

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1978

I

Assembly Documents

W E U

PARIS



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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
VAN WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

#### Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
PERIN François	PRLW
VAN AAL Henri-François	Soc. Chr.
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie
VERLEYSSEN William	Soc. Chr.

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BIZET Emile	RPR (App.)
BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
DEPIETRI César	Communist
DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
FERRETTI Henri	UDF
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDP
PELLETIER Jacques	Dem. Left
PÉRIDIÉ Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
PETIT Camille	RPR
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
TALON Bernard	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

#### Substitutes

MM. BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BOZZI Jean	RPR
COUDERC Pierre	UDF
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
DRUON Maurice	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF

### MM. LAGOURGUE Pierre

LEMAIRE Marcel

LEMOINE Georges

MALVY Martin

MÉNARD Jacques

VISSE René

WARGNIES Claude

UDF

CNIP

Socialist

Socialist

Ind. Rep.

Communist

Communist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
BARDENS Hans	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
President of the Assembly	
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
PFENNIG Gero	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

#### Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDHUBER Peter	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM	CDU/CSU
Adolf	
UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

## ITALY

## Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	DN
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

## Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Ind. Rep.
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
MART René	Dem.

## Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Soc. Chr.

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
KOOPMAN Bram	Labour
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

## Substitutes

Mr. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
Mrs. van den HEUVEL-de BLANK Ien	Labour
MM. KONINGS Martin	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Paul CHANNON	Conservative
William CRAIG	Ulster Unionist
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
John WATKINSON	Labour
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

## Substitutes

MM. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Alan BEITH	Liberal
Robin COOK	Labour
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
MM. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Lord MORRIS	Conservative
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
Mr. Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
MM. George REID	Scottish Nation.
Frank TOMNEY	Labour

**AGENDA**  
**of the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session**  
**Paris, 19th-22nd June 1978**

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**I. Report of the Council**

Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council  
to the Assembly

**II. Political Questions**

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|--|---|
| 1. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i>             |
| 2. China and European security   | <i>Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. International terrorism   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i>           |
| 4. European security and African problems  | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i>           |

**III. Defence Questions**

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. Security in the Mediterranean   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Grant on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>  |
| 3. Disarmament   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>  |

**IV. Technical and Scientific Questions**

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology                                 | <i>Report tabled by MM. Konings, Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Adriaenssens on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i>                             |
| 3. Application satellites   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i>                                |

**V. Relations with Parliaments**

- |                            |  |
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| Relations with parliaments | <i>Information report tabled by Mr. Reid on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |
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**ORDER OF BUSINESS**  
**of the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session**  
**Paris, 19th-22nd June 1978**

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**MONDAY, 19th JUNE**

**Morning 9.15 a.m.**

Meeting of Chairmen of National Delegations.

**10 a.m.**

Meeting of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives.

**10.30 a.m.**

Meeting of the Liberal Group.

Meeting of the Socialist Group.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials — Ratification of the decision of the Presidential Committee.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft Order Business of the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session.
6. Twenty-third annual report of the Council :  
presentation by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
7. Address by Mr. Stirn, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
8. Vote on the draft recommendation postponed from the last session :  
Strategic mobility :  
*Vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 758 as amended presented by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.*
9. (a) Political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly :  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ;  
(b) Application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council :  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ;  
(c) Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council :  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaenssens on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ;

Debate on the annual report of the Council and replies of the Committees.

*Votes on the draft recommendations.*

**TUESDAY, 20th JUNE**

**Morning 8.30 a.m.**

Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

**9 a.m.**

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

**10 a.m.**

1. Security in the Mediterranean :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grant on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

2. Address by Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**Afternoon 2.30 p.m.**

Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

**3 p.m.**

1. China and European security :

presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

2. Relations with Parliaments :

presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Reid on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

**At the close of the sitting**

Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

**WEDNESDAY, 21st JUNE**

**Morning 8.30 a.m.**

Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

**9 a.m.**

1. International terrorism :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

2. European security and African problems :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*



**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

**1. United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology :**

presentation of the report tabled by MM. Konings, Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**2. Application satellites :**

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**At the close of the sitting**

Meeting of the Presidential Committee.

**THURSDAY, 22nd JUNE**

**Morning 9 a.m.**

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

**10 a.m.**

Disarmament.

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION**

*Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly  
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period  
1st January to 31st December 1977*

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**INTRODUCTION**

- 1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Third Annual Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1977.
- 2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters :

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IV. Standing Armaments Committee.....	31
V. Public Administration Committee .....	33
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions .....	35

## CHAPTER I

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

A. The Council, who fully appreciate the importance of the Assembly's responsibilities in the matter of European security and policy, endeavoured to maintain close and co-operative relations with the Assembly during 1977.

1. The twenty-second annual report, giving an account of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies during 1976, was transmitted to the Assembly at the earliest possible date. Certain further details relating to the control of armaments were also included, in accordance with the procedure applied by the Council since their reply to Written Question 123 in 1971.

2. The Council noted, with interest, the reports presented by Assembly Committees during the two parts of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session, and followed the subsequent debates with attention. They regret, however, that some of these reports were very late in arriving.

3. As in previous years, Ministers attended the Assembly's plenary sessions.

The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, addressed the Assembly in June, when she introduced the twenty-second annual report, and in November. On the first occasion, after recalling the context of the dialogue between the two organs of WEU, she expressed the Council's continuing interest in the work of the Assembly, which is the only parliamentary body concerned with both the security and unity of Europe and the only European assembly responsible for defence questions. Speaking as Minister of State at the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher devoted part of her remarks to a statement of her government's views on the development of East-West relations and on progress with the construction of Europe. The follow-up to the Helsinki conference, which the Minister dealt with when addressing the Assembly on these occasions, was also the subject of speeches by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, in June, and by Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, in November.

Ministers also answered a number of questions put to them on various other subjects discussed by the Assembly.

4. The Council gave careful consideration to the sixteen recommendations<sup>1</sup> adopted by the

Assembly during the Second Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session and the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session, together with the six written questions<sup>1</sup> put by members of the Assembly during 1977.

The Council made every effort to reply in as detailed a manner as possible to all these recommendations and questions, which covered a wide range of subjects relating to European unity and security.

As requested by the Assembly, the Council's replies included information, where appropriate, on consultations in which member governments had taken part in bodies other than WEU.

The Council appreciated the satisfaction expressed by the Assembly, at its June session, concerning replies of special interest to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

5. The Council held two informal meetings with Assembly bodies.

On 26th April in Strasbourg, the Council met the Presidential Committee after the ministerial meeting, at a working dinner arranged in accordance with the 1968 agreement and presided over by Mr. Taittinger, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council also met the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, in accordance with established practice. On these occasions, the Assembly representatives were given an account of the Ministers' consultations, with particular reference to the mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee.

On 3rd November, a meeting was held in Bonn between the Council and the General Affairs Committee, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Hamm-Brücher. The talks were directed mainly to two subjects: the rôle of WEU in the building of Europe, and East-West relations. On this occasion, the Committee was given some details of the work put in hand by the Standing Armaments Committee in implementation of its mandate.

In these various ways, the Council supplied the Assembly, over the year, with a great deal of information on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

B. The Council also gave close attention to the points raised by the Assembly and indicated that

1. Nos. 291 to 306.

1. Nos. 173 to 178.

they would play their full part in joint efforts which can be taken by the two organs of WEU in present circumstances to increase the effectiveness of their dialogue.

1. It was agreed that the Assembly should receive all appropriate information on the study by the Standing Armaments Committee — particularly in relation to the work of the IEPG — and would be informed of the conclusions reached; in this context, the Council agreed to a meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on Joint Production of Armaments.

2. In their reply to Recommendation 299, the Council said that, when answering recommendations, they would continue to take account of work in progress in other international organisations to which the member states of WEU belong and would ensure that the information given to the Assembly was as accurate as possible.

3. The Council appreciated the interest shown by the Assembly in 1977, as in previous years, in speeches made by Ministers at plenary sessions. They consider that the participation of Ministers in these debates meets the Assembly's wish to be better informed of member governments' positions on the subjects on its agenda.

4. The Council understands, however, that the Assembly wishes to have a fuller political

dialogue with all members of the Council than is possible through public contacts.

Since the agreement reached in 1968, informal meetings have therefore been held each year, after ministerial sessions of WEU, between the Council and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly. This arrangement has given satisfaction to both sides.

Furthermore, two informal joint meetings were held in 1976 with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and in 1977, with the General Affairs Committee. The Council continues to favour such contacts with these Committees. They would be willing to organise them on a regular basis and will seek, with the co-operation of the Assembly, to make them as fruitful as possible. It is in this spirit that they are considering the request for a joint meeting made by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments at the end of the year.

C. As regards budgetary questions, it is recalled that in response to a request from the Assembly, the Council agreed to change the existing timetable for the submission of Assembly budgets.

Finally, in December, the Council approved the Assembly budget for 1978, as adopted during the November session.

## CHAPTER II

## ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

The Council met at ministerial level in Strasbourg on 26th April 1977, under the chairmanship of Mr. Pierre-Christian Taittinger, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

The permanent representatives met fourteen times and there were thirty-seven meetings of the working group.

\*  
\*\*

On various occasions during the year under review, the Council and, in particular, the Chairman-in-Office as their spokesman, reaffirmed the importance which they attach to the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols, and restated the determination of the governments of the member states of WEU to fulfil the obligations entered into for a term of fifty years. They recalled that the clause in Article V providing for automatic mutual assistance made the treaty a vital element in the security of WEU member countries.

The Council continued to pay close attention to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols. They were also concerned to avoid any duplication between their activities and those in which the governments of WEU member countries participate elsewhere. In this context, they took particular account of work in the framework of political co-operation between the Nine and within the independent European programme group.

\*  
\*\*

The different aspects and stages of implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared on the agenda for Council meetings thirty-one times.

At Strasbourg, as on all previous occasions, Ministers devoted a large part of their discussions to East-West relations.

As regards armaments production in Europe, the Council, after careful study of the detailed outline programme prepared by the Standing Armaments Committee in implementation of the mandate adopted on 31st May 1976, instructed the Committee to undertake a study of the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries of WEU. An account of work on this question during the year is given in Part B of this Chapter<sup>1</sup>.

1. See also Chapter IV, A. 1.

In addition, the dialogue was continued with the Assembly on all questions which it studies relating to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty. In this context, they noted with interest the views expressed by the Assembly particularly on various aspects of European defence. In their replies to Assembly recommendations or questions, they stated the position of the member countries of WEU on several major subjects affecting their foreign and defence policies or their policies on scientific, technical and space questions.

### A. Political questions

#### 1. East-West relations

On 26th April 1977, Ministers discussed East-West relations in depth.

Statements were presented on the development of bilateral relations between the member countries of WEU and the eastern countries since the previous ministerial meeting.

Information was given on the many contacts between governments, with particular reference to a number of high-level visits including: visits late in 1976 by the King of the Belgians to Romania, by the Grand Duke of Luxembourg to the same country, by the Chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister to the United Kingdom, and by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Trade and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to Yugoslavia; visits in January 1977 by the Italian Foreign Minister to the Soviet Union, and the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic to the Netherlands; in February and March by the First Deputy Prime Minister of Hungary to Italy, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Trade to the GDR, the Netherlands Foreign Minister to Czechoslovakia, the Polish Prime Minister to the Netherlands, and the Hungarian Foreign Minister to the United Kingdom; in April by the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to Poland and the GDR, and by the United Kingdom Defence Secretary to Yugoslavia. A number of visits were also exchanged between France and a number of eastern countries.

The German Delegation reported on the state of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, with particular reference to the USSR and the German Democratic Republic.

Ministers discussed the development of multi-lateral East-West relations, particularly in view of the meeting due to be held in Belgrade in implementation of the final act of the Helsinki conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

They stressed the importance attached by the member countries of WEU to the implementation of all the provisions of the Helsinki final act by the signatory powers, which they looked to for an improvement both in relations between states and in the well-being of individuals. In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 292, the Council reaffirmed the importance of the final act of the CSCE as regards the respect for human rights.

The governments of the WEU member countries co-ordinated their position closely, in the framework of nine-power political co-operation, in advance of the Belgrade meeting. They played an active part in the work of the North Atlantic Council which prepared for this meeting very thoroughly.

An extensive record of implementation was compiled concerning all the elements of the final act of Helsinki, especially "co-operation in humanitarian and other fields" and "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament". The Council referred to this in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 301. They also noted the results of the preparatory meeting for the Belgrade meeting which opened on 4th October 1977. Answering the points raised by the Assembly on this subject, they made the following comments :

The western allies had been careful to ensure that no new proposal which might weaken the position of the Alliance was added to the agenda; the western states had won agreement for an exchange of views in Belgrade, both on the implementation of the provisions of the final act and of the tasks defined by the Helsinki conference and in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and the development of the process of détente in the future; some member countries of the Atlantic Alliance had tabled a new proposal at the Belgrade meeting to strengthen and extend the provisions for confidence-building measures.

Finally, the Council wish to remind the Assembly that, during the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 8th and 9th December 1977, representatives of the member countries of WEU and of their partners in the Atlantic Alliance analysed progress at the meeting then taking place in Belgrade. Point 4 of the communiqué issued after that meeting contained the following passage :

"The exchange of views in Belgrade so far has confirmed that while some progress has been achieved in certain fields much remains to be done in improving relations between states and in ensuring the rights and well-being of individuals. Ministers, recalling the importance of the commitment of all signatory governments to respect fundamental freedoms and human rights, including that of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field, affirmed their determination to pursue a dialogue on these matters. In addition to measures to improve implementation in other fields, Ministers considered that the scope of confidence-building measures should be broadened in accordance with the provisions of the final act. Recognising the long-term nature of the CSCE process, the allies will continue their efforts both during the Belgrade meeting and afterwards, to ensure that a stronger impetus is given to full implementation of all provisions of the final act by all participating states."

## **2. Relations of WEU member countries with Greece and Turkey**

As they stated in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 296, the Council welcome the fact that Greece and Turkey wish to be more closely associated with the construction of Europe. They reminded the Assembly that the member countries of WEU intend to encourage the increasing development of relations between the EEC on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other. They recalled, however, that this was a matter for the Council of the European Communities.

The Council indicated that they felt it was too soon to consider the possibility of associating the Greek and Turkish Governments with the work of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. At the same time, they pointed out that under paragraph 10 of the decision of 7th May 1955 setting up the SAC, agreements or arrangements concluded within the framework of the SAC remain open to participation by other allied countries.

The Council, who are concerned at the disputes between Greece and Turkey, reminded the Assembly of the action taken by the WEU member states individually, within the Community or within the Atlantic Alliance, to encourage the two countries to resolve the issues between them peacefully, by direct negotiation.

## **3. Relations of WEU member countries with Spain**

In their reply to Recommendation 304, the Council stated that they fully shared the Assembly's satisfaction at the rapid advance towards a liberal régime in Spain. They welcomed

the massive endorsement by the Spanish people, on 15th June 1977, of the moves towards democracy in their country. They welcomed the reforms introduced and the fact that universal suffrage had been applied and public freedom guaranteed.

The Council noted that, having returned to the concert of democratic European nations, Spain could now play her full part on the international scene and move closer to her European partners, in accordance with both her traditions and her interests. In line with the wish expressed by the Assembly, the Council said they viewed with favour the development of close co-operation between Spain and the member countries of Western European Union.

#### **4. Situation in the Middle East**

Being convinced that a continuation of the Lebanese conflict would have had serious consequences for security in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Council welcomed the fact that the fighting had been stopped. In their reply to Recommendation 296, they drew attention to the efforts made by the WEU member states both individually and within the Community to further the settlement of this conflict, adding that it must, however, be resolved primarily by the parties involved.

In the same reply, the Council noted that the WEU member countries were anxious that machinery for settling the Israeli/Arab conflict should be rapidly set in motion. They hope that the events of the closing months of 1977 will lead to developments which will make possible a just and lasting peace established with the agreement of all the parties concerned.

#### **B. Defence questions**

The Council have continued, during 1977, to carry out the same functions as in previous years in this field. They take every suitable opportunity to emphasise to the Assembly that their competence in respect of the modified Brussels Treaty remains unaltered.

The Council remain ready to play a full part in any developments likely to assist member states in maintaining international peace and security. In this task, the contribution made by the Assembly is of great value.

On European armaments co-operation, progress with the study of the armaments industries in member countries, now being undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee, is reviewed under B. 3 below and Chapter IV.

#### **1. Level of forces of member States**

In application of the modified Brussels Treaty and its attendant agreements and resolutions, the Council have carried out, during 1977, all the prescribed procedures. As in former years, they have been assisted in this task by the Armaments Control Agency and also by NATO and SHAPE.

##### **(a) Forces under NATO command**

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1976, which was conveyed by this officer at the appropriate time, was considered by the Council on 18th May. Information indicating the status as at the end of 1977 was requested in December.

Furthermore, the Council have taken the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1976, at a meeting on 27th January 1977 in Brussels, the permanent representatives (or their substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined the levels of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council. At their meeting on 24th February 1977, the latter noted that the level of these forces, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II. At the same meeting, the Council took note of a declaration on French forces by the permanent representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for 1977.

##### **(b) Forces under national command**

The strength and armaments of forces of member states on the mainland of Europe

remaining under national command — internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces — are fixed in accordance with the procedure laid down in the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, implementing Article V of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able, in 1977, to carry out their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

## **2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe**

In accordance with the undertaking given in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 213, the United Kingdom Government declares that the total level of British forces on the continent of Europe at 31st December 1977 amounted to 61,474 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 31st December 1977 there were some 4,096 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units could be speedily returned to their duty stations in an emergency affecting NATO.

## **3. Study of the armaments industries in member countries<sup>1</sup>**

It will be recalled that, in 1976, the Council instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to submit to them a detailed outline programme for a study of the armaments industries in member countries, and that the text of the mandate for the SAC was conveyed to the Assembly.

At their meeting on 9th February 1977, the Head of the International Secretariat of the SAC presented to the Council the draft outline programme for the study, on behalf of the Committee.

After discussing this draft at several sessions, the Council, at their meeting on 20th April, decided to authorise the SAC to proceed with the proposed study; they also laid down a number of principles and gave separate instructions in response to specific questions put by the Committee. At their meeting on 26th April, the Council of Ministers unanimously adopted the

report prepared for them by the permanent representatives, and its conclusions.

With regard to progress being made with the study, an interim report was presented to the Council by the Head of the International Secretariat of the SAC on 7th July; and a second interim report was addressed to the Council at the end of November.

At their last meeting of the year, the Council, in conducting their customary review of the autumn part-session of the Assembly, examined *inter alia* certain points relating to the SAC. For example, further to the undertaking given at the meeting with the General Affairs Committee on 3rd November in Bonn, the Council requested the Head of the International Secretariat to draft a note, for later transmission to the Assembly, on the division of work between the independent European programme group and the SAC on studies relating to European armaments co-operation. In addition, the Council noted that, if it were held in time, the forthcoming meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of armaments would provide a suitable opportunity for informing the Assembly on the progress of this study of the armaments industries in member countries.

