



EDITORIAL

JAMES A. CAPORASO
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

As successor to Alberta Sbragia as Chair of the Executive Committee, I would like to make several introductory remarks. Most importantly, I want to thank the retiring members of the ECSA Executive Committee -- Alan Cafruny, Lily Gardner Feldman, and Beverly Springer -- for their good work during the 1993-1995 period. Their efforts and good cheer deserve our appreciation. It was through their initiatives, and those of the returning members (Caporaso, Lankowski, Rhodes, and Sbragia), that the numerous activities chronicled in the attached Annual Report, were so effectively carried out. I would also like to welcome back two members of the first Executive Committee -- Leon Hurwitz and Pierre-Henri Laurent -- while noting that Leon did serve as Treasurer and *ex officio* member of the Executive Committee during the 1993-1995 period. Finally, David Cameron will join us as a new member; welcome aboard David.

Let me alert our membership to a number of publications and activities on the horizon. The Annual Report documents the role that ECSA continues to play in promoting EU-related research in the US, and in facilitating discourse and collaboration between Americans and Europeans. Without repeating the information found in the Annual Report, I want to underline that the 1995 ECSA Conference, the 1995 US-EU Relations Project, and the most recent volume in The State of the European Union series are all significant contributions to EU studies and policy debates.

The recent publication and distribution of the abstracts for the 1995 Conference enable all ECSA members to order individual papers. A CD-ROM collection of papers presented at the Conference is also planned. ECSA members receive special rates for the CD-ROM collection and the State of the European Union, Volume 3: Building a European Polity?, which is edited by Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey and now available from Lynne Rienner Publishers.

ECSA members should also be on the lookout for Miles Kahler's US-EU Relations Project monograph, "Regional Futures and Transatlantic Economic Relations," which will be distributed in late October of 1995. This joint ECSA-Council on Foreign Relations publication examines a number of important issues in the transatlantic relationship. Kahler's work is particularly valuable in analyzing "behind the border" restrictions on trade and capital mobility and in outlining the potential impacts that the very different developments in the growth of regional institutions in North America and Europe may have upon US-EU relations.

As Chair, my task is made easier by the paths Alberta Sbragia has established. I want to continue the tradition of a high-quality biennial conference in 1997 and also look forward to working on the next US-EU Project. The last one, culminating in Miles Kahler's presentation in Charleston, was a resounding success. I am also certain that volume IV of State of the European Union, edited by Pierre-Henri Laurent and Marc Maresceau and scheduled for publication in 1997, will be a notable addition to this valuable series. New areas for ECSA to explore include the improvement of our visibility within ECSA-World, increasing our European membership and participation in the biennial conference, and increasing graduate student participation.

Let me conclude on a note of special thanks to Alberta Sbragia for her outstanding tenure as Chair. Alberta's dynamic leadership has contributed greatly to ECSA's growing stature among researchers and practitioners of the EU. It is an honor to be her successor, and I look forward to working with her, the new Executive Committee, and Bill Burros, Administrative Director of ECSA. Finally, but not least, I would like to acknowledge the continued generous support of the Ford Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, and Directorate General I of the European Commission, without which few of our activities would be possible.

Inside...

Conferences and Workshops	4
Grants and Fellowships	8
Research News	11
Program Announcements	12
Teaching News	12
Essays	13
Book Reviews	28
Publications	32
Association News	34




LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

The State of the European Union, Volume 3: Building a European Polity?

edited by Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey

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CONTENTS: Integration in Perspective—the Editors. REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. The EU and Regional Integration Theory—*J.A. Caporaso and J.T.S. Keeler*. The Justiciability of Subsidiarity—*D.G. Partan*. Common, Collective, or Combined?: Theories of Defense Integration in the European Union—*P. Chilton*. Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity Revisited: Trends in Public Support for European Integration—*C. Anderson*. Political Group Cohesion in the European Parliament: 1989–1994—*J.B. Brzinski*. European Monetary Diplomacy and the Rolling Crisis of 1992–1993—*D.M. Andrews*.



Integration Theory and the Enlargement of the EU—*L. Miles, R. Schwok, and J. Redmond*. EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL POLITICS. Germany's Länder and the Federalization of the EU—*R.E. Deeg*. The Franco-German Relationship in the Post-Maastricht Era—*P.C. Wood*. Institutions and Leadership: Germany, Maastricht, and the ERM Crisis—*M.E. Smith and W. Sandholtz*. The Importance of Being Independent: Central Bank Independence and the European System of Central Banks—*H.M. Kaufmann*. National Interest and Convergence of Preferences: A Changing Role for Spain in the EU?—*C. Closa*. The EU and the Nordic Countries: Impacts on the Integration Process—*L. Miles*. EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY MAKING: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS. Promiscuous Policymaking: The European Policy Style?—*S. Mazey and J. Richardson*. Regional Actors in an Intergovernmental Play: The Making and Implementation of EC Structural Policy—*M.A. Pollack*. EU Research Policy: The Politics of Expertise—*J. Peterson*. The European Commission as Corporate Actor? European Telecommunications Policy after Maastricht—*G. Fuchs*. Integrating the Environment into the EU: The History of the Controversial Carbon Tax—*A. Zito*. The EC and the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round—*Y. Devuyt*. The Lomé Convention: An Aging Dinosaur in the EU's Foreign Policy Enterprise?—*O.A. Barbarinde*.

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STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 1995-1996

Chapter Proposal Guidelines

The coeditors of the fourth volume of the biennial series of ECSA entitled The State of the European Union, 1995-1996, Pierre-Henri Laurent of Tufts University and Marc Maresceau of the University of Ghent, are requesting article proposals be submitted no later than **December 20, 1995**.

They should be addressed to the Editors at either the Department of History, East Hall, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155, USA or Europees Instituut, Universiteitstraat 4, B9000 Ghent, Belgium. They may be faxed to (USA) 617-627-3479 or (Belgium) 32-9-264-6998. Authors of proposals accepted for inclusion will be notified by the end of April 1996 and will have until the end of December of that year to submit their completed manuscripts. The editing process will be completed in early 1997 and publication by summer's end, again by Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Proposals should contain a maximum three-page c.v., a short precis of no more than one page, with a short organizational outline and prospective thesis statement on a second page. Address(es), telephone and fax numbers for the academic year 1995-96 should be included.

The tentative subtitle of the volume is The Deepening and Widening Exercise, with the activities of the EU in the 1995 and 1996 years the projected focal points. Ideas for articles should be therefore centered on the issues associated with, and work leading up to and including, the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. The enlargement or expansion of the Union, along with its major foreign relations with key global powers, will constitute the first major part of the collection. Studies on the recent three entrants, the remaining EFTA states, the Mediterranean applicants, the Visegrad and other Balkan states will be considered, as will examinations of EU interaction with Japan, the USA, the ACP, etc. A second part will be on the reform process associated with the Maastricht changes, with the CFSP, EMU, institutional and structural revision, justice and home affairs, civil rights and police, and budgetary questions seen as major areas of interest. The coeditors hope that the interrelationship of deepening and widening will be reexamined, especially the query as to whether the two are truly compatible. Proposals on questions such as variable geometry, the Franco-German leadership, role of small states, co-determination powers, anti-federalism, renationalization, and common vs. single currency will be considered if they are related to the IGC review and decision process. The last section will be devoted to theoretical and methodological essays which, again, relate their ideas to the IGC issues and exercises.

Conferences and Workshops

CALL FOR PAPER PROPOSALS

1996 European Community Studies Association Workshop

Contingent upon available funding, the 1996 ECSA Workshop will be held in May in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. The exact dates of the Workshop have not been determined.

The Workshop will be devoted to an analysis and evaluation of the European Union as an actor in international affairs. Though the ebb, flow and character of the EU as a supranational entity -- representing the reduction of sovereign barriers of member states and the creation of new institutions and patterns of governance at the European level -- is the subject of much academic and policy analysis, there is little disagreement that the EU shapes significantly the relationship and policy orientation of member states toward each other. The EU is unique as a regional organization in this respect. In the realm of foreign policy, however, the assessment of the European Union's role in affecting or replacing member state behavior is much more mixed.

Does the EU have an identity of its own, separate and distinct from its constituent member states? What is its relationship with other major international actors? Do they recognize it as a separate and distinct entity, or do previously established diplomatic relationships with member states interfere with, or affect relations with the EU? What constraints and opportunities exist for this unique entity? In sum, how is the EU shaping international relations beyond its boundaries in security and diplomatic affairs as well as in economic affairs?

The Workshop will address these questions through the solicitation of papers in the following general topic areas:

- * European Union Institutions and Foreign Policy Making
- * Member States, the European Union and Trade Relations
- * Member States, the European Union and Monetary Policy
- * Member States, the European Union and the United States
- * Member States, the European Union, Eastern Europe and Russia
- * Member States, the European Union and the Balkan Crisis
- * The WEU and NATO
- * The Common Foreign and Security Policy

Since these categories overlap, proposals may necessarily include consideration of several topic areas. Where appropriate, proposals should address the debates associated with the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Proposals which examine topics not listed are also welcome, provided they focus on the general Workshop theme of the EU as an international actor.

If sufficient funding is approved, paper authors will receive assistance toward travel, lodging and meal expenses. Application has also been made for a \$500 honorarium for paper givers. A tentative timetable of panel sessions on Friday and Saturday, with departure on Sunday, has been established. To promote discussion, the number of participants will be limited. All participants must commit themselves to the entire Workshop.

Individuals submitting successful proposals will be required to submit a first draft by April 1, 1996. It is the organizer's intention to use the papers presented at the Workshop as the core for an edited book on "The Role of the European Union as an International Actor." Following the Workshop, authors will be expected to revise and resubmit their papers for the book manuscript no later than August 1, 1996.

Paper proposals should be typed and no longer than 500 words, and contain the author's name, institutional affiliation, address, phone and fax numbers, and e-mail address. The author's curriculum vitae should be attached to the proposal. **Proposals must be postmarked no later than November 10, 1995**, and sent to:

Professor Carolyn Rhodes
ECSA Workshop Organizer
Department of Political Science
Utah State University
Logan, Utah 84322-0725
USA

Fax 801/750-3751

Fall 1995 Colloquia Sponsored by the European Institute of Public Administration

In preparation for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 1996, the European Institute of Public Administration is organizing a colloquium on "**The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Challenge of the Future**", which will be held October 19-20, 1995 in Maastricht, The Netherlands. The first day of this seminar will bring together high-level representatives of the major institutions involved with European security, such as the European Council, Commission and Parliament, and the WEU and NATO. On the second day a series of panel discussions will address the major issues relating to the European security agenda. For more information and to obtain registration forms, contact Ms. Jeannette Zuidema, Programme Organization, tel: +31 43 296 204, fax +31 43 296 296.

UACES Autumn 1995 Conferences

The University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) will be sponsoring a number of one day conferences this Fall. They include:

- The Regions, Leicester, 6 October 1995
- Evaluating the French EU Presidency, 27 October 1995
- Social Europe, London, 24 November 1995
- Governance of the EU, Manchester, date to be confirmed
- Aspects of Business in European Integration, London, date to be confirmed

The standard price for UACES one day conferences is £30 for members, £40 for non-members. For more information, please contact Susan Jones, UACES Secretariat, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK; Phone/Fax +44 171 240 0206. Readers should also note that the 1996 UACES Annual Conference will be held at the University of Leeds, from 3-5 January.

Ireland and the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference

September 29, 1995 Limerick, Ireland

This conference is organised by the Irish Committee for Contemporary European Studies. For information, contact ICCES, Nick Rees, Department of Government and Society, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland; tel (+353) 61/202212; FAX (+353) 61/338170.

The Coming Power-Struggle for Europe's Future

October 5-6, 1995 Paris

These international experts seminars are organised by Cicero Foundation in the series Great Debates. Topics will include:

- Weighing the Votes: Large versus Small Member States?
- Curbing the Power of the European Commission?
- Redefining the Relationship EP - National Parliament
- The WEU a Fourth Pillar?
- Towards a less Supranational Europe?

The programme includes workshops and lectures by leading politicians, scientific researchers and international journalists. The Conference language is English. For information, individuals outside France should contact the Cicero Foundation, c/o Mr.

Marcel van Herpen, Hondermarck D 45, NL - 6211 MB Maastricht, The Netherlands; FAX (+31)-43-260828. Individuals within France should contact the Cicero Foundation, 12 rue Dupleix, F- 75015 Paris, France; FAX (+33)-1-42679204.

Atlantic Economic Society

October 8-11, 1995 Williamsburg, VA,
March 12-19, 1996 Paris, France

Authors should submit 2 copies of at least a 500 word summary and a submission fee of \$49 for AES members (\$59 for non-members) per paper. All accepted participants will be responsible for their own expenses, including the conference registration fee. Submit papers and requests to serve as chair and/or discussant with number and name of interest area to: Atlantic Economic Conference, Campus Box 1101, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, IL 62026-1101; Phone (618) 692-2291; Fax(618) 692-3400.

Labor Market Policy and European Integration

October 17-18, 1995 Bristol, UK

The conference organized by the University of Bristol is designed to explore the impact of the single market program on labor market policy at local, regional and national levels. It looks at the consequences for employment, training and personal policies of local organizations. In addition, it also examines the available evidence from forecasts and impact studies and seeks a realistic assessment of the effects of the single market on the demand, supply and movement of labor within Britain and the European Union. For further information, contact Kevin Doogan or Randall Smith, University of Bristol, School for Advanced Urban Studies, Grange Road, Bristol, BS8 4EA; tel (+44)-117-974 1117; FAX (+44)-117-973 7308.

The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Challenges of the Future

October 19-20, 1995 Maastricht

This colloquium will bring together high-level representatives of the major institutions involved with European Security, such as the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the WEU, NATO. Topics on the agenda are: Future Security and Challenges for the EU; Enlargement and the CFSP; The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the CFSP. The working languages are English, French and German. For information, contact Jeannette Zuidema, Programme Assistant, European Institute of Public Administration, O.L. Vrouwplein 22, P.O. Box 1229, NL-6201 Maastricht, tel (+31) 43-296.204, fax (+31) 43-296.296

German Unification 5 Years Later: An Interdisciplinary Perspective

First Annual Graduate Student Conference

November 11-12, 1995 Center for German and European
Studies, Georgetown University

The CGES Graduate Student Conference will be held in Washington, D.C. and will explore the effects of reunification on Germany, other individual European countries, and the European Union. Members of the Washington metro-area academic and professional communities will participate as panel chairs. For

more information, contact Joanna Ritcey at the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University at (202) 687-5602, or fax to (202) 687-8359.

National Parliaments and the European Union

November 18-19, 1995 Wroxton College, Oxfordshire

This conference will consider proposals for change affecting the role of national parliaments. Papers are invited on all aspects of change, including proposals for institutional change within national parliaments, for the creation of a European second chamber, for the development of collective deliberation through, for example, the Conference of Parliaments and for developing and institutionalizing links between national parliaments and EU institutions. Both parliamentarians and academics are invited to participate. Those interested in participating in the conference, and in giving papers, should contact Philip Norton, Centre for Legislative Studies, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Hull, HULL, HU6 7RX, UK; tel 1482 465863; FAX 1482 466208; e-mail: P.NORTON@POLDEPT.HULL.AC.UK

The Intergovernmental Conference 1996: A Step Towards a New Constitution for the European Union?

November 23-24, 1995 Trier, Germany

The Annual Congress of the Academy of European Law Trier Foundation is sponsoring this Conference, which will examine the process of constitutional development within the European Union. Lectures and discussions will concern the substantive elements of a future Constitution for the European Union, as well as the legislative process. Speakers will include Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza, Spanish Minister of State for European Affairs and President of the Reflection Group for the Intergovernmental Conference (invited), and Klaus Hänsch, President of the European Parliament. For more information, contact the Academy of European Law Trier, Dasbaschstr. 10, D-54292 Trier, Germany; tel (+49) 6 51 1 47 10-0; FAX (+49) 6 51 1 47 10-20.

Messina, Forty Years After: Considerations on the Messina method in view of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference

December 4-5, 1995 Pavia, Italy

In spite of several political procrastination's and deadlocks (ECD, ECSC), European forces were re-launched at the Messina conference in June 1955. Two factors contributed to the construction of the Common market: on the one hand, an ad hoc assembly formulated a number of goals (e.g. common internal and external tariff policy, EMU), which were subordinated to the foundation of the political Union in the draft Statute. On the other hand, the conference of Messina set up the Comité des Sages which acted as a democratic representation of the people. This method could stand as an example for the IGC conference and the Parliament should take this line when reviewing the clauses of the Treaty as far as the co-decision procedure and art. 12 of the Treaty are concerned. In this respect, this colloquium proposes a political perspective based on the Messina method which could prove a success for the IGC. For information, contact Prof. Luigi V. Majocchi, Università di Pavia, Strada Nuova 65, I-27100 Pavia, Italy; tel (+39) 382 303577; FAX (+39) 382 303 842.

New Approaches to European Union Studies: The European Union and the Transformation of European Politics A Graduate Student Workshop

December 7-10, 1995 Center for European Studies
Harvard University

The European Union has experienced a renaissance of interest following the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union. The forty-five years of European experience in economical and political integration provide a rich history through which some of the most fundamental issues in the disciplines of political science, modern history, sociology and economics can be examined. The objective of this workshop is to promote research on European integration that addresses important theoretical debates central to border disciplines. The workshop will bring together advanced standing graduate students from North American universities to present and discuss their dissertation research. Faculty will provide commentary on student presentations and participate in a roundtable discussion: "European Integration: Model, Example or Exception?"

Applications addressing the following themes are particularly encouraged: European Integration and the Transformation of Domestic Politics; European Integration and the Changing Political Economies of Europe; Institutional Analyses of European Integration; Constructivist and Ideational Analyses of European Integration; The European Union and the Global System; and Germany and the New Europe: Hegemon or Partner?

Participation in the workshop will be limited to advanced doctoral students at North American universities, and is by invitation only. Proposals should clearly relate research on the European Union to broader theoretical questions central to the fields of comparative politics, international relations, modern history, sociology or economics. For consideration, complete applications must be received by October 13, 1995. To request an application, please contact the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 27 Kirkland Street, Cambridge MA 02138. Applications will include an application form, and a five page workshop paper. Travel and accommodations for participants will be provided by the Program for the Study of Germany and Europe, Center for European Studies, Harvard University.

Towards 1996: Problems of Governance in the Post-Cold War Era

early 1996 Brighton, UK

The conference will address the context in which the Intergovernmental Conference will take place and the new kinds of processes and ways of thinking that will have to be introduced if the very real achievements of transnational integration, up to now, are to be sustained and indeed redirected in order to overcome these deeply disturbing tendencies. The focal point of the conference will be the concept of governance. The Conference will bring together Jean Monnet Chairholders in Political Science to investigate these concepts and whether they provide an appropriate framework to understand the growing sense of drift in European governance since the end of the cold War and within which develop proposals for concrete areas of policy Cooperation. It will also include other speakers who can make a significant contribution to the subjects. For information, contact Mary Kaldor, University of Sussex at Brighton, Sussex European Institute, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN, UK; tel (+44)-1273-

**Tenth International Conference of Europeanists:
An Open Agenda for a New Europe**

March 14-17, 1996 Chicago, Palmer House Hilton

The Council for European Studies (CES) invites proposals for its 10th biennial Conference of Europeanists, to be held in Chicago at the Palmer House Hilton. Paper and panel proposals must be postmarked by October 10, 1995; prospective participants should contact the CES office for application forms.

The Program Committee encourages submissions by historians and social scientists of all disciplines, including those deploying quantitative techniques, who seek to address matters of broad concern to students of Europe, East and West. While members of the Program Committee will endeavor to commission panels on the themes noted below, we ask prospective participants to add their own projects to an open agenda. As the Council has done in the past, it will attempt to provide travel subsidies of \$400 per paper-giver or discussant traveling from Europe and \$250 to paper-givers who are graduate students. In either case, no application is needed.

