EDITORIAL

The January 13, 1995 meeting of the ECSA US-EU Relations Project highlighted the importance of the new regional instruments which the U.S. has recently constructed as well as the implications of such instruments for transatlantic economic relations. The paper delivered at the meeting -- written by Professor Miles Kahler of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California-San Diego -- makes it clear that the emergence of NAFTA and APEC, alongside an increasingly integrated EU, gives rise to a whole series of analytic and policy questions of interest to scholars and practitioners alike. The presence of the United States in both NAFTA and APEC allows the United States to play a regional as well as its traditional multilateral and global role. Transatlantic economic relations are therefore complicated by both the new American role as well as by the rapidly eroding dominance of the United States and the EU in the international economy. The transatlantic relationship cannot ignore the growing economic power of Asia, and, indeed, the US and Europe will need to collaborate if they are to have any success at the global level.

The US-EU Relations Project is funded by the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. and Directorate General I (External Affairs) of the European Commission. The project is one of the most important ways in which ECSA attempts to produce teaching materials which reflect the input of policymakers and practitioners as well as of the scholarly community. Professor Kahler presented the first draft of his paper, "Regional Futures and Transatlantic Economic Relations" to the meeting and received the comments and suggestions of practitioners from the worlds of government, business, labor and the environmental community. His final draft, which will also incorporate the comments of European commentators will be presented in a plenary session at the ECSA Conference in Charleston (details are inside). Finally, every ECSA member will receive a free copy of the published monograph with the hope that many members will order copies for relevant courses.

Professor Kahler's draft monograph and the discussion it inspired reminded me of how important economic success is to the EU. Given that the international economic context has been an important influence in shaping at least some of the critical debates about institutional reform in the past, it is possible that the outcomes of the 1996 IGC will similarly be tied, if only implicitly and tacitly, to the economic pressures rooted in the international economy. The White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment and the follow-up reports recently submitted by the member states may indicate some of the economic policy goals which heads of state and government hope that institutional reform will accomplish. It is clear that the institutional evolution of the Community, which is often analyzed exclusively as an intra-EU matter, is actually taking place within a very complex matrix of pressures, many of which stem from the international arena.

The economic competition from Eastern Europe will inevitably be a factor in the decisions taken about enlargement to the East. The skilled workforce and the low wage rates found in East Europe present a daunting challenge to the EU, especially given the priority manufacturing employment has enjoyed. (It is worth noting that the Mexican workforce is far less skilled than that of Eastern Europe, and therefore the competitive pressures faced by the U.S. from NAFTA are less severe than those faced by the EU from Eastern Europe.)

The persisting high rates of unemployment on the continent present policymakers with a dilemma. If governments decide that unemployment is largely due to rigid labor markets colliding with technological innovation, they may well choose to deregulate labor markets and develop the service sector. If that is done, the income inequality which has become so serious in the United States may become a problem in Europe as well. If, on the other hand, governments decide that unemployment is caused primarily by competition from Eastern Europe, EU member states may admit Eastern European countries in the hope that wage rates in those countries will be raised. However, rapid admission of the East European countries will present difficult challenges to the redistributive mechanisms which currently exist (Editorial continued on page 34)
European Community Studies Association
Fourth Biennial International Conference
May 11-14, 1995 Charleston, South Carolina

Because of the very large number of paper and panel proposals received, the 1995 ECSA International Conference has been expanded to include sessions on Sunday morning, May 14. The Conference will include nearly 60 panels, several plenary sessions, a luncheon, and a reception. The Conference site, the Hawthorne Suites Hotel in the historic district of Charleston, provides a charming setting for participants (and their families).

Provisional programs for the Conference are enclosed in copies of the ECSA Newsletter sent to ECSA members. The provisional program contains information on conference registration, accommodations (in addition to the Hawthorne Suites Hotel), flight arrangements, and other details. Non-members who wish to receive the preliminary program should contact:

Ms. Sallie Buice
ECSA Conference Coordinator
Institute of International Studies
University of South Carolina
Columbia, South Carolina 29208 USA
Phone 803/777-8180
Fax 803/777-9308
E-mail “buice@hsscls.hssc.scarolina.edu”

*Individuals included on the Conference Program need not contact Ms. Buice again if they have already done so.

Atlantic Economic Society
March 10-16, 1995 Vienna, Austria
October 8-11, 1995 Williamsburg, VA

Authors should submit 2 copies of at least a 500 word summary and a submission fee of $49 for AES members ($59 for non-members) per paper. All accepted participants will be responsible for their own expenses, including the conference registration fee.

Submit papers and requests to serve as chair and/or discussant with number and name of interest area to: Atlantic Economic Conference, Campus Box 1101, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, IL 62026-1101; Phone (618) 692-2291; Fax (618) 692-3400.

Women and Social Change in the Balkans
Spring 1995 Hunter College, New York, NY

This Workshop is being planned for this spring. For more information, contact Gail Holst-Warhaft, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, 120 Iris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-7601; tel 607/255-7592; e-mail “JPO1@CORNELL.EDU”

Europe Toward the 21st Century:
Politics, Policies, People
Twelfth Annual Graduate Student Conference
Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University
March 30-April 1, 1995 New York, NY

Graduate students in any field, currently enrolled in a degree-granting graduate program are eligible to submit papers for consideration. Papers must be on topics related to Western Europe, including, but not limited to: E.U. enlargement; the effects of the Maastricht Treaty; monetary, economic and foreign policy; the environment; and immigration.

Submissions must be received by January 31, 1995, and should be 20-50 pages long, typed, double-spaced with citations and include a one-page abstract. Papers should be accompanied by a copy on a 3.5” diskette. Selected presenters will receive round-trip travel and accommodations to present their paper at Columbia University. Send papers to The Student Conference Organizing Committee, Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, 420 W. 118th Street, Room 805A, New York, NY 10027. Questions should be directed to Jonathan Saw at (202) 854-4618.
Grants and Fellowships

ECSA Dissertation Fellowship at the European University Institute

Contingent upon available funding from the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, ECSA hopes to offer a one year fellowship at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. This fellowship, which is to commemorate 50 years of transatlantic cooperation, will enable an advanced graduate student to pursue coursework and dissertation research. The fellowship will provide tuition and approximately $15,000 towards transportation and living expenses. The application deadline for this program is March 15, 1995.

The European University Institute (EUI) is a postgraduate teaching and research institute. The mission of the Institute is to contribute to the intellectual life of Europe, through its activities and influence, and to the development of the cultural and academic heritage of Europe in its unity and diversity. In this context, this Institute aims to provide a European academic and cultural training and to carry out research in a European perspective (fundamental, comparative, and Community research) in the area of the social and human sciences.

The four academic departments of the Institute are History of Civilization, Economic, Law and Political and Social Sciences, all of which offer a doctoral degree program. The academic departments are complemented by two interdisciplinary centers. The Robert Schumann Center develops research bearing on important issues confronting contemporary European society. The European Forum brings together experts in a selected topic for one academic year, with emphasis on the international, comparative, and interdisciplinary aspects.

Applicants must be U.S. citizens, ECSA members, and currently enrolled in a doctoral program in the United States. For application guidelines and further information, please contact Bill Burros, ECSA Administrative Director, at:

ECSA Administrative Office
405 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Tel (412) 648-7635,
FAX (412) 648-1168
E-Mail “ECSA@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU”

ECSA Dissertation Fellowship Grants

With funding from The Ford Foundation, the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) will offer four dissertation fellowship grants for the 1995-1996 academic year. These grants provide financial support of $2,500 for doctoral students preparing dissertations on the European Union. They may be used for travel required for dissertation research, or for books, documents and supplies, manuscript preparation, and other dissertation expenses. Applicants must be U.S. citizens and ECSA members.

The application deadline for this program is March 1, 1995. For application guidelines and further information, please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.
50 Years of Transatlantic Cooperation for Peace and Democracy: European Commission Graduate Fellowship in European Integration at The College of Europe

To celebrate 50 years of Transatlantic Cooperation for Peace and Democracy, ECSA will offer a Fellowship for the Master's Degree in European Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium for the 1995-1996 academic year. Through the generous support of the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, DC, the Fellowship will offer $14,500 toward tuition, lodging, and travel expenses. The College of Europe, founded in 1949, is the oldest European institution exclusively devoted to postgraduate teaching, focusing on issues of European integration.

The Academic Program of the College of Europe is divided into three parts:

A. Specialized courses which correspond to the student's previous education. There are currently four departments: European political and administrative studies, European economic studies, European legal studies and studies in Human Resources Development.

B. Interdisciplinary work which consists of the analysis of subjects in which students from the four departments will participate actively.

C. General courses which deal with major current developments in Europe or with certain more specific problems of contemporary society.

Applicants must possess a high level of proficiency in the French language, have completed a university degree by the term of the Fellowship, and be U.S. citizens. Students may apply for the College of Europe Fellowship by submitting the following items to the ECSA Administrative Office:

1. Letter of application from the student, addressed to the Graduate Fellowship Selection Committee, which discusses:
   a. the student's preparation and qualifications for the Fellowship
   b. how the Fellowship will enhance the student's educational and professional goals, and
   c. the student's proposed department of specialization at the College of Europe.

2. At least two letters of recommendation which comment directly on the applicant's qualifications for the Fellowship.

3. Academic transcript(s), which must include evidence of proficiency in French.

4. Resume or curriculum vitae.

The application deadline is March 1, 1995. Please send all application materials and direct all inquiries concerning the Fellowship to Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

ECSA Graduate Fellowships to be Continued During the 1995-96 Academic Year at:

The University of Limerick, Ireland

Contingent upon available funding from the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, ECSA hopes to continue its Graduate Fellowship at the University of Limerick, Ireland in the 1995-1996 academic year.

The ECSA Graduate Fellowship at the University of Limerick leads to the M.A. in European Integration Studies. The program, directed by Dr. Nicholas Rees, is multi-disciplinary and intended for recent graduates in the Humanities and Social Sciences who plan careers in international business and finance, public service, journalism and the media, research and education. A Research Centre for European Studies supports faculty and postgraduate research activities in European integration and the campus library includes a European documentation center.

During the first and second semesters of the European Integration program, students are required to take seven core and two elective core modules which examine the major political, legal, and economic issues of European integration.

The core courses are: Theory of Economic Integration; The European Union as a Legal System; Politics of European Integration; History of the European Idea; Theory and Methodology of Integration; Economic Policies of Economic Integration; and Legal Aspects of Economic Integration. The elective courses are: External Relations of the European Union; Regional Politics and Policy in the European Union; and National Politics and the European Union.

Students also begin a thesis of 10,000 to 15,000 words in the second semester which is completed in the third semester.

University of Sussex, England

Contingent upon available funding from the European Commission Delegation in Washington, DC, ECSA hopes to continue its Graduate Fellowship at the University of Sussex, England in the 1995-1996 academic year.

The ECSA Graduate Fellowship at the University of Sussex leads to the M.A. in Contemporary European Studies. This program is directed by Professor Helen Wallace. Professor Wallace is also Director of the Sussex European Institute. The Contemporary European Studies program covers both eastern and western Europe, with a wide-ranging core of courses and a variety of specialized options. It is aimed at graduates in social sciences or other appropriate disciplines who wish to add a European dimension to their knowledge, and at graduates in subjects such as French or history who wish to gain a social science background. The primary teaching language for the course is English, but a good working knowledge of another European language is normally expected.

During the first term, all students are required to take the core course, The Making of Contemporary Europe. During the second term, students choose three options from a number of available electives in European history, politics, economics, and sociology. Students may select a general approach to European studies, or they may specialize by area or subject. During the third term, students are required to write a thesis of up to 20,000 words. The MA course is also assessed by two examinations (core course) and two 5,000 word papers (on two of the options).

Application Procedure: The ECSA Graduate Fellowships at the Universities of Limerick and Sussex will offer approximately $12,000 toward tuition, lodging, and travel expenses. In applying, students should state whether they are applying for the position at the University of Limerick, or for the position at the University of Sussex. Students may also apply for both positions. However, students doing so must provide a clear explanation of why their qualifications and interests are suitable for both programs. (Because of the special French language requirement, applications for the ECSA Graduate Fellowship at the College of
Europe must be made separately.)

To apply for the ECSA Graduate Fellowships at the University of Limerick and/or the University of Sussex, submit the following items to the ECSA Administrative Office:

1) Letter of application from the student, addressed to the
Graduate Fellowship Selection Committee, which discusses
a) the student’s preparation and qualifications for the
Fellowship, and
b) how the Fellowship will enhance the student’s
educational and professional goals;

2) At least two letters of recommendation which comment
directly on the applicant’s qualifications for the Fellowship;

3) Academic transcript;

4) Resume or curriculum vitae.

Applicants must be U.S. citizens and possess a university
degree by August 31, 1995. The application deadline is March
1, 1995. Please send all application materials and direct all
inquiries to Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

**ECSA Curriculum Development Grants**

Contingent upon available funding, the European Community
Studies Association (ECSA) will offer curriculum development
grants for the 1995-1996 or 1996-1997 academic years. These
grants may be used to create new courses on the European Union,
or to enrich existing courses with material on the European Union.
A maximum of four grants of up to $3,000 will be awarded.
Courses developed or enriched through this program must be
taught in the United States. Applicants must be ECSA members,
or affiliated with institutional ECSA members.

The application deadline for this program is March 1, 1995.
For application guidelines and further information, please contact
Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

**Obermann Fellowships for 1995 Faculty Research Seminar on Law and Politics in Europe University of Iowa**

The Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Iowa is
offering Fellowships for this program, June 5-29, 1995. The
program, directed by William Reisinger and Sally Kenney
(Political Science) and John Reitz (Law), includes discussion of
submitted papers and revision of the papers for a published book
or special editions of a journal. Stipends of $3500 will be
provided; applications are due January 15. For more information,
contact Jan Semel, Center for Advanced Studies, University of
Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242; tel (319) 335-4034; e-mail “lorna-
olson@uiowa.edu”.

**Social Science Research Council Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies**

This program is based at the Free University of Berlin. Its
purpose is to encourage the comparative and interdisciplinary
study of the economic, political and social aspects of modern and
contemporary German and European affairs. The program
supports anthropologists, economists, political scientists,
sociologists, and all scholars in germane social science and
cultural studies fields, including historians working on the period
since the mid-19th century.

Fellowships are available at both the dissertation and post-
doctoral levels. The application deadline is February 1, 1995.
Please contact the Social Science Research Council for further
information.

**Bundeskanzler Scholarships for Future American Leaders**

The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation awards up to ten
scholarships annually to young American citizens for study and
research at a German university or research institution and to gain
some insight into life in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Applicants in the humanities, social sciences, law, economics, and
interdisciplinary studies are preferred. Applications must be
received by October 31. Applicants must be under 30 years of
age - undergraduates, graduates, post-graduates and young
professionals are eligible. For further information about this and
other programs sponsored by the Humboldt Foundation, contact
Dr. Bernard Stein, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, North
American Office, 1350 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 903,
Washington, DC 20036; tel (202) 296-2990; fax (202) 833-8514;
e-mail “humboldt@umail.umd.edu”.

**1994-95 American Fulbright Grantees under the European Affairs Research Program (1996-1997 Applications available in March)**

The Fulbright program announces the following awards under the
European Affairs Research Program:

**David M. Andrews**, Assistant Professor, Department of
International Relations, Scripps College, Claremont, CA 91711-
3948. Research Topic: Widening, Deepening, and European
Monetary Relations: The Maastricht Treaty, Community
Expansion, and the Politics of Mutual Adjustment. London
School of Economics, January-July 1995.

**Roger J. Goebel**, Professor, Fordham University School of
Law, New York, NY 10023. Research Topic: EC Institutional
Structure after Maastricht and the Accession of New States. EU
Commission, Council, and Court of Justice, February-May 1995.

**Michael O. Moore**, Assistant Professor, Elliot School of
International Affairs, George Washington University,
Washington, DC 20052. Research Topic: EC Steel Policy in the
1980’s: Catalyst or Hindrance to Technological Innovation. EU

Information on Fulbright awards in European Union affairs for
the 1996-97 academic year will be available in March 1995 and
can be obtained by contacting Jean McPeek, Council for
International Exchange of Scholars, 3007 Tilden St., NW, Suite
5M, Washington DC 20008-3009; tel (202) 686-6241; e-mail:
“we2@ciesnet.cies.org”. The application deadline is August 1,
1995. Applicants must be U.S. citizens and hold the terminal
degree in their field. (Information on EU awards for graduate
students can be obtained by contacting the Institute for
International Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York,
NY 10017; tel (212) 984-5330.)
Program Announcements

USIS Speakers Program

The U.S. Information Service (USIS) is sponsoring a Speakers Program involving U.S. Embassies and Consulates throughout Europe. The USIS seeks speakers capable of giving the American perspective on EC Affairs, the U.S.-EC relationship, the transatlantic alliance, and related issues. To qualify for the Speakers Program, individuals must have established travel plans in Europe. The USIS will provide compensation for the costs of travel within Europe, daily maintenance, and a modest honorarium. ECSA members traveling from the United States will find this an excellent opportunity to increase their understanding of European perspectives.

Individuals interested in this Program should fax the following information, well in advance of their travel dates, to the U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels at (32.2) 512.57.20:

a) planned European arrival and departure points;
b) dates of availability;
c) an abbreviated curriculum vitae;
d) brief descriptions of topics that you find suitable for discussion; and
e) fax number(s) where you may be contacted.

European Legal Practice

The European Legal Practice program at the Tulane Law School is an elective specialization for JD students and an advanced degree for graduate law students. JD students who successfully complete 16 hours of required courses will receive, in addition to the JD degree, a certificate of specialization in European Legal Practice that could prove valuable in enabling them to secure legal positions in the field. Graduate students receive a Master of Comparative Law (Europe) upon successfully completing 22 hours of credits in the program.

For additional information, contact the Tulane Law School Admissions Office, New Orleans, LA 70118, phone (504) 865-5930, or contact Professor Lloyd Bonfield, Director of the European Legal Practice Program, at (504) 865-5850.

