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# **ECSA REVIEW**

## **IGC 2000 Watch (Part 3): Pre- and Post-Nice Desmond Dinan and Sophie Vanhoonacker**

*Editor's Note: This is the third of a series which runs concurrently with the 2000 IGC and will conclude with the signing of a new Treaty, which is expected to take place at the Nice European Council in December 2000.*

DESPITE THE BEST EFFORTS of the new French presidency, the IGC continues to languish. Like all incoming presidencies, the French projected an image of vigor and ambition. Unlike other incoming presidencies, this was *Gallic* vigor and ambition. Greater experience and superior diplomacy would triumph where earlier Portuguese efforts had failed. The French announced a fuller schedule of IGC meetings, including a new format: four ministerial conclaves (in addition to the monthly ministerial sessions on the margins of the General Affairs Council) before the decisive Nice summit in December. The first conclave took place on July 24. It was indistinguishable in format and result from earlier ministerial sessions. Then the IGC followed a quintessentially French custom by taking a break for the full month of August.

The IGC resumed in September with formal Preparatory Group and ministerial meetings, a brief discussion of IGC issues at the foreign ministers' informal (Gymnich-type) meeting in Evian, and a general discussion in the ECOFIN Council of the possibility of moving to qmv for specific EMU provisions. Every formal IGC agenda item, including for the first time closer cooperation, was discussed at official and ministerial levels. Yet the delegations' positions remained largely as they had been at the end of the Portuguese presidency. If anything, some positions hardened, such as the small member states' insistence on continued representation in the Commission. This was largely a reaction against strong French pressure (national rather than presidential) to cap the Commission's size at fewer members than there will be member states.

The contours of a possible agreement are difficult to detect. The Commission's size is potentially the most politically charged issue, because it is the one to which most people can relate. The extension of qmv is the most complex. Building on the work of the Portuguese presidency, the IGC is sifting through a list of nearly forty "provisions worth examining with a view to a possible move to [qmv]." Most of these are being considered for qmv as they stand; only specific aspects of the rest (dealing with issues such as taxation and social security) are being considered

for qmv. Denmark is particularly skittish about making any concessions on qmv in the run up to the referendum on the euro, on September 28. Regardless of the special Danish situation, it is hard to predict at this stage what the final list of new qmv measures will look like.

Britain, Denmark, and Sweden remain wary of closer cooperation lest it deepen integration, which is precisely what its proponents say that they want it to do. Spain, Greece and Portugal are wary of closer cooperation lest they never catch up with those who cooperate more closely. Nevertheless a consensus seems to be emerging on the acceptability of new enabling clauses, including a removal of the veto and a minimum threshold of eight participating member states, hedged with reassurances about the *acquis communautaire* and the institutional integrity of the Union.

Delegations seem to agree also on the need to give larger member states more voting weight, through either a "dual majority" (of votes and population) or a simple reweighting of votes, but the modalities of each option are contested. Together with the Commission's size, to which it is linked in the Amsterdam Treaty, this is the issue that most divides large and small member states. It may also divide France and Germany, if Germany demands more votes than France.

So far, negotiations have not even begun in earnest. They will probably not do so until the run up to the Nice summit, or even during the summit itself. As most agenda items are interlinked, there is some scope to make trade-offs and package deals. In contrast to the SEA and Maastricht negotiations, however, where cohesion policy was also on the table, there is no possibility in the current IGC to make side payments to recalcitrant member states. An important circumstantial roadblock to a possible agreement was removed when the Fourteen decided on September 12 to end sanctions against Austria. Had they not done so, and had Austria gone ahead with its proposed referendum, the IGC's prospects would have been seriously jeopardized.

The French have staked the success of their Council presidency on the conclusion of a successful agreement in Nice. By what measure will they judge an agreement successful? Senior French ministers have said that "a bad agreement would be worse than no agreement," that the outcome must be more than a "minor reform," that they will not accept a "lame compromise," and that the IGC must not result in a "third-rate deal." These seemingly strong statements nonetheless give the French a lot of

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**Coordinator of the Network of European Union Centers**

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wiggle room. How many treaty provisions would have to be so moved to qmv in order to constitute a successful outcome? How much more flexible must flexibility become? How radically must the Commission be reorganized? How far-reaching must the reallocation of voting weights in the Council be?

In a paper prepared for the sixth ministerial meeting of the IGC on July 10—the first ministerial held during its presidency—the French outlined in woolly terms the essentials of an agreement: a “significant” extension of qmv; a distribution of votes that reflects “more accurately” the weight of member states; measures for Council decision making that would have “more legitimacy in the eyes of the population;” clauses to put in place a Commission “whose action is legitimate and efficient;” and workable provisions on closer cooperation that would respect “the requirements of consistency and solidarity of an enlarged Europe.”

Judged by such standards, the French will be able to describe as successful almost any agreement. They will be sorely tempted to do so, and not simply to crown their presidency in glory. Like the other member states, the French know that failure to reach agreement would further weaken the EU’s credibility and send a hostile message to the countries negotiating membership. The IGC’s rationale is to prepare the EU institutionally for enlargement, just as *Agenda 2000*’s rationale was to prepare the EU budgetarily for enlargement. Nobody would seriously claim that the Berlin agreement was optimal for the EU, just as nobody (not even the French) will claim that whatever emerges from Nice is optimal for the EU. But both agreements will serve the essential political purpose of signaling the EU’s willingness, however reluctantly, to facilitate enlargement.

The Nice agreement (if it comes about) will end an important stage in the enlargement process while opening an equally important stage of the EU’s political development. Musings about the EU’s future, spurred on by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s speech last May, reached their zenith this summer with a contribution by French President Jacques Chirac. In a highly symbolic speech in Berlin, in the new seat of the German Lower House, Chirac countered Fischer’s federalist vision with a neo-Gaullist call for a geographically defined and constitutionally delimited post-enlargement Europe, based on the sanctity of the nation state, the supremacy of the Franco-German axis, and the primacy of a “pioneer group” of member states.

While the President of the Republic appeared to soar above the fray, his hapless government was left grappling with mundane EU affairs, including presiding over the slow-moving IGC. Both agree, as do the other participants in the renewed debate on Europe’s future, that substantive discussions about appropriate political models, new modes of governance, protection of regional rights (a cherished German objective), whether to constitutionalize the treaties (perhaps along the lines of the European University Institute’s proposal), where to put the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and what to do about defense policy must await the outcome of the current IGC. Nor must they become a pretext to delay enlargement. Such weighty political questions constitute the EU’s “post-Nice” agenda. Perhaps the “Nice leftovers” would be a better name for them.

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Best, Edward, Mark Grey and Alexander Stubb, *Rethinking the European Union: IGC 2000 and Beyond*, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 2000.  
“Notre Europe,” discours prononcé par Monsieur Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, devant le Bundestag, Berlin, 27 June 2000, at [www.elysee.fr/disc](http://www.elysee.fr/disc)

Most of the presidency documents prepared for Preparatory Group and ministerial meetings are available at [www.europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/geninfo/index](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/geninfo/index), approximately ten days after they are circulated at the IGC.

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## Call for Nominations ECSA Executive Committee

Nominations for the 2001 European Community Studies Association (ECSA) Executive Committee election are now being accepted. The seven members of the Executive Committee determine Association policies and supervise ECSA programs. Nominations (including self-nominations) must include a:

- 1) letter of interest;
- 2) current curriculum vitae (short version preferred);
- 3) brief biographical paragraph not to exceed 100 words (for use with the ballot); and,
- 4) short narrative describing any past/current service to the Association.

Executive Committee members must be current members of ECSA. The ECSA Nominating Committee welcomes all qualified candidates, including those from outside the academy. It is hoped that the final slate will be characterized by a balance among senior and junior level candidates, and among minority and women candidates, as well as a cross-representation of academic disciplines and geographic locations.

All nomination materials should be sent by regular mail to Dr. Valerie Staats, Executive Director, European Community Studies Association, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. The deadline for receipt of materials is December 31, 2000. A slate of candidates will appear in the Winter 2001 *ECSA Review* and a ballot will be sent to all current ECSA members at that time. Election results will be announced at the ECSA Business Meeting to take place at ECSA’s Seventh Biennial International Conference, May 31-June 2, 2001, Madison, Wisconsin.

### **Modernizing EU Antitrust Enforcement** **Thomas Doleys**

ON APRIL 28, 1999 THE Commission published a White Paper entitled "Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty" (OJ C 132, 12.5.1999). Although the title may seem innocuous enough, the contents of this document, if implemented, promise to change fundamentally the manner in which antitrust policy is conducted in the European Union. The document calls for no less than a radical decentralization of the current system. The Commission proposes to share its hitherto exclusive competence to administer certain Treaty antitrust rules with national competition authorities (NCAs) and courts in the member states. In this short essay, I will provide an overview of the rationale behind the White Paper and outline the proposed changes contained therein. I will next highlight some problems with the White Paper and argue that a number of questions critical to the success of the reform effort remain, as yet, unanswered.

The main thrust of the modernization effort is to modify the system of enforcement rules and procedures contained in Council Regulation 17. Regulation 17, passed in 1962, gives the Commission broad authority to prevent anti-competitive concentrations of market power arising either from concerted practice (Article 81 [85]) or dominant position (Article 82 [86]). Prohibition was not, however, automatic. The Treaty recognized that restrictive practices might contribute to economic activity in a manner that compensates for the restriction on competition. For this reason, the general ban on anti-competitive agreements in Article 81(1) was tempered by the exemption in Article 81(3). To enjoy the benefit of exemption, however, Regulation 17 held that the Commission must receive formal notification. A restrictive practice could enjoy an exemption only if granted by the Commission, and the Commission only granted exemptions to firms who first provided the necessary notification.

Although the enforcement system set up by Regulation 17 has been widely regarded as a critical element in developing a coherent body of Community law, Commission officials, practitioners and academics alike have come to agree that the system has outlived its usefulness. The notification system set up by Regulation 17 no longer assures effective surveillance and it has increasingly become a costly administrative burden on both Commission competition authorities and Community firms. At present, a substantial proportion of the Commission's already limited resources are being devoted to handling notifications, many of which involve agreements of minor economic importance. In the last five years, only 0.5% of notifications have resulted in a decision to prohibit (CEC 1999:5). An unfortunate consequence of this administrative burden is that competition authorities have been unable to devote much needed time and resources to investigate those relatively few practices that have a major economic impact—and which are, not coincidentally, almost never notified.

To address this increasingly untenable situation, the Commission sets out in its White Paper an ambitious package of reforms. The truly major reforms are twofold. First, the Commission would abolish the notification system. Under the proposed changes, enterprises would no longer have to seek Commission approval before implementing a restrictive agreement. Practices which are prohibitable under Article 81(1), but which claim to meet the tests of Article 81(3), would be considered lawful. The second major reform would be to decentralize enforcement. Decentralization would be achieved by making Article 82(3) directly applicable (thereby bringing Article 81(3) into line with prevailing practice for Article 81(1) and Article 82). The main effect of making the article directly applicable would be that the Commission would no longer exercise monopoly control over Article 81(3). Under the decentralization scheme, day-to-day application of antitrust policy would shift to the NCAs, but the Commission would retain a central role in setting policy. Decentralization would also broaden the scope for private enforcement. Once Article 81(3) takes direct effect, any individual or group with appropriate standing could challenge the legality of a restrictive practice before a national court.

