

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1991

III

**Assembly Documents**

WEU

PARIS

**ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 – Tel. 47.23.54.32

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART


**December 1991**

III

**Assembly Documents**

WEU

PARIS



The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SEEUWS Willy	SP
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. UYTENDAELE René	CVP

#### Substitutes

MM. CAUWENBERGHS Frans	CVP
COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

#### Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
de GAULLE Jean	RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

### GERMANY

#### Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTOR Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD

MM. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MENZEL Bruno	FDP
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
Mr. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANN'S Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MATSCHIE Christoph	SPD
MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

### ITALY

#### Representatives

MM. BENASSI Ugo	PDS
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FALCUCCI Franca	Chr. Dem.
MM. FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUZZI Elio	PDS
GUIZZI Francesco	Socialist
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MANZOLINI Gianni	Socialist
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	PDS
PIERALLI Piero	PDS
RODOTA Stefano	PDS
RUBBI Antonio	PDS
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

#### Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mrs. FRANCESE Angela PDS  
 MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio Chr. Dem.  
 GRECO Francesco PDS  
 MESORACA Maurizio PDS  
 NEGRI Giovanni Radical  
 PASQUINO Gianfranco Ind. Left  
 RAUTI Giuseppe MSI-DN  
 RUBNER Hans SVP  
 SCOVACRICCHI Martino PSDI  
 STEGAGNINI Bruno Chr. Dem.  
 TRIGLIA Riccardo Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

Mr. GOERENS Charles Dem.  
 Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle Soc. Chr.  
 Mr. REGENWETTER Jean Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mr. DIMMER Camille Soc. Chr.  
 Mrs. ERR Lydie Soc. Workers  
 Mr. KONEN René Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry CDA  
 DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob CDA  
 EISMA Doeke D66  
 JURGENS E.C.M. Labour  
 STOFFELEN Pieter Labour  
 van VELZEN Wim CDA  
 VERBEEK Jan Willem VVD

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth Labour  
 MM. DEES Dick VVD  
 EVERS DIJK Huib CDA  
 van der LINDEN René CDA  
 Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van APPELDOORN Marian H.J. CDA  
 Mr. TUMMERS Nicolas Labour  
 Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine Labour

PORTUGAL

Representatives

MM. CANDAL Carlos Socialist  
 ESTEVES Antonio Socialist  
 FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim Soc. Dem.  
 MOREIRA Licinio Soc. Dem.  
 SILVA MARQUES José Soc. Dem.  
 SOARES COSTA Manuel Soc. Dem.  
 VIEIRA MESQUITA José Soc. Dem.

Substitutes

MM. AMARAL Fernando Soc. Dem.  
 BRITO Rogério PCP  
 CONCEIÇÃO Fernando Soc. Dem.  
 MOTA TORRES José Socialist  
 PINTO Carlos Soc. Dem.  
 ROSETA Pedro Soc. Dem.  
 VARA Armando Socialist

SPAIN

Representatives

MM. ALVAREZ Francisco People's Party  
 BORDERAS Augusto Socialist  
 CUATRECASAS Llibert C.i.U.  
 CUCO Alfons Socialist  
 DIAZ Lorenzo Soc. and Dem.  
 Centre  
 FABRA Juan Manuel People's Party  
 LOPEZ HENARES José Luis People's Party  
 MARTINEZ Miguel Angel Socialist  
 MOYA Pedro Socialist  
 PERINAT Luis Guillermo People's Party  
 de PUIG Luis Maria Socialist  
 ROMAN Rafael Socialist

Substitutes

MM. BARRIONUEVO José Socialist  
 BOLINAGA Imanol Basque Nat.  
 DIAZ DE MERA Agustin People's Party  
 Mrs. FRIAS Milagros Socialist  
 MM. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel Socialist  
 GONZALEZ-LAXE Fernando Socialist  
 Mrs. GUIRADO Ana Socialist  
 MM. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO People's Party  
 Santiago Socialist  
 NÚÑEZ Manuel Socialist  
 PALACIOS Marcelo Socialist  
 RUIZ Alberto People's Party  
 VAZQUEZ Narcis United Left

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. ATKINSON David Conservative  
 COX Thomas Labour  
 Dame Peggy FENNER Conservative  
 Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG Conservative  
 MM. GARRETT Edward Labour  
 HARDY Peter Labour  
 JESSEL Toby Conservative  
 Sir Russell JOHNSTON SLD  
 Earl of KINNOULL Conservative  
 Lord KIRKHILL Labour  
 Mr. PARRY Robert Labour  
 Sir William SHELTON Conservative  
 Sir Dudley SMITH Conservative  
 Mr. SPEED Keith Conservative  
 Sir John STOKES Conservative  
 MM. THOMPSON Donald Conservative  
 THOMPSON John Labour  
 WARD John Conservative

Substitutes

MM. BANKS Tony Labour  
 BOWDEN Andrew Conservative  
 Sir Anthony DURANT Conservative  
 MM. EWING Harry Labour  
 FAULDS Andrew Labour  
 HOWELL Ralph Conservative  
 HUGHES Roy Labour  
 Sir John HUNT Conservative  
 MM. LAMBIE David Labour  
 LITHERLAND Robert Labour  
 Lord MACKIE of BENSHIE SLD  
 Lord NEWALL Conservative  
 MM. RATHBONE Tim Conservative  
 REDMOND Martin Labour  
 Lord RODNEY Conservative  
 Mrs. ROE Marion Conservative  
 MM. ROWE Andrew Conservative  
 SOAMES Nicholas Conservative

***Draft budget of the administrative expenditure  
of the Assembly for the financial year 1991***<sup>1</sup>

***Opinion of the Council***

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

RECAPITULATION OF BUDGET ESTIMATES RESULTING FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM PROPOSAL

APPENDIX

- Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, dated 11th July 1991
- Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, to Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, dated 15th July 1991
- Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, dated 25th July 1991.

***Explanatory Memorandum***

1. At its June 1991 session, the Assembly agreed to a revision of its draft budget on the basis of Document 1241 Addendum 2.
2. This new draft budget was transmitted to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and to the Secretary-General of WEU. The Council's continuing difficulty in giving a unanimous answer became apparent from an exchange of correspondence between the President of the Assembly and the Secretary-General (see appendices).
3. The refusal of a majority of the members of the Council to an increase in the Assembly's budget over 5.51% forced the Assembly to cut down the amounts earmarked for its work in order to be able to recruit two officials on the planned dates, while maintaining its overall budget within the prescribed limits. The President of the Assembly, for his part, had emphasised how impossible it was for the Assembly to reduce credits assigned to its activities in order to offset the creation of new posts.
4. During the visit by the President of the Assembly to London, the Secretary-General of WEU organised a working dinner with the Permanent Council which allowed the deadlock to be broken.
5. A compromise solution was reached because the Council's late approval of the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 would inevitably delay the process of recruitment to fill the two new posts. Consequently, savings could be released from the amounts included in Head I, the overall total of the Assembly's budget thus remaining within the limits of a 5.51% increase.
6. In a letter dated 25th July 1991, reference VII.69, the Secretary-General informed the President of the Assembly that the Council, meeting that day, had officially confirmed its agreement to this solution.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.

*Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Lagorce, Maass (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Roman), Antreter, Bowden (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Büchler, Cauwenberghs, Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: Pedregosa), Greco (Alternate: Stegagnini), Mrs. Haas-Berger (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), MM. Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond, Regenwetter, Silva Marques (Alternate: Fernandes Marques), Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara (Alternate: Soares Costa).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

7. To facilitate an analysis of the problem and the decisions which will have to be taken by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee, a table has been prepared setting out the budgetary implications of the aforementioned solution, showing the inclusion in the 1991 budget of the credits necessary for the recruitment of two new grade A officials. It is understood that the sums relating to certain allowances for these officials which might be committed at the end of the trial period of three months will be requested in 1992.

*Recapitulation of budget estimates resulting from the United Kingdom proposals*

Heads – sub-heads	Draft 1991 budget (Doc. 1241 Add.)	Supplementary budget	Revised budget
<b>HEAD I – PERMANENT STAFF</b>			
Sub-Head:			
1 – Basic salaries .....	10 219 000	+ 155 000	10 374 000
2 – Allowances .....	2 155 000	+ 45 000	2 200 000
3 – Social charges .....	1 977 000	+ 35 000	2 012 000
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials .....	–	+ 86 400	86 400
5 – Medical examination .....	11 000	+ 600	11 600
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>14 362 000</b>	<b>+ 322 000 *</b>	<b>14 684 000</b>
<b>HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF</b>			
Sub-Head:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions .....	2 902 000	–	2 902 000
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assem- bly work between sessions .....	568 000	–	568 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk .....	15 000	–	15 000
9 – Social charges .....	150 000	–	150 000
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>3 635 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>3 635 000</b>
<b>HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</b>			
Sub-Head:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises .....	525 000	–	525 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms .....	10 000	–	10 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions .....	570 000	–	570 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions .....	65 000	–	65 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk .....	15 000	–	15 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture ...	35 000	–	35 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment .....	–	–	–
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment .....	534 000	–	534 000
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>1 754 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 754 000</b>

\* These budget estimates are based on the possibility of creating, with effect from 16th October 1991, one grade A2 post and one grade A5 post, the latter corresponding to the Council's proposal to create a grade A4 post and to regrade an existing grade A4 post to grade A5.

Heads - sub-heads	Draft 1991 budget (Doc. 1241 Add.)	Supplementary budget	Revised budget
<b>HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</b>			
Sub-Head:			
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents .....	560 000	-	560 000
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies .....	280 000	-	280 000
20 - Printing and publication of documents .	1 154 000	-	1 154 000
21 - Purchase of documents .....	70 000	-	70 000
22 - Official cars .....	45 000	-	45 000
23 - Bank charges .....	500	-	500
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>2 109 500</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2 109 500</b>
<b>HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE</b>			
Sub-Head:			
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .....	200 000	-	200 000
25 - Expenses for representation .....	260 000	-	260 000
26 - Committee study missions .....	5 000	-	5 000
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk .....	630 000	-	630 000
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor ....	30 000	-	30 000
29 - Expenditure on information .....	455 000	-	455 000
30 - Expenses for political groups .....	484 000	-	484 000
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for .....	3 000	-	3 000
32 - Non-recoverable taxes .....	28 000	-	28 000
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>2 095 000</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2 095 000</b>
Operating budget .....	23 955 500	+ 322 000	24 277 500
Receipts .....	105 000	-	105 000
<b>NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET .....</b>	<b>23 850 500</b>	<b>+ 322 000</b>	<b>24 172 500</b>
Pensions expenditure .....	3 366 000	-	3 366 000
Receipts .....	621 000	+ 10 000	631 000
<b>NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET .....</b>	<b>2 745 000</b>	<b>- 10 000</b>	<b>2 735 000</b>
<b>NET GRAND TOTAL .....</b>	<b>26 595 500</b>	<b>+ 312 000</b>	<b>26 907 500</b>

*Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1990 to 1991*

	1990 a	1991 b	% $\frac{b-a}{a}$
<b>A. Operating budget</b>			
Head I. Permanent staff	13 292 000	14 684 000	+ 10.47
Head II. Temporary staff	4 045 000	3 635 000	- 10.13
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 576 000	1 754 000	+ 11.29
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 085 500	2 109 500	+ 1.15
Head V. Other expenditure	2 022 000	2 095 000	- 3.61
Total expenditure .....	23 020 500	24 277 500	+ 5.46
Receipts .....	110 000	105 000	- 4.55
NET TOTAL	22 910 500	24 172 500	+ 5.51
<b>B. Pensions budget</b>			
Pensions and leaving allowances .....	3 151 000	3 366 000	+ 6.82
Receipts	572 000	631 000	+ 10.31
NET TOTAL	2 579 000	2 731 000	+ 5.89
GENERAL NET TOTAL	25 489 500	26 907 500	+ 5.56

## APPENDIX

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, dated 11th July 1991*

London, 11th July 1991

.....

During your visit to Bonn on Monday, 8th July, we had the opportunity to discuss, inter alia, developments in connection with the Assembly budget for 1991.

In your letter to Mr. Dumas on 5th June, you expressed the hope that the Council of Ministers would look carefully at the revised draft budget for 1991 which the Assembly adopted on 5th June. You sent me a copy of your letter, but did not enclose a copy of the draft budget. Subsequent to our meeting, the Secretariat of the Assembly sent me a copy of the latter by fax on 9th July.

Following our discussion in Bonn, I raised the issue again at the meeting of the Permanent Council today and have formed the view that the Council would be able to accept an operational budget of F 24 172 000 representing an increase of 5.5% over the equivalent figure for 1990. The pensions figure (F 2 745 000) must of course be added to this, making a total budget for 1991 of F 26 917 000.

This sum covers the effect of inflation and allows the creation of one A2 post from 1st June 1991, the creation of one A4 post from 1st October 1991 and the upgrading of one A4 post to A5 from the same date.

It seems to me that the best way forward would be to submit a revised budget along the above lines. This would enable the Council to reach the required formal decision. I would in that case, of course, do my utmost to help to achieve this as soon as possible.

For your information, I may add that the next sessions of the Council are scheduled for 25th July and 25th September, but the Council may be able to proceed more quickly by silent procedure.

Yours sincerely,  
Willem VAN EEKELLEN

Mr. R. PONTILLON  
President of the Assembly  
of Western European Union  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75775 Paris Cedex 16

*Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly,  
to Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, dated 15th July 1991*

Paris, 15th July 1991

.....

Thank you for your letter of 11th July 1991, sending me your views on what might be the position of the Council concerning the Assembly's budget for the current year. I note that the amount of the operating budget you indicate would not allow the strength of the Office of the Clerk to be increased without reducing the credits under Heads II to V, which are destined to cover the Assembly's work. The Assembly had already voluntarily reduced these credits to a level lower than what would have been necessary to offset inflation.

However this may be, the revised draft budget which the Assembly adopted unanimously at its last session has been transmitted officially to the Council. I should therefore be most grateful if you could

communicate to me the Council's official position, so that I might make this known to the Presidential Committee and to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration which are to meet in Paris on 11th September next in order to prepare the draft budget for 1992.

Yours sincerely,  
Robert PONTILLON

H.E. Mr. Willem VAN EEKELEN  
Secretary-General of WEU  
9, Grosvenor Place  
London SW1X 7HL

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, dated 25th July 1991*

London, 25th July 1991

.....

Since your letter of 15th July concerning the Assembly budget for 1991, we had the pleasure of meeting together with members of the Council or their deputies at a working dinner in London on 18th July.

You will recall that following further clarification and the understanding reached in our exchange of views, you felt able to propose to the Assembly a total budget for 1991 of F 26 917 000.

I am pleased to say that the Permanent Council, at its meeting today formally confirmed its agreement to a global financial ceiling of F 26 917 000 for the 1991 budget which includes an operational budget of F 24 172 000 representing an increase of 5.51% over the equivalent figure for 1990. This is on the understanding that the two new appointments and the upgrading will be made as soon as practicable, but before 31st December 1991. It is also understood that the Assembly will be submitting a revised budget along these lines to the Council for formal approval within the agreed financial ceiling.

I hope the Standing Committee of the Assembly will be able to follow our agreement so that a revised budget can be submitted accordingly.

We also agreed that you would try to submit the draft budget for 1992 as early as possible in order to allow us to schedule a meeting of the Permanent Council in which you could explain the underlying assumptions and objectives.

Yours sincerely,  
Willem VAN EEKELEN

Mr. R. PONTILLON  
President of the Assembly  
of Western European Union  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75775 Paris Cedex 16

## AGENDA

### of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session Paris, 2nd-5th December 1991

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#### I. Report of the Council

Thirty-seventh annual report of the Council  
(first part)

#### II. Political questions

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. General report – activities of the WEU Council                | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee</i>            |
| 2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee</i>           |
| 3. WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU             | <i>Report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee</i> |

#### III. Defence questions

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis | <i>Report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee</i> |
| 2. Arms control negotiations – new initiatives for WEU    | <i>Report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Defence Committee</i>          |

#### IV. Technological and aerospace questions

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force   | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee</i> |
| 2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee</i>     |

#### V. Budgetary questions

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

#### VI. Parliamentary and public relations

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. The evolution of WEU's public relations                                  | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Ewing on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i>         |
| 2. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i> |

**ORDER OF BUSINESS**  
**of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session**  
**Paris, 2nd-5th December 1991**

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**MONDAY 2nd DECEMBER**

**Morning**

Meetings of political groups.

**11 a.m.**

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session.
5. Action by the Presidential Committee:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Soares Costa.  
Debate.
6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. The evolution of WEU's public relations:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ewing on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Address by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece.
2. WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU:  
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**TUESDAY 3rd DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. General report – activities of the WEU Council:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*
2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.  
Debate.

## Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
2. Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland:  
Resumed debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*
3. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft order.*
4. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee.  
Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee.  
Joint debate.

## WEDNESDAY 4th DECEMBER

## Morning 10 a.m.

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council.
2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe;  
Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis:  
Resumed joint debate.

## Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – Address by Mr. Wimmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State to the Ministry of Defence of Germany.
2. European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe;  
Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis:  
*Votes on the draft recommendations.*
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft budget.*
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.*

5. Arms control negotiations – new initiatives for WEU:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Defence Committee.  
Debate.

**THURSDAY 5th DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Arms control negotiations – new initiatives for WEU:  
Resumed debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*
2. Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force:  
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**CLOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION**

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly  
for the financial year 1990*

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**THE AUDITOR'S REPORT**

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  - II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1990.
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- 

***Letter from the President of the Assembly  
to the Auditor submitting the accounts  
for the financial year 1990***

*6th May 1991*

Dear Mr. Arpaillange,

In accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1990 in accordance with the statements attached hereto, which refer to:

1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1990 (Appendix I);

(b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);

(c) Contributions (Appendix III);

(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

As is customary, after being audited these tables will be signed by the President of the Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration before being submitted to the Assembly.

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 710 837, whereas the final statement

of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 720 333. The difference between these two figures, i.e. F 9 496, shows an excess of receipts over estimates:

	F	F
- Bank interest	39 181	
- Sundry receipts	60 189	
- Sale of publications	25 538	
- Contributions 7 %	<u>556 588</u>	
		691 496
- Receipts for 1990 estimated in the budget		<u>682 000</u>
	+	<u>9 496</u>

3. Excess expenditure under Heads IV and V of the operating budget – account being taken of credits blocked under Head V (F 208 000) – amounting to F 328 695 has been met by transfers from other heads of the budget. Excess expenditure under the pensions budget amounting to F 25 000 has been met by a transfer from Head I.

4. The statement of contributions for the financial year 1990 (revised 1990 budget) received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, is given at Appendix III.

5. Amounts in the provident fund of the Assembly staff are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1990, these amounts totalled F 5 603 997 as shown in Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 655 540.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of these funds. On 31st December 1990 the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

6. Also appended to the accounts of the Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed to the political groups drawn up in accordance with the directives issued by the Presidential Committee (document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:

- Unified European Left Group;
- Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats;
- Liberal Group;
- Socialist Group.

These reports will be considered as an integral part of the accounts of the Assembly;

they give details of the use of credits included in Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the Assembly.

Yours sincerely,

Robert PONTILLON  
*President of the Assembly*

Mr. Pierre ARPAILLANGE  
Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes  
13, rue Cambon  
75001 PARIS

***Letter from the Auditor  
to the President of the Assembly***

13th June 1991

Dear Mr. Pontillon,

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1990 together with my opinion and report on these accounts.

Yours sincerely,

Pierre ARPAILLANGE  
*(Premier Président de la  
Cour des Comptes de France)  
Commissaire aux comptes*

Mr. Robert PONTILLON,  
President of the Assembly of  
Western European Union  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson  
75116 PARIS

***Report of the External Auditor  
to the Assembly of Western European Union  
on the accounts for the financial year 1990***

13th June 1991

I have audited the accounts of Western European Union for the financial year 1990 in accordance with Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the correct management of the budget and the book-keeping.

The final statement of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 720 333 due to:

- a saving of F 710 837 in budget authorisations for expenditure and credits;
- higher receipts than the estimated F 9 496.

The total saving in the budget, as shown by the statement of authorisations and expenditure, may be summarised as follows:

	Total credit after transfers F	Total expenditure F	Balance F
<i>Part I:</i>			
<i>Operating budget</i>			
Head I			
Permanent staff	13 217 000	12 908 564	308 436
Head II			
Temporary staff	3 810 590	3 672 540	138 050
Head III			
Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 531 715	1 481 682	50 033
Head IV			
General administrative costs	2 098 765	2 098 750	15
Head V			
Other expenditure	2 337 430	2 129 358	208 072
Head VI			
Premises	6 650 163	6 650 160	3
<i>Part II:</i>			
<i>Pensions budget</i>			
Head I			
Pensions, allowances and social charges	3 176 000	3 169 772	6 228
Total			710 837

The financial situation compared to that on 31st December 1989 has therefore improved significantly compared with the tendency noted when the accounts for previous financial years were audited as shown in the following table:

Final statement of income and expenditure on 31st December of the financial year	Saving on expenditure	Difference between estimates and income
1987: + 35	+ 153 549	- 153 514
1988: + 6 591	+ 82 179	- 75 588
1989: + 106 113	+ 42 973	+ 63 140
1990: + 720 333	+ 710 837	+ 9 496

In particular, it should be noted that, while the result for the financial year shows an accentuation of the tendency noted in previous financial years, it may, because of its magnitude, seem to be due to circumstances. The initial budget had been adopted bearing in mind estimated expenditure of F 708 000 for holding the spring ordinary session away from the seat of the Assembly; since this credit was not required it

was partly unblocked - F 312 000 - and the balance - F 396 000 - is included in the final result.

It should also be noted that there has been an increasingly accurate adjustment of estimated receipts as shown in the budget compared with actual expenditure under the following:

- bank interest;
- sundry receipts;
- sale of publications;
- contributions 7%.

In 1990, there was a credit balance of F 9 496 (F 63 140 in 1989).

\*  
\* \*

Situation of transfers between heads in 1990

	+	-
<i>Part I:</i>		
<i>Operating budget</i>		
Head I	114 300	189 300
Head II	226 284	460 694
Head III	55 115	99 400
Head IV	233 130	219 865
Head V	327 660	12 230
Head VI	323 502	323 502
<i>Part II:</i>		
<i>Pensions budget</i>		
Head I	63 300	38 300
Total	1 343 291	1 343 291

It should be noted that:

There were two transfers from Head I, i.e.:

- F 25 000 to Head I of the pensions budget;
- F 50 000 to Head II, Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk.

These transfers were made in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations.

Net transfers between heads were mainly to Head V - Other expenditure (+ F 315 430) and in particular:

- 24: Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of

the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs;

- 27: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk;
- 29: Expenditure on information.

Due to the transfers effected, the credits opened increased respectively from one financial year to another by:

- Sub-Head 24: + 61.7%
- Sub-Head 27: + 29.2%
- Sub-Head 29: + 26.1%

As pointed out when the 1989 accounts were audited, estimates under a certain number of sub-heads seem to have been included without any precise thought for the needs or even the tendencies noted previously in the way credits are spent, thus forming reservoirs that are available during the year for other purposes; such transfers therefore significantly modify the shape of the budget initially adopted.

As an example:

*Head II (temporary staff)*

Sub-Head 6.3: Translation service  
- 16.72% (- 14 % in 1989)

Sub-Head 7: Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions  
- 33% (- 11.5% in 1989)

*Head IV (General administrative costs)*

Sub-Head 20: Printing and publication of documents  
- 19.4% (- 12.7% in 1989)

\*  
\* \*

Having completed this audit, I thank the Clerk and staff of the Assembly for their co-operation in the exercise of my duties as Auditor.

Pierre ARPAILLANGE  
(Premier Président  
de la Cour des Comptes de France)  
Commissaire aux Comptes

*Certificate of the Auditor for the financial year  
1st January to 31st December 1990*

13th June 1991

In application of Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of Western European Union, I have examined the appended financial statements of the Assembly comprising the summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1990.

My examination included verification of the books and other relevant documents that I deemed necessary.

As a result of this examination, my opinion is that these statements faithfully record the bookkeeping operations for the financial year and that these operations were in conformity with the budget estimates, the Financial Regulations, the financial instructions and other decisions of the legislative authority, and that they are a correct record of the financial situation for the year ended 31st December 1990.

Pierre ARPAILLANGE  
(Premier Président  
de la Cour des Comptes de France)  
Commissaire aux Comptes

## APPENDIX I

*Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1990*

(in French francs)

*Per attached statement*

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III) .....	32 139 663
---	------------

*Miscellaneous*

<i>(A) Sundry receipts</i>	
Bank interest .....	39 181
Sundry receipts .....	60 189
Sale of publications .....	25 538
<i>(B) Pensions</i>	
Contributions (7%) .....	<u>566 588</u>
	<u>691 496</u>
Budget credits .....	32 831 159
Total expenditure (see Appendix II) .....	<u>32 110 826</u>
Excess of income over expenditure .....	F <u><u>720 333</u></u>

*Financial position as at 31st December 1990**Assets*

Contributions received .....	4 351 671
Miscellaneous debtors .....	65 847
Contributions 7% .....	21 744
Non-recoverable taxes .....	<u>1 963 418</u>
	F <u><u>6 402 680</u></u>

*Liabilities*

Balance at the bank .....	4 359 075
Miscellaneous creditors .....	14 841
Sums paid .....	1 308 431
Excess of income over expenditure .....	<u>720 333</u>
	F <u><u>6 402 680</u></u>

*Certified correct:*

Robert PONTILLON  
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS  
Clerk of the Assembly

Tim RATHBONE  
Chairman of the Committee  
on Budgetary Affairs  
and Administration

## STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE

(in French francs)

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1990	
A.1. - ORDINARY EXPENDITURE			
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Basic salaries	9 389 000	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Allowances		
2.1.	Expatriation allowance	881 000	
2.2.	Household allowance	407 000	
2.3.	Allowance for children and other dependent persons	472 000	
2.4.	Rent allowance	85 000	
2.5.	Education allowance	60 000	
2.6.	Allowance for language courses	2 000	
2.7.	Overtime	59 000	
2.8.	Home leave	61 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Social charges		
3.1.	Social security	1 254 000	
3.2.	Supplementary insurance	415 000	
3.3.	Provident fund	167 000	
<i>Sub-Head 4</i>	Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials		
4.1.	Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts	-	
4.2.	Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	-	
4.3.	Removal expenses	30 000	
4.4.	Installation allowance	-	
<i>Sub-Head 5</i>	Medical examination	10 000	
Total of Head I		13 292 000	

X II

## ID UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1989

(cs)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		75 000	9 314 000	9 125 233	188 767
			881 000	850 735	30 265
			407 000	383 567	23 433
			472 000	447 957	24 043
		21 500	63 500	56 160	7 340
			60 000	59 079	921
			2 000	-	2 000
	21 500		80 500	80 470	30
			61 000	56 001	4 999
		42 800	1 211 200	1 197 582	13 618
		50 000	365 000	352 510	12 490
	3 500		170 500	170 426	74
			-	-	-
			-	-	-
	86 500		116 500	116 044	456
			-	-	-
	2 800		12 800	12 800	0
	114 300	189 300	13 217 000	12 908 564	308 436

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1990	
<b>HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF</b>			
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly		
6.1.	Sittings service	1 575 000	
6.2.	Interpretation service	685 000	
6.3.	Translation service	915 000	
6.4.	Other services	42 000	
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	640 000	
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Social charges		
9.1.	Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	16 000	
9.2.	Provident fund for interpreters	150 000	
9.3.	Insurance for interpreters	7 000	
<b>Total of Head II</b>		<b>4 045 000</b>	
<b>HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</b>			
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	400 000	
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Hire of committee rooms	10 000	
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	555 000	
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Various services for the organisation of sessions	100 000	
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	13 000	
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Purchase or repair of office furniture	35 000	
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	2 000	
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	461 000	
<b>Total of Head III</b>		<b>1 576 000</b>	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		80 384	1 494 616	1 356 616	138 000
137 455			822 455	822 451	4
		153 710	761 290	761 283	7
20 880			62 880	62 874	6
		211 990	428 010	428 002	8
67 949			82 949	82 945	4
		6 000	10 000	9 990	10
		6 220	143 780	143 775	5
		2 390	4 610	4 604	6
226 284		460 694	3 810 590	3 672 540	138 050
		36 510	363 490	363 482	8
		6 500	3 500	3 500	0
		4 130	550 870	550 863	7
28 250			128 250	78 248	50 002
14 350			27 350	27 340	10
		8 080	26 920	26 919	1
12 515			14 515	14 513	2
		44 180	416 820	416 817	3
55 115		99 400	1 531 715	1 481 682	50 033

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1990	
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	280 000	
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Printing and publication of documents	1 120 000	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Purchase of documents	65 000	
<i>Sub-Head 22</i>	Official cars	140 000	
<i>Sub-Head 23</i>	Bank charges	500	
Total of Head IV		2 085 500	
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Head 24</i>	Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	190 000	
<i>Sub-Head 25</i>	Expenses for representation	230 000	
<i>Sub-Head 26</i>	Committee study missions	5 000	
<i>Sub-Head 27</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk	680 000	
<i>Sub-Head 28</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	30 000	
<i>Sub-Head 29</i>	Expenditure on information	455 000	
<i>Sub-Head 30</i>	Expenses for political groups	403 000	
<i>Sub-Head 31</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	
<i>Sub-Head 32</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	26 000	
Total of Head V		2 022 000	
Total		23 020 500	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	145 580		625 580	625 576	4
		2 765	277 235	277 233	2
		217 100	902 900	902 899	1
	8 610		73 610	73 606	4
	78 760		218 760	218 760	0
	180		680	676	4
	233 130	219 865	2 098 765	2 098 750	15
	114 470		304 470	304 467	3
	36 020		266 020	266 014	6
		5 000	-	-	-
	72 530		752 530	544 530	208 000
	23 350		53 350	53 342	8
	81 290		536 290	536 282	8
			403 000	403 000	0
		1 520	1 480	1 455	25
		5 710	20 290	20 268	22
	327 660	12 230	2 337 430	2 129 358	208 072
	956 489	981 489	22 995 500	22 290 894	704 606

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1990	
A.2. - EXTRAORDINARY EXPENDITURE			
HEAD VI - PREMISES			
<i>Sub-Head 33</i>	Reorganisation of the building		
<i>Sub-Head 33.1</i>	Feasibility study	7 300	
<i>Sub-Head 33.2</i>	Work on utilities	5 129 315	
<i>Sub-Head 33.3</i>	Prime contractorship	126 645	
<i>Sub-Head 34</i>	Installation of committee rooms		
<i>Sub-Head 34.1</i>	Interpretation equipment	930 174	
<i>Sub-Head 34.2</i>	Furnishing committee rooms	263 947	
<i>Sub-Head 34.3</i>	Furnishing corridor	36 000	
<i>Sub-Head 35</i>	National delegation offices		
<i>Sub-Head 35.1</i>	Furniture and other office equipment	118 000	
<i>Sub-Head 35.2</i>	Typewriters	12 000	
<i>Sub-Head 36</i>	Lounge in the first basement	26 782	
Total of A.2		6 650 163	
Total of Part I		29 670 663	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		7 300	0		0
			5 129 315	5 129 314	1
			126 645	126 644	1
		316 202	613 972	613 972	0
	75 858		339 805	339 805	0
	4 239		40 239	40 239	0
	175 255		293 255	293 254	1
			12 000	12 000	0
	68 150		94 932	94 932	0
	323 502	323 502	6 650 163	6 650 160	3
	1 279 991	1 304 991	29 645 663	28 941 054	704 609

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET		Total budget for 1990	
<b>HEAD I – PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES</b>			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	<b>Pensions and leaving allowances</b>		
1.1.	Retirement pensions	2 582 000	
1.2.	Invalidity pensions	239 000	
1.3.	Survivors' pensions	54 000	
1.4.	Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–	
1.5.	Leaving allowances	–	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	<b>Family allowances</b>		
2.1.	Household allowances	116 000	
2.2.	Children's and dependants' allowances	42 000	
2.3.	Education allowances	35 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	<b>Supplementary insurance</b>	83 000	
<b>Total of Head I</b>		<b>3 151 000</b>	
<b>Total</b>		<b>32 821 663</b>	

Robert PONTILLON  
President of the Assembly

Georg  
Clerk

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	56 300		2 638 300	2 638 247	53
	4 700		243 700	243 637	63
	300		54 300	54 285	15
			-	-	-
			-	-	-
	2 000		118 000	117 808	192
		18 300	23 700	23 076	624
		13 000	22 000	19 763	2 237
		7 000	76 000	72 956	3 044
	63 300	38 300	3 176 000	3 169 772	6 228
	1 343 291	1 343 291	32 821 663	32 110 826	710 837

MOULIAS  
the Assembly

Tim RATHBONE  
Chairman of the Committee on  
Budgetary Affairs and Administration

## APPENDIX III

*Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1990*

	F	F
1990 budget C-B (89) 24	25 459 500	
Brought over from 1989 C-B (90) 9	6 601 941	
Supplementary budget to the extraordinary budget C-B (90) 23	<u>424 000</u>	
Sub-total	32 485 441	
Carried over to 1991	- 345 778	
NET TOTAL	<u>32 139 663</u>	
Contributions received for 1990:		
8th February 1990		1 127 432.50
14th February 1990		545 233.75
4th April 1990		1 108 950.00
30th April 1990		2 545 950.00
14th May 1990		3 840 141.25
14th May 1990		2 760 580.95
18th May 1990		1 108 950.00
28th June 1990		3 859 545.32
20th August 1990		2 673 278.95
15th October 1990		1 283 355.55
31st October 1990		849 764.41
7th November 1990		3 797 708.75
29th December 1990		849 764.41
4th January 1991		2 538 974.79
31st January 1991		1 265 937.69
15th March 1991		546 758.52
Balance at the close of 1989:		
Brought over from 1989		1 331 222.92
Surplus for 1989		<u>106 113.24</u>
TOTAL PAYMENTS		<u>32 139 663.00</u>

APPENDIX IV  
**PROVIDENT FUND**  
**ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1990**

*in French francs*

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1990	4 771 055	Withdrawals	21 647
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	252 023		
Repayments of loans by staff members	177 600	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December	5 603 997
Interest received during the year	426 562	Loss on valuation at 31st December 1990	1 596
	5 627 240		5 627 240

Robert PONTILLON  
*President of the Assembly*

Georges MOULIAS  
*Clerk of the Assembly*

Tim RATHBONE  
*Chairman of the Committee on  
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

## APPENDIX V

*1990 Balance sheet for the Unified European Left Group*

<i>Assets</i>		F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....		-
2. Interest .....		-
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1990 .....		44 042
 <i>Liabilities</i>		
I. Expenditure		
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....		16 141
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....		7 666
3. Seminars and meetings .....		8 263
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....		4 315
5. Interpretation costs .....		3 787
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....		3 186
7. Sundry expenses .....		684
II. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....		-
Total .....		44 042
Signatures of the Treasurer (PIERALLI) .....		
and two auditors of the group (BENASSI) .....		

## APPENDIX VI

*1990 Balance sheet for the Federated Group  
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....	219 424.60
2. Interest .....	12 494.48
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1990 .....	<u>156 004.00</u>
Total .....	387 923.08

*Liabilities*

## I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	69 000.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	682.60
3. Seminars, meetings and interpretation costs .....	28 400.65
4. Travel and subsistence (members and staff) .....	<u>48 554.21</u>
Total .....	146 637.46

II. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash) .....	<u>241 285.62</u>
Total .....	387 923.08

Signatures of the Treasurer (JUNG, Dudley SMITH) .....

and two auditors of the group (VALLEIX, LENTZ-CORNETTE)

## APPENDIX VII

*1990 Balance sheet for the Liberal Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....	43 096.16
2. Interest .....	1 901.31
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1990 .....	<u>68 761.00</u>
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>113 758.47</b>

*Liabilities*

## I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	25 320.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	9 680.00
3. Seminars and meetings .....	20 658.83
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	3 800.00
5. Interpretation costs .....	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	6 500.00
7. Sundry expenses .....	<u>600.00</u>
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>66 558.83</b>

II. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash) .....	<u>47 199.64</u>
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>113 758.47</b>

Signatures of the Treasurer (VOHRER) .....

and two auditors of the group (MARTINO, IRMER) .....

## APPENDIX VIII

*1990 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1989 (bank accounts, cash) .....	156 475.14
2. Interest .....	12 116.44
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1990 .....	134 193.00
4. Sundry assets .....	<u>216.00</u>
Total .....	303 000.58

*Liabilities*

## I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	82 561.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	2 475.00
3. Missions and meetings .....	26 889.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	20 201.00
5. Seminars .....	-
6. Interpretation costs .....	18 750.00
7. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	-
8. Sundry expenses .....	<u>291.00</u>
II. Surplus at 31st December 1990 (bank accounts, cash) .....	<u>151 833.58</u>
Total .....	303 000.58

Signatures of the Treasurer (LAGORCE) .....

and two auditors of the group (GARRETT, TUMMERS) .....

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly  
for the financial year 1990*

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**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY  
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1990 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of  
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1990, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 17 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Lagorce, Maass (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Roman), Antretter, Bowden (Alternate: Lord Mackie of Benshie), Büchler, Cauwenberghs, Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: Pedregosa), Greco (Alternate: Stegagnini), Mrs. Haas-Berger (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), MM. Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond, Regenwetter, Silva Marques (Alternate: Fernandes Marques), Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara (Alternate: Soares Costa).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

## INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

*(22nd May – 30th September 1991)*

London, 23rd October 1991

.....

In the summer of 1991 we have seen the springtide of peoples that first flowered in 1989 and 1990 lead to the disintegration of two federations, whose arduous creation had so marked the first half of the century. As little as six years ago, one of them, the Soviet Union, was still seen as a world super-power and regarded as a formidable potential threat. Today it is a country that has lost its bearings, its borders frayed and torn, in quest of immediate food aid and facing a perilous future. The other country, Yugoslavia, created by the will of the Slavs in the south in the aftermath of the first world war, and elevated to a federal republic in 1946, followed by nearly four decades of stability which had almost made it a model in a Europe divided by the cold war, is once again the battleground for bloody ethnic conflict.

The second major event has been the final dispelling of the Marxist/Leninist myth in Russia. This imposture, with its declared aim to liberate humanity and its price the subjection to single-party rule, was nonetheless regarded by many great minds in the early 1980s as “the intranscendible horizon of our times” despite the manifest economic failure of most of its embodiments and despite its totalitarianism and police state methods.

Yugoslavia's unhappy fate is just one more illustration of how vain and illusory were the expectations that once the Soviet adversary had vanished there would be the “end of history”. It is only natural that the abolition of an ideological colonialism concealing a perennial lust for conquest should light a flame of nationalism. Adding fuel to that flame has been the instinctive reflex to search for an identity, the most spontaneous and visible expressions being the rediscovery of national history and ethnic roots and a return to the values of religion. The fact that this has led to demands – all the more vigorously pressed in that the yoke of oppression had been so heavy to bear – does not mean that violence is unavoidable, still less justifiable. What is vital now is that the flame should not be fanned.

In celebrations of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo on 28th June 1989, Slobodan Milosevic delivered a harangue in which he combined nationalism and populism, communism and demagogy. He said that Serbia, lauded as the founder nation, had a mission to protect Yugoslav integrity. On several occasions thereafter he held up the Croats and Albanians as the scapegoats, raising the temperature in such a way as to help place Yugoslavia on the path towards dismemberment and then conflagration.

Since last June, the federal army, dominated by its Serb officers who are generally loyal to communist ideology, has been nibbling away at the Croat frontiers – historic frontiers that were in essence confirmed by the 1946 constitution. Encouraged by the absence of foreign reaction to the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, the army has pursued its campaign, despite the agreed moratorium and despite several cease-fires. With the shifting front lines characteristic of any civil war, it is hard to distinguish between the rôles of aggressor and victim. Today, however, the conflict is gradually emerging as a war of aggression by a civil and military apparatus comparable to the group that was behind the abortive coup in Moscow. Its objectives in fact appear to be the control of Slavonia and Dalmatia.

Faced with this situation, can Europe beat about the bush much longer, paralysed by the fear of creating a precedent? Can it just stand by and watch? Can there be dual standards depending on what is at stake, Croatia or Kuwait? These are weighty questions, for the future of democracy to the east of our continent might one day depend on the response we decide to make to them in the short term. The Yugoslav situation also forces us to reflect on how far the right of interference should be stretched if the aim is to prevent crises that would generate great risks in Europe, not just political risks but also in terms of socio-economic development and the environment.

Europe must act for the simple reason that all the alternatives to action, all the pretexts for inaction, might well have consequences far worse than those of an engagement whose rules are yet to be laid down and the conditions for which have been clearly defined. Our continent may be on the

threshold of a new era of conflict, both within and around the regions made all the more vulnerable by ethnic or frontier claims. The scale of the effort needed in order to reinforce democracy and improve the standard of living of tens of millions of Europeans renders undesirable and unrealistic any policy of ringing areas of instability with a cordon sanitaire, abandoning them to the throes of declared or insidious civil war. The responsibilities incumbent on Western Europe transcend the interests at stake and impose a duty on Europe to intervene realistically to help create the conditions for peacemaking and peacekeeping. If a policy of stirring up trouble, a desire to redraw frontiers by force, is allowed to take hold, a dangerous precedent will have been set.

European action to consolidate a cease-fire in Yugoslavia is inconceivable unless it is sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (whose Resolution 713 has now given clear support for Community action), and endorsed by CSCE, decided by the Twelve and implemented by the WEU Nine which, as a body, has available the bulk of European military resources for a peacekeeping operation. Certain countries of Central Europe have expressed the wish to be associated with an initiative of this kind if the situation so demands.

The Gulf conflict cannot be referred to as a precedent: in a Yugoslavia in turmoil, the opposing forces are the army and the government on the one hand, the republics among themselves on the other. Apart from stabilising the situation in the short and medium term, a European reaction might well accelerate current developments in three institutional circles. The first is in CSCE. The Yugoslav crisis offers an opportunity for a further step forward towards its institutionalisation. The creation of a European court of arbitration for the settlement of conflicts among minorities and the frontier disputes that sometimes ensue has been proposed and is being debated. Secondly, in the Community, the urgent need for progress towards common foreign and security policies, with all that entails in the way of parallel strategic thinking, is increasingly evident. Thirdly, in WEU, the milestone is the assignment of a truly operational rôle and a definition of the resources with which it should be equipped if it is to perform that rôle.

The implications of a European commitment to peace in the Balkans are now being considered by the WEU ad hoc Group, reactivated by a decision of the Ministerial Council in The Hague on 19th September last. In the future, the ability of Europeans to guarantee the stability of the continent depends a good deal on the Nine's concerted conversion of their military apparatus, an apparatus primarily planned and trained to defend a specific area in Germany against possible conventional aggression that might involve the use of chemical and nuclear weapons.

The disintegration of the former Soviet Union requires us to maintain a credible collective defence. Everything that used to make up Soviet patriotism is up for grabs. The failure of the coup has precipitated the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party and brought the bureaucratic incarnation of the communist dream to an end. The real power is now in the hands of the republics. In some places their independence raises the problem of frontier demarcation. The arrangements for their association in matters of foreign policy and defence may depend on those frontiers, as may the size of their respective armies. The problem of maintaining a flow of trade and economic exchange becomes endemic if each republic intends to retain closer control over its own resources. The question of the control of industry and nuclear weapons in itself symbolises the complexity of a situation that offers much scope for confrontation among the republics, many of which are also subjected to centrifugal pressures.

In a continent whose map will perhaps be more fragmented than ever before in its tumultuous history, is it right that Europe aspires no higher than to be a free trade area? A pole of stability, the WEU Nine and the Community Twelve must confront the perils of the current situation and lead the way for a new European renaissance. The process of European union will have to adjust to the vitality of the democracies of Eastern Europe and of those countries whose fate we mistakenly believe we could settle at not too great a cost after the two great European civil wars. The Community was brought into being to prevent the recurrence of war. Its exemplary success must be extended eastward. The self-affirmation of nations revived or rediscovered must not once again become an instrument of their destruction or enslavement. On the contrary, this precious right to one's own identity, a right they so ardently espouse, may be a sound and proper milestone on the journey towards European unity.

The goal of harmonising European architecture will be not so much to create a homogenous Europe as to build a coherent Europe out of a whole variety of elements: historic nations, provinces and regions, where the desire to live their own lives is being affirmed by peoples whose very diversity is enriching. A united Europe is not a single Europe, but a Europe that is at one with itself.

The institutional arrangements whereby the Twelve can become a true interlocutor on the international scene is the issue at the heart of the intergovernmental conference on political union. Europe must be able to express clear political choices with a single voice in the service of its specific interests on a global scale, not just continental or regional.

Today, however, there is a strong risk of imbalance in the move towards European union. If we were merely to deepen the economic dimension of European integration without taking great strides towards a common foreign and security policy, little scope would be left for responding to the claims and expectations of the new democracies. To a great extent our own stability and prosperity depend on their political stability and their economic development. Our priority should be to export more economic aid and therefore more democracy rather than the reverse. Economics, however, is a tool of political action. Economic union should accompany, not precede, political union, so that the European Community and WEU should be fully capable – each within its own respective sphere – of serving as frameworks of reference for the solution of the major problems that arise on the continent of Europe. The single market is an historic opportunity to move forward to a strong, prosperous and united Europe which will, through this strength, have the resources and dynamism needed to open out something that has already been accepted. In principle, this opening out will also lead to a broadening, although it must not be a false trail for its future beneficiaries, who rightly vest so many of their hopes in its future realisation. Monetary union is arguably the model for deepening Europe, thus paving the way for enlargement given the resources that it would help to release, in particular for a policy of investing in Eastern Europe.

Europe's malady is its refusal to act as a collective power, hence its reluctance at the prospect of rapidly acquiring a military instrument that would enable it to stand up for itself. This instrument is vital, however, in that the issue at stake in the future is not so much defence within Europe as the means of providing for the defence of Europe. With yesterday's Gulf conflict, with the jolts and shocks of Yugoslavia today, history is offering Western Europe an opportunity to progress towards the organisation of its security and stability.

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Since 21st May, the *Permanent Council* has met three times at ministerial level (on 27th June in Vianden [Luxembourg] and, to discuss the repercussions of the Yugoslav crisis, in The Hague on 19th September, and then in Brussels on 30th September). The Permanent Council met in London on eight occasions (on 21st May, 10th June as an enlarged Council to prepare for the Ministerial Council in Vianden, 26th June, 5th, 11th and 25th July and 7th August, to discuss the worsening situation in Yugoslavia, and finally on 18th September).

On the political side, the Council's discussions over this period continued to bear on developments in the situation in the Middle East, WEU's rôle and place in the new European security architecture, contacts with the democratically-elected countries of Central and Eastern Europe and relations with third countries who are members of the Community or the Atlantic Alliance.

Preparations for the Vianden ministerial meeting were the main subject of the meeting of the Permanent Council on 21st May and the enlarged Council on 10th June. In its discussions, the Council concentrated on the discussion paper for ministers on WEU's rôle and place in the emerging European security architecture, which was revised to take into account the positive outcome of the North Atlantic Ministerial Council in Copenhagen. Other reports to ministers were the reviews of work on space co-operation, co-operation in the field of verification and relations with Central and Eastern European countries.

At the Permanent Council on 26th June, the United Kingdom representative explained the proposals made by the United Kingdom Minister of Defence as regards British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe, on which SACEUR had made his views known in accordance with Article VI of Protocol II of the modified Brussels Treaty. On 11th July, the Permanent Council took note of the United Kingdom's intentions in this respect.

At the time of their meeting in Vianden on 27th June, WEU ministers made a public statement on the Yugoslav situation and issued a press release summarising the main guidelines for the work of the working groups during the second half of 1991. The decision reached by ministers to set up a WEU satellite centre was a major step forward towards European space co-operation.

The Permanent Council meeting on 5th July marked the transfer of the Presidency of the WEU Council from France to Germany. The sudden deterioration in the situation in Yugoslavia was a matter of particular concern for the delegations, who reviewed current diplomatic efforts, especially within the framework of CSCE and the Twelve. This problem together with the problem of Iraq, was one of the main issues discussed at the Council meetings on 11th and 25th July. The German Presidency convened a meeting of the Permanent Council on 7th August, in the wake of the EPC extraordinary ministerial meeting at The Hague. This meeting was devoted solely to the deterioration in the hostilities between Croats and Serbs and the options open to WEU in terms of a contribution towards maintaining the agreed cease-fire.

The meetings on 11th July and 18th September were also the occasion for considering the mandates given by ministers on 27th June and to debate the prospects for developing contacts with the democratically-elected countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The extraordinary ministerial meetings on 19th and 30th September were devoted to the Yugoslav situation and were held in The Hague and Brussels respectively. At these meetings the WEU ad hoc Group was activated and its first report considered. The work of these meetings was subject to the rules of confidentiality and the Assembly has been informed of their content separately by the WEU Council Presidency.

The Council *Special Working Group* (SWG) and the *Defence Representatives Group* (DRG) held two series of meetings (one series on 17th and 18th July, the other on 16th and 17th September). The *Special Working Group* continued to review all the fields of potential co-operation that might strengthen WEU's operational nature and intensify the politico-military concertation within WEU in order to contribute to the work of both the Atlantic Alliance and the Twelve, with particular regard for the future development of CSCE and disarmament negotiations on the one hand and the items on the agenda for the Twelve having security implications.

Contacts with Central and Eastern Europe were considered with a view to their intensification, on the basis of three initiatives. The first has been to set up information links with Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. These links have now been established with their embassies in London and will continue at ministerial level between the minister of foreign affairs in the country holding the WEU Presidency and his counterparts in the three countries concerned. The next has been to hold a seminar under the auspices of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, attended by officials responsible for politico-military affairs within the defence and foreign ministries of WEU member states and their counterparts from the five countries of Central and Eastern Europe. On 18th September the Permanent Council decided to invite Bulgaria and Romania as well. Lastly, joint Presidency/Secretariat missions are going to Bulgaria and Romania. The question of WEU's future relations with the former Soviet Union and its republics is likely to be a major topic of discussion for the Special Working Group in the near future.

The *Defence Representatives Group* has been tackling an ambitious work programme since the Vianden meeting:

- a review of the withdrawal of the coalition forces from northern Iraq and southern Turkey and the conclusion of mine-clearing operations in the Gulf;
- a study of the military repercussions of WEU being assigned a more operational rôle. The prerequisite for this study is a review of the possible tasks for WEU's future operational capability and the needs that will arise. Another prerequisite, from a more institutional viewpoint, is an analysis of new military co-ordination and operational planning structures which will prove to be necessary as soon as the political decisions have been taken;
- the relaunching of European co-operation in the field of armaments due to the fairly slow progress being made by other existing bodies. This item will be retained on the group's agenda;
- Europe's strategic mobility needs, currently the subject of an in-depth Franco-German study to be forwarded to the group as soon as possible;
- co-operation among member states' defence colleges is also on the group's agenda.

With regard to the broader aspects of European security, the DRG has continued with its review of the military situation in Europe in the context of the implementation of the CFE Treaty. It has also discussed situations that might create a threat to peace, including the ballistic weapon threat, particularly in the southern region.

The *Mediterranean Sub-Group* of the Special Working Group met on 18th June and 20th September. In continuing with its discussion of risk situations, the group covered the situation in the Balkans, Algeria, the Sahara and Cyprus as well as the development of both bilateral and multilateral co-operation relationships between the four WEU member countries most concerned and the five partners in the Arab Maghreb Union. Pursuant to the ministerial mandate it was given on 10th December 1990, confirmed in Vianden on 27th June 1991, the group continued its work on defining the essential principles that might serve as the basis for future efforts for settling security questions in the Mediterranean. The draft CSCM was discussed with this in mind. The group felt that, with the Gulf conflict and the Middle East peace conference, it would be premature to launch this initiative. A comparison of the work and discussions on security in the Mediterranean (European political co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance and the United Nations) confirmed the specific nature and value of the WEU Mediterranean Sub-Group, which will henceforth work in liaison with the Defence Representatives Group on subjects of common interest to the two groups.

*Experts on the verification of arms control agreements* met three times at the Secretariat (on 26th July and on 3rd and 27th September). Their agenda included many exchanges of information and also the procedures for practical co-operation on the implementation of an open skies agreement, the procedures for opening national inspection teams of member states, co-operation on the training of inspectors and inspection exercises.

On 10th September the *Special Working Group disarmament experts* held a meeting devoted mainly to discussing the foreseeable consequences of events in the former Soviet Union on disarmament efforts, and the content and institutional framework of future disarmament negotiations following the forthcoming Helsinki conference, with due regard for the development of CSCE security functions.

The *ad hoc Sub-Group on Space* met on 31st May, 23rd and 24th July, 10th, 11th and 12th September and on 23rd and 24th September. The ministerial decision to set up the WEU satellite centre was taken on 27th June and the group has focused on the implementation of that decision, launching studies prior to its establishment: choice of location, appointment of a director, access to the satellite-derived data needed for its operation and a preliminary draft budget. The definition of medium- and long-term studies on space co-operation is at the pre-feasibility stage as regards a satellite system based on the identification by member states of operational needs. The ad hoc sub-group's work has aroused interest in specialist circles, but delegations thought it was too early to make more detailed information on current work public before the end of the year, either directly or through other WEU bodies.

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Two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected governments of Central and Eastern Europe have entered a new phase of development since 27th June 1991, with ministers approving a series of measures designed to deepen and broaden WEU's dialogue with those countries. These are mainly:

- establishing contacts on an ad hoc basis at ministerial level with Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia on specific subjects of common interest;
- establishing information links between the Secretariat-General and the embassies of Czechoslovakia and Poland and between the government of each of these countries and the Presidency's embassies there, as was done on 9th, 10th and 31st July respectively;
- fact-finding missions by the Presidency and Secretary-General to Bulgaria and Romania;
- awarding WEU Institute study grants to young research workers in those countries;
- promoting the exchange of views among experts on subjects of common interest, in particular through seminars organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

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As part of our contacts with the government authorities of member states, I had the opportunity, while attending the NATO workshop on 11th to 14th June 1991, to meet Mr. J. Fernando Nogueira, Portuguese Foreign Minister, and Mr. Joao Deus Pinheiro, Portuguese Defence Minister, with whom I had useful discussions on preparations for the Ministerial Council in Vianden.

- on 22nd July, Ambassador Holthoff and I met the new WEU Chairman-in-Office, Mr. H. -D. Genscher, German Foreign Minister, in Bonn, where we had a wide-ranging discussion on the prospects for the process of European construction and reviewed the German Presidency's objectives with regard to the rôle of WEU;
- on 11th September, I met Mr. Jacques Santer, Prime Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, in that country. We reviewed the status of negotiations in intergovernmental conferences with a view to the European summit meeting in Maastricht.

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In the field of public relations and public information on WEU's current and future rôle and missions, my colleagues and I took part in the following events:

- on 21st May, I attended a round table discussion organised by the publishers, Brassey's, at the Naval and Military Club in London to mark the publication of the book by John Leech, "Halt! Who goes where? The future of NATO in the new Europe";

- on the same day, at the Secretariat, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, received students attending a course on security policy in Germany and gave them a briefing on WEU;
- on 22nd May, I went to The Hague to attend the international conference on parliamentary democracy and international security policy arranged by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission;
- on 23rd-24th May, I attended SHAPEX in Casteaux;
- on 24th-27th May, Ambassador Holthoff represented the Secretariat-General at the spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Rotterdam;
- on 28th May, I spoke to the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens on the subject of changes in the European security environment;
- on 31st May, I welcomed a group of Dutch students from the University of Utrecht to the Secretariat;
- from 6th to 9th June, I visited Bardejov (CSFR) to take part in the 1991 Institute for East-West security studies international conference on western assistance to East Central Europe;
- on 7th June, Mr. D. Williams, Head of the Council Secretariat section, attended the conference of the European Movement in London on the subject of European foreign and security policies, giving a talk entitled "From Western European Union to European union";
- on 11th June, I made a speech on WEU to the Joint Service Defence College, Greenwich;
- on 11th-14th June, I attended the NATO workshop on political military decision-making in Sintra, Portugal, and gave a paper entitled "The present conditions of security: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union";
- 16th-18th June, at a meeting of the European Strategy Group (ESG) in Berlin, I spoke on the problems of European security;
- on 19th June, I gave a talk on WEU to a colloquium in Brussels arranged by the Belgian members of the European Parliament Liberal Group on the subject of "The future relationships between the European Community and the United States";
- also on 19th June, I took part in a seminar in Clingendael on "The future of European security and the rôle of the institutions" organised by the Dutch Institute for International Relations in co-operation with the NATO Information and Press Bureau, where I gave a paper on the rôle of WEU;
- on 20th June, I made a speech on WEU to the English Speaking Union of the Commonwealth in Taunton;
- on 22nd June, I went to Vinkeveen to take part in the Nederlands Europa beleid (Netherlands European policy) colloquium;
- on 24th June, I attended a meeting of the Security and Disarmament Sub-committee of the European Parliament Political Committee, where I spoke about WEU;
- on 25th June, in the colloquium on Western European Union and European defence, in Paris, organised by the Forum International de Politique, I gave a speech and made introductory remarks;
- on 26th June, I spoke about the rôle and place of WEU to the Foreign Press Association in London;
- on the same day, Ambassador Holthoff welcomed to the Secretariat a group of German journalists accredited to the United States Embassy in Bonn;
- on 28th June, I was visited by a delegation from the Netherlands Naval Staff College at the Secretariat;
- on 30th June, Mr. Paolo Casardi, Director of Political Affairs, and I visited Naples for the conference on the Atlantic Alliance and the new European architecture, organised by the Comitato Italiano della Gioventù to mark the 40th anniversary of AFSOUTH. I gave a paper on the subject of European security developments ahead: the rôle of WEU;
- on 2nd July, I discussed WEU's rôle at the Central Fortress 1991 conference in Brunssum, organised by AFCENT;

- on the same day, I spoke to a parliamentary conference of the Parti Populaire Européen in Brussels on the future of European security and defence, while Ambassador Holthoff took part in a debate on European security, at the invitation of the European Commission;
- from 3rd to 5th July, I went to Berne to take part in a colloquium under the auspices of the Swiss Confederation's Federal Military Department of Defence on the subject of military and political lessons from the Gulf conflict;
- on 16th July, I spoke about WEU and armaments co-operation in Paris at the fourth seminar on armaments co-operation organised by the Defence Systems Management College of Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
- on 19th July, I attended the 19th annual session in Berlin of the Standing Conference of Atlantic Organisations (SCAO), on the theme of the future of NATO: new dimensions of European security and the rôle of Japan;
- on 16th August, Mr. Bruch represented the Secretariat-General at the seminar on "After the Gulf war: the necessity of European defence", organised by the Driekant Foundation in Valkenburg, the Netherlands, where he gave a paper on WEU and the future of European security;
- on 6th-8th September, I attended the second Antalya international conference organised by the Turkish North Atlantic Treaty Association on the subject of "NATO in a larger perspective: keeping in mind the necessity of establishing a new world order for a durable peace";
- on 9th-10th September, I took part in Rottach-Egern (Germany) in a seminar organised by the Brookings Institution on the subject of the new Germany and the new Europe;
- on 11th September, I gave the opening address in the symposium on the new support challenge, organised by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and Senior NATO Logistician Committee (SNLC) of the Atlantic Alliance in Luxembourg;
- on 12th-15th September, I attended the 30th annual conference of the International Institute of Security Studies in Zurich on the subject of new dimensions in international security;
- on 15th September, while in Zurich I took part in the colloquium on the current situation in the USSR, organised under the auspices of the Swiss Confederation Federal Military Department;
- on 17th September, I addressed the Bow Group in London on the European defence identity;
- on 18th September, I spoke at an audition in Brussels of the European Parliament Political Commission on the problems of European security;
- on 20th September, my colleagues Mr. Jacomet and Mr. Bruch welcomed to the Secretariat-General a group from the Fondation Nationale Entreprise et Performance (France), where it was briefed on WEU and discussed European security;
- on 22nd September, I chaired a session of the conference on the theme of "The new Europe - integration versus disintegration", organised by the University of Southampton;
- on 24th September, my colleagues Mr. Casardi, Mr. Jacomet and Mr. Williams received a delegation at the Secretariat from the Netherlands National Defence College;
- on 25th September, I attended the conference on European security towards 2 000, in Pittsburgh, organised by the University of Pittsburgh.

Over these four months, I have continued our regular contacts with members of the press, radio and television and also with specialists in European and strategic problems, both in London and in the course of my travel abroad. These meetings gave me an opportunity to clarify the direction that WEU is currently taking in its work.

Attached to this information letter are the texts of two papers I gave in June 1991, one in Sintra and the other in Paris. Both are in the language in which they were delivered.

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At the request of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat produces summaries of what the international press says about WEU and the debate as to its future rôle. Below is a summary of the notes for May, June, July and September 1991, together with a brief analysis of press articles directly relating to WEU published in August. The figures in brackets are references to the list of the more significant articles appearing since 1st May, reproduced at the end of this letter.

I. During the first half of May 1991, the international press paid less attention to WEU than in late April (1-16). Journalists started to take a renewed interest in WEU from mid-May on, as the European Parliament had met on 15th May to debate the prospects for a European security policy (Pottering Report) (17, 21).

Further comment on WEU was sparked off by Chancellor Kohl's visit to Washington on 20th and 21st May. This was a major *démarche*, the main aim being to reassure the Americans about the directions being taken towards a future European security policy and the work of WEU (19).

Several interesting articles appeared in the run-up to the NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting which was held on 28th and 29th May, some of them analysing France's position in the security debate (18, 20, 22). With the DPC meeting and the important decision to set up a rapid reaction force, journalists also discussed the European pillar of the alliance in general terms as well as WEU's possible rôle (24, 26, 27-32, 34, 38-43). In May 1991, the German press paid a good deal of attention to the debate on security in general and WEU's rôle in particular (23, 25, 33, 35-37, 44-46).

II. WEU featured in the international press throughout June 1991 (47-50, 69, 71). Early in the month, a few commentators reported that a European reaction force with French participation might be set up under WEU auspices. The French positions on the rapid reaction force generated a good deal of comment on the potential for WEU (51-62, 66-68, 70).

The Assembly session (3rd-6th June) naturally received more coverage in France than in other member states. Speeches by Foreign Ministers Mr. Roland Dumas and Mr. Douglas Hurd on this occasion were widely reported in the press.

The Copenhagen meeting of the Atlantic Council on 6th and 7th June gave the press a further opportunity to discuss the European dimension of defence and to analyse WEU's rôle (63-65).

The CSCE meeting, which opened in Berlin on 19th June, was the subject of many editorials and a good deal of comment, although WEU did not feature prominently (72-74).

The debate was revived at the end of the month with the WEU ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June and the EC Luxembourg summit that followed. Many articles appeared, analysing the prospects for European political union and the rôle and place of WEU in that union. There was satisfactory coverage of WEU's ministerial meeting (75, 87).

III. Early in July, WEU attracted the attention of the international press following the EC summit at the end of June (89, 92). The Yugoslav crisis also gave rise to a good deal of comment and analysis on WEU's possible rôle (88).

Germany's succession to WEU's Presidency earned no special comment in the press, even in Germany. The focus was on events in Yugoslavia, the rôle of the troika acting on behalf of the Twelve and the new Dutch Presidency of the European Community (94-97, 99-102, 105, 108 and 110-114).

During the second half of July, WEU featured more prominently in the German press, following the German and French foreign ministers' meeting in Bonn (98). Publication of the United Kingdom Government's white paper on defence also sparked off many comments in the British press as to WEU's future rôle, to which the white paper referred (103-104, 106).

Later in the month, the debate on European security and therefore on WEU was pushed out of the headlines by the emphasis attached by diplomatic correspondents to the G7 meeting – the seven more industrialised nations – in London (107).

It should be pointed out that on 2nd July Mr. Woerner declared in Brussels that the European Community could not take the place of NATO, although he approved of the idea of making WEU the main body working to strengthen defence. Mr. Jacques Chirac also made two speeches, one in Bonn on 1st July and the other in London on 10th July, in which he discussed the strengthening of WEU (93). In July, therefore, WEU was once again in the forefront of debate on European security.

IV. This impression was confirmed early in August when WEU earned unprecedented press coverage, with various speculation as to the organisation's possible rôle in the search for a solution to the Yugoslav crisis (115-119). The absence of immediate results from the European Community's attempts at mediation meant that the press often equated the approach by the Twelve with the "failure" of attempts to formulate a common foreign and security policy (120, 122-124). At the same time, doubts were expressed as to the desirability and feasibility of any military engagement by WEU and the Community in the Yugoslav conflict to separate the opposing forces (121). With the abortive coup in Moscow, the international press rapidly shifted its attention from the Yugoslav crisis to the crisis in the Soviet system.

V. The signing of a peace plan, early in September, by the European Community and the leaders of the six Yugoslav republics led to the despatch of an international cease-fire observation mission to

Croatia. In practice these events were the point of departure for WEU's gradual involvement in the crisis and a revival in media interest in WEU (125-128, 130-133).

The announcement and then the holding of a WEU ministerial meeting on 19th September were widely noted in the press. At the time of the WEU ministerial meeting in Brussels on 30th September, however, journalists were more concerned with the EPC meeting being held on the same day (134-156).

At his press conference on 11th September, President Mitterrand made a significant reference to WEU in declaring that Europe should adopt a firmer position on security and defence and that "WEU is in this respect a preliminary embryo" (129). As a whole, coverage of WEU in the international press was favourable, with particular stress on its possible operational rôle.

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*The following is a list of the more significant articles:*

1. Europe's teetering pillar, Edward Mortimer, Financial Times, 1st May 1991, Press Review No. 80.
2. EC's defence split forces NATO to postpone summit, John Palmer, Guardian, 1st May 1991, Press Review No. 80.
3. United States denies NATO slowing EC progress on security, David Buchan, Financial Times, 2nd May 1991, Press Review No. 81.
4. Defence in a warm climate, Peter Jenkins, Independent, 2nd May 1991, Press Review No. 81.
5. Pillar in a world of instability, Robert Mauthner, Financial Times, 7th May 1991, Press Review No. 83.
6. France-OTAN: le chat et la souris, Claire Tréan, Le Monde, 4th May 1991, Press Review No. 83.
7. Problem awaiting a solution, Edward Mortimer, Financial Times, 8th May 1991, Press Review No. 85.
8. For a real transatlantic security partnership, René J. Foch, Herald Tribune, 9th May 1991, Press Review No. 85.
9. EC outlines scheme for "superstate", Boris Johnson, Daily Telegraph, 9th May 1991, Press Review No. 85.
10. Brandt presses Europe to set up intervention force, David Marsh, Financial Times, 10th May 1991, Press Review No. 86.
11. Atlantic News, No. 2320, 11th May 1991, Press Review No. 87.
12. NATO: Brücke zum Osten und europäischer Pfeiler, Fritz Wirth, Die Welt, 13th May 1991, Press Review No. 87.
13. Baker und Genscher wollen für die NATO eine stärkere politische Rolle, FAZ, 13th May 1991, Press Review No. 88.
14. Europäer im Wettlauf, Peter Hort, FAZ, 14th May 1991, Press Review No. 88.
15. Land der Lügen, Dieter Wild, Der Spiegel, 13th May 1991, Press Review No. 88.
16. Vor Schwächung der NATO gewarnt, FAZ, 16th May 1991, Press Review No. 90.
17. Strassburg verlangt Zuständigkeit der EG in der Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik, FAZ, 16th May 1991, Press Review No. 90.
18. Atlantic News of 15th May 1991, Press Review No. 91.
19. Kohl to reassure Bush over Europe, Herald Tribune, 20th May 1991, Press Review No. 92.
20. In the beginning was the word, and the word was defence, The Economist, 18th May 1991, Press Review No. 92.
21. Atlantic News, No. 2322, 17th May 1991, Press Review No. 92.
22. United States and Europe closer on security, Peter Ridell, Financial Times, 22nd May 1991, Press Review No. 94.
23. Frankreich wartet auf Antworten, Günter Nonnenmacher, FAZ, 22nd May 1991, Press Review No. 94.

24. Tomorrow's NATO: A mobile force for post-cold war era, Joseph Fitchett, Herald Tribune, 27th May 1991, Press Review No. 96.
25. Hammer oder Pinzette, Rüdiger Moniac, Die Welt, 28th May 1991, Press Review No. 96.
26. NATO's Galvin is endeavouring to create a smaller, more flexible fighting force, Timothy Aepfel, Wall Street Journal, 27th May 1991, Press Review No. 96.
27. Rethinking NATO, The Economist, 25th May 1991, Press Review No. 96.
28. Eine neue Strategie, Lothar Rühl, Die Welt, 28th May 1991, Press Review No. 96.
29. Debat stokt over rol van WEU in het Europees defensiebeleid, de Volkskrant, 24th May 1991, Press Review No. 96.
30. Défense européenne sous contrôle OTAN, Pierre Lefèvre, Le Soir, 29th May 1991, Press Review No. 97.
31. Ergernis op NAVO over vaagheid van "Europese identiteit", Mia Doornaert, De Standaard, 23rd May 1991, Press Review No. 97.
32. No rapid reaction from France, The Independent, 29th May 1991, Press Review No. 97.
33. Die NATO und Europa, Karl Feldmeyer, FAZ, 29th May 1991, Press Review No. 97.
34. Europeans could have their force, François Heisbourg, Herald Tribune, 29th May 1991, Press Review No. 97.
35. Schneller Geleitzug, Herbert Kremp, Die Welt, 29th May 1991, Press Review No. 97.
36. Der Durchlauferhitzer, Günther Nonnenmacher, FAZ, 27th May 1991, Press Review No. 97.
37. Friedenssicherung und Krisenmanagement als neue Aufgaben, Karl Feldmeyer, FAZ, 27th May 1991, Press Review No. 97.
38. NATO's radical changes: manoeuvring to outflank the EC, Alan Riding, Herald Tribune, 30th May 1991, Press Review No. 98.
39. NATO's new structure, Financial Times, 30th May 1991, Press Review No. 98.
40. Europe and a security dimension, Giovanni Jannuzzi, NATO Review of April 1991, Press Review No. 99.
41. Défense et diplomatie européenne, Nicole Kern, Le Figaro, 30th May 1991, Press Review No. 99.
42. Las fuerzas de reacción rápida de la OTAN intervendrán fuera de zona si hay acuerdo aliado, Félix Monteiro, El País, 30th May 1991, Press Review No. 99.
43. A new start, The Economist, 1st June 1991, Press Review No. 99.
44. Ko-operation, Verteidigungsfähigkeit und Dialog sind Elemente der NATO-Politik, FAZ, 31st May 1991, Press Review No. 99.
45. Debatte über Zukunft der WEU, FAZ, 1st June 1991, Press Review No. 100.
46. Europe must fall in for a bigger, better NATO, Norman Stone, Sunday Times, 2nd June 1991, Press Review No. 100.
47. Kritik der WEU an den Amerikanern, FAZ, 4th June 1991, Press Review No. 101.
48. Roland Dumas: la France restera fidèle à l'UEO, Philippe Desaubliaux, Le Figaro, 5th June 1991, Press Review No. 102.
49. Keiner Entscheidung über die WEU, FAZ, 5th June 1991, Press Review No. 102.
50. Hurd digs in over defence of Europe, Ian Davidson, Financial Times, 6th June 1991, Press Review No. 103.
51. Esclaves de l'indépendance, François de Rose, Le Monde, 6th June 1991, Press Review No. 103.
52. Die NATO verärgert Frankreich, Jochen Hehn, Die Welt, 6th June 1991, Press Review No. 103.
53. France vs NATO: Both sides could end up losers, Frederik Bonnart, Herald Tribune, 6th June 1991, Press Review No. 103.
54. Frankreichs Schlüsselrolle bei der Gestaltung der Bündnispolitik, FAZ, 6th June 1991, Press Review No. 103.
55. Le nouvel OTAN bride la force européenne, Alfred Valladao, Libération, 7th June 1991, Press Review No. 104.

56. Les européens doivent accroître leurs capacités d'opérations extérieures; un entretien avec François Heisbourg, *Le Figaro*, 7th June 1991, Press Review No. 104.
57. NATO sets strict conditions on European defence aims, David Osborne, *The Independent*, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 105.
58. Paris et Washington réduisent leurs divergences sur la défense, Claire Tréan, *Le Monde*, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 105.
59. La CE no podrá formar su propio pilar defensivo en el seno de la OTAN, Felix Monteiro, *El Pais*, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 105.
60. NATO rôle firm as France loses defence debate, Boris Johnson, *The Daily Telegraph*, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 105.
61. Defending Europe, *The Financial Times*, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 105.
62. France – in a pout, *The Economist*, 8th June 1991, Press Review No. 107.
63. Nichts vergessen, nichts dazugelernt, Christoph Bertram, *Die Welt*, 9th June 1991, Press Review No. 105.
64. Stürme im Wasserglas, Günther Nonnenmacher, *FAZ*, 12th June 1991, Press Review No. 107.
65. Hurd sees risk of deadlock in EC, John Pienaar, *The Independent*, 13th June 1991, Press Review No. 108.
66. La France au balcon, Baudouin Bollaert, *Le Figaro*, 13th June 1991, Press Review No. 109.
67. Die NATO behält ihre Kernfunktion bei, Herbert Kremp, *Die Welt*, 14th June, Press Review No. 110.
68. France-Defence: Twin-track strategy, Ian Davidson, *The Financial Times*, 17th June 1991, Press Review No. 110.
69. Basic principles bolstered, Ian Davidson, *The Financial Times*, 17th June 1991, Press Review No. 110.
70. Défense européenne: la stratégie de la tortue, Thierry de Montbrial, *Le Figaro*, 17th June 1991, Press Review No. 111.
71. L'Europe à la croisée des chemins, Mr. Eyskens, *Le Figaro*, 17th June 1991, Press Review No. 111.
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77. Major wins time on Europe, Michael White and John Palmer, *The Guardian*, 25th June 1991, Press Review No. 116.
78. View from Paris, D. Moïsi, *NATO Sixteen Nations*, May/June 1991, Press Review No. 116.
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80. La France sans l'OTAN ou l'anachronisme d'une illusion, A. Lloyd, *Libération*, 25th June 1991, Press Review No. 118.
81. L'UEO resta il nucleo della difesa europea, Leonardo Maysano, *Il Giornale*, 27th June 1991, Press Review No. 118.
82. EC digs in for fight on defence, George Brock, *The Times*, 27th June 1991, Press Review No. 118.
83. Identisch oder gespalten?, Bernt Conrad, *Die Welt*, 27th June 1991, Press Review No. 118.
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93. M. Chirac a plaidé pour un pôle de défense européen, *Le Monde*, 3rd July 1991, Press Review No. 122.
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95. Europe's duty to intervene, *The Independent*, 4th July 1991, Press Review No. 123.
96. Wird KSZE allianz für den Status quo? Lothar Rühl, *Die Welt*, 4th July 1991, Press Review No. 123.
97. When nation into state won't go, Edward Mortimer, *Financial Times*, 6th-7th July 1991, Press Review No. 125.
98. Welche Rolle für WEU und NATO?, *Die Welt*, 8th July 1991, Press Review No. 125.
99. CSCE crisis-management mechanism scrapes through, Robert Mauthner, *Financial Times*, 8th July 1991, Press Review No. 125.
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101. Dutchman pins hopes on Europe-only alliance, William Tuohy, *Los Angeles Times – World report*, 2nd July 1991, Press Review No. 127.
102. How to keep a "divisible" peace, Edward Mortimer, *Financial Times*, 10th July 1991, Press Review No. 127.
103. Forces blueprint ends doubts but threatens jobs, Michael Evans, *The Times*, 10th July 1991, Press Review No. 127.
104. Mass of information conceals a lack of proper policy, John Keegan, *Daily Telegraph*, 10th July 1991, Press Review No. 127.
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108. Tarzan lernt nur langsam sprechen, Peter Hort, *FAZ*, 17th July 1991, Press Review No. 133.
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110. Coëme: Golf-koördinatie basis verdere WEU-werking, Luc Soens, *De Standaard*, 18th July 1991, Press Review No. 134.
111. Europese defensie verdient steun, Door A. van Staden, *N.R.C.*, 17th July 1991, Press Review No. 136.
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113. Nuclear age is not over, Robert Mauthner, Financial Times, 24th July 1991, Press Review No. 137.
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128. Europe needs rules and the teeth to enforce them, François Heisbourg, Herald Tribune, 10th September 1991, Press Review No. 146.
129. Mitterrand sets scene for new row on EC union, Paul Webster, Will Hutton, John Palmer, The Guardian, 12th September 1991, Press Review No. 148.
130. EG-Debakel in Jugoslawien, Viktor Meier, FAZ, 16th September 1991, Press Review No. 150.
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133. Germany's new army, Tony Geraghty, Defence and Diplomacy, August/September 1991, Press Review No. 15.
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139. UEO: débat sur l'envoi d'une force d'interposition, Jacques Duplouch, Le Figaro, 18th September 1991, Press Review No. 153.
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149. Allianz im Wandel, Günther Nonnenmacher, FAZ, 21st September 1991, Press Review No. 156.
150. Why going Dutch would leave Britain with the bill, Boris Johnson, The Independent, 25th September 1991, Press Review No. 157.
151. Notre force de dissuasion: une illusoire ligne Maginot, Sophie Huet, Le Figaro, 25th September 1991, Press Review No. 158.
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153. Next on the new world agenda: intervention, Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Wall Street Journal, 26th September 1991, Press Review No. 158.
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155. Europas Jugoslawienpolitik – ein Lernprozess, Neue Züricher Zeitung, 23rd September 1991, Press Review No. 159.
156. For the EC, a bad start en route to a doubtful union, William Pfaff, Herald Tribune, 27th September 1991, Press Review No. 159.

ANNEX<sup>1</sup>*NATO workshop on political-military decision-making*

*Sintra (Portugal)  
11th-14th June 1991*

*The present conditions of security: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union  
(A WEU perspective)*

*14th June 1991*

*Dr. W. van Eekelen  
Secretary-General  
Western European Union*

Some twenty months ago, Francis Fukuyama published his highly controversial essay on "The end of history". Though Mr. Fukuyama soon claimed to have been "so misunderstood by so many", today, in mid-1991, hardly anybody would venture to proclaim the "end of history" again. Perestroika, the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet acceptance of the unification of Germany within NATO and WEU, the signing of the conventional forces in Europe treaty, the announced withdrawal of all Soviet troops based on the territory of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies, the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the unanimous United Nations Security Council condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent endorsement of economic sanctions and military action – these unprecedented developments cannot fail to convince us that not the "end" in the history of world affairs has been reached, but rather a whole series of crucial turning-points.

One important turning-point was undoubtedly NATO's London Declaration of July 1990, as it extended the hand of friendship to the Warsaw Pact countries. In November, the London Declaration was followed by the signing of the Paris Charter, which took stock of the momentous changes of 1989 and solemnly proclaimed "a new era of peace and co-operation in Europe".

In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States Secretary of State referred to "a critical juncture in history", the British Foreign Secretary to a "defining moment" in which "the international community through the United Nations" could create a "new world order" if the Iraqi challenge to the United Nations principle of border inviolability were crushed.

The eruption of the Gulf conflict was a timely and cruel reminder of Europe's rôle and responsibilities in the world at a time when many of our countrymen were indulging in geopolitical Eurocentrism and were only too eager to see their governments reap the peace dividends of the new détente. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, some even advocated a swift dismantling of security institutions – WEU and NATO – which had guaranteed four decades of peace. But unlike the Warsaw Pact, WEU and NATO are communities of value and do not need an enemy in order to survive.

In Europe, the iron curtain has been lifted but many tangled barriers remain or may be put up again. Since the mid-1980s, the complexity of Europe's geopolitical situation has grown almost exponentially. Although it would seem that after the revolutionary changes which have taken place over the past two years, the risk of a major European conflagration has been considerably reduced, the seeds of confrontation and conflict still exist, from the Baltic shores to the Balkans – not to mention the unforeseeable repercussions of a disintegration of the Soviet Union: civil war, ethnic strife, economic chaos and mass migrations.

No, history has not come to an end. On the contrary, it has accelerated on an unprecedented scale. The magnitude of the events which have taken place since 1989 would even suggest that history has made a quantum leap. Perpetual stability is not in the offing. Time is pressing. This is why practical decisions are needed as soon as possible.

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1. The English and French texts of this annex are not identical. They consist of two speeches by the Secretary-General on the same subject, one in English, the other in French, made at close intervals. It should therefore be considered that they are two equivalent expressions of the same communication. The Secretariat-General consequently decided not to have them translated.

Before considering with you the implications for the present conditions of security of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union, I should like to stress that the outcome of NATO's strategy review, the results of the intergovernmental conference's work on European political union and, finally, WEU's transformation into a more operational organisation contributing to a more distinct European rôle in the revamped Atlantic Alliance will be of crucial importance for our ability to react adequately to future pan-European and out-of-Europe challenges.

The coherence of the three ongoing reviews is of paramount importance not only for the security of Western Europe, but also for the security of the continent as a whole. WEU's future is very much dependent on their outcome since its reactivation placed it at the crossroads of the process of European integration with the ultimate goal of a fully-fledged political union on the one hand, and the vitally important transatlantic security solidarity on the other.

Given the changing environment, we have a duty to redefine the criteria for European security. Today, we no longer speak of "threats" and we prefer the terms "risks" and "challenges", as for a threat to exist, there must be a combination of aggressive capabilities with the political will to resort to military force and a crisis situation that could serve as a pretext for resorting to force.

Gorbachev's perestroika, the "de-Sovietisation" of Central and Eastern Europe, the crisis and then the war in the Gulf will obviously have a bearing on our strategic thinking for the 1990s and beyond. I shall try to set out some of the lessons to be learned from the "acceleration" in European affairs from a WEU perspective.

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The risks and challenges to our security in continental Europe come under two main headings:

- those associated with the Soviet Union's military capabilities and with its growing instability;

- those associated with the uncertain political developments in the Central and Eastern European countries, more specifically the Balkans. Indeed, the worst of all possible scenarios - the "Balkanisation" of Central and Eastern Europe in conjunction with the "Lebanonisation" of the USSR, both with unpredictable consequences - cannot be excluded yet.

There are two main elements in the Soviet Union's situation today that justify not only circumspection but also the maintenance of adequate military resources:

- the persistent crisis in the Soviet Union's federal structure, for which the prognoses are generally fairly bleak;

- the development and constant modernisation of the most powerful nuclear and conventional arsenal in Europe.

Since his March 1985 accession to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev and his programme of reform have attracted intense worldwide interest. Nearly six years later, the General Secretary's and President's reforms remain unfinished and lack firm institutionalisation. Gorbachev's most recent accommodations to conservative elements have considerably lowered opinion of him among his most ardent supporters in the East and West. Political reform has run ahead of economic reform in the USSR, with the highly destabilising consequence that opportunities for the expression of discontent have expanded, while improvements in economic conditions have not been felt by the population. On the contrary, Soviet economic performance - already modest by western standards - has declined drastically. In addition to these unsatisfactory conditions, the lack of consensus on mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of internal disputes is most conspicuously evident in the difficult question of the renegotiation of the contractual basis for the relationship among the nationalities of the USSR.

Mounting economic chaos and nationalist separatism have eroded the centre ground that Mikhail Gorbachev has been trying to build on. By the beginning of 1991, the strength of the reactionary backlash had become painfully evident. Unable to continue his reforms, the Soviet President seemed to be attempting to placate the party and military die-hards with the crackdown in the Baltic republics and the increasing concessions on the "new thinking" that has undoubtedly transformed the international scene.

It is still too early to evaluate the implications of the most recent Soviet attempts to devise a framework for overcoming the current crisis of the USSR: after the end of perestroika's "romantic phase", will the new "Gorbachev-Yeltsin pact", the joint efforts made by both men in calling for the speedy conclusion of a new union treaty, which should be followed by the adoption of a new consti-

tution and by fresh elections to central state organs, and also the plans for economic reform and stabilisation recently agreed by the Soviet central government and the majority of the USSR's constituent republics herald a new phase of perestroika? Much will of course depend on the outcome and on the aftermath of the RSFSR presidential elections.

For us in the West, just as for the newly democratising countries, to see democracy taking root in the minds and institutions of the peoples of the Soviet Union is an important element in our future security and a prerequisite for the development of comprehensive co-operation with the USSR, to the mutual advantage of all the parties involved. We are fully justified in our constant efforts to attract the Soviet Union into the pan-European architecture that is evolving out of the CSCE. But would the currently discussed "grand bargain" be enough to mitigate the residual threat posed by the militarily most powerful country in our continent?

By the mid-nineties, most if not all of the Soviet forces should have withdrawn from Central Europe. The signing of the CFE treaty has been a decisive step in the removal of the immediate Soviet threat, but its implementation rapidly ran into considerable difficulties. Though a compromise has now been reached, we must not close our eyes to the fact that the USSR is still fast modernising its forces and will retain the largest nuclear and conventional forces in Europe.

Whereas ethnic strife could, under certain circumstances, weaken the Soviet army's cohesion, other factors related to the USSR's nationality problems cause considerable concern in the West. Should the USSR collapse, who would take control of its nuclear weapons? Who, for instance, would be in charge of the Soviet Union's fleet of nuclear submarines? Thus, the major risk for Europe is that of an "Ottoman-style" fragmentation of the world's second nuclear power. But at the same time, we should not forget that Russia does not need an empire in order to remain the foremost military power in Europe.

I welcome the end of the cold war. The political climate has fundamentally changed, and in the right direction. In the future security policy, purely military elements are losing importance in comparison to co-operative aspects. But it would be irresponsible not to take account of risks connected with the USSR's evolution when we come to make assessments about our own defence efforts.

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Under the second heading, risks and challenges are associated with the resurgence of nationalism and ethnic conflict in Central and Eastern Europe that might be aggravated by instability in the Soviet Union.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the political battle for democracy has been won in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The most obvious danger is that of a civil war in Yugoslavia. Economic backwardness and traditional nationalist tensions in this country are an explosive cocktail, with the danger of a spill-over to neighbouring Balkan countries, in which the seeds of division are also visible. The world cannot afford another Sarajevo.

The first and most difficult task for the post-communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe is the reconstruction of civil society from what was left behind by nearly five decades of fascist and communist totalitarianism. Only the re-emergence of civil societies will signify the "return to Europe" of this region and create the necessary preconditions for political stability.

Charles Gati, one of the leading experts on the Central and Eastern European area, pointed out in the New York Times of 14th February that the Soviet conservatives, while perhaps not strong enough to re-establish Soviet domination in the region, hope that the experiment with pluralism and market economy will fail. They would use this failure to reinforce their case against perestroika before the Soviet public. According to Gati, the Soviet conservatives' "road to power is paved with Central European instability". Thus, the political and economic stability of Central Europe is crucial not only for the "return to Europe" of this region, but also for the future of perestroika.

After the collapse of the Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe, much has been said and written about the "security vacuum" in this region. Indeed, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have shown signs of feeling insecure because of developments in the Soviet Union, particularly in connection with the onset of a more conservative system of government in Moscow, the crackdown in the Baltic republics, and the prolonged stay of Soviet troops in Germany and Poland. To enhance their national security, the three Central European countries have advocated an all-European security system based on the CSCE process, debated the idea of neutrality, sought contacts with NATO and WEU, and joined one another for consultations. As their membership in NATO and WEU is for obvious reasons not a realistic option, they are trying to pursue their security interests through a multitude of associative ties with Western European institutions and with one another.

The treaty recently signed between the USSR and Romania deserves a special mention, as it lays a foundation for a Soviet *droit de regard* on Romania's security policy. Government officials in the Central European capitals are highly critical of the security clauses agreed to by Romania, and refuse such terms for the bilateral treaties with the USSR to be concluded by their countries in the near future.

The idea that a security guarantee for the newly democratising nations of Central and Eastern Europe could be obtained through some kind of military function of the Helsinki process has now receded into the distant future. In Central Europe, the disenchantment on CSCE grew when it failed to condemn the Soviet repression in the Baltic republics unequivocally which it could not do because of the principle of unanimous voting that prevails in the organisation. The Soviets would not have supported such a condemnation.

From the outset, we in the West shared the aspirations of our counterparts in the newly democratising countries to establish an effective European security system based on the CSCE. But we always saw and still see such a structure as a supplement to and not as a replacement for our existing western alliance system. This approach is now increasingly shared by our eastern neighbours.

Jaroslav Jiru, a Czech publicist writing in *Lidové Noviny* of 11th February has suggested that "the grey zone" of association by commonality rather than by membership is the area in which Central and Eastern Europe has to find its bearing for the foreseeable future and that it need not fare badly if it does so. After all, not every western country has always been, or indeed is, a member of NATO and the EC. "Several European states", writes Mr. Jiru, "have survived decades in peace in this way. Perhaps we can do the same." I very much agree with Mr. Jiru, but I would suggest that we no longer refer to a "grey" zone, but rather to a zone of concrete and manifold contacts, consultations and co-operation. Indeed, even without giving the Central and East Europeans a status of full or associate membership in the western alliance structures, much can be done to address their security concerns.

In this context, I very much welcome the statement on "Partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe" issued by the North Atlantic Council on 6th June, which states that "the consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation (...) are of direct and material concern" to the sixteen NATO members. I also welcome the series of measures to strengthen NATO co-operation known as "liaising" with the Central and Eastern European countries, as they have been outlined in the same statement.

Western European Union has recently acquired an enhanced profile by virtue of its rôle in co-ordinating the military presence of member countries in the Persian Gulf. But by no means has it been idle in the field of relations with the USSR's former Warsaw Pact allies.

On the basis of its April 1990 ministerial mandate, WEU has established and is developing contacts with the democratically-elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Secretary-General/Presidency fact-finding missions have been conducted to Hungary (October 1990), Czechoslovakia (November 1990) and Poland (March 1991). On 11th-12th March 1991, under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, a seminar was held which brought together the officials responsible for politico-military affairs in the foreign and defence ministries of both the WEU member states and Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The WEU Institute has begun to establish contacts with the research communities in the Central and Eastern European countries and in the USSR. Further steps to extend and deepen WEU's dialogue on European security with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe might be taken at the 27th June WEU Council of Ministers.

The WEU parliamentary Assembly – the only European parliamentary assembly founded by treaty with competence in defence matters – has established contacts with the parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries. It appears today that all Central and Eastern European governments are interested in contacts with WEU. Increased contacts with the new democratising countries should allow us to take account of their preoccupations in the formulation of our own positions in regard to future negotiations with the Soviet Union.

All in all, the risks associated with developments in Central and Eastern Europe and in the USSR will diminish only on four essential conditions: the re-emergence of civil societies in this region, which will signify its "return to Europe" and create the necessary preconditions for political and economic stability; the existence of functioning mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of internal disputes in these countries; the continuation of western support for democratic and market-oriented reforms in Central and Eastern Europe; and finally the development of a comprehensive network of complementary institutions and co-operative relationships, in which WEU and NATO, the EC/political union and the CSCE will be the main, but by no means the only building-blocks.

Much will depend on the successful continuation of our efforts to develop the institutionalisation of the CSCE. The forthcoming Berlin meeting should be a decisive step towards its enhancement. With the Helsinki CSCE follow-up meeting scheduled for 1992, I can only repeat yet again that time is pressing.

In mid-1991, the situation in Europe remains very much in a state of flux. In this context, our strategy must continue to be directed *mutatis mutandis*, by the policy guidelines laid down by Pierre Harmel in 1967, and be based on a combination of:

- a more intensive political dialogue designed to extend co-operation and continue the process of arms control. The implementation of the CFE treaty and the development of confidence-building and stabilising measures will be the starting point for future progress;
- a strategy of deterrence of the use of force to settle conflicts in Europe.

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There can be little doubt that the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which took place in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June will be another important landmark in the development of European affairs. Its final communiqué explicitly welcomes “efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration” and recognises “the significance of the progress made by the countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy”. “Practical arrangements” will be developed, says the final communiqué, “to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the alliance”.

Now that Europe has a framework for overall co-operation, namely the CSCE, and a defensive alliance dedicated to deterrence from war, should it not look to WEU for an organisation that could help to contain potential crises in close consultation with NATO and give Europe a certain autonomy of action? Situations may arise in which NATO as such would not be able to act, but in which the Europeans would nevertheless like to take on certain responsibilities. Should WEU therefore not develop its own operational capability and have at least minimal military structures, which would enable it to perform a rôle as and when required, both inside and outside Europe? Such questions cannot be evaded and many people are putting them to us with some urgency, especially the leaders of the new democracies with which we are developing an open and constructive dialogue.

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Europe is no longer a continent of immobility and division. A sense of urgency has been injected and is accelerating progress towards the unity of the continent, but it has a corollary: unpredictability. Under the pressure of events, Western Europe is advancing towards a political union which will make it the mainstay and the motive force for a new European order. There is a time and place for theoretical debate, and a time and place for action. Today, it is our duty to act, so that the pan-European peace order, which we hope will evolve from the Paris Charter of 1990, will not fail.

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1992 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Lagorce, Maass (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez (Alternate: Roman), Antretter, Bowden (Alternate: Lord Mackie), Büchler, Cauwenberghs, Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Garcia Sanchez (Alternate: Pedregosa), Greco (Alternate: Stegagnini), Mrs. Haas-Berger (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), MM. Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond, Regenwetter, Silva Marques (Alternate: Fernandes Marques), Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Vara (Alternate: Soares Costa).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. At the time of preparing this draft budget for the financial year 1992, the Assembly still does not have a formally approved budget for the financial year 1991. However, during an exchange of views between the President of the Assembly and the members of the Permanent Council on 8th July 1991, an agreement was reached on the growth rate for this budget and the terms for creating two new grade A posts: this agreement will be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee at their meetings scheduled for 11th September 1991.

2. In so far as a comparison between the two budgets appears legitimate, the data for the financial year 1991 can be considered firm.

3. It is important to emphasise that the Assembly's activities are constantly expanding. As will be seen under Head III, these include the establishment of relations with Eastern European and Mediterranean countries. For its action to be effective and for its efforts to benefit the cause of peace, the Assembly requires the means requested in this budget.

4. Before analysing the new budgetary proposals, it is also important to emphasise that all estimates translating these proposals into financial terms have been made with the greatest possible accuracy: where specific references were lacking, account has been taken of experience. The Assembly thus tries to make its budget as realistic as possible, taking due account of the requirements recalled by the auditor.

5. In 1990 (Accounts for the financial year 1989), the auditor made the following comment: "A determination of estimates taking account of the conditions in which the previous budget was implemented and as accurate an assessment as possible for the financial year in question would make it possible to respect more strictly the initial shape of the budgetary appropriations." He repeated the same comment in his report for his audit of the accounts for the financial year 1990: "As pointed out when the 1989 accounts were audited, estimates under a certain number of sub-heads seem to have been included without any precise thought for the needs or even the tendencies noted previously in the way credits are spent, thus forming reservoirs that are available during the year for other purposes; such transfers therefore significantly modify the shape of the budget initially adopted."

6. While reserving the right to revert to this question when the report on the accounts for 1990 is presented to the Assembly, your Rapporteur can but emphasise the effort to achieve accuracy in preparing the Assembly's budgets. Admittedly, between estimates and reality there can sometimes be a not negligible gap due to corrections made by the Assembly in its priorities in the course of the year; this was particularly so in 1989 and 1990, estimates having been affected by the uncertainty about the date of the effective participation of Portuguese and Spanish members in the work of the Assembly and their possible collaboration in organising the different services of the session.

7. The situation being clarified in the meantime, it is possible to bring estimates closer to reality in this draft budget for 1992 without the management of the budget thereby being reduced to a mere question of accountancy because the Assembly, particularly in this era of great political changes, might always adapt these estimates to possible variations in programmes of work which might prove necessary in the course of the year.

8. Bearing these considerations in mind, the proposals presented in this draft budget will be analysed in three separate chapters corresponding to the following three categories of expenditure:

- expenditure relating to permanent staff (Head I of the budget);
- operating expenditure (Heads II to V of the budget);
- expenditure relating to pensions.

## *II. Head I – Expenditure relating to permanent staff*

9. The revised draft budget for the financial year 1991, approved unanimously by the Assembly on 4th June 1991 (Document 1241 Addendum 2), included the creation of five new posts, of which two grade A and three grade B, and the regrading of one grade L post and three grade C posts. Of these proposals, only the one for the creation of two grade A posts was approved by the Council.

10. To complete the programme for restructuring the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, it is necessary to include in the draft budget for 1992 credits relating to the other proposals for:

- creating three new grade B3 posts;
- regrading four existing posts (one grade L and three grade C).

11. Regarding the proposal to create three new posts of assistant, your Rapporteur can but quote the opinion of the experts in their report on the organisation of the Office of the Clerk (Part 3, paragraph 3) which reads as follows:

“ The creation of three grade B3 posts of assistant is justified by the creation of new senior posts and the increase in the tasks of the research and administrative services although the Office of the Clerk proposes only two.

The post of assistant to the Political Committee is essential in so far as the committee would be run independently of the Clerk Assistant.

While the duties and responsibilities of the administrative Clerk Assistant are not questioned and must remain as they are, the creation of a post of assistant in the administrative services is made necessary by the increase in material tasks resulting from the Assembly's opening to the outside world (mail, printing, etc.).

The third post of assistant should bring the research and documentation service up to strength and allow it to be equipped with modern documentary data retrieval systems essential for the smooth running of the Assembly bodies. ”

12. It should also be mentioned that in the explanatory memorandum of the draft budget for 1991 (paragraph 13) the place of the two grade B3 assistants in the political section of the Office of the Clerk is specified: they will be assigned to the two new grade A officials. According to the opinion of the experts, this section should be able to count on:

- “ – a secretariat for the Political Committee consisting of a grade A5 secretary and a grade B3 assistant.

This is essential to allow the Clerk Assistant, now Secretary of the committee, to carry out his new tasks in full;

- a grade A3/4 head of the research and documentation service and a grade B3 assistant. The creation of an efficient research and documentation service specific to the Assembly is essential to allow the Presidency and the committees to give a new dimension to their work. This service should not have a cumbersome structure but a dynamic organisation using modern technology for the retrieval and processing of documentation so as, in particular, to ensure a computerised link with existing sources of documentation (national parliaments, specialised institutes, etc.). However, the attribution of enough staff from the outset is a condition for the success of this operation. ”

13. As for the third post of grade B3 assistant for the archives, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has a true need for this since the archives section is also responsible for sending out documents for sessions (the Assembly does not have a dispatching office as is the case, for instance, in the Council of Europe) and is faced with an increase in the volume sent out in 1989 and 1990 of 250% compared with 1988. This figure will probably be higher in 1991. The table at Appendix VII clearly shows this evolution. It is quite clear that the person in the archives service, in spite of the occasional assistance of temporary staff, is no longer in a position to carry out all these duties alone. Should it not be possible to employ an assistant here, an alternative might be to employ the services of a dispatching firm. In this case, the budget should include a suitable increase of estimates under sub-head 18 – postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents.

14. Finally, for the regrading of four existing posts, your Rapporteur can but refer to the justifications already given in the explanatory memorandum of the budget for 1991, which remain fully valid and are summarised below.

15. Regarding the regrading, in a personal capacity, of the post of translator-interpreter from grade L3 to grade L4, it should be noted that the holder has 28 years of experience as a linguist, 16 of which in NATO (at grade L4 for 10 years). Transferred to the WEU Assembly after having worked for the WEU agencies for security questions, she has taken over, under the responsibility of the Clerk Assistant for Administrative and Financial Questions, co-ordination of the teams of interpreters and also takes part herself in the work of these teams, which allows the Assembly to limit recruitment to 20 interpreters instead of 22 for each session and five interpreters instead of six for other meetings, thus making a considerable saving. In addition, she also works in conjunction with the French translation section, which is particularly valuable since she also translates from Italian and Spanish. Finally, at the request of the WEU Secretariat-General, the Assembly places the services of this official at the disposal of the Council for ministerial meetings; the Secretariat-General recently expressed its official appreciation for the extremely valuable assistance thus provided, particularly during the year of the French presidency.

16. The other regradings concern the posts of three members of the staff assigned to the storage of and accounting for equipment and the reproduction service. In its reports on the budgets of the ministerial organs, the Assembly has on several occasions drawn the Council's attention to the problem of the staff's career possibilities, an essential condition for ensuring maximum motivation. This problem now arises more specifically for the three grade C officials (one C6 and two C4) who, having reached the ceiling of their grades, have no further prospect of advancement, although their work has changed, not only quantitatively but qualitatively. Such regrading is thus fully in line with the principle that there should be concordance between duties to be carried out, qualifications and the professional category of staff. To raise the three officials to category B (the grade C6 official to grade B4 and the two grade C4s to grade B3) is justified by their qualifications and increased knowledge. It should be pointed out that their colleagues in the reproduction service of the WEU ministerial organs are already in category B. To move these three officials to category B would, in the immediate future, have financial advantages for only one of them, who would become entitled to the expatriation allowance, but in the years to come they would be entitled to the subsequent steps provided for in category B.

17. The programme for restructuring the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly described in the last few paragraphs will render the latter more effective, in accordance with the report of the three experts on "the organisation of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly". These experts pointed out that the Office of the Clerk "works well but in precarious conditions which may have a considerable impact on any development in the Assembly's rôle". They concluded that "the standard of work in the Office of the Clerk is therefore closely linked with the Assembly's rôle in WEU and the very rôle of WEU. It can already be foreseen that this will grow in the years ahead thus raising, here and now, the question of strengthening the staff of the services". This rôle has indeed increased considerably, particularly following the exceptional events which took place in 1990. As a result, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly must be strengthened, particularly where the committee services are concerned. The two grade A officials (Spanish and Portuguese) and the two grade B members of staff who will be assigned to the committee services will allow the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs to co-ordinate his department's activities more effectively and to organise research and study in such a way as to constantly provide a thorough analysis of the world political situation for the various Assembly committees.

18. The estimates in Head I take account of the restructuring proposals and therefore concern the overall strength of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly which, in 1992, should have 37 officials in the various services (see Appendix I and organogram at Appendix II). The cost of creating three new posts and regrading four existing posts amounts to F 895 000, i.e. a nominal growth rate, compared with the previous financial year, of 6.09%.

19. However, a comparison of estimates in Head I for the financial years 1991 and 1992 shows a total increase in expenditure of F 2 498 000, resulting from:

- the financial incidence of the proposals for restructuring of the Office of the Clerk mentioned in paragraph 16 above;
- the incidence of the creation in 1991 of two new grade A posts affecting only two and a half months of this financial year (the difference may be assessed at approximately F 743 000);
- the amount required for the revision of salary scales with effect from 1st July 1991 and the steps granted to the staff concerned, which sum may be estimated at about F 860 000.

### *III. Operating budget*

20. Before starting to analyse the estimates under Heads II to V of the operational budget, where the Assembly has budgetary autonomy, one preliminary remark is necessary. Compared with the financial year 1991, this part of the budget shows a growth rate of 5.91% (see Appendix V). However, in view of the foreseeable inflation rate of 3% in 1992, it may be considered that the real growth of 2.91% is justified, compared with the work of the Assembly which is expected to be developed in 1992 through more far-reaching contacts, particularly with Eastern European and Mediterranean countries.

21. It should be underlined that if it has been possible to keep the growth rate to a modest level in spite of the considerable increase in the number of the Assembly's correspondents (governments, parliaments, press, requests for information and documents) and the amount of travelling which has already had to bear the increase in air-fares of some 20% between July 1990 and July 1991 – it is thanks to the continuous revision of the organisation of the services of the Office of the Clerk with a view to rationalising methods of work as more efficient means are placed at their disposal.

22. Thus, estimates under Head II, sub-head 6 – staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly – take account of a reduction in the number of staff recruited for sessions from 106 in 1991 to 100 (see Appendix III.1) in 1992. This reduction has been possible on the one hand thanks to the replacement of old offset machines by photocopying machines (shown in Appendix IV – five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk) which are operated by smaller teams of offset assemblers and, on the other hand, by a trial run of the use of word-processors in the French section of the service of the verbatim reporters.

23. The estimates under sub-head 7 which, together with sub-heads 24 and 27 of Head V, are the most affected by the Assembly's programme of work, are calculated on the understanding that as many interpreters as possible are recruited where meetings are held. Account has also been taken of the fact that the interpreter of the Office of the Clerk will be part of all the teams recruited in Paris and, as appropriate, teams recruited for meetings outside Paris. These estimates show a marked increase compared with credits for the financial year 1991, but it should be noted that the increases in salary scales and the cost of travelling (between 18% and 20%) have been taken into account in order to obtain a realistic assessment of these estimates.

24. Conversely, estimates under sub-head 8 – temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk – have been reduced to F 15 000 in view of the creation of three new posts of assistant. Should these posts not be created, credits under this sub-head will obviously have to be increased at least to the level of actual expenditure foreseen in 1991, i.e. F 90 000.

25. Thanks to the measures mentioned in the previous paragraphs, it has been possible to keep the growth rate under Head II to 3.9%, which bears witness to the Assembly's effort to make economies.

26. Regarding the estimates under Head III – expenditure on premises and equipment, except for sub-head 10, share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises – which shows the Assembly's share in expenditure for managing the building under the responsibility of the administrative service of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, most of the sub-heads are calculated accurately on the basis of contracts for the provision of services or supplies.

27. Estimates under sub-head 17 – hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment – are analysed in detail in Appendix IV. In particular, it should be noted that the contract for maintaining word-processors (item 10.3 of this programme) has been renegotiated to obtain a reduction of 30% of the initial sum. Also, the replacement of offset machines by photocopying machines has resulted in a reduction of temporary staff as explained in paragraph 22 above and maintenance costs are more favourable (see item 1.8 of the programme) with the result that it is no longer necessary to include specific estimates for maintenance in sub-head 17.

28. Thanks to these measures, the total nominal growth rate under Head III is very slight, showing an increase of only 0.74% over the previous financial year, this increase being less than the foreseeable 3% rate of inflation in 1992.

29. Compared with the financial year 1991, Head IV shows an increase of 9.10% due mainly to the increase in postage, telephone, telefax (sub-head 18) and the inclusion in sub-head 22 of the cost of hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly. For sub-heads 19, 20 and 21, an increase of 3% corresponding to the average rate of inflation has been foreseen.

30. The increase under sub-head 18 is justified by the considerable increase in the amount of mail sent out by the archives office (already mentioned in paragraph 13 above), particularly as a result of the impetus given by the press service to communications on WEU's activities and the greater number

of pages sent by fax. Moreover, the credits requested under this sub-head correspond to actual expenditure in 1990 and 1991 and the narrowing of estimates and expenditure corresponds to the recommendations of the auditor.

31. The inclusion of an amount for hiring a chauffeur-driven car under sub-head 22 is merely a temporary reversion to the practice of previous years, broken off in 1991 because of the proposal to create a post of chauffeur. In fact, the Assembly reserves the right to envisage having an official to take on, in particular, the duties of usher, messenger and receiving clerk and, therefore, to put forward a proposal in the draft budget for 1993.

32. Head V is the one on which the Assembly's programme of work has the greatest impact. The limitations the Council has imposed on the credits granted for the financial year 1991 have made it necessary to cancel or defer until next year certain visits to the United States, Asian countries, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean planned by various committees of the Assembly.

33. It seems paradoxical that the Assembly should be obliged to thus limit its activities at a time when many European and non-European countries are turning to it in search of a dialogue they consider necessary so as not to be isolated in such a rapidly-changing world and to make their contribution to a just and lasting peace. In addition to the visits mentioned above, the programme of work for 1992 takes into account the holding of a symposium on European defence which the Political Committee is to hold in one of the member countries.

34. Answering the Assembly's Recommendation 494, the Council welcomed "the activities conducted by the Assembly, such as the joint meeting of its committees in Palermo on 24th-26th March 1991 and the visit of a delegation to Egypt from 28th April-2nd May, a useful contribution towards enhancing international awareness of WEU". The Assembly is touched by this appreciation which encourages it to pursue its action.