## **4. Assembly recommendations and written questions**

(a) During the year, the Council replied to four recommendations based on reports tabled on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

On the subject of armaments co-operation, the Council took the opportunity afforded by their replies to Recommendations 297 and 299 to state that the maintenance of a viable European armaments industry was essential for the common defence of the countries of Western Europe and that effective co-operation between these countries was the way to safeguard this industrial and technological potential. It is in this context that the study being carried out by the SAC is relevant.

In answer to Recommendation 301 on European security and East-West relations, the Council were able to give the Assembly some information on progress at the CSCE review conference being held in Belgrade, on the MBFR negotiations and on the SALT talks.

The situation regarding anti-submarine warfare was reviewed in the reply to Recommendation 303, where the rôle of the independent European programme group in the defence equipment field was examined.

(b) In the year under review, of the six written questions put by the Assembly, four dealt with defence matters. No. 174 concerned the strategic equilibrium in Europe and in the world and

1. See also Chapters I and IV.



No. 177 agreed control measures. In their reply to No. 175 on the defensive military forces of member states, the Council revealed measures being taken by countries participating in the NATO integrated defence programme to implement the decisions taken by ministers at meetings of the North Atlantic Council and Defence Planning Committee in December 1976 and May 1977 in Brussels. No. 176 provided the Council with a further occasion, in their reply, to reassert the binding character of the automatic mutual assistance clause in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

(c) At the end of the year, the Council began their study of the recommendations transmitted to them following the November part-session of the Assembly.

#### **5. Symposium on a European armaments policy**

The Council were represented at, and followed with interest, this symposium organised by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on 3rd and 4th March in Paris.

#### **6. Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments**

The Council were able to agree in principle, at the request of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to holding a meeting of this Sub-Committee at an appropriate time.

### **C. Scientific, technical and space questions**

The dialogue with the Assembly was continued on three subjects which it has been studying regularly for a number of years: Europe's energy supplies, European aviation and space questions.

The Council noted with interest the reports submitted to the Assembly by its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and gave careful consideration to Assembly Recommendations 295, 300 and 305 and to Written Question 178.

#### **1. Europe's energy supplies**

The 1973-74 oil embargo and the increases in the price of oil since 1973 have highlighted Europe's dependence on imported energy sources, especially oil. The Council observed that this dependence is not only of great significance from the point of view of the security of Western European countries, but, because of the high price of oil, it also has important consequences for their economic and social development.

Furthermore, various international studies as well as the estimates of the EEC Commission point to a serious risk that, as early as in the

1980s, world-wide demand for oil will no longer be met.

It is therefore necessary that the world community should gradually reduce the proportion of hydrocarbon fuels in their energy supplies. This applies particularly to the countries of the western world as the largest consumers of oil.

Existing sources of energy need to be used in a more economical and efficient way and alternative sources of energy must be developed vigorously.

However, it must also be recognised that the initial expectation that a solution to the problem of a future energy shortage can be found in the more rapid development of coal power or nuclear power has declined somewhat because of the problem of safety and environmental and infrastructural difficulties. In other words, Western Europe will continue to depend on imported oil for a very large part of its energy requirements for the foreseeable future.

The Council declared that they shared the Assembly's opinion regarding the urgent need for a common energy policy.

They recalled that the Council of the European Community, which was competent in this matter, had agreed on the need to co-ordinate national policies and develop common instruments as regards energy conservation, better use of more plentiful and, in particular, indigenous fuels and development of new technologies and sources of energy.

The Council referred to action taken to this end within the EEC and added the view that these efforts should be vigorously pursued and extended.

With particular regard to the question of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which has been under consideration by the Assembly for several years, the Council recalled the co-operative action undertaken by Euratom and the projects jointly developed by a number of Community countries in the field of European fast-breeder reactors (in particular, the Superphénix fast-breeder jointly developed by France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany) and in the field of uranium enrichment (Eurodif or Urenco).

It was also noted that the Council of the European Communities had authorised the Commission to float a number of Euratom loans and that European standards had been laid down, particularly on protection against radioactivity.

Nevertheless, the Council considered that much still remained to be done, both in defining a common European supplies policy and in developing a nuclear industry with mastery of the

fusion cycle. Finally, in the longer term, Europe's nuclear fusion potential must be developed so that a prototype controlled fusion plant will be available by the end of this century. The Joint European Torus is directed to this end, as are a number of national projects. The Council therefore welcomed the decision taken on 25th October, fixing a site for the JET. They expressed the view that European nuclear fusion research must be pursued so that Europe can achieve a technological level comparable with that of the United States and the Soviet Union.

## 2. European aviation

As stated in the reply to Recommendation 300, the Council share the Assembly's view that Europe needs to develop and apply an overall aeronautical policy.

Believing that the countries of Western Europe, acting both through bilateral agreements and within the Community, should concert their efforts and co-operate to maintain the European industry's capacity and technical level, the Council noted with satisfaction the progress achieved by the European partners in working out a concerted approach.

They noted, for example, that in the case of both civil and military aircraft, a substantial degree of co-operation had been established between European manufacturers; moreover, repeated appeals had been made for closer co-operation with regard to the construction of a civil transport aircraft.

The Council stated that they shared the Assembly's wish for the development of a European civil and military aeronautical industry capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with the United States.

## 3. Space questions

The Council gave the Assembly the details requested in Written Question 178, put to them after the failure of the attempt to launch the European OTS satellite in September. They wish to recall that the European Space Agency selected the Thor-Delta rocket because of its launching capacity, which allowed the construction of a satellite designed, *inter alia*, to meet probable world market requirements more adequately. Furthermore, it was easy to calculate the reliability of the launcher chosen which had been used successfully on two previous occasions.

The Council pointed out that the OTS failure would not entail any appreciable direct financial loss for the ESA, because the launching had been underwritten and the project included a reserve satellite. A repeat launching was scheduled for

the end of April 1978. The Council recognised that the delay would, of course, have certain negative psychological effects on the users of a subsequent operational system and possible economic consequences as well for the industries concerned aiming to sell such systems on the world market. However, the Council pointed out that all users of space are exposed to the risk of failure, as the case of Intelsat at the end of September had shown.

Finally, the Council recalled that, leaving aside the failure of the American launching systems, co-operation between Europe and the United States of America had so far been good. Moreover, NASA's meticulous investigation of the causes indicated the likelihood of improvements which would also benefit its European customers.

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In their replies to Recommendations 294 and 306, the Council gave their views on two other subjects studied by the Assembly: European oceanographic activities and co-operation between European countries and Israel in the field of advanced technology.

## D. Secretariat-General

The Council appointed Mr. Edouard Longestaey, Ambassador, to be Secretary-General of Western European Union. Mr. Longestaey took up his duties on 1st March 1977.

The Council appreciated the welcome extended by the Assembly to the new Secretary-General of the organisation. They also appreciated the tribute paid to the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Friedrich-Karl von Plehwe, who had been serving as Acting Secretary-General.

The Council regretted the departure of Ambassador von Plehwe from the organisation at the end of the year, when he left the diplomatic service. Ambassador Joachim Schlaich was appointed by the Council to succeed Mr. von Plehwe as Deputy Secretary-General of WEU.

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During the year, the Secretary-General and his principal officers, representing Western European Union, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations as observers, when questions of concern to WEU were under consideration. As in previous years, the most frequent of these contacts were made with authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the Council of Europe.

## CHAPTER III

## ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

**A. Introduction**

Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency is required :

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective ;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

In 1977, the Agency's activities continued very much along the same lines and at the same rate as in previous years.

Subject to the comments made under point B.2. below, the programme drawn up by the Agency for 1977, the twenty-second year of control, was carried out satisfactorily.

**B. General problems****1. General operating methods**

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purpose of field control measures being to verify, physically, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

The Agency's operating methods, the main lines of which are set out above, did not change during the year under review.

Although the principles of the present methods, which have proved their worth, remain unchanged, their application is under constant examination with a view to improvement.

The Agency draws great benefit from the continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member state, of the progress of armaments production or procurement programmes, the Agency develops its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

**2. Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised to exercise its mandate**

The situation described in previous annual reports, regarding certain armaments, remained unchanged in 1977.

In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member state, to what that state calls "strategic forces".

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place ; no quantitative controls are made since none of the member states have declared possessing such armaments.

**C. Controls from documentary sources**

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held

by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

### **1. Information processed by the Agency**

#### **(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member states**

The questionnaire sent to member states for 1977 was broadly the same as those of previous years.

As in all previous years, follow-up action on the replies was twofold. It is recalled that some of the facts reported are checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, and compared with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

#### **(b) Request for annual information**

Control of undertakings by one of the member states regarding the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

These measures are partly prepared from a study of documents which, in 1977 as in the past, was based, in particular, on the replies of the country concerned to the Agency's request for annual information.

#### **(c) Information provided by NATO**

See point 2 (a) below.

#### **(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)**

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member states stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

#### **(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV)**

The Agency studied the defence budgets of the member states as well as the budget section of their replies to its questionnaire. In addition, there were consultations between the specialised experts of the Agency and the national authorities to complement this information and to obtain further details.

Thus, it was possible to check expenditure of credits assigned for the production of arma-

ments subject to control and in this way to verify the quantities of material produced.

The conclusions of these budgetary studies confirmed the results obtained from other studies carried out by the experts to determine quantities of armaments.

### **2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments**

#### **(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command**

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO International Staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau, on 25th November 1977, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 8th December 1977, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Director of the Agency; this meeting was attended by the representatives of the Director of the International Military Staff of the NATO Military Committee, and of the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Armaments and Administration, SHAPE, as well as by the Agency experts. There were no comments on the total quantities of armaments declared as held by the member states (Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), and presented by the Agency for study by these authorities.

In consequence, the total quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member states for forces placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe can be considered as appropriate levels for the control year 1977 within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

#### **(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe**

The quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member states as being required on 31st December 1977 for their forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe have been accepted or approved by the Council, who have taken note of these figures of maximum levels of armaments for these forces in 1977. The quantities notified to the Agency can thus be considered as appropriate levels of armaments for the current control year within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

## **D. Field control measures**

### **1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution**

(a) As recalled in the introduction to this chapter, the treaty requires the Agency:

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed;
- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

Field control measures continued during 1977 on the same basis as during previous years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

The Agency again worked on the basic assumption, which is supported by the observations of previous years, that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured.

These circumstances enabled the Agency to draw up a programme of field control measures for 1977 on a similar scale and with similar safeguards as in previous years, regarding both non-production field control measures in respect of specified armaments and verifications in respect of levels of armament stocks.

In planning its non-production field control measures, the Agency, as usual, began by reviewing all the information available to it, including that obtained from the 1976 and earlier inspection programmes, its progressive analysis of budgetary and other data and particularly the replies of the country concerned to the Agency's requests for information. At the conclusion of this review, it drew up a programme for a limited number of control measures on a similar scale to those of recent years.

With regard to the control of levels of stocks of armaments declared by member states, sampling techniques on the lines of the previous years were again judged as adequate for verifying these declarations with the requisite level of confidence. The general balances of control measures between member states, or in respect of the different types of establishments (e.g. units, depots and factories) continued virtually unchanged.

(b) With the general scale of the control measure programme so determined, the Agency proceeded to more detailed studies. Attention was, as usual, given to current special factors, such as new logistic organisations, the running down of certain depot complexes, the extension of others. The agency paid particular attention to actual and proposed factory production programmes and the repair programmes undertaken both in private and state establishments. Pro-

duction, repair depot and non-production control measures in factories are quite distinct measures. Nevertheless, wherever possible, the Agency combined two or more of these activities at a factory, in order to cause the least disturbance to the establishment visited.

(c) To avoid duplication of activities, Article VIII of Protocol No. IV provides that control measures relating to the forces under NATO authority shall be carried out by the appropriate NATO authorities. The forces subject to the Agency's control measures therefore vary in percentage and type from country to country, and this is an important factor in the Agency's programme considerations. Article VIII also affects depot inspections, but in a different manner. Since the logistic support of forces under NATO authority remains a wholly national responsibility in peacetime, difficulties can occur in defining which matériel and munitions in depots are, or will be, assigned to forces under national command. Such problems were again avoided in 1977 by the renewed approval of the system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections introduced in 1957.

(d) As the Convention for the due process of law<sup>1</sup> has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1977, as in previous years, to take the form of "agreed control measures".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld.

### **2. Type and extent of field control measures**

In 1977, the programme drawn up by the Agency was carried out in accordance with the well-tried procedure of previous years.

The total number of control measures was seventy. It should be noted, in this connection, that this pattern of control activities carried out by the Agency is entirely satisfactory: it enables some 80% of existing armaments to be checked in four years for the air force, five years for the navy and six to seven years for army munitions.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories :

- (a) quantitative control measures at depots ;

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

(b) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command;

(c) control measures at production plants :

(i) quantitative control measures :

In 1977, these control measures were carried out at plants manufacturing armoured equipment, at plants manufacturing missiles and ammunition, and at shipyards.

(ii) non-production control measures :

These control measures related to chemicals and missiles.

### 3. Conclusions

(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its task of applying control measures. Such problems as arose in this very complex field of inspections were dealt with satisfactorily through good relations with the national authorities.

(b) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1977, the Agency was able to report to the Council :

- the measures taken for the control of the stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

## E. State and problems of control in certain particular fields

### 1. Armaments for land forces

#### (a) Current production and purchases

Land forces armaments modernisation schemes and reorganisation programmes are in hand in all member countries.

With regard to armoured material, battle tank derivatives are still being built and, in particular, recovery vehicles, bridge layers and engineer vehicles. The major French and Italian battle tank acquisition programmes are nearing completion; the Federal Republic of Germany has launched a new programme for Leopard 2 battle tanks; series production is due to begin in 1980.

The AMX-10 and M-113 armoured vehicle production programmes are continuing normally; the Netherlands and Italy have started production of the VTT YPR 765 and the M-548 respectively.

Production of the Luchs armoured reconnaissance vehicle in the Federal Republic of Germany was completed during 1977; production of the different CVRT types such as Scorpion is continuing in Belgium in co-production with the United Kingdom.

The Federal Republic of Germany has launched two major modernisation programmes, namely, the 90 mm. gun mounted on 600 M-48 tanks is being replaced by a 105 mm. gun; the missile tank destroyers are being equipped with Hot missiles in place of SS-11.

As regards anti-aircraft equipment, the most important programme is for the acquisition of the Guépard anti-aircraft tank (Leopard derivative) by Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Roland anti-aircraft missile launcher programme, involving Franco-German co-production, is being prepared.

In the case of artillery, nearly all the member countries equipped with Sergeant and Honest John missile systems are replacing these by the Lance system. This system was already operational in Italy in 1977 and will become operational in the armed forces of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in 1978.

Production of the Pluton missile system is continuing in France.

The FH-70 155 mm. towed howitzer is being manufactured in co-production by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

#### (b) Control activity in 1977

Control measures were carried out at several depots, at several units under national command, and at plants manufacturing armaments for land forces.

### 2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles

#### (a) Current production

Recent advances in all aspects of technology have improved the performance of guided missiles being produced by the member states of WEU. These improvements include solid-state guidance, wide-angled infra-red seekers, larger and/or more effective warheads, stronger airframes and improved motors.

1977 saw the emergence, in the point and area air defence fields, of the first tank-mounted surface-to-air missiles Roland which will provide the army with a formidable defence against low-flying aircraft, and of a very much improved Hawk which will replace the majority of the old Hawk missiles and speed up the standardisation

of NATO Hawk units throughout Western Europe. In the anti-ship rôle, another sea-skimmer Otomat has joined Exocet to provide surface warships, including fast patrol boats and hydrofoils, with an all-weather attack capability against other surface vessels. All of the foregoing guided missiles are co-produced by certain member states of WEU.

The following modern guided missiles are currently in production in member states: Milan and Hot (jointly produced by France and the Federal Republic of Germany), Mamba, Swing-fire and Cobra anti-tank missiles; Crotale, Hawk XM-123B (as part of the Hawk Helip European improvement programme), Roland (jointly produced by France and the Federal Republic of Germany), Blowpipe and Rapier surface-to-air missiles; Martel AS-37 (jointly produced by France and the United Kingdom) air-to-surface anti-radar missiles; Matra Magic, Matra R-530 and Skyflash air-to-air missiles; Exocet MM-38 (jointly produced by France and the United Kingdom), Otomat (jointly produced by France and Italy) and Sea Killer MK-2 ship-to-ship missiles; Exocet AM-39 and Kormoran air-to-sea missiles; Masurca and Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles and the Malafon anti-submarine missile.

A number of missiles of the previous generation are still being produced: Cobra anti-tank missiles; SS-11 surface-to-surface missiles; AS-12 and AS-30 air-to-surface missiles.

Production of 100 mm. air-to-ground rockets continued in France, and of 105 mm. surface-to-surface rockets in Italy.

#### (b) *Future outlook*

Other guided missiles have reached an advanced stage of development or are awaiting series production: Seawolf surface-to-air missiles, Indigo-Mei surface-to-air missiles, Marte air-to-surface missiles, and the Matra Super 530.

The Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in conjunction with Norway and the United States, have signed a memorandum of agreement authorising a feasibility study of a second-generation supersonic anti-ship missile, to replace by 1985-90 the present generation subsonic anti-ship missiles developed in Europe and the United States. The project, known as ASSM (Anti-Ship Supersonic Missile), will be led by the ASEM (Anti-Ship Euromissile) group which was formed in December 1976 by Aérospatiale (France), Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm GmbH (Federal Republic of Germany) and Hawker Siddeley Dynamics (British Aerospace Corporation) (United Kingdom).

In addition, the British Aircraft Corporation (British Aerospace Corporation) (United Kingdom), Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm GmbH

(Federal Republic of Germany) and Aérospatiale (France) have signed an agreement which will permit the production of the Milan anti-tank missile in the United Kingdom under licence.

#### (c) *Control activity in 1977*

Quantitative control measures were carried out at a number of depots containing guided and other self-propelled missiles or launchers, at units under national command equipped with these weapons and at plants manufacturing guided missiles. Some of these measures were combined with non-production control measures.

### 3. *Military aircraft*

#### (a) *Production and purchases*

Most combat aircraft now under production or being purchased by the member countries of WEU belong to a new generation which offers appreciably improved performance as compared with aircraft of the previous generation.

Work continued in 1977 on two construction programmes referred to in the previous annual report: joint production of the Jaguar A/E by France and the United Kingdom, and the Mirage F-1 programme in France.

The two other major programmes referred to in the same report, namely the Alpha-Jet and the MRCA, have reached the following stage:

Production of the Alpha-Jet by France and the Federal Republic of Germany jointly began towards the end of the year under review, when the first pre-series aircraft in the trainer version was rolled out.

Deliveries of pre-series models of the MRCA have begun and a few have been delivered to the flight trials centres of the three countries — Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom — which are jointly producing the MRCA. The future of this programme has been assured by the launching of a second instalment of series production.

A new French programme began in 1977 with the start of work on the Mirage 2000.

In addition, the Italian programme for purchases of G-91Y aircraft was nearing completion at the end of the year; the programme for F-104S aircraft should be completed in 1978.