There is little doubt that the Commission has set forth an ambitious and far reaching reform program, and one that would, if implemented, fundamentally change antitrust enforcement in the EU. The Commission should be applauded for its bold vision. However, the reform proposals, welcome though they are, should nonetheless give some cause for concern. This concern arises from at least two quarters. First, there is a risk that decentralization will lead to the inconsistent application of Community competition rules. The reform proposals create a system of overlapping jurisdictions, where it is not always clear who is the controlling authority. The second concern arises from the question of whether Article 81(3) can be effectively adjudicated in national courts.

The first concern—that decentralization will lead to the inconsistent application of Community rules—follows mainly from the fact that the White Paper includes no mechanism or criteria to govern the allocation of cases between competition authorities. As a consequence, NCAs in several member states might claim jurisdiction over a particular case. This would not be a problem if one could be assured that the outcome would be the same regardless of who heard the case or where it was being heard. Unfortunately, this is far from the case. The framework of national procedural rules within which NCAs operate vary significantly from one country to another. In a fact worthy of note, almost half the states still have no experience or institutional framework in place for enforcing Community competition rules. And even those well-established, experienced NCAs tend to vary in their approach to particular economic sectors.

Given that decisions taken by NCAs under the reform program would lack general effect (e.g., they would be legally binding only within the territory of the deciding state), there is every reason to suspect that NCAs may, either by coincidence or by intent, render conflicting interpretations of Article 81(3).<sup>1</sup> This will, in turn, lead to the rise of forum shopping, where potential

litigants compare legal venues (e.g., the Commission or NCAs) to find the one most likely to take a favorable decision. Since the burden of proof under the new system falls on plaintiffs to demonstrate that an agreement does fall afoul the law, this will likely lead to a surge of claims in jurisdictions known to proffer a strict interpretation of Article 81(3). Indeed, some critics fear that the inconsistencies will become so great that they question whether decentralization will not, in practice, lead to the re-nationalization of competition policy.

In its White Paper, the Commission acknowledges that the key to inter-jurisdictional consistency is the ability of NCAs to apply the same body of rules the same way across the Community. Therefore, in order to reduce the likelihood of inconsistent application and the forum shopping to which it gives rise, the Commission proposes a series of procedural safeguards. The main safeguard involves the creation of a coordinated “network” of NCAs, with the Commission as *primus inter pares*. NCAs would take most day to day decisions, while the Commission would concentrate on coordinating NCA activities, issuing guidelines and notices, and taking decisions when necessary. To facilitate the creation of this network, the White Paper proposes that NCAs be obligated to inform the Commission of all cases in which Article 81(1) is applied. The Commission would have the authority to withdraw at its discretion any competition case from national consideration. This would allow the Commission to maintain supervisory oversight without the administrative burdens of the old notification system and ensure the consistency between proceedings under Community law and those under national law.

The network concept is an interesting one. However, it is not entirely clear that these safeguards will be sufficient to overcome conflicts and uncertainties arising from the unclear allocation of authority. Success of the network depends on several unknowns, not least of which is whether NCAs can develop the expertise and marshal the resources necessary to perform their function efficiently and effectively. At present, this is not at all clear. Another problematic element of the Commission proposed safeguards is the lack of any specific criteria outlining the conditions under which the Commission would intervene in a case pending before an NCA. From the perspective of firms, this concern would be that the Commission would wield this “right of evocation” in an ad hoc manner. If so, it would create rather than reduce legal uncertainties, as neither firms nor, for that matter, the NCAs would know a priori whether a case being heard locally would, in the end, be decided locally. Such uncertainties risk increasing, rather than decreasing, the burden on business—an outcome clearly contrary to the objectives of the reform effort.

The second concern involves the adjudicative role of national courts under the new enforcement regime. In short, national courts may be ill-equipped to handle the task being thrust upon them. Complicating this is the fact that it is not clear whether Article 81(3) is even justiciable. However, what is clear is that the exemption provisions in Article 81(3) involve the assessment of complex economic factors. In many cases, a given agreement may have both pro- and anti-competitive effect that require a

careful assessment of the relative balance between them and such assessments not easily made in a courtroom where contending parties offer their view of the “facts”. Few judges have the training necessary to evaluate competently the issues under dispute. If the ECJ has considered itself incompetent to assess the complex facts involved in administering Art 81(3)<sup>2</sup>, it follows that the national courts are even less well placed to balance the various interests concerned (Wesseling 1999).

Whatever the final nature of reform, whether it reflects the program outlined in the White Paper or some variant thereof, major changes in the enforcement of antitrust rules are in the offing. And, on balance, the efforts should be welcomed. However, the Commission would do well to pay heed to officials, practitioners and scholars skeptical of reforms. In its zeal to modernize, care must be taken to ensure that increased administrative efficiency is not purchased at the price of operational incoherence and legal uncertainty.

### Notes

1. In general, the risk of inconsistent application can take two forms: 1) when an NCA adopts a decision pursuant to Article 81 and the Commission or another NCA intend to adopt a different decision based on the same provision, or 2) when the Commission adopts a decision and an NCA intends to adopt a different decision based on the same Article.
2. See ruling in Cases 56 and 58/64, *Consten and Grundig v. Commission* [1966] ECR 299.

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### Constructing Europe at the Millennium: France's Council Presidency in 2000 Colette Mazzucelli

FROM THE SCHUMAN DECLARATION to the Luxembourg Compromise, the Single European Act to the Treaty on European Union and Amsterdam, France's legacy has inspired and challenged European integration. Its Presidency occurs as the Union must address the Euro's fate, revisit institutional reform and sustain enlargement's momentum despite popular reluctance.<sup>1</sup> What are France's priorities in the Chair?<sup>2</sup> Three axes orient its work: reconciling economic modernization and a stronger European social model; bringing Europe closer to its citizens; preparing for enlargement and strengthening Europe's place in the world.

The first axis is inextricably linked with the Union's objectives to enhance growth and employment by promoting a competitive and innovative economy in Europe. Severe fuel shortages and high gasoline prices across Western Europe complicate this agenda. The desire to strengthen the role and political visibility of the Euro-11 as the operational instrument of economic coordination reflects a long-standing German policy adopted by the French.<sup>3</sup> A related dimension is to strengthen the European social model. The emphasis is to improve labor conditions with special attention given to equal rights between men and women in the workplace.

The second axis aims to respond to the daily preoccupations of the Union's citizens. Two general themes are: the idea of a community of values with the goal of adopting a Charter of Fundamental Rights at the Nice European Council; and the notion, emphasized at the Lisbon European Council, to eliminate obstacles to the free movement of students, teachers and researchers with the objective to adopt a work program in Nice leading to a "Europe of Knowledge."<sup>4</sup> As sanctions on Austria were lifted, Presidency officials hinted that a monitoring system should be initiated to ensure "common European values" are respected by individual member states.<sup>5</sup> What could be the implications for new members as the Union negotiates future enlargements? Several areas of daily concern to citizens include: health, quality of life and consumer protection with reference to food and environmental standards; coastal transport security as this relates to Community control of ships; and a European asylum and immigration policy as agreed upon at the Tampere European Council. The French Presidency looks to the causes of migration flows while elaborating a coordinated policy with countries of origin.

The third axis responds to the Presidency's concern with efficiency and rank. In Nice achieving consensus about the number of Commissioners, an extension of qualified majority voting and a revision of weighted voting in the Council is critical to the intergovernmental conference. The Presidency must be perceived as the facilitator of consensus decisions; France's traditional emphasis on the role of member states defines its

interest in less Commission influence, more majority voting and a weighting that respects the role of the larger states. Differences of view with the smaller members, that traditionally look to the European Commission as "guardian of the Treaties," complicate the prospects for a resolution of this issue in December. In the wake of the Santer Commission's resignation in March 1999, the Prodi Commission struggles to assert its voice in the institutional triangle with the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.

The enlargement negotiations will be addressed in the General Affairs Council on 20 November; a German proposal to consult its population about the candidates to admit speaks to the fact that popular support for enlargement as a Union priority is decreasing gradually over time. In France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, percentages are less than a third of the population; only Ireland (42%) and Sweden (48%) have percentage levels that potentially could strike the range of current support for enlargement in Greece (53%) and Denmark (57%).<sup>6</sup>

The Presidency aims to strengthen national contributions to a European military capacity to realize Helsinki's objectives. It also envisages augmenting the Union's contributions to international economic and financial stability. Given the Euro's decline against the dollar, what measures may be taken in the short-term to sustain the Presidency's goal over time? Of more central importance to the Union's future, how may France orient its policy to offer impetus to European construction while remaining true to the principles of its legacy? This tension, and enlargement's inherent complexities, co-exist in the globalized environment of the 21st century.

#### Notes

1. The main findings of Eurobarometer No 53: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo>
2. Consult <http://www.presidence-europe.fr/> and [http://www.diplomatie.fr/europe/presidence/programme\\_pue\\_1.html](http://www.diplomatie.fr/europe/presidence/programme_pue_1.html) for the Presidency's priorities. The author thanks Dr. Christian Lequesne, CERI, and Mr. Laurent Delahousse, Quai d'Orsay.
3. Colette Mazzucelli (1999) *France and Germany at Maastricht (2nd edition)*. New York and London: Garland, 101-133.
4. Florence Delouche-Gaudez et Christian Lequesne (forthcoming) "La Politique Européenne de la France en 1999-2000," 11. Author's translations.
5. Suzanne Daley, "Europe Lifts Sanctions on Austria, but Vows Vigilance," September 13, 2000, *The New York Times* on the Web, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/13/world/13AUST.html>
6. European Commission, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo>

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## Teaching the EU

*Editor's note: Suggestion for and submissions of essays by ECSA members on teaching about the EU are welcomed. Please query ECSA via e-mail at [ecsa@pitt.edu](mailto:ecsa@pitt.edu)*

### Teaching Europe: A Core Curriculum on European Integration Studies Susanne Hägele

FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES THE EU polity is a huge laboratory of ideas and concepts, among them the redefinition of the nation state, lobbyism and corporatism, institution building or democratic legitimacy. The issues gain in complexity (as illustrated for example by the co-decision procedures) and the *acquis communautaire* evolves so fast that textbooks are permanently outdated. Many of our realities cannot be explained away by one single theory, nor understood if studied from one discipline's angle. This presents anyone who wants to teach European Integration Studies with a considerable challenge.

In an earlier issue of the *ECSA Review*, we introduced the first step of our research project which began in March 2000 by compiling and assessing the state of the discipline, gathering best practices, in short summarising the *acquis académique*. We sent out a questionnaire to 125 Jean Monnet Professors of Political Science in Europe and asked them what and how they teach. In a parallel process, we gathered brochures, course outlines and bibliographies of European Studies programs from all over Europe. At two Thematic Network Conferences in Lodz, Poland in May and Hamburg, Germany in June 2000, diverse panels of Western and Eastern European scholars reported about specific challenges they encounter in their academic daily lives. Apparent Challenges

Some of our different findings may seem evident, others less so. The still very diverse nature of course structures in Europe was one aspect we not only found confirmed, but which also made the job of comparing existing offers quite thorny. Topics addressed within courses on European integration include community law, history, economics, institutions, integration related theories, policy fields, and actors/network approaches. Teaching methods are primarily lectures and seminar style courses, though additional methods like excursions, simulations and group work appear, too. A core curriculum should, therefore, not be restricted to course outlines presenting the general topics to be addressed, but instead offer course tools going beyond lectures.

