NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

DRAFT GENERAL REPORT

on

ALLIANCE POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Presented by

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Rapporteur (1)

(1) Until this document has been approved by the Political Committee it represents only the views of the Rapporteur.
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SUMMARY

Chapter I - INTRODUCTION - as this is the last report the Rapporteur will submit to the Political Committee, he has concentrated on those issues he believes to be of most direct relevance to the future form and role of the Alliance. Two issues suggest themselves - firstly current perceptions concerning the growth of Soviet power and the spread of Soviet influence, and secondly, the growing political relevance of Communist parties in Southern Europe; the Rapporteur believes that Alliance response to these issues has been fashioned too much by out-moded concepts and exaggerated fears and preoccupations, and a more realistic and objective approach is now necessary; he also stresses that our preoccupation with the East-West relationship should not blind us or dominate our views concerning problems and issues in the developing world; the report provides a brief summary of the present situation in Spain and coverage of a rather more general but significant problem, nuclear proliferation.

Chapter II - SOVIET POWER AND INFLUENCE - remarks that public opinion has been led to accept a view of Soviet power and behaviour that is both exaggerated and oversimplified; to a large extent this has been the result of domestic developments, particularly the Presidential elections in the United States. Certainly there have been consistent improvements to Soviet forces and competition between East and West will continue but the West can cope with both factors when seen in their proper context. The tendency to over-react to Soviet power has had many unfortunate consequences, frequently regarding events in other parts of the world. The Rapporteur asks for a more balanced approach to developments based on objective analysis rather than pathological suspicions and emotional rhetoric.

The Military Balance - comments on the correlation between current assessments of the balance of power and public opinion regarding East-West relations. The Rapporteur examines the ways in which statistics are misused and misrepresented to create a distorted picture of the military balance. He quotes examples from studies recently produced by Congressman Leslie Aspin, and comments that details emerging from the examination of the MiG 25 Foxbat in Japan appear to confound previous Department of Defence assessments of the aircraft - a good example of exaggerating the threat?

Soviet Influence - examines events in Southern Africa, particularly Angola and notes that this has been widely interpreted as an unambiguous indication of Soviet expansionism. The Rapporteur discusses some of the factors which are frequently ignored and which in his view significantly qualify such an assumption; although the question of Rhodesia is now the dominant issue, the lesson of Angola must not be lost - any settlement must be based on national aspirations and realities, not on super power notions of stability and self-interest; Western credibility in African eyes is already low and will decline even further if our sole criteria for obtaining a settlement is the strategic importance of South Africa.

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Summary - asserts that over-reaction is ultimately detrimental to the Alliance; we should not ignore Soviet actions but neither exaggerate the realities of Soviet power nor ignore the limitations on their ability to gain influence; exaggerated notions of our own vulnerability do not enhance the security of the Alliance.

Chapter III - WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES - notes that the question of communist participation in governments in Western Europe is a problem for the future structure of the Alliance and is a source of a major difference between the United States and Europe; the emergence of European Communist Party's will mark a further move away from the static and rigidly defined zones of the Cold War and necessitate a further reshaping of attitudes and views towards the Alliance.

The Italian Communist Party - the position of the Italian Communist Party is significant as it has come close to assuming responsibility in the governing of the country; the Report notes the PCI's stress on its independence and autonomy, and its professed wish for Italy to remain in NATO as a "useful shield" against Soviet interference.

The Pan European Conference - comments on the success of the independent parties in opposing the efforts of the conservative parties to establish a "general line".

Alliance Objections - comments on the practical objections Alliance officials advance regarding the consequences of Communist participation in an Alliance country; the Rapporteur does not agree with these objections. Moreover he believes that threats and warnings are counter-productive and that the Alliance must adopt a more flexible and pragmatic approach to the emergence of Euro-communism.

Chapter IV - SPAIN - although several recent developments indicate that Spain is moving towards a more democratic and liberal society, the present situation contains inherent contradictions which must qualify any optimistic forecast for Spain's future; the institutional and administrative framework erected by Franco remains as a formidable obstacle to the liberalising reforms required by the popular forces; the Report notes the three groups that have emerged in this transitional period, the Bunker, the King and his government, and the popular forces. It comments on the various changes including the general amnesty, measures affecting the "freedoms", and the government's draft law for political reform, but remarks that all measures aimed at relaxation and reform have been hampered by the rigid framework within which they have to work. The government must soon choose between dismantling the old structure so that all freedoms can be legally and permanently established and popular participation ensured, and continuing with its policy of half measures and the inevitable alienation of the popular forces.

Chapter V - NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION -- comments on the very real dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the spreading of nuclear technology; it is critical in this respect of the attitudes of some member countries, adherence to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty should be a prior condition to obtaining nuclear technology and stricter measures regarding safeguards should be adopted.
I. **INTRODUCTION**

1. As this is the last report that the Rapporteur will submit to the Political Committee he has decided to restrict his coverage to those issues he believes to be of the most direct relevance to the future form and role of the Alliance. Undoubtedly the Alliance is passing through a difficult and uncertain phase involving new pressures and tensions which demand a more flexible response than has been afforded in the past. Security is no longer a question of military power alone. It is increasingly influenced by a range of political and economic factors which are tending to blur the previously well-defined lines of Alliance security policy.

2. In the Rapporteur's view two issues suggest themselves as being not only of immediate interest, but also of very crucial significance to the future direction of the Alliance. Firstly, the current perceptions of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West, particularly as reflected in common assumptions concerning the growth of Soviet power and the spread of Soviet influence; and secondly, the growing political relevance of Communist parties in Southern Europe.

3. Both issues have recently been the subject of intense public interest and debate, and both are of direct and immediate relevance to the principles and objectives on which the Alliance was founded. In the Rapporteur's view, the Alliance response to these issues has been fashioned too often by out-moded concepts and exaggerated fears and preoccupations. Its future shape and relevance, however, will depend to a large extent on its ability to cope with these and other problems on a more realistic and objective basis.

4. One aspect in particular should be stressed concerning the evolution of the Alliance and its ability to adjust to and accommodate new pressures. Although the East-West relationship will remain the dominant theme in international relations, this dominance will be threatened by the increasing power and influence of developing nations, and the significance of economic and political factors of an extra-regional nature. This process is relevant here in one important respect. We must not allow our involvement with the East-West relationship to blind us or to dominate our views concerning developments and problems in the developing world. We should not presume that every problem area can be made to respond to the demands of our own security requirements.

5. There is absolutely no necessity for the Alliance to broaden its geographic boundaries. But it should adopt a more objective and responsive understanding to developments which although outside these boundaries are felt to be of direct relevance, and for which we bear either collectively or individually some measure of responsibility. A more flexible and responsive approach would allow the Alliance to play a more constructive role, albeit indirectly, in international affairs.
6. The Rapporteur has also included a brief summary of the latest situation in Spain. Although he does not believe that events in Spain are crucial to the Alliance in the same sense as the other two issues, nevertheless, developments there are of very real interest to all member countries. Furthermore, the reactions of Alliance countries, both individually and collectively, will certainly have some impact on the degree and pace of the move to a more democratic system in Spain.

7. A brief analysis of the problems of nuclear proliferation has also been presented because, although this is a more general problem, the Rapporteur believes that it is a subject of growing seriousness and relevance, particularly for parliamentarians. It is a subject which poses crucial problems of a political, military and economic nature and has far reaching implications for the security of all nations.

8. Finally, any examination of the issues the Rapporteur has selected must inevitably place them in the broader perspective of East-West relations and consider particularly their relevance to the process of "detente". However, as "detente" has been the subject of a special working group (see Report T 170 PC/D (76) 12) the Rapporteur will, as far as possible, limit his remarks on the broader aspects of the process, and concentrate on the two issues he considers of most importance.

