ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION
(Second Part)

Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur
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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 2 with 1 abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile (Alternate: Caro), Conti Persini, De Bondt (Alternate: Michel), Della Briotta, van Eekelen (Alternate: Blauw), Gessner, Hardy, Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord McNaIr, MM. Mangelchots (Alternate: Biefnot), van der Sanden (Alternate: van der Weeff), Günther Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Thoss (Alternate: Margue), Valianze, Vecchietti, Wilquin.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on the problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism

The Assembly,

Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and throughout the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, defence and disarmament policy pursued by the western countries;

Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of strategic nuclear weapons;

Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is encountering very negative reactions from many citizens of WEU member countries;

Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations — including the part of the Geneva negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons — and the resumption or revival of other negotiations designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere;

Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters might cause these negotiations to fail and jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security;

Considering that pacifist movements in East and West are anyhow entitled to call for new initiatives from the members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations on disarmament;

Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets;

Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements;

Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political union requires close co-ordination of national policies in these fields;

Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Follow attentively and encourage participating states to ensure the success of the various ongoing negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the rest of the world;

2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the United States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the establishment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained;

3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public;

4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities;

5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters.
I. Introduction

1. In December 1981, Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, stressed the importance of the WEU Assembly examining the problems raised by the development of pacifist movements and their activities and the progress which neutralism seemed to be making among European public opinion, particularly in autumn 1981. This appeal was heeded since two Assembly committees took up the matter and the Presidential Committee decided to include in the agenda for the June 1982 session a report on this subject by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, postponing until December a report by the General Affairs Committee on these questions.

2. The report submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe at the Assembly's June 1982 session (Document 918) made a very full and well-informed analysis of the spread of movements aimed at mobilising public opinion against nuclear weapons, and in particular against the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe, in accordance with the dual decision taken by the North Atlantic Council in December 1979. This major and interesting work will spare your Rapporteur much research and allow him to go straight to the political aspects of the question, taking due account of any information obtained about the evolution of pacifist movements in Europe and elsewhere since June 1982.

3. The present report follows up a working paper examined by the General Affairs Committee on 8th July 1982. Your Rapporteur wishes to thank all committee members who took part in that preliminary discussion which was particularly fruitful and interesting. It allowed your Rapporteur to pursue his study in greater detail and he has willingly incorporated many of the remarks made about his initial draft. There were others however which he could not endorse, but he has endeavoured to mention them in this report as objectively as possible although expressing his own reservations.

II. Neutralism

4. The first question is what is meant by neutralism and pacifism. To the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, the notion of neutralism emerged in France immediately after the first signs of the cold war and is fairly close to the notion of non-alignment which subsequently spread to other parts of the world, including Yugoslavia and many countries which became independent following decolonisation, India being one of the main champions.

5. Neutralism then stemmed from the idea that the two military blocs which were being formed were based on military, political, economic and ideological domination by the two great powers which emerged from the second world war, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union. Neutralists considered it necessary for their countries to remain outside the systems of alliance so as to avoid such domination and in particular to be free to determine the course of their economic and social development. For France, it was a question of choosing a middle path between the excessive dirigism of the Soviet Union and liberalism, which some also considered excessive, of the American type in order to be able to carry out the economic and social programme of the resistance movement. The distance between this concern, that of Tito at the time of his break with Moscow and that of many leaders in the new states, was not very great, although these various countries' economic and social programmes were far from identical. In the political field proper, for France it was a question of being able to maintain or re-establish a government coalition in which the communists, who then had more than 25% of the votes, could have retained a place. Finally, in foreign policy, neutralism was the refusal if not of the Atlantic Alliance at least of any integrated military system, and it played a definite rôle, although the extent was difficult to measure, in the adoption of the previous question which prevented the French National Assembly from ratifying the draft treaty on the European Defence Community in August 1954. It is not impossible that the interstate nature of the protocols modifying the Brussels Treaty helped to win over those who were drawn towards certain aspects of neutralism.

6. This clearly shows the fundamental difference between neutralism and a policy of neutrality as pursued, each in its own fashion, by Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland. Neutralism was the rejection of the policy of military blocs which might alienate the domestic and foreign policies of states. It did not reject the choice of permanent neutrality, or
even alliances of free and sovereign states for their joint security.

7. The concept of neutralism has naturally evolved considerably since 1954, particularly because the Atlantic Alliance has proved to be flexible and has respected the right of its members to guide their policy as they think fit. The way France's withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure, the economic and social choices of the government which came to power in 1981 and the participation of communists in that government were accepted by the other members of the Atlantic Alliance, even if they did not approve, diverted a large fraction of French public opinion away from neutralism. Furthermore, the evolution of the Soviet Union and its hold on the Eastern European countries, particularly after the events in Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, showed that in the eastern bloc self-determination existed neither for the Soviet people nor for its allies and that a western defence policy offered the only possible framework for protecting the right of the European nations to decide on their political and social régime.

8. Thus, the neutralism of the fifties now no longer has at all the same meaning and one may wonder whether neutralism still exists in Europe other than in the form of anxiety that the European countries may, because of the existence of two military blocs, become involved in a war in which there would be a high risk of nuclear weapons being used. This form of neutralism, which is not very different from a refusal to accept any true defence policy, is closer to pacifism than to post-war ideological neutralism.