Teaching News

Free Educational Videos From the EU

The EU is now offering the following videos free of charge for instructional purposes:


2. International Cooperation (running time 59 minutes); Contains “Extraordinary Partners: the European Union and the United States”, “PHARE, the EU Aid Program for Eastern Europe”, Lome Mark Four: Stability in a Changing World”.


4. Environment (running time 50 minutes); Contains “The EU and the Environmental Control of Chemicals”, “The Environment”, “The Environment at the Center of EU Policy”.

5. European Union Historical Overview (running time 56 minutes); Contains “Jean Monnet: Founder of Europe”, “Who Runs the Union”?; “Towards a European Union”, “A Growing Europe.”

For order forms and additional information, contact Sandra Auman, Audovisual Coordinator/Producer, Press and Public Affairs Office, Delegation of the European Commission, 2300 M. Street NW, Washington, DC 20037; tel (202) 862-9541; fax (202) 429-1766.

Third Annual Meeting of the Midwest Model European Union

The 3rd annual Midwest Model EU will be held in Indianapolis on April 20-22, 1995. Undergraduate students from schools throughout the Midwest will participate. For more information, contact Prof. John McCormick, Department of Political Science, Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, 425 University Boulevard, Indianapolis, IN 46202; tel (317) 274-4066; fax (317) 274-2347; e-mail “JMCCORMI@INDYCMS”.

Creating a Network for European Studies at the Secondary Level

ECSA members with a particular interest in European studies at the secondary level are encouraged to contact George Wrangham, Head of the History Department, The Shipley School, 814 Yarrow Street, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010; phone (610) 525-4300; fax (610) 525-5082.

The teaching of European studies at the secondary level (grades 9-12) is obviously of great importance to all ECSA members. By identifying members with special interests in this area, ECSA hopes to create a bridge for communication between educators at the secondary and university levels and across all disciplines concerned with European studies. They can exchange information on curricula, instructional materials and techniques, and other educational issues.

George Wrangham has designed and is teaching a wholly innovative year-long course on Europe since 1945, including future studies, for advanced students in grades 10, 11, and 12. He has generously offered to serve as the liaison person in this effort. Please contact him at the address above, or Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office for more information.

ECSA Syllabi Bank

ECSA has established a syllabi bank for courses covering the European Union. It contains syllabi for a number of disciplines at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Upon request, these syllabi are provided without charge to ECSA members.

Many of the syllabi in the bank date from 1990 or 1991. To keep the bank as current and useful as possible, members are asked to contribute their most recent EU-related course syllabi. Please contact Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office for more information.
Issued Facing the EU, July-December 1994

A crucial phase in the process of defining the project of European integration was ushered in by the Single European Act and the 1989 political explosions in Central and Eastern Europe. The (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union broadened the constitutional parameters of integration and set the stage for taking four of the seven remaining members of EFTA on board. During the German Council Presidency, the EU was preoccupied with digesting all of these initiatives and with setting the stage for the intergovernmental Maastricht review conference (IGC) scheduled for 1996.

Recession highlighted fragile corporate balance sheets, job creation, and placed greater pressure on already strapped budgets of all member states. Adopted at the end of the Belgian Council Presidency in December 1993, the Delors White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment provided the basis for an action program focusing on technological innovation, infrastructure projects, and training. The European Council commissioned reports on information technology (Bangemann) and trans-European networks (Christophersen).

Meanwhile, the external relations agenda was dominated by the end-game of the GATT Uruguay Round, relations with Central and Eastern Europe, and war in the Balkans.

Germany in midst of "das Superwahljahr"

Even if the government in Bonn were not distracted by the continuing challenges of unification and a record eighteen elections (local, regional, federal and European) within a span of one year, there was no impetus to launch new initiatives at EU level. At least not any that cost money, for as the largest net contributor to the EU budget, German tax revenues strained under unanticipated high costs of unification compounded by recession. Electoral calculations made it unlikely that any EU reform would be undertaken that might antagonize constituencies traditionally supportive of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) or of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Socialist Union (CDU-CSU). Partly for these reasons and partly because the German EU agenda already had been to some extent realized through the Maastricht Treaty, the German Council presidency was an exercise in caution. Little was promised. Nothing dramatic was delivered. Aside from diffusely organized environmental groups, no domestic interest groups lost anything. Emphasis went to avoiding mistakes. German passivity was to some extent covered up by linking it to the ensuing French presidency. At the same time, the Kohl government deftly pursued linkage in another direction. The EU agenda became a means of keeping domestic opponents at bay, especially in exploiting fissures between labor and environmental constituencies in the debate over job creation.

Personnel Policy

The German Council Presidency began with the nomination of a new Commission. Judged by the outcome of the process, the government was looking for a Commission President quite different from Delors, a cautious, pragmatic federalist - someone like Chancellor Kohl, though with less political stature. Christian Democratic prime ministers of each of the Benelux countries had been anointed as heirs apparent. After the public jilting of Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers (associated with the abortive Dutch draft Maastricht treaty), Kohl turned to Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene. In a highly publicized show of displeasure over German king-making, British PM Major torpedoed this nomination at the European Council on Corfu. British interests were served by the compromise candidate, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Santer. He will possess less stature than Delors, if only because he comes from the EU's smallest member state, thus depriving the Commission of some of its initiatory potential. But he is also a European federalist and an effective intergovernmental broker.

Defining the Internal Market: EU Ordnungspolitik

Ordnungspolitik is the German expression for the institutional matrix that specifies the social parameters of Germany's capitalist order. The internal market program led to a debate over EU-level Ordnungspolitik through its regulatory harmonization practice. In contrast to the French and British systems, Germany's neo-liberal model features autonomous monetary and competition authorities, a highly institutionalized industrial relations system and a neo-corporatist style of policymaking.

Phase two of Maastricht-based EMU commenced prior to the German Council Presidency with the launch of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) in Frankfurt under the direction of Belgian economist, Alexander Lamfalussy, recruited from the Bank for International Settlements. The EMI supervises EU-member state performance with respect to the convergence criteria specified on the basis of Article 109 of the Treaty on European Union. Because these criteria and the mandate of the future European central bank are consistent with the German design, the German government was relieved of the necessity of pushing this part of its agenda during its presidency.

The German competition authority (Federal Cartel Office) began its campaign to ensure that EU competition policy, especially its recently acquired role in vetting certain mergers and acquisitions, would in the future be more rule-based. Destined to be an element of the 1996 IGC agenda, this reform would strictly circumscribe the latitude now enjoyed by the College of Commissioners to override findings of its own DG-IV-based mergers and acquisitions unit.

Because it exhibits elements of both Anglo and continental policymaking traditions, the German system provides opportunities to form shifting transnational alliances. This situation arguably gives the German government a strategic advantage over the long run in setting priorities for EU development. It also establishes a range of options for the government of the day, making it possible to advance its own political aims using the EU arena. A good example is the working group on deregulation set up during the German Presidency and directed by the former German economics ministry official, Bernhard Molitor. The initiative is responsive to the issues animating the incumbent CDU-CSU/FDP government in its electoral battle with the Social Democrats and the Greens. It also
offers a means to defuse the Euro-scepticism cloaked in the obfuscating language of "subsidiarity," since the initiative reflects the work of an Anglo-German Deregulation Group of businessmen launched last April in London during bilateral meetings.

Compromise between continental and Anglo traditions continued to evade the Council in some areas, notably with respect to labor and immigration questions. In the waning days of December, agreement was reached to implement the Schengen Agreement, now scheduled for March 26, 1995. Final agreement on linking police information services will permit the lifting of border checks along internal EU borders and for internal flights for France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Spain and Portugal. In a related development which underlines the linked character of the German and French Presidencies, the French government at the Essen Council deferred to a strong German desire for movement on questions concerning common control of borders by committing itself to implementing the Eurolander agreement before the end of June.

In the area of industrial relations, twenty years of on-again, off-again deliberations finally led to the adoption of a works council directive in September, the first successful invocation of the Maastricht Social Protocol since the British Tory government refused to concur in the scheme. Under the directive's provisions, a 1,500 firms operating in more than one EU country (including ca. 100 British firms operating on the continent) having 1) a total workforce of at least 1,000, and 2) at least 150 workers in two or more member states must form works councils, should they be requested by workers' representatives. The pattern repeated itself in the case of the directive extending paid parental leave to fathers and once again in the case of a directive on part-time work.

Britain was joined by Portugal and Greece in killing efforts of the German Presidency to pass a directive establishing minimum compensation rates for workers posted for short periods to other member states (equal pay for equal work in the same country). The objective of the initiative is to prevent "social dumping" by low wage countries. The unification boom made Germany a magnet for construction teams from throughout the EU. Because it could be outvoted under the cooperation procedure, Portugal challenged the legal basis of the proposal at the ECJ. Understandably, it viewed posted workers as a labor mobility (internal market) rather than a social protection issue. Despite efforts at reaching a compromise, the German attempt at brokering a deal failed.

Ordnungspolitik was also at issue in the ongoing discussion of free movement of services, specifically information services. Agreement was achieved on liberalization of basic telecommunications infrastructure by 1998, though the Commission desired a "start date" in 1995. This result may owe something to the German threat, against the wishes of its own telecom company, to open its markets unilaterally in the absence of an agreement. At about the same time, the Telecommunications Office began operations in Copenhagen to promote greater competition in telecoms services and provide advice on licensing. The Essen Council called on the Commission to present a revised directive on television without frontiers before the next European Council.

With regard to other German internal market priorities, no progress was made on liberalization of transborder access to electricity networks or harmonization of interest taxation in banking centers. In energy, policy aims and structural characteristics of national systems remain too heterogeneous to bridge. This is even true within countries. For example, in the gas sector, the German Federal Constitutional Court handed down a decision in November which denied that a German supplier had a right to third party access (TPA) in serving a customer in another part of the country. In the case of interest taxation, the problem is incorporating the appropriate countries, some of which are not EU members.

Whither Green Integration?

In light of Germany's mostly deserved reputation as a leader in environmental policy, no policy area comes as close to violating performance expectations as this one. German aspirations in the environmental field were blocked or undermined. The tone was set by electoral defeat in Council along with Denmark and The Netherlands on specific recycling standards under the directive on packaging waste. Later, the Germans defended drinking water standards against a Commission proposal (!) to reduce protection with respect to pesticide contamination.

Under the economic demands of unification and in a recessionary environment the government and its supporting parties shifted their attention away from environmental themes. The industrial location debate (Standortdebate) defined the terrain of public discussion during the German electoral cycle in 1994. The jobs focus tended to accentuate interest divergencies between workers and environmental NGOs, affecting the discussion of eco-taxes, energy policy and genetic engineering, to name but a few issues which played a role in the campaigns and have high salience in the EC.

The concluding chapter of the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment attempts to relate its various elements to the concept of sustainability. Reconciliation of White Paper environmental and employment priorities is achieved by an eco-tax proposal. By the end of the German Council Presidency, the tax collapsed, whether in the form originally proposed by the Commission in 1992 as a mixed levy on energy and CO2 content, or in the watered down form of coordinated raising of fuel taxes. It fell victim to relentless British recalcitrance on subsidiarity grounds, alienation of the French due to the inclusion of nuclear energy in the proposal, indifference of the Mediterranean countries and, ultimately, abandonment by the German government. German environment minister, Klaus Töpfer staked his career on implementing German and EC greenhouse gas reduction targets by way of the EC tax. He had himself appointed chairman of the Climate Convention review conference, to be held in Berlin at the end of March, 1995. Apparently, he staked out a position too ambitious for his own party. He was replaced by a novice after the October federal election.

A sign of the times is the manner in which the government chose to implement the eco-audit directive adopted last spring. After Töpfer's replacement, a self-policing model was adopted, according to which eco-auditors would be accredited by an institution owned by the private sector. Only the efforts of the chemical industry, concerned about the credibility of the scheme, were successful in attaching a supervisory committee to this institution with representation by consumer and environmental groups.

Enlargement

In April, as virtually its last act, the fourth directly elected European Parliament approved accession of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Austria by an unexpectedly large -- indeed,
unprecedented -- absolute majority. The Austrian referendum was
staged on the same day as the European Parliamentary elections
in June. Referenda in the three Nordic applicants were scheduled
for October and November. They occurred without incident, with
the result that only the Norwegian voters, replaying its decision
of 1972, elected to stay out of the Union. The most that can be said
for Germany's role is that it committed no obvious gaffes or
public relations debacles that would have led to different
outcomes. It does not appear that the "multiple speed" thesis of
the CDU paper on EU reform impinged on the ratification
debates.

GATT

The Commission asked the ECJ for an opinion on the division of
competencies between member states and the Union with respect
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) created by the Uruguay
Round. In advance of the ruling, the German government
suggested a modus operandum, fearing that a late Court decision
might imperil timely ratification. The initiative was unsuccessful.
In the event, the ECJ ruling assigned exclusive competence
regarding trade in goods, including norms relating to technical
barriers to trade, to the Community. Services not involving
physical movement of persons also falls within the ambit of
Community competence, while competence with respect to
services involving movement of persons or establishment falls to
the Community and the member states concurrently, except where
access to the internal market is at issue. Similarly, with some
exceptions, the TRIPS agreement involves shared competence.
Following the Court's ruling, the European Parliament and all
remaining member states ratified the Agreement in December, in
time for it to enter into force on January 1, 1995.

Bosnia

The German government was caught during its presidency in a
traditional bind between the US and France, this time with Britain
siding with the French. At issue was the appropriate response to
stepped up Serbian attacks, especially on Bihac. The Clinton
Administration initially sought to persuade the Europeans to
withdraw so that the Bosnian Moslems could be armed. The
German government announced its intention to contribute to any
such operation with logistical support and air cover in and around
Sarajevo. By the terms of a landmark decision of the German
Constitutional Court last summer, this would require a Bundestag
resolution but government spokesmen expressed confidence that
it could be obtained. Until now the official German consensus
had been that German forces were reserved exclusively for
defense of German territory or the territory of a NATO ally. SPD
and Greens opposed introduction of German forces in former
Yugoslavia for a variety of reasons, not the least of which
consisted in the memories that would be evoked of Nazi support
for the murderous Croatian Ustasha. But Germany was spared this
scenario, at least during its Council Presidency, as the presence of
British and French ground forces in UNPROFOR gave their
governments stronger hands and the US backed away from its
plan.

NIS

Undoubtedly the highlight of the German Council Presidency in
relations with Soviet successor states was the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement signed in July with Ukraine and the
follow-up financial arrangement in December. The deal provides
balance of payments and other forms of financial aid to the
Kuchma government to support market reforms, in return for its
signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and a promise to
close the Chernobyl nuclear power station. British, French and
Italian reluctance was overcome by determined German lobbying
on the side of the Commission and in line with US preferences. At
least for the British and French governments a major problem of
the effort was the Commission's role in it. They allegedly desired to
restrict the initiative of the Commission in the foreign policy
area.

Toward 1996

A 15 page CDU strategy paper on European policy emerged
from a CDU retreat in Berlin in August 1994. Written by
Bundestag member Karl Lamers and adopted by CDU
parliamentary leader Wolfgang Schäuble with the approval of
Chancellor Kohl, it served to initiate debate on the main issues
framing the 1996 IGC on treaty reform. Its central idea is that
unified Germany can no longer exempt itself from exercising its
power in international relations: a stance of moral superiority is
no longer desirable or possible. But, equally, balance of power
politics has become obsolete in Europe. "More than a facilitator
of increased welfare," the EU is a "fundamentally new
international order" based on an "identity of essential interests of
the members." Schäuble amplified this vision in Paris at a
colloquium in December. Though the national state will remain
indispensable for the foreseeable future, the EU has already
acquired "European statehood sui generis, i.e., neither federal nor
confederal, but a common European statehood." Acknowledging
this reality, the aim of German policy consists in strengthening the
institutional bite of the EU to ensure that the exercise of power is
undertaken collectively.

Since some member-states are not capable of mastering the
disciplines of this "deepening," the main corollary is a "multi-
speed" Europe. The paper bluntly identifies the EU vanguard:
Germany, France, and the Benelux. In this respect the paper
echoes the faux pas committed by Jacques Delors during the run
up to the first Danish referendum on Maastricht when he implied
that necessary institutional streamlining might be accomplished
by cutting back small state direct permanent representation in the
Council. Schäuble had occasion to clarify CDU position on
multiple speeds. If the lowest were allowed to dictate the tempo
of integration, the project would fail. Multiple speeds allowed
those capable to proceed to establish forms of cooperation that
remained open to others as their capabilities increase. Of course,
this argument sidesteps the real root of dissension over the future
character of the Union. The speed metaphor turns on capabilities
and assumes identical aims. However, among the large member
states, officialdom in neither France nor Britain agree with the
aims themselves. Nor is the CDU position consensual even within
Germany. Although the SPD has no fundamental differences with
the CDU in this area, the Greens remain highly skeptical of the
integration project as currently designed. And this brings us to the
other main element of the CDU paper. In order to insure its own
security and stability in Europe a real prospect for EU
membership must be offered to at least some countries of Central
and Eastern Europe.

Essen and Beyond

The two main foci of the Essen summit were the follow-ups
to the growth-competitiveness-employment White Paper, and future eastward enlargement.

As for the White Paper, finance for the 14 priority infrastructure projects subsumed under the Trans-European Networks program was the most concrete discussion point. The fact that this question shall be taken up again by the French Presidency suggests that, expansion of EIB lending for this purpose notwithstanding, the question had not been resolved under the German presidency.

Acting on a suggestion by Delors, the heads of state and government pursued the idea of establishing an advisory panel of European industrialists on competitiveness. The proposal closely resembles recent ideas floated by UNICE and the European Round Table, though UK officials said a similar plan was discussed by Prime Minister Major and Chancellor Kohl at their bilateral summit last April. Beyond that is an exhortation addressed to politicians and social partners to cooperate in five areas of social policy. A mandate to produce annual employment reports to the European Council was also given.

