum. Although the Maastricht Treaty led to formal intergovernmental cooperation in the immigration/asylum policy areas, there was a distinct “absence of effective structures of supranational scrutiny and accountability” (p.108) when it came to dealing with the rights of third country national (TCN) migrants, both in terms of extra-EU policies and in terms of anti-discrimination within nations. EU immigration and asylum policy that did emerge was “skewed towards control and security” (p.108), paying little attention to rights and anti-discrimination protection. The Amsterdam Treaty continued with the established pattern of autonomy for member states with weak democratic and judicial oversight at the EU level.

In contrasting the emergence of supranational intra-EU migration policy with the intergovernmental cooperation and limited integration of external EU migration policies pertaining to immigration and asylum, Geddes asks whether the integrative power of EU policy on free movement will bring immigration and asylum policy up to the EU level of competence and whether this would increase the rights of TCNs. Geddes demonstrates that further integration in this issue area, in the form of supranational policy development, is not inevitable, but rather is “contingent and conjunctural and calls for analysis that explores the social, economic and political factors impinging on key conjunctures at which decisions about the direction and scope of European integration have been made” (p.42).

One of the strengths of this book is that Geddes brings an institutionalist perspective to bear on his analysis of how the policy context at the EU level shapes the ongoing debate about inclusion and exclusion and structures the political relationships among EU level institutions, NGOs and member states. This institutionalist perspective helps us to see how free movement is connected to immigration/asylum policy since “single market integration and free movement have drawn into the realm of discussion the rights and entitlements of legally resident TCNs” (p.169). It helps us to understand how member states might justify the need to cooperate repressively at the EU level, emphasizing security and control rather than inclusion, arguing that this is necessary to ensure the liberal single market area. Finally, as Geddes concludes, the institutionalist perspective helps us to see that “European integration and co-operation mean that there are no national solutions to migrant inclusion with the EU’s free movement, anti-

discrimination and asylum provisions: the response must be European because these are now European issues” (pp.174-175).

This book offers a rich example and detailed illustration of the coexistence of national and supranational competencies in an important issue area. We learn a lot about EU migration policy from it, and it helps us understand something about the complexity of the interaction of national and supranational actors in shaping policy frameworks. The book also provides a coherent and interesting example of institutionalist analysis, demonstrating the relevance of this analytical approach to the study of European integration.

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Mariagrazia Rossilli (ed.), Gender Policies in the European Union. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2000, 261 pp.

Linda Hantrais (ed.), Gendered Policies in Europe: Reconciling Employment and Family Life. New York: Palgrave/St. Martin’s Press, 2000, 228 pp.

A LANGUAGE OF EUPHEMISM and obfuscation has altered much of our political discourse, not least with regard to women’s subordination. “Women’s oppression” has been trumped by policies designed to “reconcile” “gendered differences” through “mainstreaming.” Once used by feminists to depict the banality of male dominance, “mainstreaming” now refers to efforts undertaken to promote the systematic integration of equal opportunities for women *and* men. Emphasizing the irony of this rhetorical shift, some worry that this linguistic turn conceals misogyny’s influence. The intimate brutality of misogyny that was once depicted as “male violence” is now called “gender-based violence,” an occurrence so common that the European Commission estimates that it accounts for 25% of all reported violent crimes throughout the Member States. That most violence is intra-familial has not dampened the enthusiasm of those that imply that families may have changed markedly in ways that now afford women and girls refuge from a cruel world.

Is all this the result of hopeful thinking or perhaps a retreat from a more ambitious political (feminist) project? A precipitous resort to “reconciliation” without a serious treatment of injustice (which should guide authentic reconciliation) has been used to cover atrocities ranging from kidnapping, torture and murder in Argentina and Chile to South African apartheid and Europe’s recent genocide. This political path may appeal to those wishing to evade (if not deny) their responsibility for grievous conduct. It may also extend some relief to those seeking solace through appeasement. Concerning sexual inequality, some women may believe that, if given the right inducements, men will relinquish their dominance and embrace equality at home, in the labor market, and throughout life. The quest for effective (policy) incentives to mitigate “women’s inequality” (perhaps an anachronism) appears to inspire the many scholars wedded to

“gender analysis.” (The Commission defines “gender analysis” as the “study of differences in conditions, needs, participation rates, access to resources and development, control of assets and decision making powers... between women and men in their assigned gender roles.” Feminist analysis, by contrast, is relatively less interested in the exploration of gender differences than it is in ending the male dominance that creates them in the first place.)