35. The President of the Assembly was therefore quite right in writing to the new Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 4th July 1991 in the following terms:

"The programme established by the Council at its meeting in Vianden responds, to a degree which should be emphasised, to the Assembly's concerns and the recommendations it has communicated to the Council. This should allow exchanges between the two parts of WEU to be developed with special intensity and I have no doubt that the German presidency will join its efforts with mine to achieve this. However, for the useful and harmonious development of these exchanges, it would be essential for the Council to agree to take into account the budgetary implications of the strengthening of WEU and of the increase in its activities where the Assembly is concerned."

36. Your Rapporteur can but endorse the wishes expressed by the President of the Assembly and trusts the Council will agree to take a favourable view of the Assembly's requests. For such a tiny financial effort, the governments would achieve positive results at political level.

#### *IV. Pensions budget*

37. A new invalidity pension, which will probably be granted in 1991, is taken into account in the estimates for 1992 which cover all the pensions for the 14 retired officials (11 old-age pensions, 2 invalidity pensions and 1 survivor's pension), adjusted as for permanent staff in accordance with the 5.56% increase in salary scales.

38. Regarding receipts under this part of the budget, which consist of contributions by the staff to the pension scheme (7% of basic salary) account has been taken of the contributions corresponding to the creation of three new posts and the regrading of four existing posts. These contributions amount to approximately F 35 000 and should be withdrawn from the budget if these proposals are not accepted.

#### *V. Summary of the estimates of the draft budget of the Assembly for 1992 (operating and pensions budget)*

39. Finally, as may be seen from the table at Appendix V, the general net total of estimates in the draft budget of the Assembly for 1992 (operating budget plus pensions budget minus receipts) amounts to F 30 158 500 which, compared with the general net total of the budget for the financial year 1991, shows a growth rate of 12.08%.

*Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts  
for the financial year 1992*

Details	Expenditure	Receipts
<b>PART I: Operating budget</b>		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Permanent staff	17 182 000	
<i>Head II:</i> Temporary staff	3 777 000	
<i>Head III:</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 767 000	
<i>Head IV:</i> General administrative costs	2 301 500	
<i>Head V:</i> Other expenditure	2 315 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		105 000
	27 342 500	105 000
NET TOTAL		27 237 500
	27 342 500	27 342 500
<b>PART II: Pensions budget</b>		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Pensions, allowances and social charges	3 655 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		734 000
	3 655 000	734 000
NET TOTAL		2 921 000
	3 655 000	3 655 000
NET TOTAL BUDGET		30 158 500

*Budget estimates*

## PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Permanent staff*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1992	Budget for 1991	Expected expenditure in 1991	Actual expenditure in 1990
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	11 860 000	10 374 000	10 180 000	9 125 233
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances:				
2.1. Expatriation allowance	1 263 000			
2.2. Household allowance	569 000			
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons	611 000			
2.4. Rent allowance	60 000			
2.5. Education allowance	63 000			
2.6. Allowance for language courses	2 000			
2.7. Overtime	55 000			
2.8. Home leave	60 000			
	2 683 000	2 200 000	2 100 000	1 933 969
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges:				
3.1. Social security	1 644 000			
3.2. Supplementary insurance	570 000			
3.3. Provident fund	190 000			
	2 404 000	2 012 000	2 075 000	1 720 518
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruit- ment and departure of permanent officials				
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi- dates for vacant posts	5 000			
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	18 000			
4.3. Removal expenses	120 000			
4.4. Installation allowance	78 000			
	221 000	86 400	86 400	116 044
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	14 000	11 600	11 600	12 800
TOTAL OF HEAD I	17 182 000	14 684 000	14 453 000	12 908 564

### *Explanations*

#### *Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 30th June 1990<sup>1</sup>, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4% as from 1st July 1991 and 3% as from 1st July 1992. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 840 000.

These estimates take account of the financial implications of creating two new grade A posts authorised by the Council in 1991 and proposals for restructuring the Office of the Clerk set out in this budget (creation of three new posts and regrading of four existing posts).

The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and the organogram at Appendix II.

#### *Sub-Head 3*

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)<sup>2</sup>;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)<sup>3</sup>;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

#### *Sub-Head 4*

No officials are expected to leave in 1992. Estimates under this sub-head relate only to the new posts included in the organogram of the Office of the Clerk and to certain allowances or refunds (removal expenses, installation allowance, etc.) to which the two new members of staff recruited in 1991 may be entitled at the end of the probationary period.

#### *Sub-Head 5*

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

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1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA).

2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has named.

**Head II – Temporary staff**

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1992	Budget for 1991	Expected expenditure in 1991	Actual expenditure in 1990
Sub-Head 6 – Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly				
6.1. Sittings service	1 340 000			
6.2. Interpretation service	662 000			
6.3. Translation service	921 000			
6.4. Other services	65 000			
	2 988 000	2 902 000	2 780 000	3 003 224
Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	618 000	568 000	650 000	428 002
Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	15 000	90 000	82 945
Sub-Head 9 – Social charges				
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	10 000			
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters	140 000			
9.3. Insurance for interpreters	6 000			
	156 000	150 000	140 000	158 369
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD II</b>	<b>3 777 000</b>	<b>3 635 000</b>	<b>3 660 000</b>	<b>3 672 540</b>

**Explanations****Sub-Head 6**

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III.

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, guards for the security service, etc.).

Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 30th June 1991 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, the adjustment amounting to F 137 000.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6%.

**Sub-Head 7**

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Estimates are based on the recruitment of five interpreters for each meeting (200 working days, of which 120 in Paris), the sixth interpreter being the permanent official recruited in 1990. Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. the note on Sub-Head 6 above). Their salary adjustment for 1992 amounts to F 24 000.

*Sub-Head 8*

A small amount is shown for this sub-head since the creation of three new grade B posts should reduce the need to recruit temporary staff. In 1991, the non-availability of the three assistants requested will result in an overspending under this sub-head of some F 75 000. The Council will be requested to authorise the transfer of this sum from Head I to Head II, sub-head 8. These estimates include an overall sum covering salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance.

*Sub-Head 9*

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

*Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters*

Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premiums as from May 1988.

*Provident fund for interpreters*

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund, or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

*Insurance for interpreters*

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) and the interpreters (0.4%).

**Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment**

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1992	Budget for 1991	Expected expenditure in 1991	Actual expenditure in 1990
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	540 000	525 000	525 000	363 482
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	10 000	10 000	–	3 500
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	587 000	570 000	564 000	550 863
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	105 000	65 000	95 000	78 248
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000	15 000	10 000	27 340
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	35 000	35 000	18 000	26 919
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	–	–	–	14 513
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment	475 000	534 000	520 000	416 817
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD III</b>	<b>1 767 000</b>	<b>1 754 000</b>	<b>1 732 000</b>	<b>1 481 682</b>

### *Explanations*

#### *Sub-Head 10*

Estimates under this sub-head represent the 30% share of joint expenditure relating to joint services shared by the WEU organs in Paris. Following the abolition of the agencies, the Council confirmed the validity of the previous system of sharing this expenditure and made the administrative service of the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for managing joint services.

#### *Sub-Head 11*

For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to cover such expenditure if necessary.

#### *Sub-Head 12*

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telefax, screens, a detection gate and other installations in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.

#### *Sub-Head 13*

Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, transport of reproduction equipment loaned free of charge, etc.). To usual expenditure must be added the cost of using new reproduction machines (approximately F 30 000) lent free of charge. This expenditure is justified by the considerable improvement in the operation of the service allowing the number of staff operating offset machines during sessions to be reduced, thus making a saving of an equivalent amount in sub-head 6.1.

#### *Sub-Head 14*

As in the past, this sum is requested to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

#### *Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17*

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget. The considerable reduction in the amounts under sub-head 17 is due to the end of the leasing contract for three computers and the renegotiation of maintenance contracts for the Assembly's computer equipment which shows a marked reduction due to the numbers involved compared with former contracts. No expenditure is expected in 1991 under sub-head 15 since the programme for the purchase of office furniture has been suspended in order to offset expected overspending in other sections of the budget.

### *Head IV – General administrative costs*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1992	Budget for 1991	Expected expenditure in 1991	Actual expenditure in 1990
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents	630 000	560 000	630 000	625 576
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	287 000	280 000	280 000	277 233
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 187 000	1 154 000	1 000 000	902 899
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	72 000	70 000	70 000	73 606
Sub-Head 22 – Official car	125 000	45 000	100 000	218 760
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges	500	500	500	676
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD IV</b>	<b>2 301 500</b>	<b>2 109 500</b>	<b>2 080 500</b>	<b>2 098 750</b>

*Explanations**Sub-Head 18*

Estimates under this sub-head take account of the considerable increase in the volume of documents being posted which, compared with 1988, increased by 250% in 1989 and 1990 and will presumably be higher in 1991 and 1992.

*Sub-Head 19*

In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the foreseeable variation of prices in this sector (+3%), the increase in the estimate compared with the previous financial year is only slight. This has been made possible by modernising reproduction equipment, thereby economising paper and expendable items. For the consumption of paper, for instance, the replacement of two offset machines by two photocopying machines has allowed far more documents to be produced while remaining within the bounds of available credits.

*Sub-Head 20*

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in prices (3%).

*Sub-Head 21*

There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with the financial year 1991 due to the need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of studies and reports.

*Sub-Head 22*

Estimates under this sub-head include the cost of running the official car of the Office of the Clerk (garage, petrol, servicing, insurance, etc.) and of hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly.

*Sub-Head 23*

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

*Head V – Other expenditure*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1992	Budget for 1991	Expected expenditure in 1991	Actual expenditure in 1990
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	230 000	200 000	210 000	304 467
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation	360 000	260 000	360 000	266 014
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions	5 000	5 000	–	–
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	650 000	630 000	600 000	544 530
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	50 000	30 000	30 000	53 342
Sub-Head 29 – Expenditure on information	455 000	455 000	400 000	536 282
Sub-Head 30 – Expenses for political groups	534 000	484 000	484 000	403 000
Sub-Head 31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	–	1 455
Sub-Head 32 – Non-recoverable taxes	28 000	28 000	28 000	20 268
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD V</b>	<b>2 315 000</b>	<b>2 095 000</b>	<b>2 112 000</b>	<b>2 129 358</b>

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### *Explanations*

#### *Sub-Head 24*

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries, as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairman when these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee. Estimates take into account the 18-20% increase in air fares compared with the previous year.

#### *Sub-Head 25*

The participation in sessions of the Assembly of very high-ranking official speakers and the ever-increasing number of visits by parliamentary delegations from countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean to the Assembly justify the increase in credits requested under this sub-head.

#### *Sub-Head 26*

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year.

#### *Sub-Head 27*

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the variation in per diem allowances provided for in the 270th report of the Co-ordinating Committee and the 18-20% increase in air fares; they are based on figures for previous financial years and are due to the intensification of the Assembly's work, with particular regard to contacts with North American countries and eastern and Mediterranean countries. A symposium to be organised by the Political Committee in one of the member countries has also been taken into account.

#### *Sub-Head 28*

In addition to the cost of auditing the Assembly's accounts, which is done by the Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes of France, this estimate includes some F 20 000 to cover the participation of experts in the symposium to be organised by the Political Committee in 1992.

#### *Sub-Head 29*

The estimate is unchanged compared with 1991, mainly in order to give the press service means of developing its action.

#### *Sub-Head 30*

The estimate under this sub-head was increased by 20% in 1990 because of the increase in the number of parliamentarians following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU and by 20% in 1991. However, the chairmen of political groups have expressed their concern at the small resources made available to them, particularly now that they intend, through more intensive action, to help to strengthen the rôle that will be incumbent upon the WEU Assembly in the new European structure. There is therefore an increase of 10% in estimates for 1992 compared with the previous year. By decision of the Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of members listed and has to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial year. All the balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to verification by the auditor.

#### *Sub-Head 31*

The same amount is requested as for 1991.

#### *Sub-Head 32*

The same amount is requested as for 1991.

## PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

*Section B – Receipts*

	Estimates for 1992	Budget for 1991	Estimates for 1991	Actual receipts in 1990
1. Sale of publications	35 000	35 000	34 000	25 538
2. Bank interest	60 000	60 000	40 000	39 181
3. Receipts (reimbursements, social security, etc.)	10 000	10 000	30 000	60 189
<b>TOTAL RECEIPTS</b>	<b>105 000</b>	<b>105 000</b>	<b>104 000</b>	<b>124 908</b>

*Explanations*

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based on experience.

## PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Pensions, allowances and social charges*

	Estimates for 1992	Budget for 1991 (authorised)	Expected expenditure in 1991	Actual expenditure in 1990
<b>Sub-Head 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances</b>				
1.1. Retirement pensions	2 866 000			
1.2. Invalidity pensions	417 000			
1.3. Survivors' pensions	60 000			
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–			
1.5. Leaving allowances	–			
	<b>3 363 000</b>	<b>3 118 000</b>	<b>3 184 000</b>	<b>2 936 169</b>
<b>Sub-Head 2 – Family allowances</b>				
2.1. Household allowances	139 000			
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances	30 000			
2.3. Education allowances	16 000			
	<b>185 000</b>	<b>169 000</b>	<b>156 600</b>	<b>160 647</b>
<b>Sub-Head 3 – Supplementary insurance</b>	<b>107 000</b>	<b>79 000</b>	<b>100 000</b>	<b>72 956</b>
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD I</b>	<b>3 655 000</b>	<b>3 366 000</b>	<b>3 440 600</b>	<b>3 169 772</b>

**Explanations***Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

In 1992, the Assembly will be paying fourteen pensions, as follows:

- eleven old-age pensions;
- two invalidity pensions;
- one survivor's pension.

Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules. The foreseeable overspending in 1991 is due to the fact that it is anticipated that one invalidity pension will have to be paid with effect from 1st August 1991. This overspending might make it necessary to ask the Council to authorise a transfer from Head I or, should savings be insufficient under this head, a supplementary budget.

*Sub-Head 3*

Pensions are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19bis of the collective convention in force.

Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

**PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET***Section B - Receipts*

	Estimates for 1992	Budget for 1991	Expected receipts in 1991	Actual receipts in 1990
Contributions by permanent officials .....	734 000	631 000	631 000	566 588

**Explanations**


Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the thirty-five permanent staff members of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension scheme.

## APPENDIX I

*Recapitulatory table showing changes in the staff  
of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly  
proposed in the 1992 budget*

Grade	Duties	1992 budget	1991 budget	+ or -
H.G.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Clerk Assistants	2	2	-
A5	Counsellors	5	5	-
A4	First secretaries	2	2	-
L4	Translator-interpreter	1	-	+ 1
L2/3	Translator-interpreter	-	1	- 1
A2	Controller; Head of private office	2	2	-
A2	Translators; Documentalists	4	4	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Qualified assistants	7	7	-
B4	Equipment accountant; Head of documents reproduction service	1	-	+ 1
B3	Offset operator; Reproduction clerk	2	-	+ 2
B3	Accountant	1	1	-
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	7	4	+ 3
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of documents reproduction service	-	1	- 1
C4	Offset operators	-	2	- 2
		37	34	+ 3

*Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly*



Notes:  
 • Service organised/staff recruited during sessions of the Assembly.  
 • Posts underlined are those it is proposed to create in 1992.  
 \* Posts proposed for regrading in the 1992 budget.

- 1) The duties of Head of the Committee Service are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs. His assistant helps him in the exercise of all these duties
- 2) The Clerk and his assistant are responsible for the secretariat of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
- 3) This post is normally filled by the assistant in the English Translation Service.
- 4) The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Head of the Personnel Section and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are carried out by the Clerk Assistant for Administration and Finance. His assistant helps him in the exercise of these duties.
- 5) These duties are exercised by the translator/interpreter in the French section of the Translation Service.
- 6) The Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is responsible for General Services.
- 7) The assistant to the Deputy Head of the Administration and Finance Service is also the assistant for the Mail and Archives Service.
- 8) The staff responsible for storing and accounting for equipment is responsible for the operation of the printing workshop.
- 9) The duties of Head of the Translation and Publications Service are exercised by the most senior reviser who, since 1st October 1986, has been the English reviser. He is helped in the exercise of these duties by his assistant.

## APPENDIX III

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**1. Sitings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly .....	1 a	14	1 080	15 120	44 240
	1 b	16	1 820	29 120	
Heads of sections .....	1 a	8	1 182	9 456	61 628
	1 a	8	1 236	9 888	
	1 b	10	1 922	19 220	
	1 b	12	1 922	23 064	
Sergeant-at-arms .....	1 b	10	1 698	16 980	16 980
Parliamentary secretaries .....	2 a	8	958	15 328	49 288
	2 b	10	1 698	33 960	
Précis writers .....	3 a	8	958	22 992	73 932
	3 b	10	1 698	50 940	
Verbatim reporters .....	6 a	8	1 101	52 848	290 568
	14 b	10	1 698	237 720	
Editors .....	2 a	8	958	15 328	49 288
	2 b	10	1 698	33 960	
Principal assistants .....	6 b	10	1 130	67 800	
Assistants to the President's counsellors .....	1 a	14	451	6 314	14 800
	1 b	16	925	14 800	
Assistants assigned to other services .....	12 a	8	574	55 104	366 194
	20 b	10	1 048	209 600	
	1 b	12	1 048	12 576	
Ushers .....	5 a	8	476	19 040	
Messengers .....	3 a	10	476	14 280	
Installations attendant .....	1 a	14	374	5 236	
Cloakroom attendant .....	1 a	8	476	3 808	42 364
Offset-assemblers .....	8 a	10	476	38 080	38 080
	100				1 032 562
Adjustment for 1992 (5.56%) .....					57 410
					1 089 972
Travelling expenses .....					250 000
					1 339 972
				Rounded up to	1 340 000

\* In accordance with scales in force on 30th June 1990.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

**2. Interpretation service**

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters .....	13 a	8	317 512
	7 b	10	271 250
	20		588 762
Adjustment for 1992 (5.56 %) .....			32 735
			621 497
Travelling expenses .....			40 000
			661 497
		<b>Rounded up to</b>	<b>662 000</b>

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B. On 30th June 1990, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 3 053. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

**3. Translation service**

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimates <sup>1</sup>	Total F
Revisers .....	5 a	1 205	150 625	296 500
	3 b	1 945	145 875	
Translators .....	5 a	952	119 000	245 900
	3 b	1 692	126 900	
Principal assistants .....	2 a	516	30 960	90 360
	2 b	990	59 400	
Assistants .....	5 a	451	67 650	206 400
	5 b	925	138 750	
	30			839 160
Adjustment for 1992 (5.56 %) .....				46 657
				885 817
Travelling expenses .....				35 000
				920 817
			<b>Rounded up to</b>	<b>921 000</b>

1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 30 days for assistants.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

## APPENDIX IV

*Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk**(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1	<i>A. Reproduction and printing equipment</i> <i>Photocopiers</i>						
1.1	1 RX 1065 (1987)	Hire (rate blocked). Maintenance contract (indexed)	74 000 18 000	56 400 15 000	56 400 15 000	56 400 15 000	56 400 15 000
1.2	1 Gestetner 2382 ZDF	These are leased for a five-year period. The contract expires in April 1996. The cost of maintenance depends on the number of copies made. Estimated cost of maintenance	63 500	63 500	63 500	63 500	28 000
1.3	2 photocopiers (model to be chosen)	One of these photocopiers replaces the former RX 3107 now unfit for use. The other will be assigned to the offices on the second floor. Estimated cost of maintenance	20 400	20 400	20 400	20 400	20 400
1.4	1 Gestetner 2200	Property of the Assembly.					
1.5		Servicing of these machines on 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 is included in the supply of expendable material. The relevant expenditure is therefore charged to Sub-Head 19.					
2	<i>Offset machines</i>						
2.1	1 Gestetner 311 (1984)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed)	8 900	8 900	8 900	8 900	8 900
3	<i>Electrostatic stereotypers</i>						
3.1	1 Gestetner PM/9 (1980)	Property of the Assembly. Reserved for sessions.					
3.2	1 Gestetner DT 1 (1985)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed)	1 500	1 500	1 500	1 500	1 500
3.3	1 Gestetner 100PM (1986)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed)	3 100	3 100	3 100	3 100	3 100
4	<i>Binding machines</i>						
4.1.	1 Gestetner 100						
4.2.	1 Orpo Planax						
4.3.	1 Orpo Thermatic						
4.4.		Property of the Assembly. This machine is in good condition. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
5	<i>Miscellaneous equipment</i>						
5.1.	1 Logabax-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapler	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required, since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant. It is no longer considered necessary to replace it as the printing workshop is now equipped with photocopiers that assemble. A general overhaul and a single service are planned for the latter.	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
5.2.	1 AM International 5000 addressograph	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed)	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
5.3.	1 Fortematic 655 paper-cutting machine	This machine is serviced when required. A single annual service is enough to keep it in good working order. A single general service is planned.	2 200	2 200	2 200	2 200	2 200
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>						
6	<i>Office of the Clerk</i>						
6.1	8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in good condition.					
6.2	1 ET 221 Olivetti	Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in good condition.					
6.3	1 ET 2400 Olivetti	Purchased in 1989, it is in excellent condition.					
6.4	3 Olivetti calculators	These machines are in good working order.					
7	<i>For use during sessions</i>						
7.1	4 RX 6015 electronic typewriters (English keyboard)	These machines were purchased in 1986 and are assigned to session services.					
7.2	1 IBM electric typewriter (French keyboard)	Assigned to a political group.					
7.3	2 ET 109 typewriters (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters.					
7.4	1 Editor electric typewriter (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian summary reporters.					
7.5	2 Olivetti ET 2400 electronic typewriters 1 Portuguese keyboard 1 Spanish keyboard	Purchased in 1989, they are assigned to the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations.					
7.6		All typewriters and calculators are serviced twice a year, before each session, by a mechanic recruited for the purpose, but a lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000
7.7	Hired typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session: - 14 electric machines with English keyboards - 11 electric machines with French keyboards.	28 000	28 000	28 000	28 000	28 000

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	
8	<i>Typewriters in reserve</i>							
8.1	6 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters 2 English keyboards 5 French keyboards (one with long carriage)	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, they are kept in reserve in case of need (e.g. at the request of journalists or in the event of an electricity cut)						
8.2	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters 19 English keyboards 2 French keyboards							
	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i>							
9	<i>Dictaphones</i>							
9.1	2 Uher 5000	Purchased in 1971, they will remain in service as long as possible.						
9.2	1 Sony BM 80	Purchased in 1987, it is in very good working order.						
9.3	2 Sony BM 75 (1990)							
9.4	11 Grundig Stenorettes	Purchased between 1963 and 1987, they should be replaced gradually as from 1992.						
	1 Sony dictaphone BM 88	To replace one of the 11 dictaphones under item 9.4	4 500	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000
9.5	1 stenotype machine Grandjean	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order.						
9.6		Provision for an overall sum in the budget for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>							
10	<i>Computers and word processors</i>							
10.1	2 Olivetti ETS 2010 6 Olivetti M 300 2 Olivetti M 300	These have been hired on a five-year leasing basis. The three contracts expire in March 1993, May 1995 and January 1997 respectively. Estimates take account of their replacement on those dates. Cost of hire	142 000	131 000	105 400	64 400	26 000	
10.2	8 Olivetti ETS 2010	Property of the Assembly.						
10.3	1 Olivetti M 24	Maintenance contract (indexed) for all word processors and computers described in paragraphs 10.1 and 10.2	76 100	85 000	85 000	85 000	85 000	85 000
10.4	2 Macintosh SE 30	Purchased in 1988 and 1990, there will be a maintenance contract for them as from 1992.	7 800	7 800	7 800	7 800	7 800	7 800
	<i>E. Office furniture</i>							
11	Office of the Clerk	Purchase or replacement of various items of furniture.	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000

*Breakdown by budget classification*

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets				
Head	Sub-Head		1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	11	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment						
		1.1	92 000	71 400	71 400	71 400	71 400
		1.2	63 500	63 500	63 500	63 500	28 000
		1.3	20 400	20 400	20 400	20 400	20 400
		2.1	8 900	8 900	8 900	8 900	8 900
		3.2	1 500	1 500	1 500	1 500	1 500
		3.3	3 100	3 100	3 100	3 100	3 100
		5.1	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000
		5.2	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
		5.3	2 200	2 200	2 200	2 200	2 200
		7.6	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000
		7.7	28 000	28 000	28 000	28 000	28 000
		9.4	4 500	9 000	9 000	9 000	9 000
		9.6	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
		10.1	142 000	131 000	105 000	64 000	26 000
		10.3	76 100	85 000	85 000	85 000	85 000
		10.4	7 800	7 800	7 800	7 800	7 800
	TOTAL		475 000	456 800	431 200	390 200	316 300
	ROUNDED UP		475 000	457 000	432 000	391 000	317 000

## APPENDIX V

*Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1991 to 1992*

	1991 a	1992 b	% $\frac{b-a}{a}$
<b>A. Operating budget</b>			
Head I. Permanent staff	14 684 000	17 182 000	+ 17.01
Head II. Temporary staff	3 635 000	3 777 000	+ 3.90
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 754 000	1 767 000	+ 0.74
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 109 500	2 301 500	+ 9.10
Head V. Other expenditure	2 095 000	2 315 000	+ 10.50
<b>Total expenditure</b>	<b>24 277 500</b>	<b>27 342 500</b>	<b>+ 12.62</b>
Receipts	105 000	105 000	-
<b>Net Total</b>	<b>24 172 500</b>	<b>27 237 500</b>	<b>+ 12.67</b>
<b>B. Pensions budget</b>			
Pensions and leaving allowances	3 366 000	3 655 000	+ 8.58
Receipts	631 000	734 000	+ 16.32
<b>Net Total</b>	<b>2 735 000</b>	<b>2 921 000</b>	<b>+ 6.95</b>
<b>GRAND NET TOTAL (A + B)</b>	<b>26 907 500</b>	<b>30 158 500</b>	<b>+ 12.08</b>
<b>TOTAL OF HEADS II TO V OF OPERATING BUDGET</b>	<b>9 593 500</b>	<b>10 160 500</b>	<b>+ 5.91</b>


## APPENDIX VI

*Implications of the various heads for the 1991 and 1992 operating budgets*

	1991			1992		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
<b>A. Operating budget</b>						
Head I - Permanent staff	14 684 000	60.48	60.74	17 182 000	62.83	63.08
Head II - Temporary staff	3 635 000	14.97	15.04	3 777 000	13.80	13.87
Head III - Premises and equipment	1 754 000	7.23	7.25	1 767 000	6.46	6.49
Head IV - General administrative costs	2 109 500	8.69	8.73	2 301 500	8.41	8.45
Head V - Other expenditure	2 095 000	8.63	8.67	2 315 000	8.50	8.50
TOTAL	24 277 500	100.00	100.43	27 342 500	100.00	100.39
Receipts	105 000		- 0.43	105 000		- 0.39
NET TOTAL	24 172 500		100.00	27 237 500		100.00

APPENDIX VII

*Trend in the number of items sent by the Archives and Mail Service*



Press ■  
Office of the Clerk ■

\* Estimate as at 14th June.

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure  
of the Assembly for the financial year 1992*<sup>1</sup>

*Opinion of the Council*

REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Committee  
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*<sup>2</sup>  
*by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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- IV. Trend of Assembly budgets from 1991 to 1992

*Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

1. The draft budget for the financial year 1992 (Document 1281) was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee of WEU on 15th November 1991. This committee decided that the policy of budgetary limitations in force in member countries did not allow the total growth rate of 12.08% proposed by the Assembly to be accepted. Consequently, it decided to recommend to the Council:

- the withdrawal of the proposals concerning the staff of the Office of the Clerk (creation of three new posts and re-grading of four existing posts) ;
- an increase of F 35 000 in appropriations under Head II to take account of the abovementioned proposals;
- an overall growth rate for Heads II to V of the operating budget limited to 4.5 %.

2. At its meeting on 26th November 1991, the Council decided to accept the recommendations adopted by the Budget and Organisation Committee.

3. As a result of the reductions made by the Council, the net total budget of the Assembly (operating plus pensions) is reduced from F 30 158 000 to F 29 176 000. In relation to the financial year 1991, this new total represents a growth rate of 8.43 %.

4. The table at Appendix III shows the revised estimates for the draft 1992 budget divided into heads and sub-heads.

1. Adopted unanimously in committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Lagorce, Maas (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez, Antretter Bowden, Büchler, Cauwenberghs, Diaz, Durand, Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner (Alternate: Lord Mackie of Benshie), MM. Garcia Sanchez, Greco, Jurgens, Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Redmond, Regenwetter (Alternate: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette), Silva Marques, Sinesio (Alternate: Parisi), Triglia, Vara.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

## APPENDIX I

*Secretary-General's note*  
*WEU Assembly budget for 1992*

19th November 1991

1. The WEU Assembly draft budget for 1992 (Assembly Document 1281) was circulated to the Budget and Organisation Committee on 20th September 1991 under reference B (91) 18 and was examined during the meeting of the committee on 14th and 15th November 1991 (BR (91) 1 IV, 2 - to be circulated).

2. The net total of the proposed draft budget was:

A. Operating budget .....	F 27 237 500
B. Pensions budget .....	F 2 921 000
Net grand total .....	F 30 158 500

This figure represented an increase of 12.08 % over the net grand total (F 26 907 500) of the budget for 1991 (C-B (91) 11, Assembly Document 1241 Addendum 3).

3. The Budget and Organisation Committee considered that the considerable increase proposed had to be reconciled with the requirement of zero real growth. In the circumstances of the financial constraints which continue to be imposed upon national budgets, the committee could not accept any of the new posts or regradings proposed in the 1992 budget document (Document 1281).

Consequently, Head I (permanent staff) of the operating budget was reduced by F 895 000 (paragraph 18, Document 1281), but the committee agreed that, as a corollary, Head II (temporary staff) should be increased by F 35 000. The pensions budget needed to be adjusted to take account of the reduction in contribution income (7 % of net basic salary), following the removal from the operating budget of the original provision for the cost of the new posts and regradings. In addition, the committee was unable to accept for 1992 an increase in the provision in Heads III to V inclusive (operating budget) greater than 4.5 % over the corresponding provision (F 5 958 500) in 1991 (C-B (91) 11). The committee left to the discretion of the Assembly how the increase should be allocated to each of the chapters.

4. The committee requested a statement of revised figures reflecting all the adjustments. The figures (Annex A) show that, compared with 1991, the increase in the net operating budget for 1992 is 8.47 % and in the net grand total 8.43 %.

5. The following table shows the original budget proposals (Document 1281) and the revised figures recommended by the committee:

<i>A. Operating budget</i>		
Head	Original credits proposed F	Revised credits recommended F
I. ....	18 182 000	16 287 000
II. ....	3 777 000	3 812 000
III. ....	1 767 000	6 227 000
IV. ....	2 301 500	
V. ....	2 315 500	
Income .....	27 342 500	26 221 000
	105 000	105 000
Net total operating budget .....	27 237 500	26 221 000
<i>B. Pensions budget</i>		
Expenditure .....	3 655 000	3 655 000
Income .....	734 000	700 000
Net total pensions budget .....	2 921 000	2 955 000
<i>C. Net grand total</i> .....	30 158 500	29 176 000

6. The committee recommends that the Council give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's draft budget for 1992, as amended (F 29 176 000) .

7. The table at Annex B shows the net contribution to the 1992 budget for each member state.

8. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting on 26th November 1991. It is recalled that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part session opens on Monday, 2nd December 1991.

## ANNEX A

*Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1991 to 1992**(B (91) 18 Appendix V revised)*

	1991 (CB (91) 11) a	1992 b	% b-a a
	F	F	F
<i>A. Operating budget</i>			
Head I. Permanent staff .....	14 684 000	16 287 000	+ 10.92
Head II. Temporary staff .....	3 635 000	3 812 000	+ 4.86
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment .....	1 754 000	} 6 227 000	+ 4.50
Head IV. General administrative costs .....	2 109 500		
Head V. Other expenditure .....	2 095 000		
Total expenditure .....	24 277 500	26 326 000	+ 8.44
Receipts .....	105 000	105 000	-
NET TOTAL (A) .....	24 172 500	26 221 000	+ 8.47
<i>B. Pensions budget</i>			
Pensions .....	3 366 000	3 655 000	+ 8.58
Receipts .....	631 000	700 000	+ 10.93
NET TOTAL (B) .....	2 735 000	2 955 000	+ 8.04
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B) .....	26 907 500	29 176 000	+ 8.43

\*  
\* \*

TOTAL OF HEADS II TO V OF OPERATING BUDGET	9 593 500	10 039 000	+ 4.64
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## ANNEX B

*WEU Assembly budget 1992**Contributions*

In the following table, the gross contributions to the budget are calculated on the basis of the cost-sharing formula applicable to the present nine member states. However, the surplus for the financial period ended 31st December 1990 is apportioned partly (to 26th March 1990) on the former basis applicable to seven member states and partly (for the remainder of 1990) on the present basis applicable to nine member states.

## Agreed distribution

	%
Belgium .....	8.35
France .....	17.00
Germany .....	17.00
Italy .....	17.00
Luxembourg .....	0.30
Netherlands .....	8.35
Portugal .....	2.00
Spain .....	13.00
United Kingdom .....	17.00
	100.00

## Contributions to 1992 budget

1992 budget £	1990 surplus £	1992 contributions (net) £
2 436 196	62 636	2 373 560
4 959 920	127 489	4 832 431
4 959 920	127 489	4 832 431
4 959 920	127 489	4 832 431
87 528	2 217	85 311
2 436 196	62 636	2 373 560
583 520	11 052	572 468
3 792 880	71 836	3 721 044
4 959 920	127 489	4 832 431
29 176 000	720 333	28 455 667

## APPENDIX II

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
to Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly*

27th November 1991

.....

I have the honour to inform you that, at its meeting on 26th November 1991, the WEU Council expressed a favourable opinion on the draft budget of the Assembly for 1992 as contained in document C-B (91) 14.

.....

Willem van EEKELEN

Mr. Robert PONTILLON,  
President,  
Assembly of Western European Union,  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson,  
75775 Paris Cedex 16.

## APPENDIX III

*Recapitulatory table of budget estimates for 1992 as a result of the opinion of the Council*

Heads - sub-heads	Draft budget for 1992	Breakdown of changes made by the Council	Draft budget (opinion of the Council)
<b>HEAD I – PERMANENT STAFF</b>			
<b>Sub-Head:</b>			
1 – Basic salaries .....	11 860 000	– 500 000	11 360 00
2 – Allowances .....	2 683 000	– 191 000	2 492 000
3 – Social charges .....	2 404 000	– 97 000	2 307 000
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials .	221 000	– 107 000	114 000
5 – Medical examination .....	14 000	–	14 000
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>17 182 000</b>	<b>– 895 000</b>	<b>16 287 000</b>
<b>HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF</b>			
<b>Sub-Head:</b>			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions .....	2 988 000	–	2 988 000
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions .....	618 000	–	618 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk .....	15 000	+ 35 000	50 000
9 – Social charges .....	156 000	–	156 000
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>3 777 000</b>	<b>+ 35 000</b>	<b>3 812 000</b>
<b>HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</b>			
<b>Sub-Head:</b>			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises .....	540 000	–	540 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms .....	10 000	–	10 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions .....	587 000	–	587 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions .....	105 000	–	105 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Clerk .....	15 000	–	15 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture .	35 000	–	35 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment .....	–	–	–
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment .....	475 000	–	475 000
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>1 767 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 767 000</b>

Heads - sub-heads	Draft budget for 1992	Breakdown of changes made by the Council	Draft budget (opinion of the Council)
<b>HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</b>			
<b>Sub-Head:</b>			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents .....	630 000	– 30 000	600 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies .....	287 000	–	287 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents .	1 187 000	– 36 500	1 150 500
21 – Purchase of documents .....	72 000	–	72 000
22 – Official cars .....	125 000	–	125 000
23 – Bank charges .....	500	–	500
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>2 301 500</b>	<b>– 66 500</b>	<b>2 235 000</b>
<b>HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE</b>			
<b>Sub-Head:</b>			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .....	230 000	– 20 000	210 000
25 – Expenses for representation .....	360 000	–	360 000
26 – Committee study missions .....	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk .....	650 000	– 60 000	590 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor ..	50 000	–	50 000
29 – Expenditure on information .....	455 000	– 10 000	445 000
30 – Expenses for political groups .....	534 000	–	534 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for .....	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes .....	28 000	–	28 000
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>2 315 000</b>	<b>– 90 000</b>	<b>2 225 000</b>
<b>Operating budget .....</b>	<b>27 342 500</b>	<b>– 1 016 500</b>	<b>26 326 000</b>
<b>Receipts .....</b>	<b>105 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>105 000</b>
<b>NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET .....</b>	<b>27 237 500</b>	<b>– 1 016 500</b>	<b>26 221 000</b>
<b>Pensions expenditure .....</b>	<b>3 655 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>3 655 000</b>
<b>Receipts .....</b>	<b>734 000</b>	<b>– 34 000</b>	<b>700 000</b>
<b>NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET .....</b>	<b>2 921 000</b>	<b>+ 34 000</b>	<b>2 955 000</b>
<b>NET GRAND TOTAL .....</b>	<b>30 158 500</b>	<b>– 982 500</b>	<b>29 176 000</b>

## APPENDIX IV

*Trend of Assembly budgets from 1991 to 1992*

	1991 a	1992 Doc. 1281 b	% $\frac{b-a}{b}$	1992 revised c	% $\frac{c-a}{a}$
<b>A. Operating budget</b>					
Head I. Permanent staff .....	14 684 000	17 182 000	+ 17.01	16 287 000	10.92
Head II. Temporary staff .....	3 635 000	3 777 000	+ 3.90	3 812 000	4.86
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment .....	1 754 000	1 767 000	} + 7.00	6 227 000	4.50
Head IV. General administrative costs .....	2 109 500	2 301 500			
Head V. Other expenditure .....	2 095 000	2 315 000			
Total expenditure .....	24 277 500	27 342 500	+ 12.62	26 326 000	8.44
Receipts .....	105 000	105 000	-	105 000	-
NET TOTAL .....	24 172 500	27 237 500	+ 12.67	26 221 000	8.47
<b>B. Pensions budget</b>					
Pensions and leaving allowances .....	3 366 000	3 655 000	+ 8.58	3 655 000	8.58
Receipts .....	631 000	734 000	+ 16.32	700 000	10.93
NET TOTAL .....	2 735 000	2 921 000	+ 6.95	2 955 000	8.04
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B) .....	26 907 500	30 158 500	+ 12.08	29 176 000	8.43

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\* \*

TOTAL OF HEADS II TO V OF OPERATING BUDGET .....	9 593 500	10 160 500	+ 5.91	10 039 000	4.64
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***First part of the thirty-seventh annual report  
of the Council to the Assembly of WEU***

*(1st January to 30th June 1991)*

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***I. Introduction***

During the first half of 1991, the Council's activities were particularly intense; the exceptional circumstances of the Gulf war, the debate on the European security and defence identity and the progress made on practical co-operation projects all contributed to an intensification of the organisations's work.

Two extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers – one on the Gulf crisis and the other on the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture – and an informal session on humanitarian aid to refugees in Iraq – preceded the first ordinary

meeting of the Ministerial Council in 1991. Given ministers' very heavy schedule, this meeting was organised in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg by the French Presidency – with help from the Luxembourg authorities – on the eve of the European Council of 28th June in Luxembourg.

There was also a marked increase in the activities of the Permanent Council and its working groups, whether in the context of topical questions or in the fields of space co-operation, arms control verification and politico-military co-operation; in the latter case, impetus was provided by the Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on 10th April 1991.

## II. Gulf crisis

### 1. Extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers on 17th January 1991 in Paris

For the third time since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states were convened to an extraordinary meeting on 17th January 1991 in Paris to discuss the situation in the Gulf.

The Ambassadors of Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey attended this meeting as observers.

Ministers decided to step up their co-ordination, in concert with the other countries who had undertaken to uphold the rule of law. This applied in particular to the co-ordination of WEU countries' naval forces taking part in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 678, and to co-ordination by WEU countries in the field of logistics supporting the ground and air forces.

The Secretary-General has underlined the important rôle played to date by WEU, noting that out of 21 000 challenges made since August in enforcement of the naval embargo, 16 000 were made by vessels of WEU countries.

At the end of this meeting, the text of a press communiqué was adopted (see Annex I enclosed).

### 2. Extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers on 22nd February 1991 in Paris

At this meeting, ministers examined the latest developments in the Gulf crisis and adopted the text of a press communiqué (see Annex II enclosed).

### 3. Informal meeting of WEU ministers on the situation in the Middle East, Luxembourg, 8th April 1991

This meeting was called by the French Presidency in the margins of the European Council meeting that same day with the Danish and Greek Foreign Ministers invited to attend as observers together with the Turkish Ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

The Presidency's conclusions were circulated at the end of the meeting (see Annex IV enclosed).

### 4. Co-ordination of WEU naval forces

The ad hoc Group on the Gulf, set up at the extraordinary Ministerial Council on 21st August 1990, met five times in Paris during the period under review; it drew up and adopted two

sets of guidelines on the application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 678:

- "joint specific guidelines for co-ordinating WEU countries' naval forces involved in the application of United Nations Resolution 678", and
- "joint specific guidelines for co-ordination action by the navies of WEU countries participating in the mine-clearance and humanitarian operations in the Gulf".

The naval points of contact and the specific cell tasked with monitoring WEU vessels in the operation zone have continued to exchange the information needed to co-ordinate the deployment of WEU countries' vessels and to exchange information between the capitals of WEU countries.

### 5. Humanitarian aid to the displaced populations of Iraq

(i) In implementation of the conclusions of the informal meeting of WEU ministers in Luxembourg on 8th April, and following the meetings of the ad hoc group on 9th and 23rd April, co-operation was organised between WEU member countries as regards the implementation of United Nations Resolution 688; among the provisions of this operation was that logistic and co-ordination requirements relating to aid to the refugees would be dealt with via the network of military points of contact, and that regular contact would be maintained with the European Commission.

(ii) For its part, the WEU Council, which kept this item on its agenda, instructed the Secretariat-General to draw up a table of member states's contributions based on information provided by the latter.

This table was updated as the situation evolved.

### 6. Withdrawal of forces from Iraq

During the period under review, partners exchanged information on their respective plans in this field.

### 7. Lessons of the Middle East crisis

The lessons of the Gulf crisis were discussed by the Defence Representatives Group with a view to preparing the meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff on 10th April 1991.

WEU ministers also addressed this subject over lunch at the Ministerial Council in Vianden on 27th June, taking as their basis a discussion document prepared by the French Presidency.

The co-ordination within WEU involved all the member states to varying degrees.

It covered the following areas:

- enforcement of the naval embargo,
- land and air deployments and action,
- general naval support operations during the hostilities,
- mine-clearance operations in the maritime approaches to Kuwait,
- humanitarian assistance to Iraqi civilians, notably the Kurds.

It was at sea that the action taken by WEU states was the most significant: 75% of the naval embargo enforcement operations and a similar proportion of the mine-clearance operations were undertaken by the navies of WEU states.

The missions did of course vary depending on the way the crisis developed.

In its conclusions, the Presidency noted in particular that the action carried out under WEU auspices during the Gulf crisis was unprecedented both in its principle and extent. It represented the first autonomous European military undertaking on this scale.

It went on to say that the WEU action put down the first markers for European operational co-operation. The speed with which the mechanisms for co-ordinating the operations were set up testified to the political will of member states to move forward in this direction.

### **III. Rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture**

1. On 10th December 1990, ministers had invited the working groups to continue their deliberations on the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture, so that they could submit their conclusions to the spring ministerial meeting of 1991.

2. The French Presidency took the initiative of convening *an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers to discuss this subject on 22nd February 1991 in Paris*. Ministers' discussions were based on a report by the Secretary-General<sup>1</sup>, which had been examined and revised in the preceding months by the Council's working groups and presented to ministers under the title "the future of European security and defence co-operation".

1. Report mentioned under item IV, 3, b of the second part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council to the Assembly.

Following the discussions, it was agreed that this report would be annexed to the Presidency's public conclusions, with the stipulation that the report at that stage had not been formally agreed (see Annex III enclosed).

The French Presidency circulated the conclusions and the annex to the Twelve and the Sixteen.

3. The Council and its working groups continued their discussion in line with the conclusions reached by ministers on 22nd February and instructed the Secretary-General to draw up a discussion document with a view to the *ministerial meeting on 27th June in Vianden*.

Following a final revision to reflect the discussions of the enlarged Council on 10th June, this document – together with a contribution from the Spanish Delegation – was discussed in great detail by ministers; the results are contained in a passage of the communiqué adopted by ministers (see Annex V, point 1 enclosed).

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Genscher, suggested that ministers meet again in extraordinary session to continue their discussions in this field; his idea was to meet before the second ordinary Ministerial Council of 1991 scheduled for 18th and 19th November and before the summit of the Twelve on 6th December.

### **IV. Council activities**

The Council has followed the activities of the organisation as a whole and, at each of its meetings, has exchanged views and information on topical questions relating to European security, and particularly on the evolving situation in the Gulf.

The Council Working Group<sup>2</sup> met before each Council meeting to prepare the Council's decisions and if necessary to deal with other technical or administrative matters.

#### **1. Topical questions**

##### **(i) Situation in the Gulf**

The events in the Gulf and the WEU co-ordination described in detail in point III above received constant attention from the Council.

It was briefed by the representative of the Presidency on the outcome of meetings held at various levels (informal ministerial meeting on

2. Consisting of the WEU deputies to the Permanent Representatives in London.

8th April, ad hoc Groups on the Gulf, military points of contact, naval points of contact), and it took part in preparations for, and follow-up to the extraordinary ministerial meeting on 17th January devoted to this subject.

It received regular updates on member states' contributions in the region.

(ii) *Political union and security and defence questions*

The representative of the Luxembourg Presidency of the EC briefed the Council on the outcome of the main meetings of the Twelve which had taken place on this subject.

(iii) *Relations with the United States*

The French Presidency and the Secretary-General reported to the Council on their joint visit to the American administration in Washington on 26th and 27th April, the aim of which was to explain to the United States authorities the meaning and extent of the discussions taking place within WEU on the future European security architecture.

(iv) The topical questions item on the Council's agenda also provided an opportunity for delegations to inform the Council about various activities concerned with European security carried out by their respective authorities.

**2. *Rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture***

The Permanent Council monitored the progress of the debate on this subject, a report on which is contained in point III above.

**3. *Activities of the intergovernmental organs***

(i) *Council working groups*

At each of its meetings the Council took note of, and commented on, the results of the latest working group meetings.

(ii) *Agency for the Control of Armaments*

The Council took note of the report of the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the control activity for 1990, submitted pursuant to Article VII, 2, c of Protocol No. IV of the Paris Agreements.

(iii) *WEU Institute for Security Studies*

The Secretary-General invited the Institute's Director to attend Council meetings whenever the agenda made it useful for him to attend.

For example, the Director reported to the Council on the main activities carried out by the Institute from 1st October to 31st December 1990 and from 1st January to 31st March 1991 (referred to in detail under point IX below); he also consulted the Council on some of the Institute's proposed future activities.

He conveyed to the Council his impressions of the various visits he had made either alone or in the company of research fellows.

The Council had received copies of the first editions of the Chaillot papers.

Acting on the proposal from the Institute Director, the Council asked the Secretary-General to appoint Mr. Roberto Zadra to the post of research fellow with effect from 1st July 1991.

(iv) *Meetings of officials of analysis and planning centres*

In accordance with the wish expressed by WEU ministers at their Council meeting on 10th December 1990 (see second part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, point IV, 3, b) officials from analysis and planning centres met on 18th February in Paris for an initial informal exchange of views. A second informal meeting took place on 13th June at the Secretariat-General in London.

**4. *Council meetings held at ministerial level***

(i) The Council was kept informed of the preparations for, and follow-up to, the extraordinary Ministerial Councils in Paris on 17th January 1991 on the Gulf (referred to in point II above), on 22nd February 1991 on the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture (referred to in point III above) and the Ministerial Council (ordinary session) of 27th June 1991 in Vianden.

At this last meeting, Mr. Dumas and Mr. Joxe began by reporting on the discussions which had taken place during the lunches organised separately for the foreign and defence ministers. Thereafter, the debates followed the agenda approved by the enlarged Council<sup>3</sup>.

– *Situation in Yugoslavia*

Ministers agreed on the text of a statement (see Annex VII enclosed).

– *Situation in the Gulf and in Iraq*

Ministers had received a report by the Presidency on WEU co-ordination during the Gulf crisis.

Their communiqué contains a passage on this subject (see Annex VI enclosed, point 4).

3. Attendance enlarged to include political directors and representatives of defence ministers.

– *Dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe*

Ministers took note of the report on this subject approved by the enlarged Council on 10th June, and adopted the proposed future measures which accompanied this report.

Their communiqué contains a passage on this subject (see Annex VI enclosed, point 3).

– *Rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture*

Ministers held a detailed exchange of views on the basis of the Secretary-General's discussion paper (see point III above) and a contribution from Spain.

Their communiqué contains a passage on this subject (see Annex VI enclosed, point 1).

In this context, ministers decided that the Defence Representatives Group would, in liaison with the Special Working Group, study the politico-military repercussions of giving WEU a more operational rôle and, in the military field proper, the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures.

– *Space co-operation*

Ministers approved the following decisions, the drafts of which had been prepared by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space and approved by the enlarged Council on 10th June 1991:

- the decision to set up a WEU satellite centre, and
- the decision to task the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to pursue studies on the possibilities for medium- and long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system.

These decisions are referred to in point 6 of the communiqué.

– *Co-operation in the field of arms control verification*

Ministers approved the proposals put to them by the WEU experts on verification.

They are referred to in point 6 of the communiqué.

– *Security in the Mediterranean*

Ministers adopted a passage on this subject, contained in point 5 of their communiqué.

**5. Meeting of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff on 10th April 1991 in Paris**

(i) The meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff agreed on by ministers on 10th December 1990 took place in Paris on 10th April 1991; at the

end of the meeting a communiqué was issued, the text of which is contained in Annex V enclosed.

(ii) The communiqué of the Ministerial Council of 27th June in Vianden (see Annex VI enclosed) referred to this meeting as giving further impetus to the discussions under way on the possibilities of developing various forms of practical co-operation.

**6. Relations with NATO**

(i) *Presentation by the SACEUR representative on the forces of WEU member states under NATO command: implementation of Article IV of Protocol No. II*

The annual presentation to the Council on forces of WEU member states under NATO command was made by General Antonio Milani, SACEUR representative, Deputy Chief of Staff (Services) at the meeting of the Permanent Council on 27th February. The presentation gave rise to an exchange of views among members of the Council and the SHAPE representatives, notably on force structures, the current review of NATO strategy and the concept of multinational forces.

(ii) *Visit of Permanent Representatives to SHAPE on 13th May 1991*

As every year, the Permanent Representatives were invited to visit SHAPE.

Following a presentation by senior officers on SHAPE's responsibilities and future force structure, the SACEUR, General Galvin, addressed the Permanent Representatives and held discussions with them.

The NATO Secretary-General took the opportunity of the Permanent Representatives' visit to invite each one of them personally for discussions.

**7. United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe**

At the Council meeting on 26th June, the United Kingdom Representative commented on the proposals which the United Kingdom Secretary of State had made in a letter to the Secretary-General, on which the SACEUR had given his opinion in accordance with Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty.

The Council decided to put this item on the agenda of its meeting on 11th July<sup>4</sup>.

4. The Council decision on this subject (already forwarded to the Assembly) will be reported in the second part of this thirty-seventh report.

*8. Contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe*

(i) The Council has regularly monitored developments in this field.

(ii) The visits made in 1990 to Hungary and Czechoslovakia by the Secretary-General and the Head of the Service des Affaires Stratégiques et du Désarmement of the French Foreign Ministry, who was representing the Presidency<sup>5</sup>, were followed up on 7th and 8th March 1991 by a visit to Poland, during which discussions were held with ministers and senior officials from the foreign and defence ministries and from the President's cabinet, and also with representatives of both chambers of the National Assembly.

(iii) On 11th and 12th March, a seminar was organised under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies. It brought together senior officials responsible for politico-military questions from the foreign and defence ministries of WEU member states, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

(iv) On 27th June in Vianden, ministers discussed the next phase of these contacts. They approved the proposals set out in the report prepared for them, which had been approved on 10th June by the enlarged Council.

These proposals are contained in point 3 of the Vianden communiqué (see Annex VI enclosed).

*9. Relations with the Assembly*

(i) The Permanent Council has closely followed and regularly discussed the Assembly's activities and its relations with the Council:

The Secretary-General conveyed his very favourable impressions of the meeting of the Political Committee on 5th March in Madrid, and also his impressions of the grouped meeting of committees held in Palermo from 26th to 28th March.

The Council took note of the advice to the WEU Council of Ministers and to the intergovernmental conference on the future of European co-operation in security and defence questions, adopted by the Assembly's Presidential Committee in Palermo on 26th March 1991. It welcomed the fact that the points raised by the Assembly had been taken into account in the debate which it was itself currently conducting on the rôle of WEU in the new European security architecture.

(ii) The Council has given due consideration to the question of the draft Assembly budget for 1991. The Secretary-General has kept the

Assembly President regularly informed of the results of the Council's deliberations on this subject.

(iii) Meetings and exchanges of information (see point X below).

*10. Interest expressed by other countries in WEU*

*(i) Interest expressed by Norway*

The Council was notified of a letter to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council from the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing his government's wish to establish closer contacts between Norway and WEU under the same arrangements already agreed between WEU and Greece and Turkey.

In his reply, Mr. Dumas told Mr. Stoltenberg of the wholly favourable reception to the Norwegian Government's proposal, reminding him that the mechanism consisted of a meeting at ministerial level with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council which, for timetable convenience, could be arranged to coincide with a meeting decided upon elsewhere. This exchange of views could, if appropriate, be replaced or supplemented by a meeting between the Chairman-in-Office and the Norwegian Ambassador in the capital of the country holding the WEU Presidency.

*(ii) Interest expressed by Greece*

The Council was notified of a letter to the Chairman of the Council from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, reminding him of Greece's interest in accession to WEU.

In his reply to Mr. Samaras, Mr. Dumas pointed out that, in its discussions on the future of the organisation, the Council was bearing in mind the wish of the Greek authorities to belong to WEU. He noted that co-operation between Greece and WEU had become a reality, as demonstrated by the naval co-ordination during the Gulf crisis and Greece's close association with WEU's action in coming to the help of the Kurdish refugee populations of Iraq. He reminded Mr. Samaras of the WEU Presidency's concern to inform Greece of the organisation's work in accordance with the approved procedure.

*(iii) Interest expressed by Turkey*

The Turkish Ambassadors in Paris and Luxembourg were respectively observers at the extraordinary meeting in Paris on 17th January and the informal meeting on 8th April, both devoted to the Gulf.

Turkish representatives had on several occasions taken advantage of contacts with Council representatives or the Secretary-General

5. Cf. Second part of the thirty-sixth annual report, IV, 2.

to reiterate the desire expressed by their authorities for Turkey to become a member of WEU.

#### *11. Fourth European session of advanced defence studies*

The German Delegation has told the Council that it was prepared to organise this session by spring 1992 at the latest.

The Council warmly welcomed this proposal.

#### *12. Other questions*

The Council also discussed questions pertaining to the organisation's personnel, and administrative and budgetary matters:

- It approved the appointment of the new holder of the post of Head of the Political Division.
- It approved the 265th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts.
- It approved WEU's budget for 1991.
- It approved the proposed reform of co-ordination that had already been approved by the Councils of OECD, the Council of Europe and NATO.
- It approved the tax adjustment budget for 1991 concerning the pension scheme.

#### *V. Activities of the Special Working Group (SWG) in separate sessions and jointly with the Defence Representatives Group (DRG)*

During the period under review, the SWG met nine times, on seven of those occasions in joint session with the DRG.

- the first meeting of the year was devoted to questions specifically associated with the conventional arms control negotiations; the group kept this question under review in its joint meetings with the DRG;
- the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture remained on the agenda of all the other meetings of the group;
- the SWG was also interested in the organisation of the seminar that took place on 11th and 12th March under the auspices of the Institute for Security Studies, with representatives of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia;
- the SWG/DRG worked on preparations for the meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff on 10th April 1991;
- it regularly reviewed the situation as regards WEU action in the Gulf;

- it was kept informed of progress made by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space;
- the joint meetings were also an opportunity to raise the subject of a convention on chemical weapons and of open skies negotiations.

#### *VI. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group (DRG)*

(i) Over the period covered by this report, the DRG met five times in separate sessions and seven times in joint session with the SWG (cf. V above).

During the separate sessions, it addressed the military implications of the CFE Treaty for European security in the post-CFE period.

It made preparations for, and followed up the Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on 10th April 1991.

It considered a draft ministerial mandate prepared for the Ministerial Council in Vianden on 27th June 1991.

The agenda item "Topical questions" provided an opportunity for some of the delegations to brief their partners on recent events associated with defence that had occurred in their respective countries. It also provided the opportunity for a regular review by the group of WEU's co-ordination in the Gulf.

(ii) During the same period, the verification experts met five times, once in joint session with the space experts, to follow up the ministerial mandate of 10th December 1990 on the implementation of future co-operation projects on verification.

They prepared a report for ministers, the text of which was approved by the enlarged Council on 10th June. Ministers took note of the report and approved its proposals, as set out in point 6 of the Vianden communiqué (see Annex VI enclosed).

#### *VII. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group*

(i) Over the period covered by this report, the Mediterranean Sub-Group met twice.

In accordance with the mandate it had been given, the sub-group drew up an annotated list of the key principles likely to contribute to a resolution of security questions in the Mediterranean.

It kept itself regularly informed of progress with the plan for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).

It continued its exchange of information on regional situations affecting the security interests of member states in the Mediterranean region, i.e.:

- tensions in Yugoslavia and the Balkans;
- the Arab Maghreb Union;
- the Sahara;
- Cyprus.

The sub-group embarked on a study of the military situation in the Maghreb.

(ii) At their meeting in Vianden on 27th June, ministers took note of the activities of the sub-group and asked it to continue them along the lines of the mandate that had been given on 10th December 1990.

### ***VIII. Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space***

During the period under review, the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met four times in plenary session and, to discuss more technical aspects, twice at the level of experts.

It formulated two draft ministerial decisions, one setting up a WEU satellite centre and the other asking the sub-group to continue its studies on possible medium- and long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system.

The texts of the decisions reached by ministers in Vianden on 27th June are set out in point 6 of the communiqué (see Annex VI enclosed).

### ***IX. Activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies*** (see also IV. 3 (iii) above)

#### ***1. Documents intended for the Council and its working groups***

(i) The Institute produced several discussion papers on topical subjects for the Council and its working groups, such as "What future for European defence co-operation?" and "Arms control after 1992".

(ii) It forwarded reports to the Council on the seminars it had arranged (see 2 below), as well as two quarterly reports on its activities from October to December 1990 and January to March 1991.

#### ***2. Seminars***

The Institute submitted reports to the Council on the seminars it had organised during the first half of 1991, i.e.:

- The future of European security, on 14th-15th January;

- A new agenda for European security, on 11th-12th March, bringing together senior officials responsible for politico-military affairs from WEU member states and their counterparts from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary;
- The implications of the Gulf crisis for European security co-operation, on 8th-9th April; and
- Soviet Union Task Force: this was a small task force of members of research institutes meeting for the first time at the Institute on 24th and 25th June.

#### ***3. Institute rencontres***

This study group on European security consisting of official and non-official specialists resident in Paris held its first meeting on 13th February on the theme "Europe after the Gulf crisis".

#### ***4. Meeting for members of the Council***

The Institute took advantage of the Assembly session in June 1991 to invite members of the Council to a seminar on the impressions gained by the members of the Institute team during their recent visit to Washington; a working lunch was given for the Permanent Representatives' deputies.

#### ***5. Publications***

##### ***(i) Chaillot Papers***

The first two Chaillot Papers were published in March 1991: "European defence: why not the Twelve?" and "European security across the Mediterranean".

##### ***(ii) Quarterly newsletter***

The first issue came out in April 1991.

#### ***6. Library and documentation***

Since it was established in June 1990, the Institute has built up its own library. It has established a publications exchange arrangement with some thirty institutes.

#### ***7. Fellowships and study awards***

##### ***(i) Visiting Research Fellow***

Sir David Gillmore, now Permanent Under-Secretary at the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was the Institute's first visiting fellow from January to March 1991.

*(ii) Research fellowships*

Four fellowships were awarded in 1991. They were given to researchers at pre- or post-doctoral level wishing to spend a period at the Institute conducting research which would complement work already undertaken within the Institute.

*(iii) Study awards*

These were made to scholars from Central and Eastern Europe and were co-funded by the Ford Foundation. One award was given during the first half of 1991.

**8. Other activities***(i) Visit to the United States*

The Director and four research fellows visited the United States in May 1991.

*(ii)* The Director and research fellows were able to visit several other institutes and attend conferences.

They also received a large number of visitors.

**X. Relations with the Assembly**  
(see also point IV, 9 above)

**1. Speeches made during the first part of the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly, 3rd-6th June in Paris**

*(i) Ministerial speeches by Council members followed by a debate*

Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pierre Joxe, Minister for Defence, on behalf of the French Presidency of the Council, and Mr. Douglas Hurd, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, spoke during this session and answered questions from parliamentarians.

*(ii)* The Secretary-General, Dr. Willem van Eekelen, addressed the session on the opening day and took part in the discussion that followed.

**2. Meetings between the Council and Assembly representatives**

*(i) Briefing on the results of Ministerial Councils*

The Assembly Presidential Committee was briefed by the French Presidency of the Council and the Secretary-General on 18th January and 22nd February on the results of the extraordinary Ministerial Council meetings on 17th January regarding the situation in the Gulf and 22nd February on WEU's rôle and place in the new European security architecture.

*(ii) Meeting of the Assembly's Political Committee in Madrid on 5th March 1991*

This meeting was an opportunity for members of the committee to meet the Spanish foreign and defence ministers, as well as the Spanish Permanent Representative to the Council and the Secretary-General.

*(iii) Grouped meeting of committees, 26th-28th March 1991 in Palermo*

This meeting provided an opportunity for informal discussions attended by several Permanent Representatives to the Council or their deputies and the Secretary-General.

**3. Secretary-General's information letters to the President of the Assembly**

On 28th February and 22nd May 1991, the Secretary-General, Dr. Willem van Eekelen, forwarded to Mr. Robert Pontillon, President of the Assembly, information letters on the activities of WEU's intergovernmental organs.

## ANNEX I

*Communiqué of the extraordinary Ministerial Council on the situation in the Gulf held on 17th January 1991 in Paris*

1. The foreign and defence ministers of the member countries of WEU met in Paris on 17th January 1991, together with representatives of Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey who were attending as observers.

They deplored the fact that Iraq has, right up to the deadline of 15th January 1991 set by Resolution 678 of the Security Council, remained impervious to the repeated calls by the international community to comply with international law, as conveyed in the last instance by the United Nations Secretary-General. Consequently they condemn the Iraqi authorities, who were responsible for opening hostilities. If Iraq and its people are now exposed to the ordeal of war, the responsibility lies with Saddam Hussein.

They nevertheless expressed the hope that Saddam Hussein will finally see reason and withdraw his forces from Kuwaiti territory in order to bring the war to an end and to avoid further unnecessary suffering of his own people.

They recalled the primacy of international law and consequently reaffirmed their determination to implement all the decisions of the Security Council, in particular Resolution 678.

They pledged their full support for those amongst them, as well as for their other coalition partners who have quite legitimately resorted to armed force. They saluted the courage of the armed forces involved in these operations. They recalled that the objective is to restore the sovereignty and integrity of Kuwait and not to wage war on the Iraqi people.

2. Whatever the subsequent developments in this crisis, they solemnly warned Iraq against any further violation of the law, in particular the international conventions applicable in the event of armed conflict.

3. They decided to give practical expression to the solidarity which unites them and consequently to strengthen the co-ordination between them, in concertation with the other countries which are committed to ensuring that the law is upheld. This applies in particular to the co-ordination of the naval forces of WEU countries participating in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 678, and to the co-ordination by WEU countries of logistic support for ground and air forces.

As far as naval co-ordination is concerned, they stressed the importance of the setting-up of a WEU co-ordination authority in theatre, to which the member countries present in the region will be able to assign a liaison officer.

In the logistic field, they intend to provide a real-time response to the various requests made by the member countries.

They are already studying what rôle the member countries may play after the war. They hope that the countries of the region may then, without delay, be able to develop security relationships which ensure long-term peace and stability.

4. They expressed their solidarity with the countries of the region and resolved to continue their humanitarian aid, particularly to those countries most severely affected by the war.

5. Ministers agreed to remain in constant contact during the new phase of the crisis which had just begun, and to meet again whenever the need arises.

## ANNEX II

*Communiqué on the Gulf published at the extraordinary  
Ministerial Council of 22nd February 1991 in Paris*

The ministers of the member countries of WEU have examined the recent developments in the Gulf crisis.

They expressed their appreciation for the efforts made by President Gorbachev aimed at bringing about, without any further delay, the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait.

They considered that certain elements which have emerged from the contacts between Iraq and the Soviet Union may represent a step in the right direction. But other key aspects remain imprecise or defective. They hope that the necessary clarifications and significant measures will open the way to a rapid cessation of hostilities.

In particular, they reaffirmed their determination that all the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council be implemented.

## ANNEX III

*Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers,  
Paris, 22nd February 1991**WEU's rôle and place in the new European security architecture**Presidency's conclusions*

The foreign and defence ministers of Western European Union met in Paris on 22nd February 1991 in extraordinary session to discuss WEU's rôle and place in the new European security architecture.

The main basis for their discussions was a report on this question, which is annexed hereto and which it was decided to publish.

- This document was originally prepared by the Secretary-General of WEU.
- The text was discussed by the organisation's Special Working Group, chaired by the Secretary-General, and resulted in a version on which all member states reached near consensus.
- Given the nature of the subject, the report at this stage has not been formally agreed since a number of aspects have still to be discussed in greater depth within WEU and also in other forums (Intergovernmental Conference, North Atlantic Council).
- Ministers confirmed that this report in general reflected their views and they decided that discussions should be pursued on this basis, particularly as regards the method of implementing the practical measures concerning the relationship between WEU and political union on the one hand, and between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance on the other.

*The future of European security and defence co-operation**Security architecture in the 1990s*

1. The revolutionary changes which have taken place in Europe over the past year have made it possible to distinguish the three complementary levels around which Europe's security will be organised in the years to come:

- a European level currently based on Western European Union and the Twelve of the Community;
- an Atlantic level based on the Atlantic Alliance - the only organisation binding North America to the defence of Europe;
- a pan-European level based on the CSCE bringing together all European countries as well as the United States and Canada.

In addition there are other levels which are becoming increasingly relevant to European security, namely the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in which the human dimension and economic and security interests of the parties concerned should be taken into account to enhance stability in those regions in an appropriate manner, drawing on the experience of the CSCE process<sup>1</sup>.

2. At the pan-European level, the CSCE is becoming markedly more important since it is the only forum where each country's security interests and particularly those of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union, can be taken into account. As the decisions taken at the Paris summit demonstrate, the CSCE will have a crucial part to play in enhancing stability in Europe through its rôle as a forum for consultation and co-operation, conflict prevention, settlement of disputes and future arms control negotiations. On the other hand, its purpose is not to provide for all CSCE states the kind of firm defence guarantees which the Washington and Brussels Treaties provide for the member states of the Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union.

1. Certain WEU countries have put forward proposals in this respect for a CSCM.

3. At the Atlantic and European levels, two processes are taking place which will have profound consequences for the future organisation of European security and defence co-operation:

- the decision taken by the European Council in Dublin on 25th-26th June 1990 to convene an intergovernmental conference on political union and the conclusions of the European Council in Rome on 14th-15th December 1990 regarding the common foreign and security policy and rôle the political union might play with regard to defence questions;
- the review of the tasks of the alliance and the adaptation of NATO strategy and structures which is taking place in the light of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the conclusion of the CFE Treaty and which will also take into account developments in the West, notably the process of European integration.

4. One of the central objectives of both these exercises is how the identity of Europe in the field of security and defence can be developed. Indeed, European governments have been presented with a historic opportunity in which it is possible to take an overall look at the three institutions directly affected – NATO, European Community, European political co-operation and Western European Union – and at the relationships between them in order to define their security requirements for the 1990s.

#### *The Atlantic dimension*

5. It is widely recognised that the Atlantic Alliance between North America and Western Europe with its arrangements for military co-operation has formed the indispensable backbone to defence – both European and western – over the past forty years. It has also been an important stabilising factor during the past year of change in Central and Eastern Europe. This alliance, with effective defence arrangements, linking North America and Europe will remain imperative in the years to come:

- (a) as the framework for the collective defence of all allies in the case of an attack on the territory of one or more of them,
- (b) as a framework for broad political co-operation among the allies and as a forum where North America and Western Europe can discuss common security concerns,
- (c) as a stabilising factor on the continent of Europe where the Soviet Union retains the largest military capabilities including a major nuclear arsenal.

6. However, this rôle for the alliance in the future in no way lessens the urgency for a reappraisal of its organisation and structures. This reappraisal must take into account the withdrawal by 1994 of all Soviet forces to within their own territory and the significantly more important part that European forces will play in the alliance's collective defence due to the reductions in North American forces in Europe. The outcome of this reappraisal must ensure that there is no weakening of the alliance commitments on the part of either North America or Europe which could lead to a narrower national view of defence. This would involve, in particular, reaffirming the importance of retaining North American forces in Europe and ensuring that all allies refrain from taking unilateral, unco-ordinated decisions to reduce their defence effort.

7. With regard to the NATO review, European countries must define how they intend to strengthen and make more coherent the European pillar within the alliance. In particular, it will be important to ensure the complementarity between two requirements:

- for Europe to take on a greater degree of responsibility for its own defence will require an identifiable European component which will only be achieved if it is linked to the broader process of achieving a European union;
- the need for effective arrangements for military co-operation which reflect the security interests of all members of the alliance.

#### *Political union and a European security and defence dimension*

8. The developments in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, the impetus given towards economic and monetary union and more recently the Gulf conflict have all contributed to highlighting the desirability for the Community and its member states to improve their capacity for action internationally and to match the developments in the economic field with progress in the political field. The question of a common foreign and security policy is therefore now high on the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union.

9. In this context, the European Council in Rome on 14th-15th December 1990 has identified the issues in the security and defence field to which the IGC should give particular attention<sup>2</sup>. The Rome conclusions indicate that, whilst the first steps in a common security policy are taking shape, there is as yet no unanimity within the Twelve on the rôle the political union might, in the short term, play in defence matters. A gradual approach therefore suggests itself which would take account of the position of certain member states of the Twelve, of the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance and would keep in mind the security interests of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is nevertheless clear that no hard and fast distinction can be made between broader security issues and defence policy even though defence has particular characteristics which may require specific arrangements. Due to its stated objective in The Hague platform and due to its existing structures, WEU can therefore play an important part in this gradual approach to develop a European security and defence identity.

#### *Rôle of WEU*

10. In this context, WEU possesses a number of institutional advantages which would allow it to act as a bridge between the process of European integration and the Atlantic Alliance:

- (a) It is an organisation based on a treaty which affirms the member countries' intention progressively to achieve European integration. This objective was developed in the platform on European security interests of 27th October 1987 and subsequently confirmed in the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain signed on 14th November 1988 which has been accepted, approved or ratified by all the parliaments of the Nine. These two documents moreover explicitly state that "the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence".
- (b) It is the only European organisation based on a mutual defence commitment (Article V of the WEU Treaty).
- (c) It brings together both foreign and defence ministers.
- (d) Its treaty (Article VIII.3) places no geographical restrictions on its competences (which has enabled it to play a rôle co-ordinating military activities in the Gulf).
- (e) Its treaty contains a clause which, whilst requiring redefinition, commits the member countries to work in close co-operation with NATO.
- (f) It is backed by a permanent, international secretariat.
- (g) It is an organisation with a parliamentary dimension in the form of the WEU Assembly whose competence is treaty-based.

11. The task is therefore to identify practical ways in which WEU can play in the present circumstances and without precluding future developments a more effective rôle in the context of both political union and the Atlantic Alliance. The *objective vis-à-vis political union* should be to demonstrate more visibly that WEU is an integral part of the European integration process. The *objective vis-à-vis the alliance* should be to achieve a strong, new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the European component, contributing to the alliance's evolution and enhancing transatlantic cohesion in a reinvigorated alliance. This approach should include the definition and introduction of WEU contributions or positions into alliance debates. It will remain essential to ensure that all allies are willing to take account of each others' points of view before final positions are reached in alliance consultations.

12. Moreover, the more WEU can successfully take on operational responsibilities, the more its credibility will be raised and the more effectively it will become the channel of co-operation between political union and NATO. Proposals should therefore now be developed to make co-operation within WEU more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, taking account of what is stated in paragraphs 5 and 10 above.

2. "As regards *common security*, the gradual extension of the union's rôle in this area should be considered, in particular with reference, initially, to issues debated in international organisations: arms control, disarmament and related issues; CSCE matters; certain questions debated in the United Nations, including peace-keeping operations; economic and technological co-operation in the armaments field; co-ordination of armaments export policy, and non-proliferation.

Futhermore, the European Council emphasises that, with a view to the future, the prospect of a rôle for the union in *defence matters* should be considered without prejudice to member states' existing obligations in this area, bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening the ties within the Atlantic Alliance and without prejudice to the traditional positions of other member states. The idea of a commitment by member states to provide mutual assistance, as well as proposals put forward by some member states on the future of Western European Union, should also be addressed."

*Practical steps to be taken vis-à-vis political union*

13. In order to develop an organic relationship between WEU and political union, make more visible the long-term commitment to a European union including a defence dimension and without prejudicing either the WEU structures or the structures of the Twelve, increased co-operation and co-ordination between the common foreign and security policy and WEU shall be sought by the following measures:

(a) As part of political union, heads of state and government meeting in the European Council would be able to discuss all aspects of the common foreign and security policy, without there being any taboo subjects. The conclusions of the European Council on the principles and orientation of the common foreign and security policy would serve as a guideline for co-operation under the Brussels Treaty; in particular, where co-ordination in the defence field is necessary, this would be taken forward with WEU<sup>3</sup>.

(b) The dates and place of meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers should, when necessary, be synchronised with those ministerial-level meetings of the Council of the political union dealing with the common foreign and security policy. When necessary, meetings at official level of the Twelve and of the Nine should also be synchronised.

(c) Close contacts should be maintained between the Presidencies of the Twelve and WEU. Harmonisation of the sequence and duration of the Presidencies of the Twelve and of WEU should be considered.

(d) The EPC/Council Secretariats and the WEU Secretariat should maintain working contact and ensure a regular exchange of information on security matters.

(e) Possible links between the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly should be examined.

*Practical steps to be taken vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance*

14. In order to develop an organic relationship between WEU and the alliance and to enable WEU to play a more effective rôle in strengthening the European pillar within the alliance, the following steps shall be taken:

(a) The country holding the WEU Presidency or, when appropriate, another WEU member country, should:

- introduce joint WEU positions or contributions into the process of alliance consultation;
- regularly brief the North Atlantic Council and other alliance bodies on WEU activities.

(b) WEU concertation should when necessary take place at various levels, including at ministerial level and at the level of member states' Permanent Representatives to NATO, on those items on the alliance agenda which are of particular interest to WEU; this concertation should take place with the appropriate degree of transparency with regard to other allies, taking each others' views into consideration.

(c) Contacts should be maintained between NATO and the WEU Secretariat and their respective Secretaries-General, and a regular exchange of information ensured.

*Questions raised by the proposals above*

15. The first question concerns the *relationship of WEU with the European member countries of the EC/EPC and Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU*. Close co-operation between WEU member countries and all European partners and allies will remain essential. In the future, the modalities of the relationships between WEU and these countries should reflect the nature of the relationships which WEU itself will have with political union and the Atlantic Alliance. In this context, an enlargement of certain ministerial meetings to include other or all European partners and allies as observers could be considered.

3. Several delegations wish to include an explicit reference to WEU being placed under the aegis of the European Council or even under its direct authority.

One delegation does not wish to prejudge the discussions within the IGC on the institutional arrangements for the common foreign and security policy in the political union and therefore wishes to delete this sub-paragraph.

16. The second question concerns the *location of WEU*. The preceding paragraphs have begun to define the NATO-WEU-PU inter-relationship. In order to contribute to the effective functioning of WEU on the basis of the practical steps set out in paragraphs 13 and 14, the question of transferring the organisation to Brussels should be considered. A move to Brussels must ensure that *WEU retains its own clear identity* as outlined in the paragraphs above. This implies that, in order to ensure that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously, some form of permanent representation and a permanent WEU Secretariat should be retained. It would be for each government to decide on the most appropriate arrangement for representation and liaison, drawing as necessary on member countries' delegations to NATO and the institutions of political union. Nevertheless, in terms of increasing the efficiency of WEU's work, it would be desirable for member countries to appoint comparable officials to the Permanent Council of WEU.

## ANNEX IV

*Conclusions of the informal meeting of WEU ministers on  
the situation in the Middle East**Luxembourg, 8th April 1991*

Ministers for foreign affairs of member states of WEU held a meeting in the margins of the European Council of 8th April. Several delegations clearly underlined the exceptional character of this meeting.

Ministers took note of the guidelines defined by the heads of state and government of the European Community concerning the situation in the Middle East and the fate of the Kurdish population of Iraq.

They agreed that WEU should continue to play an important part in the post-war situation with a view to stability and peace in the Gulf region. As of now, they decided to put into effect the co-ordination of the humanitarian aid provided by the member states and the Community, in liaison with the Commission, for the Iraqi civilian population, in particular the Kurds, victims of repression in Iraq, and to examine ways and means for logistical support from WEU in this regard.

They requested the ad hoc group to meet as from Tuesday, 9th April in Paris to specify the concrete contribution which WEU will make, in this spirit, to the implementation of Resolutions 687 and 688 of the Security Council and to prepare the meeting of Chiefs of Staff of 10th April.

## ANNEX V

***Press release on the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting  
on 10th April 1991 in Paris***

Invited by General Maurice Schmitt, French Chief of Defence Staff and representative of the country chairing Western European Union, the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the nine members of WEU met in Paris on 10th April 1991.

The WEU Secretary-General, Mr. Willem van Eekelen was present at this meeting.

This meeting enabled the Chiefs of Defence Staff to exchange their views informally, in particular on the development of European co-operation in the military fields, especially in the light of lessons drawn from the Iraqi conflict.

In addition, at this occasion, the Chiefs of Defence Staff discussed military aspects of the contributions of the WEU countries to the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688.

## ANNEX VI

*Communiqué of the WEU Ministerial Council issued in Vianden on 27th June 1991**Introduction*

At their meeting in Luxembourg on 27th June 1991, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states reaffirmed the central position now occupied in the debate on the emergence of a European security and defence identity.

Ministers reviewed the efforts being made to promote a security architecture to guarantee all European states the peace and security to which they aspire. They pointed to the complementary rôle of the three levels around which the security of their countries should be organised in the years to come: a European level: Western European Union and the Twelve; an Atlantic level: the Atlantic Alliance level; a pan-European level: the CSCE.

*1. Rôle and place of WEU in the security architecture*

Ministers recalled that the European security and defence identity was emerging within the Twelve and WEU. In this connection, ministers confirmed their desire that WEU be fully part of the process of European integration while enhancing its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance.

They stated that the rôle of WEU should be strengthened in the context of the European construction process, which is leading the Twelve to a political union having a common foreign and security policy. They agreed that European political union implies a genuine European security and defence identity and thus greater European responsibility for defence matters. This is in accordance with The Hague platform which makes clear that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. Ministers therefore agreed that WEU should be developed in this phase of the European integration process as its defence component.

They also agreed that the development of a genuine European security and defence identity will be reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. This will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the alliance and will require, at each stage, appropriate practical arrangements to ensure transparency and complementarity. This will call for appropriate procedures for co-operation with other allies.

Ministers noted the need for the European and Atlantic debates to proceed in parallel.

*2. CSCE and security negotiations in Europe*

Ministers underlined the importance of the recent CSCE ministerial meeting in Berlin. They stressed the significance of its conclusions, particularly as regards the complementarity and links existing between the various institutions of the European security architecture, of which WEU is a part.

Ministers welcomed the recent initiatives by member countries aimed at relaunching the arms control process. They expressed their resolve to continue concertation among member states, in consultation with other partners, in order to develop a joint approach which takes account of the interests of Europeans in every field of arms control.

They welcomed the solution reached in resolving the questions regarding implementation of the CFE Treaty. They expressed the hope that the continuation of the negotiations on conventional armed forces would rapidly lead to an additional agreement aimed at strengthening stability in Europe, particularly through measures to limit and, where necessary, reduce manpower levels.

They also hoped that the negotiations on security- and confidence-building measures would be used further to enhance transparency and confidence in Europe. With a view to the Helsinki conference, they looked forward to beginning informal discussions in September among the Thirty-five on new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building within the CSCE framework.

WEU member states attach a high priority to the conclusion as soon as possible of an open skies agreement. They call upon the Soviet Union to respond positively to the ideas put forward by the western participants in the open skies talks and to join them in renewed negotiations with the aim of securing an open skies agreement by the time of the Helsinki follow-up meeting.

### ***3. Dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe***

The Charter of Paris marked the opening of a new era in Europe, based on confidence and co-operation, and it was in this spirit a year ago that ministers proposed to the new democracies that a dialogue be initiated; ministers now hoped that this dialogue could be given more depth and breadth.

They viewed the preliminary exchanges as very positive and proposed the following measures:

- to explore the possibilities of giving the dialogue a more political dimension, for example by organising ad hoc contacts at ministerial level on specific subjects of common interest;
- to establish information links between the embassies of the countries concerned and the Secretariat-General, and between the government of each of these countries and the embassy of the Presidency;
- to intensify the exchanges of view among experts on subjects of common interest following, inter alia, the seminar organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

In line with the activities already undertaken, it was also agreed that the WEU Institute for Security Studies should make a number of scholarships available to young researchers in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Ministers also gave a favourable response to the invitations from Bulgaria and Romania to the Secretary-General of the organisation to undertake a fact-finding visit, together with a representative of the Presidency. They welcomed the interest shown by the Soviet Union in the activities of WEU.

### ***4. WEU action in the Gulf***

WEU member states expressed their satisfaction that the successful outcome of the coalition's co-ordinated action in the Gulf had ensured the respect for the primacy of international law. They were resolved to grasp this opportunity of promoting measures that should secure lasting peace and stability in the region.

Ministers emphasised the major contribution made by WEU and its member states to the action of the coalition. They noted the measures for co-ordinating the action of member states in the Gulf region, particularly in enforcing the embargo.

As far as naval activities were concerned, they noted with satisfaction the major part played by the navies of WEU states in mine-clearance operations in the approaches to Kuwait, now nearing completion.

Following an informal decision of WEU foreign ministers in Luxembourg on 8th April 1991, member states made a considerable contribution to the provision and co-ordination of humanitarian aid to Iraqi victims of repression, in particular the Kurds.

### ***5. Security in the Mediterranean***

Ministers underlined their attachment to security and stability in the Mediterranean. They took note of the work of the Mediterranean Sub-Group to identify the principles likely to contribute to a resolution of security questions in the region. They asked the sub-group to continue its activities in line with the mandate it had been given on 10th December last.

### ***6. Operational co-operation among member states***

#### *In the field of space*

With the aim of intensifying space co-operation within WEU and giving concrete expression to that co-operation, ministers decided to:

- set up a satellite data interpretation centre whose immediate task would be to train European experts in the photo-interpretation of satellite-derived data, to compile and process accessible data and to make those data available to member states, particularly within the framework of

the verification of arms control agreements, crisis monitoring and environmental monitoring. The activities of the centre will be reviewed no later than three years after it has entered into operation;

- task the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to pursue studies on the possibilities for medium- and long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system.

*In the military field*

Ministers restated their resolve to give fresh impetus to programmes of co-operation among member states.

The meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff in Paris on 10th April gave further impetus to the discussions under way on the possibilities of developing various forms of practical co-operation.

Ministers mandated the Defence Representatives Group to spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures. The results of this work will be submitted to ministers at their next meeting.

*In the field of arms control verification*

Ministers decided to step up programmes of co-operation among member states on the verification of arms control agreements. In this context, they underlined the link between space co-operation and arms control verification, including verification of the CFE Treaty.

Ministers agreed on practical arrangements for co-operation within WEU concerning the implementation of the verification régime of the CFE Treaty. They also agreed to mandate verification experts to continue their study of the possibilities for practical co-operation on the implementation of a future open skies agreement.

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Ministers expressed their warm appreciation to the outgoing French Presidency for the important part it had played in WEU's achievements during the last year.

They welcomed the incoming German Presidency and expressed their best wishes to their colleagues from the Federal Republic of Germany for the coming twelve months which would be extremely important for the future of WEU and for the development of the European construction process.

Ministers also warmly thanked the Government of Luxembourg for the hospitality it had extended during this ministerial session.

## ANNEX VII

***Statement on Yugoslavia issued in Vianden on 27th June 1991***

The foreign ministers of Western European Union express their deep concern at the current turn of events in Yugoslavia.

They regret all the recent unilateral decisions which make dialogue more difficult.

They urgently appeal to all the political authorities in Yugoslavia to avoid all confrontation, to refrain from the use of force and to resume the dialogue with a view to securing the unity of the state.

They hope that the election of the new head of the collegiate Presidency can take place without delay so as to ensure the normal functioning of the federal institutions.

They call on all the CSCE participating states, in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and their declaration of 19th June 1991, to encourage the efforts aimed at a negotiated solution among the parties concerned, having due regard to all the principles of the CSCE.

## ANNEX VIII

*Fact-finding sheet on mine-clearance operations and on those relating to the enforcement of the naval embargo during the Middle East crisis*

*1. Mines destroyed by all countries as at 18th June 1991*

Ships/Countries	Mines destroyed
Sagittaire .....	145
Orion .....	40
Pegase .....	2
Aigle .....	10
Pluton .....	2
Total France .....	199
Iris .....	116
Myosotis .....	115
Dianthus .....	46
Zinnia .....	1
Total Belgium .....	278
Harlingen .....	16
Zierikzee .....	21
Haarlem .....	-
Total Netherlands .....	37
Three country total .....	514 (+ 4 bombs)
Total Italy .....	69
Total Germany .....	89 (+ 8 bombs)
Total United Kingdom .....	+ 170
Total WEU .....	842 (+ 12 bombs)
Total United States .....	+ 170
Grand Total .....	1 012 (+ 12 bombs)

*2. State of the embargo as at 16th June 1991  
(all countries)*

	Challenged	Boarded	Diverted	Warning shot	Disabling shot
United States .....	10 088	800	78	10	0
Other allies .....	400	196	4	1	0
Total non-WEU .....	10 488	996	82	11	0
Total WEU .....	22 670	632	18	3	0
Grand Total .....	33 158	1 628	100	14	0

**3. State of the embargo as at 16th June 1991  
(WEU countries)**

	Challenged	Boarded	Diverted	Warning shot	Disabling shot
France .....	8 527	304	9	1	0
Belgium .....	3 168	28	0	0	0
Spain .....	4 954	254	7	1	0
Italy .....	2 342	9	0	0	0
Netherlands .....	485	1	0	0	0
United Kingdom .....	3 194	36	2	1	0
Total WEU .....	22 670	632	18	3	0

*Europe and the Yugoslav crisis*

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**REPORT**<sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee*<sup>2</sup>  
*by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur*

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***Draft Recommendation***

*on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis*

The Assembly,

- (i) Deploring the constant worsening of the civil war that is tearing Yugoslavia apart;
- (ii) Considering that pursuit of the war is endangering peace throughout Europe;
- (iii) Considering that it is for WEU, under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, to help to restore peace in Yugoslavia to the best of its ability;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the Community and member states have called on the WEU Council to implement the military aspects of the policy defined by the Twelve;
- (v) Considering that the commitment of the European Community, in agreement with the CSCE and with the subsequent support of the Security Council, allowed the peace conference to be convened in The Hague in which all the parties to the conflict are taking part and which may lead to a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis;
- (vi) Deploring, however, that this co-ordination has not yet allowed a real, lasting cease-fire to be achieved as a prelude to a return to peace in Yugoslavia;
- (vii) Expressing the hope that the mission assigned to Lord Carrington will succeed in the near future;
- (viii) Gratified that the Council duly informed NATO and the CSCE of the results of its meetings but deploring the fact that it neglected to inform the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Decide upon and implement without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo on all supplies of arms to Yugoslavia decided upon in Security Council Resolution 713;
2. Proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the various options considered on 30th September to help to ensure respect for a cease-fire once it becomes effective;
3. Strengthen its organisation and ability to intervene to ensure Europe's security and urge the Security Council and the CSCE to give a further mandate to WEU to facilitate a return to peace;
4. Continue to associate any European countries that might make a contribution with all appropriate action to secure a cease-fire and eventual peace in Yugoslavia;
5. Use all appropriate means to bring pressure to bear on the parties to the conflict to ensure the success of the conference in The Hague on peace in Yugoslavia;
6. Continue to inform NATO and the CSCE of its decisions;
7. Inform the Assembly without delay of the results of each of its ministerial meetings.

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1. Adopted in committee by 17 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix, Brito, Candal (Alternate: Soares Costa), Caro, Collart, Cuatrecasas, De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, Goerens, Guizzi, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martinez, Martino, Müller, Pécriaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Reddemann, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton (Alternate: Rowe), Mr. Soell, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Thyraud, Ward.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU*

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 2 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix (Alternate: *Baumel*), Brito, Candal, *Caro*, Collart, Cuatrecasas (Alternate: *Barrionuevo*), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, *Goerens*, Guizzi, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: *Speed*), MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, *Lord Mackie*, MM. *Martinez*, Martino, Müller, Péciaux, *Pieralli*, *de Puig*, *Reddemann*, *Roseta*, Sarti, *Sir William Shelton*, Mr. *Soell*, Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*, MM. Thyraud, *Ward*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation***on WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 make it necessary to re-examine the organisation of the security of Europe as a whole and in particular Western Europe;
- (ii) Noting that the rôle of WEU in the organisation of European security must be redefined in the context of the process of a Community policy and adapting NATO strategy to the new situation in Europe and the world;
- (iii) Considering that the accession of further countries to the modified Brussels Treaty should be considered after the rôle of WEU has been redefined;
- (iv) Noting that the nine member countries are unanimous in considering that the Atlantic Alliance is and must remain the essential framework of western defence in Europe;
- (v) Considering that NATO is not at present in a position to take direct action outside the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty nor to respond effectively to certain threats to peace in Central or Eastern Europe, but recalling that it is essential that measures taken by WEU in such cases, in accordance with Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, should guarantee Euro-American cohesion,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Explore and set in motion the best possible machinery for co-operation with the European countries which so wish, while bearing in mind that, in present circumstances, it would not be wise to invite formally countries which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty in application of its Article XI;
2. Encourage the participation of European countries so wishing and fulfilling the necessary conditions in those of WEU's activities and institutions which, not involving the application of Articles IV and V of the treaty, concern the implementation of Article VIII;
3. Invite any countries which would be capable of making a useful contribution – side by side with members of WEU – to diplomatic or military action designed to keep the peace in Europe and in the world to participate in an appropriate manner in Council meetings intended to prepare such action;
4. Prior to any engagement of forces under the aegis of WEU, hold consultations with NATO to ensure the smooth running of the Atlantic Alliance.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. The aim of the present report is to examine the implications for relations between WEU and non-member countries of the advice adopted without opposition by the Assembly's Presidential Committee in Palermo on 26th March 1991 on "The future of European co-operation in security and defence questions". This advice defined WEU's rôle as follows:

"WEU must be at one and the same time the means of allowing Europe to make its voice heard in a Euro-American dialogue of which the Atlantic Alliance is the institutional framework and the instrument for making the most of the European contribution to the defence of the West and to its own security."

and went on to say:

"In order better to fulfil its new tasks, WEU must envisage more favourably its enlargement and where appropriate act swiftly upon such requests for membership."

2. Events since the advice was adopted, particularly in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, emphasise its pertinence rather than detract from it and have led a number of countries to think about the possibility of joining WEU for various reasons. Our Assembly must therefore define the principles it believes should govern the way the Council should respond to possible candidatures and guide all the relations the various WEU organs can and should have with countries that are not signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty.

3. Furthermore, current negotiations between the Twelve in the context of the intergovernmental conference on external policy and security are making the countries concerned wonder about the rôle WEU will have to play in the Europe of tomorrow. In October, two series of proposals, one emanating from the United Kingdom and Italy and the other from France and Germany, guided the Twelve's thinking towards this question. Furthermore, at its November 1991 ministerial meeting, NATO aims to adopt the principles of a new strategy adapted to the new situation in Europe and its security requirements. As matters now stand, the WEU Assembly cannot therefore try to define rigid principles here and now. Nevertheless, in a necessarily provisional document, it seems useful for it to offer its opinion before the

governments reach final decisions. It will then be able to review its position in the light of the decisions taken by the Twelve at the Maastricht summit meeting from 9th to 12th December and by NATO.

### *II. WEU and European security*

4. The dimensions of Europe, the number of different peoples living there and the small size of the component states mean that security in this part of the world forms a whole that can be ensured only by maintaining peace throughout the continent. Furthermore, the essential rôle of foreign trade in the economy of Western Europe, its dependence on energy and raw materials, its need for outlets for its industrial products and now for its agriculture too, and the worldwide dimension of many of its firms also make it very sensitive to events that might arise outside Europe, particularly in the Middle East. Europe can certainly not expect to ensure universal peace but it can make a contribution, especially by endeavouring to limit the spread of conflicts that may arise anywhere in the world.

5. From 1948 to 1989, the international situation caused Europe's defence to be based on a single hypothesis: a possible massive attack by the Soviet Union and its allies of which Central Europe would have borne the brunt. NATO's military and nuclear deployment was a response to this threat, which was very real at the start but subsequently less, and above all the aim was to deter the potential enemy. The purpose was to show that, thanks to their cohesion and means, the allies had the will and capability to retaliate in an appropriate manner to any form of aggression against any one of them. The goal of Western European Union was to create and maintain the conditions necessary for the participation of its members in the joint defence effort, as specified in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty.

6. Since 1989, it has been clear that the conditions for maintaining peace in Europe have changed. The economic failure of the Soviet Union has become plain to all, thus provoking a serious crisis in the ideology it had been trying to impose on the world. Its ability to pursue the military effort which ostensibly made it the world's leading military power was placed in doubt to such an extent that it had to make a radical revision of its external policy in Europe and the world. It has had to renounce its domi-

nation of Central and Eastern Europe and its overseas ventures and seek guarantees of its security in agreements with the West on arms limitation, the establishment of a new European order and assistance in restructuring its economy.

7. The West for its part has wisely been careful not to take advantage of the weakening of the Soviet Union to force it to capitulate. It has not tried to move its military deployment further east. It has let the Soviet Union evolve within its frontiers and, apart from the case of the Baltic republics whose annexation it had never recognised, it has done nothing to encourage the centrifugal forces which were developing on Soviet territory. Conversely, it has negotiated agreements to reduce both conventional and nuclear arms. Thus, medium-range nuclear weapons have been eliminated from the European continent. The November 1990 CFE agreement allowed a progressive lowering of the level of conventional forces. Negotiations are under way between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the number of intercontinental missiles. Finally, on 7th September 1991, Mr. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence, announced that NATO was preparing to propose to the Soviet Union negotiations to reduce drastically the number of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In view of the favourable answer from Mr. Gorbachev who, in turn, made major proposals for limiting arms, NATO decided on 16th October to reduce the number of its short-range weapons stationed in Europe by 80%.

8. Furthermore, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has made considerable progress. First, it managed to define the conditions in which a new European order might be established on the basis of a number of principles, accepted by all, in military matters with confidence-building measures and in external policy with the prevention of conflicts and the inviolability of frontiers, the development of trade, the application of democratic principles and respect for human rights. It then set up a permanent structure in which the thirty-eight independent European states (now that the Baltic republics have joined) could together examine all their common problems.

9. However, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the potential break-up of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new sovereign republics carry dangers which must be met. One essential for international recognition of a new sovereign state must be its acceptance of all international and regional treaties, conventions and obligations entered into by the state of which it was formerly a component part. The conduct of certain Yugoslav and Soviet republics will oblige the international community to be particularly vigilant regarding the application of this condition.

10. Finally, the disappearance of the Soviet threat has led all the European countries to cut their defence budgets. Most of them have already done so and all are planning to do so in the next few years. This means reducing their force levels and delaying the modernisation of their weapons. They also have to re-examine the deployment of their forces and the conditions in which they might have to be used, in other words their strategy. The reunification of Germany and the Soviet undertaking to withdraw the forces it still has on the territory of the former GDR will also lead to a very significant reduction in NATO forces deployed on German territory which are still by far the most important part of NATO's deployment. The decision taken by France and Germany on 16th October to set up a joint army corps that would not be under the NATO integrated military commands may further weaken NATO and give the United States the mistaken impression that Europe no longer trusts NATO to ensure its security.

11. In order to consider a possible enlargement of WEU, it is therefore essential to try to define the kind of challenge to which the organisation of European security should now respond. Europe's security, while apparently no longer seriously threatened, should be viewed in terms of three separate risks.

12. (a) In spite of the present very serious crisis now facing it, *the Soviet Union or the sum of its republics* is still a major military and nuclear power. While it has respected the letter of the CFE agreements, it did its utmost to evade the consequences either by shifting forces previously deployed in Europe to the other side of the Urals, or by assigning to the navy divisions that had hitherto belonged to the army which alone is subject to the limits set out in the agreement. It would also appear that the destruction of weapons to which it was committed is proceeding far more slowly than planned and that the reconversion of Soviet arms industries is encountering serious difficulties. Again, the attempted coup in the Soviet Union from 19th to 21st August 1991 showed that the country was in no way sheltered from events that might lead to major changes in its external policy and domestic affairs. Although most of the military leaders were dismissed after the failure of the coup d'état, there is nothing to prevent the army from one day playing a crucial rôle in the restoration of a new state order and, consequently, exercising considerable power in the Soviet Union or in any states replacing it. The extreme weakness of the central state and affirmation of the authority of the republics are certainly not guarantees of stability and peace because the question-marks they raise for the future of such a heavily-armed country mean that the West's security cannot rely on the continuity and success of perestroika.

13. In particular, it should be borne in mind that the negotiation of a treaty of union between the republics whose autonomy would thereby be confirmed was the decisive factor in triggering off the putsch. Any victory by those nostalgic for the old régime would probably mean calling in question what Mr. Gorbachev's government is now relinquishing, be it the independence of the Baltic states, the end of Russian domination in Central Europe, the defence of world communism or the security the army ensures for the Soviet Union. It should also be considered that the re-emergence of nationalism within the Soviet Union is already leading to clashes between republics or within some of them which might become worse in future years and neighbouring Asian and European countries might find it hard to remain aloof since practically nowhere do the union's frontiers correspond to ethnic borders.

14. (b) Probably for quite some time, *Central and Southern Europe* will be facing an economic, ideological and political crisis whose outcome is uncertain. Events in Yugoslavia since June 1991 testify to this. Practically none of the states in that part of Europe has frontiers that cannot be contested from the national standpoint. Several have large national minorities and there is a threat to the very existence as a state of at least one of them: Yugoslavia. Because of the Soviet military presence in Central Europe and a communist dictatorship, the expression of national realities in that region had been stifled for a very long time. The return to freedom of expression now shows that this did nothing to attenuate them. On the contrary, the maintenance in some of those countries of the former communist state system, while others have acceded more quickly to democracy, merely accentuated antagonism in which the ideological factor was added to nationalism, thus arousing tension.

15. The most serious case so far is in Yugoslavia. The country was created in the aftermath of the first world war to group the Slav peoples in the south of the Austro-Hungarian empire and Bulgaria with Serbia and Montenegro in a state dominated by the Serbs. This domination caused constant trouble until the start of Tito's communist dictatorship in 1945. Following his break with Moscow in 1948 and up to his death in 1980, Tito managed to maintain the unity of the state, which was given a federal-type structure under the 1974 constitution. Unrelenting tension in relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union kept national rivalries at bay. However, international détente and the death of Tito were swiftly followed by unrest, starting in 1981 in the Serbian province of Kosovo, where 75% of the population is Albanian, and a progressive weakening of central power in favour of the republics.

16. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the triumph of democratic forces in most

Central European countries further weakened the federal authorities in Yugoslavia. As a result of more or less free elections, nationalist governments were set up in Slovenia and Croatia in spring 1991, while the former communist leaders remained in power in Serbia and the federal state. In this situation, the Serbs opposed the application of the federal constitution in order to keep in place the Serb element, which led to revolts in Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo. Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence on 25th June 1991 but the federal army, consisting mainly of Serbs, intervened to restore federal authority. On 18th July, the collegial presidency of the federation announced the withdrawal of federal forces from Slovenia but the latter, either on their own initiative or with the complicity of at least part of the federal government, then launched an offensive in Croatia in order to recover territories occupied by a Serb minority constituting 15% of the population of the Croatian Republic. Since then, there has effectively been civil war in Yugoslavia between the federal army, assisted by Serb militia forces, and the army of the Croatian Republic. In the prevailing uncertainty about the fate of Yugoslavia, unrest has again broken out in Kosovo, and Macedonia in turn has proclaimed its independence, followed, on 15th October, by Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 23rd September, the federal army occupied a large part of Croatia with Slavonia, where the majority of the population is Serb. It also threatened the capital, Zagreb, and the Dalmatian coastal ports. The many cease-fire agreements signed by the Federal Government and the republics have been ineffective, making it clear that no democratic control, be it governmental or parliamentary, has been exercised or is even capable of being exercised over the armed forces. It is not certain that the republics can do much better.

17. It now seems impossible to consider restoring a federal Yugoslav state. However, the ethnic problems would not be solved if the republics were to become independent since each one, and in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, contains large minorities who are afraid of being oppressed in national states where they would be deprived of the guarantees afforded by a federal state. Moreover, the break-up of Yugoslavia might lead to unrest in other countries where national minorities are also tending to claim the right to self-determination and break away from the states in which they live. Hence it is the entire political geography of Central Europe, the maintenance of which was one of the foundations of the CSCE's task of establishing a new peaceful order in Europe, that is being called in question by the Yugoslav crisis.

18. On 19th September 1991, the European Council considered the Yugoslav problem but had to note that member countries were not pre-

pared to make the considerable military effort necessary to form a buffer between the hostile parties. Moreover, the conditions necessary for such a buffer force, i. e. the existence of an effective cease-fire and the agreement of all those involved, had not been met. A fortiori, it was not possible to contemplate the tremendous military action that would have been necessary to bring hostilities to an end: international law precluded this and Europe, as embodied in the Twelve, did not have the necessary means. It was therefore wise to ask the United Nations Security Council to determine the juridical bases for European action in the Yugoslav crisis.

19. These were the conditions in which the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, meeting in Strasbourg on 21st September 1991, adopted Resolution 969 on the crisis in Yugoslavia on a report by our colleague, Mr. Soares Costa, for the Political Affairs Committee, and an opinion by our colleague, Mr. Seitlinger, for the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries. The resolution reads as follows:

“ 1. The Assembly is deeply disturbed at the continuing tragic loss of life resulting from the conflict between the peoples in Yugoslavia, and calls upon all parties to respect the cease-fire agreed at Igalo on 17th September 1991.

2. Seriously concerned about the fate of the civil populations fleeing the conflict to settle in safer areas of Yugoslavia or in neighbouring countries, it fears that an aggravation of the crisis may cause a considerable increase in the number of displaced persons.

3. It condemns the acts of war carried out by the Yugoslav Federal Army, acting outside the institutional control of the federal authorities, and also condemns the offensive action of the paramilitary forces.

4. The Assembly fully supports the efforts made by the European Community to find a peaceful solution to the conflict such as the peace conference at The Hague, the mediation efforts of its Chairman Lord Carrington and the monitoring missions.

5. It notes with concern the statements by the representatives of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly and of the parliaments of Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia but regrets that the parliaments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, did not participate in the hearing held by its competent committees on 18th September 1991.

6. It notes the rights of the republics, under the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, to secede from the federation, and calls upon the Council of Europe member states to consider recognising those republics which have declared independence. It stresses that any right to self-determination must be accompanied by the full respect of human and minority rights, as well as the relevant international treaties. In this connection it welcomes the proposal adopted by the European Parliament (resolution of 11th September 1991) that minority rights also should be protected according to definitions and procedures set out by the Council of Europe.

7. It welcomes the solemn confirmation, at the CSCE meeting on national minorities (Geneva, 1st-19th July 1991) of the principle that issues concerning national minorities are matters of legitimate international concern and do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective state. It regrets, however, the failure of that meeting to agree on any practical means of protecting these rights.

8. It considers that the continued massive use of violence in Yugoslavia which could easily spill over to neighbouring countries must be considered as a threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter.

9. Consequently the Assembly calls upon the Council of Europe member states to ask the United Nations Security Council under the appropriate articles to consider sending an effective military force to Yugoslavia in order to secure a cease-fire and a sensible solution to the future of Yugoslavia and its republics.

10. It further calls upon the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers to make available to the parties to the conflict all constitutional, legal and other expertise as may be required.”

20. Furthermore, the WEU Assembly's Presidential Committee held an emergency meeting in Strasbourg on 23rd September and adopted the following statement:

“The Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly meeting in emergency session called upon the Council of Ministers to invite the United Nations Security Council to set up an effective United Nations force to secure a cease-fire in Yugoslavia and stated that WEU stands ready to play its full part in any such proposal.”

This statement clarifies the Assembly's view on the way WEU may be called upon to act in this matter.

21. On 25th September, the Security Council adopted a resolution, the operative text of which reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

1. Expresses its full support for the collective efforts for peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia undertaken under the auspices of the member states of the European Community with the support of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe consistent with the principles of that conference;

2. Supports fully all arrangements and measures resulting from such collective efforts as those described above, in particular of assistance and support to the cease-fire observers, to consolidate an effective end to hostilities in Yugoslavia and the smooth functioning of the process instituted within the framework of the conference on Yugoslavia;

3. Invites to this end the Secretary-General to offer his assistance without delay, in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the efforts referred to above, and to report as soon as possible to the Security Council;

4. Strongly urges all parties to abide strictly by the cease-fire agreements of 17th September 1991 and 22nd September 1991;

5. Appeals urgently to and encourages all parties to settle their differences peacefully and through negotiations at the conference on Yugoslavia, including through the mechanisms set forth within it;

6. Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all states shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia;

7. Calls on all states to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which would permit all Yugoslavs to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;

8. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.”

22. It is evident that such a resolution, although encouraging more active diplomatic or even economic action by twelve-power Europe, does not lay the necessary juridical basis for military action. Nor was it able to have much influence on the continuation of fighting, any more than the Soviet Union was able to do by making the parties conclude a seventh cease-fire on 8th October which had as little effect and lasted no longer than previous ones.

23. (c) *Finally, the crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait* on 2nd August 1990 again showed that Europe might be threatened, at least economically, by events in the Middle East and that it could not remain outside an international operation designed to maintain peace and balance in that region. It must realise that the allied victory over Iraq is but the first step towards restoring true peace in the East which the conference on Palestine should pursue and extend to include the question which, for almost half a century, has been preventing the establishment of lasting peace in the region.

24. WEU's responsibilities relate to the security of Western Europe and this governs its relations with the rest of the world. Present uncertainty about the requirements of European security raises the question of the possible enlargement of WEU. Some countries, such as Greece and Turkey, have officially applied for membership. Others are thinking of doing so. The purpose of this report is to examine the principles that should guide the reactions of member countries' governments at this new juncture and Europe's new security requirements.