The importance of future eastward enlargement was acknowledged with great symbolic fanfare, as leaders from the Visegrad Four (Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics) plus Rumania and Bulgaria were invited to attend a special segment of the European Council. Without specifying dates, these leaders were encouraged to believe that their countries had an open invitation to accede to the Union. Concrete steps toward that end were to be initiated, taking the form of a "structured dialogue," in which programs for approximation of laws, trade regimes, foreign and judicial policies would be worked out with the candidates. The Council mandated a Commission white paper on preparing Central and Eastern European country (CEEC) candidates for the internal market, to be submitted at its next meeting.

Scepticism is in order here, since eastern enlargement would require radical institutional and policy reforms in the EU itself. Critics of the Essen meeting immediately pointed out that any serious pretention to enlargement would mean the end of the CAP and structural funds as they are currently organized. PHARE aid allocations for the coming years (7 billion ecs for the period 1995-1999) were the only concrete figures offered and this designation gave rise to a demand from France, immediately met, that a similar commitment be made to the EU's Mediterranean neighbors. Nevertheless, the Essen Council did call for a study of the implication of enlargement for the CAP.

Meanwhile, a number of small but significant steps are to be taken. In an effort to boost trade and investment between the Union and the CEECs, cumulation will be applied to rules of origin. Antidumping and safeguard measures are to be subjected to greater discipline. The European Investment Bank was invited to expand the scope of its operations in the region, especially with respect to infrastructure projects. Finally, free access for industrial goods is foreseen for this year while free access for steel and textiles is to follow in 1996 and 1997. Still, one must wonder just how resilient the CDU federal vision will prove to be when measured against these reform imperatives. One attendee of the summit, European Parliament President Klaus Hänsch, was quoted as saying "if the price for enlargement to the East were dissolution of the Union, this price should not be paid."

Outlook

The Germans were lucky. Their turn came at a time when nothing decisive needed doing. No terrible errors were committed by the German council presidency. A necessary debate over the future of the integration project was launched and an agenda was set for the 1996 IGC. Momentum for eastward expansion has been generated, though it would probably be too much to speak of a decisive breakthrough in this regard. Surprisingly, environmental policy has been almost completely eclipsed during the German presidency. This is no fluke. Environment makes only a marginal appearance in the CDU-FDP coalition agreement which serves as the foundation for the government formed after the October 16 federal elections. And it is similarly absent from Chancellor Kohl's inaugural speech for the new government (Regierungserklärung).

We are now in the midst of the French council presidency, and it has inherited most of the German's agenda. Some displacement of attention from the CEECs to the Mediterranean can be expected. Employment questions may continue to displace environmental ones. The debate on Maastricht reform will almost certainly heat up -- at least in France --as contestants in the French presidential race seek to differentiate themselves.

That distraction will be of greater significance at a time when Kohl, Mitterrand and Delors no longer constitute the central EU leadership. There is at least a chance that Kohl may have left office prior to Mitterrand, though this is unlikely and essential policy continuity would mark a new Franco-German diumvirate under President Balladur and Chancellor Schaprow. But even this favorable constellation would have to contend with growing internal differentiation of views within each of the member states on the aims and design characteristics of European integration. The next major phase of integration will turn on the struggle over the integration of a European polity. Even getting the issue onto the 1996 agenda will be a daunting exercise in diplomacy. Failure to do so may fatally undermine the most successful experiment in international cooperation in modern European history.

The Norwegian People Reject EU Membership--Again!

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(The author wishes to thank the Norwegian Marshall Fund for granting her the opportunity to observe the referendum on EU membership in Norway on November 28, 1994.)

For the second time in 22 years, a majority of the Norwegian people voted against joining the European Union (EU).* 47.8% voted in favor of membership, and 52.2% against. Voter turnout was extremely high, with 88% of the electorate participating in the referendum. After a lengthy campaign led by Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and members of the pro-European movement to convince the Norwegian people of the advantages of joining the European Union, it was the "nei droppingen" (no queen) Anne Enger Lahnstein, leader of the anti-EU Center Party, who claimed victory on November 28. Lahnstein was a central figure in the well-organized, anti-EU social movement, "Nei til EU" (no to European Union). The "no" movement launched a nation-wide campaign with persuasive appeals to the public to reject EU membership. By presenting the EU as a threat to core Norwegian societal values (the rights of workers, the equal status of women, environmentalism, and grass-roots democracy) and as
a threat to traditional Norwegian economic activities (agriculture and fishing), the "no" movement won support from both the conservative right and the socialist left. The "yes" movement was unable to counter the negative perceptions of the EU held by many Norwegians, or to effectively mobilize support for membership outside the Oslo region. Although Norway's EU referendum was intended only to be consultative, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland stated directly following the vote, "the Norwegian people have made their decision, and the government will stand by it."2

The "no" to EU membership was viewed critically by observers in and outside the country who accused Norwegians of "constructing their own political reality," or misunderstanding how to preserve national sovereignty in an interdependent world economy. In the words of the EU's ambassador to Norway, Aneurin Rhys Hughes, a distinguished Welshman who played an important role in the debate over EU membership, "the outcome reveals that Norway is like Alice in Wonderland—living in a fairy tale world." According to one disappointed Europeanist, the EU is better off without Norway, since even if it joined it would be likely to thwart the integrationist plans of EU member-states. Given the recent decisions in Sweden and Finland to join the EU, why did Norwegians vote no? How can they afford to remain outside the EU? Is Norway likely to reconsider joining the EU—if so, when? This article addresses these questions in order to offer an interpretation of why Norwegians are more skeptical to European integration than Swedes or Finns.

Why Norway is a "Annerledes Land" (Different Country)3

Several days after the referendum, two prominent Norwegian social scientists, historian Geir Lundestad and political scientist Henry Valen, offered their analyses of why the people (again) rejected EU membership. The articles appeared in the Norwegian daily, Aftenposten, and focused on "Norwegian exceptionalism."

Lundestad attributes the outcome of the referendum to the geographic distance from Norway to the continent, the historic experience of the nation, economic conditions unique to Norway, and the egalitarian political culture. Because of Norway's geographic position, the country has remained relatively isolated from continental influences. While integration began at the center of Europe, it has come more slowly to the EU's northern periphery. Norway is also a relatively young nation, where the concept of European Union has negative associations in a society once subordinated to the kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark. In contrast to its neighbors, there was no equivalent economic rationale for Norwegians to join the EU. In the Swedish and Finnish campaigns, EU membership represented a multilateral effort to revive the domestic economy. In the Norwegian campaign, EU membership represented a threat to domestic industry and to traditional sources of employment. A final obstacle to joining the EU is Norway's egalitarian political culture. As Lundestad points out, the periphery has a stronger position in Norway than in Finland or Sweden. When the political establishment in Helsinki speaks, then the nation falls into line—especially in questions of foreign policy. In Sweden, the Stockholm elite has also demonstrated its capacity for leadership. In Norway, on the other hand, the center's initiative is seldom more than a starting point for further discussion.4

In another interpretation of the "no to EU," Norway's election expert Professor Henry Valen stressed the importance of long-standing social and political divisions between the urban and rural regions of the country.5 Norway is a sparsely populated nation, with long distances between north and south. These geographic features have contributed to internal divisions within the society. By playing on historic conflicts between the center and periphery, the anti-EU organization defined the premises of the EU debate and effectively put the "yes" side on the defensive. Only in the last two weeks of the campaign was there significant momentum on the "yes" side. For Valen, the "no" vote carried the day because they had "history on their side."

The Sheltered Economy, the Norwegian Debate
and the "No" Vote

In their analyses of the Norwegian referendum, Lundestad and Valen neglect to consider the political effects of a petroleum-subsidized economy. Norwegians depend heavily on the offshore sector, and have done little to diversify their economy since they became net exporters of petroleum in 1975. Oil and gas account for more than 40% of Norwegian export revenue, and the European Union is Norway's most important market. EU member-states will continue to purchase Norwegian petroleum—whether the country is in the EU or not. Because oil and gas reserves are expected to last well into the next century, Norwegians lacked an economic motivation to join the EU.

Yet natural resources alone cannot account for the "no" vote. It is how the state chose to spend the petroleum monies which, paradoxically, led to the periphery's rejection of the center's appeal to join the EU. Lavish subsidies to the small farmer, fisherman and rural industries have been a traditional pillar of Social Democratic policy in Norway. Why promote seemingly inefficient economic activity in regions far from the capital? The Norwegian Social Democrats sought to avoid the consequences of urbanization experienced in other industrialized societies, and have instead decided to support agriculture, fishing and small industry in rural Norway—particularly in the Northern areas—in order to keep a substantial proportion of the population in the periphery. To understand the degree of the state's commitment to rural Norway one only has to look at the amenities provided to the farmer.

In a country where the growing season is extremely short, the climate is harsh, and the soil is rocky and difficult to cultivate the 5% of Norwegians who live and work on a farm are dependent on support from the state. The average Norwegian farmer receives substantially more in price supports and subsidies than the typical farmer in the European Union. By joining the EU, Norwegians would have to accept a reduction in farm subsidies. Since many Norwegians are only one or two generations away from the family farm, the plight of the small farmer was a reason to vote "no" to European Union membership.

Norway's coastal fisherman were also threatened by EU membership. Norwegian fishermen fought against the prospect of greater competition from Spanish and Portuguese trawlers—an anticipated consequence of joining the EU. For a country which depends heavily on resources from the sea, the EU represented a threat to "Norwegian fish."

Those working in sheltered sectors of the economy were the strongest opponents of EU membership in the fall 1994 referendum. "Three of every four voters in the areas that are most dependent on agriculture and fishing voted no...Along the coast and in the valleys of southern Norway there was a clear no vote."

Without petroleum revenue, the outcome of the referendum might have been entirely different, and Norwegians would have been compelled to join the EU. Instead, a counter-cultural appeal to save the small farmer, preserve Norwegian sovereignty, keep
Spanish trawlers from fishing in local waters, and preserve the amenities of the Norwegian way of life prevailed. In short, the petroleum-based economy gave Norway the luxury of a real debate over EU membership.

A central theme in the EU referendum debate was a choice over what kind of society Norwegians want to live in. (A debate, by the way, that only a nation which perceives that it does not need the EU could afford to engage in). The anti-EU movement portrayed the EU as a super bureaucracy where labor unions, women and small states are under-represented. The EU, it was argued, does not share Norway's commitment to the environment. As far as providing jobs for the labor force, Norway has a better track record and lower level of unemployment than the average EU member-state. If Norway joined the EU, fewer decisions would be made in Oslo, with obvious (negative) implications for democratic decision-making. In contrast to Finland, where a majority of women supported membership, 57% of Norwegian women voted against membership. Many Norwegian women feared that by joining the EU, they would be in a partnership of states that did not share the societal norms of the Norwegian state-with regard to welfare policies and the equal status of women. When asked to choose between "the other" (living in an EU state) and the status quo, a majority of Norwegians decided against change.

If Not Now, When?

What now for Norway? According to disappointed representatives of the "yes" movement, Norwegians have accepted relative isolation, and will not have a political role in the development of European institutions. Changes in the EU will effect Norway's economy and society anyway--so why not join?

Directly following the decision, clear signals came from Jacques Delors in Brussels indicating that "the door remains open" should Norway change its mind. Most Norwegians I spoke to during my recent trip to Oslo expressed relief that the battle over EU membership is over (for now). Because of the defeat of the "yes" campaign, the question of Norway's relationship to the EU will remain politically sensitive for many years to come. The next time it is likely to be discussed is during the 1997 national election campaign. Until then, Norwegians will cooperate fully with the EU as outsiders. Gro Harlem Brundtland's commitment to bringing Norway into the EU will move ahead--in currency cooperation, economic ties, and political contact.

As an outsider, the Norwegian finance ministry will save approximately 1.3 billion ECU ($1.6 billion US dollars)--the fee required to join the EU. Norwegians can continue to support the agricultural sector, if they choose, as long as they conform to the modest adjustments required by the GATT agreement. While the Spanish estimate the loss of 7,000 tonnes of cod, Norwegian fishermen can anticipate a larger catch than in a more competitive EU market. Norway's export-oriented industries are already integrated in European markets, and will benefit from the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital guaranteed under the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA).

Thus, for petrol-dependent Norway, the EU can wait. It will take a great deal of politicking to convince the average Norwegian (particularly those residing outside of Oslo) that life is better in the European Union. In the meantime, Nordic analysts will be busy comparing the fate of the two Nordic EU entrants, Sweden and Finland, with the two reluctant Europeans, Iceland and Norway.

For scholars interested in the question of how European integration affects the political economies of small, corporatist states, the Norwegian case is an anomaly: oil revenue provides the government with the option to maintain policies (such as abundant subsidies to agriculture, and a free trade agreement with the EU) which are untenable across the border in Sweden, the former "model" of Scandinavian welfare capitalism, or in Finland, once considered the "Japan of the north." Perhaps if you have oil you can afford to retain a more solidaristic Scandinavian welfare state and hold more reservations about the European Union.

Notes
1 In September 1972, 53.5% of Norwegians who participated in the consultative referendum voted against membership in the EEC. See Hilary Allen, Norway and Europe in the 1970s (Oslo: University Press, 1979).
2 Interview with Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norwegian radio, November 29, 1994.
3 In the week following the referendum, the Norwegian press published numerous articles with this theme, "we are a different country, independent from Europe."
4 Translated from "Hvorfor ble det nei i Norge?" Aftenposten, December 18, 1994, p. 18.

The Anthropology of the European Union

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In 1975 Jeremy Boissevain, in an essay introducing a volume written by members of the European-Mediterranean Study Group of the University of Amsterdam, identified key theoretical and methodological problems in the anthropology of Europe at the time, problems which are still of concern to anthropologists of today. As Boissevain said:

Political, religious and economic relationships [in Europe's villages] clearly do not exist in isolation at a local level. They are influenced by relationships and processes that lie beyond the community at regional, national and even supra-national levels ... To polarize part and whole, micro and macro, community and nation in the study of complex European societies by reifying them as separate categories does violence to the nature of the dynamic relationships between them, and the meaning they have to the people involved. (1975: 9)

Boissevain, along with a number of other influential anthropologists over the years, including, among others, Eric Wolf (1982), John Cole and Eric Wolf (1974), Jane and Peter Schneider (1976), Susan Tax Freeman (1973), Anton Blok (1974), and Ralph Grillo (1980), have taken the anthropology of Europe beyond the locality in order to understand communities' relationships with people and institutions of the region, nation, and state.
As a result of efforts such as these, over the last quarter of a century the anthropological agenda in the study of Europe has been redirected to include analyses of the processes of integration which affect localities, regions, nations, and states. But there remains much more that can and should be done in the anthropology of culture and power in Europe, in particular in the investigation of the dialectical relations between localities and higher levels of sociocultural, political, and economic integration. There is perhaps no better area in which to focus these studies than in the so-called "New Europe" of today, and in particular in the European Union (EU).

An anthropology of the European Union, including the past anthropology of the European Economic Community and the European Union, is in large part an effort to study the sweep of long-term and wide-ranging sources of cultural change. Anthropologists and other ethnographers who study the EU seek to understand the transformations wrought on localities by people and institutions in wider society, and to understand the ways in which local communities can affect, and in some cases cause, that change. This is a difficult task. Some anthropologists who have undertaken it have chosen to concentrate their energies at the centers of power in the EU, among the Eurocracy and EU elites, including but not limited to regional and national government leaders and representatives, political party leaders, bureaucrats, lobbyists, and interest groups. I call this the top-down approach, looking from above at the EU as a political and social system. Other anthropologists have focused their attention on localities and institutions at lower levels of integration, and, in particular, on the impact of the EU on everyday life and the efforts of people to influence EU and national policy-makers. This is a bottom-up approach, or the EU from below.

As I have argued elsewhere (Wilson 1993a), with a few, and recent exceptions, the EU has not been prominent in the ethnography or the macro-sociological analyses of Europe conducted by anthropologists since the Community's inception. Over the last few years, however, there are indications that this situation is changing. Although categorizing the anthropological studies of the EU by pigeon-holing them into the two divisions of the "EU from above" (or perhaps it is more appropriate to call it the "EU from the center"), and the "EU from below" (in terms of the local community and beyond, or the "EU from the margins") may be doing them a slight injustice, I think it a useful exercise in order to show the range of anthropological approaches to the EU.

The EU From Above

Perhaps the most promising, and in some senses the easiest, area of study of the EU is among the government leaders, bureaucrats, and lobbyists at the centers of EU power and decision-making, in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg. I suggest that this may be a relatively easy way to study the EU precisely because these three places have been transformed by the presence of the EU; they have become "European" cities and the capitals of the new Europe. If there is any one place to study the dialectical relations between local communities and the higher levels of power, then it is in one of these cities where all the nations of Europe come, and interact with not only the constituent units of the EC Commission, Council, and Parliament, but also the agents of the relevant regions and states which house them. Ethnographic analyses of these places are all but non-existent, marking them as perhaps the ultimate of, to use Estellie Smith's phrase the "incidental urban entities" of the EC (Smith 1993). Many anthropologists over the years have turned their critical eye to bureaucrats in a number of settings (the best recent example is Hersfeld 1992), and they have mapped out number of successful strategies for conducting ethnographic studies among bureaucratic and government elites. Access to the halls of power in the EU is the key obstacle, but at least five ethnographers have achieved success in this vein. Marc Abélès and Maryon McDonald have been conducting research among the members of the European Commission, Brussels and elsewhere, and among the Members of the European Parliament, in Strasbourg, Brussels and in the MEPs' home countries. Douglas Holmes recently completed a long-term research project in both the Parliament and the Commission. Little of this research on the Commission has been published to date, although Abélès has been productive in terms of his analysis of the European Parliament, including its everyday formal and informal politics, and the work and social schedules of the MEPs (Abélès 1992, 1993). McDonald's research continues at the Commission, and she has lately been involved in a mammoth enterprise to bring the anthropology of Europe, in terms of its breadth and depth, to the Commission's attention, and in particular to the attention of the think tank set up by the former EU Commission President, Jacques Delors, to advise him on the scope of European life and integration (a suggestion of some of her research interests can be found in McDonald 1993). Others have worked on policy and policymakers in Brussels and Strasbourg. Shore and Black have been investigating cultural policies (Shore 1993), European identity, and the cultural construction of Europe as seen from Brussels (Shore and Black 1992). Black is now engaged in a project to study the community of wives of EU diplomats in Brussels and in London, while Shore is designing a long-term project to study the various ways policies are culturally constructed in the Commission.