Most teachers use their own syllabi, in addition to which there are some "bestseller" textbooks, especially in the UK, which end up being used in other countries as well for lack of similar material in the national language. Language is an issue indeed: English is the predominant language in political science. Many expressed a need to find more material (especially in English) about views on European integration from other countries. As a

consequence, the approach to European issues remains regrettably "national," with little opportunity for comparison. Annotated bibliographies to inform about publications in other languages than English would provide valuable help.

Experiences of scholars in post-communist EU applicant countries bring new perspectives on how to deal with lack of material and resources, as well as a fresh look at integration issues. In the Polish case, for lack of textbooks on European integration in Polish, teachers turned to English textbooks, which produced the side-effects of training students to read in a foreign language as well as viewing things from a foreign angle. In the Czech Republic, the need to prepare students for an international job market led to the decision to make a year of study abroad compulsory for the earning of an M.A. degree.

#### Remove the Straightjacket

We need more interdisciplinarity in European integration studies, because the European Union is a complex structure where law, economics, history and politics constantly interact. Getting professors from universities in different countries, or from distinct disciplines, to teach together, seems an obvious solution but is still seldom practiced. This is partly due to "academic sclerosis," yet what also emerged from our study was that European integration studies are not, in many European countries, to be found in political science departments, but rather within law departments. It was reported by French and Spanish colleagues, and confirmed by others, that one will often find political scientists squeezed between lawyers and economists, not to mention the distinction between political science and international relations, which is a declaration of faith in some places and a non-issue in others.

From our empirical research, two certainties emerge: on the one hand there is broad agreement on where the problems lie and what should be done about them, but on the other hand, those challenges are poorly addressed in practice. This takes us to the second step of our project.

#### Genuine Demand for a Core Curriculum

The planned core curriculum in European integration studies will provide a constructive approach to those deficiencies—not to be normative, but indeed creative, to make sure concepts that have been successfully tested by some can be used by all, each according to their needs. While scholars alone cannot change the national marking or term systems to make them more compatible (thereby facilitating exchanges), this shouldn't prevent us from exchanging and mutually enriching our teaching methods and contents, which can only reinforce and sustain the ongoing trend towards harmonization of tertiary education frameworks, like introduction of BA / MA schemes and credit points. Again we are not talking about harmonization of contents, nor prescribing to anyone what he or she has to think or teach.

Australian colleagues would have other needs, as they are battling to give European studies some space next to Asian studies (see Heather Field in Pavkovic and Welch, 1999), than, for example, would the Central Europeans in the process of joining the EU. This is why a core curriculum needs to be flexible enough, not one-size-fits-all, but rather like a toolbox where one could pick according to need, including things you did not think you needed.

The aim of our project is to develop a set of different teaching models which—according to the subsidiarity formula—can be used by a broad variety of political scientists from the EU and beyond, in the applicant countries and elsewhere, while taking into account different levels of teaching (undergraduate, graduate) and diverse study schemes (semesters, credit units, years). Concrete proposals will be designed for both substance (technical and theoretical, institutional and procedural, politics, policies and polity, with imports from other disciplines such as history, economics, law, etc.) and teaching methods and material (lists of usable publications, documents, pedagogical tools, etc. with a special focus on virtual presentations).

We are currently seeking funding to bring together a multinational group of researchers to begin shaping the curriculum. The more diverse the participants are, the more widely applicable the product will be. Through the first phase of the project we have already established contact with some universities in Western and Eastern Europe, as well as Canada, the United States and Australia.

We plan to produce in both printed and on-line versions:

- An overall menu of relevant topics for European Politics courses.
- A limited number of optimal outlines for a variety of applications; short manuscripts will be elaborated in 15-20 languages.
- Material of different kinds such as:
  - Annotated bibliographies
  - Annotated lists of documents
  - Compilation of pedagogical tools, methods and materials
- Sources for further information including Internet links

#### Call for Participation

We appeal to all interested members of the academic community to become part of the group that will design the core curriculum. Our project has been organized by the European Thematic Network for Political Science at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris; the Jean Monnet Chair for Political Science at the University of Koeln; and the TransEuropean Policy Studies Association in Brussels (also known as TEPSA).

To further build ties among scholars interested in strengthening EU pedagogy, Professor Wessels' Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Koeln would like to initiate an EU Pedagogy interest section of ECSA, and I use this opportunity to launch a call for participation. If interest is as lively as our exploratory talks suggest, we also want to organize a panel at the upcoming ECSA conference in Madison, Wisconsin in 2001. Since the deadline for ECSA panel proposals is November 1, we hope to receive some e-mail feedback as soon as possible, but even after that date we would welcome comments and suggestions.

To participate in the Core Curriculum project and/or to express interest in and support for forming an EU Pedagogy Interest Section of ECSA, please contact Wolfgang Wessels, Jean Monnet Professor, Universität zu Köln, or his project assistants, Susanne Hägele and Ingo Linsenmann. E-mail to <wessels@uni-koeln.de> or visit the Project Web site at [www.uni-koeln.de/wiso-fak/powi/wessels/Core-Curriculum/](http://www.uni-koeln.de/wiso-fak/powi/wessels/Core-Curriculum/)

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**The Transatlantic Internet Seminar Kosovo/a (TISK)**, is the first distance learning offering for Sciences Po, Paris, taught by Colette Mazzucelli, Senior Research Fellow, EastWest Institute, in cooperation with Wim van Meurs at the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich, [www.rboston.com/bosch](http://www.rboston.com/bosch). The seminar, "Contending Approaches to International Peace and Conflict Resolution: The Kosovo/a Conflict," began in October. Partner sites in the U.S. include the EastWest Institute, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, and the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. The Made Kade Center at the Monterey Institute also intends to participate on a weekly basis. TISK features presentations by alumni of the Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship Program for Future American Leaders. For more information, please contact Colette Mazzucelli, Co-President, Robert Bosch Foundation Alumni Association (RBFAA) at <co-president@boschalumni.org> and visit RBFAA's newly designed Web site for fellowship materials and the Alumni Directory Online, [www.boschalumni.org](http://www.boschalumni.org).

## Book Reviews

**James I. Walsh. European Monetary Integration and Domestic Politics: Britain, France and Italy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, 182 pp.**

With European Monetary Integration and Domestic Politics: Britain, France and Italy, James Walsh makes an important bid to integrate two strands of International Relations that often seem to drift past each other leaving only the slightest of impressions: theory and case study. His project respects each methodology as a legitimate scholarly approach. And as a result, this book demonstrates how each enhances the other, expanding the reliability of theory as well as the saliency of historical data. In sum, the project traces a methodological path that the discipline would be well served to follow. In the end, of course, the book suffers some of the pitfalls inherent in each approach, reminding us of the need to exercise caution as we craft theory and seek to explain evidence.

The book's ambit is broad: using empirical observations, it tests twin theories of domestic monetary politics as well as a pair of theories often used to interpret international monetary interactions. In the first instance, it focuses on the causes of states' (Britain, France and Italy) selection of particular exchange rate policies. Here, Walsh contrasts the open economy theory that poses the market as a supplier of particular policy preferences with what he terms the institutional explanation. Institutional theory argues that when industry and financial firms have conflicting policy preferences, states have greater freedom of action. The second problem highlights monetary politics among European Union (EU) member states (here including Germany). In this case, the author sets realist "power matters" distributional bargaining theory in opposition to learning theory, to explain the institutional outcomes of monetary regime negotiations.

The author tests these sets of theories using two methods. The first, "congruence procedure," looks at theory-predicted outcomes versus actual outcomes. The second, "process tracing," investigates the means by which initial preferences turn into final outcomes. The empirical data come from his application of the theories to specific historical moments. Thus, Chapter 3 (1979-88) and Chapter 5 (1989-99) utilize expressed group preferences and actual government policies regarding national exchange rates. Chapter 2 examines German, British, French and Italian preferences regarding the operating rules of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the final outcomes, while Chapter 4 does the same using Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

The conclusion in all instances, domestic and international, is that power matters most as an explanation of political outcomes. In the domestic cases, Walsh finds the institutional explanation—states' freedom to do what they choose is greatest when financial firms and industrialists fail to present a united front but rather express conflicting preferences—most convincing. Alternatively, in the international cases, Walsh finds that the rules governing

the structure and function of both the EMS and EMU most reflect Germany's preferences, not those of Britain, France or Italy. Thus, he holds that Germany's relatively greater relational power gave it the determining edge in the negotiation, supporting the distributional bargaining explanation.

Taking the domestic perspective first, the dependent variable is exchange rate policy—that is a government's choice not only to manage a state's exchange rate within the European system, but to do so toward a particular end. The two theories provide the causal variables. The first, open economy, tells us that the larger the tradeable sector, the more likely that government officials will make the policy choices that this sector favors, i.e., a competitive exchange rate often achieved by currency devaluations and relative currency stability, often from a fixed exchange rate. Of course even in a very open economy there will be a nontraded goods sector made up of firms with a different set of policy preferences. Thus, domestic monetary politics, according to the theory laid out by Walsh, amounts to a tug of war over state policy by these two actors. The larger the externally focused sector (this includes banks active internationally) relative to the domestically-focused sector, the more likely that the state will attempt to achieve the traders' preferences. This model posits the state as "weathervane" (Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, Houndsmill, UK: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988, p.43), turning into the wind of the most powerful groups. Interestingly, sector size is equated with political power. And, surprisingly, labor unions and other actors are almost completely ignored by the author.

The second theory also relies on the institutional structure of the domestic economy as a predictor of government's policy choices. Its causal mechanism is how institutions "... shape groups' preferences, organizational capacity, and power" (p.7). This was operationalized as whether industry and financial firms wanted the same policy, or had different preferences vis-à-vis the exchange rate. While open economy theory would predict banks' preferences based on their location in the traded/non-traded sectors, the institutional explanation would explain banks' preferences as derived rather from the character of their ties to industry. In those situations where banks and industrial concerns were not closely linked (Walsh so classifies Britain and France in the 1990s) states would have greater latitude to institute policy appropriate for the domestic economy, without regard to what other political actors wanted. It is unclear from the discussion of institutional theory whether the author expects those states with greater freedom of action to follow the floating currency/slight appreciation preferences of "unlinked" bankers or to act as a "guardian" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 11-12) implementing the policy best for the state as a whole without regard to particularized interests. That is, he does not speak to the interest formation of states as actors.

Using the periods and the countries noted above, Walsh gives the nod to the institutional explanation, finding that it better anticipated outcomes than did the open economy theory. Both theories predicted that firms involved in the traded sectors wanted the state to maintain competitive rates with trading partners. The



institutional explanation forecast that in an environment such as Britain's, where financial firms have little direct interest in industrial firms, their preferences ought to have been inherently anti-inflation, favoring reduced exchange rate volatility and for those with significant overseas business, a slight appreciation of the currency. In Italy, and in France (at least until the 1990s), the links between industry and banks ought to have led financial firms to "... adopt their industrial clients' preferences for stabilizing the exchange rate at a competitive level" (p.8). Further, banks' ability to lobby government effectively because of "[b]ankers' strong ties with finance ministers and central bank officials" (p.8) should have made them the bridge between what the firms wanted and what they got from the state, in terms of exchange rate policy.