Themes around which the Program Committee will attempt to commission panels include the following: Aging and Its Consequences; Agricultural Development: Decline and Debate; Boundaries and the New Territoriality in Europe; Citizenship; Class Decomposition: The Disappearance of Class as an Analytic Category; Collective Memory and the Construction of Post-Liberation Identities, 1944-1989; Constructing Markets, including the European Union; Corruption and the New Public; Studies in Comparative Scandals; Gendering the Welfare State; Left-Wing Liberalism in Eastern Europe; Long-Term Unemployment; Politics and Film; Privatization and Property; Protestant Fundamentalism in Europe, East and West; Reception of European Theory in the US; Security in the Post-Cold War Era; Social Protest in Europe, East and West; and Transformation of Social Democracy.

For application forms and further information, contact the Council for European Studies, Box 44 Schermerhorn, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027; Phone (212) 854-4172.

**Acceleration, Deepening and Enlarging:
The European Economic Community, 1957-1963**

March 21-24, 1996 Oxford

The fifth Research Conference will be organised by the European Community Liaison Committee of Historians at St. Anthony's College, University of Oxford in March 1996. Contributions will cover the period after 1958 which was one of major developments both within the international environment surrounding the Community (the second Berlin crisis, "grand designs" for Europe, American security proposals, the creation of the European Free Trade Association, and the first attempted enlargement of the EEC) and within the Community itself (the Fouchet Plan, the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy). The Conference will set the proposals for political union and political cooperation within the context of the acceleration and widening of the Community. It will draw upon the most recently released private and public archival evidence from Western, including Community, and Eastern archives. For information, contact Prof. Anne Deighton or Prof. Alan Milward, St. Anthony's College, European Studies Centre, Oxford OX2 6JF,

**Challenges To Labor: Integration, Employment,
and Bargaining in Scandinavia and the U.S.**

March 21 and 22, 1996 Berkeley, CA

The third Peder Sather Symposium, organized by the Center for West European Studies, University of California-Berkeley, in collaboration with the Norwegian and Swedish Consulates General, will gather scholars and policymakers from the United States and Europe for two days to discuss the effects of changes in international economics and politics on labor. The conference will be divided into four sessions: (1) International Sources of Change in Scandinavia: European Integration, Capital Mobility, and Labor Power; (2) Bargaining and Labor Relations in Contemporary Scandinavia; (3) Patterns of Work Organization; and (4) Unemployment and Underemployment. Among the participants will be: Jonas Pontusson, Cornell University; Christine Ingebritsen, University of Washington; Miriam Golden, UCLA; Douglas Hibbs, LO Research Institute, Stockholm; Michael Wallerstein, Northwestern University; as well as a number of Berkeley faculty members from Economics, Geography, Sociology and Political Science. For more information, contact the Center for West European Studies, 248 Moses Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94704-2311; tel (510) 642-9314; FAX (510) 643-5996; e-mail: <cwes@uclink.berkeley.edu>.

**Europe and the World:
External Relations, Internal Dynamics**

March 28-30, 1996 New York City

The Institute on Western Europe at Columbia University announces its Thirteenth Annual Graduate Student Conference. The Institute invites authors who are currently enrolled in a degree-granting graduate or professional school program to submit papers on all topics related to contemporary Western Europe. Papers are selected on a competitive basis in an anonymous referee process. The Conference plans to pay for presenters' travel to and accommodations during the Conference, and the presenters will compete for three awards carrying prizes of \$300 each.

Papers must be submitted in hard copy and on a 3.5" diskette (MS Word preferable). They should be 20-50 pages in length (double-spaced with citations) and include a 1-page abstract. Papers on all topics related to contemporary Western Europe are welcome. The submission deadline is January 31, 1996. Submissions should sent to the Student Conference Organizing Committee, Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027. Inquiries should be directed to Sarah Lukashok at (212) 854-4618; FAX (212) 854-8599.

The European Firm in the Global Economy

April 4-6, 1996 Thessaloniki, Greece

For a list of topics on which proposals for papers could be made, please contact Prof G Papadiodorou, TEI, Economic Society of Thessaloniki, Tel 00 30 31 791 206 or Fax 00 30 31 791 180.

**Historiography and Nation Building:
France, Germany & Italy**

April 9-11, 1996 Cardiff, Wales

For information on this event, contact Dr. S. Berger, School of European Studies, University of Wales, Cardiff, Tel 01222 874 000 x5405.

**A Changing Europe in a Changing World:
Urban and Regional Issues**

April 11-14, 1996 Exeter, UK

Proposals for papers or requests for more details to: Kathy Wood, University of Durham, Fax 0191 374 2456, E-mail: "Kathy.Wood@Durham.ac.UK"

Redesigning the European Idea

April 21-24, 1996 University of Canterbury, New Zealand

This is a joint conference organized by the European Community Studies Asphyxiation of New Zealand (ECSA-NZ) and the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia (CESAA). The main theme is the 1996 ICGs and "Redesigning the European Idea"; however, proposals for papers in the general area of European Studies are also welcome (in politics, economics, law, history, philosophy and languages). The organisers hope to be able to assist a limited number of participants in funding travel costs. The deadline for paper proposals is January 15, 1996.

Please direct paper proposals and all inquiries to the conference organizer, Dr. M. Holland, Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand; Fax 03 364 2007; E-mail: "M.HOLLAND@pols.canterbury.ac.nz".

**Memory and History:
European Identity at the Millennium**

August 19-24, 1996 Netherlands

Further details for this Conference are available from Dr. Debra Kelly, School of Languages, University of Westminster. Tel (+44) 0171 911 5000, Fax 0171 911 5001.

Third ECSA-World Conference

September 1996 (tentative) Brussels

****RESCHEDULED****

The Third ECSA-World Conference, originally planned for May 23-24, 1996, has been tentatively rescheduled for September of 1996. Rescheduling is necessary because of difficulties in obtaining meeting space in Brussels. It is hoped that specific dates will be set shortly - please contact the ECSA Administrative Office at the University of Pittsburgh for more information.

As noted in the Fall Newsletter, the Conference will deal with "The European Union in a Changing World." A June 13, 1995 meeting of the Conference Steering Committee in Brussels has established the following Working and Regional Groups:

WORKING GROUPS

1. Europe and the World Economy: Competitiveness, Competition; Investment
2. Trade Relations

3. Monetary Policy and Capital Markets.
4. Challenge and Instruments of Foreign and Security Policy
5. Europe and the International Migrations

REGIONAL GROUPS

1. The EU and Central and Eastern Europe (including the NIS)
2. The EU and the Mediterranean Countries
3. The EU and North America
4. The EU and Asia
5. The EU and Latin America
6. The EU and Africa

To accommodate representation from the thirty-two national ECSAs in ECSA-World, participation in the Conference is very limited. Paper proposals in the areas of the Working and Regional Groups should be approximately two pages in length. Proposals and a brief curriculum vitae should be sent to the ECSA Administrative Office, 405 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, PA 15260; FAX (412) 648-1168; E-mail: "ECSA@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU".

Proposals should be sent at the earliest date possible to ensure consideration by the ECSA-World Conference Steering Committee. Please note that only U.S. citizens and permanent residents should forward proposals to the ECSA-USA office in Pittsburgh. Citizens of other countries should contact their national ECSA for information on proposal procedures.

Partial funding may be available for Conference accommodations.

**Fifty Years after Nuremberg:
Human Rights and the Rule of Law**

October 1996 Storrs, Connecticut

For more information on this Conference, contact Henry Krisch, Dept. of Political Science U-24, University of Connecticut, 341 Mansfield Rd., Storrs, CT 06269-1024; Fax: (203) 486-3347; E-mail: "henryk@uconnvm.uconn.edu".

Grants and Fellowships

ECSA Curriculum Development Grants

Contingent upon available funding, the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) will offer curriculum development grants for the 1996-1997 or 1997-1998 academic years. These grants may be used to create new courses on the European Union, or to enrich existing courses with material on the European Union. A maximum of four grants of up to \$3,000 will be awarded. Courses developed or enriched through this program must be taught in the United States. Applicants must be ECSA members, or affiliated with institutional ECSA members.

The application deadline for this program is April 1, 1996
For application guidelines and further information, please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; Tel (412) 648-7635, FAX (412) 648-1168; E-Mail "ecsa+@pitt.edu".

Jacques Delors Fellowship at the European University Institute

Contingent upon available funding from the European Commission Delegation, Washington, DC and the European University Institute, ECSA hopes to continue the Jacques Delors Fellowship at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy during the 1996-1997 academic year. This Fellowship was established in 1995 to commemorate 50 years of transatlantic cooperation, and enables an advanced graduate student to pursue coursework and dissertation research. The Fellowship provides tuition and approximately \$14,500 towards transportation and living expenses. The application deadline is April 1, 1996.

The European University Institute (EUI) is a postgraduate teaching and research institute. The mission of the Institute is to contribute to the intellectual life of Europe, through its activities and influence, and to the development of the cultural and academic heritage of Europe in its unity and diversity. In this context, the Institute aims to provide a European academic and cultural training and to carry out research in a European perspective (fundamental, comparative, and Community research) in the area of the social and human sciences.

The four academic departments of the Institute are History and Civilization, Economic, Law and Political and Social Sciences, all of which offer a doctoral degree program. The academic departments are complemented by two interdisciplinary centers. The Robert Schuman Center develops research bearing on important issues confronting contemporary European society. The European Forum brings together experts in a selected topic for one academic year, with emphasis on the international, comparative, and interdisciplinary aspects.

Applicants must be U.S. citizens, ECSA members, and currently enrolled in a doctoral program in the United States. For application guidelines and further information, please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

ECSA Dissertation Fellowship Grants

With funding from The Ford Foundation, the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) will offer four dissertation fellowship grants for the 1996-1997 academic year. These grants provide financial support of \$2,500 for doctoral students preparing dissertations on the European Union. They may be used for travel required for dissertation research, or for books, documents and supplies, manuscript preparation, and other dissertation expenses. Applicants must be U.S. citizens and ECSA members.

The application deadline for this program is April 1, 1996
For application guidelines and further information, please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

ECSA Graduate Fellowship in European Integration at The College of Europe

Contingent upon funding from the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, ECSA will offer a Fellowship leading to the Master's Degree in European Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium for the 1996-1997 academic year. This Fellowship was established in 1995 to celebrate 50 years of Transatlantic Cooperation for Peace and Democracy. If funding is approved, the Fellowship will offer approximately \$14,500 toward tuition, lodging, and travel

expenses. The College of Europe, founded in 1949, is the oldest European institution exclusively devoted to postgraduate teaching, focussing on issues of European integration.

The Academic Program of the College of Europe is divided into three parts:

- A. Specialized courses which correspond to the student's previous education. There are currently four departments: European political and administrative studies, European economic studies, European legal studies and studies in Human Resources Development.
- B. Interdisciplinary work which consists of the analysis of subjects in which students from the four departments will participate actively.
- C. General courses which deal with major current developments in Europe or with certain more specific problems of contemporary society.

Applicants must possess a high level of proficiency in the French language, have completed a university degree by the term of the Fellowship, and be U.S. citizens. Students may apply for the College of Europe Fellowship by submitting the following items to the ECSA Administrative Office:

1. Letter of application from the student, addressed to the Graduate Fellowship Selection Committee, which discusses:
 - a) the student's preparation and qualifications for the Fellowship
 - b) how the Fellowship will enhance the student's educational and professional goals, and
 - c) the student's proposed department of specialization at the College of Europe.
2. At least two letters of recommendation which comment directly on the applicant's qualifications for the Fellowship.
3. Academic transcript(s).
4. Certification of proficiency in French.
4. Resume or curriculum vitae.

The application deadline is April 1, 1996 Please send all application materials and direct all inquiries concerning the Fellowship to Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

Additional ECSA Graduate Fellowships

Contingent upon available funding from the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, ECSA hopes to offer Graduate Fellowships leading to the M.A. degree in European Studies at several European universities, tenable for the 1996-1997 academic year. The universities hosting these fellowships will be determined in early October of 1995. Potential applications should contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office for more information. The application deadline for these Fellowships will be April 1, 1996.

1996 German Marshall Fund Research Fellowship Program

The German Marshall Fund of the United States offers grants for research that seeks to improve the understanding of significant contemporary economic, political and social developments involving the United States and Europe. Projects may focus on either comparative domestic or international issues. Projects

should establish the potential importance of their findings either by comparative analysis of a specific issue in more than one country, or by an exploration of that issue in a single country in ways that can be expected to have relevance for other countries.

A Fellowship is intended to allow the recipient to work on research full time, without teaching, administrative or other substantial professional responsibilities, during an academic term or up to one year. Projects of three months or less are not eligible for consideration. Within a fixed maximum (\$30,000), the Fellowship will help meet, but cannot exceed, a recipient's current income. Approximately 11 awards will be made in 1996.

Completed applications must be postmarked no later than November 15, 1995. Submissions will be reviewed by established scholars from various disciplines. An independent selection committee will make recommendations to the Fund. The Fund will announce awards by letter on March 15, 1996.

For application forms and additional information, please contact: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 11 Dupont Circle, Washington, DC 20036; Tel (202) 745-3950.

The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Opportunities for International Research Collaboration

The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation of Bonn, Germany, provides highly qualified individuals of all nationalities the opportunity to conduct research in Germany. The Foundation's North American Office in Washington, D.C., distributes information on collaborative research support programs to North American scholars. Since 1953 the Foundation has enabled more than 3500 scholars from the United States and Canada to participate in such programs.

The Research Fellowship Program provides support to non-German scholars who have earned a doctorate and are under 40 years of age for the conduct of research in Germany in all fields of scholarship for periods of 6 to 12 months. For the past several years, approximately 70 American scholars have been selected annually in worldwide competition. The Humboldt Research Award provides internationally recognized scholars with the opportunity to spend between 4 and 12 months conducting research at German institutions; candidates for awards may be nominated by eminent German scholars and previous awardees. The Feodor Lynen Fellowship Program enables German scholars under 38 years of age who have a doctoral degree to spend as many as three years at the home institutions of former Humboldt fellows and awardees. The Max-Planck Award permits internationally recognized German and non-German scholars to conduct long-term, project-oriented cooperative research; only senior officials of German research institutions may nominate candidates. The Bundeskanzler Scholarship Program provides the opportunity each year for as many as 10 promising young Americans who demonstrate the potential of playing a pivotal role in the future relationship between Germany and the United States to spend a year in Germany on research projects of their own design.

Qualified individuals are encouraged to apply for these programs. For more information about the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and its programs, please contact Dr. Bernard Stein, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Suite 903, 1350 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036; (202) 296-2990; fax:(202)833-8514.

Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD)

DAAD is a private, publicly funded, self-governing organization of institutions of higher learning in Germany. All DAAD grants are available to faculty and students in Canada and the United States. Unless otherwise stated, participants must hold Canadian or U.S. citizenship and must be full-time members of Canadian or U.S. colleges or universities at the time of application. Permanent residents should inquire about eligibility, DAAD offers funding for the following:

- Grants for German Studies Program
- Grants for Study, Research and Information Visits to Germany
- Grants for courses in German Studies and Language in Germany
- Annual Grants
- Other programs

There are grants for team teaching, guest lectureship, summer language courses, research grants for both graduate students and faculty, full-year grants, among many others. Each program has different deadlines and eligibility requirements. Those interested should contact the DAAD directly for information at: DAAD--New York Office, 950 Third Ave., 19th Floor, New York, NY 10022; Phone (212) 758-3223; Fax (212) 755-5780.

NATO Research Fellowships

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization awards fellowships to citizens of NATO member nations and cooperating partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The aim of these fellowships is to promote research leading to publication in two distinct areas. The first type of fellowship is awarded to citizens of NATO member countries for the study of aspects of the common interests and shared values of the Alliance. This category of awards targets both individual projects and institutions, the latter in the form of support for research groups. The second category, aimed exclusively at citizens of Central and Eastern European countries, originates from the May 1989 NATO Summit, which decided to establish a new fellowship program aiming at the promotion of the study of democratic institutions. For further information, contact the NATO Press Service, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium; FAX (32) 2728 50 57.

The American-Scandinavian Foundation

The Foundation offers fellowships and grants for study and research in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Grants (\$2,500) are suitable for scholars who plan a program of only a few weeks or months. Fellowships (\$15,000) are designed for graduate students, usually for a period of one year. Applications may be submitted by United States citizens and permanent residents who have completed undergraduate studies. Outstanding proposals from all fields are encouraged and will be carefully considered. Other factors being equal, priority will be given to candidates at the dissertation level. Candidates are expected to have undertaken appropriate correspondence with institutions and scholars in Scandinavia. Competence in the language of the country is expected. The deadline in November 1, 1995. For more information, contact the American-Scandinavian Foundation, 725 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10021; tel (212) 879-9779; FAX (212) 249-3444.

Council for International Exchange of Scholars

The Council offers the following awards with a November 1, 1995 application deadline.

- 1) Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence Program: Institutional proposals to host a visiting Fulbright lecturer in the arts, humanities, social science, and professional fields for a semester or academic year during 1996-97.
- 2) Fulbright International Education Administrators: Short-term seminars in Germany, Japan, or Korea for academic administrators involved in international education.
- 3) Fulbright German Studies Seminar: Five-week seminar on German Society today for professors of German, history, political science, and other humanities and social sciences related to the seminar topics.

The Council also administers NATO fellowships and institutional grants with a January 1, 1996 application deadline. These awards promote research leading to publication on political, security, and economic issues directly affecting the health of the NATO alliance. For further information, contact CIES, 3007 Tilden Street, NW., Suite 5M, Washington, D.C. 20008-3009; tel 202/686-4000; FAX 202/362-3442.

Fellowships in Post-War German History

With a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation, the German Historical Institute and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) at The Johns Hopkins University offer three one-year resident research fellowships for the 1996-97 academic year at the postdoctoral (ca. \$25,000) or advanced (ca. \$30,000) level. Historians and political scientists specializing in post-World War II German history and German-American relations, particularly the period 1945-1955, are eligible. The program strongly encourages applications from the eastern part of Germany and projects dealing with GDR history. As fellows of the two institutes, successful applicants are expected to pursue their own research projects using archival resources of the Washington area, present papers in introductory and concluding seminars, and participate in the academic life of the institutes. Fellows should take up residency no later than October 1, 1996. Applications, written in English, should include: a curriculum vitae, including a list of publications; a project proposal of no more than 10 pages, including statement of purpose, hypotheses, methodology, resources to be used in the Washington area, and relationship to prior research; three letters of recommendation, in sealed envelopes, accompanying the application; information concerning annual salary, sabbatical leave, or other research support. The deadline is January 1, 1996. Applications and inquiries should be directed to AICGS, 1400 16th St. NW, Suite 420, Washington, DC 20036-2217; tel (202) 332-9312; FAX (202) 265-9531.

Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowships

To strengthen the ties of friendship and understanding between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Robert Bosch Foundation annually sponsors an intensive work and study Fellowship Program in Germany. The program aims to

provide young American professionals and executives with a comprehensive overview of the political, economic, and cultural environment of Europe, and especially Germany. The twofold goal of the program is to contribute to the professional competence and expertise of the participants and broaden their cultural horizons, while advancing American-European relations. Program participants will be offered internships at a high executive level of government and commerce. Applicants should possess relevant work experience and a graduate or professional degree in one of the following fields: Business Administration, economics, Journalism, Law, Mass Communication, or Public Policy. The program runs from September through May of the following year, and consists of two work phases and three seminars. The application deadline is October 15, 1995. For further information, contact Elfriede Andros, CDS International, Inc., 330 Seventh Ave., 19th fl., New York, NY 10001, tel. (212) 760-1400.

Research News

New Standing Group on European Level Interest Representation

The European Consortium for Political Research has approved an application for standing group status for a network focused on the study of European level interest representation. The aim of the group is to enable a wide community of mature and young scholars to develop, through exchange opportunities proffered by permanent status, a theoretical basis for European interest group studies, focused on meso level governance and collective action at the European level. The award of standing group status involves a small amount of seedcorn money, and the opportunity for a structure to network/meet and develop activities in any way members choose.