The F-16 purchase programme to replace the F-104G has started in Belgium and the Netherlands.

#### (b) *Control activity in 1977*

Control measures were carried out at depots holding aircraft or aircraft engines and at units under national command.

#### 4. Warships

##### (a) Current construction

Work was continued in 1977 on the modernisation and new construction programmes in progress in member countries on the mainland of Europe.

##### (b) Control activity in 1977

Quantitative control measures were carried out at naval shipyards.

#### 5. Chemical weapons

##### (a) List of chemical weapons subject to control

As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to renew in 1977 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council, who noted the fact.

##### (b) Control activity in 1977

As in previous years, the Agency addressed to the appropriate authorities of the state concerned a "request for annual information to facilitate the non-production control of chemical weapons". The reply received to this request was, as in the past, of great assistance to the Agency in selecting chemical plants at which to carry out agreed control measures in 1977.

The supplementary procedure designed to increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action, which has been tried out since 1973, was again applied successfully in 1977.

For each control measure carried out, a delegation from the national authorities was present.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III.

In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, the Agency, as in previous years, asked the following question in its questionnaire: "Has the production of chemical weapons on the mainland territory of... (member state) passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage?"

In 1977, as in the past, the states concerned replied in the negative.

Any of the member states could, whilst not actually manufacturing chemical weapons on its

mainland territory, have obtained such weapons by other means such as importation. For this reason, as it does every year, the Agency requested the member states in the corresponding sections of its annual questionnaire to report any quantities of chemical weapons they may hold, whatever their origin. In the reply to this questionnaire, no member country declared holding any chemical weapons.

#### 6. Biological weapons

All member countries reported their agreement to renew in 1977 the list of biological weapons subject to control. The Council noted the fact.

However, it will be recalled (see point B.2 of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises no control in the field of biological weapons.

#### 7. Atomic weapons

Since the situation remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercise any control in the atomic field.

#### F. Technical information visits and other means of improving the efficiency of the experts

1. The value of TIVs to the Agency staff in supplementing and up-dating their knowledge was again clearly demonstrated by those carried out in 1977, which covered army equipment proving grounds, missile testing ranges and an aeronautical research and development establishment, as well as chemical and biological laboratories and factories.

As in other years, visits were made to army, naval and air shows, which provide information of direct interest to the Agency on a wide range of military equipment. They included: the thirty-second Paris air show at Le Bourget (France); the sixth exhibition of army weapons and equipment at Satory (France); the fourth Royal Navy equipment exhibition at Greenwich and Chatham (United Kingdom); and the royal ordnance factories' exhibition and open day at Patricroft (United Kingdom).

Also, as in previous years, visits were arranged for the Agency:

In France, to the Centre d'Essais des Landes at Biscarrosse, which is the only missile testing establishment in Europe where strategic as well as tactical missiles can be fully proven;

In the Federal Republic of Germany to Erprobungsstelle 51 at Koblenz, which is concerned with the testing of engineering and administrative support equipment — and to Erprobungs-



stelle 41 at Trier where armoured and logistic vehicles are automotively proven;

In the United Kingdom, to RAE Farnborough, last visited in 1970, where the Agency team were able to appreciate the significant technical advances which have been made during this period in, for example, the use of miniaturised computers and night flying aids, and to the RAE missile range Aberporth, thus complementing TIVs to similar test ranges in France and Italy.

Chemical or biological TIVs were made to research centres and industrial establishments in France and Italy.

During the four visits to plants in France, much useful information was obtained, in particular concerning the chemistry of phosphorus and its derivatives.

In Italy, experts from the Agency visited the Italian army's new Centro Tecnico Chimico-Fisico-Biologico which was opened in April 1977; they also visited the Italian army's veterinary bacteriological laboratory and a specialised civilian establishment preparing vaccines against various cattle diseases.

Finally, Establishment No. 2 (NBC) of the Defence Research Centre in Belgium was visited by an expert from the Agency.

Discussions with the experts met in the course of the visits referred to above contributed significantly towards keeping the Agency's experts informed of the latest scientific and technical developments.

2. The Documentation Office continued to collect and collate, for the benefit of the experts, both specialised and other published documents on military subjects (research and development, introduction of new weapons, reorganisation of the armed forces, etc.), as well as on financial and economic subjects (budgetary decisions of member governments, general economic trends, the growth of certain specific sectors of the economy and of certain firms working on defence, imports and exports of armaments).

Liaison was maintained with other technical documentation establishments.

### **G. Miscellaneous contacts**

1. In the conduct of its mission, the Agency must and does maintain frequent contacts with the national authorities, as well as with the authorities of SHAPE and NATO.

They may take place occasionally or periodically, involving one or several experts, but in every case, the personal links forged facilitate the task of the Agency and help resolve, in a spirit

of broad co-operation, any problems that may arise. The Agency thus considers them essential for the satisfactory execution of its mission and does everything in its power to further these activities.

It was in this spirit that General Leonelli, the new Director of the Agency, who took up his duties on 1st February 1977, visited the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries of the member countries and the members of the Permanent Council.

The Agency also maintained close contacts with the appropriate NATO authorities in accordance with the provisions of the revised Brussels Treaty. In this connection, mention should be made, in particular, of the two meetings held to fix the level of armaments of the forces under NATO command, already referred to in point C.2 (a) of this chapter.

2. The Agency is also anxious to participate in conferences and study sessions arranged by various international organisations on subjects of interest to it. Thus, the Director and members of his staff attended as observers the symposium organised by the WEU Assembly on an armaments policy for Europe, and the meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Paris.

3. Finally, the Agency was visited by two groups of young European officials on a study tour.

### **H. General conclusions**

In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1977, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV :

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV ; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1977 and for each of the member states, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for those categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls :

- either the manufacture in these establishments on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of a category of armaments that the government of this member state has undertaken not to manufacture ;
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by

export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1977, the Agency again applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it.

As in the past, the atmosphere of co-operation prevailing in relations between the Agency and the authorities of the member countries and of NATO, as well as those with members of private firms, played an important part.

## CHAPTER IV

## STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

**A. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee**

The Standing Armaments Committee met five times in normal session. The main topics of discussion were : the study of the situation in the armaments sector of industry in member countries ; the up-dating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 and its possible release to industrial firms in member countries ; supervision of the work of Working Group No. 8 on operational research and methods for evaluating military equipment.

The SAC also met five times as an ad hoc group to deal more specifically with the study of the armaments sector of industry in member countries, in implementation of the mandate adopted by the Council.

**1. Study of the armaments sector of industry in member countries**

The detailed outline programme and working method proposed by the SAC were presented to the Council on 9th February 1977. They were approved by the Council in a decision taken on 20th April, on the understanding that there would be no duplication with the work of Sub-Group 4 of Panel III of the independent European programme group. The SAC therefore began work on the study at once, making the fullest possible use of the facilities of its International Secretariat and taking account of the detailed instructions received in reply to the questions it had put to the Council.

The SAC then made contact with the IEPG through France, the pilot country for Sub-Group 4 of Panel III. As this Sub-Group had started work on a definition of the armaments sector and on the questionnaire to be sent to industrial firms, the SAC decided to start its own work with the legal aspect of the study. With regard to the remainder of the report, the SAC took note of the IEPG's time-table.

**2. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6**

WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 which relates to a technical trials programme for wheeled vehicles for the period 1970-80, is being up-dated under a procedure carried out by a group of national experts, with the United Kingdom acting as pilot country. The annual revision report for 1976-77 was approved by the SAC in July 1977.

The SAC had occasion to consider whether this agreement should be released to industrial firms in member countries. It was agreed that reproduction of volume I of the agreement (with

the exception of the technical information sheets) and its release to firms would, in the first instance, be the responsibility of the national authorities concerned, who would inform the International Secretariat.

**B. Activities of the working groups****1. Working Group No. 8**

During 1977, Working Group No. 8 on operational research met twice, in March and October. The first meeting, held in Paris, was coupled with a symposium on methods of terrain representation, and the second, held in The Hague, was combined with a visit to the operational research section of the Netherlands Physics Laboratory.

Details of subjects under study in various countries were again supplied on special forms. During the year, 111 forms, of which 75 were new and 36 up-dated earlier forms, were presented by the five delegations belonging to the group. These forms dealt with subjects relating to all three services.

Several new contributions were added to the WEU library of operational research reports, bringing the total number up to 65. Delegations concerned continued their work on the five-language WEU glossary of operational research terms which will be completed in 1978.

**2. Evaluation of military equipment**

In accordance with its terms of reference from the SAC, the group of experts on the evaluation of military equipment continued its critical, comparative study of a report on the evaluation of a recovery vehicle, under the auspices of Working Group No. 8. It held two meetings in 1977, in January and October.

At the first, the group noted that the evaluation of the vehicle by the French method *Electre* had been completed and that all possible criticisms regarding this method and the German "weighted sums" method had been studied. The group therefore decided to draft its report to the SAC on the first stage of the work.

At the second meeting, it was decided that delegations' contributions to this report required editing and that the study would probably have to include the application of two new methods presented by the French and German Delegations respectively.

It was therefore proposed that the group should hold one or two additional meetings during the first half of 1978 to complete its report on the first stage of the work.

### **C. International Secretariat**

#### **1. Relations with the Council and member countries**

On 9th February, the Assistant Secretary-General presented an oral report to the Council on the draft outline programme for a study on the armaments sector of industry in member countries, which had been drawn up by the SAC in implementation of the mandate adopted by the Council meeting at ministerial level on 31st May 1976.

Later, on 7th July, he gave his usual annual verbal report to the Council, and outlined the progress of the early stages of the study.

During 1977, the Assistant Secretary-General visited a number of member countries for talks with the appropriate authorities on the study.

#### **2. WEU Assembly**

The Assistant Secretary-General gave the SAC an account of the Assembly's debates on armaments questions during the two parts of its Twenty-Third Ordinary Session. Two documents

containing extracts from speeches, reports, debates and recommendations relating to these questions were circulated to members of the Committee.

In addition, the SAC and the International Secretariat were represented at the symposium organised by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, held in Paris on 3rd and 4th March 1977.

#### **3. Relations with NATO**

The International Secretariat of the SAC was represented, as observer, at the two meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors held at NATO headquarters in Brussels in April and October.

As in previous years, a representative of the International Secretariat attended the two meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

#### **4. Liaison with FINABEL**

In the context of the regular contacts between the Secretariats of the SAC and FINABEL, liaison missions were carried out during the first and second halves of 1977. The second coincided with the meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee, to which an observer from the International Secretariat was invited. In turn, the Secretary of FINABEL attended the SAC's last meeting of the year.

## CHAPTER V

## PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

**A. Meetings of the Committee**

In 1977, the Public Administration Committee, which meets in the member countries in turn, held its two sessions in Venice, from 27th to 29th April, and in Brussels, from 28th to 30th September.

These meetings are devoted mainly to an exchange of views on major administrative developments in member states during the preceding six months and to preparation of the multilateral course for government officials due to take place the following year under the responsibility of a member of the Committee, who acts as director.

During the year under review, the Committee considered a number of administrative problems common to most member countries. As in 1976, some of these problems stemmed directly from the effects of a difficult economic and financial situation on administrations; they included the position of civil servants and their staff associations in relation to salary restrictions; measures taken within the civil service to deal with unemployment; the effects of the economic situation on initial and further training activities, etc. Several of the other subjects discussed, such as exercise of the right to strike in the civil service, assessment systems (conventional and new methods), the problems of local authorities, etc., showed that because of general social changes, many old problems have to be approached from a new angle.

The members of the Committee also exchanged information on changes in the constitutional and administrative structure of their countries as a result of changes of government or cabinet reshuffles. The main new legislation with significant administrative consequences was reported and copies of texts were supplied in some cases.

When considering arrangements for the 1978 course for government officials, the Committee decided to break away temporarily from the recent pattern of training courses for young officials, and to return to the previous formula. This other type of course takes the form of a study of a specific theme by a group of fairly senior civil servants. The subject approved in principle is, "procedures for public enquiries prior to the undertaking of certain projects at national, regional or local level".

An account of this course will be given in the Council's next annual report.

**B. 1977 course for government officials**

The twenty-sixth multilateral course for government officials, organised by the Public Administration Committee, took place in Belgium from 10th to 21st October.

It was designed for young officials holding responsible posts in central government departments, with duties involving, or likely to involve, international aspects. The aim was to enable participants to exchange information on the main characteristic features of their national administrations, and then to apply what they learned to a negotiating exercise.

There are normally twenty-one participants in such courses: four each for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, two each for Belgium and the Netherlands, and one for Luxembourg. As a result of a number of absences (including one at the last minute for health reasons), the 1977 course was attended by only sixteen participants, but their quality and enthusiasm fully satisfied the organisers' hopes.

In accordance with its aim, the course was divided into two parts.

During the first few days, each national delegation presented a report on the characteristic features of their administration. This was followed by exchanges of view and a general discussion which added to participants' knowledge on such subjects as the rôle of political cabinets, the position of trade unions and the civil servants, the rôle of specialists, etc.

The second and more important part of the course was devoted to the preparation and negotiation of a scheme for the training of national officials for duties with international aspects. Very little emphasis has so far been laid on this kind of training, but the need for it is becoming increasingly obvious. Growing numbers of national civil servants have duties which require them to contact their counterparts in other countries, or, at least, to take account of the international "dimension" of problems in the course of their work. Furthermore, it is difficult to provide such training in a wholly convincing manner on a purely national basis (if only because in most countries there is no language problem of the kind which quickly assumes great importance at international level).

After first discussing whether such training would be of value, delegates considered the main questions which would have to be decided during the negotiation exercise: for how many civil

servants would such training be of benefit for their existing or future duties? What should be the content and duration of the training, and what methods should be used? At what point in an official's career should it be given? Should participation be compulsory or optional and, if the latter, should it be an entitlement for applicants? What body should organise and administer instruction, etc.?

One day during the course was spent in visiting the offices of the Council and Commission of the European Communities in Brussels. Views were exchanged at round table meetings with Community officials.

### **C. Study visits**

During 1977, the circumstances and conditions of study visits arranged under the auspices of the Public Administration Committee were the same as those described in the twenty-second annual report, with administrations showing some tendency to restrict or, at least, not to expand activities of this kind because funds were limited.

The Committee noted, however, that the extent to which study visits attracted civil servants depended largely on how well they were publicised. Details of the many facilities available

for bilateral exchanges are not given the same publicity in all departments and the need for a wide diffusion of information on the subject was recognised. It was noted that more information was given in some member countries than in others, and that some action might therefore be taken in the matter.

The following examples of study visits made in 1977 show the wide variety of the subjects covered: the rôle of federal and Land agencies in the matter of outdoor recreational facilities; measures to stimulate regional development, particularly in maritime, peripheral and mountain areas; system for monitoring and control of prescribing by general practitioners; siting of nuclear power and related industrial plants; administrative control and public participation; administrative measures taken or planned to implement EEC directives on equal opportunities for men and women; assistance to small manufacturing firms and particularly the effects of development and planning controls, and specific schemes of aid; administration of rural development, particularly the process of identifying and monitoring rural development projects, etc.

It will be recalled that civil servants returning from visits to a foreign government department prepare a report which is communicated to the Committee.

## CHAPTER VI

## BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

**A. Budget**

Summaries of the main budgets for 1977 and 1978 are shown in the Appendix to this report.

Until the option period for the pension scheme terminates in 1978, the budgetary consequences of the scheme cannot be finally determined.

The budget has been compiled on the assumption that 50% of the staff will join the pension scheme, and the organisation contributions to the provident fund have been reduced accordingly in 1978.

It will be necessary to introduce a revised budget for 1978 once the final situation is known after the closing date of the option period (30th April 1978).

The problem raised by the introduction of a new social security scheme in the United Kingdom is being studied.

**B. WEU administrative meetings**

The practice was continued of bringing together periodically the officials of the Secretariat-General, the Armaments Control Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Office of the Clerk responsible for administrative questions. As was already foreseen in the twenty-second annual report there was an increase in the frequency of these meetings, mainly due to the complicated and new problems arising from the introduction of the pension scheme.

**C. WEU provident fund**

This year brought some reduction in the fluctuations in currency parities and there was a more stable climate for investment. However, the option period of one year for the pension scheme, starting 1st March 1977, introduced an element of complete uncertainty as to the future level of the provident fund and inhibited long-term investment.

The advisory panel therefore considered that the interests of staff and governments were best served by maintaining the existing policy of short-term investment in currencies.

**D. Activities within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations****1. Committee of Secretaries-General**

The Secretaries-General of the five co-ordinated organisations met three times this year to discuss administrative problems. These were chiefly concerned with :

- the introduction of the pension scheme and the first practical experiences of the implementation of the pension rules ;
- means of improving the machinery of co-ordination ;
- the introduction of the salary review procedure as embodied in the 133rd report ;
- the setting-up of a joint administrative pension unit.

In order to obtain expert advice on the problems associated with the desirable aim of centralising and co-ordinating the management of pensions, the Secretaries-General consulted an internationally recognised expert, Mr. Schuler of Switzerland. He has submitted two reports and these form the basis for the discussions now proceeding between the organisations and in the Co-ordinating Committee.

The instructions implementing the pension scheme rules, to be applied in the five co-ordinated organisations, and prepared in accordance with Article 52 of the pension scheme rules themselves, were approved by the Secretariat-General on 29th June 1977.

On the instructions of the Secretaries-General, the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General and the Committee of Heads of Administration met on numerous occasions to prepare proposals on a series of administrative problems for submission to the Co-ordinating Committee.

The Standing Committee of Secretaries-General held a number of joint meetings with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations ; these meetings are now held monthly in conjunction with the meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee.

The Standing Committee of Staff Associations are now also invited to attend all meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee and to participate in its official working groups.

## **2. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts**

The Co-ordinating Committee, which met thirteen times in 1977, issued eleven reports, Nos. 136-146, in the course of the year.

The reports were the following :

*136th report* : Special transitional arrangements, applicable to staff members of the Council of Europe, affiliated to the existing pension scheme of the Council of Europe, following the introduction of the co-ordinated organisations pension scheme. Approved by the WEU Council on 20th April 1977.

*137th report* : Regarding the application of Article 53 of the pension scheme rules, concerned NATO only and was sent to the Council for information.

*138th report* : The entitlement to the expatriation allowance (and related education allowance and home leave) of staff members who commute daily between home and office, when these are situated in two different countries. This report does not directly affect WEU either.

*139th report* : The annual review of the daily rates of subsistence allowances for staff travelling on duty in member countries, effective from 1st May 1977. Approved by the Council on 1st June 1977.

*140th report* : The 1976 general review of the remunerations of staff members of the co-ordinated organisations, effective from 1st July 1976. Approved by the Council on 13th June 1977.

*141st report* : Payment of an advance to all staff members of 80% of the increase in cost of living over the second half of 1976, effective from 1st January 1977. Approved by the Council on 13th June 1977.

*142nd report* : The recommended compromise solution to the problems raised by national social

security legislation in the host countries where headquarters and agencies of the co-ordinated organisations are located. This report is still under review by the Council.

