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Policy Statement and Majority Decision in the German Bundestag

Yes to Deployment and to Further Negotiations

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to
the
point

“ *I strongly welcome the willingness of the United States to continue the negotiations. We are agreed that great importance continues to attach to East-West co-operation.* ”

From a statement made by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the occasion of the Franco-German consultations in Bonn on 25 November 1983.

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At a reception for the Diplomatic Corps in Bonn on 28 November 1983, Chancellor Kohl underscored his government's strong desire for an active and comprehensive dialogue between East and West (excerpts from his speech on the last page). He is shown here talking to Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Semyonov and U. S. Ambassador Arthur F. Burns.

Freedom

Is the

Prerequisite

for Peace

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's policy statement to the German Bundestag on the NATO two-track decision and on the current state of the INF negotiations in Geneva, 21 November 1983

Today we are again holding a major debate on the crucial question of how peace and freedom can be safeguarded in our country and in Western Europe. Whoever speaks of peace must allow himself to be judged by the yardstick of freedom.

Freedom is the prerequisite for peace. It cannot be the price of peace. Whoever is prepared to risk freedom for the sake of peace will lose both.

Threatened by internal and external pressure and struggling for freedom and human rights, the Polish bishops last year called to mind a truth that applies at all times and everywhere: "To invoke freedom is the right of every individual and every nation. It is a task facing every individual and every nation. We regard freedom and the peace connected with it as a product of conscious and well-considered action."

Safeguarding peace in freedom continues to be the dominant task of our time. This responsibility guides us in the debates we hold and the decisions we have to take.

We are all in favour of peace. The contentious issue is how best to preserve peace.

The guiding principle of my action continues to be, as I said in my policy statement of 4 May, to create peace with ever fewer weapons.

The NATO two-track decision does not primarily involve the technical side of armaments, i.e. not simply the question of whether one type of weapon is to be replaced by another.

The decision concerns an equilibrium of forces and hence the foundation of peace in Europe.

It concerns the question of whether arms control can help to establish a stable balance at a low level.

It concerns the question of whether our partners in the Alliance, an association marked by solidarity, can continue to depend on the Federal Republic of Germany, and we on them.

It concerns the question of whether the Alliance can, on the basis of trusting and friendly relations between Western Europe and the United States and Canada, continue in the final years of this century to fulfil its task of safeguarding peace and freedom.

Finally, the decision essentially concerns the question of whether or not the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared and able, together with its Allies, to

oppose the Soviet Union's claim to superiority.

Our country's orientation in external affairs is at stake. The Soviet Union must not be allowed, through its vast arms efforts, unwarranted by any perceivable defence or security needs,

- to intimidate us Western Europeans,
- to narrow our scope for political action, and
- to separate us from the United States.

Only if we can prevent this will the door remain open for a peaceful order in Europe founded on justice and not on force. Only a peaceful order of this kind can definitively safeguard peace. The Soviet Union, too, should begin to recognize this.

It is the Soviet Union's political will that makes us feel threatened. Weapons are inanimate objects.

Defensive Alliance

They do not threaten anyone. It is the political will behind them that creates tension. Let us not forget this when discussing the two-track decision.

Ours is a defence alliance. This has been borne out in its 30-year history. In the Bonn declaration of 10 June 1982 the Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed that "None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack."

Our own commitment to the non-use of force is supplemented by the moral obligation to deter others from attacking us. The fundamental goal of the Atlantic Alliance continues to consist in preventing war so as to safeguard peace and freedom. The most reliable and hitherto the only guarantee of this is deterrence involving nuclear weapons.

It is our aim to prevent any type of war, nuclear or conventional, since conventional weapons, too, have devastating effects. We remain dependent on nuclear deterrence if only because of the enormous conventional threat.

I am aware of the fear and qualms that greatly trouble many people due to the fact that we are all familiar with the terrifying effects of nuclear weapons. Our political and moral responsibility is therefore all the greater to create conditions that prevent the use of these and other weapons.

Peace in the nuclear age will, however, only be secure as long as there is certainty that whoever breaches it will suffer destruction. A unilateral renunciation of deterrence would, therefore, be an incalculable risk. Peace and freedom are too valuable an asset to take such risks.

For the time being we will have to carry on living with nuclear weapons and, as such, with the immense tension between their destructive power, on the one hand, and their peace-keeping effects, on the other.

In order to assess correctly the political and strategic significance of the NATO two-track decision, we must look back.

In the early 1960s the strategic nuclear situation between the two superpowers was characterized by the United States' overwhelming superiority in intercontinental nuclear weapons. In Europe both powers possessed intermediate-range missiles.

From 1963 onwards, however, the Americans withdrew their intermediate-range missiles from Europe. They also reduced to one quarter the strategic nuclear destructive potential that they possessed in the 1960s.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, not only retained its Eurostrategic potential, but, as we all know, developed it into an independent power factor in Europe from the early 1970s onwards.

These two opposing trends intersected in 1974 when the two superpowers enshrined in the Vladivostok declaration the strategic nuclear parity attained by the Soviet Union. However, in contrast to Salt I, the intermediate-range potential was not covered by this declaration.

At the same time it became clear to the Europeans that the strategic nuclear parity of the two superpowers was a double-edged sword for Western Europe.

- For the United States and the Soviet Union, parity in intercontinental weapons means stable deterrence. Through the use of these weapons neither side can gain anything, but could lose everything.
- For the Europeans and for us Germans, however, the loss of strategic nuclear superiority on the part of the United States is one of the gravest developments of the last two decades. In Europe there is no longer anything to counterbalance the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority and the Soviet Union's Eurostrategic threat.



Cancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher on the government bench before the vote was taken on the resolution proposed by the CDU/CSU and FDP.

Flexible Strategy

The Alliance soon took account of these changes by progressively transforming its strategy of massive retaliation into one of flexible response. However, the necessary funds were not made available.

- The Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority still exists today.
- NATO still does not possess ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear weapons, i.e. those weapons needed under Alliance strategy to assure deterrence at all levels.

Western Europe is thus in a different situation than the United States in terms of security. We are threatened by the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact.

We are also threatened by SS 20-intermediate-range missiles, a potential for nuclear blackmail that is constantly growing. These missiles are trained on European cities, not on American ones. The Soviet Union seeks to threaten us Europeans and at the same time stop the United States from protecting us.

Finally, we are threatened by Soviet intercontinental missiles that can be used against North America and Europe.

The two-track decision of December 1979 is designed to redress this dangerous imbalance for us Europeans. In the future the Soviet Union will have the choice of accepting the same dual nuclear threat as Western Europe, i.e. the threat of intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles, of foregoing Eurostrategic weapons together with NATO or of reducing them to the lowest possible level.

With its two-track decision the Atlantic Alliance forewent for a period of 4 years any effort to respond to the Soviet arms build-up with the deployment of equivalent weapons. It thus made a unilateral concession unprecedented in history. The Soviet Union is in the process of destroying a historic opportunity by rigidly opposing this new and courageous approach to disarmament.

For us, two crucial political questions derive from the Eurostrategic threat posed by the Soviet Union.

1. Are the Soviet Union's efforts to degrade Western Europe into a zone of reduced security compatible with our security and our political independence?
2. Is the Soviet Union to be allowed to retain an instrument with which it can determine the fate of Europe?

The debate on these questions and hence on the NATO two-track decision touches upon the life nerves of the peoples of Europe. Everyone senses that fundamental aspects of our security are at stake. Let me repeat in this context what I said before this house in my policy statement on 4 May 1983:

"We cannot eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth overnight. Unilateral renunciation of such weapons would not reduce the nuclear threat directed towards us, but only increase the danger of war. There is only one way out of this dilemma. We must drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides, those which threaten our existence and those which we are now forced to maintain in the interest of our security."

As long as there is no comprehensive disarmament to render military means of safeguarding peace superfluous, we remain dependent on the tried-and-true Alliance strategy of deterrence and defence on the basis of equilibrium, a strategy in which, like the Alliance's armed forces, the nations of the Alliance have confidence. This security policy has for decades received the backing of our people and our democratic parties. Our country's voice in the Alliance has been clear and our position undisputed.

On 26 May 1981 a resolution sponsored by the Government headed by Chancellor Schmidt at the time was adopted by the Bundestag with only 5 votes against and 6 abstentions. This resolution stated, inter alia, that:

Expression of the Harmel Report

"The German Bundestag supports the Federal Government in the systematic and timely implementation of both parts of the NATO decision of 12 December 1979. In this context the Bundestag stresses that the West will examine NATO's INF requirements in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations."