The group would be pleased to hear from anyone working on European level interest representation not yet in contact. A newsletter will be circulated shortly. Please contact: Justin Greenwood, School of Public Administration and Law, The Robert Gordon University, 352 King St., Aberdeen AB1 2FL, Scotland; Tel: UK (0)1224 262910; Fax: UK(0)1224 262929; E-mail: "LASJG@Merkland.rgu.ac.uk".

ECPR Standing Group on the European Union

This is a newly established Group which aims to support the development of the field by serving as a structure of information, promotion and coordination of research efforts. It will monitor the state of investigation on EU politics and signal neglected aspects. A wide range of topics are of interest to the Standing Group, for example: institutions and decision-making systems, political forces and processes, policies, common foreign and security policy, Union-state relations, integration theory and union development.

The immediate aims of the group are: to publish a directory of specialists; to establish an informal newsletter which can diffuse information on research (in progress and accomplished), books and reviews, scientific meetings and conferences, schools and courses, data banks and archives, available research funds, etc.. The Standing Group will also collaborate on the organization of workshop proposals on EU politics.

For more information, contact: Professor Fulvio Attina, Dipartimento di Studi Politici, Università di Catania, via Vittorio Emanuele 49, I-95131 CATANIA, Italy. Tel: (+39) 95 532 866/645; Fax: 95 533 128.

Program Announcements

USIS Speakers Program

The U.S. Information Service (USIS) is sponsoring a Speakers Program involving U.S. Embassies and Consulates throughout Europe. The USIS seeks speakers capable of giving the American perspective on EU Affairs, the U.S.-EU relationship, the transatlantic alliance, and related issues. To qualify for the Speakers Program, individuals must have established travel plans in Europe. The USIS will provide compensation for the costs of travel within Europe, daily maintenance, and a modest honorarium. ECSA members traveling from the United States will find this an excellent opportunity to increase their understanding of European perspectives.

Individuals interested in this Program should fax the following information, **well in advance of their travel dates**, to the U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels at (32.2) 512.57.20:

- a) planned European arrival and departure points;
- b) dates of availability;
- c) an abbreviated curriculum vitae;
- d) brief descriptions of topics that you find suitable for discussion; and
- e) fax number(s) where you may be contacted.

Masters Degree in European Social Policy Analysis

This course supported by the ERASMUS and TEMPUS programmes of the European Community provides: the opportunity to study at different European universities, each of which has a specific expertise in the field of European social policy; an integrated curriculum which is the product of close cooperation between the universities involved; a Master's degree which is endorsed by a board representing all of the participating universities; a focus on the new issues which are being placed on the European agenda by the creation of the Single European Market in 1992 and the changes in Central and Eastern Europe; a training in social policy analysis in a European context, which is relevant not only to those who intend to pursue a career in comparative social policy research, but also to the social policy administrators and decision-makers of the 1990s and beyond, who will to an increasing extent be working in a European environment.

Participating universities include St. Patrick's College, Maynooth Ireland; University of Bath, UK; Roskilde University, Denmark; Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia; University of Crete; University of Barcelona; Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Universidade Tecnica De Lisboa; and Tilburg University, Netherlands. Further details and application forms can be obtained from The School Administrator, School of Social Sciences, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK; Tel 01225-826839.

European Community Studies Association - Canada

Steps are being taken to establish a European Community Studies Association in Canada. ECSA-Canada will be in interdisciplinary organization. The goal is to bring together scholars interested in the history, economics, and politics of the European Union and its impact on European society, government, and politics. The aim is not to duplicate but rather to compliment the activities of the European Community Studies Association in the United States.

If you are interested in hearing more or becoming a member, please contact Steven Wolinetz, Department of Political Science, Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland A1B 3X9, CANADA; Phone (709) 737 7413; E-mail: "ECSAC@MORGAN.UCS.MUN.CA".

Teaching News

Free Educational Videos on the EU

The following videos from the European Union are available free of charge for instructional purposes:

1. **Implementing Common Policies** (running time 47 minutes); Contains "The Union and its Regions", "The White Paper: Europe Toward the 21st Century", "The Treaty on the European Union", and "1992 and Beyond".
2. **International Cooperation** (running time 59 minutes); Contains "Extraordinary Partners: the European Union and the United States", "PHARE, the EU Aid Program for Eastern Europe", Lome Mark Four: Stability in a Changing World".
3. **Business/Economics** (running time 53 minutes); Contains "Europe World Partner", "The ECU for Europe", "Eastern and Central European Countries and the EU", "1992 and Beyond", "The White Paper: Europe Towards the 21st Century".
4. **Environment** (running time 50 minutes); Contains "The EU and the Environmental Control of Chemicals", "The Environment", "The Environment at the Center of EU Policy".
5. **European Union Historical Overview** (running time 56 minutes); Contains "Jean Monnet: Founder of Europe", "Who Runs the Union?", "Towards a European Union", "A Growing Europe."

Requests should indicate video subjects in order of preference (first choice, second choice, etc.) as supplies are limited. To order these videos, please contact:

The European Union
c/o Video Placement Worldwide
P.O Box 58142
St. Petersburg, FL 33715-9976
Fax: 1-800-358-5218

Decision-making in the European Union: a Hypermedia Learning Tool

This CD ROM tool, produced by the University of Bath, Centre for Research in European Social and Employment Policy and Centre for Continuing Education, will be comprised of three

pathways. First, a hypothetical narrative of a piece of legislation making its way from proposal by the Commission to implementation by the member states and a challenge in the European Court of Justice. Along the pathway, students may take detours to video clips of officials at the different institutions talking about the different stages of the process in greater detail. Second, a set of three case studies of Brussels pressure groups: the agricultural lobby, the environmental lobby, and the lobby for the elderly. Students will be able to access clips of interviews with officials at both European pressure groups and the institutions they lobby. Third, a journey along the road to membership for the Central and East European states. This pathway will explore the advantages and disadvantages for the EU of expanding eastward. Here students will be able to listen to representatives from prospective new member states, as well as from the EU, discussing the challenges of the next decade.

The CD ROM will hopefully be completed during the Autumn of 1995. For more information, contact Alan Jacobs or Graham Room at School of Social Sciences, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK; Phone (+44) 1225 826826; E-mail "hssamj@bath.ac.uk".

Essays

A Faltering French Presidency

George Ross

Morris Hillquit Professor in Labor and Social Thought,
Brandeis University, and Senior Associate,
Harvard Center for European Studies

Recent French Council Presidencies have been pivotal for European integration. In the first half of 1984, assiduous work by François Mitterrand cleared the decks for the "1992" program and everything that followed it.¹ The 1989 French Presidency adopted the Social Charter, decided on an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and began confronting the changed political topography of Europe caused by the end of the Cold War.² The January-June 1995 French Council Presidency, culminating in the Cannes European Council, occurred at a critical moment. With three new ex-EFTA members it was the first to coordinate an enlarged Union whose balance of concerns had shifted northwards. It also had to deal with a new Commission, led by a second-choice President, which was almost certain to steer clear of any new leadership role. Its concrete tasks were also daunting. There was a general impression of EU impotence in the face of Europe's difficult employment situation. The 1996 IGC to review Maastricht had to be planned in difficult circumstances. The final dates and structures of EMU needed clarification. The Balkan situation was worsening. Serious reflection had to be given to future enlargement to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEEs) and the institutional issues it would raise. Unlike its predecessors, however, the 1995 French Presidency failed to clear many decks.

The Dilemma:

Electing Presidents and Presiding Over the EU

The most obvious reason for the relative failure of this year's French Presidency was that it coincided with a French

Presidential election. Mitterrand, mortally ill, politically discredited, and obliged to "cohabit" with a Right-wing government, was unable to provide strong initial leadership. Uncertainty about the election outcome and the European policies of Mitterrand's successor created paralysis in the middle, demonstrated by an unprecedented two months of Council inactivity in April and May.³ Jacques Chirac ultimately won, but even then, in early May, little could happen until a new government had been formed. The general result was a Council Presidency with confusing beginnings, no middle and weak conclusions.

Prime Minister Edouard Balladur and Alain Juppé, his Foreign Minister, announced French priorities at the end of December. There should be measures to promote employment, particularly through action on the Trans-European Network (TEN) infrastructure proposals from the Commission's 1993 White Paper.⁴ European security came second, including action on Yugoslavia, Balladur's European stability pact and an enhancement of WEU. Next came "the cultural dimension," Frenchspeak for consolidating European audiovisual spending and quotas following the Uruguay Round fights with the US.⁵ Finally came "institutional reform," mainly preparing for the 1996 IGC.⁶ In his January farewell speech to the European Parliament, François Mitterrand added social policy to this list and urged a "European Charter for public services."⁷ Nostalgically and ominously, Mitterrand also spoke of the passing of his "generation whose time is coming to a close."⁸

The next two months, in a context of new monetary instability, brought preparatory work for the Cannes summit.⁹ The French Presidency committed itself to producing a full Europol Convention, the key to activating Maastricht's inert Third Pillar. Negotiating a customs union with Turkey (which the Greeks disliked and was not helped by Turkish brutality in fighting Kurdish separatism) went very slowly forward. Disagreements on financing the EU's external aid programs - the funding split between the CCEEs and the Mediterranean area plus the amounts to go to the 8th European Development Fund (EDF) budget for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries - persisted.¹⁰ The Social Affairs Council failed to reach agreement on the Directive on Posted Workers.¹¹ At the Council of Economic and Financial Ministers (ECOFIN) in March, Edmond Alphandéry, French Finance Minister, suggested that the proper response to currency instability was to go to full EMU as quickly as possible (i.e. 1997). In the meantime French Commissioner de Silguy busily prepared a Commission Green Paper on scenarios for moving to a single currency.

The bulk of discussion before the Council ceased meeting in April was about the 1996 IGC.¹² The Spanish, whose Presidency would coordinate the work of the IGC's preparatory "Reflection Group" (to be led by Carlos Westendorp) published a first position paper in March. After briefly discussing "levels of ambition" - big vs little changes to the treaty, or perhaps two separate rounds of change, in 1996 and after Stage 3 of EMU began - the paper listed the key issues of the IGC. The issues addressed include:

- 1) the different logics of EMU variable geometries;
- 2) beefing up a feeble CFSP;
- 3) decision rules after enlargement (how to weight Council voting to demographics so that the large member states did not lose power, plus the need for more qualitative majority voting);
- 4) whether new competencies in energy, tourism and civil protection should be considered;

- 5) whether subsidiarity should be defined more clearly; and
- 6) how to guarantee fundamental citizenship rights (perhaps with a Charter of Rights in the Treaty).¹³

While these initial suggestions were being aired the Council, Commission and Parliament all worked on their own papers for the Reflection Group.¹⁴ The Council Report, the first to appear, was a modest and conservative document which focused mostly on reviewing administrative and legislative procedures since Maastricht.¹⁵ It also criticized the Parliament for being too ambitious about its own role, while suggesting that eight different legislative procedures might be too many.¹⁶ The Parliament's paper predictably advocated more qualitative majority and greater scope for codecision. The Commission paper, in May, was largely confined to reviewing the eighteen month operation of Maastricht.¹⁷ It expressed concern that the IGC and enlargement might lead to dangerous forms of "variable geometry" and urged that opt-outs be limited and structured to lead those opting out back towards full membership. Otherwise, it suggested, enlargement could turn the EU into a free-trade zone.¹⁸

The Cannes Festival

It was mid-May before Jacques Chirac moved into the Elysée Palace, had appointed a Prime Minister and formed a government. Only then, with little time to do more than prepare for Cannes, was Council activity renewed. Chirac's Cannes priorities, announced in early June, were similar to those earlier announced by Balladur. First came employment (the TENS projects), then aid to the ACPs (the 8th EDF program), action on "culture," political impetus for the IGC Reflection Group, establishing Europol, and promoting Stage 3 of EMU in 1997. In his various preparatory meetings with other European leaders, Chirac added the worsening situation in Bosnia, the problem of "competitive devaluations" within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the desirability of appointing a group of "wise men" to ponder the relationships between EMU's likely "hard core" and those outside it.¹⁹

While Chirac prepared, others maneuvered.²⁰ The German Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) produced a new paper on Germany's ambitions for the IGC, which called for an extension of qualified majority and a genuine CFSP. John Major announced diametrically opposed ambitions on both matters. Chirac then allowed that France had strong interests in the future in dealing with both the British and the Germans. This quickly became important in the week before the European Council, when British Prime Minister John Major resigned the leadership of the Tory Party to force a showdown with Tory Eurosceptics. One effect of this, which Major probably intended, was that Major's political future was up in the air during the European Council, making it virtually impossible for the Council to force any large decisions. Then, by announcing that he wanted Cannes to provide the framework for the coming IGC, Chirac angered the Spanish, who had counted on their Presidency doing the same thing.²¹ Finally, the Commission's Green Paper on paths toward the Single Currency produced new controversy with the Germans (followed by the Austrians and the UK).²² This, plus the pre-Cannes ECOFIN meeting, led to open abandonment of the 1997 EMU goal and consecrated 1999.

Cannes itself was anti-climactic. The French Presidency achieved very few of its goals. Chirac himself later averred that the EU leaders had sought out "modest compromises" to keep John Major out of further trouble. Agreement was reached, if at

levels below what the French had wanted, on the various foreign aid packages (to the CCEEs, the Mediterranean and the 8th EDF program) but mainly because the French were willing to pay.²³ British contributions were reduced. The Convention to establish Europol was approved, but a crucial section on the role of the European Court of Justice to which the British objected had to be put aside (until at least 1996). Chirac lost his campaign to appoint "wise men" to plan out hard-core vs outsider EMU relationships. A small deal was struck on agro-monetary matters to compensate for currency fluctuations. Little more than pious words were uttered about employment in general - discussion was postponed until Madrid in December, or on financing the TENs project, both big defeats for Chirac. Despite Chechnya, a resolution to regularize relations with Russia was decided. Action on the customs union with Turkey moved slowly, amidst continuing disagreement between Spain and Greece. Serious discussion about the coming IGC occurred, but with few announced results.²⁴ Finally, there was some discussion about future enlargement (new applicants would have to accept all of the acquis) and an official reception for the heads of state and government of 11 potential new members.²⁵ Noticeably absent was anything about "culture" and social policy.²⁶

Chirac seized center stage at the end for an outspoken press conference which, said one journalist, "broke every rule in the diplomatic book." He began by railing against the "abuses" which had "discredited" the EU, and declared that, "Europe has made the mistake of paying too much attention to its bureaucrats." The compromise on Europol, he noted, was necessary to protect John Major. Other matters, including most of those passed on to later European Councils (the bulk of the Cannes agenda, in fact) were presented in terms of progress allegedly made. Chirac also used the occasion to lambast the Italians for their "competitive devaluations," echoing French business complaints. Italian Prime Minister Dini retorted later that the margin for maneuver built into ERM had been instituted earlier to protect the French.

Meanings and Implications?

Relatively unsuccessful Council Presidencies have been the rule rather than the exception in the 1990s, thus one should be careful not to hold the French to higher standards than anyone else. Moreover, it would have been naive to expect a strong French Presidency during a presidential campaign. Still, as contingencies go, the contiguity of an electorally shackled French Presidency and a politically crippled Spanish one immediately following cannot be good for the EU. Beyond this, what can we say about Chirac the European from the first six months of 1995?

Chirac has been a fixture of French politics for more than three decades. He is not an unknown quantity, therefore, and has a reputation for shorter run dynamism and longer term political fickleness amply demonstrated by his recent history. Chirac positioned himself as the defender of Gaullist orthodoxy against Giscard d'Estaing in 1981, as a Reaganite neo-liberal against Mitterrand in the mid-1980s and as a populist, social démocratisant, candidate in 1995. Perhaps Chirac as President will overcome such volatility at least concerning Europe, but his present domestic circumstances are not promising in this respect. Traditional Gaullists, to whom Chirac must pay attention, have always been reserved about Europe. The extreme Right Front National, a vote-poaching threat to Chirac's base, is vehemently anti-Europe. And the 1992 Maastricht referendum revealed strong support within this moderate Right for "another politics" on Europe. Indeed, Chirac had to compromise with Philippe Séguin,

the most important leader of this "other politics" group, in order to run his campaign.²⁷ The balance of political feelings about Europe on the French Right is thus precarious and this, plus Chirac's predilection for rapid changes, makes the new President's future positions on Europe difficult to predict. What became most visible in 1995, however, was Chirac's classic Gaullist intergovernmentalism. In the words of the astute French MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges, France under Chirac "remains prisoner of a formidable contradiction: we want a strong Europe, like the Germans, but with weak institutions, like the British."²⁸ Given the EU's pressing problems, a France imprisoned in contradictions could be a serious matter.

The French Presidency brought some strong hints about the near future. The 1996 IGC will probably have to be "minimalist," avoiding anything too controversial, because EU members are far from agreement on what the 1996 IGC should be about. Moreover, as long as the Tories remain in power in the UK no British effort will be spared to frustrate change. The UK is clearly playing hardball to make a "free trade zone" (i.e., a Union without much supranationality and few common policies) the product of processes now underway. One likely way around this, prolonging the IGC into 1997 in the hope of a Labour victory in 1997, could create its own new problems. What will the IGC do with itself for the year until the British election? Who knows what different positions Labour will actually bring?

Minimalism may make sense in the light of events likely to follow it, however. Ratifying any IGC results involve an extensive round of referenda - in Scandinavia, Ireland, probably France and perhaps the UK, with contagion likely to lengthen the list. Since such referenda will occur in close proximity to the 1999 deadline for EMU Stage 3, anything the IGC produces which intensifies negative public feelings about the EU (particularly in Denmark, Sweden and France) could wreak havoc. A minimalist IGC, on the other hand, would resolve few outstanding, and pressing, problems. Among other things, the institutional and political complexities that a Union of 30 members will create do have to be resolved sooner rather than later lest enlargement create gridlock.²⁹

Cannes revealed other dark clouds. Disputes over EU foreign aid budgets indicates that future budget and program financing cannot be taken for granted. The UK has begun digging in its heels while other member states, including the Germans, have become much more pecunious. The second Delors budgetary package will run out in 1999, and debate about a new package could well turn into a difficult moment for EU common policies like the CAP and the structural funds. Another cloud covers the Germans, who are becoming ever more insistent upon achieving their purposes on Europe. Recent German papers on "hard cores" and pressure about the CFSP, the Maastricht Third Pillar and the necessity for the Union to look eastward all indicate new teutonic eagerness to assume a visible leadership role. This is not difficult to understand, given German power, but it has unforeseeable implications. In the past astute French strategy towards the Germans has minimized any problems. In the next few years the Franco-German couple will be the key to Europe's future. The renewal of vows the couple agrees, if it is able to agree, may well decide where Europe goes.

Notes

¹The 1984 French Presidency settled the dispute over the Integrated Mediterranean Program allowing the quick conclusion of enlargement negotiations with Spain and Portugal, resolved the "British check" problem to clarify the EC's budget situation, and

appointed Jacques Delors to the Commission Presidency.

²Negotiations with EFTA began, the G-7 summit in Paris was maneuvered into giving the EC an important new role in administering aid to Poland and Hungary, the EBRD was founded, the Berlin Wall fell and, after a few missteps on Mitterrand's part, the Community began to redefine the German question to facilitate reunification.

³The campaign enhanced the problems. When Jacques Delors withdrew in December 1994 a Right-wing victory became virtually certain. Since the Right was divided about Europe it was in the interest of both major candidates, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur and neo-Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac, to underplay Europe. Balladur was a convinced European who needed support from Gaullist anti-Europeans to win. Chirac, with strong traditional Gaullist and new populist anti-Europeans to conciliate within and on the fringes of his own party, needed to seduce pro-Europeans. Chirac tested the waters early on by proposing that EU decisions on EMU might be submitted to a French referendum, thereby playing to his anti-Europeans. When this was followed by a drop in his poll support, Chirac became convinced of the virtues of discretion on the issue.