The reluctance on the part of anthropologists to brave research among Eurocrats, or among the communities of people in Brussels and Strasbourg of which the Eurocrats are members, should not be surprising. There are clear problems of access to people and data; research in these central metropolises of Europe is extremely expensive; respondents are busy, elusive, and dispersed (at least after working hours); and anthropological research is a largely unknown quantity to the people of the EU hierarchies, with the result that there is even less time and money available at their end for our ethnographic interests.

The EU From Below

The importance and relevance of studies of power brokers in the EU capitals are apparent. Most anthropological studies of the EU have not been conducted among European elites, however, and although there is a growing literature in the ethnography of Europe within a variety of EU contexts, most of these studies focus primarily on local communities. Because there has historically been a preference in anthropological research in Europe towards the analysis of small communities, isolated locations, and people with little wealth and power, most of the anthropological approaches to the EU have centered on the impact of EU policies on a range of local and social political formations. Since local communities seldom have a clearly defined notion of the "Europe" of the EU, and often even less of an idea of how their communities are part of the total society that the EU represents, their role in the EU often appears to be reactive rather than proactive. Policies are experienced at local levels, but the means to affect the policy-making process at the level of the EU are either not at these communities' disposal or are perceived by
them to be absent. As a result the anthropology of the EU lacks a strong applied anthropological or policy-oriented character. There are exceptions, however, precisely because the EU since its inception has reconfigured a wide range of traditional ties between localities and nations and states.

Giordano (1987) has analyzed the wine war between Italian and French peasants and agricultural cooperatives, in one of the earliest efforts to construct an ethnographic component to the understanding of the EU. LiPuma and Meltzoff (1989, 1994) have examined ways in which Galician and other Iberian fisherman and their communities have adapted to EU fisheries policy, and they are among the few anthropologists who have attempted to chronicle ways in which local associations have carried the fight for their European rights to national capitals and to Brussels itself. Because the most important area of EU policy competence and power has been in agricultural policy, specifically in the Common Agricultural Policy, it is not surprising that most anthropological studies of rural areas of the EU are on farmers’ adaptations to the CAP. EU agricultural policy has transformed a host of past relationships between national governments and their countries’ farmers, resulting in the loss of patronage and clientage, weakening farmer support for their traditional political parties, and providing the basis for new national and international farmers lobbies, as well as the financial means and political influence to create new forms of political action. I (Wilson 1989) have studied the ways in which the Irish Farmers Association has helped to redefine local politics in Ireland, which has had a number of knock-on effects on local notions of class and culture (Wilson 1988). Jurus (1993) has demonstrated how Dutch and Spanish farmers have developed diverging regional structures to deal with their volatile national and international markets. Shuttes (1991, 1993) has predicted that the EU will threaten the entire way of life of small farmers in Ireland and elsewhere in Europe, precisely because the EU, as a market-driven economic system, will cease to subsidize peasant and post-peasant farmers in its effort to maximize profit and productivity. To achieve this the EU must also remove the financial support it has previously supplied to national governments, largely through its Structural and Cohesion Funds, which member states have used to subsidize their farmers in order to protect them from the vagaries of the free EU market, thereby guaranteeing farmers’ support for political parties and governments. This inherent contradiction between member nation and state political goals, on the one hand, and the goals of the Eurocracy and other European elites to achieve economic and political union at a "European" level, on the other hand, is another area of great potential interest to anthropologists, especially in terms of conflicts over policy and the values and meanings of identity and political culture.

The EU has had an important effect on a wide range of social and cultural identities in Europe, forcing many groups of people to reconstruct their notions of nation, state, and sovereignty, and to renegotiate the many symbolic markers to the boundaries between groups which the EU, as a post-modern political structure, has transformed. Thus, Smith (1993) has investigated the changing role of cities in Europe; Parman (1993) has explored a variety of new community symbolic boundaries in Scotland which are a direct result of EU membership; Jaffe (1993) has examined Corsicans’ attempts to renegotiate their land as both region and nation, in both France and the EU; and Costa (1993) has looked at the impact of globalization and EU policies on images of self and possessions in Greece. Much of the anthropology of the EU, in fact, is the study of transnationals and transnationalism, in which the powerless of Europe and immigrants from elsewhere must negotiate themselves as "Europeans", just as influential elites such as bankers must, as McDonagh (1993) and Gullick (1993) have respectively shown. And the more that the EU is perceived by Europeans and anthropologists as a source of the attack on the traditional nation-state, then the more will nationalism figure prominently in our daily lives and privileged discourse (for a review of ways in which nationalism, the EU, and French scholarship are intertwined, see Varenne 1993; for a view on Irish resistance to European integration, see Sheehan 1991). Perhaps there is no better arena in which to study the processes of nationalism and transnationalism than at the international borders between the states of Europe (Wilson 1993b; Donnan and Wilson 1994).

A developing anthropology of the EU has many paths open before it. Some of the most productive and relevant may be in the application of ethnographic methods and anthropological theories to the totality of the EU as a set of cultural relations. As Verdeny indicated a few years ago, the nation is an element of the cultural relations between state and subject (1992: 8, see also Wilson 1993: 18). Many anthropologists also see the EU as a social system in which regions and states act as elements in the relations between subjects and supranation. These elements are understood by Europeans to be about culture and power. The ways the EU is meaningful in their lives, and the ways they are able to withstand or effect cultural change in the midst of EU-building, should be the concern of anthropologists and other social scientists. To achieve this anthropologists must be aware that the supra-nation or supranational of the EU is not a nation and it is not a state. As Walker Connor has been warning social scientists for years, in regard to "nation", "state" and "ethnic group", we must be clear about our definitions (Connor 1978). So too must we be aware that the EU is a new type of sociopolitical configuration, which is as new, surprising, and daunting to the peoples of Europe as it is to us. It is the process of constructing itself which may be the most exciting aspect of the EU to Europeans. Perhaps our attempts to understand this process, which goes beyond the mechanisms and issues of nation and state building, will prove to be the most exciting aspect of the EU to anthropologists. One thing is clear. National elites and state governments and bureaucracies are losing power in and to the EU. The eventual home for this power, and the fate of the peoples who will be the winners and losers in the creation of a European Union, will be elements of the political culture of all of the localities, nations, and states of the EU. The future anthropology of Europe may very well stand or fall on its ability to understand and to adapt to this fact.

Notes

This is an abridged version of a paper presented at the 1994 annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association in Atlanta, on the panel, organized by Susan Parman and William Douglass, on "American Perspectives in the History of the Anthropology of Europe".


US Law Contributions to European Union Studies

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Although European Community studies in US law faculties date to the early 1960's, the field has developed tremendously since the late 1980s. This is principally due to the success of the internal market program which has drawn the pragmatic interest of multinational American law firms and has, in turn, led to enhanced study by law professors and students. The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, with its concurrent expansion of fields of activity and movement toward European Union, has also stimulated comparative constitutional law study.

To provide a bit of historical perspective, law faculty pioneers in EC studies included notably Eric Stein, Michigan; Mauro Cappelletti, Stanford; Peter Hay, Illinois (now in Dresden); Peter Herzog (Syracuse); Steve Riesenberg, California Berkeley; Hans Smit (Columbia); and Gabriel Wilner, Georgia. All were writing and teaching in EC law in the 1960s and 70s.

Professors Stein and Hay created the first European organizations casebook in 1963, radically revised as an EC law book in 1976 with the aid of Michel Waeltbroeck, Université libre de Bruxelles. Professors Smit and Herzog edited a multi-volume treatise annotating each article of the ECC Treaty, The Law of the European Economic Community (Matthew Bender, 1979-83). This valuable research tool is presently being updated. Professors Stein and Terrance Sandalow edited a valuable comparative federalism study, Courts and Free Markets (Oxford 1982), which is still a rich source of contrasts in basic US and EC constitutional principles. The CCH Common Market Law Reporter, begun in the 1970s, is still by far the best American source of Court of Justice cases, recent EC legislation and other developments.

By the early 1980's, EC competition law had become a highly developed legal system of great importance in international law practice and presented highly significant points of contrast with US antitrust law. Further, EC trade protection law, notably its antidumping and antisubsidy rules, presented a similar interest in law practice and comparative studies. Finally, the EC harmonization of law programs in company, securities and banking law, consumer rights protection, environmental law, professional rights, social and employee rights (including gender discrimination rules), etc., provided major new fields for comparative law scholarship.

This had three consequences: many EC law school courses were introduced; a number of new law professor specialists in EC law emerged; and domestic law specialists in a variety of fields (i.a., antitrust, trade, environmental law, employee rights) began...
using EC law for comparative scholarly writing. Thus, I began teaching EC law in 1978, my co-authors on *Cases and Materials on European Community Law* (see below) began their scholarly work in the field in the 1980's, as did Professors Herbert Bernstein, Duke; Roger Billings; Northern Kentucky; Ralph Folsom, San Diego; Mark Jones, Mercer; Suman Naresh, Tulane; and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Harvard. Professor Joseph Weiler, a leading EC constitutional scholar at the European University Institute, came to Michigan in the mid-1980s and is now at Harvard. Other specialists in specific EC-US comparative fields include Richard Buxbaum, Berkeley (company law); David Gerber, Chicago-Kent (antitrust); Barry Hawk, Fordham (antitrust); Cynthia Lichtenstein, Boston College (international finance), Joel Trachtman, Fletcher (international finance) and Diane Woods, Chicago (antitrust).

Since the mid-1980s, the number of law school courses concentrating on European Community law (now become European Union law) have proliferated. Moreover, many international business and trade law courses contain a substantial EC component, as do some domestic law courses in antitrust, environmental law and trade protection. In addition to teaching in the home campus, over thirty US law schools have summer programs in Europe which include one or more courses centered on EC law. EC law has become one of the most popular courses in the international business and trade field, and it is frequently seen as a more valuable comparative law study area, especially for constitutional and commercial law, than the more traditionally civil law-oriented comparative law course.

The appearance in 1993 of the first casebook in nearly twenty years, *Cases and Materials on European Community Law* (West, 1993), co-authored by Professors George Bermann, Columbia; Roger Goebel, Fordham; William Davey, Illinois; and Eleanor Fox, New York University, has greatly facilitated classroom teaching. Over sixty US and three Canadian law schools taught EC law courses in 1993-1994 using the casebook, which contains comprehensive coverage of constitutional law principles, the four freedoms and the internal market program, competition rules, external relations and trade law, employee rights and environmental protection law. It incorporates the Maastricht Treaty modifications and will be supplemented on current developments in the fall of 1995. The casebook can serve as the basis not only of survey courses, but also advanced seminars. Perhaps, in appropriately adapted form, it may also be used as a text in undergraduate education, just as public international or trade law casebooks are sometimes used.

While it is always a bit invidious to make references to specific schools, manifestly some law faculties have particularly promoted EC studies. For many years, Eric Stein and his collaborators gave Michigan a preeminent position. Today, Fordham has the most courses: four each year since 1990, covering EC competition, corporate, finance and trade law, and intellectual property specialties, as well as basic EC law. Fordham's Center on European Community Law also arranges the invitation of ten to twelve EC officials as guest lecturers each year, including a judge of the Court of Justice for the last six years.

Both Tulane and Georgetown have two EC courses, one a survey and the second concentrating on competition law and internal market harmonization. Tulane situates its courses within its European law program, while Georgetown's are in its international trade field. Harvard usually offers a year-long course in EC law. Among the other schools with dedicated faculty experts and large classes in EC law are Boston College, Boston University, Chicago-Kent, Columbia, Duke, Emory, Georgia, Illinois, New York University, Ohio State University, and San Diego. Although many law schools have a permanent faculty member teaching the field, some continue to use eminent European visiting professors (i.a., California Berkeley, Chicago, Connecticut, Fordham, and Michigan).

The volume of law faculty academic writing in the field has also grown enormously in the last decade, prompted in large measure by interest in the constitutional law developments of the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, and by comparative work in antitrust, trade law, environmental protection, and the fields of the internal market program. Most legal literature is contained in US law review articles, although some American law professors also contribute to leading European journals, such as the *Common Market Law Review*, *European Law Review* and the *European Journal of International Law*. The *Fordham International Law Journal* and the *Boston College International Law Review* both devote an annual issue to EC law, and other reviews frequently devote a symposium issue to EC law developments. All are easily accessed through Lexis, Westlaw, and the *Index to Legal Periodicals*. Although most law review articles are topical and descriptive in nature, some are deeply analytical, authoritative and even seminal in character.

Professors Cappelletti and Weiler have edited several valuable EC-US comparative law books in the *Integration Through Law* series (DeGruyter, 1986-90). They cover not only basic constitutional law topics, but also company law, environmental protection and consumer rights. Professor Billings has produced a text for practitioners, *Handling Business Opportunities in the EC* (Clark Boardman), and Professor Folsom a short text for law students, *EC Law in a Nutshell* (West 1992). Professor Hawk has written the treatise, *US, Common Market and International Antitrust* (Transnational, updated), and also edits the well-known series of international antitrust books compiling the papers presented at the annual Fordham Corporate Law Institutes. These books are widely considered to contain the most authoritative current expert views on US and EC antitrust.

Naturally, leading authorities such as Professors Buxbaum, Stein, and Weiler have authored books on particular EC topics in their academic fields of interest.

Although our concern is with US law professors' contributions to EC scholarship, manifestly the bulk of current legal literature in English is published in Europe. Space constraints permit reference to only a few of the leading works.


Books on antitrust and trade laws are numerous indeed. A select sampling would include C. Bellamy & E. Child, *Common

A few key books concentrating on the four freedoms, substantive law and the internal market are D. Lasok, The Professions and Services in the EEC (Kluwer 1986); S. Johnson & G. Corcelle, The Environmental Policy of the EC (Graham & Trotman 1989); M. Maresceau, The EC's Commercial Policy After 1992: The Legal Dimension (Martinus Nijhoff 1993); E. Rehbbieber & R. Stewart, Environmental Protection Policy (DeGruyter 1988); P. Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the EEC (European Law Center 2d 1988); M. Van Empel, Financial Services and EEC Law (Kluwer, updated); D. Wyatt & A. Dashwood, EC Law (Sweet & Maxwell 3d 1993); and J. Usher, Legal Aspects of Agricultural in the EC (Clarendon 1988).

It should not be surprising that US law professors who have become known for their competence in EC law, or in a specific field thereof, are frequent speakers at bar and business conferences. This includes not only the American Bar Association and state bar meetings, but also the American Society of International Law, The American Comparative Law Society, The American Foreign Law Association, the International Law Association and similar groups. American law professors also increasingly participate in European academic and legal conferences devoted in whole or in part to EC law.

In conclusion, American law professors are making important contributions to EC and EU studies in three ways. First, the proliferation of courses and the availability of a modern casebook enables the training of law students, some of whom will later represent clients involved in EC law affairs. Second, the professors' legal publications, speeches and participation in bar conferences and programs help provide current practitioners with broader perspectives and deeper insights into technical aspects of EC law. Third, and most important in the long term, law professors' academic writings and participation in academic colloquia promote serious analytical scholarship into EC constitutional law and specialized sectors of substantive law. This can particularly benefit European scholarship by providing a comparative perspective. It also enables a critical comparative examination of US constitutional and substantive law fields in the light of EC principles and rules.

American Policy toward European Integration: Partnerships then and now

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American Policy Toward European Integration from Roosevelt to Truman

Many of us remember Kennedy's historic address in Philadelphia on 4 July 1962: "We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner...capable of playing a greater role on the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce and commodities and currency, and developing coordinated policies on all economic and diplomatic areas." More recently, President Clinton addressed an audience of "Young Europeans" in Brussels and committed his administration to support the European Union, recognizing that the United States would "benefit more from a strong and equal partner than from a weak one."

American support for European unity is not new of course. Long before the creation of the European Communities, Americans and Europeans alike were fascinated by the idea of establishing some kind of union or federal system in Europe. During World War II, some policy-makers in Washington, both in and outside the government, viewed a united Europe as a key ingredient in a peace characterized by full employment at home, and liberalized trade and national security in the framework of an international organization. Yet they also envisaged that a European union, like the little girl in the nursery rhyme, could be either "very very good or horrid."2

On the good side, American policy-makers anticipated great gains from the creation of a European customs union (excluding the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) and considered ambitious schemes for European monetary unification and a regional transport authority. Eastern European countries would form the agricultural part of the union, exporting agricultural goods in exchange for manufactured goods from the Western union members. Planners were hopeful that European collaboration in agriculture would discourage Europeans from producing crops which were fostered artificially and that this might help American farmers to recapture "over one fourth of the world market" from which, in their minds, the European countries had robbed them in the past.3 In addition, the European union's central authority would simplify commercial policy with third countries, including the United States, thereby facilitating access to European markets. The customs union, and perhaps an economic and monetary union, would also help remove intra-European financial and trade barriers, promoting a greater degree of complementarity among European countries. This would lead to more efficiency and prosperity, which would translate into more demand for imports of raw materials, food, and manufactured goods, of which the United States would be the primary beneficiary. More economic prosperity would then foster political stability in Europe and contribute to international and American stability. Last but not least, Germany was given a key role in this blueprint for an acceptable peace. Arguing that Germany accounted for three-quarters of European coal production and half of its steel output, and that these were badly needed for European reconstruction, the planners hoped to channel German energies towards European recovery and unification by integrating Germany within an economically and politically unified Europe, further increasing political stability. This equation for winning the peace later formed part of the thinking behind the Marshall Plan.