In that debate the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Willy Brandt, appealed to Moscow: "Stop your arms build-up, eliminate your superiority, and then we will not need to modernize our weapons."

The parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union supported that resolution. My Govern-


ment has continued this course. I personally have declared on various occasions that I consider myself bound by both parts of the NATO decision. The conditions prevailing at that time continue to apply to both parts of the decision.

The two-track decision led to the Geneva talks. It defines the requirements, conditions and goals of the Western negotiating position. The decision is a concrete expression of the Harmel Report of 1967, which clearly and cogently describes the Alliance's political concept, a concept founded on the interlinkage of military security and a policy of détente.

The present Government is continuing the course embarked upon by its predecessor and following the line of the Atlantic Alliance.

In order to make agreement possible, the United States has continued to develop its position at the INF talks in Geneva in the closest possible consultation with its NATO partners.

1. In November 1981 President Reagan proposed that both sides should forego the entire category of ground-launched, long-range INF and their launchers. His proposal was based on the earnest conviction that this mutual zero option would best serve our security interests and those of the Soviet Union. I continue to find it regrettable that the Soviet Union still refuses to accept this proposal.
2. In March 1983 the United States suggested an interim agreement because the Soviet Union was evidently not prepared, unlike the West, to



Pierre Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister from 1966 to 1972.

forego intermediate-range missiles. This new proposal met the Soviet Union half-way in that it envisaged an equal number of warheads between 50 and 450 for each side.

3. Since this proposal for an interim agreement was also rejected by the Soviet leadership, President Reagan submitted new proposals in September 1983 responding to concrete concerns of the Soviet Union. The United States is prepared.

- to counterbalance only the Soviet INF potential in Europe, provided that a global ceiling is agreed on,
- to negotiate not only on intermediate-range missiles but also on aircraft of the same range, and
- in the event of a reduction of the deployment requirement, to reduce the number of missiles and Pershing IIs proportionately.

A week ago President Reagan enlarged on this proposal of September 1983 and gave specific figures.

During the first year of my Government the West submitted three substantive proposals. The Soviet Union has clung to its maximum demands. It continues to seek to prevent the deployment of American INF in Europe and to safeguard its monopoly in ground-launched INF.

From the very outset the Federal Republic of Germany has taken an active and constructive part in the progressive development of the American position in Geneva. I personally have made every effort to ensure that every possibility of compromise compatible with the security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Alliance is sounded out in Geneva. In so doing I have constantly been in close personal contact with President Reagan in order to consult on all details for the talks in Geneva.

Let me state quite clearly that the close consultations between the United States and ourselves on the Geneva talks are unique in German-American relations.

In this context I have in mind not only the national interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. I have also striven to bring our weight to bear for Western Europe. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany has remained a cornerstone of the Alliance on which the United States can depend for its conduct of the talks and for deployment in the event that Soviet intransigence ultimately forces us to take such action. This clear-cut position

was, and remains, vital. The NATO two-track decision is today a touchstone of NATO's capacity to act and its will to assert itself. Outside the Alliance people are watching with concern to see, whether the free Western world will have the strength and resolve to resist the Soviet Union and assert its security interests. Many countries know that they would not be spared the repercussions that would be triggered by a weakening of NATO in the East-West framework.

Respect of Legitimate Security Interests

What is the current situation at the bargaining table?

With his proposals of 22 September and 14 November 1983 President Reagan indicated possible solutions for all decisive problems, solutions that do justice to the Soviet Union's main concerns. General Secretary Andropov took up these proposals in his reply of 28 October 1983. The problems have not yet been solved. However a basis exists for a negotiated compromise. The Soviet Union has systematically clung to its maximum demands from the outset. It has obstructed the negotiations for months now with its demand that British and French systems be included. I hope that the signs coming from Geneva indicate a change in the Soviet position.

We, for our part, cannot accept this demand.

- In essence it amounts to preventing American nuclear presence in Europe and, in the long run, driving the United States out of Europe.
- It deprives us, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, of the nuclear shield afforded by the United States.
- It denies the Alliance the means needed to carry out its strategy and thus seeks to decouple Europe from the United States.

I continue to believe that the way has been paved for an agreement. But this is contingent on the Soviet Union abandoning its maximum demand, the goal of securing a monopoly in ground-launched missiles targeted on Western Europe.

In my speech to this high house on 9 June 1983 I outlined the criteria for a negotiated settlement. Let me reiterate them.



Petra Kelly, the spokeswoman of the small opposition Green Party (28 deputies), vehemently rejected the deployment of INF missiles in the Federal Republic. The Greens declared their support of those parts of the peace movement that advocate a nuclear-free West Germany and a possible withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO.

- (1) We are willing to respect the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests. However, we are not willing to accept the transformation of Europe into a zone of reduced security.
- (2) Effective arms control agreements must rest on the principle of equality and must be verifiable.
- (3) Consideration of the French and British systems has no place in INF negotiations.
- (4) We seek a reduction to zero of the Soviet intermediate-range arsenals targeted on Europe and are willing, in return, to forego the deployment of American intermediate-range weapons. If no result is achieved because the Soviet Union is not ready to agree, then the missiles will be deployed in accordance with the two-track decision. If an interim solution is reached, then the scale of the deployment of missiles will depend on the concrete results of the negotiations.
- (5) A removal of the Soviet Union's intermediate-range nuclear arsenal to the Far East is not acceptable.
- (6) We continue to call on the Soviet Union not to prevent an agreement

by establishing a new hegemonic instrument of power against its Asian neighbours as a result of its arms build-up in the Far East and thus, at the same time, a transferable potential that could be used against Western Europe.

I have reiterated these criteria in order to make two points clear:

- (1) The Federal Government presented at an early stage its ideas on a negotiated result to the Bundestag. Today's debate is a follow-up to this earlier presentation.
- (2) On this issue the Federal Government has pursued a constructive course. Ever since the day on which we came to office this Government has exerted its influence on the American negotiating position. The close personal consultations with President Reagan are unparalleled in German post-war history. Unparalleled, too, are the close consultations within the Alliance.

We have continually striven to ensure that all opportunities for negotiation are kept open, even after the start of deployment. Deployment will not create an irreversible situation. The Alliance is prepared to dismantle any systems de-

ployed once an agreement is achieved. The Soviet Union does not have any cause to leave the bargaining table now.

The West carried on negotiating whilst the Soviet Union continued its build-up of SS-20 missiles. The Soviet Union spoke of a moratorium, whilst the West in fact observed a moratorium for over four years and made a unilateral concession, by not deploying any missiles.

Comprehensive Disarmament Offer

The West has submitted to the Soviet Union the most comprehensive set of disarmament proposals in history.

- In the negotiations on intercontinental strategic weapons, the United States has offered not only to make drastic cuts in the number of launchers but, above all, to reduce by 40 per cent the number of warheads on ground and sea-launched missiles.
- At the Vienna MBFR talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, the United States has, together with us and the other European partners, presented a detailed draft agreement. This is intended to ensure a verifiable reduction of the two Alliances' ground and air forces to 900,000 on each side in the area of reductions.
- In the Geneva Committee on Disarmament the West is working for an agreement that prohibits, on a verifiable basis, the production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.
- On 17 January 1984, the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is due to start in Stockholm. This conference is the result of a Western initiative.

In 1980 NATO unilaterally withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the two-track decision. Another 1,400 warheads are yet to be withdrawn. In this fashion NATO is reducing by one-third the number of its nuclear warheads in Europe.

There could be no more cogent testimony of our policy of creating peace with ever fewer weapons than this great number of disarmament initiatives.

We are striving for balanced disarmament because we need to release resources to provide relief, especially in the developing countries. It is nonsensical and cannot be a matter of indifference to us that arms expenditure is rising worldwide, whilst hundreds of millions of people are suffering from hunger. For me, this is a crucial reason for urging that progress be made in balanced disarmament and arms control.

There can be no swift, radical solutions to these problems. What is essential in disarmament and arms control are perseverance, staying power and patience.

With his personal commitment to the most comprehensive Western disarmament programme thus far President Reagan has given all those the lie who have suggested that he treats the security of the European allies differently than the security of the United States.

In his speech to the Japanese Diet on 10 November 1983 President Reagan stated unequivocally:

"A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. The only value in possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure that they cannot be used - ever."

The West has time and again demonstrated its readiness for disarmament and arms control. Nonetheless, we are constantly faced only with proposals for unilateral renunciation and concessions by the West. What we have already foregone cannot be the subject of negotiations. How then is the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to be eliminated?