⁴These had been narrowed to planning for 14 particular proposals, including the French TGV Est, which needed Council approval to be funded. Delors had tried for three European Councils to obtain such funding, particularly through new Euro-bond issues, but had always been turned down.

⁵The French were particularly concerned with passage of a favourable "Television Without Borders" directive and a strong Media program.

⁶The schedule for preparations involved initial discussions around Council, Commission and Parliamentary papers to provide a working base for a "reflection group" that would begin its work in June. For the Juppé speech, see *Agence Europe*, no. 6329, December 30, 1994.

⁷Mitterrand wanted to include the Social Charter in the Treaty. The public services charter was for French domestic consumption to deal with anxiety about the likely deregulation of bastions of the French state in utilities, telecommunications and the postal service.

⁸Mitterrand also cautioned the Parliament to beware of weakening the EU through the IGC discussions. Meanwhile, Jacques Chirac, campaigning, urged that France, Germany and the UK should seek agreement on central issues to prevent IGC deadlock (threatened by John Major's repeated insistence that the UK would in no circumstances cede any part of its Council veto). Dominique Moisi provided a particularly good overview of the beginning of the French Presidency in the *Financial Times* of January 20, 1995.

⁹The troubles were caused by the weakening of the US dollar against yen and D-mark, which hit weaker ERM currencies hard.

¹⁰The British wanted less aid in general and a big reduction in their own contributions while the Germans grumbled about the size of their own check.

¹¹The difficult issue was the amount of time allowed workers "posted for services" from one to another member state before social provisions (wage levels and social insurance coverage) of the host country kicked in. The Germans and others who had become the targets of transnational "social dumping" in the construction industry, argued for no grace period at all, while the UK and "Club Med" countries, exporters of cheap labor, advocated one as long as three months. The Commission failed to broker a compromise.

¹²In the meantime, the General Affairs Council in March debated the future relationships of WEU to the EU and NATO, revealing persistent strong disagreements (the Germans wanted WEU and EU to merge, the British an integrated WEU-NATO defense).

¹³A proposed change in the nature of the Council Presidency, to a three-year President, was among Jacques Chirac's rare campaign pronouncements on Europe.

¹⁴In the meantime the Reflection Group was being constituted. Each member state was to name one delegate (the UK's nominated a

hardline Eurosceptic). The Commission sent Manuel Oreja and Parliament named Elisabeth Guigou and Elmar Brok. After its first meeting in Messina on June 2, the Reflection Group scheduled 15 two days each meetings before reporting to the Madrid European Council in December 1995. It was charged to work in five areas: the general principles and objectives of the IGC; institutional issues; European citizenship (including asylum rules); external policy, including the CFSP; and "instruments" (hierarchy of EU standards, jurisdictions, budget, common policies).

¹⁵Under the rubric of subsidiarity it underlined with some satisfaction the decline in the Commission's production of legislation, from 200 measures in 1990 to 50 in 1994.

¹⁶For a summary see Agence Europe, March 25, 1995.

¹⁷The CFSP had largely failed, despite great need for European action in these areas. Pillar 3 had also failed because of ineffective structures. Maastricht's decision-making procedures, including codecision, were too complex and opaque.

¹⁸See Commission Report for the Reflection Group, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, May 1995.

¹⁹Chirac's first steps on the broader world stage revealed things about the new President relevant to the EU's future. In mid-June, Chirac announced France's "irrevocable" intention to pursue a new series of nuclear tests in the South Pacific, provoking a planetary wave of protest and causing his poll support in France to go down by 15 points. Then, at the Halifax G-7 meeting his outspokenness was the hit of an otherwise dull show. Both episodes showed the new French President as an energetic and ambitious man who enjoyed stirring up the world around him. In his younger years of relentless careerism he had acquired the nickname "the bulldozer," which implied not only a style of work but a capacity to unearth things which neither he nor those around him had anticipated.

²⁰Lest small EU matters disappear from sight, it is worth noting that in mid-June the "social partners" (European Trade Union Congress [ETUC], Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe [UNICE], European Centre of Enterprises with State Holdings [CEEP]) agreed to hold the first collective bargaining under the Maastricht Social Protocol, about parental leave. Following the Social Protocol, the Commission had signalled its intention to act in the area of parental leave (stemming from an unpassed Directive from the early 1980s) and then asked the social partners whether they were willing to negotiate rather than accept legislation. They were.

²¹The Reflection Group started its work under the firm leadership of Carlos Westendorp after the commemorative Messina meeting on June 2.

²²Very briefly, the Green paper proposed three steps for phasing in the single currency. There would be one year between the date set for movement to EMU stage 3 and the fixing of exchange rates. The European Central Bank would then pursue a single currency market policy with this fixed parity regime which would last for a further three years, during which large banking and commercial matters - debts and other European financial instruments - would be denominated in single currency terms for the purpose of creating a "critical mass." The single currency itself would be phased in with the public after this three year building period. The Bundesbank initially wanted, instead, a "delayed big bang" in which there would be a several year delay at the beginning of stage 3 but no trial period, with the single currency being introduced all at once. See the Financial Times, June 15, 1995. The Bundesbank later shifted its position towards the Commission's (see Financial Times, July 20, 1995).

²³The dispute on the CCEEs vs the Mediterranean, which was settled by compromise, was between the Germans, who wanted more to get the CCEEs and the Latin Europeans, led by the Spanish, who wanted more for the Mediterranean. On EDF the Germans wanted a budgetary standstill while the UK spoke more and more as if it disapproved of the entire idea of EU foreign aid.

²⁴For more discussion and the Presidency Conclusions see

European Report, supplement to no. 2053, June 29, 1995.

²⁵The CCEEs, including the Baltic States, plus Cyprus and Malta. Negotiations for membership with the latter two will open six months after the IGC conclusion.

²⁶Another thing overlooked, interestingly, was the Molitor report on lightening up the EU's regulatory load on member states in the interests of subsidiarity. The report was too neo-liberal for most in attendance.

²⁷Seguin stands as the most likely next Prime Minister when Alain Juppé needs to be replaced.

²⁸Bourlanges, in Le Figaro, June 26, 1995.

²⁹Moreover, waiting until after EMU is solidly underway may be politically prudent (with another IGC later to face the institutional implications of enlargement) but the certainty of a variable-geometry EMU could then encourage broad resort to systems of variable geometry to cope with differences among new members.

The European Parliament's Strategy in View of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996

Karlheinz Neunreither*
Heidelberg University, Germany

Preparations for what is now commonly called the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) are well under way and an increasing number of possible actors are trying to participate in shaping the future of the European Union. This is not a bad thing in itself since the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty revision was largely criticised as being too closed and too diplomatic; and a lot of lip service has been paid in promising that a future revision should be prepared more democratically and much closer to the citizen.

As far as the EU institutions are concerned this means that they will have to deal with a different public opinion environment. Of course, they still are privileged: they were all asked to evaluate the first results of the application of the EU Treaty which provides them a possibility to introduce recommendations for improvement. Another question is how the institutions are involved in the Treaty revision procedures.

The European Parliament (EP) would have liked to be a full participant sitting at the table together with the governments at the IGC itself, but since no EU institution, not even the Commission is likely to be given this status, the EP more realistically now hopes that perhaps it might at least have a kind of observer status. For the time being two of its members are participating in the so-called reflection group which prepares the ground for the conference itself.¹ This group, composed of representatives of the 15 member states under the chairmanship of the Spanish Secretary of State, Carlos Westendorp, has started its work last June and will finalise its report next November. The main task of this preparatory group is to find out the scope of questions which the conference should put on its agenda, and discuss possible options.

There is a basic choice to make: either the IGC will limit itself to a narrow interpretation of the mandate given by the EU Treaty in its Article N, that is basically to have a look at the new procedures and to examine whether to include further EC policies

*Karlheinz Neunreither is a Director-General in the European Parliament. The views expressed in this article are purely personal.

as Community objectives²; or a second, much bolder option, which would consist in saying that inevitably the Union will be enlarged shortly and will include in the near future practically all Central and Eastern European countries, (excluding Russia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine) and some other applicants like Malta and Cyprus. Total membership would then be increased from the present 15 to about 25 or 30 countries. It is argued that a Community system originally designed for 6 member states, which already has difficulties in operating with 15 countries will be completely ineffective if that number would be doubled, and if in addition a larger degree of countries with much lower economic and social capacities would join. The choice then, seems to be either to lower the common level down to a very large free trade area, or to abandon the unicity of the system allowing the more capable countries to forge ahead more rapidly.

The Constitutional Role of the European Parliament

Since the days of Walter Bagehot, political science has drawn up lists of functions of parliament. One of these functions concerns the future of the system, or in a more classical way, constitutional reform. In national systems which are, in comparison to the EU, by definition much more static and to some extent less open ended, the constitutional function may be less present in day-to-day activities in a parliamentary institution. The EP, on the contrary, has put forward from its beginnings contributions on the evolution of the EU institutions and on the finality of the European Community itself. The Spinelli Report of 1984 was a landmark in which the EP elaborated nothing less than a draft constitution envisaging an executive embodied in the Commission and a bicameral system where the present Council of Ministers would have become a kind of Senate responsible for legislation together with the EP.³ This would have been somewhat close to the German federal system where the second chamber, the Bundesrat, is composed of representatives of the Land governments, i.e., the regional executive authorities play a role in federal legislation and not the regional legislatures.⁴ The wide ranging ambitions of the Spinelli Report were not followed by the EC Member States but, on the other hand, had an influence on the shaping of the Single European Act (SEA) which came into force in 1987.

Over the last years the EP's Committee on Institutional Affairs tried to take up the institutional debate again and presented a report to the plenary in February 1994. This report prepared by Mr Fernand Herman (Christian Democrat, Belgium) was finally close to the Spinelli approach while being more cautious in its choice of language and certainly successful in avoiding the word "Federal". The fate of this draft constitution was rather strange: it was not voted on or amended by the plenary but annexed to a rather general and meaningless resolution which said that the Herman report was a very good basis for discussion, and that the EP shared its overall views, but that unfortunately due to the end of the legislature and the forthcoming elections scheduled for June 1994 its opinion could not be finalised.⁵ The reactions were twofold: some observers maintained that the EP had more or less confirmed its overall federalistic orientations and that its main political groups would certainly carry this orientation over the next years. Others suggested that the EP had chosen a peculiar way to avoid a subject which might have become embarrassing. The answer to this question was only given in May 1995 when the EP defined its orientations for the IGC.

In any case, it should be underlined that the EP more than the Commission, the Council or the other EC institutions has a

tradition of constitutional dialogue. This is clearly reflected in the various papers prepared by the EC institutions in the Spring of 1995 in application of the Maastricht Mandate: all other institutions more or less stuck to the mandate, i.e. to analyse the functioning of the Treaty, like schoolchildren sitting in a class afraid of being disqualified for missing the subject. Only the EP chose a much wider approach and presented not a detailed analysis on the present functioning of the Treaty but concentrated on future options. The EP clearly preferred to open an overall dialogue and be part of the agenda setters, rather than to provide background material for the decision makers.

Trying Very Hard to be a Serious Partner

If one looks at the EP's evolution between the mid '80s and the early '90s one could summarise it as a continued endeavour to shape an identity as a serious partner in EC decision making. The major starting point in this context was the cooperation procedure introduced by the SEA in 1987, giving the Parliament the possibility to influence EC legislation much more than before, under the condition that amendments were backed by an absolute majority of its members. This single procedural modification - by the way, the first increase of powers for the EP since the budgetary revisions of 1970 and 1975 - had two major impacts: it ended the internal division of the EP on many subjects on a left vs. right basis and introduced what might be called a system of grand coalition, i.e., a close cooperation between the two major political groups: the Socialists and the Christian Democrats.⁶ The second impact was less obvious; when it realised the limited but real results from its increased participation in the legislative process, the EP began to show more interest in a step by step approach. Such an approach might be more successful than the presentation of an overall federal project, which would be unlikely to win the approval of some member governments. The EP managed to master the rather complicated new procedures, and to play its role in the increased and accelerated legislative programs which led to the Single Market of 1992. Rewards were presented in the Maastricht Treaty revision where the EP was upgraded to full legislative partnership in major areas by the introduction of the so-called co-decision procedure.

Over the last years it had become evident that the EP was finally an accepted partner including questions not directly covered by the Treaty, such as the meetings of the European Council, where the President of the EP is now regularly invited; or the very close cooperation in the so-called Trilogue, where the presidents of the Commission, the Council and the EP discuss current affairs.

With this evolution in mind, it is no surprise that the EP has concentrated its efforts, since the coming into force of the EU Treaty (i.e. November 1993), on its new role in the legislative process and in the nomination of the Commission. The new co-decision procedure is generally functioning well and the introduction of a conciliation committee composed of representatives from the Council and the EP in case of disagreement has also made its proof.⁷ On the second main subject, the nomination of the Commission, the EP showed that it could be quite innovative and was able to cover the ground in the absence of more detailed treaty provisions. This will set the mark for future nominations of Commissioners.⁸

As a result, since its re-election the EP confirmed the previous trend to pursue the step by step approach and to give less priority to more visionary options. This can be clearly seen in its resolution of May 1995 concerning the goals of the 1996 IGC,

where not only the more radical Spinelli or the somewhat similar Herman approach are not presented, but where even other elements which might blur the image of a reliable partner, such as a possible call for elements of direct democracy through the instrument of referenda or others, are either not put forward or if so, only as questions or mild suggestions. The cautious reformers had their day and not the visionaries.

The Reformist Approach of May 1995

In the Autumn of 1994 it was confirmed that the preparatory reflection group for the IGC was going to take up its work in June 1995 after the Cannes European Council, and that its mandate would only be for 6 months in order to report its findings to the Council concluding the Spanish Presidency. For two reasons it seemed to be paramount for the EP to have its own options not only internally discussed in committees and political groups, but "ratified" by a plenary resolution before the reflection group would start its work. First, in order to give an orientation to the two MEPs and to "bind" them to some extent to the guidelines of their own institution, though of course, they were supposed to be individual members, like those sent by the member states. Second, it was an advantage to be "on the market" at an early stage and to be able to influence the orientation of the overall debate before the avalanche of all kinds of papers, official and unofficial, would be published and become the object of numerous seminars, congresses and other manifestations.

The Committee on Institutional Affairs decided to use the time at its disposal for an internal preparation unprecedented in the EP's history. All other Committees were asked to give an opinion on the future treaty reform within the limits of their own competencies. All other 19 standing committees (except one) and the Temporary Committee on Employment replied to that invitation. In addition, the Committee asked no less than 17 of its members to prepare internal working documents on such various subjects as comitology, subsidiarity, the co-decision procedure etc. All these contributions had to be discussed one by one. After some time it became clear that this rather broad and democratic approach actually might lead to negative consequences: it would be difficult at the end of the day to concentrate on a few priorities and eliminate minor issues or questions which might be taken up in any case by other institutions - such as the number of judges of the European Court - so that the final result might be a rather lengthy shopping list.

In addition, the Committee thought it might be useful to keep the two major political groups of the Parliament linked with the exercise. To this end it designated not just one rapporteur, as is formally foreseen by the EP's rules, but two: Mr Jean-Louis Bourlanges (Christian Democrat, France), and Mr David Martin, (Socialist, UK). In the beginning it might have been useful to ask one of the rapporteurs to concentrate on the Maastricht Mandate to present a summary on the actual functioning of the Union and of the new procedures, while the second rapporteur could then have concentrated on the future. But this could not be done in the presence of the two very strong and eminent personalities which were chosen. In particular, Mr Bourlanges did not limit himself to an analyses of the present functioning of the Treaty, but presented a highly interesting but controversial working document of around 70 pages discussing all major challenges, including proposals for differentiated integration or variable geometry. The other rapporteur, Mr Martin, more or less covered the same ground, but did stick more closely to the basic orientations which had been defended by the EP on previous occasions.

In the final stage, and when time was already running short, the two approaches had to be harmonised in one draft document. No less than 662 amendments were received before the Committee could vote on this text. The draft resolution finally adopted by the Committee was then submitted to the plenary, where again 229 amendments were put to vote. The result is a text of about 7,000 words which touches on a considerable number of issues but concentrates on institutional reform.⁹ Of course the EP knows that the citizens of Europe will be only moderately interested in a debate on institutions and efficient and democratic government. Unemployment, economic and social development, peacekeeping or damage to the environment are much more burning issues. The EP refers to these questions in an opening chapter on the objectives and policies of the Union, but it becomes quite clear that in its opinion, the IGC will mainly discuss institutions and procedures.

Unfortunately, this does not include, in a crucial phase of its evolution, a thorough reflection on the political finality of the EU. More and more the question is asked whether a new balance between EU decision making and national and regional decision making is not needed, and some are afraid that the next treaty revision will include additional transfer of powers to a central authority as was the case in all previous revisions. The EP argues that, with a few exceptions no additional transfer to the EU level is envisaged but that the main objective should be a better distribution and handling of the existing powers already transferred. The question is whether this argument is sufficient especially in view of future enlargement, where groups of member states might just be capable or willing, or both, to cooperate more closely by intergovernmental procedures, but not to apply the Community method, which might then be restricted to a few areas like the internal market, as some already suggest. The dividing line between the Community method and intergovernmental cooperation might well be re-defined, and, to this end, an updated answer to the fundamental questions might be useful here.

An Institutional Challenge and How to Respond to it

The EP identifies a threefold institutional challenge: the well-known democratic deficit, a redefinition of the excessively complex and often inefficient decision-making process, and adaptations in view of future enlargement. At present major deficiencies consist of a lack of openness and democratic accountability of the Council, and the lack of cohesive and effective common foreign and security policies (CFSP), and justice and home affairs (JHA) policies. Finally, the institutional mechanisms designed for a Europe of six members cannot simply be transposed to a EU with more than 20 members.

The EP does not like the pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty. It calls for "a more effective EU foreign policy within the framework of the Community pillar" in which the common commercial policy, development cooperation policy, humanitarian aid and CFSP matters would be integrated.¹⁰ Security and defence policies at the EU level should be better defined, with a permanent common strategy within the international organisations concerned, and with a final goal of the West European Union (WEU) being absorbed into the Union. Joint actions could be decided by a qualified majority of member states and this possibility could cover not only humanitarian and diplomatic actions but military ones as well. On the other hand, no member state should be forced to take part in such an action against its will. A quite original proposal consists in the

establishment of a European civil peace corps which would include conscientious objectors.

In justice and home affairs, the Parliament calls for a gradual integration of this third pillar, including the Schengen agreement, into the Union policies. This would concern, above all, asylum policy, the checks on border crossing, immigration policy on non-Community nationals, and action against drug abuse. The role of Europol should be strengthened. The proposals in these areas are a clear demonstration of Parliament's continued belief in the possibility of a unique institutional system. While the overall approach contains some flexible elements and gradual transitions are foreseen, the final goal is nevertheless a common EU system. No separation line is drawn between matters reserved for the Community method and others which should in the long term stay out of it.

On economic and monetary union (EMU), the EP is not in favour of reopening the debate on the timetable or on convergence criteria, let alone on the final goal of a common currency. The most important requests in this area concern a reinforced economic policy coordination in order to create a "counterweight" to the monetary policy, and the introduction of a link between the broad goals of Article 2 of the EU Treaty concerning the levels of employment, social protection, raising of the standard of living and the quality of life and finally economic and social cohesion, with the monetary provisions. Democratic accountability on EU matters should be strengthened by a more extensive role for the EP. This is what the EP has to contribute after the widespread discussion on the introduction of a single currency which has taken place over the last years. One might argue that the establishment of a European Central Bank with nothing less than real supranational powers is unlikely to function unless embedded in political structures and a general acceptance by the citizen which goes far beyond what exists today. Reconfirming the principles and the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and adding an instrument for economic policy coordination, might prove not to be enough. It is to be hoped, that the EP will come back to these issues in its subsequent contributions to the IGC.