### III. WEU's responsibilities

25. The modified Brussels Treaty gave WEU very wide responsibilities, including economic, social and cultural matters. However, over the years the application of other treaties and the development of other institutions have restricted its activities to the application of the security- and defence-related provisions of the treaty. These measures, which follow the principle that it is preferable, whenever possible, to use the organisation associating the largest number of countries, have not jeopardised WEU's responsibilities but have merely transferred the exercise of these responsibilities to NATO, the Council of Europe and the European Community respectively. Those steps are not final, however, since, should results not be satisfactory, there is nothing to prevent WEU resuming the exercise of these tasks. This fact is also important in the definition of relations between the Council and the Assembly since it is

the basis of the Assembly's right to ask the Council to account for the application of the treaty, even in cases where this is conducted outside the framework of WEU. For instance, it justifies the Council's communication to the Assembly, for the first time in 1991, of the annual report of the Independent European Programme Group and also exchanges between the Assembly and NATO bodies.

26. This naturally does not mean the Assembly has to concern itself at all times with the way the Council of Europe carries out the exercise of responsibilities in cultural and social matters that WEU transferred to it in 1960 nor how the Community exercises in practice WEU's de jure economic responsibilities. Other international assemblies are better placed to do this. Conversely, it is entitled to ask the Council to keep it duly informed of progress at the inter-governmental conference which was opened at the beginning of the year at which the twelve Community member countries are examining how they are to develop a joint external policy from which security matters would not be excluded. In any event, this conference should lead to a clearer definition of the responsibilities of each European institution. The Anglo-Italian and Franco-German proposals of October 1991 are useful contributions to this step.

27. The wording of the preamble in which the high contracting parties undertake "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe" must imply that WEU has responsibilities covering at one and the same time the programme of the intergovernmental conference and also the evolution of the entire European continent. This second logic must be borne in mind when considering:

- (a) the accession of new members to the modified Brussels Treaty and hence to WEU;
- (b) the association of non-member countries with a specific WEU activity as advocated in Recommendation 500 in relation to Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic;
- (c) the possible use of WEU to help to maintain balance and peace in Europe either by setting up armed forces to implement international agreements requiring peace-keeping action, as the Council considered doing on 7th August 1991 in respect of Yugoslavia, although it was unable to take a decision in the absence of agreement between the parties concerned, or by affording guarantees to non-member countries if such guarantees might make it easier to safeguard peace;
- (d) the participation in the Assembly's work of parliamentary observers from

non-member countries, representatives of international parliamentary assemblies, members of governments from outside countries and senior international officials.

28. However, a distinction should be drawn between the case of the Assembly which may, at any time, invite whoever it wishes in response to topical concerns without involving the policy of member countries' governments and that of the Council and its dependent bodies since they commit governments and any approach to external powers may become more or less permanent. Thus, the Council's decision, after Greece and Turkey had applied for membership, to inform the representatives of those two countries about its discussions, are a form of association between them and WEU, while the exchanges now held between the Assembly and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union have no legal consequences. The Council gave its approval, but this is merely moral and political.

29. However, it should be recalled that the Assembly has always been discriminating in using its right to invite guest speakers or parliamentary observers to take part in its work. In the case of the latter, it has based itself largely on decisions taken by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe so as not to grant régimes in which the representativity of parliamentary institutions was not guaranteed the benefit of what might, even wrongly, have been seen as recognition of their democratic nature. Nor has it wished to anticipate the recognition by member states of certain forms of dissidence, which is why, at the time of writing, it has not invited any Yugoslav observers to its December 1991 session whereas the Yugoslav Federal Parliament was represented at previous sessions. Conversely, it does not intend to allow the Council to impose its views as to who it should invite or the circumstances in which this is done.

30. Under Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, there must be close co-operation between WEU and NATO. In the past, such co-operation was mainly designed to dispel any doubts that might arise about member countries' armaments in order to ensure the cohesion of the alliance. Now, it is rather the too feeble effort of certain countries that might breach this cohesion. Article II of the draft treaty proposed by the Assembly in Recommendation 504 provides for co-operation that corresponds better to the new circumstances.

31. Such co-operation is essential because, alone, the WEU countries almost certainly do not have the means of facing up to many of the challenges still inherent in the present state of international society. The Gulf crisis revealed

the limited means the WEU countries could mobilise in terms of observation, strategic transport and logistics. It even showed how few land and air forces Europe could deploy outside the NATO area. Although WEU was capable of equalling or even exceeding the United States naval deployment when a naval blockade had to be set in place against Iraq, it could not, on its own, consider conducting a far-reaching operation against that country, even by drawing on a large part of its forces earmarked for deployment in Central Europe. Although certain WEU countries were not acting in the Gulf in a NATO context, it was thanks to the experience of inter-allied co-operation in NATO that they were able to do so alongside the Americans. This means that any enlargement of WEU that drew it away from NATO would weaken Europe's ability to ensure its security. The Franco-German proposal of 16th October recognises this, as does the Anglo-Italian proposal.

32. Admittedly, on 27th June 1991 the WEU Council decided to set up a European satellite data interpretation centre which may eventually make Europe less dependent on the United States in this area. However, so far Europe has no real means of acquiring satellite images. The Franco-German proposal to set up a strategic transport force is still just a thought. Cuts in defence budgets, significant in all WEU member countries, makes it unlikely that they will set up large-scale forces capable of acting overseas in the near future. This will probably not so for the army corps that France and Germany are planning to set up jointly. Everything indicates therefore that, for some time to come, co-operation with the United States will be essential in any European operation outside the NATO area, and such military co-operation is possible only on the basis of a political understanding that the North Atlantic Council is still alone able to achieve.

33. Similarly, in cases such as that of Yugoslavia, where the United States had decided to leave Europe to act alone without participating directly itself, political and military understanding between member countries of the Atlantic Alliance is still indispensable if Europe is to avoid becoming involved in situations where it alone might have to face up to a major enemy. The Soviet Union's opposition on 6th August to any western interference in Yugoslav affairs on the grounds that this might then deteriorate into a pan-European conflict, according to the warning issued by Tass, shows that, even in this case, WEU could not claim to act except in concert with NATO. In fact, more recent events in the Soviet Union have shown a weakening of Soviet positions in Europe and the world, but it is not in Europe's interest to create situations where it might have to face the Soviet Union without the prior certainty of American support.

34. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty rules out the admission to WEU of countries that are not determined to play an active part in joint defence. It also bars the participation of countries to which WEU would not be able to afford effective assistance or to which member countries would not unanimously wish to afford such assistance in any circumstances if they were attacked.

35. Article VIII provides for consultations in the event of a crisis occurring outside the NATO area and for subsidiary bodies to be set up for certain activities necessary for the strengthening of joint security. It leaves the door open for non-signatory countries of the treaty to be associated with certain Council discussions, as in the case of the Gulf crisis, or with the activities of one or other of its subsidiary bodies, as is now the case for the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

36. The creation of a WEU satellite centre on 27th June may also offer a forum for co-operation with non-member countries, in particular for everything relating to the verification of international agreements on the limitation of conventional forces in Europe. However, one will have to wait for this centre to be duly set up and for its capability to have been demonstrated before giving serious consideration to the participation of countries which are not members of WEU in its activities.

#### *IV. The enlargement of WEU to include the European members of the Atlantic Alliance*

37. The most sensible and practical way to ensure the cohesion of European countries in the framework of NATO is to link membership of WEU with membership of NATO. This is the condition for the existence of a true European pillar in the alliance and the only way to avoid creating two categories of members of the alliance, some of whom might be left out of consultations in WEU. This is the message that the Turkish authorities were anxious to convey to the Assembly, particularly in President Özal's address on 5th June 1991. NATO leaders whom your Rapporteur consulted in 1990 spoke in the same vein as did the American authorities in those of their warnings to European countries in the first half of 1991 of which your Rapporteur is aware.

38. Turkey's application for membership of WEU is based on a number of important considerations:

- (a) In spite of the ups and downs of its internal policy, Turkey has constantly been a particularly faithful and important member of NATO. It should be underlined that, with an army more than 700 000 strong, it provides the largest contingent to the

NATO system. It has never raised any difficulties over the location of NATO bases on its territory. This has allowed NATO to set up observation bases close to the southern part of the Soviet Union and thus gather valuable data on the Soviet military system.

- (b) Turkey is the only NATO country, apart from Norway, to have a common frontier with the Soviet Union. This frontier crosses regions in which the same ethnic groups are represented on either side, thus making Turkey particularly sensitive to the present crises in the Soviet Union from the moment they spark off national reactions among the Turkish peoples of the union. More than ever, it needs support in view of the considerable risk for its internal cohesion and frontiers. In order to face up to these risks, the Turkish Government must be able to rely on western solidarity.
- (c) In view of rising Islamic fundamentalism, Turkey needs the West to confirm that it believes Ataturk made the right choice when he decided to base the Turkish Republic on a liberal, democratic constitutional system, thus distinguishing it from most other countries in the region.
- (d) During the Gulf crisis, Turkey provided far more assistance to the West than it had to under the North Atlantic Treaty and thus facilitated air operations that allowed Iraq's defensive capability to be reduced. After the war, in spite of the risks for its own national cohesion, it allowed a large section of the Iraqi Kurdish community to take refuge on its territory and opened its frontiers to international assistance for those refugees.

39. It would be difficult to ignore these facts and to continue to postpone indefinitely Turkey's application to join WEU, to which Turkey says it attaches great importance. In particular, Turkey objected to the Franco-German proposal of 15th October 1991 addressed to the chairmanship-in-office of the Community which it accuses of calling for the immediate accession of the member countries of the Community to WEU, including Greece, but assigning to Turkey and other NATO member countries an a yet ill-defined status of association.

40. The accession of the European member countries of the alliance would have the advantage of aligning membership of WEU with that of the IEPG and Eurogroup (if France

agreed to join in) and, consequently, allow WEU to group these three complementary institutions, restore its activities in the production, standardisation and interoperability of armaments, foster the development of joint production of armaments at European level and, finally, exercise more effectively its rôle as the European pillar of NATO that is now ensured by Eurogroup. Such co-operation is of particular importance now that the general decline in defence budgets is making it increasingly difficult for European arms-producing firms to survive.

41. One of the tasks that has been assigned to WEU since its reactivation is to organise a better sharing of burdens and responsibilities in the alliance. Here, the existence of a stronger and more firmly-established European pillar would be a decisive help now that the number of American forces stationed in Europe is being reduced.

42. The modified Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty are complementary insofar as Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty makes it compulsory, if a country so requests, to hold consultations on any threat to international peace even if it does not concern the area defined by the Washington Treaty. However, consultations between Europe and the United States are still essential, even in such cases, since the United States cannot accept involvement in a crisis having repercussions in Europe if it is not consulted about its allies' policy.

43. Moreover, Europe needs close consultations with its North American allies for everything relating to arms limitation negotiations because they concern its security, although the European members of the alliance do not take part in some of them, in particular START. If the European members of the alliance were the same as of WEU, this would strengthen WEU's influence in that area.

44. Enlargement of WEU to include the European members of the Atlantic Alliance would therefore at one and the same time strengthen the cohesion of the alliance and Europe's rôle within the alliance. Conversely, admitting to WEU countries which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance would inevitably result in WEU being disqualified as the United States' partner in NATO because the United States would not agree to countries not members of the alliance helping to define alliance policy in either military matters or arms limitation. Since the beginning of 1991, the United States has understandably warned its European allies several times about the pitfalls of such actions and it is a pity the WEU Council did not see fit to inform the Assembly of these important political facts.

45. For some time, it has been suggested that only member countries of the Community should be allowed to join WEU. This concept is based upon neither a treaty nor any joint declaration by the countries concerned. It encounters very real practical difficulties since certain member countries of the Community are not members of the alliance or have little perception of threats to Europe's security. To bring pressure to bear on them to join WEU would, if such pressure were successful, result in WEU not expressing the will of Europe but echoing its inability to take decisions. It seems essential not to endorse such proposals.

46. The former Secretary-General of WEU, Alfred Cahen, gave his name to a doctrine which made twofold membership of the Community and NATO the *sine qua non* condition of their accession to WEU. This doctrine, which would now mean that possible candidatures in the coming years would be confined to Denmark and Greece, has the disadvantage of presenting as a right – and the Greek authorities have not failed to interpret it in this way – what was only one condition among others. In any event, there can be no question of limiting the power given by Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty to member states to decide by common agreement to “invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited”. On the other hand, this article in no way restricts the Assembly's right to recommend that the Council take a given initiative, as it did at the appropriate time for enlargement to include Portugal and Spain, for the greater benefit of WEU, the Atlantic Alliance and European co-operation.

#### V. WEU and the European Community countries

47. Since the twelve-power summit meeting in Rome in December 1990, two intergovernmental conferences have been set up to advance the union of the Twelve, on the one hand towards a monetary union and on the other towards a political union including security. The outcome of these conferences, expected by December 1991, cannot be taken for granted. Nevertheless, where security and defence are concerned, the convergence between the United Kingdom and Italian proposals on the one hand and those of France and Germany on the other is sufficient, if not from the standpoint of major principles which, in point of fact, have little importance, at least from that of practical proposals which are the only ones that count, to suggest that the Maastricht summit meeting will result, in this matter, in a compromise that gives WEU an important place in the organisation of European security.

48. Some would have liked the European Community to take over quite soon responsibility for joint foreign policy and security in order to set up a real European super-state in the near future. Such plans now seem to have little chance of succeeding. However, the idea of associating WEU and the Community under the authority of a single European council seems to be making headway. Like the first proposal, this one implies WEU and the Community being composed of the same states. In principle, this would raise a serious problem in the case of Ireland, which does not wish to renounce its policy of neutrality. However, it would also prevent the accession to WEU of certain countries which are not members of the Community and whose early membership cannot be guaranteed, such as Turkey and Norway, while Turkey has applied for membership on the grounds of the scale of its participation in joint defence.

49. Reality is even more complicated. In view of the policy pursued by Greece, although somewhat modified by the new Greek Government, the words of its leaders and its accusations against Turkey, everything indicates that if Greece accedes to WEU before Turkey it would mean Turkey's candidature being rejected indefinitely and for some considerable time WEU would be unable to identify itself with a European pillar of the alliance so it is clear both would have to be admitted simultaneously. Experience in the European Community should remind us of the need for caution in this area.

50. Several non-member countries of NATO have now applied for membership of the EEC, including Austria, which has neutral status, Sweden, which intends to pursue a policy of neutrality, Malta and Cyprus. Others are considering applying. The Community has not adopted a final position towards these candidatures and has deferred considering them until 1993. Should it give a positive response, any hope of WEU and the EEC having the same member states would be relegated to an even more distant and uncertain future.

51. The crises in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in summer 1991, Sweden's application to join the EEC following that of Austria, the new interest shown by Switzerland and Finland and the independence of the Baltic countries suggest that, as from 1991, the Community will have to make decisive choices for its future. If it accepts, even as associates, neutral countries or countries whose defence policy has not yet been clearly defined, the Community's hope of extending its activities to include foreign policy and security matters will very quickly recede. Yet it now seems quite unlikely that the Community will be able to delay for much longer the holding of negotiations with the EFTA countries, and the choice between “deepening”, implying a joint

security policy, and "enlargement" to include countries with permanent neutral status or which for more than forty years have had a policy of neutrality which has distanced them from NATO. It is certainly possible to envisage the evolution of these countries, of their external policy and even of their international status, but this would necessarily be a slow process whereas, economically, most of them, more than others, are capable of adapting themselves swiftly to the requirements of the Common Market. Their participation would also make the Community better able to face up to the problems that will be raised by any form of rapprochement with the Central European countries, since it is evident that Western Europe will have to do its utmost to promote the economic recovery of this region.

52. The fact that the EEC member countries cannot join WEU en bloc is in no way an obstacle to the development of links between individual countries and WEU. Association might include provisions appropriate to the position, interests and views of each of them, in particular:

- (a) *participation as observers in certain Council activities.* This was the case of Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey at the ministerial meetings held to co-ordinate WEU's activities in the Gulf in 1990-91. The same countries, plus Ireland and Canada, took part in WEU Council meetings on Yugoslavia during summer 1991. If WEU is, as the Netherlands presidency of the European Council requested on 16th August 1991, to organise peace-keeping operations in Yugoslavia, there is nothing to prevent it associating, on an ad hoc basis, countries prepared to participate, whether they are members of the Community or not;
- (b) *participation on a permanent or temporary basis in the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies* such as the WEU Institute for Security Studies, which has already opened its doors to nationals of non-member countries. The creation of the WEU satellite centre might also allow co-operation beyond the framework of WEU members, particularly when the CFE agreements have to be verified.

53. Your Rapporteur therefore believes that various forms of co-operation between WEU, on the one hand, and the European Council and the subsidiary bodies it will probably have following the intergovernmental conference, on the other, are both possible and desirable. He also believes that any member countries of the Community so wishing might be asked to participate in the

activities of WEU, as might non-member countries of the EEC. However, he does not consider it appropriate for the smooth running of an organisation whose essential aim is to ensure Europe's security that the right to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty be granted to any country just because it belongs to the Community or to any other organisation not having the same aims as WEU. Only membership of NATO seems a decisive criterion for joining WEU, although this does not mean it is sufficient to establish a right.

#### *VI. The Eastern European countries*

54. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has brought to an end a certain form of order in Central Europe and the countries in that region are afraid of finding themselves in a vacuum where security is concerned which might make them the battlefield for a possible European conflict. Each of those countries sees its security in terms of its internal development at the same time as the international situation.

- (a) The Soviet Union for its part has established exchanges with NATO and the EEC and has shown its interest in the activities of WEU. It has also signed bilateral treaties of friendship and co-operation with WEU member countries, but those treaties do not call in question their signatories' continued membership of WEU and NATO. The Assembly has established regular exchanges with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. However, events since the attempted coup d'état on 19th August 1991 raise the question of what will be the future external and defence policy of the Soviet Union and also what will be the ability of the union or each of the republics to ensure their security.
- (b) There is even greater uncertainty about the future of the Yugoslav state and there can be no question of considering any kind of accession by the federation, or by the republics which are or were part of it, to a collective security organisation such as WEU. Admittedly, action by WEU to promote peace in the country is now being considered, but that very action would mean WEU being impartial towards all the belligerents. The Assembly itself has had to refrain from inviting Yugoslav parliamentary observers to its next session.
- (c) Albania and Bulgaria have not yet clearly defined their intentions regarding their internal régime or secu-

riety policy. The Assembly has invited Bulgarian parliamentary observers to its recent sessions, but they have shed little light on their country's intentions. The government formed after the elections on 13th October 1991 will probably be better able to determine Bulgarian external policy.

- (d) Romania has signed a bilateral security pact with the Soviet Union. It has shown little interest in WEU. However, for the first time the Assembly invited Romanian parliamentary observers to its June 1991 session and they duly attended.
- (e) Finally, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland, after exploring the possibility of a rapprochement with NATO, have organised exchanges with that organisation but the prospect of their joining has been ruled out. NATO no doubt did not wish to seem anxious to take advantage of the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact to spread into Central Europe, which might have appeared threatening to the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is not evident that the members of the alliance would have been unanimous in extending the guarantee afforded by NATO to those countries in present circumstances. The new appeal by Mr. Walesa, Mr. Havel and Mr. Amtall on 6th October 1991 following their meeting in Cracow seems likely to be no more successful.

All three have applied to join the Community but, because of the state of their economies, it seems impossible for them to accede in the near future. On the other hand, association seems likely and is being actively negotiated.

Symbolically, they showed solidarity with the coalition in the Gulf conflict and their intention to establish links with WEU. It would also appear that the crisis in Yugoslavia and the attempted putsch in the Soviet Union increased their feeling of insecurity. This might prompt them to ask for these links to be developed quickly or even for accession to WEU, on the one hand to draw them closer to the European Community and on the other to lay sounder foundations for their external – and perhaps in some cases internal – security.

55. As matters now stand, only the last three countries raise a question for WEU. It seems out

of the question for them to sign the modified Brussels Treaty because:

- (a) they are not members of NATO and consideration cannot be given to applying Article V in cases where there is no certainty of United States support;
- (b) extending WEU to include non-member countries of NATO would disqualify WEU from becoming the European pillar of the alliance and might well lead the United States to withdraw its guarantee to Europe.

56. However, it is necessary to give them assurances to prevent them from seeking elsewhere the protection refused by the West. With this in mind, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 500 asking the Council to associate them with any of its activities in which they could and wished to participate.

57. In accordance with the wishes expressed by the Council, the Assembly for its part has started to encourage parliamentary observers from those three countries to take part in its work. It invited Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, to address it in Luxembourg on 22nd March 1990, Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, on 7th June 1990 and Mr. Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, has been invited to address it on 3rd December 1991. The Assembly has a continuing relationship with the Supreme Soviet and proposes to organise a symposium in March 1992 in which nationals, including parliamentarians, of all the Central and Eastern European countries would take part. This is intended to develop exchanges between parliamentarians from all over Europe to allow better mutual understanding. It is not of a diplomatic nature and would not be binding on governments or be a substitute for positive action on their part.

## VII. Conclusions

58. The purpose of the modified Brussels Treaty is to ensure the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance is still the essential instrument of such security. Speculation either about the future of Community Europe or about the possible establishment of an all-European security order should therefore in no event jeopardise the close link between WEU and NATO. The present period of uncertainty should, on the contrary, lead to this link being strengthened, and the enlargement of WEU to include European countries members of the alliance might be a means of doing so and giving maximum strength to the European pillar of the alliance. Only when relative stabilisation of the

situation in Europe allows NATO to redefine its policy, strategy and means will it be possible to examine the conditions for its possible enlargement to include new European members. The question of those countries acceding to WEU will then, but only then, arise.

59. Conversely, any enlargement to include non-member countries of the alliance would be dangerous for NATO and for Europe's security. Co-operation between WEU and countries not members of the alliance, whether members of the European Community or not, may develop and, becoming a real association, help to establish peace in Europe on firmer foundations.

It must not imply recourse to Article V or call in question the rôle of European pillar of the alliance that the nine member countries unanimously wish to attribute to WEU.

60. As your Rapporteur said at the beginning of the present document, only provisional conclusions can be presented today. Only when Central and Eastern Europe find a new balance, the intergovernmental conference has managed to define the Community's security responsibilities and its links with WEU and when NATO has defined its new strategy will it be possible to give realistic consideration to the prospects of enlarging WEU.

*WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU*

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AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Pieralli*

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1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “Atlantic Alliance” add “and of the European Community”.

*Signed: Pieralli*

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1. See 9th sitting, 2nd December 1991 (amendment negatived).

*WEU's external relations – the enlargement of WEU*

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AMENDMENT 2 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Hardy  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

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2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:  
“ 3. Prepare to invite other European countries to co-operate with members of WEU in diplomatic or military action designed to keep the peace in Europe; ”

*Signed: Hardy*

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1. See 9th sitting, 2nd December 1991 (amendment agreed to).

*General report – activities of the WEU Council*

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Sir *Geoffrey Finsberg*, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix (Alternate: *Baumel*), Brito, Candal, *Caro*, Collart, Cuatrecasas (Alternate: *Barrionuevo*), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, *Goerens*, Guizzi, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: *Speed*), MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Lord Mackie, MM. *Martinez*, Martino, Müller, *Péciaux*, *Pieralli*, *de Puig*, *Reddemann*, *Roseta*, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mr. *Soell*, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Thyraud, *Ward*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**  
*on the activities of the WEU Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Satisfied that WEU has enabled Europe to play an active part in applying the measures decided upon by the Security Council for establishing a new, peaceful order in the Middle East;
- (ii) Noting with satisfaction that the Council has undertaken to provide the Community with the means they may require for possible action to promote peace in Yugoslavia;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that, during the year, the Council has developed the means available to governments for co-ordinating their action in areas within the purview of WEU;
- (iv) Considering that the various proposals concerning the future of European security that have been presented at the intergovernmental conference all assign a major rôle to WEU both as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the military organisation of the Twelve;
- (v) Welcoming the fact that the successive French and German presidencies made considerable progress in these areas;
- (vi) Welcoming the fact that, at its ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991, the Council took useful decisions for adapting WEU to the new requirements of European security;
- (vii) Regretting however that the Council, at the level of the Permanent Council, applies only in a limited manner its commitments under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in particular:
  - (a) by sheltering behind formalist considerations so as not to answer the Assembly, as has frequently been the case, and especially in its replies to Recommendations 479 and 490 and Written Question 288;
  - (b) by taking liberties with the facts as was the case in several respects in its replies to Recommendations 490 and 494 and in the first part of its thirty-seventh annual report;
  - (c) by resorting to generalities and vague phrases as in its reply to Recommendation 492;
  - (d) by breaking away from its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty as in its replies to Recommendations 490 and 491;
- (viii) Regretting further that the public is still insufficiently informed of the activities of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine without delay the adaptation of WEU that has become necessary due to the transformation of Europe, the development of the European Community's external and security policy and the reorganisation of NATO and inform the Assembly of its conclusions but not relinquish in favour of institutions other than WEU decisions concerning the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, as it appears to be envisaging in its reply to Recommendation 490;
2. Set up the WEU satellite data interpretation centre without delay and quickly define the conditions for developing Europe's observation satellite capability;
3. In consultation with NATO, study attentively command structures allowing forces assigned to NATO or to national commands to be used for missions defined by WEU, taking into account the lessons learned from the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav question;
4. Study the disarmament proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1991 in order to ascertain Europe's security requirements and allow Europe to play a more active rôle in disarmament matters;
5. Define areas in which consideration might be given to countries that are not members of WEU, including Greece, Norway, Turkey and certain Central European countries, being associated with the activities of the Council or of its subsidiary organs;

6. Not neglect the application of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, which makes the Assembly an essential organ of WEU, and to this end:

- (a) Ensure that it replies pertinently to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions and in particular:
  - (i) not take as a pretext for refusing to reply the fact that the Assembly, which it keeps inadequately informed, is not always able to word its texts in a manner it considers pertinent;
  - (ii) ensure that it does not give credence to statements not very close to reality;
  - (iii) ensure that the English and French texts of its replies correspond as accurately as possible;
  - (iv) give sufficiently precise and detailed replies to precise and detailed recommendations;
  - (v) respect the law embodied in the modified Brussels Treaty in its decisions and in its replies to the Assembly;
- (b) To allow a true dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, ensure that:
  - (i) its replies to recommendations reach the Assembly in time for it to be able to study them before the sessions following their adoption, i.e. within three months of being communicated to the Council;
  - (ii) its replies to written questions reach the Assembly within a reasonable lapse of time;
  - (iii) its half-yearly reports reach the Assembly within three months of the end of each half-year;
- (c) Transmit to the Assembly those of its discussion papers, reports and proposals which are not secret, as is normally done by the European Community authorities in the case of the European Parliament and as it did on 22nd February in the case of the working paper submitted to it by the Secretary-General;
- (d) Inform the Assembly of progress made with the study on Europe's development of a means of strategic, maritime and air transport;
- (e) Inform the Assembly of the nature and aim of the military group on Yugoslavia set up in Metz;
- (f) Apply its own decision of 13th November 1989 concerning the WEU Institute for Security Studies:
  - (i) by communicating to the Assembly "the results of the Institute's unclassified work", including "discussion papers on topical subjects" and "reports ... on the seminars it had arranged";
  - (ii) by not opposing the Institute giving the Assembly opinions on topical questions;

7. Implement as soon as possible the decision to which all the governments have agreed on moving the seat of the Permanent Council to Brussels and having that body formed of the permanent representatives of member countries to the European Community;

8. Instruct the Secretariat-General to prepare and circulate to the press a periodical information bulletin on the activities of WEU.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. Under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Assembly's first task is to approve the annual report of the Council. This duty devolved mainly from the application of the protocols establishing controls over the armaments of member states. It meant the Council preparing a very detailed, comprehensive report on those activities and the Assembly making a very rigorous examination of the text communicated to it. Although Article IX of the treaty has not been amended, the almost total disappearance of arms controls, the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain and the development of WEU's activities in new directions according greater importance to its inter-governmental organs while the tasks of its international administrative bodies have been considerably reduced have made the annual report of the Council far less important than in the past. The Council has developed new forms of relations with the Assembly, more appropriate to communicating information on the political aspects of its activities, but its work is described less systematically and is less detailed and, above all, the collegial nature of its message has diminished. Although the presidency and the Secretary-General endeavour to express the view of the whole Council, they do so in their own way and this does not commit the nine member governments to the same extent as the annual report.

2. For these reasons, the Political Committee decided not to restrict its report merely to answering the annual report of the Council but to present a general report at the second part of the Assembly's thirty-seventh session covering all the Council's political activities as may be understood from the many communications received in recent months without remaining within the chronological limits of the annual report. In view of the date on which the Assembly received the second part of the thirty-sixth annual report (19th April 1991), only in December 1991 will it be able to examine on that basis the Council's activities during the second half of 1990. On the other hand, the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report reached the office of the Clerk of the Assembly on 14th October 1991, allowing your Rapporteur to deal with it in this report. Nevertheless, the nature of the annual report is now such that, if the Assembly examined that alone its work would be devoid of political interest.

3. In fact, the part played by the presidency in the Council's activities in recent years means

that the history of WEU is henceforth marked by the succession of presidencies from 1st July of each year to 30th June of the next year. The Council's decision to issue its annual report in two half-yearly parts covering the calendar year allows this succession to be very largely taken into account. Consequently, the present report will deal with the Council's activities during the French presidency from 1st July 1990 to 30th June 1991 without neglecting matters tackled by the Council since 1st July 1991, i.e. at the start of the German presidency, which are principally the Yugoslav problem, the consequences of the failed coup d'état in the Soviet Union and the progress of the twelve-power intergovernmental conference.

### *II. The French presidency*

4. Account will have to be taken of a number of trump cards held by the French presidency as well as certain handicaps. It covered a period of political stability in France, the replacement of Mr. Rocard's government by that of Mrs. Cresson on 15th May 1991 not having produced any noticeable change in France's external policy. It was therefore marked by continuity of views and practice. It also coincided with the meeting of the European Council in Rome in December 1990, when it was decided to hold two intergovernmental conferences, one of which is to prepare the political union of twelve-power Europe which is to be extended to security matters. This presidency lasted throughout the Gulf affair and ended just when one could start thinking about the consequences for the organisation of European security. Finally, it witnessed the start of the Yugoslav crisis. In other words, France had an opportunity to make known its views on the future of political Europe and to guide WEU's action in a serious conflict of direct concern to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty.

5. Conversely, for a quarter of a century, France's attitude towards the NATO integrated military commands has carried suspicion that, to a greater degree than most of its partners, it drew a distinction between European action and NATO action. This has inevitably made several of its allies reserved, or at least cautious, when French initiatives might have been interpreted as implying some degree of dissociation between WEU and NATO even if France has always asserted, as Mr. Joxe again told the Assembly on 4th June, that it had no such intention. It should

be recalled that it was just when France was proposing to consider the possible organisation of co-operation between WEU member countries' rapid action forces that its eight partners endorsed, in the framework of the NATO Defence Planning Committee, the proposal to set up a NATO rapid reaction force which might have seemed to be an alternative to the French proposal. Moreover, NATO had announced that the force would be European but would have the support of air units supplied by the United States. Exercise Certain Shield, held in Germany from 10th to 20th September, included a strong American force alongside Belgian, Dutch and British contingents. Furthermore, at the various stages in the European countries' participation in Gulf operations, it was clear that the governments of the WEU countries did not always present in the same way the collective action in which they were taking part. Some insisted on their European nature and the importance of co-ordination in the framework of WEU and others on co-operation with the United States and the continuity of their action in the Gulf with their NATO commitment. There was certainly no contradiction between the two presentations of the same fact, but the different descriptions meant that the situation was not perceived in an identical manner by the public in the various WEU countries and that, in general, it was insufficiently perceived.

6. This handicap probably helped to paralyse the presidency when, early in 1991, the American authorities sent member countries a series of warnings against the intention attributed to them, probably not without reason, to assert a European identity in security matters. The American authorities feared that WEU's activities might jeopardise the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. These warnings came in the wake of the thanks the United States had conveyed to WEU in the last quarter of 1990 for the rôle it had played in the Gulf. Clearly the WEU Council should have drawn attention to the contradiction between these two approaches, but none of the Council's communications has mentioned the American messages, or its reactions to them, or any possible answers, which suggests that Europe did not manage or did not wish to show its hand in this connection.

7. It may be noted that the French presidency tackled its term of office with a certain concept of the future of Europe, referred to several times by the President of the French Republic and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roland Dumas. For them, it was a matter of progressing along the road to the future establishment of a federal Europe based on the European Community and embodying a European identity in external and defence policy matters. In view of prevailing uncertainty about the future of the European continent and the risk the European Community feared it was

running of this identity being diluted due to rapid enlargement, France wished a decisive step to be taken towards strengthening Community cohesion before the end of 1992, which corresponded moreover to the concerns of most of its partners. However, for less explicit but nevertheless quite clear reasons, relating mainly to its nuclear independence and its relations with certain African countries, France did not seem to think it either possible or desirable for the Community proper to be given responsibility for defence matters at least in the immediate future. Describing his country's policy in the Gulf affair on 16th March 1991, Roland Dumas said: "Europe cannot be asked for what it cannot give. Conversely, it has given what it could. In the security and defence area, a single body exists and that is WEU." For the French presidency, it was thus a matter of asserting at one and the same time the link between WEU and the Community and the differences between the two organisations on the one hand and between WEU and NATO on the other. It did this in three areas: the legal area, with the tabling of the first Franco-German proposal at the intergovernmental conference, the area of administrative practice, by using the prerogatives of the presidency in a way that your Rapporteur will try to analyse, and the area of political action, through the initiatives it took, mainly in the Gulf but also in other connections, such as guiding WEU towards the military use of space, the regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff of member countries, the participation of non-member European countries in certain WEU activities and examining the possibilities of WEU intervention in the Yugoslav crisis.

8. Your Rapporteur will not dwell on the Franco-German proposal, which was set out by Mr. Charles Goerens, committee Rapporteur on "The revision of the modified Brussels Treaty", in Document 1261 of 26th March 1991. The facts seem to confirm the impression then expressed by that Rapporteur, i.e. that the proposal would be a decisive guide for the work of the Twelve on foreign policy and security, and the communiqué issued at the close of WEU's ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991 indicate that the Nine agreed on most of what was contained in that proposal. However, it should be noted that the French presidency did not invite the WEU Council to examine the organisation of European security from its own standpoint. The Council's argument, contained in the reply to Recommendation 490, was that, before doing so, it had to wait for the Twelve, on the one hand, and NATO, on the other, to redefine their prerogatives before thinking of revising the modified Brussels Treaty. Yet there is nothing to prevent parallel steps being taken by the three bodies, as proved by the decision taken by the Council at the request of the German presidency to hold an extraordinary

ministerial meeting on 29th October 1991, i.e. before the NATO meeting and also before the conclusion of the intergovernmental conference for the Maastricht summit meeting from 9th to 11th December, to examine this matter, as Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher told the Assembly committees meeting at the Petersberg on 8th July 1991.

9. Where political action is concerned, there is every indication that the French presidency sought to seize the opportunities afforded by circumstances to anticipate decisions that the Twelve had not yet taken by showing, in practice, that they were realistic and perhaps also inevitable. On the one hand, the presidency convened several ministerial meetings of the WEU Council, first of all to take military initiatives to allow Europe to follow up the decisions taken by the Twelve in the framework of political co-operation to ensure respect for Security Council resolutions on Iraq and subsequently to make more permanent the intergovernmental bodies set up during the crisis, including the meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff. It attempted to give some publicity to the ministerial decisions and the activities of those bodies, and the Assembly benefited from that attitude since its Presidential Committee was asked to meet the presidency at the close of several ministerial meetings and the Defence Committee was briefed by the French chief of defence staff on how military co-ordination was working, while a delegation from the Assembly was received by several naval units in the Gulf.

10. However, it should be noted that, apart from confidential meetings with Assembly organs, the Council did not give the press and public satisfactory information about the rôle played by WEU in the Gulf. It is now common practice to stress Europe's inexistence on that occasion but this is a very unfair interpretation of the rôle played by WEU. Little attention has been paid to the fact that the establishment of a co-ordinating authority was an unprecedented event in Europe's history. This is probably largely due to the procedure adopted by the Council at its ministerial meetings: it adopts a brief communiqué defining positions adopted jointly in terms that are often not very explicit and then each individual minister receives representatives of the press, i.e., generally speaking, from his own country, to whom he says far more about that country's specific rôle than about WEU action. The result has been fragmented information which could but provide grist for general scepticism about Europe's ability to assert itself in security matters, even in cases when such pessimism seems to have been unjustified. Your Rapporteur believes that, at the present juncture in WEU, it should be for the presidency to give far more systematic and better organised information not only about the decisions of the Council of Ministers but about

the progress of all WEU's activities and, on the latter point, it should have the permanent assistance of the Secretariat-General. The Assembly, on the one hand, and the Institute for Security Studies, on the other, are now each issuing a periodical information bulletin. The Secretariat-General might usefully do likewise and even, in times of crisis, issue frequent information bulletins so that the press will no longer be unaware of WEU's activities. The periodical letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly is written too long after the event to be able to play this rôle effectively vis-à-vis the press.

11. In spite of this poor management of its communications, the Council was able to give tangible proof that:

- (a) the modified Brussels Treaty, and Article VIII in particular, allowed Europe to carry out significant military operations outside the NATO area;
- (b) the intergovernmental character of WEU did not necessarily lead to paralysis but preserved the possibility of co-operation between members, even if they did not share the same concept of the nature and scope of their action;
- (c) the different membership of WEU and the European Community did not prevent the former being able to act as an instrument for the latter.

12. On the other hand, WEU's action has encountered a number of obstacles which have stopped it from being continued on several occasions. The land and air operations against Iraq were not co-ordinated in WEU. It may be wondered what is the basis for the contrary claim in the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council. Attempts by the presidency to revive meaningful WEU co-ordination of humanitarian action for the Kurds when, after the military operation against Iraq had stopped, the latter started a campaign against its Kurdish population, causing a massive exodus of Kurds towards Iran and Turkey, were very limited. The initiatives referred to by the Council in July 1991 to establish a buffer force to prevent armed clashes between the peoples of Yugoslavia came to naught. These setbacks showed the limit of the capabilities of WEU and of international organisations in general if members are not unanimous about the aims to be pursued or the means to be used. The action carried out in the WEU context during the French presidency thus allows no final conclusions to be drawn about the rôle WEU can play in the future. However, it seems clear that, if the governments manage to agree on the conditions which possible WEU action should meet, for instance the regions of

the world to which it might apply, which international bodies would be able to instigate it and the means that might be used, it would be easier for it to decide upon measures designed to apply these principles when the need arose and to present the initiatives it takes to the press more convincingly than the Council managed to do when it was succeeding in setting up relatively effective co-ordination in the Gulf. It should be noted that the Franco-German proposal at the intergovernmental conference on 11th October 1991 contains several interesting suggestions that concord with your Rapporteur's wishes.

13. Finally, where the functioning of WEU is concerned, the French presidency sought to assert the intergovernmental nature of WEU, going so far, apparently, as to hold a ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in April 1991 without the Secretary-General being present. This was the culminating point of a steady trend in the Council in recent years which, in certain ways, brings the procedures used in the framework of WEU closer to those practised in European political co-operation. The effect has been to transfer a number of prerogatives and initiatives from the Secretariat-General to the presidency with the assistance, in some cases, of representatives of the previous and subsequent presidencies, the so-called troika system. However, the effect of these practices has been to limit the collegial nature of the Council, which is a handicap for its dialogue with the Assembly and is also detrimental to the continuity of its action since the succession of member countries holding the presidency leads to over-frequent and over-important changes in the way it works. If, as has been considered in recent months, there were to be a switch from a yearly to a half-yearly presidency, this drawback would be amplified if the rôle of the Secretariat-General is not restored, in particular with regard to the circulation of information and the preparation of the Council's replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions put by parliamentarians.

14. In spite of these disadvantages and also a certain degree of improvisation from which meetings between the presidency and the Assembly's Presidential Committee sometimes suffered, due to the will of the French presidency to have WEU react rapidly to events threatening international peace which, after all, corresponds to the commitment imposed on member countries in Article VIII of the treaty to allow the Council to meet immediately if necessary, the French presidency had two great merits: it gave definite substance to the reactivation of WEU, which had hitherto been a subject of speeches and declarations without becoming an actual fact, and it showed relatively clearly the place of reactivated WEU in the establishment of a Europe built up round the Community. If, to this, one adds the successful outcome, at the meeting in Vianden on

27th June 1991, of the first stage of a proposal actively supported by France for European space co-operation, the evolution of WEU under the aegis of the French presidency can be considered very positive.

### *III. The ministerial meeting in Vianden*

15. The ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991, concluding the French presidency seems to have been a remarkable success for WEU in general and for its Assembly in particular, and the communiqué issued at the close was a welcome change from the brevity and vagueness of only too many Council communications. It set out a political programme for Europe very close to the one the Assembly had outlined in many of its recommendations in recent years. This convergence allows the rôle of the Assembly to be underlined since, once again, it has proved to be a useful inspiration for the governments. The Council might have referred to this.

16. *On the architecture of European security*, the communiqué confines itself to general declarations but contains two noteworthy indications whose interpretation now seems to be dominating the negotiations at the intergovernmental conference:

- (a) "WEU should be developed in this phase of the European integration process as its defence component";
- (b) "Ministers noted the need for the European and Atlantic debates to proceed in parallel."

17. Although the communiqué does not say so, several ministers have said that the Council has decided to meet at ministerial level for an extraordinary meeting prior to the November meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which is to decide the new policy, new structures and, above all, new strategy of the alliance, which meets a constant request of the Assembly, hitherto always set aside by the Council. This decision is in direct line with the establishment, in the framework of WEU, of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It should probably lead the Council to invite the other European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to participate, at an appropriate level, in a meeting which will have a considerable impact so as to avoid WEU's activities appearing to be a threat to the cohesion of the alliance, as the United States seems to fear. This practice, started by the French presidency during the Gulf crisis, conforms fully with Article VIII of the treaty, provided such invitations remain limited to discussion of a specific topic and do not lead to the fact that the existence of the Council is linked with the application of the treaty being overlooked. According to British newspapers, one of

the aims of that meeting is to examine the consequences for WEU of the creation of the NATO rapid reaction force at the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in May 1991, which should encourage the Council to decide on the principle of a possible deployment of units assigned to the NATO force in peacetime in the framework of action decided upon by WEU. This meeting too will probably take place shortly before the intergovernmental conference completes its work. Hence the Council should by then be able to decide to resume its examination of the necessary revision of the modified Brussels Treaty.

18. *In regard to the CSCE*, it should be noted that:

- (a) The "statement" on Yugoslavia adopted by the Council in Vianden, calling for full application of the principles of the CSCE, shows the rôle WEU might have to play in making these principles prevail. This vocation is also shown in the Nine's endorsement as a bloc of the request to convene a ministerial meeting of the CSCE to consider the situation in Yugoslavia which was decisive since, according to the Berlin agreement, the endorsement of thirteen states was required for such a request to be followed up. It can thus be seen how the action of a regional defence organisation can help the functioning of the CSCE, *inter alia* by allowing it to take effective action in the event of a crisis and a threat to peace in Europe. This rôle could have been still greater if the Council had been able to set up a military buffer force, as the Twelve had proposed at the beginning of July.
- (b) Notification of the will of the Council "to develop a joint approach which takes account of the interests of Europeans in every field of arms control": this intention assumes new importance in the aftermath of the crisis in the Soviet Union at the end of August, following the failure of the coup by conservative factions intended to overthrow Mr. Gorbachev. At the time of the coup d'état, questions were raised about how far its instigators would have been prepared to respect the undertakings entered into by the Soviet Union in recent years in the framework of the START agreements, the agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles, the CFE agreements or bilateral agreements with Germany and several Central European countries on the removal of Soviet forces from their territory. The

failure of the putsch made any such risks more remote, but the changes among military leaders imposed by the Soviet Government show this threat was real. As long as the Soviet Union has not recovered true stability this cannot be entirely ruled out. Moreover, initiatives by President Bush and President Gorbachev in October 1991 oblige Europe to work out a new doctrine of disarmament.

19. Moreover, in the new situation created by the failure of the coup d'état and calls for independence in most of the Soviet republics, the question arises of the union's military and nuclear forces coming under the control of the republics. The division of the union would inevitably call in question the application of all the agreements relating to the limitation of armaments and this imparts particular importance to the Council's decision, even if the most recent developments allow it to be hoped that a central body will have sole control of Soviet nuclear strength.

20. *In regard to the dialogue with the Central and Eastern European countries*, the Council responds convincingly to the Assembly's recommendation on creating a statute of "associated country" by proposing "ad hoc contacts at ministerial level on specific subjects of common interest" and "to intensify the exchanges of view among experts" on such subjects. It should be noted that, in addition to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, contacts have also been made with Romania, Bulgaria and, apparently, the USSR. Finally, the proposal which France and Germany addressed to the chairmanship-in-office of the Community on 11th October 1991 about the organisation of security and defence in Europe advocates developing the association of those countries with WEU's activities.

21. The Assembly therefore welcomes the course followed by the Council which on the whole corresponds to the direction it has itself taken, although as a parliamentary body the Assembly has to be more careful about establishing relations with parliamentary organs whose representativeness may seem questionable. It will note that the Council, in its reply to Recommendation 490, approves the steps taken by the Assembly to develop its relations with the Central and Eastern European countries, as is normal, but the Assembly has been unable to convince the Council of the weight of its financial burden due to the development of its exchanges with many countries which are not members of WEU which limits its possibilities of taking action in this area.

22. Furthermore, one may wonder whether the crises in July and August 1991 will not make WEU speed up the development of its relations with certain Central European countries. On the

one hand, the breaking-up of the Yugoslav federation is making several of those countries fear a resurgence of nationalism that might call in question their internal cohesion and the security of their frontiers. On the other hand, the Moscow putsch made them fear a sudden switch in Soviet policy, particularly in regard to the evacuation of forces stationed on their territory. They have seen that they had no firm guarantee against such threats and some believe that the only way to emerge from their security isolation is not just to participate in specific WEU activities but to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty and thus benefit from the application of Article V. There is thus already a question of whether it is not necessary to speed up the negotiation of far more binding defence agreements than those considered at the last session of the Assembly and at the time Recommendation 500 was adopted.

23. In *space matters*, the creation of a satellite data interpretation centre corresponds to Assembly recommendations, but the Council wished to avoid the word "Agency", probably to indicate that the status of the centre will be different from that of the former WEU agencies and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. It is important to know to what extent the Council intends to reserve participation in the centre for WEU member countries or whether it intends to leave it open to non-member countries. The communiqué also says it will be used "particularly within the framework of the verification of arms control agreements", which means it might be used for other purposes, including military operations by member countries, whether co-ordinated or not. This would respond to what many observers have noticed and certain governments stressed during the Gulf crisis, i.e. that Europe was lagging so far behind in developing its observation capability, which significantly limited its ability to act independently.

24. In this connection, one should recall the major rôle played by the Assembly in preparing these decisions, not only through the reports it prepared and the recommendations it addressed to the Council, but also thanks to the organisation of the symposium on "Observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament", held in Rome on 27th and 28th March 1990, which provided the Council with a particularly detailed file on the political, military and technical aspects of the question. It helped to alert public opinion to the importance of the decisions to be taken in this matter. The Assembly can but welcome the considerable support the French presidency gave to its proposals and the fact that the French Minister of Defence, Mr. Pierre Joxe, used his address to the Assembly on 4th June to announce:

"... In the arms control and disarmament plan announced yesterday by France, the

French authorities stressed their willingness to pass on any information they had to regional agencies in the interests of transparency, and that they were in favour of any European-held space-derived observations, in particular, being passed on to such regional agencies."

This approach gave effective substance to the future Council decision to set up a satellite data interpretation centre, the import of which Mr. Joxe spelled out:

"As you know, France, Spain and Italy are involved in the Helios programme in which the objective is to have a first observation satellite in orbit in 1993. In the WEU context, we hope that at the next ministerial meeting it will be decided to set up a centre for interpreting satellite images to which Helios could contribute."

Finally, the decision "to pursue studies on the possibilities for... co-operation" in this field suggest that the governments are determined to embark upon more advanced space co-operation, as recommended by the Assembly. Here, too, Mr. Joxe specified the French Government's intentions as follows:

"However, I hope that we can go even further. For Europe, the development of a space capability of strategic interest could represent a collective ambition in an area of high technology, essential for its future security.

It would be a clear sign of our resolve to go ahead in the direction of a common security and defence policy."

25. However, it is most curious that the Council, in spite of the rôle played by the Assembly in preparing its decision, waited until 9th September to communicate to it the text of the decision it took in Vianden on 27th June on the creation of the WEU satellite centre, although this decision was the subject of a "public document", the text of which your Rapporteur managed to obtain. It will surprise no one if the Assembly persists in believing, in spite of the Council's denials, such as those in the reply to Recommendation 490, that the Council views in an off-hand and negligent manner its duty to keep the Assembly informed.

26. Your Rapporteur draws attention to several important aspects of this decision. First, the WEU satellite centre actually is a subsidiary organ of WEU in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the treaty, but, unlike the ACA, this does not give it its own legal entity. This demonstrates the flexibility of the relevant treaty provision which allows organs of very different kinds and with different statutes to be created. It should also be underlined that paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision strongly confirm that it is an intergovernmental body.

27. Although not very large, the budget allocated to the centre seems sufficient to suggest that the governments are quite firmly decided. It should be added that, in reply to a written question put by our colleague, Mr. Lagorce, in the French National Assembly on 27th May 1991, the French Minister of Defence said that, in addition, a budget of 5 million ecus had been granted to the Council for 1992 for studies to allow the requirements of WEU countries in observation and intelligence satellites to be determined. While the location of the centre is not given in the decision, your Rapporteur believes it might well be in Spain, which would have the advantage of providing WEU with better anchorage in the Iberian Peninsula, where the public still knows little of its activities. According to Mr. Joxe's reply to Mr. Lagorce, the decision is to be taken at the meeting planned for 18th November.

28. In regard to *operational co-operation between member states in military matters*, the wording of the Vianden communiqué is singularly cryptic. It speaks of "programmes of co-operation", which seems to refer to armaments, but the reference to the meeting of chiefs of defence staff on 10th April, which "gave further impetus to the discussions under way on the possibilities of developing various forms of practical co-operation" and then to making "co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures" might suggest the Council has taken into account proposals such as those in Recommendation 492, presented by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Political Committee in December 1990. It would thus mean that the creation of the rapid reaction force decided upon by NATO does not mean that WEU should not promote the creation of frameworks for the co-ordinated deployment of the forces of member countries whether or not they are integrated in the NATO commands in peacetime and whether or not they are assigned to the rapid reaction force. The wording of the Anglo-Italian proposal at the intergovernmental conference on 4th October suggests that the two countries concerned would be in favour of this idea. On this point, the Council should give clearer and more precise information than it did in the Vianden communiqué. There is every reason to think that linguistic confusion is designed to conceal certain differences between the ministers in this connection.

29. On *Mediterranean questions*, the Assembly can but note that the Council gives it no means of ascertaining the scope of the mandate given to the sub-group responsible for following these questions, the guidelines for its work, the report it submitted to the Council in Vianden or how it intends to follow these up.

This discretion gives a hint that little progress is being made in this area, which is understandable, moreover, just after the Gulf war.

30. Although the Vianden communiqué gives rise to several reservations, including the fact that there was no reference to relations between the Council and the Assembly, in spite of the rôle played by the Assembly in the preparation of the decisions taken, it nevertheless testifies, with the political trends it presents and the practical decisions it includes, to very real activity on the part of the Council and, following on the initiatives taken during the Gulf crisis, it is a wholly satisfactory sign that the reactivation of WEU is at last becoming an established fact.

#### IV. The German presidency

31. The German presidency started on 1st July 1991 and had the merit of circulating, on that date, a document setting out its programme. On 8th July, Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs, received the Presidential Committee and the Political and Defence Committees at the Petersberg and gave them details about how it intended to implement this programme. Inter alia, it announced its intention of convening an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers on 29th October to examine WEU's place in the overall architecture of Europe. In July and August, the German presidency also had to face up to two crises which, in different ways, concerned WEU, and it had to convene ministerial meetings on 19th and then 30th September 1991 to consider the implementation of decisions concerning Yugoslavia taken the same day by the European Council.

32. The communiqué, circulated by the German Embassy in London on 1st July 1991, after stating that "WEU has proved itself to be an important forum for consulting about questions of European security policy" and that "its efficiency has been shown, for instance, in co-ordinating the maritime activities of WEU member states in the Gulf and giving help to the Kurdish population" (although this last assertion is in point of fact an audacious one), asserts that:

"WEU forms part of Europe's new political security architecture alongside NATO and CSCE. As an integral component of the process of European unification and the core of a European security and defence dimension it is constantly gaining new importance. WEU also contributes towards closer co-operation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the security policy field.

The presidency gives German foreign policy an important job to do. Our aim is

to bring more clearly to the fore WEU's bridging function between the Atlantic Alliance and European political union.

A political union having a common foreign and security policy implies a genuine European security and defence identity and thus greater European responsibility for defence matters. WEU should be developed in this phase of the European integration process as its defence component.

At the meeting in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June, NATO foreign ministers stressed the responsibility of the European allies for formulating a joint security and defence policy and that developing a European security identity will strengthen the Atlantic Alliance's effectiveness. At the 19th and 20th June Berlin CSCE conference, too, the foreign ministers decided to create a link with WEU as one of the most important European institutions.

At a time when important decisions have to be taken in discussions over NATO strategy and the intergovernmental conference on political union, Germany will be co-ordinator inside WEU and in foreign relations WEU's representative to work towards realising the concepts for the union's future rôle in the European security structure and to make sure it is put to good use as a medium of consultation in the security policy field.

Besides determining the union's place in the European context the main aim of the German presidency will be seeking to define a more operational rôle for WEU, its relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, disarmament issues and arms control as well as co-operation in space matters."

33. The communiqué also specifies that its next regular ministerial meeting will be held on 18th November 1991, which does not affect the date of the extraordinary meeting proposed by Mr. Genscher in Vianden, which it has been learned, moreover, might be held on 29th October.

34. This text is interesting because of what it says and also because of what it does not say. No one will be surprised that it stresses, as the French presidency did, the relationship between WEU and the European union being prepared by the intergovernmental conference and that it stresses more than France did the Atlantic dimension of European security and the link between WEU and the CSCE. Moreover, at the meeting at the Petersberg on 8th July, Mr. Genscher mentioned other aspects of Germany's intentions, including that of advancing the Franco-German study on a strategic, maritime

and airborne means of transport. But it will also be noted that the communiqué says nothing about a possible rôle for WEU either inside or outside the NATO area or about any form of military co-ordination among the goals it sets for WEU. These differences probably demonstrate the special way Germany on the one hand and France on the other view the future rôle of WEU and probably also the European union and they perhaps throw light on the way the two summer 1991 crises were tackled by the WEU Council.

35. The Yugoslav crisis started well before the beginning of July 1991 but it was in the early days of that month that it took on new dimensions when the armed clashes suddenly worsened and the Slovenian and Croatian Republics expressed their will for independence, which dramatically called in question the survival of a federal state that had long been threatened. The federal army carried out military operations designed first of all to make the two contestants submit. Serbia for its part was trying, in case the Yugoslav state should disappear, to ensure, with the assistance of the federal army, that it would have control of the territories of the Croatian Republic peopled with Serbs. The problem also became ideological because there was still communist leadership in Serbia, the federal state and its army and international because the Soviet Union, feeling its own cohesion threatened by the wish for independence expressed by several of its component republics, did nothing to conceal its hostility towards any external intervention in Yugoslav affairs because this might have heralded claims to intervene in Soviet internal affairs.

36. These were the conditions in which the ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve met in The Hague on 6th August, after Serbia had refused the mediation of the European troika that they had proposed, to examine the French and German proposals intended to promote the restoration of peace in Yugoslavia. According to information in the press, France informed its partners that it intended to place the Yugoslav affair before the Security Council under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter providing for the Security Council to meet in the event of a threat to peace. It is also reported to have asked the presidency to convene a meeting of the WEU Council to examine the possibility of setting up a European buffer force. Germany for its part endorsed the idea of placing the matter before the Security Council and proposed that the Community take economic sanctions against Serbia, responsible for the failure of the first attempts by the Twelve to achieve a cease-fire. The French proposal to instruct the WEU Council to examine the possibility of a WEU contribution with a view to enforcing the cease-fire in Yugoslavia led the German presidency to convene the Permanent Council on

7th August, while a meeting of political directors of the CSCE ministries for foreign affairs was organised in Prague on 8th August.

37. In fact, the meeting of the WEU Council produced no results. The "elements for responses to enquiries from the press" that it issued merely stated that "the Council agreed to continue to follow closely developments in the situation in Yugoslavia" which did not, however, prevent it, despite the acuteness of the crisis, from fixing its next meeting for 18th September. Furthermore, "member countries agreed to continue their reflections on possible concrete contributions they might make to the maintenance of an agreed cease-fire, taking into account the efforts made in other international fora, such as the European Community and the CSCE".

38. Clearly, Serbia's refusal of any form of buffer force and the participation of foreign military personnel in the verification of successive cease-fire agreements that it accepted in principle without any real determination to respect them meant that WEU could not be used to help to implement a policy defined by the Twelve, particularly as, on 7th August, the Soviet Union had warned the West about the risks to peace involved in any interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. Hence, nothing needs to be said about the results of the WEU Council meeting.

39. The precedent of the Gulf crisis and the fact that the ministers for foreign affairs were meeting in The Hague on 6th August indicate that, if the ministers had wanted to take major decisions in the framework of WEU's responsibilities, they could quite well have decided to meet in the context of WEU. It may indeed be wondered whether, even before the meeting on 7th August, they were not well aware of their disagreement on two points: the expediency of European military participation in the crisis and the kind of political order that should be established or maintained. Some countries had expressed a preference for giving priority to maintaining the federal Yugoslav state or to the independence of the Croatian and Slovenian Republics, although all agreed that the Yugoslav state should be profoundly transformed to give the republics far greater independence. A peace-keeping intervention would to a certain extent have meant choosing between two possible orders, which led Europeans to confine themselves to action by the Twelve to foster a cease-fire, inspected solely by civil observers. In view of the impact of the Yugoslav crisis in several Central and Eastern European countries and the prevailing uncertainty for more than a month now about the maintenance of the cease-fire and the ability of the parties involved to reach an understanding, it may be wondered whether the more energetic action that would have been possible if WEU had been used to serve the

European Council would not have been desirable. Recourse to such action has still not been ruled out, but to date the WEU Council seems to have given it no serious thought and, at the joint meeting on 8th July, Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, did not conceal his opposition to any WEU intervention in this matter. According to the International Herald Tribune of 5th September 1991, Mr. Genscher proposed the creation of a CSCE "blue helmets" force to play a rôle in Yugoslavia that, early in the summer, others had envisaged for WEU with the possible participation of non-member countries and countries that were not neighbours of Yugoslavia such as Czechoslovakia and Canada. It may be wondered whether the thirty-eight members of the CSCE will be able to reach agreement on such a decision more easily than the nine members of WEU. Subsequent events showed this was not so.

40. Your Rapporteur believes there is every reason to fear that the Yugoslav crisis will continue in a manner that cannot yet be foreseen. The situation might become extremely serious through an extension of and increase in international struggles and the repercussions the Yugoslav conflicts may have in other countries either because they feel solidarity with certain minorities in Yugoslavia, which is the case of the Hungarians and Albanians, or because their own minorities may be tempted to follow the course set by the Slovenes and the Croats. It cannot be ruled out, therefore, that in the coming months Europe may have to contribute a military presence to help to maintain peace in Yugoslavia or on its outer frontiers and that WEU will be seen as the only organisation capable of setting up a European force, even if it were to include non-member countries, as seems to have been envisaged at the beginning of August. It is not certain that Serbia's opposition to a foreign military presence on Yugoslav territory will continue if the armed conflict assumes new dimensions, since such action can be contemplated only after an effective cease-fire and with the agreement of all those concerned.

41. It was therefore normal for the Council on the one hand to study developments in Yugoslavia with a view to harmonising the views of its members and facilitating political decisions when the time is ripe and, on the other, to examine the military options which it might then have to take. It has been reported in the press that quite considerable progress has been made in this sense, military headquarters having been set up in Metz to prepare for possible military action. The fact that it was impossible for the Council to take operational decisions on 7th August did not therefore make it postpone sine die its consultations on these two matters but, on the contrary, it continued them and it should be congratulated for this.

42. The Soviet crisis at the end of August was obviously not within WEU's area of responsibility since, if the instigators of the unsuccessful coup d'état are to be believed, it did not call in question Soviet external policy nor, in particular, its intention to respect the agreements it had signed on arms limitation, evacuating its armed forces from the Central European countries and security and co-operation in Europe. One could well wonder about the determination and ability of those responsible for the putsch to keep their word but, in view of the fact that in less than three days their undertaking collapsed, the WEU Council cannot be reproached for not having reacted since it was in other forums, particularly that of the Twelve, that Europe considered the steps to be taken to help the supporters of legality to thwart those attempting to revert to Soviet orthodoxy.

43. This does not mean that the consequences of the crisis do not concern WEU because the undermining of the very foundations of the Soviet state may have considerable repercussions on the security of Europe as a whole. The imbalance created by the disappearance of a Soviet power may encourage an increase in internal or even inter-state conflicts. The disintegration of the Soviet state may cause clashes between nationalities. Its disappearance would raise the question of respect for treaties and the devolution of its armed – and particularly nuclear – forces. Its weakness gives rise to fears of further crises from which no one can predict what form of state organisation or external policy will emerge.

44. These uncertainties should encourage Western Europe to exercise greater responsibilities than in the past in maintaining international order in Europe. The Twelve seem quite aware of this as testified by their efforts to terminate the Yugoslav civil war. The link that already exists, that should be confirmed by the intergovernmental conference, between the Community, political co-operation and WEU should induce the WEU Council to specify the possibilities for action that it can place at the service of peace in Europe from the moment the common external policy of the Twelve raises the question of intervention with armed forces. Its steps in this sense in the aftermath of the Gulf war seem very slow and timid when compared with the magnitude and urgency of the challenges to be met.

45. In the light of events in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, it would therefore appear that the task to be tackled by the German presidency goes much further than could have been imagined on 1st July. The programme presented by the German Ambassador in London on that date corresponded more or less satisfactorily to the situation on that date. In the circumstances facing Europe two months later, it seems very

inadequate and, at the extraordinary ministerial meeting planned for 21st October, the Council should consider the rôle of WEU in today's Europe in terms that are not confined to reaffirming its links with the Community, NATO and the CSCE. It should try to respond to the new requirements, in particular the need for stability and security guarantees felt by the Central and Eastern European countries which, having emerged from the Warsaw Pact system, will be unable to accomplish the immense task of internal recovery that faces them if they do not have the assurance of a peaceful, stable Europe.

#### *V. Relations between the Council and the Assembly*

46. Communications between the Council and the Assembly have been the subject of much discussion over the years and the Assembly notes that while, *in its reply to Recommendation 490* on 5th June 1991, the Council gave its views on the subject it cannot share these views in many respects. This reply calls for comment because the Council, after affirming that it "ensures that the Assembly receives appropriate information about its work", shows, in a series of statements of half-truths, that it does practically nothing of the sort:

- (a) In paragraph 1, it says that "for the first time, the presidency's Foreign Minister addressed a joint meeting of the Assembly's Political and Defence Committees". A brief glance at its archives would have shown it that such meetings had already been held regularly since the reactivation of WEU. Previously, it received the two committees separately for joint meetings for which the Council itself had fixed the procedure in 1972. Moreover, it has never wished to apply its own proposal in spite of the Assembly's requests and the dialogue has been reduced to an informal exchange of views between the committees together and the Chairman-in-Office. Hence there is no need for the Council to present as progress something which has in fact been a step backwards in the procedure for its dialogue with Assembly committees.
- (b) In the same paragraph, it says "the Secretary-General also appeared before these committees", whereas in fact he only spoke to the Political Committee.
- (c) The Council says that in its replies to recommendations it "is at pains to arrive at precise positions on the ques-

tions raised”, an assertion which, to say the least, does not generally correspond to the impression of members of the Assembly. A few examples are given below of cases where the assertion seems ill-founded.

- (d) The Council goes on to say that “ ministerial decisions ... alone are authoritative”, thus contradicting Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty which set up the Permanent Council to respond to urgent situations. If the Permanent Council’s decisions are not authoritative, what is the point of them? Moreover, the English text differs noticeably from the French text since it refers to ministerial “decisions” and not “déli-bérations”, which obviously does not have the same significance. The Assembly does not know which version is the authoritative one.
- (e) In paragraph 2 of the same reply, the Council says “ no new drafting of the treaty could be undertaken until the process to redefine Europe’s rôle in security and defence matters has been completed”, which is stating the obvious. It is also obvious “that account will have to be taken of the developments taking place in the context of the intergovernmental conference on political union and of the process of adapting NATO to the new situation in Europe”. However, these developments and this process are under way and, quite rightly, the Council does not say it is necessary to wait for their conclusion. One might, on the contrary, with the same logic, say the intergovernmental conference and the North Atlantic Council should take account of the prospects of revising the modified Brussels Treaty. This was the reason that justified the Assembly’s approach in this sense and, if the Council does not share its opinion, it should explain why.
- (f) The Council concludes that “ it would therefore seem premature to contemplate drafting proposals such as those put forward by the honourable parliamentarian”. This wording seems particularly unfortunate since the Council was not answering the opinion of a parliamentarian – it is to be assumed that it was thinking of the Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg – but a recommendation adopted by the Assembly. Secondly, neither the Rapporteur, nor the committee, nor the Assembly was attempting to

replace the Council in drafting the text of a treaty article; they believed the recommendation they were addressing to the Council would carry even greater weight for being drafted in a more specific manner. It is for the Council to express its decisions, which it is not doing. It is desirable for the Assembly to express its opinion as precisely as possible and the Council should not criticise it for doing so and, above all, take shelter behind this formal consideration so as not to answer on the substance. Finally, the Council might perhaps have made it possible for the Assembly to give its views on other articles of the treaty in a different manner if it had made its reply known before 5th June 1991, by which date the Assembly had already met in session to adopt Recommendation 504, presented by Mr. Charles Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee, in a similar form to the one proposed by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. The lateness of this reply prevented a true dialogue being held on an essential matter on which there was probably no serious opposition between the Assembly and the Council. The Council preferred to dismiss this matter with little explanation on a date that made it impossible for the Assembly to discuss it, thus probably allowing it to claim a precedent regarding the recommendation adopted on Mr. Goerens’s report that the Assembly will have been unable to challenge in time. This was a very regrettable way of eluding a dialogue between the two WEU organs to which the Council nevertheless says it is attached.

- (g) *In its reply to Recommendation 494*, the Council says that “ the presidency’s chief of defence staff ... personally briefed a joint meeting of the Political and Defence Committees on the co-ordination measures decided by the Council in the Gulf crisis”. It is not true that the Political Committee was invited to take part in such an exchange of views. Since this reply to a recommendation adopted in December 1990 arrived only on 20th June 1991, one might think that the Council had had time to verify such assertions, which, moreover, contradict paragraph 1 of the reply to Recommendation 490 which, on this point, was accurate.
- (h) *In its reply to Recommendation 491*, the Council says “ the working doc-

ument on the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture, made public by ministers ... on 22nd February 1991, reveals the aims espoused by member states and the new responsibilities they would like WEU to assume". This is effectively the sense of this document, prepared by the Secretary-General. However, when making it public, the ministers revealed that they had not adopted it, which makes it difficult to claim later that it expresses their point of view. This procedure can but confirm the Assembly's impression that the Council is not being very rigorous in its replies to recommendations.

- (i) *Recommendation 492* on Europe's security and the Gulf crisis set out the Assembly's views in great detail. These views had been discussed in depth both by the Political Committee and in plenary session. In particular, paragraph 7 listed the matters on which the Assembly believed the organisation of a new peaceful order in the Middle East should be based: ban on ABC weapons, limiting conventional weapons, application of Security Council resolutions relating to Palestine, restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and ensuring regular supplies of oil. It would have wished the Council to give the views of the European governments on each of these points. To reply that "for several years now, the member states have been stepping up their initiatives to find ways of settling the many conflicts" and underline "the urgency to address the manifold problems of the region in order that fair and lasting solutions can be worked out" is treating the work of the Assembly in a very off-handed manner. The replies to several other paragraphs of this recommendation, communicated to the Assembly on 5th June, i.e. six months after the recommendation was adopted, reveal the same attitude.

47. Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, received the Presidential Committee and certain rapporteurs of the Assembly in Bonn on 30th October after the extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Council to inform them of the activities of the ministers since July. The Assembly welcomes such contacts. In fact, this extraordinary meeting was not devoted exclusively to the new architecture of European security as had been announced in July, but touched upon four questions:

- (i) Conventional disarmament, regarding which the WEU countries noted the American and Soviet delay in ratifying the CFE agreement. Mr. Genscher also emphasised the risks of proliferation stemming from the dislocation of the Soviet state and the prevailing uncertainty about the possibility of the republics taking over short-range nuclear weapons.
- (ii) The Council has received the report of the ad hoc group on the maintenance of peace in Yugoslavia which shows that WEU is prepared to act from the moment the preliminary conditions are met.
- (iii) The Permanent Council has been instructed to present to the ministerial meeting on 18th November firm proposals regarding the relations WEU intends to develop with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic countries and the USSR.
- (iv) The Council has examined a report by the Secretary-General on WEU's place in the future European architecture. Points of convergence between the various proposals were noted. Europe has to set as its goal the constitution of a European identity in security questions and access to greater responsibilities in defence matters. To that end, WEU should be an integral part of the process of European unification at one and the same time as the defence wing of the union and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Significant divergences remain, however, which will be re-examined on 18th November. These questions appear to concern mainly the nature of the links between WEU, the European union and NATO, the possible enlargement of WEU and the definition of WEU's military rôle.

The ministers also decided to meet "in conclave" before the Maastricht summit meeting in order to allow themselves every possibility of achieving important results. The minister specified that in this matter the Council did not consider the Maastricht summit as an end but as a point of departure for new thinking on the future rôle of WEU that it had decided to undertake.

48. This meeting confirmed your Rapporteur's impression that the German presidency was determined to do its utmost to make

WEU advance in these various matters. It has certainly managed to bring viewpoints much closer together but, so far, it cannot be said that it has managed to obtain decisive results. The Assembly can but encourage it to persevere.

49. Even more deplorable are the replies to *Written Questions 288 and 289* because they relate to the international law established by the modified Brussels Treaty. The questions had been put by the former President of the Assembly, Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the Political Committee, on 11th January and were quite obviously intended to help him to prepare his report. As the replies did not arrive until 29th May, they were of no use for this purpose.

50. *Question 289* related to a statement by the Council in its reply to Recommendation 479 that the modified Brussels Treaty provides no legal basis for the presence of the forces of one member state in the territory of other WEU states. The question was whether Article VI of Protocol No. II was no longer in force. This article reads as follows:

“ Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. She undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decision in the knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency...”

51. It is evident that sending British forces stationed in Germany to join the allied operation against Iraq was a perfectly satisfactory justification of the withdrawals effected and, on the other hand, the general situation in Europe leads logically to a reduction in British troop levels in Germany. Even then, as long as Protocol No. II remains in force, the procedure provided for in Article VI (majority vote and opinion of SACEUR) must be respected. Replying that Protocol No. II “ is not the legal basis for the military presence of member states on the territory of other states that are parties to the modified Brussels Treaty ” is juggling with words since the “ maintenance ” of that force is a treaty provision. However, that allows the Council not to reply to the substance whereas the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report tells us that this matter has effectively been

raised by the United Kingdom Government and claims – falsely – that the Assembly was informed.

52. Question 288 asked the Council “ on what basis some governments have declared that 1998 is the date as from which each signatory country would be entitled to cease to be a party to the treaty ”. The Council replied as follows:

“ Protocol No. I, under the terms of Article I, amended and completed the Brussels Treaty. Accordingly, it did not create a new treaty that would have caused all the clauses of the original treaty to be null and void. Those provisions of the original treaty that it did not amend are still in force. A change in the numbering of an article does not constitute grounds for considering this to be a new provision. This is particularly the case of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty, formally Article X of the treaty signed in Brussels on 17th March 1948.

This means that the period of 50 years specified in this article runs from the date on which the Brussels Treaty came into force, i.e. 25th August 1948.”

53. Clearly this reply cannot be taken seriously, not only because the English text does not correspond to the French, which refers to Article XI as “ formerly ” Article X and not “ formally ”, but above all because it is based on specious reasoning. The four protocols form a whole which came into force in 1955, the date on which the period of fifty years specified in Article XII of the modified treaty starts. The Council’s reply is tantamount to saying that Protocol No. I would expire in 1998 whereas the other protocols would remain valid until 2005, which is legal nonsense. Moreover, the final act of the 1954 London conference shows perfectly clearly that the signatory countries had no intention of merely enlarging the 1948 treaty but that, in a quite different political context, they were anxious to strengthen and extend the treaty “ to make it a more effective focus of European integration ”. The former treaty was therefore merely raw material for the authors of Protocol No. I. It facilitated the drafting of the new treaty but the latter was therefore not simply a “ revised ” treaty. It is not by chance that the word “ modified ” was preferred to “ revised ”.

54. The weakness of the Council’s reasoning conceals one fact: each of the signatory countries will individually be able to denounce the modified Brussels Treaty in 1998 because, in 1990, the Council so decided for reasons that are political and have little to do with law. One may wonder what these political reasons are. Everything indicates that they are not the same for all nine governments:

(a) some, including Italy, have quite recently announced their intention of

ensuring as soon as possible that what they consider to be essential in the modified Brussels Treaty is integrated into the Rome Treaty;

- (b) some governments are perhaps anxious to underscore a certain degree of continuity between WEU and the former Western Union, which was set up by the 1948 treaty and hence before the Atlantic Alliance and providing Europe with an integrated military force that was assigned to NATO command in 1950, in anticipation of the possible revival of such a force;
- (c) events in Eastern Europe are no doubt making several countries rethink their security policy in new terms, be it closer relations with the United States or a more independent policy inside or outside Europe;
- (d) some may fear that the importance given to Article VIII by the Gulf crisis will involve them in commitments to which they do not wish to subscribe;
- (e) others, like France, know that they are not applying one or other provision of the modified Brussels Treaty (in the case of France, Article III of Protocol No. III) and wish to escape from this uncomfortable position.

55. If these considerations are accurate, they seem very short-sighted in view of the fact that the modified Brussels Treaty is to be revised, which will probably involve the disappearance of Protocol No. III; there is nothing to prevent it being merged with the Rome Treaty when the governments concerned so agree and Article VIII contains no obligations apart from consultation. Similarly, it is not under the 1948 treaty that a WEU military force can be set up: in any event, a unanimous Council decision will be required for this. Conversely, the levity with which the Council deals with the commitments incumbent upon all the signatories has major political drawbacks, in particular that of weakening the deterrent capability of Article V by showing that the member countries attach only relative importance to the texts they signed. It also weakens the decisions taken by the Council, for instance the decision to set up a WEU satellite centre, because it shows the governments are determined at all cost to shorten the period of their commitments.

56. If Article V of Protocol No. I set up a WEU parliamentary assembly, in itself already a major modification of the initial treaty, it is because the signatories wished to make application of the modified treaty subject to parliamentary control, no doubt because they well knew how airily governments in recent history

had frequently fulfilled their international commitments. The Assembly has constantly used its prerogatives to denounce the Council's laxism in this respect. It has no powers to do more.

57. These various examples, taken solely from replies to recommendations presented to the Assembly by the Political Committee or to related written questions, make it possible to contradict the Council's claim that it replies adequately to Assembly recommendations or written questions put by its members. One may wonder whether the deterioration – notable for several years – in the standard of the replies to recommendations is not due to the fact that they are now rarely prepared by the Secretariat-General but by the presidency, which is paralysed by the often very slow procedure inherent in the hierarchy of member countries' ministries for foreign affairs. They are consequently very late in reaching the other delegations which then make a hasty examination of the texts proposed without the authorities responsible for the quality of the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly having time to intervene to ensure that the Assembly's prerogatives are correctly respected. It may also be wondered whether the Secretariat-General is able, in such circumstances, to fulfil its due rôle in reminding the Council, in regard to the text of these replies, of its duty, in the interests of the smooth running of WEU as a whole, to work out a joint reply to Assembly recommendations, or even to questions put by parliamentarians, as precisely and fully as possible. Inevitably, government officials are in many cases not sufficiently knowledgeable about certain aspects of WEU's activities. It is natural for them to seek to overcome the Council's difficulty in working out collegial replies by taking the easy way out and preparing vague, inadequate or dilatory replies. It is for the Secretariat-General to supply the necessary information in such cases and, above all, faced with the particular interest of a government or of the Council, to insist on the general interests of the institution, which is to give as much substance as possible to the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly.

58. No doubt *the Secretariat-General* is aware of this general interest and proves it by playing an essential rôle in keeping the Assembly informed thanks inter alia to the Secretary-General's regular letters to the President of the Assembly. These are an inestimable contribution to exchanges between the two WEU organs. The half-yearly meetings that the Political Committee has been able to have with the Secretary-General have been particularly interesting and the dialogue has been improved. The Assembly welcomes this, but it also wonders whether this is truly a dialogue with the Council, i.e. to what extent the governments really commit themselves at such meetings or

whether they do not find it more convenient to leave it to the Secretary-General, under his own responsibility, to answer questions put by the parliamentarians.

59. Similarly, after ministerial meetings, successive *chairmen-in-office of the Council* have regularly agreed to inform either the Presidential Committee alone or the committees of what happened at the meetings but, in the ensuing exchanges of views, they seem to have steadfastly described their own country's policy rather than reflect the collegial side of the Council. This is perfectly normal, but means that official communications from the Council to the Assembly retain their full importance.

60. All these remarks lead to the same conclusion: now that Western Europe's responsibilities in security and defence matters are increasing considerably and it is trying to set up a real political union in which WEU will have a place, the WEU Council is paying less and less attention to seeking a collegial expression of European policy. Yet it would seem logical for what is being done in the framework of the intergovernmental conference to be accompanied by practice in the framework of WEU drawing WEU closer to the Twelve at intergovernmental level. In particular, there is no doubt that, in regard to humanitarian assistance to the Kurds, the governments did not manage to take decisions in WEU on the organisation of air transport which would have been the logical, essential complement to decisions taken by the Twelve on the assistance itself. One may therefore wonder about Europe's ability to translate into an energetic, coherent policy the provisions decided upon by the European Council from the moment they leave the specific area of the European Economic Community's responsibilities and, consequently, about the merits of the steps being taken by the intergovernmental conference.

61. In regard to relations between the Council and the Assembly, it emerges from *the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council* that the concerns of the two WEU organs are remarkably similar, at least for all that relates to political and space matters, whereas there is no mechanism for organising or making compulsory the co-ordination of their activities other than through replies to recommendations. Admittedly, most of these topics were imposed by current events. It should also be noted that there is a real parallel between the Council's political conclusions and those of the Assembly, even if they are not identical. These are rather remarkable results and hearings of the Secretary-General at committee meetings have made a major contribution to establishing a link between the thinking of each side. This fact, which certainly distinguishes the WEU Assembly from other European parliamentary

bodies, should make the Council pay greater attention to the standard of its communications to the Assembly. It should also make the Council keep the Assembly better informed of matters that it intends to tackle, just as the Assembly does by communicating the agenda of its next session to it six months in advance in order to maintain and strengthen the parallelism which the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report welcomes.

62. *The first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council* is unlikely to change the Assembly's opinion about how seriously the Council approaches the dialogue with it. On 16th October, your Rapporteur put four written questions to the Council asking for details because he had noted that:

- (i) contrary to the claim in the annual report, the Council did not inform the Assembly of its decision of 11th July 1991 concerning United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe, i.e. concerning the withdrawal of some of these forces (Written Question 292). In fact, the Council's replies to Recommendation 479 and Written Question 289 show that the Council did not wish to give the Assembly any information on this point;
- (ii) the Council asserted in this annual report that WEU co-ordination in the Gulf had covered "land and air deployments and action", which hardly seems to concord with the truth (Written Question 293);
- (iii) the Council approved a proposed reform of co-ordination between the western international organisations without informing the Assembly of the nature of that reform, although it concerns the staff of the Office of the Clerk (Written Question 290);
- (iv) the Council "welcomed the fact that the points raised by the Assembly" in Palermo on 26th March 1991 "on the future of European co-operation in security and defence questions" ... "had been taken into account in the debate which it was itself currently conducting on the rôle of WEU in the new European security architecture", which contradicts its reply to Recommendation 490 (Written Question 291).

63. Over and above this contradiction, it is above all clear from a report that is of a purely administrative nature that the Council, which extended its area of activity considerably in the first six months of 1991, is pursuing a more

restrictive policy than ever in regard to the information it gives the Assembly, even about matters which are in no way military. Thus, the report apparently refers to at least twelve documents that it has examined without transmitting them to the Assembly, including:

- two directives concerning the co-ordination of naval forces in the Gulf;
- a report by the presidency on WEU co-ordination during the Gulf crisis;
- a working paper prepared by the French presidency on lessons to be learned from the Gulf crisis;
- a document by the presidency and a Spanish document on the rôle and place of WEU in the new European architecture. The Assembly would also have liked to know the conclusions drawn by the presidency and the Secretary-General from their joint visit to Washington on the same subject. Only in the press did it learn of American approaches in this connection in the early months of 1991;
- a report on the dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe approved by the enlarged Council on 10th June;
- proposals made by a United Kingdom Minister in application of Article VI of Protocol No. II, not to speak of the Council decision of 26th June that the Council claims to have transmitted to the Assembly;
- the exchange of letters between the presidency and the Greek and Norwegian Governments on relations between those two countries and WEU;
- the proposed reform of co-ordination;
- the draft ministerial mandate prepared by the Defence Representatives Group;
- the report by the verification experts on implementation of future co-operation in verification.

64. To this list should be added the Institute's communications to the Council. It should above all be noted that the Assembly learned only from the press and Yugoslav sources of the creation under the aegis of WEU of a military headquarters set up in Metz to prepare possible action by WEU forces in Yugoslavia (if such sources are reliable). The most detailed information on the subject was given in a dispatch from the Agence France-Presse (Paris, 21st October 1991) which, in the absence of a more

official communication from the Council, your Rapporteur will quote in full:

"Military representatives from the headquarters of the various Western European Union (WEU) countries are now working in Metz (Moselle) on the formation of a force which might possibly be sent to Yugoslavia, it was learned on Monday from a well-informed source.

These representatives are studying various possibilities for forces that might be sent to Yugoslav territory once all the conditions are met, in particular the agreement of the belligerents, said the same source.

This 'WEU military cell' recalls the one set up in Paris at the Naval Ministry during the Gulf crisis and subsequently the war. At the time, the military headquarters of WEU - an organisation which groups the twelve countries of the EEC minus Greece, Ireland and Denmark - had co-ordinated the deployment of their ships in the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean in order to enforce to the best of its ability the embargo decreed by the United Nations embargo against Iraq."

65. So the Council may well welcome the divergence between its concerns and those of the Assembly! It is really not its fault but it has, on the contrary, done its utmost for the Assembly to receive only a minimum of information on its activities. This attitude contrasts with that of the same ministers in the framework of the Twelve since, for instance, most of the texts relating to the intergovernmental conference on external policy and security were released immediately to the public. Naturally, the Assembly can understand that certain texts may be covered by the secrecy that is necessary in defence matters, at least for a time. Does this still apply to texts concerning WEU co-operation in the Gulf? In any event, it does not apply to most of the texts referred to in the annual report.

66. There is no point in saying that much of the value of the Assembly's work, which is serious and to which the Council occasionally feels it should pay tribute, is lost because of the Council's policy which is a de facto violation of Article IX of the treaty. It sets the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly at a pitiful level and this also explains the public's lack of knowledge and indifference vis-à-vis WEU just when the intergovernmental conference is starting to assign a more important rôle to it in the European defence system.

67. These are not new grievances but they are growing steadily worse as WEU's intergovernmental activities increase, and they are opening a deep chasm between the two organs of WEU.

There has been no response to the Assembly's warnings about the deterioration of its official exchanges with the Council and the Assembly is powerless in face of the Council's constant, deliberate policy in this connection.

68. It is hard to subscribe to the argument that distributing documents that have not been approved by the Council would deprive the expression of WEU's identity of its collegial aspects. On the one hand, the Council shows little concern for this collegial expression, particularly when ministers hold simultaneous, individual press conferences at the close of ministerial meetings. On the other hand, in order to exercise its scrutiny of the annual report on the activities of the Council in accordance with Article IX of the treaty, the Assembly needs to know as much as possible about the conditions in which decisions are taken. In the absence of other information, mere examination of an administrative text such as the annual report would be pointless.

69. The Political Committee has examined the reasons for this absence of communication. It could but attribute responsibility to the Permanent Council since it has noted that it did not correspond to the policy pursued by the governments in other institutions or even in WEU, where the ministers or the Secretary-General have frequently shown their readiness to hold a dialogue. It considered that the composition of the Permanent Council made it an obstacle and a screen between the other WEU organs and the Assembly which has expressed the wish that the Permanent Council henceforth be composed of permanent representatives capable of following closely all WEU's activities, which the ambassadors in London cannot do. The Political Committee believes that moving the seat of the Council to Brussels, to which all the governments have now agreed, should provide an opportunity to effect this change in the attitude of the Council which is essential if a true dialogue is to be established between the Council and the Assembly.

70. The smooth running of WEU should also result in the establishment of *co-operation between the Assembly and the WEU Institute for Security Studies*. Co-operation is not facilitated by a degree of ambiguity about the status of the Institute, the nature of whose relations with the Council is far from clear. It will be noted that the Council refused to allow the Assembly any hand in guiding the work of the Institute although its Director, according to the annual report, attends – in certain conditions – meetings of the Permanent Council, reports on its activities to the Council and prepares studies for it which have not yet been communicated to the Assembly. On the other hand, it has published at least two studies under the name of their authors, but it is not easy to ascertain to

what extent they engage the responsibility of the Institute and WEU.

71. Your Rapporteur believes it would be desirable for the Assembly to be better informed about the activities of the Institute than it is through the Council's annual report, which comes late and is very brief and administrative. It would even be possible to consider members of the Assembly playing a greater rôle and more frequently in the work of the Institute. In particular, a request might be made that Assembly rapporteurs be systematically invited to attend meetings or receive documents concerning matters they have to handle. However, only the Institute itself or the Council can take the initiative. On the other hand, the Institute has no need for an Assembly initiative in order to know about its work and it is a pity that the editorial on security in Eastern Europe in the Institute's July 1991 issue of its quarterly bulletin ignores the proposals made by the Assembly in Recommendation 500 and the accompanying report by our colleague, Mr. Caro, which had been a public document since 27th March.

72. Ambiguity about the status of the Institute and the way the Council interprets it was confirmed by an incident between the Assembly and the Council at the beginning of October. At its meeting in Strasbourg on 15th September, the Presidential Committee decided to invite the chairmanship-in-office to brief the Political and Defence Committees on the Council's reactions to the Yugoslav crisis. It was also decided to invite the Institute and experts from the French and United Kingdom Ministries of Defence to give their opinion "on the military aspects of that situation and on the technical requirements of the various actions for which WEU might possibly be made responsible", to quote the words of the letter of 24th September 1991 in which the President of the Assembly asked the Secretary-General to have the Council authorise a briefing by a representative of the Institute. This approach was based on the ministerial decision of 13th November 1989 according to which "the Assembly may, with the Council's approval, assign to the Institute studies relating to the Assembly's own activities". Since the same decision specifies that the Institute's "research will be carried out independently", the Assembly could not expect to receive any information from it on the Council's activities. Nevertheless, the answer received from the Deputy Secretary-General, after the Permanent Council had discussed the matter, turned down this request because "in this case it [the Council] believed the German presidency was probably better placed to give an opinion on the problems raised by the present Yugoslav crisis".

73. The Assembly cannot accept this answer for two reasons: (a) It cannot allow the Council to replace it in determining who would be best

placed to give it an opinion inasmuch as this opinion does not relate directly to the activities of the Council. (b) The Council makes an opinion given "independently" equivalent to a communication by the presidency, which should express the collegial views of the Council.

74. Furthermore, the Council was also opposed to the French and United Kingdom Ministries of Defence sending experts to brief Assembly committees on 15th October. Ambassador Klaiber, representing the presidency, was therefore the only speaker at that meeting and expressed with competence and authority the view of the presidency which, it is to be hoped, was also that of the Council. However, asked about the Council's refusal to allow a briefing by the Institute, he said he knew nothing at all about the matter, thus throwing light on the rôle played by the Permanent Council to the detriment of the information conveyed to the Assembly. Instead of trying to achieve a collegial expression of the governments' views, the Permanent Council is endeavouring, not without success, to erect a screen between the Assembly and the Council proper. The Assembly can but protest strongly at such behaviour.

75. Where the Institute is concerned, it must also recall that the ministerial decision of 13th November 1989 specifies that "the Assembly shall have access to the results of the Institute's unclassified work". However, paragraph 1 of Chapter IX of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council indicates that "the Institute produced several discussion papers on topical subjects for the Council and its working groups", such as "What future for European defence co-operation?" and "Arms control after 1992". Are these studies really classified and if so is classification justified by reasons other than the Council's determination to keep the Assembly at a distance from the Institute's activities? The same is true for the summary records of seminars organised by the Institute in which representatives of countries not members of WEU have participated but of which the Assembly is not informed, and also for the quarterly reports on the activities of the Institute.

76. If one recalls the rôle the Assembly played in promoting the creation of the Institute, it has to be noted that the Council, violating the commitments it entered into in November 1989, has made the Institute its own instrument without there even being any guarantee that it really gains much from the work submitted to it by the Institute.

77. The matter becomes even more strange in that the European Parliament, after asking, apparently in vain, for a Community institute for security studies to be set up, is now calling for direct relations with the WEU Institute. This is the subject of a report submitted to that parliament by Mr. McMillan-Scott on 23rd October

which asks that the Security and Disarmament Subcommittee of the European Parliament be invited, together with members of the WEU Assembly, to take part in a consultative committee which would help the [WEU] Institute for Security Studies to plan its activities. This report proposes a programme of work for the Institute which would include studies of:

- the concept of a European security identity;
- new European security structures and the specific position of Central and Eastern European countries;
- matters relating to the defence of Western Europe;
- the economic aspects of European security;
- the North-South dimensions of European security.

78. It will be most interesting to examine the answer the governments, and in particular the governments of WEU countries, will give to these proposals after the way the WEU Assembly was dismissed when it reminded the Council of the implications of the decision of 13th November 1989.

79. The thirty-sixth annual report mentions the Council's intention of continuing the experience of *European sessions of advanced defence studies*, but no new session is announced. The Assembly would obviously be very happy to have a more precise knowledge of the conclusions the Council has drawn from earlier sessions. It notes that the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report indicates that no sessions were organised in 1991 and that the next one will be held in Germany only in 1992.

## VI. Conclusions

80. An overall assessment of the Council's activities since mid-1990 must quite obviously be tempered. It is evident that, during the Gulf crisis, the Council was unusually active and WEU thus appeared to be the instrument by means of which twelve-power Europe could assume a new dimension, if not by acquiring the means of a joint defence policy, at least by setting up, to quote the annual report, "unprecedented political and military co-ordination arrangements... with the participation of every member country, each according to its own procedures. Although limited, this action demonstrated the Europeans' will to act as one". Unfortunately, this will was subsequently not demonstrated with such intensity, be it in affording humanitarian assistance to the Kurds, or in the Yugoslav problem, unless importance should be attributed to the establishment, if confirmed, of a military headquarters to plan WEU

action in Yugoslavia. However, the Assembly has not been informed about this. Nor was this will shown in "the launching of a process of fundamental change in WEU, where the aim has been to give the organisation a substantive operational rôle of its own within the Atlantic Alliance linked with the creation of political union". It is necessary to wait for the extraordinary ministerial meeting on 29th October to know whether the WEU Council intends to act or whether it has to wait, in order to assess the changes, for NATO and the intergovernmental conference to define the limits of their area of activity before, in turn, studying the area left free.

81. The only Council initiatives that, to a certain extent, commit the future of the organisation are:

- (a) the meeting of chiefs of defence staff "to undertake a military appraisal of the challenges to European security and of co-operation programmes among member states", about which the Assembly has received only the minimum information;
- (b) the twofold Vianden decision relating to the creation of a satellite data interpretation centre and a study of a programme for the military use of space;
- (c) the announced intention of intensifying contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the development of the Council's relations with Denmark, Greece and Turkey;
- (d) the announced development of the study of Mediterranean problems, be it the settlement of conflicts or the proposed CSCM. However, the meagre information given to the Assembly on these two points suggests that little progress has been made;
- (e) the same is true of the German proposal for strategic means of transport.

82. Conversely, it must be borne in mind that it was in the framework of the Twelve that several governments made important proposals that essentially concerned the future of WEU

and that it is at the Maastricht summit meeting, outside the WEU Council, that the real decisions relating to the definition of a European defence policy are to be taken. It is gratifying to note, however, that on 29th October 1991, the German presidency decided to tackle this question in the framework of WEU.

83. Furthermore, the Assembly has to note that, while the presidency has made serious efforts to inform the press and public of the Council's initiatives in the Gulf affair, the results were limited and, on the whole, the importance of WEU's action in this area was not clearly perceived. Nor have the continuity of WEU's activities or the nature of the questions raised by its relations with NATO, the EEC and the CSCE been explained satisfactorily.

84. However, the Assembly must above all emphasise that the Council has not used the possibilities offered by the institutional dialogue that the treaty obliges it to hold with the Assembly for WEU's activities to be made known to the public. Although, at meetings held in camera, the ministers or the Secretary-General show a real will for dialogue, the institutional instruments for these statutory exchanges are deliberately neglected as if, in the framework of WEU, the parliamentary institution was also considered as an obstacle to the smooth running of the organisation. The interesting and cordial dialogues that have been held between the Presidential or other committees and the presidency or the Secretary-General sometimes seem intended more to calm any discontent shown by the Assembly than to ensure the openness that each of the governments claims to wish to introduce into WEU's activities. Yet, in many cases, the Assembly has proved to be a useful partner for the Council's action and it has helped to make known and have accepted by the public the rôle played by WEU and its possible importance. It is paradoxical that, just when the governments seem to agree about giving WEU an important place in the European architecture, the Council is showing so little willingness to place its exchanges with the Assembly at a suitable level. It is also paradoxical that just when the Assembly can at last welcome important action by WEU which responds to the new requirements of security in Europe, the Council continues to provide the Assembly – and through it, the European public – with so little and such poor information.

*General report – activities of the WEU Council*

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Hardy  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

1. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after “WEU” insert “where this is approved by national governments”.
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “allow Europe to play a more active rôle in disarmament matters” and insert “make it possible for Europe to play a much more active rôle in disarmament matters”.

*Signed: Hardy*

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1. See 10th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendment 1 negatived; amendment 2 agreed to).

*The evolution of WEU's public relations*

**REPORT**<sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relation*<sup>2</sup>  
*by Mr. Ewing, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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on the evolution of WEU's public relation

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ewing (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Mr. Müller), Sir William Shelton (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Bühler (Alternate: Junghanns), Caccia, De Bondt, Esteves, Eversdijk, Fiandrotti, Mrs. Frias, MM. Gouteyron, Greco, Sir John Hunt, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Kempinaire, Kollwelter, Lemoine, Lopez Henares, Nuñez, Pfuhl, Reimann, Seitlinger (Alternate: Forni), Stegagnini (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Tummers (Alternate: Dees), Vial-Massat.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on the evolution of WEU's public relations***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the public's interest in WEU's future rôle and function has never been so high as in the second half of 1991;
- (ii) Deploring that neither the Council nor member governments have so far been able to explain adequately in public the organisation's achievements and contributions, particularly during the Gulf crisis, in order to avoid misunderstanding among the European and American public;
- (iii) Considering that the Council's reply to Recommendation 494 is insufficient;
- (iv) Noticing that the two parts of the thirty-sixth annual report and the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council contain no mention of the Council's public relations activities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider again the Assembly's proposals made in Mr. Pontillon's Written Question 285 and in Recommendation 494 and in particular:
  - publish basic information documents for widespread circulation in all member countries and in North America;
  - create a WEU periodical in the official languages of the member countries;
  - urge member governments to release more information about the activities of the various WEU bodies;
2. By implementing an effective communications campaign, provide a clear public explanation of WEU's position in the present international debate on its future rôle and place in the European and Atlantic framework;
3. Instruct the Secretary-General to implement his reported plan to circulate a booklet on WEU in the languages of all member countries for the use of pupils in the senior classes of secondary schools;
4. Study the possibility of circulating other information documents with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies;
5. Resume its information to the Assembly on its public relations activities in its annual reports as used to be the practice;
6. Earmark sufficient funds for a study of a general communications strategy and the wherewithal to implement it.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Ewing, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. Nobody would have expected this some years ago, but it is true: Western European Union is on the front pages of the international press and continues to be there. Over decades it seemed first and foremost to be the concern of the Assembly to convince public opinion that the organisation still existed and did useful work. Now the interest of the public and of the press in the rôle of WEU has grown to the point that, at the beginning of 1991, the Permanent Council instructed the Secretariat-General to produce summaries of the coverage of WEU activities by the international press and the debate on its future.

2. Such press reviews might be useful if the Council used them as a basis to work out a solid and co-ordinated information policy in order to avoid public misunderstanding or misleading or wrong press reports. But we are far from that. One example might stand for many others: at the end of the extraordinary ministerial meeting on Yugoslavia in The Hague on 19th September 1991, ministers decided not to publish any declaration but several of them gave separate press conferences in which journalists could find little unity but many differences.

3. Of course it is not possible to demonstrate a united position in public if there is no consensus. But more serious is the fact that the Council has even been unable to present in an effective way to the public what WEU was able to achieve in recent times.

4. Most member governments and the Council itself still do not pay enough attention to public information policy or, if they recognise its importance, they do not act accordingly. The interested public therefore continues to rely on the electronic media and the press which themselves have difficulties in obtaining correct information and which, again, do not pay much attention to information on WEU since they know little about its activities.

### *II. WEU, once Sleeping Beauty, then Cinderella, now bone of contention?*

5. During the Gulf conflict, the United States Government and its military command did their utmost to inform American and international opinion regularly about what was happening and their actions in the area. It was

impressive to see how the American Government made use of all the means of communication at its disposal including daily press briefings, interviews and written information. This was due to longstanding experience proving that, to be successful, political and military action must have the firm backing of the public. Such procedure was automatic in a continent where the importance of public relations in political life has a longstanding tradition.

6. And the European contribution? The main impression transmitted to the public and repeated incessantly was that Europe was absent from the Gulf conflict, there being merely contributions from certain European countries on a strictly national basis.

7. The general public is still unaware that WEU made a major contribution to implementing the naval embargo on Iraq decided upon by the United Nations Security Council in co-ordinating the naval forces of WEU member countries which were present in the Gulf with more than thirty-five vessels; that WEU asked the United Nations Security Council to extend the embargo to air traffic; that WEU convened for the first time in its history a meeting of the chiefs-of-staff in order to examine military provisions and means of co-ordination in the area; that WEU co-ordinated logistic support for ground and air forces; that WEU co-ordinated humanitarian aid for the Iraqi civilian population, in particular the Kurds, victims of repression in Iraq, and that WEU carried out the major task of mine-sweeping in the area by sending a mine-hunting force composed of naval units of WEU member countries for operation "cleansweep".

8. The communiqués issued at the close of the ministerial meetings of the Council on 21st August and 18th September, 10th December 1990, 17th January, 22nd February and 8th April 1991 were too general and vague to give a clear picture of what the organisation really did in this conflict.

9. It is obvious that some member governments – for different reasons – did not want their participation in the Gulf conflict to be presented under the WEU flag. Thus a unique chance for improving WEU's public image was missed. The first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, which reached the Assembly on 14th October 1991, contains a fact sheet on mine clearance and the enforcement of the naval embargo during the Gulf crisis, but

this was too late for communication to the public for information purposes.

10. Another missed chance was on 27th June 1991 when the Ministerial Council – following steady pressure from the Assembly – decided to set up a *satellite data interpretation centre*. This decision was announced in paragraph 6 of the communiqué issued at the close of the Vianden meeting. This meeting was overshadowed by other current political events and particularly by the start of the crisis in Yugoslavia. Without special information on this important decision, with few exceptions even most of the specialised press were still not aware of this two weeks later.

11. Apart from the abovementioned communiqué, the Council had issued a “public document” on the decision setting up a WEU satellite centre. In this document it was explained that the centre will be a subsidiary body of WEU in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty, and further important details were communicated in that document.

12. The document was not sent officially to the Assembly until more than two months after the decision was taken. It is not known if and how the Council used it for press information but its public impact was practically nil. (Only on 16th September 1991 did a major article on this issue appear in *Defence News*). This poor result is the more regrettable the more it becomes evident that the Council’s decision might have major political and practical consequences with regard to Europe’s independence in earth observation.

13. On 27th June 1991, the WEU Council of Ministers issued a special public statement on Yugoslavia which was echoed by a large number of European and American newspapers. The interest of the international press was again aroused at the beginning of August when France requested the convocation of an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council in order to examine the situation in Yugoslavia. This was held on 7th August at the level of the permanent representatives. The Permanent Council decided not to issue a communiqué but to release elements for responses to enquiries from the press.

14. WEU’s real public breakthrough was on 17th September and the following week when it was made known that the Netherlands had requested an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in order to examine the possibilities of sending a European peace-keeping force to Yugoslavia. For more than a week thereafter, the rôle of WEU in settling the crisis was topical in the major European newspapers. Never before had WEU thus been the centre of public interest.

15. However, there has since been neither communiqués nor agreed guidelines for informing the public and the press has been left alone to assess the situation before and after the extraordinary meeting of WEU ministers which was held on 19th September. On the other hand, the twelve foreign ministers of European political co-operation held their meeting just before the WEU meeting and issued a public declaration which is important for several reasons.

16. First the Twelve (and not the WEU ministers) declared that no military intervention in Yugoslavia was contemplated, secondly that the European Community gave a mandate to WEU to explore ways in which it could protect the activities of the monitors and thirdly that the European Community wished to endorse any conclusion of a WEU study in this direction.

17. This declaration and the absence of any public statement from the WEU Council (apart from a press conference given by the German Chairman-in-Office and several separate press conferences by other ministers) gave the public the clear impression that WEU is totally dependent on the Community and has no mandate of its own in security matters. Since this is a totally new interpretation of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council should explain it more explicitly in public. But again no communiqué was issued after the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council in Brussels on 30th September 1991.

18. Clearer public explanations are also necessary in a more general way with regard to WEU’s future rôle and functions in the new European and Atlantic security architecture. At the close of its extraordinary meeting in Paris on 22nd February 1991, which was devoted just to these problems, the Council issued a public document on WEU’s rôle and place in the new European security architecture based on a paper prepared by the Secretary-General. The presidency however stressed that “given the nature of the subject”, the document at this stage had not been formally agreed. It therefore may serve for discussion but not as a basis for information to the wider public.

19. Furthermore, its message is difficult to understand without further explanation for a public which is not familiar with the relationship between the numerous international organisations. With regard to WEU’s future rôle, the document states that “WEU possesses a number of institutional advantages which could allow it to act as a *bridge* between the process of European integration and the Atlantic Alliance” (paragraph 10 of the document). The notion of “bridge” has been repeated several times by WEU ministers and officials, but the question is how can this be explained tangibly in a public discussion?

20. The Vianden communiqué on 27th June 1991 devotes the first chapter to the "rôle and place of WEU in the security architecture" in which it expresses the desire "that WEU be fully part of the process of European integration while enhancing its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance". The international press showed considerable interest in the outcome of the Vianden meeting and the numerous press commentaries reflected their uncertainty in drawing firm conclusions about WEU's future.

21. The Guardian for instance stated on 28th June that WEU was lying "uneasily between the European Community and NATO". Furthermore it went on: "The WEU communiqué did not make explicit reference to a possible future rapid deployment force..." In fact, this question was of topical public interest. According to the Guardian, officials said that the reference in the communiqué to making co-operation among WEU governments "more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper" clearly implied a possible force in future.

22. The question remains open, as do many others such as WEU's future relations with the Eastern European states and the former Soviet Union mentioned in paragraph 3 of the communiqué. In the public debate on WEU, the confusion has been increased by recent bilateral meetings and communiqués issued by the United Kingdom and Italy, by France and Germany, together with public statements by representatives of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. But where is the voice of Western European Union itself? So far only the President of the Assembly issued a press release on 17th October 1991 welcoming the latest Franco-German initiative and calling for decisions by the WEU Council.

23. When the German Government took over the presidency of Western European Union for one year as from 1st July 1991, its London Embassy issued a press release in which the new presidency announced its intention "to bring more clearly to the fore WEU's bridging function between the Atlantic Alliance and European political union... Germany will be co-ordinator inside WEU and in foreign relations WEU's representative to work towards realising the concepts for the union's future rôle in the European security structure... German presidency will be seeking to define a more operational rôle for WEU, its relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, disarmament issues and arms control as well as co-operation in space matters".

24. The new presidency thus summarised a complicated future programme of work for WEU which is not only difficult to achieve but also to explain in public. The second task is as

important as the first. If the gap between the activities and the achievements of an organisation such as WEU and the public awareness of them becomes too great, it may have very negative repercussions on the international credit of the organisation and its future prospects. One should not minimise the influence the press has on public opinion and on politicians, ministers, officials and members of parliament...

25. In present circumstances, this gap still exists. According to the introduction of the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council "during the first half of 1991, the Council's activities were particularly intense". But one should not be surprised to read in the press words such as "Western European Union, the obscure defence group... whose membership even political specialists have difficulty identifying"<sup>1</sup>, "WEU, not even a paper tiger but a paper butterfly"<sup>2</sup>, "Embryonic defence grouping"<sup>3</sup>, "WEU, Europe's teetering pillar", "Die WEU, ein Holzweg"<sup>4</sup> (WEU, the wrong tack), "WEU im politischen Dämmerzustand"<sup>5</sup> (WEU in a political twilight); "Western European Union, a largely dormant group"<sup>6</sup>, "Die in der Öffentlichkeit kaum bekannte WEU" (WEU hardly known by the public)<sup>7</sup>, "The obscure Western European Union"<sup>8</sup>, etc. Furthermore, a number of newspapers deem it necessary to introduce WEU in a special way presuming that the readers have no idea of it. For instance: "Western European Union, a regional defence body... has traditionally been overshadowed by NATO"<sup>9</sup>, or "a regional military body called Western European Union"<sup>10</sup>. So, shall this organisation be condemned to play the rôle of Cinderella within the international organisations or it is now a bone of contention between them?

### **III. Action taken on Assembly Recommendation 494**

26. It took about half a year for the WEU Council to be able to transmit its reply to Recommendation 494 on enhancing WEU's public relations adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1990 on the basis of the report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations<sup>11</sup>. This rec-

1. Los Angeles Times, 2nd July 1991.

2. Armed forces Journal international, 9th July 1991.

3. The Daily Telegraph, 8th June 1991.

4. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

5. Die Zeit, 9th June 1991.

6. International Herald Tribune, 20th September 1991.

7. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20th September 1991.

8. The Washington Post, 22nd October 1991.

9. International Herald Tribune, 17th September 1991.

10. International Herald Tribune, 18th September 1991.

11. Document 1246.

ommendation referred particularly to Question 285 put by Mr. Pontillon on 16th January 1990<sup>12</sup> to which the Council had not yet replied when Mr. Roman presented his report. This reply arrived only on 30th November 1990, just before the Assembly's December session. As the Council's reply to Recommendation 494 refers mainly to its reply to Question 285, the latter should be examined first.

27. The Council confirmed that it "shares the... concern that public opinion should be kept fully informed of WEU activities". It even considers "that the momentum generated by WEU reactivation must be reflected in an active public relations policy".