*143rd report* : The 1977 general review of remuneration of B and C grade staff members of the co-ordinated organisations, effective from 1st July 1977. Approved by the Council on 14th December 1977.

*144th report* : Scales for calculating the pensions for four countries, as addendum to the 1976 general review of remunerations. Approved by the Council on 14th December 1977.

*145th report* : Interim measure for the application of Article 36 of the pension scheme rules to the 1976 general review, and the re-convening of the working group on pensions to advise on the future application of that article and its compatibility with salary reviews. Approved by the Council on 14th December 1977.

*146th report* : Extension of the period of option for the pension scheme, so that it shall terminate on 30th April 1978 for all five co-ordinated organisations. This report resulted from difficulties in applying Article 36 of the pension scheme rules. Approved by the Council on 14th December 1977.

## **E. Staff Association**

The co-operation with the WEU Staff Association has been, as in previous years, excellent. Although there have again been long delays in effecting salary reviews and the granting of intermediate advances on cost-of-living increases, as in 1976, meetings between the Secretary-General, the Association and officials dealing with budgetary questions have offered opportunities to exchange information and views with staff members regarding present problems of administration in the co-ordinated organisations.



APPENDIX

Summary of revised WEU main budget for 1977

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances .....	757,810	6,028,224	13,026,605	19,054,829
Pensions .....	14,420	954,500	2,287,100	3,241,600
Travel .....	22,795	86,000	350,300	436,300
Other operating costs .....	80,865	370,500	449,800	820,300
Purchase of furniture, etc. ....	3,395	10,500	19,400	29,900
Buildings .....	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .....	879,285	7,449,724	16,133,205	23,582,929
WEU tax .....	250,025	2,087,275	4,447,778	6,535,053
Other receipts .....	5,800	31,200	54,960	86,160
Pension receipts .....	14,420	954,500	2,287,100	3,241,600
TOTAL INCOME .....	270,245	3,072,975	6,789,838	9,862,813
NET TOTAL .....	609,040	4,376,749	9,343,367	13,720,116

National contributions called for under the revised WEU main budget for 1977

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium .....	59	59,888.94	1,349,144.74
France .....	120	121,808.00	2,744,023.20
Germany .....	120	121,808.00	2,744,023.20
Italy .....	120	121,808.00	2,744,023.20
Luxembourg .....	2	2,030.12	45,733.72
Netherlands .....	59	59,888.94	1,349,144.74
United Kingdom .....	120	121,808.00	2,744,023.20
TOTAL .....	600	609,040.00	13,720,116.00

\* A Secretariat-General.  
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.  
C Armaments Control Agency.

**Summary of WEU main budget for 1978**

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances .....	814,120	6,240,350	13,501,600	19,741,950
Pensions .....	27,425	365,000	704,300	1,069,300
Travel .....	26,685	81,000	387,450	468,450
Other operating costs .....	87,740	352,475	491,505	843,980
Purchase of furniture, etc. ....	3,495	5,500	43,700	49,200
Buildings .....	—	—	—	—
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</b> .....	<b>959,465</b>	<b>7,044,325</b>	<b>15,128,555</b>	<b>22,172,880</b>
WEU tax .....	270,050	2,140,100	4,590,150	6,730,250
Other receipts .....	9,600	39,500	83,500	123,000
Pension receipts .....	13,110	117,100	247,250	364,350
<b>TOTAL INCOME</b> .....	<b>292,760</b>	<b>2,296,700</b>	<b>4,920,900</b>	<b>7,217,600</b>
<b>NET TOTAL</b> .....	<b>666,705</b>	<b>4,747,625</b>	<b>10,207,655</b>	<b>14,955,280</b>

**National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1978**

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium .....	59	65,559.33	1,470,602.53
France .....	120	133,341.00	2,991,056.00
Germany .....	120	133,341.00	2,991,056.00
Italy .....	120	133,341.00	2,991,056.00
Luxembourg .....	2	2,222.34	49,850.94
Netherlands .....	59	65,559.33	1,470,602.53
United Kingdom .....	120	133,341.00	2,991,056.00
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>600</b>	<b>666,705.00</b>	<b>14,955,280.00</b>

\* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Application satellitesREPORT<sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur*

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## APPENDIX

Written Question 178 put by Mr. Valleix and reply of the Council

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.  
2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Warren (Chairman); MM. Valleix, Lenzner (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaenssens, Bernini, Bouilloche, Cavaliere, Cornelissen, Hawkins, Konings, Lewis, Mart, Müller, Péronnet, Dr.

*Phipps, MM. Pinto, Schwencke (Alternate: Scheffler), Talon (Alternate: La Combe), Treu, Ueberhorst, Van Waterschoot.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on application satellites**

The Assembly,

Welcoming the Council's statement that Europe needs to develop and apply overall aeronautical, space and energy policies and that European industry's capacity and technical level should be maintained ;

Considering that the ESA convention was signed on 30th May 1975 but that of the original ten members of the former ESRO only the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland have ratified it ;

Regretting the unwillingness of several member countries' governments to adopt and finance an extended overall communications satellite programme as well as the Ariane launcher programme ;

Aware of the need to enable the European aerospace industry to supply a satisfactory share of satellite systems intended for European countries, international organisations and domestic and regional systems in third world countries ;

Noting the lack of a long-range European meteorological satellite programme and an earth resources programme apart from ESA's earthnet programme ;

Considering that, although some member countries support their military forces, or realise the need to do so, through military application satellites, there are no plans for a proper European programme to terminate Europe's total dependence on United States satellites in spite of the fact that many European satellites are, technically speaking, on a par with American satellites ;

Considering further that the European aerospace industry should be given a fair share of orders for military application satellites from NATO countries and the Alliance as a whole,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

I. Urge the governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to accelerate ratification of the ESA convention and address a similar request to the Spanish Government ;

II. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate steps to assure a substantive European presence in the exploitation of space and in particular :

- (a) to adopt a three-year ceiling for compulsory expenditure ;
- (b) to adopt and finance an extended overall communications satellite programme ;
- (c) to decide on the production of a first series of five Ariane launchers ;
- (d) to make sure that Europe will be associated with future development of the United States space transport system as it has been associated with its present development in financing the spacelab ;
- (e) to ensure the pursuit and development of European activities in earth observation including meteorology and remote sensing by satellites ;
- (f) to promote the Europeanisation of the French project Spot (*satellite probatoire d'observation de la terre*) ;
- (g) to offer European industry a fair share of NATO orders for military application satellites,

with a view to further strengthening Europe's industrial potential in aerospace matters and, in the light of the early prospect of world markets being opened, thus promoting Europe's position in application satellites which is of major importance for employment in this industry.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur)

### **Introduction**

1. In its reply of 25th November 1977 to Recommendation 300 on scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council, the WEU Council of Ministers stated that it shared the Assembly's view that Europe needed to develop and apply overall aeronautical, space and energy policies and that the European industry's capacity and technical level should be maintained.

2. In 1977, the Council of the European Space Agency met at ministerial level on 14th and 15th February and at delegate level every two or three months, the last meeting being from 12th to 14th December.

3. The ministerial meeting was devoted to reviewing the agency's programmes and preparing its new activities. The Council adopted some declarations and resolutions which had to be implemented by precise commitments taken in the course of the year. However, the Council was unable to decide on three of the most important points on its agenda, i.e. the production of a series of five Ariane launchers, the extension of a European regional communications satellite system and, thirdly, the agency's ceiling of compulsory expenditure for its general and science activities for the next three years and consequently a firm breakdown of general and scientific expenditure in 1978. The specialised activities have their own budgetary appropriations which have already been approved.

4. As was pointed out in the report by Mr. Lenzer<sup>1</sup>, a definite decision on the production phase of the Ariane launcher was essential if operational launches were to take place in 1981.

5. Failure to reach decisions on the extended telecommunications satellite system is the more serious since a European communications satellite organisation called Interim Eutelsat has been set up by the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT). CEPT has to decide whether to rent part of the European communications satellite system, for instance, for relaying Eurovision television programmes; however, this project has had to be postponed and the European post office authorities will also have to hold in abeyance any final decisions on the commercial use of the satellite network. Further studies of a heavy telecommunications satellite platform might also have to be postponed.

6. Notwithstanding numerous meetings during the months which had elapsed since the Ministerial Council's meeting on 15th February 1977, no overall space policy has yet been formulated.

7. A positive decision taken at the December Council meeting was the approval of credits for launching the European scientific satellite Geos-2 at the end of June 1978. This satellite will replace the Geos magnetospheric research satellite which failed to reach the required orbit in 1977.

8. Another important decision taken by the Council was on the spacelab utilisation programme for 12 million accounting units. A spacelab will be launched in December 1980 — a combined European-American mission with sixty European and fifteen American experiments; one Japanese experiment will also be included in the mission. The main purpose of the first spacelab flight will be to verify the performance of spacelab systems and sub-systems and to measure the environment surrounding the shuttle.

9. All in all the results of the ESA Council meetings in 1977 were not as substantial as was hoped.

10. ESA has still not started on definite future developments which are vital if Europe is to pierce the world market with proven application satellites.

### **I. General remarks on application satellites**

11. Addressing the Committee in Bonn on 4th November 1977, Mr. Haunschild, Secretary of State at the Federal German Ministry for Research and Technology, said that all the participating countries had a part in the European Space Agency's programme, depending on their specialisation. He considered the result of this co-operation satisfactory. A serious difficulty was that all ESA's major plans were now reaching a point at which heavy investment would be needed at the same time. This was one of the reasons why European development in the field of applications satellites was not problem-free. The 1977 meetings of the ESA Council had shown that the problems were political, commercial and technical.

12. Long-term planning on communications satellites had been inadequate as, on the one hand, the governments of the ESA member countries had not yet adopted the package deal in telecommunications and, on the other hand, the competence of the European space industry was not yet sufficiently recognised to permit direct fruitful contacts with future users of European communications satellites. To prepare a market for European application satellites ESA had to convince future buyers of the quality of its pro-

1. Document 736, paragraph 33.

ducts, which it had not been able to do as its programmes were not yet advanced enough to show results, the only exception being the successful but experimental Franco-German Symphonie satellite.

**(i) Orbital test satellite (OTS) programme**

13. European point-to-point satellite communications activities began in 1971 with the evaluation of a European regional system. The development of an orbital test programme was started in 1972 based on needs defined in consultation with the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations and the European Broadcasting Union. The orbital test satellite was to be a forerunner of future European communications satellites. It was to demonstrate the performance and reliability in orbit of its equipment and provide experimental communications systems including telephone circuits and television channels. Originally it was thought that it would be used for relatively simple transmission tests but it was subsequently decided that it should be used for full-scale routing of telephone and television traffic. Finally, experiments relating to new applications were also included in the orbital test programme. It is ESA's task to investigate possible new uses of communications satellites and this programme provides the opportunity to assess the feasibility of proposals by means of practical experiments.

14. The OTS will be used for experiments requiring large earth stations with antennas of fifteen to nineteen metres in diameter of the type needed by post office administrations for the European communications satellite system. One large station is ready for service and three more are under construction. The other types of experiments require small stations of which thirty-three are under construction or have already been completed. The total cost of this infrastructure is 40 million accounting units<sup>1</sup>. This is roughly half the cost of the main development contract of the orbital test satellites. If the postal administrations increase their interest in such means of communication additional large investments will have to be made.

15. The first orbital test satellite should have been launched on 14th September 1977 by the American Thor-Delta rocket type 3914. It was destroyed shortly after launching, thus leading to the loss of the first European satellite of this type, which induced Mr. Valleix to put Written Question 178<sup>2</sup> to the Council on 15th September 1977. The Council replied<sup>2</sup> on 14th December 1977 that the OTS failure would not entail any

great financial loss for ESA and that a repeat launching was scheduled for the end of April 1978.

**(ii) Communications satellite programme**

16. An overall communications satellite programme based on the extension of existing programmes is composed of four elements: the extension of the Marots programme, proposed by the United Kingdom in 1973 and since increased to two experimental maritime orbital satellites; a European regional communications satellite system, capable of relaying either telephony or television signals as well as specialised communications services, data and telex transmissions; a programme for the development of a heavy platform with a payload primarily devoted to the development of direct television broadcasting, a satellite of 900 kg; an advanced systems and technology programme, which is in fact a research and development programme preparing the next stage in space application technology. The cost of the overall communications satellite programme is estimated at 280 million accounting units (\$308 million) at 1977 prices.

17. The general objective of the European space effort in the field of satellite communications is to meet European domestic requirements with systems supplied by European industry and to enable European industry to supply a satisfactory share of systems intended for international organisations such as Intelsat and for the regional and domestic systems of third world countries which constitute a market in full expansion.

18. This overall communications satellite programme interested all ESA member countries. All indicated their willingness to participate in some or all elements but it is still subject to further discussion as for instance Germany did not underwrite the declaration of intent. It was of the opinion that future users and the aerospace industry should now come to the fore and that ESA's rôle should be restricted to the research and development phase. Contributions to the programme have not therefore been definitely defined, nor has the industrial breakdown of work been calculated since this depends on the financial contributions of the States concerned. The Director-General of ESA is to take appropriate measures with the States wishing to participate in the various elements of the overall communications satellite programme.

19. Several international and national telecommunications systems exist, the most important being Intelsat in which some hundred countries participate to the tune of some \$750 million in investments. Nine satellites are operational: five over the Atlantic, two over the Pacific and two over the Indian Ocean, but only six are in actual use, the other three being held in reserve. The annual growth in Intelsat communications is some 15-18 %.

1. One accounting unit on 1st January 1978 = US\$ 1.1.

2. The full text of the question and reply is given at Appendix.

20. National communications satellite systems exist in the United States where private carriers such as Western Union, RCA and AT&T have or are planning to use their own communications satellites. This movement started in 1974 and will continue to develop. Nearly all the fifty States of America are now covered by communications satellites. In Canada a national communications system began in 1972 with the Anik system of Telesat Canada.

21. In Indonesia, the Palapa system, based on the American-Canadian system, is operational. The first operation was in 1976.

22. The Soviet Union has the Molnya system which has also used geostationary satellites since 1975.

23. The Indian Government plans to have the Indian national satellite system operational by the early 1980s.

24. Simultaneously, twenty Arab countries are planning to start their Arabcom satellite system.

25. Other countries planning to have such a system are Brazil, China, Australia, the Philippines, Argentina, Chile, Zaire, Nigeria, the Scandinavian countries and the member countries of the Andean Pact.

26. In Europe the earliest communications satellite was the Franco-German *Symphonie* satellite, the first one of which was launched in 1974 and the second in August 1975. These satellites are used for experimental communications links between Europe and Africa, within India, Iran and Indonesia and between France and its overseas departments.

27. In August 1977, Italy launched the *Sirio* satellite (*Satellite Italiano Ricerca Industriale Orientata*) the main purpose of which is to study the characteristics of certain types of signals in communications between Europe and the United States in bad weather conditions. The experimental satellite is run by Telespazio; postal authorities from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Finland and Italy are participating in this study.

28. In December 1975, the Nordic Council of Ministers of the Scandinavian countries, consisting of the Ministers of Education and Culture, instigated a study of the technical, administrative, political, legal and financial aspects of direct inter-Nordic broadcasting via satellite. This study concluded that a total Nordic programme supply via satellite would be possible by the beginning of 1980. For receiving programmes from a direct transmission satellite a field receiver would be needed to supplement the present television aerials and receivers. Mass production of such receivers at low prices would be possible by 1980. The satellites would be placed in a geostationary orbit which as is known is about 35,000 km above

the equator. The purpose would be to strengthen Scandinavian cultural unity and increase freedom of choice for viewers who would gain access to programmes from neighbouring countries. The second goal would be to afford Scandinavian emigrants an opportunity of viewing their home programmes.

29. During the symposium organised by ESA and the European Broadcasting Union in Dublin in May 1977, an economical survey of a broadcasting satellite and a comparison with terrestrial television systems was made by Mr. Terzani, Chairman of the EBU Technical Committee. He came to the conclusion that, except for countries of limited geographical area, a ground-based television network is much more expensive than a satellite television system. It will not be possible to confirm this view before the 1980s when experimental and later operational satellites will have replaced or will be integrated in the existing ground network and meet the same standards.

### (iii) *Meteosat programme*

30. The *Meteosat* programme is ESA's first meteorological satellite programme and represents the agency's entry into the field of earth observation. This programme started in 1972 and in 1973 the design and development of the *Meteosat* system was placed in the hands of the European industry, and especially *Aérospatiale*. It acquires data on the earth's atmosphere for weather forecasting. The programme is integrated into a world-wide meteorological programme of the World Meteorological Organisation, a specialised agency of the United Nations, which will employ at least five geostationary satellites — two from the United States, one from Europe, one from the Soviet Union and one from Japan. These satellites, placed at equal distances around the globe, will transmit cloud cover images to ground stations and then, after processing by the main station, will relay them to the users.

31. Meteorological data collected from platforms, buoys, or in the case of *Meteosat* from satellites on low polar orbits, are also being relayed. The system is an important element of the world weather watch and of the global atmospheric research programme. For the future the respective rôles of geostationary and low orbit weather satellites in a global system must be examined, as must the possible rôle of specialised modular low-cost satellites in space-to-space links with geostationary satellites and the possibility of developing a common platform for meteorological and remote sensing satellites.

32. The first meteorological satellite was launched by a NASA Thor-Delta rocket on 23rd November 1977. In early 1977 the programme board approved the launch of the second meteorological satellite by the Ariane launcher in May 1980. Images are taken every thirty minutes by

optical and by infrared means and transferred to the European control centre, ESOC, in Darmstadt. The satellite will be declared fully operational in mid-1978 which will mean the start of a European programme using geostationary satellites for the benefit of meteorology and related disciplines.

33. To date the member States of ESA have not been able to agree on a long-range European meteorological satellite programme which would be based on a combination of geostationary and low altitude missions. The data acquired and transmitted by Meteosat and other spacecraft making up the global network would be available to meteorologists, oceanographers, hydrologists and other earth scientists and would thus contribute to significant improvement in weather forecasting. The system's most obvious and spectacular potential is that of saving human lives and limiting property damage by early warning of hurricanes or severe storms, but in fact it will also benefit agriculture, fishing, and all weather- and climate-related industries. The meteorological information concerns wind fields, sea surface temperatures, cloud cover, cloud-top altitude, radiative exchange balances and measurements of the water vapour content of the upper troposphere.

#### (iv) Earth resources programme

34. Remote sensing techniques and especially remote sensing by satellite increase our knowledge of the earth's resources, the environment and man's action on both of them. They permit a better global management of our natural resources. All analyses from experimental projects in this field indicate that remote sensing from space is potentially of exceptional economic and political importance.

35. ESA is therefore deeply interested in the establishment of a European network to receive, reprocess, store and distribute data from remote sensing satellites. It has set up a European network called Earthnet to provide European users with data from NASA's remote sensing satellites in the earth resources observation system. This system could be of great interest for offshore oil and gas exploration and development, shipping, fishing, maritime safety and in general for further study of such satellites in operational systems.