Our security and the protection of our freedom now demand that we proceed with the deployment of the new American intermediate-range missiles. We do this in awareness of the solidarity within the Alliance, whose members have committed themselves, with us, to this deployment. From the very beginning NATO has set qualitative and quantitative limits to deployment.

Door to Negotiations Remains Open

It is thus clear that we have no intention of creating a threat to the Soviet Union, but that we are limiting the necessary measures to the minimum essential for our security. For every missile which is now installed, one other nuclear weapon will be withdrawn from Europe.

The Soviet Union knows that. It also knows that at the end of the year, when the first units are operational, there are still five years for a negotiated result to be obtained which would limit or reverse the installation of these missiles.

The start of deployment has not closed the door to negotiations. The West is ready to go on negotiating for as long as it takes to find a compromise acceptable to both sides.

A few days before this debate, the Soviet Union signalled in Geneva that it might be ready to give up its present position and negotiate on the British and French systems with the relevant States in another forum.

I am certain that persistence, tenacious and constructive negotiating as well as defence of our own security interests in conjunction with acknowledgement of the legitimate security requirements of the other side will lead to results.

The Soviet Union continues to pursue the aim of preventing the deployment of American intermediate-range systems in Europe altogether while preserving its own missile monopoly. This remains unacceptable to us.

However, latest developments show that even the Soviet Union recognizes that the inclusion of the British and French systems in INF represents an artificial problem of its own creation.

if the Soviet Union really showed willingness to compromise, it ought to be possible to agree upon a balance between the Soviet systems remaining after reductions and the American systems being deployed, thus satisfying our demand for the lowest possible yet balanced level of arms for both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Let me say it again. There are no grounds for the Soviet Union to walk away from the negotiating table. It can have a settlement if it truly desires one.

A continuation of negotiations is in the Soviet Union's own true interest.

Once again I call upon the Soviet leadership not to entrench itself behind rigid principles, but to take action to make a negotiated agreement possible.

The Soviet Union maintains that the start of deployment will force it to take "counter-measures". This claim is further evidence that the Soviet Union is prepared to use nuclear weapons to exert political pressure.

Furthermore, we know that the short-range nuclear arms programme described as a "counter-measure" has been under preparation for several years. The time needed to develop these weapon systems amounts to eight to ten years. They were produced completely independently of the NATO INF decision, and it is now intended to provide post factum justification to the public.

Negotiations on intermediate-range weapons are an important element of the East-West security dialogue.

They are part of our effort to reach an overall East-West balance and to consolidate peace in Europe.

The Federal Government has woven a close network of talks and negotiations with the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. Time and again we have been able to obtain substantial progress by this method. The agreements of recent weeks bear particular witness to this fact. East-West relations must not be restricted to the missile question alone.

The offer I made in my policy statement of 4 May 1983 still stands. We want to attain relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries that are of a new and better quality. Our policy is a policy of goodwill and the best of intentions.

As I recently wrote to General Secretary Honecker, it is my conviction that the two States in Germany should commit themselves with all their strength to improving and developing their network of links and

co-operation, particularly at times when the international situation is more difficult. It is precisely because of our historical experience that we Germans bear a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace.

We remain willing to pursue dialogue and co-operation in all spheres on the basis of the agreements concluded with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.

Through these agreements the Federal Republic of Germany made the renunciation of force the central element of its policy for peace.

The nations of East and West would not accept the abandonment of this process which we have hitherto pursued together.

Philosophy of the Alliance

The Federal Government stands unreservedly by both elements of the Harmel

Report. According to the report, the Atlantic Alliance has two main functions.

– One consists in maintaining sufficient military strength and political solidarity.

– The other function consists in continuing the search for progress in establishing a lasting relationship between East and West by means of which fundamental political issues can be settled.

Military security and a policy of détente are not a contradiction in terms, but rather complement each other.

It was the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, Willy Brandt, who agreed to the Harmel Report in December 1967 on behalf of the Federal Government. The two-track decision of the Alliance was a logical consequence of this report.

This decision represents in a nutshell the philosophy of the Alliance that defence capability and arms control are tasks of equal importance. Whoever says no to the two-track decision thereby opposes the common security policy of all NATO member States.



On 18 and 19 November 1983, prior to the Bundestag debate, a special SPD party conference was held in Cologne at which a large majority of the delegates voted against the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in West Germany and demanded a continuation of the arms policy talks in Geneva. Only 14 out of 400 delegates voted with Deputy Party Chairman Helmut Schmidt (left) for deployment and against the motion supported by Party Chairman Willy Brandt (right).

Whoever breaks the linkage between military security and détente is also destroying the political concept of the Alliance without providing an alternative to it.

Whoever pursues only the one or the other of the two elements of the Harmel Report according to his own needs will make his policy incalculable both to his friends in the Alliance and to the States of the Warsaw Pact.

Whoever revokes the two-track decision and thereby breaks the linkage between defence and arms control is to all intents and purposes putting at risk the Alliance itself, its free will and its viability.

In view of this situation, the Social Democratic Party of Germany has to answer the following questions before the German and international public:

- Why does it choose not to take heed of the Soviet arms accumulation and the threat resulting from it?
- Why does it want to deny the Alliance the requisite military cover?
- Why does it again and again embrace the arguments of the Soviet side, thereby isolating itself in the West as well as from the majority of its brother Socialist parties?
- Why does it invariably impute to the United States a lack of willingness to negotiate in Geneva, regardless of the facts which indicate the contrary?
- And why does it not acknowledge the endeavours of the Federal Government to exhaust all negotiating avenues?

Professor Karl Kaiser, a prominent and internationally respected member of the Social Democratic Party, said on 2 October 1983 to the Seeheim branch of the SPD:

"In the two-track decision the essence of the issue at stake is whether or not the Federal Republic of Germany, in agreement with its allies, should dig in its heels against the incipient Soviet claim to hegemony over Western Europe. The Soviet aim is a new political system in Europe, born of the erosion of Euro-American co-operation and increasing European dependence upon the Soviet Union. This is a vital issue of national interest, namely of the self-determination of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which Soviet positions must not be unquestioningly adopted nor efforts directed against them be undermined internal-

ly. This was recognized by the Social Democratic Government under Helmut Schmidt. It therefore pursued the two-track decision, which was approved by the party.

However, in a process extending over several years, rejection grew stronger within the SPD and developed into a change of course. The party's position has, in effect, taken a 180-degree turn."

I have nothing to add to that.

Principles of Our Security Policy

Let me enumerate the principles which govern the security policy of this Federal Government.

1. We are part of the West. The Alliance for peace and freedom is a fundamental component of German policy. In it are combined our basic values, our way of life and our security. Only a capable and united Alliance can ensure peace in freedom. The Alliance serves peace in Europe and the world. It remains the basis of the policy of understanding with the East.

The Federal Government stands firmly by the security policy of the Alliance. This policy combines deterrence and defence with arms control and disarmament.

2. East and West are on trial as we stand poised at the crossroads leading either to success in disarmament or to further accumulation of nuclear arms in view of the decision either to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear weapons or to ban an entire category of nuclear weapons from this earth, or at least to limit them on an equal basis.

Success will require that both sides pay due heed to their respective security requirements.

3. The Federal Government stands firmly by the NATO two-track decision. If the negotiations bring no immediate result the Alliance will make the first Pershing and cruise missiles operational by the end of the year. The Federal Republic of Germany will contribute its share to this. We know that even once this has happened the United States of America will leave no stone unturned in the Geneva negotiations in the search for a successful outcome.

4. Firm support of the NATO decision is now synonymous with the survival of democratic Europe, the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance and the continuation of relations on an equal basis with the Soviet Union.

5. The Federal Government is adhering to that unambiguous security policy which the German people needs.

The pillars of our foreign policy remain the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. The decision in favour of the Atlantic Alliance, in favour of partnership with the United States and Canada, will continue to ensure peace and freedom for us.

Therefore, whoever commits himself totally to peace, whoever regards freedom and human dignity as supreme values, whoever wishes to see our national interests ensured in the long term, must preserve the health and strength of the Western Alliance. The Atlantic Alliance, whose nucleus remains the deep-rooted friendship of the old States of this continent with the new world beyond the Atlantic, will ensure peace in Europe.

I advocate that this path, which the CDU, CSU and FDP pursued under Konrad Adenauer, should not be deviated from. We are not wanderers between East and West.