II. SOVIET POWER AND INFLUENCE

9. The last year has witnessed a rising crescendo of criticism and alarm against several aspects of current relations between East and West, and most specifically what has been perceived as the substantial growth in Soviet power and influence. Public interest has focused on two areas, firstly reports of the continuing build-up in all aspects of Soviet arms, and secondly Soviet support in assisting the MPLA to gain power in Angola, which many observers claim represented a quantum jump in the attainment of Soviet objectives and in their eyes is therefore classified as a major defeat for the West.

10. The Rapporteur will examine both of these areas in turn because in his view public opinion concerning detente has been led to accept a view of Soviet behaviour which is both exaggerated and over-simplified. The complexities of the international situation have been ignored through the adoption of simple slogans aimed primarily at generating domestic support for political platforms, rather than contributing to a genuine understanding of developments in the international field. Detente has become associated with such phrases as "being soft on the Russians", "being second best", and confirming "the enslavement of Eastern Europe".

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There are, in the Rapporteur's view many reasons for this. Firstly, public reaction to detente has been shaped more by the requirements of domestic politics than by the realities of international affairs. This is particularly true in the United States where the introduction of detente as an issue of considerable importance in the Presidential elections has made objective viewing to say the least difficult. Furthermore detente has become so closely identified with the present Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, that opponents of both the style and content of his diplomacy have been able to use it as an easy and convenient weapon with which to attack his position.

These internal developments have all contributed to a growing feeling of public scepticism and disenchantment with detente. This mood has been reinforced by the ever present arguments of military officials and armaments manufacturers whose interests quite naturally direct them to presenting the Soviet Union as a threatening and formidable enemy.

In making these comments the Rapporteur is in no way suggesting that the Soviet Union is a power whose motives are based on altruism or the ultimate well-being of the Western system. He is fully aware of the consistent improvements in both quantity and quality to the Soviet forces and of their constant endeavours to gain influence. He recalls, however, Mr. Sonnenfeldt's comments to the Sub-Committee on 'detente' that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a super-power on a global scale was a development that was inevitable regardless of the regime that existed in Russia. It had not occurred through any Western policy or failure of Western policy, and it was a phenomenon that the West would have to contend with for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Mr. Sonnenfeldt had stressed that the substantial weaknesses of the Soviet system and the diversity in the international communist movement meant that the West should be able to restrain this emerging power.

Areas of competition between East and West will inevitably continue, but in the Rapporteur's view, this is a contest in which the West need have few fears. It is the East that is moving to closer economic relations with the West and yet, at the same time, attempting to prevent the accompanying Western influences. Despite their efforts it is an inevitable process and it is by this route that East-West relations will gradually evolve to a more stable and constructive level. This evolution, however, will not occur easily if we are distracted by those who continue to cry alarm and despondency, and who for a variety of reasons prefer that East and West relations revert to a level of hostility, suspicion and continual friction.

The tendency to over-react to Soviet strength and influence has had serious consequences in several respects. It has continued to fuel the endless arms spiral at all levels of armaments. It has also influenced our perceptions of events in other regions of the world. Too often we have allowed our preoccupation with 'the threat' to blind us
to the realities of local or regional problems. In order to save or ensure the balance of power we have attempted to impose solutions that have ignored national aspirations. Frequently, we have been influenced by voices whose pathological reactions to the Soviet Union obscures their objectivity to developments outside the East - West context.

16. The Rapporteur would therefore suggest that, when seen in the full context of international affairs and with a realistic and objective approach to East-West relations,

- developments in Soviet power and influence are not as sinister and threatening as frequently represented, particularly when each issue is examined in its proper context;

- any view of detente that sees it as an end to all forms of competition between the two systems is extremely myopic;

- it is impossible to relate every development in the world to the East-West relationship;

- an exaggerated response to these developments could provoke a return to the mood of the Cold War years, a heightening of tension and an inevitable escalation in arms development that could have fatal consequences.

17. The Rapporteur is therefore asking for a more balanced approach to developments than has frequently been accorded, an approach based on objective analysis rather than pathological suspicion and emotional rhetoric. This rhetoric is all too often designed either to attract domestic political support, or to gain funds for costly defence programs, or to interest prospective buyers in weapons systems. One is thus forced to ask whether the frequent pronouncements of substantial increases in Soviet power and influence are accurate reflections of the present situation, or are they the exaggerated response of those whose reactions to the Soviet Union are dictated by the positions they hold or the political platforms they seek to promote?

18. Briefly, the Rapporteur would like to examine two aspects of Soviet behaviour that have been widely discussed: Soviet increases in the armaments field and Soviet actions in Southern Africa, and to suggest that the dramatic pronouncements on both issues should be somewhat qualified.

The Military Balance

19. Although detailed analysis of the current balance in military strength between East and West belongs in the Military Committee, the methodology of arriving at many of the current interpretations and the use to which these interpretations are put are distinctly relevant to the Political Committee, because these assessments frequently influence
political judgements. It is important to realise the full political significance of military assessments and the fact that too often these assessments acquire a definitive authority that is left unchallenged and unsubstantiated.

20. Furthermore, a definite correlation exists between current assessments of the balance of power and public opinion regarding the condition of East-West relations. Publicity concerning the rise in Soviet military capability can often be explained by the annual examination of the United States Defence Budget, and the presentation of arguments by officials anxious to get the maximum allotment of funds possible. However, this is not the only explanation for the continual emphasis on Soviet military strength. As part of the trend in which detente is seen as a negative process the expansion of Soviet military power is consistently quoted as evidence of Soviet "double talk".

21. During the following brief survey the Rapporteur will examine certain examples to show how the statistics which are frequently presented, can be misused and misrepresented to create the desired effect. He will also indicate certain areas where Western superiority in technology has been demonstrated. Several of his arguments will be based on recent studies produced by Congressman Leslie Aspin which analyse in greater detail some of the bare statistics submitted in testimony to Congressional Committees by Department of Defence officials.

22. **Defence Expenditure** - Mr. Aspin quotes Department of Defence statements to the effect that the Soviet Union is outspending the United States by approximately 30%, but he explains that such estimates are based on a "dollar comparison", i.e. the United States intelligence agencies examine what the Soviets have in tanks, planes, manpower etc. and then calculate what it would cost to build that equipment and pay those men in the United States. When one remembers that the Soviets draft men and pay them very little, whereas the United States pays high wages, this sort of comparison is clearly unrealistic. As the Military Balance points out comparing Soviet and United States defence spending is a very complex process because of the different inputs, different pricing practices and above all, the difficulty in finding an accurate and meaningful exchange rate. For a fuller discussion of this issue see the Military Balance 1975-76 published by the IISS.

23. **Strategic Arms**: considerable publicity has been given to the growth in Soviet missile capability, yet, as Dr. Kissinger has said, the United States is still way ahead in warheads (8,500 to 2,500) and precision guidance technology and these remain the critical factors in the strategic equation.

24. Furthermore, the United States is currently moving ahead on a new ICBM which arms control experts maintain will add a new dimension to the nuclear force by providing not only a retaliatory capacity, but also...
a clear war-fighting capability to attack Soviet missiles and military installations. The new missile will have more warheads, several times the payload and be twice as accurate as the present Missileman 6. It will also be mobile, a development which adds further complications to future arms control agreements, because of the obvious complications for monitoring procedures.