Walsh's case studies bear out the validity of the predictions of the institutional explanation with what he terms a "modest preponderance of the evidence" (p.137). In Britain, Tory governments—both under Margaret Thatcher and John Major—but also the Labour government under Tony Blair, evinced a much greater interest in quashing inflation and generally maintained a studied hands-off policy toward the pound's exchange rate. In the British case, the links between industry and banks were the weakest, and such peak industrial organizations as the Congress of British Industrialists were almost wholly unsuccessful in pressing their members' demands for a more competitive exchange rate. In France and Italy, where relations between industry and banks were much closer, banks were either neutral or actively supported industries' demands for continued devaluations of the currencies to "bleed off" real appreciation vis-à-vis the German mark in the ERM. And, where banks were either neutral or supportive, Walsh finds, industry enjoyed greater success in securing its demands.

A shift in French policy particularly supports the institutional explanation. Beginning in the late 1980s, French industry began to move from debt to equity financing. Thereafter, in the 1990s, French banks failed to stand with industry in its calls for the devaluation of the franc. In fact, bankers used their control of interest rates to support the French government's monetary policies. As statistical evidence does not point to a significant opening of the French economy, Walsh concludes that the difference in bankers' behavior must have stemmed from the institutional change—the delinking of financial firms and industry. He also addresses one seemingly anomalous episode in Italy, in the early 1990s. At this time, both firms and banks support a modest appreciation of the lira. In this instance, however, Walsh states that they favored currency appreciation as a way to pressure the government to rethink its tight monetary policy/loose fiscal policy mix. He terms this their response to "exceptional circumstances" (p.137). As such, he holds that it presents no problem for institutional theory.

Walsh also examines monetary policy in the larger European realm. In these cases, the dependent variable is the final set of rules for operation of regional monetary institutions while the causal variables are power (relational bargaining theory) and relative policy failure (learning theory). The empirical evidence comes from the negotiations that shaped first the EMS and then

the EMU. Specifically, the preferences of Germany, Britain, France and Italy provide the data.

Distributional bargaining theory focuses on what the most powerful state party to the negotiations wants. Here, power is defined as "... a credible threat not to participate ... [Thus,] the state with the least to gain from creating new rules has the most power to set the institution's rules" (p.13). In both of these instances, Germany is cast as the reluctant partner; given this, distributional bargaining accords German preferences the greatest weight. In contrast the learning explanation posits the formation of state preferences within a dynamic environment. This allows a state to observe its own failures as well as others' successes and consequently reshape its policy choices. Accordingly, European governments should look to Germany's economic success and decide to model not just German tools but also German policy goals. This, too, would lead to monetary agreements resembling German domestic policy. Because of the similarity of predicted outcomes, Walsh instead examines "... the *processes* by which states create such rules ..." (p.15) to evaluate each explanation.

The author finds that the theory which says that states (or rather their chief decision makers) learn had little analytical purchase in relation to the EMS and EMU. Instead, the path of the negotiations for each monetary institution highlighted Germany's ability to force its preferences on the others. Thus, in EMU, for example, the data demonstrated that Britain pushed for the smallest loss of autonomy possible, for a common rather than a single currency and for a system of opting-in to the third stage of EMU rather than opting-out. The final rules of EMU showed clearly that these preferences were not incorporated. In contrast to Britain, France's and Italy's preferences were for a strong and immediate monetary union within which Germany's disproportionate influence could be limited. The French differed from the Germans in their conception of the level of independence of the European Central Bank (ECB). The French argued for a strengthened Ecofin Committee to share power with a regional central bank under the EU's political authority. As well, as against German preferences, both the French and the Italians wanted explicit deadlines for transition to the second and third stages of EMU. Finally, the Italians wanted the convergence criteria for entry into the third stage to be "... political goals rather than legal requirements" (p.97).

The process of intergovernmental negotiations led to a slight weakening of the ECB and transfer of power to the ECOFIN, explicit transition deadlines, and some flexibility in the interpretation of the convergence standards for entry into the third stage of EMU. In sum, except for issues that Walsh characterizes as of "secondary importance" (p.104) to the Germans, he notes that they got their way across the board when their preferences differed from those of other states. This finding supports the bargaining power rather than the learning explanation.

Thus Walsh accomplishes what we all hope to do: he sets out theories, applies them to data and draws conclusions as to which provides greater analytical purchase. This is an ambitious and welcome project, albeit one that leaves room for further

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Moving to the international cases that Walsh examines, several areas deserve further comment. These include the conception of the state as unitary actor, the trustworthiness of public statements and the author's definition of power, and again the transformative mechanism by which power (plus preferences) shapes the rules of monetary organizations. Learning theory is dismissed rather quickly with regard to the intergovernmental negotiations on monetary institutions. The author notes, however, that he cannot discount this theory as an explanation for the Delors Report, which clearly reflected the preferences of the Bundesbank. He accepts that the committee's participants were technical experts and as such might have been swayed by the "intellectual merits" (p.91) of the Bundesbank's case, even in light of different national preferences. Walsh, consistent with realist assumptions, conceives of the state as acting with a lone voice. This, together with distributional bargaining theory, implies a single set of preferences whose outcome in international negotiations is conditioned by the state's power, or lack thereof. Yet we also know from the historical evidence presented that, at least in the German case, the Bundesbank notably objected to the monetary arrangements that state leaders negotiated. The bank's vocal dissent created pressures that affected the German preferences, even though the bank did not get all that it wanted. Can we be sure that this was an isolated case? If technical experts' preferences may be changed by learning and governments rely on experts' opinions/expertise to establish preferences, then it seems problematic to dismiss learning theory, based on the book's own evidence.

Further, Walsh does not address the difficult issues of the trustworthiness of his data. He accepts at face value the public positions of the negotiators. This begs the question of how much of what they state publicly is influenced by a desire to please the electorate, rather than a reflection of true preference. If it is possible that Italy or France postured for domestic consumption safe in the knowledge that Germany would reject their proposals, then whose preferences do the final outcomes reflect? We must consider also how this affects the book's conception of power.

The definition of power provides, finally, one of the most difficult issues. Certainly the most vexing question the reader confronts is why Germany took part in the EMS and EMU negotiations at all. As the state that benefited the most from the EMS, for example, why would it be willing to forego the status quo for a system in which it had less autonomy? This puzzle provided one of the Bundesbank's key objections to EMU. And, given that Germany did take part in the negotiations, it is hard to understand why it was willing to compromise at all, no matter how secondary the issue. Based on the project's conception of power, it should not have had to compromise, yet we know that it did. We might also ask, if power measures willingness to walk away, how did Britain fail to garner a single policy objective? Clearly this variable encompasses more; otherwise it could not explain Germany's assent or Britain's failure. One possible remedy might be to extend the examination to the domestic and regional linkages in other issue areas, to highlight the rewards and punishments in other arenas where power configurations may be different. These games are not simply nested, but also

refinement in those areas where the author has neglected to confront some of the theories' limitations and assumptions.

Again, taking the domestic cases first, issues ripe for further study include non-business political actors, state autonomy and the transformative mechanism that changes group preferences into state policy. The open economy and institution theories' focus on industry and banks ignores myriad other political actors. In the case of Europe especially, labor unions and interest groups organized around farming, traditional crafts, or immigration, all apply political pressure that falls outside the scope of these theories. Given Walsh's numerous references to governments' reluctance to devalue or to tighten monetary policy just prior to elections, it is clear that he realizes the importance of other actors to political decision makers. As well, there are important actors external to the state. Certainly the institutions of Europe had some influence. Additionally, during these years the Group of Seven (G-7) was active, crafting such monetary agreements as the Plaza and Louvre Accords. Ignoring these other actors, while it creates parsimonious theory, paints an incomplete picture of the political pressures that affected exchange rates policies.

Further, Walsh neglects to convey clearly his conception of the state—weathervane, partisan, or guardian. This then obscures his reasoning as to the origins of states' preferences. If he means to tell us that states do not prefer policies but only accept the dictates of the strongest social group (weathervane), that provides one type of framework within which to evaluate these theories of domestic politics. If, on the other hand, states broker deals among groups in a state (partisan), or have endogenous preferences (guardian), then both theories leave much to be explained. The absence of a discussion of the mechanism by which preferences become policy helped to create this weakness. Not to drag out the dreaded "black box," but the author's case would be greatly strengthened by an examination of how the wishes of industry and banks actually translated into exchange rate policy. That firms had preferences and that the state made policy that reflected those preferences, does not necessarily signify a link. This is especially true if states are assumed to have some degree of autonomy.

intertwined. Once again, an examination of the mechanism by which power was transformed into outcomes would enhance our understanding of this theory and its application.

Theory will never give an exact fit, the perfect data set does not exist and definitions will remain slippery. Certainly Walsh is not responsible for the data's or the theories' omissions or tenuous assumptions. For our discipline to progress, however, our work must acknowledge and address such issues. This project reflects the author's challenge to us to move forward in a rigorous way. This is a valuable message.

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**Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. The European Union as a Global Actor. London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 316 pp.**

Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler have written an interesting and stimulating but ultimately frustrating book structured around their particular conception of the EU's "presence" and "actorness" in the contemporary international system. In doing so they have followed an idiosyncratic agenda which leaves one ultimately wondering who the book is aimed at.

This ambiguity of purpose is reflected in the rather uneasy linking of some interesting conceptual ideas with a solid core of essentially descriptive writing based on well-established secondary sources but illustrated with press cutting and interview material drawn from a rather limited time period (January 1996-July 1997). The result is a manuscript which has dated more rapidly than it should have: a combination of bad luck—in that much of relevance and significance has happened subsequently—and bad judgment—in that the publisher should have pushed the authors to at least consider the likely impact of the passage of time on their text. This volume could have formed the basis of an excellent lecture course for the 1998-1999 academic year, but it relies on material and contains judgements that were inevitably going to be overtaken by events. While it would be unreasonable to expect the authors to have predicted the war in Kosovo and its dramatic consequences both for the EU's enlargement strategy and the development of a Common European Security and Defense Policy, it is hard to see how the publisher's claim that the book is "the most up-to-date analysis of the EU in global politics" (back cover) can be sustained. The book depends so heavily on the illustrative use of material that was contemporary at the time of writing that it is hard to see how it can be easily updated in subsequent editions.

The central argument of the book is that the EU's external activity can be usefully understood by distinguishing between the notions of "presence" and "actorness." Each chapter examines an area of EU external activity and seeks to establish the nature of the EU's presence and then examine the extent to which this presence has been successfully converted into actorness. Where

they establish that the EU is an actor and not merely a presence the authors then go on to evaluate the quality of EU action using the criteria of consistency and coherence. The problem of defining these terms is ably explored in Chapter 2 but not resolved, although the authors come up with a number of "basic requirements for actorness" which are listed, but not explained (p.38) and then revisited in the concluding chapter (pp.249-253).