There is no middle road between democracy and dictatorship. We are on the side of freedom. Our freedom means free personal development for each individual combined with responsibility for his neighbour. Since we have a duty towards our neighbour we must not, particularly as Christians, increase the danger of tyranny, and thereby of war, for our fellow human beings.

Without freedom there can be no peace. Where the basic values of freedom and justice are abused, where human rights are infringed, peace is always in danger. Without freedom there is no peace worthy of the name. A policy which ensures freedom will also bring peace.

War must not be a means of pursuing policies. This is a basic principle of democratic States. Any State which permits of no violence within its borders and forms the national will by the peaceful majority decision of its citizens will also avoid using force towards other States.

But it is equally true in the struggle for external peace internal peace must not be endangered.

I respect the expression of personal convictions in the peace debate.

Preservation of Internal Peace

However according to our democratic constitution the decision lies with the majority of the freely elected parliament. Particularly in matters which are termed survival issues there is not the slightest legitimation for the pretensions of a minority to impose its will upon a majority.

No one has the right to resist democratic majority decisions of our freely elected representative body.

That is the way of our free and peaceful democratic order.

This order is worth preserving at home and defending abroad. We owe that to ourselves and our partners in the Alliance. We also owe it to the people in Central and Eastern Europe.

Seldom has the will to resist hegemonic designs and to defend resolutely one's own freedom been so compellingly expressed as it was by Manès Sperber in the speech he gave on acceptance of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade:

"Since I, like so many others, have always been inclined to criticize our civilization with unrelenting harshness, I wish today to emphasize all the more loudly that in spite of everything Europe can be saved if it does not allow itself to be seduced into surrendering at the very time when the courage to stand up for humanity and truth presupposes the courage to enforce one's will."

We are all called upon to do this. Since I bear responsibility for our fellow citizens I regard this as a very personal commitment.

As a Christian who also knows himself to be bound in his high office by Christian ethics, I oppose attempts to bring the Sermon on the Mount into politics in a way which I, for one, find unacceptable.

To live up to the Sermon on the Mount means to recognize in all humility that there is no God-like perfection here on earth. Confusion of the promise of paradise with earthly reality does no justice to the Sermon on the Mount.

Christians know about the contradictory nature of man, which has left its mark in history and has time and again endangered peace. This condition of human existence cannot be removed from us.



Strong police forces had to be used against members of the peace movement to reinforce a „no-entry law“ for demonstrators applying to a defined zone around the government quarter.

If, by being Christians, we transcended human nature, we would no longer need politics. The Sermon on the Mount is no call to deny reality, but an obligation to act responsibly.

The fact that war has been prevented in Europe for such a considerable time is the result of responsible action, an achievement of reason, indeed a work of statesmanship which must be continued and reinforced.

This purpose is served by our defence preparedness, our efforts to achieve a balance of power and thereby to ensure peace and freedom.

Whoever has to give in to the pressure of tyranny because he does not stand up to its power, goads it on to new acts of blackmail and to the use of force. No democratic politician must put himself in a position where he can no longer choose freely. We should not forget that bitter realization of British Prime Minister Chamberlain who, after signing the Munich agreement, described British powerlessness in the face of the National Socialist regime to the House of Commons. He said, "Our experience has shown us only too clearly that weakness in armed strength means weakness in diplomacy."

History teaches us that whoever is weak will encourage hegemonic claims and is actually challenging others to threaten him. He makes himself subject to blackmail and puts at risk his freedom and thereby eventually peace too. Only the firmness of the free world can show totalitarian States their limits. We must never play off peace and freedom against each other.

Only a people which lives in peace and freedom can render a real contribution to peace in the world.

We Germans all want peace in freedom. We want peace with all nations. And above all want it with all our neighbours, in West and East.

We are aware of the abhorrent things which took place in the name of Germany. We will never forget the unspeakable misery experienced by the nations of Europe and of other continents in two world wars. Our own people retain a vivid memory of the wounds inflicted by despotism and war.

Innumerable Germans experienced terrible suffering at that time, within their families or amongst their friends. We will never know exactly how many people lost their lives in the prisons of the Nazi

regime, in the battles of the war, in nightly bombings, as prisoners of war or while fleeing or being expelled from their native regions.

Many of those who survived war and dictatorship remained scarred by those dreadful experiences.

We have learned the lesson of history. These experiences have engraved themselves deeply on the minds of our people.

Weapons and military strength hold no fascination for us. We are not missile addicts.

But in a world without peace we must be prepared to do all that is necessary to ensure our peace in freedom. We cannot step aside and hope from the historical sidelines that others will succeed in securing peace and our freedom.

We must also render our own contribution.

"To serve the peace of the world" as is laid down in our constitution has been and remains for us a constant political imperative and moral obligation. But this peace in freedom has its price. We must be prepared to endure sacrifices for it. We must do our duty, each in his own place, all the citizens of our country, the freely elected parliamentary representatives, the democratically legitimized Federal Government and I myself. Aware of the great and, indeed, heavy responsibility which I bear in my office, I remain convinced of the following:

Only by restoring the balance now and thereby re-endorsing our commitment to the Alliance will we secure peace in freedom for our country.

A Funda- mental Decision on the Orientation of German Foreign and Security Policy

Speech by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Bundestag Debate of 21 November 1983 on the NATO Two-Track Decision and the State of the Geneva INF Talks
- Excerpts -

In the past few days my thoughts have frequently wandered back to 14 December 1979. Having just come back to Bonn from the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, where the two-track decision was taken on 12 December, I made the following statement that day here in the Bundestag on behalf of the Federal Government:

„The United Kingdom, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany have already agreed to deployment on their territory, to be effected in three to four years' time.”

On that occasion all parties represented in the Bundestag, the FDP, the SPD and the CDU/CSU, endorsed this decision.

It was a decision that the Federal Government did not take arbitrarily. It was a decision that had been prepared in numerous deliberations of the Federal Security Council, the Federal Government, the committees of the Bundestag and several plenary meetings here. All parliamentary parties were in full agreement that this was the right method of countering the enormous challenge posed by the ever-increasing Soviet arms build-up.

Today we must decide whether developments have occurred since 14 December 1979 justifying the abandonment of that decision. The NATO two-track decision stated for that purpose: „NATO's requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations". Developments since then have shown that no such concrete results have been attained. They have simultaneously shown that the threat posed by Soviet INF has not diminished, but rather increased, and that Western restraint over four years, you could even describe it as a Western concession, did not serve as an incentive to reduce the existing threat, but was construed as an encouragement to continue with the arms build-up. Anyone who speaks now of further restraint offers further encouragement. We cannot accept any responsibility for this.

In reality, it is not a question of today having to decide on the two-track decision of December 1979. We decided on this four years ago and since then this Alliance decision has time and again been

reaffirmed here in the Bundestag. Today our decision is whether or not we wish to abide by the decision already taken by the Alliance. However, it would be self-deception to believe that this is the crucial point. Let me set aside the significance of this point for a moment.

The History of the Two-Track Decision

It is not a question of adhering to a decision suggested to us or possibly imposed on us by others. It is not a case of doing someone in Washington a favour by agreeing to the deployment of Western missiles in Western Europe. The history of the two-track decision is completely different. The fact is that the Europeans, and publicly the German Chancellor at the time, were the first to point out the danger of the Soviet arms build-up. This aroused anxiety that this build-up could result in Western Europe being decoupled from the United States and hence prompted the Europeans to broach the question of Western modernization. The implementation of the two-track decision is not a favour Europe is granting to the United States, but a contribution the United States is providing to European security. We will be able to maintain this contribution to European security in every conceivable form, and by this I do not just mean the deployment of INF, only if we Europeans are prepared to contribute our share to the collective security of the Western Alliance. Above all this implies that we here in Europe and here in the Federal Republic of Germany do not give cause for doubt as to our willingness to abide by our acknowledged responsibility and meet our assumed obligations. We have to decide whether we wish to stand by these decisions or whether we want to embark on a course terminating in a grave loss of trust, ultimately in isolation, and hence in the forfeiture of all security. Seen in this light, the decision to be taken here today and tomorrow is a fundamental decision on the orientation of German foreign and security policy. It is in reality a decision on which position the Federal Republic of Germany will take in the future, i.e. that of a reliable member of the West or of a country drifting out of the union of Western democracies.


As you know, our Western Allies abide by the two-track decision. The two other countries selected for the first phase of deployment, the United Kingdom and Italy, have voted with large parliamentary majorities in favour of the 1979 decision on deployment being put into effect because of the lack of a concrete agree-

ment, which they, like us, find regrettable. It has rightly been pointed out that the majority of the European Parliament has also decided in this manner.