25. A further symptom of the tendency to exaggerate and distort Soviet policies was seen in the recent debate over Soviet civil defence measures. This was sparked by the publication of a book which alleged that these measures were endangering the United States nuclear retaliatory capacity. However, claims regarding the extent and effectiveness of Soviet civil defence measures were found to be either exaggerated or unsupported, indeed it was admitted that much of the extrapolation was pure guesswork. While it is true that the Soviet Union does put a high priority on defensive measures and has undertaken measures to protect war related industries, there is no evidence that they have a widespread civilian evacuation capability that would, in any way, affect the United States deterrent capability. It would appear that the experts had ignored the gap between the rhetoric of Soviet civilian capability as represented in their literature and in their actual capabilities. It was, perhaps, not entirely coincidental that Soviet civil defence preparations appeared as one of the driving factors in the DOD's bid to deploy new large-yield and more accurate strategic weaponry.

26. Conventional Forces - frequent pronouncements by defence officials concerning the substantial increases in Soviet conventional power has greatly heightened public interest in this issue. Indeed there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union has a considerable quantitative advantage over the West in several important areas. Nevertheless, the Rapporteur believes that many analyses and comparisons frequently omit certain important qualifying factors and thus present a somewhat distorted picture. The following short review contains examples of this tendency:

1) United States comparisons frequently omit the European contribution, for example, on the question of expenditure and manpower totals', according to the Military Balance if all NATO is counted the situation is: NATO total expenditure $149.87 (billion) and total manpower 5071.3 (thousand); Warsaw Pact total expenditure $111.37 (billion) and total manpower 4,639.0 (thousand). It should also be noted that contrary to popular opinion the defence expenditure of Europeans has shown a slight increase in real terms over the past five years;

2) the importance of China in the strategic equation is often ignored, 'a prudent Soviet analyst would add to the resources

deployed against the Soviet Union the Chinese Defence Expenditure of perhaps $12.15 billion and Chinese Military manpower of 3,850,000 (the Strategic Survey);

iii) in comparing NATO - Soviet Union force levels, French forces are often omitted yet, it is difficult to see a European conflict in which France would not be involved;

iv) the very real advantages in quality possessed by the West, - although acknowledged by defence experts, are frequently submerged by the emphasis on numbers;

v) although Soviet military manpower is double that of the United States many of the Soviet Troops are assigned jobs performed in the United States by civilians or perform jobs that do not exist in the United States forces;

vi) the distortion that can be achieved through the selective use of statistics is most clearly shown in the maritime field. The Soviet Navy has been firmly established in popular opinion as representing a further area of Soviet superiority; its growth is impressive - but in relation to its previous size. Distortion has occurred because estimates have stressed only the numerical levels, including even the smallest Soviet vessel and have omitted the size, role and force potential of these forces. Compared on a size or tonnage basis the United States Navy outweighs the Soviet Navy by 4 million tons to 1.5. Furthermore, a Department of Defence estimate that the Soviet Union was outbuilding the United States in combat ships was contradicted when a detailed breakdown revealed the inclusion of small Soviet vessels, and showed that during the past 15 years the United States has built 122 surface ships of 3,000 tons or more and the Soviet Union 57. When the whole NATO Balance is examined NATO has 355 major surface combat ships compared with 236 Soviet vessels. Even in the area where the Soviet Union has superiority, conventional and nuclear attack submarines, the figures are not as asymmetrical as sometimes suggested, 213 NATO and 263 Soviet Union. It should be noted that with regard to submarines and major surface units the contribution of the other Warsaw Pact states is insignificant.

vii) frequently it is not the present balance that is attacked but the future trends, hence General Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "the thing that worries everyone, I think, concerning the sea power balance is not the balance today as much as the trend of growing Soviet naval power". However, a brief study by Congressman Aspin provides the following data: the adverse trends in United States naval power were caused by bloc obsolescence, the problem is passed for the United States Navy, but lies in the future for the Soviet Navy (the Soviet ship building boom was in
the 1950's; the United States now outproduces the Soviets in both surface warships and nuclear attack submarines (the Soviet submarine fleet will decline because of the retirement of diesels); the United States Navy is growing again and, based solely on the ships approved for construction by Congress as of the end of 1975, it will continue to grow;

viii) finally, perhaps the most revealing view of the state of Soviet military strength, and of the accuracy of some of our estimates of their strength, will be afforded by the results of the analysis of the Mig 25 Foxbat that landed recently in Japan. This was the aircraft frequently described in the Western press as the most advanced interceptor aircraft in the world. Already there are suggestions that Western experts have vastly overrated the Foxbat's capabilities. A recent article by Congressman Carr (a former pilot and member of the House Armed Services Committee) noted that the preoccupation of the media with the aircraft's ability to fly high and at fast speeds had obscured the fact that in terms of the requirements of modern airpower the Foxbat is extremely limited, and significantly inferior to United States jets in every sense. Carr commented that maximum speed and altitude are of no significance to a fighter aircraft; the chief requirements are acceleration, manoeuvrability, small size, cockpit visibility and good missiles. Thus, he noted that the Mig 25:

- as a fighter is barely equal to the 15 year old F-4 Phantom and is hopelessly outclassed by the F-15 and F-16;
- as a reconnaissance plane it is good but the United States has had better for a decade (the SR-71 Blackbird gets its longest range on top speed and altitude, the Mig 25 can only sustain high speed and altitude for 10 minutes.);
- as an interceptor it is obsolete and inadequate, it has no "look down" radar to detect low flying bombers (United States strategic bomber missions now call for penetration below 500 feet.);
- at low level penetration it is poor; it is incapable of supersonic performance at low altitudes;
- "highly capable avionics" claimed for it are in fact simple vacuum systems that the United States considered obsolete 10 years ago;
- despite predictions by United States Department of Defence officials that titanium (a light very strong metal used in all United States aircraft) fabrication was an area where the Soviet Union was 'unequivocally' strong, the Mig 25 does not employ titanium but steel, with an inevitable degradation of performance.
As Carr remarks, these initial findings must cast the gravest doubts on the credibility of the Department of Defence's claims of Soviet military sophistication and expenditure.

27. These are only a few of many instances where misuse or partial application of statistics and slanted interpretations have led to an unnecessarily exaggerated presentation of the threat. Attention has recently been focussed very heavily on the military balance with the general view that the balance is shifting steadily and dangerously in favour of the Soviet Union. This has been linked with other 'failures' of detente to create a general picture of pessimism and alarm. In the Rapporteur's view much of the substance for this picture is highly questionable. While he believes that we should, as an Alliance, be constantly aware of Eastern military capabilities, they should be seen with greater perspective and objectivity than is frequently afforded. Our strategy of deterrence is not enhanced by making the Russians more capable than they actually are.

Soviet Influence

28. Events in Southern Africa and particularly Angola have given rise to the most bitter attacks and criticisms of the current detente policy, and have been widely seen as an unambiguous indication of Soviet expansionism. The Soviet Union is said to be ruthlessly pursuing her objective of spreading her power beyond her traditional areas of influence and supposedly turning force into political influence.

29. The more extreme critics claim that the elimination of South Africa is really the final objective of Soviet policy, an achievement which will secure for the Soviet Union a strategic position from which she can begin the final undermining of Western Europe. Thus her policy in Angola was part of the Soviet Union's messianic grand design for world conquest, the prelude to a well orchestrated campaign which will eventually end in the domination of the West.