Regarding subsidiarity, the EP is of the opinion that the present Article 3B of the EU Treaty should be maintained and correctly applied. That means that no revision should occur. A fixed list of EU and member state competencies would be too rigid and too hard to achieve. Here again a more traditional line is followed, maintaining some degree of possible expansion of EU competencies by the use of Article 235.

Flexibility within Unity

In considering the overall institutional system, the EP advocates "flexibility within unity": this means that the single institutional framework be maintained and reinforced. It was mentioned above that CESP and JHA should be brought within the Community system and that, for only a transitional period specific features of the former "pillars" could be retained. In addition the "acquis communautaire" should not be questioned. There is also no question of splitting up the Union in various classes of member states; on the contrary the principle of equality of all states is confirmed. Finally, the option of a "Europe à la carte" is discarded.

One may conclude that the EP is not very much impressed by the ongoing discussions on the various forms of differentiated integration. The existing examples both in EMU and in the opting out clause of the Social Chapter and in some additional Danish reservations have one thing in common: the final goal was

discussed by all participants and the rules on how to agree or disagree were defined by all. Now there are obviously a number of additional categories of differentiated integration one could imagine.¹¹ We will see how far these will be discussed in the IGC.

It is obvious that the EP is quite afraid of the possibility of having to deal with policies which are only applicable to a number of member states. The Council could do so much more easily and even the Commission with major difficulties might be able to be part of this new game, though its traditional role would be considerably reduced. But what about the Parliament? How would co-decision work in the case of policies applied only to six, eight or ten Member States? What about the MEPs from the other countries? Would they leave the plenary when these questions would be discussed? For the EP the answer is quite clear: "The European Parliament as a whole will be responsible for exercising control over those Union policies which are pursued by a limited number of Member States on a temporary basis."¹²

As far as its own prerogatives are concerned, the EP demands:

- 1) that it should give its assent to all political nominations of EU institutions
- 2) that it should have equal status with the Council in all fields of EU legislative and budgetary competence
- 3) that its role should be reinforced in matters of CESP and JHA as well as EMU.

The EP also asks for a substantial reduction of the present number of legislative procedures, which have become more and more incomprehensible. Co-decision should be the normal legislative procedure, with the cooperation procedure being abolished. The assent procedure should apply to treaty revisions, international agreements, etc. The consultation procedure should be restricted to decisions in the present second and third pillar.

If this line were followed, Parliament's powers would be expanded in a few areas. First, and above all, by the generalisation of the co-decision procedure, which should be revised, taking into account the first experiences. Second, by the redefinition of the EP's budgetary function, abolishing the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, formalising the multi-annual financial programming which has become more and more important over the last years and finally - very interestingly - making the EP co-responsible for revenue in the form of assent.

You will note that it is the Council which would have to give away some of its prerogatives, but not the Commission. The Commission is treated with extreme caution, for example on the question of the right of initiative, where the EP only asks that its own initiatives in application of Article 138b of the EC Treaty should be given a follow-up by the Commission. Implicitly, earlier attempts to give the EP the full right of legislative initiative were abandoned. A second indication of the EP's effort to maintain or even step up the Commission's role can be found in the proposals for the revision of the co-decision procedure: at present in the crucial phase of conciliation only two delegations, one from the Council and one from the EP are mandated to agree on a common text, the Commission being at their disposal for assistance. Now the EP wants to give the Commission the right to propose and put to the vote a compromise text between conflicting positions of the two Conciliation Committee Delegations. This is astonishing and might be counterproductive if a rather weak Commission would be tempted to follow generally the approach of the Council, especially in those cases where it had not previously adopted EP's amendments.

Even if the EU would be substantially enlarged, the Commission should still be composed of at least one

Commissioner per member country. Instead of reducing the number of Commissioners as many suggest, the EP prefers an internal restructuring and a "presidentialisation" of working methods. The President of the Commission should be directly elected by the EP from a list of names put forward by the European Council, but except for the already existing final vote on the Commission as a college the EP does not request to influence the nomination of the individual Commissioners. On the other hand, it requests the right to ask for compulsory retirement of individual Commissioners in cases of misconduct.

Where the Council is concerned, the EP is not persuaded by the arguments envisaging a substantial change in the Council Presidency system by either having longer periods, distinguishing between larger and smaller Member States, or by enforcing the Troika system. On the contrary, the six month period of presidency should be maintained but there should be greater flexibility in its operation i.e. in the order in which individual member states would exercise it. Here again this might be not the last word in meeting future challenges.

Conclusion: A Cautious Reformist Approach Which Calls for Implementation

The Parliament's resolution of May 1995 might be considered a first contribution to the highly complex issue of the 1996 IGC. The second major debate is already scheduled for early 1996 where two new rapporteurs, Ms Raymonde Dury (Socialist, Belgium) and Ms Johanna Maij-Weggen (Christian Democrat, Netherlands) will present a report on the results of the reflection group and the conclusions the EP will draw out of it. Obviously, the basic lines drawn in the May resolution cannot be radically changed at short notice and will continue to serve as orientations; but there is certainly room for implementation.

This concerns a number of issues, for example the role of the citizens. As in similar resolutions and in all EU papers, the role of the citizen is considered to be a priority; but you look in vain for concrete and inspiring suggestions as to how to improve it. The new challenge of the information age which clearly asks for a parliamentary dimension is for the time being neglected. The question of a referendum on the future treaty revision is approached in an extremely cautious way: the EP esteems that consideration should be given to such a referendum, but it opens immediately an alternative by saying that member states could also agree to hold national referenda or their respective parliamentary votes at the same time. This is too timid an approach where one would have wished that the Parliament shows more courage, taking profit from its increased standing since its last reelection.

In sum, the EP has decided to play the card of the fully competent and reliable partner in the game. This is the institutional lesson it has learned over the last 7 or 8 years since the coming into force of the SEA and in a parallel way by increasing without major treaty revisions its actual participation and influence in the budgetary process. Legislative procedures, nominations to the Commission and other internal areas are the priorities where the EP was and still is eager to present a very positive balance sheet. This has been rewarding so far and will certainly have its effects on the new IGC as the first echoes from the work of the reflection group indicate, where it seems that some of EP's request, such as the generalisation of the co-decision procedure, may be well received. We also have to keep in mind that it is not easy to agree on general orientations in a parliamentary assembly, where on institutional issues it is highly

desirable to have large majorities. The EP's somewhat classical, reformist approach has certainly to be seen in this context.

The only question is whether improving the present institutional system is enough in order to find an answer to the challenges of the future. Without saying so, the EP implies that the Union can be run with 25 or 30 member states much less homogeneous than the present ones, more or less on the same institutional basis as the present. The unicity of the institutional system represents certainly a very high value and should not be questioned lightheartedly. The EU institutions which draw their force out of it would be ill advised if they put forward theoretical answers to questions which are not yet asked. This is why the Commission in its paper has discarded these questions completely as has the Court of Justice. The EP, in its much more elaborated proposals, could not be completely discrete about it and that is why we are confronted with rather limited answers which do not completely satisfy our intellectual appetite.

It might be permitted to say that this looks more like the beginning of a discourse and not like its end. We can be sure that additional contributions, orientations and reflections will follow. In any case it seems that the forthcoming period of the future treaty revision will be a quite exciting one for every scholar of European integration.

Notes

¹These are Mr Elmar Brok (Christian Democrat, Germany) and Ms Elisabeth Guigou (Socialist, France).

²A more political interpretation might come to the conclusion that the whole pillar structure of the EU Treaty could come under revision, as well as the future of the common security and defence policy, the extension of the Treaty to new policies (energy, tourism, etc.) and the overall organization of legislative and budgetary procedures. See Jean-Louis Boursanges' Working document on the realization of the Union; doc. PE 212.450/fin, part I.3.

³The EP adopted the Draft Treaty on the European Union (Spinelli Report) on May 14, 1984. (OJ C 77/84, p. 33).

⁴This approach seems to exclude a direct participation of national parliaments in EU decision-making, which explains some of the present orientations of the EP

⁵See the resolution on the constitution of the European Union (February 10, 1994) in EC OJ No. C 61/155.

⁶This includes arrangements for the presidency, which alternates between the two major groups. The marginalization of smaller groups since the mid-eighties and the increasing propensity of absorption of the larger ones would be an interesting subject for research.

⁷For an excellent evaluation of the first year of application of the co-decision procedure, see Gary Miller, "Post-Maastricht Legislative Procedures - Is the Council Institutionally challenged?" Paper presented at the 4th Biennial ECSA Conference, Charleston, South Carolina, 11-14 May 1995.

⁸The most interesting element in this is the hearings of candidates for Commissioner in EP's committees. See Francis Jacobs - "The EP's role in nominating the Members of the Commission. First steps towards parliamentary government or US Senate-type confirmation hearings". Paper presented at the 4th Biennial ECSA Conference, Charleston, South Carolina, 11-14 May 1995.

⁹Resolution on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - Implementation and development of the Union (Boursanges/David M. Martin report). Doc. PE 190.441. This resolution was adopted on May 17, 1995. Votes: 288 in favour, 103 against, 76 abstentions. (Publication in the OJ pending). In addition the explanatory statement by Mr David Martin can be found in Doc. PE 212.450/fin/Part I. B.2. For Mr

Bourlanges' statement see note 2.

¹⁰Resolution (see note 9). Art. 3.

¹¹Unfortunately, there is, to my knowledge, no satisfactory typology of the various forms of differentiated integration.

¹²Resolution (see note 9). Art. 16.

Member State Preferences and the IGC

Youri Devuyst

Professor of European Politics
Vrije Universiteit Brussel*

On 3 June 1995, at the commemorative Messina Conference, the European Union set up a Reflection Group to prepare the so-called Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 1996. This Conference will adapt the Union's institutional structure in the perspective of its enlargement with the Central and Eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus. Two substantive policy discussions will weigh heavily on the IGC's institutional debate. The first discussion concerns the Union's role in the economy, and this in light of Europe's struggle for competitiveness and employment in a new world economy characterized by the fast growing dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region. The second substantive policy discussion deals with the Union's foreign policy role, in view of the perceived weaknesses of the current Common Foreign and Security Policy. That the substantive policy differences between the Member States will be reflected during the IGC's institutional discussions is the red thread running through this article. The IGC is, indeed, largely a position game during which the Member States attempt to create a congenial institutional framework, favorable to their substantive policy preferences.

I. The IGC and the European Union's Economic Role

As the preamble to the Treaty of Rome indicates, ensuring "economic and social progress" has always been one of the European Community's main goals. In order to safeguard the Union's economic future in light of today's global economic revolution, the European Council in Brussels (December 1993) adopted an Action Plan for growth, competitiveness, and employment. In spite of the consensus on the broad lines of the Action Plan, there are significant differences between the Member States' concrete economic policy preferences. These differences lead to contradictory institutional priorities. Also, while the Maastricht Treaty's Economic and Monetary Union provisions are not on the agenda of the IGC in 1996, they nevertheless influence the stance taken by the Member States during the institutional debate. Broadly speaking, the positions expressed by the Member States in the economic policy debate can be summarized in three categories.

*From 1992 to 1995, Youri Devuyst served as Expert-Counsellor for European Union issues to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. This article was written in a personal capacity and does not contain the official point of view of the Belgian government. The article represents two chapters of a larger work entitled, "The European Union's Future: A Preview of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996," published by the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

I.1 Rejecting Active Economic Regulation

The first viewpoint is that expressed most clearly by the Conservative Government of the United Kingdom. Seen in a historical perspective, the UK has never been in favour of a European Community which would move beyond the stage of a free trade area. That was the reason why the UK, in the 1950s, decided not to join the Common Market of the Six, but to form a much looser alternative: the European Free Trade Area (Calleo, 1968; Camps, 1964). As was made clear in the British contribution to the strategy for growth, competitiveness and employment, the UK Government still adheres to the point of view that the Community should not develop an active economic and social policy. Through the Maastricht Treaty's Social Protocol the UK partly succeeded in escaping the constraints of the Union's social dimension. Also, Prime Minister Major managed to obtain a Protocol on EMU stating that the UK shall not be obliged or committed to move to the final stage of Economic and Monetary Union. The Conservative Government is determined to pursue its "opt-out strategy" and not to surrender any economic sovereignty during the IGC. "Britain could lose control of its own destiny", warned current Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, if it were to join the continent in such projects as a single currency (Barber and Parker, 1995).

In the tradition of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, the UK blames over-regulation for Europe's current economic problems. If Europe is to regain its competitiveness, labour markets have to become more flexible and economic structures have to be increasingly liberalized. According to this view, the European Union's main task is the completion of Internal Market liberalization. European attempts to regulate economic activities through the adoption of Community-wide legislation, "whether it relates to labour markets, social protection, the environment, health and safety or other areas" are rejected as "damag[ing] the competitiveness of European business" (United Kingdom, 1993: 289). Since the Conservative Government sees all European regulation as harmful, it is not aiming for an active Union which would be able to intervene swiftly in the European economy through a streamlined decision-making system. On the contrary, in view of its philosophical aversion from European regulation, the UK Government wants to make decision-taking as hard as possible. This implies, as former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd has stated, that the UK will try to "hang on to the British right, and the right of other countries, to say 'no'" (White et al, 1995). Thus, the UK will attempt to maintain the unanimity requirement where it still exists and to increase the threshold of the qualified majority, so as to reduce the number of votes needed for a blocking minority.

Enlargement is, in the perspective of the Conservative Government, an opportunity to impose its ideal of a more "flexible" Union. As Prime Minister John Major stated: "Greater flexibility is the only way in which we shall be able to build a Union rising to 16 and ultimately to 20 or more Member States" (Major, 1994: 6). In a more flexible Union, Members would pick and choose the areas in which they want to participate. In such a Union, characterized by a multiplication of opt-outs, the Social Protocol would serve as the positive example to follow by the Central and Eastern European candidates for membership.

I.2 Protecting Particular Mediterranean Interests

The second point of view is that vigorously expressed by Spain during the negotiations on voting in the Council, in preparation for the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden.

Spain acted in defense of the Mediterranean region. It feared that specific Mediterranean interests, such as the maintenance of the financially important economic cohesion instruments or the protection of particular agricultural and fisheries policies, would be endangered in an enlarged Union shifting to the North and the East. In the prospect of a further enlargement, Spain claimed, in 1994, a blocking minority in the Council for the Mediterranean countries. In addition to protecting established policies against dismantlement, a blocking minority for the Southern members was expected to serve a second cause: preventing the adoption of new "harmful" European legislation in such areas as social or environmental protection. While the Southern countries, in the tradition of "Latin capitalism", have no philosophical objections to economic or social regulation, they have nevertheless rejected the approval by the Council of Northern social and environmental standards, requiring extensive industrial adjustment in the Mediterranean region.

Also, Spain protested firmly against proposals for the institutionalization of a "hard core" of Northern Member States that would not only start the final phase of Economic and Monetary Union, but would also pursue integration in other economic areas without Southern involvement.

Thus, to keep a further enlargement of the Union from endangering the Mediterranean region's vested interests, Spain in particular can be expected, during the IGC, to argue against a further erosion of the Mediterranean countries' relative voting power. Spain has shown, during the enlargement negotiations of 1994, that it is willing to go to the brink to achieve this purpose.

I.3 Fostering the "Social Market Economy" through Active European Intervention

For the Community's Founding Fathers, European integration had to go well beyond the level of a free trade area. The famous Spaak Report of 1956, which formed the basis of the Treaties of Rome, stressed the necessity to eliminate distortions which could hinder the proper functioning of the Common Market. The Spaak Report proposed a specific procedure by which the Council would tackle problems as differences in direct and indirect taxation and in the financing of social security systems (Spaak, 1956: 60-66). Today, the Member States striving for the consolidation of the "social market economy" continue in the tradition embodied in the Spaak Report. They defend what Michel Albert (1991) calls "Rhineland capitalism", in which free initiative goes hand in hand with active solidarity. From the point of view of these Member States, the European Union would lose much of its interest if it would degrade into an undisciplined free trade area, as proposed by the UK, or into a mere instrument transferring resources to the poorer members but unable to tackle new challenges, as could be the consequence of Spanish demands. Consolidating the social market model, as proposed by Germany and the Benelux countries, necessitates an active European Union which not only liberalizes rigid economic structures but also ensures minimum standards for social, environmental or consumer protection. Thus, European institutions with a high decision-making capacity are essential. Two arguments are used to sustain this position.

First, Member States such as Germany and the Benelux countries share the view that continuing Internal Market liberalization and greater labour market flexibility are essential components of a successful European adjustment strategy. A policy limited to pure liberalization is insufficient, however, to deal adequately with such problems as the lack of permanent education or a degrading environment. Since the globalization of

economic activity reduces the impact of national economic, social, and environmental measures, the Rhineland countries argue that achieving a proper balance between the free market, on the one hand, and their social and environmental goals on the other, requires an active European involvement. The Commission has traditionally shared this view.

The point made by the Rhineland countries is illustrated by the carbon/energy tax story. According to the Commission, the Union as a whole suffers from a triple social and ecological problem which cannot be resolved through liberalization (Commission, 1993: 136-142 and 145-147). The components of the problem are the following:

- 1) the "underuse" of available labour resources: the European economies are characterized by structural unemployment of around 11% of the registered workforce, which is partly due to the high social security contributions which must be paid by employers;
- 2) the "overuse" of environmental resources: the Member States have only just begun to deal in economic terms with issues as the preservation of the quality of drinking water or the reduction of CO₂ emissions; and
- 3) the need to find alternative ways to finance expanding social security costs.

To deal with this triple challenge, the Commission suggested the organization of a swap between reducing the cost of labour and increasing pollution charges. More concretely, the Commission, in 1992, proposed a compulsory tax on carbon dioxide emission in all Member States. This so-called CO₂ tax was to serve three purposes:

- 1) it would limit the emission of greenhouse gases and promote the efficient use of energy;
- 2) it would generate substantial revenues, which would constitute an alternative way to finance Europe's social security systems; and
- 3) it could boost employment since it would permit a reduction in the social security contributions to be paid by employers.

The Commission proposal was strongly supported by the Rhineland countries. They appreciated the social and ecological benefits of a common European approach that would minimize competitive disadvantages among the Member States. The proposal was opposed, however, by the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent by the Union's southern members. Britain strongly argued that taxation was a matter for nations to deal with individually. Moreover, the UK and the Mediterranean countries were worried that a CO₂ tax would harm their industrial competitiveness both vis-à-vis the modern economies of Northern Europe and vis-à-vis their world-wide competitors. Because tax measures must be approved by unanimity in the Council, the resistance of the UK and the southern members could not be overcome. In the light of this experience, the defenders of the Rhineland model are currently striving for a generalization of qualified majority voting, also for environmental measures of a fiscal nature. The generalization of qualified majority voting is their only option to overcome the resistance by those members opposing an economically active European Union.

The second substantive reason for the Rhineland countries to work toward a streamlining of the Union's decision-making is related to the move toward Economic and Monetary Union. EMU

is regarded by the Rhineland countries as vital to restore a stable macroeconomic and monetary framework that forms a basis for job-creating growth. The evolution toward EMU's final phase is based on macroeconomic convergence. This implies that the economic and budgetary policies of the Member States are being brought ever closer together. From the perspective of the defenders of the Rhineland model, EMU is therefore also bound to increase the need for social and fiscal convergence. According to the Parliamentary Group of the German Christian Democrats, the core group which is laying the foundations for EMU "should strive for ever closer coordination and aim to establish common policies", not only with regard to "monetary policy", but also "in the fields of...fiscal and budgetary policy [and] economic and social policy" (CDU/CSU, 1994: 5). The alternative would be destructive social and fiscal competition, which could be especially painful for the Member States with a high degree of social protection. Achieving social and fiscal convergence requires, once again, a European Union which is able to act efficiently and which avoids decision-making paralysis.