Yet a European union could also prove to be an impediment rather than an asset for peace. At the time, a unified Europe still evoked the specter of Europe unified under the authority of Nazi Germany. The fear existed that a European union might be dominated by a single power of a group of powers with belligerent intentions; both the Soviet Union and Germany were seen as candidates for hegemony on the continent. This danger could only be averted by creating an effective security system after the war. Another danger was the emergence of a protectionist Europe surrounded by high tariff walls. As a sense of "European nationhood" developed, the government of the union might
consider using "the economic weapon as a means of furthering continental policy." A strong European entity and the creation of similar entities as a reaction to it might result in "the break-up of the world organization in favor of a series of power blocs acting in unstable equilibrium without the ballast provided by the smaller nations." Finally, the Soviet Union might fear German domination of the union, which posed a direct threat to Soviet security. American support for a European union might accordingly undermine prospects for building the peace in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Although President Roosevelt liked the idea of a European union and mistrusted on the whole the effectiveness of an international organization, his main concern at the time was to avoid alienating the Soviet Union, and to enlist Soviet cooperation to rebuild the old continent. Thus, the European union idea was a political non-starter at that point, even though the President is said to have begun to change his mind right before his death.

Although President Truman initially hoped to rebuild Europe in cooperation with the Soviet Union, prospects for a pan-European peace settlement soon dimmed. The Marshall Plan, while encouraging regional economic association among European countries, also consecrated the division of Europe into East and West. As the United States turned away from Roosevelt's globalism and his policy of conciliation with the Soviet Union, European integration appeared in a more favorable light. No longer an impediment to peace with the Soviet Union, a united Europe would now buttress the free world against the menace of totalitarianism, and, at the very least, keep Western Europe within the free world. European cooperation would not only make American aid more efficient, but would also solidify the West Germany and its resources to the West. Besides containing the Soviet Union and Communism, Western European integration held the additional prospect of exerting an irresistible pull on Russian satellites.

On the other hand, the costs of not making Europe would be staggering. If the United States did not infuse enough dollars into Germany and Europe, if Europe did not unite, Germany might coalesce its industrial resources and technological advance with the enormous manpower of the Soviet Union. If Europe as a whole turned toward the Soviet Union, George Kennan said, "we would be a lonely nation in the world in the sense that we would be on the minority side not only in the sense of world resources but also in the sense of philosophy and outlook at the world."

The American Administration gradually reached the conclusion that Europe could not psychologically withstand the communist threat without an American military guarantee. The result was the North Atlantic Treaty, which, again according to Kennan, created "the irrevocable congelation of the division of Europe in two military zones: a Soviet zone and a U.S. zone" while it also prevented "the development of a real federal structure in Europe which would aim to embrace all free European countries, and which would be a political force in its own right." In other words, the Soviet and American military spheres of influence in Europe occluded Pan-Europe as a political entity.

Meanwhile, the creation of the first European Community was well on its way. American reactions to the Schuman Plan were rather mixed. Secretary of State Dean Acheson wondered whether the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) would be the biggest cartel ever. Since it was open to all countries, would it mean the emergence of a neutral Europe, a disengaged Europe, "a third force" Europe that would not so much be the partner of the United States as act independently and perhaps against American interests? On the other hand, however, the ECSC could end the Franco-German conflict, integrate Germany within the West, and act as a stepping stone towards a European federation.

After North Korea's invasion of South Korea, the French proposed the creation of a European defense community (EDC) mainly to counteract the pernicious effects American plans for German rearmament and the restoration of German sovereignty might have on the Schuman Plan as well as on French interests. At first, the Americans opposed the plan. They suspected it to be a device to delay German rearmament and to maintain Germany in a second-rate status. They also found it badly conceived militarily. Although a strong proponent of European unification General Eisenhower remarked that the proposal seemed "almost inherently to include every kind of obstacle, difficulty and fantastic notions that misguided humans could put together in one package."

The Frenchman Jean Monnet, who was known as "Mr. Europe" in the United States at the time, was instrumental in convincing Eisenhower that the key part of the plan was its human aspect: by making the Germans and the French serve under the same uniform, one would also unite people.

The Eisenhower Administration and European Integration

When Eisenhower became President of the United States, he and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a long-time friend of Monnet, strongly backed European integration. Eisenhower now hoped that the EDC would lead to a real European federation. To him, the political and economic unification of Europe became a sine qua non for the permanent security of the West; without it, there could be no long-term economic health to the region and without economic strength, adequate military force could not be maintained. Eisenhower's recurring nightmare was that the Russians would spend the United States into bankruptcy. A united Europe would prevent this from happening as it would strengthen the Alliance not only by providing desirable markets for American goods but also by contributing more to the common defense. The EDC offered the prospect of cutting down American troops on the continent, which would further reduce costs.

When the EDC died in the French Assembly on 30 August 1954, American supporters of European integration were disappointed. Their reaction to the Messina Conference in early June 1955 was rather lukewarm, all the more so since one of the only tangible results of the conference seemed to have been to divest Monnet of his post as head of the High Authority of the ECSC. Yet Messina led to the creation of two further European Communities, Euratom and the European Economic Community (EEC), and Monnet proved resilient. Shortly after leaving the High Authority, he decided to create an Action Committee for the United States of Europe, which began its work in 1956 and was instrumental in helping to obtain parliamentary majorities for the ratification of Euratom and the EEC. The ideas that inspired and motivated Monnet's action and which he tried to posit as the main tenets of his Action Committee were similar to the views held by certain policy-makers in the US - the so-called "Europeanists."

This was no coincidence. Eisenhower and Dulles, as well as some close advisors of John F. Kennedy, belonged to a unique network of people, who considered the advancement of European integration essential to attain the larger goal of an acceptable peace settlement. All of them had lived through one if not more European wars; this common experience gave them the shared goal of toning down nationalism in Europe.
Yet European integration or unity were relatively vague terms. Did they in fact mean cooperation between governments through loose associations such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) or the Western European Union? Or did they entail something more? For Jean Monnet, cooperation among governments was not enough. Member states must "delegate certain of their powers to European federal institutions responsible to all of the participating countries as a whole." By the end of 1955, the Eisenhower Administration had reached a similar conclusion and opted for the supranational six-nation approach as opposed to "cooperative arrangements" such as the OEEC which did not involve transfers of sovereignty in favor of a supranational authority such as the High Authority of the ECSC. The lukewarm attitude of the US towards the Free Trade Area negotiations initiated by the British, and subsequently, towards the creation of the European Free Trade Association, can be traced back to this tendency to favor "genuine integration" à la Monnet, not only because of the "expected economic and technical advantages," but also because this kind of integration was thought to lead to European political union. Only such a union could capture the imagination of European nations and especially of West Germany. By channeling German energies and loyalties towards European integration, one would increase economic efficiency in Western Europe while creating a new link between Germany and the West, thereby strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. The opposite scenario was much less appealing: failing a sufficient pull from the European common endeavor, the West might be weakened by competitive economic nationalism within Europe and Germany might look East. Worse still, the State Department projected that the Soviet Union was making great economic progress and would soon overtake Western Europe's aggregate GNP. A lack of unity and diminished economic prowess in the West might then also encourage developing nations to cast their eyes toward the communist bloc for leadership.

The Kennedy Administration and Atlantic Partnership

The Kennedy Administration continued to support European integration for many of the same reasons as the Eisenhower Administration, and for some additional ones. Continuity between the two administrations was insured in part by Europeanists in both administrations who had close ties to Monnet. For example, Under Secretary of State George Ball, one of Kennedy's top advisors in European affairs, had known Monnet since the Roosevelt Administration and later became involved in the preparation of the ECSC Treaty. The Ball/Monnet connection was put to good use when the Democrats resumed power in the early sixties. Already in August 1960, Kennedy had asked Adlai Stevenson to help him develop a program of action for the first few months of the new Administration "somewhat reminiscent of the celebrated Hundred Days of the first term of Franklin Roosevelt." Stevenson then commissioned Ball to write the report for him. He, in turn, asked Monnet to contribute to the project by helping him define American policy towards Europe as well as "measures for the strengthening of ties between Europe and the United States." He insisted that Monnet keep the project strictly confidential since the program was "known to only four or five people in the United States." The final product, the so-called Stevenson Report, heeded the suggestions of Monnet and his colleagues, and included a twenty-page paper outlining a plan for a "Policy for Partnership Between a United Europe and America within a Strong Atlantic Community." Just before the new Administration took office, Monnet also met frequently with Ball and other future members of the Kennedy administration in Europe and in the United States to discuss U.S.-European relations. When Monnet came to Washington in March, George Ball introduced him to the President, with whom Monnet discussed his plans for an Atlantic partnership over lunch, and during other long conversations.

In July and August 1961, Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom applied to join the EEC. The American administration strongly encouraged the United Kingdom to make that move. Dean Acheson, George Ball and others urged that the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States be replaced by a new special relationship between the United States and the new Europe. Instead of attempting to weaken the European communities from the outside the United Kingdom would then play a key role in a united Europe, not least by inoculating the Community against bouts of protectionism, and by diluting what seemed to be an emerging coalition between the French and the Germans against American influence in Europe. Britain's full membership in the EEC held the additional prospect of weakening EFTA and other British inspired free trade arrangements which discriminated against the United States without holding the promise of European political integration.

Meanwhile, the new Administration prepared to meet the challenges and opportunities of an enlarged Common Market. In December 1961, Kennedy spoke of the need to replace the old Reciprocal Trade Agreements due to expire in June of 1962 with a "new and bold instrument of American trade policy." The idea was based in part on a foreign economic policy which Kennedy had asked Ball to write during the interregnum. "If the United States production is not to be at a serious disadvantage in the rapidly growing Common Market," wrote Ball, "the President must be armed with weapons enabling him to bargain effectively for the generalization to the United States of the internal tariff cuts within these markets - or, at least, for the substantial reduction of their external tariff."

Initially, Monnet did not view the Trade Expansion Act with much sympathy. At this early stage in the history of the Common Market, he believed that "common tariff and the common commercial policy" were "for the moment essential to the sense of union between the European people just as in the past the tariff was one of the formative elements of American unity. Free trade between Europe and America today would undermine the European institutions, the existence of which is the only hope of our obtaining a real Atlantic partnership between equals and a partnership will only be possible between equals." In the end, however, Monnet was prod by Ball and others and heartedly endorsed the Trade Expansion Act once Congress had passed it. The Action Committee's Declaration of 17 and 18 December 1962 called attention to President Kennedy's Independence Day Speech, in which he looked "forward to the interdependence of the United States and Europe as equal partners." The Trade Expansion Act would "enable the United States to negotiate on this partnership in the economic field."

In truth, for the time being the partnership between equals which Kennedy advocated was mostly economic, for although Europe had recovered economically and possessed resources much nearer to the United States, politically it still spoke with many voices. In addition, if part of the Kennedy Administration leaned towards giving more participation to Europeans in the nuclear field, this was not to translate into effective control of the nuclear deterrent. Here the right word to describe the U.S. European relationship was not so much interdependence as
integration. In addition, the idea of partnership contained a strong burden-sharing element. Upon graduating into the club of economic giants, European partners were expected to contribute more to common defense and to common economic endeavors such as helping developing nations. In this sense, NATO and the newly created OECD were partly burden-sharing exercises which would not only help solve American balance of payments problems but also strengthen the Alliance, notably by helping to mend the rift between the EFTA and members of the European Communities.

Kennedy’s grand design for Europe rested on two important premises: the necessity for the West to form a common and cohesive front against communist expansion and the imperative need to maintain American leadership in Europe to assure that European resources would be channeled towards meeting the common tasks of the free world. Rather than an independent third force Europe, Kennedy preferred a Western bloc which encompassed an American senior partner and, for the time being, a European junior partner. For Kennedy and Monnet, only Western cohesion would make it possible to negotiate the peace with the Soviet Union. This did not agree with De Gaulle’s blueprint for peace, where only a united Europe free from American tutelage would allow the Soviet Union to make concessions and loosen its grip on its satellites.

Conclusion: The Ups and Downs of the Transatlantic Partnership

American support for European integration began to show signs of fatigue particularly during the last years of the Johnson Administration and under the Nixon Administration. First, this was due to the lack of progress Europeans made towards the twin goals of economic and political integration, which translated into a lack of interest on the part of Americans for European integration. Second, the generation of American Europeanists gradually disappeared from American governmental circles. Finally, increased economic competition between the U.S. and the EC, as well as a European tendency to criticize certain American political or military initiatives, did much to usher in an eclipse in the U.S. support of European integration.

In recent years, however, the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, and the end of the cold war have revived the interest of the American administration and American academic and business circles in European integration. Faced with the challenge of a highly volatile European situation, Washington has dusted off the idea of a partnership between the US and a tightly integrated European union, which Kennedy advocated some thirty years ago. No longer reduced to the expression of “Fortress Europe,” the European Union is now regarded by the Clinton Administration as a potential element of stability on the European continent and a stepping stone towards an undivided, democratic and prosperous Europe. Then as now, the question is whether the European Union will learn to develop a common foreign and security policy, so that the United States and the EU can become governmental equals.

Notes

1 For more details on the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods, see Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, St. Martin’s Press (Macmillan, 1993); this article was prepared in part with a NATO fellowship.
2 U.S. State Department, Division of Economic Studies, “How Would a European Full Customs Union Affect the Long-Run Economic Interests of the United States?” 17 September 1943, Record Group 59, The Records of Harley A. Nottet, Box 84, National Archivist.
5 Subcommittee on Problems of European Organization, “How would the Political Unification of Europe Affect the Interests of the United States,” Subcommittee on Problems of European Organization of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, 10 December 1943, RG 59, The Records of Harley A Nottet, Box 84, R63c, NA.
6 Policy Planning Staff Meeting, 13 June 1949, RG 59, Box 29, PPS, NA.
7 Kennan draft memorandum for Marshall and Lovett, 26 September 1948, Policy Planning Staff Records, Box 27, “Europe 1947-1948.”
10 Circular telegram from the Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, 6 March 1957, pp. 534-536.
11 Ball to Monnet, 1 September 1960, Ball’s papers, Box 7, Princeton Library.
14 Monnet to Ball, 18 January 1961.

REFERENCE WORKS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

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This article briefly describes a number of recently published reference works on the European Community/Union. The primary audience is academicians in the social sciences; items published primarily for the corporate, financial, legal or scientific communities are omitted. (Editor’s note: please see Roger Goebel’s article in this issue of the Newsletter for a review of legal literature on the EU.) The term reference work is used broadly; one of the items is a journal, and others have scholarly essays. In choosing works to include, the author selected items containing information on the nature, organization, structure, institutions, activities, and personnel of the EU which are particularly useful to researchers. Works on specific policy areas are not included.

Some of the items listed are EU publications. Depository libraries receive them on a regular basis. Most can be purchased from UNIPUB, 4611-F Assembly Drive, Lanham, Maryland, 20706-4391 (800/274-4888). UNIPUB is the sole domestic distributor of EU materials; it sells all subscriptions and priced publications, annuals and yearbooks, and some Official Journal and COM (Commission) documents.
European Access. (bi-monthly). Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey. 0264-7362. $150. The best current awareness tool, includes updates on recent EU events, short articles highlighting important areas, and a thorough bibliography including both EU and non-EU publications.

The European Communities Encyclopedia and Directory (annual). London: Europa Publications Ltd. 390 pp. 0946653658. 0962-1032. $300. The most comprehensive of the items reviewed here, includes a cross-referenced dictionary on EU member states, institutions, officials, and widely-used terms and acronyms, essays on the institutional structure, 1992, and external affairs, a survey of statistical information (agricultural, industrial, demographic, etc.), a directory providing extensive lists of principal officials in EU institutions, summaries of major treaties governing the EU, and an extensive list of trade, industry, professional and consumer organizations which interact with the EU in some way.


Butterworths Guide to the European Communities 2nd, 1992. London: Butterworths. 150 pp. 0406060245. Describes the principles and framework of the legal and judicial systems and various policy areas and treaties of the EU, the EU institutional structure and procedures, and major EU policies, citing relevant treaty provisions, legislation, and major court cases.


Fallik, Alain, ed. (1994). The European Public Affairs Directory. Brussels: Landmarks SA. 9074373038. 0777-5814. $100. Lists over 5,000 key decision-makers and organizations within EU institutions, with addresses, phone and fax numbers. Also covers staff and committees of EU institutions, media, corporate and professional bodies.

Hunt, Nigel, ed. 1994 Directory of EC Information Sources. 6th. Brussels: Euroconfidential. 950 pp. 2930066113. $250. This item outlines types of information available from within the EU and how to obtain it. It describes the EU's "information structure," major EU publications and databases, and the Commission and its structure, primary functions, and officers (with contact information). It also includes lists of press agencies, journalists, consultants and lawyers specializing in EU matters.


Lists people and departments within EU institutions, listing names, functions, addresses, and phone numbers.


There are several promising titles which the author could not examine or see a review of, and so could not annotate. These include:


A Preview of
*The State of the European Union, Volume 3*

Carolyn Rhodes
Utah State University

and

Sonia Mazey
University of Cambridge

In the late summer of 1995, *The State of the European Union, Volume 3* will be published by Lynne Rienner Publishers with the partial support and sponsorship of ECSCA, the Ford Foundation and the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities. Coedited by Carolyn Rhodes of Utah State University and Sonia Mazey of University of Cambridge, this collection of essays, the third biennial volume since 1991, updates readers about major developments in European integration during the past two years and offers a set of analytical perspectives that enhance our understanding about European integration in general. Contributions were selected as a result of a call for papers in the fall 1993 and winter 1994 ECSCA Newsletter issues, a rigorous critiquing and revision process, and a final selection based upon subject matter, quality and analytical interest. Ranging from intergovernmentalist interpretations of member state bargaining to examinations of European Union and domestic institutional factors affecting integration, the contributions offer a variety of explanations about the substance, pace and implications of European integration.