30. Such interpretations ignore many factors fundamental to any clear understanding of the situation:

- whatever the rights or wrongs of Soviet actions there can be little doubt that at the time of Angolan independence the West, and the United States particularly, found itself without a coherent policy towards this part of Africa;

- even worse, the West was commonly associated with the colonial rule of Portugal while the Soviet Union was identified with the popular forces of liberation;

- the United States was also seen as being on the same side as South Africa, whose direct involvement brought the large numbers of Cuban combat troops. Most sources agree that it was the success of
the South African supported armoured column, which by the middle of November had advanced close to Luanda, that caused the massive increase in Soviet supplies and the substantial involvement of Cuban combat troops. In this respect the Rapporteur read with interest the recent article by Lord Chalfont in the Times which stated that 'confidential military analysis now circulating in the government here points out that South African troops not only reached Lobito during the Angolan war, but inflicted heavy losses on the Cuban forces in exchange for light casualties. The inference is that they could, had it not been for the collapse of American support, have reached Luanda and delivered Angola to an anti-Communist leadership'.

- the assumption that Soviet support will give her a position of influence and a strategic base is very uncertain; past experience has shown newly independant countries to be very anxious to develop their own policies without outside interference;

- the reference to the detente process was always faulty because the Soviet Union has never interpreted detente as meaning she would not assist wars of liberation wherever they occurred.

31. Irrespective however of past or future developments in Angola the most relevant point is the way that this episode was interpreted to further undermine detente and to prove the ultimate unreliability of the Soviet Union. One positive feature was the refusal of Congress to allow further United States involvement, and the definite rejection of the concept that opposition to the Soviet Union wherever it became involved was necessarily a major security interest of the United States. This was a clear rejection of Dr. Kissinger's concept of the indivisibility of detente, that is that Soviet involvement must always be judged within the detente framework and most important from the perspective of United States security interests.

32. Events in Angola have now been overshadowed by developments in other parts of Southern Africa, particularly Rhodesia, and by Dr. Kissinger's initiative. However, if the West is to act responsibly towards achieving an equitable solution in Southern Africa then the lessons of Angola must not be lost. The primary lesson must be that any settlement must be based on national aspirations and realities, and not on super-power notions of stability and self-interest. Any attempt by the West to hinder or obstruct progress in the direction of national self-determination will undoubtedly inject the ideological East-West competition into the potentially explosive black-white conflict.

33. Whatever the outcome of Dr. Kissinger's initiative we must not be influenced by those who for so long have ignored the contradictions inherent in South African and Rhodesian society and who now advocate change but under the terms of reference of the white minorities. It is these people who in explaining any subsequent failures in the negotiations will talk of the "moderation" of the present Rhodesian government and stress the irresponsibility and unreliability of the nationalist leaders. Yet it is these same people who have consistently
opposed all measures designed to influence both the Rhodesian and South African governments of the necessity of change. They have therefore contributed substantially to the present unfortunate situation.

34. If Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy is not successful then it must be said that it has come too late. We all hope for a peaceful settlement and an orderly transition to majority rule, but we must realise that in the eyes of black Africans this has already been delayed too long. In their eyes our efforts at mediation inevitably lack credibility. This credibility can only deteriorate further if it is seen that we are now pursuing a settlement not from a sense of moral obligation and a commitment to human dignity, but out of self interest for our own security. A lack of faith on the part of the Africans in the West's desire and ability to bring about the radical transformation that is needed, will obviously increase the potential for Soviet influence. It is ironic that those who shout loudest about Communist infiltration and Soviet encirclement are the very people whose policies facilitate the introduction of this influence by making Soviet support the most attractive option for nationalist leaders.

35. The credibility of our objectives is not only at stake with regard to Rhodesia but also, in our general attitude to South Africa. There is little room in this report for a detailed reference to the domestic situation in South Africa. The Rapporteur will, therefore, restrict himself to the following comments. Despite signs that South Africa is moving away from the application of 'petty apartheid' (minor measures of racial discrimination such as separate park benches, elevators, theatres etc.) there is no change in the fundamental concept of apartheid. The South African Government continues to pursue a policy of political and economic domination of the black majority by the white minority without the participation of the majority in the decision-making process. The means of implementing that domination have changed from outright racism to the more sophisticated concept of 'homelands' and promises to move to 'independent' black states, (the 'white areas' comprise approximately 85% of the total land area and include all major towns and cities). The concept remains the same. Moreover there is no indication that the South African Government has moved away from its determination to enforce apartheid through repugnant and oppressive laws, such as the pass laws, banning laws, the terrorism act, discriminatory labour laws etc. African political leaders remain banned, exiled and jailed.

36. The Rapporteur wishes to draw particular attention to the question of Namibia. The blind stubbornness of the South African government in continuing its illegal hold over Namibia, and its total disregard for UN rulings and recommendations could easily produce yet another serious instability with ominous international repercussions. What meaningful actions can our governments take to demonstrate our total condemnation of South Africa and her policies? In the Rapporteur's view the complexity of economic relations makes the imposition of economic sanctions extremely difficult to implement. However, he does
believe that the Security Council's Resolution calling for an arms embargo could be considerably strengthened and made to work. The failure of member countries to implement any positive actions on these lines must undermine black African faith in the seriousness of our intentions.

37. Those who stress the strategic and economic importance of Southern Africa to the West should realise that if these are our sole criteria for attempting to find a settlement then we have little to contribute to a lasting solution. If our only purpose is to achieve the minimum change compatible with ensuring our security interests then we will again find ourselves supporting the wrong side, and this time the stakes in terms of potential conflict are very high.

38. There are those, of course, who will argue that the battle lines are already drawn and that the very survival of the West and indeed the 'free world', depends on thwarting Soviet influence in Southern Africa. One might ask by what right South Africa with 87% of its population rightless and voteless can claim to be part of this 'free world'. We cannot "win" or "lose" in South Africa in absolute terms because if "winning" means supporting the present system, or frustrating natural aspirations, then it will be a very short lived victory. We have a responsibility to try to influence developments in this region, and this responsibility is based on our respect for human dignity and our commitment to greater economic and social justice in the world. We must recognise that to claim that the security of an Alliance founded to protect the principles of freedom and of equality is dependent on the maintenance of a system based on outrageous suppression and a denial of these values, is a total contradiction in terms.

Summary

39. Events in Southern Africa are relevant to the present discussions on detente because they reflect many of the misperceptions and exaggerations concerning the central East-West relationship. Furthermore, as reactions to these events have too frequently been viewed from the East-West perspective, they have tended to enforce the prevailing suspicions of the Soviet Union, regarding both the military balance and its spread of influence.

40. In the Rapporteur's view in both these cases there has been considerable exaggeration and over-simplification, and the results are untimately detrimental to the Alliance. Even the most cursory examination of these issues indicates that the simple interpretation of the Soviet menace is exaggerated and misleading. Certainly we should not be guilty of ignoring Soviet actions, but neither should we be guilty of alarmism or of exaggerating the realities of Soviet power and by consequence of diminishing our own, or of ignoring the very real limitations on Soviet ability to gain influence. Such actions can only lead in one direction, a return to tension and confrontation. The Alliance does not need such development for justification, nor will its ultimate credibility be enhanced by such action.
In the Rapporteur's view it is important that the Alliance learn to adjust to the changing circumstances without returning to Cold War rhetoric. Detente represents a vital period of transition, a period which will inevitably be dominated by continuing suspicion on both sides, and equally a period where competition will continue in many areas. However, this competition should not be allowed to submerge the areas of co-operation and understanding that have been developed, nor should it be allowed to produce exaggerated notions of our own vulnerability, nor finally should it be allowed to distort our attitudes and policies towards external developments so that we ignore local realities and national aspirations.

III. WEST EUROPEAN COMMunist Parties

The problem of assessing the threat to Western security posed by Soviet Power is an issue that has confronted the Alliance since its beginning. However, a more radical challenge is now facing the Alliance through the growth in influence of several West European Communist Parties. The question of Communist power-sharing has become not only a problem for the future structure of the Alliance, it could also become the source of a major difference within the Alliance, particularly between the United States and Europe.