For those Member States wanting to go beyond Internal Market liberalization, a successful economic and social adjustment necessitates a substantial streamlining of Council decision-making, including the generalization of qualified majority voting. Current plans to enlarge the Union increase, in their view, the urgency to eliminate unanimity requirements. Also, in order to prevent an enlarged Union from diluting the social and ecological dimension of the Union, the Rhineland countries will clash with the "pick and choose" model proposed by the UK. A strictly monitored "multi-speed Europe", in which all Member States accept the obligation to strive for a - necessarily gradual - integration in all policy areas, is their alternative for the "Europe à la carte".

I.4 France and the Link between Substantive Interests and Institutional Preferences

Obviously, the logic explained in this article - the link between substantive policy interests and institutional preferences - is "an abbreviation of reality". France, for instance, is a country which has always defended an active European Union, for example in the social policy field. At the same time, it also has strong intergovernmental tendencies which, in the history of European integration, have provoked grave institutional crises. It suffices to remember the 1965 empty chair policy, due in large part to President Charles de Gaulle's refusal to accept qualified majority voting from entering into force, as foreseen by the Rome Treaty, on 1 January 1966. Of course, France's refusal, in 1965, to give up the right to veto Community decisions was closely related to its substantive, mainly agricultural, interests (Camps, 1966; Couve de Murville, 1971: 334-339).

France's substantive interests today make it difficult to imagine a return to a purely intergovernmental stance, even under the Presidency of Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac. First, France has lost all illusions about sovereignty in economic policy-making during the first Mitterrand years. Since 1983, France's goal, both under Socialist and Conservative Governments, has been to search for macroeconomic and monetary stability within a European framework. German pressure to build an effective Political Union around this European monetary framework will certainly influence France's attitude during the IGC (Landau, 1993; Juppé, 1995). Second, once the Union starts a discussion on concrete policy proposals, France's theoretical views soon makes place for a pragmatic attitude. For instance,

during the negotiations on the Community's trade policy instruments in 1993, France's current Prime Minister Alain Juppé was the leading voice in favour of a proposal which would increase the Commission's powers to the detriment of the Council. France simply wanted an effective European anti-dumping and anti-subsidy policy. This substantive policy interest resulted in an institutional preference which was the opposite of France's theoretical intergovernmental view.

It remains uncertain how President Chirac's Gaullist inspiration will affect France's European policy. To the degree the negotiators at the IGC argue in terms of substantive priorities and rational policy interests, France might nevertheless more closely toward the side of the Federal Republic and the other Rhineland countries than the Gaullist rhetoric would predict.

II. The IGC and the Common Foreign and Security Policy

One of the innovations included in the Treaty of Maastricht was the creation of the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). According to the Treaty, the CFSP shall include "the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense". The Western European Union (WEU) was charged with the elaboration and implementations of Union's decisions with defense implications. In spite of the promising wording of this new CFSP Treaty title, it is hard to discover meaningful differences with the level of foreign policy coordination which existed under European Political Cooperation, before the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht. The CFSP's lack of effectiveness has led to almost daily "Union bashing" in the media. In many respects, the failing CFSP has served as the scapegoat that is being blamed for all foreign policy tragedies in Europe, in particular for the continuing war in the former Yugoslavia. It is not surprising, therefore, that improving the CFSP's functioning is listed as one of the IGC's priorities in most preparatory reports. Still, disagreement exists firstly on the relative importance to be attributed to the CFSP during the IGC, secondly on the role which the Union should play in the foreign policy and defense fields, and thirdly on the concrete steps which must be made to improve the CFSP's effectiveness.

II.1 The Relative Importance of the CFSP

With regard to the relative importance of the CFSP among the other topics for discussion during the IGC, two viewpoints stand out.

The first viewpoint is that most clearly expressed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to the Belgian Minister, strengthening the economic and social dimension of the Union must be regarded as the IGC's top priority. "However," he added in a speech on 3 April 1995:

"with preparations for the IGC under way, all eyes seem to be fixed on such problems as the restructuring of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Given our past experiences in former Yugoslavia and the justified media-attention for the CFSP, this is hardly surprising...But, considering what Richard Rosecrance describes as 'The Rise of the Trading State', we must keep in mind that the international position of Europe in the medium to long term will be determined mainly by its economic power, rather than by classical diplomatic and military means. Moreover, I believe that the European citizens are much more interested in what Europe can do

for them in terms of employment or social security, than in the power and influence projected by the European Union on the international stage. For these reasons, I insist that we should forget neither to reinforce economic and social integration, nor to improve the old European 'Economic' Community's decisions-making capability." (Derycke, 1995: 2).

The opposite viewpoint is that of the United Kingdom (Rifkind, 1995: 17-31). For the UK, the CFSP is one of the few "safe" areas of cooperation. By taking a leading role during the IGC's preparations regarding European foreign and defense cooperation, the UK tries to ensure that the CFSP keeps its "harmless" intergovernmental character. At the same time, focusing on the CFSP distracts attention from the "deepening" exercise in the "Economic" Community pillar. Apparently, the UK has decided to make such a constructive contribution in the area of security and defense that, in counterpart, it hopes to extract concessions toward a reduced "centralism" or "federalism" in the other areas of integration. This reasoning is precisely what is feared by the integration-minded Member States that want to strengthen the decision-making capacity of the Union's "economic core" in preparation for a new enlargement round.

II.2 The Union's role in Foreign and Defense Policy: The Member States' Substantive Preferences

The discussion on the relative importance of the CFSP must be distinguished from the debate regarding the form which the Union's foreign policy activities should take. At least five points of view can be distinguished regarding the latter problem.

First is the long-term and maximalist view, as expressed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. "[A] genuine 'Euro-diplomacy,'" he stated, "will only become possible through coherent action, in which external economic relations and classic foreign and security policies are integrated and implemented according to the same procedures." Although he realized that this maximalist point of view would not obtain a consensus during the IGC, the Belgian Minister insisted that "a European foreign policy would be better able to translate the full economic importance of Europe into political influence, if it, too, followed the Community method: i.e. the Commission takes the initiative, the Council decides by a qualified majority, the European Parliament exercises its democratic control and the Commission sees to the implementation of policies under the supervision of the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. Any other method," he added, "whether intergovernmental or mixed, is bound to be less efficient and will eventually fail the test of subsidiarity" (Derycke, 1995: 7).

The point of view expressed by the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister is inspired by the experience of the small Member States that, on an individual basis, have lost all influence on the world stage. Through the Community method, however, the small Member States have experienced a relative power gain, at least in external trade matters. During the Uruguay Round, for instance, particular interests of countries like Greece and Portugal were defended with vigor by the Community as a whole. Within the intergovernmental CFSP, on the contrary, the role of the small Member States is minimal. The EU's policy toward the former Yugoslavia, for instance, is determined by a "directoire", in the form of the so-called Contact Group in which only the large Member States are represented. Thus, for the small Member States, the creation of an efficient Euro-diplomacy in accordance with the Community method, looks by far the most attractive alternative.

A second viewpoint is defended by the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany too wants to move decisively in the direction of a powerful Euro-diplomacy which includes a common defense. Germany's interests are different from those expressed by a small country like Belgium. As the Parliamentary Group of the German Christian Democrats stated, referring notably to foreign and defense policy: "Owing to its geographical location, its size and its history, Germany has a specific interest in preventing Europe from drifting apart. If Europe were to drift apart, Germany would once again find itself caught in the middle between East and West, a position which throughout its history has made it difficult for Germany...to establish a stable and lasting balance in its external relations". Under the current post-Cold War conditions, a further integration, in particular in the foreign policy and defense field, is seen as crucial to prevent a return to an unstable past: "If (West) European integration were not to progress", the German Christian Democrats argue, "Germany might be called upon, or be tempted by its own security constraints, to try to effect the stabilization of Eastern Europe on its own and in the traditional way" (CDU/CSU, 1994: 2-3). The Party of Chancellor Kohl is striving for, firstly, a European foreign and security policy system that is an effective force in favour of stability on the entire European continent. The second characteristic aimed for by the CDU/CSU, is a CFSP capable of assuring "control over Germany by its partners" while allowing some degree of "control over these partners by Germany" (CDU/CSU: 1994, 2). In order to accomplish the purpose of binding Germany firmly to Europe and vice versa, the Federal Republic is looking for institutional structures that go well beyond pure intergovernmentalism. However, in a realistic effort to make concrete progress toward an effective "Euro-diplomacy", Germany's first objective is to find common ground with France. The Treaty of Maastricht's CFSP title too, found its basis in a joint initiative by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand.

France's viewpoint on the CFSP, the third perspective examined here, does not exclude a further move toward closer foreign and security cooperation. For France, "deepening" the CFSP is important for two reasons. First, CFSP-discipline should be strengthened in order to prevent that - in an enlarged Union - foreign policy coherence would dilute while Germany, as a centrally located and economically dominant player, would acquire far greater power and assume a dominant foreign policy position. Second, a strengthened CFSP is France's only hope to engrandize its position as a former "great power". In order to achieve its "power projection" goal as a diminished player, France has - since the days of President Charles de Gaulle and his famous Fouchet proposals - played a leading role in the development of a European foreign and defense identity which would provide the Republic with a sounding board for its foreign and defense positions (Bloes, 1970). While it shares with Germany a substantial interest in the improvement of CFSP coherence, France's method is more directed toward intergovernmentalism than Germany's. Indeed, as a former "great power", France is not envisaging to decrease the traditional role of those nations with a "glorious" past. On the contrary, as a permanent member of the Security Council, France is looking favorably toward consolidation of a European foreign policy "directoire" that would get its world-standing, however, by speaking on behalf of the European Union as a whole.

The fourth viewpoint on the CFSP is that expressed by the United Kingdom. With even more persistence than France, the UK has been arguing that Europe's action in the foreign, security and defense fields should first of all be "inter-Governmental, based on cooperation between nation states, and not dictated by

supra-national bodies" (Rifkind, 1995: 25). Also, the UK uses the prospect of enlargement to plead in favour of defense arrangements that will strengthen rather than weaken flexibility. Thus, the UK would like to increase the role of NATO partners Turkey, Norway and Iceland in the WEU. This last element is, obviously, linked to the UK's strategy aimed at preserving the leading foreign policy and defense role of the Atlantic Alliance. Through the NATO framework, the UK hopes to maintain a greater foreign policy role than would be possible in the EU system, where it is unable to rely on "the special relationship" with the United States.

Finally, the fifth perspective on the further development of the CFSP will be that of the Member States with a tradition of foreign policy restraint or neutralism. Obviously, all Member States have accepted the CFSP and the common defense goal. Also, upon their accession to the Union, Austria, Finland and Sweden formally agreed "to take on, in their entirety and without reservations, all the objectives of the Treaty, the provisions of its Title V [on the CFSP], and the relevant declarations attached to it" (Council, 1994: 44). Still, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria are not members of the WEU. While their attitude, in particular toward European defense cooperation has always been characterized by extreme reluctance, it is difficult to predict their stance during the IGC in view of the profound geo-political changes which have occurred on the European continent since 1989. The Danish government, for instance, requested a major study on the post-Cold War security situation and its consequences for the Danish position during the European Union's institutional debate on the CFSP and the common defense (Danish Commission, 1995).

II.3 The IGC and the CFSP: Concrete Institutional Options

The disagreement on substantive policy preferences will, obviously, be reflected during the IGC's discussion regarding concrete institutional options for the CFSP. The following paragraphs give a brief overview of the main ideas which are currently being advanced to change the CFSP institutional structure. When evaluating the EU's experience with the CFSP, the Council (1995: 25-29), in its report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union, made a distinction between three stages of conducting a foreign policy: planning (the input stage), decision-making, and implementation (the output stage).

The CFSP's input stage has been characterized by fragmentation in planning and by the lack of a central "motor" equipped to provide a coherent view of the total political, economic and military security picture. In order to remedy this defect, a consensus seems to be emerging in favour of the creation of a permanent central analysis and evaluation center in Brussels, that would prepare CFSP strategies to be discussed by the European Council and the Council. This central planning body could be incorporated either in the Commission or in the Council's General Secretariat. Alternatively, a number of Member States are thinking about the creation of a separate General Secretariat or High Authority for the CFSP which would work in close contact with Council and Commission. Whether this new body should receive the (non-exclusive) right of initiative, and thus the right to act as "the motor" of the CFSP is also a point of controversy between the Member States.

The decision-making stage of the CFSP has been marked by rigidity. As the Council report evaluating the Treaty of Maastricht states: "Unanimity has been the rule. Neither the qualified majority, use of which is made possible by Article J.3(2) of the

TEU, nor the possibility allowed for in Article J.3(7), has been used" (Council, 1995: 27). A report on the CFSP, by a high-level group formed at the request of Commissioner Hans van den Broek, proposed to make a distinction between CFSP decisions with military implications and those without. For decisions without military implications, the group suggested the introduction of qualified majority voting, though subject to a special ponderation of the votes which more accurately reflects the different political and military weight of individual Member States. In case of decisions with military implications, the decision would be taken only among those Member States effectively contributing to the EU's military resources (High-Level Group, 1994: 19). It is clear that the removal of the general consensus practice in the CFSP would be very difficult to accept for the adherents of the intergovernmental viewpoint.

With regard to the output stage, the Council's report identifies two important problems. The first problem concerns the EU's profile and representation on the international stage. While the EU is currently represented by the rotating Presidency or the Troika, some Member States advocate the need for a continuous high-profile presence on the international scene. For a federalist country like Belgium, the ideal solution would be to put the Commission in charge of CFSP policy-implementation, since that would also strengthen the link between the CFSP and external trade policy. An alternative idea which has been advanced by the intergovernmental-oriented members is the designation, by the European Council, of a prominent senior figure to personify the CFSP over a period of several years. France has shown particular sympathy for this idea. The name of former President Giscard d'Estaing has been informally advanced as a suitable candidate for the position.

The second problem with regard to the implementation of CFSP decisions is its financing. As the Council report stresses, "[T]he funding of the CFSP has given rise to controversy and has not yet been resolved" (Council, 1995: 28). One of the aspects of the problem is the European Parliament's attempt to increase its political control over the CFSP by exercising its budgetary powers. Giving the CFSP the necessary financial means to fulfil its tasks, without constant recourse to national contributions, is one of the main objectives of the integration-oriented Member States.

Finally, in the defense area, the UK has taken the lead by proposing a framework for discussion on the role of the Western European Union (WEU). Integration-minded Member States such as Germany and the Benelux countries see the WEU as a subsidiary of the European Union. In this perspective, the WEU should be fully integrated in the Union. Under the Union's direction, the WEU's main long-term project should be the implementation of the common defense goal, as foreseen by the Treaty of Maastricht. The UK's ideas regarding defense cooperation are of an entirely different nature (Rifkind, 1995: 17-32). The UK explicitly rejects the option of simply folding the WEU into the European Union. According to the Conservative Government, maintaining the WEU as a separate organization guarantees that its essential intergovernmental nature would be preserved, with none of the involvement of the European Commission or the European Parliament which is provided for elsewhere in the European Union's structure. In order to strengthen the WEU's intergovernmental character, the UK proposes the creation of a new WEU body at Heads of State and Government level, involving the WEU's full members, associate members (Turkey, Norway, Iceland), and observers. This new body would meet "back-to-back" with the European Council.

Also, the hierarchy between the Union and the WEU, foreseen in Maastricht, would be eliminated. As a result, the WEU would no longer receive political guidelines from the Union. Instead, the Union would merely be allowed to address "proposals" to the WEU Summit, thus subjecting all European decisions on defense to the separate approval of this new and intergovernmental body. In operational terms, the UK wants the WEU to focus on minimalist tasks, while the common defense in the strict sense should remain a matter for NATO. For a Member State like France, which tries to foster greater European self-sufficiency in defense, giving NATO's non-EU members such as Turkey, Norway and Iceland a decisive say in Europe's defense policy is likely to be unacceptable.

The concrete steps currently envisaged with regard to the CFSP are far from spectacular. This is not surprising in view of the substantive policy differences between the Member States. The main players, including the Commission, have apparently come to the conclusion that foreign policy, security and defense issues are 'special cases' to which it is impossible artificially to apply 'Community' formulas. It is unlikely, therefore, that the IGC will be able to close the "gap between expectations and capabilities" in the CFSP area (Hill, 1993: 305-328). Also, through intergovernmental attempts at "power projection" via declarations and common positions, the CFSP is likely to play only a minor role in the economic and political stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe.

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Reform, Restoration and European Integration: American Influence in Postwar Italy

John Gillingham
Department of History
University of Missouri, St. Louis*

The history of postwar Italy is complicated, fascinating and, thanks to the recent work of a number of first-rate scholars, instructive in regard to two issues relating to the origins of integration. One is the American role in reorganizing and reviving Europe: Was it large or small? The other concern is more specific: Did Italy support the creation of a united Europe because of the United States or for more compelling reasons of its own? Both sides of these questions have now been argued for many years in various ways, at different layers of analysis, and in a number of contexts. A brief survey like this one cannot get to the bottom of such issues, nor do justice to every individual contribution. Such superficiality would be inexcusable in discussing a literature beset with controversy. In our case, however, a high degree of consensus prevails; we can thus limit ourselves to singling out certain of the more important conclusions that emerge from recent writings and citing just a few important works, though always with the caveat that others may well be equally worth mentioning.¹

The first conclusion is that from the very outset anti-communism took precedence over reform as a motive in both American and Italian policy-making. Italy was of course: the first European nation to be liberated, if only in part; the scene of

*With thanks to Chiarella Esposito for comments and suggestions.

a kind of civil war; and a former enemy with a discredited fascist government but also a powerful resistance movement under heavy communist influence. In 1945 and 1946 it appeared, at least to Americans, as if Italy might undergo something like the New Deal. Fresh leadership entered the postwar cabinets, representatives of the main elements of the resistance -- Communists (PCI), Socialists (PSIUP), Christian Democrats (DC), and the so-called Action Party, which would soon decline. They all proclaimed the need for new beginnings.

Appearances could be deceptive. Thinking on the right was in a pre-fascist mold, be it traditional liberalism or Catholic corporatism; doctrinaire Marxism along with an absence of any economic program prevailed on the left. A vast gulf divided the two. Necessity rather than choice determined the tripartite political configuration. The CGIL, the new united labor federation, was the only organization that could command the political loyalties of urban antifascists; without its help, order could neither have been restored nor maintained.²

American support for CGIL and the tripartite cabinets, in which the PCI participated, was always heavily qualified. One source of opposition, as demonstrated in strikingly similar studies by Federico Romero (The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944-1951 [Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992]) and Ronald Filippelli (American Labor and Postwar Italy, 1943-1953 [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989]), was the American Federation of Labor (AFL), whose representatives, often battle-scarred veterans of struggles against communists in the labor movement, featured prominently in the occupation government. Their aim of splitting the federation would be realized in the summer of 1948, after an attempted assassination of Communist party chief Palmiro Togliatti, in July.

The second point is that the "politics of productivity" championed by the Marshall Plan had an essentially political rather than economic function. The idea behind "the politics of productivity" was that enlightened labor practices would reduce costs enabling wages and investment to rise, thereby increasing productivity, purchasing power and living standards. In the long-run, then, Italy could shift from low-wage exportation to high-wage consumerism, stability, and democracy.³

The necessary institutional basis for such a policy simply did not exist in Italy; consequently, Michael Hogan's thesis that the Marshall Plan introduced Europe to American "corporate capitalism" -- featuring producer cooperation, close ties between state and industry, and labor co-determination in some form -- clearly does not apply.⁴

Its validity in the American context might even be questioned. The possibility of a New Deal-inspired partnership between labor and capital, as sought notably by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), did not, in Romero's view, survive the massive winter strikes of 1946. Truman's expulsion of Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace from the cabinet in September betokened a sharp lurch to the right, and the elections of November, which resulted in a Republican landslide, confirmed the course. After the 1948 rout of the Progressive Party, even the CIO dropped its demands for co-partnership. European Recovery Program (ERP)-sponsored "Americanization" of Italian industrial relations was not firmly grounded in US reality.