9. Seen in this light, a certain number of aspects of neutralism today deserve attention:

10. (i) Under the guise of refusing military blocs it rejects the Atlantic Alliance, or in any event a number of its consequences for Western Europe, without accepting the fact, however evident it may seem, that the alliance has had beneficial effects for Europe. On the one hand, although it has not totally eradicated the innumerable causes of conflict which for centuries have split Western Europe, it has at least reduced them to a point of far less gravity. The fact that no one any longer considers there is a hereditary or even potential enemy among his neighbours and that no one any longer thinks of resorting to force as a means of settling any problems which may arise in relations between states is a huge step forward in the history of European mankind. A community organisation of Western Europe, in the economic field at least, was possible only because there was a defensive alliance. Moreover, this alliance has allowed a relative balance of forces and mutual deterrence to be maintained, enabling our continent to avoid armed conflict for thirty-eight years, which is unprecedented in its history. There is absolutely no guarantee that the dissolution of this alliance would not lead to an imbalance of forces which would be liable to revive dreams of domination and allow dangerous speculation about the ability or desire of one or other country to resist. The balance of terror is certainly not the most desirable form of relations between states and the dissolution of the blocs may be considered as the aim of a collective security policy. Neutralism makes it a means of strengthening peace, which is in any case not evident.

11. (ii) It should be noted that the very people who are trying within the Warsaw Pact to obtain greater freedom or to move away from Soviet domination clearly reject any form of neutralism and proclaim their loyalty to alliance with the Soviet Union. Such words were not enough of course to reassure the Soviet Union or to avert the invasion of Czechoslovakia and pressure on Poland, probably because they were not thought to be sincere. However, the liberalisation of the Eastern European régimes can be considered only in the context of the overall evolution of the eastern bloc and not by certain countries breaking away and moving towards neutralism. It cannot therefore be hoped that the neutralism emerging in Western Europe will spread to the East through contagion. It is hardly likely and probably not very desirable for the peoples of the area and for peace in Europe, as proved by the Polish affair.

12. (iii) The consequence of dismantling the western defence system in Europe would be to leave each Western European country in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union which, without even having to resort to force, would be able to impose on them certain constraints in their political, economic or social lives, their external relations and individual freedom. Rightly or wrongly, this process has often been called Finlandisation. Finland's situation may admittedly not seem intolerable to outside observers nor, which is more important, to the Finns. Nevertheless, Finland's fate largely depends on balances stretching well beyond its frontiers, and there is nothing to show that, between the Soviet Union and a neutralised Europe, Finland would be able to protect the freedom it has preserved in more favourable circumstances. The picture conjured up by the word Finlandisation is extremely vague and is only a very imperfect reflection of what a neutralised Western Europe's fate might be in a Soviet-dominated continent.

13. (iv) In such conditions, the logic of true neutralism for Western Europe would be to acquire by and for itself sufficient means of deterrence to be able to ensure its own security without
having to take account of interference from outside. It is a long way from this and its economic difficulties since 1973 leave little likelihood of it being able to achieve this in the foreseeable future. Short of that, neutralism for Europe would be a weakness, not a force. It would not be a guarantee but a threat to its freedom. It would not be a factor of peace but a danger of war in Europe.

14.(v) These remarks obviously do not apply to Germany as a whole to the same extent as the rest of Europe, and it is quite understandable that the prospect of reunification for the German nation would make it easier to accept the idea of Finlandisation as a price of reunification, particularly for the citizens of the GDR for whom, after all, Finlandisation would not mean less freedom. However, certain German members of the committee recalled most usefully that pacifist or neutralist demonstrations in the GDR in 1981 and 1982 were severely put down, whereas pacifist or neutralist demonstrations in the Federal Republic were given wide coverage in the press and other media of Eastern European countries.

15.(v) All these considerations show clearly that although the Soviet Union is not always behind neutralism in Western Europe it is trying to derive the maximum benefit from it, while doing its utmost to stifle neutralism in Eastern Europe. Conversely, Western European neutralist movements, whether or not inspired, assisted or encouraged by the Soviet Union, serve Soviet strength, which does not hesitate to back their action. Just as the development of a form of neutralism in Europe in the years preceding the second world war cannot be attributed solely to the influence of Hitlerism, its development in present-day Europe cannot be attributed solely to Soviet influence. However, it has to be recorded that just as the absence of cohesion or of the desire of many European countries to defend themselves strongly contributed to the general collapse in face of Hitlerian aggression, today the development of neutralism which refuses to build up the military means required for the policy it advocates might sorely tempt the Soviet Union and provide it with opportunities to use its strength to impose its will on Europe.

III. Pacifism

16. The notion of pacifism has far more ancient and varied roots. There were protests in the nineteenth century against the use of force by states as a means of action for promoting their interests. From the very outset, the international workers' movement denounced such methods and made peace one of its major aims. It was joined by other movements, sometimes Christian, sometimes non-religious, which multiplied before and particularly after the second world war.

17. The originality of pacifism is not to advocate the peaceful settlement of conflicts but to place peace before all else and underline that no cause is worth the sacrifice of human lives implicit in modern warfare. The first world war, whose causes were far removed from the vital interests of the European nations but which was responsible for the death of more than ten million people and nearly five years' suffering for almost all the inhabitants of Europe, obviously gave considerable impetus to this tendency, particularly among the left-wing parties and socialists. It emerged as a fight against the militarist tendencies then coming to the fore in many European societies, the rejection of military budgets, calls to reduce military service and unremitting objections to the armaments policy pursued before and after the war.

18. It is evident that the rise of fascism and its conquest of Europe were a serious blow to pacifism which bore its share of responsibility for the weakness shown by the European democracies towards Hitler. Unlike the first world war, the second left little room for pacifism and left-wing parties everywhere were in the vanguard in the anti-fascist struggle throughout Europe.