36. Earthnet is considered a necessary activity preparatory to the definition of a coherent remote sensing programme of European origin. NASA has launched or will launch several satellites called Landsat, Nimbus and Seasat. The main objective of Earthnet is to provide European users with access to NASA data. Experience thus gained will enable European users to define their requirements for future remote sensing satellite programmes.

37. The first two elements of Earthnet are: (i) integration into the new network of existing data reception and system reprocessing facilities at Fucino, near Rome, run by the Italian firm Tele-spazio, with which ESA has concluded an agreement in order to integrate this station into the European earth resources network; (ii) use of ESA's computerised data centre at Frascati, near Rome.

38. ESA has also concluded an agreement with the Swedish space corporation for the establishment of a station which is now being built at Kiruna for receiving data from the NASA satellites.

39. Within the framework of earth resources detection satellites, your Rapporteur wishes to mention the French project Spot (*satellite probatoire d'observation de la terre*). This satellite of some 700 kg will be launched at the end of 1983 or the beginning of 1984 by the Ariane launcher. Its mission will be to detect resources and observe French territory and developing countries where France has an interest in mining and other operations, and finally global observation in order to give the French Government an instrument for its political and economic strategy at world level. The satellite will be equipped with two main optical systems in order to acquire the necessary images. This decision on its equipment was one of the reasons why the other ESA countries were not willing to include this French project in the general ESA framework. Germany especially was of the opinion that infrared instruments should be used in addition to optical ones. The French were reluctant about this since optical instruments exist and infrared scanning apparatus is still in the development stage. Another difficulty was the fact that a satellite of this type can easily be converted into a military reconnaissance satellite which is preferably equipped with optical instruments.

40. In the absence of a positive decision by the ESA Council, the CNES (*Centre national d'études spatiales*) has taken up contact with NASA and an agreement has been concluded by which the future French satellite would use the same type of images as NASA's Landsat D. It is to be hoped that a European programme will finally emerge from this national activity following the terms of the ESA convention under which national programmes are to be Europeanised progressively to the greatest possible extent.

## II. Military application satellites

41. Both the United States and the Soviet Union maintain space programmes with major emphasis on the support of military operations. The support by space systems is related to both tactical and strategic forces. The main purpose is to achieve an improved military capability. The



United States authorities believe that it is difficult to make numerical comparisons between the United States and Soviet expenditure but the resources which the Soviets allocated to their military space programme over the past years are much larger than is the case in the United States.

42. On 24th January 1978, one of the most spectacular accidents of the space age occurred. A five-ton Soviet surveillance satellite with an atomic power plant aboard burnt up in the atmosphere over the remote reaches of Canada's North-West territories. The Soviet satellite was probably an ocean surveillance satellite using radar to locate United States naval vessels in all the major oceans of the world. Of sixteen satellites of this type launched by the Soviet Union, this is the first time such an accident has occurred; the Soviet Union has had satellites of this type in space for six years. There are always two on patrol at the same time.

43. As can be seen from this example, the main military interest in space is the global nature of space systems. They are far cheaper than any other means of communication and space technology, like all advanced technology, has spin-off in many fields. At the same time many people were made aware of an aspect of space flight that had hitherto escaped them: the danger of nuclear fallout from damaged vehicles. The proper place for taking it up might be in the United Nations Committee on the peaceful use of outer space which has now been responsible for four international agreements on different aspects of the use of space from liability for damage to the registration of objects launched. It will not be easy to reach agreement, not least because of the sensitivity that the Soviet Union is bound to show over satellites for military use. The United Nations Committee has to decide whether it wants to continue to run the risks revealed by this incident<sup>1</sup>. After discussing this paragraph the Committee expressed the view that the United Nations Committee should take appropriate action as quickly as possible.

#### **(i) Navstar global positioning system**

44. One of the most important present-day developments is the Navstar global positioning system which makes it possible for the military commands using satellites to have direct communication with the smallest units through mobile terminals which consist of square black boxes which can be carried in jeeps, other vehicles, planes and ships. A capability for accurate all-weather positioning and navigation could also prove useful to the civil community. This new system could have a revolutionary impact on both strategic and tactical warfare. The system is expected to achieve full operational status in the mid-1980s. The naval navigation satellite system

(Transit) will continue as a major system for providing position-fixing information to strategic submarine forces until the Navstar global positioning system becomes operational.

#### **(ii) Communications satellite systems**

45. Communications satellite systems have been established by several NATO countries but the most elaborate is that of the United States which acquired these systems for three fundamental reasons: (a) communications, command and control of nuclear forces for which such a system is a military necessity; (b) liaison between major bases overseas, command centres, large naval ships, and advanced airborne command posts in the framework of the military command control system; (c) beyond-the-horizon communications with and amongst ships in the framework of the fleet communications system. The changing global communications needs of the United States Defence Department can best be served by satellite communications which allow great capacity and flexibility in their geographic coverage. Significant progress has also been made towards establishing the United States-USSR direct communications link via communications satellites.

46. The United States started its defence satellite communications system in the beginning of the 1960s with its initial defence satellite communications project. Tactical communications satellites — the Lincoln experimental satellites — were then built. The NATO satellite system has been based on this system. New types of satellites are now being built by TRW and General Electric.

47. The Skynet system of communications satellites was built for the British forces.

48. With its Cosmos series the Soviet Union already has more communications satellites in orbit for military than for civil purposes. More than one hundred and eighty of these satellites have been launched.

#### **(iii) Geodetic satellite programme**

49. The basic purpose of such a programme is to map the surface of the earth more accurately and, wherever necessary, to obtain accurate data and variations on the field of gravity. This is of great importance for guiding missiles.

#### **(iv) Early warning satellites**

50. Both superpowers have early warning satellites which are operational in geostationary orbit and which can provide warning of launches of intercontinental or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

#### **(v) Meteorological satellites**

51. Several NATO countries have meteorological satellite programmes under the aegis of defence

1. See Documents 388 and 444.

departments providing special weather data of importance for military requirements which are often quite different from civilian requirements; they are a most important source of data for weather analysis required by the general staff. The relationship between military and civil meteorological satellite systems has been established everywhere and once the data have been declassified they are passed on to the civil institutes.

52. In the United States the defence meteorological satellite programme (DMSP) continues to provide high quality visual and infrared imagery and other specialised meteorological data to support military operations. The DMSP provides weather data for the entire earth four times a day using two satellites in polar orbit. One collects early morning and evening data and the other collects noon and midnight data. These weather data are stored aboard the satellites and later transmitted to Air Force Global Weather Central in Nebraska and the Fleet Numerical Weather Central in California. The imagery is also transmitted in real-time to transportable read-out stations at key locations world-wide to support tactical operations. During 1976, a new temperature sensor and other specialised meteorological sensors were developed. Satellite reliability and life have also been improved.

53. The Department of Defence continues to co-operate with NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in development of the Tiros-N domestic weather satellite.

#### **(vi) Ocean surveillance satellites**

54. In ocean surveillance special attention is being given to naval forces. The positions of fleets all over the world are now being monitored and it is considered that no surface ships can go undetected.

55. Space systems are providing increasing support for the forces and national security is becoming more and more dependent on military space programmes. There is no doubt that satellites, and in later years the space shuttle, will have an increasingly important rôle in the military field.

### **III. Spacelab**

56. The development of application satellites induced the Americans to seek a new system of transportation. With the orbiting of the first satellite it became clear that its operation and viability depended on the performance which could be expected of it. In 1965 the weight of the first Intelsat communications satellite was only 39 kg; in 1979 Intelsat V will weigh 975 kg. The weight increase is directly related to the thrust of the launcher.

57. If the space shuttle is operational by the beginning of the 1980s, the weight of the satellite might be even more than 2,300 kg and it is quite possible that with the space shuttle system and the possibilities of extra-vehicular activities satellites might be built of 3,000 to 10,000 kg and placed in geostationary orbit. A modular spacecraft could be assembled in the vicinity of the shuttle before it is sent into final orbit. The capability of building a communications satellite in a variety of pieces which can be assembled in the shuttle bay or outside in space is of great importance.

58. The Department of Defence maintained close liaison with NASA on the space shuttle programme during 1976. The space shuttle holds great promise for reducing the cost of future space operations and Department of Defence requirements have been incorporated in the shuttle design. A solid-fuelled interim upper stage was chosen by the air force because of its reliability, safety and lower cost for development and use with the shuttle. The interim upper stage will be used beginning in 1980 for Department of Defence and civil payloads from Kennedy Space Centre which require low-inclination or high-altitude orbits. The space shuttle launch and landing capability at Vandenberg Air Force Base will be ready for operational use in December 1982. A contract was awarded in July 1976 to define shuttle ground support systems at Vandenberg.

59. The space shuttle era is to begin some twenty-five years after the first space probe and the technological and operational experience since acquired is now being applied in developing the space shuttle. This vehicle will be the basic element in a space transportation system that will start a new era of routine operations in space. The primary mission for the space shuttle is the delivery of payloads to earth orbit and especially the placing of satellites in this orbit. The space shuttle also makes it possible to retrieve a satellite launched on a previous mission and return it to earth to be refurbished for a future mission.

60. The advantages of a shuttle launch are many. Its large bay, capable of housing two Intelsat V satellites or three satellites of the Anik type, has practically abolished the constraints of a normal launch missile. Also, the personnel on the shuttle can accurately control the spacecraft and the orbiter when it leaves the shuttle.

61. In the late 1980s, when shuttle launches have become normal practice and extra-vehicular activity has been developed it will be possible to orbit complex satellite systems in space. However, it must be realised that progress in this field as in many others will have to be gradual, but it may safely be predicted that large satellite complexes will be assembled in space and provide a system equivalent to six present satellites. Such a satel-

lite would be able to provide meteorological, earth resources, communications and broadcasting services. The system might replace many existing satellites thus relieving orbital congestion and using modularity techniques for economically viable repair in orbit. Such a development will of course be possible only if shuttle launches are successful. The first manned orbital flights are scheduled for 1979. The launch and the return flight will be at the Kennedy Space Centre.

62. An integrated equipment of the space shuttle is spacelab of which several configurations will be flown in the future. Spacelab will provide an extension of the ground-based laboratories with additional qualities such as a long-term gravity-free environment. The first spacelab will be provided by ESA which has instructed ERNO to develop and build the spacecraft. ERNO is a fully subsidiary company of the VFW-Fokker group which began its activities in June 1974. The memorandum of understanding signed by ESA and NASA in August 1973 covers the delivery to NASA of one spacelab engineering model and one flight unit. NASA has undertaken to buy additional spacelabs from Europe subject to certain conditions being met. The engineering model is scheduled for delivery in the second half of this year and the first flight unit one year later. The tasks so far envisaged for the research and application models are related to the following disciplines: astronomy, physics, earth observation, material science — manufacturing in space, technology and biology.

63. ERNO is especially concerned with experiments in the material sciences field such as crystal growth, pure metals and alloys, composite materials and fluid physics. One application might be the manufacture of high-purity vaccines.

64. In the field of earth observation, experiments will be made through remote earth sensing in meteorology, land use planning through mapping and charting, pollution control of either water or air pollution, the monitoring of water resources, as well as mineral resources. There will be a total of seventy-six experiments in the first spacelab mission. The great advantage of spacelab is the greatly increased weight and volume available for experimentation at relatively low cost.

65. The first mission will be in the second half of 1980. Spacelab may stay in orbit for a week to a month at a time and will be reusable.

66. The primary purpose of the first mission is to verify the performance of the spacelab systems and sub-systems and to measure the environment surrounding the shuttle. The second aim is to obtain valuable scientific applications and technological data and to demonstrate the capability of spacelab for space research. Spacelab comprises two main units: the actual module in which scientists can work under normal atmospheric conditions and the pallet which they may

enter in pressure suits only. The latter will mainly carry astronomical and earth observation instruments needing direct exposure to space and which will be controlled from inside the laboratory or the ground. The module accommodates the sub-systems required for operation, data acquisition devices, together with the equipment for these experiments which require a normal or special atmosphere.

67. If the spacelab experiment succeeds it will mark a new low-cost concept of space exploration and exploitation. A permanent relationship between Western Europe and the United States in the space field will then prove essential.

68. Europe will have invested some 500 million accounting units (\$550 million) in the space transportation system which will be the basis of all great space ventures by the year 2000. It is therefore logical and necessary that Europe should be intimately associated with the space transportation system and its further development from the very outset. Europe should avoid the situation which arose with the post-Apollo programme when political decisions were postponed for so long that European participation came too late. In order to take appropriate decisions in time a sufficient research and development programme should be established to provide the decision-making authorities with all the required data.

#### IV. Ariane launcher

69. Although not coming directly within the framework of his report, your Rapporteur nevertheless considers it useful to mention the problems concerning the Ariane launcher as they are significant for European space policy developments.

70. In July 1973, countries now members of ESA adopted the Ariane heavy launcher development programme in order to give Europe an independent launching capability for its own satellites. They also hoped that in the 1980s there would be a market for European satellites. Many studies have been undertaken to assess the size of the world satellite market and the general conclusion is that it will be worth \$10-12,000 million, the European share of which might be some 15 %.

71. The Ariane launch vehicle, designed in particular to place satellites of up to 970 kg in geostationary orbit, will be operational at the end of 1980. The four development launches in the qualification programme are scheduled for June and December 1979 and May and October 1980. Aérospatiale is the design leader and responsible for assembling the launch vehicle.

72. Ariane will be launched from the Guiana space centre at Kourou. The operational launches, five or six of which are presently planned, should take place between 1981 and 1983. The cost of the production will be 185 million accounting units most of which will be borne by Ariane users. It

is therefore indispensable to guarantee a loan for financing this operation if the six operational launchers are to be built. Most of the ESA countries which have participated in the development programme recognise the need to pre-finance this operation. Nevertheless, the German Delegation has refused to contribute to the pre-financing although it accepts the idea of using Ariane for ESA's programme and its promotion on the world market. The ESA convention requires the elaboration of a European space policy which is not limited to the agency's programmes but covers also objectives in space matters which the member States think useful.

73. The convention also provides for an industrial policy at European level in order to allow for the necessary specialisation and access to external markets through better competitiveness. Here of course lies the origin of the difficulty as several member countries of ESA would agree to subsidise the Ariane launcher in order to com-

pete effectively with the NASA launch services. NASA is required by law to recuperate the full cost of its launch services from foreign countries. Unless your Rapporteur is mistaken, a NASA launch would cost some \$30 million, whereas ESA is thinking in terms of \$20 million for its launch services. The situation will of course change when the shuttle becomes operational. It remains important for Europe to have its own launchers in order to be independent and, for the United States, competition in this field can only be called sound.

74. However this may be, a decision on the operational series of Ariane will have to be taken and arrangements will have to be made to pre-finance this series. If no decision can be reached a contradictory situation will arise in which the development of the launcher is agreed but its economic utilisation for European programmes jeopardised since it will not be promoted on the world market.

## APPENDIX

**Written Question 178<sup>1</sup>  
put by Mr. Valleix**

1. On 14th September 1977, the American Thor-Delta rocket carrying the European Space Agency's OTS satellite was destroyed a few seconds after launching, thus leading to the loss of the first European satellite of this type. Was this type of rocket also used for launching the European scientific satellite Geos on 20th April 1977 which failed to achieve the expected results ?
2. Why did the American authorities use a type of rocket which had not yet proved its reliability for this launching ? Why did the European authorities concerned agree to this choice ?
3. What is the Council's assessment of the financial, technical and commercial consequences of the failure on 14th September ? In particular, does it consider that the Marots programme can be carried out in the conditions planned ? Is it not urgent to review the terms of the contract with NASA, under which all the risks and costs are borne by the customer alone, i.e. ESA ?
4. Does the Council consider that co-operation between Europe and the United States in space matters has proved to be satisfactory enough to justify its being pursued ?

**Reply of the Council<sup>2</sup>**

1. Two different versions of the Delta vehicle produced by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation were used for launching the OTS and the Geos : type 3914 for the OTS, type 2914 for the Geos. The difference between the 3914 and the 2914 lies in the former's greater booster strength on the periphery of the first stage. There were different reasons for the two abortive launchings.
2. The choice of the TD-3914 for the OTS was made not by NASA but by the European Space Organisation. Because its capacity was greater than that of the TD-2914 it was possible to give the OTS a larger volume, which in turn meant that the satellite could be designed, *inter alia*, to meet probable world market requirements more adequately. It cannot be asserted that the reliability of the 3914 had not been proved. The only distinction between the 2914 and the 3914 is that the latter has Castor IV boosters which have been used successfully for many years as the second stage of the American Scout launcher vehicle. The 2914 itself is, on the statistical average, one of the most reliable launchers. Thus it was easy to calculate the reliability of the combination 2914 plus Castor IV boosters. The OTS launching was the third using the 3914, both previous ones having been successful.
3. The OTS failure will not entail any appreciable direct financial loss for ESA because the launching was underwritten and the project included a reserve model. A repeat launching is scheduled for the end of April 1978. The delay will of course have certain negative psychological effects on the users of a subsequent operational system and, possibly, economic consequences as well for the industries concerned aiming to sell such systems on the world market.  
  
Furthermore, all users of space are exposed to the risk of failure, as the case of Intelsat shows. It is not felt that the Marots programme will be seriously impaired.
4. Leaving aside the failure of the American launcher systems, co-operation between Europe and the United States of America has so far been good. Moreover, NASA's meticulous investigation of the causes shows that it is endeavouring to make improvements which will also benefit its European customers.

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1. Transmitted to the Council on 15th September 1977.

2. Communicated to the Assembly on 19th December 1977.

***Replies of the Council to Recommendations 307 to 311***

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**RECOMMENDATION 307 <sup>1</sup>**

***on the application of the final act of the CSCE <sup>2</sup>***

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The Assembly,

Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki together with earlier treaties between eastern and western countries opened the way for a process which ought to lead towards international peace, freedom of peoples and the fulfilment of human rights ;

Considering that the development of this process will inevitably be by successive steps ;

Considering that jointly-planned developments must be achieved by all ;

Considering that further steps towards détente at the Belgrade meeting and in other negotiations, particularly in the field of arms control and mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe, are essential for the pursuit of the process of détente ;

Considering that such a stage cannot be completed unless all the participants are firmly determined to achieve positive results,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Continue to examine the conduct of the Belgrade meeting in parallel with governments and relevant European and Atlantic organisations ;
2. As a priority, endeavour to promote the process of détente through arms control agreements with a view to improving understanding and co-operation between all the signatory States and affirming human rights and fundamental freedoms ;
3. Ensure that all signatory countries apply the provisions of the Helsinki final act, recognising that a reminder of the need to respect all the provisions of the final act in full does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the signatory States.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (9th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Segre on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 753).