From the very outset German foreign and security policy has striven to guarantee the firm integration of our country in the family of Western democracies, the European community and the Western Alliance, as well as the credible coupling of Europe's security interests with those of the United States. We would have to pay dearly for any decoupling or any development that might lead towards such decoupling. The price would be a weakening of the Alliance and an erosion of our security.

surely cannot be denied that our Allies in the West, not only the Americans, but also the French, the British and other Europeans, are feeling increasing concern.

Their concern at what is happening here is not, as in the past, concern over German militarism. And it is certainly not the fear that the deployment of American missiles on German soil might increase the risk of war in Europe. They are concerned about a new kind of unpredictable German neutralism. We must counter this concern in order to preserve stability in Europe. Their concern is that we Germans might, in a state of somnolence, proceed to withdraw from the Western community, captivated by the illu-



If the Federal Republic of Germany, if the Bundestag were to decide tomorrow against deployment, against the NATO two-track decision, then this Alliance would no longer be what it has always been. On no account would it any longer be a guarantor of freedom and security here in Europe. This is the issue at stake. We, in particular, cannot take any security risks. We know that all efforts for accommodation, co-operation and détente require the reliable foundation of our integration in the Western Alliance. It would be illusory to believe that one could refrain from supporting the necessary decisions of the Alliance and still be successful in the progressive development of co-operation with the East. Security cannot be obtained free of charge.

It is now for us to reaffirm the fundamental elements of our policy. This is a task that points and extends far beyond the significance of the two-track decision. It

sion that we can best solve our national problems through neutralism.

Our Special Responsibility

Our Allies are concerned about this because they realize how important the Federal Republic of Germany is for joint Western security. Throughout their history, our people have borne a special responsibility by dint of their geographical position at the heart of Europe. We cannot claim that we have always properly discharged this responsibility. On the contrary, we have caused grave upheavals in Europe. But the task we had was not easy. We have often been at loggerheads with our neighbours. Today we are in harmony with them. Today we have linked our national fate to the destiny of

Europe. If we again evade this responsibility by seeking to go it alone, then a great deal of the stability in Europe to which we all contributed together after the Second World War will be lost.

If our country were to drift out of the Western Alliance, initially not on the basis of restated positions, but only through its conduct, this would lead to serious destabilization. This time it would not be Germany's strength that poses problems for Europe, it would be the weakness of the Federal Republic of Germany that would create hazards for Europe. A weak Federal Republic of Germany outside the framework of the Western Alliance would produce a vacuum of power around us and become the victim of rivalry. This must not happen. Consequently, the fulfilment of our responsibilities in the Alliance, which were not imposed on us, but which we accepted because we perceived them as right, constitutes our contribution to peace in Europe. No question must be left open, including the question of the attitude of all responsible political forces towards the Western Alliance.

Whenever the implementation of decisions taken by the Western Alliance is involved, it is essential that we perceive our responsibility. In the debate on peace and freedom for the Western democracies we are not merely passive onlookers in the confrontation between the two superpowers. Whoever believes this and seeks, by word and deed, a position equidistant from the two superpowers is calling fundamental German interests into question. After all, it was not by chance or historical coincidence that we became a member of the Western Alliance. It was a deliberate decision. It was a decision in favour of peace and freedom. We are ourselves a party to East-West confrontation.

When we ask ourselves what developments have occurred since 14 December 1979, the date on which the Bundestag endorsed the Federal Government's positive vote, we have to note that the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles was much lower than today. This figure has been multiplied as a result of a constant build-up by the Soviet Union.

The reasons that prompted the NATO two-track decision then have not become any less significant. With each new SS-20 missile they have gained further significance. Whoever voted in favour of the two-track decision then cannot vote against it today when the threat is even greater, but must instead state that the decision taken then was a right and necessary response, one that cannot be called into question today.

Nor must we forget that developments have occurred that were marked by the use of force, for instance in Afghanistan. Here in the West we have nonetheless undertaken every effort to make the talks in Geneva a success. Did we not regard it as a joint achievement that, through the firmness of all parties in the Bundestag, it proved possible to convince the Soviet Union of the need to start negotiations, and indeed to do so only a few months after Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had insisted in Bonn that there would be no negotiations?

German Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons

We must now draw our conclusions from the absence of the tangible agreement we desired. The period since the two-track decision has been used by the West to make concrete proposals, proposals that have taken into particular account the fundamental interests of our country.

It was surely not an illusionary and unrealistic demand of *détente* when the United States proposed, at our request, the zero-zero option, in other words renunciation by the Soviet Union of its INF build-up and renunciation by the West of INF modernization. Could there indeed be a better result for our divided nation than complete mutual renunciation of intermediate-range missiles.

The Federal Republic of Germany is one of the countries that have renounced ownership of nuclear weapons. This renunciation of nuclear weapons entitles us to demand not to be threatened with nuclear weapons. This is our right and we

must lay claim to it. When we renounced possession of nuclear weapons, we did so in the expectation that our territory would not be threatened by the nuclear weapons of another nuclear power. We continue to assert this claim. This claim means that we continue to regard Soviet renunciation of all ground-launched missiles not only as the best solution for our people, for Western Europe, for all European nations, but also as a logical consequence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But on that occasion we were also granted, without objection, the right to assure ourselves, in the event of being threatened with nuclear weapons, of protection with nuclear weapons by an allied and friendly power. This is what led to the second part of the NATO two-track decision, namely the right to and, in the event of the other side not withdrawing its threat, the obligation to carry out modernization. We shall continue this policy, which is marked by a readiness to negotiate and the resolve to take the necessary steps for our security. When it became clear that the Soviet Union was not prepared to forego its arms build-up, altogether, the Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, brought the proposal of an interim agreement into the discussion, since we felt that it would be better to reduce the Soviet build-up in part, and hence scale down Western modernization, than to leave things as they were. We did not make our discussions in the Alliance and with the United States a public debate, but rather an intensive dialogue. What mattered to us was to obtain an effective Western negotiating position and not to artificially provoke differences with the Americans.

In the further course of these discussions we also helped to ensure that the proposal was filled out with details, that it was made clear that the West is prepared to acknowledge the security interests of the East and that, with mutual global ceilings, we do not intend to meet all the modernization requirements in Western Europe. This is, incidentally, an element taken from the „walk-in-the-woods proposal” which is not being mentioned in public at present. When doubts arose as to whether the West is prepared, in the event of reduced modernization in response to a reduced Soviet build-up, to deploy fewer Pershing II missiles as well, or whether Western reductions would only extend to cruise missiles, it was made clear at the bargaining table that the reductions will of course apply proportionately to both systems, to Pershing IIs and cruise missiles alike. On this point the Western negotiating position was presented in an increasingly differentiated manner.

One thing was clear from the outset: equal global ceilings on both sides, as stated in the NATO two-track decision, and rejection of a Soviet monopoly on ground-launched INF. This needs to be stated quite unequivocally. We will not accept a Soviet monopoly on ground-launched INF directed against Western Europe or other parts of the world. Such a monopoly would make it possible to use threat as a political instrument, whenever deemed necessary.

Nobody here will accuse the Soviet leaders of wanting to attack a peaceful Western Europe with their intermediate-range missiles, but the existence of these weapons, the possibility of using these weapons as a form of threat would impair the freedom of political choice of Western Europe and decouple us from the United States. It would be the beginning of a process of political strangulation of Western Europe. We must not allow this process to be set in motion.



The French and British Systems

We must therefore abide by the decision that received the backing of the parties represented in the Bundestag on 14 December 1979. This cannot be altered in any way by the demand made at a later stage that French and British systems be included or taken into account in the talks. The question as to whether these systems should be taken into account is not new. We examined it when preparing the NATO decision and rejected it for good reasons. In 1980, at our talks in Moscow, the Soviet leaders still voiced the opinion that they regarded these French and British systems as strategic and that they did not therefore consider it right to include them in the INF talks.

Nobody in France or Britain holds the view that there cannot be any negotiations in which these systems are taken account of. During the current session of the United Nations General Assembly the French President and the British Foreign Secretary made it quite clear that, if certain preconditions are met, they are indeed prepared to have their systems included in international talks. This is the path to follow. Today we should not, in addition to the problems that we undoubtedly face in East-West relations, drive a deep wedge between our country and these two important European allies by altering our position on the French and British systems.