28. Regarding the concrete proposals, however, contained in Mr. Pontillon's written question, the Council took action only on proposal 3 (a) in issuing press communiqués at the close of meetings of the Permanent Council. Regarding proposals 3 (g) and (h), (strengthening co-operation with groups, associations, private institutes, industrial associations, trades unions, cultural associations, educational establishments and universities) the Council referred to the activities of the new WEU Institute for Security Studies. (See paragraph 36 below).

29. The Council gave no specific reply to proposal 3 (d) to establish WEU information offices in the European member countries of the alliance and in particular in the United States and Canada. It said only in general "that... action should be conducted in a variety of ways through WEU bodies, each adapting its own particular approach rather than through the setting up of specific new communications structures".

30. When the Assembly recommended working out a communication strategy both in Europe and in North America, the Council referred to the Secretary-General's recent contacts and those of the Institute with authorities on the other side of the Atlantic. It is obvious that these ad hoc activities fall well short of what is necessary for providing public opinion in the United States with an improved image of WEU. The Institute itself stressed in the second edition of its new quarterly news letter the need for a continuing dialogue between WEU and the United States.

31. The Council made absolutely no comment on the proposals in paragraph 3:

- to publish basic information documents for widespread circulation in all member countries (b);

- to create a WEU periodical in the official languages of all member countries (c);
- to invite member governments to release more information about WEU (e);
- to define methods of organising opinion polls at European level (f);
- to use television as a mean of presenting WEU (i);

and in paragraph 4:

- to grant the financial means WEU needs to pursue a public information policy.

32. Nevertheless, when Mr. Kempinaire put a question on Recommendation 494 in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 19th February 1991, the Belgian Government issued the following good news:

"... I would point out an initiative by the Secretary-General who, under his own responsibility, will in the near future be circulating a booklet on WEU in the languages of all member countries for the use of pupils in the senior classes of secondary schools."

When will the pupils have a chance to see and read such a booklet?

33. According to the reply to Question 285, the Council attributes different responsibilities in public relation matters to the Presidency, the Secretary-General, the Institute and the Assembly. The Council says that "as a part of its rôle to stimulate debate, it is for the *Presidency* to assume responsibility for political information. It fulfils that responsibility towards the Assembly, to which the country holding the presidency regularly presents a report on the Council's rôle". In its reply to Recommendation 494, the Council reiterates that the effort to inform public opinion on WEU activities has continued... particularly as regards the Assembly".

34. Thus the Council repeats its longstanding position according to which its relations with the Assembly are considered mainly as "public relations". This is unacceptable. According to the treaty, the Assembly forms an integral part of the organisation as a whole and cannot be handled as if it were only a branch of the general public. The dialogue between the Council and the Assembly has special significance based on the modified Brussels Treaty. Unfortunately this dialogue with the Assembly is so far not intensive, regular and substantial enough to stimulate a meaningful public debate. The Chairman-in-Office with his strong position in the organisation's structure can be assured that he would be in the centre of public interest if he

12. Document 1254.

made greater use of the important public relations means a government has at its disposal in order to promote what may be described as "an active public relations policy".

35. The Council underlines that "the WEU Secretary-General also has an important task in the area of public relations and contact with the press". His relevant activities in fact have always been welcomed and appreciated by the Assembly. Nevertheless, he often cannot speak for the Council but only under his own responsibility, and his personal abilities and technical and financial means have their limits. The Assembly, however, notes with interest the news that "the Secretariat-General also issues press releases, information and leaflets and is currently increasing its efforts in this direction". What specific results have been achieved? What kind of information is issued, to whom and what leaflets have been published?

36. Furthermore, the Council assures that "the creation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies... is in a sense also a response to the need for information. One of the Institute's missions is to stimulate the public debate". It then refers to the Institute organising various seminars and contacts with study and research centres, leading academics, industrialists, journalists and parliamentarians.

37. Since most of these meetings take place in camera and are not supposed to be reported in public in order to facilitate free speaking, the work of the Institute and even its existence is not generally well known. It is therefore to be welcomed that in spring 1991 the Institute started publishing a "Quarterly Newsletter" in which its current activities are summarised. For instance, recent newsletters reported the introduction of two study awards, one for academics or officials of WEU countries and the other for young people from Eastern and Central Europe working on international security questions.

38. Furthermore, this year the Institute started publishing the "Chaillot Papers" based on work carried out by or on behalf of the Institute. Every Assembly representative has the possibility of obtaining these papers on request. So far, two papers have been published, one on "European defence, why not the Twelve" and another on "European security across the Mediterranean". At the end of the year, the Institute plans to issue a first major publication on "European integration and the Gulf crisis" based on a project for collective work in order to compare various national experiences and the immediate lessons that each WEU country has learnt from its specific involvement in each stage of the Gulf crisis. According to the third Quarterly Newsletter of the Institute, another paper on "European Security Integration in the 1990s" is to be published shortly.

39. By its very nature as a research centre, one cannot expect that the public impact of its work will be very great. This does not diminish the importance of its work. Unfortunately, there is no indication that the Council has followed up the Assembly's recommendation that the Institute help in elaborating a comprehensive communications strategy nor that the Institute itself has devoted a branch of its activities to studying how the organisation could develop its public relations.

40. Finally, the Council's answer to Mr. Pontillon's written question contains no indication that the Council has asked member governments to release more information about WEU. This is regrettable since most governments are reluctant in this regard, although some of them spend vast sums of money on informing their own public about various other activities. The German Government, for instance, answering a question put by Mr. Antretter on 7th March 1991, repeated that it would only consider "publishing an information booklet on Western European Union" when "more was known about the future rôle of WEU in an evolving European environment... In particular, the results of the intergovernmental conference on political union now being held must be awaited"<sup>13</sup>. Thus, the fulfilment of a firm promise made by this government already in October 1988, has been postponed yet again.

41. Summarising the Council's reaction to Written Question 285 and Recommendation 494 as well as the concrete follow up action it has taken, the result is rather depressing. Only the Belgian Government, answering a question put by Mr. Kempinaire in the Chamber of Representatives on 19th March 1991, said that it went without saying that the Belgian Government would follow up Recommendation 494.

#### *IV. The Assembly's contribution to enhancing WEU's public relations - possibilities and limits*

42. At the end of its answer to Written Question 285, the Council "welcomes the impetus given by the Assembly in informing public opinion; its members can, in the respective parliaments, play a useful rôle in mobilising opinion on European security, and more particularly on WEU's efforts in the new European context". Furthermore, in its reply to Recommendation 494, "the Council welcomes the activities conducted by the Assembly, such as the joint meeting of its committees in Palermo on 24th to 26th March 1991 and the visit of a delegation to Egypt on 28th April to

13. Collected Texts No. 53, page 25.

2nd May 1991, a useful contribution towards enhancing international awareness of WEU”.

43. These reactions are remarkable for several reasons. First, the Assembly is delighted that the Council pays tribute to its activities and above-mentioned meetings and hopes that this is an indication that the Council's recent difficulties in providing the Assembly in reasonable time with an operational budget will belong to the past. Secondly, as demonstrated particularly in the first half of 1991, WEU representatives have made a greater effort in their home parliaments to instigate the public debate on security matters.

44. Regarding the wish to propagate WEU's efforts in the new European context however, Assembly members cannot do more than ask the Council and member governments to give more information about these efforts and WEU's future rôle. The replies they receive however are in most cases far from satisfactory.

45. As a result, the lasting impression among the public is that there is neither a consensus within member countries nor a firm determination to reach such a consensus. There is rather a tendency to wait for results in other forums such as the intergovernmental conference on European political union. As it was stated already in Recommendation 494, the Council cannot transfer the burden of information responsibilities to members of the Assembly.

46. Conversely the Assembly considers it as one of its responsibilities to use the impact a public debate can have to urge the Council and member governments to reach a consensus in order to overcome difficulties and deadlocks. It has increased considerably the number of those who receive regularly the texts of recommendations adopted by the Assembly. Starting in 1989, the transmission of Assembly reports and other documents to external recipients (journalists, embassies, institutes, ministries, libraries, parliaments, political parties, individuals, etc.) has increased by about 400% in comparison with 1988. Nevertheless, there is no slackening in requests for information emanating from the public. However, with its present means and personnel the Assembly's ability to spread information has reached its limits.

47. Up to September 1991, the Assembly issued more than thirty-six press releases on topical security questions (compared with twenty-seven for the whole year in 1990 and twenty-three in 1989). Most of them were published by the Assembly's President and Presidential Committee, but some were also issued by committees and political groups.

48. Furthermore, the Assembly's press department circulated in the form of press releases, summaries of a number of conferences held by members of the WEU Ministerial Coun-

cil (for instance those given by MM. Hurd, Dumas and Joxe) as well a summary of the Secretary-General's speech to the Assembly in June 1991. The Assembly's efforts to enhance its public information service are not intended to compete with those of the Council but to serve the interests of the organisation as a whole.

49. The Assembly shares the opinion that all WEU organs have a collective responsibility to make the organisation known to the public. The growing number of articles published and interviews given by the President of the Assembly and by members of the Presidential Committee is only one example of how members of the Assembly are aware of their responsibilities.

50. The permanent efforts of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to instigate and co-ordinate follow-up action in member parliaments based on the adopted texts remain a difficult task of varying success depending on the particular situation in each member country. Working relations with the Portuguese and the Spanish Parliaments should be enhanced. The committee and its members should not hesitate to use the assistance of delegation secretaries who officially take part in its meetings and activities.

51. The important rôle of national delegations has been underlined in the past, particularly in Resolution 82 based on the report on the new rôle of national delegations in the activities of WEU tabled by Sir John Hunt<sup>14</sup> on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. It is welcome news that – as Sir Geoffrey Finsberg informed the President of the Assembly and the Assembly's secretariat by letter dated 3rd July 1991 – the United Kingdom Delegation has started issuing a regular information bulletin on the activities of this delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly, the first number covering the period June 1990 – March 1991. The document was primarily prepared for the information of parliamentary colleagues but a copy was also sent to the Prime Minister.

52. Thus the United Kingdom Delegation has followed the initiative taken by the French Delegation at the beginning of 1990. In order to inform the other delegations about this new and useful initiative and to give them some incentive for considering similar action (particularly in the new Spanish and Portuguese Delegations) the United Kingdom information bulletin has been transmitted to all member delegations.

53. The Belgian Delegation has recently announced that, starting with the Assembly's next session, it intends to include a brief

14. Document 1227.

summary of Assembly reports in the weekly information bulletin published by the Chamber of Representatives. This bulletin is sent, among others, to journalists accredited to the Chamber, ministers and secretaries-general of ministerial departments, the Belgian members of the European Parliament, leaders of political parties, certain institutions (universities, etc.) and anyone requesting it.

54. Furthermore it should be repeated that the German Government is still the only WEU member government to transmit half yearly reports to parliament on the activities of Western European Union. The public impact of this document however is diminished by the fact that it is destined only for the information of members of the Bundestag and not debated in plenary session.

55. Last but not least, in order to enhance the public impact of its new logo, the Assembly has recently ordered a number of "pins" showing the Assembly logo which will soon be available. One should not underestimate the importance of such means in making WEU more visible to the public eye, particularly at a time when pin collecting has become so popular. There are certainly various other means of enhancing WEU's image. For instance, many national postal ministries pay tribute to the work of most of the existing international organisations by issuing special postage stamps. This has not been done for WEU, however. It will have its fortieth anniversary in 1994. Why not create a WEU postage

stamp to mark this occasion in all member countries?

### *V. Conclusions*

56. Neither the two parts of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council to the Assembly nor the first part of the thirty-seventh annual report covering the period from 1st January to 30th June 1991, contains any chapter on relations with the public. This certainly cannot be regarded as an indication that the Council takes the problem of information policy really seriously. The impression is that the Council and member governments believe it is enough for the Secretary-General to travel around and give speeches and briefings in various conferences and expert circles. But this is only a drop in the ocean and cannot be regarded as the expression of a general communication strategy recommended by the Assembly.

57. So, at a time when the interest of the international press and the public in knowing more about the activities and rôle of Western European Union is reaching a higher degree than ever before, and when all sorts of bilateral initiatives and discussion papers are flooding the international debate on European security, the public has still too little assistance from the Council and member governments in increasing its knowledge of WEU's achievements and dispelling uncertainty and public confusion about its future rôle and place.

***Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation  
in security and defence matters***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ewing (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Mr. Müller), Sir William Shelton (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Bühler (Alternate: Junghanns), Caccia, De Bondt, Esteves, Eversdijk, Fiandrotti, Mrs. Frias, MM. Gouteyron, Greco, Sir John Hunt, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Kempinaire, Kollwelter, Lemoine, Lopez Henares, Nuñez, Pfuhl, Reimann, Seitlinger (Alternate: Forni), Stegagnini (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Tummers (Alternate: Dees), Vial-Massat.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Order*****on transatlantic parliamentary co-operation  
in security and defence matters***

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the establishment of a regular dialogue between the WEU Assembly, on the one hand, and the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament, on the other, is necessary and in the interests of all;
- (ii) Regretting that the invitations sent by the WEU Assembly regularly since 1988 to the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament to send observers to its sessions have so far not been taken up;
- (iii) Concerned that incomplete information available to Congress and the American public on the thinking and positions of Europeans may aggravate existing and create further misunderstanding on the other shore of the North Atlantic;
- (v) Convinced that parliaments in Europe and North America might and should help and consult each other more with a view to strengthening their parliamentary rights and powers vis-à-vis the executive in foreign policy and security,

**REQUESTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE**

To contact the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament in order to:

- (a) encourage their committees and sub-committees whose responsibilities include questions dealt with by the WEU Assembly to take a closer interest in the activities of WEU and its Assembly;
- (b) promote the formation of American and Canadian parliamentary groups responsible for establishing relations with the WEU Assembly;
- (c) promote meetings between representatives of the United States Congress and of the Canadian Parliament and members of the WEU Assembly to establish a regular system of parliamentary co-operation and communication.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. The title of the present report may be considered somewhat audacious for several reasons. Audacious because, by taking the initiative of examining this matter closely, the commission is venturing on to new ground. Audacious, too, because neither the committee nor your Rapporteur has yet been able to pay the planned visit to the United States and Canada to obtain on-the-spot information and to establish contacts and working relations with parliaments, their members and institutions across the Atlantic. Audacious, finally, because concepts about the shape of transatlantic inter-parliamentary relations may not be identical in all the parliaments concerned and their development does not arouse the same interest in the United States as in Europe.

2. In spite of all these uncertainties, there nevertheless seem to be grounds for conducting such a study, whose importance can but increase at a juncture when definition of the European security architecture calls for a broad redefinition of transatlantic co-operation. This report therefore proposes to examine the parliamentary aspect. Since this is quite new ground, it cannot hope to offer final solutions but will endeavour to circumscribe the problem, throw light on its various aspects and provide the basis for a debate on what must be done and what is wanted and can be done in this area. The present report was discussed in depth by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on 4th November 1991; some members were sceptical about the chances of attaining this aim by creating new structures for establishing contacts. No one, however, contested the main opinions set out in the report.

### *II. The present situation*

3. Transatlantic parliamentary relations in the field which concerns us are established either at bilateral level between the various parliaments and political parties in Europe on the one hand and those of the United States Congress and of the Canadian Parliament on the other, or at the level of international parliamentary assemblies with responsibilities in defence questions and security. There is also, however, a multilateral aspect to bilateral relations between the various parliaments of Europe and their opposite-numbers across the Atlantic as was seen, *inter alia*, at the international conference on parliamentary democracy and inter-

national security policy held in The Hague on 22nd and 23rd May 1991 at the initiative of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission.

4. One of the main concerns of parliaments in all democratic countries is their supervision of the executive bodies and the dialogue with them, particularly in matters concerning the armed forces, the application of the defence budget and, more generally, security policy. Problems and differences between legislative and executive bodies are sometimes similar in the various countries and it was consequently very appropriate that the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. van den Broek, in his inaugural address at the abovementioned conference, raised the question of whether there was a means of arranging for the parliaments to help each other in their tasks of supervising governments. He also broached the idea that the future parliamentary assembly of the CSCE might be an appropriate framework for debates and exchanges of information in this respect, for instance, on the question of improving the comparability and transparency of national defence budgets or the rights of parliaments to be informed more generally. It is clear that all these considerations concern the WEU Assembly.

5. Furthermore, during the conference, a number of other interesting subjects were tackled and were the subject of an exchange of interparliamentary information from which it emerged that the experience and rôle of the United States Congress with its very broad responsibilities allowing a true balance between the authorities governing the United States are worthy of special attention. However, this conference revealed a practical problem which often emerges when one wishes to bring together United States and European parliamentarians: of the some 200 participants, there was not one member of the United States Congress. (The latter was represented, however, by an official of the research service and a member of the secretariat of the Senate). Nevertheless, the conference was very useful because it allowed light to be thrown on the fact that the exchange of information between parliamentarians on defence and security questions is still in gestation and a study should be made of the extent, aims and framework of future mutual assistance and transatlantic co-operation.

6. The situation is somewhat different if one considers international assemblies. The North Atlantic Assembly is at present the only interparliamentary institution attended by a thirty-six member delegation from the United

States Congress and a twelve member delegation from the Canadian Parliament. In this assembly, Europeans and Americans sit side-by-side and meet to adopt joint positions, which is the most developed form of co-operation, even if one considers that the impact of its recommendations and resolutions is still limited since there is no commitment on the part of the governments to follow them up or even to reply to them. It is certainly not for the WEU Assembly to give an opinion on the effect that Euro-American co-operation in the framework of the North Atlantic Assembly may have on the executive, Congress and public opinion in the United States and particularly to what extent specifically European preoccupations are voiced and understood in that forum. Since the thirty-six members of the delegation of the United States Congress represent primarily the interests of their country, it is for their European counterparts to interest them as much as possible in the positions and problems of Europeans.

7. The more the WEU Assembly develops its relations with the North Atlantic Assembly, the more it will be able to take advantage of the presence of North American parliamentarians to inform them of European concerns. For some years now, the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly has been meeting from time to time with the Defence and Security Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly. These relations were recently intensified:

- the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly was invited to attend the autumn session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Madrid from 17th to 22nd October 1991 and accepted this invitation;
- the two committees expressed their intention to exchange views on relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the CSCE Assembly.

8. For the United States members of the North Atlantic Assembly in particular to be able to be associated with this type of co-operation, they must attend meetings, which is still far from always being the case.

9. The creation of a parliamentary assembly for the CSCE which is to meet for the first time in 1992 has opened a new area of co-operation between the United States and Europe, the extent of which cannot be foreseen, but the WEU Assembly and its committees should have every interest in establishing a close working relationship with this new assembly and particularly with its United States and Canadian representatives.

10. The WEU Assembly has a special place in transatlantic relations. It is the only international assembly with treaty responsibilities in

defence and security matters. It is composed exclusively of parliamentarians of Western Europe. Nevertheless, in accordance with the spirit of the modified Brussels Treaty, Article IV of which provides for close co-operation between Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the WEU Assembly has always devoted an important part of its work to the problems of co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in defence and security matters.

11. The Assembly attaches great importance to establishing regular contacts with the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament within the limits of its budgetary constraints. Each year, one of its three committees with a political vocation organises, in turn, a visit to the parliaments, governmental authorities and various bodies in these two countries, even though this modest action raises budgetary problems.

12. These committees have had to note, however, that in general the two parts of Congress are less prepared to develop contacts with the Assembly than those in Canada and it is relatively difficult to interest the United States Congress in the activities of the WEU Assembly.

13. Proof of this are the Assembly's steadfast attempts to invite observers from the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament to attend ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Assembly. Already in 1977, the Presidential Committee made a preliminary review of the problem, noting that certain parliaments, in particular the United States Congress, had been invited fairly regularly to be represented at sessions, but had not always been in position to respond to such invitations. Only in 1974, 1975 and 1976 did United States and Canadian parliamentary observers attend debates of the Assembly.

14. As from April 1988, the Assembly resumed the initiative and has since invited regularly United States and Canadian observers to attend its sessions, but, unfortunately, so far without success. Consequently, parliamentarians from the other side of the Atlantic have not yet taken advantage of the possibility for observers to speak in the Chamber in Paris.

15. In the framework of its political work, our Assembly has, from time to time, turned directly to the United States Congress, in particular with Resolution 77 on the INF Treaty adopted on 2nd December 1987<sup>1</sup>, urging the Senate of the United States to give its consent to the United States-Soviet treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. During the second Gulf war, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the President of the

1. See Document 1116, Addendum.

WEU Assembly sent a letter dated 31st October 1990 to all members of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Congress informing them of the contribution made by WEU and its member countries to applying the embargo imposed by the United Nations on Iraq, since media reporting in the United States had given the impression that the European effort in the Gulf had not been fully understood by American public opinion.

16. Yet these isolated initiatives only show that there is so far no systematic or regular dialogue with the parliamentary institutions of North America and a fortiori no reciprocity in relations.

### *III. Aims of better co-operation*

17. Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation may have different aims, depending on whether one considers problems of general interest for all the parliaments concerned or those of special interest to the Assembly of WEU in conducting its work.

18. In the first case, which may also be applied to our Assembly, the aim of transatlantic co-operation would primarily be to strengthen the positions and supervisory and co-decision rights of the parliaments concerned in the elaboration of foreign and defence policy in their respective countries and perhaps the joint definition of the minimum principles required in these matters.

19. At the conference in The Hague on parliamentary democracy and international security policy, the following principles were proposed:

- the right of parliaments to scrutinise the defence budget in detail at a stage when proposals for new expenditure were still in preparation in the governments. Here, the powers of the United States Congress are particularly broad;
- the right of parliaments to examine draft international treaties before they are signed, particularly those dealing with international co-operation in armaments;
- a clear and specific definition of the rights and powers of defence and foreign affairs committees, particularly with regard to their right to be informed by government officials;
- definition of the type of information a government should be obliged to provide to parliament; for this, an example is the Freedom of Information Act which defines the type of information that should be provided to the United States Congress;

- the establishment of an efficient research and documentation service and better possibilities for parliamentarians to obtain the information to supervise the government by means and staff independent of the government and through access to a second source of information; in this field too it might be useful to draw on the experience of the United States Congress which has a very well-developed congressional research service.

20. The abovementioned examples show that better knowledge of the rôle, powers, structure and operation of the United States Congress in foreign policy and security matters might be useful to everyone interested in strengthening parliamentary powers. The balance of political powers in the United States gives Congress greater weight than many European national parliaments and, a fortiori, international assemblies.

21. Moreover, it is the United States Senate alone that has the authority, on behalf of Congress, to participate in elaborating the foreign policy of the United States. In theory, the Senate may intervene on three occasions. It can be required to ratify the nomination of treaty negotiators, but this practice has fallen into disuse. The Senate may also give instructions to the negotiators, but the executive does not much appreciate this practice and consequently it is not often invoked.

22. The main powers are therefore exercised at the time of ratifying treaties signed by the executive which requires a two-thirds majority of the senators. This majority is necessary, however, only for the final vote, all other decisions being taken by simple majority. In security matters, the constitution lays down that only Congress can declare war and the War Powers Act of 1973 obliges the President of the United States to inform Congress of any military intervention abroad within 48 hours. With effect from this declaration, Congress has 60 days to decide to stop or to prolong it.

23. The broad powers of Congress in budgetary matters are also exercised in the area of security and defence policy and allow the justification of expenditure to be verified and also the specific attribution and breakdown of expenditure between the various programmes proposed by the administration. Several special committees on appropriation have been created to this end.

24. A detailed framework of Congress and its committees is appended to this report. It should be noted that the number of representatives in the two parts of Congress, i.e., 100 senators and 435 representatives for a population of about 226 million is very small compared with the

number of parliamentarians in most European countries and in Canada where the parliament is composed of 399 members (104 senators and 295 representatives) for a population of about 24 million.

25. The 100 United States senators who alone have true power in foreign affairs and security matters have special responsibilities in addition to considerable influence. All senators have the problem of obtaining adequate knowledge of varied and complicated matters in order to supervise the executive. The practice of having a staff for each parliamentarian and also for the committees is therefore widely developed. The senators cannot always carry out alone the vast spectrum of tasks incumbent upon them; they cannot attend all the meetings. The system therefore allows each senator to employ a large number of personal assistants who even have the right to take part in working meetings of committees. Furthermore, the Congressional Research Service provides United States parliamentarians with an independent source of information and research which is very sophisticated.

26. The example of the United States Congress therefore might certainly provide interesting ideas for defining the minimum powers that should be attributed to democratic parliaments. While parliaments in Europe may find advantage in examining what they can gain from American experience, the specific interest for the WEU Assembly in strengthening transatlantic relations is quite different.

27. It is first a matter of sounding and explaining Europe's voice, and particularly that of WEU, on the other side of the North Atlantic. The WEU Assembly is asserting itself increasingly as the main European parliamentary assembly in a position to co-ordinate and elaborate the parliamentary positions of Western Europe in the new international security architecture. Americans and Europeans meet in the Atlantic Alliance, but the North Atlantic Treaty does not create an official parliamentary section for NATO. The interparliamentary dialogue is therefore limited to the North Atlantic Assembly, the European part of which is certainly preponderant. However, the Euro-American co-operation thus established in this framework and similarly between the member governments of the alliance has not prevented a large section of the United States Congress and of public opinion in the United States from having less knowledge than ever of the problems of Europeans, their contributions to joint security and their concerns and thoughts.

28. Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear that greater divergences than in the past are to be anticipated in the way of perceiving and assessing security problems which concern both Europeans and Americans. Lack of information

has already led to erroneous conclusions as a result of which Europeans have been the target of criticism from the United States Congress and press concerning a number of questions of concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Such criticism is not limited to the alliance itself as the continuing debate on burden-sharing has shown; it also extends to all out-of-area questions for which the alliance is not competent, but in which Euro-American understanding and co-operation are necessary.

29. The public debate in the United States on the rôle and contribution of the European allies in the Gulf war is an example of this, but it is to be expected that the problems for Western Europeans regarding the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and, more generally, future relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and with the former Soviet Union also have every chance of being misunderstood by American opinion for lack of adequate information.

30. It is therefore necessary to improve interparliamentary information, but how? Information is pointless if it fails to arouse sufficient interest. American parliamentarians must therefore be encouraged to wish to improve their understanding of European concerns; at the same time, they must be given the opportunity to explain their own positions. This will only be possible if our American colleagues can perceive an interest in such an exchange. The problem does not arise in the same way, however, in relations with the Canadian Parliament.

#### *IV. How to achieve such co-operation?*

31. First and foremost, it is necessary to take advantage of all the structures for developing and strengthening the Euro-American dialogue which now exist in transatlantic parliamentary institutions. Only the Senate answered a questionnaire sent to the secretariat of the two houses asking whether there were permanent structures, ad hoc relations, or exchanges of information with European parliamentary committees on foreign policy and security questions. The answer was that there was only the British-American parliamentary group. In Congress, all committees and sub-committees have specific responsibilities which are listed. Scrutiny of the responsibilities of the main committees shows that there is no specific reference to relations with Europe or with international defence organisations such as NATO or WEU.

32. Among the sub-committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, there are several working units that might be able to co-ordinate with the WEU Assembly. For instance, a sub-committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee is responsible for operations abroad and has responsibility in regard to international organisations and programmes.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate has instituted, inter alia, a sub-committee for European affairs. Again, the Senate has formed a bipartite group of observers for the control of armaments composed of 20 senators who act as official observers for negotiations in which the United States is a party on the reduction of nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons.

33. In the House of Representatives, there is also a sub-committee of the Appropriations Committee for operations abroad which supervises appropriations for international organisations. The many sub-committees of the Armed Services Committee include a panel for the North Atlantic Assembly responsible for:

- "organising the preparation of the committee's input to NATO's parliament - the North Atlantic Assembly"; and
- serving as a focal point for the committee's involvement in North Atlantic Assembly meetings and in any broader, pan-European successor or counterpart.

The description of the nine-member panel's responsibilities shows that it might also be a valuable contact for our Assembly.

34. Among the sub-committees of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the activities of the Sub-committee on Arms Control, International Security and Science should be of interest to the Assembly, together with those of the Sub-committee on Europe and the Middle East responsible, inter alia, for reporting on international parliamentary conferences. Conferences and parliamentary exchanges also appear among the responsibilities of the Sub-committee for International Operations.

35. Finally, one should not overlook the few bicameral organisations of the United States Congress, such as, for instance, the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus and the National Security Caucus.

36. If more regular contacts are to be established, it is first essential to have a better understanding of the structures and methods of work of Congress in order to determine how to increase its interest in the activities of our Assembly and WEU as a whole. The Assembly's proposal to establish WEU information bureaux in the United States and Canada in accordance with Recommendation 494 was not endorsed by the Council. Again, the Assembly's own means of intensifying the transatlantic dialogue are too limited. For this reason, the Assembly should be able to draw on the services of a well-established relay of opinion in Washington and have the necessary funds for this purpose.

37. In the framework of renewing contacts, it is also necessary to tackle the question of

whether Congress would be prepared to start a regular dialogue with the Presidential Committee and other committees as is done with the Supreme Soviet. However, when thinking about establishing a dialogue between the WEU Assembly and the United States Congress, the situation on the American side must be borne in mind: the American internal political system is such that every parliamentarian is practically always in the throes of an electoral campaign. Relations have already been established with Europe through the intermediary of various institutions such as national parliaments, the North Atlantic Assembly, the CSCE Assembly and the European Parliament. It will therefore be difficult to interest the Americans in creating a new means of contact. It is therefore crucial to convince them that a dialogue with the Assembly will be more than just a repetition of contacts that already exist in other parliamentary frameworks. However, until this dialogue is established, the WEU Assembly's national delegations should be encouraged to improve the co-ordination of their positions with those of the North Atlantic Assembly, the parliamentary assembly of the CSCE and any other parliamentary institutions that include American parliamentarians in order to make WEU's voice heard in the Euro-American dialogue.

38. In view of the large staff in Congress, which exercises remarkable influence on senators and representatives, closer co-operation between secretariats would be useful. Documentation raises a special problem. Working relationships should be established, in particular for the exchange of documents and information on a reciprocal basis between secretariats and the appropriate organs of North American parliamentary institutions and the secretariat of the WEU Assembly.

39. Regarding relations with the Canadian Parliament, it is gratifying that the two Chambers have clearly shown their interest in European affairs and the activities of WEU, although Canadians also have difficulties in travelling to Europe.

40. In the Canadian Parliament, there is a Canada-Europe parliamentary association, which sends delegations to the Council of Europe and co-operates with the European Parliament, but so far it has established no special links with the Assembly of WEU. Conversely, there is a Canadian parliamentary association of NATO, composed of 44 senators and 119 representatives. On a bilateral level, there are Canada-France parliamentary associations and Canada-Italy and Canada-Germany friendship groups.

41. According to the Canadian Parliament's answer to a questionnaire on its relations with Europe, there are no formal relations between

the committees of this parliament and those of European parliaments, nor with the European assemblies, but the institution of such contacts has already been proposed. It would therefore be useful for the WEU Assembly to invite Canadian parliamentary authorities to appoint a parliamentary delegation with the specific task of following the Assembly's activities and establishing a dialogue with it.

#### *V. Conclusions*

42. As matters now stand, one has to note that relations between the WEU Assembly on the one hand and the United States Congress on the other are too meagre to justify talking about a dialogue. The establishment of transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence questions is therefore a goal and a programme to be achieved. The first step is to improve reciprocal information and develop exchanges of views on a more regular basis, as our Assembly has been advocating for several years.

43. The achievement of this goal must overcome a number of political and budgetary obstacles plus the constraints of the time available to all the parliamentarians concerned. But the most important task is to arouse the interest of the United States Congress in establishing the dialogue and to convince it that it has something to gain in this, which seems less difficult in the case of the Canadian Parliament.

44. If our Assembly fails to strengthen and improve considerably the transatlantic dialogue and the information communicated to the United States on its rôle and activities and on WEU as a whole, it is to be feared that the misunderstanding in Congress and American public opinion about the policy of Europeans will be further heightened. Conversely, if Europeans had a better knowledge of the working and powers of the United States Congress in the definition of foreign policy and security in the United States, they might draw useful guidance from it and help all democratic parliaments in their efforts to consolidate their rights and their powers in such matters vis-à-vis the executive.

## APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 480<sup>1</sup>*on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance*<sup>2</sup>*(Extracts)*

1. THE ASSEMBLY recalls that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty closely associates WEU's activities with those of NATO and that NATO is still the essential guarantee of Europe's security because it is the only framework in which the deterrent power of the United States can be used for the benefit of Europe.

....

It considers that the security situation in Europe has been fundamentally changed through the democratisation processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of borders....

It wishes the CFE negotiations to be concluded rapidly, a new mandate to be drawn up by the CSCE for a subsequent reduction in the level of armaments, exclusively defensive military systems to be established and negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons to be started immediately.

It welcomes the development of the CSCE and the efforts made in that framework to establish a new peaceful order in Europe.

It considers that in the context of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures, the Vienna negotiations and other forums significant steps are being taken to improve the security situation in Europe.

It considers that, with the increasing pace of European developments and the changing nature of security problems, planning for European security co-operation must be accelerated.

It considers that, in the new circumstances, Western European countries will have to play a larger rôle in this planning process, which will require closer co-operation between WEU member states.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council do its utmost to facilitate the United States Government's action to maintain and strengthen the association of the United States with the organisation of European security by:

- (a) asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance, inter alia by moving the seat of its ministerial organs closer to that of NATO;
- (b) asking those of its members which do not participate in the NATO integrated commands to examine to what extent the new situation and the new rôle to be played by NATO allow them to associate their armed forces more closely with joint deployment;
- (c) keeping the Assembly constantly informed of the discussion that is to be held on the reorganisation, rôle and future of NATO in the context of the transformation of the military pacts into political alliances following arms reduction agreements;
- (d) tightening its links with the European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are not at present members of WEU;
- (e) ensuring that member countries make a military effort sufficient to guarantee a balance of conventional forces between the West and the Soviet Union;
- (f) for this purpose, fixing the troop levels that each of them undertakes to place at the service of joint defence and providing for these undertakings to be revised in conformity with future CFE agreements;
- (g) ensuring maximum security in Western Europe with a minimum deployment of forces and urgently studying the conditions in which multinational units might be set up;

1. Adopted on 6th June 1990.

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1225).

- (h) organising, in the framework of a general reduction in military expenditure and the level of armaments, fair burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and between WEU member countries.

2. ....

3. THE ASSEMBLY considers that recent developments in certain non-European countries, particularly in the Near and Middle East, are a new danger to international peace and the security of Europe. It notes that the Atlantic Alliance is making no provision for the necessary guarantees against such threats but that any initiatives Europe may take to counter them help to strengthen American confidence that the alliance is operating correctly.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council make regular assessments of all possible threats to European security and inform the public of the results of its work on security in the Mediterranean.

4. THE ASSEMBLY ... welcomes the steps taken by the Council to co-ordinate member countries' action for applying an open-skies agreement and for ensuring the effectiveness of verification operations.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council contribute to the success of the disarmament negotiations and enable member countries to play an active part in verifying and implementing future agreements by:

- (a) taking an early decision on the joint production and use of observation satellites;
- (b) widening the decision taken in Brussels on 23rd April in order to organise a permanent exchange of information between its members on the results of each one's verification operations;
- (c) organising co-operation between member countries and, possibly, other European members of NATO for training the staff necessary for carrying out these operations.

5. THE ASSEMBLY notes that Western European security continues to be guaranteed through implementation of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council fulfil that guarantee by ensuring that member states make an effort to facilitate the rapid conclusion of the first phase of the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament and urge the immediate commencement of Vienna II negotiations.

6. THE ASSEMBLY notes that the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe will lead to a reduction in arms production and troop levels in national armies.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council exercise its mandate and at last give the necessary impetus to the establishment of interoperability of armaments used by NATO and the standardisation and joint production of armaments by member countries by:

- (a) assessing the requirements of European security in this area during the period of implementation of the CFE agreement;
- (b) fostering understanding between arms-producing firms in member countries, inter alia through harmonisation of relevant national legislation, as suggested in the study conducted by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee in April 1982;
- (c) having the WEU Institute for Security Studies give priority to studying the economic and social consequences of a potential reduction in the activities of the arms industries and the number of persons employed on defence work.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council take steps to prepare for changing military strategies and doctrines and to adjust to the new situation in Europe: whilst retaining defensive capabilities, the present strategy of forward defence and flexible response in Europe will have to be re-examined and in this context the deployment of the armed forces may have to be changed.

It welcomes the decision of President Bush and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to terminate the follow-on to Lance programme and to cancel any further modernisation of United States nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe which indicates the willingness and ability of the alliance to take the initiative in a rapidly changing situation.

7. THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies are now open to exchanges of views and information with the West on defence and security matters.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council help to restore mutual confidence between Eastern and Central European countries and Western European countries by holding, together with the WEU Institute for Security Studies, exchanges of information with appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union and the Eastern and Central European countries on matters relating to security, disarmament and verification, as decided on 23rd April 1990.

8. THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the Council's efforts to help to inform the public about its work. It notes with satisfaction that, for the first time, the Council has given it a document in which the IEPG gives it information about its activities. It considers, however, that this policy of openness is still inadequate, which is detrimental to the cohesion of NATO.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council provide the public more information about the work of its dependent organs and the results they obtain. It also recommends that it ask the presidency of the IEPG to report regularly and directly to the Assembly on its activities.

9. THE ASSEMBLY notes that the decisions taken by the Council on the abolition of arms control and of the Standing Armaments Committee have in fact impaired the WEU ministerial organs' relations with NATO. It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to develop other forms of contact.

However, it RECOMMENDS that the Council resume the practice of asking the NATO authorities for an opinion on matters within their purview raised by Assembly recommendations or written questions from members of the Assembly.

## APPENDIX II

***Working units of the United States Congress  
with responsibilities in foreign policy and security***

**I. Senate*****Committee on Appropriations***

*S-128 Capitol Building  
Washington, DC 20510-6025*

***Jurisdiction:***

1) Appropriation of the revenue for the support of the government; 2) rescission of appropriations; 3) the amount of new spending authority; 4) new spending authority.

***Sub-committees of the Committee on Appropriations******Defence***

*SD-137 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510*

***Jurisdiction:***

1) Department of Defence – military: Departments of Army, Navy (including Marine Corps), Air Force, and Office of Secretary of Defence (except Military Construction); 2) the Central Intelligence Agency; 3) Intelligence Community Oversight.

***Foreign Operations***

*SD-137 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510*

***Jurisdiction:***

5) Department of State 6) anti-terrorism assistance; 10) foreign and military credit sales; 17) international military education and training; 19) international organisations and programmes; 20) military assistance programme; 22) Peace Corps; 23) special defence acquisition fund; (etc.).

***Committee on Armed Services***

*SR-228 Russell Senate Building  
Washington, DC 20510-6050*

***Jurisdiction:***

1) Aeronautical and space activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems or

military operations; 2) the common defence; 3) the Department of Defence, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force, generally; 4) maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal, including administration, sanitation and government of the canal zone; 5) military research and development; 6) national security aspects of nuclear energy; 7) navy petroleum reserves, except those in Alaska; 8) pay, promotion, retirement and other benefits and privileges of members of the armed forces, including overseas education of civilian and military dependants; 9) selective service system; 10) strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defence. In addition, the committee is mandated to study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to the common defence policy of the United States and to report on them from time to time.

***Sub-committees of the Armed Services Committee******Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence******Jurisdiction:***

United States nuclear forces, research and development and procurement.

***Conventional Forces and Alliance Defence******Jurisdiction:***

Land combat forces, tactical air and naval, procurement and research and development for those items.

***Projection Forces and Regional Defence******Jurisdiction:***

Shipbuilding, procurement and research and development for naval forces (excluding naval aviation), Marine Corps, airlift and sealift.

***Defence Industry and Technology******Jurisdiction:***

Defence acquisition policy, industrial base, technological base, defence stockpile and defence laboratories.

*Readiness, Sustainability and Support**Jurisdiction:*

To provide to the full committee general oversight of readiness and sustainability in support of our military forces, including military construction programmes.

*Manpower and Personnel**Jurisdiction:*

Designated by title.

*Committee on Foreign Relations*

SD-446 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510-6225

*Jurisdiction:*

1) Relations of the United States with foreign nations generally; 2) treaties and executive agreements, except reciprocal trade agreements; 3) boundaries of the United States; 4) protection of United States citizens abroad and expatriation; 5) intervention abroad and declarations of war; 6) foreign economic, military, technical and humanitarian assistance; 7) United Nations and its affiliated organisations; 8) international conferences and congresses; 9) diplomatic service; 10) international law as it relates to foreign policy; 11) oceans and international environmental and scientific affairs as they relate to foreign policy; 12) international activities of the American National Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross; 13) international aspects of nuclear energy, including nuclear transfer policy; 14) foreign loans; 15) measures to foster commercial intercourse with foreign nations and to safeguard American business interests abroad; 16) the World Bank group, the regional development banks and other international organisations established primarily for development assistance purposes; 17) the International Monetary Fund and other international organisations established primarily for international monetary purposes (except that, at the request of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, any proposed legislation relating to such subjects reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations shall be referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs); 18) acquisition of land and buildings for embassies and legations in foreign countries; 19) national security and interna-

tional aspects of trusteeships of the United States. In addition, the committee is mandated to study and review matters relating to the national security policy, foreign policy and international economic policy as it relates to foreign policy of the United States and matters relating to food, hunger and nutrition in foreign countries, and to report on these matters periodically.

*Sub-committees of the Foreign Relations Committee**European Affairs**Jurisdiction:*

Matters concerning: (i) the continent of Europe, including the Soviet Union, Greece and Turkey; (ii) the United Kingdom, Greenland, Iceland and the north polar region.

*East Asian and Pacific Affairs**Jurisdiction:*

1) Matters extending geographically from China and Korea to Burma, inclusive, on the mainland of Asia; and to Hong Kong, Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, Oceania and the South Pacific Islands; 2) trusteeship matters in the Pacific region.

*Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs**Jurisdiction:*

1) Matters extending geographically from the Arctic Ocean to Tierra del Fuego, including the Caribbean. Problems which are of concern to the sub-committee include relations between the American nations, United States-Canadian affairs, boundary matters, the implementation of various treaties and conventions, economic relations and security matters affecting the western hemisphere and the Organisation of American States; 2) general oversight over all of the activities and programmes of the Peace Corps.

*Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations**Jurisdiction:*

All matters, problems and policies involving international operations, terrorism and the international flow of illegal drugs, including: 1) the oversight of all United States foreign policy, programmes

and international co-operative efforts to combat international terrorism; 2) the oversight of all United States foreign policy, programmes and international co-operative efforts to combat the flow of illegal drugs or substances; 3) the general oversight responsibility for the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Foreign Service, international educational and cultural affairs, foreign broadcasting activities, foreign buildings, United States participation in the United Nations and other international organisations not under the jurisdiction of other sub-committees. In addition, the sub-committee has jurisdiction over general matters of international law.

#### *African Affairs*

##### *Jurisdiction:*

1) Geographic responsibilities corresponding to those of the Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State; 2) all matters and problems relating to all of Africa, with the exception of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean Sea from Egypt to Morocco, which are under the purview of the Sub-committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

#### *Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs*

##### *Jurisdiction:*

Matters extending geographically from: 1) Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka across North Africa to Morocco and Algeria; 2) the Arab states and Israel; 3) South Asia, the Middle East; 4) the relationships between Israel and the Arab states; 5) economic development and general security in the Middle East, South Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean.

#### *Senate Arms Control Observer Group*

*SH-637B Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510*

The Senate Arms Control Observer Group is a bipartisan group of 20 senators who act as official observers to any formal negotiations to which the United States is a party on the reduction of nuclear, conventional or chemical arms.

## **II. House of Representatives**

### *Committee on Appropriations*

*H-218 Capitol Building  
Washington, DC 20515-6015*

##### *Jurisdiction:*

1) Appropriation of the revenue for the support of the government; 2) rescissions of appropriations contained in appropriation acts; 3) transfers of unexpended balances; 4) the amount of new spending authority which is to be effective for a fiscal year, including bills and resolutions (reported by other committees) which provide new spending authority; (etc.).

### *Sub-committees of the Appropriations Committee*

#### *Defence*

*H-144 Capitol Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

##### *Jurisdiction:*

1) Department of Defence-Military: Departments of Army, Navy (including Marine Corps), Air Force; 2) Office of Secretary of Defence (except military construction); 3) Central Intelligence Agency; 4) Intelligence Community staff.

#### *Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programmes*

*H-307 Capitol Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

##### *Jurisdiction:*

5) Department of State; 9) foreign military financing programme; 18) international military education and training; 20) international organisations and programmes; 21) military assistance programme; 24) Peace Corps; 25) peace-keeping operations; 26) Presidential contingency fund; 27) special defence acquisition fund.

#### *Military Construction*

*B300 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

##### *Jurisdiction:*

1) Military construction: Army, Navy (including Marine Corps), Air Force and defence agencies and reserve forces; 2) military family housing 3) DOD base

closure account; 4) homeowners assistance fund; 5) NATO infrastructure.

***Committee on Armed Services***

*2120 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-6035*

***Jurisdiction:***

1) Common defence generally; 2) the Department of Defence generally, including the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force generally; 3) ammunition depots; forts; arsenals; Army, Navy and Air Force reservations and establishments; 4) conservation, development and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves; 5) pay, promotion, retirement and other benefits and privileges of members of the armed services; 6) scientific research and development in support of the armed services; 7) selective service; 8) size and composition of the Army, Navy and Air Force; 9) soldiers' and sailors' homes; 10) strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defence; 11) military applications of nuclear energy. In addition, the committee has the special oversight function with respect to international arms control and disarmament and military dependants' education.

***Sub-committees of the Armed Services Committee***

***Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems***

*2343 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

***Jurisdiction:***

Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) the annual authorisation for procurement of military weapons systems and components thereof, including systems transition, and those portions in the procurement category, other procurement not assigned to the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Sub-committee; 2) military application of nuclear energy, including research and development related thereto; 3) intelligence matters related to national security and related legislative oversight; 4) oversight responsibilities with regard to international arms control and disarmament.

***Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials***

*2343 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

***Jurisdiction:***

Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) procurement and construction of naval

vessels; 2) torpedoes and other weapons portion of navy weapons; 3) ship-related items in navy other procurement; 4) sealift; 5) anti-submarine warfare; 6) disposal of naval vessels; 7) strategic and critical materials necessary for the national defence; 8) related legislative oversight.

***Research and Development***

*2120 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

***Jurisdiction:***

1) Annual authorisation for research and development; 2) airlift; 3) related oversight.

***Military Installations and Facilities***

*2120 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

***Jurisdiction:***

Legislative oversight over: 1) military construction; 2) real estate acquisitions and disposals; 3) housing and support facilities; 4) base closures; 5) real estate generally; 6) civil defence; 7) defence burdensharing; 8) base maintenance and repair funding; 9) related legislative oversight.

***Military Personnel and Compensation***

*2343 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

***Jurisdiction:***

Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) authorised strengths; 2) active-duty and reserve training; 3) recruiting; 4) reserve officers' training corps; 5) selective service system; 6) military justice; 7) enlistments and separations; 8) awards; 9) academies; 10) human relations; 11) medical care delivery and funding; 12) pay and allowances; 13) promotion; 14) retirement; 15) related legislative oversight.

***Investigations***

*2343 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

***Jurisdiction:***

Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) defence acquisition regulations and related procurement matters; 2) organisation of the Department of Defence, including pro-

posed reorganisations; 3) naval petroleum reserves; 4) related legislative oversight; 5) investigative authority in relation to the committee's general oversight responsibilities.

**Readiness**

2339 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

**Jurisdiction:**

Legislative jurisdiction over: 1) the annual authorisation for operation and maintenance; 2) the current readiness and preparedness requirements of the defence establishment, including the supporting defence industrial base; 3) special operations forces oversight; 4) commissaries and exchanges, clubs and related non-appropriated funds activities of the Armed Forces; 5) related legislative oversight.

**Defence Policy Panel**

**Purpose:**

To consider matters related to Department of Defence policy generally and the impact of such policy matters on defence resources.

**Military Education Panel**

**Purpose:**

1) To review Department of Defence plans for implementing the joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward assuring that the phases of military officer education provide the proper linkage between the service-competent officer and the competent joint officer; 2) to assess the ability of the current Department of Defence military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint warfighters and tacticians.

**Structure of United States Defence Industrial Base Panel**

**Purpose:**

1) To examine the current structure of the United States defence industrial base, how it has changed and its responsiveness to the new military and economic conditions of the post-cold war era; 2) to review the implications of financial viability of defence suppliers; and related issues.

**Future uses of Defence Manufacturing and Technology Resources Panel**

**Purpose:**

To explore ways in which the current manufacturing and technology capabilities of the Department of Defence and DOD-controlled assets might be available to civilian enterprises while preserving defence manufacturing capacity and avoiding costly and inefficient "moth-balling" of key defence industries.

**North Atlantic Assembly Panel**

**Purpose:**

1) To organise the preparation of the committee's input to NATO's parliament – the North Atlantic Assembly; 2) to serve as a focal point for the committee's involvement in North Atlantic Assembly meetings and in any broader, pan-European successor or counterpart.

**Environmental Restoration Panel**

**Purpose:**

1) Review and report on Department of Defence compliance with applicable environmental statutes; 2) make recommendations to streamline and improve Department of Defence environmental programmes; 3) recommend funding and personnel resource levels necessary to meet environmental requirements; 4) monitor and report on the evolution of environmental issues as they relate to national security matters.

**Department of Energy Defence Nuclear Facilities Panel**

**Purpose:**

To review issues related to the military application of nuclear energy – including, but not limited to – the modernisation and maintenance of defence nuclear facilities to support national security requirements, nuclear reactor safety and environmental issues.

**Committee on Foreign Affairs**

2170, Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-6128

**Jurisdiction:**

1) Relations of the United States with foreign nations generally; 2) acquisition of land and buildings for embassies and lega-

tions in foreign countries; 3) establishment of boundary lines between the United States and foreign nations; 4) foreign loans; 5) international conferences and congresses; 6) intervention abroad and declarations of war; 7) measures relating to the diplomatic service; 8) measures to foster commercial intercourse with foreign nations and to safeguard American business interests abroad; 9) neutrality; 10) protection of American citizens abroad and expatriation; 11) the American National Red Cross; 12) United Nations organisations; 13) measures relating to international economic policy; 14) export controls, including non-proliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear hardware; 15) international commodity agreements (other than those involving sugar), including all agreements for co-operation in the export of nuclear technology and nuclear hardware; 16) trading with the enemy; 17) international education.

***Sub-committees of the Committee on Foreign Affairs***

***Arms Control, International Security and Science***

2401A Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

***Jurisdiction:***

1) National security and scientific developments affecting foreign policy; 2) strategic planning and agreements; 3) war powers and executive agreements legislation; 4) arms control and disarmament agency and all aspects of arms control and disarmament, with particular emphasis on the investigation and evaluation of arms control and disarmament proposals and concepts; 5) security aspects of nuclear technology and materials; 6) international terrorism, with special focus on the United States Government's policies and programmes for combatting international terrorist movements and actions; 7) oversight of military aspects of foreign policy and foreign intelligence; 8) oversight of state and Defence Department activities involving arms transfers, arms export licences, administration of security assistance, arms sales, foreign military training and advisory programmes and conventional arms control.

***Europe and the Middle East***

B359 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

***Human Rights and International Organisations***

B358 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

***Asian and Pacific Affairs***

707 O'Neill House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

***Africa***

816 O'Neill House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

***Jurisdiction:***

Oversight of matters relating to parliamentary conferences and exchanges involving the region; (etc.).

***Western Hemisphere Affairs***

705 O'Neill House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

***International Operations***

709 O'Neill House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

***Jurisdiction:***

1) Department of State and United States Information Agency operations and legislation; 2) the diplomatic service; 3) international education and cultural affairs; 4) foreign buildings; 5) international terrorism, with special emphasis on policies and programmes relating to the enhancement of embassy security and the protection of United States personnel and institutions abroad; 6) parliamentary conferences and exchanges; 7) protection of American citizens abroad; 8) international broadcasting and international communication and information policy.

***Committee on Science, Space and Technology***

2320 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515-6301

***Sub-committees of the Committee on Science, Space and Technology***

***Technology and Competitiveness***

B374 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

***Space***

2320 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

**House informal organisations****Export Task Force**

337 Ford House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

The Export Task Force, an ISO, is a bipartisan group with approximately 65 members representing almost every geographic region in the United States and a variety of economic interests and philosophical viewpoints. It is the primary vehicle that serves to inform members on export issues; to co-ordinate efforts on trade-related legislative proposals, both within Congress and the business community; and to advocate trade legislation that aids and supports American business and promotes American export trade.

**Congressional Caucus for Science and Technology**

1717 Longworth House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

The caucus, a bipartisan Legislative Service organisation, is composed of members of Congress and was created to promote better understanding throughout the Congress of issues that affect or are affected by science and technology. The caucus' aim is to help the Congress become well-informed about the extremely complex scientific and technological issues on which it is increasingly called to make critical decisions.

**Congressional Space Caucus**

2188 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

The Congressional Space Caucus, an LSO, is a bipartisan group of representatives whose common goal is the revitalisation of America's space programme. Toward that end, it provides legislative support on space issues and serves as a clearing-house on space information.

**Army Caucus**

2344 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

Founded in 1987, the Army Caucus is an informal, bipartisan group of members of Congress that works with the army to raise the visibility of the army's needs, inform members of the importance of the nation's conventional capability and assist the army in presenting programmes to the Congress.

**House leadership and party organisations****House Republican Research Committee**

1622 Longworth House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

The Republican Research Committee is the official research arm of the House Republican Conference.

**Task Forces**

*Arms Control*  
*Foreign Policy and Western Alliance*  
*Space Exploration*  
*Strategic Defence Initiative*  
*Technology and Policy*  
*Technology Transfer*  
*Terrorism/Unconventional Warfare*

**III. United States Congressional Bicameral Organisations****Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe**

237 Ford House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

The Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission) was enacted into law in 1976 to monitor and promote compliance with the human rights and other provisions of the international Helsinki Accords of 1975 and to monitor and encourage United States governmental and private programmes seeking to expand East-West economic and cultural co-operation. The commission is composed of 18 members of Congress and 3 executive branch representatives.

*3 members appointed by the President*

*7 members appointed by the Senate*

*8 members appointed by the House.*

**Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus**

501 Ford House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

The Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, an LSO, is a bipartisan caucus of Senate and House members concerned with foreign and military policy. It is open to any member of Congress who subscribes to its general purposes of co-ordinating congressional concern for world peace into specific action for the development of international co-operation, a strengthened United Nations and arms control and disarmament.

***The Congressional Military Reform Caucus***

The Congressional Military Reform Caucus is a bipartisan, bicameral group of members whose goal is to support the work of relevant committees for a stronger, more cost-effective national defence. Its agenda includes: 1) acquisition process reform, including the creation of a unified acquisition corps for the Department of Defence; 2) improved weapons testing; 3) and oversight of defence acquisition legislation enacted by Congress.

***Congressional Budget Office***

*Ford House Office Building, Fourth Floor  
Washington, DC 20515*

The Congressional Budget Office, established pursuant to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, is a non-partisan organisation which provides to the United States Congress budget-related information and analyses of alternative fiscal, budgetary and programmatic issues.

***National Security Division***

Programme analysis in the area of national defence.

***General Accounting Office***

*441 G Street, N.W.,  
Washington, DC 20548*

The United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, was created in 1921 to aid Congress in meeting its oversight responsibilities. The head of the agency, the Comptroller General of the United States, is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to a non-renewable 15-year term of office.

***Information Management and Technology Division***

Defence and security information systems (etc.).

***National Security and International Affairs Division***

Communications, command, control and intelligence issues; Air Force issues; Army issues; Navy issues; logistics issues; NASA issues; research, development, acquisition and procurement issues; security and international relations issues (etc.).

***Office of Technology Assessment***

*600 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.,  
Washington, DC 20003*

Established by statute (P.L. 92-484) in 1972, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) is a non-partisan analytical support agency which serves the United States Congress. Its purpose is to help Congress cope with new and unique kinds of issues that confront our increasingly complex, interdependent, high-technology society.

OTA's task is to provide early warnings and analyses of emerging, difficult and often highly technical issues, clarifying for Congress both the range of policy options and the potential impacts of adopting each of these options.

***National Security Caucus***

*133 Cannon House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515*

The National Security Caucus is composed of 40 senators and 153 representatives.

*Transatlantic parliamentary co-operation in security and defence matters*

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AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Hardy  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

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1. In the draft order, at the end add “on a basis of equality”.

*Signed: Hardy*

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1. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendment negated).

*Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU*

REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Alternate: Tummers), Mr. Uyttendaele (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox, De Decker, Dees, Ewing, Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Fourré, Irmer, Jung, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden (Alternate: De Hoop Scheffer), Marten, Mota Torres, Moya, Pecchioli, Perinat, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed, Steiner, Sir John Stokes (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), MM. Vazques (Alternate: de Puig), Vieira Mesquita, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

### *Rapporteur's Preface*

In preparation for this report, the committee as a whole was addressed by the following at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, on 11th and 12th June 1991:

H.E. Mr. Gérard Errera, Ambassador, France;  
 H.E. Miss Tessa Solesby, Ambassador, United Kingdom;  
 H.E. Mr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner, Ambassador, Germany;  
 H.E. Mr. Ledogar, Ambassador, United States;  
 H.E. Mr. Chadha, Ambassador, India;  
 H.E. Mr. Garcia-Moritan, Ambassador, Argentina;  
 H.E. Mr. Batsanov, Ambassador, USSR;  
 H.E. Mr. Hou, Ambassador, China;  
 H.E. Mr. Komatina, Ambassador, Yugoslavia;  
 H.E. Mr. Marcel Houlellez, Ambassador, Belgium;  
 H.E. Mr. Andrea Negrotto Cambiaso, Ambassador, Italy;  
 H.E. Mr. Julien Alex, Ambassador, Luxembourg;  
 H.E. Mr. Hendrik Wagenmakers, Ambassador, Netherlands;  
 H.E. Mr. Luis Roma de Albuquerque, Ambassador, Portugal;  
 H.E. Mr. Don Joaquin Perez-Villanueva, Ambassador, Spain.

*Interviews with the following were conducted on behalf of the Rapporteur in London on 26th and 27th September 1991:*

Mr. Ian Dawson, Assistant Under Secretary of State (Policy), Ministry of Defence;  
 Mr. Edgar Buckley, Head of the Defence Arms Control Unit, Ministry of Defence;  
 Mr. Andrew Barlow, Foreign Office Arms Control Research Department;  
 Mr. Michael Clarke, Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London University.

*The Rapporteur met the following at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 7th October 1991:*

H.E. Ambassador Carlos Miranda (SP) Permanent Representative of Spain on the North Atlantic Council;

Mr. M. Jochems (NL), Head of Defence Policy Section;  
 Colonel R. Volk (D), Nuclear Planning Branch;  
 Mr. L. Zannier (D), Head of Disarmament and Arms Control Section;  
 Mr. N. Nedimoglu (TU), Head of Verification Support Staff;

*SACEUR Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, on 8th October 1991:*

Minister Kent Brown (US), Special Assistant to SACEUR for International Affairs;  
 Brigadier General Javier Pardo de Santayana (SP), Chief, Spanish Military Mission;  
 Mr. Harry Brown (GB), Special Assistant for Global and Strategic Events;  
 Air Commodore Willie Rae (RAF) (GB), Chief Special Weapons Branch;  
 Colonel Graham Messervy-Whiting (GB), SHAPE Special Briefer;  
 Group Captain Andrew Vallance (GB), Arms Control Branch;

*and at the NATO School, Oberammergau, on 9th October 1991:*

Colonel Lance Smith (USAF), Commandant;  
 Colonel John Beasley (US), Director, Academics/Operations;  
 Commander Niels Borck (DA), Orientation Department;  
 Major James Sohl (US), Verification Section.

In addition, the Rapporteur met Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, in Bonn on 8th July and 30th October 1991.

*The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, ambassadors, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.*

The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the changes affecting peace and security which have occurred in recent years in Europe resulting in major progress in disarmament agreements and offering henceforth unprecedented possibilities for greater reductions in all types of armaments;
- (ii) Noting the importance of the agreements achieved so far for the reduction of conventional and nuclear armaments and the monitoring and verification of the ban on certain weapons of mass destruction;
- (iii) Welcoming the proposals for radical reductions in nuclear weapons recently made by President Bush and President Gorbachev which represent a major step forward in this area in both qualitative and quantitative terms;
- (iv) Welcoming the reduction in nuclear armaments agreed by NATO at its recent meeting in Taormina;
- (v) Convinced, however, that the principles reiterated in The Hague platform remain a mainstay of European defence;
- (vi) Convinced that the CFE Treaty will be a milestone in the limitation of these armaments and expressing the wish that this treaty be ratified without delay by all countries;
- (vii) Considering that there are new prospects of developing conventional disarmament in the framework of the CSCE and of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (viii) Recognising the efforts made in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference for a total ban on chemical and biological weapons;
- (ix) Aware that WEU has an important rôle to play in backing the process of disarmament and in taking initiatives for its achievement in practice;
- (x) Determined for its part to maintain a permanent debate on arms control matters in co-ordination with all appropriate forums,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Contribute by its action to the advancement of all initiatives for peace and détente now being taken, in particular by endorsing disarmament and arms control proposals;
2. Act continuously to promote a consensus between member countries on disarmament in order to draw positions closer together, harmonise legislation and take joint measures to reduce and control armaments, including the regulation and transparency of arms sales;
3. Ensure that the organisation of peace at European and national level concords increasingly with quantitative and qualitative criteria in defence matters to achieve reasonable minima;
4. Actively support the Bush-Gorbachev proposals to reduce nuclear weapons and efforts to avoid their proliferation, in accordance with the terms set out in the non-proliferation treaty and to obtain a ban on nuclear testing;
5. Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of recent changes but which safeguards European interests;
6. Continue to press for the banning of the production, deployment and sale of chemical and biological weapons;
7. Resolutely endorse the CFE Treaty by urging member states to ratify it without delay, thus ensuring that WEU sets an example in this respect;
8. Give impetus to the verification agreements so as to be able to establish verification systems and programmes acceptable to all member states;
9. Ensure that the satellite data interpretation centre is integrated into the verification process to be instituted;
10. Implement the necessary procedure for WEU to participate in a co-ordinated manner, in particular with the Atlantic Alliance and with other responsible bodies in the necessary exchange of information and elaboration of disarmament proposals.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. At the time of writing, your Rapporteur, like the rest of his colleagues, is awaiting the results of three momentous meetings arranged between now and the date when the present report is to be debated: Rome (NATO), Bonn (WEU) and Maastricht (EC). For the moment, various participants are still manoeuvring, positions changing, sometimes daily. For some, these shifts represent totally different approaches now compared with only a year ago, for others it is a question of having come nearly full circle compared with almost thirty years ago, for example:

“ We quite accept that the European political union if it is to be effective, will have a common concern of defence problems, and that a European point of view on defence would emerge ”<sup>1</sup>.

2. The Assembly's position has been strongly in favour of a continuing rôle for NATO, the EC and WEU, each in its particular context. It is hoped that this solution will be adopted by our ministers and their colleagues from non-member countries when the moment is judged right and formal structures established to link the three bodies cited.

3. The result of such an arrangement could well be an added impetus for arms control, whether on short- or longer-range (tactical and/or strategic) weapons. WEU initiatives hitherto, especially concerning verification, have focused particularly on conventional weaponry. With some of the latest ideas from various quarters highlighting nuclear issues, the time has come for WEU to involve itself more closely in what was until comparatively recently the “*domaine réservé*” of the superpowers.

4. To this end, we should ensure that the European voice and opinion are clearly expressed and clearly heard, even if not fully appreciated by third parties.

5. The aim of the present report is to update colleagues on the implications for WEU of a series of contemporary discussions and to identify just where further WEU initiatives may be directed.

6. Current negotiations range across a broad spectrum of specific subjects, usually neatly compartmentalised. These include the purely bilateral talks (such as START, see below) between

the United States and Soviet authorities. Take away the nuclear element, add in the NATO allies and the erstwhile Warsaw Pact Organisation and one finds the trickiest ground to cover – the CFE talks in Vienna which, although still enjoying the reflected kudos of a successfully concluded treaty, have to be pursued in an attempt to focus also on issues concerning other equipments and not least of all on manpower, a subject especially dear to European hearts.

7. CSCE, the United Nations – there is room for all countries who wish to play at least some part in the arms control saga. The latest moves by the United States are obviously linked to problems of control in a gradually fragmenting Soviet Union. The Soviets in turn are trying to grasp the ideal moment to push, perhaps for the last time, certain ideas such as zero options, nuclear-free zones, naval arms control, etc. The end result is surely that the (Western) Europeans must keep their wits about them and not allow their own legitimate interests to be eroded.

8. Such is also the case in Geneva where, at the Conference on Disarmament, the Defence Committee in June witnessed at first hand the rivalries and susceptibilities which sometimes divide even the staunchest of allies. “*Intrusive inspection*” was the watchword amongst those trying to thrash out the modalities of a convention on chemical weapons. Since June other initiatives aimed at clarifying positions and smoothing ruffled feathers have in fact had other effects on many of the participants.

9. Notes follow on each of the forums in turn with the greatest emphasis being reserved for the latest dramatic developments (at the time of writing that is): the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives concerning all categories of nuclear weapons.

10. Fortunately the Assembly's Rules of Procedure will allow your Rapporteur to update the present report and amend recommendations right up to the last moment: essential during a time of such swift and sudden change when the potential for pragmatic political gesticulation rather than calm cartesian logic is probably at its highest point since Reykjavik (although obviously for other reasons and in a quite different context).

### *II. Nuclear disarmament*

#### *(i) The START agreement*

11. Apart from the failed coup in the Soviet Union, with its obvious implications for the future of arms control, as discussed elsewhere by

<sup>1</sup> United Kingdom statement to the WEU Council, 10th April 1962.

your Rapporteur, a major event this past summer has been the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Wednesday, 31st July 1991. The treaty is documented at Appendix I.

12. The START agreement is of course a major advance in the continuing battle to reduce weapons of mass destruction but, when put in perspective, proves in fact to be only a very small step in the right direction. For example, the START warhead reductions, when implemented, will leave both sides at a point higher than when the SALT II talks began in 1972 (although of course lower than when the START discussions themselves began in 1985). Total actual strategic warheads over the years:

	1972	1985	1991	post-START
United States	7 883	11 984	11 966	8 926
USSR . . . . .	2 441	10 012	10 880	7 052

13. Apart from the comparatively small reductions involved and the length of time taken for the negotiations themselves, the START agreement is remarkable for the issues it did not raise or cover, viz. naval weapons, space weapons and strategic arms belonging to third parties (especially Britain, France and China). Britain in particular had always declared that the United Kingdom would only become involved in talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons when the two superpowers had declared their intent to abolish "well over 50%" of their own arsenals. The treaty signed on 31st July 1991 presented no imminent incentive for any of the "second échelon" nuclear powers to become involved in new rounds of talks.

14. Events only two and a half weeks later were to present a very new and unexpected dimension, bringing us to:

*(ii) American disarmament proposals*

15. In his address on 28th September 1991, President Bush presented the United States' new nuclear strategy, and his spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, said that this address would mark "an historic turning-point in our national defence posture".

16. This plan, following the evolution of the situation in the Soviet Union, proposes new limitations in strategic nuclear armaments, including the elimination of multiple-warhead strategic missiles and a review of United States opposition to reductions in sea-launched ballistic missiles.

17. This proposal showed an evolution compared with the last START treaty of 31st July which limited only the number of nuclear warheads and allowed the Soviet Union to repatriate to Russia the strategic missiles stationed in other republics. Here, the aim is to eliminate the vehicles necessary for launching warheads. In fact, the United States is afraid that the central Soviet Government will lose control over nuclear weapons. It is possible that at least three republics might share control and political responsibility for strategic weapons.

18. President Bush therefore believed that to avert nuclear proliferation in the Soviet Union it was necessary to negotiate greater reductions in the arsenals of the superpowers.

19. The new American proposals extend well beyond the previous START treaty. The reduction and possible banning of multiple-warhead missiles was welcomed by arms control groups which have long maintained that SS-18s and MXs were the most destabilising elements in the balance of forces.

20. The new proposals might therefore concern a ban on the plan for the new version of the MX missile and therefore open the possibility of negotiations on sea-launched multi-warhead systems, although the Americans will probably maintain that submarine-borne missiles are less destabilising than those based on land.

21. However, if missile-launching submarines are covered by the new negotiations, this might affect Britain's Trident programme, although the United Kingdom is still adamant that the Trident cannot be banned. Similarly, France will be in an embarrassing position if it continues its Hades programme. For the time being, the White House is proposing that the Soviet Union work in parallel with the United States on their own defence strategies.

22. The United States disarmament plan also has internal repercussions and some experts are wondering whether President Bush sincerely wishes to accelerate arms reductions or whether he is trying to relieve pressure on his budget. Furthermore, if this is an upheaval in the United States defence strategy, its nature has not changed. It is still based on deterrence.

23. The American plan which contains unilateral measures and proposals submitted to the Soviet Union is causing far-reaching strategic changes and calling for vast cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two powers so as to reduce the nuclear threat. This proposal is justified by the end of the cold war and of the Soviet threat and has been fostered by a recent French proposal for a meeting of the four nuclear powers in Europe.

24. The American proposal concerns two nuclear weapons systems: short-range nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons.

25. Regarding the first category, by unilateral decision the United States is to repatriate or destroy missiles, shells and bombs stationed in Europe. It will do likewise for missiles on naval vessels, in submarines or stationed on American territory.

26. Although unilateral, this decision was taken so that the Soviet Union would take equivalent measures and dismantle tactical weapons spread throughout its territory which constitute a real danger in the event of regional hostilities and the decline in central control.

27. Regarding strategic nuclear weapons, the United States proposes new negotiations with the Soviets on the elimination of land-based, multiple-warhead intercontinental missiles which are considered to be the most destabilising.

28. This proposal is favourable to the United States, however, since it does not cover the multiple warheads in submarines where the United States has the lead over the Soviet Union. However, the American proposal is an improvement on the 31st July START treaty which concerns only relatively old weapons systems.

29. President Bush also announced the end of the permanent alert for bombers and strategic missile batteries. Similarly, the modernisation programmes of Midgetman missiles and MXs were abandoned. To offset these measures, the United States President is still asking for equivalent Soviet decisions, none of which call in question the existence of credible nuclear deterrence based on intercontinental missiles and strategic bombers.

30. The third part of the American proposal concerns the joint development of an anti-missile defence system which would mean renegotiating the 1978 anti-ballistic missile treaty which authorises the United States or the Soviet Union to deploy only one anti-missile system so as not to upset the balance of power, but the Soviet Union is opposed to any such renegotiation.

31. The Soviet Union's initial response on 31st September to the United States proposal contained no specific measures apart from a proposal to introduce an immediate ban on nuclear testing and General Omelichev said the Soviet Union was prepared to follow the United States in standing down Soviet bombers on nuclear alert.

32. The Soviets are now continuing talks with the Americans to see how the proposals can be implemented.

33. At the same time, the International Monetary Fund said it was preparing to unveil a plan for achieving global reductions in military spending that could save between \$140 billion and \$180 billion a year worldwide. If adopted, the plan would save the Soviet Union alone between \$80 billion and \$100 billion, freeing funds desperately needed to achieve the country's transition to a market economy. The IMF believes that these reductions are now possible, thanks to the end of the cold war.

34. According to Pravda, the American administration was deeply concerned about the reliability of Soviet control over its nuclear arsenal and this may be one of the driving motives behind the American proposals. Moscow saw some inequity in President Bush's proposal for rapid reductions in heavy, land-based multiple-warhead missiles which were the main pillar of the Soviet deterrent, whereas the Americans were also heavily reliant on submarine-launched weapons.

35. The Soviet response was carefully calculated to show that President Gorbachev was not content to follow blindly President Bush's initiatives. He therefore insisted that they were the direct consequence of the transformation of Soviet-American relations and the logical prolongation of the various summit meetings attended by President Gorbachev. He thus stressed that disarmament was not solely the result of American initiatives.

36. He subsequently tackled the problem of other European nuclear powers to ask the President of the United States whether the United Kingdom and France were concerned by his proposals and renewed questions about nuclear tests which he wished to be totally eliminated.

37. Boris Yeltsin, for his part, has often said he wanted the USSR to take important reciprocal measures. Again, Marshal Shaposhnikov, the Soviet Defence Minister, wants the total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and a larger reduction in strategic weapons.

38. Like the Soviet reaction, NATO's reaction was very positive. The United Kingdom and France, the two other European nuclear powers concerned by the Soviet proposals for disarmament, reacted, in the case of the former, by announcing that British warships would no longer be permanently equipped with nuclear weapons and land-based, short-range shells and missiles would be eliminated. France declared that it would be associated with the disarmament of the two great powers only when the latter reached a sufficient level.

39. According to the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Manfred Wörner, the American initiative "opens up a new and promising chapter in Soviet-American relations. It is a milestone in building a peaceful, free and co-operative

Europe, thereby making the whole world a significantly safer place". He therefore hoped the Soviet Union would respond favourably to these proposals.

40. Finally, to discuss the consequences of this proposal at the level of NATO member states, he convened a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of permanent representatives on 28th September. The latter stated that these disarmament initiatives were following the same course as the present renovation of the alliance decided in London in July 1990.

41. Furthermore, after the American nuclear disarmament proposal, the meeting proposed by President Mitterrand on 11th September last between the four European nuclear powers has now secured an agreement of principle in spite of British and American reticence since they would have preferred prior consultation between the western powers. The United Kingdom fears this might disturb public opinion and part of the American administration does not wish to break with the tradition of bilateral negotiations on strategic problems.

*(iii) The Soviet response*

42. The Soviet response came on 6th October with a more ambitious plan than the American initiative. It proposed the destruction of nuclear mines and shells, the dismantling of tactical missiles and warheads and the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and submarines. As anticipated, President Gorbachev also proposed that the other nuclear powers take part in this massive disarmament plan. He also announced that the Soviet Union would cut its troops by 700 000 men.

43. The destruction of tactical nuclear weapons in response to the American proposals reassured the White House regarding its fears about the use of such weapons in local conflicts or their falling into the hands of enemies. Since these weapons were spread throughout Soviet territory they might escape the control of a legitimate authority as the power of the central Soviet Government declined.

44. The last two items in the Soviet proposal concerned nuclear bombers in respect of which the Soviet Union fell in with the American proposal by decreeing the end of a permanent state of alert and declaring a unilateral halt in the manufacture of mobile ballistic missiles, a freeze on multiple-warhead ballistic missiles and the withdrawal of six nuclear submarines. Finally, it was proposed that the United States study creating a joint anti-missile system.

45. There are therefore five specific proposals in President Gorbachev's statement: tactical weapons, strategic means, anti-missile defence, nuclear testing and conventional means.

46. The Soviets followed the American proposal for tactical weapons by undertaking to destroy atomic shells and mines, deactivate anti-aircraft rockets and withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from the navy and naval aircraft. President Gorbachev went beyond the American initiative, however, by proposing to extend these measures to the air force and inviting the other nuclear powers to act in concert with the two superpowers.

47. In the strategic area, like President Bush, President Gorbachev declared the end of the permanent state of alert for bombers and unilaterally he extended this measure to 503 intercontinental missiles, 134 of which had multiple warheads. Finally, six submarines have been, or will be, de-commissioned, but President Gorbachev did not follow up the American proposal to ban multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles for which President Bush had proposed negotiations. He merely announced a freeze on modernisation programmes for this type of weapon.

48. Regarding anti-missile defences, President Gorbachev proposed studying the possibility of creating joint systems to avert nuclear missile attacks.

49. The Soviet Union again proclaimed a one-year unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, but it is hardly probable that President Bush will do likewise.

50. In the conventional area, President Gorbachev announced a reduction of 700 000 men in the strength of the Red Army, which would bring its strength down to some 3 million.

51. The historical impact of President Bush's address is due to the fact that, for the first time, the strategic defence of the United States is no longer based on the possibility of a surprise Soviet attack. Yet the unilateral measures taken by President Bush are not irreversible: the nuclear bombers are still operational within 24 hours, the withdrawal and destruction of tactical weapons, although decided unilaterally, may be revised if the Soviet Union fails to take reciprocal measures and the programmes that have been halted can be reactivated.

52. This attitude on the part of the United States may be explained by the fact that the disarmament plan is addressed to three different audiences: the Soviet Union, of course, but also the other nuclear powers and the United States Congress. In regard more particularly to American-Soviet relations, a problem arises at present with short-range nuclear weapons whose chain of command is no longer reliable. They must therefore be eliminated as quickly as possible. Beyond the consequences this would have on security, this measure is also destined to weaken the Soviet Union as a superpower and to increase the present gap between the two super-

powers, particularly since the American proposal concerns only ground-based weapons, whereas the United States is a maritime power.

53. In like manner, the American proposal in no way changes the development of the B-2 stealth bomber, the Sea Wolf silent submarine and the SDI programme. Yet Washington reacted favourably to President Gorbachev's speech and consequently the present disarmament process bears no resemblance to past practices based on negotiations. It is more a question of the two great powers trying to outbid each other. In Washington there is now talk of the disarmament race.

54. As matters now stand, the most important thing for the Americans is President Gorbachev's agreement to start negotiations on anti-missile defences whereas traditionally he was inflexible about any renegotiation of the 1972 ABM treaty.

55. Furthermore, in tactical weapons, the Soviet Union goes farther than its commitments under the START treaty and will keep only 5 000 missiles instead of 6 000, thus upsetting in favour of the United States the numerical balance that existed between the two great powers. Conversely, the Soviet Union proposes not to eliminate but to limit the deployment of airborne weapons in Europe, the only category of tactical weapons not mentioned by President Bush, thus trying to break the strategic link between Europe and the United States and thus shake one of the pillars of NATO's doctrine. This is the question raised by General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who welcomed the Soviet initiative, but recalled that NATO would retain airborne tactical weapons.

56. He believes the Atlantic Alliance is necessary for handling instability in Europe and the Soviet military capability, although the Soviet Union no longer has aggressive intentions.

57. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, John Major, reacted in like manner when he emphasised that the American-Soviet disarmament plan in no way affected the nuclear submarine programme equipped with Trident missiles which was the minimum defence Britain needed.

*(iv) The Bush and Gorbachev nuclear initiatives*

58. Heralded by many as the great leap forward in nuclear disarmament, the Bush and Gorbachev nuclear initiatives make for an interesting comparison:

*Ground-based tactical nuclear weapons*

Bush: will bring home and destroy all nuclear artillery shells and short-range missile warheads.

Gorbachev: will match those cuts by destroying all nuclear artillery shells and warheads from short-range tactical missiles. As Bush suggested, Soviets also will remove nuclear warheads from their anti-aircraft missiles and land mines, two types of weapons the United States no longer has.

*Sea-based tactical nuclear weapons*

Bush: will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, submarines and navy aircraft. Some will be dismantled; others will be stored in central areas in case of crisis.

Gorbachev: will match by removing all tactical nuclear weapons from ships and submarines, as well as from navy planes. Some will be destroyed, others put in central warehouses. Goes a step further than Bush by offering to open talks on dismantling all naval tactical nuclear weapons.

*Air-based tactical nuclear weapons*

Bush: will preserve air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe because it is "essential to NATO's security".

Gorbachev: calls for bilateral talks to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from aircraft, and to store these bombs and air-to-ground missiles in warehouses.

*Heavy bombers*

Bush: immediately will take all United States strategic (B-52) bombers off alert.

Gorbachev: matches by removing heavy bombers from alert and storing their nuclear weapons in warehouses.

*Land-based strategic missiles*

Bush: will immediately "stand down from alert" all intercontinental nuclear missiles scheduled for deactivation under the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, or START, signed in July at the Moscow summit. Calls on Soviets to confine their mobile strategic missiles to their garrisons.

Gorbachev: will match by taking 503 intercontinental ballistic missiles off alert, including 134 with multiple warheads. As Bush asked, Soviets will freeze the number of mobile stra-

tegic missiles and place them at fixed locations. Also will stop their modernisation.

#### *Sea-based strategic missiles*

**Bush:** does not suggest any cuts in nuclear missile submarines, a category in which the United States has advantage over Soviets.

**Gorbachev:** will take three nuclear missile submarines, with 48 launchers, out of service.

**Bush:** calls on Soviets to allow limited deployment of anti-missile defences to protect against attack by any of 15 countries with ballistic missiles. Says United States will proceed with SDI, known as Star Wars.

**Gorbachev:** proposes development of a joint Soviet-United States early-warning system on land and in space, plus a joint anti-missile defence system. Essentially calls bluff by former President Reagan, who proposed eventually to share such technology.

#### *Overall numbers of warheads*

**Bush:** will accelerate timetable for warheads to be cut under START agreement, as soon as it is ratified. Also proposes talks to eliminate all land-based missiles with multiple warheads, where Soviets have numerical superiority. Does not mention possibility of cuts in sea-based missiles, where United States is ahead.

**Gorbachev:** goes beyond Bush, pledging unilateral cut in the Soviet strategic arsenal to 5 000 warheads, instead of 6 000 required by START. Calls for negotiations for a further 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons, but does not limit scope of talks to land-based missiles.

#### *Testing*

**Bush:** no mention in proposal.

**Gorbachev:** announces an immediate, unilateral, one-year moratorium on testing of nuclear warheads. Calls on other nuclear powers to follow suit.

#### *Weapons development*

**Bush:** will cancel development of a short-range nuclear missile for heavy bombers, the MX missile, and mobile portions of the small ICBM

Midgetman programme. But will proceed with B-2 Stealth bomber programme.

**Gorbachev:** will cancel development of a short-range nuclear missile for heavy bombers, and of a small mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. Will not modernise railroad-based strategic missiles.

#### *Command and control*

**Bush:** will put strategic weapons under a single command, instead of having navy in charge of submarines and air force in charge of bombers and land-based missiles. Calls for talks on safe storage, transportation and control of nuclear weapons to prevent accidental use.

**Gorbachev:** expressed readiness to begin talks on safe methods of storing and transporting nuclear weapons. Also will put all strategic nuclear weapons under a single command.

#### *Doctrine*

**Bush:** no mention in proposal.

**Gorbachev:** calls for joint declaration of "no first use" policy, meaning both sides would pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This would mean a change in NATO doctrine, which now includes threat of United States nuclear retaliation if Soviets attacked Europe with conventional forces.

#### *Conventional forces*

**Bush:** no mention in proposal.

**Gorbachev:** will reduce army by 700 000 men, from 3.7 million to 3 million.

(A schematic comparison of the various bids and offers is at Appendix II.)

#### *(v) NATO's latest decisions*

59. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of the North Atlantic Alliance held its 50th ministerial meeting at Taormina, Sicily, on 17th and 18th October 1991. The following statements were made in the final communiqué:

"The principal objective of our meeting was to agree a new sub-strategic nuclear force posture and stockpile level which responds to the changing security environment in Europe. In adapting our nuclear policy to the needs of the 1990s we were guided by the conclusions of the

London summit last year that the alliance could reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and in particular those of the shortest ranges. Events since then have confirmed the validity of these conclusions, but allow us to go even further; there is no longer any requirement for nuclear ground-launched short-range ballistic missiles and artillery. In this context, we welcomed President Bush's recent decision, and the reciprocal response by President Gorbachev, to withdraw and destroy the associated nuclear warheads worldwide. We also welcomed the decision to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from surface vessels, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft, and to destroy many of these weapons.

In addition to the elimination of ground-launched nuclear systems, the number of air-delivered weapons in NATO's European stockpile will be greatly reduced. The total reduction in the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in Europe will be roughly 80%.

These unilateral measures, which are additional to the substantial reductions already made in recent years, accord with our long-standing policy of maintaining only the minimum level of nuclear forces required to preserve peace and stability. Nuclear weapons will continue for the foreseeable future to fulfil their essential rôle in the alliance's overall strategy, since conventional forces alone cannot ensure war prevention. We will therefore continue to base effective and up-to-date sub-strategic nuclear forces in Europe, but they will consist solely of dual-capable aircraft, with continued widespread participation in nuclear rôles and peacetime basing by allies. Sub-strategic nuclear forces committed to NATO continue to provide the necessary political and military link to NATO's strategic nuclear forces and an important demonstration of alliance solidarity.

President Bush's initiatives also include far-reaching proposals aimed at changing the strategic nuclear postures of the United States and the Soviet Union, to which there has also been a constructive Soviet response. These initiatives taken as a whole, together with the recently agreed START treaty, represent a historic step towards enhanced security and stability. They will result in smaller nuclear arsenals and a dramatic change in the speed of transformation to a more secure and co-operative relationship. In this regard, we are convinced that a dialogue with the Soviet Union on nuclear policy

would result in improved understanding and increased co-operation.

We discussed the growing problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which remains a matter of great concern. We also discussed the crucial issue of the control of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and welcomed the statement by the Soviet leadership about their plans to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of these weapons. This matter clearly affects the security interests of the entire alliance. We look forward to further steps by the Soviet Union to meet our concerns and to continuing timely consultations within the alliance."

60. In essence, these decisions are a formalisation of American and then British announcements of unilateral reductions and make up for a definite lack of consultation between the allies before the event.

61. Nevertheless, an 80% reduction in tactical nuclear weapons represents the decimation of Europe's original nuclear stockpiles over some ten years and is quite an achievement.

62. As for the remaining 20%, SACEUR has been asked to prepare proposals on the sharing of nuclear responsibilities with future deployment presumably linked to the existing principles whereby seven European nations (Germany, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom) share the commitment from which no country has yet asked to be released.

63. In addition, however, NATO is to study Mr. Gorbachev's proposal on centralised basing, an idea which is the mirror image of Mr. Bush's suggestion intended to maintain one nuclear interlocutor in the Soviet Union, but which would be a definite paradox for the European countries, given past insistence on "nuclear burden-sharing". Again the WEU nations must be very circumspect about such ideas.

*(vi) Nuclear perspectives*

64. In its annual review, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) considers that the USSR is no longer a superpower and the evolution of the Soviet system will have very far-reaching repercussions on the strategic organisation of Europe. The first problem is the risk of the illegal use of the Soviet nuclear potential. This problem turns on three points, the first of which is who controls what. Then there is the question of how the nuclear capability will be shared out between the Soviet republics. Finally, there is the risk of a spread of nuclear weapons sold or stolen by terrorist groups or third world dictators.

65. There is also the problem of the future of Soviet nuclear experts who will find themselves unemployed. They must be given no opportunity to reveal their knowledge to unauthorised states. Co-operation between the western powers, the USSR and the International Atomic Energy Agency seems necessary to settle this problem.

66. Disarmament cannot be total. States which have had access to the system of deterrence will not give it up, but nuclear strategies might now follow the French example with a logic of no war, or existential deterrence, as François Heisbourg, Director of the IISS, has said.

67. The question is therefore: what implications do the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives and NATO's latest decisions hold for the Europeans in general and for WEU in particular?

68. Only four short years ago, in October 1987, our Western European countries, shaken less than a year earlier by the sudden realisation that, at Reykjavik, decisions which could affect our very vital interests were being taken over our heads, our countries decided to subscribe to The Hague platform. Seven countries, with the same Dutch President as now serves the European Community, chose willingly to sign a solemn declaration – a restatement of faith which brought up to date nearly 40 years of common experience of alliance. In this declaration the long-standing Seven of WEU were soon to be joined on accession by Spain and Portugal, giving the present nine-nation membership.

69. About nuclear issues we declared:

“To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.

.....

The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence. In the conventional field, the forces of WEU member states represent an essential part of the alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which from a part of deterrence, the co-operative arrangements that certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security.

Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alternative to it. They should

lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic unity of the alliance and should not preclude closer European defence co-operation. Arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have a common interest in achieving this.

.....

We are each determined to carry our share of the common defence in both the conventional and nuclear field, in accordance with the principles of risk- and burden-sharing which are fundamental to allied cohesion:

- in the conventional field, all of us will continue to play our part in the ongoing efforts to improve our defences;
- in the nuclear field also, we shall continue to carry our share: some of us by pursuing appropriate co-operative arrangements with the United States; the United Kingdom and France by continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are determined to preserve.”

70. Would we be prepared to make the same statement today? Or has the situation changed so much that we can now afford to abandon the nuclear commitment and rely solely on a conventional defence? It is possible to appreciate both ends of the argument, to advocate one extreme or the other, or even a series of nuances in between.

71. The world *has* changed even in those four short years since 1987 and we may all cite our own examples of just how much change there has been and indeed which still lies potentially around the corner. But what we need now, as Europeans, in the nuclear realm as well as in the conventional, is a thorough re-appraisal of disarmament needs vis-à-vis our need for security. Such a re-appraisal should be conducted within the European pillar and should involve thorough transatlantic consultation on the effective way of preserving European security over the coming years. Transatlantic consultation, preferably in the context of the Atlantic Alliance, but also West-East consultation in an open and determined manner to ensure a proper dialogue with our eastern neighbours who are themselves engaged in similar exercises on defence policies and doctrines.

72. While the adage “nuclear deters only nuclear” is probably truer now than ever before, there has been such a qualitative leap in delivery

systems: guidance and propulsion improvements leading to vastly perfected accuracy – accuracy which, as we saw during the Gulf war, may provide precision possibilities which virtually eliminate the need for nuclear warheads in certain circumstances. This aspect must be prime consideration in attempting further denuclearisation.

73. In parallel with such developments, however, has come a measure of inexorable proliferation where nuclear systems are concerned. One of our WEU nations, France, is now joining its allies in signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). An essential step if we are to turn a common face to the problem of proliferation. Coupled with the NPT régime, we need to strengthen the provisions and scope for action of the partial test ban treaty (the missile technology control régime) and also the work of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and in these contexts the Bush and Gorbachev nuclear initiatives are not without potential influence.

74. In particular, five WEU nations will be affected by President Bush's decision to remove battlefield nuclear weapons: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. All operate nuclear-tipped artillery shells and Lance short-range surface-to-surface missiles under dual control with the Americans. In addition, the United Kingdom has announced a significant change to nuclear weapons policy by deciding to remove all nuclear-armed depth charges from ships and aircraft and stocking them for contingencies. In another context, France had already announced a decision to produce only 30 examples of the new Hades short-range surface-to-surface missile system, and not to deploy them.

75. In the particular setting of European security, the Bush and especially the Gorbachev initiatives carry special implications for much greater co-operation in a range of nuclear matters between the two Western European nuclear powers: France and the United Kingdom. Some co-operation is perhaps imminent but there is much greater potential for such convergence in all aspects of nuclear deterrence.

76. Your Rapporteur ventures to suggest that the Defence Committee should further investigate the whole realm of nuclear deterrence in order to provide informed debate in the Assembly over the coming crucial months.

### *III. Conventional disarmament*

#### *(i) The CFE Treaty*

77. The CFE Treaty is designed to limit permanently the major equipment holdings in Europe of the NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries (Table 1).

78. The maximum holdings permitted will serve largely to eliminate the existing imbalances in major conventional weapons systems in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. Regional limitations will prevent concentrations of forces in particular regions which would have a destabilising effect for the security of Europe. Finally, under a sufficiency rule, ceilings limit the holdings of any one state to ensure that no one country can hold in Europe more than about one-third of the total. Maximum holdings for individual nations were set by agreement within each group of states (Figure 1).

79. The reductions thus fixed are to be completed within 40 months from treaty ratification. Implementation of the CFE limits by the Soviet Union, together with unilateral reductions already under way, would reduce its holdings of military equipment in Europe by nearly 100 000 major weapons systems compared to 1988 levels. But even then the Soviet Union will remain by far the preponderant military power in Europe (Figure 1).

80. Problems of application include the classification of certain equipment according to data provided and the removal of equipment from the zone covered by the treaty before it was signed.

81. For verification, all countries should provide each year detailed information regarding the size and deployment of its land and air forces in Europe. The first such exchange, giving details of each country's current holdings in each category of armaments covered by the treaty and the maximum levels to which they would be entitled after implementation, took place as the treaty was signed (Tables 2 and 3).

82. Inspection teams will be able to check the information provided by each state through visits to declared sites and challenge inspections of other sites. Nations also have the right to inspect the destruction of equipment in excess of treaty ceilings and to ensure that it has been carried out in an irreversible manner. In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Defence has established a joint arms control implementation group to carry out inspections abroad and to escort inspections in the United Kingdom.

83. Transparency could be further facilitated by adoption of the open skies proposal to allow NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries to fly unarmed aircraft over one another's territory in order to verify the effective implementation of measures taken by states to conform with the obligations of the treaty.

84. Future prospects include new negotiations for limiting military personnel in Europe and agreement on this should be sought in time for the next scheduled meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki in March 1992.

TABLE I

*Maximum holdings of CFE treaty-limited equipment*

<i>Equipment type</i>	<i>Maximum holding for each group of states</i>	<i>Maximum holding for any individual state</i>
Tank .....	20 000	13 300
Artillery piece ...	20 000	13 700
Armoured combat vehicle (ACV) ...	30 000	20 000
Combat aircraft .	6 800	5 150
Attack helicopters	2 000	1 500

85. The implementation of the cuts agreed in the CFE Treaty will contribute to cementing improvements in European security and will allow the goal set in 1986 to be achieved and eliminate any possibility of the Soviets launching a major offensive or surprise attacks.

86. Regarding the confidence- and security-building measures introduced by the Stockholm document of 1986, the CSCE leaders at a summit meeting in Paris in November 1990 agreed a package of further CSBMs, including annual implementation review meetings, the establishment of a communications network linking all CSCE capitals, and provisions for the exchange and evaluation of information on military forces and for the explanation, when requested, of unusual military activities.

87. Regarding sub-strategic nuclear forces, the treaty on intermediate nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union was brought up to date in May 1991 and now provides for the withdrawal of all United States ground-launched cruise missiles. Ten inspections by official Soviet representatives have already been made in the United States. At the London summit meeting in 1990, alliance leaders proposed that new negotiations to reduce United States and Soviet short-range nuclear forces should begin shortly after the CFE Treaty had been signed. They also proposed the withdrawal of all NATO artillery shells from Europe, subject to reciprocal action by the Soviet Union.

88. Since the end of the second world war, the division of Europe has been maintained by the massive conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The signing of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe on 19th November 1990 signalled the end of the Soviet Union's military dominance of Europe. It also fulfilled one of NATO's long-held ambitions: to balance conventional force levels from the Atlantic to the Urals and thereby enhance the security and stability of all of Europe.

89. Implementation of the CFE Treaty was to involve one of largest disarmament programmes in history. The Soviet Union was to destroy part of its arsenal and withdraw 30% of its equipment from Europe.

90. The sufficiency rule set out in the treaty is intended to prevent any nation from creating a conventional force greater than one-third of the total armaments permitted in the area concerned. In practice, it affects only the Soviet Union. Finally, through a system of regional sub-limits, the CFE Treaty curbs any nation's ability to concentrate forces in a manner threatening to its neighbours.

91. A stringent verification régime will ensure that reductions prescribed under the treaty are carried out. Inspections and information exchanges will make it difficult to hide militarily-significant violations of the treaty. In addition, it will hamper any nation's ability to amass equipment in excess of the treaty's limits.

92. The verification measures thus act as a hedge against future militarism or political excess and provide a standard by which we can judge the actions of the other signatories. The treaty's required reductions and provisions for intrusive monitoring constitute obligations that go well beyond the unilateral and bilateral withdrawal agreements the Soviet Union concluded following the coup in 1989. The binding nature of the CFE Treaty, its extensive verification régime and the strict regulations on destruction, location and storage of equipment will make a significant contribution to the security and confidence needed to produce a new, more stable European order.

*Sub-zones**Zonal limits to ground equipment in active units*

<i>Ground equipment in active units</i>	<i>Central</i>	<i>Expanded central</i>	<i>Extended</i>	<i>Flanks</i>
Tanks .....	7 500	10 300	11 800	4 700
Artillery ...	5 000	9 100	11 000	6 000
Armoured combat vehicles ....	11 250	19 260	21 400	5 900

93. The CFE Treaty includes geographic sub-zones with special limits on ground equipment. Equipment in excess of these limits must be kept at designated storage sites.

*Elements of the treaty:*

Conventional armaments limited by the treaty:

*Battle tanks:* battle tanks are the chief instruments of an offensive campaign and their limitation is a vital element of the

CFE Treaty declared holdings and residual ceilings <sup>1</sup>

TABLE 2

Country	Tanks		APCs <sup>②</sup>		AIFVs <sup>②</sup>		HACVs <sup>②</sup>		ACVs <sup>②</sup>		Artillery Pieces		Combat Aircraft		Attack Helicopters	
	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual
BEL	359	334	932	N/A	236	731	213	133	1 381	1 099	376	320	191	232	0	46
CAN	77	77	277	N/A	0	169	0	0	277	277	38	38	45	90	12	13
DEN	419	353	316	N/A	0	210	0	0	316	316	553	553	106	106	3	12
FRA	1 343	1 306	2 684	N/A	884	1 635	609	535	4 177	3 820	1 360	1 292	699	800	418	352
GER	7 000	4 166	5 402	N/A	3 254	3 282	264	135	8 920	3 446	4 602	2 705	1 018	900	258	306
GRE	1 879	1 735	1 478	N/A	96	1 719	67	75	1 641	2 534	1 908	1 878	469	650	0	18
ICE	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ITA	1 246	1 348	3 958	N/A	0	2 220	0	0	3 958	3 339	2 144	1 955	577	650	168	142
LUX	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NEL	913	743	749	N/A	718	718	0	0	1 467	1 080	837	607	196	230	91	69
NOR	205	170	81	N/A	53	153	12	0	146	225	531	527	90	100	0	0
POR	146	300	194	N/A	0	292	50	77	244	430	343	450	96	160	0	26
SPA	854	794	1 139	N/A	0	1 078	117	117	1 256	1 588	1 373	1 310	242	310	28	71
TUR	2 823	2 795	1 502	N/A	0	2 121	0	93	1 502	3 120	3 442	3 523	449	750	5	43
UK	1 198	1 015	2 553	N/A	339	1 335	301	335	3 193	3 176	636	636	842	900	368	384
US	5 904	4 006	3 545	N/A	2 202	2 337	0	0	5 747	5 372	2 601	2 492	626	784	243	518
<b>TOTAL NATO</b>	<b>24,366</b>	<b>19,142</b>	<b>24,910</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>7,762</b>	<b>18,000</b>	<b>1,833</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>34,225</b>	<b>29,822</b>	<b>20,744</b>	<b>19,209</b>	<b>5,340</b>	<b>6,800</b>	<b>1,894</b>	<b>2,000</b>

Country	Tanks		APCs <sup>②</sup>		AIFVs <sup>②</sup>		HACVs <sup>②</sup>		ACVs <sup>②</sup>		Artillery Pieces		Combat Aircraft		Attack Helicopters	
	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual	Declared	Residual
BUL	2 145	1 475	1 888	N/A	143	1 100	173	100	2 204	2 000	2 116	1 750	243	235	44	67
CZE	1 797	1 435	1 140	N/A	1 398	1 430	0	103	2 538	2 050	1 566	1 150	407	345	56	75
HUN	1 345	835	1 219	N/A	494	1 020	7	85	1 720	1 700	1 047	840	110	180	39	108
POL	2 850	1 730	928	N/A	1 391	1 700	58	107	2 377	2 150	2 300	1 610	551	460	29	130
ROM	2 851	1 375	2 567	N/A	139	500	430	105	3 136	2 100	3 817	1 475	505	430	13	120
SU	20 725	13 150	11 521	N/A	17 767	12 250	602	1 000	29 890	20 000	13 938	13 175	6 611	5 150	1 481	1 500
<b>TOTAL WARSAW PACT</b>	<b>31,713</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>19,230</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>21,332</b>	<b>18,000</b>	<b>1,270</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>41,832</b>	<b>30,000</b>	<b>24,754</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>8,427</b>	<b>6,800</b>	<b>1,862</b>	<b>2,000</b>

APC - Armoured Personnel Carrier    AIFV - Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle    HACV - Heavy Armoured Combat Vehicle    ACV - Armoured Combat Vehicle

**Notes:**

① Declared Holdings represent force levels declared as held by each state on 19 November 1990. Residual Ceilings indicate maximum holdings agreed within groups of states to be applicable after implementation of the Treaty. For all categories except Attack Helicopters, agreed Residual Ceilings for NATO countries do not take up the full allowance.

② Figures for ACVs comprise total numbers of APCs, AIFVs and HACVs. Within residual ceilings for ACVs there are sub-ceilings on maximum numbers of AIFVs and HACVs to be held by each state and group of states. There are no sub-ceilings on APCs.

TABLE 3

*British equipment declared under CFE***Battle Tanks**

Type	UK	Elsewhere ①	Total
<i>Chieftain</i>	244	508	752
<i>Challenger</i>	44	364	408
<i>Centurion</i>	11	27	38
<b>Total</b>	<b>299</b>	<b>899</b>	<b>1 198</b>

**Artillery Pieces**

Type	UK	Elsewhere ①	Total
<i>M107</i>	4	33	37
<i>M110</i>	1	15	16
<i>M109</i>	8	101	109
<i>FH70</i>	68		68
<i>Abbot</i>	18	133	151
<i>105 Light Gun</i>	173	7	180
<i>5.5" Howitzer</i>	9		9
<i>Pack Howitzer</i>	52		52
<i>MLRS</i>	6	8	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>339</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>636</b>

**Armoured Combat Vehicles**

Type	UK	Elsewhere ①	Total
<i>FV432</i>	180	1,060	1,240
<i>FV432 Rarden</i>	1	12	13
<i>Humber</i>	274	39	313
<i>Saracen</i>	129	32	161
<i>Spartan</i>	254	278	532
<i>Saxon</i>	291	11	302
<i>Saladin</i>	13		13
<i>Scorpion</i>	176	117	293
<i>Warrior</i>	115	211	326
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 439</b>	<b>1 754</b>	<b>3 193</b>

**Combat Aircraft**

Type	UK	Elsewhere ①	Total
<i>Buccaneer</i>	62		62
<i>Canberra</i>	50		50
<i>Harrier</i>	94	30	124
<i>Hunter</i>	33		33
<i>Jaguar</i>	137		137
<i>Lightning</i>	1		1
<i>Phantom</i>	97	28	125
<i>Tornado</i>	214	96	310
<b>Total</b>	<b>688</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>842</b>

**Attack Helicopters**

Type	UK	Elsewhere ①	Total
<i>Gazelle</i>	128	65	193
<i>Lynx</i>	56	53	109
<i>Scout</i>	66		66
<b>Total</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>368</b>

Note: ① Almost entirely Germany.

CFE Treaty. Each side – NATO and the states of the former Warsaw Pact – will be restricted to 20 000 battle tanks. Equipment over this limit must be destroyed, but each state may convert up to 750 tanks to civilian use. No one country may hold more than 13 300 battle tanks.

*Armoured combat vehicles (ACVs):* These vehicles provide infantry mobility and fire support during combat. They can be a crucial factor in an offensive campaign and their restriction is therefore linked to the need to reduce tanks. Each side is limited to 30 000 ACVs, with an 18 000 subceiling of the more capable armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) and heavy armament combat vehicles (HACVs). Of these, no more than 1 500 can be HACVs. Equipment over this limit must be destroyed; however, each state may convert up to 3 000 ACVs to civilian use. No one country may hold more than 20 000 ACVs.

*Artillery:* Artillery provides the major fire support for conducting combat operations. Artillery, tanks and ACVs together constitute the core of conventional offensive capability. Each side is limited to 20 000 pieces of artillery and no one country may hold more than 13 700 pieces.

*Combat helicopters:* Combat helicopters offer fire support and air transport for the infantry, giving a commander considerable flexibility of manoeuvre in conducting military operations. Combat helicopters include both attack helicopters and combat support helicopters. Each side will be limited to 2 000 attack helicopters. Specialised attack helicopters in excess of agreed limits must be destroyed. Multi-purpose attack helicopters in excess of agreed limits may be recategorised by rendering them incapable of employing guided weapons. No one country may hold more than 1 500 attack helicopters.


Reductions, regional differentiation and sufficiency:

*Reductions:* Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, all equipment above agreed levels must have its military capability irreversibly destroyed. This important provision will prevent the rapid recreation of military capability or the holding of equipment for future military use.




*Regional differentiation and sufficiency:* In addition to agreed limits on the number of armaments in each category that can be maintained, regional numerical limits also have to be negotiated to prevent destabilising force concentrations in any

FIGURE 1

The treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE)





RESIDUAL CEILINGS



A Sufficiency Rule governs the holding of equipment by individual countries

NATO countries with the nine highest residual ceilings are shown for each category. In each case, "Other NATO" comprises aggregate residual ceilings of remaining NATO countries

For all categories except attack helicopters, total percentages are less than 100% because agreed ceilings for NATO countries do not take up the full allowance



one area. A series of interlocking sub-regions has been created with specifically numerical limitations on each category of ground equipment within each region.

#### *Verification*

94. Each state has to declare the location of its armaments. The treaty provides for the exchange of information which should be brought up to date regularly and as significant changes to such data and reductions of equipment take place. Inspections and information exchange will add to military transparency in the entire region, significantly enhancing confidence and stability throughout Europe.

95. The parties have the right to conduct on-site inspections within the area of application. Two types of on-site inspections are without quota or the right of refusal: (i) reduction inspections of treaty-limited equipment destroyed or converted, and (ii) inspections of the certification of recategorisation of certain helicopters and of the reclassification of certain combat-capable trainer aircraft. One of the most important outcomes of the treaty will be the destruction of many thousands of Soviet weapons systems and these two types of inspections will allow us to confirm compliance with all CFE Treaty reduction obligations.

96. On-site inspection at declared sites is subject to quotas, but cannot be refused. On-site challenge inspections may be refused, but if so the refusing state must provide reasonable assurance that the area specified for inspection does not contain treaty-limited items. In addition, parties to the treaty are committed to negotiating a CFE aerial inspection régime during the current CFE 1A negotiations.

97. This régime is intended to go into effect after the completion of the CFE reduction period.

98. Regarding verification of conventional disarmament, it may be considered that on-site inspections, together with open skies measures for air and space observation, would allow any violation of the CFE Treaty to be detected in time, thus avoiding surprise attacks. This means of verification raises no technical problems and the slight margin of error that remains is tolerable and is no threat to the security of the countries concerned. The only obstacles would be political. Verification raises the problem of unequal access to data gathered by satellite. To overcome this shortcoming, Europeans should therefore develop their space observation technology.

99. Before verification problems, however, that of the implementation of the treaty itself arises due to the Soviet attitude after the signing of the treaty. At the end of April, it was con-

sidered that the CFE Treaty now depended on Gorbachev's attitude since he had to find a means for the army to save face.

100. Ratification of the treaty had, in fact, been delayed because three divisions had been transferred from the Soviet army to the navy, thus removing them from the treaty area. The United States accused the Soviet Union of violating the spirit of the treaty but, to end the deadlock, President Bush has now offered to let the Soviet Union keep the three extra divisions, provided it removes the equivalent number of equipment from divisions in the treaty area.

101. Having accepted this compromise, the Soviet Union then agreed to destroy more than 10 000 pieces of military hardware it had moved out of Europe and a fifth of the equipment it had moved beyond the Urals. This solution was confirmed on 14th June, thus ending the CFE Treaty deadlock. The Soviet Union therefore agreed to include in the thresholds established by the treaty the equipment of four infantry divisions transferred to the navy, the remaining artillery tanks being offset, in regard to the treaty, by reductions in other divisions. The combat capability of armoured vehicles was to be reduced and their ability to transport troops modified.

102. The thresholds for the Soviet Union were fixed at 13 150 battle tanks, 13 200 artillery pieces and 20 000 armoured vehicles.

103. The fact that the deadlock was now ended allowed the states to start planning new discussions on the level of troops not covered by the present treaty. This second stage started in Vienna on 4th July 1991. Three proposals were made regarding national forces: the one by Hungary, Poland and the United Kingdom suggested a three-stage procedure for limiting national forces, the first stage being concentrated on the exchange of information on present levels, the second would be devoted to defining the military forces to be limited and the third would be concerned with fixing thresholds for each state.