Although, at the beginning of the book, "presence" is defined as the conceptualization of "the relationship between the internal development of the EC and external expectation" (p.5), this is not in fact how the term is subsequently applied. This is a pity because the one thing that the literature on the EU's external activities has yet to come to grips with is a serious empirical examination and understanding of the way that other international actors perceive the EU and its external behavior. This book promises to pay particular attention to "the perceptions and expectations of third parties" (p.1) but, apart from a couple of one-liners taken from interviews in Brussels, this is never seriously attempted. Consideration of how the EU's presence and/or actorness is perceived and what it actually means to others remains a serious lacuna in the academic exploration of the international significance of the EU. Ultimately the authors prefer to explore the idea of presence as potential which is linked to external expectation. The EU just by existing is a presence in the international system and has the potential to be an actor, provided it can develop the capability to respond to the expectations of other actors (created by its presence) as well as structural opportunities in the external environment. As the authors themselves note (p.33) this is a somewhat circular argument and I am not sure that it takes us anywhere interesting. The idea of presence as mere potential also has its problems, as it is based on the flawed assumption that the EU's internal development has no purpose vis-à-vis the international system but that it does have consequences. However, policies like the CAP and the Single Market do not just have an "accidental" impact on the rest of the world. They are themselves policies with built-in external purposes. The CAP was based on the notion of Community preference in relation to external agricultural producers and the Single Market Program was designed specifically to meet the challenge of external competitors. Furthermore, this restricted notion of presence being distinct from actorness is not helpful when considering those EU external policies which have always been purposefully and specifically directed towards the outside world.

The core of the book consists of six chapters, which cover the major areas of EU external activity. The authors are not the first to argue that the EU's significance as an international actor must not be judged only in terms of the evolution of the CFSP but must include consideration of the EC's activities under Pillar One of the Treaty on European Union. One would expect a book dealing with the EU as a global actor to include chapters on relations with the countries that make up its "near abroad" (Central and Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean), as well as the rest of the developing and developed world. One would also expect chapters on the CFSP and the evolution of the EU's security and defense role (it is bad

luck that so much has happened in this sector since the book went to press but most of the authors' judgements remain valid despite recent events). These chapters are all here and represent solid pieces of scholarship, well-researched and well-written and certain to be cited by students in their essays. It is perhaps surprising to find the EU's role in international environmental diplomacy given such extensive and prominent treatment, but Vogler is an acknowledged expert in this area and the chapter makes an interesting read from which a number of useful insights have been harvested. There is also a slightly underdeveloped penultimate chapter dealing with issues of identity and legitimacy which is full of ideas but poorly referenced for those who would want to explore them in more detail.

In summation, this is a difficult book to categorize, as I remain unclear about exactly who it is aimed at. The publishers do not help with their claim that it fills a gap in existing literature for "all those involved in European studies, politics and international politics" (back cover). I am not sure that this book does fill a gap—it has little new empirical research to report other than one or two anecdotes drawn from interviews that seemed to be limited to subjects based in either Brussels and London. (I do think that it would have been worthwhile investigating perceptions of the EU as an actor held by third party representatives in national capitals, as well as perspectives held by those based in Brussels who have an obvious interest in regarding the EU as internationally significant.) The authors have a distinct view of the EU as a post-modern polity which cannot be studied or understood as a quasi-state, but this is not new either. The authors also have their distinct view of presence and actorness which, to their credit, they never lose sight of. Each chapter returns to these ideas and seeks to develop them, but it is not clear to this reviewer that this approach results in any particularly interesting insights.

There are two significant omissions in this otherwise comprehensive survey of EU external activity. One, already mentioned, is the lack of any real consideration of third party perceptions of the EU, and the other is the almost total absence of consideration of the role of the EU member states in EU actorness. If the EU is to be treated as *sui generis* and not as a potential state then it must be considered as an actor that is made up of European institutions *and* member state governments (not to mention the numerous other non-state actors who reside within the territory of the EU and who too are part of the EU's international profile). Refusing to choose between an intergovernmentalist or a supranationalist perspective and rejecting the state-centric view of the EU makes it all the more important to consider all the external outputs from this extraordinary actor. The volume under review does mention the member states but only to regret (especially in the chapter on development) their failure to harmonize their individual and collective activities, which is itself a rather state-centric critique—why should a post-modern polymorphic polity (p.258) be expected to be consistent, coordinated and coherent? Nobody seriously doubts that the EU is a global actor, but it remains unclear what this means either for the EU or the rest of the international system. This book is not an essential text (it is not

actually that user-friendly in terms of its organization and presentation of ideas and empirical data and it is already dated), but it is worth buying and reading because it provokes one to think about why it is hard to write about the EU as a global actor.

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**Ian Bache. The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping? Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, 172 pp.**

**Reiner Martin. The Regional Dimension in European Public Policy: Convergence or Divergence? New York: St. Martin's, 1999, 197 pp.**

Though neither the costliest nor the most defining policy area of the EU, regional policy has generated some of the most interesting research. Ian Bache's short and highly readable review of regional policy joins the ongoing theoretical debates about the politics of EU policy-making. Reiner Martin engages the economic debate over the spatial economic impact of regional integration and regional development programs. The books examine regional policy from completely different perspectives, and they each make valuable contributions to the field. However, they also leave the reader hoping for a truly comprehensive analysis that brings together in an integrated manner the political and economic dimensions of this key policy area.

Bache begins with an overview of various theoretical models of EU policy-making, including liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, Pollack), multi-level governance (Marks, Hooghe), and the policy networks approach (Rhodes). His historical review of key decision-making points describes the evolution of EU regional policy, but also provides a sufficiently detailed account of the *politics* of regional policy formation and implementation. This allows him to draw conclusions on the ability of contending theories to explain regional policy decisions and outcomes.

Bache's monograph covers regional policy from its origins through the proposed reforms of the Agenda 2000 program. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the pre-1988 years, when the Commission was concerned with many regional policy weaknesses, including: limited financial resources, an insufficient concentration of resources, and the lack of coordination between the EC and national policies, as well as between the European Regional Development Fund and other EC policies and instruments. Until 1988, most of the Commission's proposals for a larger and more autonomous regional fund were rejected or diluted by opposition from national governments.

Two important developments triggered the major reforms of 1988: the Spain/Portugal enlargement of 1985, which greatly increased the number of low-income regions, and the 1986 Single European Act, which presented new structural adjustment

problems. Under the reforms, regional policy financing doubled, reaching 25 percent of the EU budget. Generally interpreted as the product of a straightforward intergovernmental bargain, from another perspective, the reform marks a strengthening of supranational authority. Expenditures would be guided by four principles championed by the Commission: 1) a concentration of resources on five priority objectives (lagging regions, declining regions, long-term unemployment, youth unemployment, and agricultural and rural development), 2) multi-annual programming, 3) “partnership” with subnational authorities, and 4) budgetary “additionality.” In 1993, however, national governments would override Commission preferences, on distributive as well as administrative provisions. The additionality principle, in particular, was weakened because of budgetary pressures created by the Maastricht convergence criteria.

Bache reminds us correctly that implementation is not only an important stage of the policy process, but it is also important for, and often absent from, our political analyses. The national experiences in implementing the “partnership” and “additionality” principles are highly varied and therefore need to be analyzed. The existence of multilevel networks confounds the intergovernmental interpretation in certain cases—especially where political decentralization is most pronounced—while in other cases (e.g., the UK) the central government exercised its gatekeeping prerogatives, limiting supranational penetration and subnational participation. Drawing on case study material from the UK, secondary sources, and EU and national government documents, Bache rejects the intergovernmental and multi-level governance interpretations and argues for a more nuanced, “flexible gatekeeping” model that he believes more accurately describes the dominant but adaptable position of the national governments. He begins and ends his book by asserting that, “... no single theory can explain the complex politics of policy-making in the European Union” (pp. 16, 157). This may be an anemic conclusion for some readers, but the book can nevertheless be commended for its balanced analysis and skillful integration of theory, description, and analysis. Bache’s argument is reasonable; however, the evidence provided does not amount to a rigorous and systematic rejection of existing theories.

Besides the absence of an index, the only other important shortcoming of the book is its tendency to adopt implicitly an intergovernmental/unitary actor approach through its repeated references to actions taken by the German (or French or Belgian, etc.) governments. Only when discussing the British case does Bache mention the partisan composition of a national government. Ironically, although domestic politics is considered in the theoretical discussions, and in assessments of the role of subnational actors, partisan politics at the national level is largely absent from the analysis. These concerns notwithstanding, Bache’s review will be useful to students and scholars who wish to develop a familiarity of EU regional policy.

The focus of Reiner Martin’s book is not on politics, but on the economics of EU regional policy, and thus it nicely complements Bache’s contribution, since the latter underemphasizes this area. The analysis is primarily economic and the method primarily econometric. There is also a brief

description of EU regional policies, a concluding set of programmatic recommendations, and a four-table appendix. The book is divided into two parts. Part I reviews economic convergence and divergence theory and presents an empirical analysis of regional convergence in the EU. Part II reviews EU regional policies and their economic outcomes, including individual chapters on the spatial patterns of productive sector investments and R & D and transport policies.

Martin begins by reviewing regional economic disparities and the contradictory predictions of economic convergence and divergence theories. His regression models show that regional economic convergence is occurring, but at a very slow pace, and that regional growth depends highly on national growth rates. Where the macroeconomic climate is favorable, regional educational and infrastructural endowments significantly affect Objective 1 (low-income) region growth rates. He examines also the spatial allocation of regional spending using multivariate regression analysis, and finds, predictably, that per capita income is a statistically significant factor explaining allocations. The models, however, are underspecified—demographic and political variables are absent—and at times, poorly explained. Country dummy variables are employed, but it is impossible to know what precise factor or factors they are capturing. Martin acknowledges that there may be “a large element of political discretion in the allocation of regional policy funding,” but this is left as a residual explanation (p. 94). There are also unavoidable problems, which Martin recognizes, with incompatible and missing data.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are case studies of national and EU regional production incentives, R & D programs, and transport infrastructure projects. These chapters offer original and useful analyses of Commission data and form the basis of a concluding chapter that offers thoughtful programmatic recommendations for immediate and more systematic reforms. Martin does not attempt to estimate the economic effects of EU structural policy financing, but relies on other evaluation research, and his own distributional analyses to argue that EU regional programs need far more thematic and spatial concentration, and far greater coordination with national initiatives in order to be effective. The study is richly supported with data analysis, the descriptive analyses being more useful than the explanatory ones. The prose is somewhat dense, and encumbered by more than seventy tables, figures, and boxes, some of which could benefit from clearer labels. Despite these shortcomings, Martin’s detailed analysis of national and EU regional policy makes an original and beneficial contribution to the literature.

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*(Book reviews continue on the next page.)*

**Anthony R. Zito. Creating Environmental Policy in the European Union. Basingstoke, UK and New York: St. Martin's, 2000, 225 pp.**

What accounts for the kinds of environmental legislation adopted by the European Union? In the three detailed case studies of Creating Environmental Policy in the European Union, Anthony R. Zito attempts to answer this question by focusing on the role played by entrepreneurial actors within a context of particular institutions, ideas, and interests. In this book, Zito analyzes not only the results of bargaining over legislation, but also develops a micro-level perspective on the day-to-day accretion of policy decisions that result in the environmental policy we see today. Arguing that the dominant theories used to explain integration—neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism—cannot explain the puzzles of EU environmental policy, Zito employs three cases—transboundary air pollution, the carbon/energy tax proposal, and hazardous waste policy—to illustrate the importance of several variables he claims we must take into account to explain these puzzles.