Mariagrazia Rossilli’s edited volume, Gender Policies in the European Union, is one of the most refreshing on the subject. Insisting on substantive proposals to challenge male power, she delivers eleven perspectives on policies ranging from employment and political representation to migration and sexualized subordination. Rossilli introduces several critical themes, including women’s political representation. She is reluctant to promote increasing women’s presence because empirical evidence does not “univocally confirm” that doing so ensures the adoption of feminist policy (p.18). By contrast, Eliane Vogel-Polsky rejects the expectation that women represent women because men are entitled to represent an entire citizenry. Distraught that “sex equality was (and still is) considered as an ideal to promote, a goal to achieve, and not a real Right” (p.69), she proposes the immediate adoption of obligatory rules to guarantee “parity democracy” (i.e., equal numbers of women and men in power).

Like the policies that are their focus, scholars of “gender equality” often maintain distance from issues of male violence and sexual abuse. Yet two chapters in Gender Policies in the European Union offer exceptions. One considers sexual harassment at work, the other prostitution. The first opposes sexual abuse at work; the second proposes that prostitution be recognized as “sex work”. Marjan Wijer proposes that the ILO set standards for the marketing of women as sexual merchandise for johns by pimps within the sex industry. In short, she argues that the better-organized and more efficient implementation of prostitution will ameliorate the sexual and economic exploitation of women and reduce their social stigma. The author does recognize some of the oppressive conditions of prostitution but only as a means to call for improved conditions, not the eradication of prostitution. There is, however, an added irony. The growing call to legitimize prostitution makes more vivid the contradiction between the proposition that sexual harassment is abuse when it happens to women in the wage labor market but not when the abuse is a condition of what she terms “employment” (as in prostitution).

If the sexual abuse inherent in prostitution is concealed by calling it “work”, the sexual abuse women suffer at work (as “sexual harassment”) can be seen as an expectation—not a transgression. Efforts to end sexual harassment already rest on fragile ground. Jeanne Gregory examines the effects of EU policy on numerous member states and reveals that women’s precarious position in the labor market increases their vulnerability to sexual harassment. She adds that a major cultural shift is required to end the sexual abuse of women. Her scholarship is a step toward this transformation. The same is true of other chapters in this important volume.

In Linda Hantrais’s anthology, Gendered Policies in Europe: Reconciling Employment and Family Life, the focus is (as the subtitle suggests) more circumscribed. Those interested in policies pertaining to women *as* workers and mothers will appreciate this book. It maps the EU’s movement from attempts to address equal pay and equal treatment at work to balancing family and working life.

While this anthology’s chapters on “reconciliation” are often single European case studies, Marlene Lohkamp-Himmighofen and Christiane Dienel provide a comparative analysis that delineates six European models. Their method, which sometimes presumes the “underlying objectives” of policy makers, regenerates governing assumptions without offering evidence to support them.

Let us consider two of the models—the “women-friendly egalitarian” and “labor market oriented demographic” models. The first is one in which “women-friendly policies were a priority for governments long before European integration” (p.60). Ostensibly motivated by a concern for women, Nordic politicians (especially in Sweden) adopted policies that provided some greater benefits to women. Many Scandinavian scholars have questioned this presumption of benevolence. Christina Bergqvist and Ann-Catherine Jungar, both Nordic contributors to this volume, observe that “it was the need for women’s labour that dominated among male participants” in debates over Swedish “equality policies” (p.166).

While Sweden retains a “women-friendly” image, similar policies adopted by France and Belgium have not granted them the same status. Instead, Lohkamp-Himmighofen and Dienel depict French and Belgian policies as “aimed less at promoting equality of opportunity than at exploiting the full potential of the labour force” (p.61). They thus cast these states into the “labor market oriented demographic” model. The insistence on Sweden’s benevolence persists despite Bergqvist and Jungar’s conclusion that “the impact of EU legislation on national legal practice in Sweden has been to require adaptation and leveling up of the existing Swedish equal opportunities act” (p.176). This finding subverts conventional wisdom.