The authors reveal that substantively 1993-94 have been difficult, yet extremely interesting, years for the European integration process. The Treaty on European Union, which came into effect in November 1993 pledged member states to an ambitious new set of goals: a common foreign and security policy, monetary union, and social and environmental policy cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty followed the earlier logic of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). However, whereas the latter had been primarily concerned with 'negative integration' (the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor), the Maastricht Treaty sought to strengthen 'positive integration' measures (the coordination of social and environmental politics and monetary policy). This marked an important development in the integration process, which not surprisingly prompted widespread debate. To counter concerns among some member governments (and some subnational governments) that such a project would result in excessive supranationalism, the Maastricht Treaty also introduced the subsidiarity principle. In accordance with this principle, responsibility for public policy making should rest with the most appropriate governmental level possible. In short, the EU should only be permitted to assume responsibility for those policies which cannot be satisfactorily carried out by national (or subnational) governments.

Notwithstanding this safeguard, ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was not a simple matter; public debate over the provisions and implications of the Treaty during the ratification process was heated, and ratification itself was only narrowly achieved. In France, the longstanding political consensus in favor of European integration was for the first time seriously challenged; the referendum held on the Maastricht Treaty produced only a tiny majority in favor of ratification. In Denmark, ratification of the Treaty was achieved only after the introduction of special provisions for the Danes. Meanwhile in the United Kingdom, parliamentary opposition to the Maastricht Treaty forced the Prime Minister to make ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the subject of a parliamentary vote of confidence in the government. The fact that the United Kingdom government had in any case been permitted to 'opt out' of key provisions of the Treaty relating to social policy and monetary union did little to appease the Euroskeptics within the Conservative government's own party and alienated Opposition members of parliament, committed to further integration.

Several recent developments within and beyond the European Union help to explain this ambivalence towards further European integration, which ratification of the Maastricht Treaty has done little to dispel. Within the Union, high unemployment levels and economic recession have provided fertile conditions for the rise of populist, extreme, right-wing parties such as the French _Front Nationale_ and the German _Republikaner_ party, who have sought to link European integration with increased immigration, high unemployment and a loss of national identity. More generally, political opposition to federalism and ideological objections (notably within the United Kingdom) to the 'interventionist' economic and industrial policies of the Commission have prompted widespread public uneasiness about the implications of the Maastricht agreement. Meanwhile, the 1992-93 European monetary crisis, obvious tensions in the traditional Franco-German alliance, and the European ramifications of German reunification have tempered, if not tarnished, enthusiasm for the Union. The difficulties experienced by the Union in reaching agreement--both internally and with the United States--in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, demands from former Soviet bloc countries for closer ties with the Union, and the uncertainty which surrounds the future development of a European defense policy have further called into question the unity and purpose of the Union. Thus, even as the twelve member states embrace Austria, Sweden, and Finland (Norway's population having again rejected accession), there is already in the Union's infancy a critical reassessment of the state of European integration. This is reflected in debates over widening versus deepening of the Union and the enthusiasm with which many national groups have focused on the subsidiarity principle as a way to avert further supranational intrusion into the domain of member state governance.

Among scholars there is now a serious effort underway to place recent events and their relationship to economic and political integration into a broader theoretical and historical perspective. This effort has in turn been influenced by the ongoing debate among policy makers within Member States and at the European Union level about the appropriate direction of future European integration. This reflective and somewhat
critical mood is evident in this volume as contributors review EU developments and debates and analyze them within the wider historical and theoretical contexts of European integration.

As editors, our purpose in preparing this volume is twofold: first, to update readers on key, recent EU policy developments and the integration process; secondly (and perhaps more importantly), to highlight the importance of different theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of EU affairs. A concerted effort has been made to cover a range of topic areas and issues; however, because chapters were selected for their quality and analytical contributions rather than merely for their topicality, coverage is by no means universal.

Even so, the picture that emerges of the period 1993-95 is a complex one, in terms of substance as well as theory. Several contributors note the persistence of nation-state preferences and resistance to further European integration in certain areas. However, other contributions suggest that in some policy areas, transnational institutions and interest groups are influential in the EU decision-making process. In part, this ambiguity may reflect the fact that integration is easier to achieve in some policy sectors than others. However, we would argue that it is also in part a consequence of the adoption of different analytical approaches, which in turn lead researchers to focus upon different phenomena and to interpret events rather differently.

Regardless, it is clear that integration has been taking place asymmetrically across different issue areas, that member state governments have been under increasing pressure to represent the interests of domestic interest groups, but that those groups have also been making the most of transnational linkages, European-level lobbying and institutional opportunities to influence policy outcomes. This multi-tiered character of policy influence reflects the multi-layered character of decision-making within the European Union, where institutions from the domestic level on up to the European level provide opportunities and constraints for various interest groups. The variety of contributions to this volume illustrate this, representing a range of analytical perspectives and focusing attention on different aspects of the decision-making process from sub-national to international factors.

In many cases the authors also go beyond traditional patterns of analysis and offer new insights into such phenomena as German federalism and European Union, subsidiarity, developing European identity in the European Parliament, the Nordic acessions, and enlargement in general. Other issues such as member state relationships, and how policies emerge demand that we focus on bargaining, issue linkage, and the role of interest groups as well as European level bureaucrats to offer a wide range and rich set of interpretations about European integration. Anyone who follows European integration with interest, who likes to be up-to-date, and who values analysis in a comparative context will find this volume very useful. The volume will be available in September 1995 for $49.95 from Lynne Rienner Publishers. As in the past, ECSA members will receive a 20% discount.

Perspectives

Editor's Note: This new section of the Newsletter is designed to promote a constructive dialogue on matters of great importance to the EU. The views presented in this section are those of the author, and not those of ECSA. ECSA takes no positions on matters of public policy. Correspondence for publication concerning the Perspectives section should be sent to Bill Burros at the ECSA Administrative Office.

Myths and "Loaded" Terms in Today's Balkan Wars

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In the fourth year of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession that have ravaged first Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina, the magnitude of violence and the bestiality of "ethnic cleansing" and other atrocities spasmodically but vainly continue to horrify Europeans and the wider world. The toll of mostly civilian victims already exceeds 200,000 killed and more than two million refugees. Europe's "never again!" of fifty years ago echoes in mockery over a new but so far geographically limited tide of evil.

No one disputes the quality, magnitude, and potentially wider implications of this evil and of failure to find a way to end it. There is also general agreement that ending it ultimately depends on the willingness of its chief protagonists to do so -- but that a host of international, multi-national, and external national actors, with the European Union and several member states prominent among them, share the blame because of their total (most would add shameful and ominous) failure to make an effective contribution either to stopping the war and its atrocities or to shaping a potentially lasting and preferably "just" peace. There is similar agreement that this "little war in the Balkans" has had what one commentator has called "a corrosive effect" on every inter- and multi-national institution it has touched: EU, NATO, UN, et al. Of late, and especially since open disagreements between and within NATO and the UN before and after particularly blatant "humiliations" inflicted on both by Bosnian Serbs in November-December 1994, their officials and member-state governments appear to be giving higher priority to saving these institutions from further "corrosion" than to saving Bosnians and remnants of yet another and supposedly take-it-or-leave-it international "contact group's" peace plan.

Consensus ends at this point. There is no agreement, and much dispute, over what should have been and should be done, and how responsibility and blame for the war's origins, expansion, atrocious conduct, and duration should be distributed among internal and external actors and sanctimoniously hand-wringing bystanders.

One striking feature of these disputes and media reports and commentaries on the war and its background is the frequency with which speakers and writers either deliberately invoke or sometimes unwittingly reveal the influence of myths (understood as "stories" that are usually in some part based on actual events and facts and thereby in some degree "true") and "loaded" words and terminology that support the judgments and the actions or inaction they are pursuing or advocating. In addition to providing
pointers to the partisanship and sometimes the otherwise hidden agendas of those who use them, either purposefully or in apparently uncritical acceptance, an examination of such myths and loaded terms is also an exploration of some aspects of what the war is and is not, and how myths can become self-fulfilling prophecies.

"Ancient hatreds", which have always provoked former Yugoslavia's national communities to large-scale and singularly brutal reciprocal violence that only alien imperial regimes or domestic dictatorships have sometimes and temporarily restrained, is a myth particularly favored by a long list of EU and US politicians, diplomats, and media commentators. It purports to explain the war, its horrific brutalities, and the inability "not only of the EU, but of the whole international community, to achieve peace and to uphold principles of human rights and acceptable conduct" (Jonathan Davidson of the European Commission Delegation in Washington in the Fall 1994 ECSA Newsletter). There are two problems with this myth: the uses and abuses it serves, and its historical inaccuracy.

In addition to purportedly explaining the quality and intractability of current violence, "ancient hatreds" are frequently cited as evidence and the ultimate reason that Serb and Croat nationalists are right in claiming that Orthodox Serbs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Muslim Slavs "cannot live together" in peace, or in a single state without domination by the most powerful or numerous of these, and that "Ethnically cleansed" separate nation-states must therefore be created, and accepted by the outside world, as the only solution. For the war's protagonists this argument has become a deliberately manipulated self-fulfilling prophecy. For the "international community" it serves to justify turning one's back to the war's horrors and victims ("since they want to kill each other") or endorsing and even facilitating an outcome, otherwise also known as "rewarding aggression and condoning ethnic cleansing," that partitions Bosnia (and Croatia) into largely "cleansed" parts and de facto recognizes the "Greater Serbia" and Croatian annexations in Bosnia that Serb and Croat nationalists have made war and committed atrocities to achieve. (However, this course also has a humanitarian rationale: to end at least large-scale war sooner rather than later, and to allow "ethnic cleansing" to be completed by non-violent although still compulsory means.)

It so happens that the myth of ancient hatreds and chronic inter-communal violence of a peculiarly virulent and ineradicable "Balkan" species is contradicted by the historical record. As three new books by authoritative students of Bosnia's history persuasively and passionately repeat, Orthodox (Serb), Catholic (Croat) and their fellow-Slavs of Muslim faith and/or national consciousness have almost never hated or fought one another as communities because of differences in religion and ethnic identity. Violence, indeed a common occurrence, has had other causes and usually multi-communal recruitment on all sides. The same is true of Croatian and other parts of former Yugoslavia where two or more of these and other peoples have rubbed elbows and cultures in the same towns or neighboring villages for centuries. The major exception was during World War II, when reciprocal massacres (especially but not only of Serbs by German-sponsored Croatian fascists in Croatia and Bosnia) and other inter-communal atrocities occurred in exceptional circumstances and with external (Axis) provocation. In most other periods cooperative barn-raising seems to have been at least as common as competitive barn-burning, with mixed marriages (mostly urban) and friendships as much a feature of their shared history as bloody but rarely inter-communal feuds.

Another common and demonstrably false "historical" argument contends that both the Bosnian state and its borders that the EU and US recognized in April 1992 fail the legitimacy test provided by a certifiable historical pedigree. In a part of the world where historical claims commonly substitute for "ethnic" claims to disputed territories, this contention is a significant part of a broader argument concerning the "artificial" or "fictionitious" nature of a state that should never have been recognized and should be "de-recognized". Thus its Serb and Croat nationalist challengers claim that Bosnia was never in its history a separate and independent state, unlike Serbia and Croatia in the Middle Ages and Serbia again from 1878 to 1918. Serb challengers further claim that Bosnia's (and Croatia's) borders in post-1945 Yugoslavia were merely arbitrary "administrative" borders between federal units, drawn by Tito to divide the Serbs and weaken Serbia, and never historic or internationally recognized borders between states. In fact Bosnia was as independent as a Medieval Kingdom as Serbia and Croatia, and for nearly as long or longer. Far from being new and arbitrary, Bosnia's borders in "Tito's Yugoslavia" (apart from minor changes involving a few villages near Bihac and on the Bay of Kotor) and almost all of Croatia's (except with Serbian Vojvodina) are among the oldest and most enduring borders in Europe. Bosnia's have had their present shape, drawn and recognized in successive treaties during centuries of war and diplomacy between the Ottoman Empire and its neighbors, since 1718 and in most portions much earlier. Whether the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia is described as "aggression" or "a civil war" is or should be a matter of importance, dictating or at least shaping the outside world's response.

If it is a war of aggression (and if "aggression" is understood to mean something one state does to another, which is of course not the word's only meaning), then Serbia and its small Montenegrin partner in "rump Yugoslavia" must be the "aggressor" and should be treated accordingly. After all, it is that state's army (although still formally the army of "Tito's Yugoslavia" when war began in 1991) that was actively engaged during 1991-92, alongside Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, in taking over large portions of Croatia and Bosnia, which were in the process of achieving or had already won recognition by the UN and many of its members as independent states. Furthermore, the Serbian regime's declared aim of "all Serbs in one state," either rump Yugoslavia or Greater Serbia, clearly required and anticipated changes by force in what were now recognized as international frontiers. Noting all this, the "international community" made what seemed an appropriate identification of "aggressor" (Serbia or rump Yugoslavia) and "victims of aggression" (Croatia and Bosnia). Later, as it became evident that the costs of taking effective action corresponding to these identifications would be greater than member-states of this community were willing to pay, there has been a growing tendency to prefer "civil war" to "war of aggression."

Those who prefer "civil war" - a war fought inside a country or state between factions or groups of its inhabitants - point out that this war began within a country called Yugoslavia, pitting armed groups (mostly Serb) initially mobilized to preserve that country against others who were attempting to create separate states of their own. Some then argue that unilateral declarations of independence by secessionist groups and international recognition of new states after six months of war (in Croatia) or coincident with its outbreak (in Bosnia) cannot "grandfather" such a Civil War into a War Between the States. An alternative argument achieves the same conclusion and effect by describing
the conflict as a two-phase civil war. Its first or "Yugoslav" (but also internal Croatian and Bosnian) phase ended when the Yugoslav Army formally withdrew from Croatia and Bosnia after these achieved international recognition. What has been happening since then is a civil war between opponents and supporters of the unity and territorial integrity of these entities: between Croatian Serb rebels and Croats in Croatia; and in Bosnia between Muslims, Serbs, and Croats (or between Serb, Croat, and some Muslim rebels and a Bosnian government, army, and anti-partition citizenry that are predominantly but not only Muslim). It is therefore inappropriate and unjust to label and punish as an "aggressor" an outside state whose government and citizens are only supplying political and material support and some "volunteers" to fellow Serbs fighting for their communal or personal survival.

Non-partisan observers (assuming there still are some) may be inclined to a mixed verdict: former Yugoslavia's wars are basically civil wars waged inside two federal units of a disintegrating Yugoslavia and then inside the same as internationally recognized independent states, but with a series of decisive inputs -- which look, walk, and quack like acts of aggression -- from an outside and de facto also sovereign state. In other words, these are civil wars in which one side (the Serb side) has been incited, politically and militarily mobilized, and largely armed from Serbia and a former Yugoslav and latter Serbian army. Furthermore, primary responsibility for Yugoslavia's disintegration and the civil wars and violent partitioning of Croatia and Bosnia that followed belongs to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his strategy, evident in his actions and policies since 1987, to impose Serb and personal hegemony on all of Yugoslavia, and failing that to create a Greater Serbia carved out of its pieces. This two-phase takeover bid was what sent Slovenes, Croats, and others scurrying to the exits and then to the barricades.

Whether these roles warrant indictment for "aggression" is debatable. It is also moot, since it is clear that no international organization or state with the requisite capability is willing to impose the kind of meaningful (effective) sanctions that international charters prescribe for those found guilty of aggression.

Two other myths that affect actions and outcomes provide further examples - like "they cannot live together" - of mythology becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It has become a media and politicians' cliche that Russians and "Russia" are supporting Serbia and the Serb cause because of "traditional" Russian sympathy with these particular "Slavic brethren" (some avoid the obvious objection that Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims are also Slavs by amending this to "fellow Orthodox Slavs") and Russia's "historic" alliance with Serbia and Serbian interests. In fact Russia has been an ally or patron of Serbia and Serbian causes only for brief periods, and arguably less long and usefully than the United States, since Serbia began to re-emerge from the Ottoman Empire two centuries ago. Indeed, a counter-myth (popular during the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict after 1948) of repeated Russian "betrayals" of Serbia and its Yugoslav successor can lay claim to as much or more supporting evidence.

As for the present conflict, there is less evidence from its first two years of Russian sympathy and support for the Serb side than of Russian agreement with EC and US condemnations of Serbs and Serbia and consistent, helpful cooperation in seeking to curb Serb atrocities and ambitions. If this is lately no longer true, it is surely in part because Russian nationalists and a Yeltsin government sensitive to their sentiments and votes have come to take the myth of a special Russian interest in and concern for their "Serb brethren" more seriously - perhaps because Western media and statesmen have said it so often?

(A corresponding and even less tenable media and politicians' myth cites "traditional" German links and sympathy with Croats and Croatia to explain allegedly strong pro-Croatian as well as clearer anti-Serb German prejudices and policies since 1991. Austrian links and sympathies derived from shared histories in the Habsburg Empire are plausible, but when are Germans and Croats supposed to have established such historic links? Even in World War II, which most Germans and Croats would prefer not to remember, most of Hitler's senior officials in Croatia were actually Austrian.)

Another myth-becoming-prophecy describes Bosnia's Muslims as militantly orthodox or "fundamentalist" believers led by people and a party whose aim is the establishment of an Islamic state in the heart of Europe, Christian Serbs and Croats would have become religiously and otherwise persecuted minorities in such a state, and are therefore justified in rejecting and rebelling against it.