Basing his conclusions on a close reading of EU documents and almost five dozen interviews, Zito argues that the focus on the power of larger member-states or the technocratic influence of supranational institutions (pp.6-7) of intergovernmental and neo-functional approaches, respectively, ignores the importance at various stages in the policy process of developments at the international level and within international institutions, and the role of smaller member-states, entrepreneurial coalitions, the European Parliament, and organizations within different levels of government. While we must consider the ability of larger member states to shape outcomes to their liking and the importance of institutions such as the Commission, as well as decision-making rules, we cannot ignore the role of other actors. Neo-functionalism's view that institutions and policies arise because they are beneficial fails to acknowledge that different types of institutions and policies may provide equally beneficial outcomes. Zito argues that only if we take into account a new set of variables, can we successfully show why a specific set of choices was made from a range of possibilities. Looking at the so-called "three Is" (institutions, ideas, and interests) alone does not help explain why ideas are or are not accepted by the Commission and member states, or the endurance of an issue on the agenda. One of the book's main contributions is to shift our focus away from "the usual suspects" and toward these new variables. Zito combines various perspectives from international relations (intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism), comparative politics (the new institutionalism), and the policy-making literature (the "network" literature) to offer a framework that is complex and multi-faceted, but provides a more nuanced picture of policy-making in this issue area.

For Zito, EU policy-making is a six-stage process: problem definition, organization of interested parties, placing the issue on the agenda, development of proposed solutions, development of support and legitimation for the policy solution, and inducing a vote in favor of the solution (p.8). In this view, ideas, institutions, and interests alone are too fixed to explain policy change.

Intervening factors, what Zito calls "modes of decision-making," shape environmental decisions. In EU environmental policy-making, two modes dominate: entrepreneurial decision making (EDM) on the one hand, and lowest common denominator bargaining (LCD) on the other. While LCD bargaining has been the most common mode in the past, under certain conditions, Zito contends, policy entrepreneurs successfully innovate and persuade actors to move beyond LCD bargaining. In the case studies, then, he traces the development of policy in each phase and within three member states (the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands).

Unfortunately, his theoretical framework does not allow one to claim with any certainty which variable(s) determined an outcome. In the case of transboundary air pollution, for example, Zito finds that while entrepreneurial coalitions existed, it is "more difficult to assert that their presence was a necessary condition for the actual policy outcomes to occur" (p.80). Zito's emphasis on the importance of policy entrepreneurs is interesting, and certainly, in the cases presented, policy entrepreneurs played a key role in placing issues on the agenda and in proposing solutions to serious environmental problems. In two of the cases, the carbon/energy tax proposal and EU hazardous waste policy, however, LCD bargaining still won out. One wonders about the importance of other variables if at the end of the day, national interests win out after all. It might be useful to see the framework applied to other cases. At the beginning of the conclusion, in fact, Zito notes the continuing prominence of intergovernmental policy-making in the EU. Institutions, after all, do play a critical role in determining when collective entrepreneurship is likely to prevail over LCD bargaining. The three cases also demonstrate, however, that different institutional elements may matter at different times in the policy process. The openness of EU institutions to outside interests, for example, may provide entrepreneurial actors with a chance to place new ideas on the Union's agenda (p.172). On the other hand, the number of veto points and the necessity to overcome all opposition at particular points makes it difficult for policy entrepreneurs to see their preferences actually enacted into EU legislation. After reading this book, one is forced to conclude that we cannot predict policy outcomes as easily as the neo-functionalists or intergovernmentalists might like. Outcomes are contingent, and depend very often on the success of policy entrepreneurs or interest groups at getting an issue on the agenda and converting important actors to their cause.

This book presents a thorough, very detailed and theoretically informed analysis of policy-making in a particular issue area. Students of EU policy-making in general and of environmental policy-making in particular will find its accounts very useful. This is also a provocative work. It is now up to other researchers to test this framework in different policy areas to see if its range of the theoretical framework can be extended and to increase the pay-off from this admirable piece of scholarship.

**Michael J. Gorges**  
**University of Maryland Baltimore County**



## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES ASSOCIATION

Seventh Biennial International Conference

"Globalization, European Integration, and Domestic Transformation"

May 31-June 2, 2001

Madison, Wisconsin

### Call for Paper and Panel Proposals

Deadline for receipt of all proposals is **November 1, 2000.**

The European Community Studies Association invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of Europe and the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for the 2001 Seventh Biennial International Conference. The general theme of the conference will be: "Globalization, European Integration, and Domestic Transformation." The Program Committee hopes to promote broad exchange of disciplinary perspectives and research agendas, and is particularly interested in work that relates issues of European union to country-level politics and policies and to the broader international context. The Committee actively seeks proposals relevant to the European Union from scholars from a variety of disciplines, including work that places the EU in comparative perspective. Participation by graduate students is welcomed.

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Helen Milner, Department of Political Science, Columbia University

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For complete guidelines on the proposal process as well as general information about the Conference and its location, please visit the ECSA Web site at [www.ecsa.org/conf2001.html](http://www.ecsa.org/conf2001.html)

Panel proposals must be accompanied by the Panel Proposal Cover Sheet, available on the ECSA Web site. Individual paper proposals are also welcomed, and the Program Committee will assign those individual papers accepted to appropriate panels. Paper proposals must be accompanied by the Paper Proposal Cover Sheet, also available on the Web site. The Proposal Cover Sheets may be printed from the Web site or photocopied as need be, or you may send a self-addressed, stamped envelope to the ECSA office to receive cover sheets.

Panel and paper proposals should be submitted by regular mail (not by fax or e-mail) to **ECSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA**. We regret that we won't be able to consider proposals received after the November 1 deadline. Proposers will receive responses in writing no later than the end of January 2001. For questions about the Conference, please visit the ECSA Web site or send an e-mail to [<ecsa@pitt.edu>](mailto:ecsa@pitt.edu).

## Books

### New and Recent EU-Related Books

- Andor, Laszlo (2000) Hungary on the Road to the European Union: Transition in Blue. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Baun, Michael J. (2000) A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
- Best, Edward, Mark Gray and Alexander Stubb (eds.) (2000) Rethinking the European Union: IGC 2000 and Beyond. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration.
- Bromley, Simon (ed.) (2000) Governing the European Union. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Caporaso, James A. (2000) The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Gärtner, Heinz, Adrian Hyde-Price, and Erich Reiter (eds.) (2000) Europe's New Security Challenges. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Guay, Terrence (1999) The United States and the European Union: The Political Economy of a Relationship. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press.
- Guttman, Robert J. (ed.) (2000) Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Jolly, Adam and Gerry O'Brien (eds.) (2000) CBI European Business Handbook 2000. London, UK: Kogan Page.
- Jonsson, Christer, Sven Tagil and Gunnar Tornqvist (2000) Organizing European Space. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Lewis, Gail, Sharon Gewirtz, and John Clarke (2000) Rethinking Social Policy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- McCormick, John (1999) The European Union: Politics and Policies (2nd edition). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Minahan, James B. (2000) One Europe, Many Nations: A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Overturf, Stephen (2000) Money and European Union (Paperback edition). New York: Palgrave/St. Martin's Press.
- Phillips, Donald G. (2000) Germany and the Transnational Building Blocks for Post-National Community. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Pond, Elizabeth (2000) The Rebirth of Europe. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Roney, Alex (2000) EC/EU Fact Book: A Complete Guide. London, UK: Kogan Page.
- Schmitter, Philippe (2000) How to Democratize the European Union ... and Why Bother? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Slomp, Hans (2000) European Politics into the Twenty-First Century: Integration and Division. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Thomas, Kenneth P. and Mary Ann Tétrecault (eds.) (1999) Racing to Regionalize: Democracy, Capitalism, and Regional Political Economy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

## Journals

### Of Interest to EU Scholars and Practitioners

- Comparative Political Studies*, Sage Publications, [www.sagepub.co.uk](http://www.sagepub.co.uk)
- Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, Nova Science Publishers, [www.nexusworld.com/nova/](http://www.nexusworld.com/nova/)
- Europe-Asia Studies* [formerly *Soviet Studies*], Carfax Publishing, [www.carfax.co.uk](http://www.carfax.co.uk)
- European Business Forum*, Kogan Page Publishers, [www.kogan-page.co.uk](http://www.kogan-page.co.uk)
- European Journal of Industrial Relations*, Sage Publications, [www.sagepub.co.uk](http://www.sagepub.co.uk)
- European Journal of Social Theory*, Sage Publications, [www.sagepub.co.uk](http://www.sagepub.co.uk)
- European Law Journal*, Blackwell Publishers, [www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk](http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk)
- European Security*, Frank Cass Publishers, [www.frankcass.com](http://www.frankcass.com)
- European Union Politics*, Sage Publications, [www.sagepub.co.uk](http://www.sagepub.co.uk)
- Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, [www.rienner.com](http://www.rienner.com)
- International Affairs*, Blackwell Publishers, [www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk](http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk)
- International Organization*, MIT Press, [mitpress.mit.edu/journals/](http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/)
- Internationale Politik: Transatlantic Edition*, German Society for Foreign Affairs, [www.dgap.org](http://www.dgap.org)
- Journal of Common Market Studies*, Blackwell Publishers, [www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk](http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk)
- Journal of European Integration/Revue D'Intégration Européenne*, Harwood Academic Publishers, [www.gbhap-us.com/journals.htm](http://www.gbhap-us.com/journals.htm)
- Journal of European Public Policy*, Routledge, [www.routledge.com](http://www.routledge.com)
- Journal of European Social Policy*, Sage Publications, [www.sagepub.co.uk](http://www.sagepub.co.uk)
- Mediterranean Politics*, Frank Cass Publishers, [www.frankcass.com](http://www.frankcass.com)
- Regional and Federal Studies*, Frank Cass Publishers, [www.frankcass.com](http://www.frankcass.com)
- Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, Blackwell Publishers, [www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk](http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk)
- South European Society & Politics*, Frank Cass Publishers, [www.frankcass.com](http://www.frankcass.com)
- West European Politics*, Frank Cass Publishers, [www.frankcass.com](http://www.frankcass.com)
- ECSA members knowing of journals that should be included in our next compilation, please send details in an e-mail to <[ecsa@pitt.edu](mailto:ecsa@pitt.edu)>. Send sample journal copies to ECSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA.



ECSA is delighted  
to announce  
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**The State of the European Union (Volume 5):  
Risks, Reforms, Resistance, and Revival**  
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Edited by Maria Green Cowles, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University, and Michael Smith, Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics, Dept. of European Studies, Loughborough University

*The State of the European Union* offers an insightful and up-to-date examination of the challenges facing the European Union. The Amsterdam treaty, monetary union, future enlargement, as well as global economic and political developments pose new risks and opportunities for EU institutions and policies. Chapters by leading scholars explore different conceptual approaches to the emerging European polity, needed reforms of European institutions, difficulties awaiting monetary union, risks of enlargement, and the resulting implications for the development of European policies—*Oxford University Press*.