Alisa Del Re challenges the stereotype that southern Europe states have unsophisticated gender policies in her chapter, “The Paradoxes of Italian Law and Practice.” Distinguishing between policy and practice, she writes, “[t]he specificity of the Italian situation can be found in the fact that legislation on equal pay was enacted much earlier than in other EU member states (in the early 1960s), but the culture of equal opportunities came much later (1991)” (p.113). Celia Valiente’s chapter on Spain is as compelling. She describes women’s distrust of “pro-family” policies, attributing this to Spain’s authoritarian past when most women were defined exclusively as mothers.

The critical contributions in Hantrais’s volume make it a welcome addition to the scholarship on “family life.” Yet this category itself begs further empirical analysis (of the kind that Hantrais did well in her earlier work) which would encourage us to question assumptions about it. For instance, European data that documents declining birth rates, escalating divorce rates and an increase in the percentage of those selecting to live “alone,”

suggests that the conventional nuclear family (e.g., cohabiting married heterosexual parents with children), which often preoccupies scholars of “gender,” is itself an anachronism. It is therefore curious that attempts to reconcile such “family” with work is often promoted as one of the most substantive contributions we can make toward attaining women’s equality.

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Simon Duke, The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP. New York: Palgrave/St. Martin’s Press, 2000, 406 pp.

Heinz Gartner, Adrian Hyde-Price, and Erich Reiter (eds.), Europe’s New Security Challenges. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, 469 pp.

SIMON DUKE HAS PROVIDED students of European security issues a great service. His latest book provides a good historical narrative of the building of European security and defense institutions from the immediate post-war period to the present. He himself states that his work is meant to “appeal to the general reader who may be curious about what the second pillar of the European Union is, and how it evolved” (p.1).

Duke’s main thesis is that there “are striking similarities between current attempts to breathe life into European security structures and the 1950-4 EDC debate, although the parallels should not be exaggerated” (p.292). However, the author does demonstrate, quite clearly, that many of the issues, concerns, and debates that surrounded the building of the European Defense Community have resurfaced with regard to the building of contemporary European security structures and institutions.

The study is divided into eight chapters along with an introduction. The first several chapters provide an historical background to contemporary European security structures, while the latter chapters focus on thematic concerns such as transatlantic relations (Chapter 5) and the fall of Yugoslavia (Chapter 6). Duke has also provided the reader with several useful appendixes including the texts of the Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty on European Union, and the Franco-British Summit - Joint Declaration on European Defense.

There are four central questions/themes that provide a framework for the book. The first provides an analysis and narrative of the origins of the security dimensions of European integration. The second looks at certain pragmatic arrangements from the 1990s that were introduced to facilitate a better working relationship between the WEU, the EU, and NATO. Thirdly, Duke examines “the role of the US in current and future European security. The importance of the US to European security designs is built upon the assumption that an active American role in European security issues continues to be beneficial to both parties” (p.3). The last area of inquiry revolves around certain problems relating to the development of a Common Defense Policy (CDP) and Common Defense (CD).

At a time when European-American relations seem to be at a straining point with the Bush Administration’s plans for missile defense, Duke’s work provides the graduate student, journalist, and policy analyst with a guidepost to European security issues. He aptly demonstrates that while the context of European security concerns has changed, “the themes remain surprisingly durable” (p.292). The only downside to this work is that it can seem somewhat terse and dry. While it is not a text one would sit down and read cover to cover, it does serve as a valuable source of reference to anyone interested in post-war and contemporary European security issues. It is a must for the bookshelf of any graduate student working in the field.

The editors of Europe’s New Security Challenges have collected a series of essays on European security, its conceptual framework, the OSCE, regional security within Europe, and the role of the major powers in the international system. “The book is the result of a cooperative venture undertaken by the Bureau for Military Scientific Studies, the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, and the Austrian Defense Academy” (p.ix). It focuses around two major themes, namely the “empirical concern with the nature of, and policy responses to, the new security agenda in Europe and the wider international system. The second is an intellectual and theoretical concern with the future development of security studies as an academic discipline” (p.ix).

The text is divided into nineteen chapters, each of which is an essay from a contributor. There is also an introduction by Gartner and Hyde-Price. The issues and concerns raised in this volume range from the future of the soldier (chapter 4), and an evaluation of the OSCE’s role in conflict management (chapter 10), to the role of arms control in the Baltic region (chapter 14). The wide range of the articles makes it such that this work will prove to be valuable to scholars working in a myriad of academic disciplines.