104. The second proposal was made by Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom on the formal structure of the new treaty. The third proposal was made by NATO for fixing national thresholds for ground-based forces, thus ensuring a balance of conventional forces in Europe at a lower level.

105. These negotiations are due to be completed by 1992 before the CSCE meeting in Helsinki, starting on 23rd March. However, the failed coup in the Soviet Union will certainly have repercussions on disarmament. The CFE Treaty will have to be reviewed with particular regard to the thresholds fixed which are now no longer valid because of changes in the Soviet

structure. This is particularly so for areas and sub-areas with specific limitations. A further question is what authority will now be responsible for pursuing negotiations on behalf of the Soviet Union in the new CFE 1A round, which started in Vienna on 5th September. This second stage of negotiations concerns the level of troops in Europe regarding which there is great uncertainty since the events in Moscow. The Soviet Delegation has promised that the CFE 1 Treaty would enter into force as quickly as possible and emphasised that the Soviet Union wished to continue the negotiations but the political and military restructuring might raise problems.

106. The CFE Treaty is an essential pillar for European security and two principles must be respected, whatever may happen in the Soviet Union. The first is that the Soviet republics concerned by the treaty must continue to respect it. This applies to the republics within its area of application (cf. the recent declaration by Ukraine) and which might declare their independence. The second is that the Baltic republics should quickly clarify their position in regard to the CFE Treaty.

107. President Bush has now transmitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification. He recalled that the treaty was an essential foundation for moving "from the European security order based on confrontation to one based on co-operation". In spite of recent events in the Soviet Union, the CFE Treaty is still valid and we must reconfirm our interest in having it ratified quickly.

#### (ii) Verification

108. Verification has become a watchword, not only for WEU (whose whole *raison d'être* for over 30 years was bound up in the implementation of a very special verification régime) but also for the United States and Soviet Presidents. And with the creation of the WEU satellite data interpretation centre the WEU is on its way to setting up a growing operational organisation for the first time since the early 1950s.

109. At the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on 27th June 1991 in Vianden, Luxembourg, it was formally decided to further operational co-operation in a number of areas among member states:

#### (a) In the field of space

110. With the aim of intensifying space co-operation within WEU and giving concrete expression to that co-operation, ministers decided to:

- set up a satellite data interpretation centre whose immediate task would be to train European experts in the photo-

interpretation of satellite-derived data, compile and process accessible data and to make those data available to member states, particularly within the framework of the verification of arms control agreements, crisis monitoring and environmental monitoring. The activities of the centre will be reviewed no later than three years after it has entered into operation;

- task the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to pursue studies on the possibilities for medium- and long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system.

#### (b) In the military field

111. Ministers restated their resolve to give fresh impetus to programmes of co-operation among member states.

112. The meeting of the chiefs of defence staff in Paris on 10th April gave further impetus to the discussions under way on the possibilities of developing various forms of practical co-operation.

113. Ministers mandated the Defence Representatives Group to spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures. The results of this work will be submitted to ministers at their next meeting, (scheduled for 18th November).

#### (c) In the field of arms control verification

114. Ministers decided to step up programmes of co-operation among member states on the verification of arms control agreements. In this context, they underlined the link between space co-operation and arms control verification, including verification of the CFE Treaty.

115. Ministers have agreed on practical arrangements for co-operation within WEU concerning the implementation of the verification régime of the CFE Treaty. They also agreed to mandate verification experts to continue their study of the possibilities for practical co-operation on the implementation of a future open skies agreement.

116. At the time of writing it is known that a number of countries: France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have bid to provide the site for the WEU satellite data interpretation centre and, in some cases, also to provide the first director for the centre. By the time the present report is scheduled for discussion in the plenary session, such matters should have been

decided and the first director should be well on the way to establishing a *modus operandi* for the centre.

117. Your Rapporteur trusts that a regular and formal link will be established early on with NATO's Verification Co-ordinating Committee which is already making progress, together with the Verification Support Staff in Evère, in preparing the implementation of the CFE verification régime, once ratification by national parliaments is achieved. Once again it is worth repeating the Assembly's wish, originally expressed in the Defence Committee's report on "Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union" (Rapporteur Lord Newall), that the WEU centre should not be exclusive but should co-operate extensively with other bodies/nations involved in CFE.

118. Another area where co-operation should be established as a matter of urgency is with the NATO school at Oberammergau where courses are being run to help train future inspectors for the CFE verification régime<sup>2</sup>. Four courses have been run there this year, and others are planned next year. All our countries have sent students on the verification courses, bar France and the United Kingdom which have contributed instructors. Your Rapporteur is certain that an input would be much appreciated from WEU on the practical programmes of co-operation among member states and on the experience gained through the various trial inspections already held.

*(iii) Conventional and unconventional perspectives*

*"Arms procurement as part of arms control"*

119. The WEU Council of Ministers "restated their resolve to give fresh impetus to programmes of co-operation among member states" and the Secretary-General has made reference to a possible reinstatement of the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) dissolved perhaps too hastily when the old WEU agencies were abolished at the end of June 1990. There is probably room for such a body still in the international context, perhaps establishing a formal link with the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG).

2. The CFE Arms Control Verification Inspector/Escort Procedures Course taught at the NATO school, Oberammergau, is designed to prepare designated individuals to perform duties as inspectors and escorts to ensure proper compliance with the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty. The course teaches in detail all aspects of the treaty and its protocols necessary for correct implementation of the treaty including: entry/exit procedures; identification of treaty-limited equipment (TLE); inspection reporting requirements and procedures, etc. A mock inspection practical exercise using German or United States forces is included to put into practice procedures taught in the classroom.

120. Three years ago, when the presidency of both WEU and IEPG was held in the United Kingdom, the principle was established of an annual report from the IEPG to WEU (along the same lines as the OECD's annual report to the Council of Europe, despite similar different membership disparities). This arrangement has continued although somewhat intermittently through Belgian and French presidencies of WEU. The time has come to formalise the liaison, especially as the IEPG itself has recently created a new ad hoc group dealing with EC and WEU matters.

121. The potential for co-operation in armaments procurement must be fully exploited in these times of falling defence budgets and in addition a link with the various arms control régimes established.

122. For the furnishing of armaments for export must be seen in the same context as arms control. The bitter experience of the Iraqi episode should serve as a lesson to us all, where proliferation, conventional as well as nuclear, is concerned. The recommendation adopted by the Assembly in June 1991 on "Arms control: force reductions and the rôle of multinational units", (Rapporteur: Mr. Uyttendaele) to "Institute a register of arms sales by member countries, support European initiatives to ensure transparency in this domain and urge the United Nations Security Council to begin the process of seeking a general agreement on the regulation of arms sales", is particularly relevant and greater efforts are needed, in the Security Council and other bodies – why not in a particular WEU initiative also?

123. Of course, it is difficult to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" armaments, but manufacturers might well be advised, if they wish to safeguard their profits, to concentrate on developing "defensive" systems for export, both land and air based. Given the increasing ranges of missiles available now to countries which hitherto had never possessed such systems, placing the accent on anti-missile defence may well prove a money-spinner for the future. The United States has already taken various steps forward in this domain showing a new flexibility in United States policy, a change from the previous refusal to bargain over the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). This comes with increasing confidence in Washington that American military predominance is growing as the Soviet Union disintegrates.

124. The United States idea, a spin-off from SDI, would no longer try to protect the United States from a massive missile attack but would rather intercept missiles, including those launched by "third parties". This programme for a space-based missile defence is known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).

125. If, as announced by President Bush, the United States has offered to share this type of technology with the Soviets and other nations, there are far-reaching implications for the future effectiveness of British and French minimum nuclear deterrence systems.

126. While on such considerations, as well as co-operating on hardware, our governments would be well advised, through WEU and/or IEPG, to concentrate more particularly on developments in the fascinating fields of Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM). In terms of defence per se EW and ECM systems have a vast potential which has not yet been exploited. Further study in the WEU Defence Representatives Group and perhaps in our sister committee, the Technological and Aerospace Committee, is strongly recommended.

127. This sort of lateral, not to say tangential, thinking will be essential as arms control comes of age and as new structures and approaches for arms control become necessary especially in the light of what may be possible at and after the CSCE review conference in Helsinki in March 1992.

#### *IV. Open skies*<sup>3</sup>

128. The open skies conference between member states of NATO and of the former Warsaw Pact resumed in Vienna for one week on 9th September 1991. The three Baltic republics were invited as observers, but did not send representatives.

129. The open skies negotiations had been suspended since the opening meeting in Ottawa in February 1990 and the Budapest meeting in April 1990. The aim of this new meeting is to promote greater transparency through the notification of flights in accordance with pre-established quotas in order to verify disarmament treaties, for instance.

130. An open skies treaty should be concluded before the next CSCE conference in Helsinki in March 1992.

131. Differences between East and West bear mainly on the nationality of aircraft used for flights, the on-board technical equipment, the number of flights and the areas opened for flights.

132. According to Ambassador Hartmann of Germany, there is a chance that the open skies treaty will be concluded as planned, thanks to

the greater flexibility of the Soviet Delegation whose previous reticence had deadlocked the conference for a year and a half.

133. The open skies régime is intended to organise reciprocal overflying of the territory of member states for purposes of verification and transparency. The head of the German Delegation, however, said that there were still two problems: the USSR did not wish to open large areas of its territory to overflights and was calling for the opening of bases in third countries, which was an unacceptable condition for the West. Regarding the number of flights, the USSR was authorising 25, whereas NATO proposed 100. A compromise might be some 52 flights per year or one each week.

134. The choice of equipment and nationality of the aircraft used has not been settled. The German Delegation is proposing to form a pool of aircraft of various nationalities.

135. The conference is to be continued at the beginning of November to settle the problem of sharing the information gathered for which the CSCE conflict prevention centre might be used. However, at the request of the USSR, the next round has been delayed for 15 days and, furthermore, it will be extended to the 38 members of the CSCE, instead of the 22 members of NATO and of the former Warsaw Pact.

#### *V. Chemical disarmament*<sup>4</sup>

*(the Geneva Disarmament Conference)*

136. At present, a few states are blocking the agreement on the programme of work which would allow the treaty banning chemical weapons to be concluded in 1992. For the time being, the central aim of the conference is to complete work on the convention.

137. At the disarmament conference, a convention is being negotiated which would ban the procurement, development, production, transfer and use of chemical weapons, eliminate stocks throughout the world and introduce effective verification measures.

138. In May, the United States undertook, unconditionally, to destroy all its chemical weapons and production capabilities connected with such weapons. It proposed that the conference's ad hoc committee remain in session until the end of the conference so that the more important questions may be settled before the end of 1991 and the convention completed in May 1992.

3. For a background to these talks, see Appendix II A "Current negotiations - a primer" in Document 1223 "Vienna, disarmament and WEU" (Rapporteur: Lord Newall).

4. For a background to these talks, see Appendix II A "Current negotiations - a primer" in Document 1223 "Vienna, disarmament and WEU" (Rapporteur: Lord Newall).

139. The question of inspections is one of the problems that will have to be settled before the end of the year. Similarly, verification of the chemical industry and the composition of the executive council raise problems.

140. Regarding challenge inspections, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States have presented a new approach to the Conference on Disarmament to reassure certain states which feared that such on-the-spot inspections might be also used to spy on their defence secrets. This approach outlines a certain level of protection for national security and installations and suggests procedures to solve this problem. In order to avoid any abuse, the four delegations endeavoured to establish a balance between efficient verification and the need to present sensitive activities which have no connection with chemical weapons.

#### *VI. Biological disarmament*

141. The third Geneva review conference provided an excellent opportunity to strengthen the implementation of a system to prevent such weapons. The problem is to verify the ban on biological and toxin weapons.

142. As emphasised in the preamble to the 1972 convention, the purpose of the negotiations is to eliminate completely the use of biological and toxin agents as arms of mass destruction. To meet their responsibilities, participants in the conference must reaffirm their support for a complete ban on such weapons which are a threat to humanity as a whole. The international community cannot, nor must it, tolerate the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons.

143. This convention is the only usable international standard concerning biological and toxin weapons, but it is not perfect. One aim of the United States will be to pursue actively the search for efficient verification measures to implement the convention and strengthen confidence. The convention will be the main world rampart against this type of weapon and one of the aims of the United States is to strengthen its implementation. It is for the signatory states, however, to give assurances that their biological research is for peaceful purposes since this convention cannot be verified effectively, nor is there any indication that this will be possible in the future. During the conference, therefore, the United States insisted on transparency. The states must be as open as possible regarding their biological weapons-related activities.

144. During the third review conference, many questions were raised concerning proliferation, non-conformity to the convention and confidence-building measures.

#### *(i) Proliferation concerns*

145. The proliferation of biological and toxin weapons is frightening the whole world. Such weapons may be more potent than the most deadly chemical weapons and many are highly unpredictable in their effects. Many countries are working to produce these weapons in spite of the bans introduced by the convention because the control of proliferation is difficult since many research and development efforts in this field are dual use.

146. Unlike the production of chemical weapons, there is no equipment that can be used solely for the production of biological agents for hostile purposes. The same materials are critical for vital research to control the spread of many serious diseases and for certain types of vaccine production. Many substances that may be used as biological weapons occur naturally on the territory of a number of parties. Actually, any nation with a modestly developed pharmaceutical industry can produce material for biological or toxin weapons, if it so chooses. We must therefore ensure that such a choice is not an option.

147. In November 1990, President Bush issued an executive order tightening United States sanctions aimed at preventing the proliferation of several weapons of mass destruction. For instance, the export of dual-use equipment suitable for making biological and chemical weapons now requires an export licence. The President of the United States has strengthened sanctions against United States citizens who knowingly assist foreign chemical and biological weapons or missile programmes.

148. The present situation in the Middle East raises many problems. On 29th May 1991, President Bush took steps to curb the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in this area of the world. He called for strengthening the 1972 biological weapons convention through full implementation of existing provisions; he urged regional states to adopt biological weapons confidence-building measures. These initiatives complete the measures already taken regarding the United Nations Security Council embargo against arms transfers to Iraq, as well as the efforts of the United Nations special commission to eliminate Iraq's remaining capabilities to use or produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them.

149. The United States Delegation is also endeavouring to strengthen the implementation of the biological weapons convention in ways that do not impede the biotechnology industry or legitimate biological defence activities. Thus the United States is reported to be proposing that the parties declare their intentions regarding possible national export controls and

the transfer of dual-use equipment to states that are not parties to the convention. To this end, the United States would provide parties with a list of organisms and dual-use equipment to encourage other states to consider similar measures in their individual export and control policies.

150. It is important for no state to contribute to the proliferation of these weapons. An important step in this direction would be the adoption of national export controls on biological agents and toxins and related equipment.

*(ii) Compliance concerns*

151. Unfortunately, the problem of the proliferation of biological weapons is not limited to states which have not yet signed the convention. We must not and cannot turn a blind eye to states not in compliance with the object and purpose of this convention.

152. Proliferation is a problem for all of us, in part because some states have not lived up to their international obligations.

153. A striking recent example of the threat posed by non-compliance is Iraq, which has clearly had a biological weapons programme, even though it had signed the convention. No one knows how many biological weapons Iraq has produced, nor what it may be hiding in order to pursue this deadly trail. Such behaviour is unacceptable and international pressure should be brought to bear on states which do not conform to the treaty.

*(iii) Confidence building*

154. Since the convention on biological weapons is not effectively verifiable, the only way for the conference to achieve its aims is to increase transparency and openness. The first United States request in this matter is to make confidence-building measures as effective as possible by drawing attention to violations of the convention and by advocating a series of confidence-building measures to increase transparency and to support international investigations into allegations of violations.

155. The final document of the second review conference in 1986 had listed several confidence-building measures, but only a quarter of the signatories applied them. We must do better.

156. The United States proposed that states should declare whether or not they had a biological defence programme. If so, they should provide detailed information on their work. Such information might include a general description of main research activities, the location of facilities, the source and amount of funding for a given year at each research facility and testing and evaluation involving any biological or infectious agent or toxin.

157. The United States also proposed that states provide a null report should they not have a biological defence programme. Finally, the United States proposes that all states inform the World Health Organisation of unusual outbreaks of disease.

*(iv) Problems in verification*

158. There is an inherent difficulty in verifying methods of producing micro-organisms and toxins. From the standpoint of technology, the production of such materials for offensive purposes is extremely difficult to differentiate from production for peaceful purposes and, as long as these practical problems of differentiation remain, the convention will not be verifiable.

*(v) Efforts towards effective verification*

159. The United States is prepared to explore the feasibility of effective verification, provided a multilateral effort is made. The United States proposes to encourage parties to study on a national level the technical feasibility of effective verification and the results of these studies should be reported to other parties; it also proposes to support the establishment of an ad hoc multilateral expert group to study the technical feasibility of effective verification.

*(vi) Consultation/enforcement measures*

160. The United States proposes the adoption of national legislation that includes domestic penal legislation to prohibit any support by its nationals of prohibited activities in any country and report annually on measures taken in this regard. This report might include whatever legislation is enacted and whatever enforcement measures are taken.

161. It also proposes to establish reports where a state considers its international obligations are suspended and to respond to any claim by a state that considers that another state party is no longer respecting its international obligations through consultation procedure or through the Security Council of the United Nations.

162. The United States also asks parties to declare their intentions regarding sanctions against any state using biological weapons. These measures might include cessation of scientific and technical collaboration on any biological work, trade restrictions or denial of foreign assistance.

*(vii) Facilitation mechanism*

163. The United States emphasises the need to improve the distribution of information. Reports circulated solely in the original language are not readily usable. The aims sought in exchanging information are not therefore attained.

164. The United States therefore proposes that the review conference establish a mechanism for facilitating the implementation of confidence-building measures during the five-year period between review conferences. Such a mechanism should be informal and flexible and include facilitating implementation of the agreed confidence-building measures, making arrangements for consultative meetings requested by a party, providing support for meetings mandated by the review conference, serving as a clearing-house for scientific and technical information, obtaining information from WHO on unusual outbreaks of disease and providing a channel for protective or humanitarian assistance.

*(viii) Conclusion*

165. This third review conference represented an important opportunity to review how well the conference has functioned so far and to consider ways of strengthening the implementation of the régime against biological and toxin weapons.

166. Stress should be laid especially on wider participation in the convention and confidence through greater transparency on all sides.

**VII. The WEU rôle**

167. Earlier this year, the Defence Committee unanimously adopted the report on "Arms control: force reductions and the rôle of multinational units - reply to the annual report of the Council"<sup>5</sup>. The draft recommendation adopted then (and debated in plenary session by the Assembly in June) read:

The Assembly,

*(i)* Conscious that Soviet redeployment undermines the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armaments in Europe signed in Paris in November 1990, but insisting on full respect for both the letter and the spirit of this international agreement;

*(ii)* Looking forward to a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession and use of chemical weapons, together with appropriate verification methods;

*(iii)* Insisting that discussions should now begin on considerably reducing numbers of short-range nuclear weapons;

*(iv)* Determined that general agreement should be reached on the regulation of arms sales, preferably within a United Nations context;

*(v)* Noting that unco-ordinated defence budget cuts in the majority of member countries are proceeding apace;

*(vi)* Reiterating the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity through NATO;

*(vii)* Emphasising the development within the Atlantic Alliance of a European pillar, which should be comprised of all European NATO members who wish to be associated;

*(viii)* In the knowledge that the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee has already discussed the creation of a European multinational rapid action force and that NATO's Military Committee has endorsed the idea of a NATO multinational rapid reaction force;

*(ix)* Respecting the sovereignty of each member nation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage member nations to begin the ratification process of the Treaty of Paris while remaining firm with the Soviet Union on respect for both the letter and the spirit of the CFE Agreement;

2. Encourage member nations to give a common impetus to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament with a view to obtaining a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification régime;

3. Make the services of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments available to the United Nations for advice on verification of the chemical arms ban on Iraq;

4. Urge the United States and the Soviet Union to begin the promised discussions on considerably reduced numbers of short-range nuclear weapons;

5. Institute a register of arms sales by member countries, support European initiatives to ensure transparency in this domain and urge the United Nations Security Council to begin the process of seeking a general agreement on the regulation of arms sales;

6. Initiate discussion within WEU on the co-ordination necessary to ensure that a sufficient level of security is maintained in Europe despite cuts in national defence budgets;

5. Document 1270, Rapporteur: Mr. Uyttendaele.

7. Express its wholehearted support for the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity through NATO and emphasise that the European pillar within the alliance should be composed of all European members of NATO who wish to be so associated;

8. Instruct its chiefs of defence staff to begin work on the creation of a permanent multinational command structure capable of planning, co-ordinating and exercising WEU actions in the context of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. ”

168. While the WEU Council has failed to move on a number of recommendations, a good proposition seems well on the way to fulfilment and the Council deserves congratulation for what is now being achieved. Let us hope that this may be a new beginning and that the Council will now acknowledge the pioneering spirit which the Assembly tries to bring to its work, together with a wealth of parliamentary experience which reflects the will of the elector and the mood of the population.

169. One of the particular strengths of the WEU Assembly is that it brings together the representatives of nine member parliaments: nine European assemblies which are fully in touch with the mood in national capitals; a complete contrast where WEU competence (defence and security) is concerned with other, supposedly more European instances.

170. We should now be working wholeheartedly to bring our expertise in WEU together with that of colleagues in national defence committees as well as those in sister organisations such as the North Atlantic and CSCE Assemblies.

171. With the Defence and Security Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) we have held regular exchanges of views, facilitated in particular because of a coincidence of membership where five of our countries are concerned. The frequency of joint meetings is increasing with two held this year: firstly at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to hear the differing views of a range of national delegations there and then latterly at the 37th annual session of the NAA in Madrid. Consideration

should now be given to the possibility of appointing mutual observers between the two committees.

172. The CSCE Assembly is a new creation which is in the process of elaborating a mandate to coincide with what is being tackled in the CSCE conference proper. We should ensure that the WEU Defence Committee stays abreast of the subjects being discussed in the CSCE with a view to making appropriate contributions to the debates, beginning in July next year in Budapest.

173. As to the WEU Council's own part in furthering arms control, there are two strands to be developed. Firstly more of the same, building in particular on recent decisions concerning the establishment of the satellite data interpretation centre (see III (ii) above) and further study on the possibilities for medium- and long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system. This is a very positive move towards helping share the burden of effective verification without which no arms control agreement is really worth the paper on which it is written (who will verify the announced short-range nuclear reductions?).

174. Secondly, there should be a shift of emphasis from the concentration hitherto on bloc-to-bloc weapons holdings towards a new openness, a transparency in international dealings – a harmonisation of interests – more actual reductions perhaps, but also a security dialogue coupled with more structural arms control.

175. High on the list for future action must be arms export policy, arms production, arms proliferation. The question is how to tackle the problem: through selective measures, concentrating on regional or geographic problems?

176. Should one go for the naval dimension in the future, now that President Bush has opened that particular Pandora's box? (Probably too difficult to attack on a zonal basis given the mobility of fleets...).

177. Hence the idea of trying to enhance conflict prevention, crisis management, etc. – which brings us back to the CSCE and the need for a more formal link between CSCE and WEU – something which should appeal to the present Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council!

## APPENDIX I

*Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)*

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed on 31st July 1991 includes a basic treaty text and a number of supporting documents. In addition, there are several protocols that provide implementing procedures that support the obligations of the treaty and which are integral parts of the treaty.

*The treaty document*

The 17 articles in which the United States and the Soviet Union agree to reduce and limit their strategic offensive arms cover weapons limits, counting rules, conversion or elimination of weapons, verification and inspections, cooperative measures, the creation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), and procedures for entry into force, amendment, duration and withdrawal.

*Basic provisions of the treaty**Reductions*

Reductions to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in three phases over seven years from the date the treaty enters into force.

Specific, equal interim levels for agreed categories of strategic offensive arms by the end of each phase.

*Central limits include:*

- 1 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs)
- 6 000 accountable warheads
- 4 900 ballistic missile warheads
- 1 540 warheads on 154 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the Soviet side. The Soviets also agreed in a side letter to eliminate 22 SS-18 launchers every year for seven years to achieve this level
- 1 100 warheads on deployed mobile ICBMs
- Throw-weight ceiling of 3 600 tons.

*Delivery vehicles*

1 600 ceiling on the number of SNDVs, comprising deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their associated launchers, and heavy bombers.

*Warheads*

6 000 accountable warhead ceiling, comprising the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (LRNA), attributed to heavy bombers equipped for LRNA (see LRNA), and one warhead attributed to each heavy bomber equipped only for nuclear-armed gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs).

*Ballistic missile warheads*

Each ballistic missile warhead attributed to a missile counts as one under the 6 000 warhead ceiling.

No flight testing of missile with RVs in excess of attributed number.

A quota of on-site inspections to verify that deployed ballistic missiles contain no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to them.

Ban on new types of ICBMs and SLBMs with more than 10 warheads.

Ban on increasing warhead attribution on future types of ICBMs and SLBMs.

*Downloading*

The number of warheads on up to three types of ballistic missiles and their attribution under START may be reduced ("downloaded") up to a total of 1 250 RVs.

Each Soviet SS-N-18 may be attributed with 3 RVs; a total of 896 SS-N-18 warheads count toward downloading limit.

United States Minuteman III may be reduced by 1 or 2 RVs. Insofar as permitted by the 1 250 limit, up to 500 RVs may be downloaded on two other existing ballistic missile types (up to 4 RVs per missile).

Ban on downloading of new types. Ban on deploying a new type with more warheads than on a downloaded type (except for the Minuteman III and the SS-N-18). Ban on downloading of heavy ICBMs.

If an ICBM is downloaded by more than two RVs, it must be equipped with a new front section platform, and all old platforms destroyed.

*Heavy ICBMs*

In addition to the requirement to reduce deployed heavy ICBMs and their warheads by 50%, other constraints on heavy missiles

include: no downloading; no increase in launch-weight or throw-weight; no mobile launchers for heavy ICBMs; ban on new types of heavy missiles. New heavy ICBM silo construction allowed, but only in exceptional cases for relocating; never to exceed 154 such silos. Modernisation and testing of existing heavy ICBMs can continue.

#### *New types of ICBMs and SLBMs*

An ICBM or SLBM will be considered a new type of ICBM or SLBM if it meets any of the following criteria: change in number of stages; change in type of propellant; 10% change in missile or first stage length; 10% change in missile launch weight; 5% change in diameter; 5% change in first stage length combined with 21% increase in throw-weight.

Ceiling of 21% on permitted increases to throw-weight of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

Warheads attribution for future types of ICBMs and SLBMs will be the maximum number of RVs tested and simulated, but no less than the number derived by dividing 40% of missile throw-weight by the weight of the lightest RV tested on that type of ICBM or SLBM. Application of the 40% rule to new systems with unconventional front ends will be discussed at the JCIC.

#### *Heavy bombers*

Each heavy bomber counts as one SNDV. Each heavy bomber equipped only for nuclear weapons other than long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missile (i.e., only for gravity bombs and SRAMs) counts as one warhead under the 6 000 limit. An agreed number of heavy bombers could be removed from accountability under the 1 600 SNDV limit by conversion to a non-nuclear capability. Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs (LRNA) will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers.

In exchange for not including the Tupolev 22-M (Backfire) bomber in START, the Soviet Union will make a politically-binding declaration that it will not deploy more than 300 air force and 200 naval Backfires and that these bombers will not be given intercontinental capability.

#### *Long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (LRNA)*

Nuclear-armed ALCMs with a range in excess of 600 kilometres (LRNA), will be affected under START. New long-range conventionally-armed ALCMs that are distinguishable from nuclear-armed ALCMs are not limited in START and may be deployed on any aircraft.

For the purpose of counting against the 6 000 warhead limit, accountable warheads will be attributed to heavy bombers equipped for LRNA as follows: each current and future United States heavy bomber equipped for LRNA will count as 10 warheads but may actually be equipped for up to 20 LRNA (except as noted below). Each current and future Soviet heavy bomber equipped for LRNA will count as 8 warheads but may actually be equipped for up to 16 LRNA (except as noted below).

The United States may apply the above counting rule to 150 heavy bombers equipped for LRNA; the Soviet Union may apply the above counting rule to 180 heavy bombers equipped for LRNA. For any heavy bombers equipped for LRNA in excess of these levels, the number of attributable warheads will be the number of LRNA for which the bombers are actually equipped.

Multiple-warhead long-range nuclear ALCMs are banned.

#### *Mobile ICBMs*

Categories of permitted movements and associated notifications have largely been agreed.

Non-deployed mobile ICBMs and launchers will be limited numerically and geographically (see Non-deployed missiles below). Soviet mobiles are: SS-24 and SS-25. For purposes of reciprocity the United States Peacekeeper will be treated as mobile although it has never been tested as a mobile ICBM.

#### *Non-deployed missiles*

There will be a numerical limit of 250 on non-deployed ballistic missiles for all ICBMs of a type that has been flight-tested from a mobile launcher; of those, no more than 125 may be non-deployed missiles for rail-mobile launchers. There will also be a numerical limit of 110 on non-deployed launchers for mobiles of which no more than 18 may be non-deployed launchers for rail-mobile ICBMs.

Other non-deployed ballistic missiles will not be subject to numerical limits, but there will be restrictions on their locations and movements and they will be subject to data exchange requirements.

Various other provisions are also agreed to prevent rapid reload of ICBM launchers.

The sides have also agreed there will be no restrictions on the number of cruise missiles and other heavy bomber weapons. There will be limited restrictions on the location of LRNA.

#### *Exemptions from treaty limits*

75 non-modern heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear arms, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers.

20 test heavy bombers.

25 test silo launchers and 20 test mobile launchers at test ranges.

#### *SLCMs*

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will not be constrained in the START Treaty. However, each side will provide the other with a politically-binding declaration concerning long-range SLCMs, i.e. those nuclear SLCMs whose range is over 600 kilometres. In annual declarations, the planned maximum number of these deployed nuclear SLCMs for each of the following five treaty years will be specified. The planned maximum number will not exceed 880 long-range nuclear SLCMs. Nuclear-armed SLCMs with a range of 300-600 kilometres will be the subject of confidential annual data exchanges. The sides will not produce or deploy multiple-warhead nuclear SLCMs.

#### *Verification*

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was designed with verification in mind, and verification measures were negotiated in parallel with other aspects. Thus, the basic structure of the treaty is designed to facilitate verification by national technical means (NTM). The START Treaty contains detailed, interlocking and mutually reinforcing provisions, which supplement national technical means to establish an effective verification régime. This régime provides for data exchanges and notifications on strategic systems and facilities covered by the treaty, a ban on the denial of data from telemetry, twelve types of on-site inspection and exhibitions, continuous monitoring at mobile ICBM final assembly facilities, and co-operative measures. These elements are outlined below.

**National technical means (NTM):** START provides for the use of, and non-interference with, national technical means of verification, e.g., satellites. There are explicit provisions prohibiting interference with NTM, or use of concealment measures that impede verification by NTM.

**Telemetry:** Parties are prohibited from engaging in any practice that denies full access to telemetric information during missile flight tests, with certain limited exceptions. Moreover, parties are obligated to exchange telemetry tapes, interpretive data and acceleration profiles for every test flight.

**Data exchange and notifications:** Prior to treaty signature, the sides will exchange data on numbers, locations, and the technical characteristics of START-accountable weapons systems and facilities and will provide regular notification and data updates thereafter.

**Co-operative measures:** Seven times a year, either party may request the other to display in the open-road mobile launchers, rail

mobile launchers, and heavy bombers at bases specified by the inspecting party. Additional co-operative measures may be requested following an operational dispersal.

**Continuous monitoring activities:** START establishes continuous monitoring at the perimeter and portals of each side's mobile ICBM assembly facilities. The United States had the right to establish a monitoring facility at Vorkinsk, which is the final assembly facility for the SS-25, and at Pavlograd, which is the final assembly facility for the SS-24. The Soviet side had the right to monitor the Thiokol strategic operations facility at Promontory, Utah, the final assembly facility for the accountable stage of the Peacekeeper. Such monitoring would also be established at any future facilities at which ICBM assembly takes place.

**On-site inspections (OSI):** There are twelve types of OSI and exhibitions. These are: baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, suspect site inspections, re-entry vehicle inspections, post-exercise dispersal inspections, conversion or elimination inspections, close-out inspections, formerly declared facility inspections, technical characteristics exhibitions, distinguishability exhibitions and heavy bomber baseline exhibitions.

**Compliance:** Compliance concerns may be raised by either side in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) or any other appropriate forum.

#### *Data denial*

Agreement to broadcast all telemetric information from test flights of ICBMs and SLBMs and to ban any practice (including encryption, encapsulation and jamming) that denies full access to telemetric information, with certain limited exceptions. Requirement to provide full telemetry tapes, acceleration profiles, and certain specified interpretive information after each test flight of an ICBM or SLBM. As a goodwill gesture, the sides agreed not to engage in encryption or jamming beginning 120 days after treaty signature.

#### *Treaty duration*

The treaty will have a duration of 15 years, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement. If the sides agree, the treaty may be extended for a successive five-year period.

#### *Non-circumvention/third country issues*

No transfer of strategic offensive arms (SOA) to third countries, except that there will be no interference with existing patterns of co-operation.

There will be no permanent basing of SOA outside national territory and no inspections outside national territory. Temporary stationing of heavy bombers overseas permitted, but certain notifications may apply. Port calls for SSBNs permitted.

## APPENDIX II

*United States and Soviet nuclear proposals**United States offer*

- Negotiations to eliminate land-based ICBMs with MIRVs
- Mobility of ICBMs cancelled
- ICBM development to one single warhead missile (Midgetman) silo-based
- United States ICBMs due out under START stand down from alert – early destruction after ratification
- Bomber stand-down from alert
- Cancel STAM-2 missile
- Centralise strategic command and control (C2)
- Destroy worldwide all ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons
- Withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from submarines and surface vessels, return to United States, many destroyed, rest stored centrally
- Cancel SRAM-T (TASM), but preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe
- Jointly permit deployment of limited ABM system and to prevent nuclear and missile proliferation
- Improvements in security, safety and C2
- Technical co-operation on storage, transport dismantling and destruction of warheads

*Soviet offer*

- 5 000 strategic warheads instead of 6 000 under START
- Immediate negotiations after ratification on further cuts of 50%
- Retention of some MIRVed ICBMs
- Stop work on mobile ICBMs
- Scrap work on rail cars and to modernise them
- Return to storage ICBMs on rail cars
- Heavy bombers removed from alert, nuclear weapons stored
- Stop work on bomber SRAM and remove from alert 503 ICBM, including 134 MIRVed missiles
- All nuclear artillery, mines, warheads to be destroyed
- Anti-aircraft warheads stored in central bases, some destroyed
- All tactical weapons removed from surface ships, multi-purpose submarines and ground-based naval aviation, some stored, some destroyed
- Propose United States and USSR destroy all naval weapons
- Remove all DCA weapons and to central store
- Study joint systems – avert nuclear missile attacks
- One-year unilateral moratorium on tests leading to full cessation of nuclear testing
- Agreement with United States on cessation of all fissionable materials for weapons
- Dialogue on development of safe and ecologically clean technologies to store, transport, etc.
- Agreement on no first use

## APPENDIX III

*A CFE chronology*

- 1st August 1975                      Signing of the Helsinki Final Act
- 30th May 1986                      Halifax: meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The ministers call for serious progress towards conventional arms control. A working group is set up to work out recommendations
- 11th July 1986                      Budapest: meeting of the Warsaw Pact:
- proposal to discuss conventional force reductions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals
  - proposal to negotiate reductions in troop levels
- 11th December 1986                Brussels: meeting of the North Atlantic Council: declaration on the control of conventional weapons, providing for two series of negotiations:
- confidence-building and security measures
  - elimination of existing disparities between conventional weapons of NATO and Warsaw Pact member countries and establishment of stability at the lowest possible level
- 27th July 1987                      NATO presents to member states a draft plan for negotiations with three priority aims:
- elimination of force disparities that are detrimental to stability and security
  - elimination of possibilities of launching surprise attacks or mounting a large-scale offensive
  - establishment of an effective verification system requiring an exchange of information and on-site inspections
- 17th December 1987                Vienna: opening of informal talks between member states of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact to work out a plan for negotiations on conventional forces in Europe
- 2nd-3rd March 1988                Brussels: NATO summit meeting
- Declaration of the heads of state: "Conventional arms control: the way ahead": "The Soviet Union's military presence in Europe, at a level far in excess of its needs for self-defence, directly challenges our security as well as our hopes for change in the political situation in Europe. Thus the conventional imbalance in Europe remains at the core of Europe's security concerns."
- 7th December 1988                President Gorbachev submits a unilateral decision to the United Nations:
- reduction of 500 000 troops in the Soviet armed forces within two years
  - reduction of 8 500 pieces of artillery
  - reduction of 800 aircraft
  - reduction of 10 000 tanks withdrawal of 50 000 troops from Eastern Europe
- 8th December 1988                The North Atlantic Council outlines NATO's approach to future negotiations on conventional forces:
- substantial limitations on tanks, pieces of artillery and armoured troop carriers
  - limitation of forces stationed outside national territory
  - effective and strict verification measures

10th January 1989	Vienna: NATO and the Warsaw Pact initial a plan defining the scope and form of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe
9th March 1989	Opening of the CFE talks in Vienna NATO proposes reductions in and limitations on battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery
23rd March 1989	Conclusion of the first round of CFE talks
5th May 1989	Start of the second round of CFE talks
29th-30th May 1989	NATO summit meeting. States approve President Bush's proposal to extend the scope of the CFE Treaty to include the limitation of troop levels, combat aircraft and combat helicopters
13th July 1989	Vienna: NATO presents the plan drawn up at the May summit meeting Conclusion of the second round of CFE talks
7th September 1989	Start of the third round of CFE talks
22nd September 1989	NATO proposals: exchanges of information, stabilisation and verification measures
19th October 1989	Conclusion of the third round of CFE talks
9th November 1989	Start of the fourth round of CFE talks
21st December 1989	Conclusion of the fourth round of CFE talks
12th January 1990	Start of the fifth round of CFE talks
13th February 1990	Ottawa: meeting of ministers for foreign affairs: limitation of American and Soviet air forces stationed outside national territory
22nd February 1990	Conclusion of the fifth round of CFE talks
15th March 1990	Start of the sixth round of CFE talks
26th April 1990	Convocation of stage 1A of the CFE negotiations Official opening of the meeting of the joint consultative group
27th April 1990	Conclusion of the sixth round of CFE talks
14th May 1990	Start of the seventh round of CFE talks
1st June 1990	Washington: summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Joint declaration that the CFE Treaty is essential for stability and security on the continent. They undertake to conclude the treaty by the end of 1990. Joint declaration by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister of the GDR. Troop levels in the armed forces of unified Germany should not exceed 370 000
5th October 1990	Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze agree on the principal questions in the CFE Treaty: – artillery and combat helicopters – progress in regard to ceilings on the number of aircraft, zones and verification
12th October 1990	Moscow: Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze declare that manpower levels should not be taken into account in the CFE Treaty
30th October 1990	Unification of Germany
18th November 1990	End of the negotiating procedure
19th November 1990	The heads of state or of government sign the CFE Treaty in Paris
November-December 1990	Problem of the accuracy of data provided by the Soviet Union. Discussion on coastal defence equipment, naval infantry, strategic missiles and the organisation of civil defence which, for the Soviets, is outside the scope of the treaty

- 6th December 1990 American team of experts in Moscow; discussion of the fact that, between March 1989, when the CFE negotiations started, and the date the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union considerably reduced its forces in Europe. Some of these reductions were made by a unilateral decision by President Gorbachev and some were the consequence of bilateral agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany. Others were due to the efforts to make reductions under the CFE Treaty
- 14th February 1991 The Soviet Union submits further data on its equipment but continues to exclude from the area of application of the treaty equipment held by the coastal defence naval infantry, strategic missiles and the organisation of civil defence. This is a problem of interpretation of Article III.  
The United States does not wish to submit the treaty to the Senate until the Soviet Union has fulfilled its commitments
- 21st February 1991 Convocation of stage 1A of the CFE negotiations
- 21st March 1991 Conclusion of stage 1A of the CFE negotiations
- 20th-23rd May 1991 Visit by Chief-of-Staff Moiseyev to Washington to discuss the problem of Article III
- 2nd-3rd June 1991 Mr. Baker and Mr. Bessmertnyk seek an arrangement in regard to Article III
- 14th June 1991 The Soviet Union makes a declaration at the extraordinary conference on conventional forces in Europe bringing them into line with the treaty ceilings  
The other signatories accept the Soviet proposals as a satisfactory basis for proceeding to ratify the treaty

## APPENDIX IV

*Glossary of arms control*

" 23 " talks	Conventional Forces in Europe talks (CFE)
AA	anti-aircraft
AAM	air-to-air missile(s)
AB	airborne
ABM	anti-ballistic missile(s)
ACM	advanced cruise missile
ACV	armoured combat vehicle(s)
AD	air defence
AEW	airborne early warning
AFAP	artillery-fired atomic projectile
AFV	armoured fighting vehicle(s)
AIFV	armoured infantry fighting vehicle(s)
ALCM	air-launched cruise missile(s)
APC	armoured personnel carrier(s)
ASAT	anti-satellite (sometimes anti-satellite talks or weapons)
ASM	air-to-surface missile(s)
ASW	anti-submarine warfare
ATBM	anti-tactical ballistic missile
ATGW	anti-tank guided weapon(s)
ATK	anti-tank
ATM	anti-tactical missile
AWACS	airborne warning and control system
BM	ballistic missile
BMD	ballistic missile defence
BW	biological weapon
BWC	Biological Weapon Convention
CBM	confidence-building measure(s)
CBW	chemical and biological weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDE	Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe talks
CPD	Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CSBM	confidence- and security-building measure(s)
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CTB	Comprehensive Test Ban
CW	chemical warfare
DEW	distant early warning, radar system across Canada
EDI	European Defence Initiative, for tactical defence of Europe
ENDC	Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, a precursor of the CD
EW	electronic warfare
EWng	early warning
FAC	fast attack craft (gun)
FAC(G)	fast attack craft (missile)
FAC(P)	fast attack craft (patrol)
FAC(T)	fast attack craft (torpedo)
FBS	forward-based systems (US nuclear-capable delivery systems based out of the US "forward" toward the Soviet Union)
FGA	fighter(s), ground-attack
FOTL	follow-on to Lance (SNF missile)
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile(s)
Group of 23	the 16 NATO and 7 WTO nations which put together the CFE mandate
Group of Six	Mexico, Sweden, India, Argentina, Tanzania and Greece seek to halt arms race (also known as Five-Continent Peace Initiative and Six-Nation Peace Initiative)
GW	guided weapon(s)

HACV	heavy armament combat vehicle
HLTF	NATO's High Level Task Force
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile(s)
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile(s)
KT	kiloton (1 000 tons TNT equivalent)
LCA	landing craft, assault
LCAC	landing craft, air cushion
LCM	landing craft, medium/mechanised
LCT	landing craft, tank
LCU	landing craft, utility
LCVP	landing craft, vehicles and personnel
LHA	amphibious general assault ship(s)
LRTNF	long-range theatre nuclear forces
LSD	landing ship, dock
LSM	landing ship, medium
LST	landing ship, tank
LTB	Limited Test Ban Treaty
MAD	mutual assured destruction
MARV	manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks
MBT	main battle tank
MCMV	mine counter-measure vessel(s)
MENFZ	Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone
MICV	mechanised infantry combat vehicle(s)
MIRV	multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle(s)
MLRS	multiple-launch rocket system
MR	maritime reconnaissance
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile(s)
MRL	multiple rocket launcher(s)
MRV	multiple re-entry vehicle(s)
MT	megaton (1 million tons TNT equivalent)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NNA	neutral and non-aligned
NNFZ	Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone
NNPA	United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
NNWS	non-nuclear weapon state
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NST	nuclear and space talks, Geneva
NTM	national and technical means, usually referring to verification
NWF	nuclear weapon-free
NWS	nuclear weapon state
PNE	peaceful nuclear explosion, also Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
PTB	Partial Test Ban Treaty
PUNE	Conference on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
RCL	recoilless launcher(s)
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force (US)
RL	rocket launcher(s)
RV	re-entry vehicle(s)
RW	radiological weapon
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or talks
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SANFZ	South Asia nuclear weapon-free zone
SAR	search and rescue
SCG	NATO Standing Consultative Group, followed the INF negotiations
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SES	surface-effect ship(s)
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile(s)
SLCM	sea-launched cruise missile(s)

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SNDV	strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
SNF	short-range nuclear forces
SPNFZ	South Pacific nuclear weapon-free zone
SRAM	short-range attack missile(s)
SRBM	short-range ballistic missile(s)
SRINF	shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces
SS	surface to surface, designation for missiles
SSBN	ballistic-missile nuclear submarine(s)
SSD I	First Special Session on Disarmament
SSD II	Second Special Session on Disarmament
SSD III	Third Special Session on Disarmament
SSM	surface-to-surface missile(s)
SSN	submarine(s), nuclear
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
STOL	short take-off and landing
SVC	Standing Verification Commission for INF Treaty
TASM	tactical air-to-surface missile
TTB	Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission
V(/S)TOL	vertical(/short) take-off and landing
WDC	World Disarmament Conference
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation
Zero option	United States INF proposal to stop deployment if Soviets withdraw all medium-range missiles

*Arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU*

ADDENDUM <sup>1</sup>

*to the report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Uyttendaele (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox, De Decker, Dees, Ewing (Alternate: Lord Newall), Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Fourré, Irmer, Jung, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Marten, Mota Torres, Moya, Pecchioli, Perinat, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), Steiner, Sir John Stokes, MM. Vazquez (Alternate: de Puig), Vieira Mesquita, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation***on arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU*

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the positive results of the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn on Monday, 18th November 1991, namely:

(a) the decision to establish the WEU satellite data interpretation and training centre at Torrejón, in Spain, with effect from 1st January 1992;

(b) the decision to form a study group in 1992, in France, to examine the necessity and desirability of a medium- and long-term realisation of a European space-based observation system;

(ii) Pleased that the Council has taken so many of the Assembly's previous recommendations on arms control verification to heart and strongly approving the 18th November communiqué on the subject:

“ Ministers took note of the progress made on co-operation among member states on the verification of arms control agreements. In this context, they underlined the link between space co-operation and arms control verification, including verification of the CFE Treaty.

Ministers noted with approval the preparatory steps taken to set up multinational inspection teams as part of the implementation of the verification régime laid down in the CFE Treaty. They approved a set of rules for the co-operation of multinational teams.

They decided to take into account in their subsequent deliberations the possibility of co-operation with all CSCE member states.

The Council welcomed the progress made following the resumption of the open skies negotiations in Vienna, which gives hope for their successful conclusion by the time of the Helsinki follow-up meeting. The ministers continue to attach great importance to accelerating the search for cost-effective solutions in the implementation of an open skies agreement. ”

(iii) Taking account of the new strategic concept defined by NATO at its Rome meeting and its consequences and urging still further practical co-operation between WEU member states to cover all aspects of arms control and disarmament;

(iv) Concerned however that not enough international concertation has been applied to the particular problem of pollution control now urgently required to ensure the safe disposal of both conventional and nuclear weapons;

(v) Welcoming all moves towards a reinforcement of the missile technology control régime and especially the People's Republic of China's recent declared willingness to abide by its provisions,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Support the Atlantic Alliance's new strategic concept and show that WEU, as the European pillar, is ready to respond to current challenges by producing a specific initiative on arms control which would demonstrate our considerable political, legal and technical capabilities;

2. Encourage the participants at the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces to reach positive conclusions to be presented at Helsinki in March 1992;

3. Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay greater attention to the environmental problems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons, study and report on avoiding this type of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this important domain;

4. In addition to seeking progress on verification, satellite observation, multinational inspection teams and open skies, actively seek a greater respect for the missile technology control régime.

### *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by M. de Puig, Rapporteur)*

#### *I. Introduction*

When the Defence Committee adopted the report on arms control negotiations – further initiatives for WEU, your Rapporteur promised to produce an addendum to bring matters up-to-date. The present recommendations are designed to reflect that promise and the following conclusions cover a number of points made by colleagues on 7th November. A further report will be necessary next year to develop certain other arms control themes.

#### *II. Conclusions*

1. Throughout the original report, the Rapporteur expressed his opinion on various aspects of the subjects tackled, making what he felt to be apt analyses in each case, as can easily be seen in the chapters on nuclear and conventional prospects and the rôle WEU should play in arms control and disarmament. However, at the risk of much repetition, he thinks it is more important in point of fact to draw general conclusions that take account of what we know of decisions taken in Taormina, Rome and Bonn in recent days. In other words, these conclusions are no longer provisional as they were when the draft report and recommendation were written.
2. It should first be said that the analyses and opinions expressed provisionally by your Rapporteur were quite simply confirmed by the recent NATO and WEU decisions taken in November and which add a touch of optimism and satisfaction insofar as we can hope for substantial progress in disarmament, détente and demilitarisation in international relations.
3. We have never in fact had such peaceful means of solving possible conflicts, be it in Europe or in the world. The changes in Eastern Europe brought a move from the military to the political which allows hope to be cherished of peace being established. Dialogue, political compromise, co-operation and security agreements are increasingly able to replace armed peace and the balance of terror.
4. To create lasting stability and the necessary mutual confidence, a radical change was needed in what had hitherto been the arms race and the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons. This radical change is undeniably under way. The establishment of the CSCE, the ensuing disarmament agreements, President Bush's initiatives, President Gorbachev's proposals, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the unilateral disarmament decisions taken by NATO and its new strategic concept are a historic change and the unequivocal sign of a new international order and more particularly of a new European order.
5. Many factors have helped to bring about this new situation. It is not only a matter of changes in the East. The situation requires far more complex analysis and it is not for your Rapporteur to do so here; he nevertheless ventures to point out the importance in this process of the new military concepts and doctrines, technological progress, pacifist thinking and pressure, the economic situation, the planned European union, the internationalisation of conflicts, the Gulf war, the progress of international political co-operation and, above all, the desire of citizens, of the public, for the establishment of a lasting, stable peace free from incalculable risks. All these factors, plus the crisis in the communist system, have enabled us today to look towards a far more promising new order.
6. The dilemma that constantly has to be faced is how to reconcile disarmament and the peaceful solution of disputes with the need for guarantees of non-aggression and, in the last resort, means of defence. When one has political responsibility, history, human nature and the present international situation preclude giving in to ingenuity or idealistic or even romantic pacifism, however respectable. Europe and the world must disarm in depth and control armaments rigorously and implacably while guaranteeing security, it being understood that, by ensuring ability to neutralise any aggression, it is, in reality, being avoided: through deterrence, war is being averted and prevented.
7. To guarantee peace and attain desirable levels of détente and confidence, arms had to be reduced, controlled and, in certain cases, totally banned. The report shows the great progress achieved in this area in recent years and even recent hours. There have been considerable quantitative and qualitative reductions in nuclear, conventional, chemical and biological armaments and the most important thing is that the process is only just starting.
8. To ensure lasting stability, there had to be compromises with a view to co-operation and in-depth verification agreements. These compromises and agreements are in the process of being achieved as the report tried to show.

Confidence-building measures and technological co-operation initiatives also allow us to be optimistic in certain cases.

9. It still has to be seen exactly what armaments system will be adopted in the long run. It seems evident that it can only be a defensive system at the lowest level compatible with security guarantees. The threat of a massive attack from the East has disappeared. Possible threats are of another kind: deep-rooted instability due to social and economic factors, ethnic rivalry, expansionist fundamentalism, etc. To avert these dangers, work must be done far more in the political than in the military field. The decisions taken in Paris, Rome and Bonn give a glimpse of a solely defensive system at the minimum level, sufficient to safeguard peace and stability. This is the right direction.

10. The diminishing numbers of nuclear weapons are being assigned a strictly political rôle in that their only purpose must be to persuade a possible aggressor of the uselessness of his action and convince him of the impossibility of winning and of the incalculable price of his act. Nuclear weapons obviously help to maintain peace, and the possibility of their being used is extremely remote. Progress in this area is fundamental and, if it has been impossible to take one step further, it is perhaps due to the circumstances with which we are concerned today, the proliferation of such weapons and their technology or, at least, their possible proliferation being a negative factor.

11. As for conventional weapons, the impetus given by the CFE agreements and the agreements relating to the CSCE meeting in Helsinki will be decisive if these arms are to be reduced to a sufficient minimum on the basis of the new strategic concept of small but operational and rapid multinational forces. In all cases, the defensive system will be based on conventional forces.

12. For other weapons of mass destruction – chemical and biological – we are moving towards a universal, worldwide ban that we must enthusiastically support.

13. In this context, WEU has much to say and do. In the body of the report, as in the recommendations, your Rapporteur proposes certain initiatives which it is possible to carry out: co-operation between members in disarmament matters, control and verification, harmonisation of legislation, co-ordination with other bodies and direct participation in the decision-taking process and the implementation of agreements. The satellite data interpretation centre – to be set up in Torrejon (Spain) – may be a fundamental instrument in this participation.

14. In the end, your Rapporteur considers that WEU, its Council of Ministers and its Assembly must support progress achieved to date during this historic stage in the process of disarmament and détente without, moreover, giving up proposing new action likely to lead to further progress in the near future.

## APPENDIX

***References to arms control and disarmament at the NATO meetings  
in Taormina (17th and 18th October: Nuclear Planning Group)  
and Rome (7th and 8th November: NATO summit)***

***A. NATO Nuclear Planning Group, Taormina,  
17th and 18th October 1991***

“ 1. The principal objective of our meeting was to agree a new sub-strategic nuclear force posture and stockpile level which responds to the changing security environment in Europe. In adapting our nuclear policy to the needs of the 1990s we were guided by the conclusions of the London summit last year that the alliance could reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and in particular those of the shortest ranges. Events since then have confirmed the validity of these conclusions, but allow us to go even further; there is no longer any requirement for nuclear ground-launched short-range ballistic missiles and artillery. In this context, we welcomed President Bush's recent decision, and the reciprocal response by President Gorbachev, to withdraw and destroy the associated nuclear warheads worldwide. We also welcomed the decision to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from surface vessels, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft, and to destroy many of these weapons.

2. In addition to the elimination of ground-launched nuclear systems, the number of air-delivered weapons in NATO's European stockpile will be greatly reduced. The total reduction in the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in Europe will be roughly 80%.

3. These unilateral measures, which are additional to the substantial reductions already made in recent years, accord with our long-standing policy of maintaining only the minimum level of nuclear forces required to preserve peace and stability. Nuclear weapons will continue for the foreseeable future to fulfil their essential rôle in the alliance's overall strategy, since conventional forces alone cannot ensure war prevention. We will therefore continue to base effective and up-to-date sub-strategic nuclear forces in Europe, but they will consist solely of dual-capable aircraft, with continued widespread participation in nuclear rôles and peacetime basing by allies. Sub-strategic nuclear forces committed to NATO continue to provide the necessary political and military link to NATO's strategic nuclear forces and an important demonstration of alliance solidarity.

4. President Bush's initiatives also include far-reaching proposals aimed at changing the

strategic nuclear postures of the United States and the Soviet Union, to which there has also been a constructive Soviet response. These initiatives taken as a whole, together with the recently agreed START Treaty, represent a historic step towards enhanced security and stability. They will result in smaller nuclear arsenals and a dramatic change in the speed of transformation to a more secure and co-operative relationship. In this regard, we are convinced that a dialogue with the Soviet Union on nuclear policy would result in improved understanding and increased co-operation.

5. We discussed the growing problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which remains a matter of great concern. We also discussed the crucial issue of the control of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and welcomed the statements by the Soviet leadership about their plans to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of these weapons. This matter clearly affects the security interests of the entire alliance. We look forward to further steps by the Soviet Union to meet our concerns and to continuing timely consultations within the alliance.”

***B. NATO summit, Rome,  
7th and 8th November 1991***

“ 1. We strongly support President Bush's initiative of 27th September 1991 which has opened new prospects for nuclear arms reduction. We also welcome President Gorbachev's response. We particularly applaud the decisions of both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-range weapons systems. The allies concerned, through their consultations, have played a central rôle in President Bush's decision which fulfilled the SNF arms control objectives of the London Declaration. They will continue close consultations on the process of the elimination of ground-based SNF warheads until its completion. We will continue to work for security at minimum levels of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability. We look forward to the early ratification of the recently signed START agreement.

2. We note with satisfaction the recent achievements in the fields of conventional arms control and disarmament. We reiterate the paramount importance we attach to the CFE Treaty

and call upon all CFE signatories to move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation. We urge our negotiating partners to work with us to reach substantial agreements in the CFE IA and CSBM negotiations, and remain dedicated to achieving concrete results by the time of the CSCE Helsinki follow-up meeting. We welcome the resumption of the open skies negotiations; we look forward to agreement on an open skies régime by the time of the Helsinki meeting as an important new element in greater openness and confidence-building in the military field.

3. The Helsinki meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe, now with the participation of all CSCE states. This will offer a unique opportunity to move this process energetically forward. Our goal will be to shape a new co-operative order, in which no country needs to harbour fears for its security, by:

- strengthening security and stability at lower levels of armed forces to the extent possible and commensurate with individual legitimate security needs both inside and outside of Europe;

- conducting an intensified security dialogue within a permanent framework and fostering a new quality of transparency and co-operation about armed-forces and defence policies; and
- promoting effective mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention.

4. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional armaments beyond legitimate defensive needs to regions of tension make the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We support the establishment by the United Nations of a universal non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. We support steps undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and other initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security. We also deem it essential to complete a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons next year. We welcome the positive results of the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in particular the decision to explore the feasibility of verification. ”

*Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland*

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 7 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman); MM. Garrett (Alternate: *Lambie*), Lopez Henares (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Atkinson, Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Böhm, Caccia, Conceição, De Bondt (Alternate: *Noerens*), Dimmer, Mrs. Francese, MM. Lagorce, Le Grand, Lenzer (Alternate: *Müller*), Lopez Valdivielso, Malfatti, *Menzel*, Moreira, Palacios, *Parry*, Pedregosa, Lord Rodney, MM. Tummers, Valleix, Verbeek, Worms.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Rapporteur's Preface*

In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

*WARSAW**Ministry of Industry and Trade*

Commander A.W. Ochal, Engineer, Director, Defence Industry Department;  
Mr. Piotr Kowalski, Director, Department for Economic Integration with Foreign Countries;  
Colonel E. Hacel, Deputy Director, Defence Industry Department;  
Colonel J. Olszak, Chief Expert, Defence Industry Department;  
Mr. S. Soja, Chief Expert, Department of Industrial and Technical Policy;  
Mr. J. Kipikroch, Chief Expert.

*Ministry for Foreign Economic Co-operation*

Mr. J. Suvinski, Director, CENZIN.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs*

Mr. Jerzy Makarczyk, Secretary of State;  
Mr. A. Towpik, Director, European Institutions Department;  
Mr. Stankiewicz, Chief Expert.

*PCO Warszawa, industrial centre of optics*

Mr. Roman Lukaszewski, Engineer, Managing Director.

*BRATISLAVA**Ministry of the Economy of the Slovak Republic*

Mr. Jozef Belcak, Minister of the Economy;  
Mr. Lancaric, Counsellor to the Vice-Prime Minister;  
Mr. Kinces, Counsellor to the Vice-Prime Minister;  
Mrs. Maria Hrachovcova, Counsellor to the Vice-Minister for International Relations of the Slovak Republic;  
Mr. Ing. Peter Tirinda, Deputy, Slovak National Council;  
Mr. Ing. Josef Blahusiak, Expert.

*TRENCIN**Aircraft repair factory*

Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Palko, Director.

*PRAGUE**Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR)*

Mr. K. Viktorin, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Assembly, and members of the Defence and Security Committee, the Economic Committee, the Committee for Plan and Budget and the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the House of the People and of the House of the Nations.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the CSFR*

Mr. Busniak, Director in charge of the CSCE, and staff members.

*Ministry of Defence*

Major General Dr. Jiré Jindra.

*Ministry of Industry of the Czech Republic*

Mr. Vitezslav Vasica, Deputy Minister.

*Ministry of the Economy of the CSFR*

Ing. Jozef Kralik, Head of the Department of Industry Policy.

The Rapporteur also wishes to thank the following persons, who have been kind enough to provide useful information and help in the preparation of the abovementioned visits:

Mr. Juraj Berta, Press Attaché, Embassy of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

Mr. Roman Jankowiak, Minister Plenipotentiary, Economic and Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of the Polish Republic, France.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ferenc Pados, Defence Attaché, Embassy of the Hungarian Republic, France.

Mr. Marek Witkowski, Economic and Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of the Polish Republic, France.

***Draft Recommendation***

***on the defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the complete economic reform from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy now taking place in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, here also to be referred to as the Triangle;
- (ii) Recognising that the Triangle, in the framework of the former Warsaw Pact, was obliged to develop a large defence industry with considerable armaments and equipment production and several hundred thousand employees;
- (iii) Aware that the traditional export markets for this defence industry, mainly the former Warsaw Pact allies and third world countries formerly in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, have virtually collapsed overnight;
- (iv) Conscious that, due to arms control, severe budget cuts and restructuring of the national armed forces, the home market of the Triangle's defence industry has also shrunk dramatically, with immediate negative consequences for its production level;
- (v) Aware that massive unemployment in many of the Triangle defence industry's establishments will lead to a complete collapse of those regions where they are the exclusive generator of economic activity and the basis of the social and cultural structure as is often the case;
- (vi) Recognising that conversion in a narrow sense, insofar as it means turning defence manufacturing companies fully or partially into manufacturers for the civilian market, will mainly have to depend on private enterprise initiatives;
- (vii) Understanding that the Triangle countries, after more than forty years of complete dependence and submission, have a legitimate interest in an autonomous defence capability linked to the maintenance of a national defence industrial base;
- (viii) Conscious that the Triangle countries have pledged to stop arms exports to areas of tension and terrorist organisations;
- (ix) Recognising that the Triangle countries will gradually have to adapt their armed forces and defence equipment to their new security needs and to their future rôle in a larger European security framework;
- (x) Aware that, in the foreseeable future, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are bound to be full members of the European Community and that in parallel they will be included in a future European security and defence system;
- (xi) Aware that the defence ministers of the member countries of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) recently initiated appropriate contacts between the IEPG on the one hand and, on the other hand, Western European Union and the European Community, both engaged in the elaboration of the future European security architecture;
- (xii) Convinced that for the Triangle nations the IEPG as a European forum is an ideal framework to start harmonising their operational requirements and re-equipment time-scales, while offering them, through a concerted European military research programme and cost-effective defence equipment programmes, a fair chance to adapt their slimmed down defence industry to new circumstances and include it in European collaborative efforts;
- (xiii) Recalling that, notwithstanding considerable liberalisation in the Cocom export control régime, in particular regarding Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, these countries are still among the proscribed countries of Cocom,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urgently call for negotiations between Cocom and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to remove these countries from the list of proscribed countries as soon as possible;

2. Promote the participation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in the activities of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), in particular with a view to including them in the European sessions for armament managers, in the work of Panel I (operational requirements programmes) at an early stage, later to be followed by participation in Panel II (research and technology, including Euclid) and Panel III (procedures, economic matters and action plan for a more efficient European defence industry);
3. Promote the idea of granting Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland the status of developing defence industry countries as defined by the Independent European Programme Group which might enable them to share in the opportunities offered by the opening of the European defence equipment market;
4. Urge all member states to respond positively to requests for advice on re-training, the acquisition of new skills, special help for self-employment and the establishment of small businesses, attracting new industries and developing employment opportunities by establishing enterprise zones.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. Breathtaking is one of the words frequently used to describe both the character and speed of changes which occurred and are still occurring in Central and Eastern Europe. But while this word is rightly being used here in a metaphorical sense, the very pace of these changes sometimes literally seems to take the West's breath away when the time comes for adequate responses to the many different emerging needs.

2. Granted, many efforts are still being made in different areas of concern and no doubt the West's general attitude is positive. Still, one can imagine the sense of uneasiness, if not disappointment, in Central Europe when comparing the fine statements of all Western European governments at the collapse of the communist system in the Warsaw Pact countries with the painful attitude of some of the same governments when it came to fulfilling the expectations raised.

3. Such feelings were perfectly voiced by Lech Walesa, President of Poland, formerly highly appreciated in the West for his candid statements on the communist system, when he said that the West "shirks its responsibilities and ventures painfully into the economic transformation (of those countries)". He called this attitude "myopic if not frivolous"<sup>1</sup>.

4. One of the many problems Central European countries are now facing is the future of their defence industries. Under communist rule these industries used to be pampered and no questions were asked about competitiveness, priority access to raw materials and waste of energy. Now that its privileges are quickly disappearing and that it will have to compete in a shrinking world market, operating according to the rules of the market economy, its prospects are less than bright. Even so, it is employing more than 200 000 workers and its collapse will only aggravate the social economic situation in those countries.

5. The present report highlights the defence industry of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in an attempt to indicate existing problems, their solution as pursued by these countries and the positive contribution which could be made by Western European nations.

6. Even if the products of the Central European defence industry are well known among experts, relatively little is known of its organisation and of the governments' policy to transform and partly convert it. This report should be seen as a first investigation which may be followed up if there are new developments.

### *II. The general framework*

7. It is a well-known fact that under communist rule the countries of Central Europe were effectively satellites of the USSR. Not just politically, but also economically and militarily, they were fully dependent on their great ally. Naturally, the defence industry was no exception to this general rule. As a result of a determined Soviet policy, the defence industry of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland was practically an integral part of the military-industrial complex of the Warsaw Pact.

8. In the early years after the second world war, after the imposition of communist régimes, it is believed these countries were provided with Soviet military equipment free of charge.

9. The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, known as the Warsaw Pact, also introduced a completely different method of organising military equipment transfers. The Soviet Union deliberately wanted to build up the military capability of its Central European allies in order to counterbalance the rearmament of West Germany. Worried that its own economy would be unable to sustain the full burden of a large military build-up, the Soviet Union induced its Warsaw Pact allies to share the burden, a procedure which sounds familiar to Western European ears.

10. Among other allies, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were urged to set up a national defence industry, but at the same time none was allowed to be self-sufficient militarily. They were allowed only a very limited research and development capability, the development and production of key weapons systems was excluded and there was a ban on arms exports without Soviet permission.

11. Within this narrowly-defined framework, Poland was allowed to manufacture landing craft, tanks, light helicopters and some training aircraft.

12. Czechoslovakia mainly made tanks, explosives, artillery, armoured personnel car-

<sup>1</sup> Statement made at a Triangle conference, 6th October 1991, Krakow.

riers and training aircraft and Hungary produced armoured personnel carriers, hand weapons and guns.

13. Arms transfers between Warsaw Pact countries were carried out on a barter basis with weapons being swapped for other weapons, raw materials or manufactured goods. When sales involved the Soviet Union, the barter rate was set by the Soviet Union in its favour.

14. Moreover, Central European countries had to deliver weapons and military equipment to friendly third world countries free of charge at the Soviet Union's request.

### *III. Arms production in Czechoslovakia*

15. Czechoslovakia has a long tradition of arms production, but the efforts of this industry increased considerably when communist rule was installed after the second world war. As said earlier, satellite states of the former Warsaw Pact were encouraged to set up their own arms industries in order to share the burden of a massive build-up of military capability. Czechoslovakia was allowed to produce artillery, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, training aircraft and explosives, of which Semtex became world-famous through its use in terrorist actions. Shipments of Czechoslovak automatic weapons to revolutionary and terrorist organisations around the world were also frequently mentioned in the press.

16. The entire arms industry, now consisting of some 110 state-owned companies, was then narrowly connected with the armed forces command of both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Its management was centralised and brought under the responsibility of the now abolished Federal Ministry for Metallurgy, Mechanical Industry and Electrotechnology. The share of arms production in this sector of the industry increased from 4% in 1950 to 27% in 1953, which illustrates how steep the rise was. In the late 1980s, military production represented 2-3% of gross industrial production in Czechoslovakia.

17. Among the best known arms production companies in the Czech Republic are AERO Ltd. Praha with its successful L-39 Albatros jet training aircraft and MESIT Uherské Hradiště, producing aircraft radio communication sets and a wide range of electronic and other equipment. Ceska Zbrojovka Uhersky Brod is a well-known manufacturer of sporting and hunting firearms and other small arms and TESLA Pardubice produces airport radars, radar systems for military applications and other electronic equipment.

18. In the post-war build-up of the arms industry, large arms production companies were

established in Slovakia. This stemmed from obvious strategic considerations, but economic policy also played a rôle, since these new companies were supposed to boost the economy of this part of the country.

19. Here, ZTS Martin and ZTS Dubnica nad Vahom are producing heavy armour and artillery, such as the T-72 tank, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled rocket launchers, cannon howitzers, mortars, towed mortars and all kinds of munitions.

20. Other important companies in Slovakia are Povazska Strojarne, Povazska Bystrica, producing the DV-2 jet engine and a wide range of other products such as bearings, machine tools and gearboxes, and the computer industry in Banska Bystrica. Almost two-thirds of arms production is located in Slovakia with a labour force of approximately 80 000.

21. When in the late 1980s, for a number of only too well-known reasons, the demand for military equipment dwindled, the consequences were felt immediately, and conversion came of its own accord.

### *IV. Czechoslovak arms exports*

22. Until about 1985, the yearly revenue from Czechoslovak arms sales outside the Warsaw Pact amounted to approximately \$ 500 million, which was one third to one half of total Czechoslovak export revenue. Exports then started to decrease. In 1989, Czechoslovakia had a 1.5% share in global conventional arms exports. In that same year, Czechoslovakia exported conventional arms totalling \$ 543 million, \$ 256 million of which was destined for developing countries. According to SIPRI, Czechoslovakia is seventh on the world list of leading exporters of major conventional weapons with a total value of arms exports in the period 1986-90 of \$ 2 408 million. It should be noted, however, that its arms industry is far more dependent on exports than the arms industries of its major competitors, which all have a considerable home market. Until now, the largest export customer by far has always been the Soviet Union. Other traditional customers are India, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Libya, very few of them being reputed for their purchasing power. It is said that Czechoslovakia has not received cash for any arms sold to the third world since 1985. These customers bought their weapons with long-term government credits.

23. Apart from the licence-produced T-55 and T-72 tanks, the Aero L-39 Albatros basic and advanced jet trainer is prominent among Czechoslovakia's export successes. The Albatros flew for the first time in 1968 and series production started in late 1972. It is the standard jet

*Value of exports of major weapons by Czechoslovakia, 1981-90<sup>2</sup>*

Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values, as expressed in US \$m,  
at constant (1985) prices

Recipient	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total
USSR .....	373	373	373	373	373	373	373	373	259	259	3 500
Iraq .....	107	98	79	79	79	38	38	38	19	0	573
Iran .....	0	0	0	0	0	44	44	44	98	23	253
Ethiopia .....	0	0	0	44	8	16	16	57	29	29	199
German DR .....	41	39	39	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	145
Syria .....	30	30	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	119
Cuba .....	0	0	37	37	37	0	0	0	0	0	111
Vietnam .....	0	93	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	93
Nigeria .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	89	0	0	0	89
Romania .....	18	12	58	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	89
Libya .....	7	7	8	33	0	15	0	0	0	0	71
Algeria .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	30	0	59
Afghanistan .....	7	7	0	7	0	11	11	7	0	0	52
Bulgaria .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	37
Poland .....	0	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
Congo .....	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
Ghana .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7	10
TOTAL .....	583	664	644	634	497	497	570	548	437	355	5 429

2. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by Ian Anthony, Oxford University Press 1991.

trainer for the Soviet and many other air forces and it is also being produced in a ground attack and reconnaissance version. The Albatros has been exported to at least 13 foreign nations and to date more than 2 000 have been built.

24. An upgraded version of this trainer, the L-59, now being built, will be equipped with an integrated fire control system, allowing for live firing. According to Omnipol, Czechoslovakia's main export organisation, it has good sales prospects in Egypt, Libya and possibly Iran. Omnipol also hopes to obtain United States approval to fit the L-59 with a United States built engine and avionics system, which would enable it to compete in the United States Air Force future trainer programme.

25. Other well-known export products are the TESLA airport radar equipment, the self-propelled multiple launch rocket system on an armoured Tatra 813 (8×8) chassis, the Skorpion machine pistol and the 75 model 9 mm pistol which is even used by the United States police.

26. The DANA, a 152 mm self-propelled howitzer mounted on a Tatra 815 (8×8) truck chassis deployed by the Czechoslovak army, has been exported to Libya and Poland.

27. The industrial plastic explosive Semtex, frequently used by terrorist groups, is too well-

known as an export product to be mentioned in detail here.

### *V. The future of arms exports*

28. Under communist rule, where political considerations always held sway over economic performance, arms exports were a means of forcing political influence in the world-wide battle against capitalism.

29. For a long time, arms were often provided free or on long-term credit in the framework of military assistance agreements. Later, when a growing need for foreign currency and raw materials gained ground, commercial principles played an increasing rôle in arms exports and arms had to be paid for in hard currency or were bartered against strategic raw materials.

30. But arms exports had barely started to promise a profitable source of income when radical changes in East-West relations at the end of the 1980s caused a general movement towards arms control and disarmament, formalised in the CFE treaty. Especially in Central and Eastern Europe the demand for new arms collapsed completely, the more so because these countries were aware that the arms race had even further eroded their already crippled economies. Developing countries, the other traditional export market for Central European arms manufacturers, are in such a state of bankruptcy that arms are and must be their lowest

priority. Moreover, some countries such as Brazil, Singapore, South Korea and others are serious competitors with attractive prices on a leaner arms market.

31. The velvet revolution and the advent of a new government did not facilitate the national defence industry's export prospects.

32. In accordance with their long-standing tradition of non-violence, the leaders of the new federal government, desirous to give the world a clear sign that a new Czechoslovakia was taking its seat in the concert of nations in 1990, made it known that it wished to reduce arms exports and that as a first step no weapons would be sold to areas of tension. At the same time, it announced that much of the defence industry would be converted to civilian production. Soon, however, it was forced to recognise that the economic and political situation in the country did not allow it to live up to these sincere and lofty ideals.

33. Prospects of political and social unrest in the regions most touched by a possible sudden breakdown of the defence industry led to reconsideration of government policy.

34. A first incentive for arms export contracts was the country's search for the hard currency it needed for the conversion of its arms industry. Secondly, it was also obliged to eliminate large quantities of the heavy weapons in its national armed forces' inventory as stipulated in the CFE treaty. Last but not least, there was an urgent demand from the Slovak authorities to allow exports of heavy arms for the near future in order to allow its defence industry a more gradual transition towards civilian production, thus preventing additional political and social unrest.

35. In the same year, 1990, Omnipol agreed to sell approximately 1 500 T-55 tanks to Iran. According to some Czechoslovak sources, it had also started negotiations with Iran to build an assembly line in Iran to manufacture the T-55. It seems, however, that negotiations on both issues have not led to a contract being signed.

36. When Jiri Dienstbier, the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Iran in March 1991, his hosts told him they were interested in the procurement of T-72 tanks and missiles. The government's policy to limit arms production and not to export arms to crisis areas was an obstacle to this deal. This same policy has prevented an agreement to sell 200 tanks to Pakistan. It should be said that Poland, less catholic this time, then seized this opportunity to deliver the number of tanks solicited.

37. The proposal to sell 300 T-72 tanks to Syria produced a national political storm. The government argued that such arms exports were virtually the only means of obtaining the hard currency it needed to convert an estimated 700

military factories to civilian production. On the other hand, the authorities hinted that they could cancel the tank sale to Syria in exchange for substantial United States conversion financing.

38. It has been said that both the United States and Israel have urged Prague to halt the tank transaction to Syria<sup>3</sup>, but there is no official confirmation of such contacts, nor if a quid pro quo agreement was reached.

39. On 9th October 1991, the Czechoslovak Government suspended its sales of heavy weapons to Middle East countries including Syria, pending the international peace conference on that region. Officially, this measure also covered the planned export of T-72 tanks to Syria, but the Slovak Government seems to be determined to implement the original contract in one way or another.

40. In May 1991, the Czechoslovak authorities cleared Semtex, the well-known Czech plastic explosive manufactured by the Synthesia Company in Sentim, for export sales. This happened after an international team of chemists had devised a chemical additive to make it more easily detectable by airport devices. Names of purchasers of Semtex will be kept strictly secret, but Synthesia insists that it will maintain strict control over end users.

#### *VI. Conversion in Czechoslovakia*

41. As early as 1988, the then Communist Government of Czechoslovakia announced measures to reduce its military potential in the framework of unilateral Warsaw Pact initiatives to stimulate early results in the forthcoming CFE negotiations in Vienna. Inter alia, it planned to reduce military production by 16 % in 1989 and a further 25 % in 1990. In May 1989, it adopted a resolution expressing the need to expand civilian production at the expense of military production.

42. With the new government that came into power after the velvet revolution, conversion became inevitable because of the new Czechoslovak military doctrine aiming at sufficient defence at reduced cost. The structure of the armed forces is to be changed in order to make the best use of existing resources, while the quality of equipment is to be improved. At the same time, the government declared that it is not prepared to spend a single penny on heavy weaponry for years to come. An additional reason for conversion is that the new government wants to end the production of heavy armour and the indiscriminate export policy of its communist predecessor.

43. Moreover, it was believed that the heavy arms industry is consuming large quantities of

3. International Herald Tribune, 20th October 1991.

raw materials and energy, both of which are being imported from the Soviet Union, which is now becoming an unreliable source, as was proved recently when energy deliveries were heavily cut. According to the government, scarce raw materials and energy should be used rather to improve the standard of living through civilian production and exports of civilian products.

44. In the federal budget for 1990, 1.5 billion koruna was allocated for direct conversion programmes. Arms manufacturing companies were asked to submit their own schemes for civilian production programmes with an application for government financial support.

45. In September 1991, from a total of over 300 schemes submitted, the federal Ministry of the Economy selected 127 schemes which will obtain financial support. Slovak companies will obtain 1.2 billion koruna, while the remaining 300 million koruna will go to Czech companies.

46. On top of the 1.5 billion koruna for direct conversion programmes, the federal government released 2.6 billion koruna in 1990 to resolve other problems related to conversion, in particular to help companies eliminate huge stockpiles and machinery which has become useless, although not obsolete. The huge stockpiles now still being accumulated by some companies are a consequence of the centrally-planned economy. Under the old economic system, raw materials and semimanufactured products had to be ordered eighteen months or more in advance. The sudden reduction in production levels left many with large stockpiles which are often still increasing due to fixed long-term contracts. Stockpiles are now being sorted out. Materials that can still be used will be sold at residue price and the rest will be destroyed.

47. In order to give an indication of the character of the conversion effort, some of the projects retained are mentioned here.

48. ZTS Martin, the largest arms manufacturer in Slovakia, which employed more than 11 000, obtained a 406 million koruna state subsidy in 1990. One programme employing 350 envisages the production of bulldozers in co-operation with the German firm Hanomag. Another programme is preparing the production of water-cooled diesel engines in co-operation with an Italian company and will employ 650. Lorries may be produced in co-operation with an American company at the Podpolianske strojarne Detva. This company signed an agreement with the Italian firm Cesab on the production of diesel-engined forklifts and is negotiating the production of shafts and spindles with the American firm Canon. At the same time, Martin is continuing its efforts to attract foreign capital and the participation of foreign firms in the framework of privatisation.

49. ZTS Dubnica nad Vahom, the second largest arms producer in Slovakia, mainly of combat vehicles, has decided to extend the production of hydrostatic gear-boxes in co-operation with the Swedish firm Sauer-Sandström. It has also developed the technology for producing snow vehicles and snow scooters. The production of forklift trucks in the 5 to 10 ton range is now starting and there is a programme to produce excavators.

50. A relatively small part of arms production will be maintained because it is considered to be vital for the defence capability of the state or because it still provides export opportunities without producing seriously offensive weapons systems. This includes the production of ammunition, radio and other electronic equipment, jet training aircraft, artillery systems and small arms. Among the manufacturers of these products are AERO Ltd. Praha, Blanické strojirny Vlasim, ZTS Dubnica nad Vahom, Tesla Pardubice and Ceska Zbrojovka Uhersky Brod.

### *VII. The scale of conversion*

51. The rate of the decline in arms production and the parallel conversion effort in Czechoslovakia should not be underestimated. In 1987-88, when arms production was at its highest peak, its value was 29 billion koruna. It is expected that the 29 billion koruna of arms production in 1988 will fall to only 4 billion koruna in 1992.

52. The Slovak Republic in particular is affected. While in 1988 the total Slovak arms production was 19.3 billion koruna, it was 9 billion koruna in 1990 and only 5 billion in 1991. It is expected that in 1992 there will be an output of 1.4 billion koruna, or only 7.2 % of the 1988 production.

53. According to the federal Ministry of the Economy, the number of jobs in the arms industry will fall from 100 000 in 1988 to an estimated 15 to 20 000 in 1993. In some regions, particularly in Slovakia, where the arms industry is the only employment generator, unemployment will seriously affect the purchasing power of the entire population and cause an additional crisis in other branches of economic activity such as the service sector.

54. However serious the situation may be in the near future, the existing overcapacity leaves the government and the arms industry no choice. In some companies, arms production dwindled by 80 %. It is said that in ZTS Martin, the heavy arms manufacturer with more than 11 000 employees, 10 % of the employees is responsible for 60 to 70 % of total production, generating more than 90 % of the profit. One may wonder if profit is the appropriate word to be used in this case.


55. In general, the governments of both the Czech and the Slovak Republics agree that conversion of the defence industry is inevitable and urgent. Slovakia, however, has criticised the pace at which conversion is being imposed by the federal government. Its economy is far more dependent on the arms industry, which in some regions is virtually the only primary source of income for an overwhelming part of the population. It is afraid that an all too sudden decline in arms production at a time when alternative civilian production is not yet possible might disrupt the social and political structure of the Slovak Republic, thus opening a door to radical political movements wishing to destabilise the country to their own advantage.

### VIII. Economic reform

56. After early hesitation, Czechoslovakia launched its economic reform policy on 1st January 1991, the last of the Triangle countries to do so. This is progressing in such areas as price liberalisation, monetary reform and the limitation of subsidies, while in others, to name only corporate law, bankruptcy, privatisation and financial institutions, it has not yet really got into its stride.

57. The control of inflation is one of the early successes. While at the start of 1991 price liberalisation produced a steep rise, the situation has now stabilised and according to Vaclav Klaus, the Finance Minister, the inflation rate is at a level comparable to that of other European nations. Here, a tight incomes policy has made an important contribution. It should be noted that the population has accepted a drop in purchasing power of 30 % without too much grumbling.

*Inflation under control*<sup>4</sup>



4. Source: Le Monde, 1st October 1991.

58. Another success was the stabilisation of the exchange rate. After a 100 % devaluation in relation to western currencies in 1990, the koruna's exchange rate has now stabilised very close to the black market rate of five western currencies.

59. Many structural reforms still remain to be done. Ownership law has been redefined, but continuing discussions on the restitution of nationalised property have delayed its introduction. The commercial code has not been revised. In industry, important changes are still awaited.

60. The bankruptcy law came into force on 1st October 1991. So far, very few state companies have closed their doors or dismissed their employees. Many continue to operate thanks to mutual credit agreements. In fact there is a hyperindebtedness among state companies which allows them to survive artificially for some time. It is, however, a dangerous potential source of inflation which will sooner or later create tremendous problems for the government.

61. Fiscal reform should lead to the introduction of the VAT by 1st January 1993. Because of slowness in reforming the fiscal system, foreign investors have been reluctant to move. According to the Central Bank, Czechoslovakia has absorbed \$600 million in foreign investments during the first half of 1991, this being the equivalent of 3 to 4 % of the GDP.

### IX. Privatisation

62. Privatisation, an essential part of the government's economic reform, only just started in 1991. In Czechoslovakia, the private sector has always been less important than in Hungary and Poland. Before the velvet revolution, 97 % of total production was in government control.

63. The so-called small privatisation has been under way since the beginning of 1991. It is said that until now more than 10 000 shops, restaurants and small industrial companies have been sold. The government's aim is to sell 100 000 economic units to the private sector.

64. Czechoslovakia has now started to privatise large companies. A company should take the initiative of choosing one of four options: selling itself to foreign partners, turning to the stock exchange, distributing shares to employees, or using the voucher method (see paragraphs 68-69). Some 1 776 large companies are to present their plans for the future for approval before 31st October 1991 and the second batch of 1 118 companies should follow before 31st May 1992.

65. Recently, however, the Minister for Privatisation of the Czech Republic announced that this privatisation programme was being delayed to make sure it was prepared properly. Originally scheduled to start in January 1991, it is now unlikely to start before March.

66. Approval should be obtained from the ministry which owns the company, the Ministry for Privatisation and the "Fund responsible for national wealth". It is still questionable, however, whether enough reliable experts can be found to handle all requests.

67. The defence industry will be privatised only in the last resort. No final decisions have yet been taken as to which part of this industry will remain under state control. Some larger companies may be divided into sections in order to allow partial privatisation.

68. Parallel to privatisation, Czechoslovakia will have to modernise its banking system from top to bottom. The client-oriented service is non-existent and a great deal of red tape will have to be eliminated.

69. Another issue is the new legislation governing investment funds. As part of the privatisation effort, citizens will be able to buy investment vouchers. These vouchers entitle them to subscribe to shares of individual companies or to shares in special investment funds. The government is endeavouring to have all privatisation shares distributed by the end of 1992.

70. Nobody knows how the investment funds will function and many questions still have to be settled such as how these funds will be managed and if there will also be specific responsibility for surveying and advising former state companies so that they may become modern, efficient companies.

#### *X. Government support programmes for the industry*

71. The Czechoslovak industry is now facing several problems caused by the lack of flexibility of the centrally planned economy and its inability to react immediately to the needs of the market. The greatest problem now is the inferior level of the technology of Czechoslovak industrial production, in particular in the consumer goods industry. The poor-quality products provided by an antiquated industry lacking even the most basic knowledge in marketing could not be competitive on the European or world market. This has the inevitable consequence of poor performance on the export market, the complete inability to buy in the markets of industrialised nations and thus there is ever-increasing underdevelopment.

72. Both the Czech and the Slovak Republics agree that economic reform is the only solution for the many social and economic problems they are facing. The two have different opinions on the speed and the degree of progress towards economic reform.

#### *(a) Policy of the Czech Republic*

73. At the end of March 1990, the Czech Government published a support programme for the development of industrial production in the Czech Republic which is aimed mainly at support for the creation and development of small and medium-sized companies, in particular in the weakest areas of the existing structure of Czech industry.

74. A state subsidy will be granted to citizens whose projects, in accordance with the criteria set out in the programme, are accepted in a comparative test. Projects should contribute to reducing the consumption of energy and materials, to better use of the country's raw material resources and to increased performance and competitiveness of industrial production. Among the remaining criteria are the creation of new jobs and a positive environmental contribution. Candidates should guarantee a majority participation in funding the project. Accepted projects will have advantages such as a three-year interest-free loan, a non-reimbursable allowance up to 20 % of the cost, reimbursement of the cost of a bank credit, a tax reduction and a state guarantee of up to 70 % for bank credits. Several hundred applications have now been submitted and they are being examined by experts.

#### *(b) Policy of the Slovak Republic*


75. However, while the Czech Republic is in full agreement with the shock therapy chosen by the federal government, a number of Slovak economists are not. They argue that the basic conditions of the Slovak economy are different from those in the Czech Republic, referring to the following specific odds:

- Slovak industries are mainly concerned with processing imported raw materials such as petrol, iron ore and non-ferrous metals;
- the triple devaluation of the koruna has strongly limited Czechoslovakia's import ability and this had a far more direct negative influence on Slovakia's industry than on the Czech industry which is mainly manufacturing consumer products;
- the major part of the federation's arms industry, now confronted with a radical conversion programme affecting more than 80 000 employees, is located in the Slovak Republic.

76. But there is more. In the Czech Republic including Bohemia and Moravia, with 10.3 million inhabitants, unemployment in May 1991 was 92 000 or 1.9 % of the labour force. In Slovakia with a 5.2 million population, including 53 000 Czechs and 560 000 Hungarians, unemployment in May 1991 was 130 000 people or 5 % of the labour force with a daily increase of one thousand unemployed since June this year.

77. The price of food in Slovakia is on average 4 % higher than in the Czech Republic, while consumer goods in Slovakia are even 13 % more expensive.

*Unequal unemployment*<sup>5</sup>



78. As the economic reform gathers momentum, the creation of new industrial activity appears to be limited and unemployment is increasing twice as fast as in the Czech Republic. This is causing a sharp decline in the population's purchasing power, which in turn has a negative influence on the marketing of new products. Social and political problems are the result of this downward spiral.

79. As pointed out in earlier chapters, Slovakia's main concern is its arms industry with 80.000 employees. Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, it has been deprived of 90 % of its market in Eastern Europe. Other regular consumers such as Syria and Iran are still willing to buy heavy arms, but this is causing a political upheaval and recently the federal government stopped heavy arms exports to the Middle East,

a decision which the Slovak Government contested by all possible means.

80. Apart from the arms industry, the Slovak building industry is also seriously afflicted and it is said that 30 % of the workers in this sector will soon be unemployed. It goes without saying that the suppliers of this industry will suffer the same fate.

81. All this, Slovak economists say, combined with the strict austerity policy of the federal government, could lead to an outright disaster. In short, they plead for an active employment policy by the government, which means maintaining and stimulating industries with good chances for the future and creating new jobs by supporting investments in both the production and services industry. In particular they strongly advocate rapid action in the following:

- solving the problem of company insolvency;
- creating regional employment programmes;
- establishing rules to stimulate the employment of graduates, which would also prevent a brain drain from Slovakia.

82. Until now, this partly-justified criticism has not led to new decisions and a determined policy on the part of the Slovak Government, mainly due to lack of funds and the difficulty in reaching agreement with the federal government. It is to be hoped that no precious time will be wasted; only an early dynamic approach will help.

#### *XI. Czechoslovakia's economic results and prospects*

83. Understandably, in many respects 1990 was a disastrous year for the Czechoslovak economy. The old communist economic system collapsed while new market relations only gradually started to emerge. The management of companies was changed radically and large economic units were split up into smaller ones. There were many uncertainties about property and the best way to organise privatisation.

84. There was just as much trouble in external trade relations. Comecon disintegrated and the economic situation in the Soviet Union, traditionally Czechoslovakia's most important trading partner, continued to deteriorate. At the moment, the Soviet Union has a debt of approximately \$5 billion in its trade with Czechoslovakia. Both these developments led to the loss of important export markets and problems in the provision of fuel and raw materials. Other important export markets virtually disappeared when the GDR ceased to exist and a trade embargo was proclaimed against Iraq.

85. The main economic indicators for the first half of 1991 are bad. On average, industrial

5. Source: Le Monde, 1st October 1991.

production was down 17 %, while the unemployment rate went up 5 %. Consumer prices went up almost 50 % after the price liberalisation on 1st January 1991. It is encouraging, however, that the transition to a market economy did not cause any significant social unrest and that, for the time being, inflation is under control at a level comparable to the Western European average rate.

### *XII. Czechoslovakia's economy*

86. It is expected that by the end of 1991 the Czechoslovak balance of payments will have a deficit of \$ 2.5 billion.

87. The communist government was quite careful not to increase the national debt beyond the country's resources. While in the period 1985-89 the debt increased from \$ 2.6 billion to \$ 7.9 billion, it is expected to increase to a relatively modest \$ 8.7 billion by the end of 1991.

88. In January 1991, the IMF approved Czechoslovakia's economic reform programme and granted a loan of \$ 1.7 billion. At the same time, the EC granted a \$ 500 million loan and the World Bank a \$ 450 million loan.

89. In the Czech Republic, the total value of privatised property is estimated at 550 billion Czech koruna. Privatisation concerns 1 321 companies of the Czech Ministry of Industry. Of these, more than 150 have made progress in their negotiations with foreign partners.

90. In 1990, federal expenditure for defence and security was slashed by 12 % compared to 1989. Part of the savings were a reduction of military service from 24 to 18 months and from 19 to 12 months for conscripts with higher education certificates.

91. Also in 1990, subsidies to economic organisations such as co-operative agricultural establishments were cut by 10 %. The government is also considering economies in research and development.

92. The government's restrictive policy regarding subsidies for industrial activity has caused serious financial problems for a number of companies. It has been clearly stated, however, that companies should solve these problems preferably by mobilising internal reserves, with bank credits or by bond issues.

### *XIII. Hungary's defence industry*

93. As compared to Czechoslovakia and Poland, the capabilities of Hungary's national defence industry are rather limited. A number of defence manufacturers are concerned with the production of hand weapons, guns and ammunition, in particular the companies FéG (arms

and machinery), Danuvia, Diosgyöri Gépgyar, Mechanikai Művek (mechanical works), Matra-vidéki Fémművek (steelworks of the Matra area), and Bakony Művek. Of these manufacturers, Danuvia is no longer existent while FéG and Diosgyöri Gépgyar are being restructured. All the others have practically given up their defence manufacturing activities.

94. There is no aeronautical industry in Hungary but the Pest-vidéki Gépgyar is a maintenance establishment for aircraft of the national air force. This establishment is in financial trouble at the moment because of the lack of new maintenance contracts for aircraft and helicopters of former Warsaw Pact countries, once an important source of income. Discussions to privatise Pest-vidéki Gépgyar have started with a British company interested in civil aircraft repair, but these can only be concluded successfully if the new company to be set up can guarantee the maintenance and repair of the national air force's aircraft. According to experts, both these different activities would have to be conducted in strictly separate establishments.

95. Moreover, the continuation of an autonomous national military aircraft maintenance and repair activity is considered to be vital for future aircraft replacement. It is said that Hungary will have to replace its aging fighter aircraft by the end of this decade, in which case it should have a national industrial establishment which could serve as a basis for offset activities.

96. The truck manufacturers Raba and CSEPEL still have the capacity to produce heavy trucks for the army in the 5 to 10 tons category, but an imminent bankruptcy is jeopardising the very existence of both establishments.

97. The mechanical works of Gödöllő, a repair shop for the armed forces' armoured cars which is also partly responsible for manufacturing army vehicles, has already gone bankrupt but the managers are arguing that an immediate state subsidy for the Gödöllő mechanical works would be cheaper than recreating the same capacity at a later stage.

98. Hungary also has an electronics industry which is producing for both the civilian and the military market. This industrial activity could boast positive results in the era of radio tubes until the beginning of the 1960s, but lost its competitive edge when it had to comply to Soviet licences which were less advanced than the Hungarian technology. A microelectronics programme, initiated in 1978 to catch up with new developments, was not very successful. The main national companies in this field, Mechanikai Labor Művek, Finommechanikai Művek and ORION, are in great trouble now and Videoton has started to wind down its activities. Apart from producing for the military,

Videoton used to export electronic goods with vintage technology to the Soviet market and throughout Eastern Europe, but all this came to an end when the importation of these goods from third countries was liberalised. It should be noted, however, that many of Videoton's skilled labourers have found jobs at a consumer electronics plant taken over by Philips or at a \$ 100 million new electronics component plant built by Ford in Videoton's home town.

99. Notwithstanding this gloomy situation, Hungary has managed to create and maintain a research capability of world level in certain areas of electronics which is believed would enable it to play a rôle in the development of a new air defence system, considered as one of the major priorities.

100. Both industry representatives and national defence authorities are well aware that a national defence industry, due to the limited needs of the national armed forces, would not be cost-effective without considerable export activities. In this framework it should be noted, however, that according to SIPRI's latest world list of values of exports of major conventional weapons over the period 1981-90, Hungary is ranked 48th, as compared to Czechoslovakia 8th and Poland 16th. It is noted here that Hungary will certainly not have an easy job in trying to extend its share in a leaner international defence market where it will meet increasingly aggressive marketing practices of other established defence industries.

#### *XIV. Hungary's economic policy*

101. Since 1968, Hungary has already made cautious attempts to shift to a market economy under its reform-minded communist régime, but the pace has been very slow. The new democratic government has had to take far more radical decisions about economic reform and it is well known that the main goals of the Hungarian economic policy are to curb inflation, create a monetary and fiscal balance and institute structural reform.

102. The cut in subsidies for energy prices and a further reduction in a number of other subsidies made the consumer price inflation increase to 38.9 % in June 1991. Since then, the inflation rate has declined and it is expected to fall towards 20 % next year.

103. Exports to hard currency markets have increased by 18 % in both 1990 and 1991. Exports to the former Comecon countries however are expected to fall by 60 % in 1991, and at the moment these represent only 15 % of total exports.

104. Hungary's energy-consuming heavy industry is performing very badly at the moment, but the declining production and

growing unemployment in this sector of the economy is partly counterbalanced by the activities of many small private companies. The government intends to restructure part of the heavy industry in order to maintain employment in especially hard hit areas of the country. Unemployment is expected to rise to between 300 000 and 320 000 by the end of 1991.

105. It should be noted that in the last 18 months more than 40 000 small private companies have been established. While a few years ago, the private sector as a whole accounted for approximately 10 % the nation's GDP, some experts now estimate it at about 50 % of GDP. This is more than the 25 % reflected in official statistics, but these experts point to the fact that a large part of the private sector's activities is not yet covered by official statistics.

106. Unlike Czechoslovakia and Poland, Hungary rejects any system to distribute ownership of state companies among the population through vouchers or otherwise. With a few specific exceptions, privatisation is taking place through the classic method of sale to new owners.

107. A first centralised privatisation programme, launched in 1990, turned out to be a failure, and this year, a simplified method, called "self-privatisation" has been introduced. The State Property Agency has drawn up a list of approved privatisation consultants. Companies can choose a consultant from this list, but apart from that they are expected to find private investors on their own. This new system of self-privatisation is being applied for a first group of 343 small state enterprises and this number could be extended to 900 in the coming months.

108. At the moment, approximately one-tenth of Hungary's 2 000 state-owned enterprises have been fully or partly privatised, representing 4 % of GDP. This last figure is expected to rise to 14 % by mid-1992.

109. Among the Triangle countries, Hungary appears to be the most attractive country for foreign investors. While in 1990 it attracted \$ 300 million in foreign investments, in the first nine months of 1991 these investments totalled around \$ 800 million and the central bank expects this amount to increase to more than \$ 1 billion by the end of this year. The Hungarian Government has now published a list of strategic companies in which foreign control would not be permitted and this clarification has to define the field for action for foreign investors.

110. As is the case in the other Triangle countries, many companies need more than foreign investments; they also need management skills, technology and marketing channels.

### *XV. Arms production in Poland*

111. Poland started to establish the basis of its existing defence industry shortly after the first world war. The first combat aircraft were built in 1921 and in the same early 1920s arms manufacturing companies like MESKO in Skarzysko Kamienna, Lucznik in Radom and Pronit in Pionki were established. Other defence industries, later established in the framework of the central industrial area, were the steelworks at Stalowa Wola and the electronics industry PZL-Rzeslow. Also dating from the years before the second world war are the well-known mechanical industries Bumar-Labedy, now producing tanks and artillery trucks, and PZL Wola, part of the aerospace industry.

112. After the second world war, existing defence manufacturers were enlarged and some new ones were created. In the framework of burden-sharing and division of labour within the Warsaw Pact, Poland started exporting arms, mainly to its pact allies, on average the destination of approximately 80% of total Polish arms exports. Other export destinations were third-world countries within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.

113. Main products of the Polish defence industry were landing-craft and small sea-going vessels, helicopters, small transport and training aircraft and tanks, in particular the T-55 and lately the T-72, both licensed by the Soviet Union. In fact, most of the Polish arms and equipment production was based on Soviet licences. Major weapon systems, such as combat aircraft, fighting ships and missile systems, had to be imported.

114. During the 1980s, Poland started to develop new defence equipment to indigenous design such as helicopters, training aircraft, and advanced optical and communications equipment. Other production includes radio-location equipment, hand weapons and logistics equipment.

115. According to a well-known concept in the former Warsaw Pact, defence manufacturing establishments in Poland have a rather large capacity, which has never been used to the full.

116. The aeronautical industry is capable of producing several hundreds of small aircraft and several hundreds of helicopters per year, with the corresponding engines. The tank manufacturing industry can turn out each year 350 tanks, 600 armoured cars and 1 000 tracked vehicles, while the ammunition industry has a yearly capacity of several hundred thousand artillery grenades and several hundred million rounds of ammunition for hand weapons. In a number of companies, the existing overcapacity for military production was used for the civilian market.

117. For reasons too well-known to be repeated here, a steep decline in the demand for military equipment both in Poland and on the world market started to make itself felt from 1988.

118. This forced the defence industry to try to change from military to civilian production. Actually it led to the same wild and rather chaotic conversion effort as took place in the Soviet Union at that time. Some manufacturers extended their existing civilian production of domestic appliances and consumer electronics. Others made use of their military production lines to turn out civilian products. Many examples could be given, but most of these well-intentioned efforts foundered because of the dramatic recession and the almost non-existent expertise in marketing.

119. The urgency of restructuring the national defence industry is sufficiently illustrated by the fact that, during the last few years, the value of Poland's defence industry production has declined dramatically from \$ 3 177 million in 1988 to \$ 1 022 million in 1991. In the same period, the procurement budget of the Ministry of National Defence declined from \$ 1 422 million in 1988 to \$ 350.1 million in 1991. Clearly a coherent policy was needed, and the government took action, as will be seen in the next chapter.

120. In the early eighties, the Soviet Union stopped supplying arms to Poland, but by the mid-1980s, when the Polish political situation seemed to have stabilised, the Soviets resumed deliveries of modern weapons. It was then that licensed production of the T-72 tank started at Labedy in Poland.

121. Nowadays, most of the products of Poland's defence sector are licence-produced Soviet designs, such as the T-72 tank at Bumar-Labedy and the Mi-2 helicopter, built by PZL at Swidnik.

122. On the other hand, the Soviet Union allowed very few transfers of advanced military technology and the Warsaw Pact allies were not allowed to develop their research and technology base to any extent.

123. Successful modifications made to Soviet designs by the Poles indicate that they would have a potential to develop their own domestic research and development base to modern western standards if resources were made available.

### *XVI. Polish aviation industry*

124. More should be said here about Poland's aviation industry since it is a relatively well-developed industrial activity, parts of which may have good chances of surviving in one form or another in a wider European framework.

125. In 1982, the activities of the Polish aviation industry came under the control of the Ministry of Mechanical Industry.

126. The PZL (Association of Aircraft and Engine Industries) comprises 27 factories, scientific and development units, technical and commercial organisations which at the moment are employing approximately 90 000 workers.

127. Products of PZL are aircraft, engines and equipment of its own design, but there are also co-operation and co-production programmes with foreign aircraft manufacturers in both East and West such as Antonov, Mil, Ilyushin, and Piper.

128. Aircraft manufacturing in Poland started as early as 1910 and since then thousands of aircraft have been delivered. As an example, mention should be made of the Soviet-designed Antonov AN-2 workhorse of which PZL Mielec has manufactured more than 11 200 under a licence agreement.

129. Currently, the latest military aircraft of Polish design is the PZL I-22 Iryd, a two-seat advanced jet trainer reconnaissance and light close support aircraft with day/night and bad weather capability, the prototype of which made its first flight in 1985. The PZL-130 Orlik, a piston-engined training aircraft performing a wide range of training duties, made its first flight in 1984. Later, a turboprop version was developed for the export market.

130. The most successful company of the Polish aviation industry is probably PZL Swidnik, which mainly manufactures helicopters and employs about 10 000 people. It has built large numbers of Soviet-designed Mil Mi-1 and Mi-2 helicopters under licence. PZL Swidnik got the exclusive right to develop, produce and market it in several different versions. More than 5 000 have been produced since the beginning of series production in 1965.

131. At the moment, the showpiece is the PZL Sokol, an all-Polish design developed since the late 1970s. Fitted with two Polish-developed turboshaft engines, the Sokol accommodates a crew of two and 12 passengers or a maximum of 2 100 kg internal cargo.

132. Recently, in a major move to reduce Poland's reliance on Soviet equipment, it has fielded two new helicopters based on the PZL W-3 Sokol.

133. One is the Anakonda search and rescue version which completed its service trials in June. It is expected that a total of 12 Anakondas will replace the Soviet Mil Mi-14 PS helicopters currently in service with the Polish naval aviation.

134. The other is the Salamandra assault version with equipment developed from the Soviet Mi-24 Hind such as a fuselage-mounted

twin GSh-23 cannon and stub-wing mounted AT-6 Spiral missiles or 80 mm rocket pods.

135. A smaller new model is the PZL-Kania, a new light utility helicopter powered by two Allison 250-C20B turboshaft engines. The standard passenger version provides seating for 1 pilot and 9 passengers. Converted for cargo, it is capable of carrying up to 1 200 kg of cabin load. Different other configurations of the PZL-Kania are on offer.

136. On the other hand, there are clear signs that Poland wishes to be associated with western helicopter industries. The Polish Air Force, which has a requirement to replace its Mil Mi-8s in transport helicopter regiments, is said to have selected the Bell 412 and the Sikorsky S-70L Black Hawk as possible candidates. There are rumours that PZL-Swidnik would like to produce the S-70 under licence.

### *XVII. Conversion in Poland*

137. In 1988, when the Warsaw Pact made public important unilateral measures to reduce its arms potential, the Polish Government took initiatives to convert some of its arms production lines to civilian production. This early conversion effort was especially focused on arms manufacturing factories where existing machinery and production lines could easily be adapted for civilian production.

138. In this framework, the Bumar-Labedy heavy armour factory decided to produce forklifts, cranes and other lifting equipment, to be used in construction and the mining industry. However, this civilian production had barely started when a deep recession affected both construction and the mining industry and the demand for new equipment fell almost to zero.

139. More examples of this rather improvised early conversion effort could be given, recalling that the general recession in Eastern Europe radically changed the situation, raising serious problems for the converting arms manufacturers.

140. In other specific cases a combination of various factors left no chance of survival for large companies producing partly for the defence industry and partly for the civilian market.

141. Such is the case for the FUM ball-bearings factory at Ostrzeszow, established in 1969 to serve the Soviet mechanical industry. In the top production year 1989, when it had 1 600 employees, FUM produced 650 000 bearings, 580 000 of which were exported to the Soviet Union. Half of the total production of this largest ball-bearings factory in Europe was made for the defence industry. Since January 1991,

when Central and Eastern European countries, then still united in Comecon, decided to drop the "transferable rouble", the accounting currency formerly used between these countries, and use hard currency, no new orders came in from the Soviet Union. The recession in Poland itself caused a dramatic decline in domestic orders. Conversion of the factory in order to produce for western markets would have required such huge investments in machinery, while marketing know-how was non-existent, that this idea had to be rejected. At the moment, FUM still has 700 employees, but only 100 are at work and the factory will soon have to be closed.

142. Meanwhile, the new Polish Parliament passed a resolution, stating that Poland, as an independent sovereign nation, should have a national defence industry capable of providing a range of arms and ammunition required for the protection of the national territory.

143. The government then decided that all subjects related to the security and defence of the nation should be thoroughly reviewed. On the one hand, a complete review of the national defence doctrine was initiated. On the other hand, in 1990, the government set up a commission under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Industry and Trade charged with developing a concept on the position of the defence industry in the nation's industrial structure and keeping account of the economic reform taking place. At the same time, trade in defence products was to be an integral part of this study.

144. The final conclusions of this commission will be submitted to the government by the end of 1991, but according to an outline of its likely recommendations, the existing 80 defence manufacturers would be organised into three groups.

145. The first group of 8 basic defence manufacturers which has been selected provisionally would obtain the status of "military state factory". These companies would come under the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. They would operate under the general rules of the market economy, managed by a board of directors, nominated by the Ministry of Industry and Trade in accordance with the Ministries of National Defence and of the Interior. There would be no works council in these factories and the rôle of the trade unions would be limited. The general activities of these companies would be ruled by a statute for defence industry companies to be granted by the council of ministers. The companies in this group and their military products are the following:

- personal arms and artillery - Metal Works Lucznik in Radom and Metal Works Tarnow;

- ammunition and rockets - Metal Works Mesko in Skarzysko Kamienna, Home Appliance factory in Niewiadow;
- powder components and rocket propellant - Synthetics factory Pronit in Pionki and Synthetics factory Gamrat-Erg in Jaslo;
- radiolocation equipment - Radwar factory in Warsaw;
- armoured equipment - Bumar-Labedy factory.