The real purpose of the reformist ideology, in other words, was to weaken the Italian left. This objective unwittingly set American policy on a contradictory course, in opposition to Italians of similar views; only after the Christian Democratic triumph in 1948 did the ERP-men fully realize that in economics

"their" Italians thought like Midwestern Republicans!

A third point, which receives special emphasis in Esposito's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950 (Greenwood Press: Westport, CT/London, 1994), is that American anticommunism made reform policy hostage to conservative Italian governments intent upon restoration. Beginning in Spring 1947 the DC ran the Italian economy with methods crafted to keep labor costs low, the lira cheap and stable, and exports of goods and excess manpower high. Only after fascist-era inefficiencies had been wrung out and "stabilization" achieved could modernization be considered. Esposito marshals instance after instance of successful Italian resistance to ERP pressure -- exerted by withholding counterpart funds -- for increases in industrial investment, housing, and transfer payments. In short, Italy's new political institutions, superimposed upon a society that had undergone little change since the fascist era, operated as Italians chose to operate them.

As the De Gasperi government prepared to move at least one step in the direction of the ERP by entering the so-called "modernization phase" of development, the Korean War intervened. The Bank of Italy, in other words, had begun at this time to reduce interest rates in order to stimulate private sector borrowing. The cuts would, however, have mainly benefited established interests because of the tax laws in effect. Envisaged were productivity increases without reform.

Lorenza Sebesta's L'Europa indifesa: Sistema di Sicurezza atlantico e caso italiano, 1948-1955 (Florence: Ponte Alle Grazie, 1991) -- to get to the next important conclusion -- demonstrates that in the early 1950's the Italians managed to use military assistance, which in value roughly equaled the annual rate of Marshall Plan aid, to promote the modernization policy. The purpose of the 1951 Mutual Security Act, under which most of it was provided, was to promote rearmament. The Italian government failed, as did NATO governments generally, to persuade the US to invest in "high tech" defense sectors such as electronics, aviation, and precision machinery, or in fact to purchase much of anything in Italy other than munitions. The US did, however, outfit the Italian Army, releasing funds that the government directed into the fields of energy, agriculture, basic industry, chemicals, textiles and infrastructures.

Point number five, harkening back to the first conclusion, concerns common Italo-American interests and viewpoints: they extended to the issue of international organization as well as that of anticommunism. As Leopoldo Nuti (see "Italy and the Defense of NATO's Southern Flank, 1949-1955," in Klaus A. Maier and Norbert Wiggershaus, eds., Das Nordatlantische Bündnis, 1949-1956 [München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993]) and others have emphasized, Italy embraced NATO membership both for security reasons and in order to gain diplomatic respectability. Ruggiero Ranieri ("L'espansione alla prova del negoziato. L'industria italiana e la Comunità del carbone e dell'acciaio 1945-1955," Dissertation, European University Institute, Firenze, 1988) discovers that a similar combination of motives accounts for support of membership in the European Coal and Steel Community, whose founding the United States also strongly endorsed.

Federico Romero has gone one step further. He argues in a still unpublished paper ("Europe as a Tool of Nation-Building. The Culture, Language and Politics of Italy's Postwar Europeanism," DOC IUE 272/94, Col. 45), presented at colloquium held from 26 to 29 October 1994 in Florence and Bologna on "Beyond the Cold War: The United States and the Renewal of Support," that European integration served as an

important mechanism of community formation. The persistence of traditional social structures, the lack of satisfactory ideological alternatives, and frustration at Italy's inability to overcome historic problems combined, paradoxically, with steady economic growth, an improving diplomatic climate, and better business opportunities to create a climate of public opinion almost universally in favor of "Europe." The sentiments rested at bottom on a conviction that decision-making at this higher level would better serve Italian interests than could any national government.

It would be premature at this juncture to put forth firm conclusions about the representativeness of the Italian case. Unlike France, Italy was a defeated enemy power, experienced occupation, was the scene of a quasi-civil war, followed (after 1947) the classic prescriptions of economic liberalism, and did not build up the apparatus of the welfare states until the early 1970's. But the German situation is also not altogether comparable to the Italian because, in the ex-Nazi state, the occupation lasted long after the end of the war, civil strife was absent, the left remained weak, the nation was divided, a social democratic alternative was available to the Catholic party in the Federal Republic, and -- one might add -- necessary organizational structures of local origin were on hand for New Deal arrangements of the corporatist variety.

Esposito's Feeble Weapon, the first attempt at country-to-country comparison of US Marshall Plan influence, concludes that it was not much greater in France than in Italy. There, too, the Americans were hostage to anticommunist governments, in this case centrist coalitions, for which, once again, no alternative existed. Although French policy preferences were more like those of the ERP than in the Italian case -- in part because of the special role of the Monnet Plan -- the strength of the technocratic tradition provides the explanation. In any event, Esposito reveals that again and again French resistance overcame American dicta regarding the use of counterpart funds. Irwin Wall's The United States and the Making of Postwar France (Cambridge University Press, 1991) reaches similar conclusions.

Several of the contributors to Clemens Wurm's edited volume, Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945-1960 (Oxford/Washington: Berg Publishers, 1995) echo the points of emphasis in the Italian literature, in particular, parallelism with the United States as regards both anticommunism and integration-transatlanticism and an American inability to impose priorities in the host nation. Anthony Carew's findings in the British case (see Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987]) are essentially similar.

The historical literature of American influence on European reconstruction nevertheless remains spotty. Sorely lacking are studies of technology transfer both public and private, be it in the realm of science or consumer products. In closing, one should also emphasize the need for inquiries such as those of David Ellwood that include culture as well as economics and politics as components of the Americanization process. It is, Ellwood cites in conclusion to a paper ("American Power and European Culture in the Cold War Era") presented at the 1994 colloquium mentioned above, "...time to examine both what has been exported and what remains unknown abroad...(as well as) appropriate to analyze the modular structure of American culture, to see how it is taken apart, shipped abroad in little pieces, interpreted, and assimilated."⁵

¹John Lamberton Harper, America and the Reconstruction of Italy 1945-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); James E. Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).

²Paolo Baffi, "Via nazionale e gli economisti stranieri, 1944-1953," Rivista di Storia Economica 11.1 (February 1985): 1-45; Giorgio Mori, ed., La cultura economica nel periodo della ricostruzione (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1980); Rosaria Quartararo, "L'Italia e il Piano Marshall (1947-1952)," Storia Contemporanea, 16.4 (August 1984): 647-722.

³Pier Paolo D'Atorre, "Anche noi possiamo essere prosperi. Aiuti ERP e politiche della produttività negli anni cinquanta," Quaderni Storici 58.1 (April 1985): 55-93; David W. Ellwood, "Il Piano Marshall e il processo di modernizzazione in Italia," in Elena Aga Rossi, ed., Il Piano Marshall e l'Europa (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1983): 149-161.

⁴Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

⁵See also Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

Book Reviews

Jacques Delors and European Integration. George Ross, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

George Ross, noted observer and analyst of the French political scene and West European labor unions, was given a unique opportunity in Brussels in 1991: to be a participant observer in the work of the Delors Cabinet and have free reign of meetings, documents and interviews. As Ross had already written, "very little is known about the workings of the Cabinet system inside the EC [European Commission] and even less about the Delors Cabinet."¹ His enviable opportunity occurred almost accidentally. A mix of happenstance and intuition prompted Ross to propose to Delors' *Chef de Cabinet*, Pascal Lamy, that someone study the Cabinet and Lamy liked the idea. That, and the fact that both Lamy and Delors were also intrigued by the possibility of obtaining some scholarly testimony to their tenure, set things in motion. The timing of Ross' study was even more fortuitous. His stay in Brussels coincided with some of the most critical negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty and a turning point in the fortunes of Delors, the European Commission and Europe writ large. The result is a fascinating book, full of insight and rich in information.

Jacques Delors and European Integration is, in fact, more than just one study; it is several studies rolled into one. First, it provides the most detailed description available anywhere of the workings of a presidential Cabinet and the many ways it can interface with the lead players in the European Commission and its various directorates general. It also chronicles in fine detail the negotiation of the Treaty on European Union. Last but not least, it sheds light on the political style and leadership strategies of both Jacques Delors and Pascal Lamy, thus providing valuable material on leadership and the role of the individual in politics.

Ross seeks to go a long way beyond mere narrative even though he adopts an "expository strategy" in the book. I could not agree more with the reasons he offers for his choice:

The European Community/Union as a political system is enormously complex, so much so, in fact, that many scholars are tempted to premature theorizing that truncates reality or to baffling journeys through multiple institutions and procedures further obscured by acronyms (p. viii).

Ross does not engage in premature theorizing, thank goodness. He also refuses to "collapse the case-study material into any too-rigid analytical framework"(p. viii). He does, however, boldly claim that the decisive action of the European Commission, along with the work of other actors, played a central role in pointing Europe towards a renaissance of ambition. In addition, he offers us an explicit conceptual framework, that of "political opportunity structure," which he asserts is adaptable to the EC. The underlying thesis of the concept of political opportunity structure is that "the workings of institutions and the proclivities of elite social groups vary over time to facilitate or block movements for change even as they also partly shape them" (pp. 5-6). This is a notion familiar to comparativists and a welcome and refreshing change from the approaches currently in vogue among IR scholars which bear less and less relation to real people, everyday events and major currents of change sweeping through international politics and economics.

The reader is reminded more than once that the book is about "the turning point of Delorist strategy for regenerating European integration in the 1990's" and situating this "turning point in the life of the European Community and its institutions" (p. 20). Ross set about doing this by following as many of what he calls the "hot dossiers" on the Delors strategic agenda as possible, from President through the Cabinet and Commission (p. 72). In order to do this he needed to steep himself in the documents, familiarize himself with the terminology and the jargon, interview, at length, many officials inside the Commission, and live as part of the team that made up the Delors Cabinet. Understandably, given the force of Delors' intellect and personality and the outstanding political and managerial capacities of Lamy, Ross, the participant observer, rapidly became drawn into the magnetic field generated by his subjects. The members of the Cabinet are referred to by their first names, the niceties of after-dinner smoking etiquette are explained and the reader is asked to share the author's quest for an acceptable mode of addressing Delors (since Delors made it very clear to Ross that he did not like to be called Monsieur le President). As a result, despite all his good intentions and careful research, Ross is likely to lose even the best informed reader on occasion. As he himself admits, "It is hard not to be marked by proximity to a great project" (p. ix). The book is much sounder later when Ross gets into the "hot dossiers."

There is an admirable prologue to this, "Europe Comes Alive," in which Ross introduces us to Delors and his political development as a Christian social democrat and confirmed federalist, who "knew full well that the earlier federalist dream of the 'United States of Europe' was no longer plausible" (p. 47). There is also a lucid brief account of the constitutional development of the Commission, the powers of its president, the way Delors and Lamy structured the Cabinet and, through it, imprinted the Commission and European politics for the next ten years spanning Delors' presidency from 1985-1994. This is one of the best summaries I have seen of the Single Market project and its implementation during Delors' first four-year term.

The "hot dossiers" are those all too familiar to us today: the systematic but trouble-ridden preparation of the Economic and Monetary Union buffeted by increasingly frequent turmoil on the international monetary scene; the much less systematic, at times almost inept, efforts to develop a common foreign and security policy; the hasty packaging of the Political Union; and what Ross entitles "Organizing European Space"--the CAP, industrial policy, science and technology and competition (pp. 107-135).

Throughout, one of the keys to Delors' success was what the insiders termed the "Russian doll" strategy:

The Russian doll metaphor implied iterated episodes of strategic action to seize upon openings in the political opportunity structure, resource accumulation through success, and reinvestment of these resources in new actions to capitalize on new opportunities (p. 39).

But political packaging and the Russian doll strategy worked only in certain contexts. When the European economy started unraveling in 1991 and Delors, his Cabinet and the Commission as a whole lost the power it had built up during the 1980's, repeated efforts to apply the strategy were to no avail. Indeed, the concluding chapter of the book, "The Delors Strategy at the End of the Day" is perhaps the strongest confirmation of the claim Ross makes at the outset: that two processes, not one, were at work to get the EC moving after 1985. "The first was a changing political opportunity structure, itself connected to broader contextual changes as impinging on EC institutions and policy legacies. The second was successful strategizing and resource mobilization by agents for change...to capitalize upon these prospects" (p. 12). With the benefit of hindsight we know only too well that Delors had a probably unrealizable vision and that the Commission went too far too fast.

This does not mean that I do not heartily agree with the book's judgement that Jacques Delors was the most successful Commission leader in the history of the Community--for a while. But, he was surely wise to withdraw from close involvement with the European Union after his term was up and refuse to become embroiled in the 1995 French presidential race. After all, as The Economist noted recently, Jacques Santer, the current President, "got his job precisely because the big countries, and Britain especially, were fed up with the high-profile and often abrasive leadership of Mr Delors" (July 15, 1995, p. 34). President Santer certainly does not run the risk of heading a Commission like that headed by Jacques Delors in the early 1990's, whose pugnaciousness made many people afraid of Brussels. The struggle for influence between the Commission and the national governments is indeed a constant theme, but it does not bode well for the successful conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the consolidation of the European Union to see the current president of the Commission already vying for the title of most ineffectual. Surely one element of Delors' success was that he was able to stand up to the big countries (not to mention be a match for their leaders) rather than be their poodle.

Glenda G. Rosenthal
Columbia University

¹"Inside the Delors Cabinet," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4: December 1994, p. 500.

Sharon Macdonald (ed.) Inside European Identities: Ethnography in Western Europe. (Providence: Berg, 1993)

Thomas M. Wilson and M. Estellie Smith (eds.) Cultural Change and the New Europe: Perspectives on the European Community. (Boulder: Westview, 1993)

The social reality of the European Union will rise or fall on its members' sense of sharing a common culture and identity. Yet according to the writers in these two collections of anthropological essays, *European* is a problematic concept or, at the very least, a concept still in construction. For these authors, the questions confronting the peoples of Europe are (1) what does being a European mean and (2) what does being a member of its (economic, political, social, cultural) Union mean. As Thomas Wilson pointed out earlier in these pages:

The EU has had an important effect on a wide range of social and cultural identities in Europe, forcing many groups of people to reconstruct their notions of nation, state, and sovereignty, and to renegotiate the many symbolic markers to the boundaries between groups which the EU, as a post-modern political structure, has transformed. ("The Anthropology of the European Union," *ECSA Newsletter*, Fall 1995, p. 14)

The anthropologists in these volumes under review illustrate Wilson's assertion as they confront the two questions above. Those contributing to Sharon Macdonald's volume, *Inside European Identities*, directly address the first issue: what being a European means. This anthropologists in Thomas Wilson and M. Estellie Smith's volume, *Cultural Change and the New Europe*, are also concerned with identity, but focus more directly on people's relations with the EU.

The articles in Sharon Macdonald's valuable volume cover the contemporary range of anthropological discourse from straight social science (Cecil, Bowie) to chatty remembrance (Chapman) and finally to post-modern dilemmas of identity (McKechnie). As Macdonald points out in her fine introduction, "Identity Complexes in Western Europe." the authors try to look beyond the historical community by addressing historical considerations and/or by looking at larger, often transnational, social groups (e.g., immigrants, ethnic and racial groups, volunteer organizations). Cris Shore's contribution, "Ethnicity as Revolutionary Strategy", is an interesting attempt to analyze the Italian Communist Party as an ethnic group. Jeremy MacClancy discusses "acting Basque" as the accepted Basque criteria for determining who is Basque. Oonagh O'Brien's "Good to be French?" shows how Catalans who work for the French government assert their ethnicity by (over) emphasizing their Catalan identity. Rosemary McKechnie offers a reflective study on having a (self-perceived) marginalized political identity (Scots) and studying other marginalized peoples (Corsicans). Malcolm Chapman's piece on Cumbria begins as an amiable ethnographic chat about "moral geography" and ends by making sharp observations about the pitfalls of social science research and the resulting political (and moral) consequences. Maryon McDonald's concluding article, "The Construction of Difference," is an excellent summary of the anthropological study of stereotypes and the processes involved in creating and maintaining them.

I have one criticism of this volume which does not, however, affect my overall recommendation. Despite its restricted ethnographic range (two articles each on Italy, Spain, France, and

three on Britain), there is a concentration on marginal peoples and the penetration of their communities by outside forces. But it is often difficult to ascertain from these articles the relative importance of the different agents of penetration (e.g., the State, Euro-bureaucracy, mass media, consumerism). Thus, while these people's formerly secure identities are threatened, it is not clear how much they are threatened and from which directions.

The Wilson and Smith volume is an interesting contrast to Macdonald. Macdonald's volume offers a broad topical focus (identity), but a restricted data set (marginal peoples in four European countries). Wilson and Smith offer a somewhat narrower topical focus ("culture change in a reconstructing New Europe of the EC" p. vii), but an eclectic set of examples. Thomas Wilson contributes the informative opening essay on the "Anthropology of the European Community" and a cautionary tale, "Frontiers Go But Boundaries Reamin," which queries the assumption that a Europe without borders will necessarily be a united Europe. Using Irish case material, Wilson argues that not only will bellicose cultural divides persist, but local security concerns may thwart efforts toward unity. Alexandria Jaffe and Janeen Arnold Costa also offer cautionary tales arguing that for many countries marginal to the European centers of power (Corsica for Jaffe and Greece, Spain and Portugal for Costa), European unity presents disturbing and often suspect opportunities. In one of the best essays in the volume, Charles J.M.R. Gullick shows how many of the above concerns, typical of marginalized populations, also apply to European elites, specifically bankers and financiers.

This book also offers a number of programmatic pieces which should inspire and guide further research. M. Estellie Smith investigates the EC's institutional neglect of cities and how cities have responded. André Jurjus highlights how intermediate structures (e.g. cooperatives, farmer's organizations, collective marketing groups) affect the implementation of EC policies and thus how these structures are often more important to local peoples than those of the State. Mark Shutes, using data from European dairy farms, demonstrates how anthropological insights from particular communities can be extended to more distant groups. Thus he demonstrates how anthropology's micro-models, usually depreciated for being applicable to only one locality, can generate predictive statements. Susan Parman's "The Future of European Boundaries," also asserts the predictive value of anthropological research when she investigates how "an ethnic group [Scots] acquires class-oriented, nationalist political aspirations to breach existing nation-state boundaries" (p.189). Of particular interest to many readers will be Parman's use of social boundary theory to account for why sub-national groups are acquiring prominence as the supra-national EC subordinates the nation-state. Gary McDonogh presents a closely reasoned piece on "European Integration, Immigration, and Identity" and argues that the tools anthropologists have developed are particularly appropriate for investigating this subject. Hervé Varenne concludes this volume with some thoughts about the constructed nature of identity and what this means for "European Nationalism," as he defines it.

While both of these volumes are worth studying, the non-anthropological scholar will probably find the Wilson and Smith offering more immediately accessible because it directly addresses issues typically of concern to political scientists, administrators, and area specialists. The Macdonald volume should not be overlooked, however. Although at first glance it may seem typically anthropological (stories of marginal peoples in marginal areas), the issues it raises and the conclusions it

presents are applicable to the core populations of the EC which are struggling with many of the same issues. Indeed the marginal peoples typical of anthropological interest can be viewed as canaries in the coal mine. The problems that will eventually confront all Europeans appear first and most virulently among these peoples.

Robert Roy Reed
The Ohio State University

Women in Nordic Politics: Closing the Gap. Edited by Lauri Karvonen and Per Selle. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995.

Why have Nordic women opposed European integration? What threats do Nordic women feel the EU presents for their states and their status within those states? Is their skepticism well-founded? Why do Nordic women and men vary in their perceptions of the EU? The recently-published volume Women in Nordic Politics helps illuminate some of these questions, while it challenges certain presumptions behind them.