The editors have provided the reader with a vast and useful bibliography of relevant works in the field. There is also a much-needed glossary of acronyms for those who are unsure of the differences between such things as the ESDI (European Security and Defense Identity) and the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy). An appendix with the texts of documents was not provided, although it would have been useful.

In summary, these two works provide the reader with an historical analysis of European security since the Second World War with a heavy analysis of contemporary debates and concerns regarding the future of European security.

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Janerik Gidlund and Magnus Jerneck (eds.), Local and Regional Governance in Europe: Evidence from Nordic Regions. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2000, 291 pp.

WHO WOULD WANT TO BE a local government official in Europe today? Gone are the days when one had only local voters and skeptical central authorities to worry about. Now angry calls

about potholes seem downright quaint compared to the constant scrutiny of European Union (EU) bureaucrats with ever-widening competencies and the relentless pressure of competitive markets on local industries. But exactly how has local and regional governance changed in an age of Europeanization? This volume explores the impact of integration on government below the national level. In the process it raises important questions about the changing nature of European governance and the shifting roles of national and sub-national actors.

The Nordic area would seem the ideal setting for testing the impact of integration on local government. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden share many cultural, economic and political characteristics, not least in the area of local governance where strong central authority, weak regional government and well-developed local autonomy describe administration in each country. Integration, as an intervening process, has affected the Nordics differently. Danish local government has had the longest time to adjust to integration as Denmark has been a full European partner since 1973. Sweden and Finland, on the other hand, have recently joined the EU, making it easier to determine just how an intensified integration process affects local government. Finally, Norway has refused to join the EU but has entered the single market through the European Economic Area. Thus, we should see integration affecting Norway differently if EU membership is an important explanatory factor.

A systematic, most-similar-cases research design seems appropriate to this study, and indeed the editors of *Local and Regional Governance in Europe* promise such an approach. Unfortunately the volume fails to deliver. The result is a long, turgid book that few will finish. A pity. For hidden in the convoluted prose are nuggets of gold that may signal a rich vein.

After two introductory chapters, the book is divided into three main sections. The first deals with the “West Nordic Territories” of Denmark and Norway, the second with the “East Nordic Territories” of Sweden and Finland, and the final part contains two disparate chapters under the title “The Nordic Puzzle.” The east-west division supposedly allows comparison of two administrative models—ministerial (east) and ministries/independent agencies (west)—but the differences are never well explained (p.5). The contributors seem to have written without much guidance from the editors as to topic, form, methodology, and definition of key concepts (e.g., “Europeanization,” “internationalization,” and “integration” are most often used interchangeably). One chapter on Denmark (Chapter 4), for instance, focuses on *national* integration and the role of interest organizations in Danish policymaking. The chapter has merit but belongs in another book.

The best chapters report the results of empirical studies. Lars-Inge Ström (Chapter 6) uses data from the European Integration and Local Government (EUROLOG) surveys of 1991 and 1994 to rank the Swedish municipalities on an EU activity index. He then performs a regression analysis (though no coefficients are reported) to determine that higher levels of EU activity (e.g., hiring EU specialists, establishing a lobbying presence in Brussels, seeking regional partners) are based on population, population density, economic structure, and public attitudes

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toward the EU. Marie-Louise von Bergmann-Winberg (Chapter 8) also uses EUROLOG data to show how external and internal municipal EU activities have increased in Finland since 1991, how widely EU activity levels vary in Finland, and how Finnish municipalities have pushed ahead of Swedish municipalities in adjusting to European integration. Finally, Magnus Jerneck (Chapter 9) provides a fine case study of transnational (Denmark and Sweden) regional cooperation in Öresund.

These successful chapters suggest a better way. The editors would have produced a much more interesting and useful book if they had provided analysis of the available EUROLOG data for all four countries, then supplemented these general findings with key case studies based on elite interviews. In addition, a short chapter describing the local administrative structures in each country and a good set of maps—both of which are lacking in the current book—would help the non-expert follow the text.

So where are the gold nuggets? Buried deep, but there nonetheless. And they lead to provocative questions. First, municipalities in the Nordic area are not all engaged in EU activity. Some regions are pressing far ahead; others are lagging way behind. Some are participating in European governance; some are content to let governance happen to them. Will this diversity create greater differences in regional prosperity? Probably. Second, local governments are choosing to participate in two-level games by lobbying their own governments to fight for positions in national bargaining rounds *and* they are participating in multilevel governance by lobbying Brussels directly (see Chapter 10). We know little about when and why municipalities make these choices. But we do know the division of labor between central and local governments is changing. Will national governments wither away? Probably not, but their bargaining positions will weaken. Finally, this study, in its imperfect way, demonstrates the glorious complexity of European governance in the twenty-first century. Even the centralized Nordic governments are watching their local councils by-pass them to reach out across borders and, increasingly, up to Brussels. Will this give local officials the confidence to thumb their noses at Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo, and Stockholm? Probably. Won't Nordic politics be fun?