These military state factories would maintain their present military and civilian production.

146. The second group would comprise 24 defence industry companies with the state having a majority of shares. This would enable the state to have a decisive influence on the nature and scale of the military production.

147. The activity of each of these companies would be controlled by a board of directors composed of representatives of the Ministry of Privatisation, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of Poland and of the employees. These companies would be open for foreign capital participation.

148. These companies would manufacture defence products but they would at the same time produce for the civilian market. Among others, this group would include:

- aircraft production and aviation equipment: PZL-Mielec, PZL-Swidnik, PZL-Rzeszow, PZL-Kalisz, PZL-Okecie, PSL-Warszawa II;
- electronics and optical electronics: Radwar, Unimor, Kasprzak Radio factory;
- ships and ship repairs: North Shipyard and Wisla Shipyard.

Other companies in this group are workshops for repair, maintenance and overhaul of defence equipment and spare parts manufacturers.

149. The third group would comprise the remaining 48 companies. These companies would be completely privatised and no longer come under the organisation and responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Their production should be completely market-oriented. Under consideration is the possibility of them having to accept a legal obligation to put their production capacity at the disposal of defence and state security in case of threat, war or disaster. If they decided to turn out defence products in a period not subject to compulsory production, it would be completely at their own risk.

150. The abovementioned study of all aspects of the defence industry, to be submitted to the government by the end of 1991, is expected to lead to final decisions in the Council of Ministers after decisions on the new national defence strategy, expected in the first half of 1992.

### *XVIII. Polish arms exports*

151. In the former Warsaw Pact, Poland was the third largest arms exporter in the years 1981-90, but the level of its arms exports has always been considerably lower than exports from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

152. According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, in 1988, the last peak year, the total value of defence production in Poland, was \$3 177 million, or between 2.4 % and 2.6 % of the total GNP. The production was meant both for the Ministries of National Defence and of the Interior and for export destinations. Approximately 40 % of the total defence production was exported in that year, but this was not more than 1 % of Poland's total exports.

153. The value of arms exports in 1989 was estimated at only \$ 188.3 million and at the moment, exports have almost come to a complete halt.

154. Traditionally, an average of 80-90 % of Poland's arms exports went to Warsaw Pact countries. In recent years, other customers have been Angola, Cuba, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria and Vietnam.

155. Until 1990, all decisions concerning Poland's arms exports were the monopoly of Cenzin (central engineering management), a department of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, now the Ministry of Foreign Economic Co-operation.

156. In May 1990, it was announced that Cenzin would become a partnership with a majority share for the government and the rest to be owned by the arms industry. The idea was to give it the rôle of a more independent trading company. In the structure now being prepared, arms exports contracts would no longer be monopolised by the state, but they would be a matter between manufacturers and consumers. Nevertheless, all arms sales and exports would be subject to state control in accordance with strict legislation.

157. All defence-related products which may come under "special trade" have been divided into two main categories: military supplies and auxiliary equipment. Military supplies cover such items as explosives, ammunition, hand-held weapons, artillery rocket launchers, tanks, armed aircraft and helicopters, ships, armoured personnel carriers, special communications systems, other armoured equipment and supplies for military or armed police use. Auxiliary equipment covers items such as communications systems, radars, engines, construction equipment, transport, engineering and logistics equipment or other goods manufactured according to special specifications but not armed. The two remaining categories cover services and technology and know-how.

158. At the moment, all defence-related economic activity is still subject to the law of 23rd December 1988. This law requires a licence granted by the Ministry of Interior for all economic activity in the field of production and trade of explosives, arms and ammunitions within the borders of Poland's territory.

159. On top of this, a specific licence granted by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Co-operation is required for export activities regarding arms, military or police equipment.

#### *Value of exports of major weapons by Poland, 1981-90<sup>6</sup>*

*Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values, as expressed in US \$m., at constant (1985) prices*

Recipient	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total
USSR .....	103	103	99	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	950
Iraq .....	204	68	0	0	20	20	0	0	0	0	312
India .....	0	0	0	0	35	35	0	0	0	0	69
Libya .....	21	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41
Syria .....	0	0	21	5	9	0	0	0	0	0	34
Hungary .....	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Nicaragua .....	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
Cuba .....	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Czechoslovakia .....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL .....	327	181	142	97	158	149	92	92	92	92	1 423

6. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by Ian Anthony, Oxford University Press, 1991.

An export activities licence can be refused if a vital state interest or the defence and security of the state are at issue.

160. Finally, a specific export or import licence, also to be granted by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Co-operation, is required for every single transaction. Surveillance, control and inspection at the frontier is implemented by the customs authorities.

161. The export control system also concerns chemical products, explosives, radioactive elements and isotopes which can directly or indirectly be used for weapon production. A supplementary control system concerns the export of modern technologies and products resulting from the application of such products.

162. All exports of arms and equipment to conflicting parties, to countries supporting terrorism or to terrorist organisations are prohibited. Arms embargos decided by international organisations are strictly observed.

163. Since the beginning of 1990, Poland is having bilateral negotiations with the United States and a number of other Cocom member states. Bilateral agreements have now been signed with Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. The ultimate aim of these negotiations for Poland is to be completely removed from Cocom's current list of proscribed nations. To this end, it has promised to expand its safeguard system for controlling end-user destinations in Poland.

164. In the first phase, which went into effect on 1st October 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Co-operation controls all technology imports as listed by Cocom through a system of import certificates. The importer is also informed that, in case of re-export, the Polish Government should first be asked for permission. In the second phase, legislation will be introduced in order to comply with all other existing international export régimes, i.e. the MTCR (missile technology control régime), the Australia group, and the NPT (non-proliferation treaty).

165. A draft bill has now been prepared, for discussion by the parliament in 1992, which will impose a strict import and export control régime for all products listed in the abovementioned agreements. It goes without saying that the government will only be able to manoeuvre this legislation through parliament if it can make sufficiently clear that Poland would no longer be a proscribed country once the new legislation comes into force.

166. Poland takes the view that the future of its defence industry is closely related to the chances of arms exports. Since Poland's traditional arms export market – the Warsaw Pact countries – has collapsed completely, it is seeking new

export markets. At the moment, the government is trying to make its national arms production and arms exports more competitive. Implicitly, it hopes that Western European countries will give up some of their traditional export markets in favour of the Polish defence industry or at least that Poland will obtain a fair chance to compete in those markets.

167. According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the only viable way to save the Polish defence industry would be through close co-operation with western companies which could bring in capital and modern technologies, thus allowing this now ailing branch of the national industry to develop new products for domestic use and export to western markets.

168. Some individual defence manufacturing companies have found western partners to set up production lines for specific civilian products. The Radwar factory has a joint venture with the American firm Westinghouse for the production and marketing of radio-location equipment for air traffic control. The Bumar-Labedy factory is producing heavy trucks in a joint venture with Volvo, and Polcolor is negotiating now with Thomson CSF to conclude a joint venture for the production of electronics equipment.

169. On the other hand, both government and parliament agree that Poland should remain self-sufficient in branches of arms and equipment manufacturing in which it has proved expertise. Here, the Ministry of Industry and Trade is thinking specifically of the production of different types of seagoing vessels, helicopters, communication equipment, tanks, armoured vehicles, trucks, trailers, fire control systems and different types of anti-armour munitions.

170. It was stressed that in the future the Polish defence industry should preferably produce defensive weapon systems.

### *XIX. Polish defence expenditure*

171. In 1989, after the major cuts made by the new government, Poland spent 500 billion zlotys or 23.2 % of its total military expenditure on procurement, including research and development.

172. In order to indicate the trend, SIPRI provides the following figures on Polish defence spending<sup>7</sup>:

	% of GDP	% of total government expenditure
1986 .....	3.6	8.3
1987 .....	3.4	8.5
1988 .....	3.0	7.7
1989 .....	2.8	6.3

7. SIPRI Yearbook 1991, page 154.

SIPRI estimates that currently the Polish defence industry has a dramatic excess capacity of 60 to 80 % as a result of lower demand at home and abroad.

### *XX. Poland's economic policy*

173. In its efforts to transform Poland's social-economic structure, the Polish Government has concentrated mainly on two issues: the creation of a new legal system and the modernisation of the economy.

174. In the new legal system, parliament has adopted the most important laws which will lay the foundations for a market economy.

175. The modernisation of the economy is a more complicated issue, but here too important progress is being made.

176. Here, one of the government's main objectives is to privatise the economy through the promotion of new private entrepreneurship. This is thought to bring about changes in the substantive structure of industry and foster decentralisation and smaller companies as well as shape a competitive operating environment.

177. By far the largest part of the private sector is dependent on newly-established enterprises. Since 1st January 1990, some 400 000 new enterprises have started business.

178. A large part of Poland's economic production is now in private hands as is shown by the following mid-1991 percentage share figures: trade 75-80 % (7-8 % in 1989), industry 20 % (2 % in 1989), construction 43 %, transport 17 %, exports 15 %, imports 43 %.

179. In agriculture, which has never been collectivised on a large scale, 85 % of the production is in private hands. It is estimated that altogether about 40-45 % of the working population is employed in the private sector, which is responsible for approximately 40 % of GDP. Apart from the agricultural sector, Poland has about two million unemployed and there will be many more once a number of large state companies close down for lack of orders and financial means.

180. Meanwhile, the government has recognised that state companies will have to be privatised, but not much has been done so far. Only recently, the government took a new initiative to promote privatisation. It is said that around 8 000 companies, half of them in the coming three years, will be released from the state's responsibility. The details of this programme have not yet been worked out completely. At the moment, only fifteen large state companies have been privatised.

181. Other objectives of the government's original shock therapy were to reduce rampant

inflation, remove obstacles to foreign investment and establish a western-style banking system.

182. Inflation, which reached 2 000 % by the end of 1989, is now under relative control and for the whole of 1991 the inflation rate is expected to be 80-90 %.

183. One major problem in reshaping the economy is that Poland still has considerable difficulties in attracting foreign investment. It is noted that self-government structures in large companies and the trade unions have proved to be stumbling-blocks in many negotiations on privatisation, joint ventures and take-overs by foreign investors. The 1989 law on joint ventures was relaxed considerably in June 1991 and the government expects this to have positive results in the near future.

184. In the transitional period, expectations that the economic reform would have a negative effect on production were largely true. In the first half of 1991, industrial production fell by 10 % and investment by 13 %, while unemployment rose to 10 %.

185. In September 1991, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) published an action plan indicating sectors that can be promoted with relatively modest investments. It says that in Poland technical and financial help should preferably be made available for privatising and restructuring state companies, banks and selected private companies. The action plan points out that the transport sector needs huge investments. Other sectors in great need of support are the building of houses, development projects in communities and cities, tourism and education. The potential of Poland's agriculture and agro-industry is highly rated and specific support for this vital sector is examined in depth.

186. Finally, the action plan believes that the high technology which has been developed in the military industry could be used for civilian applications.

187. Through negotiations with the Paris Club of creditor governments, Poland has managed to shed 50 % of its \$ 33 billion official debt burden.

188. In April 1991, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) granted a loan of \$ 2.5 billion for a three-year period to support Poland's economic reform. At the end of September 1991, however, the IMF suspended its credit loan to Poland because the country was no longer able to meet the conditions, which were a strict control of government spending and inflation. At that time, the Polish Parliament had just decided to increase the budget deficit.

189. Part of the loan was meant to absorb the increased cost of imported fossil fuel. The Soviet

Union, Poland's traditional fuel supplier, is now to be paid in dollars while delivering less. This forced Poland to buy part of its fuel needs on the world market. In September 1991, Poland signed a barter trade agreement with the Soviet Union to export among other things agricultural products in exchange for natural gas.

190. In its negotiations with the EC, Poland has frequently insisted – as did Czechoslovakia and Hungary – on the taking away of as many trade barriers as possible, indicating that exports to the EC were of vital importance for its economic life. The following chart is a clear illustration of this argument:

*Polish trade balance*<sup>8</sup>  
(January-August 1991, in '000 million zlotys)<sup>9</sup>

	EC	Former Comecon <sup>1</sup>	Other trade partners	Total
Exports .....	46 024	16 104	24 679	86 807
% share .....	53.0	18.6	28.4	100.0
% <sup>2</sup> evolution .....	+ 24.4	- 39.5	- 11.3	- 2.5
Imports .....	40 684	17 981	27 450	86 115
% share .....	47.2	20.9	31.9	100.0
% <sup>2</sup> evolution .....	+ 85.4	- 44.5	+ 61.1	41.0
Balance .....	5 340	- 1 877	- 2 771	692

1. European members only, including USSR and, until October 1990, also the former GDR.

2. Compared with the same period last year, at constant prices.

191. Poland's economic reform programme introduced in 1991 included the removal of a broad range of import limitations in the belief that imported goods would stimulate competition, which in turn would increase pressure to change the structure of production through monopolies in the national economy. Polish authorities argue that if western markets are not soon opened more generously for Polish products, they will be forced to take protectionist measures leading to the same autarky as had recently caused the collapse of both communism and the national economy.

192. The EC's fear of imports from Poland and the other Triangle countries is paranoid indeed if it is realised that in 1990 the convertible currency exports of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia were together the same as those of Hong Kong (excluding its re-exports). In the same year,

Germany's exports were five times as large as the convertible currency exports of the Soviet Union and the six abovementioned Central and Eastern European countries.

#### *XXI. Defence equipment requirements of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland*

193. When considering the defence industry of the Triangle countries, the present and future defence equipment needs of these countries should also be taken into account.

194. At the moment, each of the Triangle countries has a surplus of treaty-limited equipment, which, according to the CFE Treaty, should be reduced. The following table indicates the holdings of the individual countries in November 1990 when the treaty was signed, the cuts required and the 1995 CFE ceilings<sup>9</sup>.

Country	Battle tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Combat aircraft	Attack helicopters
Czechoslovakia .....	3 035	3 485	4 359	369	56
Cuts .....	1 600	2 335	2 309	24	19+
CFE .....	1 435	1 150	2 050	345	75
Hungary .....	1 345	1 047	1 720	110	39
Cuts .....	510	207	20	70+	69+
CFE .....	835	840	1 700	180	108
Poland .....	2 850	2 300	2 377	654	128
Cuts .....	1 120	690	227	194	2+
CFE .....	1 730	1 610	2 150	460	130

8. Source: GUS Central Statistics Office, Monthly bulletin, August 1991.

9. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991, page 423.

195. It should be noted, however, that even after the implementation of the required CFE cuts, much of the remaining equipment will be old and ill-suited to the new defence posture which is now being implemented.

196. Nevertheless, these countries have made it clear that the acquisition of new equipment cannot be a priority as long as the national governments are under heavy pressure to provide financial means in order to solve huge economic and social problems.

197. An intermediate solution now being negotiated is to acquire surplus spare parts and more up-to-date equipment, in particular from Germany which has large stocks of the former East German People's Army's equipment, but it is believed that the negotiations with Germany will not lead to very substantive results. The items concerned are subject to the same restrictive regulations as defence products manufactured in Western Germany and, in addition, the question arises of how to reconcile possible exports with the Cocom regulations still in force.

198. One priority problem which cannot be solved in the same way is the need to improve the air defence network. During the Warsaw Pact years, the Triangle countries' air defences were designed to fit the needs of the Soviet Union. Apparently, this does not meet the new requirement of providing proper protection of the national airspace. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are now co-operating in an effort to find collaborative solutions for this and other immediate problems.

199. Considering the present situation with extremely tight defence budgets, major restructuring operations of the national armed forces and still much uncertainty over their eventual tasks and military doctrines, the procurement by the Triangle countries of any major weapons from western arms manufacturers would be premature.

200. A far better procedure would be to make these countries' defence authorities familiar with all that is inherent in the management of armed forces in a democratic nation including military doctrines, restructuring of armed forces, procurement and relations with the defence industry. This would be a task for Western European nations through both bi- and multilateral contacts, especially since many of them are very similar in scale. This would create a far more natural and gradual process leading to deliberate procurement schemes which might better respond to long-term defence needs while, it is hoped, using certain national capabilities in defence equipment manufacturing. In Chapter XXIII some more specific proposals are made which may help to institutionalise such contacts.

## *XXII. Cocom (Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls)*

201. In November 1989, the Committee which was then called the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of the WEU Assembly published an extensive report on Cocom<sup>10</sup>. Suffice it here to say that Cocom is an informal co-ordinating arrangement, the members of which are all NATO countries minus Iceland plus Japan and Australia. A small number of other countries with high-technology industries has pledged to conform to Cocom's rules. The main objective of Cocom is to prevent the eastern bloc from obtaining highly sensitive technology from the West, which could jeopardise the western alliance's military technological edge. At the moment, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are still listed among the proscribed countries.

202. In a recommendation adopted unanimously on 7th December 1989, the Assembly called for a complete review of the Cocom lists with a view to encouraging maximum opportunities for trade. The Assembly also stressed that more high technology should be shared between East and West. It was thought that this would help countries in Central and Eastern Europe to modernise their economies and succeed in the conversion of their defence industries, for which early proposals were then emerging.

203. Since December 1989, there have been many changes. Among the essential changes it should be noted that the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved completely and that one of the main objectives of the Triangle countries is to be associated with western defence and security alliances as closely as possible if they cannot be made full members.

204. Meanwhile, Cocom understood that it had to react positively to the sweeping changes taking place. At a high-level meeting in June 1990, important decisions were taken to relax the existing export control régime. Inter alia, it was decided to liberalise controls for the computer, machine tools and telecommunications sectors, to delete 38 items from the Cocom international industrial list and to start developing a new "core list" to replace the international industrial list.

205. Moreover, it was decided to further liberalise levels of controls and give more favourable consideration to "exception requests" for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, provided they adopted Cocom-approved safeguard régimes, since these particular countries were considered to represent a lesser strategic risk.

<sup>10</sup>. Cocom, report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur, Document 1207.

206. A new Cocom high-level meeting was scheduled for February 1991, but it was postponed several times, especially because the United States could not make up its mind over a further relaxation in the export régime for telecommunications equipment.

207. Finally, the meeting took place on 23rd-24th May 1991 and a new "core list" was established including the following categories of technologies with important reductions of controlled items in all important technology categories:

- electronics: controls were lifted on most 32-bit microprocessors, all dynamic random access memories (DRAMs) and semiconductor manufacturing equipment for 2.5-micron integrated circuits. The new core list represents a 45 % reduction in currently controlled items;
- machine tools: an overall decontrol to machine tools with a plus or minus 3 microns precision;
- telecommunications: the export of fibre-optic cable with transmission speeds of 565 megabits per second is now allowed to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which compares to what is available in most parts of the world. However, the export of fibre-optic cable with transmission speeds above 45 megabits per second to the Soviet Union is still prohibited by Cocom;
- lasers and sensors: the number of controlled items has been reduced by 60 %, but restrictions have been maintained on second generation night vision and thermal imaging equipment and their components;
- navigation, avionics and aircraft technology: controls over most civilian aircraft were lifted, while control was reduced on civil air navigation and communications equipment. This represents a reduction of approximately 50 % in controlled items;
- marine technology: there is a 30 % reduction of the list, and most commercial hydrofoils and surface effect ships and certain unmanned submersible systems will be available;
- computers: a new parameter called "composite theoretical performance" was adopted for computers, permitting a more accurate measurement of their performance and critical capabilities. Using the new measurement, Cocom will decontrol most personal com-

puters, workstations and minicomputers. The core list is expected to result in up to a 70 % reduction;

- advanced materials: all but the strongest carbon and polymer fibres which are used in structural composites have been taken from the control list, resulting in a 30 % reduction of controlled items;
- propulsion systems: the controlled items have been reduced by 50 %; this concerns civilian certified gas turbine engines, certain marine gas turbine engines and some liquid fuel rocket engines and technologies.

208. New measures were taken at the high-level meeting to expand the access of three East European countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, to goods on the Cocom list. Over the past eighteen months, Cocom has signed strategic trade agreements with these countries to ensure the effective protection of Cocom-controlled technology. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have all agreed to set up export control systems in line with those of the Cocom countries. In turn, the three "will be eligible for every item on the core list on a favourable consideration basis." Some cases will still have to be brought before Cocom, but most will now enter the grey area of "national discretion."

209. Even if it is true that, according to the existing Cocom decisions and strategic trade agreements, the Triangle countries will have favourable treatment, their technology imports are still at the discretion of Cocom or of the governments of other nations, which still places these countries in a humiliating "beggar's" position.

210. While now a relatively large group of technology exports to Central and Eastern Europe has been liberalised, the export control régime for the most highly-advanced, sensitive products and technologies included in the core list has been strengthened according to the "higher fences around fewer products" approach.

211. It is generally agreed that Cocom, apart from maintaining a western technological edge in military matters, has also implicitly forced the proscribed countries to rely on technologically less sophisticated and thus less efficient equipment in many branches of the civilian industry and services which in turn has significantly slowed down the economic development of these countries. It can be argued that this dramatic technological inferiority and economic leeway was the communist system's and rulers' fault because they wasted energy and resources while always giving priority to the military but, even if that may be true, such arguments no longer make sense.

212. In the Triangle countries, new democratic governments have acceded to power which are all involved in a painful process of complete economic and social reform. They have deliberately urged and finally succeeded in completely dissolving the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. At the same time they are changing – one could almost say reversing – their military structure and doctrine while aiming at association with, if not inclusion in, western security alliances.

213. This all means that the fundamental rationale for applying Cocom export controls and in particular maintaining these three countries on the list of proscribed countries has significantly altered or even disappeared. Since these countries no longer pose any strategic threat to the West, Western European nations and the United States as united in Cocom should not only stop restricting but should actively support the flow of new technologies to these countries in order to support the political and economic changes taking place.

214. Mr. J. Makarczyk, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland, speaking in The Hague on 22nd-23rd May 1991, was right in saying that the lunatic economic system based on ideology which was imposed upon Central and Eastern Europe has caused civilisational retrogression and deprived the former socialist world, including the USSR, of access to the means of modern advanced technological progress, creating the huge civilisation gap which is perhaps the main European problem that we all face.

215. A proposal to remove Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland from Cocom's list of proscribed countries should be considered urgently and seriously.

### *XXIII. IEPG (Independent European Programme Group)*

216. In this report, IEPG as a European organisation is singled out because it specifically covers issues which are closely related to a number of problems faced by the defence industry of the Triangle countries as observed in the preceding chapters.

217. The IEPG, consisting of all European NATO member states except Iceland, has been dealt with in detail in a recent report by this committee published in May 1990. IEPG's main objective is to enhance co-operation in defence equipment procurement and thereby to promote efficiency and economy in Western Europe's armaments industry.

218. Following key recommendations of a major study of the future of the European defence industry, the Ministers of Defence of

IEPG countries have agreed upon an action plan for a more efficient European defence industry, including:

- the pursuit of a transnational open and competitive market;
- a dedicated European co-operative research effort, now formalised with the establishment of "Euclid", a common defence research and technology programme;
- the encouragement of the developing defence industry nations (DDIs) Greece, Portugal and Turkey.

219. Arguably, IEPG could offer practical procedures and a matter-of-fact approach which could help the Triangle countries to confront at least part of their problems regarding equipment procurement and national defence industries in a structured framework which is tailored to their long-term security and defence requirements.

220. Having said that, it is worth while quoting the communiqué of the last meeting of IEPG Defence Ministers in Brussels on 3rd July 1991. Regarding the relation between IEPG and EC-WEU it reads as follows:

"Ministers recognised the profound implications of discussions now taking place on the future security architecture of Europe, and the significant impact these could have on the research, development, production and trade in defence equipment. The unique expertise of the IEPG on defence equipment matters could be useful to the discussions that are taking place in the intergovernmental conference on political union, the European Community, and Western European Union. The future activities and structure of the IEPG is one of the issues linked to the outcome of this debate. Ministers agreed to exchange information through appropriate contacts between the IEPG on the one hand and, on the other hand, the European bodies engaged in the elaboration of the future European security architecture."

221. Clearly, the Ministers see a rôle for the IEPG and its main tasks in a future European security architecture even if they recognise that the IEPG's structure and activities may be adapted if it is to be integrated in a future all-embracing European union. This future union, now being debated very intensively in different forums, may not take shape this year or next year, but evidently there is an irreversible trend towards a political union. A political union implies the gradual elaboration and implementation of a common foreign and security policy and a stronger European defence identity with the longer-term perspective of a common

defence policy as is recognised by even the most reluctant participants in the intergovernmental conference.

222. A European identity in security and defence will naturally have to be pursued through an evolutionary process involving successive phases.

223. It is hoped that, before the end of 1991, the EC will sign an association agreement with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, with the explicit intention of preparing their full membership in the foreseeable future, perhaps within the following decade. The preparation of full membership should include all aspects of a future European union, even if some of them, in particular a common foreign and security policy including a common European defence policy, may take longer to reach maturity.

224. Four different activities of IEPG which seem to be particularly relevant for the Triangle countries are discussed in the following paragraphs:

*(a) Harmonisation of requirements and equipment co-operation*

225. In their July 1991 communiqué,

“Ministers stressed that – in view of the new political/military environment and limited defence budgets – harmonisation of requirements and equipment co-operation and standardisation were more important than ever. Noting that it was an uncertain time for the initiation of new programmes, Ministers welcomed the measures taken to improve procedures. These measures are designed to help identify opportunities for increased co-operation based on common requirements and to implement them more effectively.”

226. It should be recalled here that essential work in this field is being done by IEPG's Panel I. The core of Panel I's work is the equipment replacement schedule (ERS) exercise, its principal mechanism for identifying potential projects for collaboration. The ERS, outlining all the IEPG nations' forward equipment plans, is updated annually. It highlights equipment areas where *prima facie* reasons exist for co-operation, that is, where two or more nations appear to have broadly similar requirements with in-service dates (ISD) up to a maximum of five years apart. In a following phase, Panel I invites nations to comment on the result of the ERS review and their subsequent examination. The panel will then prepare a report to National Armaments Directors, which will outline the equipment areas which appear to offer scope for co-operation. A representative of the European Defence Industry Group (EDIG) sits in as an observer in all Panel I meetings.

227. The Triangle countries would be worst served with headlong procurement of different types of western arms and equipment, not only because they lack the financial resources. Their procurement schemes should be seen as the logical consequence of a defence posture and strategic doctrine which in the longer run will be an integral part of common European defence policy.

228. It is recommended that arrangements be made for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to participate in the activities of IEPG's Panel I at the earliest possible date. It would allow these countries to consider commonality and standardisation of their defence equipment at an early stage. At the same time it would offer the best opportunity to examine in detail the rôle of their national defence industries in a future larger framework of European equipment co-operation.

*(b) Developing defence industries (DDI) and Euclid*

229. Even if the defence industries of the Triangle countries, according to their scale and range of products, are well developed in many respects, there are undeniably some characteristics in common with what the IEPG calls developing defence industries (DDI). These characteristics include the following:

- shortage of advanced technologies and modern management techniques;
- lack of capability for the design and integration of arms systems and a relatively low level of research activity;
- small domestic market and difficulty in finding access to foreign trade markets.

230. In order to support DDI nations, the developed defence industry countries have established special information centres for DDI countries to give them a possibility of obtaining contracts. It is recommended that the possibility of creating a similar possibility for the Triangle's defence industry be considered, thus facilitating the implementation of their intention to maintain at least part of their defence industry. In the programme memorandum of understanding for IEPG's military research and technology programme Euclid, measures have been included to facilitate the DDI countries' participation in Euclid projects. Consideration should be given to whether, in the future, the Triangle countries could participate in such projects in the same conditions.

*(c) European session for armaments managers*

231. Since 1989, IEPG member countries have offered study programmes lasting several weeks twice a year to relevant officials. The aim of these programmes is to favour mutual infor-

mation relating to the operation of organisations in charge of arms procurement, as well as to improve relations between partners who are supposed to work together. They reflect a sincere intention on the part of IEPG countries to create a European cadre of armaments managers who are well acquainted with each other's procurement problems and procedures and who know each other personally through intensive joint experience, which is also important.

232. It is proposed here to invite Triangle officials to these sessions, believing that it could be mutually beneficial.

#### *XXIV. Other European support and co-operation agreements with the Triangle countries*

##### *(a) Multilateral co-operation arrangements*

233. The Visegrad declaration of 1991, a trilateral declaration by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, contains no specific clauses on security co-operation but it envisages a new commitment to work more closely to solve common problems. The main objective of the Triangle is co-ordination of approaches to European integration. Possibilities are now being explored.

234. For any co-operation between countries of the Triangle and Western European countries to be fruitful, Western European economic standards and procedures should be observed. This means that certain transformations and adaptations of the Triangle's economic system are still required.

235. The Hexagonal, consisting of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia, offers another particularly important opportunity for multilateral co-operation in a regional framework. It is a flexible and practical framework for carrying out economic, infrastructure and cultural projects and for exchanges of information on European integration processes. It should be observed, however, that this co-operation agreement is still at an early stage of development. The industry has not yet started direct collaboration in this framework.

##### *(b) Association agreements with the EC*

236. The association agreements with the European Community which have now been negotiated are regarded by these countries as a major contribution to building the structures for a prosperous, stable and united Europe, with the EC as one of its cornerstones. There can be no question but that this association is an intermediate stage in the process leading to full membership of the EC, at the turn of the millennium - it is hoped.

237. In the negotiations between the Triangle and the EC, the Triangle countries have been asked to guarantee a certain reciprocity, limiting the possibility of invoking the protection clause for new industries. This is meant to parallel the Commission's policy of taking into account the repercussions on certain EC areas of the liberalisation of imports of sensitive products, in particular in the sectors of textiles, agricultural products and steel.

238. On 22nd November 1991, association agreements between the EC and the Triangle countries were finally concluded. They are expected to be signed by the foreign ministers. An interim agreement encompassing many trade issues will enter into force on 1st March 1992 to tide over until the national parliaments of all nations concerned have ratified the agreements.

239. In the preambles of the three nearly identical agreements, it is said that they "will help to reach the objective" of EC membership. The agreements are meant gradually to dismantle trade barriers between the signatories over the next ten years for both industrial and agricultural products and they call for an increasingly free movement of workers and capital. They provide for progressive harmonisation in legislation in order to prepare the three countries for possible future membership and institutionalise a regular political dialogue among senior officials.

240. The multi-year financial assistance under the PHARE programme will continue. PHARE (Pologne-Hongrie: Assistance à la Restructuration Economique) is a programme set up by the EC in 1989 specifically to channel aid to Poland and Hungary. In early 1990, its scope was enlarged to include other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. PHARE is to provide technical assistance to the governments of the above-mentioned countries to help them to privatise their economies in the best possible conditions and to create a favourable environment for foreign investment.

241. One area of PHARE's activities is the conversion of the defence industry. Specific action is being taken to determine what can be done in this respect. Experts involved in these activities recognise the multiple problems pointed out earlier in the present report, but they see certain limited chances for successful conversion in areas where the Triangle's defence industry has developed specific capabilities. However, they think that the opportunities for large-scale classic conversion should not be exaggerated.

242. It should be noted that the PHARE programme has a substantial budget. While, in 1990, 500 million ecu were earmarked, the figure for 1991 is 850 million and 1 billion for 1992.

243. Mention should also be made here of the activities of the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) which was established in April 1991. It started granting the first credits in mid-1991 and the number of credits granted to companies and organisations for specific projects in the Triangle countries is growing rapidly. EBRD credits are meant especially to help bring about important reforms such as creation of capital and financial markets, promotion of the private sector, the restructuring of banks and industrial companies, trade decentralisation, introduction of international standards for accounting, stocktaking and amortisation and the creation of a modern infrastructure for telecommunication, transport and energy. The EBRD has made it known that it is considering the establishment of a new bank to finance trade from Central and Eastern European countries to the Soviet Union.

*(c) Eureka*

244. Eureka, the European advanced technology programme for civilian applications which was established in 1985, could play an important rôle in the development of market economies in Central Europe.

245. Its aim was to "raise through closer co-operation among enterprises and research institutes the productivity and competitiveness of Europe's industries on the world market", as was stated at that time.

246. In June 1990, the VIIIth ministerial conference in Rome acknowledged the possibilities of scientific and technological co-operation with companies and institutes from Central and Eastern European countries. The ministers ascertained that co-operation in the framework of Eureka could contribute to the transformation process in European non-member countries towards free and open market economies.

247. Along this line of thought, a congress was held in Budapest on 2nd and 3rd May 1991, called "Eureka, exploring co-operation between East and West".

248. At their IXth ministerial conference held in The Hague on 19th June 1991, ministers and the Vice-President of the Commission stressed the importance of further enhancing co-operation with European non-member countries, while also stressing the need to use and improve the transparency of Eureka's supportive structures for companies and institutes from European non-member countries which are moving towards a market economy.

249. To that end, an action programme was decided upon, including an extended information policy, expanded network and a flexible application of the Eureka rules. The first two elements of this programme are aimed at more

intensive and extended dissemination and distribution of information on activities in Eureka, inter alia by promoting the setting up of national points of contact in the respective European non-member countries. A flexible application of the Eureka rules should facilitate increased and earlier participation by these countries in Eureka projects.

### *XXV. Conclusions*

250. Since the end of the second world war and for more than forty years, the citizens of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have been subjected to the despotism of an ally which had imposed itself upon them with the consent of the western allies.

251. Now the complete failure of the communist ideology to redeem its promises of better living standards and an equitable society has ultimately led to the liberation and rebirth of these Central European nations. They are facing the immense task of complete reconstruction. This does not mean just the revitalisation of their societies through drastic social and economic reform.

252. There is much more to be achieved in the immaterial field too. One of the central issues at stake here after so many years of collective humiliation is the re-establishment of a well-balanced feeling of national pride and self-esteem. Under these circumstances the basic elements confirming the sovereignty of a state play an extremely important rôle.

253. One basic element is the ability of the state to guarantee the security and defence of its citizens. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that this issue is one of the main thrusts in the foreign policy of the Triangle nations. In all fairness, it should be admitted that the actual geostrategic situation does not enable any one of these nations to implement such a security guarantee without allies. Hence the comprehensible striving for incorporation in an alliance of western nations.

254. Having regard to the forthcoming association of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in preparation for future full membership of the EC, their future inclusion in a common European security and defence system can only be a question of time.

255. It should be noted, however, that their incorporation in a European security system would be meaningful and lasting only if these countries are able to make a contribution in accordance with their status and capabilities. Their desire to maintain a basic defence manufacturing capability appears perfectly legitimate now and against the background of a future wider European context.

256. However, like all European countries, they will have to give up the considerable over-capacity of their defence industry. They should not exclude the possibility of mergers with or take-overs by other companies inside or outside the borders of the Triangle even if reduced state influence was the consequence. Taking into consideration their own arms exports in recent years and the considerable amount of Soviet equipment in use all over the world which may need maintenance, overhaul and updating, there must still be chances for exports of goods and services, but these should not be overestimated, given the surplus of conventional weapons on the second-hand market as a consequence of the CFE treaty.

257. There is another reason why the prospects for arms exports from Central European countries are not very bright. Until recently, Central European arms were relatively cheap. With the introduction of economic reforms, including the application of commercial accounting methods, prices will be more realistic and consequently higher. Moreover, as matters now stand, Central European arms will still not have the same level of technological sophistication as may be offered by western arms producers.

258. A more delicate issue is that certain countries had no choice but to procure Central or Eastern European arms because, for political reasons, they did not have access to western arms. Will Central European countries, understandably keen to have the closest possible links with Western Europe, be able to continue with impunity their cynical attitude of indiscriminate arms exports? Apparently this issue is still being debated in the Triangle countries.

259. In the first instance, however, the Triangle's national defence industry will mainly have to manage with their home market which, in the years to come, will be rather restricted.

260. In the present report it is therefore suggested that these countries be included in a number of specific IEPG activities and granted a status comparable to DDI nations in that framework. It may help them to become familiar with the western alliance's system of procurement and defence equipment co-operation. At the same time it may facilitate the survival of the defence manufacturers they consider essential for their national security through participation in collaborative programmes on a European scale or through successful bidding for contracts on the European defence market, whether or not in co-operation with other defence manufacturers.

261. An additional advantage would be that, over the years, the Triangle would gradually develop commonality, harmonisation and standardisation of their equipment preparing for full participation in Europe's future.

262. It is further suggested that Cocom, in close co-operation with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, should now quickly remove these nations from the list of proscribed countries as soon as they have passed the necessary legislation in export control matters. This would finally raise the formal barriers which are still denying them access to advanced technologies indispensable for their development into modern economies with a sound basis of high-technology products up to world standards.

263. If some people raise their eyebrows, considering these to be far-fetched proposals, the answer is that the West and in particular Western Europe cannot continue to deliver promising speeches, containing little substance when it comes to implementation. The far from generous attitude of some European partners during the association negotiations is a disgraceful example which would be better forgotten quickly.

264. Moreover, it should be noted that at the NATO summit in Rome on 7th and 8th November it was decided to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and co-operation on political and security issues between NATO and Central and Eastern European countries. Among the activities proposed are annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level in what might be called a North Atlantic Co-operation Council, and also regular meetings with the Military Committee and, under its direction, with other NATO military authorities.

265. Likewise, at its meeting in Bonn on 18th November 1991, the WEU Council of Ministers took decisions to enhance the dialogue between WEU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on security and co-operation. The measures envisaged by WEU were meant to reinforce and to be complementary to similar endeavours by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community.

266. Nobody can pretend that the Triangle's ailing defence industry can be maintained to a large extent. Conversion in a wider sense will be possible only for a small part which can be adapted to new markets and which is viable for joint ventures with foreign companies prepared to take a calculated risk. It can only be left to private enterprise to act in this area.

267. To organise another symposium on conversion may be useful, but it is not suggested here.

268. The Triangle countries' wish to maintain a defence industrial base is completely legitimate. It will only make sense, however, in a wider framework of defence needs, procurement and industry. This framework is bound to be European. Western European nations can take practical steps to help them achieve this. They should not hesitate.

*Défence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland*

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AMENDMENT 1 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mrs. Blunck  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

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1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Signed: Blunck*

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1. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendment negatived).

*Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland*

AMENDMENT 2<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Tummers  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Signed: Tummers*

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1. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendment agreed to).

*Defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland*

AMENDMENTS 3 and 4<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Atkinson,  
on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee*

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ (IEPG) ” to the end and add:
- “ as an ideal framework to gain familiarity with procurement procedures for democratically-controlled armed forces, in particular with a view to including them in:
- (a) those regular meetings of government officials known as the ‘European sessions for armament managers’, organised with the objective of exchanging information relating to the operation of organisations in charge of arms procurement;
  - (b) the work of Panel I, which would help them to harmonise their equipment requirements with other European nations and to identify potential projects for collaboration; ”
4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ skills ” insert “ conversion ”.

*Signed: Atkinson*

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1. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1991 (amendments agreed to).

*Information letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of  
WEU, on the activities of the ministerial organs*

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Dear President,

The relentless confrontation of Serbs and Croats, an odious anachronism, together with the economic collapse of the former Soviet Union, are a sombre backdrop for the current negotiations on developing institutions for the European enterprise in furtherance of the 1985 Single Act.

The declaration on Yugoslavia adopted by the WEU Ministerial Council takes note of the failure of the Federal Army to comply with cease-fire agreements or its own undertakings. WEU can now direct its action along two lines: preparing for the deployment of Blue Helmets on the basis of a Security Council resolution, a deployment to which member states might contribute; and stepping up member states' efforts to create humanitarian corridors. It is the ad hoc group's rôle to consider the practical arrangements for the contingency plans required with this prospect in mind.

The extraordinary Ministerial Council on 29th October and the regular Ministerial Council on 18th November – both of which were held at the Petersberg in Bonn – provided an opportunity to take interim stock of member states' views on the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture. This stocktaking exercise was accompanied by a number of decisions sanctioning the work of our organisation since the Ministerial Council in Vianden on 27th June 1991.

The purpose of this sixteenth information letter is therefore to give you a succinct but comprehensive account of these meetings, as you prepare for the second part of your Assembly's 37th ordinary session and the meetings of the Presidential and other committees to be held on this occasion.

The final decisions on WEU's rôle and place in the new European security architecture are on the agenda of the European summit in Maastricht. The most obvious points of convergence are the inclusion of a security and defence dimension in the European enterprise, the strengthening of WEU's operational rôle and the recognition that relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand and, on the other, between WEU and the political union differ in nature.

The primacy of the Atlantic Alliance is recognised by all WEU member states. The texts adopted by the Rome summit are unequivocal: Europe can and must work on the development of military structures, which will have a major rôle to perform in reinforcing the allies' capacity to co-operate on their own common defence. It should no longer be too hard to devise a common language for the Nine and the Twelve on the future structuring of relations between WEU and the alliance. Progress with the substance of the debate can now be expected from the Intergovernmental Conference and the conclaves of foreign ministers. WEU can be said to be at the fulcrum point of the scales. A comparison of the Rome texts with the Copenhagen communiqué bears witness to the remarkable progress that has been made, and this progress must now be followed up by the success of the European summit. Whatever happens, the practical implications of that summit for WEU must be evaluated in the wake of Maastricht.

Developing an operational rôle for WEU will be a gradual process. There will have to be several stages in confirming our organisation's rôle as the union's defence component and as the means whereby the European pillar of the alliance can be strengthened. The formulation of a European defence policy and its translation into practice must be based on a series of practical steps designed to forge new links with both the alliance and the political union. Progress with this démarche should be reviewed as necessary from time to time. A review focusing on WEU will no doubt be necessary towards the end of the decade.

WEU's third field of action to which ministers have been devoting their attention is that of contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Their decisions may be summed up in three points: following the fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and Romania, these two countries will be offered the same opportunities for co-operation as Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia; relations with these five countries will be further expanded; and it is WEU's intention to initiate relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union and with the three Baltic states, provided that both groups express interest.

Decisions have now been reached on a whole series of intergovernmental measures, with a view to developing relations between WEU and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe:

- an extraordinary meeting of the members of the Council and the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia is planned for next year;

- contacts will be organised on an ad hoc basis at ministerial level on specific subjects of common interest, in addition to the bilateral contacts between WEU and each of these five countries;
- an information link will be established between the WEU Secretariat-General and the five countries' embassies, and between the embassy of the Presidency's country and their respective governments;
- seminars under the auspices of the WEU Institute will be organised for officials responsible for politico-military affairs in the foreign and defence ministries of WEU member states and the five countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In Vianden, WEU ministers decided to set up a WEU satellite centre for a three-year experimental period, with a budget of 38.25 million ecus. As decided by ministers in Bonn on 18th November, this centre will be established on the site of the Torrejón base near Madrid from 1st January 1992. Its Director will be Mr. Blaydes, a scientific expert from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, who will be appointed for a period of three years. In 1992, the sum of 4.5 million ecus will be allocated towards commissioning from industry feasibility studies on the opportunities for medium- and long-term co-operation on developing a European satellite observation system. These studies will be administered by a team set up in Paris under Italian chairmanship.

In all other fields of operational co-operation among member states, ministers took note of the reports submitted to them, i.e. interim reports and one report on activities. The Council will continue its work on all these subjects, in particular the operational reinforcement of WEU, and I shall of course keep you informed of progress in the course of 1992.

One last word, Mr. President, about relations between the WEU parliamentary Assembly and the Permanent Council. As you know, when I visited Paris on 6th November to address the Political Committee, I had an extremely fruitful dialogue with its members; the following day at the Secretariat, I had the honour and pleasure of welcoming you and Mr. Rathbone, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. You addressed the Permanent Representatives on the direction being taken by the Assembly in its future activities and on the guidelines for its draft 1992 budget. In the ensuing discussion, you explained your concerns about the Assembly's political programme over the coming months.

This exchange of views will, I believe, have made a positive contribution to the institutional dialogue between the intergovernmental organs and the parliamentary component of our organisation.

I look forward to more such meetings in the future on specific topics, which need not be confined to administrative or budgetary matters. Through this dialogue, we shall not only improve our mutual understanding of the problems facing us but we shall also have a far clearer perception of the constraints under which we are working together in carrying forward the process of European construction.

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Since 1st October, the *Permanent Council* has met four times (9th and 23rd October, 7th November, and 11th November as the Enlarged Council to prepare for the ministerial meeting on 18th November).

During these six weeks, the Council has continued to supervise the activities of its various working groups. The three main topics of its deliberations during this period of preparation for the ordinary ministerial meeting on 18th November in Petersberg, near Bonn, were as follows:

- developments in the Yugoslav crisis;
- further contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
- the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture.

With regard to the deteriorating situation in the republics of the former Yugoslav Federation, the Permanent Council was briefed on progress with the work of the ad hoc group and the sub-groups of experts tasked with preparing a report for ministers on the political implications of United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 and possible measures to be agreed by the WEU member states. This report, drawn up by the Presidency, was considered at the extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council on 29th October, and ministers took due note. On 11th November, the Enlarged Council thanked the ad hoc group for its studies and reports and agreed that the ad hoc group and the Joint Contingency Study Group (JCSG) would not be convened again unless warranted by a change in the situation as a result of a decision to impose economic sanctions.

As regards contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Council decided on fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and Romania in the early part of November. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, have been invited to send representatives from their foreign and defence ministries to the seminar being organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris on 28th and 29th November next; also participating will be the heads of delegations from the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group. At the meeting of the Enlarged Council, there was a preliminary exchange of views on how WEU could best carry forward its relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Permanent Council discussed the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture with a view to the extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council in Bonn on 29th October, and in preparation for the regular meeting of the Ministerial Council on 18th November. In the context of negotiations on a draft treaty of political union, due to be submitted to the European summit in Maastricht, the Council considered the joint Baker-Genscher declaration of 3rd October, the Anglo-Italian declaration of 4th October and the joint letter from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl of 14th October. These three contributions have stimulated a constructive debate within WEU and within the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union and the Atlantic Alliance. As a result of the discussions on 29th October, a closer convergence of positions has been secured. The Permanent Council has kept this item on its agenda so that it can draw initial conclusions from the outcome of the alliance summit on 7th and 8th November.

The Council's *Special Working Group* (SWG) and *Defence Representatives Group* (DRG) held a series of meetings on 16th and 17th October. The SWG Deputies' Group also met on 25th October to complete preparations for the extraordinary Ministerial Council on the 29th.

Apart from topical questions, overshadowed by the developments in Yugoslavia, the two groups, at their joint meeting on 16th October, analysed the Anglo-Italian declaration, the joint letter from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl and a paper submitted by the Netherlands in the framework of European political co-operation. On the basis of this analysis, the idea of drawing up a preliminary draft declaration by WEU member states to be annexed, at the appropriate time, to the treaty on political union, received delegations' assent. A preliminary draft was therefore discussed by the Deputies' Group the following week. Preparations for the extraordinary Council meant that the discussion on the prospects for progress with arms control and for a joint approach in preparing for the Helsinki CSCE Conference had to be adjourned.

On 17th October, the *Defence Representatives Group* took stock of the work of the Joint Contingency Study Group and the fresh prospects for Franco-German military co-operation opened up by the letter from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl.

The Group also continued its work on the military implications of WEU being given a more operational rôle. Two reports were to be submitted to ministers: one on possible tasks for WEU operational capabilities and the resulting requirements, the other on new requirements for co-ordination and planning structures which would arise from the organisation's operational rôle.

The group continued its analysis of the ballistic missile threat and the means of countering that threat, as well as of Europe's strategic mobility requirements. It has kept the subject of arms co-operation on its agenda, briefly addressing the proposal for a European arms agency contained in the letter by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl.

The *Mediterranean Sub-Group* of the Special Working Group met on 5th November. Information was exchanged on the situation in Albania, preparations for the referendum in Western Sahara and the Cyprus question. As part of the continuing process of joint reflection on proposals concerning security in the Mediterranean, the group discussed the Middle East Peace Conference, which opened in Madrid on 30th October, and the Ministerial meeting of the Five + Five Group held in Algiers on 26th and 27th October. Several delegations felt that a discussion on the appropriate arrangements for a dialogue on security between WEU and the Maghreb countries would be opportune.

Several contributions were made to the work of developing key principles likely to contribute to a settlement of security questions in the Mediterranean. Attention focused on transparency and the non-proliferation of weapons.

The *experts on the verification* of arms control agreements met on 24th October. The aim of this meeting was to review CFE inspections, examine various documents concerned with practical co-operation in implementing an open skies agreement and prepare a report on activities for submission to ministers on 18th November.

The *ad hoc Sub-Group on Space* met on 14th and 15th October. The experts on medium- and long-term studies continued their work in London in the margins of this meeting, while the team responsible for the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre met from 7th to 10th October and on

23rd and 24th October. On the basis of this project team's work, the group was able to reach agreement on a draft ministerial decision.

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The annual seminar of the Public Administration Committee was held in Maastricht from 14th to 18th October 1991 at the European Institute of Public Administration. The theme was the implications for the organisation of public administration in WEU member states of a changing security environment. Participants examined the potential implications of changes in the international security environment for the organisation of public administration, including policy structures, in WEU member states, both domestically and with respect to international organisations.

The seminar was opened by the Secretary-General of Western European Union and chaired by Ambassador Charles Rutten (retired), former Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the EC. Apart from EIPA faculty members, the invited speakers included experts from ministries, other institutions and intergovernmental agencies.

The seminar working groups concluded that, in the space of four short years, European security conditions as listed in the Hague platform had changed radically on account of the revolutions in Europe and the Gulf war. Henceforward, Europe had to face new risks associated principally with the demise of Soviet power as well as risks from outside Europe. The working groups thought that a new definition of common security interests was needed which went beyond the purely military aspects and embraced other aspects referred to in the modified Brussels Treaty, namely economic, social and cultural.

The seminar working groups made a comparative study of the positions of WEU member states and were able to identify a number of basic common attitudes to the new strategic environment. The seminar participants called in particular for a West-East transfer of expertise in the field of public administration, in respect of which the Public Administration Committee could be given a co-ordinating rôle.

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Under the programme of two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected governments of Central and Eastern Europe, Ambassador Klaiber and I made two fact-finding missions during the period covered by this letter: to Bulgaria on 31st October and 1st November followed by Romania on 3rd and 4th November 1991.

In Sofia, we had meetings in turn with: the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Victor Valkov; the Bulgarian President, Mr. Jelio Jeleu; the Defence Minister, Mr. Yordan Mutavchiev; the Prime Minister, Mr. Dimitar Popov, and the Chairman of the UDF Co-ordination Committee, Mr. Filip Dimitrov.

We briefed them on the status of discussions on the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture and explained WEU's approach to its relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We asked for their opinions on the changing situation of European security and the rôle of the CSCE. They also described to us the main aspects of Bulgaria's security and defence policy.

Bulgaria regards its association with, and subsequent integration into, the European Community as a priority. It supports the efforts by the Community and the CSCE to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Bulgaria has no territorial claims and is concentrating its efforts on strengthening bilateral relations (a treaty has been signed with Germany and with Greece; negotiations are under way with Turkey and Italy). Bulgaria supports the proposals set out in the joint Baker-Genscher declaration and hopes that there will be no discrimination among the countries of Central Europe. It is in favour of the development of a political dialogue with WEU, including a dialogue at parliamentary level. As regards the country's security, Bulgaria would like to see regional imbalances corrected and new security guarantees negotiated. All our interlocutors stressed their determination to pursue the process of democratisation in their country and the urgent need for economic development to ease the transition to a market economy.

In Bucharest, we met: the Romanian President, Mr. Ion Iliescu; the Prime Minister, Mr. Teodor Stolojan; and both the Foreign and Defence Ministers, Mr. Adrian Nastase and Mr. Nicolae Spiroiu. To each one we explained WEU's present rôle, resources, objectives and future prospects.

Our interlocutors stressed their wish to see Romania treated on an equal footing with the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They pointed to their initial proposal to set up an organisation similar to WEU to bring these countries together, thus promoting a better understanding

of their positive attitude to the proposals contained in the joint Baker-Genscher declaration and the recent letter sent by President Iliescu to the Secretary-General of NATO.

Mention was made of the problems of Romania's southern and eastern frontiers and of minorities in Romania. Instability in both the West and the East, in the former Soviet Union and in the former Yugoslav Federation are matters of great concern to the Romanian leaders, who fear that their country might feel isolated; hence their interest in developing relations with NATO, the Community and WEU. The process of democratisation is continuing, and we were told of the government's intentions regarding the electoral timetable for the first half of 1992: local elections, referendum on the Constitution, followed by a general election.

Lastly, we had talks with representatives of the Romanian Parliament, including the Vice-President of the Senate, Mr. Oliviu Gherman.

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As part of the ongoing contacts with the government authorities of member states, I had the opportunity on 8th October, on the occasion of a conference organised by the Spanish Atlantic Association in Madrid, to meet H.E. Mr. Julian Garcia Vargas, the Spanish Defence Minister, with whom I had useful discussions on preparations for the Ministerial Council in Bonn.

- On 24th October in Brussels, I met H.E. Mr. W. Martens, the Belgian Prime Minister. We had a wide-ranging exchange of views on the prospects for the process of European construction and talked about the rôle of WEU;
- on 29th October, I was invited to join H.E. Mr. G. De Michelis, the Italian Foreign Minister, on board the aircraft bringing the Italian delegation back to Rome after the extraordinary Ministerial Council on 29th October. During the flight, we exchanged views on the outcome of the ministerial meeting that day and on preparations for the regular Ministerial Council on 18th November;
- on 30th October in Rome, I had talks with H.E. Mr. G. Andreotti, the Italian Prime Minister. We took stock of the negotiations in the two intergovernmental conferences in the run up to the European summit in Maastricht. I also met H.E. Mr. C. Vitalone, State Secretary in the Italian Foreign Ministry with responsibility for European affairs and European organisations, and also H.E. Ambassador B. Bottai, Secretary-General in the Italian Foreign Ministry, with whom I discussed preparations for Italy's future Presidency of WEU. Whilst in Rome, I was also invited to visit the premises of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs information research unit and crisis unit.

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Turning to public relations and information on WEU's rôle and current and future missions, my colleagues and I have taken part in the following events:

- on 3rd October at the Secretariat-General, I received a group of Dutch students from the University of Groningen;
- from 7th to 8th October in Barcelona, I took part in a seminar entitled "Challenges in the Mediterranean - the European response", organised by the Bertelsmann Foundation;
- on 8th October, I gave a talk in Madrid on the subject "WEU relations with the European union and the Atlantic Alliance" as part of a seminar organised by the Spanish Atlantic Association;
- from 9th to 10th October, in Washington, I took part in the conference on NATO's future: a congressional-executive dialogue; this event was co-sponsored by the Congressional Research Service and the United States Information Agency under the auspices of Senators Nunn and Warner and Representatives Aspen and Dickinson. On the 11th, I spoke on WEU's rôle in the emergence of a new European security order. During my stay in Washington, I had a number of contacts with senior officials in the administration. In particular, I had talks with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Reginald Bartholemew, Under-Secretary of State at the State Department, and Mr. Robert Zoelick, Adviser in the State Department. I explained to all of them the importance of the European pillar for the future of transatlantic relations;

- on 9th October, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, and Mr. A. Jacomet, Head of the Policy and Planning Section, outlined WEU's structures and activities to foreign students at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich;
- on 11th October, I spoke of the rôle and place of WEU to students at the Defence University in Washington;
- on 12th October, I gave a talk on Europe's rôle in NATO during a dinner-debate organised at Casteaux by the SHAPE Officers' Association as part of their 31st general assembly;
- on 14th October in Maastricht, I gave the opening address, entitled "The rôle of WEU in a changing security environment", in the seminar on the implications for the organisation of public administration in WEU member states of a changing security environment; this was being held under the auspices of the WEU Public Administration Committee at the European Institute of Public Administration;
- on 14th October in Aachen, I gave a talk on WEU as part of an event organised by the Arbeitskreis Aachen of the Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft;
- on 15th October I took part in a seminar entitled "Security policy in the year 2000" organised by "the Deutscher Bundeswehrverband e.V." in co-operation with the ÖTV (Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr) in Hanover. I spoke on the subject of the evolution of Europe and the armed forces: the rôle of WEU;
- on 19th/20th October I took part in the European meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Brussels. On the 20th, I addressed the issue of building a European defence identity;
- on 20/21st October, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the Secretariat at the annual session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Madrid;
- on 21st October, I spoke to the IEPG National Armament Directors' meeting in The Hague on a WEU perspective on the future European security architecture and its implications for European co-operation;
- on 22nd October, I took part in a seminar organised by the Economist at Gleneagles in Scotland on the theme of "The retrenchment of defence spending and how to live through it". I gave an address entitled "An ideal world: a prescription for Europe";
- on the same day, I gave a talk on WEU at a dinner-debate organised by the Anglo-Netherlands Society in London;
- on 22nd/23rd October, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, attended a conference in Madrid on "The European puzzle: the new geometries of security", organised by the Humanism and Democracy Foundation. He spoke on the defence of Europe and its uncertainties: the end of bipolarism, European integration, new nationalisms;
- on 23rd October, I took part in the 12th Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) symposium and exposition in Brussels, speaking about WEU during a dinner-debate organised as part of this meeting;
- on 25th October, I delivered the opening address of a seminar on European security and economics - the rôle of regional powers, organised in The Hague by the Young Europeans for Peace and Security;
- on 30th October, in the company of Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, I gave an address on WEU in Rome as part of a seminar co-sponsored by the Italian Centre for Advanced Defence Studies and the Diplomatic Institute. In the presence of senior representatives of the Italian military establishment and ambassadors of WEU member states, I gave an address on WEU's rôle in maintaining security and stability on the European continent;
- on 31st October, Mr. P. Casardi spoke to students on the General and Flag Officers Course at the NATO Defence College in Rome on the subject "WEU's rôle in the emergence of a new European security order";
- on 4th November, Ambassador H. Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, and Mr. D.J. Williams, Head of Council Secretariat, represented the Secretariat-General at a seminar on the new agenda and institutions of European security policy: the changing rôles of WEU, the EC and NATO, organised in London by the Federal Trust. Ambassador H. Holthoff spoke on the new rôle of WEU.
- on 5th November in Paris, I took part in a debate among members of the Journalists' Group of the WEU Institute on "European security in a changing world";

- on 8th November, Ambassador H. Holthoff visited the premises of the Deutsche Luft- und Raumfahrt-gesellschaft (DLR) at Oberpfaffenhofen near Munich;
- on 9th November in The Hague, I took part in the second meeting of general secretaries of European and regional institutions and organisations with a delegation of the Executive Committee of the International European Movement;
- the same day, I spoke about WEU to members of the Stichting voor vrijheid en veiligheid at Apeldoorn in the Netherlands;
- on 12th November, I gave an address on WEU to students of the Joint Service Defence College in Greenwich (London) on the theme of WEU's rôle in maintaining security and stability on the European continent;
- on 13th November, I spoke about WEU to students from the Faculty of Diplomacy of the University of Leeds;
- on 14th November, I spoke about WEU to students of the Royal College of Defence Studies in London;
- on the same day, Mr. P. Casardi, Director for Political Affairs, spoke on European security and the rôle of WEU at the Forecast Conference on Advanced Technology International which was held in London;
- on 15th November, I took part in a seminar entitled "De West-Europese opbouw met een deur naar het Osten" (the European construction process with a door to the East) organised by the Stichting VredesPolitik in The Hague. I spoke on the subject "De West-Europese veiligheid: een nieuwe pijler?" (Western European Union: a new pillar?) ;
- on 16th November, I took part in the conference of leading members of the Young Europeans for Security movement organised in Zeist, the Netherlands, by the European Movement in the Netherlands, where I gave an address on WEU;
- on 19th November, I gave a talk on WEU in Munich as part of a conference organised by the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung;
- on the same day, I spoke about WEU during a symposium on the EC as a world power in the new world order, organised by the NAVO-Kring Association in Louvain.

Over the past two months, I have maintained regular contact with the press and with specialists on European and strategic problems, both in London and in my travels. These meetings have given me an opportunity to clarify the present orientation of WEU's work.

Annexed to this information letter are the texts of two presentations I gave on similar topics on 5th and 14th November. They are in the language in which they were delivered.

My concern is that you should receive them without having to wait for a translation into the other official language of the organisation, otherwise these texts – which are not official Council documents – would probably be out of date.

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At the request of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat prepares summaries of international press reaction to WEU activities. The following is a résumé of its note for October 1991.

WEU was mentioned in the international press throughout the month of October 1991. The organisation was featured in a number of editorials and commentaries following the ministerial meeting on 30th September 1991 in Brussels, which was specifically devoted to the situation in Yugoslavia. The press set this meeting of WEU in the far wider context of the European Community and the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. The attention of journalists, however, rapidly switched to the question of the rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture, due to the rapid succession of major initiatives by member states directly concerning the future of the organisation.

The Anglo-Italian declaration of 4th October 1991 was generally perceived by the press as an important stage in the process of defining a common European defence policy. Noteworthy in this context has been the growing interest in WEU shown by the Italian press. The commentaries on the Anglo-Italian declaration soon gave way, however, to comments prompted by the Franco-German initiative of 11th October. The rapid sequence of events relating to WEU prompted a good deal of comment and speculation about the rôle and place of the organisation in the immediate run-up to the extraordinary meeting of the Ministerial Council in Bonn on 29th October 1991.

ANNEX <sup>1</sup>*Joint Service Defence College, Greenwich**WEU's rôle in maintaining security and stability  
on the European continent*

*Presentation by Dr. Willem van Eekelen,  
Secretary-General of Western European Union,  
12th November 1991*

The Paris Charter of the CSCE proclaimed: "the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended". However, the geopolitical situation of Europe is more fragmented than ever before. More than a hundred minority problems and twenty border disputes can be enumerated. Several risks of confrontation exist, from the Baltic shores to the Balkans where the former Yugoslavia has erupted in violence. They could trigger unforeseeable repercussions ranging from economic chaos to unprecedented migrations. What happened with the Albanians in Bari last summer may only have been a foretaste. Several statesmen have underlined that mass migrations from the East and the South are indeed the main threat to Western European security.

The Gulf conflict was a timely reminder of Europe's rôle and responsibilities in the world when many of our countrymen were only too eager to see their governments reap the peace dividends of the new détente; some even ventured that "history had come to an end" and, with the demise of the Warsaw Pact, advocated a swift dismantling of our security institutions – WEU and NATO – which had guaranteed more than four decades of peace.

Before considering where we stand in the process of reinforcing the European pillar, I should like to consider with you two situations that affect Europe's security directly and that should instil in us a real sense of urgency. Accelerando seems to be the tempo of history on our continent after almost forty years of East-West stalemate.

1991, from a European defence viewpoint, is the year in which success must be achieved on all three fronts of the ongoing reappraisal of the structures of European security:

- NATO's strategy review;
- the intergovernmental conference's work on European political union and, finally,
- WEU's transformation into a more operational organisation contributing to the Europeanisation of the revamped Atlantic Alliance.

The synchronisation of these exercises is indeed necessary but their coherence is of paramount importance. WEU's future is very much dependent on their outcome since its reactivation placed it at the crossroads of the process of European integration with the ultimate goal of a fully-fledged political union on the one hand, and the indispensable transatlantic partnership on the other.

If we look at the international scene, there are four levels on which the emerging European defence and security architecture should be buttressed:

- First, the United Nations which has, in timely fashion, acquired a new prestige. However, it remains to be seen whether the recent consensus between the permanent members of the Security Council will again be forthcoming in future international crises.

- The second level is the pan-European framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the ongoing process leading us from Helsinki 1975 to Helsinki 1992. It was instrumental in making human rights a legitimate subject of East-West dialogue and played an important rôle in bringing us where we are today. Its value lies in principles and prevention – principles of conduct among states and prevention of conflicts arising among them. If, however, prevention

1. The English and French texts of this annex are not identical. They consist of two speeches by the Secretary-General on the same subject, one in English, the other in French, made at close intervals. It should therefore be considered that they are two equivalent expressions of the same communication. The Secretariat-General consequently decided not to have them translated.

fails and conflict breaks out, the consensus-based CSCE will be a cumbersome machinery for effective action. The consequences of the rule of unanimity are exemplified by the Yugoslav crisis as conflicts are most likely to arise as a result of tension among minorities or nationalities for ethnic, cultural or even religious reasons. The test for the CSCE will come when such conflicts spill over and assume international proportions. During my visits to five Eastern European countries I was struck by the declining level of interest in the CSCE; those countries aim at more concrete security guarantees through links with NATO or WEU. This largely results from the fact that the pan-European agenda has moved from individual human rights to peoples' rights with an increased risk of limited, albeit protracted, conflicts.

Secretary Baker suggested, in his address to the Aspen Institute in Berlin on 18th May 1991, a larger Euro-Atlantic community for which the CSCE could be a comprehensive and diverse framework, which should be extended to the Soviet Union. Last September's German-American initiative for regular ministerial meetings with the East European countries and the republics of the former Soviet Union is an illustration of how NATO's increased political rôle is now envisaged. It will not be to the detriment of the alliance's core function, namely collective defence.

Our American allies have also taken on board the idea of co-operative security in Europe for which CSCE, NATO, WEU, the Community and other European institutions, taken as a set, would form the basis. It will not, however, be easy to give substance to an extended Euro-Atlantic community. East European countries look primarily to the European Community to resolve their economic problems, while their admission to the Council of Europe will transfer much of the human rights discussion to Strasbourg. There will be subjects for pan-European co-operation in all three baskets of the Helsinki process but, on the whole, the potential of CSCE to integrate the ex-Soviet republics with the West should not be exaggerated. The CSCE could acquire a new dimension if it becomes involved in the definition of the security posture of the independent republics. The CSCE would primarily have to monitor the development of their armed forces and the implementation of their share of the provisions of the CFE Treaty. Today we can only conclude that the notion of collective security needs further development and seems likely to be useful only in conjunction with well-established collective defence arrangements such as those embodied in NATO and in WEU.

- The third level is NATO. The Rome Declaration on peace and co-operation has clearly reasserted that it will continue to find its main purpose in collective defence and deterrence. It will remain a much needed forum where Europeans and North Americans discuss any politico-military issue affecting their common interests anywhere in the world. In our continent, Russia is more than likely to remain the largest military power, with a sizeable nuclear armoury. Unless dramatic improvements in arms control take place before the mid-nineties, that capability can be balanced only in conjunction with the United States; that is what NATO is all about. In the past, it was geared to meet a surprise attack and could move quickly from a peacetime posture to war fighting. In the future, it will provide an irreplaceable insurance against things going wrong. Equally, its consultation function should remain as wide as possible.

The new mechanisms for contacts with Eastern Europe as sketched out in the Rome Declaration are useful since they might effectively link new democracies and new republics to a consultative process which has proven its efficiency for over forty years in defusing crises. But there is an element of window-dressing in offering an association without the prospect of an extension of guarantees through membership. Indeed, NATO as a defensive alliance uniting European countries to the American superpower, cannot provide for ad hoc interventions outside the treaty area.

NATO enabled us Europeans to live more or less comfortably in the vicinity of the other superpower, the Soviet Union, but it also had its limitations. Joint action outside the NATO area, although legally possible if all sixteen member nations agree, is unlikely, because it would be regarded as the extended arm of the United States. Of course, there would be consultation in NATO, but in my view NATO action will have to concentrate on collective defence and deterrence. Outside the NATO Treaty area I see a two-pillar approach, as we organised twice in the Gulf, with close liaison on the spot, but not under a NATO flag.

- That brings me to the fourth defence tier, the West European one. I like to describe WEU as both the European pillar of NATO and as the security dimension of the European integration process, but I have to admit that in both rôles WEU is far from perfect. But it is irreplaceable and easily perfectible. We do not have all the European Community countries as members, and other European members of NATO are outside our organisation as well. Nevertheless, it is the only pillar we have. The Eurogroup and the IEGP cannot provide an alternative in that respect.

From the London summit to the Rome summit, the Europeans have succeeded in securing the recognition of their security identity and defence rôle within the alliance. The two paragraphs agreed in

Copenhagen at foreign minister level have been expanded into a full sub-section of the Rome Declaration. Paragraphs 6 to 8 are indeed worth quoting in full. Allow me to sum them up in three sentences:

- enhanced responsibilities for the Europeans are essential for a successful transformation of our alliance;
- strategic unity and the indivisibility of security are compatible with the emergence of specific European defence arrangements;
- such arrangements would entail practical measures guaranteeing transparency and complementarity between NATO, WEU and other European institutions competent in the field of security and defence.

The strategic concept even recognises in its paragraph 52 that future European integrated and multinational structures will have – and here I quote – “ a similarly important rôle to play in enhancing the allies’ ability to work together in the common defence ”.

The alliance’s new strategic concept is a framework common to the Sixteen and to the Nine for their future national defence programmes and collective defence co-operation ventures.

The need for a strong transatlantic partnership in an unstable world has never been challenged by any ally. Unquestionably, a North American military presence in Europe remains necessary as does nuclear deterrence. However, the size of North American contingents will also depend on factors external to Europe. The Europeans are very likely to have to do more rather than less. The more they act together, the more militarily efficient and cost-effective their effort will be.

In the run-up to the European summit at Maastricht, we can now be more confident that a constructive compromise will be reached on the definition of the European pillar. The European pillar of the alliance is essential if NATO is to retain its vitality. How can we expect the United States to maintain significant forces in Europe unless we Europeans organise ourselves? Without such a European pillar NATO would lose its vitality and wither away.

I cannot imagine a European union without a defence dimension. Unfortunately, the Twelve have been entangled in an artificial distinction between defence and security, with European political co-operation being able to deal only with the political and economic aspects of security. That was the outcome of the Genscher-Colombo initiative leading to the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart of 1983. As a result, those countries wanting to go further in the field of defence decided to revitalise WEU and bring the ministers of defence into the WEU Council, which previously consisted of ministers of foreign affairs only.

I believe that today we should not go back to the early 1980s and attempt to attach defence to European political co-operation. In so doing, we would lose the ministers of defence, because I do not yet see the Twelve unanimously agreeing to meetings of the defence ministers. It seems preferable to use WEU as a transitional framework until defence can be fully incorporated into a European union. The platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague in 1987 underlined that perspective. It is necessary to provide a link with the process of convergence towards European union. Does it make sense to envisage a defence dimension being separate in the Europe of the future, where defence will no longer have the priority it received in the past?

In my paper published by the WEU ministers on 22nd February 1991, I proposed a link with the European Council of heads of state or government. The conclusions of the European Council on the principles and orientation of the common foreign and security policy would also serve as a guideline for co-operation under the Brussels Treaty. It would mean that any common conclusions reached by the Twelve would also apply to WEU. This idea may well be implemented in relation to Yugoslavia. WEU could be the operational body implementing the decisions in the defence field and would retain its full autonomy in cases where no conclusions were reached by the European Council. In this way, there would be some coherence between the Twelve and the Nine.

Does this linkage give countries who belong to the Community but not to WEU an indirect voice in WEU or indirectly even in NATO? I believe not. Defence will be the last area to apply majority voting, so the Council’s conclusions will have to be unanimous, with an abstention not standing in the way of reaching a conclusion. If there are contrary opinions there will be no conclusions and WEU will have full freedom to act. Thus the position would be that whatever the Twelve are able to agree would also apply to WEU; if any member objects, WEU would not be bound by it.

At present the European Commission does not claim a rôle in defence except on questions like arms production and export, which do not touch on the “ hard core ” of defence. In principle the European Parliament’s involvement in defence matters could be similar to the arrangements agreed for the common foreign and security policy. It would mean closer co-operation with the WEU parliamentary Assembly – the only such body whose competence in defence matters is based on a treaty.

Returning to the NATO side of the coin, I plead for more consistency in approaching European-American relations on both sides of the Atlantic. If Washington advocates "partnership in leadership" then the only partner can be a European pillar as such. The problem of the non-member countries is difficult but not all-pervasive.

The Americans do not want to be marginalised in European security debates. America's anxiety about being presented with European "faits accomplis" which are virtually impossible to influence is quite understandable. Both sides of the Atlantic have to make their proposals with an open mind. It is essential to ensure that all allies are willing to take account of each other's points of view before final positions are reached in alliance consultations. That applies to the Americans just as much as to the Europeans.

Washington has come to accept WEU as a useful instrument for out-of-Europe contingencies. Europe needs to develop and maintain capabilities for intervention when and where the political will exists to take it. Therefore European multinational forces should be structured so that they can be used by NATO in collective defence scenarios and by WEU in European contingencies as well as out-of-Europe. Their commanders could be "double-hatted", with NATO and WEU responsibilities. In situations where not all participating nations are prepared to join in a specific action, parts of the multinational units would be available as building blocks for a task force. In addition to their great political importance, multinational units, with national inputs at brigade level and above, would be a powerful incentive for equipment standardisation and interoperability.

The decision to deploy these forces would be reached in a process of alliance and European consultation. The Americans want to be involved in any crisis management which might ultimately involve them in hostilities on the European continent. On the other hand, NATO has never been created for intervention in Eastern Europe. I foresee some situations in which Europe takes the lead and the United States follows and others where the United States provides its traditional leadership. A scenario in which Europe would act alone, without North American involvement, is most improbable.

To sum up, WEU cannot be relegated to an "out-of-Europe" rôle only. The strengthening of NATO depends both on a clearer definition of the respective rôles of the Europeans and the Americans and on a WEU contribution to collective defence on the European continent. If a European security dimension requires an overall framework, transatlantic relations in general – economic, monetary as well as security – need much care, especially at a time when defence budgets are being streamlined.

In the aftermath of the Gulf war, Europe has a rôle to play by contributing to the definition of a concerted approach to the Euro-Arab dialogue, which should be a major component of any future European foreign and security policy. Western European Union has enhanced its profile through its rôle in co-ordinating the military presence of member countries in the Gulf. It has fulfilled this essential rôle because it is not hampered by the traditional obstacles to NATO being involved "out-of-area" and can base the defence of vital European security interests on Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Building on the experience of co-ordinated mine-hunting activities in the Gulf in 1987/1988, WEU set up a co-operation framework with agreed guidelines for the duration of the sanctions against Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations.

An ad hoc group of experts from foreign and defence ministries supervised a network of naval and military points of contact, a permanent co-ordination unit in Paris and co-ordination among commanders on the spot which was eventually put under the command of a WEU naval authority.

The guidelines for co-ordination went well beyond the measures adopted in 1987. They covered:

- definition and performance of missions;
- definition of areas of action;
- co-ordination of deployments;
- exchange of information;
- mutual protection of shipping in the area;
- logistic and operational support.

In the implementation of the embargo strategy, over 16 000 out of some 21 000 ships challenged for inspection were monitored by WEU vessels. After the war, WEU countries bore the brunt of mine-clearing operations.

The presence of European forces in the Gulf underscored WEU's acceptance of its responsibilities, side by side with the United States, for providing the means to attain the objective supported by the United Nations Security Council. Since collective action under similar circumstances would be more efficient and politically more acceptable than intervention by individual states, Europe should acquire its own capability to project forces and support them wherever necessary. It would entail increased co-operation in intelligence acquisition, earth observation communications, transport and, possibly, highly professional multinational units as a reaction force.

The threat posed by the dissemination and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will have to be closely monitored in the future and, if needs be, checked by means of the relevant international co-operative mechanisms, which should now be planned for that purpose.

Lastly, there is no room for complacency about defence planning and arms co-operation now that tension in Central Europe has eased. With the combined pressures of successful arms control, lower budgets and international competition, a more comprehensive and coherent system of procurement co-operation is increasingly needed. A sensible division of tasks among Europeans is the only way to achieve interoperability and standardisation to the benefit of all.

Our traditional view of crisis management has to evolve. In the past we thought that crisis management involved primarily light forces, showing the flag and demonstrating allied solidarity. The Gulf war showed the need for heavier forces to deal with an opponent possessing large armoured forces and advanced technological capabilities.

The new challenges which have emerged in continental Europe also require our full preparedness and vigilance. Ukraine's independence is the foremost. What about nuclear weapons stockpiled on its territory? Maybe the West should offer to help neutralise them in exchange for immediate economic aid. Proliferation by leakage could be countered by the concerted use of appropriate inducements. How will Moscow react if nuclear weapons are used as bargaining chips in the context of the disintegration of the union? What about Ukrainian plans for a conventional army which would be stronger than the German, French, British or Italian armies taken individually? It seems to me that some quick thinking is needed to establish a common West European approach to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic when it officially becomes a new sovereign state in early December.

The military invasion of Croatia by Serbia and the extraordinary spread of ethnic unrest across Eastern Europe may well do much to convince European leaders of the urgent need to endow WEU with the permanent structures it needs to reach joint decisions on continental and out-of-Europe security problems and, where necessary, to implement plans of action tailored to possible theatres of operation.

To come back to the Yugoslav quandary, I wonder whether it is appropriate any more to speak of a civil war. What we have in effect seen since the beginning of October is a virtual take-over by Serbian communists and a step-by-step military invasion of Croatia. To me, the leaders and commanders involved on the Serbian side are a clique akin to the one which launched the failed coup in Moscow last August.

The United Nations, in their Resolution 713, have commended the European determination to influence events through political mediation. To intervene in Yugoslavia, Europe would need not only the blessing of the United Nations Security Council and the unanimous endorsement of the CSCE – responsible for the enforcement of principles and for conflict prevention – but also a commonly agreed Community policy which could finally lead to an appropriate mandate for WEU action in the field. The WEU ad hoc group has been reactivated and has been engaged in intense work since late September. All the mechanisms set up at the time of the Gulf crisis could similarly be reactivated at very short notice.

The action envisaged – at the stage of pre-contingency planning – was a reinforcement of the observers' mission with the possibility of guaranteeing their security in an autonomous way. Twelve failed ceasefires make such a step increasingly unlikely. Intervention as such or interposition would be on a different scale and probably imply a long-term military commitment. The evolution of the situation shows that such a course of action could well worsen the conflict and extend it to other republics within the Yugoslav Federation. The CSCE principles and the commitments subscribed to at The Hague peace conference are being blatantly ignored.

Politically, one must recognise that the Community has succeeded in being firmly in the lead with the backing of the CSCE. Both the United States leadership and the United Nations Secretary-General are well aware of the positive rôle of the Community. The joint statement of the Twelve, the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated a common will to contain the conflict. Sanctions were inescapable although their immediate effect is likely to be limited. Political mediation will remain useless as long as the belligerents continue to pay no attention whatsoever. It is on the spot that a

political framework must emerge, not in the cosy conference centres of The Hague or Brussels. An irregular army faction out of political control is running the shameful risk of re-enacting on European soil the atrocities of Lebanon and Cambodia at a time when those protracted conflicts have been brought to an end.

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These dramatic events certainly militate in favour of the development of joint planning and capabilities by WEU member states. A genuine division of labour among Europeans is the only way of combining greater effectiveness and interoperability with the economies of scale and cost made possible by standardisation.

Until such time as WEU merges with the European union, it can play two rôles.

First, from an institutional viewpoint, it should have a similar, though not identical, contributory rôle with regard to European political co-operation and in relation to NATO. WEU could caucus on items on the European agenda and contribute to their deliberations. Establishing the Secretariat in Brussels would make it easier to work with NATO and European institutions. It would also facilitate relations with non-member countries. Within WEU, it seems possible to agree on the presence of the other European allies as observers when discussing important matters on the NATO agenda. This happened in ministerial meetings on the Gulf and Yugoslavia.

Second, from an operational viewpoint, it should develop as the military arm of the Community without being subjected to the same rules. This would have to be done on the basis of political compatibility and operational complementarity with all the relevant alliance mechanisms.

The road to Maastricht should see the progress made at Rome translated into a more realistic appraisal of the definition of a new Western European defence structure for the nineties.

May I remind you that the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk of 1947 paved the way for the Brussels Treaty of March 1948 which in turn preceded the Washington Treaty of 1949. By deciding to be bound together by collective security arrangements, six European states thus made possible the Atlantic Alliance and a continued American presence in Europe. In so doing, they devolved part of their sovereignty to intergovernmental structures. The new circumstances in Europe have in turn led the alliance to acknowledge and encourage the establishment of a strong European pillar based on WEU.

Forty-three years after European initiatives opened the way for American underpinning of our security, the alliance now offers the WEU countries an opportunity to regain the ground lost at the time of the European defence community.

It should entail the devolution of some military responsibilities to the reactivated union. The Twelve now clearly know the strategic framework in which the Nine intend to co-operate further. Their decisions in four weeks' time should therefore be made easier. In any case, much more could be achieved in the defence field without any more sovereignty being relinquished than occurred at the time of the signing of the Brussels Treaty.

The 1989 revolution and the momentous events of summer 1990 and 1991 have forced a change in the pace of construction of European union. In the final analysis, the future of peace and security in Europe depends on the political will of the WEU member states and the Community to develop their co-operation and harmonise their policies more closely. For want of a foreign and security policy, there is a real risk of Europe being a spectator on the sidelines of history and being reduced to a "regional non-power". The time has come for a choice in favour of a reactivated WEU with a credible operational rôle whatever the differences may be between its member countries regarding the long-term evolution of European security structures. That choice can no longer be deferred.

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 491, 494 and 496 to 505*

**RECOMMENDATION 491 <sup>1</sup>**

*on WEU and the European Community <sup>2</sup>*

1. The Assembly is the only parliamentary assembly empowered to deal with the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and regrets that, in spite of this, the Council did not inform it of important proposals made by a member country to associate Western European Union with the European Community.
2. It notes that the Commission of the European Communities is considering the inclusion in the Rome Treaty of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus separating it from the other provisions of the treaty although they are its essential complement, particularly in regard to relations between member countries and NATO.
3. It also notes that a resolution adopted by the European Parliament proposes that the reactivation of WEU be terminated so that it may be integrated into the Community, although some member states of the EEC are still opposed to developing a European concept of defence.
4. The Assembly considers that, if implemented, these various measures would weaken the Atlantic Alliance and Europe's ability to play a major rôle in international affairs.
5. It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council pursue the reactivation of WEU so as to allow Europe to play a more effective part in NATO and to provide it with the wherewithal to act more effectively each time the security of Europe is threatened.
6. It also RECOMMENDS that the Council take no decision calling in question the modified Brussels Treaty without consulting it beforehand.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1990 during the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1250).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 491***

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Redefining the future rôle of Western European Union is a fundamental exercise not only for the organisation itself but also in the challenge it represents, both in the context of the European construction process and within the framework of the Atlantic community. At issue is the major political impetus that member states have agreed to give to the organisation. In this enterprise, it is the Council's prime concern to identify the means of creating a specifically European security and defence dimension that will be of benefit to the Atlantic community as a whole.

The working document on the "Rôle and place of WEU in the new European security architecture", made public by ministers at the extraordinary Council meeting on 22nd February 1991, reveals the aims espoused by member states and the new responsibilities they would like WEU to assume.

The framework within which WEU's rôle could be strengthened was specified by the Ministerial Council of 27th June. For the information of members of the Assembly, the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting has the following to say on this subject:

"Ministers recalled that the European security and defence identity was emerging within the Twelve and WEU. In this connection, ministers confirmed their desire that WEU be fully part of the process of European integration while enhancing its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance.

They stated that the rôle of WEU should be strengthened in the context of the European construction process, which is leading the Twelve to a political union having a common foreign and security policy. They agreed that European political union implies a genuine European security and defence identity and thus greater European responsibility for defence matters. This is in accordance with the Hague platform which makes clear that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. Ministers therefore agreed that WEU should be developed in this phase of the European integration process as its defence component.

They also agreed that the development of a genuine European security and defence identity will be reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. This will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the alliance and will require, at each stage, appropriate practical arrangements to ensure transparency and complementarity. This will call for appropriate procedures for co-operation with other allies.

Ministers noted the need for the European and Atlantic debates to proceed in parallel."

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd July 1991.

**RECOMMENDATION 494 <sup>1</sup>**  
***on enhancing WEU's public relation* <sup>2</sup>**

(i) The Assembly notes with satisfaction the increased interest shown by the media, public opinion and in parliamentary debates in the rôle of WEU as a result of its action in the Gulf region following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

(ii) This open debate nevertheless shows that a large section of the public, if not ignorant of WEU, still holds preconceived and mistaken ideas about it which, in member countries and across the Atlantic too, lead to a lack of credibility in the institution that does not correspond to the increase in its activities.

(iii) Conversely, the Assembly is gratified at being kept better informed of the Council's activities, in particular through the information letters from the Secretary-General, in spite of the fact that their contents in no way commit the Council.

(iv) The Assembly notes with interest that, starting this year, numerous communiqués have been issued at the close of meetings of the Council of Ministers and several of its organs. It considers the Council is thus starting to keep the public better informed.

(v) However, upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe and new threats emanating from regions outside Europe call for more systematic, coherent efforts to explain to the public the possibilities offered by the modified Brussels Treaty for establishing a new European security system; the Council must not, however, transfer the burden of these efforts to members of the Assembly.

(vi) The hesitation shown by the Council and member governments, failing to grasp the political importance of public relations or to agree on WEU's future rôle, might increase the now prevalent uncertainty among the public about how Europe's future security should be guaranteed and organised.

THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Include information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency, in accordance with the suggestions made by Mr. Pontillon in Written Question 285, with a view in particular to increasing the now inadequate financial means available to WEU and its Assembly in this area;
2. Work out, with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, a communications strategy allowing the public debate on European security to be intensified and WEU's image to be enhanced in public opinion, not only in Europe but also in North America;
3. Support and extend the Secretary-General's public relations work and urge member governments to intensify their efforts to explain to the public WEU's work in helping to establish a new security system in Europe;
4. Inform the Assembly of measures taken to attain the abovementioned goals.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1990 during the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Roman on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations (Document 1246).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 494***

As the Council pointed out in its reply to Written Question 285 by Mr. Pontillon, all WEU bodies are helping, each as appropriate to its functions, to inform public opinion on WEU activities.

This effort has continued during the first few months of the year, particularly as regards the Assembly. The Presidency's Chief of Defence Staff, for example, personally briefed a joint meeting of the Political and Defence Committees on the co-ordination measures decided by the Council in the Gulf crisis.

As recommended by the Assembly, special attention has been devoted to intensifying the public debate on European security in the United States.

Taking advantage of his many contacts, the Secretary-General, accompanied by a representative of the Presidency, has paid an information visit to the United States, where he met senior officials in the United States administration to clarify WEU's current thinking on the organisation's future rôle.

The Institute for Security Studies, for its part, is also directing special efforts towards the United States, and has arranged several missions and events on the other side of the Atlantic in the first half of 1991.

Finally, the Council welcomes the activities conducted by the Assembly, such as the joint meeting of its committees in Palermo on 24th-26th March 1991 and the visit of a delegation to Egypt on 28th April-2nd May, a useful contribution towards enhancing international awareness of WEU.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th June 1991.

RECOMMENDATION 496<sup>1</sup>*on konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry*<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the far-reaching changes taking place in the USSR, in particular since the Reykjavik agreement;
- (ii) Convinced that the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency in defence being introduced by the Soviet Union will have immediate repercussions on military production;
- (iii) Aware that the INF Treaty and the imminent agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) will reduce even further the quantitative demand for military equipment;
- (iv) Considering that, through conversion, the Soviet Union is making a sincere effort to use for civilian purposes the human and material resources thus being released;
- (v) Aware that the Soviet authorities consider conversion to be an important means of improving the living standards of the population;
- (vi) Recalling that the preamble to the Brussels Treaty refers to economic, social and cultural ties as means for fortifying and preserving the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty;
- (vii) Recognising that it is too early to assess the full significance of economic and political reforms now taking place in the Soviet Union;
- (viii) Convinced that in the post cold war era strong social, economic and cultural ties between Western European nations and the Soviet Union will greatly contribute to reinforcing peace and security in the whole of Europe;
- (ix) Recognising that, in a first phase of the Soviet Union's transition to market economy, direct exchanges between companies, experts and politicians will be crucial;
- (x) Aware that, notwithstanding existing uncertainties, both the Federal Republic of Germany and France have recently concluded bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union on partnership and co-operation,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member governments to promote the extension of existing and the establishment of new exchange programmes so as to enable both Soviet and Western European experts to learn more about each other's social, economic and cultural systems;
2. Urge those member governments which have not yet done so to conclude formal bilateral agreements on good neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation, based on the new pattern of international relations in Europe and modelled on two such agreements as recently concluded by WEU member states;
3. Appoint a special committee of experts from national administrations with the task of studying conversion problems and exchanging experience and advice with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union.

1. Adopted on 6th December 1990 during the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session (12th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1249).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 496***

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1. The security of WEU states, and of all European states, can only benefit from the Soviet Union opening out to democracy and from its leaders' resolve that it be part of a single European area. WEU states are wholeheartedly in favour of stepping up exchanges with these countries over the widest range of sectors, since such contacts will promote confidence and weave a close fabric of relationships, serving as a powerful factor for stability.

2. In the politico-military domain, the confrontation between two blocs is disappearing with the dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact and with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe now under way. It is being replaced by a desire for co-operation, which several member states have translated into treaties. These legal instruments are helping to set up a network of bilateral agreements beneficial to all European states. The Council hopes that these instruments will be the formal embodiment on a bilateral level of the equality and sovereignty of states, as expressed notably in the Helsinki Final Act and in the Charter of Paris.

3. The conversion of the military industry is a major challenge for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and for the Soviet Union.

WEU member states consider that discussions and the sharing of expertise with the Soviet Union on this question may be a useful contribution towards meeting this challenge.

To ensure that the technical assistance is as effective as possible, member states consider that it should be established between the Soviet Union and those countries best able to contribute their experience. The prime need is for a flexible approach commensurate with the problems to be solved.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th June 1991.

**RECOMMENDATION 497<sup>1</sup>**

***on European security and threats outside Europe –  
the organisation of peace and security in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the crisis caused by Iraq's aggression against Kuwait aggravated an already difficult situation in the Middle East which makes it urgent for Europe to take steps to promote a solution to conflicts in the Middle East and the establishment of a peaceful, secure order throughout the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East with due respect for the cultural and religious traditions of each people;
- (ii) Welcoming Arab initiatives to establish a regional security system and considering that a reduction of tension requires co-operation between the countries of the region, respect for human rights and the promotion of balanced economic and social development;
- (iii) Considering that an international conference is needed in order to solve Middle East problems on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and approving the intention expressed by the European Council on 8th April 1991 to have Europe play an active part in settling conflicts in the Middle East;
- (iv) Considering that the organisation of lasting peace requires immediate preparations to be made for a conference on peace and security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM) after the fashion of the CSCE, duly adapted for application in the Mediterranean region;
- (v) Considering that the limitation of arms supplies to countries in the region calls for international agreement associating purchasing countries and selling countries in order to fix levels of armaments for countries in the region;
- (vi) Considering that the proliferation of all conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East is a serious threat to peace;
- (vii) Gratified that WEU, after helping to apply the embargo imposed on Iraq as decided by the Security Council, has taken responsibility for co-ordinating military action to assist Kurdish refugees following the decision taken by the European Council on 8th April 1991,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I

With a view to helping to bring about peace in the Near and Middle East, should, where appropriate:

1. In all areas within its purview, pursue the action undertaken by the European Council to allow Europe to help to establish and then maintain peace in the Middle East and security in the Mediterranean, in particular by laying the foundations for a system of co-operation, good-neighbourliness, co-responsibility and interdependence between all countries in the region with respect for human rights. This system will make possible the essential process of economic and social development that should reduce the present imbalances between those states. It will also ensure respect for the legitimate rights of all peoples in the region, including those of the Palestinian people;
2. Continue to implement European Council decisions relating to humanitarian aid to the Kurdish people;
3. In all its activities, use the good offices of the Secretariat-General;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Martinez on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1271).

4. Instruct the WEU committee of chiefs of defence staff to:
  - (a) determine, if so requested by the countries concerned or decided by the United Nations Security Council, the kind of military assistance member countries are able to make at the present time in order to guarantee any peace agreements which may be reached in the Middle East and organise the co-ordination of such assistance;
  - (b) ensure an improvement in member countries' means of information, communication and transport with a view to affording such assistance if necessary;
  - (c) co-ordinate the use of military and other resources used for peaceful purposes for the benefit of refugees in the region;
5. Promote the achievement of a general agreement governing the possession of and trade in arms in the Middle East and insist on transparency in the arms trade by having the United Nations record contracts and sales;
6. Promote agreement between member countries to end or at least to reduce supplies of arms to the Middle East with a view to making peace and stability possible;
7. To this end, invite the Institute for Security Studies to:
  - (a) study the ongoings of armaments of all kinds in the Middle East;
  - (b) gather information supplied to it by member countries on the armaments contracts they or their private firms sign with countries in the region and on the possible transfer of technology that might be used to produce armaments and ensure compliance, wherever possible, with end-user certificates;
  - (c) report back to the Assembly;

## II

Help to prepare a conference on security and peace in the Mediterranean and the Middle East by instructing its Mediterranean Sub-Group to work out Western Europe's positions on all matters relating to the first basket, in particular:

- (a) the non-proliferation of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on the production and holding of chemical and bacteriological weapons as a first step towards the creation of a zone free of atomic, biological and chemical weapons;
- (b) controlling the arms trade;
- (c) the limitation and verification of conventional armaments;
- (d) confidence-building measures;
- (e) the creation of a conflict prevention centre;

## III

Append to its annual report detailed information on the activities and conclusions of the Mediterranean Sub-Group and information obtained by the unit responsible for studying armaments in the Middle East.

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**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 497***

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1. The Council and its working groups are closely and continually monitoring the evolution of the recent initiative launched by the United States for a regional peace conference leading to the start of negotiations between the parties in the Middle East. They are making every bilateral and multinational effort to contribute to the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and for security in the Mediterranean including the respect for the legitimate rights of all peoples in the region. In this context, they have successfully co-ordinated their maritime presence in the Gulf area and their humanitarian aid in favour of the civilian population of Iraq. Within the framework of the European Community and on a bilateral basis they will continue to promote a balanced social and economic development in the region as a necessary element of lasting peace.

2. The Council welcomes the initiative of the European Community and Japan for a comprehensive but non-discriminatory register of arms transfers in the framework of the United Nations. WEU member states are, moreover, actively fostering a convention of a global ban on the manufacture, possession and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification régime to be concluded in 1992. They also support all measures against proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction.

3. The Council is studying the idea of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). The WEU Institute for Security Studies devotes a substantial part of its analytical work to questions pertaining to security in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sub-Group – in accordance with a ministerial mandate of 10th December 1990 – has drawn up an annotated list of principles likely to contribute to a resolution of the security issues in the Mediterranean. At their meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991, WEU ministers took note of the work and asked the sub-group to continue its activities.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991.

**RECOMMENDATION 498 <sup>1</sup>**

***on the Gulf crisis – lessons for Western European Union <sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Congratulating the WEU Council of Ministers on what has been achieved by the forces of member nations to help the coalition resolve the crisis in the Gulf and in particular applauding the initiatives taken by the Chairman-in-Office to co-ordinate WEU activities;
- (ii) Seconding the Council's prompt action in helping to provide the military support necessary to take aid to and ensure the protection of the Kurdish refugees;
- (iii) Welcoming the German decision to join current WEU mine-clearing operations in the Gulf;
- (iv) Believing that a longer-term WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area would considerably strengthen the chances of maintaining peace and stability in the region;
- (v) Supporting the idea of regular meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff;
- (vi) Dismayed that there is no certainty that the excellent arrangements made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to co-ordinate WEU activities both in the Gulf area and between national capitals, as well as in the WEU operational cells, will continue beyond the end of June;
- (vii) Convinced that the time is now ripe formally to associate Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey, if they wish, with the work of WEU,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Establish, in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an occasional basis, to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts directed towards the same ends;
2. Invite the governments of Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey to be associated on a permanent basis with the work of WEU at all levels and in all bodies;
3. Instruct the chiefs of defence staff to meet regularly and to examine the feasibility of co-ordinating national assets to establish WEU rapid action forces for extra-European operations;
4. Ensure the continuity, as long as may be necessary, of WEU co-ordination of:
  - (a) the application of the United Nations embargo on arms, etc., for Iraq;
  - (b) mine-clearing operations in the Gulf;
  - (c) helping to protect the environment where the threat to ecology is used as a weapon;
  - (d) support for aid to the Kurds and their protection,

both on the spot and between national capitals, by either transferring the total task from Paris to Bonn with the change of Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 1st July 1991, or mandating the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1268).

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**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 498***

1. The WEU Council of Ministers in Vianden stated that ministers are resolved to grasp the "opportunity of promoting measures that would secure lasting peace and stability" in the Gulf region. In this context, member states have successfully co-ordinated their maritime presence in the Gulf area and their humanitarian efforts in favour of the civilian population of Iraq. They will continue to promote, on a multinational and national basis, the search for a just and lasting peace.

2. The question of associating other European states with the work of WEU is under discussion in the competent international organisations. Different solutions are being studied by WEU member states but it is still too early to predict the outcome. The Council is confident, however, that appropriate procedures for adequate co-operation with all European members of EC and NATO can be worked out.

3. On 27th June 1991, ministers mandated the WEU Defence Representatives Group "to spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures". The result of this work will be submitted to ministers as soon as possible.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991.

RECOMMENDATION 499 <sup>1</sup>*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union  
for the financial years 1990 (supplementary budgets) and 1991* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

(i) Considering that:

- (a) the abolition of the Agencies for Security Questions meant the Secretariat-General bearing the cost of pensions payable to the staff of those agencies and expenditure relating to the operation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments;
- (b) the Secretary-General consequently submitted two supplementary budgets (the first and the third) during the financial year 1990 to include the abovementioned expenditure in his budget;
- (c) a "liquidation" budget terminated the management of the former agencies as from 30th June 1990;
- (d) in the financial year 1990, the Secretary-General strengthened his staff on the basis of a management study conducted by the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, introduced new means of work and included the corresponding credits in a supplementary budget (the second) for 1990 and in the 1991 budget;
- (e) these measures, representing a growth rate of 15.05% in the budget for 1991, seem fully justified by the increase in work due to the reactivation of WEU and the implementation of the principles set out in the platform of October 1987;

(ii) Regretting that:

- (a) the WEU Council refused the proposals to strengthen the staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly and authorised the creation of only two new posts on condition one of them was financed by savings elsewhere in the Assembly's operating budget;
- (b) this decision, justified by "the present climate of financial stringency [which] places severe constraints upon national budgets", is in contradiction with the decisions taken in respect of the Secretariat-General and discriminates against the Assembly;
- (c) the Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration had great difficulty in obtaining the budget documents from the Secretariat-General whereas communication of these documents is an obligation for the Council under Article VIII (c) of the Charter and Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly;

(iii) Noting that:

- (a) the conclusions of the examination in the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts of matters concerning the staff (participation of staff representatives in negotiations on employment conditions and establishment of means for encouraging and facilitating movements of staff from one co-ordinated organisation to another), referred to in Assembly Recommendation 487, have still not been communicated;
- (b) the Committee on the Budget and the Intergovernmental Work Programme of the Assembly of the Council of Europe has conducted a study of the careers of staff of the Council of Europe and this study sets out the broad lines of a career policy which might be applied to WEU staff,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Reconsider its position towards the Assembly's requirements, which were set out and duly justified in its draft budget for 1991;
2. Arrange for all documents on budgetary matters, circulated under B, C-B, BR or CR references, to be systematically sent to the Assembly;
3. Communicate to the Assembly its conclusions on staff policy problems;
4. Examine to what extent the proposals contained in the study of the careers of staff of the Council of Europe might be taken into account in the framework of WEU's staff policy.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fabra on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1264).

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**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 499***

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1. The regular contacts between the Secretariat-General and the President of the Assembly have cleared the way for a mutually accepted compromise solution as to the Assembly's budget for 1991.
2. As the references B, C-B, BR or CR indicate working or classified documents, an automatic presentation to the Assembly cannot unfortunately be envisaged. However, in order to meet the Assembly's increasing information requirements, such documents, or an indication of their content, could be sent to the Assembly at the latter's request, on a case by case basis and when deemed necessary.
3. At the present moment, the Council endeavours to maintain a maximum of flexibility in the formulation of its staff policy in order to cope with the changing challenges to which the organisation has to react. When a final decision has been taken as to the rôle and place of WEU in the European security architecture it would of course become possible to envisage a longer-term staff policy.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1991.

**RECOMMENDATION 500**<sup>1</sup>

***on the consequences of developments in Central  
and Eastern Europe for European security***<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the fact that events in the Soviet Union have not modified the guidelines of its external policy;
- (ii) Welcoming the Soviet Union's support in defending the cause of peace and law at the United Nations Security Council during the crisis provoked by the invasion of Kuwait;
- (iii) Considering that the signing of the CFE agreement, although preceded by a redeployment of Soviet armed forces which places Western Europe out of reach of a surprise attack, has not yet led to a massive reduction in the level of Soviet armaments;
- (iv) Considering as positive the Supreme Soviet's vote in favour of ratification of important parts of the agreement providing for the reunification of Germany;
- (v) Recalling that the new international order, whose principles were affirmed in the Paris Charter of November 1990, implies maintaining freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights of minorities and calls for an intensive effort to find practical means of implementing these principles;
- (vi) Recalling that the Charter of Paris expresses new principles and includes specific measures for disarmament, the establishment of a European security system and, in particular, the creation of a conflict prevention centre;
- (vii) Noting the will shown by certain European countries to redirect their internal and external policies and to seek ways of drawing closer to Western Europe;
- (viii) Also noting with great concern the re-emergence of national conflicts in the Soviet Union and in certain Central European and Balkan countries;
- (ix) Noting the extreme difficulties encountered in reforming the economy of all the countries in these regions and in particular the current Soviet request for western economic assistance and President Gorbachev's desire to address the forthcoming G-7 summit in London on 15th-17th July;
- (x) Considering that, according to the preamble and Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, one of WEU's tasks is "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe", there being no limit to the geographical extension of this undertaking;
- (xi) Recalling further that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty invites WEU to co-operate closely with NATO;
- (xii) Underlining finally that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty does not limit participation in the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies to member countries and recalling that the Council has in certain cases invited representatives of non-member countries of WEU to its ministerial meetings;
- (xiii) Welcoming the pursuit of its exchanges with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and the participation of observers from the parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries at its sessions;
- (xiv) Considering that the various organisations contributing to co-operation in Europe participate in the establishment of security throughout the European continent,

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1263).

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote, as provided for in the Charter of Paris and in accordance with the recommendations of the Assembly, the negotiation of a second agreement on conventional forces to establish a true balance of forces and armaments between the Soviet Union and the deployment of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe, a second agreement on confidence-building measures extended to the thirty-five countries participating in the CSCE and the rapid creation of the conflict prevention centre in Europe;
2. Examine with the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe which are no longer members of the Warsaw Pact, insofar as they so wish, the conditions for making them "associated countries" by allowing them to co-operate here and now in:
  - (a) the activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies;
  - (b) bodies for European co-operation in armaments matters;
  - (c) the activities of the Council's subsidiary bodies whose aim is to verify the application of agreements on the limitation of conventional armaments;
  - (d) any activities of the Council itself intended to consolidate international peace in Europe or outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;and examine with those countries any desire on their part to be released from being proscribed under the Cocom rules;
3. Foster a rapprochement between those countries and the Community and WEU;
4. Examine any steps that might be taken to ensure application of principles defined by the CSCE to all European countries, with particular regard to the inviolability of frontiers, in view of the requirements of security, respect for human rights and economic and social co-operation;
5. Foster the development of the international mechanism provided for in the supplementary document of the CSCE Charter of Paris and to this end support the establishment of a CSCE parliamentary assembly in which WEU would undertake its rightful rôle;
6. Promote co-operation between all institutions participating in the security of Europe, in particular the CSCE, NATO, the Community, the Council of Europe and WEU, and take steps to contribute thereto, especially in regard to exchanges of information and documents.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*to Recommendation 500*

1. At their meeting in Luxembourg on 27th June 1991, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states explicitly welcomed the recent initiatives by member countries aimed at relaunching the arms control process. They expressed their resolve to continue concertation among member states, in consultation with partners, in order to develop a joint approach which takes account of the interests of Europeans in every field of arms control. Ministers welcomed the solution reached in resolving the questions regarding implementation of the CFE Treaty. They expressed the hope that the continuation of the negotiations on conventional armed forces would rapidly lead to an additional agreement aimed at strengthening stability in Europe, particularly through measures to limit and, where necessary, reduce manpower levels.

WEU ministers also expressed their hope that the negotiations on security- and confidence-building measures would be used to enhance transparency and confidence in Europe.

Furthermore, WEU member countries have actively contributed to the creation of the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), which was inaugurated in Vienna on 18th March 1991. At the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council on 19th-20th June 1991, the foreign ministers of WEU member states – together with their counterparts from the other CSCE member states – adopted a mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regard to emergency situations.

2. On the basis of its April 1990 ministerial mandate, WEU has established and is developing “contacts for two-way information with the democratically-elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe”. Meeting in December 1990, ministers took note of a progress report on the contacts established, and endorsed steps to develop those contacts. At their meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991, ministers hoped that this dialogue could be given more depth and breadth. They viewed the preliminary exchanges as very positive and proposed the following measures:

- to explore the possibilities of giving the dialogue a more political dimension, for example by organising ad hoc contacts at ministerial level on specific subjects of common interest;
- to intensify the exchanges of views among experts on subjects of common interest.

In line with the activities already undertaken, WEU ministers also agreed that the WEU Institute for Security Studies should make a number of scholarships available to young researchers in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In July 1991 in London, the WEU Secretary-General and a representative of the German presidency met on separate occasions with the Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to inaugurate the information links between the WEU Secretariat-General and the embassies of those countries.

Furthermore, WEU fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and Romania will take place soon in accordance with the same ministerial mandate with the aim of extending WEU's dialogue to those two countries. It is also envisaged to organise a follow-up to the seminar organised under the aegis of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris earlier this year and which brought together the officials responsible for politico-military affairs in the foreign and defence ministries of both the WEU member states and Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The WEU Institute for Security Studies is establishing links with the academic communities of Central and Eastern Europe. The Institute has also created a “task force” on the Soviet Union composed of experts in Soviet affairs from WEU member countries.

The Council is therefore confident that WEU co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe is developing in a very positive direction.

3. As regards Cocom, any desire on the part of the Central and Eastern countries to be released from the residual proscriptions under the Cocom rules will have to be examined primarily in the framework of the seventeen-nation Cocom organisation.

4. The principles of the Helsinki Final Act apply to all CSCE member countries. It is the policy of WEU member states to encourage steps that might be taken to ensure the application of principles defined by the CSCE. The Council agrees with the Assembly that the task now is to exploit fully the

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991.

opportunities to improve security and stability in Europe through the institutions established by the Charter of Paris.

5. It is the policy of WEU member governments to promote the development of the international mechanism provided for in the supplementary document of the CSCE Charter of Paris. To this end, WEU member states have supported the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly. At the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council on 19th-20th June 1991, ministers of foreign affairs of the Thirty-five welcomed the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

6. The promotion of co-operation and the practical aspects of co-operation between all institutions "participating in the security of Europe, in particular the CSCE, NATO, the Community, the Council of Europe and WEU" are at the heart of WEU's ongoing discussions.

In this context, the Council wishes to recall that, on 27th June 1991, WEU foreign and defence ministers explicitly underlined the importance of the CSCE ministerial meeting in Berlin. They stressed the significance of its conclusions, particularly as regards the complementarity and links existing between the various institutions of the European security architecture, of which WEU is a part. Ministers also stated that WEU should be fully part of the process of European integration while enhancing its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance.