It was widely feared that the Italian elections would provide the Alliance with its first major test on this issue as it was thought that the Italian Communist Party would win a sufficient percentage of votes to guarantee them actual participation in the government. In fact, their support did not increase sufficiently to displace the Christian Democrats as the leading party, but it was enough to guarantee them a powerful, though indirect, say in the governing of the country. Signor Andreotti was able to form a government only with the agreed abstention of the Communist Party and his policies will of necessity be influenced by the priorities of the Communist Party.

However, in the Rapporteur's view the elections did not answer, but merely postponed the questions posed before the elections. The growing relevance of the Communist Party in the eyes of the Italian electorate has been a reflection of its success in local government and its contrast to the apparent irrelevance of the Christian Democrat Party which had failed to provide firm government. Its future success will depend on whether the present Christian Democrat government can succeed in providing the political and economic reforms that Italy needs.

However, the Rapporteur does not intend to analyse in any detail the current political situation in Italy. He will refer to recent events in Italy only in as much as they are relevant to the two issues he considers most important - the growth and future role of Western European Communist Parties and their significance to the Alliance.
46. Opinion regarding the growth and significance of West European Communist Parties is extremely mixed. Many observers regard these parties as the unfortunate but inevitable products of the failures and weaknesses of our own systems, products that cannot be suppressed or ignored, but must be accommodated or defused by eradicating the conditions that produced them. Other more extreme critics regard them simply as manifestations of the International Communist Movement, derived and sponsored from Moscow. To these observers the very term Communist is an anathema and the existence of a Communist Party a direct threat to democratic society, thus they should be opposed wherever they appear. Between these approaches there is a large body of opinion which is both confused and uncertain. Among this group few would disagree that the European Communist Party's are the products of their environments, and not simply agents of Soviet power. But there is great uncertainty as to the precise role and function of these parties, vis-à-vis Moscow and also regarding their ultimate objectives.

47. It is for this reason that the Rapporteur wishes to examine the present position of the parties. In his view they represent an evolutionary process which will have a significant impact on East-West relations and thus on the Alliance itself. Their emergence will mark a further move away from the static and rigidly defined zones of the Cold War, and will necessitate a further reshaping of attitudes and views towards the structure and objectives of the Alliance...There has already been a marked blurring of the lines of tension and conflict through the various paths of 'detente' and the emergence of European Communist Parties will almost certainly contribute substantially to this process. Their actions and policies will either confirm or erode the present 'credibility' gap that exists between their preferred intentions and their presumed objectives. Their evolution will also certainly have a significant effect on concepts and attitudes that are the products of the harsh realities of the Cold War. It is, of course, extremely difficult to come to any definitive judgements on the future role of the parties because all Communist Parties in Western Europe operate from the comfortable position of being outside the immediate power structure. However, in this respect it is particularly significant to examine the position of the Italian Communist Party because it has come close to assuming responsibility in the governing of the country.

The Italian Communist Party

48. During the election campaign the Italian Communist Party (PCI) stressed its moderation and its adherence to the 'bourgeois' political freedoms of free associates, free speech, and the alternation of political parties in power. Furthermore, it continually stressed its independence from Moscow and the right for each party to seek its own path to socialism. This position, however, did not suddenly appear. Over the past two decades the PCI has gradually and increasingly manifested its independence, particularly regarding domestic and inter-party affairs. It has demonstrated this independence by its opposition to the
Soviet 'ex-communification' of China, and its criticism of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the repression of Eastern European countries.

49. During the recent conference of European Communist Parties, Mr. Berlinguer stressed the importance of independence and individuality. He said that the traditional form of international Communist meetings dominated by the Moscow party 'is now outdated and must be abandoned ... the truth is that there is not, and cannot be, any leading party or leading state, this is not the meeting of an international Communist body which does not, and could not, exist in any form, on either the world or the European level'.

50. Mr. Berlinguer also reaffirmed his party's pledge to maintain Italy's membership in the Common Market and in NATO "we are fighting so that the Italian people within the framework of the international alliances to which our country belongs can autonomously decide, without any foreign interference, its own political leadership." The view expressed by PCI officials is that any move towards taking Italy out of NATO would create instability in Europe. They have stated their desire to work towards doing away with the system of military alliances and blocs, but until this is accomplished they do not favour changes forced by unilateral action. This includes budgetary spending and the presence of theatre nuclear weapons. Thus the PCI professes an acceptance of NATO's defence policy and of NATO bases. Mr. Berlinguer has even argued that with regard to the PCI's independence of Moscow NATO could be viewed as a 'useful shield' behind which the PCI could pursue the Italian road to socialism without fear of Soviet intervention. "It is also for this reason that I want Italy not to leave the Atlantic Pact, and not only because our departure would upset the international balance, I feel more secure being on this side .......

The Pan European Conference

51. The PCI is not alone in its bid to establish a new and more flexible relationship with the Soviet Union. Several other European Communist Parties (including those of Spain and France) favour a more independent line. Moscow's efforts to reassert Soviet authority through international conferences have tended, in fact to strengthen these independent tendencies by almost institutionalising the right to dissen...
53. The final document was as important for what it omitted as for what it contained; there was no reference to international proletarianism, no mention of a leading centre, no condemnation of China. The declaration spoke of "equality and sovereign independence of each party, non-interference in international affairs and respect for their free choice of different roads for social change and socialism". It also recognised that "dialogue and co-operation between Communist parties and other democratic and peace-loving forces is necessary .... Communist parties do not consider all those who are not in agreement with their policies as being anti-Communist .... even broader Catholic forces, members of other Christian communities and adherents of other faiths play an important role in the struggle for the rights of the working people and for democracy and peace."

54. Most observers agree that the East Berlin Conference marked a decisive phase in the history of the Communist movement and a definite diminution of Moscow's role and authority. However, despite these developments many critics remain unconvinced of any substantial change. They see the Conference and the speeches of the several leaders who emphasised their right to an independent approach as a tactical move designed to enable the parties to gain electoral support. For other observers, dependence or independence of Moscow does not alter their basic objection to Communist parties which is based on the fact that Communism, whatever its form, is something inherently evil which must be opposed wherever it emerges. Alliance officials point to more practical objections regarding the consequences and implications of Communist participation in an Alliance country:

- on a philosophical basis can an Alliance that was founded to counter the threat of Communist aggression accommodate a government that includes Communists?

- United States officials stress that this development would be difficult for public opinion in the United States to accept, and could therefore lead to pressure for a reduction in the United States commitment;

- a Communist party would inevitably seek to reduce defence expenditure in order to shift resources to other social priorities; such a reduction would impact on to the general equilibrium of power between East-West;

- a Communist Party's attitude to foreign policy would be different, and in time of crisis a Communist Party would inevitably lean towards Moscow;

- to what extent can the European parties be independent of Moscow and does such independence guarantee the maintenance of such a stance once in power?
- to what extent will the participation of one party such as the PCI produce a 'domino' reaction, in which other European countries would move in the same direction;

- although Communist parties have agreed to work within and maintain the democratic pluralistic system can they be relied upon to keep their word?

- once in power would the Communists ever leave? What would prevent the sort of take-overs seen in Europe just after the second World War?

- how could NATO function in the knowledge that Communists would have access to military information of a sensitive nature?

55. A rather wider implication that is frequently overlooked is the effect that Communist participation in Western Europe would have on the countries of Eastern Europe. It has been suggested that an independent Italian Communist Party participating under pluralist conditions would create the demand in Eastern Europe for greater autonomy and possibly reform. The ultimate effect of such demands on the development of East-West relations is difficult to foresee but certainly merits closer examination and discussion.