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NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes for Summer 2001 www.eucenters.org

The European Union Center of the University of Wisconsin Madison served as local host for the Seventh Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association in Madison (31 May-2 June). Papers were presented by UW faculty including David Trubek, Mark Pollack, Greg Shaffer, and Graham Wilson on transatlantic issues and governance. The EU Center also participated in the major fundraising effort for UW Madison, the Bascom Hill Society Spring Event, on 8-9 June. Organized for major donors to the university, the Bascom Hill event had international studies as the guiding theme for the first time, and Europe was the region of focus, with the European Union Center receiving special attention.

As part of our Lecture Series, the European Union Center of New York sponsored two talks in June: On June 12th, Václav Šmejkal, Director of the Center for European Integration Economic Chamber of the Czech Republic, delivered a lecture on "Sensitive Issues of the Czech Republic's Accession to the European Union" at the Czech Center in New York. On June 20th, Pierre Schori, Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations, spoke on "The State of the European Union" at the Permanent Mission of France to the U.N. Also in June, EUCNY Co-Director Martin A. Schain was elected to a two-year term as Chair of the European Union Studies Association.

On June 7, the EU Center in Georgia co-sponsored an executive workshop, "The EU: A Target of Investment," for area firms (whether U.S. or EU), conducted in cooperation with The Georgia Tech Center for International Business, Education and Research, Globalspeak.com, International Business Exchange, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. The program was oriented to preparing businesses for opportunities in the European market as a result of the emergence of the EU as a regulatory authority. Participants explored how a business operates locally in the European context and how a firm enters the market, overcomes local barriers, and becomes integrated into the local economy. On July 19 the Center conducted a workshop for the Gwinnett (Georgia) Chamber of Commerce on the euro and the changes it has promoted in the economy of Europe, as well as opportunities for Georgians in the EU.

The Pittsburgh EU Center organized, with the School of Information Sciences, the policy conference "International Aspects of e-Government" (June 25-26). This was the 3rd annual policy conference on a transatlantic topic. Practitioners and academics from the EU Commission, member states, and the U.S. participated. The Center also co-sponsored, with the Allegheny Intermediate Unit and the Pennsylvania State Modern Language Association, a French Immersion Institute (June 25-29). The Institute provided middle school and high school teachers opportunities to learn about the EU in French (from an EU Center PhD student), improve their cultural understanding of France, sharpen their French listening and speaking skills, and develop standards-based language learning curricula.

This summer the European Union Center at the University of Missouri sponsors the original research of six graduate students enrolled in the EU Graduate Certificate Program, who are examining social, economic and political variables that impact upon the EU, its citizens, and its external relations. Two students in political science, Enyu Zhang and Zeynep Taydas, will examine the EU's trade policy toward China and Turkey's accession process to the EU, respectively. Shari Riley (law) investigates domestic violence in the EU; Mark Mulcahy (journalism) examines press coverage on the Euro; Jason



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Hans (human environmental sciences) looks at the impact of EU enlargement on cross-border family relations in Poland and the Ukraine; while Michael Charlton (archeology) tracks the role of EU institutions in creating a European identity.

July 24-25: The EU Center of Seattle sponsored a two-day workshop for secondary and community college educators entitled "The European Union and the United States Today." The workshop, presented in cooperation with the Washington Council on International Trade, will provide teachers with basic information on EU institutions and policies and on current issues related to EU-U.S. relations. Individual sessions will focus on the euro, multiculturalism in Europe, and EU-U.S. trade ties. A hands-on Internet session and curriculum seminar will review the various EU-related resources available for teachers.

During July and August, the Claremont International Studies Education Project, a partner institution of the EU Center of California, will be preparing for its Institute on Technology and the Teaching of the European Union in the Contemporary World. This 40-hour institute will be focused on the European Union, with the EU Center providing content. The Institute is intended as a pilot study for a larger statewide project on The EU in the Social Science/World History Curriculum, aimed at high school social science teachers, and will be using digital technologies to teach about the EU.