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Part II. Conceptualizing the European Union

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Sieglinde Gstöhl: The EU after Amsterdam: Towards a Theoretical Approach to (Differentiated) Integration

Jo Shaw and Antje Wiener: The Paradox of the European Polity

Part III. Monetary Union: Ideas, Interests, and Impact

Amy Verdun: Monetary Policy and the EU: Ideas and Evolution

Miriam Campanella: ECOFIN-II and the European Central Bank: Game Theoretic Perspective

Erik Jones: EMU and the New Political Economy of Adjustment

Part IV. Enlargement: Understanding Past, Present, and Future

Helen Wallace: EU Enlargement: A Neglected Subject

Ulrich Sedelmeier: Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality, and Role-Compliance

Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy: The Enlargement: A Complex Juggling Act

Part V. Institutions and Identity: Capacities, Legitimacy, and Perception

Mitchell Smith: The European Commission: Diminishing Returns to Entrepreneurship

Roger M. Scully: Democracy, Legitimacy, and the European Parliament

Paul Mullen: Do You Hear What I Hear? Translation, Expansion, and Crisis in the European Court of Justice

Mark Pollack: Blairism in Brussels: The Third Way in Europe since Amsterdam

David Michael Green: On Being European: The Character and Consequences of European Identity

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Ingmar von Homeyer, Alexander Carius, and Stefani Bär: Flexibility or Renationalization: Effects of Enlargement on Environmental Policy

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## NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

*News and Notes for Fall 2000* [www.eucenters.org](http://www.eucenters.org)

➤ On September 29, the EU Center in Seattle will host Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator for German-American Cooperation and Chief Advisor on German-U.S. Relations in the German Foreign Office, speaking on the new German foreign policy after German unification and the Treaty of Maastricht, which resulted in the participation of German soldiers in the peace efforts within Kosovo. On October 12, Iris Marion Young, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, will speak on "The Dilbert Syndrome: On the Reduction of Work to a Job." On October 18 the EU Center will sponsor, with the Institute for European Studies, Geoffrey Gooch from the University of Linköping to speak at the University of Washington on European cross-border environmental issues. Gooch's visit is timed to coincide with the "Rethinking the Line" conference hosted by the Canadian federal government in Vancouver.

➤ The EU Center in Pittsburgh will sponsor the symposium "Social Policy & Social Practice: University-Community Partnerships For Community Development & Social Inclusion" (with the School of Social Work), and the workshop "Democratization and the Promotion of Peace," both in September. These events will have participants from many EU member states. The Center will also host numerous visitors, including Mr. Fernand Sauer, Executive Director of the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (counterpart to the U.S.'s FDA), co-sponsored with the University's Health Sciences and School of Pharmacy. Ambassador Guenter Burghardt, Head, Delegation of the European Commission to the U.S. in Washington, DC, will also visit the EU Center in November. Judge Fidelma Macken of the European Court of Justice will give an address the University at the beginning of November.

✧ The EU Center of California, in cooperation with the European Forum of the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and the Luso-American Development Foundation in Lisbon, will sponsor a conference, "Competition Policy and the New Economy: a Transatlantic Perspective on Regulatory Challenges," at Stanford on November 3-4. The conference will bring together academic economists, lawyers, and political scientists, as well as invited private sector and government participants from Europe and the United States, to explore the application of competition policy rules to aspects of the "new" economy. Questions of transatlantic cooperation and anti-trust regulations will be explored with a special focus on sectors currently undergoing structural changes through mergers: telecoms and Internet access; e-commerce and Internet marketplaces; airlines and code-sharing; and biotechnology and genomics.

✧ The EU Center in Wisconsin has two special events planned for early Fall 2000. Spending a week in Madison as a Marshall-Monnet Fellow (1-7 October) will be Robert Taylor, Financial Times Employment Editor, to give a series of talks on labor markets, employment, and economic performance in Europe and the U.S. to campus audiences and the wider business and public affairs community in the region. The Wisconsin Center will also hold an international workshop on mainstreaming gender as a central public policy issue for the EU, with speakers Anne Havnor from the government of Norway (formerly European Commission, Equal Opportunities Unit), Jo Shaw of the University of Leeds, and Sally Kenney of the University of Minnesota.

✧ The UNC Chapel Hill and Duke EU Center has three new working groups/colloquia for Fall 2000. At Duke an interdisciplinary graduate student colloquium on Europe will give students a venue to present their research, have it evaluated by a local editorial board, and published. At UNC a new graduate student working group, "Transatlantic Dialogues," will integrate graduate students from Latin American, American and European Studies to re-open discussions across geographic and disciplinary boundaries on topics of concern in the transatlantic arena: fate of the welfare state, race, and multiculturalism. Faculty at UNC and neighboring North Carolina State University will lead a group on the historical political economy of Europe. The Center will also host numerous EU officials and scholars of the EU as speakers throughout the fall.



## NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

*News and Notes for Fall 2000* [www.eucenters.org](http://www.eucenters.org)

✧ The EU Center of the University System of Georgia will sponsor a workshop with the University of Munich on the development of nine Web-based courses on the European Union. The workshop is part of a long-term project in which 24 Web courses will be completed. Second, the Center is co-sponsoring a conference with the Southern Center for International Studies on November 20th entitled "Reinventing Europe: The Political and Business Challenges." Keynote speaker will be Thomas Niles, former ambassador to the European Union. Also in November, the Center sponsors a roundtable on the data privacy agreement between the EU and the U.S. Gerald de Graaf, First Secretary of Trade for the European Commission, is the featured speaker.

✧ The EU Center of New York welcomes two 2000-01 EU Post-Doctoral Fellows: Kathrina Zippel, based at Columbia, and Chien-Yi Lu, based at NYU. The Speakers Program includes Michael Calingaert (Brookings Institution) on Implications of EU Enlargement for Transatlantic Relations; Ambassador Francois Bujon de l'Estang (Ambassador of France to the U.S.) on The Priorities of the French Presidency; Ambassador Jean-David Levitte (Permanent Representative of France to the U.N.) on Multilateralism, Multipolar World and Globalization, in September; Andre Bayens (former Consul General of France in New York) on Will the EU's Security and Defense Force Affect European-American Relations? in October; Dr. Ellen Frost on Globalization and Transatlantic Relations; and Dr. Juerg Martin Gabriel on Switzerland and the European Union, in November.

✧ The Harvard EU Center 2000-01 program includes research conferences on "Federalism in the New Europe," "Theorizing European Integration," and "Ideas and Discourse in European Integration." Graduate training conferences will be held on "Recent Developments in European Diplomatic History" and "Political Parties in Modern Europe." Workshops will cover European defense collaboration, the Schuman Plan after a half-century, European monetary cooperation, and transatlantic conflict and cooperation over trade in cultural goods. Two colloquia will focus on "Democratic Accountability in the New Europe" and "Visions of European Governance." Fall visitors will include Philippe Maystadt, Pascal Lamy, and Antonio Vitorino. Five additional courses or seminars on the EU will be taught this year at Harvard. Seven research visiting fellows and two graduate fellows are in residence.

✧ The EU Center at the University of Missouri sponsors two conferences in October that address EU and U.S. business and trade relationships: "Dimensions of Organizational Change: The European Union, the Multinational Corporation, and Cultural Complexity," takes place in Columbia, Missouri October 2-3, and aims to enhance knowledge and understanding of the political, economic, and organizational challenges for conducting business in the EU; "Dealing with the Euro: Implications for Policy, Banking, and Business" will meet October 20-21 in St. Louis. Co-sponsored with the EU Center at the University of Illinois, this conference examines the impact of the introduction of the euro, and its subsequent decline, on policy-making, banking, and trade. Both conferences include panelists from the EU Commission, corporate representatives, and groups that represent private and public interests on both sides of the Atlantic.

✧ The EU Center at the University of Illinois is co-sponsoring with the Missouri EU Center the "Dealing with the Euro" conference in St. Louis (see above) as well as a pre-conference seminar at the Urbana-Champaign campus to be given by Paul de Grauwe of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The Illinois Center will also host its second annual "European Union Day" on October 27, with a "State of the European Union" address to be given by François Bujon de l'Estang, Ambassador of France to the U.S.; a meeting of trade attachés from consulates in Chicago will follow. This semester the Illinois Center also sponsors a multi-disciplinary graduate seminar on EU-U.S. relations, focusing on the euro and the European Central Bank, that has drawn students from political science, economics, finance, law, and urban and regional planning.

## Conferences

*November 14, 2000:* "The EU, the Baltic States and the Northern Dimension," UACES, London, UK. Conference on the prospects and difficulties facing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as they negotiate EU entry, and on the Northern Dimension Initiative and perspective and prospects of the Nordic countries and Russia. Contact e-mail <admin@uaces.org> or visit <www.uaces.org>.

*November 20-21, 2000:* "Keep Ahead with European Information," and *November 27-28, 2000:* "Foundations of E-Europe: Achieving the Common Market in Telecommunications," Maastricht, the Netherlands. Both conferences organized by the European Institute of Public Administration. Contact by e-mail <s.vandepol@eipa-nl.com> or visit <www.eipa.nl>

*December 8-9, 2000:* "Globalization and Cultural Diversity in Europe," Notre Dame, Indiana. Organized by the Nanovic Institute for European Studies, Notre Dame University. Contact e-mail <ND.Nanovic.1@nd.edu> or tel. 219.631.5253.

*December 14-15, 2000:* "Enlarging the European Union," Brussels, Belgium. Fifth ECSA World Conference. Organized by the European Commission's ECSA Secretariat. Visit the Web site <www.ecsanet.org/fifth\_ecsaworld.htm>.

*Call for Proposals:* "The Legacy of Slavery and Emancipation in Europe and the Americas," March 9-11, 2001, Saint-Claude, Guadeloupe. Funded by The German Marshall Fund and organized by the Centre d'Etude des Politiques d'Immigration, d'Intégration et de Citoyenneté in Paris, for scholars in all disciplines working on the history and legacy of slavery and emancipation. The goal is to provide new perspectives on contemporary debates about immigration and integration in Western Europe and the USA. Please send a 1-2 pp. description of the proposed paper and your *c.v.* in hard copy *and* by e-mail attachment to each of two evaluators: Prof. Laurent Dubois, Dept. of History, 301 Morrill Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48104; e-mail <duboisl@msu.edu> and Prof. Patrick Weil, Director, CEPIIC, 9, rue Malher, F-75181 Paris Cedex 04, France, e-mail <weil@univ-paris1.fr>.

*Call for Proposals:* "The New Public Philosophy: Redrawing the Boundaries between Public and Private," March 30-31, 2001, Norman, Oklahoma. Organized by the Research Section on the Structure of Governance of the International Political Science Association. Many public tasks today are handled by private organizations, producing changes in social security, environmental regulation, corporate governance, etc. Proposals invited for papers that examine the theoretical, conceptual and empirical aspects of the changing boundaries between public and private. Submit to Robert Henry Cox, Dept. of Political Science, University of Oklahoma, 455 West Lindsey (205), Norman, OK 73019; e-mail <rhcox@ou.edu>; fax 405.325.0718.

## Grants and Scholarships

The **Fulbright Scholar Program** is accepting applications for for spring and summer (2001) seminars in Germany, Korea, and Japan for international education and academic administrators. Open to college and university faculty and administrators at 2-year, 4-year, and graduate institutions, professionals from business and government, artists, journalists, lawyers, independent scholars, and others. Applications are also being accepted for the **European Union Scholar-in-Residence Program** for 2001-2002. This program is targeted for institutions with EU-related programs to bring to your campus a European scholar specializing in EU affairs for one term. The resident fellow will give lectures and conduct seminars, consult with faculty and students on research, engage in collaborative study, and provide outreach to neighboring institutions. Contact the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, 3007 Tilden Street NW, Suite 5L, Washington, DC 20008; by tel. at 202.686.4004, by e-mail at <apprequest@cies.iie.org>, or visit <www.cies.org>. Application deadline for both programs: November 1, 2000.