56. The Rapporteur disagrees with several of these basic objections. With regard to contravening the philosophical basis, the Alliance has already accommodated governments in which Communists have participated, e.g. Iceland and Portugal. Each specific case will have to be judged on its merit and the Alliance reaction will clearly depend on the numbers of Communist Ministers and the positions they hold. In the case of the platform of the PCI with its emphasis on pluralism and democratic freedoms, it would not in the Rapporteur's opinion, contradict the philosophical basis of the Alliance.

- On the question of the allocation of resources, the Rapporteur does not believe that this would be any more of a problem than in the North European countries currently governed by Social Democrats. Moreover, he would point out that it is precisely because insufficient resources have been devoted to curing social and economic problems that the Communist movement has been able to gain electoral support in South European countries. Thus the argument concerning priority of allocation is self-defeating. The more socially satisfied a society the less its population will subscribe to doctrinaire Communism.

- The analogy with the take-overs in Eastern Europe after World War II is hardly appropriate. They were affected against a background of circumstances which bear no relation to the Europe of 1976 and moreover were affected through the military presence of the Red Army.

...
- Finally, on the question of military secrets there are very few "NATO secrets" and in the Rapporteur's view the problem could be dealt with relatively easily.

57. In most discussions on the implications of Communist participation the example of Cunhal's actions in Portugal are frequently quoted as an example of why Communists cannot be trusted. However, it should be remembered that the Portuguese CP and Cunhal in particular was a unique case among European CP's in its attitude to the Soviet Union. Cunhal's experience under Salazar and Caetano and also his lengthy stay in Moscow had given him a very particular perspective on Portuguese society, a deep dislike for NATO because of its failure to act against Caetano and a sense of gratitude and obligation to Moscow. It should also be remembered that he was defeated by popular reaction and because his response was not a nationally inspired one.

58. In the Rapporteur's view the consequence for the Alliance will not come from the direct effects of the participation by Communists in member governments but rather from our own inability to adjust and accommodate to this new development. It is important to realise that Western Communist Parties are social realities that no amount of cajoling or threatening will remove from sight. The position of the United States Administration to the election process in Italy was wrong because it appeared to evolve from the belief that all political behaviour is automatically geared to the East-West context, and that the Italian situation could be made to conform to the demands of international stability.

59. Rather than continuously contemplating worst-case implications and repercussions the Alliance should react to the growing influence of Communist Parties in a pragmatic and measured fashion. Communist participation in any member country should be seen for what it is, a national response to national problems and preoccupations. It should not be represented as a fatal anti-body in the democratic framework of the Alliance. It should be remembered that this framework survived the membership of Portugal under Caetano and Greece under the Colonels neither of which regime showed much liking for the principles of democracy.

60. No one, of course, can be sure that if or when the Communists participate in government they will keep their promises. However, if we cannot predict future developments we can at least refrain from negative actions such as dramatic threats and warnings based on 'worst-case' projections. Such forecasts serve only as self-fulfilling prophecies as they contribute to the very process they are attempting to prevent. Perhaps in our reactions to these developments we are still conditioned too much by semantics and by our past experiences. Thus our assessments of the present situation are based on concepts that are no longer valid. In this respect it is instructive to recollect that for a considerable period many observers in the United States failed to distinguish between Communists and Socialists, and that for several years we did not perceive the very real split between Soviet and Chinese Communism.
61. It is possible, therefore, that the growth of West European Communist Parties does mark a new phase in East-West relations that calls for a fresh response and fresh assessment on our part. The appearance of these parties may not be desirable but it is important to recognise that they are created by the conditions in our own societies and not by outside influences. Dire warnings of international repercussions have no relevance because situations like these are not responsive to the demands of international stability. Such a reaction merely ignores national realities and is ultimately counterproductive. The challenge these parties pose must be faced. The Alliance must show itself capable of adapting to them because there is no alternative. Whether Euro-communism is a passing phenomenon or a development of greater permanence it demands a flexible and pragmatic response. The Alliance has, in the past shown itself capable of real flexibility and in the Rapporteur's view it has the capacity to do so again.

IV. SPAIN

62. Since the interim report in May there have been significant developments in Spain that in the Rapporteur's view necessitate a more detailed analysis of the current situation.

63. The government of Mr. Arias Navarro has been replaced by that of Mr. Suarez who has already adopted several measures which would appear to move the country towards a more democratic and liberal society. However, while welcoming these developments the Rapporteur notes with considerable apprehension the formidable obstacles which remain to be overcome before fully democratic conditions can be installed in Spain.

64. The present situation contains inherent contradictions which must inevitably qualify any optimistic forecast for Spain's future. The essential paradox is that the government is attempting to find a path to democracy within the existing anti-democratic framework when the very changes that it seeks can only be achieved through the elimination of this framework.

65. The institutional and administrative framework erected by Franco and his 'basic law' remain in force. The powerful military and economic interests of the old guard (the Bunker) still retain considerable power and they have so far shown themselves unwilling to entertain the concept of liberalising reforms and certainly not the degree of reform sought by the popular forces. The government is attempting to introduce measures gradually in a fashion that will not provoke this still powerful opposition, but will move the country closer to democracy and satisfy popular demands. The King and his government are faced with the almost impossible task of trying to move fast enough to satisfy popular demand while not moving too quickly and alienating the Bunker. Thus the full powers of the repressive Franco regime remain to intimidate and restrict and it is difficult to envisage real progress until these have been removed.

66. Three groupings have emerged during this transitional period -
(i) the Bunker, the military, economic and administrative institutions established by Franco to perpetuate his role; as this includes the Council of the Realm, many members of the Cortes, senior officers in the armed forces and police, and key figures in the world of finance, it still yields considerable power and stands as a permanent bulwark to reform.

(ii) the King, and his government, supported by a certain section of reform-minded technocrats who accumulated influence and position during Franco's time under his policies; they are now aware of the stultifying effect of his legacy, anxious that Spain should move towards Europe, and aware of the basic requirements of such a move, willing to implement liberal reforms but through the control of the constitutional legitimacy of the King; the King himself is faced with the problem of establishing a democratic legitimacy for his throne based on the sovereignty of the people, as opposed to the personal prerogative of General Franco.

(iii) finally, the popular forces as represented by the many political parties, associations and trade unions; after years of harsh suppression the Opposition is inevitably factionalised on a regional, functional and ideological basis, but they are united in the common desire to achieve real and meaningful reforms that will guarantee true democracy, and they are impatient for change.

67. In July Mr. Arias Navarro resigned as Prime Minister reportedly over disagreements with the King over the slowness of his reform measures. The choice of Mr. Adolfo Suarez as his successor was something of a surprise as he had been Minister responsible for the Falangist movement in the Arias government and President of the right wing Democratic Union. However, under his leadership several liberalising measures have been promulgated, including a general amnesty and a draft electoral programme, and a general atmosphere of tolerance has ensued. Although appreciating and welcoming these measures the Rapporteur must comment that in each case they are limited in application. Most specifically he notes that the air of tolerance has been engendered by changes in attitude rather than substance, the basic laws of the old Franco regime remain in existence as a permanent obstacle to the effectiveness of any liberalising measures.

The Amnesty

68. A general amnesty was announced by the King on 30th July. It was applied to all political prisoners or exiles "who had not endangered or committed attacks against life or the integrity of the human being". Although a considerable number of people have been released there has been some criticism of the slowness of application caused by the military courts which pronounced judgement being required to reconsider each case individually. The government is also still restrictive in its policy towards permitting the return of exiles.
The Freedom

69. There has been substantial movement on the part of the King and his government to provide Spain with what many people regard as the classic principles of democracy, freedom of association, assembly and expression, and a parliament freely elected by universal suffrage. However, for the moment these goals remain in the realm of promise and expectation rather than substance. In all cases, the movement towards relaxation and reform has been restricted by the rigid framework within which it is forced to operate.