The University of Illinois European Union Center awarded seven predissertation grants to graduate students to conduct research in Europe this summer. Research projects range from a study of the feasibility of a tax coordination scheme among European member states to market transition of the housing sector in the CEE economies and its relationship to the EU accession. On August 10 the European Union will be featured at the Illinois State Fair in Springfield, Illinois. Spotlighted each year is the country currently holding the Presidency of the European Council at that time—this year, Belgium.

Looking ahead to the Fall semester in North Carolina, the EU Center at Duke University is preparing to welcome Olivier Brunet (DG Education and Culture) as visiting EU Fellow for 2001-02. The UNC Chapel Hill EU Center is gearing up for a new class of eighteen Transatlantic Master's students. The incoming class includes students from the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and Europe. Students enrolled in this one-year master's degree program in U.S.-EU politics and policy will spend the first half of the year at UNC Chapel Hill and the second half at one of the partner sites in Europe. All work is done in the language of the host institution.

The Network of European Union Centers in the United States is funded primarily by the European Union with additional support from the host institutions and other donors. The Network of European Union Centers is coordinated by the European Union Studies Association (EUSA), and the EUSA committee overseeing this project is comprised of George A. Bermann (Columbia University School of Law), Chair, M. Donald Hancock (Vanderbilt University), and George Ross (Brandeis University). For more information about the EU Centers, their activities, locations, and how to contact them, please visit the Web site www.eucenters.org or send an e-mail to network@eucenters.org

Calls for Papers

Journal of International Relations and Development, special issue on NATO Summit in Prague 2002, to examine questions such as NATO's open door policy, views of NATO member states, role of Russian views on NATO enlargement, aspirant states preparations for NATO membership, experiences of three Central European States that became NATO members in 1999, *inter alia*. Authors from aspirant states and other experts are invited to submit paper proposals to Journal of International Relations and Development, P. O. Box 2547, SI-1001 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail <jird.fdv@uni-lj.si>, Web site <www.fdv.uni-lj.si/JIRD/Index.htm>. Deadline: July 30, 2001.

Bigger and Better? The European Union, Enlargement, and Reform, 4th Biennial Conference of ECSA Canada, May 29-31, 2002, Toronto. Meeting in conjunction with the Canadian Political Science Association. Panels and papers related to the main theme will be grouped under six sub-themes: (1) Enlargement of the EU: Prospects and Challenges; (2) Reform of the EU and Critical Policy Fields of European Integration (EMU, CFSP, JHA, etc.); (3) Emerging European Polity in Comparative Perspective; (4) EU and the Challenge to the Westphalian Model; (5) 'Europeanisation' of National Politics; and (6) Theorising European Integration. Proposals should include full details of the convenor, all paper givers and the discussant (full name, last completed degree, academic title, institutional affiliation, mailing address, tel/fax numbers, e-mail address), and should be sent to the Programme Chairs with a 250-word abstract of the panel and of each paper. Contact Thomas Hueglin, Dept. of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5, e-mail <thomashueglin@attcanada.net> and Oliver Schmidtke, Dept. of Political Science, University of Victoria, P. O. Box 3050, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada V8W 3P5, e-mail <oliver@uvic.ca>. Deadline: October 12, 2001.

European in the New Millennium: Enlarging, Experimenting, Evolving, 13th International Conference of Europeanists, Council for European Studies, March 14-16, 2002, Chicago. Council strongly encourages interdisciplinary papers and panels on Eastern or/and Western Europe from all fields of study and especially on the following themes: European and National Identities in Transition; Gender, Race, and Class Conflict; Globalization, Europeanization, and Regionalization; Postcolonialism and Europe; Making of Borders and Boundaries; Relationship between European Studies and Other Fields; and, Transformations in Welfare States and Economic and Social Policy. Sessions that are innovative in format are also welcomed. A more detailed call is posted on the Council's Web site at <www.europanet.org>. Proposals must be submitted by regular mail, accompanied by the conference cover sheet available on the Web site, and include seven copies of all materials. Send to Program Committee 2002, Council for European Studies, 420 West 118th Street, Mailcode 3310, New York, NY 10027. Deadline: October 15, 2001.

Conferences

August 30-September 2, 2001, 97th Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA. For program and other information visit <www.apsanet.org>.