It is essential that in this matter, too, we do not increase the concerns of our friends that we Germans might be trying to shun our obligations and responsibilities. In actual fact, these systems are, by their very nature and purpose, not intended or even suitable for guaranteeing the security of the Federal Republic of Germany or of other non-nuclear Western European countries. It is even questionable whether they suffice to guarantee the security of the two countries owning them. This is why these two countries belong to the Alliance. Let us therefore not jeopardize with this new demand the confidence of our European allies in the steadfastness of our policies.

The question now is how to continue along the path embarked upon by the



The Bundestag debate following the government policy statement of 22 November 1983 focused on the Pershing II missile, which is to be deployed exclusively on West German territory. Left photo: Successful test of a Pershing II missile at Cape Canaveral. Right photo: American military trucks at U. S. air base near Mutlangen in southwestern Germany, where a part of the new Pershing systems are to be deployed.

Federal Republic of Germany and the Western Alliance. Many people in this country and throughout the world are concerned about how the negotiations are to continue. For four years after the NATO two-track decision we, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western States, declared and demonstrated our readiness to carry on negotiating despite the continuing Soviet build-up. This attitude entitles us, and by „us“ I mean the governments of these countries, our peoples, all the peoples of Europe, to expect the Soviet Union likewise to display a readiness to continue the negotiations in order to reach an agreement. Such negotiations at the present or another conference table are just as much in the interest of the Soviet Union and its allies as in our own interest. We will not leave the negotiating table. We will sit down at any negotiating table set up elsewhere. We will do the utmost to work towards a concrete agreement during the process of deployment, which we are about to initiate.

Nothing Is Irreversible

The declaration of the Western Alliance remains valid. Each individual American intermediate-range missile now deployed can be removed again as a result of a negotiated agreement. Nothing is irreversible. We shall make every effort to ensure that the negotiations lead to such an agreement.

We will achieve this if we give effect to all aspects of our policy, the NATO two-track decision and the other elements of our peace policy. These other elements of our peace policy extend beyond the NATO decision, but are inconceivable without this part of our foreign and security policy.

The question of the strategy pursued by the Western Alliance coincides with the question of the suitability, reliability and perspectives of the Western strategy of deterrence. When we speak of deterrence, we must ask ourselves: deterrence against what? The answer is deterrence against war, i. e. ensuring that war can no longer be conducted in Europe. This strategy is a war-prevention strategy. That is why we support it.

We must never forget that even a conventional war in Europe, i. e. without the use of nuclear weapons, would be a thousand times more horrifying than the Second World War, of which we all have such bitter memories. We must therefore make every effort to prevent every form of war. This is our strategy.

Yet we know that a strategy of deterrence cannot be the definitive response to the question of how to secure lasting peace throughout Europe. But it will have to remain the response until we have created the political conditions in which the absence of war ensured through deterrence can be superseded by a peaceful order founded on mutual trust. This is the task of our policy for peace. This is a task that we must fulfil not only at the INF talks. Indeed, it is dangerous to reduce the question of safeguarding peace, the question of East-West relations, to a single issue.

We must comply with this task. We must fulfil it at the Geneva disarmament talks, in the United Nations Committee on Disarmament and at the talks on force reductions in Central Europe. We must fulfil this task at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe due to start next January, during the first phase of which the main aim is to build up confidence in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and then, departing from this basis of confidence, to work towards a balance of conventional forces throughout Europe. We want to attain a conventional balance in the whole of Europe by means of disarmament. This means that the Soviet Union will have to be willing to reduce its conventional superiority.

We will systematically continue on this path of circumspect and realistic peace policy together with our allies. Through co-operation with the GDR, and through participation in international conferences we will do our utmost to ensure the necessary political conditions for the establishment of an order in Europe that can justifiably and deservedly be called a peace order.

In this context we must bear in mind that, located as we are at the heart of Europe, we have a special responsibility in attaining this goal.

We discharge this responsibility by pursuing a calculable foreign policy, by ensuring that this policy accords with the views and jointly developed goals of the peace policies of all our neighbours and allies in the West, and by our sincere will to proceed with the governments and peoples of the East along the path leading, through reduction of tensions, confidence-building and disarmament, to precisely this peaceful order.

We know what repercussions each of our decisions have on relations between the two German States and we will ask ourselves this question whenever we take a decision. This is why we attach such importance to the task of shaping these relations.

As a government, as a parliament and as a people in a State representing only part of our nation, it is our task to make every effort to preserve the interests of our other countrymen, just as it is our task as Europeans to preserve the interests of other Europeans. As we understand it, this responsibility implies that we preserve peace for all of us in East and West alike. It also implies, in our view, the recognition that we cannot safeguard peace for others by placing our own freedom at stake.

Resolution of the German Bundestag of 22 November 1983

Implementation of both parts of the NATO two-track decision of 12 December 1979


I. The German Bundestag reaffirms its resolution of 26 May 1981 to support „the Federal Government in the consistent and timely implementation of both parts of the NATO decision of 12 December 1979“.

II. The German Bundestag and all the citizens of our country share the wish to preserve and strengthen peace and freedom and to obtain marked arms reductions without imperilling our security. The Federal Republic of Germany's membership of and participation in the NATO defence alliance serve this goal. For over three decades now this Alliance has successfully contributed towards preserving peace and freedom and will continue to do so. The Alliance does not threaten anyone. In the Bonn declaration of 10 June 1982 it was stated: „None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack“. The Alliance safeguards peace through a policy of military equilibrium at the lowest possible level. It strives for a reduction of East-West tensions through a policy of accommodation with the East.

The German Bundestag stresses that understanding and accommodation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact can only be accomplished on the basis of equal political rights and the recognition of equal security for all States. With its deployment of SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union has changed the security situation and is thus threatening the freedom of political choice of the countries of Western Europe. The NATO two-track decision is designed to avert this threat.

The German Bundestag regrets that the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) have not yet led to an agreement, despite the great efforts made by the United States and its allies. In order to ensure Western Europe's military security and freedom of political choice we therefore need, in conformity with the NATO two-track decision, a counterbalance to the Soviet SS-20 missiles threatening us.

The German Bundestag therefore supports the decision of the German Federal Government to initiate the process of deployment on schedule in accordance with its obligation deriving from the second part of the NATO decision.



The vote on the resolution regarding INF deployment introduced by the governing parties. Bundestag President Rainer Barzel (CDU) is shown at the ballot box.

The German Bundestag recalls that the Alliance, despite a vast Soviet build-up of modern INF, forewent any arms modernization for four years and made earnest efforts to obtain negotiations and an agreement acceptable to both sides.

The German Bundestag welcomes the declared readiness of the United States to continue the INF talks irrespective of the commencement of deployment. The aim continues to be to reduce drastically, if not scrap completely, long-range, ground-launched INF in Europe. This can only be achieved through negotiations. Such negotiations remain expedient in any event. The process of deployment will extend over several years. Through negotiations a limitation of intermediate-range missiles and the removal of missiles already deployed can still be attained in the future.

The German Bundestag calls upon the Soviet Union, in its own interest, not to prevent a continuation of the INF talks through unilateral action. It appeals to the Soviet Union to abandon its claim to a monopoly on ground-launched INF and hence clear the way for an equitable agreement.

The German Bundestag urges that the East-West dialogue be continued and deepened in all spheres and at all levels in order to create, through confidence-building and co-operation, a climate in which tensions can be defused and where equitable and verifiable agreements on disarmament can be achieved.

(This resolution was introduced by the governing CDU/CSU and FDP coalition. It was adopted with a vote of 286 for, 225 against and 1 abstained.)

Future of Détente in Europe

Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 2 December 1983
(excerpts)

The deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles, which deprives the Soviet Union of the possibility of obtaining, with its build-up of SS-20 missiles, an instrument for political dominance in Europe or for decoupling Europe from the United States, represents a turning point in the development of European security and of East-West relations in Europe.

Implementation of both parts of the two-track decision in the face of great internal and external strains confirms the Western Alliance's ability to act.

- The Alliance has moved closer together as a result of the consultations, which permitted the United States' European Allies to participate to an unprecedented extent in the development of negotiating positions.
- France is a firm pillar of Alliance policy, including the two-track decision. It has moved closer to the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of security policy.
- The Soviet concept of „military détente“, which suggests to the Europeans that they should regard their security as being ensured primarily through détente without their undertaking adequate defence efforts of their own, constitutes a dangerous alternative to a realistic policy of détente and has not gained acceptance.
- Among the Soviet Union's neighbours in Western Europe and the Far East a common awareness of the Soviet threat has evolved and hence a common awareness of security.