19. Thus, whereas neutralism is a purely political concept based on a certain analysis of the world situation, pacifism is based on purely moral concerns, passing over political considerations to oppose anything relating to war, armaments or armed forces. Conscientious objection is one of its traditional forms. However, the situation in Europe in the fascist era showed the limits of protest which, separating peace from every other value, risked helping the cause of those who were trying to override Europe and make war the instrument of their domination. This was an experience which cannot be forgotten by the generations then alive and the facts must be constantly recalled for subsequent generations.

20. For a long time pacifism was merely a protest, a refusal of everything in modern society that might lead to war or hostilities. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, pacifists felt they were strong enough to consider action which was not just intended to impress public opinion by symbolic gestures, like German socialists who, after 4th September 1870, risked imprisonment by organising demonstrations against continuing the war against France following the fall of Napoleon III. Thus, within the international workers' movement, a concept of general strike emerged with the specific purpose of preventing governments from resorting to force. But the cir-
circumstances in which the first world war broke out prevented international socialism from uniting to put a halt to the governments' policy of conquest and it subsequently paid dearly for the helplessness it then showed.

21. Although the division of the workers' movement on the one hand and the rise of fascism on the other considerably weakened the possibilities of action of those with pacificist leanings between the two wars, new means of expression and new strategies have been worked out in recent years. Immediately after the second world war, the peace movement, very clearly dominated by communist parties, endeavoured to rally public opinion in Western European countries against American policy which insisted on the rearmament of the Federal Republic as a condition for maintaining American forces in Europe. The Korean war, the Atlantic Pact, the European Defence Community and later the Vietnam war were stepping stones for agitation directed mainly against the organisation of western defence although the true aim, for those organising it at least, was to support Soviet policy. Events in the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia progressively undermined any credence there may have been in a movement whose true goal, as it became increasingly evident, was not peace.

22. The same cannot be said about the more recent shape of the pacifist movement, although one may conclude that in the last resort the same cause is espoused. Pacifism today is based mainly on the particularly inhumane nature of any war involving nuclear weapons. Hence it is no longer a movement pursuing particular political objectives but the expression of a profound reaction which is quite understandable when it is borne in mind that there would be little chance of any war in Europe not crossing the nuclear threshold. Thus, the Christian churches, or related associations, which hitherto had remained aloof from pacifist demonstrations, are now prominent, be it the catholic church, particularly in the United States and to a lesser degree in France, or protestant churches in the Netherlands, Germany, the Scandinavian countries and even, more cautiously, the United Kingdom. The same is true of many associations of a non-political nature, including ecologists.

23. More than its predecessors, this new pacifism has sought to make proposals and to define concepts of security which are no longer based on the accumulation of armaments, particularly nuclear arms. It emphasises the waste of wealth represented by military expenditure in a world where the true problems are the development of the third world and the horrors of modern warfare. At the same time it points to the meagre results obtained in disarmament negotiations in whatever framework they may have been held and urges society to bring pressure to bear on the governments by all available means to make them take steps, if necessary unilaterally, to set the world on a new course. Certain pacifist associations such as the movement for a non-violent alternative bring together persons who are highly respectable because of their political impartiality, moral and intellectual values and standing among young people to work out a possible defence policy in which non-violence would no longer be merely an objective but also a means of action by states and peoples to ensure their security. This research is of great interest because it is based on a serious analysis of the notion of deterrence. Its aim is not to dispense with deterrence but to achieve it by means which would be unlikely to arouse reactions of fear on the part of the potential enemy. However, one may wonder how effective such deterrence might be and how much impact it may have in practice.

24. Another aspect of the present form of pacifism is its partial or total rejection of nuclear weapons. Sometimes it totally rejects a defence policy based on the balance of terror, i.e. any form of nuclear deterrence, or calls for a solemn declaration by governments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which is almost the same since renouncing first use of such weapons would be tantamount to renouncing their use to retaliate against a conventional attack, thus annulling any deterrent effect. At other times there is less radical opposition to nuclear weapons, the intention being to strengthen their deterrent role rather than limit it. This is the case of opposition to enhanced radiation weapons and, generally speaking, to so-called theatre nuclear weapons. Here the basic idea is that only fear of massive retaliation has a deterrent effect, whereas the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war makes it possible for the great nuclear powers to envisage winning a war without resorting to strategic nuclear weapons. While recognising that only strategic nuclear weapons play the essential deterrent role, your Rapporteur considers however that in present circumstances it would be dangerous to give a potential adversary the impression that he might have a choice of weapons and hence some hope that the West might hesitate to use strategic weapons in response to a limited attack.

25. These remarks apply only for pacifism as it is known in the West. But it now appears that a similar form of pacifism is emerging in Eastern Europe, particularly in the GDR and the Soviet-Union. This is a welcome sign, not because pacifism would weaken these countries but because it can provide an area of agreement between East and West by encouraging the east-
ern countries, in matters relating to disarmament, to take account of pacifist views and hence foster East-West rapprochement on matters which are essential for peace. It should be noted however that pacifist demonstrations are still considered seditious in Eastern Europe and are therefore fought and repressed, particularly in the Soviet Union and the GDR. Thus, at its fifth meeting in September 1982 the Central Committee of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, the youth branch of the SED, decided to conduct a vigorous campaign against the effects of the pacifist movement on young people in the GDR and inter alia against the spread of conscientious objection.