September 3-5, 2001, University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UK), 31st Annual Conference and 6th Research Conference, "The State of the Union in 2001," Bristol, UK. Visit <www.uaces.org> or e-mail <admin@uaces.org>.

October 5-6, 2001, American Society of Comparative Law Annual Meeting, Willamette University College of Law, Salem, OR. Visit <www.comparativelaw.org> or send an e-mail to Symeon Symeonides at <symeon@willamette.edu>

October 4-7, 2001, German Studies Association, 25th Annual and 25th Anniversary Conference, Greater Washington, DC. To register contact the German Studies Association, Arizona State University, Box 873204, Tempe, AZ 85287; tel. 480.965.4839; fax 480.965.8989; Web site <www.g-s-a.org>.

October 11-14, 2001, 52nd International Atlantic Economic Society Conference, Philadelphia, PA. For program and registration details go to the Web site <www.iaes.org/conferences/future/philadelphia_52/index.htm> or send an e-mail to <iaes@iaes.org>.

November 2-3, 2001, Annual meeting of the International Studies Association Midwest, St. Louis, MO, co-sponsored by the European Union Center at the University of Missouri Columbia. EUSA member Marijke Breuning, Truman State University, is Program Chair. Visit <www.isanet.org/Midwest/AnnualMeeting/> or e-mail <mbreunin@truman.edu>.

January 3-6, 2002, 116th Annual Meeting, American Historical Association, on the theme, "Frontiers" (spatial, national, intellectual), San Francisco, CA. Visit <www.theaha.org/annual/> or e-mail <aha@theaha.org>.

March 14-16, 2002, 13th International Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, IL. Council for European Studies biennial conference (see call for papers at left). For information visit <www.europanet.org> or send e-mail to <ces@columbia.edu>.

March 19-23, 2002, 98th Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers, Los Angeles, CA (has a Specialty Group on Europe). Visit <www.aag.org> or e-mail <meeting@aag.org>.

March 24-27, 2002, 43rd Annual International Studies Association Convention, "Dissolving Boundaries: The Nexus Between Comparative Politics and International Studies," New Orleans, LA. Program chairs are Suzanne F. Werner and David R. Davis, Dept. of Political Science, Emory University. Visit <www.isanet.org/neworleans/> or e-mail <isa@u.arizona.edu>.

From the Chair / continued from p.2

three biennial prizes "to recognize and encourage excellence in scholarship in the field of European Union Studies." (Photographs from the awards ceremony are posted on our Web site at www.eustudies.org/prizes2001.html). David Green, a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, accepted the prize for the Best 1999 Conference Paper: "Who Are 'the Europeans'? European Political Identity in the Context of the Post-War Integration Project." (The paper is available on our Web site.) Our prize for the Best Dissertation in EU Studies was awarded to Joseph Jupille ("Procedural Politics: Issues, Interests, and Institutional Choice in the European Union"), who received his degree at the University of Washington Seattle, under the direction of Professor James A. Caporaso.

As recognition for his long contribution to this field, Leon Lindberg of the University of Wisconsin, was awarded the Lifetime Contribution Award in EU Studies. All of us owe a great debt to Lindberg. As Vivien Schmidt, 1999-2001 Chair of ECSA, said, "Lindberg's work on European integration set the standard for subsequent work on theories of integration. The concepts, arguments, and lines of analysis he developed still serve as the intellectual foundation for theoretical work on the European Union ... the study of European integration will occupy many scholars for at least several generations, and all of them will be permanently in Lindberg's intellectual debt." Please see the remarks of Alberta Sbragia (University of Pittsburgh), a former student of Lindberg, and of Leon Lindberg himself, in giving and accepting the Prize, respectively, included in this issue on pp.12-13.

Finally, I am particularly pleased that Demetrios Melis, a visiting scholar at the Center for European Studies at New York University, won the Conference "door prize" of a three-year membership in EUSA.

I look forward to the opportunities that EUSA will have during the next two years to help shape the study of Europe and the European Union. The EUSA Executive Committee would also welcome your input and reactions to our work.

MARTIN A. SCHAIN
New York University

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Founded in 1988 (and formerly called the European Community Studies Association), the European Union Studies Association™ is a non-profit academic and professional organization devoted to the exchange of information and ideas on the European Union. EUSA also coordinates the Network of European Union Centers in the United States.

European Union Studies Association
Information and ideas on the European Union



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