The book is an eclectic collection of informative, detailed essays on the dynamics of Scandinavian women's political activity since World War II. Essays range in topic from Scandinavian women's voting behavior, party activity (including one chapter specifically on Social Democratic parties), trade union activity, and local voluntary activity, to alternative women's movements and a textual analysis of the evolution of male and female candidates' campaign language over the past 40 years. While not all of the chapters will be relevant to European integration scholars, Women in Nordic Politics offers detailed analyses of women's political participation in Nordic states, and may be useful as a supplementary resource, especially when focusing on the EU's impact on Scandinavia.

Editors Lauri Karvonen and Per Selle divide the book into six parts: an overview of women in Nordic politics (chapters 1 and 2); "Women as voters and party members" (chapters 3 and 4); "Organizational participation" (chapters 5 through 8); "Public institutions" (chapters 9 through 12); "Attitudes and symbols" (chapters 13 and 14); and "Beyond Scandinavia" (chapter 15). I will group them differently here to highlight those most useful for European integration studies.

For those concerned with European integration, chapters 5, 6, and 12 are of the most interest. In chapter 5 (apparently written before the 1994 EU referenda in Sweden, Norway, and Finland), Ulf Lindström highlights the critical role the Social Democratic parties of these countries played in overcoming skepticism toward EU membership, and raises an interesting argument as to why Nordic women opposed EU membership. Lindström postulates that because Social Democrats framed their rhetoric in terms of "the primacy of economic growth" and targeted an outdated "market-patriarchate household" (as opposed to contemporary "public" and "tripod" households), they seriously jeopardized their pro-EU campaign (pp. 120-122). Around this issue, Lindström raises interesting questions, particularly regarding the relationship between party rhetoric and party approach to women's economic concerns. In addition, Lindström raises important questions about how European integration may affect party activity. The "market patriarchate/public/tripod" categories ought to prove useful for scholars comparing demographic divisions in EU member states.

In chapter 6, editor Lauri Karvonen addresses the impact of the influx of women on Nordic labor union activities, and on

Nordic labor policy in general. This investigation of the most rapidly changing segment of Scandinavian societies sheds light on similar public/private and male/female employment dynamics in other EU countries, and may instigate important questions about the possible effects of EU integration on union activity. For example, will membership weaken union strength in Nordic states as it may have in Spain, as demonstrated by union/state debates regarding legalization of temporary hiring agencies in some sectors?. Noting that union growth can be attributed almost exclusively to the influx of women into the labor market over the past 30 years, Karvonen finds that this increase in membership has not led to an increase in the level of women's representation in these unions (p. 145). However, Karvonen offers a somewhat optimistic reading of this situation. She cites an upward trend in the level of women's representation in unions, and predicts further decentralization of wage policy systems, which appear more responsive to women's demands (p. 151).

In chapter 12, Richard E. Matland argues that the structure of electoral institutions plays a critical role in the gender composition of representative bodies. While the essay does not directly address Nordic women's skepticism toward EU membership, it does suggest that different institutions within Nordic societies may be more resilient than others in the face of integration. Thus the question becomes, do Nordic women sense this? Does their opposition to EU membership fluctuate according to the type of institution being discussed? Matland's chapter could be used as a basis for such an investigation. In addition, Matland's study could be used as a control for structural differences in states or parties, to investigate variation in women's representation among EU states or parties. Matland offers a devastating response to the "shrinking institutions" theory, stating that "Far more plausible than the assertion that men are leaving politics because there is no power left there," is a comparative institutions approach, which "considers how different institutions process similar demands." (p. 303) Using this approach, Matland suggests that one would find different levels of female activity in parliament, private firms, and trade unions, due to their distinct structures (p. 303). Matland finds that women tend to lose in campaigns with an even number of candidates, regardless of district magnitude. He also finds that even with imposed quotas, the election process will not provide women with equality (in numbers) of representation. Matland concludes that institutional arrangements, plus effective organization, are crucial to increasing women's level of formal political activity.

Like Matland's chapter, most of the remaining chapters present critical responses to those theories which "a priori tak[e] for granted that Scandinavian women are marginalized and excluded" from traditional political structures, as advocated by the editors (p. 11). However, only chapters 4 and 9 offer much in terms of the relationship between Nordic women and European integration.

In chapter 4, Jan Sundberg concludes that women's increased presence in Nordic political parties is due in part to party rules (which contain no formal barriers to women's election to parliament) and to party quotas and women's concerted efforts to change party voting procedures (p. 106). In essence, Sundberg finds that the state has empowered women in Scandinavian politics. Analyzing the electoral systems of Scandinavian political parties (with Denmark, Norway, and Finland treated most exhaustively), Sundberg finds that the electoral channel seems the most successful way for women to attain their policy goals, as opposed to grass-roots or protest activity -- an important conclusion for investigating the relationship between the EU and

women.

Chapter 9 echoes themes discussed in chapter 4. Like Sundberg (but with more of a focus on individuals), Christina Bergqvist "brings the state back in", and concludes that state bureaucrats (in this case, Swedish Commissions of Inquiry members), and particularly "femocrats" (women bureaucrats supporting "women's" interests when possible) play a crucial role in increasing women's political and corporatist power (p. 224). In essence, it is the state, *but only via individual actors*, rather than through electoral rules and quotas, that enables women to improve their political status. That is, women-friendly states may exist, but only because of women's personal contacts and proactive activity--the most effective of which is conducted on an individual level. Such a conclusion may suggest why Nordic women's reticence to joining the EU: they have fought long and hard for increased representation of "their" interests, and do not want to see them squandered. Thus, Bergqvist calls into question theories about women's dependence on the (welfare) state, an issue of debate in other European states, such as Spain and France.

In chapter 2, Nina Cecilie Raaum takes an ideological position similar to Bergqvist's, arguing that hierarchical and functional divisions of labor between men and women representatives in Scandinavia are overstated. Raaum's call for analyzing and critiquing the "iron law of politics" (i.e., the more the power, the fewer the women) is well-argued, and her proposed "lag hypothesis" presents a useful tool for comparing the evolution of European women's political activity, and perhaps for analyzing how European integration will affect that activity. Do women indeed suffer from the "iron law", or is it simply a matter of time before women become more politically active, and what effects has the EU had on their participation?

In terms of European integration, chapter 3 offers intriguing data about Nordic voting behavior. Maria Oskarson concludes that no real gender gap exists, although one might be emerging among younger generations in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (p. 79). Thus she provokes but does not pursue such questions as what EU membership might do to exacerbate or alleviate voting trends. Will integration increase gaps in voting behavior? Will increased contact between European youths via the EU "Erasmus" university exchange and other programs alter trends in Scandinavian youths' voting behavior? Will voting behaviors show the same patterns for EU elections and local, regional, or national elections?.

While it could be argued that voluntary organizations may not be the epicenter of political power, and therefore that whether women are equal in this arena has little bearing on their true political status, chapter 7 raises many important issues about this type of Scandinavian political activity and how it may change during the integration process. The author's ask, for example, whether women's recent opposition to EU integration will evolve into a stronger female presence in voluntary organizations, or into new networks of women-dominated organizations. In this chapter, Per Selle and Bjarne Øymyr make a compelling argument for using voluntary organizations as barometers of social change in Norway. They aver that changes in women's "complementary" voluntary role, witnessed in decreasing numbers of women in teetotaling and missionary organizations, reflect a general societal reorientation toward women as equal (p. 173). Even as they note the increasing male domination of these organizations, Selle and Øymyr remain optimistic about these dynamics, arguing that such changes mark a decrease in gender-specific political roles, even if men are the "main

organizational modernizers" in this transformation process (p. 173).

In terms of other issues facing Scandinavian women today, the book offers several good chapters, most notably a discussion of patterns of tolerance in different genders by Lise Tøgeby, and a diligent historical analysis of the women's shelter movement by Kristin Morken and Per Selle, but these are only distantly relevant to discussions of European integration. The final chapter, Einar Berntzen's comparison of cultural influences on Scandinavian and Nicaraguan women, could be useful as an example of how the information in this collection might be used in a comparative study, but otherwise adds little to European integration study.

Thus, as a resource for EU integration scholars and/or teachers, the volume should be assigned in combination with books addressing other European regions (e.g., Iberian states, Mediterranean states) or major European powers. It provides a much-needed contrast to those studies that overlook the differing effects of integration on female citizens, as opposed to their male counterparts. There are a few general flaws: it is slightly antiquated (it does not address the recent accession of Norway, Sweden, and Finland to the European Union), and no chapters discuss directly the possible effects of Scandinavian integration on European market structures. Nonetheless, Women in Nordic Politics offers a broad picture of structural, institutional, and political forces created by and experienced by Scandinavian women. It is a useful addition to any European integration curriculum, if not as a primary text, then as an empirically sound and subtly argued secondary resource.

Kristin Edquist
University of Washington

All correspondence for the Book Review section should be sent to the Book Review Editor:

Christine Ingebritsen, Assistant Professor
Scandinavian Department, DL-20
University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195
e-mail: ingie@u.washington.edu
fax: (206) 685-9173
phone: (206) 543-0675

Publications

University of Pittsburgh
Center for West European Studies
Policy Paper Series

In August 1995, the Center for West European Studies published and distributed the first in a series of policy papers on issues facing government and business leaders in or dealing with Western Europe. The paper, by Professor Youri Devuyt, is entitled "Transatlantic Trade Policy: US Market Opening Strategies."

The policy papers will be short (no more than twenty pages in length) and will offer clear, concise and informed introductions, mainly to issues in the field of international political economy. They will contain the minimum of jargon and the barest academic apparatus. Contributors from all disciplines will be welcome.

The intended audience for the papers includes U.S. scholars

and students specializing in Western Europe, as well as members of the business, diplomatic and legal communities and the media. The papers will be distributed free on demand: authors will receive 25 free copies in lieu of an honorarium. Initially, two papers will be published each year.

Inquiries about the series and manuscripts for review should be submitted to the series editor, Prof. Martin Staniland, Acting Dean, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, 3N29 Forbes Quadrangle, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; tel. (412) 648-7650; fax (412) 648-2605; e-mail: <Mstan@vms.cis.pitt.edu>.

A Select Bibliography of Books on European Integration 1990-1994

This wide-ranging guide to recent literature on European integration is an invaluable aid both for those wishing to acquaint themselves with the field and for those desiring more detailed information about specific policy areas. Compiled by Eva Evans, MBE, the guide covers the following topics: Early texts - General texts - Institutions - Member-states, EFTA and enlargement - External Relations - Economics - Business Studies - Law - Security - The CAP and Fisheries - Social Affairs - Other Issues. The bibliography is available from the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) at an inclusive price of £6.00 per copy (£7.00 outside the UK). To order, please contact UACES, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK; FAX: 44.171.240.0206.

South European Society & Politics

The aim of this new journal is to provide a forum for comparative interdisciplinary studies of Southern Europe, along with innovative country and subnational studies, and to encourage work on the region and its social, economic, cultural and political dimensions. In particular, the editors wish to encourage quantitative work and a more extensive study of policy-making. To these ends, the journal will publish regular assessments on the state of the art in major research areas. The principal countries of study will be Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. The editors will also consider contributions on southern France, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, particularly where there is a strong comparative component. The disciplines can be any of the social science - sociology, social policy, social anthropology, political science, political economy. Emphasis will be placed on interdisciplinarity and, where appropriate, empirical and quantitative methodology. Enquiries regarding submissions should be directed to the editors: Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Institute of European Studies, The Queen's University of Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK (Tel:44 1232 335414; Fax 44 1232 683543; E-mail m.baldwin-edwards@v2.qub.ac.uk); Martin Rhodes, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, CP No. 2330 FIRENZE, Ferrovia, Italy (Tel: 39 55 4685 370; Fax 39 55 4685 330; E-mail Rhodes@datacomm.iue.it); or Yiannis Yfantopolous, Tel 301 613 0448; Fax 301 684 0212. For subscription information, contact Frank Cass, 890-900 Eastern Avenue, Newbury Park, Ilford, Essex, IG2 7HH, UK(Tel: 44 181 599 8866; Fax 44 181 599 0984; E-mail 100067.1576@compuserve.com) US orders: Frank Cass c/o ISBS, 5804 NE Hassalo Street, Portland, OR 97213 3644 (Tel: 503 287 3093 or 800 944 6190; Fax 503 280 8832).

The Columbia University School of Law and the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law announces the launch of a new journal, the *Columbia Journal of European Law*, which will provide academics and practitioners with an ongoing scholarly analysis of Europe's rapidly evolving legal landscape through articles, notes and reviews by authorities in the field. Legal developments within the European Community (in the post-Maastricht context of a European Union), as well as shifting relations with Eastern Europe and North America, will be examined. For subscription information, contact Transnational Juris Publications, Inc., One Bridge Street, Irvington, NY 10533; tel (914) 591-4288; FAX (914) 591-2688.

European Union Report: Newsletter on Policy and Politics in the New Europe

European Union Report will be launched in January 1996. It will be published in Washington, DC with three elements: 1) a 15 to 20 page fortnightly Report, combining a detailed analysis of the main policy developments in Brussels with reports on Council of Ministers meetings, European Parliament committees and plenary sessions, and European Council sessions; 2) a 20 to 30 page quarterly Supplement, on the history and prospects of a particular area of European Union policy-making, such as Economic and Monetary Union, environmental policy, competition policy and Foreign and Security policy; and 3) an index with a thorough key-word cross-referencing system, updated quarterly. After six-months, the Reports, Supplements and Index will be available on-line. Depending on the exact format, an annual subscription for the Reports, Supplements, and Index should be in the \$400-\$600 range.

For more information, contact the editor, Simon Hix, at: European Union Report, c/o Simon Hix, 156 Ogden Avenue, Dobbs Ferry, NY 10522; or by email at: "HIX@DATAComm.IUE.IT".

Short List of Recent Books on the EU

- Roger Benjamin, C. Richard New and Denise Quigley (eds). *Balancing State Intervention: The Limits of Transatlantic Markets*. St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Sten Bergland, ed. *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe*. Edward Elgar, 1994.
- Roger Blanpain. *European Labour Law*. Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1995.
- Christoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner and James Sperling. *The Future of European Security*. Dartmouth Pub., 1995.
- Peter Brophy. *Opportunities for Libraries in Europe: (OPLES)*. American Library Association, 1995.
- Michael Chisholm. *Britain on the Edge of Europe*. Routledge, 1995.
- Paul Close. *Citizenship, Europe and Change*. Macmillan, 1995.
- Peter Coffey. *The Future of Europe*. Elgar, 1995.
- Richard Corbett, Francis Jacobs and Michael Shackleton. *The European Parliament*. 3rd ed., Catermill Publishing, 1995.
- Deirdre Curtin and Ton Heukels, eds. *Institutional Dynamics of European Integration*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
- Marjorie Deane and Robert Pringle. *The Central Banks*. Viking, 1995.
- Sara Delamont. *Appetites and Identities: An Introduction to the Social Anthropology of Western Europe*. Routledge, 1995.

- Yves Doutriaux and Christian Lequesne. *Les Institutions de l'Union européenne*. La Documentation française, 1995.
- Robbie Downing. *EC Information Technology Law*. Wiley, 1995.
- Pái Dunay, Gábor Kardos, and Andrew J. Williams. *New Forms of Security - Views from Central, Eastern and Western Europe*. Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1995.
- Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, eds. *The European Commission*. Catermill Publishing, 1994.
- Heinz Fabmann and Rainer Münz, eds. *European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Patterns, Actual Trends, and Social Implications*. Edward Elgar, 1994.
- Riccardo Faini and Richard Portes (eds). *European Union Trade with Eastern Europe*. Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995.
- Federal Trust. *Network Europe and the Information Society*. Federal Trust Report distributed by BEBC Distribution, Ltd., UK, 1995.
- C. Folmer. *The Common Agricultural Policy Beyond the Macsharry Reform*. Elsevier Science, 1995.
- Ralph H. Folsom. *European Union Law in a Nutshell*. West Publishing Co., 1995.
- Bronislaw Geremek. *The Idea of Europe*. Polity Press, UK, 1995.
- Victoria A. Goddard, Joseph R. Llobera, and Chris Shore, eds. *The Anthropology of Europe: Identities and Boundaries in Conflict*. Berg, 1994.
- David M. Harrison. *The Organisation of Europe: Developing a Continental Market Order*. Routledge, 1995.
- Nigel M. Healey. *The Changing European Economy: From Community to Union*. Routledge, 1995.
- Bill Hebenton. *Policing Europe: Co-operation, Conflict, and Control*. St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Martin Holland. *European Union Common Foreign Policy: From EPC to CFSP joint action and South Africa*. St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Steve Hollins. *A Source Book of European Community Environmental Law*. Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Richard Hugman. *Aging and the Care of Older People in Europe*. St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Barbara Inhorn, Mary Kaldor and Zdenek Kavan, eds. *Citizenship and Democratic Control in Contemporary Europe*. Edward Elgar, 1994.
- Adam Jolly and Jonathan Reuvid. *CBI European Business Handbook*. Kogan Page, 1995.
- Barry Jones and Michael Keating. *The European Union and the Regions*. Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Miles Kahler. *International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration*. Brookings Institution, 1995.
- Michael Keating. *The Politics of Modern Europe: The State and Political Authority in the Major Democracies*. Edward Elgar, 1994.
- Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker. *The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates and Future Implications*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
- Robert Leonardi. *Convergence, Cohesion and Integration in the European Union*. St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- P.S.R.F. Mathijssen. *A Guide to European Union Law*. Sweet and Maxwell, 1995.
- Robert Miles and Dietrich Thranhardt. *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*. Dickinson University Press, 1995.
- J. Miller. *The Future European Model: Economic Internationalization and Cultural Decentralization*. Praeger, 1995.
- William Pitt. *More Equal than Others: A Director's Guide to EU Competition Policy*. Director Books in association with the Institute of Directors, 1995.
- Allan Rosas and Esko Antola. *A Citizens' Europe: In search of a New Order*. Sage Publications, 1995.
- Joanne Scott. *Development Dilemmas in the European Community: Rethinking Regional Development Policy*. Taylor and Francis, 1995.
- Josephine Steiner. *Enforcing EC Law*. Blackstone Press, 1995.
- Alfred Tovias, Ephraim Ahiram and Paul Pasch, eds. *Whither EU-Israeli Relations? Common and Divergent Interests*. Peter Lang, 1995.
- William Wallace. *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*. The Brookings Institution, 1995.
- Paul J.J. Welfens, ed. *Economic Aspects of German Unification*. 2nd ed., Springer, 1995.
- Paul J.J. Welfens, ed. *European Monetary Integration*. 3rd ed., Springer 1995.
- Martin Westlake, *The Council of the European Union*. 2nd ed., Catermill Publishing, 1995.
- Clemens Wurm, ed. *Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration*. Berg Publishers, 1995.
- John Yochelson. *The Future of the U.S.-EU-Japan Triad: How Dominant? How Interdependent? How Divergent?* Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995.

Association News

CD-ROM Collection of Papers Presented at the 1995 ECSA Conference

In conjunction with Ellis Publications of Maastricht, The Netherlands, ECSA is producing a CD-ROM of papers presented at the 1995 Conference. The Collection is scheduled for publication in late October or early November, 1995. ECSA members receive a substantial discount on the collection (flyer/order form is enclosed in this [Newsletter](#)).

ECSA Home Page

ECSA now has a home page on the World Wide Web. It includes basic information on ECSA's activities, and will provide updated announcements on grant and fellowship opportunities, etc., between issues of the [Newsletter](#). The URL for the home page is <<http://www.pitt.edu/~ecsa101>>. Comments and suggestions concerning the home page are welcome!

Other Important Items in This [Newsletter](#)

Readers should be aware of notices for [State of the EU, Vol. IV](#) (p.3), the 1996 ECSA Workshop (p.4), and ECSA grant and fellowship opportunities (pp. 8-9) contained in this [Newsletter](#).