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**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
***to Recommendation 307***

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1. The Council have repeatedly reviewed the conduct of the Belgrade meeting.
2. The Council attach great importance to the furthering of the process of détente. The affirmation of human rights and fundamental freedoms is of primary significance for the improvement of understanding and co-operation between all the signatory states. Member governments approached the Belgrade meeting with the hope that it would be possible to achieve a better implementation of all the provisions of the final act and that concrete measures to this effect would be adopted. Although this goal was not realised the meeting was not without value. It was one more stage in the long process of détente. It is to be hoped that the conference in Madrid in 1980 will inject a new momentum into that process.
3. It was the Belgrade meeting's main objective to discuss the thorough implementation of the provisions of the final act by signatory countries. The sixth principle does not exclude dealing with topics which touch upon the international obligations or responsibilities of states. A reminder of the need to respect all the provisions of the final act in full cannot be considered as an intervention in internal affairs because the participating states, by adopting them, have accepted that there should be a thorough exchange of views on their implementation.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978.

RECOMMENDATION 308<sup>1</sup>*on communications and crisis management in the Alliance*<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

Stressing that the Alliance's first purpose of preventing and deterring war, without prejudice to its vital interests, requires a system of crisis management to ensure that the Alliance and its members, acting in concert, take timely measures to prevent a crisis developing or to defend its interests ;

Calling for measures of crisis prevention to be strengthened and increased ;

Welcoming the development of the crisis management system centred on NATO headquarters and believing the loyal participation of all countries of the Alliance to be essential ;

Calling on the member governments never to shirk the burden of responsibility for the timely implementation of readiness measures whenever warning time is available,

## RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member governments :

1. To promote crisis prevention measures designed to improve stability and increase warning time of any real threat :
  - (a) in the CSCE negotiations by calling for the confidence-building measures agreed at Helsinki to be strengthened and augmented ;
  - (b) in the MBFR negotiations, by calling for progress to be made on NATO proposals for the reduction of forces and for associated measures ;
  - (c) by ensuring that the arms control negotiations in which members of WEU could participate cover all categories of weapons (including the so-called grey-area weapons) which have an immediate impact on European security ;
2. To seek to improve arrangements for NATO crisis management :
  - (a) by calling on all NATO countries to participate fully :
    - (i) in the early completion of the NATO Integrated Communications System ;
    - (ii) at an appropriate high official and, from time to time, at political level, with all relevant government departments, in crisis management exercises based on likely and realistic scenarios ;
    - (iii) in the provision and evaluation of information, and in consultation, on a world-wide immediate and continuous basis, covering any events that may involve allied interests with a view to developing a collectively-agreed assessment of a crisis situation ;
    - (iv) in subsequent crisis management decisions as often as may be necessary, including the implementation of diplomatic and economic measures ;
    - (v) in assigning more elements of existing national forces to the NATO mobile, standing and on-call forces to provide a greater range of deterrent options in periods of tension ;
    - (vi) in ensuring that full use is made of military warning time by making timely preparation through the implementation of the agreed alert measures ;
  - (b) by calling on the North Atlantic Council to establish an ad hoc group to review and make recommendations for the improvement of the existing NATO crisis management machinery and procedures ;
  - (c) by calling on the North Atlantic Council to study the possibility of establishing a permanent teleprinter link between NATO headquarters and the Government of the Soviet Union and of designating an authorised NATO spokesman to use the link on appropriate occasions.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Watkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 757).



**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 308**

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1. The Council welcome Recommendation 308. Like the Assembly, the Council recognise that the continuing increase in the strength of Warsaw Pact forces during recent years has, *inter alia*, focused allied attention on the need for adequate warning time and a more stable military balance. The Council endorse the call to improve arrangements for crisis management and for full participation by the member countries concerned.

2. In particular, the need for confidence-building measures to be strengthened and augmented is recognised by member countries of the Atlantic Alliance who have put forward a constructive and even-handed package of proposals to improve the implementation of the final act's confidence-building measures at the meeting in Belgrade.

Before extending current negotiations to cover all categories of weapons, WEU nations would need to assure themselves that their involvement in such negotiations would indeed offer the prospect of redressing the force imbalance and of improving stability. Members of WEU would also need to give very careful consideration to the many complex issues involved.

3. The Council have taken note of all the proposals for improving the existing NATO crisis management machinery and procedures, and will accordingly forward the text of the recommendation and this reply to the NATO authorities.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978.

**RECOMMENDATION 309 <sup>1</sup>**

***on WEU's contribution to the development of European union <sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

Considering that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty contains a binding commitment to automatic military assistance ;

Convinced that application of this provision, as of Article VIII, calls for close and continuing consultations between its signatories on external policy and defence questions ;

Further convinced that only full application of the treaty can maintain mutual confidence, which gives full deterrent value to Article V ;

Considering that neither the North Atlantic Council nor, in present circumstances, the political consultations organised between members of the EEC are able to replace entirely the consultations provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly under Article VIII ;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty has introduced a new ethical dimension into relations between signatory States ;

Considering that the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee by the Council on 31st May 1976 should make a substantial contribution to :

(a) paving the way towards a harmonisation of armaments with a view to protecting the production capability of industries which are essential for maintaining employment and safeguarding the independence of member countries ;

(b) preparing a joint policy for member countries in respect of sales of arms, which might lead to disarmament ;

Deploing the fact that in practice the Council fails to take adequate account of these considerations ;

Convinced that a future European union can be based only on treaties and institutions associating member countries,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Examine to what extent the modified Brussels Treaty is really applied by organisations other than WEU ;
2. Implement Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty whenever the international situation so requires, i.e. consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or to economic stability ;
3. Examine the implications of Article V for all member States, with the aim *inter alia* of harmonising strategic concepts and strengthening procedure for consultation ;
4. In the context of the search for universal, progressive and controlled disarmament, consider how WEU can contribute to the establishment of lasting peace ;
5. Ensure that the task given to the Standing Armaments Committee is pursued promptly and efficiently and is extended to cover the sale of arms with a view to making meaningful progress towards general and complete disarmament ;
6. Meet the wish regularly expressed by the Assembly to hold a true dialogue on the various aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Forni on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 756).

## REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>

### to Recommendation 309

The Council have very carefully considered Recommendation 309 and the accompanying explanatory memorandum.

Before dealing with the various points in the main body of the recommendation, the Council feel they cannot leave unanswered certain passages of the preamble and explanatory memorandum which seem to imply that the Assembly has doubts as to the Council's willingness to apply the whole of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Indeed, in this preamble, the Assembly refers to certain features of the treaty, in particular those which arise out of Articles V and VIII and then deplores the fact that "in practice the Council fails to take adequate account of these considerations".

Likewise, in paragraph 16 of the explanatory memorandum, it is stated that "the WEU Council as it now operates does not appear to be taking its tasks seriously". Further on, in paragraphs 55 and 56 dealing with relations between the Council and the Assembly, it is stated *inter alia* that the work of the Assembly is hindered first and foremost by "the fact that its partner, the Council, is constantly evading its responsibilities, carefully providing only a strict minimum of information, etc."

The Council wish to point out that the member governments of WEU share the Assembly's convictions regarding the need to uphold and apply the modified Brussels Treaty and that they therefore feel the Assembly's concern is unjustified.

Nor do the Council agree with the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the recommendation, according to which neither political co-operation between the Nine, nor consultations within the North Atlantic Council can constitute the consultations provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Indeed, they find that the consultations which take place within these bodies are complete and thorough and have sufficient continuity to make it unnecessary, in present circumstances, to repeat such contacts in the more limited framework of WEU. Nevertheless, the provisions of Article VIII remain in force. The Council can be called upon by one of their members to consult on any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or endanger economic stability.

As regards the automatic implementation of Article V, the Council stated recently, as is indeed mentioned in the rest of the explanatory memorandum, that there could be no doubt as to the binding character of this provision. The Council are fully aware of the consequences of this fact.

The peaceful aims of Western European Union are expressed in the preamble to the treaty. Measures taken by the member governments towards disarmament, particularly within the United Nations, follow naturally from these aims. The Council consider that in this context, the member governments are pursuing policies which correspond to the wish expressed by the Assembly.

The sole purpose of the study at present being carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee is to describe the economic and legal position of armaments industries in member countries. It is not required to include any political assessments or conclusions leading to the regulation of the sale of arms. Hence there is no connection between this study and action by the member states in the field of disarmament.

The Council make every effort to have as thorough-going and fruitful a dialogue as possible with the Assembly. At the present time, various requests made recently by the Assembly have been or are being complied with. On 3rd November 1977 at the General Affairs Committee and on 28th November, at the plenary session of the Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office announced that the Council would try to have more regular contacts with the Assembly. On those same occasions, the Chairman-in-Office promised the Assembly detailed information on the tasks handed down to the SAC. This information has been transmitted.

Finally, mention should be made of the efforts both of the Council as such and of the governments of the member states to provide the Assembly with the information it calls for.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978.

**RECOMMENDATION 310<sup>1</sup>**  
***on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems<sup>2</sup>***

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The Assembly,

Considering that nuclear energy is a fact of international life which will provide a high percentage of the world's electricity by the end of the century, that several other energy options might eventually be available and that decisions regarding nuclear energy should take account of the major concern to avoid further proliferation of nuclear weapons capability ;

Aware that at present the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna exercises safeguard and control measures only with regard to certain specific nuclear equipment and material imported under bilateral agreements, and nuclear material in or under the control of non-nuclear weapon parties to the non-proliferation treaty ;

Welcoming the agreement reached by the fifteen nuclear exporting countries in London in September 1977 to prevent further sales of nuclear material, equipment and technology without adequate safeguards and controls ;

Stressing the need to avoid any form of safeguard and control measures which would undermine the existing non-proliferation treaty, which guarantees countries non-discriminatory access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

**Urge member governments :**

1. To promote world-wide co-operation in monitoring all the various activities in the field of nuclear energy ;
2. To make full use of diplomatic channels in order to strengthen world-wide international safeguards and controls, increase the responsibilities of the IAEA and establish multinational nuclear fuel centres ;
3. To concert their policies with other supplying countries to make the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries dependent on the latter's acceptance of full IAEA safeguards on all nuclear installations and materials on their territory or under their control ;
4. To give impetus to the development and international application of procedures and stringent measures to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, in storage or in transit, from terrorist seizure or diversion.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 760).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
***to Recommendation 310***

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1. The member governments of the Council have already acted to promote co-operation between supplier countries for the purpose of safeguarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy by appropriate controls.

The guidelines which were adopted by the fifteen countries composing the London group, and were communicated to the IAEA on 11th January, provide that this Agency shall control the peaceful use of all sensitive exports to non-nuclear weapon states.

2. The IAEA is the controlling body for the peaceful use of nuclear materials. Its responsibilities are set out in its statute and it was also empowered under the terms of the NPT to control all the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. The Board of Governors of this Agency, on which a number of member states are represented, is the appropriate body to improve the terms of these controls, in compliance with the agreements concluded by the Agency, e.g. the IAEA/Euratom agreement.

The subject of multinational centres for the nuclear fuel cycle industry, with which the IAEA has already been concerned for a number of years, will be considered by the experts taking part in the INFCE study.

3. Those members of the Council who participated in the London meetings did find common ground for their policies on civil nuclear assistance to third countries. The result of this action is made clear in the guidelines referred to above, which contain no ban on nuclear exports to states which have not made all nuclear installations and materials on their territory or under their control subject to IAEA control.

The Council believe that, while taking account of the London guidelines, it is the responsibility of each state to define its own export policy and express the hope that the guidelines referred to above will receive wide international support.

4. Measures to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, in storage or in transit, from illicit use by individuals are police measures for the implementation of which each state is responsible within its own territory. Whilst there is an agreement on the level of physical protection necessary (London guidelines), the details and implementation of this protection are the exclusive responsibility of the sovereign states.

Studies on the various measures possible are also carried out within the IAEA; they include, in particular, consideration of a draft international agreement for the physical protection of nuclear materials during transfer.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978.

**RECOMMENDATION 311 <sup>1</sup>*****on progress in aerospace <sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

Considering its original aim of promoting a European aircraft industry to be ambitious in present circumstances but essential if the industry is to survive ;

Believing that the present national concentrations and nationalisations in Europe's airframe industries have not strengthened Europe's position vis-à-vis the United States aircraft manufacturing industries ;

Aware of the vast differences between the airframe industries in the various countries of the Common Market and considering that in the military field only those of the United Kingdom and France are economically, commercially and politically comparable since both countries have :

- (a) a large military production ;
- (b) a wide military export market ;
- (c) a comparable approach on several matters relating to defence policy ;
- (d) well-established helicopter and aero-engine industries ;

but aware also of the will of all member countries to widen their share of the civil market for medium-range aircraft at world level ;

Noting with regret that apart from some common research, development and finance activities the governments of member countries will not :

- (a) agree on a common aeronautical policy ;
- (b) promote a unified civil and military aircraft manufacturing and user market ;
- (c) set up a European military aircraft procurement agency ;
- (d) form a European aeronautical council ;

Convinced however of the need to sustain a European aircraft industry, but recognising that this calls for solidarity between participating industries and governments which are now omnipresent in elaborating aeronautical policy ;

Underlining that output for military purposes, which partly offsets a low level of civil production, involves a permanent risk since military orders depend largely on political factors,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Urge all member governments :

1. To establish a long-term relationship between their national airframe industries — alternating design leadership — in order to promote families of aircraft based for example on the Airbus and aircraft equipped with CFM-56 engines ;
2. To agree on a form of specialisation and rationalisation based on these types of medium-range aircraft ;
3. To open discussions on a permanent relationship for the construction of military aircraft and helicopters ;
4. To examine the advisability or otherwise and the possibility of a concerted military aircraft export policy to countries considered acceptable by WEU member countries and to seek this concertation in the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee ;
5. To seek a co-ordinated approach with a view to collaboration with American aircraft manufacturers on long-range civil aircraft.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1977 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 755).

## REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>

### *to Recommendation 311*

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1. The Council recognise that the competitiveness of the European aircraft industry needs to be increased by long-term co-operation between European airframe manufacturers. They start from the assumption that the governments will do all they can to ensure that the on-going negotiations between European airframe industries will soon produce a satisfactory result.

Whilst appreciating the primary responsibility of the industry for organisation and programme implementation, the Council deem it important that within the framework of a common industrial organisational structure design leadership should, where possible, be delegated with due regard to the potential of all countries, without the introduction of strict rules.

The Airbus has developed into a major programme of integration for long-term co-operation. The development within "Airbus Industrie" of a commercially promising European aircraft family should be a priority objective, especially as more recent market trends also give rise to optimism.

The Council would point out in this connection that, proceeding on the basis of the Airbus A-300, several countries are at present jointly defining the new B-10 project and preliminary studies are in progress for an aircraft with 130-160 seats which will have, initially, two CFM-56 engines.

2. The Council share the view that new European civil aviation programmes cannot become competitive without specialisation and rationalisation.

Governments should support plans to be prepared by the industry for burden-sharing in the case of new programmes making allowance for economic requirements.

3. The Council agree that there should be close and permanent consultation between the European states with a view to finding European solutions for the development of military aircraft and helicopters. Possibilities of co-operation in these fields are being intensively studied, both at government level and within the framework of the independent European programme group, including co-operation on a European helicopter. In this connection governments start from the assumption that there is adequate European demand for the independent development of helicopters and military aircraft provided the states concerned can agree on types of aircraft and can commit themselves to purchases which would guarantee an adequate market for co-operative programmes. The Council are aware of the importance of these programmes to the aircraft and space industry in Europe and the strengthening of European competitiveness in relation to the United States of America.

4. The EPG has set up a working group on armaments exports. Thus matters concerning a concerted military aircraft export policy will be studied by that group and there would appear to be no need to envisage a study of the same subject by the SAC.

5. The Council are of the opinion that the establishment of long-term co-operation between the European aircraft industries should be combined with a co-ordinated approach vis-à-vis non-European manufacturers.

European partnership for an extended Airbus programme does not rule out a dialogue with American manufacturers. Co-operation with these manufacturers could be envisaged in the long term, and the industry should therefore determine the category of aircraft which should have priority in the negotiations; but, in order to offer potential American partners a counterbalance, Europe needs first of all consolidated co-operation among its own manufacturers.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1978.

***Political activities of the Council —  
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council  
and the future of the WEU Assembly***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mrs. von Bothmer (Alternate : *Schwencke*) (Chairman) ; *Sir John Rodgers*, Mr. Sarti (Alternate : *Treu*) (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Abens*, *Ariosto*, *Beith*, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bizet, Brugnion, Cermolacce, Faulds (Alternate : *McGuire*), Gessner (Alternate : *Vohrer*), Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van

den Heuvel-de Blank (Alternate : *Voogd*), MM. Mangelschots, *Mende*, Minnocci, (Alternate : *Calamandrei*), Mommersteeg, *Müller*, *Péridier*, Perin, *Portheime*, *Reddemann*, Segre, Urwin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*



***Draft Recommendation******on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Gratified that in the presentation of its annual report for 1977 the Council has in many respects reverted to the practice it followed prior to 1976 ;

Noting with satisfaction that the Council has met most of the commitments made on its behalf for improving its relations with the Assembly ;

Regretting that there is still much ambiguity about the nature of the “informal meeting” with the General Affairs Committee in November 1977 ;

Noting that in several respects the Council falls far short of giving the Assembly sufficient information on the political aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by member countries ;

Recalling that the Council's responsibilities are defined in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Examine regularly, at whatever level it may be meeting, the questions connected with the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by other organisations ;
2. Provide more extensive information on consultations between member countries on matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
3. Organise a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee during the second half of 1978 ;
4. Improve participation by Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member countries in plenary sessions of the Assembly.

***Draft Order***  
***on the appointment of members of the WEU Assembly***

The Assembly,

Considering that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty confers a very heavy burden on parliamentarians already exercising duties in their national parliaments ;

Noting that the future election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage will lead parliaments of member countries to re-examine their participation in the European parliamentary assemblies ;

Considering it desirable for the largest possible number of parliamentarians interested in defence matters to take part in the activities of the WEU Assembly ;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty as a whole forms an irreplaceable basis for any European security and defence policy ;

Considering it highly desirable for work to be shared out between the European parliamentary assemblies on the basis of the responsibilities conferred on them by treaty or by statute,

REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY

To ask the authorities concerned to ensure that in the future an appropriate number of parliamentarians interested in defence matters can be appointed to the delegations of WEU member countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

**Explanatory Memorandum**  
(submitted by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur)

**Introduction**

1. Your Rapporteur has been asked to deal with two quite separate questions :

- (i) the political activities of the WEU Council in 1977 and its relations with the Assembly ;
- (ii) the decision taken by the Committee on 4th November to examine, in the present report, the appointment of members of the Assembly.

2. It was seen at the meeting of the General Affairs Committee in Paris on 27th February 1978 that it would be difficult to embrace both these matters in a single recommendation, particularly since the examination of the second question is liable to stretch beyond the June 1978 session during which the Assembly has to reply to the Council's report on its activities in 1977. Consequently, your Rapporteur has separated the question of the Council's political activities from matters relating to the appointment of members of the Assembly.