All of these considerations must not, especially in this nuclear age, give rise to complacency or even swaggering. Instead, they are the basis of an obligation for responsible action with due regard for everyone's interests.

Owing to the changed conditions now prevailing, the Soviet Union will reassess its situation and draw conclusions for its future policy towards the West. We, too, must ponder what the consequences of this new situation are for the future of East-West relations.

Now that the missile debate is over, the East-West relationship in its entire breadth must again come to the fore. Western Governments will demonstrate that, contrary to the assertions of many critics of the new INF deployment, the missiles will not be an instrument of a „new policy of strength“ and are not intended to be an instrument to be used in a strategy of confrontation with the Soviet Union on European soil, but that we adhere to détente and co-operation. Western Europe is becoming more secure against the Soviet threat without the Soviet Union's security being impaired.

The deployment of new American intermediate-range systems in our country that are able to reach the Soviet Union, just as the Soviet SS-20s have long been able to reach us, reinforces our responsibility and our policy in the Alliance of working towards moderation and understanding between East and West.

Time Ripe for a New Attempt

The West will not accept Soviet superiority, nor will it hope for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conversely, the Soviet Union will have to acknowledge that its hopes of Western Europe being decoupled from the United States will not be fulfilled. Both sides, East and West alike, can only gain if, bearing in mind the manifold ties and experiences of their shared past, they devote their attention to opportunities for co-operation in a common future.

The time is ripe for a new attempt at bringing about a comprehensive, long-term and viable form of détente with the Soviet Union, based on equilibrium and equal rights. In this attempt, account should be taken of the experience gained in the 1970s, when the efforts for détente produced considerable results, at least in Europe, but no lasting, overall form of détente.

In the 1970s the Soviet Union obtained from the United States recognition as a world power. However, in the text of the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union of 29 May 1972, the Soviet Union pledged to exercise restraint, to refrain from efforts to obtain unilateral advan-

tage at the expense of the United States and to recognize the latter's security interests. The restraint practised by the American Government in arms policy and in the Third World after Viet Nam and Watergate was wrongly regarded by the Soviet Union as a sign of weakness. It wrongly concluded that it could abandon the principle of restraint without jeopardizing the superpower relationship established in 1972. Soviet advances in the Third World must be seen in this context. Above all, the Soviet Union apparently believed that it could exploit its strategic parity with the United States to build up an SS-20 missile potential in Europe and thus gain military superiority that would enable it, in the long term, to exert political influence and bring about a strategic decoupling.

Thus, détente policy in the seventies was only a partial success. The treaties concluded in Europe and the co-operation in many fields that evolved on this basis yielded benefits for both sides. The arrangements relating to Berlin and the further strengthening of the United States' role in Europe by means of the Quadripartite Agreement and the CSCE Final Act served to meet the essential security needs of the West. In the treaties it concluded with the East the Federal Republic of Germany rendered a contribution to stability in Europe that takes Soviet security needs into account. The Helsinki process combined human concerns with détente and economic exchange. Above all it promoted co-operation as an element of stability.

In other words, the path of détente was embarked upon in Europe; and the benefits continue to be felt. However, détente was impaired by the adverse effects which the Soviet Union's arms efforts and policy of decoupling had on the vital security interests of Western Europe. The Soviet Union must recognize that détente can be achieved in the long term only if both sides have the same goal, and not if one side views détente as a device for gaining security advantages over the other.

The Kremlin Will Have to Decide

The Soviet leaders will now consider the question as to which option is best suited for the realization of their own long-term interests:

- a return to increased confrontation, since détente has not allowed realization of their aspirations to dominance, and is not likely to do so in the future,

- continuation of a selective policy of détente in those sectors that are particularly worthwhile for the Soviet Union, especially economic co-operation,
- or a commitment to comprehensive co-operation on equal terms and on a long-term basis...

The Soviet Union ought to realize that a policy of ever closer co-operation does greater justice to its own security interests than a hegemonic system established at the expense of its neighbours.

Despite serious strains, the Soviet Union must of necessity have a crucial interest in constructive relations with the United States. A modicum of stability and constancy in the superpower relationship is an essential prerequisite for the development of stable East-West relations in Europe. A wider-ranging system of détente is hardly conceivable without regulated and improved American-Soviet relations.

Objectively speaking, the United States and the Soviet Union have essential, shared interests: the prevention of armed conflicts that might lead to nuclear escalation, the attainment of tangible results in disarmament talks, as well as mutually beneficial economic and agricultural co-operation.

There must be a restrengthening of political dialogue. The Soviet Union's principal interest consists in regaining American recognition of its status as an equal superpower, recognition which Moscow, no doubt wrongly, believes it has lost. In this context, the leaders in Moscow will have to ponder the link, established in the Nixon-Breshnev communiqué accompanying the signing of SALT I in 1972, between recognition of superpower parity and a commitment to restraint and moderation. By pursuing a prudent policy of moderation, the Soviet Union is able to influence the United States' attitude. This applies to the disarmament talks, regional conflicts and human rights issues.

Prospect of Political Unification

A close examination of its own interests should leave the Soviet Union in no doubt about the advantages of placing its relations with the West on a broader, more stable and long-term foundation. The Soviet Union's decision on this matter will be essentially determined by two questions:

- the question of the future unity of the West - in the countries of deployment, among the Europeans, and between the Europeans and the Americans, as well as
- the expected long-term course of the Western Alliance as a whole towards the Soviet Union in view of the new security situation in Europe.

These questions have both short-term and long-term implications.

In this situation the following tasks are of paramount importance for us:

We must make every effort in the Federal Republic of Germany to restore consensus as far as possible on the country's foreign policy, in Europe to bring the prospect of political unification to the fore again, and in the Alliance to strengthen the political dimension, above all through increased transatlantic co-operation...

Our partners in the European Community should also see our commitment to Europe in this historical perspective, but at the same time be aware of their own responsibility for Europe.

Working Consistently Towards Political Union

Anyone here who complains of a lack of European influence on the Alliance must

commit himself to strengthening Europe's voice by resolutely promoting European unification. We must work consistently towards political union. But no strengthening of the role of Europe should be directed against the United States or even used as a means of uncoupling Europe from America. This would doubly undermine the gains in terms of stability and security promised by European unification. The Soviet Union will have to think hard about its longer-term attitude to the increasingly cohesive European Community. In this respect Moscow must be left in no doubt that the Community will remain in extremely close partnership with the United States on the basis of shared values and in the interests of equilibrium in Europe...

The Europeans have found regular informal meetings of the „Gymnich type“ to be beneficial, i. e., meetings at which Foreign Ministers conduct a personal exchange of views on political questions and developments without staffs or press statements. Why should the Allies not formally adopt this model? I consider a meeting of this kind urgently necessary at the beginning of 1984. One important topic of such meetings must be the development of East-West relations in a longer-term perspective. To this end greater conceptual clarity is necessary. It is equally important that the Alliance strategy be shared by all NATO members and not put at stake whenever there is a change of government. Longer-term strategic perspectives, including those which concern outer space, are topics



U. S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Genscher held a meeting in Bonn on 6 December 1983. They continued their exchange of views in a meeting with Chancellor Kohl.

which affect the common security interests of all who believe in the unity of the Alliance area.

Détente and Co-operation with the East

We in the Alliance must signal to the East that our wish for détente and co-operation is just as genuine as the wish to guarantee our security. The balanced concept expressed in the 1967 Harmel Report, i.e. military security and détente, should be expressly reaffirmed. To this end, popular consensus on security policy must continuously be sought and attained in all member States. Strengthening our own security, after all, creates precisely that firm foundation which will enable us to offer the Soviet Union long-term co-operation in all spheres on the basis of balance, equality and mutual advantage. The Soviet leadership must realize now more than ever that, although the option of a weak and docile West has been denied them, we are offering the option of honest, fair and long-term co-operation, which is consistent both with Soviet security interests, on the one hand, and the advancement of the prosperity of the peoples within the Soviet Union and their economic stability, on the other. Anyone dealing with the Soviet Union must be fully aware that it will only alter its policy in the direction of greater restraint if such a change promises greater benefits or fewer losses. It would be a mistake to believe that the threat of losses could achieve more than professed benefits...