The **European University Institute** is offering Doctoral Grants and Post-Doctoral Fellowships for 2001-2002. The three-year Doctoral Programme is structured around courses on research methodology and advanced research seminars, and prepares for the submission and defense of a doctoral thesis. The research student is expected to participate in workshops, seminars, and conferences and to present work in progress on a regular basis. Research students receive a grant for the three years they are at the Institute. Candidates from non-EU countries are welcomed under special arrangements. Jean Monnet Fellowships are post-doctoral research grants to support research related to the Institute's program or on other European topics in history, law, economics, political and social sciences, or related to the work of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the Institute. The Jean Monnet Fellowships are open to professors or academics in possession of a doctorate or likely to have one by the relevant date. Academics on sabbatical leave are eligible. For applications visit the Web site at <www.ieu.it> or tel. 39.055.4685.373. Deadline for Doctoral Grants: November 1, 2000; deadline for Jean Monnet Fellowships: January 31, 2001.

The Program for the Study of Germany and Europe at the Center for European Studies, **Harvard University**, offers up to two James Bryant Conant Fellowships in German and European Studies for academic year 2001-2002. Applications are accepted from non-tenured persons who are teaching or planning to teach at the university level in North America. Topics should be in history, politics, economics, society or culture, and preference will be given to projects that involve Germany. The Fellowship is resident at the Center for European Studies. Applicants must be officially post-doctoral by July 1, 2001. For application details contact by e-mail <cesgrants@fas.harvard.edu> or by telephone at 617.495.4303, ext.221. Deadline: January 12, 2001.

## World Wide Web Sites

This annotated list highlights Web sites of interest to EU scholars and practitioners. NB: All the Web addresses below are preceded by <http://> (omitted here for the sake of brevity).

**www.eubusiness.com** provides regularly updated information about EU policy, legislation, tenders, statistics and documents affecting economic activity in the European Union. The majority of the site is free, but visitors who register may receive a free weekly electronic newswire, "EUBusiness Week." The site is targeted primarily at business professionals, both within and outside the EU, as well as EU consultants, advisors and civil servants, who need information about EU legislation and policies affecting their particular industries.

**www.ecmi.edu** is the Web site of the European Centre for Minority Issues based in Flensburg, Germany. The Centre conducts practice-oriented research, provides information and offers advisory services concerning minority-majority relations in Europe. It serves European governments and regional inter-governmental organizations as well as non-dominant groups. It also supports academia, the media and the general public through the early monitoring and study of ethnic tension and potential conflict in all regions of Europe. The ECMI Web site includes a searchable catalogue of their library and an e-mail sign-up form.

**www.euforic.org** (Europe's Forum on International Cooperation) is a Web site for NGOs and communities involved in Europe's international cooperation. The site aims to answer the need for more transparency in Europe's international cooperation and to improve the access to scattered information on the Internet. Euforic focuses on European development cooperation policies and related issues. This multi-lingual site is based in Maastricht. The main audiences are experts and students in development issues from all over the world. Several thousand documents are presented in full text, along with a calendar of activities, directories, country specific information, and discussion forums.

**web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/which.europe.html** is a private person's Web site (hosted by WorldCom in the Netherlands), organized as a bibliography, devoted to alternative perspectives on the European integration project. Pages and topics on the site include Europe of Nations, Language Futures Europe, Europe of Regions, Structures of Nationalism, Europe of the peoples, European spatial planning, Unitary Europe, Visions of Europe, Divisions and patterns, Forms of state, and others. While the site represents an individual work rather than that of an institution or an organization, it is worth visiting for its extensive and well-researched set of Web links on its various topics, usefully catalogued. The section on the futures of languages in Europe, for example, includes sub-sections of links to sites on language and EU policy; national language policies; language policy research, institutions, and organizations; and more.

## Miscellany

The **Institute of European Business Administration (IEBA)**, located near Brussels, was founded to provide academic, executive, and managerial education regarding the European Union and its implications for U.S. businesses. The IEBA trains undergraduate and graduate students, executives, politicians, and diplomatic personnel. The IEBA is currently internationalizing its activities and exploring ways of cooperating with U.S. universities. An IEBA grants plan has been designed for small groups of students, attending the IEBA summer school and accompanied by a faculty member, in programs tailored to the sending institution. Such programs could include visits to EU institutions and meetings with high ranking officials such as Commissioners and MEPs. Cooperating universities are not required to make a financial investment. For more information please contact Pierre Heyndrickx, President, IEBA, St. Pietersnieuwstraat 202, B-9000 Gent, Belgium; fax 32 9 236 12 21.

We have recently received printed materials from the following organizations with an EU studies component in their missions:

**AES-Russia Newsletter**, No. 2: 4, from the Association of European Studies-Russia, Moscow, e-mail <[aes@centro.ru](mailto:aes@centro.ru)>

**CEPII Newsletter**, No.13, from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, Paris, [www.cepii.fr](http://www.cepii.fr)

**CESAA Review**, No.26, from the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia, Victoria, e-mail <[p.murray@politics.unimelb.edu.au](mailto:p.murray@politics.unimelb.edu.au)>

**Collegium**, No.20, from the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, e-mail <[collegium@coleurop.be](mailto:collegium@coleurop.be)>

**EIPASCOPE**, No.2000/2, bulletin of the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, [www.eipa.nl](http://www.eipa.nl)

**European Studies Newsletter**, Vol.29, No.5/6, from the Council for European Studies, New York, [www.europanet.org](http://www.europanet.org)

**UACES News**, No.25, from the University Association of Contemporary European Studies, London, [www.uaces.org](http://www.uaces.org)

The **Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association**, also known as TÜSIAD, publishes a quarterly international journal, *PrivateView*. The current issue (No.8), subtitled "Turkey 2000: The Transformation Begins," features a photograph of the December 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki on the cover and substantive articles on Turkey-EU relations such as "Turkey and the EU: Is Culture the Next Frontier?" by Pekin Baran, Vice-President of TÜSIAD's Foreign Relations Commission, and "European Security and Turkey," by Atila Eralp, Director of the Center for European Studies and Chair of the International Relations Department at Middle East Technical University. Also included is an essay by Günter Verheugen, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, "For a More Inclusive Union," in which Verheugen outlines the EU's current thinking on next steps for Turkey. With foreign offices in Brussels and Washington, TÜSIAD maintains a bilingual Web site at <[www.tusaid.org](http://www.tusaid.org)> where the current journal edition may be found on-line.

### 1999 ECSA Conference Papers

ECSA members and others are ordering copies of 1999 ECSA Conference papers using the order form we sent to members with the *ECSA Review* in Fall 1999 or the same form printed from our Web site at [www.ecsa.org/intro\\_abs99.html](http://www.ecsa.org/intro_abs99.html). As we did two years ago, we'd like to report on the "best sellers" among the papers, and two are tied for first place in numbers of orders: Jeffrey Anderson (Brown University), "European Integration and Political Convergence since Maastricht: The View from the Member States," and Regina S. Axelrod (Adelphi University), "The European Union: Environmental Policy and Strategies." Ten papers, too numerous to name here, are tied for second place. About seventy percent of the papers deposited with ECSA at our 1999 Conference have been ordered at least once.

### ECSA Interest Sections

Please take a few moments to visit the Web pages of the two ECSA Interest Sections that have been formed this year. Each section will have its first meeting at the 2001 ECSA Conference in Madison, Wisconsin. This *ECSA Review* also includes a call for expressions of interest in forming a third ECSA Interest Section on EU Pedagogy (see p.7, bottom left). The EU Law Interest Section pages may be found at [www.ecsa.org/eulawsection.html](http://www.ecsa.org/eulawsection.html) and the EU Political Economy Interest Section pages may be found at [www.ecsa.org/pesection.html](http://www.ecsa.org/pesection.html)

### 2001 ECSA Conference

An on-line conference registration form will be available on the ECSA Web site beginning January 1, 2001 (and mailed to current members with the Winter 2001 *ECSA Review*), as will full details about the conference hotel, the Hilton Madison. The hotel will be able to accept reservations beginning January 1, 2001. For your planning purposes, the room rate will be \$US 119 (single or double). Please keep a close eye on the ECSA 2001 Conference Web pages at [www.ecsa.org/conf2001.html](http://www.ecsa.org/conf2001.html). You will also find there useful links about touring in Madison and the region.

### ECSA E-Mail List Serve

The ECSA e-mail list serve now numbers slightly over 700 participants, or approximately 60% of our over 1200 members. While an e-mail list has important advantages—reaching a large number of people virtually instantly, with the possibility of a multiplier effect if messages are forwarded to other lists—there are shortcomings as well. Not everyone reads all of his or her e-mail, particularly if many have accumulated while one travels, for example. Also, some announcements, such as those for conferences or scholarship opportunities, come too late for message recipients to plan to attend or apply. We encourage you to complement your e-mail publicity with traditional paper notices, particularly for inclusion in the *ECSA Review*, both to reach all ECSA members and to give as much advance notice as possible so people have sufficient planning time.

THIS ACADEMIC YEAR MARKS one of the busiest seasons for the European Community Studies Association. Our work is well under way in preparation for our Seventh Biennial International Conference to be held late next spring. Paper and panel proposals are arriving in the ECSA office apace—from throughout the USA, EU member states, Malta, Hungary, and other countries—and our Conference Program Committee will meet this fall to do the hard work of choosing the papers and panels for our conference. The ECSA Executive Committee is working to establish our Conference keynote speaker, and two distinguished selection committees will be working this fall to determine the awardees of ECSA's Best Dissertation Prize and the ECSA's Best 1999 Conference Paper Prize; both of these, along with our award for a Lifetime Contribution to EU Studies, will be awarded at the ECSA Conference luncheon.

Visit the ECSA Web site for more details about the Conference and the venue. The Conference registration form will be included with the Winter 2001 *ECSA Review* and posted on the Web site beginning January 1, 2001, as will full details about the Conference hotel, the Hilton Madison (connected to our lakefront Conference venue by a beautiful skywalk). The brand-new Hilton Madison is scheduled to open this spring and we will be among their first conference groups to be housed there. The European Union Center of the University of Wisconsin Madison will be our local conference host, providing logistic support at the time of the conference and helping us attract EU scholars and practitioners from the Midwest to our event.

This fall also marks our open nominations process for candidates to serve on the ECSA Executive Committee. This very important volunteer committee, comprised of seven people, makes program and policy decisions for the Association and is elected by you, the membership. Service on the Executive Committee is a valuable opportunity both to shape and assist ECSA, as well as to gain exposure to the workings of a USA non-profit organization. Please see page 2 of this issue for nomination details; the deadline for receipt of materials in the ECSA office is December 31, 2000. We look forward both to an exciting slate of candidates and to the election itself, which will take place in early Spring. Ballots will be mailed to current ECSA members and the election results will be announced at the biennial open ECSA Business Meeting at our Conference, at which time the new Executive Committee members will be seated in office.

This year is not only a busy time for ECSA, but also is a fascinating time to be studying and researching Europe. The EU enlargement process continues; the current Intergovernmental Conference is about to conclude; the Danes have just rejected participation in economic and monetary union. These and other ongoing EU developments make our jobs as interpreters and analysts of the European integration project ever more engaging and compelling.

VIVIAN A. SCHMIDT  
Boston University

## ECSA Review

The *ECSA Review* (ISSN 1090-5758) is published four times yearly by the European Community Studies Association, a membership association and non-profit organization founded in 1988 and devoted to the exchange of information and ideas about the European Union. We welcome the submission of scholarly, EU-related manuscripts. Subscription to the *ECSA Review* is a benefit of Association membership.

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*Founded in 1988, ECSA is a non-profit academic and professional organization dedicated to the exchange of information and ideas on European Union affairs. ECSA coordinates the Network of European Union Centers in the United States.*

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*Information and ideas on the European Union*



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