3. Where the annual report proper is concerned, your Rapporteur must first underline that although the Assembly finds it far from satisfactory, it is a definite improvement on the report on the Council's activities in 1976 and meets fairly adequately a number of grievances expressed to the Council in this respect.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

**I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly**

**1. Chapter I of the report**

4. Relations between the Council and the Assembly certainly improved considerably in 1977 thanks to the Council's efforts to which tribute should be paid. There can be no doubt that the new Secretary-General, Mr. Longerstaey, was very largely responsible for this, but the governments should also be congratulated for having in several respects acceded to the requests made by the Assembly, *inter alia* at the joint meeting between the General Affairs Committee and the Council held in Bonn in November 1977.

5. First and foremost, special mention should be made of the position adopted by the Council on an essential question, as set out in paragraph

3 of Chapter I A of the annual report, where the Council confirms that it considers the Assembly to be "the only parliamentary body concerned with both the security and unity of Europe" and "the only European assembly responsible for defence questions". In these words the Council in fact confirms the view constantly expressed by the Assembly that the Assembly of Western European Union is destined to handle the defence aspects of the European Community. This deserves particular emphasis in view of steps being taken by the European Parliament which tend to create ambiguity about the respective responsibilities of the European parliamentary assemblies in that its aim seems to be to extend its activities to fields which are clearly the responsibility of WEU.

6. This responsibility is also confirmed by the Council in paragraph 2 of Chapter I B, which recalls that :

"In their reply to Recommendation 299, the Council said that, when answering recommendations, they would continue to take account of work in progress in other international organisations to which the member states of WEU belong and would ensure that the information given to the Assembly was as accurate as possible."

Here too it is evident that the Council is formally acceding to a request frequently made by the Assembly.

7. But the Council's concessions to the Assembly do not stop short with these two points. They also concern budgetary matters, as underlined in section C of Chapter I. They relate to the information given on the co-ordination of work between the IEPG and the SAC and their extent should therefore be emphasised.

8. It should be added that in paragraph 4 of Chapter I A the Council indicates that it "appreciated the satisfaction expressed by the Assembly, at its June session, concerning replies of special interest to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions". If your Rapporteur understands diplomatic language correctly, the Council thus recognises that it has noted the discontent voiced by the General Affairs Committee last year in its reply to the annual report and he hastens to add that the Council appears to have taken account of this discontent.

9. The Council has a grievance to make in paragraph 2 of Chapter I A of the annual report. Referring to reports by Assembly Committees,

the Council says "they regret, however, that some of these reports were very late in arriving". This is a warning to the Assembly which seems perfectly justified in view of Article V (d) of the Charter of the Assembly, which specifies that :

"The Clerk shall communicate the reports mentioned in paragraph (b) above, together with the necessary documentation relating to the detailed subjects with which they deal, to all representatives at least six weeks before the opening of the session at which they are to be considered."

Since the Council receives Assembly reports at the same time as representatives, following the adoption of these reports by the Committees, the Council is entitled to complain that too many reports are late in being sent. In a few cases, this delay may be perfectly justified when current events force Committees to postpone consideration of certain reports, and there may also be justification when political difficulties prevent reports being adopted on the date planned. But Assembly Committees should make a serious effort to conform to the Charter and adopt the reports they are to submit within the prescribed time limits.

10. This said, it would be desirable for the Council, in drafting its report, not to go beyond its purview and freedom to express its opinion. When, referring to its meetings with the Presidential Committee at the close of its ministerial meetings, the Council states that "this arrangement has given satisfaction to both sides" it is clearly impinging upon the freedom of judgment of members of the Presidential Committee. Your Rapporteur can attest that some of them are far from sharing the views expressed by the Council.

11. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to point out that although the Council appreciated the interest shown by the Assembly in speeches made by Ministers at its sessions, this appreciation should be shown in the more frequent presence of those members of governments most qualified to address the WEU Assembly. It is highly regrettable that the Assembly has not yet had an opportunity of hearing in plenary session either the present Ministers of Defence or the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, or Italy.

## 2. Joint meetings

12. The joint meeting held in Bonn on 3rd November did little to clear up the ambiguities underlined by your Rapporteur in the reply to the annual report of the Council for 1976, nor did it meet the requirement for a real dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. The meeting was indeed an informal one, but even so the Committee's request that several Ministers be

present was not met : the only two participants of ministerial rank were Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, of the United Kingdom. Mrs. Hamm-Brücher chaired the meeting with considerable understanding and authority, thanks to which the meeting was particularly pleasant and cordial.

13. The situation was spoilt, however, by the fact that several countries were not represented by their Ambassadors in London, i.e. by those who normally attend meetings of the Permanent Council, since some of them had commitments in London on the date fixed for the joint meeting ; they were represented by lower-ranking officials, although Italy's Ambassador in Bonn attended.

14. It is evident that the rank of these representatives or the fact that they had never attended a meeting of the WEU Council did not prepare them for taking an active part in such a meeting. Moreover, it is to be feared from this composition of the Council that the governments, despite their soothing statements, will, in future, pay far less attention to the activities of WEU.

15. Hence there is some doubt about the value of the replies given to the Committee by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, who chaired the meeting in the name of the Council, or by those she asked to speak. It may in fact be wondered to what extent Mrs. Hamm-Brücher or Mr. van Well really replied on behalf of the Council.

16. To the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, Mr. van Well, Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, had never attended a meeting of the WEU Council, yet it was he who replied most often and in most detail to the questions put by parliamentarians. Was he able to answer on behalf of the WEU Council or did his opinions represent only those of the German Government ? It is difficult to know but it may be wondered whether the views he advanced, on disarmament for instance, would have secured the unanimous assent of the Council and in particular whether the French Government would have endorsed them.

17. Referring to this meeting during the eighth sitting at the second part of the twenty-third session of the Assembly on 29th November 1977, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher merely spoke of an "informal meeting in Bonn", which seems to indicate that she was not quite clear whether it was a joint meeting with the Council or merely a meeting with the Government of the Federal Republic such as the General Affairs Committee has often held in the past with representatives of governments of all the member countries. Moreover, when referring to this meeting, the

annual report uses the same particularly ambiguous words.

18. If therefore the Federal Government is to be thanked and congratulated for the part it played in this informal meeting and for the interesting remarks made outside the framework of the meeting by Mr. Genscher, Federal Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher and Mr. van Well at the meeting itself, the Committee must ask the Council with particular emphasis to explain what it means by an informal meeting, i.e. how far the remarks made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council express the unanimous opinion of the WEU member countries. If this is not so it is impossible to speak of a joint meeting with the Council since the latter, apart from the few cases specified in the modified Brussels Treaty, can only act unanimously.

19. In any event, the Committee will be able to judge how far the Council feels bound by the remarks made at such a meeting by the manner in which the four promises made there in its name are carried into effect. These promises were :

- (i) that joint meetings between the Council and the General Affairs Committee would be held annually (a promise made by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher herself) ;
- (ii) that the Assembly would be given detailed written information on the division of work on European armaments co-operation between the European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee — a promise made by Mr. Plantey, Assistant Secretary-General of WEU, Head of the International Secretariat of the SAC, at the joint meeting and confirmed by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher in her address to the Assembly on 29th November. The Council kept this promise in February 1978, for which it is to be thanked ;
- (iii) that the Assembly would be allowed greater freedom to manage its budget, a promise which was repeated, though admittedly with some reservations, by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher on 29th November ;
- (iv) that the utmost would be done to meet the Assembly's wishes by reverting to practice followed prior to the 1976 report when preparing the Council's annual report (a promise made by Mr. Longerstaey, Secretary-General of WEU). This constituted the reply which the Council had not felt able to give in writing to the reply of the General Affairs Committee to the annual report for 1976. In fact, the 1977 report largely meets this promise.

20. The Committee has been able to note that the Council has fulfilled at least some of these undertakings. But it would also be desirable for the General Affairs Committee to ask for a joint meeting to be held during the second half of 1978. Such a meeting would allow the dialogue which the Chairman-in-Office of the Council had to interrupt prematurely in Bonn, for reasons quite unconnected with WEU, to be resumed, extended to include matters which could not be tackled last November, pursued further in regard to matters of more particular concern to WEU and its work and, finally, it would test the promise made by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher. The Chairman-in-Office will then probably be an Italian Minister, which would mean meeting in Rome.

### 3. Questions put in national parliaments

21. In his reply to the Council's report for 1976, your Rapporteur pointed out that the governments appeared to have agreed to adopt restrictive practices in replying to questions put in national parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly. In 1977, this spread to at least one other country, the United Kingdom. Conversely, the Italian Government appears to have continued replying correctly to questions put by Italian parliamentarians, and the French and Belgian Governments, which in 1976 were extremely reticent in their replies, proved far more co-operative in 1977.

22. Replying to questions put by Mr. Reid on Recommendations 299, 301, 302, 304 and 305, Mr. Judd, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom and former member of the General Affairs Committee, gave the same reply to all the questions :

"Recommendations of the Assembly of Western European Union are addressed to the Permanent Council who consider them and forward replies to the Assembly. A reply to the recommendation to which the hon. Gentleman refers will be put before the Assembly when it meets in Paris at the end of this month. The United Kingdom will have a shared responsibility for this reply and I am sorry therefore that I cannot make any advance statement."

23. On the other hand, Mr. Vanden Boeynants, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, replying to a question put by Mr. De-jardin on strategic mobility, Mr. Bourges, French Minister of Defence, replying to a question put by Mr. Debré on Recommendation 309, Mr. Lattanzio, then Italian Minister of Defence, replying to a question put by your Rapporteur on Recommendation 290, and Mr. Lattanzio, now Minister of Transport, replying to questions put by Mr. Minnocci on Recommendations 293 and 296, made no attempt to use the pretext that these

questions had been or were to be considered by the WEU Council but gave replies which were often clear, specific and detailed in their respective parliaments.

24. The Council's reply to Recommendation 298 could obviously not be considered at all satisfactory by the Assembly since it left the governments free to reply or not, according to the time or the case, to questions put to them by parliamentarians in their own countries on matters relating to recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly.

25. One solution naturally comes to mind : quite simply to put the same questions with no specific reference to WEU Assembly recommendations. Your Rapporteur feels that no government would be able to decide which of the written questions put by their parliamentarians related to matters also raised in recommendations of the WEU Assembly. Your Rapporteur might therefore advise members of the Assembly to put their questions, simply omitting to refer to Assembly recommendations.

26. However, there is no real justification for a government refusing to reply to a question on the pretext that it corresponds to a subject dealt with by the WEU Council when that government would reply to the same question in other circumstances. Your Rapporteur therefore asks the Council to revert to earlier practice and not insist on defending a position which he considers pointless. The Council has no way of preventing parliamentarians putting any questions they wish to their governments.

## II. Activities of the Council

27. The chapter of the report on the Council's political activities may be considered from two standpoints. From the formal standpoint, it shows that the Council is clearly anxious to meet the wishes expressed by the Committee last year, although basically no marked change can be discerned in its action. Thus, in its presentation the Council has in many respects reverted to practice followed before 1977 in accordance with the Committee's request and as promised by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher at the joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee. For instance, the number of meetings of the working group is again included in the report, together with several other details, of little importance in themselves but which as a whole allow the Council to give the Assembly an effective account of its work.

28. There is also a definition of the Assembly's responsibilities which seems satisfactory and contrasts with the definition of the Council's responsibilities set out in the annual report on the Council's activities in 1976. Your Rapporteur wishes to emphasise the importance of this defini-

tion, which corresponds to the view which the Assembly has always held of its responsibilities. However, it must be recalled that Article IX of the Brussels Treaty, which embodies the Assembly's responsibilities, is meaningless without Article VIII which enacts the Council's responsibilities. This means that its responsibilities and activities must remain parallel with those which it concedes to the Assembly.

29. Yet the Council's report is far from adequate on matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty in organisations other than WEU which are quite obviously the most important and most numerous of all, and it is necessary to recall the undertakings in this sense entered into on several occasions by the Council, which appear to be only very partially respected.

30. Thus, as usual the annual report for 1977 devotes considerable space to East-West relations which are discussed at the Council's ministerial meetings. There is a list of bilateral contacts, as was the case until 1976 but not in 1977. However, it would be desirable for the Council not merely to list its bilateral relations but to inform the Assembly of their content, insofar as this is not secret of course. Otherwise, what is the meaning of such a list? That the Council has confined itself to noting intergovernmental East-West contacts, or that it has examined the matters dealt with during these contacts but has not bothered to inform the Assembly about them?

31. Where multilateral relations are concerned, the information supplied by the Council on developments leading from the Helsinki conference to the Belgrade conference demonstrates the concerns which are common to the WEU member countries and the measures they have taken in the framework of WEU or in other organisations to work out a joint policy in this field. This is in fact the only really interesting paragraph in the chapter on the Council's political activities. It might provide a model for drafting this whole chapter in future years.

32. Note will also be taken of the paragraphs on WEU's relations with Greece, Turkey and Spain. While the General Affairs Committee took a favourable view of Greece and Turkey joining WEU, it must be noted that the Council still approaches this question in terms connected with the decision of 7th May 1955 which leaves the agreements or arrangements established in the framework of the SAC open to participation by non-member countries of WEU. One may wonder what is the significance of these words. Have Greece and Turkey shown no interest in acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty or does the Council not consider this possibility desirable? It would be useful for the Assembly to know the Council's views on this matter and particularly important at a time when relations between Greece on the one hand, Turkey on the other

and the EEC are developing and when there is a likelihood of Greece acceding to the EEC in the near future.

33. The Council is even more vague about relations with Spain. In this connection, it refers only to "relations of WEU member countries with Spain", which it considers should be developed. Does this mean that Spain's attitude towards WEU is different from that of Greece and Turkey or that the Council's attitude towards Spain is not the same as towards Greece and Turkey? Why does it not even consider this country taking part in the agreements or arrangements established in the framework of the SAC? In view of the magnitude of its industry and defence effort, Spain, henceforth resolutely turned towards democracy, would be a most important partner in a policy of European co-operation in armaments matters. Your Rapporteur suggests that the Assembly turn its thoughts to this matter in coming months.

34. Members of the Assembly will learn little from the section of the Council's annual report on the situation in the Middle East, but they will note that the Council did not think fit to reintroduce, in its report for 1977, the paragraph on relations with the United States which was a regular feature in previous reports. Here, the Council has failed to give the Assembly satisfaction in its wish that it revert to former practice.

35. From all these remarks it emerges that there has been a real improvement in the annual report, i.e. in the Council's presentation of its activities to the Assembly, but that this improvement does not reflect a real improvement in the Council's activities. It still seems that the Council takes refuge behind other organisations in order not to fulfil its obligations under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Council has often said that it was glad to see the Assembly play an active and dynamic rôle in its consideration of all matters raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly for its part would wish the Council to act in like manner, not by encroaching upon the work of other organisations, but by examining, for each one of them, to what extent these activities contribute to the application of the treaty.

36. In fact, despite an evident desire to meet the Assembly's wishes, the Council's attitude continues to be a passive and routine one and it acts only insofar as the Assembly rouses it from its apathy. It may be wondered whether this reflects a deliberate decision by the governments. The very positive and encouraging remarks made by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher at the joint meeting in Bonn would imply that this is not so. Similarly, the attitude adopted by the new Secretary-General in relations between the Council and the Assembly and the initiatives he has taken give grounds for

believing that the Council's passiveness cannot be attributed to him either.

37. Has not the Council rather been guided in this unfortunate direction by the Permanent Council and its members, who now form the WEU Council apart from the brief annual ministerial meeting? It may be assumed that the governments expect those who represent them on the WEU Council to have a more active and positive concept of the treaty and of the rôle of the organisation. This at least is what might be inferred from remarks made by Ministers to Assembly bodies.

38. Your Rapporteur can but emphasise what the Assembly has already proclaimed on many occasions, i.e. that all efforts to improve relations between the Council and the Assembly will be in vain if the Council is not determined, of its own accord, to tackle the application of the modified Brussels Treaty more dynamically than heretofore.

## CHAPTER II

### APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE WEU ASSEMBLY

39. According to Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty :

"The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe."

40. For a long time parliamentarians have been aware that having the same delegation to the Consultative (now Parliamentary) Assembly of the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly raised a number of difficulties, the main one being that parliamentarians who also have major commitments in their own countries have to take part in the work of two international assemblies which, in view of the number of sessions and committee meetings, means a considerable amount of travelling.

41. Consequently, thought has often been given to two separate delegations being formed, one for each assembly. The wish has sometimes been expressed that the parliamentarians elected to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage as from 1979 should constitute their countries' delegations to the WEU Assembly.

42. It should be noted, however, that if at least part of the delegations to the European Parliament is to be elected from among members of

national parliaments, as many seem to wish, those who would thus have a dual mandate would already have very heavy commitments and it is hard to see how they could also be members of the WEU Assembly, whose responsibilities are so very different from those of the European Parliament. The situation might of course be different if the European Communities were at some time given defence responsibilities, but such a prospect seems unlikely in the near future.

43. Further, in each of the WEU parliaments some members have specialised in the study of defence matters, but they are not always members of their country's delegation to the Council of Europe since the Parliamentary Assembly's responsibilities have absolutely nothing to do with defence matters. Moreover, since many of them are already members of the North Atlantic Assembly they have no reason to seek appointment to the Council of Europe. Hence, the WEU Assembly, which deals first and foremost with defence matters, is deprived of the participation of several who would be best able to make a useful contribution to its work.

44. At its meeting on 4th November 1977, the General Affairs Committee, when considering Mr. Forni's report on WEU's contribution to the development of European union, decided to add the following paragraph to the draft recommendation urging the Council to :

"Give favourable consideration to the possibility of revising Article IX of the treaty so as to allow better participation by members of parliament in the work of the Assembly."

45. During the plenary session, Mr. Forni suggested to the Assembly that this paragraph be withdrawn, not because it did not meet his wishes but on the one hand because the explanatory memorandum which he had prepared did not refer to this matter which would be mentioned only in the recommendation, thus depriving it of much of its impact, and on the other hand because the Committee had agreed to ask a Rapporteur to study this matter for the June 1978 session. The Assembly should not therefore vote on it until a substantive report had been submitted to it by the General Affairs Committee.

46. For these reasons the Committee, at its meeting on 30th November 1977, instructed your Rapporteur to examine this matter.

47. In point of fact, the paragraph hastily included by the Committee in the draft recommendation in Mr. Forni's report raised difficult problems since it would imply a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly has always feared that the governments might apply the treaty insufficiently or not at all. Might the risk not be greater if it now asked for the treaty

to be revised which would, in any event, be a long-term undertaking?

48. The governments for their part have on several occasions — most recently on 29th November 1977 in Mrs. Hamm-Brücher's address — expressed their determination to maintain the commitments stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty. Although the treaty imposes considerable burdens or restrictions on the freedom of action of at least some of them, they all feel that the benefits which the WEU countries as a whole draw from it far surpass the burden of the responsibilities incumbent on each one.

49. But the problems raised by the modified Brussels Treaty are considerable and it is to be feared that to open negotiations for its revision might bring out such differences between governments or even within certain member countries that the Assembly would be taking a great risk in adopting this proposal because each State would then be tempted to abandon a treaty and organisation from which the whole of Europe benefits, in pursuit of immediate and often vaguely-defined interests. Your Rapporteur therefore feels it far more realistic to consider how far it is possible to arrange the representation of the various countries to the Assembly on the basis of present regulations and without affecting the treaty.