70. It is certainly true that there is a general air of relaxation in Spain but this mood is based on tolerance rather than established rights. The government is tolerating many activities that were illegal under the old regime, but has done nothing to alter the laws or dismantle the old structure.

71. Expression - freedom of expression has been introduced in the sense that a critical press now exists and books are freely available. But the censorship laws are still in force and the Minister retains the power of ultimate control. It has been reported that the press is still subject to considerable pressures. The government has maintained full control over the television and radio.

72. Assembly - under the law of May 25th, meetings of more than 25 are permitted, no authorisation is needed for indoor meetings but applications are required for outdoor assemblies.

73. Association political parties may be authorised if they accept preliminary examination and a process of registration, a process which rejects any party that "is subjected to international discipline and aims to establish a totalitarian regime" and which refuses to obey the basic laws still remaining from Franco's regime. These considerations are clearly aimed at the Communist Party which thus remains illegal and excluded from participation in the constitutional future of the country. The Communist Party is said to represent around 10% of the population, but after years of suppression its popular support is difficult to assess. However, whatever its support its exclusion is a clear violation of a fundamental democratic principle.

74. Trade unions are becoming organised but are still not technically recognised. The government's Programme Declaration stated that it "intends to speed up reform of labour laws, and recognise Trade Union freedoms". However, a parliamentary Bill which will be submitted to the Cortes stipulated that unions must show themselves independent from political parties, must apply for government recognition, and set limits on trade union freedoms which the unions regard as unacceptable. Like the political parties the trade unions enjoy much greater freedom to organise and hold meetings but they need full recognition through new laws.

75. The Draft Law on Political Reform - in promulgating the Draft Law the Prime Minister proclaimed that sovereignty rested with the people and that democracy in Spain would be based on the supremacy of law. Legislative powers will rest with the Cortes consisting of a Lower House elected by secret and universal suffrage and a Senate, with members elected on a regional basis. This process will be put to the people in a referendum...
but must first pass the present Cortes by a two-thirds majority.

- already the Ruling Council of the National Movement (the only political party allowed under Franco) has voted to modify and dilute the government's proposals for direct elections to both houses.

- the passage of the Bill through the Cortes (it will be presented in the very near future) will be extremely difficult.

- the Bill itself has been criticised for its ambiguity in several key areas, e.g. what will the relationship be between government and parliament, will the referendum jeopardise the sovereign powers of the elected parliament?

75. The Opposition - there are believed to be between 200 and 300 opposition groups ranging from moderate right to extreme left. The retention of the Francoist institutions and practices has led to this wide spectrum of grouping withholding their support from the government's proposals. They have rejected the draft law on the grounds that the people cannot exercise their sovereignty until granted all freedoms currently denied by the present order. The proposed system will be credible only when all parties can express themselves freely. The opposition parties wish, therefore, to participate in the process of popular consultation, they object to having their future structure handed down without any popular participation. They have therefore demanded immediate freedoms for all parties, including the Communists, the formation of a broadly based provisional government, and prompt elections for an Assembly to write a new Constitution.

The Economy

76. The difficulties facing Spain during this vital transitional period will undoubtedly be compounded by the economic problems she is currently encountering. Any government will have to cope with severe problems and will need help and cooperation from all sectors of the working public.

77. Finally, the government's task is complicated by separatists' demands for regional autonomy and the spasmodic outbursts of violence. These tend to strengthen the position of the extreme right, particularly the army and police, in their demand for stricter measures to improve law and order.

Summary

78. Many observers take the view that Spain has now begun a slow but irreversible march down the road to democracy. Others, however, feel that such optimism is not justified by the present situation and that the still powerful forces of reaction will inhibit and restrict progress to true democracy. Certainly the internal contradictions between the government and the existing framework are all too evident in the uncertain course that the government is pursuing, a curious balance of freedoms granted and freedoms withheld. The most essential problem for the government is to avoid the polarisation of Spanish society. It is attempting to prevent this with measures aimed at satisfying two sets of irreconcilable
forces. These measures have served only to irritate one side and frustrate the other.

79. The government remains the prisoner of Franco's legacy and of the irrational fears of the vested interests who see chaos and anarchy in every reform. Unfortunately, if it continues to placate the Bunker it will inevitably lose whatever credibility it has built up with the Opposition. Thus it must soon make a choice between dismantling the old structure so that freedoms can be legally and permanently established and genuine participation achieved, or maintaining the present balancing act, in which case whatever progress is achieved will probably be too little and too late.

V. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Introduction (*)

80. In his introduction the Rapporteur referred to the new pressures and problems that were beginning to affect the member countries of the Alliance - problems that were not responsive to formulae and solutions devised during the past decade and which in their long term significance transcend the lines of competition between East and West. In his view the problem of the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons is such a problem.

81. In its latest publication SIPRI states that within the next nine years as a by-product of peaceful nuclear proliferation 35 countries will possess the capability to make nuclear weapons. This statement represents the crux of the "proliferation problem". As the development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes has become an increasingly attractive option so the number of nuclear reactors has multiplied, particularly among the developing countries.

82. The rapid advance of technology and its widespread dissemination has meant that the problem of moving from nuclear power for peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear weapons has decreased substantially. Essentially a technical problem during the past 15 years the issue of proliferation has now moved into the political forum.

83. Since World War II five powers have deployed nuclear capable military forces, another state has detonated a single nuclear device, and at least one other state is thought to have several nuclear weapons in a secret reserve. The question that no-one can predict is how long will it be before another country turns its nuclear programme to the production of a nuclear weapon. The question that faces all responsible politicians is what framework can be erected and what procedures devised that will control the proliferation of nuclear power and thus avoid the nightmare of a world full of states equipped with nuclear weapons.

84. Concern over this situation has manifested itself in several areas. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been signed by 115 states and ratified by 100, although there are some notable near-nuclear absentees including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. Considerable concern has been demonstrated recently in the United States and both President Ford and Mr. Carter have made the problem of nuclear proliferation a substantial part of their pre-election programmes. International concern has also been shown by the formation of a suppliers' club aimed at establishing guidelines for future exports of nuclear technology.

85. Despite this political concern it would appear that economic and commercial interests continue to reign supreme. This dominance was demonstrated recently by the sales of France and West Germany of nuclear

* For a discussion of the technical and economic aspects of proliferation members are referred to the Draft Report on Nuclear Energy (T149 STC (76) 11).
facilities, including nuclear processing plants, to Pakistan and Brazil respectively. Although both the latter countries have agreed to inspection and supervision by the IAEA (*), the deals have aroused considerable international criticism. The reason for this criticism is that it is not felt that such agreements provide sufficient constraints to prevent a country from "going nuclear" in the long term.

86. Can proliferation be controlled? The question immediately provokes several others - why should we want to control proliferation, do we have the right to impose restraints and limitations on the freedom of action of developing nations, what means do we have at our disposal, can political control overcome economic and commercial factors, what is the impact of proliferation on our security interests, would proliferation make for a less or a more stable world, and finally what are the realistic chances of establishing a formula that satisfies both the buyers and the sellers of nuclear technology? The list could be extended but these indicate the complexity of the issue.

87. Running throughout these issues are two central themes: firstly the relationship of the "developed" to the "developing" world and our desire to ensure a more equitable distribution of the earth's resources, and secondly the implications of proliferation for the security of the world, particularly from the perspective of the East-West relationship.

Why should we prevent proliferation?