26. It can therefore be seen that the pacifist movement is disturbing in both East and West. On each side, there is a tendency to attribute its influence to manoeuvres by the other side so as to evade the highly pertinent questions it raises for our societies. But to look just beyond suspicion which may stem from its opposition to government policies and examine the reasons guiding it and the elements of society supporting it, one has to note that on both sides these reasons are respectable, and these social groups are particularly worthy of interest since apart from intellectual circles they also represent the younger elements of society. It would therefore be morally contestable and politically imprudent not to take full account of its aspirations, to refuse a dialogue with it and not to weigh carefully its arguments, even if it seems difficult to accept some of its conclusions.

IV. The revival of agitation since 1980

27. In recent years, there has been agitation in Western Europe which has sometimes hastily been qualified as neutralist and pacifist and which reached a peak in October 1981. This agitation had an echo in the United States and in the German Democratic Republic. Having been analysed in Mr. Mommersteeg’s report your Rapporteur will not therefore go back over it. He will merely bring out a few features in order to draw conclusions.

28. A first comment concerns the link between agitation and nuclear weapons. It is a definite fact that the prospect of American intermediate-range nuclear weapons being deployed in Europe, although not the origin of the protest movement, gave the movement, which had existed since nuclear weapons came into being, particular importance and significance. Moreover, it is not difficult to see how this weapon of mass destruction, with ill-controlled side effects, can instil considerable horror and fear resulting in the belief that anything would be better than nuclear war. The fact that, unlike strategic nuclear weapons which are launched from aircraft, submarines or silos in the United States or Soviet Union, intermediate-range weapons are for deployment in Europe itself, on permanent sites dispersed in many areas, has drawn attention to the dangers their presence represents for many sections of the population of Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons, also deployed in Europe, had not provoked such strong reactions because, being mobile, they were less in evidence and did not form the same kind of target.

29. Hence it would be a mistake to attribute to Soviet propaganda alone a movement whose scale was demonstrated in Mr. Mommersteeg’s report and which affects many circles which can hardly be suspected of being influenced by Moscow. This obviously does not mean that such propaganda has been inactive and it has certainly done its utmost to exploit a favourable situation in order to weaken the West’s determination to resist and to create a gap between the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance. Certain committee members pointed out that the Soviet Union was financing some pacifist movements, including the World Peace Council. One member recalled a remark by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, that $15 million are believed to have been spent by the Soviet Union on pacifist campaigns in Western Europe in 1981. But Soviet propaganda would certainly not have managed to give the protest movements the impetus they gained when directed against the NATO dual decision of December 1979 if fertile ground had not been found in Europe and, to a certain extent, in the United States where the uncompromising policy pursued by President Reagan, especially towards the Soviet Union, revived the fear of a nuclear war in which the United States might not be spared.

30. Among today’s pacifist movements, there is obviously no complete unity of doctrine nor even of fundamental motives, insofar as it is possible to determine what they are. Several trends can be distinguished however:

31.(i) Opposition to theatre nuclear weapons, caused mainly by the NATO dual decision of December 1979 and the prospect of the development of enhanced radiation weapons, the so-called neutron bomb, which would also be theatre weapons. This opposition is largely based on a concept of deterrence which corresponded to circumstances twenty or thirty years ago but far less to the present situation. In fact, true deterrence, exercised by the United States, then also by the United Kingdom and finally by France, was based on the doctrine of massive retaliation, alone capable of diverting a potential adversary from aggressive intentions by convincing him that any war would bring unacceptable destruction to his own territory.
This doctrine now seems out of date where United States and Soviet strategy in Europe are concerned because the existence of short- or medium-range weapons which can be used against the attacking force makes the immediate use of intercontinental-range weapons less credible: is it imaginable that, when countries are able to stop a conventional attack, they will risk their own territory being laid waste? But it is particularly difficult to make public opinion understand the reasoning behind deterrence, that a country wishing to avoid war must equip itself to fight a war, since what distinguishes a deterrent policy from a policy of war is not the weapons, which remain the same, but the use it is intended to make of them.

32.(ii) A distinction between the possession of nuclear weapons and their use, which has led certain pacifists to ask the western governments to undertake not to be the first to use such weapons. It is not necessary to underline the danger of this idea whose effect, if adopted, would be to leave the way open for a potential enemy with far more troops and conventional weapons to use them without risk of nuclear retaliation. This would destroy deterrence and make war more probable without even really preventing nuclear escalation after the outbreak of war.

33.(iii) The formation of denuclearised zones, for long proposed by certain Eastern European countries, particularly in the Rapacki plan, is again being considered by certain pacifist movements, mainly in Scandinavia. Although such proposals might be considered for regions where there is no risk of conventional attack by a stronger enemy, in Europe they would have the same effect as an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

34.(iv) The appeal for western countries to abandon completely the possession of nuclear weapons, taken up inter alia by the conference of American catholic bishops, is liable to become one of the main themes of pacifist movements in the next few months. Coming from the United States, this call is expected to find a wide response in the third world. It is based on the full horror of nuclear war but takes no account of the fact that conventional war would probably be hardly less horrific, at least in Europe, nor of the fact that the aim of nuclear weapons is not war but deterrence and that their disappearance, outside the framework of a general agreement on disarmament, would make war more likely.

35.(v) Not far removed from this primarily anti-nuclear pacifism is the action of ecological movements which have spread in the last ten years and whose electoral results in certain countries are a measure of their strong influence on public opinion, particularly as clearly many people who do not vote for the ecologists are alive to their concerns. Ecologists can admittedly be distinguished from pacifists because their main concern is the protection of the natural surroundings rather than external or defence policy. But they are close in their more or less radical opposition to any military or civil activities which make use of nuclear activity.