It may be true that the political party that won the most Muslim votes in 1991 and its (now Bosnia's) president, Alija Izetbegovic, secretly wanted and would have sought to create such a state. Many qualified observers think so; others (including myself) doubt it. If the former are right, Izetbegovic & co. would have had a tough time with most of Bosnia's Slavic Muslims, whose casual attitude toward Islamic doctrines and practices over the centuries since their conversion is notorious. (Someone once described Islam in Bosnia as "the Church of England of the Muslim world."). However, recent reports from government-controlled areas describe significant increases in Mosque attendance and observance of Ramadan, harassment of shops selling pork, proposals to make Muslim religious instruction obligatory in public schools, etc. These reports suggest that Serb and Croat behavior over the past three years, based on the claim that these historically undogmatic, even heterodox, and often hard-drinking, pork-eating Muslims are inspired by "Islamic fundamentalist" doctrines and goals, may indeed be making that falsehood into self-fulfilling prophecy by "shelling them into Islam."

This exploration of some myths and terms that have found their way into external and also internal discourse about the wars of Yugoslav succession has sought to indicate some things those wars are not, although many of those who invoke these myths and terms have reasons for wanting their listeners and readers to believe they are:

- They and attendant atrocities are not a consequence of "ancient hatreds" and the "inevitable" rather than contrived disintegration of an "artificial" (Yugoslav, Bosnian, or Croatian) state whose peoples historically "cannot live together" - although the myth of such hatreds and the way disintegration has occurred may have made it at least temporarily impossible for them to do so.

- They are not only civil wars or wars of Serbian "aggression", but they are also not wars and atrocities for which all parties are equally (or even close to equally) to blame. "Victimized Muslims and victimizing Serbs" is a distortion because it implicitly ignores numerous victimized Serbs and victimizing Muslims (and Croats), but it correctly identifies the nationality of the principal.
victims and victimizers.
- Sympathy and support for one of the warring parties by outside governments and public opinions are not really pre-determined by alleged historic links and affections that turn out to be exaggerated or false -- but may arouse or amplify such sympathy and support if repeated often enough.
- War did not come to Bosnia because its Christian Serb and Croat communities really faced the imposition of a fundamentalist Islamic state, although many believed this was so and whatever Bosnian Muslim entity survives the war may now turn out to be more religiously as well as exclusively Muslim than those who declared Bosnia's independence probably intended and its largely secularized Muslim citizens would have tolerated.

Yugoslavia's disintegration and wars of succession are consequences of the policies of megalomaniac, ruthless or stupid, and demagogic politicians with competing national(ist) programs and overlapping claims. They are thereby also and ultimately consequences of conflict between linked but contradictory concepts with deep roots and almost ubiquitous acceptance in the 20th century world: the sovereignty of states, national self-determination, and the homogeneous nation-state as their ideal and even necessary manifestation. As Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. Ambassador to Tito's Yugoslavia, argues in a thoughtful and persuasive commentary, current events in that former country provide dramatic and tragic reminders that the homogeneous nation-state (he calls it "a single-nation state") is "a concept that is a highly imperfect expression of modern reality and which, more importantly, has caused the world nothing but trouble" -- especially in eastern and southeastern Europe's complex ethnic and national shatterbelt.

Notes


2Especially that the Serb third of its population allegedly (and in many cases clearly and vociferously) did not want it.

3Except that the Serbo-Bosnian border became a fully de jure international border only in 1878, when the Congress of Berlin recognized Serbia's complete independence from the Ottoman Empire.


Book Reviews

Note: In recognition of the three national referendums on EU membership held in Northern Europe this fall, the book review editor specifically requested reviews of recent books on Nordic-EU relations.


On the first of January 1995, membership in the European Union will be expanded to include two somewhat reluctant European countries: Finland and Sweden. For the second time, Norway has decided instead to mind its own business. As teachers of courses on the European Union, and by no fault of our own, we find ourselves in the new year with syllabi which are outdated overnight. After all, the literature on the European Union (when it does address nation-state interests and perceptions) concentrates on the current club of twelve. What options are available to us for quickly expanding our syllabi to capture the recent expansion of Union membership?

In its own right, Nordic accession to the European ranks is also a worthy object of study. Following on the heels of the Danish "no to Maastricht," there has been a great deal less enthusiasm among the publics of each of the Nordic states for EU membership. The Nordic public, in spite of (or, quite possibly, because of) the constant nagging of their respective elites, have showed themselves to be the reluctant Europeans. What explains the Swedish and Finnish decisions to join, and why is Norway so peculiar?

I have been asked to review the three books above with these two questions in mind; their titles, at least, suggest that they may provide some answers. By reviewing them, I hoped to provide the non-Nordic specialist with access to a quick-fix for his or her EU-syllabi shortcomings. In so doing, I also hoped to find an expose of the Nordic political, economic and cultural landscape--one that could better help us to explain their reluctance to membership.

All correspondence for the Book Review section should be sent to the the Book Review Editor:
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With these two goals in mind, I wrote the respective publishers. Unfortunately, I was greatly disappointed: all three books fail to provide adequate answers to either of my queries, albeit one was less spectacular a failure than the others. While all three books were written and published before the referenda, being out of date is not their only shortcoming. Indeed, the objective of each book is sometimes difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, I will try and highlight the utility of each, independent of its ability to answer the needs which I have posed. Let's start with the best book and work backwards.

The Nordic Social Democratic Parties have been instrumental in bringing EU membership onto the Nordic agenda, and Ulf Lindstrom's *Euro-Consent, Euro-Contract or Euro-Coercion?* captures a great deal of that procedure. Indeed, the instrumental timing of the Nordic referenda sequence seems to have been the result of intra-Nordic social democratic planning. Understanding Nordic policies, and the Nordic response to EU membership is probably best captured by the Social Democratic Party line; and, arguably, it is the division within Social Democratic Party ranks which was the real stumbling block to membership.

Lindstrom provides a detailed political sociological account of Nordic social democratic support for EU membership. He not only tries to explain the difficulties for political elites trying to rule over severely divided ranks and file, but he manages to explain the reasons for these divisions in social, economic and cultural terms. It is an enormous task, but Lindstrom meets the challenge. The book includes a respectable variety of socioeconomic indicators, polling data, and historical detail.

But is it enough to understand just the social democratic vote? Ellen Wibe, one of the leaders of Norway's right-wing Progress Party, once complained that, "the worst thing about Norway is that four million social democrats live there." 1 To the extent that the Social Democratic Party has managed to capture and mold the Nordic public's imagination (and votes), Ulf Lindstrom's account is an adequate, and often entertaining, description of social democracy and the European impasse. And for those who are interested in social democracy per se, Lindstrom's book is a gold mine of cynical, catchy, sound-bites. Norway, for example, is described as "a Lutheran Kuwait cast in a Dutch social make-up..." (p. 63).

My only reservation in recommending Lindstrom as a textbook is that the book is not organized in a course-friendly manner. The author is not always economical in his use of language, concepts and stories. There is no index. The chapter headings and content tend to overlap one another; digestion is made more difficult in that we need to consume it all in one big bite. The division of material is not always clear cut, as Lindstrom relies on conceptual categories as breaks; not chronology, class, nation-state, or policy issues.

The two remaining books are collective projects, both of which were produced by small publishers in Denmark. The book edited by Lise Lyck, *The Nordic Countries and the Internal Market of the EEC*, is a collection of idiosyncratic essays which anticipate the sort of economic changes that the Nordic countries can expect with membership, or as the result of the 1992 project. Unfortunately, it is very outdated. Not only are some of the predictions embarrassingly wrong (e.g. "Finland is unlikely to join...", p. 204), but the data and research agendas themselves entertain topics of the moment—yesterday's moment.

In an edited book it is always difficult to knit the disparate chapters into a coherent presentation; Lyck's book is a testament to the fact. The book is a conference collection of 17 papers and 21 authors, the contents of which vary in nearly every conceivable dimension: in length, discipline, quality, subject matter, national focus, etc. In this book you can find the most peculiar bits of information: ranging from an estimate of the current Danish revenues from nine duty-free ferries, to an effective exchange rate index for the now defunct Finnish Markka basket.

If forced to think positively, I might respond that the book is grounded in political economy, and most of the arguments about Nordic EU membership are generally framed in politico-economic terms. In principle, therefore, the book should be able to provide much insight into the expected costs and benefits of Nordic membership in the EU. More significantly, the Nordic countries have shared a common market for some time, and the Nordic lessons of integration might have important implications for the integration process in Europe. Indeed, the chapters which pursue this theme are the strongest and the most interesting in the book. In general, the book can be said to offer a description of the flavor of discussion which characterizes the Nordic route to EU membership. Although there is a decidedly Danish bias to the book, and the Finnish question of membership is never seriously entertained, the reader does get a glimpse of how costly EU membership will be for Norway, Sweden and Finland. In particular, pieces by Jan Fagerberg, Jan Karl Karlsen and Thomas Wieser shine through. We might visit each briefly.

Jan Fagerberg's argument is both innovative and insightful, though he has made it before in other places. The chapter grapples with the fascinating field of innovation, new technology and so-called user-producer relationships. As these are often buzzwords for integrationists, Fagerberg sets out to see how important open markets, as opposed to cultural and institutional links, are in spurring innovation. Nordic economic integration, contrasted against the EC's earlier integration rounds, presents itself to Fagerberg as a useful comparative study, where culture is (largely) controlled for in the Nordic examples. By comparing Nordic integration with that on the lower continent, Fagerberg finds European integration to have increased more slowly than Nordic integration, and that Nordic integration is distinguished in its emphasis on advanced products which utilize user-producer relationships. Fagerberg's lessons for Europe are that open markets without concomitant cultural, institutional and economic links will not necessarily lead to the sort of high-tech integration which Unionists have set in their sights.

Jan Karl Karlsen compares earlier Nordic and European integration rounds, using foreign direct investment as an indicator for integration. Nordic integration is shown to follow a pattern of bureaucratic and legislative harmonization, while in Europe integration proceeded according to the less burdensome principle of subsidiarity. His analysis suggests that the development of the internal market project in Europe has not dramatically changed the overall pattern in outward FDI from the Nordic countries, though there is a tendency toward increased orientation toward EU investment options (pp. 71-72).

Thomas Wieser gives an often dry but informative presentation on the success of previous integration efforts, based on the degree of price dispersion. Whereas the core six countries of the EU seem to have experienced a great deal of integration, the EFTA countries are less notably integrated, as measured in terms of price differentials. The chapters by Wieser, Karlsen and Fagerberg represent the potential that the rest of the book should have set as its goal.

Turning to the last book, Tiilikainen and Damgaard Petersen's *The Nordic Countries and the EC*, we find a collection of articles whose sole function appears to be to act as cheerleaders.
for Nordic integration to the European Union. The Norwegian chapters, for example, are terribly ideological and the general theoretical chapters—although the strongest part of the book—offer very little new to students of the European Union.

However, reading this book might help scholars to understand the mind-set and frustration of pro-EU elites in each of the Nordic countries. Haaland Matlary's chapter on Norway is the most blatant example. In addition to problems of accuracy on several points (Haaland Matlary makes the prediction that Norway would be unable to address the question of membership until 1997, and incorrectly asserts that Norway was a member of the EMS), she does not address the rational arguments against EU membership. Her depiction of the No-movement's parochialism belittles the economic and rational arguments that more often lie beneath No-voter attitudes; and hides the degree to which the No-movement and the Yes-movement both are guilty of playing to Norwegian fears.

Haaland Matlary is strongest when describing Norway's oil interests, and this is the richest part of her chapter on Norway. It is also the strongest part of her theoretical review later on in the book, when she speaks to the role of the Commission in Energy policy and the integration process generally. Unfortunately, this second chapter—though it provides a useful overview of the disparate traditions for evaluating (and sometimes explaining) integration—is equally ideological in its perspective. Like several of the other theoretical chapters in the book, there is much here that will already be covered by other books on the European Union.

Jernerck's chapter on Sweden is probably the best in the book. It is both balanced and informative, providing a good description of the rapid change in opinion among Swedish elites about the possibilities of EU membership, and it is organized around a coherent theoretical framework. Non-Swedes will learn a great deal about Sweden's turbulent path to EU membership. They should, however, be taken aback by the fact that unemployment is not named in this context.

Raimo Vayrynen's chapter on Finland is equally straightforward, though it too tends to confuse modernity with integration. Still, Vayrynen covers all the necessary bases: the role of economic crises, unemployment, foreign policy, public opinion, etc., so that the reader gets a good description of the Finnish pre-membership position. The same can be said for Nikolaj Petersen's chapter on Denmark. The reader will come away from this chapter understanding the Danish "no to Maastricht," and the nature of the coalition which eventually accepted the Edinburgh solution.

In sum, three of the Lyck book's national chapters provide the sort of information that we set out to collect. The remainder of the book, however, seems unnecessarily ideological and empirically underdeveloped. The latter part of the book does not at all meet our objectives, in the sense that the material collected there will—in all likelihood—already be covered in our existing syllabi.

Arguably, the best representative of the Nordic response to EU membership is not to be found in book form, but hangs (once again) on the walls of Norway's National Museum: it is Edward Munch's "The Scream." Voters in each of these countries are being dragged into membership because of their weary uncertainty about future developments in both the economic and security spheres. Rather than a hope for the future—EU membership, the national debates, and each country's referendums are public exercises in Nordic collective angst. Despite the attempts of political and economic elites to paint a more rosy scenario, EU membership has been accepted as the worse of two evils.

Ulf Lindstrom's book is, hands down, the favorite on the list under review—this despite the shortcomings I have mentioned. Not only does his book focus on the changing political features of the Nordic states; but the cynicism with which he writes seems to echo the frustrated angst of the Nordic social democratic voter. Students will get a deeper understanding of why the Nordic countries had troubles in accepting membership, and may even enjoy the read. I did. The Lyck and Tillikainen/Damgaard Petersen books have chapters that are suitable for our needs, but they are—unfortunately—too far and few between. In conclusion, I might reflect on one good piece of news; at least for Nordic scholars. There is still room for a good book which explains the Nordic routes to EU membership, describes the unique Nordic position on the costs and benefits of EU membership, and details the steps taken along the path to (and away from) EU membership. The present author only wishes he had the time and energy.

Jonathon Moses
University of Trondheim


To many Norwegians now in their forties or fifties, the closely fought 1972 EC referendum was the most critical formative experience of their political lives. Norway experienced another emotional confrontation over European Union membership in the fall of 1994. Brent Nelsen's edited volume on Norway and European integration is a most timely and informative guide to the issues central to the Norwegian debate. According to the editor, the book has two purposes: to illuminate the issues facing Norway in its relationship with the EU, and to provide the student of the EU with a case study in the political economy of integration. The essays were presented at a conference in November 1991 and finalized in late 1992. Given the fact that Nelsen and his collaborators have been aiming at a rapidly moving target, there are obviously some respects in which this volume was obsolete even before it was published (much less reviewed). For example, some contributors apparently completed their essays before the Norwegian parliament had decided to ratify the EEA agreement. Yet, the bulk of the book will age well, since it provides analytical frameworks and contextual insight that will continue to inform those who are interested in Norway's relationship with the rest of Europe.

The book falls into four parts, out of which parts two and three are the most substantial. Jan Wessel Hegg provides a brief introductory chapter on the negotiation of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. The next three chapters (by Martin Saeter, Brent Nelsen, and Janne Haaland Matlary) focus on the political dimension of Norway's ties to Europe. The following five chapters (by Margarita Ponte Ferreira, Steinar Juel, Stine Nicolaesen and Hilde Olsen, Magne Holter, and Ole Gunnar Austvik) concern themselves with the economic aspects of these relationships. Finally, the editor concludes with the dynamics of the integration process.
Norway and the European Community emphasizes the economic aspects of Norway's relationship with the EU. The five chapters on the "economic dimension" constitute well over half the total volume. Austvik's chapter examines the rapidly growing Norwegian petroleum sector and its implications for European integration. The remaining chapters in this section focus on the four freedoms of the European Union—the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor—and detail Norwegian trade, investment, and migration patterns systematically, comprehensively, and in a very readable manner. Although these issues are critical to the EU debate, I have seen no comparable treatment. This is where Nelsen's nicely edited book makes its greatest and most original contribution.

Readers who are interested in the politics of the EU debate will not go away disappointed, however, since the editor's own contributions provide a very concise and readable guide. Nelsen sees the EU debate as a manifestation of the longstanding, but occasionally dormant, Norwegian conflict between center and periphery. Drawing on Rokkan's encyclopedic work, he traces this conflict from the 19th century battles between "peasants" and "officials" (Harry Eckstein's terms), through the debates of the 1960s and 1970s, to the current campaign. Nelsen's well-crafted and unbiased account will please readers interested in the historical sources of the extraordinary mobilization and engagement that have characterized the Norwegian campaigns. The other two chapters on the political dimension (by Saeter and Matlary) should appeal especially to readers whose main interest is in European integration rather than the Norwegian case. Saeter's historical approach is straightforward and informative, whereas Matlary's theoretically ambitious contribution requires a greater tolerance for abstraction than the rest of the book.

Norway and the European Community is a most gratifying contribution to the literatures on European integration and Scandinavian foreign policy. Clearly, Nelsen and his associates succeed in both of their objectives. The book functions particularly well as an introduction to the Norwegian debate. It is also a successful case study of the political economy of European integration more generally. If there is a criticism to be made, it must be that Nelsen and his associates more explicitly could have placed the Norwegian case in a comparative context. The reader with a general interest in political integration will want to know how Norway differs from or resembles other states considering EU membership. Yet, the book does not systematically compare Norway with other future or potential EU entrants, such as Austria, Finland, or Sweden. But this may be asking for a different, rather than a better, book. On its own terms, this is a highly successful volume. Nelsen's book is so meaty and well-edited that many readers may be tempted to read the entire manuscript even if they only intended to use it for reference. Anyone interested in European integration should take that risk.

Kaare Strom
University of California, San Diego


The Cold War's demise has set off an inspired debate among Western commentators over the causes and consequences of the Soviet foreign policy revolution. The first wave of works interpreted the USSR's radical break with past practice as a case of compelled adaptation to economic stasis at home and a deteriorating position abroad. More recently, students of the former Soviet Union have advanced less mechanistic accounts focusing on the interplay of domestic and international level processes in bringing about the Gorbachev leadership's effort to redefine state interests and transform East-West relations. A new volume edited by Neil Malcolm and published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) is representative of the second wave and is a welcome addition to the growing body of studies on Soviet/Russian international behavior in the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras.