RECOMMENDATION 501 <sup>1</sup>*on weaponry after the Gulf war –  
new equipment requirements for restructured armed forces* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the continuing improvement in relations between all countries participating in the CSCE;
- (ii) Recognising that the process of political détente, combined with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Central European nations and reductions of troops and equipment in the framework of the CFE agreement have reduced the security risk in Central Europe;
- (iii) Aware that the economic deterioration and increasing political instability in the Soviet Union and in Eastern and South-East Europe constitute a security risk for Europe which cannot be ignored;
- (iv) Conscious that, in some parts of Eastern Europe, recent democratisation has also brought to the fore a number of ethnic, national and economic difficulties, thus creating instability;
- (v) Recognising that the Gulf war was very different from past wars, particularly in regard to new technology and lessons and consequences have to be drawn from it;
- (vi) Fearing that for many years to come the Near and Middle East may remain an area of instability marked inter alia by the accumulation of military equipment and thus carry serious risks for the security and other interests of Europe;
- (vii) Concerned that existing intelligence and surveillance systems failed to provide adequate information on the military build-up prior to the invasion of Kuwait as was also the case in Afghanistan in 1979;
- (viii) Alarmed by developments in ballistic missile technology in a number of countries in the Mediterranean and in the Near and Middle East;
- (ix) Aware that as a consequence of institutional constraints some possible security risks cannot be controlled by NATO as such, but that in certain conditions, such as out-of-area crises, WEU can play a useful complementary rôle;
- (x) Convinced that WEU will need an operational capability in order to give Europe more influence within NATO and the ability to respond with the United States to world events;
- (xi) Convinced that a European rapid reaction force for use outside the NATO area would be logical and compatible with NATO's responsibilities to defend NATO territory;
- (xii) Aware of the new force structures which will be introduced in the allied forces, on both a national and multinational level, based on the principles of flexibility, mobility and reinforcement,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urgently establish a WEU centre for satellite data interpretation as a first step towards setting up a European observation satellite agency;
2. Thoroughly review national force reductions as soon as the Atlantic Alliance has reached decisions regarding future allied force structures;
3. Instruct the committee of chiefs of defence staff of WEU to examine in detail the consequences of future allied force structures and the lessons of the Gulf war for European military co-operation, in particular with a view to studying:
  - (a) the possibility of setting up a European strategic airlift command equipped with a military version of the Airbus A-340 and operating in a WEU framework;
  - (b) the ballistic missile threat on Europe's southern flank and a possible subsequent common European requirement for an anti-ballistic missile capability;
  - (c) a common European requirement for a stand-off capability and precision-guided weapons.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (Document 1272).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 501***

1. In the field of space co-operation within WEU, and with a view to giving concrete expression to that co-operation, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states decided at their meeting in Luxembourg on 27th June 1991 to:

- set up a satellite data interpretation centre whose immediate task would be to train European experts in the photo-interpretation of satellite-derived data, to compile and process accessible data and to make those data available to member states, particularly within the framework of the verification of arms control agreements, crisis and environmental monitoring. The activities of the centre will be reviewed no later than three years after it has entered into operation.
- task the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to pursue studies on the possibilities for medium- and long-term co-operation on a European satellite observation system.

2. The Ministerial Council on 27th June 1991 in Vianden tasked the WEU Defence Representatives Group to "spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures". In this framework, the structures and the lessons of the Gulf war will be considered.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991.

**RECOMMENDATION 502**<sup>1</sup>

***on arms control: force reductions and the rôle of multinational units***<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Conscious that Soviet redeployment undermines the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armaments in Europe signed in Paris in November 1990, but insisting on full respect for both the letter and the spirit of this international agreement;
- (ii) Looking forward to a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession and use of chemical weapons, together with appropriate verification methods;
- (iii) Insisting that discussions should now begin on considerably reducing numbers of short-range nuclear weapons;
- (iv) Determined that general agreement should be reached on the regulation of arms sales, preferably within a United Nations context;
- (v) Noting that unco-ordinated defence budget cuts in the majority of member countries are proceeding apace;
- (vi) Reiterating the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity through NATO;
- (vii) Emphasising the development within the Atlantic Alliance of a European pillar, which should be comprised of all European NATO members who wish to be associated;
- (viii) In the knowledge that the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee has already discussed the creation of a European multinational rapid action force and that NATO's Military Committee has endorsed the idea of a NATO multinational rapid reaction force;
- (ix) Respecting the sovereignty of each member nation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage member nations to begin the ratification process of the Treaty of Paris while remaining firm with the Soviet Union on respect for both the letter and the spirit of the CFE Agreement;
2. Encourage member nations to give a common impetus to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament with a view to obtaining a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification régime;
3. Make the services of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments available to the United Nations for advice on verification of the chemical arms ban on Iraq;
4. Urge the United States and the Soviet Union to begin the promised discussions on considerably reduced numbers of short-range nuclear weapons;
5. Institute a register of arms sales by member countries, support European initiatives to ensure transparency in this domain and urge the United Nations Security Council to begin the process of seeking a general agreement on the regulation of arms sales;
6. Initiate discussion within WEU on the co-ordination necessary to ensure that a sufficient level of security is maintained in Europe despite cuts in national defence budgets;
7. Express its wholehearted support for the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity through NATO and emphasise that the European pillar within the alliance should be composed of all European members of NATO who wish to be so associated;
8. Instruct its chiefs of defence staff to begin work on the creation of a permanent multinational command structure capable of planning, co-ordinating and exercising WEU actions in the context of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Uyttendaele on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1270).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 502***

1. At their meeting in Luxembourg on 27th June 1991, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states "welcomed the solution reached in resolving the questions regarding implementation of the CFE Treaty. They expressed the hope that the continuation of the negotiations on conventional armed forces would rapidly lead to an additional agreement aimed at strengthening stability in Europe, particularly through measures to limit, and, where necessary, reduce manpower levels."

2. The functions of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) are exhaustively defined in Part II (Article VII – Article XII) of Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments, signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954, which entered into force on 6th May 1955. Article IX states explicitly: "The operations of the Agency shall be confined to the mainland of Europe."

3. WEU member states are actively fostering a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, possession and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification régime. This position has been stated repeatedly by the Council over the last couple of years, inter alia, in the Council's replies to Assembly Recommendations 403 (communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 1984, Assembly Document 996, paragraph 4), 441 (communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1987, Assembly Document 1104, paragraph 6), 460 (communicated to the Assembly on 11th April 1990, Assembly Document 1233, paragraph 7).

Within the framework of the European Community, WEU member states have, together with Japan, introduced a resolution at the 46th United Nations General Assembly calling for a comprehensive but non-discriminatory register of arms transfers in order to enhance and make worldwide the process of reducing excessive holdings of conventional weapons.

4. As regards the planning, co-ordination and exercising of WEU action in general, the Council would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the ministerial mandate of 27th June 1991 given to the Defence Representatives Group "to spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures".

5. On 27th June 1991, the foreign and defence ministers of WEU member states "agreed that the development of a genuine European security and defence identity will be reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance". Ministers noted furthermore the need for the European and Atlantic debates to proceed in parallel. The question of associating the European members of NATO with the work of WEU is under consideration in this framework.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991.

**RECOMMENDATION 503<sup>1</sup>**

***replying to the annual report of the Council<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

Considering the security and defence aspects of the annual report of the Council,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Instruct its Defence Representatives Group to make a study of the suggestions in the present report concerning multinational units and report;
2. Provide the Assembly with fuller accounts of the discussions held by its various bodies and give the Assembly priority of information concerning its decisions;
3. Instruct the WEU Institute for Security Studies to prepare unclassified versions of its reports and discussion papers and forward them to the Assembly;
4. Continue to provide the Assembly with information regarding inspections carried out by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Uyttendaele on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1270).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 503***

1. The Council has noted with interest the suggestions concerning multinational units contained in the Assembly's report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Uyttendaele on "Arms control: force reductions and the rôle of multinational units - reply to the annual report of the Council" (Assembly Document 1270). The Council considers that these suggestions represent a useful contribution to the reflection on this subject. In this context, and as a result of the ministerial mandate of 27th June 1991, the Defence Representatives Group has been tasked "to spell out and assess, in liaison with the Special Working Group, proposals to make co-operation more operational both in the politico-military field as well as in the military field proper, covering among other things tasks and the requirements for co-ordination and planning structures".
2. As the abovementioned report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Uyttendaele readily admits, communication between the Council and the Secretariat-General on the one hand and the Assembly on the other has steadily improved in line with WEU's reactivation. While bearing in mind the need for confidentiality, the Council considers that possibilities for further improvements in the exchange of information with the Assembly could be explored as WEU becomes more operational.
3. The Assembly has full access to the Institute's unclassified work. As regards the preparation of unclassified versions of the Institute's classified reports and discussion papers with the aim of forwarding them to the Assembly, this presents a number of practical problems. Indeed, in most cases the preparation of unclassified versions of the Institute's classified documents would lead to a considerable loss of substance. In other cases, questions discussed in the Institute's unclassified publications are already closely related to problems analysed in classified documents prepared by the Institute. Nevertheless, the Council will try to find solutions to improve the information of the Assembly by the Institute as WEU becomes more operational.
4. The Council has no intention of discounting its current practice of providing the Assembly with general information regarding inspections carried out by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991.

**RECOMMENDATION 504<sup>1</sup>**

***on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU and the reunification of Germany make necessary a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) Considering that certain provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer meet European security requirements but are obstacles to harmonious co-operation between member countries in security and defence matters;
- (iii) Considering that WEU is required to take its place, together with the Community and political co-operation, in a European union whose responsibilities will be extended to include security and defence matters;
- (iv) Considering that the North Atlantic Treaty is still essential for the security of Europe as a whole;
- (v) Considering that the new order of peace and security that the CSCE is in the process of establishing throughout Europe calls for a demonstration of a collective European will to ensure respect for the principles set out in the Paris Charter;
- (vi) Considering that WEU is still essential for any co-ordinated action by member countries outside the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Examine without delay the changes to be made to the modified Brussels Treaty to adapt it to the new circumstances;
2. To this end, take into consideration the draft treaty proposed by the Assembly as follows:

The high contracting parties

Resolved:

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the European Convention on Human Rights;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create a firm basis for the European economy;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Determined to pursue their action to organise the integration of their economies, their economic, social and cultural co-operation, their legitimate collective defence and the organisation of security and co-operation in all European countries;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (7th sitting).  
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1261).

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I <sup>1</sup>

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to play fully their due rôle in organising a new order of peace and security in Europe and maintaining peace and economic and social development in the world, the high contracting parties will co-ordinate their action in the various organisations helping to attain these aims.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VI, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other organisations in which the high contracting parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations.

#### ARTICLE II <sup>2</sup>

In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

While retaining the right to prepare for any military operations they may deem necessary, the Council and its subordinate bodies will ensure that there is no overlapping with NATO civil and military bodies and will pursue a continuing exchange of information and opinions with them.

#### ARTICLE III <sup>3</sup>

If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

#### ARTICLE IV <sup>4</sup>

All measures taken as a result of the preceding article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the high contracting parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

#### ARTICLE V <sup>5</sup>

The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the high contracting parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty.

None of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the high contracting parties.

#### ARTICLE VI <sup>6</sup>

1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between them and with other European organisations, the high contracting parties to the Brussels Treaty create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this treaty.

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1. Amended text.  
 2. Former Article IV amended.  
 3. Former Article V, amended in French.  
 4. Former Article VI.  
 5. Former Article VII.  
 6. Former Article VIII amended.

2. This Council is known as the " Council of Western European Union "; it is so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary. It may invite to take part in some of its activities or those of any bodies it may set up any country subscribing to the principles set out in the preamble to the present treaty whose co-operation it considers useful. It may grant such countries a status of associated country in Western European Union.

3. At the request of any of the high contracting parties, of the European Council or of the Assembly, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to concert their approach to any challenge to security and co-operation in Europe or to the application of arms limitation conventions and to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise.

4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed.

#### ARTICLE VII <sup>7</sup>

The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities to an assembly of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers appointed in accordance with the same criteria as representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

#### ARTICLE VIII <sup>8</sup>

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the high contracting parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:

The high contracting parties will, while the present treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, by referring them to the court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the high contracting parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

#### ARTICLE IX <sup>9</sup>

The high contracting parties may decide, by joint agreement, after the Council has consulted the Assembly, to invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited.

Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government will inform each of the high contracting parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

#### ARTICLE X <sup>10</sup>

The present treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

It shall be considered to enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification of the 1954 Paris Agreements and will remain in force for fifty years. After the expiry of the fifty years, each of the high contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other high contracting parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

7. Former Article IX amended.

8. Former Article X.

9. Former Article XI amended.

10. Former Article XII.

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**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 504***

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The Council takes due note of Recommendation 504 and of the report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Goerens on the "Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty" (Assembly Document 1261). In reply to Recommendation 504, the Council wishes to quote from its reply to Recommendation 490 (communicated to the Assembly on 5th June 1991, Assembly Document 1276, paragraph 2): "The principle of a revision, as and when necessary, of the modified Brussels Treaty was agreed when Portugal and Spain joined WEU. The Council is aware that this is an extremely important political undertaking and that, logically, no new drafting could be undertaken until the process to redefine Europe's rôle in security and defence matters has been completed. This means that account will have to be taken of the developments taking place in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union and of the process of adapting NATO to the new situation in Europe."

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991.

**RECOMMENDATION 505**<sup>1</sup>

***on the rôle of women in the armed forces***<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling the United Nations conventions, European directives and national legislation concerning the equality of women, and civil liberties and rights to employment;
- (ii) Considering that there is a perceived reduction in East-West tension in Europe;
- (iii) In the knowledge that formal moves are under way towards a reduction in the strengths of armed services through negotiation (cf. the Vienna CFE process);
- (iv) Acknowledging that changing technologies are altering the way in which armed forces are employed;
- (v) Given the consequence of reduced defence budgets in most European countries;
- (vi) Bearing in mind that the debate on conscription is being re-opened in a number of WEU member countries, with a tendency towards shorter periods of service and a reduced requirement for the total male population to accomplish such service and that these considerations may lead in the future to volunteer forces;
- (vii) Recognising the growing operational character of the WEU organisation, with regular meetings now of chiefs of defence staff,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage, where appropriate, member nations to pay more than lip service to the principle of women serving in the armed forces and indeed persuade those countries which at present do not permit women to join their armed forces to change their policies;
2. Encourage those countries re-examining conscription to recognise the contribution to be made by women;
3. Encourage member nations with women serving to increase or at least maintain the same relative percentage of women in national military forces during all future force reductions;
4. Encourage all member countries actively to recruit women and provide full careers leading to the highest ranks on a basis both of equality of opportunity and integration;
5. Encourage member nations to consult together to harmonise policies concerning women and combat;
6. Persuade governments that the idea in some countries of a system of:
  - (a) advisory bodies on the rôle of women in the armed forces;
  - (b) women inspectors,should be adopted generally;
7. Suggest that the WEU chiefs of defence staff include the subject of women in the armed forces on their agenda at a future meeting.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1267).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 505***

The Council notes with interest Assembly Recommendation 505 on the rôle of women in the armed forces and welcomes the report presented by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence Committee. This report offers an interesting comparative analysis of questions pertaining to the rôle and status of women in the armed forces. It has the merit of pointing out the shortcomings in harmonisation in this field while describing objectively and comprehensively the considerable progress achieved over the past few years. For the time being, some differences in the status of women in the armed forces of WEU member states seem to be inevitable, however, as they arise mainly from divergences in national traditions.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1991.

*Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force*

REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted by 6 votes to 2 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman); MM. Garrett (Alternate: *Lambie*), Lopez Henares (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Atkinson (Alternate: *Sir Dudley Smith*), Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. *Böhm*, Caccia, Conceição, De Bondt (Alternate: *Noerens*), Dimmer, Mrs. Francese, MM. *Lagorce*, *Le Grand*, Lenzer, Lopez, Valdivielso, Malfatti, Menzel, Moreira, Palacios, *Parry*, Pedregosa, Lord Rodney, MM. Tummers (Alternate: *Aarts*), Valleix, Verbeek, Worms.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation*****on arms and equipment for a European rapid action force***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the decision of NATO's Defence Ministers to establish a multinational Allied Command Europe rapid reaction corps;
- (ii) Aware of the declaration on European security and defence issued jointly by Italy and the United Kingdom on 4th October recommending that WEU members develop a European reaction force;
- (iii) Aware of the Franco-German initiative of 14th October on security and defence in the European union recommending the creation of military units under WEU's responsibility;
- (iv) Convinced that there is an irreversible trend towards more political responsibilities for Europe on the international scene in the context of a political union;
- (v) Recognising that a political union with a common security policy also implies a stronger European defence identity in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy;
- (vi) Conscious that now and in the future the United States defence budget is and will be subject to considerable restraints which, as a consequence, will increasingly limit the possibilities for European armed forces to rely on United States equipment;
- (vii) Recognising that WEU member countries will be obliged to provide the full range of equipment needed for an operational and effective European rapid reaction force, in particular including an autonomous strategic and tactical airlift capability;
- (viii) Aware that major equipment procurement programmes are long-term projects requiring timescales up to 15 to 20 years before coming to fruition,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Instruct the committee of chiefs of defence staff of WEU to examine urgently the possible contributions of all member countries which have agreed to participate in a future European rapid action force in order to harmonise the arms and equipment of this force at an early stage;
2. Urge the Defence Representatives Group to proceed energetically with its study of a European sea- and airlift capability and include in this study the possibility of establishing a European strategic airlift command in the WEU framework.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. In the last two or three years, such sweeping changes have taken place in Europe that even the most daring politicians and strategists would not have thought them possible in their boldest imagination.

2. In fact, they have left the Atlantic and European Community with a number of problems for which there are no immediate and adequate solutions. The changes are multiple and they generate difficulties of a different nature which nevertheless have to be addressed.

3. Among the issues at stake are the development of new democratic systems, economic reconstruction, the formation of a new security framework, including detailed reconsideration of existing strategies, the restructuring of armed forces and the possible reshaping of alliances.

4. Moreover, these different issues cannot be dealt with in isolation and the solutions offered should preferably be part of a grand and logical design.

5. The subject of this report is only a tiny part of the vast range of issues. By exception, it is also a matter for which solutions are at hand relatively easily, even if some of the political and military questions as regards the nature and participants of a future rapid reaction force (RRF) have not yet been answered in full.

6. The aim here is not to offer a final answer to whether the rapid reaction force should operate exclusively in a NATO framework or whether it should also have the ability to operate out of area under the aegis of WEU. At the time of writing of this report, the discussion on this subject was still going on and different proposals are mentioned in chapters III and IV.

7. Here it is assumed that for a number of reasons, to be enumerated later, the creation of a multinational rapid reaction force is inevitable. For such a force to be effective, some important equipment issues will have to be addressed by the WEU member countries which are likely to be involved. This report makes an effort to provide a few considerations.

8. The present report should also be seen as a follow-up to the report on weaponry after the Gulf - new equipment requirements of restructured armed forces<sup>1</sup>. For this reason, the report does not repeat in full what has been stated

earlier as regards important equipment which has proved its value in the Gulf.

9. With great pleasure the committee has taken note of the Council's reply to Recommendation 501, especially as regards the Council's decision to establish a satellite data interpretation and training centre. On 18th November 1991, this decision was implemented by the Council, establishing the centre in Spain as from 1st January 1992.

10. The Council's recent decision that in 1992 a study group will be formed to examine the need for and desirability of the development in the medium and long term of a European space-based observation system has given further reason for satisfaction. The committee is looking forward to early results in the study group's activities.

11. It is hoped that the working group of representatives of the defence ministries in association with the WEU Special Working Group on the operational organisation of co-operation within WEU both in the politico-military field and in the military field will make rapid and tangible progress.

### *II. General character of the threat and resulting tasks for members of the alliance*

12. Even if the world balance of forces may have changed, the basic tasks of armed forces of European nations have not. These forces primarily defend their national territory and make sure that the approaches to that territory remain open. In co-operation with other armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance, they should also help to preserve peace and security in Europe if the area covered by NATO is threatened. Finally, they should protect their nation's or Europe's interests throughout the world, alone or in the framework of a coalition, particularly under the aegis of WEU.

13. After its ministerial session in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June 1991, the North Atlantic Council summarised the fundamental security tasks of the alliance in the following solemn phrases:

- “(i) To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful res-

<sup>1</sup> Document 1272.

olution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

- (ii) To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
- (iii) To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
- (iv) To preserve the strategic balance within Europe."

14. A large number of European allies, not completely satisfied with a NATO monopoly in this field, had insisted that reference should be made to other organisations. As a consequence, the Council also recognised that:

"Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have rôles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity."

15. At the Rome summit on 7th-8th November 1991, the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council solemnly reiterated and confirmed the Copenhagen texts as quoted in paragraphs 13 and 14.

16. After all, the allies knew perfectly well that the governments of the twelve EC member countries were, in the framework of an intergovernmental conference, discussing changes in the original Rome Treaty in order to include common foreign and security policy, objectives which ultimately cannot but lead to a common defence policy.

17. Logically, in the final communiqué of the NATO Council meeting it was also made clear that there was an

"agreement of all allies to enhance the rôle and responsibility of the European members. We welcome efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognise the significance of the progress made by the countries of the European Community towards the goal of political

union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence rôle, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance."

18. It is extremely difficult to specify which commitments are to be expected. The political situation in many areas of the world is extremely volatile. It is well known that in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa the situation is far from stable. Anything could happen with serious consequences for Europe's security. In fact, one should expect the unexpected and it is impossible to have forces especially tailored to specific emergencies.

19. Be that as it may, recent military history, supported by contingency studies, has sufficiently demonstrated that a multinational rapid reaction force must be an essential part of the allied armed forces. If the general requirement for the efficiency of armed forces is to be mobile, well-equipped, highly-trained and versatile, this is particularly true for a rapid reaction force, which is destined to be the spearhead in any military operation.

### *III. Recent decisions in NATO*

20. Existing ideas on a rapid reaction force which were being discussed in different forums first crystallised in the framework of NATO, where the Military Committee worked out a concept for new force structures endorsed by the NATO Council in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June 1991. It should be noted here that the new force structures were decided even before decisions had been taken regarding NATO's future rôle and purpose or as regards the review of the existing strategic concept which is no longer up-to-date. This new strategy was decided at NATO's summit conference on 7th and 8th November in Rome.

21. Critics of NATO's force structure decisions at that time said that they were taken at such an early stage in order to forestall exclusively European initiatives on that subject. Another objective of NATO's decision was certainly to put a brake on defence budget cuts in almost all European member states which can hardly be called a co-ordinated effort and thus jeopardises the defence effort of allied countries which should be based on close co-operation.

22. On 28th and 29th May 1991, the NATO Defence Planning Committee met in Brussels and sketched the main outlines of an allied multinational rapid reaction force. Among other

things, the communiqué of this meeting reads as follows:

“ We have agreed the basis of a new force structure consisting of main defence forces, reaction forces and augmentation forces, including multinational forces of all types: land, air and maritime. In particular we have agreed various national contributions to the multinational corps of main defence forces for which detailed planning will now proceed. With regard to reaction forces, we have agreed that these should consist of immediate and rapid reaction forces, comprising contributions from most NATO nations and including national as well as multinational formations. As part of the rapid reaction forces, we have agreed the creation of a rapid reaction corps for Allied Command Europe, under United Kingdom command with a multinational headquarters. These forces, together with our future air and maritime force structures, will provide the basis for the flexible deployment of a range of forces depending on the situation. In this context we have agreed the establishment of a multinational reaction force planning staff at SHAPE for development and co-ordination of plans for all Allied Command Europe reaction forces. A number of important aspects relating to the implementation of the new force structure now require examination, including the composition of multinational air and naval components and their command arrangements. We agreed that the necessary studies should be undertaken immediately. Finally, we have agreed that a study of NATO's command structure should be pursued as a matter of urgency with the aim of streamlining and adapting it to the new situation. ”

23. This basic agreement left many questions which still had to be worked out, but gradually, more details are taking shape. The new rapid reaction force, referred to as the multinational Allied Command Europe rapid reaction corps (ARRC), will be established under British command and with a multinational corps headquarters.

24. While, except in the United Kingdom, no final decisions on different national contributions have yet been made, with the detailed organisation still being developed within the alliance, it is thought that the ARRC could be composed of the following elements:

- first division: a United Kingdom armoured division based in Germany;
- second division: a multinational air-mobile division comprising two air-mobile brigades, one each from the

United Kingdom and the Netherlands and two airborne brigades, one each from Belgium and Germany;

- third division: a multinational division comprising units from NATO's southern region nations, in particular Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey;
- fourth division: a United Kingdom division composed of two mechanised brigades and one airborne brigade, with possible support of a commando unit.

A possible outline structure as given by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence is shown at Appendix I.

25. Finally, it has been suggested that the United States armed forces could provide air support, satellite intelligence and other satellite services and naval support in the Mediterranean area.

26. It is important to note here that, according to the early concept, the entire corps of more than 70 000 troops including equipment should be deployable on five to seven days' notice.

27. Experts estimate that it will take five years for this new force structure to become operational.

28. A tentative effort has been made to endow the ARRC with a WEU command in case of out-of-area operations, but this idea was abandoned after fierce French opposition.

29. Important decisions regarding such subjects as the exact command structure and the relation between the rapid reaction forces and other elements of the new force structure have yet to be taken.

30. Early expectations that final decisions on the deployment and tasks of this ARRC would be taken at the NATO summit in Rome on 7th and 8th November 1991 did not materialise.

#### *IV. European initiatives*

31. The Yugoslav crisis has demonstrated that in the post-cold war contingencies may develop which do not come within NATO's area of responsibility nor threaten vital United States' interests, but which could be contained by an armed forces operation.

32. There can be little doubt that the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe, including the development of democratic structures and the policing of its regional conflicts, will increasingly be a task of the Western European Community with closely co-ordinated responsibilities in the field of foreign policy, security and defence.

33. The reactions of European governments to the crises in both Kuwait and Yugoslavia have been confused and contradictory. In the Kuwait crisis they were able to adjust their reactions thanks to the duration of the crisis and determined and decisive United States leadership. A future crisis may allow them less time to organise themselves.

34. Many people in Europe are convinced now that the present diverse ways of European governments of conducting security policy is disorderly and therefore unacceptable. Even the most dogged opponents of further integration in Europe begin to recognise that the road towards more unity in foreign and security policy is not only indicated by the creed of blind idealists but also by the logic of common self-interest. It is no surprise, therefore, that in recent weeks two new proposals were made in the framework of preparations for the European summit conference in Maastricht on 9th and 10th December 1991. One proposal, submitted on 4th October, was a common declaration by Italy and the United Kingdom. The other proposal, made public on 14th October, is a combined Franco-German effort.

*(a) The Anglo-Italian proposal*

35. It has rightly been said that, in this declaration, the United Kingdom for the first time has recognised the perspective of a common European defence, as stated in paragraph 2:

“Political union implies the gradual elaboration and implementation of a common foreign and security policy and a stronger European defence identity with the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy compatible with the common defence policy we already have with all our allies in NATO.”

36. Obviously, in accordance with a long-standing tradition in United Kingdom policy, reference is also made to the common defence in the Atlantic Alliance and to the presence of United States forces in Europe, which are both considered to be vital elements for the common defence of Europe.

37. The document further emphasises the complementarity of the review of the alliance's tasks and strategy on the one hand and the development of a common foreign and security policy within the framework of a European political union. The document also states:

“WEU should be entrusted with the task of developing the European dimension in the field of defence. It will develop its rôle in two complementary directions: as the defence component of the union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance.”

38. It then makes a number of proposals to improve co-ordination between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. In the three final paragraphs, the Anglo-Italian document proposes an autonomous European reaction force for out-of-area operations as follows:

“In order to give a first practical content to the European defence identity, members of WEU should develop a European reaction force. This would be capable of responding flexibly in a range of possible circumstances outside the NATO area, for example in response to threats to the interests of WEU members or in peace-keeping operations. It would thereby make a new contribution to the common defence.

Such a force would be autonomous, separate from the NATO structure, and would have its own peacetime planning cell to develop contingency plans and organise exercises. Political control would be exercised by WEU Ministers.

There should be co-ordination with other members of the alliance, so that such a force could deploy alongside forces of other allies.”

*(b) The Franco-German proposal*

39. Only a few days later, on 14th October 1991, the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany submitted a new initiative, which was more detailed and far-reaching than the earlier Anglo-Italian proposal. To discuss the Franco-German proposals in detail would lead beyond the scope of this report, but some of its aspects should be mentioned here.

40. The Franco-German document considers the security and defence of the European union to be part of a common foreign and security policy. WEU has a rôle in the process within the framework of its competence and in accordance with the direction established by the union.

41. It then lists a number of priority subjects to be included in a common foreign and security policy. Next, the main objectives of WEU are given, among which the need to establish a real European defence and security identity and to assume increased responsibilities in defence matters.

42. It was further proposed to develop a clear organic link between WEU and the European union and to make WEU more operational, acting in accordance with the directives of the European union.

43. The proposal also envisaged the creation of a military planning and co-ordination group in WEU with the following tasks:

– the planning of common actions including actions in crisis situations;

- operational planning for co-operative action in case of natural disasters;
- co-ordination of the examination of existing needs in all areas of co-operation;
- organisation of common exercises.

It recommended the creation of military units under WEU's responsibility without mentioning a time-frame.

44. New procedures were proposed to improve co-operation and to ensure transparency and complementarity between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.

45. Finally, and strangely enough in a post-script at the end of the document, a proposal was made to reinforce the existing Franco-German brigade:

"Franco-German military co-operation will be strengthened beyond the present brigade. Thus, the reinforced Franco-German units could serve as the core of a European corps, including the forces of other WEU member states. This new structure could also become the model for closer military co-operation between the WEU member states."

46. Later some sources said that the reinforced Franco-German unit would consist of a German division, based in Sigmaringen, one of the two French divisions which were based in Germany until now, and the existing Franco-German brigade, altogether some 20 000 troops, the size of a French army corps. The combined headquarters would be based in Strasbourg, which as a consequence would mean the permanent posting of German officers on French territory.

47. It should be noted here that the Franco-German proposal does not call for a rapid reaction (or action) force. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine what other task could be assigned to this unit if it is meant to become the core of a European corps and even could become the model for a closer military co-operation between WEU member states. It is well known that the present Franco-German brigade, while having an important political significance, could scarcely be deployed in a real military operation. In order to be able to understand what the French and German Governments have in mind for European defence forces, more clarification is required.

48. At its meetings on 30th October and 18th November, preparing the European Council in Maastricht, the WEU Council of Ministers discussed the abovementioned proposals in the context of an in-depth discussion on the place and rôle of WEU in the future European security architecture. As stated in the communiqué issued after the 18th November meeting, the

ministers were able to narrow their positions but, understandably, no decision was taken on this subject.

### *V. A plethora of problems*

49. Now that an agreement over the establishment of European multinational force with a rapid reaction capability seems to be developing, with NATO's decision as a guiding principle for future decisions in a European framework, many problems still remain to be solved. Some of the issues involved can be singled out as being of particular importance. They will be mentioned in this chapter. In the following chapters, attention will be paid to equipment under development in co-operative programmes, which is of vital importance for any rapid reaction force to be effective.

50. The command structure of any kind of common European defence force is inevitably causing a certain amount of discord between European nations.

51. The United Kingdom is in favour of a double-hatted command, which would allow the deployment of European multinational forces under NATO command in case of collective defence scenarios in accordance with North Atlantic Treaty obligations and the same forces to be deployed under WEU command in European contingencies or out-of-area operations. France is emphasising an option with a purely European multinational defence force under WEU command.

52. Germany has not been completely unambiguous in its comments, but a double-hatted solution would probably have its preference.

53. On the other hand, the German Defence Minister has been quoted as saying that in a conflict between NATO and European tasks, the European mission would have priority<sup>2</sup>.

54. Both the Italian and the Spanish Governments are said to be in favour of a double-hatted command structure.

55. The question remains, however, as to whether a genuine European defence identity exists as long as it is dependent on United States command for all its operational activities, as it is at present under the command structure of the Atlantic Alliance.

56. If the command structure is a priority issue to be decided unambiguously and at an early stage, the other problems to be addressed are certainly not of minor importance, as will be seen in the following paragraphs.

57. For a rapid reaction force to be credible, it is essential to have an extremely flexible military

2. The Independent, 8th October 1991.

crisis management instrument, together with the political decision infrastructure for immediate decision-making and reaction to any kind of crisis.

58. On the other hand, it seems obvious that any decisions on a WEU military force will be premature if attention is not paid at the same time to the creation of infrastructure for planning and for organising WEU manoeuvres.

59. If military personnel are to be part of multinational units, it is essential to co-ordinate different national training programmes and methods from the very start, in order to make them familiar with the procedures and operating methods of a multinational force.

60. Joint exercises and the use of training facilities in contingency areas are indispensable and should be strongly promoted. There should be exercises and training programmes both in Europe and out-of-area on an all-arms, inter-service and inter-allied basis. They should also reflect the further development of common doctrines and procedures within the Atlantic Alliance.

61. All units should certainly employ the same procedures and doctrines in order to operate coherently. It will be vitally important for all formations to speak a common language and use compatible communications equipment.

62. Many problems connected with setting up a multinational rapid reaction force stem from the lack of standardisation and interoperability of equipment. Logistic support for multinational formations is more complicated and communications difficulties are multiple, which will have a negative influence on C<sup>3</sup>I activities, vital in military operations of modern armed forces.

63. When multinational forces are created, it is advocated that several different national divisions be combined at the level of the multinational corps. Experience has demonstrated that setting up multinational units at a lower level would create too many problems as regards organisation, logistics and command.

64. No official statement has been made on the operational concept for a rapid reaction force and it should be admitted that operations will have to be adapted to the different nature of various possible contingencies.

65. For the rapid reaction force to be effective, it should be capable of implementing the manoeuvre war concept, in which offensive air and long-range artillery systems prevent the movement of an enemy's ground and air reserves and paralyse his command systems, while at the same time ground forces manoeuvre and concentrate to strike at an enemy's vital terrain or assets. It goes without saying that high mobility and a balanced force of all arms where the operational level should also be able to control and direct long-range assets are essential.

66. The air component should include all systems for air superiority, long-range attack and ground support. Indirect fire artillery systems should have a long-range attack capability. Apart from that, there should be an armoured force for manoeuvre. This should include tanks, armoured infantry, anti-tank helicopters, air defence systems and long-range artillery, all capable of both strategic and operational mobility.

67. Finally, one important subject which is more of a political than of a military operational bearing should certainly be addressed with care. It is suggested that with changes in political strategic relations in Europe, the different elements of a rapid reaction force should not be positioned exclusively on German soil, but that the different national components should be stationed on the territory of other nations as a proof of the multinational and multidirectional character of these forces.

#### *VI. Existing capabilities in European countries*

68. In the following paragraphs a succinct review is given of the existing and planned capabilities in those European nations whose armed forces might participate in a future rapid reaction force.

69. As of now, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom each have some kind of rapid reaction force available, or being set up at a national level.

70. The aim of all these forces is to be able to intervene in hotbeds of tension at very short notice. They should allow tension and force relations in crisis areas to be changed very quickly and aggressive enemy action to be controlled or slowed down until main action forces arrive in the theatre of operations.

71. Some of the abovementioned nations have already designated specific units for participation in a multinational force, while others, as will be seen, are still in a less advanced state of preparations.

72. Since the structure of the proposed multinational forces has not yet been agreed upon in detail, some disparities may appear in national plans for contributing to these forces.

#### *(a) Belgium*

73. Belgium will assign its para-commando regiment to the rapid reaction force. This regiment is now being transformed into a brigade, reinforced with a Recce squadron, equipped with light tracked vehicles and a battery of 105 mm towed artillery. The A-129 combat helicopters and the transport helicopters which

have been ordered could, under specific circumstances, be used to support the para-commando brigade.

*(b) France*

74. It should be noted that, after the NATO Council meeting in Copenhagen, France's Minister for Foreign Affairs stressed that the debate on force restructuring was not yet closed, that the alliance was in a transitory phase and that only at NATO's Rome conference could final decisions be taken.

75. The French Defence Minister made it clear that future security threats and risks will be diversified and difficult to predict, which means that one should be prepared to face them at several different levels: national, European, Atlantic and multinational.

76. More specifically, he said that Europeans should have flexible forces at their disposal which, if need be, could operate together in a coherent and efficient way. In order to achieve this, WEU member states should develop mechanisms for co-operation and co-ordination. A permanent military planning and co-ordination centre at the WEU Secretariat-General would be an extremely useful basic instrument.

77. Similar ideas have been put forward and worked out in recent reports of the Assembly's Defence Committee presented by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

78. In the Gulf war there was a need to reinforce the force d'action rapide (FAR) with professionals and with matériel from other units because of the distance of the war theatre, the level of forces present, the different services and the allied character of the operation. For the future, with possible operations of a widely different level of intensity, studies are being conducted to set up completely professional units which could intervene immediately and anywhere in the world and provide reinforcement with heavy equipment. These army corps units could temporarily even be placed under operational command of the force d'action rapide.

79. According to the French Defence Minister, Pierre Joxe, other lessons from the Gulf war were the need to improve the interoperability of equipment with that of the most important allies for actions within or out of Europe, improve the airlift capability, watch the availability and sufficiency of supplies, in particular for the most modern weapons, and create an internal balance in the armed forces between conscripts and professionals adapted to the different operations to be envisaged.

80. A thorough revision of intelligence systems at strategic and tactical level is needed.

81. All these subjects will be discussed in the French national parliament in the framework of

the new law on the military equipment programme at the beginning of 1992<sup>3</sup>.

*(c) Germany*

82. The German Government has not yet taken a final decision on the German contribution to the rapid reaction corps and State Secretary Willy Wimmer declared that for the time being the units still to be designated will be provided without specific or additional heavy matériel. Mr. Wimmer did not exclude, however, a future change in equipment due to new tasks<sup>4</sup>.

83. Meanwhile, it could be observed that the German Government has been lacking consistency and transparency in its comments on the rôle of WEU, rapid reaction forces and a European defence force. In the early days of the Yugoslav crisis, when Germany had just assumed the presidency of WEU, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hans Dietrich Genscher, opposed any out-of-area operation by a rapid reaction force in the WEU framework. In recent months he has proposed establishing a security council within the CSCE framework and making the CSCE capable of action through CSCE "blue helmets", a new peace-keeping force. Mr. Genscher argues that such action could widely expand the opportunities for conflict prevention on European soil. Mr. Scheer (SPD) welcomed these ideas, saying that a peace-keeping force should be established in the CSCE framework in order to control ethnic violence and regional conflicts.

84. Later, after a trilateral meeting in Weimar between Ministers for Foreign Affairs from France, Germany and Poland, these ministers stated that NATO and WEU should continue to play an important rôle to ensure stability in Europe<sup>5</sup>.

85. When in Washington to meet the United States foreign minister on 2nd October, Mr. Genscher and his United States counterpart, Mr. Baker, published a new initiative which, after having paid obligatory lip service to the EC, WEU and the CSCE, endorsed a largely extended rôle of NATO in a European-Atlantic community from Vancouver to Vladivostok which should also be implemented in new institutional relations between NATO and the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.

86. Only some days later, the German Government, together with the Government of France, submitted a new initiative in the framework of the European intergovernmental

3. Assemblée Nationale, written questions and ministerial answers, 8th July 1991.

4. Written answers to parliamentary questions, Bundestag 12/767, 14th June 1991.

5. FAZ, 30th August 1991.

conference, mentioned in Chapter IV, envisaging a reinforced rôle for the EC and WEU which can scarcely be seen as a logical complement to the American-German initiative in Washington.

*(d) Italy*

87. According to the Ministry of Defence, the Italian contribution to the rapid reaction corps will consist of four brigades and four support units at battalion level. These units are:

- one brigade in the multinational southern region division which is said to include also a Greek and a Turkish brigade;
- two brigades in the division with a permanent Italian command, which will also include a Portuguese brigade;
- one brigade in the mechanised United Kingdom division;
- four battalions or groups which will be placed in the different support brigades (reconnaissance, engineering, helicopters and health).

88. The specific equipment for these units will be defined by a working group which has just been established and whose task is to define structural details and solve organisational problems. At the moment, a new procurement process has been started and more modern concepts of equipment are being studied with a view to improving mobility and flexibility for the different units.

89. The rapid intervention force of the Italian armed forces is now fully operational and regularly carries out training activities.

90. The new defence white paper has been announced but not yet published because recent developments in the politico-military situation have made further revision necessary, but it is expected to be published before the end of 1991.

*(e) The Netherlands*

91. The Dutch Defence Minister, Relus ter Beek, said that the establishment of the new Dutch air-mobile brigade of 2 000 men, to be included in the rapid reaction force as announced in the 1991 defence white paper, will cost 5.2 billion guilders up to 2001. Of 3 320 million guilders earmarked for equipment, 3 100 million will be needed for the acquisition of 20 to 25 transport and 40 armed helicopters, including the cost of leasing armed helicopters until 1995. The Dutch parliament has not yet agreed to these ambitious plans.

92. Anti-tank weapons, mortars, air defence missiles and specialised vehicles will become available through the restructuring of other units or, if need be, through procurement.

93. In order to upgrade its transport capability, the Royal Netherlands Air Force intends to procure two second-hand McDonnell Douglas DC-10s which will be converted into tankers. These DC-10s should provide the air force's F-16s the extended range needed for deployment on NATO's southern flank or out-of-area.

94. Furthermore, five or six medium-weight transport aircraft will be acquired with the CASA CN-235M and the Alenia G-222 as candidates on the shortlist. It should be noted here that the Dutch parliament has asked the government to reconsider its plans for an upgraded transport capability taking into account the possibility to include Fokker, the national aircraft manufacturer, in the competition for new aircraft. The government has responded positively to this request.

95. For the forty advanced armed helicopters to be procured, final decisions regarding the type have not yet been taken, but it has been said that they should not exclusively have an anti-tank rôle but also be capable of carrying out escort, anti-armour, air-to-air and reconnaissance rôles.

96. The idea is to lease 20 armed helicopters, eventually culminating in the procurement of 40 dedicated, advanced helicopters. The candidates being mentioned are the McDonnell Douglas Apache, the Eurocopter Tiger and the Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche. The two helicopters last mentioned, however, will not be available until the year 2000.

97. The order for medium-lift transport helicopters is expected to be placed in 1992, with 1994 as the planned in-service date of the first helicopters. No candidate for this procurement has been mentioned, but the NH-90 must be excluded, since it will only become available by 2000.

98. The aim is to have sufficient airlift capacity to deploy the operational part of an air-mobile battalion over a range of 300 km in air wave. This should include 300 to 400 infantry troops, a staff element, a combat support element with mortars, engineers and communications and a forward area refuelling and rearming post with fuel and ammunition supplies to support some of the armed helicopters.

99. For the proposed rapid reaction force, the Royal Netherlands Air Force is planning to offer an air defence/fighter brigade. This contribution could include three F-16 A/B squadrons and up to four SAM squadrons, each a mix of improved Hawk and Patriot PAC-1/2 fire units. According to Dutch air force officers, this mix permits point defence in the shortest possible time with a 360 radar coverage of both aircraft and tactical ballistic missile threats.

100. Among the new equipment to be acquired will be a mobile light-weight low-level air

defence radar system, helicopter mounted mine-dispensers and 270 buggy-type vehicles.

101. The air-mobile brigade has two armoured infantry battalions, equipped with YPR-765 AFVs, one tank battalion with Leopard 1-Vs and field and air defence artillery. The anti-armour capacity of the battalions will consist of both TOW and Dragon anti-tank weapons, of which the Dragons eventually will be replaced by TRIGAT. There will be fire support from 81 mm and 120 mm mortars while air defence will be provided by portable Stingers. The first battalion should be operational by 1993, with the second to follow in 1994. A third battalion will be filled with mobilisable personnel who have served in the two standing battalions.

*(f) Spain*

102. In 1988, the decision was taken to set up a national Spanish rapid reaction force. Implementation awaits further analysis of its composition. It has been determined that it will not have a fixed organic structure. A division headquarters is being created within the army component. The combat units will be assigned for operations or exercises each time according to the planned task following the task force principle. The parachute brigade and the legion forces, plus a light brigade, are initially the units to be trained to operate with the rapid reaction force. This rapid reaction force may also be used to accomplish missions for the common defence of the alliance, but it needs further airlift capability to be really effective.

103. Recently, it has been proposed that the fuerza de intervencion rapida should be made permanent, reinforced with specialised units for specific operations. This point was emphasised by the Spanish Defence Minister, Mr. Garcia Vargas, in conversation with the Rapporteur in Madrid in October. While the fuerza de intervencion rapida is thought to consist of a brigade of approximately 4 000 men, its core should be formed by a fuerza de intervencion inmediata, an elite battalion of a few hundred men which should act as the vanguard of the Spanish armed forces in unforeseen crises, while the remaining units of the brigade, moving less quickly, are on their way.

104. Among the possible tasks of the fuerza de intervencion rapida are operations on foreign territory in addition to mutual assistance commitments concluded with the NATO allies and also operations out of Europe if so decided by the Spanish Government.

105. It should be noted that any Spanish contribution to an allied RRC will not be part of NATO's military structure, in accordance with the existing agreements between Spain and NATO.

106. In principle, Spain is prepared to contribute a brigade of around 4 000 troops.

107. As regards force modernisation, Spain is especially keen to take new procurement decisions in co-ordination with its European allies in order to ensure the greatest possible standardisation of equipment.

108. Among the equipment decisions to be taken in the future are the procurement of a replacement for its MBB BO-105 anti-tank helicopter, a tactical transport helicopter and a fixed wing-tactical transport aircraft, which are all connected with the formation of an RRC.

109. In this matter, however, no early decisions are expected since the Spanish defence budget is under great pressure, with possibly more budget cuts ahead.

110. The Spanish Minister of Defence has declared that the only viable way for a European defence force would be the double-hatted formula where units of the national armed forces would be assigned missions in the framework of both NATO and WEU. He added that the actual debate on this subject was a political one and that it would take years before a European defence force would materialise, since this is not a matter which can be improvised.

*(g) Turkey*

111. Turkey has said it wishes to contribute two brigades to the southern flank (fourth) division of the NATO rapid reaction force. It has also proposed to locate the fourth division's headquarters in Turkey to underscore this country's growing regional importance after the Gulf war<sup>6</sup>.

*(h) United Kingdom*

112. According to existing planning, the United Kingdom army will play a major rôle in the ARRC. One of the reasons for this key position is that the British armed forces are particularly well-trained and experienced because of their all-professional character.

113. More specifically, the United Kingdom army will provide the ARRC's commander, a significant proportion of the headquarters infrastructure and associated corps combat support, including communications, reconnaissance, depth-fire and air defence units.

114. To one of two multinational divisions that will form part of the corps, the army will contribute an air-mobile brigade - 24 Air-mobile Brigade - including two air-mobile infantry battalions and two aviation regiments, together with supporting arms. It will also assign to this corps the 1st (United Kingdom)

6. Defense News, 10th June 1991.

Armoured Division, a strong armoured division based in peacetime in Germany, comprising three armoured brigades, each consisting of two armoured regiments, two armoured infantry battalions and a full range of supporting arms.

115. This armoured division will be reinforced considerably with high-quality new equipment such as the Warrior armoured infantry fighting vehicle, the self-propelled AS-90 155 mm howitzer, due to enter into service in 1992, and the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). In the not too distant future, the air defence capability of the division will be provided by the Starstreak high-velocity missile and Rapier Field Standard C, both in an advanced state of development.

116. The army will further provide a second more lightly-equipped division, the 3rd (United Kingdom) Division, based in the United Kingdom and comprising two mechanised brigades, and 5 Airborne Brigade. If required, this second division will also be able to take command of the United Kingdom/Netherlands amphibious force of which 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, is the British component.

117. Altogether, the United Kingdom contribution to the ARRC will amount to some 55 000 soldiers, together with a number of individual reservists and territorial army units.

118. Appendices II and III of this report show the likely composition by the mid-1990s of the two British divisions and their constituent brigades which are planned to participate in the ARRC. In its contribution to the ARRC, the United Kingdom is building on the important lessons learned in the Gulf war.

### *VII. The rôle of tanks*

119. While many analysts have been trying to announce the end of the tank's rôle on the battlefield, the Gulf war provided evidence to the contrary. In fact, tank battles on a large scale failed to occur, but after weeks of massive air attacks to reduce the resistance of Iraqi troops, tanks and armoured vehicles had to cross the frontiers of occupied Kuwait in order to drive the Iraqis out and take possession of Kuwaiti territory.

120. In particular, the United States M-1A1 Abrams tanks were able to detect and destroy enemy tanks at a greater distance than their opponents.

121. Improved armour, sophisticated night vision equipment, less weight, higher speed and guns with improved bearing are requirements being met by the new French Leclerc and the British Challenger 2 main battle tank.

122. The so-called armoured gun system (AGS), a 22 ton lightly-armoured vehicle, which is air transportable and equipped with a relatively heavy gun, may be useful equipment for future rapid reaction forces. If such vehicles cannot replace the main battle tank, they can certainly fill a gap until heavier equipment has been brought into the theatre of operations.

123. In June 1991, the British Government announced that it would purchase 130 to 140 Challenger 2 tanks to re-equip two Chieftain regiments in Germany. The first Challenger 2 is expected to be delivered in mid-1994. It further intends to proceed with a programme to upgrade the 420 Challenger 1 tanks which will remain to make up the bulk of the British army's tank fleet.

124. A programme for a mid-life modernisation of the Leopard 2 main battle tank for the Dutch and German army, which would also include modernisation of Swiss Leopards, is threatened by serious cost overruns.

125. The first production Leclerc tank will be delivered to the French army just before the end of 1991, but there is still great uncertainty over the number of Leclercs to be procured. Instead of the originally-expected 1 400, the army might procure far less with figures now being quoted of between 300 and 1 000. The first Leclerc tank regiment will be formed in 1995.

126. It should be noted here, however, that the United States army, under strong priorities in its armoured systems modernisation plan, has indefinitely postponed the further development of a new tank and a new infantry fighting vehicle. The army now prefers to have combat support vehicles such as the advanced field artillery system, a combat-mobility vehicle, a rearming vehicle and a fast command and control vehicle, able to keep up with the modern tanks.

127. Even if less tanks may be needed in the future, they should be up to date and well equipped. It is hoped that there will be enough modern tanks in future European armed forces to make tank operations feasible and credible.

### *VIII. Helicopters*

128. Helicopters in all kinds of different configurations are due to play an ever more important rôle in future military operations. Since they are the epitome of flexibility, mobility and versatility, helicopters must be considered vital equipment for rapid action forces. It may nevertheless take until the end of the century for the main participants of a multinational rapid action force to have new dedicated helicopters at their disposal.

*(a) Attack and reconnaissance helicopters*

129. The Franco-German Tiger which is being developed in a combat-support and an anti-tank version will most probably not be in service in the French and German armed forces before 1998.

130. If the planned 125 Apache attack helicopters are procured for the British armed forces, they will probably come into service in 1998.

131. At the moment, the British army is examining the acquisition of the Boeing/Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche light reconnaissance helicopter to replace its Westland Lynx helicopters by 2005.

132. The Netherlands army has an early requirement for combat helicopters which should fulfil different rôles.

133. The three abovementioned helicopters are under review as possible candidates, which would ultimately lead to the same in-service time-frame, but a lease arrangement for half the number required is being considered as an intermediate solution.

134. Spain has shown an interest in the Tiger helicopter, but budgetary restraints exclude an early decision. Italy now has a number of A-129 Mangusta anti-tank helicopters in service, with more to come.

135. Belgium has acquired a number of Agusta A-109 helicopters which have been adapted for an anti-tank rôle.

136. Recently, the United Kingdom has announced that it would withdraw from the programme for a long-range anti-tank missile AC3G Trigat in which it is now engaged together with France and Germany. The two reasons given by the Ministry of Defence were budgetary constraints and the high costs of the programme.

137. The Trigat long-range anti-tank missile of the new fire-and-forget generation, with a range of 5 000 m, is meant to replace the HOT and TOW anti-tank missiles by 1998 and should be the main weapons system for the Franco-German Tiger helicopter. Some industry sources have suggested that for a future missile replacement, the United Kingdom might wish to choose from a competition between the European long-range Trigat and the United States advanced Hellfire anti-armour missile. Others say that the United Kingdom has announced the decision to withdraw in order to put pressure on its partners to diminish the programme cost or to enable it to pay less while remaining a partner in the Trigat programme.

*(b) Tactical transport helicopter*

138. The NH-90 tactical transport helicopter, now under development in a co-operative pro-

gramme with France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands as participating nations, will make its first flight in 1995. It will be in service in 1998 at the earliest.

139. Italy and the United Kingdom might well acquire the transport version of the EH-101, but no orders have yet been placed, apart from the 44 EH-101 Merlin anti-submarine warfare helicopter for the British Royal Navy.

140. With the abovementioned time-scales in mind, it appears that altogether it will take ten more years before a European rapid action force will be equipped adequately with a sufficient number of up-to-date helicopters to be used in different rôles.

*IX. The importance of airlift capability*

141. In my earlier report on weaponry after the Gulf war, attention was already paid to the serious deficiencies which came to light in the airlift capability of European armed forces.

142. It turned out that of all the nations that could possibly participate in a RRF, only France and the United Kingdom have a strategic airlift capability. But their existing fleet of DC-8Fs and VC-10 MK1s respectively is aging quickly.

143. Moreover, the House of Commons report on the Gulf war, quoted earlier, gave new insight into what the existing RAF Air Transport Fleet (ATF) could do to transport helicopters to the war theatre. Helicopters are crucial in providing in-theatre mobility as well as attack and reconnaissance capabilities. Generally they have to be transported by air or sea to the theatre of operations.

144. The United Kingdom support helicopter force deployed to the Gulf comprised 12 Chinooks, 19 Pumas and 12 Sea King IVs. United States Air Force C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft airlifted 11 Chinooks, 15 Pumas and 2 Sea Kings, while the remainder were sent by cargo ship.

145. Helicopters transported by air required some preparation at the United Kingdom airhead. For the Chinooks, this took approximately 30 hours, and the rebuild in the Gulf about 2 days. The Pumas required less preparation, with stripdown taking some five hours and recovery about ten hours. The Sea Kings required 3 days' preparation and 4 days to reassemble.

146. The Hercules is the only RAF transport aircraft capable of carrying a helicopter. The Puma is the largest helicopter that the Hercules can carry, but preparation takes some 48 hours and recovery some 72 hours.

147. This sounds not very encouraging for an ARRC of more than 70 000 troops and

equipment which should be deployable in five to seven days.

148. The C-130 Hercules can be operated from readily-prepared unsurfaced airfields, but the prefabricated surface which is necessary for other aircraft is exceedingly bulky and would require shipment by sea or land.

149. Lynx and Gazelle helicopters deployed with 1 (BR) Armoured Division were transported by a mixture of RAF Hercules, USAF C-5, chartered Belfasts and chartered shipping. Both aircraft types required 4 hours for preparation and 3-4 hours for recovery, whether transported by air or sea.

150. One of the conclusions drawn by the House of Commons Defence Committee from Operation Granby was that it is no longer realistic to plan for a major out-of-area operation without some support from allies.

151. At the moment, the only ally really capable of a large-scale strategic airlift is the United States. The question now is whether the United States will be capable of providing the necessary airlift in future contingencies when there may be a need for power projection at short notice. In the Gulf war, the coalition forces had six months to prepare the military offensive and to bring in sufficient troops and equipment by sea and by air, but this may not be the case in a possible future emergency. The United States Air Force will most probably not replace its C-141 strategic transport aircraft by C-17s on a one-for-one basis.

152. Of the European allies, only France and the United Kingdom have a long-distance air transport capability, but in view of the transport requirements of a modern rapid reaction force, this can barely be called a strategic airlift capability.

153. It has been pointed out earlier that France has four DC-8Fs, aged between 25 and 30 years, of which two will be phased out shortly, while it is hoped to keep the other two in service until the end of the century.

154. The United Kingdom has 13 VC-10 MK-1s, now 20 to 30 years old, while it has 9 Tristars which, after a current modification programme, will all be used as tanker/transport or tanker/cargo aircraft.

155. None of the aircraft mentioned, however, has been designed for the strategic airlift of heavy equipment for military purposes. As a consequence, they do not have a cargo bay of sufficient height and width, nor do they have a front or rear loading ramp.

156. If Europe is really committed to the new military concepts which are now being worked out, calling for the projection of power at short notice to almost any place in the world, it will have to procure the appropriate means.

157. For improving Europe's military airlift capabilities, the only possible candidates are the McDonnell Douglas C-17, which made its first flight on 15th September 1991, and the Airbus A-340 M, a military version of the civilian A-340-300, and the Future Large Aircraft, now being proposed by Euroflag.

#### *X. Candidates for Europe's airlift capability*

##### *(a) The Airbus A-340 M*

158. At present, Aérospatiale and MBB are examining the possibilities of developing different military versions of the civilian long-distance carrier A-340-300, which made its first flight in October 1991. The following versions are proposed:

- (i)* A-340 M, for transporting a maximum of 434 troops. Apart from the installation of military communications and navigation equipment, this version would be very similar to the civilian A-340-300.
- (ii)* A-340 M Combi, for transporting 295 troops and 20 tons of freight, with a 3.58 m × 2.57 m cargo door in the aft fuselage.

These two versions could be available as from 1996.

- (iii)* A-340 M cargo, capable of carrying heavy loads. For this purpose, the load floor should be reinforced considerably. A large cargo door, 6.79 m × 2.57 m should give access to the upper deck, while there should be two cargo doors in the lower deck, with dimensions of 2.74 m × 1.72 m and 2.78 m × 1.67 m respectively. It could also be equipped with an autonomous loading system. According to studies which have been carried out, the A-340 M would be able to transport lighter equipment up to the size of an AMX 10 RC armoured reconnaissance vehicle or a VAB armoured personnel carrier. This cargo version should have a 5 000 nautical miles range with a maximum load of 53 tons. It could also be equipped with two refuelling pods for in-flight refuelling of accompanying fighter aircraft. If the decision to develop this version is taken in 1994, first deliveries could take place in 1997.
- (iv)* AMP-340 Tanker, an in-flight refuelling tanker aircraft with 3 pods, capable of carrying 128 tons of fuel. There is no early requirement for this

version, which could replace existing French C-135 and United Kingdom Victor and Tristar tanker aircraft, but not before the years 2010-15.

159. In Europe, the demand for a troop transport and cargo version of the A-340 M is believed to be fairly limited. According to Aérospatiale's estimates, it would be for not more than 40 aircraft up to 2010. A basic A-340 M version would cost between 20 and 150 million, dependent on the number of aircraft procured and the period during which a production line should be kept open. It should be noted, however, that the A-340 M, while capable of providing long-distance logistic transport, cannot perform strategic missions with a tactical profile.

*(b) The McDonnell Douglas C-17*

160. The McDonnell Douglas C-17 is a strategic military transport aircraft, developed to replace the C-141 Starlifter. The C-17 has been designed to operate in rugged conditions and should be capable of landing on short airfields, thus enabling it to perform strategic missions with a tactical profile. It has a specially-designed large-size cargo bay, equipped with a loading ramp and an autonomous loading system. These characteristics enable the C-17 to transport even the heaviest arms and equipment of a rapid reaction force to the theatre of operations. The arms would include multiple-launch rocket systems, Patriot air defence systems, main battle tanks (Challenger, Leclerc and Leopard) and Apache attack helicopters. With a maximum payload of 78 tons, it will have a range of 2 400 nautical miles.

161. The C-17 now being built for the United States Air Force is equipped with Pratt & Whitney power plants. However, a study by McDonnell Douglas and the European engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce has demonstrated that the installation of Rolls-Royce RB 211-535 power plants would provide a perfect alternative, making the C-17 exceed the existing requirements while reducing maintenance costs. The cost of the C-17 is now estimated at approximately \$200 million, but might be lower if more than the 120 aircraft now being procured by the United States Air Force were built.

*(c) Tactical airlift, the European future large aircraft*

162. A large number of European nations will need a replacement for their existing fleet of tactical transport aircraft by the early years of the next century. Aircraft in use for this purpose now are mainly the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, the C-160 Transall and also the G-222.

163. Discussions in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), with Belgium,

France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom as participating nations, resulted in a draft outline European staff target (OEST) in April 1988. This draft OEST contains a number of requirements such as an improved payload capacity, increased range and speed, good short field performance and improved survivability, threat avoidance and manoeuvrability. Moreover, a reduced life cycle cost in peacetime operation, major savings in manpower and day/night all-weather operability were considered to be essential.

164. Aérospatiale (France), Alenia (Italy), British Aerospace (United Kingdom), CASA (Spain) and Deutsche Airbus (Germany) then joined forces in Euroflag SRL, a Rome-based company, with a view to developing the future large aircraft (FLA) designed to satisfy the requirements of the IEPG member countries mentioned earlier.

165. Meanwhile, SONACA and SABCA (Belgium) and TAI (Turkey) have shown their interest in the programme. Negotiations on their legal status in Euroflag are expected to lead to an agreement in the weeks to come.

166. Preliminary studies by Euroflag have led to a design concept with a four-engine turbofan, a rear loading ramp, a maximum payload of 25 tons and a maximum range of approximately 4 500 km. With its cargo bay dimensions of 4 m width, 3.55 m height and 17.30 m length, ramp excluded, it will be able to transport a Tiger attack helicopter and two pallets or four Gazelle SA 342 light helicopters or else a 4 ton lorry, 4 3/4 ton vehicles with 3/4 ton trailers and their crews.

167. The FLA cargo bay's size as compared with the United States C-5, C-141 and C-17 and with the C-130 and C-160 which it should replace is given in Appendices IV and V.

168. Possible derivative versions of the basic model include a combined tactical transport/convertible tanker, a long-range maritime patrol and an electronic warfare/surveillance/airborne early warning version.

169. Euroflag estimates the total requirement in Europe until 2015 at 300 aircraft, or 350 if a long-range maritime patrol version is available. Unit price of an aircraft in the basic tactical transport version is said to be \$ 5 million.

170. If nations concerned could agree to a twelve months prefeasibility study at a cost of 6.51 million ecu at the end of 1991, the first aircraft could be available in 2003-2004.

171. As regards the cost of the FLA, calculations have been submitted to the French armed forces which allow a preliminary estimate to be made.

172. If France procures 52 FLAs from a full programme for the production of 300 aircraft, the total cost for France would be F 6 167 million for development and F 23 257 million for the series of 52 aircraft, or a unit cost including development of F 565 million (January 1990 value) – approximately \$ 94 million. In a more optimistic vision of a total production of 750 FLAs, the same number of 52 aircraft would cost F 2 633 million for development and F 21 450 million for the aircraft, or a unit cost of F 463 million including development – approximately \$ 77 million. It should be noted that this second vision seems rather unrealistic at the moment.

### *XI. The choice between different options*

173. There can be little doubt that the Gulf war has demonstrated a number of deficiencies in airlift capability. Happily, the allied forces had some six months to build up their forces, using both sea- and airlift, before military operations started. Also, every now and then the United States was able to provide European allies with the huge cargo bays of their C-5 Galaxies and C-141 Starlifters.

174. Europeans should realise that in future crises the situation may be quite different. There may be less time to prepare military out-of-area operations and the infrastructure near the theatre of operations may be less favourable than it was in the Middle East with new harbours and modern airfields.

175. Moreover, the United States may have a reduced airlift capability in the future, which could make it less easy for it to provide generous assistance to its European allies. It should be noted that congressional debates on defence spending are increasingly acrimonious. While under current plans a 25 % reduction in forces is envisaged by 1995, further reductions cannot be excluded. The United States administration is under growing attack from critics, asserting that it has failed to address problems at home. The Defence Secretary, together with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has now ordered a new comprehensive review of future military needs that could result in deeper reductions in the armed forces. This could include the cancelling or extension of production schedules of new weapons programmes and, in the coming debates on priorities, the C-17 programme, which earlier had been criticised for cost overruns, may well have difficulty in escaping unharmed.

176. In the future, European armed forces will increasingly have to rely upon their own capabilities and their own equipment. If they are serious in setting up a rapid reaction force which could also be deployed for out-of-area operations, sufficient airlift capacity will have to be

one of the priority issues to be addressed. It should be recalled here that, according to the early ARRC concept, the entire corps of more than 70 000 troops including equipment should be deployable on five to seven days' notice.

177. To give an idea of the number of aircraft needed to move a relatively small rapid reaction force with equipment, the example one may give is that the air transport fleet is assumed to consist of the following aircraft: 30 C-17s, 10 A 340 Ms, 20 C-130s, 20 C-160s, 10 G 222s, 10 C-212s.

178. The theatre of operations is assumed to be within six hours' flying time from the rapid reaction force's bases, which means that aircraft can make two deliveries each day. After two days, the force available in the theatre would consist of:

- 1 Patriot squadron (750 tons of equipment, 45 vehicles and 75 personnel);
- 30 Apache attack helicopters;
- 90 main battle tanks (Challenger, Leopard II, Leclerc);
- 20 multiple-launch rocket systems;
- 10 tactical missile systems;
- 195 Scorpion light tanks;
- 90 M-113 armoured personnel carriers;
- 30 AMX-13 light tanks;
- 60 AML Scout cars;
- 17 000 troops;
- 680 tons of light artillery equipment and fuel.

179. The third day should then be used primarily for transporting fuel for the vehicles and helicopters and food and water for the troops.

180. The existing fleet of transport aircraft of Europe's armed forces is only capable of transporting equipment up to the size of an AMX-13 light tank.

181. Replacement of the existing transport aircraft by the FLA would considerably enhance the airlift capacity as compared to the C-130 and the C-160 in both range and payload, as can be seen in Appendices VI and VII.

182. The FLA has the great advantage of being able to move a Tiger helicopter without complicated stripdown and recovery operations requiring highly-specialised labour. According to Euroflag, the only operations would be to fold away the tail section and the tail rotor, take off the main rotor head and the wings holding the missile systems. Euroflag claims that the FLA could also hold the Apache, but no details can be given as regards stripdown and recovery operations. Obviously, the C-17 has the additional advantage of a still larger cargo bay and a payload of 78 tons, roughly three times the FLA payload. It can move the most heavy battlefield

equipment without problems. Its range, however, would not exceed the FLA's range.

183. The A-340 M is an aircraft completely different from all the abovementioned. It has a very long range and can take a 53 ton payload, but is based on a civilian aircraft design, which means that it has a cargo bay of limited height, no forward or aft loading ramp and no capability to land on rugged airstrips. It is able to transport people and packages and, theoretically, light battlefield equipment up to the size of an AMX 10 RC armoured reconnaissance vehicle. For moving this kind of battle equipment, however, it would always remain a second best solution which, considering the price of an A 340 M, would still be quite expensive.

184. For an optimal value for money solution, Europe's armed forces may have to consider the procurement of a mixed fleet of the aircraft mentioned in Chapter X. The House of Commons Defence Committee has rightly pointed out that it is no longer realistic to plan for a major out-of-area generation without some support from allies. It is suggested here that, in the future, WEU could offer a framework for the common procurement and operation of an air transport fleet for its member countries.

185. The committee is pleased that one of the activities of the WEU Defence Representatives Group (DRG) since the June 1991 Council of Ministers' meeting in Vianden is to examine Europe's strategic mobility needs. At the moment, the DRG is waiting for a Franco-German in-depth study on this subject, but it seems that only slow progress is being made within this study since it was announced by the German presidency in July 1991. It is now expected that the Franco-German study will be submitted to the DRG in May 1992, after which consideration could be given to a wider multinational study.

186. The committee argues that the study of Europe's strategic mobility needs is a matter of urgency which should obtain the attention that it deserves.

## *XII. Conclusions*

187. Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments. The Yugoslav crisis has taught Europe how true this statement of the Prussian King Frederick the Great still is. This present report has demonstrated that there are still many problems to be overcome before a true European defence force could be operational.

188. There can be little doubt, however, that the core of any such force should have a rapid action capability in order to control an armed crisis in its early stages.

189. Questions regarding the command structure should be solved at an early stage. A well-defined division of labour between NATO and WEU regarding operational activities would also be helpful. It would certainly be useful if these questions could be considered in an open and less dogmatic atmosphere than has too often been the case until now. An awareness of historic events and developments is useful for a better understanding of existing international relations, but never should it be turned into a dogmatic exercise since this excludes inventive solutions for new situations. The collapse of communism is the ultimate proof of how dangerous it can be to rely upon dogmatism.

190. If Europe is striving for a political union with a common foreign and security policy, which in the longer run will also call for a common defence policy and a European defence force, this should not only be seen as a means of countering possible threats or as a determined policy to score off existing security organisations, but also as an expression of sovereignty, as an indispensable ultimate means to support diplomatic action.

191. In some ways, the procurement of new equipment for the armed forces in order to allow them to face up to new tasks and challenges should be seen in the same light. A rapid reaction force will need basic equipment to make it operational and effective. This report has especially mentioned a few areas where basic equipment may be lacking in the near future or where it may not be available at all unless the European nations concerned take procurement decisions. It is well known that programmes to develop and procure major equipment take many years before they come to fruition. A 15 to 20 year time-frame is no exception, particularly not for multinational co-operative programmes.

192. It would be ill-advised for European nations to assume that for some basic equipment such as strategic military airlifters, ground support and satellite intelligence they will be able to rely upon their American allies in all circumstances in the future. It should be recognised that these allies are also feeling the pinch of defence budget constraints. Even the vital C-17 strategic airlifter programme is under heavy criticism from Congress and there will be less aircraft available than planned originally.

193. Early in October this year, the United States House of Representatives did not vote the financial means required for the installation of the 401st tactical fighter wing with 72 F-16 aircraft from Torrejon in Spain at the Italian air base Crotone, even though they knew that the allies had considered this necessary for the protection of the southern flank.


194. Europeans will have to set up a rapid reaction capability and increase their capability

for out-of-area operations. For these capabilities to be credible, they will have to adapt their airlift and in-flight refuelling capability. At the same time, many nations will have to change the structure of their conscript armed forces and make it possible for volunteers to be sent to the theatre of operations.

195. The WEU Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, has rightly pointed out that the United States has now come to accept WEU as a useful instrument for out-of-Europe contingencies. This is an even bigger reason for Europe to develop and maintain capabilities for intervention when and where the political will exists to take it.

APPENDIX I

ACE rapid reaction corps: an outline structure




NOTES :


- (1) Headquarters Includes a multinational element.
- (2) Multinational Airmobile Division.
- (3) Multinational Division comprising contributions from Southern Region nations ; composition yet to be decided.
- (4) Available to ARRC if required.

APPENDIX II


*Illustrative composition of 1st (UK) armoured division*



*Illustrative composition of 3rd (UK) division*




## APPENDIX III

*Major rôles of the British army in the mid-1990s*


APPENDIX IV

*Comparison of cargo hold lengths*



APPENDIX V

*Comparison of fuselage cross sections*




APPENDIX VI  
*Comparison of aircraft*

	UNITS	FLA min.	FLA max.	C-130	C-160	C-17
T.O.W. max. ....	Tons	85	111	70.5	51.1	263.10
Payload/G-Level .....	Tons	20.0/3.0	25.0/3.0	19.3/2.5	16.0/2.5	78.0/2.5
Floor Area .....	m <sup>2</sup>	70.5	87.4	47.2	54.2	147.1
Payload/Floor Area .....	Kg/m <sup>2</sup>	284	286	408	295	530
Wing Span .....	m	39.00	42.70	40.41	40.0	50.29
Overall Length .....	m	37.00	40.30	29.8 or 34.4	31.1	53.4
Cruise Speed.....	Kt	424	424	296	260	445
Range.....	Km (N.M.)	4360 (2350)	4360 (2350)	3340 (1770)	1580 (860)	4440 (2400)

LOGISTIC TASKS

APPENDIX VII  
*Payload - Range*



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*European union and developments  
in Central and Eastern Europe*

REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix, Brito, Candal, Caro, Collart, Cuatrecasas (Alternate: Diaz), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni (Alternate: Seitlinger), Foschi, Goerens, Guizzi, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martinez (Alternate: Moya), Martino, Müller, Pécriaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Reddemann, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mr. Soell, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Thyraud, Ward.*

*N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation****on European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe**

- (i) THE ASSEMBLY notes that, while events in summer 1991 both in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia do not directly endanger the security of WEU member countries, they significantly increase the risks to Europe's security.
- (ii) It hopes the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht will allow a decisive step to be taken towards co-operation between WEU and the Community in the framework of a European union.
- (iii) It welcomes the fact that the various proposals made at the intergovernmental conference on external policy and security and the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council in Rome tend to strengthen the rôle assigned to WEU in ensuring the maintenance of peace throughout Europe.
- (iv) It reiterates the advice given by the Presidential Committee to the WEU Council of Ministers and the intergovernmental conference that "parliamentary control of the measures by which WEU shoulders Europe's new security and defence responsibilities must remain the task of the WEU Assembly which is composed of delegations from national parliaments whose attributions in this respect are unchanged".
- (v) It considers that, at the present juncture, the modified Brussels Treaty provides more than ever the juridical basis for European co-operation in defence and security matters and it regrets that the Council has not yet agreed to give it any indication about the course it intends to follow in revising the treaty.
- (vi) It notes with satisfaction that, at its meeting on 18th November, the Council decided to set up operational bodies meeting some of the requirements implied by WEU's new responsibilities.
- (vii) It welcomes the fact that NATO has taken decisions to strengthen the CSCE and started to organise a permanent dialogue with all the countries which were members of the Warsaw Pact and that the Council has decided to organise parallel action.
- (viii) It notes, too, that the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland have started to take coherent action in all areas leading to their association with Western Europe but also that they are expressing serious concern about their security.
- (ix) It recalls the urgency of implementing its Recommendation 506 on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis.

## IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Meet at ministerial level the day after the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht to prepare the adaptation of WEU to the new situation created by the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council in Rome and by the Maastricht meeting, with particular regard to:
  - (a) the organisation and command of WEU forces earmarked for the defence of Europe, and their co-ordination with NATO;
  - (b) the organisation and command of possible WEU rapid action outside the NATO area or in the framework of United Nations or CSCE decisions;
  - (c) the necessary revision of the modified Brussels Treaty;
  - (d) defining the respective rôles of the IEPG and a future WEU armaments agency;
  - (e) moving the Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General to Brussels in order to help WEU to carry out its share of responsibilities in decisions on external and security policy matters taken by the European union and to develop co-operation between WEU and NATO along the lines of the Presidential Committee's advice of 26th March 1991.
2. Propose forthwith to the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland:
  - (a) participation in meetings of the Council when matters relating to the security of Central and Eastern Europe are discussed;
  - (b) association with the activities of the WEU satellite centre for everything relating to the verification of the CFE Agreement;

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(c) the possibility of participating in the activities of the IEPG and all forms of European co-operation in armaments matters.

3. Propose to Hungary, and any country making a formal request, the posting of military observers to Hungarian territory, in the area of its frontier with Yugoslavia, in order to record any further violation of Hungarian territory or air space by Yugoslav belligerents.
4. Take without delay the necessary military and naval measures to enforce the embargo on certain supplies to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav republics decided by the Twelve on 8th November.
5. Co-ordinate as soon as possible humanitarian operations for Yugoslav civilians and afford them naval protection.
6. Establish the necessary co-operation between member countries with a view to their participation in a peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia as soon as the conditions exist for making this legitimate.

### *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur)*

#### **I. Introduction**

1. In July 1991, the committee instructed your Rapporteur to prepare a report on WEU and the political union of Europe. The main purpose then was to follow the twelve-power intergovernmental conference on the joint external policy and security aspects of the European union in order to allow the Assembly, prior to the Maastricht meeting in December 1991 at which it is planned to adopt the new treaty, to express its views on matters within its purview and to draw conclusions for the WEU Council before the latter in turn proceeded to revise the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. Two series of events since then, outside twelve-power Europe and WEU, will probably have a strong influence on the work of both the intergovernmental conference and the WEU Council. First, there was the heightening of the Yugoslav crisis which progressively took on the dimensions of a full-scale civil war and is already having major repercussions on the whole of Europe that may well become even worse. Second, there was the coup d'état in the Soviet Union on 19th August. Admittedly, on 21st August it was plain that this had failed. However, it was a serious crisis from which the Soviet state can obviously not emerge intact. Moreover, throughout Central and Eastern Europe it aroused new fears that Western Europe must not neglect when considering its future and, above all, that of its security policy.

3. It was therefore normal for a study of the prospects of a European union including external and security policy to take these facts into account. For this reason, the Presidential Committee therefore decided, on 11th September, to change the subject entrusted to your Rapporteur by including it in the agenda of the second part of the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly under the title "European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe".

4. On 15th October, the Presidential Committee adopted, under urgent procedure, a first recommendation on WEU's action in the Yugoslav crisis. The present document, while analysing certain aspects of that affair, is more concerned with explaining the second substantive text which, going beyond current events, tries to draw lessons from the crisis for the organisation of European security as it is to be defined at the summit meeting on 9th December and by the Council of WEU.

5. In order to prepare this report, your Rapporteur went to Hungary and Poland on 7th and 8th November to obtain direct information about the security concerns of those two countries and their intentions in regard to co-operation with Western Europe in this area. Since Mr. Dienstbier, Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, is to address the Assembly on 3rd December, he did not visit Prague. He wishes to express here his sincere gratitude to the governments and parliaments of the two countries which received him, not only for their warm welcome but, even more, for the level of the talks he was able to have in all of them. Special thanks are due to Mr. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. Szokaï and Mr. Sandoz Peisch, Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Mr. Joo Rudolf, Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Andrzej Wielowieyski, former Vice-President of the Polish Senate, Mr. György Papp, Mr. Kocsenda Antal, Mr. Rockenbauer Zoltan, Mr. Gabor Perjés and Mr. Lajos Horvath, members of the Hungarian National Assembly, Mr. Andrzej Towpik, Director of the Department of European Institutions at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Ferencz, Counsellor to the Prime Minister of Hungary, and Mr. Baba and Mr. Jozsef Nyerki from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Hungary. His talks with them provided important information and above all confirmed the direction he intended his report to follow by improving his understanding of how Hungary and Poland viewed their place in the Europe of tomorrow. Your Rapporteur must also stress the contribution made to his thinking by the talks on 8th July between several Assembly committees and Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, on 30th October between the Presidential Committee and Mr. Genscher and on 6th November between the Political Committee and Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

6. Finally, your Rapporteur has to point out that, after an initial discussion on 16th October, the Political Committee decided to defer the final examination and adoption of the report until 27th November so that the Assembly may debate a text on 4th December which takes account of the latest developments in a situation which has changed very quickly in recent weeks and adopt a recommendation adapted to the circumstances just before the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht on 9th December. Your Rapporteur has endeavoured to meet this concern.

## II. Prospects for European union in June 1991

### (a) *The intergovernmental conference*

7. Since the beginning of 1991, two intergovernmental conferences, one on economic and monetary union and the other on joint external and security policy, have been held by the twelve members of the European Community in preparation for a European Council meeting at the level of heads of state or of government in Maastricht in December 1991. The aim of this European summit meeting is to decide on the changes the Twelve are prepared to make to the Rome Treaty to extend the Community's responsibilities in these two areas, to redefine the respective powers of the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament and to specify the links by which political co-operation and WEU should be associated with the European Council and the Community. The work of the conference was prepared by several proposals the external policy and security aspects of which have already been analysed by your Rapporteur in Document 1261.

8. Both intergovernmental conferences met with difficulties and when, on 17th June, the Luxembourg Government, which then held the presidency of the Community, after consulting the various member countries, tabled draft changes to the Rome Treaty, it was strongly criticised, on the one hand by those in favour of moving quickly towards a union that would be a true European federal state and, on the other, by countries which were more anxious to safeguard their national sovereignty in the areas concerned, as was the case in particular for the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it then seemed likely that the already considerable difficulties would be overcome in time and that the European summit meeting in Maastricht would make significant progress towards European union.

### (b) *The problem of enlarging the Community*

9. Although the intergovernmental conference groups the twelve member countries of the Community, it must not forget that the latter will be enlarged in coming years. The question of enlargement arose with the announcement of Austria's candidature, followed, in June, by that of Sweden, and with the negotiations being held with EFTA, which indicated that there would be a move by all the EFTA member countries towards progressive accession to the Community. In fact, all those countries have prosperous economies, with structures not basically different from those of the EEC. From this point of view, therefore, their accession would present no major problem. Conversely, two of them have neutral status that it would be difficult to reconcile with membership of a European union whose responsibilities included external and

security policy. Since 1815, Switzerland has been committed by international treaty to a perpetually neutral status, and it has always considered that this neutrality governed its external policy in all respects. Moreover, Austria's neutrality is written into its constitution and modification of its constitutional law proclaiming that neutrality was the condition for the signing of the 1955 Treaty of State which marked the end of the second world war for that country. Neither country can renounce its neutral status on its own authority. This is not so for Sweden, which, since 1815, has been pursuing a neutral policy without however being bound by an international statute, or for Finland, which, since the end of the second world war, has had to pursue a neutral policy that was a pledge of its friendly relationship with its Soviet neighbour but which is not guaranteed by treaty. It is nevertheless difficult to see how these two countries could take part in a union that included foreign and security policy if they did not renounce the principle underlying their policy of neutrality. It should also be recalled that Cyprus, Malta and Turkey have applied officially for membership.

10. Furthermore, three Central European countries have announced their intention to join the European Community as soon as possible, i.e. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Their reasons are clear: following the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact and of Comecon, to which, moreover, they had made a major contribution, they feel the need for a link with a European economic and political entity which would help them to redirect their own economies and guarantee their security. Other Central and Eastern European countries have, in various ways, shown their interest in closer links with the Community, although continuing uncertainty about the course being followed by their régimes and their external policy for the time being precludes their applying for membership.

11. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have already carried out the political reforms necessary to set up democratic régimes which are already working more or less satisfactorily with serious hopes of stability. They have also shown true solidarity with the Community countries, particularly during the Gulf crisis. The only real obstacle to their early accession is the state of their economies which, in spite of major reforms and opening to western firms and goods, are not yet ready to come to grips with the wider Western European market. At present, therefore, it would seem that these countries can consider only association agreements with the Community. Agreements are now being negotiated, but it is necessary for them to be concluded in the very near future. The associations must be seen in terms of a progressive enlargement of the European union in their direction. Other Central, Eastern or Southern European countries will probably also wish to

take their place in the European Community in subsequent years, but today it is not possible to draw up an exhaustive list of those countries. However, there are ample signs that the Community is increasingly recognising its vocation as the federator of Europe, in the economic area at least. The question is whether it can also play this rôle in external and security policy.

12. In June 1991, it therefore appeared that the Community would eventually group a large part of Europe but that it could take its time in doing so. It seemed possible to strengthen its institutions before moving on to the stage of enlargement. The Maastricht summit meeting and then, at the end of 1992, the completion of the single market were to allow this deepening. Only subsequently would it tackle the problems raised by the various candidatures. While the remarks made by the President of the French Republic, François Mitterrand, in Prague in June at the conference on the concept of a confederation of Europe, when he said the Central European countries would have a long wait at the Community door, seemed to some to be unduly discouraging, they reflected a fairly realistic view of the importance of the problems to be solved. The approach might be slow in order to handle enlargement satisfactorily so as not to dilute what the Community had attained and paralyse the future European union.

13. However, subsequent events make it necessary to reconsider these facts. On the one hand, instability in Central Europe, revealed by the serious unrest in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, suggests that countries in that region will not be able to wait long for Western Europe to assume responsibility for their security and economic stability. These events also showed that, when such crises arose, the Twelve were not yet prepared to agree on a joint external policy or military action. It must therefore be seen whether it will be possible to build a sound enough European union before the question of enlargement becomes crucial. During his visit to the former GDR, and in particular in Dresden on 19th September, President Mitterrand spoke in favour of the accession of the Central European countries without mentioning the need for a very long wait, thus adopting the same attitude as many European governments, including Germany. Time is no longer on our side and the Community is being forced to consider its enlargement even before the negotiations on strengthening, which are proving difficult and will quite obviously not be completed at Maastricht, have led to a European union in the full meaning of the term.

### *III. Yugoslavia and Europe*

#### *(a) The collapse of the Yugoslav state*

14. Set up in 1920 further to the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon and Sèvres ending the

first world war as far as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires were concerned, Yugoslavia grouped round the former Kingdom of Serbia a very large proportion of the southern Slavs – Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrans – and a number of minorities such as Hungarians in Vojvodina and Croatia, Albanians in Kosovo, Bulgarians in Macedonia and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the second world war, Yugoslavia was also given Istria, where there was an Italian minority. In fact, there is considerable intermingling of these populations within what was to become the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 and above all within several of its component republics, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina. A few details are given at appendix showing the composite nature of the federation and its component republics.

15. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, dominated by a Serb element which went out of its way to impose its law on the country, was constantly contested by some of the ethnic groups of which it was composed and, above all, by the Croats from whom emanated the Ustachi movement, responsible for the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934 and which took advantage of the second world war to set up a Croat state which, with Axis support, imposed a cruel reign of terror in the regions peopled by the Serbs under its control. This does not mean there were no Yugoslav national feelings, and these were embodied in the resistance movement led by the Croat communist Tito, which fought at one and the same time the Axis armies, the Ustachis and the Serb Chetnik monarchist movement. It was Tito's partisans who took power at the end of the war without the Soviet Union intervening. They instituted a communist régime, the only one of its kind, which broke with Moscow in 1949, and formed a new federal-type state. The dictatorship of Tito and the Communist Party succeeding in quelling nationalist claims and allowed Yugoslavia to play an important rôle on the international scene.

16. With Tito's death in 1980 came a weakening of the federal state and a renewal of nationalist claims, first by the Albanians in Kosovo and then, too, by the Croats and Slovenes. The collapse of communist ideology in Eastern Europe in 1989 encouraged Yugoslavia to move towards more democratic practices. Free elections were held in all the republics in 1990. They produced clear majorities for anti-communist forces in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia and for former communists who had become "socialists" in Serbia and Montenegro. It was not very clear who had the majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These elections allowed the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia to set up non-communist, nationalist governments with the support of large majorities in

their parliaments, while the former communists retained a preponderant influence in Serbia and the federation. Thus, to renewed national disputes, ideological and political struggles were added which grew decidedly worse in spring 1991.

17. On 25th June, Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence. However, they then accepted a moratorium postponing its implementation until 7th October. In August, they were followed by Macedonia and, in October, by Bosnia-Herzegovina, and unrest again broke out in Kosovo, whose local assembly was dissolved by the Serbian Government in May 1990 after it had proclaimed that the province was now a fully-fledged republic. Slovene and Croat armed forces managed to liberate the territory of the two republics from the federal authority and Croat forces, with the support of local militias armed with equipment recuperated from the federal army and procured from several Central European countries. They also blockaded federal forces in their Croatian bases. For their part, the Slavonian Serbs on the territory of the Croatian Republic took up arms against that republic with the active support of the federal army and Serb militias. Although presided by a Croat, Mr. Stipe Mesic, the Federal Government first set about restoring order by claiming its authority throughout the country. Seeing that this had failed, in July it appeared to wish to negotiate with the two dissident republics, but the cease-fires it signed, in particular in Brioni on 7th July urged by the European Community, were not respected by the federal army dominated by Serb elements and officers or by the Slavonian Serb militias. Whereas hostilities then came to an end for Slavonia, in August and early September the federal army conducted an offensive which allowed it to occupy a large part of Croatian territory in Slavonia and along the frontiers of Croatia and Bosnia, where it threatened Zagreb and the ports along the northern Dalmatian coast. For about twelve days after a further cease-fire which the republics and the federal state signed on 17th September under pressure from the European Community, the forces involved seemed to be respecting it. The Community had made Lord Carrington responsible for leading a peace mission in Yugoslavia and presiding the conference in The Hague intended to work out the conditions for a return to peace. However, when, on 30th September, the Croatian forces took over a federal army base, hostilities were resumed with new violence and the Serbs launched an offensive against Dalmatian ports, and Dubrovnik in particular.

18. While, at the outset of the conflict, the aim of the government and federal army was to maintain the existence of a Yugoslav state, this no longer seems to be the case. The non-Serb members of the collegial presidency of the federal state left that institution at the beginning

of October, while the Croats and Slovenes deserted the federal army in large numbers. Conversely, private militias have increased, particularly in Croatia, and now pay little heed to the governments of either Zagreb or Belgrade, thus negating each of the cease-fires signed by the republics and federal authorities. On 5th November, the twelfth cease-fire was concluded without any of the earlier ones having ensured more than a slackening off in the fighting for more than a few hours or, at best, a few days. The federal army itself seems out of the control of what is left of the federal power. It is just as if Yugoslavia has already ceased to exist and each section of the population is trying to occupy a strong position before negotiations between independent republics. The war today is something of a series of conflicts between the governments of certain republics and national minorities with the support of other republics or the federal army. This situation adds to the difficulty of the negotiations in The Hague, presided since July by Lord Carrington, since, apart from the government of the Slovene Republic, no authority seems capable of really committing itself on behalf of the portion of Yugoslav society that it is supposed to represent.

19. This civil war has attained a degree of violence and led to clashes between national sentiments so serious that a return to the status quo ante bellum seems out of the question. Where the future of Yugoslav territory is concerned, the question is whether it will be possible to maintain a link between the various republics, whether the frontiers between those republics will remain as they are and what protection minorities will have if certain republics such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia or even Montenegro show sufficient cohesion to be able to form independent states. These various questions are on the agenda of the conference in The Hague, but they obviously depend on the establishment and maintenance of an effective cease-fire.

20. On 3rd October, the non-Serb members, including the President, Mr. Mesic, were removed from the collegial presidency of the Yugoslav Federation, thus significantly weakening the latter's hopes of continuing as a de jure state. Yet, on 4th October, the same presidency, in agreement with Serbia, made major concessions at the peace conference, declaring that it was prepared to recognise the independence of republics so wishing, in exchange for the lifting of the blockade of the federal barracks in Croatia and guarantees that minority rights would be respected. But at the same time it decreed partial mobilisation in Yugoslavia and surrounded the city of Dubrovnik. Since the moratorium on the effective proclamation of the independence of the Slovene and Croatian Republics expired on 7th October, the reconstitution of a Yugoslav state now seems out of the

question, but the peace conference is still considering whether it is possible to define certain links, in particular economic, which would associate the sovereign states.

21. At the beginning of November, the main obstacle to a effective cease-fire stemmed from the fact that the "Serb bloc", consisting of Serbia, Montenegro and the federal army, insisted that the cease-fire line, which might be guaranteed by international monitors protected by a small military deployment, be located on the territory of the Republic of Croatia and correspond to the present front line. Conversely, the Republic of Croatia insisted that the cease-fire line be along its frontier with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. It is therefore apparent that both sides consider the conditions for the cease-fire binding on the future of Yugoslavia. Hence it is necessary to pursue at one and the same time the negotiations on the return to peace and the search for a cease-fire, as is being done at the conference in The Hague. However, this makes the achievement of an effective cease-fire unlikely in the near future. The economic sanctions decided by the Twelve on 8th November for the entire Yugoslav territory are obviously intended to force the two parties to agree on the cease-fire, but it seems unlikely that the effect will be felt very quickly. On the other hand, a marked failure of the conference in The Hague could but lead to recognition of the independence of the republics by the international community, which would in no way settle the main problem, that of the right of minorities within the republics.

*(b) The threatened spread of the conflict*

22. In view of the number of alien minorities living in Yugoslavia, the crisis affects neighbouring countries which fear they may be threatened by a spread of the conflict since they feel a degree of solidarity with one or other faction of the Yugoslav population, particularly as they are receiving increasing numbers of refugees.

23. (a) Hungary is worried about the fate of some 500 000 Hungarians, the majority of whom live in Vojvodina, an autonomous territory dependent on Serbia, but others live in Croatia, particularly in the part of Croatian territory occupied by the federal army in August 1991. Members of the Hungarian minority are now being called up to serve either in the federal army or in the Croatian army, and are thus being forced to fight each other for causes that they cannot endorse. Anxious not to be caught up in an internal Yugoslav conflict, Hungary, whose territory and, above all, air space have been violated several times since the civil war started, is supporting efforts by the European

Community and the United Nations to establish a cease-fire. It is asking for the more important alien minorities, i.e. Albanians and Hungarians, to be represented at the peace conference as well as the republics.

24. In fact, Hungary is afraid that, if the conflict continues, it may be dragged in by Yugoslav forces which wish to internationalise the war. It has had to take in several tens of thousands of refugees, including many members of the Hungarian minority and several thousand deserters from the federal army. Furthermore, although it has considered the violations of its air space to be in general due to initiatives taken at a low level, it is questioning why, at the beginning of November, the federal air force dropped a scatter bomb on its territory near the frontier which, by mere chance, caused no casualties. It is now wondering whether this was not a deliberate policy of provocation on the part of certain military authorities.

25. Anxious not to give a foothold to such provocation, Hungary withdrew its armed forces from the immediate vicinity of the frontier and gave its wholehearted support to initiatives by the Twelve, the CSCE and the United Nations to promote a cease-fire. However, above all it explains why the question of the country's security, which had moved to back stage in Hungarian concerns once Soviet forces had left, has again become a matter of urgency for Hungary, particularly as the revolt of Croatia and Slovenia might well encourage claims by certain minorities in some of Hungary's other neighbouring countries, such as Romania and Czechoslovakia, where there are large Hungarian minorities estimated at more than 200 000 in Slovakia and more than 2.5 million in Romanian Transylvania. Hence it was not just to move closer to the European Community but also because of very serious, well-justified fears for its security that in October Hungary, in association with Czechoslovakia and Poland, again asked to join NATO and is seeking to tighten its relations with both WEU and twelve-power Europe.

26. (b) Austria's frontiers and air space have also been violated, particularly at the beginning of the conflict when the struggle included Slovenia. It has had to take in many Croatian and Slovenian refugees and has been strongly in favour of international recognition of the independence of the Slovene and Croatian Republics, which were part of the Austro-Hungarian empire prior to 1918 and with which it has close relations. However, it did not wish to take an isolated initiative in this sense.

27. (c) Bulgaria considers the people Yugoslavia calls "Macedonian" to be in reality Bulgarian. It recognised immediately the independence of Macedonia proclaimed on 15th September, but part of the Bulgarian public wishes the Republic of Macedonia to be linked

with Bulgaria and the difficulties standing in the way of the formation of a coalition government in Bulgaria following the elections on 13th October may lead to the parties outbidding each other in this connection.

28. (d) Greece, a member of the European Community, is worried about the possible creation of a state bearing the name of Macedonia that might claim the Greek part of Macedonia. The Prime Ministers of Bulgaria and Greece met in Athens from 24th to 26th September and then signed an agreement of co-operation, good-neighbourliness and friendship in Sofia on 7th October and considered a meeting enlarged to include other Balkan countries, including Serbia and Romania, but this was eventually postponed at the request of Bulgaria. Mr. Samaras, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, has said his country will in no event recognise a country "bearing the historic Greek name of Macedonia".

29. (e) There is an Italian minority in the Dalmatian part of Croatia, and Italy showed particular concern at the land offensive, air raids and naval blockade targeted on the larger Dalmatian ports at the beginning of September. This minority seems in reality to be far larger than shown in official Yugoslav statistics and the lack of enthusiasm it showed for the explosion of Croat nationalism seems to have led the Croatian people and authorities to take rigorous measures against it. Its status, acceptable in a federal state that includes many other minorities, would be far less so in a Croatian national state.

30. (f) The Albanians, who are in the majority in the autonomous Serbian territory of Kosovo, are calling for Kosovo to be reunited with Albania. However, although Albania is itself in the midst of too serious a crisis to embark upon dangerous ventures abroad, it may be tempted by the political benefits of a burst of national feeling.

(c) *The principles involved*

31. Since July, the Western European press and television have been showing daily pictures of the atrocity of this civil war, testifying to the relentlessness of the belligerents and their determination not to give in. However, it may be noted that, during the first two months of hostilities, the media in the various western countries did not show the same pictures or report the same incidents. Some concentrated on the blockade of the federal army base in Croatia, the misfortunes of the Serbs in Slavonia and accounts of continued Yugoslav national sentiments among some of them, while others laid greater stress on the will for independence of the Croats and Slovenes, the inferior weapons of the

Croatian Republic's forces and the air raids to which the people of Croatian towns are subject. These media orientations revealed different kinds of feelings about the Yugoslav crisis and the combatants and showed that national public opinion had conflicting reactions to these events. To some extent, they reflected political viewpoints and reactions which varied from one country to another.

32. Everyone certainly agreed that Europe must do its utmost to put an end to the war and the accompanying atrocities, but they differed significantly about how this could be achieved. Thus, in the Federal Republic and Italy, public opinion in July was firmly in favour of recognising the independence of the Croatian and Slovenian Republics, whereas in France it seemed far more reserved on this point. However, these differences died down as the civil war developed and, while there are still differences between reactions, they are no longer a major obstacle to European action to promote a compromise peace. At the meeting of the European Council on 19th September 1991, Germany and France together proposed the formation of a European buffer force for deployment in Yugoslavia as soon as the essential conditions were met, while the United Kingdom was extremely reserved about the idea.

33. Throughout the nineteenth century, Europe was split by an ideological conflict between those in favour of the right of states, of which Metternich was the most important champion, and the liberals, who were in favour of the right of peoples to self-determination. The former considered that priority should be given to a European order guaranteeing peace and based on a balance between the great powers. The latter wanted a new order whose guarantee would be the satisfaction of the peoples. In 1919-20, the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Sèvres represented an attempt to build Europe on the basis of the principle of nationalities, at the same time trying to reconcile this with the need to create viable states, before the weaknesses of this edifice were revealed at Munich in 1938. However, in the aftermath of the reunification of Germany and the Baltic republics' proclamations of independence, it might have been thought that, apart from Poland's frontiers, the political geography of the Europe of Versailles would be rebuilt on the ruins of the Europe of Yalta. The revolt of the Slovenes, and then of the Croats and Macedonians, against the Yugoslav state indicates that this is not at all the case.

34. What the Slovenes, Croats and Macedonians are now claiming, like the Albanians of Kosovo, is application of the same right to self-determination on which the Europe of 1920 that they are aiming to destroy was said to be based. There are no real criteria allowing the notion of

nationhood to be defined or a clear idea to be obtained of the conditions on the basis of which the international community should recognise the right of a people to form a state. At the most, it can be accepted that a certain level of national will is necessary but that maintaining internal order and international peace must also be taken into account. Yugoslav national movements are based on ethnic, religious or linguistic interests and contest an existing state that is recognised by the international community. The struggle of the Slovenes and Croats is proof of the existence among them of a strong national will, but certain details are still lacking that would allow us to measure what remains of Yugoslav national feelings in each section of the country's society.

35. Moreover, the peaceful reunification of Europe following the collapse of the Soviet system is being achieved on the basis of the principles laid down in the CSCE Final Act signed in Helsinki in 1975, which were clarified and confirmed in the November 1990 Charter of Paris for a new Europe. These principles certainly concern individual and collective freedoms, the application of democracy and respect for minorities within each country, but they also include the inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in states' internal affairs. This does not imply the intangibility of states and frontiers but excludes all individual or collective right to intervene in the internal affairs of a state. It is certain that, without the adoption of these provisions, neither the Soviet Union nor, moreover, any of its allies, not to speak of Yugoslavia itself, would have subscribed to these texts which made a major contribution to allowing the recent evolution in Central and Eastern Europe towards more liberal and democratic régimes. To abandon these principles might jeopardise this evolution.

36. When the present report was discussed by the Political Committee, some of its members stressed that progress made towards establishing a new international order, in particular during the Gulf crisis, had laid the foundations for new international law authorising the international community to intervene in the internal affairs of a country if the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, or the Charter of Paris for members of the CSCE, were not respected. They believed that, as soon as one of the fundamental principles on which a new international order might be based, in particular respect for human rights and the rights of minorities and democratic foundations, were clearly violated, it was henceforth for the international community as a whole to intervene to ensure that they were respected. The question raised is twofold. It stems first from the weakness of positive law in this area. It is clear that the requirements of the international community cannot be the same vis-à-vis economically developed countries and more or less underdeveloped countries. Pressure

exercised by the international community to put an end to dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and Greece or even to bring about the end of apartheid in South Africa were moderate and did not involve the use of force. Is it possible to tackle any more energetically the problem of Yugoslavia or that of many African, Asian or Latin American states where there is no reason to think that the West would be able to solve the economic, social and cultural problems facing those countries?

37. Your Rapporteur can but note that European public opinion is evolving towards the definition of a certain right to intervene in the internal affairs of states where the fundamental rights of individuals or groups of individuals are flagrantly violated. However, he has at the same time to note that this evolution, evident in certain declarations by the CSCE at its meetings in Copenhagen in 1990, on the human dimension of the CSCE, and Geneva in 1991, on national minorities, has been included in positive law only in exceptional cases such as that of the treaty of good neighbourliness and co-operation concluded between Germany and Poland on 17th June 1991. This treaty devotes three long articles (20, 21 and 22) to the guarantee of extremely precise, broad-ranging rights for the minority of each nation on the territory of the other and also the duty for members of the two minorities to behave loyally towards the state in which they live and to obey its laws. He believes the WEU Assembly would be carrying out useful work by examining this question. In tackling the Yugoslav problem, the Twelve and WEU seem to have kept to a traditional concept of law since they offered mediation to all parties, envisaged resorting to armed force only in conditions accepted by all and confined themselves to limited economic sanctions to induce the republics to negotiate. They cannot be blamed for keeping strictly to the law in regard to a concept of the evolution of international relations which has not yet been translated into texts that are commitments in the strictest meaning of the word.

38. Furthermore, can democratic societies be asked to sacrifice human lives for causes that do not directly concern them? The question is clear where Yugoslavia is concerned: would Western Europe be prepared to accept significant losses in the hope, but not the certainty, of restoring peace between the Yugoslav peoples? These considerations mean that any proposal to involve Europe in armed interventions in that country must be approached cautiously.

39. Europe, as embodied in the twelve-power Community, has a major rôle to play in seeking a peaceful solution to a conflict which calls in question the survival of a Yugoslav state. Not without reason, the Americans seem to have considered that, if the Yugoslav affair was not to

assume a worldwide dimension, it was essential for NATO not to become involved, relying simply on twelve-power measures, particularly as the Soviet Union readily believed, prior to 19th August at least, that the attitude adopted by the West towards Yugoslav dissension would be reflected in its attitude towards contestation of the Soviet state by a number of its component republics. This is obviously why the Soviet Union has so far been very reserved about the Yugoslav crisis and, on 6th July, made known its opposition to any armed intervention by the West. At the beginning of October, however, it tried to induce the belligerents to accept a cease-fire, but it failed to do any more than the Twelve.

40. The question is therefore whether twelve-power Europe, over and above its appeals for a cease-fire, its offers to help to apply it and its contribution to the search for a constitutional compromise that would probably provide only a fragile basis for a lasting order, will, when all is said and done, opt for the right of each of the Yugoslav peoples to constitute a sovereign state or for the maintenance of a federal state at any cost. It is hard to envisage it playing a military part in guaranteeing peace through the intermediary of WEU if Europe has not agreed on its aims. So far, it has decided to do its utmost to induce the representatives of the republics to agree on the future of what used to be Yugoslavia so as to place its force at the service of a freely-consented peace. There is no proof that it will manage to do so. Were the conference in The Hague to be a failure, it would have to express its opinion and it seems hardly ready to do so.

*(d) The European approach*

41. Developments in Yugoslavia had been a subject of preoccupation for the Western European countries for a long time and it was not by chance that this was the first, and until quite recently more or less the only, question to be tackled by the Mediterranean Sub-Group set up by the WEU Council. The armed conflict which started in spring 1991 was considered by the Council at its ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991. The statement it issued was a simple appeal for "a negotiated solution among the parties concerned, having due regard to all the principles of the CSCE".

42. The worsening of the situation in July, first of all in Slovenia and then in Croatia, caused a meeting of the CSCE emergency committee responsible for consultations in the event of a crisis to be convened in Prague on 3rd and 4th July and the European Community examined the possibility of forming a team of observers to monitor the application of the truce reached by the Slovene Government and the federal army on 3rd July. The ministers for

foreign affairs of the Twelve, meeting in The Hague on 5th July, decided to impose an embargo on supplies of arms to the parties involved, to freeze financial assistance and to send the European troika to Yugoslavia. On 8th July, at a meeting in Brioni with Serbian, Croatian, Slovene and federal leaders, the troika obtained the adoption of a joint declaration including an immediate cease-fire, the return of the federal army to its barracks and a three-month moratorium by the Croatian and Slovene Republics on the implementation of their declarations of independence to allow an agreement on the future of Yugoslavia. In fact, the Brioni agreement allowed peace to be restored only in Slovenia when federal forces withdrew from the republic.

43. This was not so in Croatia, where fighting continued to worsen, in Slavonia and in Krajina and, on 29th July, the ministers of the Twelve proposed extending the mandate of the cease-fire monitors to include Croatia. However, in spite of a further intervention by the European troika, Serbia and Montenegro were against this measure and, on 6th August, the ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve, condemning the use of force by any republic to impose solutions on other republics, called for the opening of negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia, invited the Commission to study economic sanctions that might be taken against parties refusing the cease-fire and measures to be taken in favour of parties that co-operated. They launched an appeal for CSCE support, approved the intention expressed by Belgium, France and the United Kingdom to inform the Security Council of the Twelve's initiatives and took note of the decision to convene the WEU Council to examine the conditions for a possible WEU contribution to stabilising an agreed cease-fire.

44. In fact, at the request of France, the German presidency had convened a meeting of the WEU Permanent Council on 7th August. According to the communiqué:

"... It examined whether WEU could make any contribution to the maintenance of an agreed cease-fire in Yugoslavia.

The Council agreed to continue to follow closely developments in the situation in Yugoslavia.

Member countries agreed to continue their reflections on possible concrete contributions they might make to the maintenance of an agreed cease-fire, taking into account the efforts made in other international fora, such as the European Community and the CSCE.

Further meetings will be held as necessary."

45. In reality, it would appear that member states then decided to examine on a national basis the military options according to which WEU might make a contribution in the event of a political decision by the Twelve in this sense, and in particular: the military anchorage of a civil team of observers or monitors, simple military observation or peace-keeping force. Once the capitals had completed their assessments, the delegations were to meet in the Council and its working groups to continue to examine the options open to WEU.

46. This amounts to saying that WEU, without adopting a position on the political aspects of the problem, has made a technical examination of the possibilities of military action by member countries in the light of decisions to be taken in the framework of the Twelve. At the beginning of September, the United Kingdom Delegation is reported to have submitted a document to the Council in which, on the basis of experience acquired from buffer operations for which the United Kingdom had been responsible in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, it considered that a buffer force designed to ensure respect for a cease-fire accepted by all parties would require the mobilisation of a force of about 40 000 men for a period that it would be difficult to determine in advance but which would, in any event, last many months.

47. On 27th August, the ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve, noting the further deterioration in the situation in Croatia, decided to impose their mediation in the Yugoslav crisis and, even in the case of Serbia not endorsing the plan, to organise a peace conference in The Hague in which the republics concerned and the Yugoslav state would be invited to participate and, finally, call for a new cease-fire to be concluded by 1st September. On 30th August, the Federal Government accepted the prolongation of the mission of the European civilian cease-fire monitors in Croatia but refused military participation. It also accepted mediation by the Community and the convening of the peace conference. However, this acceptance of the Twelve's initiatives has not prevented the fighting from continuing almost without interruption since then or the federal army's advance into Croatian territory.

48. The conference in The Hague for its part started on 7th September under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, former United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence. After three plenary sittings, it set up three working groups to study respectively institutional questions, questions of minorities and economic relations that should be maintained or established between the republics. Their task ought to be to ascertain the issues that should be submitted to an arbitration commission presided by

Mr. Badinter, former French Minister of Justice. Thus, this conference is a forum for negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia which does not go into immediate questions such as the introduction and monitoring of a cease-fire. However, it is clear that the evolution of the situation on the spot has a considerable influence on the progress of the conference.

49. In these circumstances, the French and German Governments agreed to propose to the Twelve, at their meeting in The Hague on 19th September, that a buffer force be sent to Yugoslavia. This would nevertheless be subject, on the one hand, to the establishment of an effective cease-fire and the creation of a neutral zone between the two sides and, on the other, to the agreement of all parties concerned. Believing these conditions were not met and alive to British arguments about the number of troops and means necessary for such an operation, the ministers merely asked the WEU Council to provide solely for the establishment of a small force to protect civilian monitors of the cease-fire. Moreover, noting that an agreement between all the parties concerned in favour of such a measure was hardly probable, the Twelve decided to ask the Security Council to intervene and fix a mission to be assigned to the Community.