88. Some experts argue that in areas of regional tension possession of nuclear weapons could actually have a stabilising effect in that they would inhibit rather than encourage the use of force. They would make the desire for total victory risky and thus impose more limited aims on potential contestants. For the Rapporteur, however, such a contention is outweighed by the many uncertainties and imponderables involved in the widespread possession of nuclear weapons.

89. In his view the greater the diversification of the possession of nuclear weapons the greater the chance of nuclear war whether by chance or design. The acquisition of a nuclear device by one state would certainly be followed by similar actions by its neighbours. Regional proliferation of this nature has the implied risk that these weapons would at some stage be controlled by irresponsible or unreliable leadership not subject to the usual restraints of international behaviour.

90. Acquisition by developing nations could have the effect of making nations who have already renounced their claim to nuclear weapons and signed the NPT reconsider their decision.

91. Proliferation on this scale would clearly have an adverse effect on the super-power relationship because it would increase the uncertainty of this relationship. It could also have a negative effect on arms control, for example, one could foresee defence experts making a very convincing argument for the return of ABM sites.

92. Finally, any such proliferation must make the scenario of the seizure of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist gang more likely.

* International Atomic Energy Authority
Have we the right?

93. There are clearly an overwhelming number of arguments why we should try to control the export of nuclear technology but have we the right? From our own Eurocentric or "industrialised world" perspective the position is very clear, we and the world, would be much safer if nuclear technology was under strict control. But from the perspective of the "developing" nations the situation is somewhat different.

94. Our efforts to impose procedures and formulae are seen as yet another example of the "have"s dictating terms to the "have nots". These terms are seen to benefit the "have"s and to restrict the freedom of choice of the "have nots", and are thus regarded as discriminatory.

95. There is also a growing feeling of resentment at the implied message in the present formulae being offered, that these countries lack the essential experience, expertise and responsibility to be trusted with this technology.

96. Finally, developing countries see the value of nuclear weapons as symbols of power and prestige, the key to a voice in international affairs, and in the absence of any other criteria this may be their formula for having their voices heard. They can also point to the total failure of the superpowers to make any meaningful move to restrain or reduce their own strategic arms arsenals. It should be remembered that Article IV requires "Each of the Parties to the Treaty... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". Since the Treaty the nuclear weapons stockpiles of each of the superpowers have greatly increased both in numbers and diversity.

97. The resentment and suspicion of the developing nations does not mean that our efforts at proliferation will not work but it does mean that we should make every endeavour to involve them in the establishment of a non-proliferation framework. It must be demonstrated that proliferation is not only a problem for the "have"s and that the industrialised world is acting in the general interest. Procedures must be found to involve the developing nations in the management of the system, it should not remain a seller's monopoly.

What has been achieved?

Economic Background

98. Two ingredients are necessary for the production of a bomb - weapon grade material and technological expertise; present trends make neither an insuperable problem. The question has ceased to be "whether" a country has the capability to make a bomb but how to "dissuade" or "prevent" it from doing so.

99. On a technical level the solution lies in dissuading states from acquiring nuclear fuel cycle facilities that use or produce weapons grade material. Several methods have been suggested -
increasing supplies of uranium, regional multi-national fuel cycle facilities, spent fuel and plutonium repositories, and to create a buyer's market for enrichment and reprocessing services.

100. However, such dissuasion is difficult to implement because it is here that commercial factors appear to override political. In any commercial environment the prospective seller has to make the most advantageous offer and this may not always be commensurate with the interests of non-proliferation. Furthermore there may be many reasons, both political and economic why a buyer may want to have his own facilities.

101. Thus where sales of these facilities take place the maximum that can be asked is that the supplier state insists on the most rigorous set of conditions. Ideally this would involve ratification of the NPT or placing all nuclear facilities under safeguards.

102. However, it must be remembered that whatever the degree of control agreed to these agreements are only as good as the faith of the contracting parties and the efficiency of those responsible for their enforcement. The fact is that no-one can really prevent a state from obtaining a nuclear capability if it so wishes. Thus, despite the necessity of diminishing the opportunity through a strict sales policy and rigid safeguards the problem of preventing proliferation is essentially political in nature.

Political Background

103. As the technical barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons have declined it has increasingly become a political problem. Essentially political factors must become dominant over economic and commercial interests.

104. One over-riding necessity is to reduce the prestige and symbolic importance of nuclear weapons in world politics. This can only be done by the super-powers and until they make meaningful arms control agreements that actually restrain the present vertical proliferation of their own systems it will remain difficult for them to preach the necessity of non-proliferation.

105. Non-nuclear states will normally be led to acquire nuclear weapons as they anticipate receiving political and security benefits from possessing them. As the most likely candidates will be states that are confronted by major challenges to their borders this poses some difficult dilemmas. To what extent will the major powers be prepared to offer disincentives in the way of security guarantees, weapons etc. To what extent is the flow of United States arms to Israel to remove the necessity of the development of a nuclear "deterrent"; what guarantee would we be willing to offer South Africa to dissuade her from developing a nuclear weapon as the ultimate answer to her threatening black neighbours?

106. The political dimension of non-proliferation is thus highly complex. Political awareness and interest is beginning to show itself. The terms and status of the NPT are well known as are its limitations. Despite its lack of effectiveness it is important to realise that its
existence does provide a framework within which to work and a set of objectives. As such it is important and should be continually strengthened.

107. It has been reported that the suppliers club (the original seven, the United States, USSR, France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, Canada and Japan have been joined by Belgium, CSSR, German Democratic Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) reached agreement for the safeguarding of exports of the three most sensitive technologies. It should also be noted that following the severe criticism of its deal with Pakistan the French government is showing signs of flexibility and responsiveness to this international concern. It has been reported that President Giscard has established a high ranking nuclear review committee and that French officials are ready to discuss future nuclear export restraints.

108. The United States has been pushing for a much tougher line, pressing for a ban on exports of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. The United States wants to ensure that nuclear fuel for power is enriched or reprocessed in international installations under IAEA and open to all on equal terms. Hence the friction generated by the French and German sales. If the United States does decide to adopt a tougher line this could lead to serious disagreement and friction within the Alliance.

Conclusions

109. Despite the complexity of the subject there are many areas of improvement to be pursued. Fundamentally it is important to overcome the discriminatory aspects of the implementation of non-proliferation, that is between those countries possessing a nuclear capability and those that do not.

110. Although the NPT is far from perfect it does provide a political framework and a set of objectives; thus every effort should be made to improve its membership and its provisions. The most ideal solution would be to press for a ban on the export of all nuclear technology to non parties to the NPT, but politically and commercially this is not possible. However, the status of the Treaty could be enhanced by:

- the nuclear weapon parties making a more determined effort to carry out their obligations undertaken at the time of the signing of the Treaty - a genuine SALT agreement would demonstrate the seriousness of the super-powers' intentions.

- all countries should be encouraged to join and ratify the Treaty

- every effort should be made to reduce the sale of sensitive fuel facilities and a system developed involving multi-national participation in, and international supervision of, the critical elements of the fuel cycle, thus giving an assurance that nations can obtain the materials and facilities necessary for their power programmes.

- where sales of these critical facilities take place maximum restraints should be demanded from the buyer, i.e. agreement to accept
full IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear programmes (not only on the particular materials concerned).

- international and national safeguards systems should be strengthened and made universal, particularly regarding physical security against theft or sabotage by private groups or individuals.

111. Above all, it should be recognised that whatever terms and controls are agreed the non-acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability is a question of good faith. Therefore all parties, buyers and sellers, should be involved in the acquisition and management of a system of international control.

112. As proliferation is in the final analysis a political problem the dominance of political values over commercial ones must be asserted and the objective of non-proliferation accepted throughout national policy.