36.(vi) The claim for a new balance between expenditure on armaments and that for assistance to the third world is based on two considerations, one purely humanitarian which underlines the scandal of the extreme poverty of a large part of the world population and the other, more political, which recalls that poverty is a far greater danger to tomorrow's peace than any military threat whatever. There is nothing to say in answer to these two arguments, which are perfectly fair, and if it is considered that the requirements of the third world should be given priority, there is no excuse for the slender assistance granted by the industrialised countries. But this has no direct connection with armaments. If they are useless, there is no excuse for accumulating them. But if it is considered that there is a real threat from outside, there would be no excuse for abandoning them. Consequently analysis of the military threat must govern armaments policy and analysis of the situation of the third world must determine assistance policy, there being no grounds for linking the two elements.

37.(vii) In several countries, particularly the United Kingdom, pacifist movements are proposing unilateral disarmament measures in the hope that such decisions will lead other countries to follow suit. At its conference in September 1982, the Labour Party, while confirming its loyalty to NATO, adopted a motion calling for such measures in the field of nuclear weapons. It must be wondered first whether this would effectively be the case and then whether such measures would not in the long run have the reverse effect of that sought because, a priori, they would deprive disarmament negotiations of their content.

38.(viii) Finally, as your Rapporteur noted above, in other countries, including the Netherlands, the Federal Republic and the Scandinavian countries, pacifist movements have adopted a neutralist tone, whereas in others, such as France, still-powerful neutralist tendencies have little link with pacifism and in yet others, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, pacifism is important but in no way associated with neutralism. The committee pondered on the reasons for these differences. Some members attributed the lack of influence of the peace movement in France to its links with communism and underlined the difficult position in which events in Poland
placed this movement. These remarks are certainly to the point, but are they adequate explanation? What rôle was played by the fact that certain Western European countries have nuclear weapons while others have none? What part was played by more ancient cultural or religious traditions? Whether or not the left, closer to the pacifists than the right, is in power certainly has some effect. Your Rapporteure is convinced that it is impossible to reduce to simple and unequivocal elements the complex facts which explain the reactions of the various peoples of Europe to pacifism today.

39. These protest movements or proposals can therefore be assimilated neither to neutralism nor to pacifism in the traditional sense. They do not necessarily deny that a Soviet threat exists and in general do not refuse the means of countering it. The famous slogan “Better red than dead” heard in certain demonstrations in Germany does not seem to take due account of these movements’ main roots which cannot therefore be confused with traditional pacifism. Therefore, while they have a neutralist aspect because of their desire to take account of political and military facts and not allow Western Europe to become over-dependent on decisions taken in Washington and a pacifist aspect because of their absolute rejection of certain weapons, they cannot be confused with either.

40. Finally, it must be noted that these are worthy reactions, not only because of their motives but also because of their scope and the determination and moral and intellectual qualities of many of their proponents. Hence, pacifism cannot be assimilated to an enemy who must be fought, an aberration which must be put right at all cost or a blind instrument used by an external power. In the United States in particular, but in many European countries too, it seems to meet deep-rooted national aspirations. It must be taken seriously and a true dialogue must be held with the leaders of pacifist movements in order to find the means of ensuring true European security, due account being taken of the nature of the danger from without and of the threats which western activities might also involve for peace.

V. The imperatives of European security

41. There are two categories of reasons for taking full account of the spread of pacifist and neutralist movements in the West. First, the intrinsic value of their concerns, proposals and claims, second the extent of the movements, their ability to mobilise public opinion and the influence of those who help them, in short their political weight. Democratic regimes cannot turn a blind eye to what a large proportion of their citizens want and think. It is therefore important to answer their concerns and, although the answer cannot always be fully positive, it must nevertheless take account of the arguments put forward and not merely reject requests which a large section of society has at heart. One question is how large is this section. It is often difficult to assess the number taking part in big pacifist demonstrations, their commitment and their enthusiasm. For instance, the fact that in France far fewer people take part in such demonstrations than in Italy, Germany or the Netherlands may be due to political considerations and may not necessarily mean that pacifism has less of a hold on French people than on people in neighbouring countries.

42. Still more important is the impact of the ideas upheld by pacifist and neutralist movements. It is evident that in the period of crisis through which the world is now passing military expenditure is a waste of resources which could be better used elsewhere, particularly for investments in the third world. Similarly, the accumulation of nuclear weapons places peace on unhealthy foundations and creates dangers, whose scale is difficult to assess, of war being started by mistake or by accident, or of escalation in the event of hostilities. Moreover, the same is true of conventional weapons which, in the last decade, have caused millions of victims in vast areas of the world and whose improvement, at the same time as the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons, makes it increasingly difficult to envisage war stopping at the nuclear threshold.

43. The only way of meeting the challenge of pacifism and neutralism is therefore to show a genuine will first to limit armaments and forces and then to achieve true disarmament. It is easy to understand that the meagre results the world has achieved in this field have raised doubts about the seriousness with which the governments have tackled the question of disarmament and encouraged considerable scepticism about speeches made on this subject in the United Nations and elsewhere. It should be added that the American decision not to ratify the SALT II agreements after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan rightly or wrongly gave the impression that a process of limiting armaments by negotiated consent between the two great powers had been interrupted. This may help to explain the spread of pacifist initiatives in America and in Europe since it might be wondered whether, following this break in a process already started, there was a way of disarming other than by unilateral decisions taken in individual countries or means of bringing pressure to bear on states other than by resorting to demonstrations or
strikes, such as a peace movement which is in the process of acquiring a European structure and strategy seems to be organizing throughout Europe in 1983.