Russia and Europe brings together a number of distinguished European scholars (including two Russians) who have produced an empirically rich and cogently argued volume that sharpens our understanding of the wellspring of latter day Soviet/Russian policy toward that country's continental co-inhabitants. The authors demonstrate a firm grasp of Soviet/Russian domestic politics and the way it interacts with the international environment to produce policy outcomes.

The phrase "common European home," one of the signature themes of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking, is the conceptual anchor for many of the essays in Russia and Europe. While there is some question as to the Kremlin's initial objectives in invoking this image, the authors show that it became far more than a statement of geo-strategic fact. It expressed the desire of the Gorbachev cohort that the USSR become integrated into the community of Western industrialized nations. Doing so entailed jettisoning Marxist-Leninist ideology as the prism through which Soviet decision makers viewed the world and as the guide for defining national interests.

The general analysis presented in the volume yields two powerful findings. First, the shift in Soviet behavior which relegated the Cold War to the history books was by no means inevitable. Not only did the Gorbachev leadership have to overcome entrenched conservative opposition, but reformers themselves were far from agreed on a prospective solution to the nation's problems. Following Gorbachev's accession to power, Soviet policy continued to evolve as reformers embraced a more radical variant of New Thinking. The contingent nature of Soviet/Russian international behavior is hit home in Malcolm's chapter on competing foreign policy perspectives in present day Moscow and in Sergei Karaganov's provocative essay on possible alternative futures for Russia's European policy. Second and relatedly, while the Gorbachev braintrust was determined to dismantle the military confrontation in Europe, the absence of a concrete strategy left a good deal of room for improvisation and for ongoing policy innovation, a process one scholar has called learning by doing. As the authors make clear, this was particularly true with respect to Eastern Europe. The Kremlin's plan to deregulate the bloc and its repudiation of force to prop up fraternal allies put in motion forces which the Soviet leadership could not control. In the words of contributor Alex Pravda, Moscow adopted a stance of "reactive permissiveness." A third finding which is prominent in Malcolm's introductory chapter but receives insufficient attention elsewhere is the importance of Western ideas and values in shaping the USSR's redefinition of interests in the international sphere. To be sure, the volume's contributors are sensitive to the continuing salience of the centuries old debate over Russian national identity vis-a-vis the West and its implications for policy toward the outside world. And several of them do discuss the impact of international institutions and strategic interaction on the development of Soviet/Russian policy practice. But one might have expected closer examination of the transmission of Western principles to the USSR, particularly the role transnational networks linking
European liberal-left specialists and reform-minded counterparts in the USSR who went on to help formulate New Political Thinking.

Russia and Europe demonstrates one of the problems common to many collective volumes. Although the book is well organized and sufficiently narrow in scope that authors are addressing complementary dimensions of the same general policy issue, it still lacks an overarching analytical framework which would lend greater coherence and force to the project. This shortcoming in turn inhibits a more systematic attempt to draw some broader generalizations about the sources of Soviet foreign policy moderation. For example, several chapter writers refer directly or indirectly to policymakers having rethought the basic assumptions of the prevailing Soviet worldview but frequently don’t offer an explanation (i.e., was the catalyst the perception that initial policies failed to produce desired results or that moderate success encouraged ever bolder measures, or some combination of the two?), thereby making it difficult to offer insights about the conditions which facilitate such cognitive evolution.

Still, by providing analytically sophisticated and empirically rich accounts of the shift in Soviet policy post-1985 (e.g., experts Hannes Adomeit and Fred Oldenburg skillfully trace the Gorbachev regime’s attempt to cope with the fallout from the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, specifically the question of a unified Germany and its subsequent incorporation into NATO) the volume’s authors have performed an invaluable service for those undertaking more theoretically-inclined studies. This is not to imply that the book is suited only for academic audiences. While scholars and graduate students may be the most appreciative consumers of this research, there is much here for policymakers grappling with how to ensure Russia’s continued commitment to norms of behavior governing relations among the Western democracies. A lucid writing style should also make the volume accessible to advanced undergraduates.

Another strength of the book is the attempt by almost all of the contributors to situate their individual examinations of contemporary policy in a broader historical context. This gives the reader a better sense of the continuities and departures from past practice embodied in Gorbachev’s new course. It also makes more intelligible current foreign policy debates within Russia and the Yeltsin government’s demonstrated proclivity to pursue a less unabashedly pro-Western line. A work which simultaneously sheds new light on Soviet international strategy during the remarkable period of the late 1980s and on the factors likely to shape Russian policy in the future is a must read for those interested in the construction of a peaceful post-Cold War order on the European continent.

Robert Herman
The Brookings Institution


This is the second in the series of research annuals sponsored by the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, a conservative British think tank. The period covered by the papers included the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War. These tumultuous events stimulated an uneven set of essays from the authors brought together by Frost, the Director of the Institute, and McHallam, for whom no affiliation is given. Contributors include generally well-known historians and political scientists, journalists and policy analysts (most of whom are Britons).

The book is divided into three parts. Three of the four chapters of Part One—"From Collectivism to Democracy"—try to trace one dimension or another of the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Their common theme is the need for the destruction of the culture of communism. It is their view that the revolutions of 1989 and since did not go far enough, that numerous communists were left in positions of power to the detriment of their societies. The other chapter, the first, by Brian Crozier, is a strange review of the state of the Communist parties in Western Europe and of their ties to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I believe his aim—in 1992—-is to ring the alarm bell of domestic subversion. And yet, it is very difficult to see the miniscule and divided parties in Britain and Germany, or the withered party in France or the renamed party in Italy as anything besides dinosaurs or curiosities.

The authors are at a loss to explain the transition from communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The problem is, of course, that the generally bloodless, mostly nonviolent, astonishingly rapid collapse of state socialist regimes clashes with every belief about left totalitarianism conservatives have held since Lenin arrived at the Finland Station. Both historian Mark Almond (author of two chapters) and journalist Brian Crozier go so far as to see the retreat of the Bolsheviks as a ruse to pull unsuspecting publics while the Reds lick their wounds and plan their returns. The evaporation of the communist threat clearly presents a paradox for rightists. Though cheered by the downfall of Leninism, conservatives pine for the certainty of the good old bad old days. With the nuclear-tipped clarity of the Cold War never to return, these gentlemen simply cannot accept the messiness of the post-communist era: the Communist Parties no longer have a monopoly of power, and yet ex- or reformed, post- or renamed Communists are in or near positions of power throughout the former Warsaw Pact.

Part Two is the heart of the book. It contains three traditional essays about conventional arms control, the Gulf War, and nuclear defense. The first, by accomplished arms analyst Christopher Coker, proclaims the death of arms control as we know it. From now on, "arms control" will consist of unnegotiated, and frequently unilateral (though ultimately reciprocal) restraints and limits rather than formal treaties and verification regimes. Former United States Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament head Kenneth Adelman made many of the same points in the mid-eighties. What seemed preposterous then makes considerable sense in today’s radically transformed international context. The second essay, by Cambridge military analyst Philip Towle, is part "look how wrong you were" polemic against the erroneous pre-Gulf War prognostications of the academic pundits, and part commentary on the course of the war. Towle writes as if the strength of the Iraqi military was the only issue upon which the decision to go to war hinged. The third essay, by widely known American defense policy specialist Keith Payne, is a familiar sales pitch for what was then George Bush’s scaled-down version of Star Wars. It was this version that was also endorsed by former Clinton Defense chief Les Aspin, and that limps along even today. The decline of the Strategic Defense Initiative from Reagan’s dream of a space-based Astrodome to the current point defense is a classic case of highly flexible threat mongering. As threats to Western security declined, ballistic missile defense advocates were forced to trim the bangles and gewgaws from their grandiose visions. They are left today with a
The victory of democracy and a market economy over one-party rule and central planning was complete. However, it is not accurate to interpret these events retrospectively as a political confirmation of the policy of confrontation. 'Real socialism' did not fail because of Reagan's or Thatcher's renewal of the Cold War between 1979 and 1984. Rather it was Stalinism's inherent inability to deal with the complexities of economic and political interdependence, while the West dealt with these phenomena more effectively. Political 'rapprochement' plus economic superiority led to change (p. 15).

This is in striking contrast to Garton Ash's unflattering portrayal of most "Ostpolitik" supporters as naive, hypercritically opposed to Poland's Solidarity and other East European revolutionary movements, and trapped in a Stockholm Syndrome of selling-out to one's captors!

Garton Ash is also more hesitant about accepting Germany's new Europeanism at face value, hence the title of his book, whereas Gutjahr takes Germany (as represented by Genscher and Kohl) at its word and foresees a challenging but promising future. In this respect Gutjahr and Garton Ash reflect the very real political debate going on currently in German and European politics--as witnessed in the German election campaigns this past summer and in the huge uproar created by Germany's recent call for a "multispeed" approach to European unity, led by a "hard core" of "more community-spirited" countries like Germany and France! When John Major condemns Helmut Kohl for calling nationalism "regressive," one knows that post-Cold War politics will be neither predictable nor dull.

In keeping with the general format of the "New Germany Series," the Gutjahr volume is aimed at university students and general readers and includes a collection of pertinent documents and extensive bibliography. Forty-four pages of the Gutjahr book are devoted to sixteen key documents covering the years 1987-1992, most translated for the first time from German. The documents lack a clear conceptual framework, however, and are never cross-referenced in the text. In addition, the footnoting in the book is more cumbersome than helpful; chapter one is only eighteen pages but has seventy-four short footnotes; chapter seven is seventeen pages and one hundred sixty-five footnotes. As a study in contrasts, the Garton Ash book has one hundred eighty-two pages of very long but unnumbered footnotes, mostly of interest only to specialists and graduate students.

Given the differences in the perspectives of Ash and Garton it is probably not surprising that neither author cites or refers to the works of the other, but this noticeable gap does raise questions of balance and objectivity. But aside from these comments, there is rich material for scholars interested in European politics in both volumes. Gutjahr's contribution would be the better choice for undergraduate courses, whereas Garton Ash's book would be more appropriate for a senior or graduate seminar. Both books are valuable reading.

Daniel P. Conneron
Visiting Scholar
University of Washington

Publications

Journal of European Public Policy

The Journal of European Public Policy publishes contributions from all the social sciences and from practitioners at the national and European level in a wide range of public policy areas. Recent special issues have focused on "The European Policy Process" and "The EC Social Dimension". The Journal of European Public Policy also contains a substantial Book Notes section, specifically designed to bring information on new books to the policy analysis community quickly.

Contributions should be submitted to: Prof. J. Richardson, Director, European Public Policy Institute, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK. Requests for subscriptions and related information should be directed to Trevina Johnson, Routledge Journals, ITPS Ltd., Cheriton House, North Way, Andover SP10 5BE, UK; Tel + 44 (0) 264 332424; Fax +44 (0) 264 342807.

European Journal of International Relations

Sage Publications announces the launch of the European Journal of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes of Uppsala University Sweden. It will be particularly concerned with conceptual, normative and formal theories, seeking in particular to foster an awareness of methodological and epistemological questions in the study of International Relations. Publication will commence with the March 1995 issue, and four issues will appear each year.

Contributions should be submitted to Prof. Carlsnaes at the Center for European Studies, Department of Government, Uppsala University, PO Box 514, S-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. Subscription information in Europe may be obtained from SAGE Publications, 6 Bonhill Street, London EC2A 4PU, UK; Tel +44 (0)71 374 0645; Fax +44 (0)71 374 8741. US and Canadian subscribers should contact SAGE Publications at PO Box 5096, Newbury Park, CA 91359.

European Urban and Regional Studies

This new journal will provide a means of dialogue between different European traditions of intellectual enquiry on urban and regional development issues. In addition to exploring the ways in which space makes a difference to the future economic, social and political map of Europe, European Urban and Regional Studies will highlight the connections between theoretical analysis and policy development. The journal will also place changes in Europe in a broader global context.

This new journal is the first international journal to deal with all aspects of cultural policy, management and the support of the arts. The scope includes Broadcasting, Film, Publishing and Recording, as well as the Performing Arts, Museums and Heritage. It explores the policies of cultural producers and the agencies that promote, support or regulate them. Contributions should be directed to the editor, Oliver Bennet, Joint School of Theatre Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL UK; tel (+44) (0203) 524399; fax (+44) (0203) 524446. For subscription information in the U.S., call (215) 750-2642. For all other countries, call (+44) (0734) 568211.

University of Pittsburgh
Center for West European Studies
Policy Paper Series

In May 1995 the Center for West European Studies will start publishing and distributing a new series of policy papers on issues facing government and business leaders in Western Europe. The papers will be short (no more than twenty pages in length) and will offer clear, concise and informed introductions, mainly to issues in the field international political economy. They will contain the minimum of jargon and the rarest academic apparatus. Contributors from all disciplines will be welcome.

The intended audience for the papers include U.S. scholars and students specializing in Western Europe, as well as members of the business, diplomatic and legal communities and media. The papers will be distributed free on demand: authors will receive 25 free copies in lieu of an honorarium. Initially, three papers will be published each year.

Inquiries about this series and manuscripts for review should be submitted to the series editor, Prof. Martin Staniland, at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, 3N29 Forbes Quadrangle, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA; tel (412) 648-7656; fax (412) 648-2605; e-mail "Mstan@vms.cis.pitt.edu".

Call for Papers:
Special Issue of New Political Science

A forthcoming issue of *New Political Science* will be devoted to British politics in the wake of Thatcherism. Among the topics to be included are: the prospects for social democracy, the future of the welfare state, youth culture, race and immigration, trade unions and the enterprise culture, the Conservative Party after Thatcher, Northern Ireland, Britain and the European Community. The deadline for submissions is March 1995. Anyone interested in contributing should contact: Chris Toulouse, Division of Social Sciences, Fordham University - Lincoln Center, 113 West 60th Street, New York, NY 10023, e-mail "Toulouse@Mary.Fordham.edu"; or Kent Worcester, Social Science Research Council, 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158.

Conference Papers Available from
"Breton Woods Revisited"

Papers are now available from this October 15-17, 1994 conference organized by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. These papers include:

Edward M. Bernstein, "The Making of the Bretton Woods Institutions" and "Further Evolution of the Exchange Rate System"

Sir Alexander Cairncross, "A British Perspective on Bretton Woods."

William Diebold, "From ITO to GATT - and Back?"

Barend A. de Vries, "Challenges and Opportunities for the World Bank"

Isaiah Frank, "Post Uruguay Round Trade Policy for a Global Economy"

Margaret Garritsen de Vries, "Bretton Woods Fifty Years Later: The View from the International Monetary Fund" and "The International Monetary Fund: Its Founding, Its Operation, and Its Current Challenges"

Joseph Greenwald, "Regionalism, Multilateralism and American Leadership"

Andrew M. Kamarck, "The World Bank: Challenges and Creative Responses."

Jacob J. Kaplan, "Bretton Woods and European Reconstruction"

Raymond Mikesell, "Some Issues in the Bretton Woods Debates"

Fred Sanderson, "Agriculture and Multilateralism"

Robert Solomon, "The Uncertain Future of the Exchange Rate Regime"

Victor L. Urquidi, "Reconstruction vs. Development: The IMF and the World Bank"

Raymond Vernon, "The U.S. Government at Bretton Woods and After"

Audio and video tapes of conference addresses and panels are also available. For more information, contact the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 1313 Fifth Street SE, Suite 303, Minneapolis, MN 55414-1546; tel (612) 379-5980; fax (612) 379-5982; e-mail "iatp@igc.apc.org".

Historical Dictionaries of International Organizations

Scarecrow Press announces a new volume in its *Historical Dictionaries series*. It is the *Historical Dictionary of European Organizations*, by Derek W. Urwin. This volume covers the European Union, NATO, and a number of other organizations impacting European affairs. Other volumes in this series, edited by Jon Woronoff, include the *Historical Dictionary of the European Community* by Desmond Dinan and works on individual countries, such as Germany, Portugal, Turkey, Poland, Greece, Cyprus, and Sweden. For more information, contact Scarecrow Press, PO Box 4167, Metuchen, NJ 08840; tel (800) 537-7107 or (908) 548-8600; fax (908) 548-5767.
Association News

Slate of Candidates for
1995-1997 Executive Committee Election

ECSA members will shortly receive ballots for the election of the 1995-1997 Executive Committee. The seven highest recipients of votes cast will take office at the ECSA Conference, May 11-14 in Charleston. The candidates are:

Regina Axelrod, Department of Political Science, Adelphi University
Alan Cafry, Department of Government, Hamilton College
David Cameron, Department of Political Science, Yale University
James Caporaso, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle
Leon Hurwitz, Department of Political Science, Cleveland State University
James S. Jackson, Institute for Social Research, Program for Research on Black Americans, University of Michigan
Peter Karl Kresl, Department of Economics, Bucknell University
Paulette Kurzer, Department of Political Science, University of Arizona
Carl Lankowski, School of International Service, American University
Pierre-Henri Laurent, Department of History, Tufts University
Stephen Overturf, Department of Economics, Whittier College
Carolyn Rhodes, Department of Political Science, Utah State University
Alberta Sbragia, Center for West European Studies, University of Pittsburgh

The ballots will be distributed in early February, with a return deadline to the ECSA Administrative Office of April 1, 1995. Members who do not receive ballots by February 20 should contact Bill Burros at 412/648-7635; fax 412/648-1168; e-mail “ECSA@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU”.

Credit Card Payments Now Accepted

Payment by credit card is now be accepted for ECSA membership fees. As indicated on the membership application and renewal form at the back of the Newsletter, both VISA and Mastercard may be used. Credit card facilities will provide many members with a more convenient form of payment and should be particularly helpful for ECSA members residing outside of the United States.