50. Meeting the same day, the WEU Council set up a working group to study the size and nature of the forces to be deployed in each of the possible hypotheses and report to it at its ministerial meeting on 30th September.

51. At the ministerial meeting on 30th September, no decision seems to have been taken other than to pursue this study. According to information given to the press by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council at the close of the meeting, attended by the Prime Minister of Turkey, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Norway and a representative of Canada, the following decisions were taken:

- (i) The Council examined the report by the ad hoc group and approved it.
- (ii) WEU would strengthen its action in favour of the monitors and Lord Carrington's mission. Consideration was given to increasing the number of monitors from about 80 to 250 and extending their mission to include Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- (iii) When the Community decided, after Lord Carrington had given his opinion, that WEU should act, the WEU Council would be convened within a few hours.

- (iv) The conditions for any action remained:
  - (a) the agreement of all parties;
  - (b) effective respect of the cease-fire.
- (v) The Council would study Security Council Resolution 713 and its implications for WEU, particularly in regard to the application of the arms embargo.
- (vi) WEU would continue its work.
- (vii) WEU would immediately convey its decisions to:
  - (a) the Community;
  - (b) NATO;
  - (c) the CSCE group of senior officials;
  - (d) the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

52. It has to be noted that, after three months' diplomatic efforts, Europe had achieved only very limited results in its attempts to restore peace in Yugoslavia: it managed to put an end to hostilities in Slovenia and to promote the convening of a conference associating the republics and the federal state under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington to examine the conditions for a return to peace. It took a number of economic measures to exercise pressure on the parties involved. It had the Yugoslav question brought before the Security Council which, in Resolution 713 of 25th September 1991, gave its support to Community initiatives and to the conference on Yugoslavia and decided to place an embargo on all supplies of arms to the country. However, it did not manage to obtain a lasting cease-fire, which was its main objective. In these circumstances, military action in the framework of WEU to restore peace is still out of the question because any operation designed to guarantee the cease-fire depends inevitably on the existence of such a cease-fire and the agreement of all parties.

53. The only alternative would have been an operation on quite a different scale designed to impose peace by the use of force. No member of the Community proposed this. Since 6th July, the Soviet Union had been saying quite plainly that it would be against this, nor was the United States in favour of such action. Germany was unable to participate. The United Kingdom ruled out the prospect of major military action. The other countries did not seem prepared to do much more and, legally, a humanitarian operation similar to that in favour of the Kurds could have found backing in a Security Council resolution. The latter is not empowered to promote an intervention in the internal affairs of a member state of the United Nations and, in

any event, the Soviet Union and China do not seem at all prepared to agree to one.

54. Hence it cannot be claimed that Europe's meagre results in the Yugoslav crisis are due to a failing on the part of WEU. The political decisions were taken at twelve-power level, the WEU Council having been convened on 7th August at ambassadorial level and on 19th and 30th August at ministerial level only following specific decisions by the Twelve in order to deal with the truly military aspects of a European action. It did what was asked of it by instructing an ad hoc group to prepare four options, which were presented to the Council and approved by it on 30th September:

55. *First option:* logistic underpinning, with the mission to support the work of EEC monitors, which would possibly require the presence of 2 000 or 3 000 personnel.

56. *Second option:* escort and protection by armed military forces in order to ensure the safety of the civilian monitors, composed of 5 000 to 6 000 persons. The group recognised that, starting from this option, there would be an inherent change in quality.

57. *Third option:* peace-keeping force composed of military personnel of between 4 500 and 5 000, with additional support personnel of 3 000 to 5 000, to monitor and, if possible, maintain the cease-fire. This force's mandate would then be restricted to policing the cease-fire.

58. *Fourth option:* peace-keeping force of 20 000 military personnel and additional support personnel of 10 000 to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire and contribute to maintaining peace by military surveillance of combat areas, encouraging negotiations on the spot so as to reduce tension and re-establish trust between the adversaries, deterring violations of the cease-fire agreement and preventing the extension of the conflict into other areas.

59. Implementation of one or other of these options was to be decided by the Twelve and it is clear, at the time of writing, that they are not prepared to go beyond the second option. This was confirmed at the ministerial meeting on 29th October.

60. However, the ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve, meeting in Rome on 8th November on the occasion of the NATO ministerial meeting, decided to take economic sanctions covering the entire Yugoslav territory: suspension of the economic agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia, restrictions on imports of Yugoslav textile products and suspension of the generalised preference system applying to Yugoslavia. These measures are not likely to have immediate effects or, consequently, to force the belligerents to lay down their arms. The only

sanction likely to do so, i.e. an embargo on oil products, has been called for by the Twelve in the Security Council and, if this is decided, WEU might be required to take naval action to ensure its application. Finally, the EEC has retained the possibility to grant financial assistance to republics co-operating with the European mediators, while imposing immediate economic sanctions on the whole of Yugoslavia.

*(e) Lessons to be learned from the crisis*

61. The first thing that has to be noted is Europe's weakness vis-à-vis the Yugoslav crisis. It seems that, in a conflict of this kind, which is of primary concern to European security, it can act only through diplomatic channels which, in this case, proved ineffectual. It had to turn to the CSCE and then to the Security Council to try to obtain a mandate which was too limited to allow effective action and to make it possible for Lord Carrington's mediation on behalf of the Twelve to overcome the exacerbated national sentiments of the parties involved.

62. Western Europe itself was too divided initially to overcome a number of obstacles such as the opposition of the Soviet Union and China to any intervention in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and the repeated insistence of the United States that NATO be consulted prior to any decision committing its European members. While, in mid-September, the French and German Governments agreed to propose the deployment of a buffer force, Germany did not intend the Bundeswehr to take part in this operation, to which the United Kingdom was opposed. Moreover, since the proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, Germany had been proposing to recognise it. This obviously encouraged the two republics' claims and also made the Serbs feel that Europe was hostile to their cause. It took two months for viewpoints to draw sufficiently close to allow Europe to take real action at diplomatic level by imposing its mediation. Finally, France and Germany agreed that possible recognition of the independence of the Yugoslav republics should be granted simultaneously by the Twelve. They were followed by the others, which should give special importance to any decision taken by the Twelve in this respect. Furthermore, agreement was reached, but not until 8th November, on limited economic sanctions. These facts nevertheless suggest that, at the present juncture, no European structure, however integrated, would be able to do more than the Twelve did during the summer.

63. Conversely, mechanism for placing WEU at the service of the Twelve for implementing any policy they defined once this implied a mil-

itary commitment, already implemented during the Gulf crisis, worked properly: WEU defined military options and said it was prepared to implement them when the Twelve so decided and in conditions determined by the Twelve. Similarly, the presence at the WEU Council meeting of countries that were not members but could take part in the task set by the Twelve is nothing new but is tending to become a practice that conforms to WEU's vocation of ensuring the security of Europe as a whole. The presence of Ireland was a noteworthy innovation since it showed it was moving closer to the Twelve in security matters. Your Rapporteur does not know whether Czechoslovakia and Poland were also invited and why they did not take part in the meeting on 30th September in view of the fact that, at the beginning of August, France had proposed their participation as well as that of Sweden in maintaining peace in Yugoslavia, while excluding that of the countries bordering on Yugoslavia.

64. Assuming responsibility for Europe's security, while hardly allowing effective action in the Yugoslav conflict, should lead the Twelve and WEU to give more serious consideration than hitherto to the consequences this crisis may have both for the countries bordering on Yugoslavia and for Central European states which might run the risk of disintegrating should their inhabitants in turn call for independence.

65. This is the case, in particular, for Czechoslovakia, where there is unrest in the Slovak part, and it is feared that premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the Community countries might encourage Slovak nationalists. Admittedly, Czechoslovakia has already said it would not use force in response to Slovak dissidence, but it is certainly not in Europe's interest to see a country which has just returned to democracy and respect for freedoms to find itself as a consequence, challenged and weakened by a particularist movement which could not express itself during the communist dictatorship. It is not certain that Slovakia is the only region of Eastern Europe liable to react in this way and, in Western Europe itself, there are several regions where separatist unrest might thus be strengthened.

66. Conversely, any assurances that might be given by the Community or WEU in respect of the external security of non-member countries would be likely to strengthen states faced with nationalist claims. There is certainly no question giving formal guarantees such as those the United Kingdom gave Poland and the Baltic states with effect from 15th March 1939, because such guarantees, with nothing in exchange, give those benefiting from them too much freedom of action in their external relations, as Beck's Poland showed only too well, but of giving guarantees through the devel-

opment of economic, political and military solidarity such as the Community and WEU can offer. Naturally, there can be no question of promising others what Europe has been unable to do for Yugoslavia but, vis-à-vis the Yugoslav affair, WEU must make it quite plain that the legal and other obstacles that opposed its intervention in the internal affairs of a state would not apply in the case of a conflict between two countries. These two initiatives could doubtless help to allay the fears of Yugoslavia's neighbouring countries and maintain peace and stability in Central Europe, which are in the interest of all. It is preferable to avert crises while there is still time than to try to remedy them when conflicts come out into the open and passions are unleashed.

#### *IV. Europe and developments in the Soviet Union*

67. Since 1985, Europe has been wondering about the nature, extent and possible consequences of developments in the Soviet Union. It welcomed unreservedly the elimination of Soviet domination of Central Europe which led to the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, the reunification of Germany and a move towards democracy by most countries in the region, albeit at rather different rates, even before the Red Army had withdrawn. It was also delighted at the strides made by the CSCE and, in particular, the adoption in November 1990 of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and the progress made towards disarmament with the CFE agreement, although the application of that agreement did not seem entirely satisfactory, above all since the CSCE has not yet proved its effectiveness in regard to collective security, as the Yugoslav crisis has just shown.

68. Conversely, internal developments in the Soviet Union have caused some concern. Apart from the case of the Baltic republics, whose annexation had never been recognised by most western countries and whose return to independence had been one of its aims, the West has never sought the dislocation of the Soviet state but merely its integration in a more open international community, which implied the liberalisation of its régime and the recovery of its economy. Whatever certain conservative elements in the Soviet Union may have claimed, the West has never supported the republics' calls for independence and it has endeavoured to support the Soviet economy, at the same time favouring a government which was attempting to make essential reforms while maintaining the country's cohesion.

69. The attempted takeover of power by a group of men who seemed determined to put an end to the reforms and restore the dictatorship

of the Communist Party might, had it succeeded, have led to a crisis in relations between the Soviet Union and the West. The latter, without interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, has never relaxed its encouragement to all those who resisted the coup d'état on 19th August 1991, nor its assistance to the Soviet authorities following the failure of the coup. The latter were unable to prevent eleven of the fifteen Soviet republics proclaiming their independence and the weakening of central power. It is a moot question whether the treaty of union now being negotiated will leave sufficient room for manoeuvre for the leaders of the union in external and security policy matters. It should be decided by the end of 1991. Since the West is anxious for undertakings entered into by the Soviet Union in all fields to be properly applied, it can but trust that it will find a single, responsible interlocutor for continuing the current arms limitation negotiations, ensuring that they are applied and, in general, for all matters relating to Europe's security.

70. It would also seem that the autonomy acquired by the republics is leading to renewed claims by national, ideological or religious minorities, to the repression of separatist movements that are to be feared far more by a republic that professes to be national than by a federal state and even to armed clashes between republics, as has been the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the last two years.

71. Although the instigators of the coup on 19th August do not seem to have had a great deal of support from the Soviet people or even from the Communist Party, army or KGB, it is not clear either, according to information now available, that there was such massive popular support for the legal authorities as the media, and television in particular, suggested. In fact, it seems evident that the Soviet people were extremely disoriented by the radical challenge to all the values which had constituted ideological dogmas and Soviet propaganda for more than seventy years. So far, perestroika has merely increased the confusion in the economy and those who implemented it at federal state level do not seem to have very strong support from the public whose standard of living and economic and social security has deteriorated quite significantly. It is just as if, at the same time as Marxism-Leninism, a certain concept of the state is collapsing in the Soviet Union, making way for a multitude of individual or collective claims. This movement should not surprise the West where, for more than twenty years, there has been a similar trend, but where it took root more slowly and has been accompanied by the development of Community Europe and by decentralising reforms. This transformation of society has not therefore been so dramatic as in the Soviet Union. Thus, the coup on 19th August, in spite of its failure, indicates a fragility

of the Soviet state and society greater than was previously apparent. The risks of coups d'état, of the dismantling of the union, of major economic, social and political crises and of anarchy at every level seem greater than ever in spite of President Gorbachev's efforts to base the "Union of Sovereign Republics" on a new treaty of union that would leave the central state most of the control over external and defence policy but which it is not evident all the republics will sign.

72. Admittedly, these are internal Soviet matters that do not directly concern either WEU or even the European Community. Nevertheless, Europe as a whole is affected by this sudden weakening of the principal European power. Naturally, this weakening has positive aspects, particularly for the countries which were members of the Warsaw Pact and have managed to recover almost total freedom of action. However, the Soviet Union is still a leading military power and any restoration of a sufficiently strong political power in the union or in a newly-independent republic would again change the European balance. First of all, this is a source of concern for the security of several Central or Eastern European countries which have common frontiers with the Soviet Union and Polish, White Russian, Ukrainian and Moldavian people on both sides of the frontiers. The situation is similar for the Asian countries which have frontiers with the Soviet Union. Turkey in particular fears the rising power of Islamic fundamentalism in the Central Asian Muslim republics and its possible repercussions in Asia Minor.

73. The second question raised by the weakening of the Soviet Union is the devolution of the army, and above all of nuclear weapons, in the event of the reconstituted union not retaining sufficient authority in military matters. Apart from the risk of a dissemination of nuclear weapons in favour of states with uncertain frontiers and whose external policy cannot be foreseen, there is also a danger of those states not agreeing to apply arms limitation commitments entered into by the central state, thus jeopardising all the work accomplished in this area in the last ten years.

74. The question of the extent to which Western Europe should still consider the union to be its only legitimate partner in its exchanges with the former USSR now arises. The solution so far adopted of recognising only the union is encountering steadily increasing difficulties because relations with the centre do not allow many matters to be handled with the parties directly concerned, i.e. essentially the republics. In 1990, certain Central European countries, such as Poland, grasped the extent of the movement taking shape in the Soviet Union and started to establish relations with some of the

republics, particularly those with which they had common frontiers. The legitimate concern to privilege the union shared by the Western European countries must not prevent them from establishing a dialogue with the republics, particularly those which may become significant military and nuclear powers, as this will be essential in order to induce them, each of its own accord, to respect past treaties concluded by the union, particularly in regard to arms limitation, non-proliferation and respect for human rights, the rights of minorities and frontiers.

75. It was probably in view of the weakening of Soviet military strength and of the risks of nuclear dissemination that, on 29th September, President Bush took the spectacular step of proposing the elimination of all American short-range weapons stationed in Europe, a very large reduction in those carried on board aircraft or surface ships and the end of the permanent state of alert of American strategic bombers. At the same time he asked the Soviet Union to follow suit. The American initiative thus gave Mr. Gorbachev a reason to speed up nuclear disarmament throughout the republics. Hence it is not surprising that, on 5th October, the Soviet President answered the American proposal positively, while making new proposals of his own on disarmament matters.

76. However, it must be realised that President Bush's initiative has major consequences for Western European security since it implies, in the immediate future, a radical change in NATO strategy, a weakening of its defensive capability and probably, in the long run, a much larger withdrawal of American forces stationed in Europe than planned. This would mean that, relatively soon, Western Europe, i.e. in this connection WEU, would have to play a proportionally far larger part than in the past in the military deployment designed to ensure European security, just when the risk of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty having to be applied seems much less but when Article VIII is taking on new importance since it is under that article that the members of WEU have to examine threats to international peace that may arise from the crises in Eastern Europe. WEU must draw the full consequences from this situation and the Twelve's faltering approach to the Yugoslav affair seems to show that they are hardly ready to do so yet.

77. Furthermore, the at least provisional relinquishment by the Soviet Union of its rôle in policing international order in the area it controlled has made a major contribution to the outbreaks of disorder in that region and the resurgence of nationalism. The West is obliged to replace it, using methods that are certainly different, as the promoter of order in Europe and throughout the world, and Western Europe will have a leading rôle to play in this area

should the United States and NATO turn away from certain matters. Its relations with the countries that have left the Warsaw Pact will also have to take account of this new situation.

*V. The problem of European union  
in autumn 1991*

78. Succeeding Luxembourg in the presidency of the Community, the Netherlands, noting the objections to the Luxembourg proposal, in turn drew up a proposal to modify the Rome Treaty that it submitted on 24th September. It was discussed by the ministers for foreign affairs in Brussels on 30th September just when the ministers were to decide on their position towards the Yugoslav crisis. There is obviously no direct link between the discussions in the context of the intergovernmental conference and those in the context of political co-operation, but the ministers were clearly mainly concerned with decisions to be taken in relation to Yugoslavia and one might well wonder to what extent underlying feelings about European union helped to determine the choice of some of them about the action that might be taken by the Twelve and WEU in Yugoslavia.

*(a) The Netherlands proposal*

79. The Netherlands proposal, "Towards European union", did not try to fix permanently the responsibilities and structures of the union, that it preferred to call the "Community", but simply to enable the Twelve to take a major step in that direction. Unlike the Luxembourg "non-paper", it included a long and detailed chapter about external policy and security. After agreeing that, in this area, member states retain specific responsibilities, the Netherlands presidency foresaw that, in the context of the eventual definition of a defence policy, at latest in 1996, consideration would have to be given to subsequent measures to be taken in this connection in the light of events occurring in the meantime. This common security policy would be complementary to the policy resulting from the obligations stemming for certain members from the treaties establishing NATO and WEU which continue to make a substantial contribution to security and stability. The Council promoted cohesion between the Community's security policy and the policy pursued by a number of states in the framework of WEU and NATO with due respect for the specific responsibilities of each of those organisations. Within those limits, the European Commission would have received a right of "co-initiative" and the European Council could have been expected to vote by qualified majority, i.e., according to a Portuguese proposal, by a majority of eight members.

80. Generally speaking, the Netherlands proposal stressed the federal vocation of the European union and provided for a significant growth in the powers of the European Parliament and the Commission. This vocation was demonstrated in particular by the abandonment of the division of the union into more or less independent pillars as proposed in the Luxembourg proposal, each, according to its own procedure, dealing with matters within its purview. In such matters as foreign policy, security and, finally, defence, the Netherlands proposal would have given the Community far stronger means of action than many member states and probably also most candidate countries were prepared to grant it, particularly since this integral structure would have made it possible for the Court of Justice to intervene in affairs that states did not intend to submit to it. In this proposal, it was a matter of remaining within the Community structure to define the tasks the Community and its member states, each within its own purview, set themselves, as Mr. Piet Dankert, Netherlands Minister for European Affairs, said, on the basis of Community experience that would grow. It would then have sufficed progressively to eliminate derogations and move from "the Community and member states" to "the Community" thanks to the disappearance of the system of evolutive provisions and bridges provided for in the Luxembourg proposal. None of these proposals left much room for WEU, condemned as a result to see most of its activities transferred to the Twelve in the short or medium term without the Community being given any guarantee that it would effectively have means of implementing a policy defined on such bases.

81. Finally, in an interview published in *Le Monde* of 25th September 1991, Mr. Dankert said it was impossible at present to take steps leading to the operation of a twenty-power Community when decision-taking procedures would have to be modified far more profoundly than now. He did not believe member states were ready for this.

82. This proposal was circulated just when the Twelve had been compelled to admit that, in the absence of true political understanding between them, their possibilities of action were still very limited, as shown by the Yugoslav crisis. In any event, the proposal apparently encountered serious objections. On 30th September, it was rejected by the ministers for foreign affairs of the Community, *inter alia* because most of them would not agree to their foreign policy and collective security being subject to bodies that might, without their consent, take decisions involving the right for the Community to deploy their armed forces or, on the contrary, to refuse their involvement in matters which they might believe to be of importance to their country. The Twelve therefore

decided to take up the Luxembourg proposal again as a basis for their work, perhaps using the Netherlands proposal to amend some aspects of that proposal. In other words, no progress has been made by the intergovernmental conference since June.

83. In point of fact, apart from the positions of principle defended by one or other on the more or less federal nature of the future European union, it would appear that the slow approach adopted in 1990 towards the enlargement of the Community is no longer defensible since the events in summer 1991. In an article in the *International Herald Tribune* of 29th August 1991, Mr. Eduardo Punset, President of the Polish Delegation to the European Parliament, and Mrs. Romana Sadurska described, in particularly firm terms, a position which is not only that of most Central and Eastern European countries but is also increasingly shared by Western European countries. It read: "Now is the time for the Community to make clear its commitment to Central Europe. At the least, it should open its markets, allow in workers and help in restructuring these economies. Better, Brussels should accept a realistic deadline for these nations' full EC membership." Events in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia give special weight to this remark and any plan to restructure the Rome Treaty that postponed until a more propitious time consideration of the problem of the enlargement of the Community, now a priority, would have every chance of disappearing into thin air. In fact, the association agreements between Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland and the European Community are due to be concluded in November 1991 and these agreements should be considered merely as the first stages of a process leading to accession.

84. What the intergovernmental conference is trying to do, at least for external and security policy matters, is to instigate institutional procedure whereby a European identity might be defined in these areas. Clearly, the identity of a significantly enlarged Community will not be the same as that of a twelve-power Community with a predominance of members of the Atlantic Alliance and it would seem unwise, unless it is intended to force all candidate countries to repudiate their own political identities, to fix here and now an institutional framework into which they would have to fit as the price of their accession to the economic advantages that the Community is supposed to offer them. From this point of view, the Netherlands proposal, which included the integration of external policy and defence very closely in a single Community mechanism, hardly corresponded to the reality of today's Europe, in spite of the compromises for which it left room. It took little account of the fact that, in both the Gulf and the Yugoslav

affairs, it was the member countries that had to decide how they would contribute to a co-ordinated action, effective in the first case, possible in the other, and that it was member countries and not any of the European institutions which decided what they were prepared to do. A majority decision-taking mechanism could not at the present juncture oblige them to abide by decisions to which they did not subscribe, and the enlargement of the Community, particularly if on a large scale, would not facilitate the taking of collective decisions which, strictly, must conform to the principle of unanimity or qualified majority.

85. The Yugoslav crisis was a particularly good opportunity for the expression of a European identity because the two great powers had decided, if not to remain outside, at least to stay in the background. However, it took two months for this identity to emerge. It is not within the powers of any institution to create it and certain governments may be reproached for having suggested the contrary, making it seem as if Europe has failed because it has not yet managed to impose a cease-fire in Yugoslavia that it did not have the powers to ensure was accepted by the parties involved. It is still to be hoped that the economic measures decided upon by the Community on 8th November will induce these parties to return to a better frame of mind or that the weakening of the federal army due to the fact that, even among the Serbs, a large part of the population and servicemen are showing little enthusiasm for the cause upheld by the government and military leaders may induce the latter, in one way or another, to accept European mediation.

86. These considerations make your Rapporteur believe that the lesson that the intergovernmental conference might learn – and the rejection of the Netherlands proposal by a strong majority of the Twelve makes it possible to say: apparently will learn – from the Yugoslav affair is that, in present circumstances, the wisest course for Europe is not to wish to form a too coherent, too unified whole. However, prevailing uncertainty about the future of Europe should encourage it more than ever to handle each area separately, using existing instruments and providing for their extension in the light of the possibilities of today. To link WEU and the Community organically by unduly binding procedures might be an obstacle to Europe's progress towards unity. This would effectively prevent the possible and necessary enlargements, in particular of the Community to include the EFTA countries and of WEU to include member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, and at the same time the rapprochement of the Central European countries with one or the other and the strengthening of both organisations in areas within their purview.

This option in no way rules out association in operations such as the one carried out during the Gulf war and planned in the case of Yugoslavia, or the development of permanent relations between WEU and the Community, ensuring that such relations do not lead to mutual blockages, which would probably have been the case if the Netherlands proposal had been adopted. Nor does it preclude a regular exchange of information between WEU and NATO, either directly, or through the intermediary of the CSCE, as has been the case during the Yugoslav crisis.

*(b) The Anglo-Italian and Franco-German proposals of October 1991*

87. On 4th October, the United Kingdom and Italy presented a "Declaration on European security and defence" at the intergovernmental conference designed to guide the work of the conference in this area. According to this declaration, "the development of a European identity in the field of security and defence shall be pursued through an evolutionary process involving successive phases". It adds that "the special relationship between Western Europe and North America... is a key element of the European identity" and "the revision of the alliance's tasks and strategy and the development of a common foreign and security policy in the context of political union are complementary". Hence the alliance should be consolidated by the development of this European identity, for which WEU would be responsible "in two complementary directions: as the defence component of the union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance". In this context, meetings of WEU and of NATO would be synchronised and links established between WEU and NATO presidencies, secretariats and parliamentary assemblies. "The alliance will remain the essential forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members" but, on other matters, in particular "to protect European interests outside the NATO area", decisions would be made in WEU in close consultation with NATO. As to the operational rôle, "a European reaction force ... autonomous, separate from the NATO structure", under WEU control, should be developed for operations outside the NATO area.

88. This proposal has the great merit of setting Europe's defence and security in the framework of an institution which corresponds to the reality of the Europe of today, while associating it with NATO and, to a lesser degree, with the Community. However, the rôle it assigns to NATO will be contested by some and it will probably be necessary to seek a new balance in favour of the link with the Com-

munity. However, it seems to provide an important working basis for the intergovernmental conference.

89. In the meantime, on 11th October President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl addressed a number of proposals to Mr. Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, and these were published on 14th October. The Political Committee asked our colleague, Mr. Caro, to submit to it an analysis of the Franco-German proposal, most of which your Rapporteur believes he can sum up here.

90. These proposals were a logical follow-up to the document addressed by France and Germany to the intergovernmental conference for its meeting on 4th February 1991. This text, together with the Anglo-Italian proposal of 4th October, is of direct concern to WEU, its work and its future.

91. The French Head of State and the German Head of Government set their thinking on the security and defence of Europe in the framework of the intergovernmental conference, i.e. decisions and measures of the union in this matter may be wholly or partly worked out and implemented by WEU which is an integral part of the process of European union. This is entirely in conformity with Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty and gives WEU two distinct rôles:

- (i) to implement in an area outside the competences of the Community the decisions of the twelve-power European Council;
- (ii) if necessary, to take the place of the Twelve to work out decisions that the Twelve would not have been in a position to take.

92. Thus, at the top, the European union would have a European Council formed of heads of state and of government under which there would be, in addition to the Community, the present political co-operation, becoming political union, and WEU. This provision would not affect the commitments stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty or the Washington Treaty for the signatory countries, nor specific aspects of the defence policy of certain member countries, which is probably directed at Ireland, but perhaps also France and the United Kingdom for their nuclear force arrangements and overseas commitments, and Germany for the limits that its basic law imposes on the use of the Bundeswehr. In reality, the reservations implied by this article suggest that the policy determined by the Council will not truly commit all member countries: as is now the case for WEU, it would only be a question of co-ordinating the action of countries which so wish and which can take part in joint action. This, moreover, is what

underlies the second part of the same paragraph which specifies that these provisions of the present chapter are not an obstacle to closer co-operation between certain members of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance – obviously to allow the development of Franco-German co-operation.

93. The two governments seek a better application of the modified Brussels Treaty, of The Hague platform and of the Vianden communiqué, thanks to a strengthening of WEU to make it capable of defining a true European defence identity, assuming greater responsibilities and achieving the stage-by-stage building of WEU as the defence component of the union. To this end, they propose sending to the members of the Community which are also members of the Atlantic Alliance an invitation to adhere to the modified Brussels Treaty and to offer observer status in WEU to those that are not members of the alliance.

94. The Franco-German proposal also refers to the development of a clear, organic relationship between WEU and the union and the operational organisation of WEU which acts in conformity with directives from the union. To this end, it proposes:

(a) Harmonisation of the sequence and duration of presidencies, which raises a practical problem since three members of the Community are not members of WEU. It is known that the WEU Council has drawn up a table to overcome this difficulty by attributing the presidency of that organisation in turn to WEU countries during the half years in which the presidency of the Community is held by countries which are not members of WEU.

(b) The allusion to the synchronisation of sessions and methods of work seems to indicate that the meetings of the WEU Council will be held after meetings of the corresponding Community bodies and would deal with the same subjects.

(c) Closer co-operation should be established between:

- (i) the Secretariat-General and the Council of Ministers of WEU on the one hand and, on the other, the Secretary-General and the Council of Ministers of the union;
- (ii) the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament. Here it should be specified in what areas such co-operation might be applied. Inviting observers to sessions? The WEU Assembly has practised this in recent years but without reciprocity. The sovereignty of each parliamentary assembly leaves little possibility of going further, other than on

the basis of a clear division of responsibilities which can be done only if the future of each institution is clearly defined. In a communiqué of 17th October 1991, Mr. Robert Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly, expressed views on this matter that should be examined more carefully because they propose a juridical basis for the co-operation mentioned in the Franco-German text:

“ ... Alongside the European Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage, the WEU Assembly for its part is already fully competent to be one of the two chambers of a parliament of the European union, the one composed of representatives of the parliaments of member states in which priority would be given to handling matters arising from the application of the modified Brussels Treaty in the area of security and defence... ”.

(d) The creation of a WEU military planning group responsible for:

- planning joint action including in the event of crises,
- operational planning for co-operation in the event of natural catastrophes,
- co-ordinating the study of requirements in all areas of co-operation,
- the organisation of joint manoeuvres,
- closer military co-operation complementary to the alliance, in particular in logistics, transport, training and information,
- closer co-operation in armaments with a view to creating a European armaments agency,
- regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff.

95. These various proposals all take up recommendations of the Assembly which can but be gratified to see two governments endorsing them.

(a) The transformation of the WEU Institute into a European academy for security and defence is clearly a criticism of the status of the Institute agreed by the WEU Council in November 1990, no doubt because this status makes the Institute too dependent on the Council, but the notion of academy is not very clear and the two countries should say what they mean by this term. According to the Secretary-General, who spoke to the Political Committee on 6th November, the purpose would be

to entrust the Institute with an educational rôle, the details of which should be specified.

(b) The transfer of the Secretariat-General of WEU to Brussels seems to have already secured the agreement of all the governments, but the question of who would form the Permanent Council is a subject of division. The Franco-German proposal seems to reconcile the two views in paragraph IV 3 with a dual hat proposal for the permanent representatives to the alliance and to the Community which solves the problem at the level of words but not in reality because it does not answer the question of who will manage WEU and who will be authorised to take decisions concerning its action. In fact, it leaves open the question of whether WEU is to be first the European pillar of the alliance or the armed wing of the Community.

(c) The constitution of military units dependent on WEU also raises a problem. Would they be units under NATO command? Would one set up WEU commands in time of peace? Would it be a question of a mobile force or of a force for the defence of Europe? Here again, agreement on words does not make agreement on realities any easier.

96. In regard to co-operation between WEU and the alliance, general agreement on three proposals seems probable: strengthening the rôle and responsibilities of Europeans in the alliance by setting up a European pillar, making practical arrangements to ensure openness and complementarity between WEU and the alliance and developing co-operation between the secretariats-general of WEU and the alliance.

97. Conversely, it will be noted that France and Germany agreed to propose regular co-ordination between WEU member states with the aim of defining a joint position on all essential matters in the alliance, this being just what the American authorities opposed in their messages to the WEU countries at the beginning of 1991. This proposal follows the sheer logic of a European union which claims responsibility for its security and defence.

98. While the Franco-German proposal offers simple observer status for members of the Community, it offers association for members of the alliance. This corresponds to a practice inaugurated during the Gulf crisis and continued with the Yugoslav crisis that has not run up against serious objections. However, it proposes only "relations" with other European states, which is very far removed from what several of those states expect in order to guarantee their security: in Recommendation 500, the Assembly proposed that some of them be granted true associate status in WEU so that, without bringing

into play Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, they would be given the security guarantees they have needed increasingly since the events in summer 1991.

99. Finally, the Franco-German text is accompanied by an account of a bilateral decision to strengthen Franco-German military co-operation with a view to setting up a European corps that might include forces of other WEU member countries and which might also become a model for closer military co-operation between the WEU member states. This is not therefore a proposal but notification of a decision already taken by the two countries which is not, however, intended to be exclusive.

100. It may be noted that, apart from one clear difference in the overall approach, the practical arrangements proposed by France and Germany are no different from the Anglo-Italian proposal, which means that a compromise between the two proposals might well be found. The recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly in recent years reflect similar differences of opinion, which did not prevent the Assembly adopting by very large majorities recommendations relating to specific points, many of which may be found in both the Franco-German and the Anglo-Italian texts. The fact that Italy approved the Franco-German proposal confirms the impression that there is no fundamental conflict between the two texts. This is what Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, has said on several occasions. It was also the opinion expressed by the Netherlands and Italian Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Mr. van den Broek and Mr. De Michelis.

101. In fact, in both the Anglo-Italian and the Franco-German texts, WEU seems to have a leading rôle to play in the organisation of European security in the next few years. The question is how, in a future which it seems very daring to set in 1996, it will be integrated in a European system that also includes the Economic Community and political co-operation. The Franco-German proposal has the great merit, here and now, of linking WEU closely with the political consultation known as political union. This is quite clearly the means of giving some weight to the union since Europe's ability to play a rôle in international life will depend on its relationship with WEU since the Community's economic means would no longer be enough to ensure implementation of a European policy, as is the case with Yugoslavia. This close link between WEU and political co-operation is thus the condition for the existence of a European political union since the Community is not able to set up an armed force itself.

102. Yet, in order to attain this result, WEU must no longer be content with forming a sort of interface between Europe and NATO, as has

been the case since its creation in 1954; it must resume most of the prerogatives of Western Union between 1948 and 1950, when its military responsibilities were transferred to NATO. This means WEU should henceforth have armed forces of its own with proper headquarters. The Anglo-Italian proposal accepts this, just as the Franco-German proposal accepts that NATO is still an essential part of Europe's security which must continue to be part of the relations of openness and continuing consultations with WEU. However, the Anglo-Italian proposal separates the responsibilities of the two organisations geographically, assigning to WEU command and a WEU rapid reaction force responsibility for actions outside the zone guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty, whereas the Franco-German proposal does not restrict WEU action but also intends it to represent Europe in NATO and to have its own forces in Europe. It is just as if the first document drew lessons from the Gulf crisis while the second also took account of those of the Yugoslav crisis and today's threats to European stability. In the first case, WEU would remain a European complement to NATO, which was obviously the view of those who signed the 1954 protocols, while in the other NATO would be an admittedly essential adjunct to a policy of defence of Europe by Europeans.

103. Is it necessary take a decision on this fundamental matter in order to make progress? It does not seem essential since the practical measures implied by both proposals largely overlap. In view of present uncertainty about the rate at which the European union will be able to develop in the decade ahead, it seems on the contrary wise to avoid theological debates and to advance in the directions mentioned in the two series of proposals. In particular, consideration might be given to organising European defence on the basis of the Franco-German decision to set up a European corps that might include forces from other WEU member states without all those states necessarily taking part. WEU has already demonstrated the full flexibility the modified Brussels Treaty allows it in such cases, particularly as shown during the naval deployment in the Gulf.

*(c) The NATO summit meeting in Rome*

104. Furthermore, at the meeting of heads of state or of government of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance in Rome on 7th and 8th November 1991, four texts were adopted which throw new light on the future of the Atlantic Alliance and Europe's rôle in that forum:

105. (a) A text on "The alliance's new strategic concept", which is the first true collective expression of a defence policy that meets the sit-

uation in Europe in 1991. After defining the requirements of European security, this text reaffirms the essential rôle of NATO, which is a permanent link between the security of North America and of Europe. It is the tangible expression of a collective effort aimed at defending the common interests of all its members thanks to "common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states".

106. This document therefore distinguishes two essential rôles for NATO: "protecting peace in a new Europe" through dialogue and co-operation with countries hitherto members of the Warsaw Pact and through a policy of "management of crises and conflict prevention", a policy that is, however, restricted by the principle that "none of [the alliance's] weapons will ever be used except in self-defence", thus limiting its deterrent rôle whenever it is no longer a question of the direct protection of member countries. The deployment of forces will therefore no longer play an important rôle in NATO's defence concept and it may even be wondered what is meant by the concept that has been defined as a "reduced forward presence" since the same document states that the notion of forward no longer exists. In any event, the overall size of forces and their readiness will be reduced, their geographical distribution "will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the alliance". Then there are "the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject", and, in the southern region "the military capabilities in the adjacent areas". Finally, these forces "will require enhanced flexibility and mobility". There will be "main defence forces... to ensure the alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of communication" and "immediate reaction forces".

107. For the first time, NATO recognises a specific rôle for Europe in this document since "integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European defence identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important rôle to play in enhancing the allies' ability to work together in the common defence".

108. The rôle of nuclear forces in the alliance is recognised and there is a continued requirement for "widespread participation by European allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear rôles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements". However, sub-strategic nuclear forces can therefore be reduced "significantly" and "will consist solely of dual capable aircraft", while nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles "will be eliminated".

109. (b) A "Rome declaration on peace and co-operation" provides for "a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other". NATO's security policy will be based on "dialogue; co-operation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability". However, the declaration underlines the need:

"to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and WEU, and the alliance. We welcome the spirit in which those allies who are also members of the Twelve and WEU have kept the other members of the alliance informed about the progress of their ongoing discussions on the development of the European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. The alliance's new strategic concept, being an agreed conceptual basis for the forces of all allies, should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process. As the transformation of the alliance proceeds, we intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defence depends. We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the rôle of WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the alliance and with the European political union. We note the gradual convergence of views in the discussions concerning the developing European security identity and defence rôle compatible with the common defence policy we already have in our alliance. We feel confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the result will contribute to a strong new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the European component in a transformed alliance. We will help move this development forward."

110. The alliance also embarks upon a true eastward-facing policy addressed to all the countries which were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union and the three Baltic countries (but not Albania or Yugoslavia) which would associate them closely with NATO by:

"annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level in what might be called a North Atlantic Co-operation Council;

periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at ambassadorial level;

additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at ministerial or ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;

regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed, with:

- NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees;
- the Military Committee and, under its direction, other NATO military authorities."

111. This North Atlantic Co-operation Council would not jeopardise renewed NATO support for the CSCE and the arms limitation negotiations.

112. (c) A declaration on "The situation in Yugoslavia" which, it should be pointed out, expresses the decision not to "recognise any unilateral change of borders, external or internal" imposed by force, condemns federal army attacks on Dubrovnik and other Croatian towns and urges "all parties to co-operate fully with the European Community" for implementing a cease-fire and at the conference in The Hague.

113. (d) A declaration on "Developments in the Soviet Union" which France did not endorse, in particular because it affirmed that the allies are firmly convinced that the political change must be accompanied by economic freedom and a move to a market economy, which the President of the French Republic considered to be unacceptable interference in internal Soviet affairs.

114. From WEU's point of view, it should be noted that the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council are likely to facilitate the decisions to be taken by the heads of state or of government of the Community in Maastricht by setting aside all the objections made by the United States to the definition of a European security and defence identity. The place reserved for a European defence organisation in the Atlantic Alliance, but separate from NATO, is clearly indicated and its need for the solidarity of the alliance is confirmed.

*(d) WEU and Central Europe*

115. However, there is some ambiguity in the twofold programme referred to in the texts adopted in Rome. On the one hand, they organise a purely defensive system which is admittedly not directed against any country (but the reference to "forward" suggests that it is still turned in a certain direction), but which rules out any military intervention not required

to defend member countries. On the other hand, they launch a vast co-operation undertaking in security matters with all the former members of the Warsaw Pact, but excluding non-aligned European countries and drawing no distinction between countries which have adopted a clear policy intended to draw them closer to Western Europe in all areas and those which have not actually taken this step. It should be recalled, for instance, that, as recently as 5th April 1991, Romania signed a treaty of co-operation and good-neighbourliness with the Soviet Union, Article 4 of which specifies that Romania and the Soviet Union will not be part of an alliance that is contrary to the interests of the other, thus in fact giving the Soviet Union a say in, or even a right of veto over, Romania's external policy. Since then, Romania has tried to draw closer to NATO and referred to the denunciation of that treaty, but, to say the least, the course it is following is not very clear.

116. Your Rapporteur believes that it is not in WEU's interest to follow the same course as NATO in this connection, which would moreover lead to duplication which the governments have rightly wished to avoid. On the contrary, by adopting a more restrictive and stringent policy, it can help to meet the security concerns of a number of Central European countries and, for that, it must take as a basis NATO's recognition of the special nature of its relations with the European Community. This effectively means that any enlargement of the Community must take account of the intention shared by all member governments to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance and also the wish expressed by all members of the alliance for Europe to have a greater say in NATO decisions. For WEU, this implies not only a global rapprochement with all the countries which were members of the Warsaw Pact, such as NATO has embarked upon, but closer association for any such countries which have already started the process leading towards accession to WEU, in accordance with the proposal in the Assembly's Recommendation 500.

117. WEU's initiatives should have a twofold aim. On the one hand, the link between WEU and the Community should be marked and, on the other, there should be a response to the global approach to Western Europe adopted by several Central European countries and to their legitimate security concerns, without however extending application of the treaty, and particularly Article V, to countries not able to fulfil all the commitments it implies and which, moreover, in any event the WEU member countries would not be prepared to defend by "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power".

118. During his visits to Hungary and Poland, your Rapporteur was able to discern a number

of areas in which those countries, and probably Czechoslovakia, too, are prepared to co-operate with WEU, as its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dienstbier, will have an opportunity to specify when he addresses the Assembly on 3rd December.

119. (i) Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, wrote to Mr. Dumas, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, expressing the wish that his country be invited on an ad hoc basis to attend WEU Council meetings which related to matters concerning which Poland might make a useful contribution, particularly matters relating to Central and Eastern Europe. The answer he received said nothing of how this proposal would be followed up. The Assembly for its part has received no information from the Council about this approach, which nevertheless seems to conform entirely with the practices inaugurated by the Council when it invited certain countries that are not members of WEU to take part in its discussions on the Gulf question.

120. (ii) There would appear to be no reason why the WEU centre for interpreting satellite data should not be opened to participation by the three countries, at least for everything relating to control of the application of the CFE Treaty.

121. (iii) Participation of the three countries in the activities of the IEPG, in conditions to be defined, would meet at one and the same time western industrialists' concern to see the market for which they produce extended and the three countries' concern to equip their armies with western equipment and weapons and to keep their armaments industries going through co-operation with western firms. This seems particularly urgent since these countries often have only aging, obsolescent Soviet arms. They obviously have very limited means of payment, but it seems in the interest of all for them to be invited to take part, here and now, in an appraisal of Europe's armaments requirements. Western European military assistance in the modernisation of the armaments of those three countries, particularly the Hungarian air force, will probably be essential if Europe wishes them to be able to ensure their own security in view of the present risks to peace in that area. However, such assistance will assume its full meaning and the necessary magnitude only in the framework of organised co-operation, alone capable of giving those countries access to advanced military technology.

122. (iv) The co-operation that started in March 1991 between the three countries and the WEU Institute for Security Studies was highly appreciated. It has already helped to allow them to redirect their thinking on security matters and, if the statute of the Institute is to be changed, as suggested in the Franco-German

proposal, in its new form it should open its doors even wider to full, wholehearted participation by representatives of those countries. Similarly, the latter might be invited to take part in the European sessions organised by member countries' institutes for defence studies.

123. (v) There has been a large-scale development of the Assembly's exchanges with the parliaments of the three countries and the symposium it is organising in Berlin from 31st March to 2nd April 1992 should allow it, in agreement with the parliamentary delegations of those countries, to continue the initiatives it has already taken.

124. (vi) In the immediate future, Hungary is mainly concerned that its security is being threatened by many, geographically limited, violations of its land and air frontier with Yugoslavia. Sending even a small number of Community or WEU observers to monitor the Hungarian side of that frontier would not raise the same legal or practical problems as sending observers to Yugoslav territory. However, it would help to enhance Hungary's security and that of the whole of Europe, which has everything to fear from an extension of the Yugoslav conflict. It would also respond to Hungary's gesture in authorising any Western European observers wishing to move from one Yugoslav republic to another to use its territory so as not to have to cross areas of fighting.

125. These proposals, which are based on a general appraisal of the policy of the Three and in particular on the considerable effort they have already made to appear before Western Europe not as seeking isolated assistance but as an association of countries already involved in an advanced stage of regional co-operation, should in no way affect the cohesion of WEU: but they should confirm its intention, in its own area, to accompany the opening decided upon by the Community towards countries which appear to be permanently committed to choices of internal and external policy which make them fully western countries until such time as they are able to join both the Community and WEU.

*(e) The WEU Council meeting on 18th November 1991*

126. At its regular meeting in Bonn on 18th November, the WEU Council of Ministers was at last able to start its own thinking on the place and rôle of WEU in the future European security architecture on the basis of the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council in Rome and the progress achieved at the intergovernmental conference. This was only a first step since the Council instructed the Special Working Group "to complete their work on this subject before the next conclave of the EC foreign ministers on 2nd December". It would decide, if necessary,

to meet again before the Maastricht summit meeting on 9th December. It was nevertheless able to issue two communiqués, one on the future activities of WEU and the other on Yugoslavia. Furthermore, what your Rapporteur has been able to learn from remarks by certain ministers at their press conferences at the close of the meeting allows him to comment on a few points.

127. There is no doubt that the decisions the alliance ministers took in Rome allowed the positions of member countries to draw much closer on many important questions. The ministers set WEU the task of developing "the European security and defence identity", linked with the European union through relations that still have to be defined and with NATO through relations of "transparency and complementarity", in conformity with the decisions of the North Atlantic Council.

128. However, the most important was the definition of the "future tasks and specific tasks of WEU", which cover three areas:

129. (a) "Operational co-operation among member states" has not led to the creation of a military planning unit, which will be decided only after Maastricht, as will the creation of an ad hoc group to study the Franco-German proposal on co-operation in strategic transport. The Council did not indicate the subjects of the working group's studies on "the operational organisation of co-operation within WEU both in the politico-military field and in the military field", which were to be pursued further in the light of decisions on the future rôle of WEU.

130. On the other hand, the Council took the necessary steps to implement the decisions on space co-operation taken in Vianden on 27th June since it decided to establish the satellite data interpretation and training centre in Torrejon, Spain, with effect from 1st January 1992 and to appoint a British Director. It also decided to set up in Paris in 1992, under Italian chairmanship, a study group "to examine the necessity and desirability of a medium- and long-term realisation of a European space-based observation system". Finally, the Council "noted with approval the preparatory steps taken to set up multinational inspection teams as part of the implementation of the verification régime laid down in the CFE Treaty" and "rules for the co-operation of multinational teams", taking into account "the possibility of co-operation with all CSCE member states".

131. (b) The Council asked the Mediterranean Sub-Group to study "the question of developing contacts between WEU and the Maghreb states".

132. (c) The Council reaffirmed its intention to enhance "the dialogue on security and co-operation between WEU and the countries of

Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states and the Soviet Union" and added to the measures already decided:

- invitations to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania to take part in a special meeting with the members of the Council;
- organisation of seminars in those countries by the Institute for Security Studies;
- expansion of the WEU Institute scholarship programme;
- fact-finding visits by the Presidency and the Secretary-General to the Soviet Union and to the Baltic states, if the latter are interested.

133. The communiqué adds that "ministers expressed the conviction that these measures envisaged by WEU and the similar endeavours by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community are mutually complementary and reinforcing".

134. To tell the truth, your Rapporteur is not very convinced by this assertion and he recalls the countless declarations by the Council that WEU should in no case duplicate the work of NATO. He can but note that, however useful it may be, the WEU Council's decision leads to WEU being used for a task that the North Atlantic Council has just specifically assigned to NATO. He will certainly not complain about such a dialogue being developed but would underline that this is in no way a substitute for specific offers of co-operation such as he is asking the Council to make to the three Visegrad countries. He does not wish WEU's initiative, which merely seeks some kind of dialogue with a variety of countries, to dispense the Council from associating those three countries with WEU's effective work to promote Europe's security.

135. In regard to Yugoslavia, the declaration by the WEU Council bears a strong resemblance to the NATO statement in the principles it defines, but differs in that it proposes effective WEU participation:

- (a) "in operations in order to establish humanitarian corridors", which seems to be saying that member countries are prepared to co-ordinate the deployment of their navies to ensure the protection of ships sent to take supplies to or evacuate civilians;
- (b) in the application of a possible "United Nations Security Council resolution concerning a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia" by giving

"practical support" as soon as the two necessary conditions are fulfilled;

- (c) by making available to the United Nations "details of the contingency planning work already done by WEU experts". These plans will moreover be developed and adapted "in anticipation of a United Nations resolution".

136. What seems significant is not so much the decisions effectively taken by the Council on 18th November as the unanimity in attempting to define a rôle for WEU after the NATO decisions but before Maastricht, both in regard to the dialogue with Eastern Europe, where the difference between the aim NATO has set itself and the one WEU has set itself is probably not defined well-enough, and in regard to operational co-operation between member states. The will shown to express WEU's views before Maastricht on its own rôle as "the defence component of the European unification process" meets a concern constantly expressed by the Assembly for WEU not to wait for decisions to be taken in other forums before affirming its own vocation. It will therefore welcome the fact that the Council has, however tardily, rallied to these views that it was still rejecting in its reply to Recommendation 504.

## VI. Conclusions

137. The Assembly will have to vote on the draft recommendation in the present report five days before the start of the Maastricht summit meeting. This will obviously give special weight to its decisions but it also makes it most difficult for your Rapporteur to draw conclusions which, in any event, will be out of date soon after they are drafted. However, he thinks a number of considerations he has developed here will remain relevant, but that the Assembly will have to take up and go further into several of them after Maastricht.

138. Following the publication of the Anglo-Italian and Franco-German proposals, and above all the decisions taken at the NATO summit meeting in Rome, it would seem that the Twelve will be able to take a number of decisions in Maastricht of importance for the future of Europe without being able to achieve more than the outline of a political union. In any event, the rôle that should be earmarked for WEU in the coming years can be seen relatively clearly. The twofold link which must associate it with both the Community and NATO makes it possible for it to define its own activities without being unduly tied by options taken by one or the other provided the governments are willing to concentrate their preoccupations on Europe's security needs rather than on institutional structures.

139. The NATO summit meeting shows that that organisation is to follow two aims simultaneously: adapting military co-operation between Western Europe and America to the new realities of international society and developing an all-European security system. The first of these two directions leaves far more room for WEU than it occupied previously in the NATO military deployment. It gives the alliance's endorsement of a trend that started with the decision to reactivate WEU taken by the Seven in 1984 which accelerated with the Gulf crisis. It is becoming increasingly clear that Europe must prepare to play a rôle of its own in establishing a defence system that meets its original vocation: to ensure the security of member countries, consolidate peace in Europe and promote world progress towards a peaceful order. The second direction adopted by NATO should lead WEU to support the effort undertaken by the CSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO to give peace in Europe a firm structure and, in particular, to give assurances of support to certain countries which are concerned about the possible consequences of the re-emergence of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe, especially, today, in the territories of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. This does not necessarily imply an enlargement of WEU to include new members which, at the present juncture, have little to contribute to a collective defence system and which might involve Western Europe in ventures into which it would not intend to follow them. It is enough to imagine what the present Yugoslav crisis would have meant for WEU had Yugoslavia, in one capacity or another, been allowed to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty at some time in the past to realise that the utmost caution is necessary in giving formal guarantees to any new country.

140. Nevertheless three countries – the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland – are making a combined effort to organise solidarity in the centre of Europe stemming from their choice to adopt democratic régimes, reorganise their economies on liberal bases, draw closer to the European Community, renounce any claims to change their frontiers and pursue, and ensure that their neighbours pursue, a policy that protects alien communities. Before the Assembly meets, those three countries will probably have signed an act of association leading to future accession to the European Community. This is why, in June, the Assembly asked the Council to consider their association with the work of WEU. Your Rapporteur has tried to set out here the areas in which he believes such association to be possible and desirable.

141. There seems little need to pay heed to accusations sometimes heard that such association would discriminate against other countries which also left the Warsaw Pact. So far, none of those countries has made any such approach, i.e. a global, clear and coherent approach, to Western Europe, its values and its concept of an order of peace and security in Europe. They are not being left on one side if they are told they should do likewise if they wish to be treated in the same way as the three countries of the Visegrad group. NATO is now offering them the possibility of a dialogue with the West on security questions. So they are not being left out in the cold. However, the time does not seem ripe for them to be associated with a Western Europe that is rightly anxious not to allow its identity to be diluted just when it is starting to affirm it.

142. The fact that the problem of European union arises at a time when the boundaries of Europe, as embodied in the Community and WEU, are open to question obviously does not facilitate the steps being taken by governments in the intergovernmental conference on external and security policy. However, this coincidence has the merit of making the European governments face up to the facts.

143. The time has now passed when Europe could prefer enlargement to deepening. Neither morally nor materially can it renounce enlargement. The Maastricht summit meeting should show that it still wants a deeper Europe. However, succeeding with one and the other, and above all reconciling the two, still implies a progressive, rigorous approach. Just as Maastricht will not set up the United States of Europe, Western Europe should not imitate the nevertheless very desirable approach by NATO to all the countries which were members of the Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, in the framework of both WEU and the Community, it must, when the time comes, make any progress the situation effectively allows. Your Rapporteur considers the decisions taken by NATO in Rome and the association of the three Visegrad countries with the Community afford WEU a possibility of taking a major step for the development of its own activities and for strengthening its contribution to the establishment of a new order of peace in Europe as a whole provided it does not try to replace the Atlantic Alliance or to compete with the CSCE. The modified Brussels Treaty – subject to slight revision, as proposed by the Assembly in Recommendation 504, to which your Rapporteur regrets the Council did not wish to give a serious reply – more than ever provides the basis for deepening and enlarging WEU to make it the instrument of European union in the defence area.

## APPENDIX

*Statistics on Yugoslavia**I. Federal State*

## YUGOSLAVIA

Area		255 804 sq.km
Population in 1990 <sup>1</sup>	23 670 000	
of which: Serbs	36.3 %	
Croats	19.8 %	
Muslims <sup>2</sup>	8.9 %	
Slovenes	7.8 %	
Albanians	7.7 %	
Macedonians	6.0 %	
Montenegrans	2.6 %	
Hungarians	1.9 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		9.5 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		15.0 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		380 469 dinars

YUGOSLAVIA'S ECONOMY  
(in \$ '000 million)

		1989 figures
Overall GNP		60.00
Per capital GNP		2 550
Variation in volume of GNP		1.5 %
Assistance granted (+ or -) <sup>6</sup>		- 0.33
Gross external debt		19.93
% inflation		1 239.9 %
Revenue from tourism		2.23
Rate of the United States dollar		2.876

YUGOSLAVIA'S FOREIGN TRADE  
(in \$ '000 million)

		1989 figures
Exports of goods fob		+ 13.56
Imports of goods fob		- 13.50
Trade balance		+ 0.06
Exports of services		+ 5.80
Imports of services		- 10.10
Balance of services		- 4.30
Balance of payments		+ 2.43

*II. Republics*

## BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Area		51 121 sq.km
Population <sup>5</sup>	4 443 000	
of which: Serbs	32.2 %	
Croats	18.4 %	
Muslims <sup>2</sup>	39.2 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		14.5 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		14.0 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		338 925 dinars

**CROATIA**

Area		56 538 sq.km
Population <sup>5</sup>	4 681 000	
of which: Croats	75.1 %	
Serbs	11.5 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		5.6 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		6 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		437 870 dinars

**MACEDONIA**

Area		25 713 sq.km
Population <sup>5</sup>	2 088 000	
of which: Macedonians	67 %	
Albanians	19.6 %	
Serbs	2.3 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		10.9 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		16.0 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		274 585 dinars

**MONTENEGRO**

Area		13 812 sq.km
Population <sup>5</sup>	633 000	
of which: Montenegrans	68.5 %	
Muslims <sup>2</sup>	13.4 %	
Albanians	6.5 %	
Serbs	3.3 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		9.4 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		18.0 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		297 571 dinars

**SLOVENIA**

Area		20 251 sq.km
Population <sup>5</sup>	1 943 000	
of which: Slovenes	90.5 %	
Serbs	2.2 %	
Croats	2.9 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		0.8 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		3.0 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		615 843 dinars

**III. Serbia (Republic)**

Area		88 000 sq.km
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**OLD SERBIA**

Area		56 000 sq.km
Population <sup>5</sup>	5 832 000	
of which: Serbs	85.4 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		11.1 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		11 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		364 559 dinars

*IV. Autonomous provinces***KOSOVO**

Area		10 900 sq.km
Population <sup>5</sup>	1 894 000	
of which: Albanians	77.5 %	
Serbs and Montenegrans	14.9 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		17.6 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		25 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		272 554 dinars

**VOJVODINA**

Area		21 800 sq.km
Population <sup>5</sup>	2 052 000	
of which: Serbs	55.8 %	
Hungarians	21.7 %	
Croats	7.1 %	
% illiteracy <sup>3</sup>		5.8 %
% unemployment <sup>4</sup>		11.0 %
Average wage <sup>5</sup>		380 469 dinars

1. The ethnic groups indicated and the corresponding percentages are from official Yugoslav sources.

2. By "Muslims" is meant Islamised, Serbo-Croat speaking populations officially considered as a national group.

3. Over the age of ten (1981 figures).

4. 1989 figures.

5. 1988 figures. Population figures are estimates.

6. "Gross" assistance granted to Yugoslavia amounted to \$ 745 million in 1987, \$ 637 million in 1988 and \$ 636 million in 1989, but the repayment of the capital of earlier loans gives negative "net" assistance.

*European union and developments  
in Central and Eastern Europe*

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**AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>**

*tabled by MM. Pieralli and Brito*

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1. In paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ outside the NATO area or ”.

*Signed: Pieralli, Brito*

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1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment negatived).

*European union and developments  
in Central and Eastern Europe*

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AMENDMENT 2<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Jurgens  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

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2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “to prepare the” and insert “to consider which”, and after “meeting” insert “should be prepared”.

*Signed: Jurgens*

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1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment negatived).

*European union and developments  
in Central and Eastern Europe*

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AMENDMENT 3<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Hardy  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

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3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, at the end add “ under the authority of the United Nations ”.

*Signed: Hardy*

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1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment agreed to).

*Operational arrangements for WEU –  
the Yugoslav crisis*

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REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Uyttendaele (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas, Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox, De Decker, Dees, Ewing (Alternate: Lord Newall), Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Fourré, Irmer, Jung, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Marten, Mota Torres, Moya, Pecchioli, Perinat, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), Steiner, Sir John Stokes, MM. Vazquez (Alternate: de Puig), Veira Mesquita, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation***on operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendation 506 on Europe and the crisis in Yugoslavia;
- (ii) Welcoming the series of initiatives taken by the WEU Council to help support the continuing search for a lasting peace in Yugoslavia;
- (iii) Congratulating the Council especially concerning the prompt actions taken to prepare the possible options for a WEU peace-keeping force and in particular France for making available the necessary facilities at Metz to allow the WEU joint contingency study group to function effectively;
- (iv) Pleased that some member countries are prepared to participate in operations to establish humanitarian corridors and that Italian and French ships are already involved in evacuating children and the wounded;
- (v) Supporting the efforts of WEU member states in the United Nations Security Council in favour of a resolution concerning peace-keeping operations in Yugoslavia and stressing the readiness of WEU nations to give practical support to such operations, in addition to making available to the United Nations details of the contingency planning work already carried out by WEU;
- (vi) Reiterating the warning that the stationing of peace-keeping forces should not sanction the seizure of any territory by force;
- (vii) Convinced that the achievements of WEU over the past three years in creating the necessary ad hoc operational structures to meet different contingencies with pragmatic and practical solutions augur well for the important new rôles soon to be devolved to the organisation;
- (viii) Considering that all the various proposals concerning the future organisation of European security assign a major operational rôle to WEU, both as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the defence dimension for the coming European union;
- (ix) Convinced that there must now be a rationalisation and concentration of WEU;
- (x) Stressing the importance of adequate and appropriate operational structures, together with a realistic budget, for all component parts of WEU,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue every effort to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, supporting the continuing initiatives of the European Community, the CSCE and the United Nations;
2. Make all the necessary preparations to ensure that appropriate forces would be ready to take part in peace-keeping operations, given the right conditions, in particular concentrating on command and control arrangements, rules of engagement, communications, intelligence and logistics;
3. Encourage all member states to take part in humanitarian operations, whatever may have been previous limitations on action outside traditional areas – “all of one company” should be the example set by WEU nations;
4. Instruct the joint contingency study group to examine urgently the most effective ways of:
  - (a) grounding all military aircraft in Yugoslav air space;
  - (b) using electronic counter measures (ECM) to best effect;
  - (c) imposing effective arms and oil embargos on all Yugoslav belligerents (even to the extent of helping control landward frontiers by offering to second police and/or customs officers to third countries);

and make available the results of such studies to the United Nations and other bodies as appropriate;

5. In the light of experience of both the Gulf and Yugoslav crises and in the knowledge that WEU will be given a definite rôle to play as an operational organisation complementary to both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, take the necessary preliminary measures:
  - (a) to move the seat of the Permanent Council to Brussels and form the Permanent Council itself by "double hatting" either NATO Permanent Representatives, or EC Permanent Representatives, or with a combination of the two;
  - (b) institute a planning staff as urged by the Assembly in Recommendation 502 and ensure that it maintains a liaison link with both the Atlantic Alliance and European union;
  - (c) invite the United States to appoint an Ambassador to Western European Union;
  - (d) form a military advice group of nine experts on detachment for normal lengths of appointment, to provide the military expertise necessary for the Secretariat-General and to ensure continuous liaison with national defence ministries;
6. Give the necessary political and military impetus to the above by:
  - (a) convening an extraordinary Council meeting after Maastricht;
  - (b) convening a further meeting of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff early in the New Year;
7. Help the four countries (France, Germany, Belgium and Spain) which have decided to form a European army corps, to be headquartered in Strasbourg, to elaborate ideas so that such a unit will be compatible with proposals regarding a European rapid action force;
8. Ensure that appropriate provisions are made concerning
  - command, control, communications and intelligence;
  - transport;
  - logistics;
  - standardisation, if possible, or at least interoperability of equipment used by multinational units;
  - common procurement (e.g. through links with the IEPG and the Eurogroup);
9. Seek to develop military satellite communication systems within WEU, as suggested by the French Defence Minister, Mr. Joxe, on 6th and 7th November 1991, and associate non-member countries such as Canada and Norway (which have already expressed an interest) with not only this project, but also the satellite data interpretation and training centre and in addition the study on a European space-based observation system;
10. Examine the possibility of making a WEU concerted contribution when it comes to disaster relief, pollution control and crisis management generally, thus ensuring that WEU expertise is used to best advantage.

### ***Explanatory Memorandum***

*(submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur)*

1. In the light of the sad events in Yugoslavia, the Political Committee of the Assembly decided earlier this year to produce a major report, examining the Yugoslav situation in the context of "European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe" (Rapporteur: Mr. Goerens)<sup>1</sup>. WEU has played an ancillary rôle right from the beginning of the crisis, supporting efforts by the European Community, the CSCE and the United Nations to find a peaceful solution to the present internecine conflict.

2. Of late, however, it has become obvious that the operational arrangements being prepared by WEU have a potential far beyond the immediate crisis in Yugoslavia.

3. The parallel debate on European union described by Mr. Goerens in his report implies a new and definite rôle for WEU. What has been elaborated for Yugoslavia, in terms of military planning, command and control, communications logistics, etc., will have a lasting effect on WEU and is providing a basis for future WEU operational co-operation.

4. Which is why the Defence Committee has decided to build on the recommendation adopted only a few months ago (Recommendation 498: "The Gulf crisis - lessons for WEU", Rapporteur Mr. De Hoop Scheffer) and produce now a comprehensive set of recommendations on "Operational arrangements for WEU".

5. These recommendations are self-explanatory and will be presented formally in only a matter of hours.

6. The recommendations are therefore as up-to-date as possible and are designed to give the political impulse required for making WEU a more operational organisation, *whatever may be* the formal decisions taken at Maastricht on WEU's place in relation to NATO and European political union.

7. The meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council in Bonn on Monday 18th November has already set the ball rolling - we must make certain that it gains sufficient momentum to enable WEU to play its full part in helping to guarantee lasting European security.

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1. The present appendices are designed to complement the background statistics given in the Political Committee's report.

## APPENDIX I

*A chronology of events***1991**

- 27th June** Vianden: Declaration on Yugoslavia.  
The WEU ministers for foreign affairs express their keen concern at present developments in Yugoslavia. They appeal to Yugoslav leaders to avoid confrontation, refrain from recourse to force and resume the dialogue in order to safeguard national unity. The Ministers want a return to the normal operation of federal institutions and ask the CSCE states to encourage a negotiated solution with due respect for the principles of the CSCE.
- 28th June** The Federal Government announces unilaterally a cease-fire in Slovenia.
- 29th June** The cease-fire is respected in Slovenia but fighting breaks out again in Croatia.
- 3rd July** Prague: Emergency meeting of the CSCE. A team of observers is sent to stabilise the cease-fire and supervise the return of armed forces to their barracks.  
Washington: J. Baker proposes that the United States and the EEC suspend their assistance to Yugoslavia and apply an embargo on arms sales.
- 5th July** The Hague: Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Twelve. It is decided to send a dual troika to Yugoslavia, to suspend Community assistance amounting to F 6 000 million planned for between now and 1996 and to impose an embargo on sales of arms.
- 7th July** Brioni agreements between the Slovene, Croatian and Federal authorities. The European Community asks Croatia and Slovenia to suspend their accession to independence for three months.
- 8th July** Bonn: Meeting of the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly. It declares that a peaceful settlement must be found that reconciles nations' right to self-determination and the principle of the inviolability of frontiers. It recalls WEU's special responsibility for maintaining peace and international security.
- 10th July** The Slovenian Parliament accepts the Brioni agreements.  
The Hague: Political co-operation meeting of the EEC ministers for foreign affairs. A thirty- to fifty-strong team of civilian and military observers is sent to enforce the three-month truce accepted by all parties to the Brioni conference and to relieve the ten senior officials of the European troika (Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal) who have been in Yugoslavia since 9th July.
- 2nd August** The German Government votes in favour of sending a European buffer force to Yugoslavia although for constitutional reasons German armed forces cannot take part.  
A European troika is sent to Yugoslavia, not to announce a military intervention but to try to extend the EEC's monitoring task to include Croatia.
- 6th August** The Hague: The EEC implicitly threatens Serbia with economic sanctions. It asks the Yugoslav Presidency to convene negotiations on the future of the country, otherwise the Twelve themselves will convene such a conference on the basis of the principle that no changes in frontiers by force are acceptable and that any solution will have to respect the rights of minorities.  
The Twelve have asked the Commission to inform them about possible economic and financial sanctions that might be taken against parties refusing the cease-fire and refer to selective assistance by the EEC with political connotations.  
Differences between the Twelve on the possibility of recognising the independence of the breakaway republics.  
Call for the matter to be placed before the United Nations Security Council.  
Call for support from the other European states members of the CSCE in the EEC's efforts to restore peace.

- Call for an appraisal of how WEU might help to stabilise the situation without there yet being any question of sending European peace-keeping forces.
- Soviet opposition to such a possibility which might internationalise the conflict.
- On the spot, hope of an unconditional and absolute cease-fire agreement in Croatia which may be proclaimed by the Yugoslav Presidency at midnight.
- Roland Dumas calls for an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Permanent Council and believes everything should be ready for sending a buffer force if so decided.
- 7th August Cease-fire in Croatia.
- London: Meeting of the WEU Permanent Council which decides not to intervene and to continue to follow developments.
- Prague: meeting of the CSCE emergency committee on Yugoslavia.
- United Nations: Belgium, France and the United Kingdom announce that they reserve the right to convene the Security Council for informal consultations.
- Paris: Roland Dumas, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, announces that France is in favour of early consultations of the Yugoslav people under international control.
- 8th August Declaration by Mr. Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly, who believes that if WEU is to support efforts by the EEC and the CSCE it must also be prepared to co-ordinate action by member states to ensure respect for a cease-fire agreement.
- 21st August The collegial Presidency and the Presidents of the Yugoslav republics study the adoption of another cease-fire.
- 27th August Extraordinary meeting of the European Council.
- The European Community is dismayed at the growing violence in Croatia.
- It recalls its determination never to recognise a change of frontier that does not come about by peaceful means.
- It calls on the Federal Presidency to put an immediate end to the illegal use of the Yugoslav army by the Serb side.
- It calls on Serbia to drop its objections to the activities of the team of monitors being extended to include Croatia.
- It believes a cease-fire agreement should allow it to convene a peace conference and introduce arbitration procedure.
- At the peace conference, there should be a rapprochement between Yugoslavia, the Federal Presidency, the Federal Government and the presidents of the republics, on the one hand, and the President of the European Council, representatives of member states and the Commission, on the other.
- For the arbitration procedure, the relevant authorities will have to submit their dispute to a five-member arbitration board composed of two members appointed unanimously by the Federal Presidency and three chosen by the European Community. In the case of disagreement about which members are to be appointed by the Yugoslav side, they will be appointed by the three members chosen by the Community.
- The arbitration board will have to take a decision within two months. In the absence of an agreement on respecting the cease-fire and on the peace conference by 1st September, the Community is considering additional measures, possibly including international action.
- Emergency meeting of the Croatian Government calling for the rapid organisation of a general call-up.
- 28th August Paris: President Mitterrand receives Mr. Tudjman, Croatian President.
- 29th August Paris: President Mitterrand receives Mr. Milosevic, Serb President.
- 1st September Declaration by the Yugoslav branch of the European Movement supporting the EEC declaration of 27th August 1991.

- 2nd September Belgrade: Leaders of the Federation and of the six republics accept the European Community's peace plan of 27th August. The Yugoslav republics agree that there should be a cease-fire guaranteed by the Community. Serbia accepts the presence of foreign observers to monitor the cease-fire in Croatia.
- 3rd September Lord Carrington is appointed Chairman of the conference on peace in Yugoslavia.
- 7th September The Hague: Opening of the conference on peace in Yugoslavia. Invitations have been sent to the presidents of the six republics, the President and Prime Minister of the Federation and the ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve. Hans Dietrich Genscher warns that in the event of the conference being unsuccessful his country will immediately recognise Croatia and Slovenia.
- 8th September Referendum in Macedonia: 95% of the electorate vote in favour of independence.
- 9th September Prague: CSCE declaration on Yugoslavia: embargo on arms sales: support for the European Community peace conference.
- 11th September Madrid: The Spanish Government says it agrees to WEU having a buffer force. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Garcia Vargas, thinks it necessary for Europe to have a defence organisation capable of intervening and helping to solve European conflicts. He therefore considers WEU should have a NATO-compatible rapid action force.  
European observers are sent to the Croatian combat area.
- 15th September Macedonia proclaims its independence.
- 16th September The Hague: The Netherlands Presidency of the EEC asks the German Presidency of WEU to convene a ministerial meeting on the subject of a buffer force because of the deteriorating situation and the impossibility for observers to go to the scene of the fighting.  
For the same reasons, the Netherlands convenes an extraordinary meeting of the Twelve on 19th September.  
The Netherlands proposal follows the declaration by Mr. Mitterrand who wishes the United Nations Security Council to consider the matter and says that if, for legal reasons, the United Nations cannot intervene, it will be for the European Community to assume its responsibilities, a possibility to which the Serb Minister for Foreign Affairs is strongly opposed.  
Paris: Mr. Pontillon, President of the WEU Assembly, strongly supports the Netherlands initiative.
- 17th September Igalo: Lord Carrington obtains the signing of a cease-fire between Mr. Tudjman, Croatian President, Mr. Milosevic, Serb President, and Mr. Kadijevic, Yugoslav Minister of Defence, but there is a problem due to the absence of political control over the military factions. The cease-fire is not respected.  
The Yugoslav President, Mr. Stipe Mesic, asks the United Nations Security Council to decide to send a buffer force.  
There are differences in WEU:  
Portugal and the United Kingdom are against sending a European buffer force. Portugal would prefer to send United Nations forces and believes, too, that recognising Croatia and Slovenia will not solve the conflict.  
Italy says it is prepared to take part in a buffer force.  
For constitutional reasons, Germany cannot send troops outside the NATO area but it is prepared to participate by providing logistic support.
- 18th September The cease-fire is broken in Croatia.
- 19th September Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council which lays down very strict conditions for sending a force to protect European observers: effective respect for the cease-fire: agreement of all the Yugoslav parties.  
This force will not have a peace-keeping rôle but a protective rôle to enhance the credibility of the European commitment since only 80 of the 200 observers are at present operational.

The Hague: Meeting of the EEC ministers for foreign affairs. They rule out sending a European buffer force as proposed by the Netherlands Presidency, Mr. Mitterrand and Mr. Kohl. The Twelve reiterate the principles they laid down at the start of the crisis: the use of force is unacceptable; any change of frontier imposed by force is unacceptable; the rights of minorities must be respected; account must be taken of all interests and legitimate aspirations.

The Twelve also consider that the possible deployment of troops must be explicitly approved by the CSCE and the United Nations. France asks that the United Nations deal with the Yugoslav question without delay.

- 22nd September Cease-fire in Croatia.
- 23rd September The Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly holds a meeting under urgent procedure and asks the Council of Ministers to urge the United Nations to form a buffer force to enforce the cease-fire in Yugoslavia.
- It declares that WEU is prepared to shoulder its responsibilities in the context of such a proposal.
- 25th September United Nations: The Security Council adopts a resolution decreeing an embargo on supplies of arms to Yugoslavia.
- The idea of sending an emergency force is not accepted: some countries wish to limit the possibility of United Nations interference in the internal affairs of member states.
- 30th September The Ad Hoc Group submits the four options open to WEU for an intervention: logistic underpinning with the mission to support the work of EEC monitors, which would require the presence of 2 000 or 3 000 personnel; escort and protection by armed military forces composed of 5 000 to 6 000 persons to ensure the safety of civilian monitors; peace-keeping force composed of between 4 500 and 5 000 military personnel, with added personnel of 3 000 to 5 000, to monitor and keep the cease-fire. This force's mandate would be restricted to assuring the policing of the cease-fire; peace-keeping force of 20 000 military personnel and an added support group of 10 000 to monitor the setting up of a cease-fire and contribute to keeping the peace by military surveillance of combat zones, encouragement to negotiations so as to reduce tension and re-establish trust, deterrence of all violations of the cease-fire agreement and preventing the conflict spilling over into other areas.
- 3rd October The Serb bloc in the collegial presidency takes over federal power, decreeing that there is an imminent danger of war.
- 7th October The Croatian presidential palace is bombed.
- The Yugoslav army undertakes, as from midnight, to respect the cease-fire absolutely provided that, beforehand, the European Community guarantees identical respect on the part of Croatia.
- The United States is considering sanctions in co-ordination with the EEC.
- The Twelve again turn to the United Nations.
- 8th October Adoption of a general cease-fire agreement in Croatia. The blockade of federal army barracks and Croatian ports must be lifted simultaneously.
- The Croatian Parliament votes to confirm independence and to break completely with the federation.
- Independence of Slovenia.
- Appointment of Mr. Vance as official representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. He is to present a factual report to Mr. Perez de Cuellar, who will inform the Security Council.
- 10th October After the Ad Hoc Group presents WEU's four intervention options, France endorses the fourth.
- It wishes forces to be deployed that are appropriate to the various situations that might arise. WEU's military rôle is not to fight except in self-defence, but the United Kingdom is in favour of the first option: an unarmed military mission to give logistic support to Community observers. The Netherlands prefers the third option and totally rules out the fourth.

- France believes the first two options would be ineffective politically and militarily and would be dangerous for WEU's rôle.
- WEU should co-ordinate actions by member countries to ensure the military embargo, which should be global: at sea, on the land and in the air. It therefore requires political will and involves the United Nations.
- 11th October The Serb bloc in the Yugoslav collegial presidency is opposed to the Yugoslav army evacuating Croatia.
- 14th October The Hague: Fifth plenary meeting of the conference on Yugoslavia.
- 15th October The WEU Assembly's Presidential Committee adopts Recommendation 506 on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis, recommending that the Council:
- promote without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo on all supplies of arms to Yugoslavia decided upon in Security Council Resolution 713;
  - proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the various options considered by the Ad Hoc Group on 30th September to help to ensure respect for a cease-fire;
  - ensure Europe's security;
  - urge the Security Council and the CSCE to give a further mandate to WEU to facilitate a return to peace.
- Mediation attempt by Mr. Gorbachev: he obtains an undertaking that the dialogue will be resumed and fighting stopped (in vain).
- Draft tripartite declaration by the United States, the EEC and the Soviet Union whose contents are not very different from the the others but whose political significance would force the Yugoslavs to play a more active part in the peace conference.
- Sarajevo: The parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopts a memorandum on its sovereignty.
- Moscow: Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Tadjman sign the ninth cease-fire.
- 15th-25th October Metz: WEU military cell.
- Meeting of military representatives of the headquarters of WEU countries to consider forming a force that might be sent to Yugoslavia on condition the belligerents agree.
- 16th October The ninth cease-fire is broken.
- 18th October The Hague: Plenary meeting of the conference on peace in Yugoslavia. The European Community draws up a plan for a new Yugoslavia providing for: an association of sovereign, independent republics; maintenance of present frontiers between the republics; measures to protect the rights of minorities under international control.
- This proposal is rejected by Mr. Milosevic who considers it is outside the terms of reference of the peace conference. The proposal would need a popular referendum.
- Signing of an unconditional, immediate cease-fire.
- Evacuation of federal barracks in Croatia. The European Community is considering recognising Croatia and Slovenia if the federal army has not evacuated Croatia within one month.
- Tripartite declaration by the EEC, the United States and the Soviet Union: Moscow and Washington endorse European Community initiatives.
- 19th October Cease-fire decreed by the federal army and the Croatian President but not respected. Serbia rejects the European plan for remodelling the Yugoslav Federation.
- 25th October The Hague: Third meeting of the peace conference. The Serbs do not take part as they believe Croatia has not lifted its blockade of Yugoslav army barracks.
- 26th October Trieste: Meeting between the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. De Michelis, and representatives of the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian minority in Yugoslavia.

- 28th October Brussels: European political co-operation declaration that the Community has decided to co-operate with the five republics willing to negotiate to find a solution to the conflict. On the Serb ultimatum, the European Community asks the Serbs to stop holding up the peace process otherwise, on 5th November, the Community will take economic sanctions against Serbia, pursue the conference with the other five republics to find a political solution in the prospect of the recognition of the independence of republics so wishing and will ask the Security Council to consider taking further restrictive measures on the basis of Chapter VII.
- 29th October Belgrade: Major land and air offensive by the Yugoslav army against Vukovar where large numbers of Croatian forces are entrenched.  
Bonn: The WEU ministers of defence and foreign affairs believe conditions are not right for a WEU intervention in Yugoslavia.
- 30th October The Serb Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs announces that he will take part in the meeting of the peace conference on 5th November but that Serbia does not accept the 28th October ultimatum.
- 3rd November The Serb bloc finds the latest European proposals fundamentally unacceptable, but Mr. Milosevic, the Serb President, says Serbia cannot accept the ultimatums and pressure to which it is subject.  
Serbia rejects the idea that Yugoslavia no longer exists as a state (European Community proposal of 18th October).  
The Serb bloc affirms that the Serbs all have the right to live in a single state and it wants the Serbs to have the right to secede.  
Mr. Stipe Mesic, Yugoslav Federal President, is in favour of an oil embargo which he believes would be the only effective measure. He says the Croats will make no territorial concessions.
- 4th November The Twelve draw up a series of restrictive measures to be taken against Serbia if it does not accept the political settlement proposed by the European mediators:  
– restrictive Community measures: denunciation of the co-operation agreement; implementation of the necessary procedures and, in particular, consultations with the European Parliament; immediate suspension of the co-operation agreement: end of financial co-operation and tariff preferences; restrictions on textiles; abolition of generalised preferences; suspension of benefits from the Phare programme;  
– possible additional restrictive measures in co-operation with other international organisations such as the United Nations and the CSCE: total embargo; embargo on oil products; freeze of Yugoslav holdings in Community banks; suppression of Yugoslav's participation in international organisations;  
– independent positive measures in favour of "entities" to promote the peace process: restoration of trade preferences; application of the Phare programme; possible participation in Community or international programmes (Tempus, Eureka).  
Political settlement proposed by the Community: the present Yugoslav Federation will become a free association of sovereign, independent republics; individual integration of republics at political and economic level; any republics so wishing may form a common state; economic co-operation will not necessarily follow market economy principles but may be organised in accordance with other forms of ownership; possibility of a customs union or single market.  
This last European plan now glosses over the return to independence of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina which have been annexed by Serbia.
- 5th November Conclusion of the twelfth cease-fire (not respected).  
The Hague: eighth plenary session of the conference on peace in Yugoslavia. The Chairman of the conference makes the pursuit of the discussions dependent on respect of the latest cease-fire. If it is not applied by 8th November, he will recommend that the ministers for foreign affairs adjourn the conference.  
Serbia rejects the European Community's peace plan but wishes to continue the negotiations.

- 8th November Rome: The ministers for foreign affairs of the Twelve decide to apply restrictive measures against republics making an agreement impossible. The Chairman, Mr. van den Broek, announces that the Community has decided to take measures in accordance with the sanctions proposed by the Commission to the Council in Brussels on 28th October.
- 9th November The Hague: Mr. Bush announces that the United States is to associate itself with European economic sanctions and the proposed oil embargo that the Community is asking the United Nations to apply.
- The Yugoslav Presidency (under Serb control) asks for United Nations troops to be sent to Croatia as a matter of urgency and for the situation of Serbs in Croatia to be examined by the Security Council.
- 12th November Economic sanctions are formally adopted by the Council of the Community but the compensatory positive measures are still be studied since certain member states believe all responsibility does not lie on the same side.
- The Twelve call for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council.
- The German Government has decided to recognise Croatia and Slovenia in December.
- Noordwijk: The Twelve declare that the deployment of peace-keeping forces depends on the prior establishment of an effective cease-fire, but Mr. Major will not agree unless there is a political settlement of the crisis in the meantime.
- Declaration on humanitarian action: joint action with UNICEF to establish humanitarian security and peace corridors.
- The Twelve ask the United Nations Security Council to examine the consequences of requests by the Yugoslav parties to send peace-keeping forces.
- 13th November Lord Carrington visits Yugoslavia to meet Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Tudjman, who have asked for the deployment of international peace-keeping forces in the crisis areas, but there is a problem regarding the exact area where they should be deployed.
- Cease-fire in Dubrovnik.
- 15th November United Nations: Meeting of the Security Council in camera: the United Nations special envoy, Cyrus Vance, lays down five conditions for sending a peace-keeping force: agreement of all parties; clear mandate; undertaking by members of the United Nations to provide the necessary troops and assume financial responsibility; support of the Security Council.
- 16th November Thirteenth cease-fire agreement (not respected).
- 18th November Bonn: Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers. The ministers for foreign affairs and defence launch an appeal to the United Nations Security Council to speed up its discussions with a view to sending a buffer force to Yugoslavia. The ministers say the WEU member countries are prepared to provide practical support for such an operation but that the stationing of peace-keeping forces will absolutely not imply recognition of territory taken by force.
- 19th November The Serb bloc in the Yugoslav Presidency rejects the presence of foreign warships in the Adriatic to guarantee the security of humanitarian convoys.
- 20th November Adriatic: The Italian ship San Marco and the French ship La Rance, escorted as far as Yugoslav territorial waters, begin operations to evacuate the wounded, women and children. The British assault ship Fearless, visiting Venice, is earmarked for WEU operations.

## APPENDIX II

*The Yugoslav protagonists***Mr. Ante Markovic (Prime Minister) (elected in 1989)**

In June, the Federal Prime Minister still thought the nationalist movements were merely a phenomenon following the fall of communism. He thought the economic link would be enough to maintain the union between the six republics.

Pending a political agreement on the country's future, he had implemented economic reforms and a "minimum programme" likely to suit everyone.

**Mr. Markovic**

Mr. Markovic is 70. Of Croatian origin, he directed a large firm in Zagreb for twenty-five years. From 1982 to 1986, he was President of the Executive Council of the Assembly of Socialist Croatia before being elected President of that republic. In 1990, he founded the Democratic Reform Party, which was attached to "Yugoslav" principles.

Several republics wish him to be dropped: Croatia and Slovenia consider his minimum programme to be too "centralising" while Montenegro and Serbia find it too "decentralising".

He has been left out of recent events: the army did not even inform him of its operations in Slovenia.

**General Blagoje Adzic**

As Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav army, he is the man the least inclined to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. He believes he can win peace by force. He is the strong man of the army and very close to the Serb leader, Mr. Milosevic. His inflexible attitude towards the Croats dates back to the second world war when his entire family was massacred by Nazi collaborators in the independent Croatian state set up by Hitler. He thought it was inconceivable for a Croat to become President of the collegial directorate of Yugoslavia and Mr. Stipe Mesic tried in vain to stop him holding any senior military command post.

**Mr. Milan Kucan, President of the Slovenian Republic**

Democratisation has been under way in Slovenia since 1986 and Mr. Kucan thought it was possible to reform the old system progressively.

He was a member of the Youth Organisation of the Communist League and then joined the Central Committee. He has been President of the Slovenian Parliament and was Secretary-General of the party in 1986. In the latter post, he promoted the development of a multi-party system and freedom of the press, thinking he could thus offer a model for the whole of Yugoslavia.

In spite of his communist past, he was elected President of the republic after the free elections in April 1990 that were lost by the Democratic Reform Party to the advantage of a Christian Democrat pro-independence coalition.

**Mr. Franjo Tudjman, President of Croatia**

He was a former supporter of General Tito. After the war, he entered the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Yugoslav army headquarters and resigned in 1961. In 1972, he was condemned to two years in prison for taking part in the democratic and nationalist movement that was severely repressed by Tito. In 1981, he was again condemned to three years in prison for criticising the single-party socialist system. Henceforth, he was not allowed to leave the country or to work in the administration.

In the campaign for the 1990 free elections, he made very nationalist remarks and exasperated the Serb minority in Croatia, who form 11% of the population of that republic. He then organised local referenda on attachment to Belgrade. However, he has toned down his statements since he became President.

**Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia since May 1989**

He represents a Serbia which wishes to dominate Yugoslavia. He is socialist, nationalist and close to the army. He believes the Serbs must be prepared to defend their country. However, his popularity has declined in the last two years because he did not introduce the necessary economic reforms. Furthermore, on 9th March 1991, he ordered the militia to intervene brutally to put down a peaceful demonstration calling for liberalisation of the media. In May 1991, he prevented the election of Mr. Stipe Mesic at the head of the collegial rotating state presidency and encouraged the Serbs in Croatia to organise themselves, thus making the other republics more afraid of the renaissance of the "Greater Serbia".

## APPENDIX III

*The Yugoslav republics*

In 1918, Yugoslavia became a state consisting of six nations, fifteen minorities and four religions.

*Serbia*

With its President, Mr. Milosevic, it is trying to become Greater Serbia again but, since the rioting in March 1991, the latter's popularity has steadily fallen. It is also under pressure from the international community, which holds it responsible for the conflict, particularly as it will accept no intervention from the outside.

Its aim is to extend its territory to the maximum and to impose a realignment of its frontiers.

*Croatia*

For Mr. Tudjman, President of Croatia since April 1991, the "dissociation" of Croatia represents the struggle between freedom and communism. However, he has shown great moderation since the beginning of the crisis, going so far as to propose autonomous status to the 600 000 Serbs in Croatia and to open his government to the opposition and minorities. However, he will not give in over the now established principle of the independence of Croatia.

Croatia, which has dubious historical legitimacy, is very attached to the artificial 1945 frontiers and bases its right to "dissociation" on the fact that, unlike Serbia, which is orthodox, it has always been catholic and has remained closer to the Germanic world than to Russia.

*Slovenia*

This is the wealthiest republic in Yugoslavia. The Slovenes therefore believe they have suffered the most from the waste of socialist management.

Mr. Peterie, the new Prime Minister, is in favour of a market economy and Mr. Kucan, the President of Slovenia, is in favour of independence, confirmed de facto by Belgrade since the withdrawal of federal troops from Slovenia at the beginning of July.

*Bosnia-Herzegovina*

This republic has two original features: 40% of its population consists of Muslims – Slavs islamised by the Ottoman Empire – and

the River Drina, the historical frontier between the Holy Roman Empire and Byzantium, flows through it.

In December 1990, the moderate Muslim Mr. Ilija Izetbegovic was elected democratically and formed a tripartite coalition with the pro-Serb and pro-Croatian parties. However, the republic was coveted by the Serbs, on the one hand, because they wanted an outlet to the sea and by the Croatians, on the other, who were prepared to share it with the Serbs in order to achieve peace.

However, if the conflict were to spread to this republic, experts, who are very pessimistic, agree that it would then degenerate into a true religious war.

*Montenegro*

This republic is Serbia's only ally. It is traditionally communist-run and its inhabitants consider themselves to be Serbs.

*Kosovo*

Since 1990, this autonomous province has been under the protection of Serbia, which oppresses the Albanian minority and has held the region under semi-siege since 1980 when periodical opposition demonstrations started.

*Vojvodina*

This autonomous province was Hungarian until 1918. Hungary would certainly not fail to raise this point if a break-up of the federation were to call in question the location of Yugoslavia's frontiers.


*Macedonia*

This republic already has a nationality of its own but the six-month old multi-party coalition is on the verge of collapse. It does not conceal its ambitions in the event of Yugoslavia breaking up.

There are two reasons for the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation: first, inability to overcome differences between the wealthy north (Croatia and Slovenia) and the underdeveloped southern republics and, second, opposition between supporters of democracy and liberalisation and "the others".

Three risks probably also face Yugoslavia today: lebanonisation of the conflict, economic collapse – since all means of communication have been cut – and internationalisation of the conflict.

APPENDIX IV  
*Map of Yugoslavia*



*Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis*

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AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Hardy  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

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1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “operations” insert “under the authority of the United Nations”.

*Signed: Hardy*

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1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment amended and agreed to).

*Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis*

AMENDMENT TO AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Sir Dudley Smith  
on behalf of the Defence Committee*

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “operations” insert “preferably under the authority of the United Nations”.

*Signed: Sir Dudley Smith*

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1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment to amendment 1 agreed to).

*Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis*

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AMENDMENT 2 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Tummers  
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

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2. In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, after “pollution control” insert “protection of cultural heritage”.

*Signed: Tummers*

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1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment agreed to).

*Operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis*

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AMENDMENT 3<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Lagorce*

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3. In paragraph 5 (c) of the draft recommendation proper, after “the United States” add “and Canada”.

*Signed: Lagorce*

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1. See 13th sitting, 4th December 1991 (amendment agreed to).

*The situation in East Timor*

**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>**

*tabled by Mr. Brito and others  
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure  
with a request for urgent procedure*

1. While affirming its commitment to defending the freedom and democracy of nations in accordance with international law, the Assembly condemns the massacre in East Timor on 12th November and the continuous violence of the occupying Indonesian forces.

2. In face of a policy of forced annexation by the Indonesian Government, constituting a crime of genocide, which is being pursued and is worsening, the Assembly considers the international community must take further action to bring about conditions in which the people of East Timor may exercise the right to self-determination and independence. This right is recognised by the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of that organisation's Security Council and General Assembly, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Parliament and also by the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

4. To this end, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU calls upon the Indonesian Government:

- (a) to stop all violence and violation of international standards guaranteeing respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence;
- (b) to withdraw armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the political conditions necessary for the free exercise of self-determination;
- (c) to open up the territory of East Timor effectively and immediately and allow international aid and human rights organisations and United Nations missions to exercise their humanitarian activities there and assess the situation in regard to the violation of human rights.

The Assembly asks the international community:

- (i) to place an immediate embargo on arms for Indonesia;
- (ii) to suspend immediately agreements with and economic and military support to Indonesia.

*Signed: Brito, Stoffelen, Soell, Mackie of Benshie, Kirkhill, Pieralli, Finsberg, Caro, de Puig, Müller, Diaz.*

1. See 8th sitting, 2nd December 1991 (urgent procedure agreed to).

*Action by the Presidential Committee*

## REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee  
by Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly*

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- II. Administrative action

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- I. Recommendation 506 on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis
- II. Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, to Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

1. While, in political matters, the Presidential Committee endeavoured to follow closely the progress of negotiations on the architecture of European security and to prepare the Assembly's debates on the subject, it was the problem raised by the civil war in Yugoslavia that led it to make declarations on behalf of the Assembly and address a recommendation to the Council.

2. In budgetary matters, the need for the Assembly at last to have a budget for the current financial year led it to adopt, on its behalf, a revised draft budget for 1991.

*I. Political action*

3. On 8th July, a joint meeting of the Presidential Committee, the Defence Committee and the Political Committee was held for exchanges of views with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher. The Presidential Committee met on that occasion and concluded its discussions with a statement on Yugoslavia.

4. It first endeavoured to set out the principles which should govern a peaceful settlement of the dispute between certain republics and the central authorities. It recalled the need to reconcile the requirements of the right of nations to self-determination with the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and it affirmed that WEU had special responsibility in regard to the conflict in Yugoslavia. The Presidential Committee therefore called on member countries to offer their assistance to the parties concerned in order to work out the conditions for a lasting peace acceptable to all and, possibly, take the necessary steps to guarantee that they are respected by following whatever decisions are taken in the framework of the CSCE.

5. As the dispute turned into an increasingly acute conflict, the Presidential Committee, meeting on 23rd September 1991 under urgent procedure, issued another statement in which it urged the WEU Council to ask the United Nations Security Council to set up an effective force in which WEU would play its full rôle in order to ensure a cease-fire in Yugoslavia.

6. Finally, the Presidential Committee considered it could no longer confine itself to issuing statements and that it was incumbent upon it to submit a formal recommendation to the Council in the framework of its responsibilities under Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure which is invoked whenever it seems necessary to ensure the continuity of the Assembly's action in the period between sessions.

7. The Presidential Committee wished to give its views on the basis of accurate information. Noting the absence of an official communication from the Council on the situation in Yugoslavia, the Presidential Committee expressed the wish that the Defence and Political Committees hold a grouped meeting in Paris on 15th October to be briefed on the political and military conditions of WEU participation in a possible peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. At the close of this meeting, the committees were to deliberate and the Presidential Committee was to vote on a draft recommendation drawn up on the basis of a report by the Political Committee.

8. At the request of the Presidential Committee, the President of the Assembly asked the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to ensure that the Assembly was informed about the work of the Council and its working groups in this matter.

9. Also on behalf of the Presidential Committee, Mr. Pontillon asked the Secretary-

General to instruct the WEU Institute for Security Studies to give the Assembly an independent opinion on "the military aspects" of a particularly complex situation and on "the technical requirements of the various actions for which WEU might possibly be made responsible".

10. Still in order to meet the wishes of the Presidential Committee, contacts were made with the authorities of certain member countries which were asked to designate experts to guide the work of our committees on the aspects of the problem within their purview.

11. The Presidential Committee had to note with regret that only the representative of the chairmanship-in-office briefed the committees. The Institute was not authorised to present the study the Assembly wanted and the experts requested were not able to give the Assembly the benefit of their knowledge.

12. The Presidential Committee hopes the chairmanship-in-office will endeavour to facilitate the Assembly's access to information to allow an institutional dialogue between the two WEU organs to be developed further so as to improve parliamentary scrutiny of European security policy, which is a fundamental aspect of WEU and a reason for the Assembly's existence.

13. At the meeting on 15th October 1991, the Presidential Committee adopted, with a few slight amendments, the draft recommendation included in the report by the Political Committee. This text, given at Appendix I hereto, having been adopted in application of the procedure provided for in Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, *it now has to be ratified by the Assembly.*

\*  
\* \*

14. On 30th October, after an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Presidential Committee resumed its dialogue with the chairmanship-in-office at a joint meeting which allowed an exchange of views on Yugoslavia, the architecture of European security, developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the new risks, such as that of nuclear proliferation.

15. Conversely, the Presidential Committee did not hold a joint meeting after the ordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers on 18th November since the Chairman-in-Office of the Council is to report the results of that meeting to the Assembly on 3rd December.

16. Not only has the Presidential Committee considered crises, it has endeavoured to avert them. In the context of the Assembly's recommendations on establishing a just and lasting peace throughout Europe, it examined how to

follow up Order 77 by which the Assembly decided to organise, in 1992, a symposium on co-operation between WEU and any Central European countries so wishing with a view to establishing a new order of security in Europe.

17. It was agreed that the symposium would be held at the Reichstag in Berlin from Tuesday, 31st March, to Thursday, 2nd April 1992, inclusive. The symposium will be organised by the Presidential Committee and the President of the Assembly will take the chair. It will include participants and speakers. Participants will be parliamentarians designated by the presidents of the parliaments of the countries invited. Each country's delegation may consist of a maximum of six parliamentarians. Speakers will be persons invited by the Presidential Committee in the light of the subjects to be tackled.

18. In application of Order 77 of the Assembly, the parliaments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland will be invited to take part in the symposium. The question of extending invitations to other countries will be examined in the near future.

19. Finally, the Presidential Committee is responsible for ensuring that the Assembly's work keeps in close touch with international current events and the work of the Council. It therefore had to adapt the agenda of the second part of the present session to rapidly evolving circumstances. It deferred the Assembly's examination of certain reports, such as the one by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee on reserve forces and one that Mr. Aarts was to have presented on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the problems raised by the exportation of armaments, while the Defence Committee was instructed to present a report on operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis, to be prepared by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer. Finally, it instructed the Political Committee to give its views on the progress of work of the intergovernmental conference and the WEU Council with a view to consolidating Europe's security and defence identity. In this spirit, it changed the title of the report being prepared by Mr. Goerens on behalf of that committee to "European union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe", so that the report would take account of events in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union during the summer.

## *II. Administrative action*

20. In budgetary matters, the Presidential Committee first ended its dispute with the Council about the budget for the current financial year.

21. It will be recalled that, at the June 1991 session, the Assembly approved a revised draft budget that took up most of the estimates in the

draft budget refused by the Council at the end of last year. However, apparently the Council was still finding it as difficult as before to give a unanimous answer. The majority of its members refused to allow the Assembly to create three grade B posts and to regrade other posts and also any increase in the Assembly's operating budget that exceeded 5.51%. The Assembly would thus have been forced to cut appropriations for its activities in order to recruit, on the planned date, the two new officials that the Council had authorised. The President of the Assembly had underlined that the Council could not ask the Assembly to reduce its activities to offset the creation of posts.

22. Nevertheless, during a visit to the Permanent Council on 18th July, the President of the Assembly was able to reach a compromise solution due solely to the fact that the financial year was by then so advanced that the repercussions of the recruitments to fill the two new posts were very considerably reduced. The savings thus made allowed the increase in the Assembly's overall budget to be kept within the limits of 5.51%. On 11th September, therefore, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, and then the Presidential Committee, approved, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 49, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly's revised budget for the financial year 1991 as set out in Document 1241, Addendum 3. This budget includes the creation of a grade A5 post and a grade A2 post but not the three grade B posts or the regradings initially requested by the Assembly and refused by the Council. *The Assembly is asked to ratify the action taken by the Presidential Committee in accordance with the procedure set out in Rules 14 and 49.*

23. On 7th October, the Council said it approved this budget, i.e. less than three months before the end of the year. Never had a budget been approved so late. Until then, the Assembly's activities were financed in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Financial Regulations, which lays down that "if the budget is not approved by the Council at the beginning of the financial year, expenditure may be incurred... for Heads II to V of the operating budget within the limits of one-twelfth of the total appropriations for all these heads for the preceding financial year".

\*  
\* \*

24. Together with the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, the Presidential Committee therefore had to make the necessary arrangements for the next financial year. The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 was approved unanimously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-

tration and then by the Presidential Committee. This budget, which is circulated as Document 1281, repeats the Assembly's proposals on which agreement has not been reached with the Council, i.e. the recruitment of three grade B assistants and a few regradings.

25. In order to avoid the difficulties encountered by the Assembly in the procedure for approving the budget for the financial year 1991, the President of the Assembly went to London on 7th November to explain to the Permanent Council the political guidelines underlying the budget for the financial year 1992. He was accompanied by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Mr. Rathbone, the Clerk and the Clerk Assistant responsible for administrative and financial questions.

26. The Permanent Council, with the Secretary-General in the chair, showed great interest in the political presentation of the Assembly's budget thus made for the first time and some ambassadors spoke favourably of their governments' intentions in regard to the budget thus presented.

27. Nevertheless, we have had to note that, on the contrary, the Assembly's budget was received quite differently by the members of the Council's Budget and Organisation Committee, i.e. the representatives of the ministries of finance, since these officials refused all the Assembly's proposals for the creation of posts and regradings.

28. In order to induce the Council to adopt a more favourable position than its experts, the President of the Assembly wrote to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council (see letter at Appendix II).

29. However, the Council's opinion, which was communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1991, confirms the position adopted by the Budget and Organisation Committee. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee will have to meet on the first day of the plenary session to propose a line of conduct for the Assembly.

30. We can but regret that, once again, the Council has given its views just before the session on a draft budget that was communicated to it on 12th September. The Assembly is thus forced to postpone consideration of its draft budget until the Wednesday morning sitting so as to have the minimum of twenty-four hours necessary for examining it, as correctly prescribed in its Rules of Procedure. However, such delays must not become a rule. A change in procedure for adopting the budget should, in my opinion, be envisaged if the Assembly is to have time to consider the budget, with due regard for efficiency and dignity.

## APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 506<sup>1</sup>*on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis*<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Deploring the constant worsening of the civil war that is tearing Yugoslavia apart;
- (ii) Considering that pursuit of the war is endangering peace throughout Europe;
- (iii) Considering that it is for WEU, under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, to help to restore peace in Yugoslavia to the best of its ability;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the Community and member states have called on the WEU Council to implement the military aspects of the policy defined by the Twelve;
- (v) Considering that the commitment of the European Community, in agreement with the CSCE and with the subsequent support of the Security Council, allowed the peace conference to be convened in The Hague in which all the parties to the conflict are taking part and which may lead to a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis;
- (vi) Deploring, however, that this co-ordination has not yet allowed a real, lasting cease-fire to be achieved as a prelude to a return to peace in Yugoslavia;
- (vii) Expressing the hope that the mission assigned to Lord Carrington will succeed in the near future;
- (viii) Gratified that the Council duly informed NATO and the CSCE of the results of its meetings but deploring the fact that it neglected to inform the Assembly,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Decide upon and implement without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo on all supplies of arms to Yugoslavia decided upon in Security Council Resolution 713;
2. Proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the various options considered on 30th September to help to ensure respect for a cease-fire once it becomes effective;
3. Strengthen its organisation and ability to intervene to ensure Europe's security and urge the Security Council and the CSCE to give a further mandate to WEU to facilitate a return to peace;
4. Continue to associate any European countries that might make a contribution with all appropriate action to secure a cease-fire and eventual peace in Yugoslavia;
5. Use all appropriate means to bring pressure to bear on the parties to the conflict to ensure the success of the conference in The Hague on peace in Yugoslavia;
6. Continue to inform NATO and the CSCE of its decisions;
7. Inform the Assembly without delay of the results of each of its ministerial meetings.

1. Adopted by the President Committee on 15th October 1991 in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1283).

## APPENDIX II

*Letter from Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly,  
to Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany,  
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council*

Paris, 18th November 1991

.....

The Assembly wishes to avoid the budgetary controversies which might jeopardise the atmosphere of understanding and co-operation which must govern relations between the two parts of the organisation. It was to ensure a better grasp of the reasons underlying the Assembly's action that I went to London to explain to the Permanent Council the political context within which our draft budget for the next financial year is set. I was led to believe that the Council was satisfied to receive this information and had listened with interest to the Assembly's arguments.

However, the report I have been given of the recent meeting of the Budget and Organisation Committee seems to show that the financial experts responsible for submitting recommendations to the Council took no account of the effects of the enlargement of the range of the Assembly's activities on the conditions in which its secretariat works.

As I am aware of your concern to give security and defence Europe its full force and to make parliamentary supervision of European defence policy wholly effective, I am writing to you, in your capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to ask you to invite the WEU Council to take a different standpoint from the purely financial one of zero growth which seems to have been the basis of the position of its budgetary experts. I should be very grateful if you would remind it that the measures planned to allow the assembly of European defence to fulfil its new tasks form a whole so that one cannot recruit senior officials of Portuguese and Spanish nationality without recruiting executive staff or taking account of changes in the duties of certain officials to adapt them to the Assembly's greater volume of work.

The draft budget for the financial year 1992 completes the adaptation of the Office of the Clerk to the enlargement of WEU and provides for a minimum adjustment in the budget to allow us to finance our activities. Its adoption will allow the Assembly to establish fruitful co-operation with the Council. We shall thus be able to tackle together the great task of building political Europe, which is also the Europe of defence, to which the Assembly wishes to bring the support of the representatives of the people.

.....

Robert PONTILLON

Mr. Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER,  
Vice-Chancellor,  
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council,  
Auswärtiges Amt,  
Adenauerallee 101,  
D-5300 BONN.

1. Adopted by the President Committee on 15th October 1991 in application of Rule 14, paragraphe 2, of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1283).

*Procedure for approving the budget*

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**MOTION FOR AN ORDER <sup>1</sup>**

*tabled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration  
under Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure with a request for urgent procedure*

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The Assembly notes that present procedure for approving the budget:

- (a) makes it impossible for it to consider properly the Council's position on its draft budget before the plenary session at which it has to be voted;
- (b) seems to give technical arguments by budget experts priority over political considerations.

It consequently asks the Presidential Committee to work out, in agreement with the Council, new procedures based on a political dialogue between the Council and the Assembly to ensure that the Assembly and its committees have time for proper reflection and debate.

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1. See 8th sitting, 2nd December 1991 (urgent procedure agreed to).

*The situation in East Timor*

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**DRAFT RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Brito, Rapporteur*

---

1. While affirming its commitment to defending the freedom and democracy of nations in accordance with international law, the Assembly condemns the massacre in East Timor on 12th November and the continuous violence of the occupying Indonesian forces.
2. From the outset of annexation, the occupying Indonesian forces were faced with resistance from the population of East Timor. In sixteen years, this has led to the death of 200 000 Timorese.
3. In face of a policy of forced annexation by the Indonesian Government, constituting a crime of genocide, which is being pursued and is worsening, the Assembly considers the international community must take further action to bring about conditions in which the people of East Timor may exercise the right to self-determination and independence. This right is recognised by the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of that organisation's Security Council and General Assembly, the Council of Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Parliament and also by the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.
4. To this end, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU calls upon the Indonesian Government:
  - (a) to stop all violence and violation of international standards guaranteeing respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence;
  - (b) to withdraw armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the political conditions necessary for the free exercise of self-determination;
  - (c) to open up the territory of East Timor effectively and immediately and allow international aid and human rights organisations and United Nations missions to exercise their humanitarian activities there and assess the situation in regard to the violation of human rights.

The Assembly asks all member states:

- (i) to place an immediate embargo on arms for Indonesia;
- (ii) to suspend immediately military support to Indonesia.

---

1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix, Brito, Candal, Caro, Collart (Alternate: *De Bondt*), Cuatrecasas (Alternate: *Diaz*), De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra (Alternate: *Moya*), Feldmann, Forni, Foschi, Goerens (Alternate: *Mrs. Ers*), Guizzi, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martinez, Martino, Müller, Péciaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Reddemann, Roseta, Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mr. Soell, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Thyraud, Ward (Alternate: *Rowe*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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**IMPRIMERIE  ALENÇONNAISE**  
Rue Édouard-Belin : 1<sup>er</sup> trimestre 1992  
N<sup>o</sup> d'ordre : 21825

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**IMPRIMÉ EN FRANCE**