44. Your Rapporteur nevertheless remains convinced that the only form of disarmament which can consolidate peace is one which ensures the security of all, i.e. that any unilateral initiative would involve serious dangers because peace is based on a certain balance of forces. Overall security and disarmament can be protected by structuring international society, by negotiated decisions and by specific and controlled measures, whereas unilateral decisions would deprive these negotiations of meaning and jeopardise their success.

45. This is particularly true of the western countries because in almost every field the Atlantic Alliance forces are now in a position of inferiority compared with those of the Warsaw Pact and any unilateral disarmament on their part would increase their inferiority and hence the chances of armed conflict. While the Warsaw Pact lead seems to have only limited implications where strategic nuclear weapons are concerned, this is not so for conventional weapons, particularly tanks, artillery and combat aircraft and, above all, intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Even the United States navy has been caught up by the Soviet Union. At the request of the committee, your Rapporteur has had a comparative table of these forces drawn up, which is given at appendix.

46. Furthermore, the relatively small proportion of their gross national product earmarked for defence (5.9% in the United States, 5.1% in the United Kingdom, 3.9% in France, 3.4% in the Netherlands, 3.3% in Belgium, 3.2% in the Federal Republic and 2.4% in Italy) has prevented the countries of the Atlantic Alliance from replacing their armaments at the same rate as the Soviet Union, which appears to spend between 12 and 14% of its GNP on defence, while the other members of the Warsaw Pact spend about the same proportion as the western countries. It is therefore probable that the quantitative inferiority of western armaments is no longer offset by qualitative superiority as was the case ten years ago.

47. Europe can ensure its security by associating a true disarmament policy with a defence policy which retains the elements of credible deterrence by convincing Europeans themselves, then their American partners and finally the Soviet Union, that it does not intend disarmament to be a renunciation or the beginning of neutralisation, but that it has a place in a coherent operation of which it is a major aim.

Certain pacifists wish disarmament to be a means of achieving détente and peace, but in present circumstances it can but be a consequence of this although subsequently it may help to consolidate what has been achieved. To tackle the problem of disarmament in isolation from military necessities and political realities would be a threat to the peace and freedom of Western Europe.

48. No more than for its security, there is no reason why Europe should rely wholly on the United States for everything connected with disarmament. It can certainly not act without the United States, and a committee member recalled that the North Atlantic Council should place greater emphasis on the European wish to associate defence and disarmament as already expressed in the Harmel plan. This would require close consultations on disarmament matters between the European members of the alliance. The WEU Council could and therefore should be the framework for such consultations because this is its own particular area of responsibility. Faced with the desire of the peace movement to adopt a European strategy, it is of some importance for the governments of Western European countries to concert their response, which need not be identical, so as not to react according to national or local situations and thus disperse Europe's approach to its defence and disarmament requirements. Economic difficulties in all our countries are strong encouragement for such reactions. In a European Community economy it is difficult to envisage unduly wide differences in the military burden on national economies. This does not mean that cuts in military expenditure must be avoided, but they should perhaps be limited in the immediate future with a view to negotiating a balanced reduction with the Warsaw Pact.

49. Such a step will surely find encouragement in the policy pursued by President Reagan, who can in no way be accused of being unaware of the Soviet threat. This policy is highly positive and encouraging since it led to the START negotiations being opened in Geneva together with negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic nuclear weapons on a basis which should be satisfactory to pacifists, i.e. the zero option or the controlled elimination of all medium-range nuclear weapons. This proposal is in the interests of all insofar as the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons known as instruments of limited warfare is a particularly serious danger because it might give the impression that an attack in Europe might lead to the total nuclear destruction of this area without the two great powers being fully involved. It is not by chance that the announcement of the deployment of these weapons caused the most widespread pacifist
demonstrations in Europe, and one of the lessons to be learned from these demonstrations should be to make the destruction of these weapons one of the first aims of disarmament, which fully conforms to President Reagan’s proposals.

50. Moreover, very probably the United States Government’s determination to adopt this approach has shown the green light for a whole series of negotiations which appeared to be marking time, be it the MBFR talks, the conference of the Disarmament Committee or the United Nations special session on disarmament. Admittedly, no agreement seems imminent in any of these frameworks but the resumption of diplomatic activity in the disarmament field – provided it is not merely a question of appeasing the pacifist movements but is based on a true will to succeed – will presumably show these movements that the western countries are determined to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and its allies for an effective reduction of armaments or, one way or another, they will force the Warsaw Pact countries to assume their responsibilities towards their own citizens and towards the rest of the world by revealing whether they consider disarmament to be merely a tactic designed to weaken the West or whether it is really a goal.

51. Another question on which the new pacifist movement may be right is probably that any war in Europe could well lead to a nuclear exchange on its territory. Already a conventional war on this territory would have deadly and highly devastating effects because of the density of the population and the extreme fragility of present-day industrial and urban civilisation. Although military planners now tend to think that any war would be short for lack of sufficient means to wage a long one, such reasoning is no more infallible than the same way of thinking was in 1914. Hence it is essential for war no longer to be envisaged as a means of pursuing a policy but it should be realised that, victorious or not, it would lead to the destruction of all the values upheld by the West.

52. What is less evident is that the presence of nuclear weapons increases the risk of war and even of nuclear war. It may even be considered that the existence of such weapons has removed much of the threat of war from the areas they protected, and countries equipped with them have had to find peaceful means of ending the many conflicts which have arisen between them in the past thirty-five years. Conversely, it is in areas where there were no nuclear weapons to play a deterrent rôle that armed and often deadly conflicts have increased during the period in question.