The negotiations on arms control and disarmament will have a critical bearing on East-West relations. An unequivocal commitment to Western security policy should be combined with new initiatives for the disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Union is called upon to resume negotiations on intermediate-range systems. The MBFR negotiations in Vienna should be given fresh impetus. The conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, to be held in Stockholm, should, from the very beginning, be used to explore all avenues to progress in East-West relations, including political progress. It is consistent with this goal that the Foreign Ministers should open the Conference. Economic co-operation within the framework of our security interests is an integral part of our policy of détente, just as arms control is an integral component of our security policy.

It is in the interest of all of us that crises in peripheral theatres should not further

hamper the difficult task of fostering peace in Europe. Both major powers are called upon to conduct a dialogue. Moscow must consider whether readiness to contribute to the political settlement of regional crises, instead of probing weak spots, is not a better way to obtain recognition as a responsible and equal world power. The West must concentrate even more on the social and economic roots of regional crises and not only on the rivalry between foreign powers which let themselves be drawn into such conflicts.

It is no coincidence that the security debate has again turned towards the more distant future. For each side it is important to know how the other side imagines a future peace order in Europe. Three questions will play an important role in this regard:

- the security question in the narrower sense, particularly nuclear confrontation,
- the question of Germany,
- the fate of Eastern Europe.

Europeanization of the German Question

It is certainly not possible today to identify conclusively the elements of a just and lasting peace order in Europe. In Helsinki on 2 November 1983 I described in detail elements of a European peace order in which people could live free of fear and nations free of interference and tutelage. There is no doubt that progress towards such a peace order can only be achieved if balance is ensured and all hegemonic designs are eliminated. Confidence-building in the widest sense and in its constantly evolving variations will be an important factor. Based on balance and linked to confidence-building, the definition and joint endorsement of the principle of renunciation of force in word and deed can serve a valuable purpose.

Conversely, those ideas which ostensibly create new security, but in fact benefit those who already have the upper hand, such as nuclear-free zones in Europe or selective renunciation of the use of weapons, are obstructive. A policy aimed at peace demands that the use of all weapons, nuclear and conventional, be renounced. A policy for peace precludes varying degrees of security.

In the German question the crux of the matter is to expedite the development of what is possible today and at the same time to remain aware of the European


perspective of the German question. That means that the German question should not revert to being a national question, but should be a European one, keeping our national interests in concert with European interests. The belief of Germans in West and East in their joint responsibility for stability and peace in Europe is an important basis which provides the efforts to develop relations with the special attribute of a European policy for peace.

The German Democratic Republic is our partner in the co-operation which we believe will, in the long term, lead to overcoming the rift which cuts through Europe. History will show which philosophy will one day win over the other German State. The German Democratic Republic says it will be a socialist philosophy (no doubt meaning communist) while we are convinced that it will be the philosophy of freedom. However, this difference of opinion should not hinder intergovernmental co-operation on the agreed basis, a wish endorsed by statements from the German Democratic Republic.

The CSCE process is the framework in which changes will take place in Central and Eastern Europe which we consider desirable and important and at the same time it is the driving force behind them. The special characteristic of the CSCE process is that it promotes a climate of rapprochement, so that where stagnation has hitherto reigned the need for renewal and change is becoming visible. For this reason, too, we should regard each individual member of the Warsaw Pact as an individual partner for talks and negotiations. This calls for respect of the national dignity of the other country, its cultural and scientific achievements and its contributions to progress in the world.

We want consistent and intensive dialogue and the broadest possible co-operation with the Soviet Union and all member States of the Warsaw Pact in awareness of our common history and common fate. A peaceful order in Europe cannot be established without dialogue and co-operation. An important role in this falls to the process of reconciliation with Poland. We therefore remain anxious to develop German-Polish relations.

It is important to pursue discussion of the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe with far-sightedness and political imagination, but without forgetting that the long journey to this goal can only be mastered if it is begun in the right manner.



heart
of the
matter

The NATO

Two-Track

Decision

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programmes modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers

Communiqué of the Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979

significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance could best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the de-

ployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launches, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of rôles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the rôle of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.


10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF

build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defence and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.



Special Meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, Brussels, 12 December 1979

Resolution of 16 November 1983 on the Deployment of Missiles in Western Europe


The European Parliament,

- A. aware that in broad sections of the European population there is concern regarding the danger of war,
 - B. convinced that pacifism and appeasement policy are not an appropriate reaction to the threat to Western Europe,
 - C. dismayed at the attempt of a Member State to make use of European Political Co-operation to discuss the question of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, a matter exclusively in the range of jurisdiction of the Atlantic Alliance,
 - D. making reference to the fact that a Member State of the Community does not belong to the Atlantic Alliance and that a further Member State, although a member of the Alliance, does not participate in its integrated military command structure,
 - E. making reference to the report adopted in 1983 on European Political Co-operation and European Security (Doc. 1-946/82) which states „that arms control talks between East and West are of mutual interest, must have the character of a continuous process and be oriented towards the goal of mutual security on the basis of a balance of military forces at the lowest possible level,
 - F. noting with satisfaction that the rights and duties of the European Parliament regarding the discussion of European security receive broad political support, aware however that the institutions of the European Community possess no explicit competence for military matters,
1. rejects the attempts undertaken by the government of a Member State and by certain political forces to exploit European Political Co-operation for the purpose of changing the position agreed upon among the governments of the EC Member States and the other countries in the Atlantic Alliance in the crucial question of missile deployment,
 2. supports the governments of the Member States that are firmly resolved to preserve the balance of forces necessary in the interest of the security of our States and the entire West,
 3. expresses the hope that the current and future negotiations on arms control, arms reductions and confidence-building measures will render a significant contribution to peace and security in Europe,
 4. points out the grave danger that the Western negotiating position in Geneva will be undermined by the support of proposals that deprive the West of an important weapons category, but would grant the other side the unaltered deployment of a large number of these weapons,
 5. requests for this reason the support of all Member States for a double strategy consisting of serious arms control negotiations leading to a reduction of all arsenals, whether nuclear, chemical or conventional, to the lowest possible level commensurate with the security needs of Western Europe and, until this goal is reached, the preservation of a position of military strength sufficient to deter aggression and intimidation from the outside and in this way provide the other side with the necessary incentive to negotiate agreements on mutual and verifiable disarmament measures,
 6. request that its President convey this resolution to the Foreign Ministers of the Member States meeting in the context of Political Co-operation.


(Result of the vote: 170 for, 108 against, 26 abstained.)

Press Reaction to INF
Deployment in the Federal
Republic of Germany


Comments in Cartoons




Wolter



E. M. Lang




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
The dropout of the year

Hanel



Doves of peace 1983-style

Klaus Pielert



Parliamentary rift

Gerboth



... and yet another new argument ...

Haitzinger



Federal Republic of Germany
Press and Information Office

“... preventing any type of war in Europe.”

From a speech given by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the occasion of a reception for the Diplomatic Corps on 28 November 1983

For us Germans, in our special situation in the heart of Europe, divided by an unnatural frontier at the interface between East and West, the preservation of peace is an question of existential importance. We Germans do not separate peace from freedom. In bitter past experience we first lost freedom and then peace. Thus it has been and will continue to be the supreme objective of all governments of the Federal Republic of Germany to safeguard peace and freedom.

Our membership in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community is an expression of common fundamental convictions regarding democracy, self-determination, human rights and social justice.

On this basis we strive for constructive and stable relations with our neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. We adhere to the treaties we conclude. We act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Final Act of Helsinki. The aim of our policy in relations between East and West is the reduction of tensions, the building of confidence and the expansion of co-operation. We conduct and promote an active and comprehensive dialogue to this end.

Our defence effort is, like that of our allies, exclusively aimed at preventing any type of war in Europe. The Atlantic Alliance and its members have committed themselves to strict respect of the princi-


ple of the renunciation of force as a basic prerequisite of peace.

We would like to see peace safeguarded with ever fewer weapons. Our aim is a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level. For this reason the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany advocates in all areas and in all fora

the conclusion of equitable and verifiable agreements on arms limitations and disarmament. We have noted with great concern the year-by-year build-up of a land-based intermediate-range nuclear potential, most of which is targeted on Western Europe. Western Europe cannot accept a state of lessened security. A destabilization of the peace-preserving balance of forces cannot be in the interest of the rest of the world either.

The resolutions of the Alliance and the United States' conduct of the talks in Geneva show that we are emphatically and steadfastly seeking a negotiated solution.

At the suggestion of Foreign Minister Genscher the NATO Council adopted a “Brussels Declaration” on 9 December 1983 conceived of as a political signal intended to bring about a resumption of the dialogue between East and West in this time of tension.



A signal to the East from the autumn meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels.

SZ Cartoon by Legor