53. Where NATO’s dual decision in 1979 may be called in question is in the extent to which it would make nuclear weapons an instrument of strategic fighting rather than of a policy of deterrence. It is on this point that the discussions which have been going on in the United States for the last twenty years raise a problem. While strategic nuclear weapons are the ideal instrument of deterrence, the military array of the West must not hide such weapons or make their use in the event of attack more certain but, on the contrary, it must enhance them and convince a potential aggressor that he cannot hope to wage battle and win without risk of such weapons being used.

54. In other words, the aim of the Western allies should not be a balance of forces and weapons at every level but, on the contrary, deployment limited to the requirements of deterrence. An American force which, as everyone knows, is only too small, is essential for Europe’s security, not so that it may fight Soviet forces but because its very inadequacy proves that the strategic force of the United States will be involved should there be an attack on Western Europe. Similarly, short- or intermediate-range nuclear weapons do not have to equal in quantity those deployed by the Soviet Union lest they give the impression that the West is prepared to accept a conflict limited to a given nuclear level. Their presence is necessary to convince the Soviet Union that it cannot hope to stop escalation at the level of its choice. If Western Europe had no short- or intermediate-range nuclear weapons to confront the some 350 SS-20 missiles now deployed by the Soviet Union in Europe, it would be possible for a potential aggressor to speculate on his superiority in the conventional field and confront the United States with the impossible choice between abandoning Western Europe to its sorry fate or releasing an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons which would ravage American territory. The existence of a limited number of such weapons, on the contrary, is enough to convince a potential aggressor that a conventional attack would lead to escalation and hence gives true weight to the American deterrent.

55. This in no way signifies, as certain committee members thought, that your Rapporteur considers the doctrine of massive retaliation should be resuscitated. On the contrary, the doctrine of flexible response must be given its full deterrent value by not allowing it to become just a combat doctrine. But here again the main aim should be to reach an agreement banning the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons by the West but also obliging the Soviet Union to renounce its SS-20 and other missiles (SS-4s and SS-5s).

56. Because of its limited means, France has to base its security on a minimum level of deterrence: its conventional forces, its tactical
nuclear weapons and its eighteen intermediate-range missiles are not enough to stop an invasion, but this limited deployment gives full deterrent value to strategic nuclear weapons which, although also limited, should be enough to convince an enemy that he would sustain intolerable losses and damage in the event of an attack on Western Europe. Consequently, French defence policy, whose principles have not been modified by the recent change of majority, seems to meet security requirements quite well, not only those of France but also of most Western European countries which admitted, in the North Atlantic Council declaration in Ottawa in 1974, that the fact that two European members of the alliance “possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own” contributes to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the alliance. This declaration noting the specific deterrent rôle of the French and British nuclear forces appears to correspond quite closely to the present views of most European members of the alliance which in fact no longer have much objection to them while the French Government for its part has on several occasions, particularly since May 1981, recalled that it considers France’s security area begins far beyond its national frontiers.

57. But it is not simply a matter of armaments. There is every reason to think that pacifist reactions in Europe since December 1979 also express uneasiness of a political nature in view of the fact that the strategy implemented in the framework of NATO is in fact defined in the United States and adopted by the latter’s European allies in the North Atlantic Council under political, military and often economic pressure. The overwhelming domination of the United States in the defence field indeed makes it almost impossible for its partners to oppose the application of measures already decided upon by the United States Government, even if these partners do not feel such measures meet their true interests. The threat, explicit or more often implicit, of a withdrawal of American forces from Europe, whose effect would be to undermine NATO’s deterrent strength, is generally enough to win over those who might be tempted to oppose such decisions. But it is evident that this situation is not likely to calm the legitimate anxiety of the populations. In this connection, one may wonder about the degree of consensus reached in the North Atlantic Council in December 1979 since several countries that took part in reaching this decision seem to be having the greatest difficulty in carrying it into effect at home.

58. This problem, raised by American preponderance in the alliance, is even more serious when United States policy seems to waiver. In the last ten years this has often happened, particularly where nuclear strategy is concerned, and the recent article by four leading Americans in Foreign Affairs, asking for the development of western conventional forces in NATO, was not likely to reassure that portion of European public opinion which is wondering whether the Americans truly wish to place the deterrent strength of their strategic nuclear force at the service of their allies.

59. It is certainly not without significance that the two European countries with a deterrent capability of their own, the United Kingdom and France, have not experienced anti-nuclear reactions comparable to demonstrations in the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium and even Italy. Is the reason not to be found in the dependence of the latter countries on American decisions where defence policy is concerned? The question is worthy of consideration.

60. Finally, if the message transmitted by the 1981 demonstrators is taken seriously, it is clearly urgent to advance towards disarmament. Indeed, if the West does not show it is prepared to embark resolutely on the road to disarmament provided its security is ensured, it will give the impression that it is not really determined to succeed.

61. In your Rapporteur’s view, these are the main points on which Western Europe can satisfy the movements rightly or wrongly called pacifist and neutralist, not in order to silence them and then calmly resume an arms policy but to take account of the requirements of a strategy of deterrence based not only on the accumulation of armaments but also and above all on the desire of nations to defend their peace and independence at any cost. By questioning this desire, the development of pacifism and neutralism might weaken European positions vis-à-vis the United States, ruin the deterrent strength of the Atlantic Alliance and consequently make war in Europe more conceivable. It cannot therefore be ignored and the alliance must answer the questions it raises but without jeopardising Europe’s security. Indeed, there is every indication that the Soviet Union’s aim, for the moment at least, is probably not so much to invade Western Europe as to reduce it to a situation in which the European countries have no choice but to renounce certain aspects of their internal and external sovereignty in face of Soviet pressure, this being currently but probably mistakenly called Finlandisation. This would then be a form of neutralisation involving a paralysis of external policy guaranteed by pro-Soviet political forces holding positions of responsibility. Under such pressure, democracy based on the free alternation of different majorities in the government following the choice of the electorate would be
likewise jeopardised. The attainment of this aim might be actively fostered by pacifist and neutralist movements which, on the one hand, would give the American partners in the Atlantic Alliance the impression that Europe did not wish to defend itself against attack, thus bringing grist to the mill of advocates of the withdrawal of American forces from Europe, and, on the other hand, would make it difficult for the European governments, particularly at a time of economic difficulties, to pursue the effort necessary for ensuring their countries' security and gaining the confidence of their American allies.

VI. Conclusions

62. After the widespread demonstrations in autumn 1981, pacifist agitation calmed down relatively in 1982, although some observers considered it had played a major rôle in the Dutch elections in September. But the signs are that agitation will resume on a large scale, in Western Europe at least, in 1983 when the deployment of American medium-range missiles is due to begin. A strategy for 1983 was drawn up at a meeting of leaders of the peace movement in Paris in September 1982. The first action is planned to take place in the Federal Republic on 12th December with the participation of Americans, Belgians, Dutch and Italians to obstruct the twenty-five sites where it is planned to install these missiles. A second is planned in Sicily in May 1983 and a third in all the European capitals on 28th October. Other more focal demonstrations are envisaged.

63. It is therefore evident that all the problems raised by the pacifist movement will return to the centre of European politics next year, which fully justifies the request made by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, to the WEU Assembly in December 1981 that it deal with matters raised by neutralism and pacifism. As the Council has to reply to Assembly recommendations, it was obviously not left out of this proposal. Clearly it was not a matter of planning a strategy to fight the movement but of asking the WEU Assembly what it considered should be the response to many Western Europeans espousing a neutralist or pacifist ideology. As this ideology is spread throughout Western Europe, European answers must be found.

64. This is not necessarily easy, since although Western European security forms a whole not all countries have the same requirements. There are various reasons for this, particularly the nearness of the threat, whether or not a country possesses nuclear weapons, and above all the ability to decide on their use, and the extent and nature of a country's overseas commitments. These considerations have an effect on the size and trend of pacifist movements in each country and are a major obstacle to political and military rapprochement, the need for which in the interests of overall security and real progress towards European political union cannot be denied. These are two aspects of WEU's main rôle under the modified Brussels Treaty and it is therefore its task to work out replies.

65. Your Rapporteur considers these replies must be positive on the essential aspect: the search for peace and disarmament. But at the same time they must take account of a number of facts which, in spite of the Afghanistan and Polish affairs, seem to have been left on one side by the peace movement which is more anxious to achieve tangible results as quickly as possible than to take account of the complexity of the international situation, whereas the rôle of politicians is above all to base peace on the security of the people for whom they are responsible. Your Rapporteur would sum up the essential requirements for consolidating peace in Europe as follows:

(i) Disarmament is a true factor of peace only if negotiated, balanced and controlled so that it does not become an element of imbalance, insecurity and hence tension.

(ii) Disarmament must not jeopardise a system of credible deterrence which ensures peace in Europe. It therefore has to be progressive.

(iii) Medium-range nuclear weapons must be deployed in Europe as long as the Soviet Union does not follow up the proposals for a general renunciation of such weapons.

(iv) New impetus should be given to all the negotiations on the limitation and progressive reduction of the nuclear armaments of the United States and the Soviet Union and conventional weapons in all countries, particularly in Europe.

(v) There should be more consultation between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance so as to give Western Europe all necessary guarantees about the deterrence protecting it.

(vi) The Western European countries for their part should concert their defence and disarmament policies with a view to making specific disarmament proposals which are not liable to jeopardise their security. WEU, at both government and Assembly level, is the natural framework for this.

(vii) A special effort should be made to assist the development of the third world, whatever the results of disarmament negotiations.
(viii) Public opinion should be better informed about the levels of forces and armaments deployed by East and West so as to prevent pacifism covering up the defence of certain countries' own interests.

(ix) Representatives of pacifist movements should be listened to and their statements discussed in each country's debate on internal policy, and the Eastern European countries should be reminded of the degree of freedom of expression they should be granted, particularly on the occasion of the CSCE meeting in Madrid.
APPENDIX

(a) Comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact

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<tr>
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<th>NATO</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpower (thousands)</td>
<td>4,998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserves (thousands)</td>
<td>5,079</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main battle tanks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear warhead launchers</td>
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Submarines:
- with cruise missiles  
  - 0  
  - 54
- attack
  - 184  
  - 174

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<tr>
<td>Surface vessels</td>
<td>1,351</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>3,543</td>
<td>7,756</td>
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(b) Comparison between the Soviet Union and the United States

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<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>269.6</td>
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<td>GNP (000 million)</td>
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<td>Roubles: between 339 and 614</td>
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<td>Defence budget in 000 million</td>
<td>$216</td>
<td>Roubles: between 17.5 and 192</td>
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<td>as % GNP</td>
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<td>Total armed forces (thousands)</td>
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<td>Tanks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
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<td>Attack submarines</td>
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<td>Cruise missile submarines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
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Submarines:
- submarines  
  - 32  
  - 83
- launchers  
  - 518  
  - 989

Long-range aircraft  
  - 436  
  - 150

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<td>ICBM</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Strategic bomber</td>
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<td>Total strategic</td>
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<td>Grand total</td>
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*Source: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, 13th November 1981, page 17.*