50. One possibility is offered by the vagueness of the texts, particularly as regards substitutes. Article 25 (c) of the Statute of the Council of Europe stipulates that :

"Each representative may have a substitute who may, in the absence of the representative, sit, speak and vote in his place. The provisions of paragraph (a) above apply to the appointment of substitutes."

[Paragraph (a) sets out the method of appointment of full representatives.]

But Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty does not mention substitutes. There are thus two possible courses :

51. (a) First, it might be arranged for substitutes of the delegations to the Council of Europe to be appointed with a view to their serving as representatives to the WEU Assembly and, conversely, the representatives to the Council of Europe would serve as substitutes in the WEU Assembly. This resolution would be based on the idea that the word "representative" used in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty is a global term covering all members of the delegations of the signatories to the treaty to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This interpretation seems particularly justified since the Brussels Treaty makes absolutely no mention of substitutes who are quite obviously assimilated to titular members.



52. Moreover, Article 25 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, which is referred to indirectly in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty since it defines the conditions for forming delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly, clearly states that the same provisions apply to representatives proper and to substitutes.

53. Moreover, this interpretation concords with regular practice in the Assembly which, except in cases specifically provided for in the Rules of Procedure, has always treated full members and substitutes in the same manner, particularly for the appointment of Rapporteurs, just as the national parliaments follow the same procedure for appointing their representations. It seems too difficult now to go back on practices which for more than twenty years have been generally accepted as being in conformity with the treaty.

54. The question therefore would be how to achieve this result. The fact that each country has its own procedure for appointing its delegation adds further complication, particularly as it is not for the Assembly to interfere in matters which are the sole responsibility of national authorities.

55. Your Rapporteur considers that the most reasonable step would be to draw the attention of member countries to the problem arising and to possible remedial measures. This should be done through the national delegations themselves since they are the natural and compulsory intermediary between the Assembly and the national parliaments. The Assembly's Presidential Committee was aware of this since it decided that the General Affairs Committee's decisions on this subject should be discussed in the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and the Presidential Committee before the next session. Insofar as these suggestions imply no change in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, it is perhaps not essential to consult the Committee on Rules of Procedure, but it is particularly important for the Presidential Committee to be consulted since it includes the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly from each of the delegations. In the circumstances, the Presidential Committee might co-opt the Chairmen of Delegations who are not also Vice-Presidents of the Assembly in order to examine how the delegations could bring this question to the attention of those responsible for their appointment. Your Rapporteur believes that only if an approach by the delegations fails to achieve the expected result should more formal steps be envisaged.

56. (b) Some members of the Assembly propose to interpret the two abovementioned texts — from the modified Brussels Treaty and the Statute of the Council of Europe — as applying only to representatives in the strict sense of the term and consider that the question of substitutes

is left open. This would allow governments or parliaments to be asked to appoint different substitutes for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and for the WEU Assembly.

57. Such a solution would have the advantage of allowing substitutes to be chosen from among parliamentarians having no other international commitments, thus enabling those who are particularly interested in the matters with which it deals to become members of the WEU Assembly.

58. However, your Rapporteur must admit that he finds such an interpretation of Article IX of the Brussels Treaty and Article 25 of the Statute of the Council of Europe extremely tendentious since for him it is clear that these texts assimilate substitutes and representatives proper under the global term of representatives. He believes the Assembly would have nothing to gain by interpreting an article of the Brussels Treaty in such a way when it is always asking the Council to apply the treaty loyally. Finally, he does not believe that the parliaments of member countries would be prepared to separate the appointment of substitutes from that of titular representatives.

59. Your Rapporteur therefore prefers the first proposal because he finds it the least questionable and closest to the letter and the spirit of the modified Brussels Treaty.

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60. At the meeting of the General Affairs Committee on 27th February 1978, there was a very lively and wide-ranging discussion on this chapter. Several Committee members felt that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty should be revised without delay. They considered that the coming election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage would lead to vast changes in the composition of delegations to the various European parliamentary assemblies and would provide a particularly suitable opportunity for cutting the link between the WEU Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

61. Some members even felt that it was with the deliberate intention of limiting the activities and responsibilities of WEU that the governments decided in 1954 that the Assembly should be composed of representatives of member countries to the Council of Europe so that they would not be tempted to spend too much time supervising the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

62. However, the members of the General Affairs Committee who proposed taking steps to revise the modified Brussels Treaty were adamant about limiting a revision to Article IX and not allowing

other articles of the treaty to be called in question. Some specified that they believed any step in this sense should depend on the seven member governments first being approached to ensure that they would all be prepared to subscribe to a revision strictly limited to Article IX.

63. Finally, with a view to effectively organising co-operation between the European assemblies, certain Committee members insisted that the WEU Assembly for its part should ensure that it kept strictly to the study of matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and not encroach on the responsibilities of other European assemblies. Such a limitation could but strengthen the positions of the Assembly in view of the recently-expressed claims by other European assemblies to handle questions relating to European co-operation in defence matters which

are quite evidently the strict responsibility of the WEU Assembly.

64. Personally, your Rapporteur is prepared to subscribe to the latter position. But he fears that it might be hardly realistic and most dangerous at the present juncture to refer publicly to a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty. Of the views of those in favour of such a revision he therefore included in the draft order which he proposed to the Committee only the proposal that more detailed enquiries be made among member governments to ensure that they would be prepared to consider a revision strictly limited to Article IX. If full guarantees could not be obtained, he considered it would be preferable to avoid taking any steps to revise the treaty. Finally, the Committee decided to remove any reference to a possible revision of the treaty.

19th June 1978

***Political activities of the Council —  
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council  
and the future of the WEU Assembly***

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**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Voogd***

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Leave out the operative text of the draft order and insert :

"To ask the authorities concerned to promote the appointment of an appropriate number of parliamentarians interested in defence matters to the delegations of WEU member countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe."

*Signed : Voogd*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment amended and agreed to).

***Political activities of the Council —  
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council  
and the future of the WEU Assembly***

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**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by Mr. Roper and others***

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In the draft order proper, leave out "the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe" and insert "its Assembly".

*Signed: Roper, Gessner, van den Bergh*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment withdrawn).

28th February 1978

***Division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee  
and the independent European programme group***

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**NOTE FROM THE COUNCIL**

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***Letter from Mr. E. Longerstaey, Secretary-General of WEU,  
to Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel, President of the Assembly***

23rd February 1978

Sir,

The Council has instructed me to send you the enclosed note, prepared at its request by the Head of the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, on the division of work between the SAC and the independent European programme group.

As you will recall, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council had agreed to have such a note prepared in reply to a request made at the meeting with the General Affairs Committee held in Bonn on 3rd November 1977.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) E. LONGERSTAEY

***Division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee  
and the independent European programme group***

In her address to the Assembly on 28th November 1977, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, referring to the joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee held in Bonn on 3rd November, stated that the Assembly would, as had been requested, be given details of the division of work between the SAC and the IEPG for the studies of European co-operation in the armaments field.

The Council circulate herewith a note on this subject.

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By a decision taken by the WEU Council of Ministers on 31st May 1976, the Standing Armaments Committee was instructed to prepare a detailed outline programme for a study of the situation in the armaments sector of industry in

the member countries, together with a description of a working method suitable for such a study.

In complying with this instruction, the SAC took account of the fact that a body bringing together all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance had been set up in February 1976 for the purpose of harmonising their armaments programmes (the independent European programme group). Consequently, in its proposals, the SAC pointed out that the IEPG intended to start work forthwith, by drafting a definition of the armaments sector of industry.

In the course of 1976, the IEPG set up a number of panels, each dealing with a specific subject. Panel III, under the chairmanship of the Federal Republic of Germany, is responsible for studying economic questions and procedures, with a view to working out guidelines for European co-operation in the field of armaments. This panel

has five sub-groups ; of these, No. 4, for which the pilot country is France, is to prepare a study on industrial co-operation and the rationalisation of the European defence industry, and will be able to use any available findings of studies now in progress in the SAC on the subject; and Sub-Group 5, which is headed by Italy, is beginning by collecting details of legislation, regulations and agreements relating to the export of armaments.

On 20th April 1977, after considering the detailed outline programme submitted by the SAC, the Council decided to authorise the Committee to proceed with the proposed study, with the reminder that governments were anxious to avoid any overlapping with the work of other bodies, particularly the IEPG. The Council therefore requested that the SAC should be kept sufficiently closely informed of progress of the work of the IEPG. These decisions were confirmed by the WEU Council of Ministers at their meeting in Strasbourg on 26th April.

In accordance with the principles so laid down for sharing the work between the two bodies, the SAC adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach, taking particular care to co-ordinate with Sub-Group 4 of Panel III of the IEPG. It was mainly this concern which led to modification of the programme and method originally worked out.

As a first stage, the SAC received from the IEPG a draft definition of armaments and the industrial sector which produces them. In order to make the list of equipments annexed to the document easier to use, the SAC made a few changes to the layout, which were incorporated in the final text by the IEPG. Thus, the two

bodies are now working on the basis of a common definition.

Noting subsequently that the IEPG had begun work on an economic survey of the armaments industries, the SAC decided to study the legal status of firms and domestic legislation as the next step in implementing its mandate. This study does not figure in the IEPG's plans, but could be of interest to it. This part of the final report is now being prepared.

With regard to the compilation of economic data, the SAC has decided to wait until the data produced by the questionnaire prepared by the IEPG for circulation to national industries are available, so that there will be no overlapping or omissions in current or planned activities. However, in order to minimise the delay resulting from this decision, the Committee is beginning at once to study this questionnaire in relation to its duties under its own mandate.

Thanks to information received from the Federal Republic of Germany and from France as pilot countries, the SAC remains in contact with Panel III of the IEPG and in particular with its Sub-Group 4. Furthermore, the reports adopted by the Committee are sent to the Chairman of the IEPG for information. In this way, the method and programme of work of the SAC ensure efficient liaison and work-sharing between the two bodies, which are kept regularly informed of the progress of each other's studies, on the understanding that the IEPG has priority in carrying out its own mandate.

Each of the governments of the member countries of WEU is, moreover, in a position to ensure that the work and results of all bodies on which they are represented do not conflict with each other.

***China and European security***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee <sup>2</sup>***  
***by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman) ; Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Abens, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate : Page), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bizet, Brugnon, Cermolacce, Faulds, Gessner, Gonella, Hanin

(Alternate : *Van Aal*), Mrs. van den Heuvel-de-Blank (Alternate : *Voogd*), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate : *Van Waterschoot*), *Mende*, Minnocci, Mommersteeg, *Müller*, *Péridier*, Perin, *Portheine*, *Reddemann*, Segre, *Urwin*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on China and European security***

The Assembly,

Noting China's continuing determination to safeguard its own security and ensure respect for its fully independent nationhood and its frontiers ;

Considering that total resistance to external aggression from any source is a fundamental element in Chinese political thinking as it is in Western Europe ;

Noting that the Chinese Government continues to express the wish to develop good relations with Europe, particularly in economic matters ;

Considering that China is now a significant factor in the maintenance of global peace and security,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Examine attentively the rôle China may play in regard to European and global security and study carefully the views expressed by the Chinese Government on matters relating to threats to international peace ;
2. Encourage member governments both to develop their bilateral trade relations with China and continue to concert their approach especially within the framework of the EEC with a view to increasing trade between Europe and China ;
3. Favourably consider China's requests for increased industrial technology.



## Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur)

### Introduction

1. Supposedly every country's basic attitudes in foreign policy are derived to a considerable extent from history and not just from pragmatism in regard to the current realities of any particular era. This is particularly true in the case of China, partly because of its centuries-long seclusion from the rest of the world arising from its geographical position and its natural topographical barriers that have so long cut it off from the main stream of developments in other parts of the world where no similar obstacles to access exist.

2. It was for this reason that Napoleon Bonaparte was reported to have said, when looking at the globe for fresh fields to conquer, "Ah, China — she is a sleeping giant — let her sleep; for when she wakes she will shake the world".

3. Fortunately or unfortunately, according to one's point of view, no one heeded his warning and the nineteenth century witnessed the pillage and exploitation of the sleeping giant from many quarters and in many different forms. For their part the western powers concentrated their energies not to any extent on direct colonisation through annexation, but rather by obtaining through duress privileged commercial positions and economic dominance along China's eastern seaboard. Technically, of course, Hong Kong and Macao are exceptions to this generalisation; but even these two territorial acquisitions were not really in pursuit of land, but to ensure privileged access to the hinterland for trading purposes.

4. France, of course, through its South-East Asian conquests cut across a Chinese historic concept of a special sphere of interest in that part of the world. Britain too in its delineation of India's northern frontier with Tibet, also regarded by China as part of its natural domain, caused resentment in Peking which has never fully abated: but is now vented on India, not Britain.

5. But it was of course along China's north and west frontiers that the only substantial direct annexation of huge areas of traditional Chinese suzerainty occurred at the hands of Tsarist Russia. The first example of such aggression, as seen through Chinese eyes, occurred in the seventeenth century, when tens of thousands of square miles of desolate Siberia, hitherto regarded by the Chinese as forming part of their empire, were transferred to Russia, as laid down in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk.

6. After that there was a long period of calm before the storms to come until in the nineteenth

century one act after another of further aggression and annexation took place, each one accepted reluctantly *de facto* by a crumbling Chinese dynasty powerless to call a halt, in the Treaties of Aigun, Tientsin, Peking and Livadia. All of these are still referred to now by Chinese as "unequal", to use their terminology — and hence invalid. Not unnaturally China's entry onto the world stage at that time, marked as it was chiefly by acts of exploitation or expropriation by foreign powers, led to a historic sense of seclusion from the rest of the world gradually changing into a frenetic but understandable xenophobia — a dislike of all foreigners. When Japan joined in the despoliation of the enfeebled empire, the sense of outrage by a people proud of the fact that they were civilised when most of the rest of the world was barbarian became even more marked, added to by feelings of frustration at their inability to resist materially stronger and better organised external forces, albeit often culturally inferior to themselves.

7. Fortunately for the West the Chinese — when redress is made — are a forgiving people and the exodus from South-East Asia firstly of France and later of the United States, the departure of the British from direct involvement in Indian affairs and the Japanese expulsion from Manchuria led to a general xenophobia, still apparent during the cultural revolution, soon waning in favour of a wary readiness to develop ties on a basis of real equality, later developing into growing cordiality with those countries, irrespective of ideological differences, with whom no conflict of interest exists. Even Hong Kong and Macao do not obstruct this trend since China is well aware firstly that the present form of government of these two enclaves presents no threat to it in any way; secondly, if and when it no longer suits its interest to accept their presence, their status can be altered almost at will.

8. In the case of the United States, American support of Taiwan remains of course a constant irritant but the Chinese are not only forgiving but are also very patient, and are well aware that it can only be a question of time before some accommodation is reached between the two Chinas with the mainland obviously emerging as the dominant factor in any such accommodation.

9. However, there is one great power, the USSR, where no attempt has been made by the Kremlin to erase deep and enduring resentment at what is still regarded at all ages and levels in China as continuing, unacceptable occupation of large parts of the old Chinese Empire.

10. These feelings were just as strong at the time of as before the first republican government

of China under Sun Yat-sen ; as they were under Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalists ; and as they are today under a communist government.

11. This fact is one that has to be faced and accepted as real by anyone who seeks to understand, let alone explain China's attitude towards its powerful neighbour, dominating both its northern and western flanks. When Mao Tse-tung first came to power he had no alternative other than temporarily to appear to abandon historic claims because he himself and his government, disliked by and estranged from the western world, had no other help on which to rely other than his ideologically affiliated neighbour ; but this period of friendship, enforced by then unavoidable realities, was soon eroded because China was not prepared to become just another Russian satellite as the Kremlin wished, along similar lines to Russia's enslaved East European neighbours. It was then that the Kremlin made its biggest mistake in thinking that cutting off supplies of technical, material help at a critical time in China's determination to become an industrialised nation in its own right would soon bring Peking to heel, especially because the Soviet rulers felt that the ties of a common ideology would prove stronger than national pride. Instead, as more subtle men would probably have realised, the opposite proved to be the case : and feelings of subdued, historic hostility about the past combined with a new sense of resentment about being let down by their then one and only ally. In the result, suspicion about the USSR's whole global strategy became an overriding feature in all Chinese thinking about international affairs.

12. So, as the Soviet Union has, irrespective of its relationship with China, continued to show more and more its imperialist intentions throughout the whole world — at least in Chinese eyes — these flames have been fanned ; and their sense of insecurity has increased as Peking has gained an impression that, temporarily at least, the western world including even the United States has lost the will to resist Russia's expansionist aims. Under these circumstances China is determined at all costs to look after itself rather than rely on anyone else. It is for this reason that, within the limit of its resources, wherever a new example of Russian expansionism occurs, Peking tries to put a spanner in the works, irrespective of what the reaction of other powers may be.

## CHAPTER I

### *Relations between China and the western powers*

13. Two factors are constantly intertwined in Peking's relations with the outside world : a national aspiration which aims at restoring China

on the same lines as before the nineteenth century "unequal peace treaties" and an ideological factor according to which countries with communist régimes should help to "free" nations with non-communist régimes. As long as the colonial system prevailed in Asia, China, with these two aims in parallel, gave priority to the fight against the West. Subsequently, relations between communist China and the United States and Western European countries were influenced on the one hand by the general trend in eastern Asia, particularly decolonisation, and on the other hand by the deterioration of relations between China and the Soviet Union. Whereas 1949 witnessed the start of a period of co-operation between the two great communist countries and ideological wars were still being fought in Indo-China and Malaysia, soon to be followed by Korea, relations between communist China and the West were then practically non-existent.

#### (i) 1949 to 1958

14. While the Eastern European countries immediately recognised the new régime set up in China, in Western Europe the United Kingdom did so on 6th January 1950, followed by the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. But the United States and other Atlantic Pact countries were discouraged from following their example by a number of attitudes adopted and actions taken contrary to the normal pattern of friendly relations between countries even of differing political outlooks, and of course, too, sympathy still felt for Chiang Kai-shek in the United States had its impact in Washington.

15. Relations between China and the West further deteriorated with the Korean war. Information now available indicates that the attack on 25th June 1950 which triggered off the Korean war was made on the sole initiative of the North Korean Government. The defeat of the North Koreans appears to have surprised the Chinese, who first hesitated about intervening, probably with thoughts in mind that the war might spread to their own territory, that their industry, which was still concentrated in Manchuria, might be dislocated if not destroyed, and that civil war might even break out again, spreading from Taiwan with American support.

16. Nevertheless, China had reason to fear that a permanent American and Japanese base might be set up on its north-eastern frontiers. To have done nothing might have demonstrated the weakness of the new régime and thus allowed the Soviet Union to gain a dominating position in eastern Asia since it alone might then have acted to save North Korea.

17. A solution was found : a Chinese military intervention involving the government as little as possible through the use of "volunteers", China at the same time indicating that its sole aim

was to revert to the situation prior to 25th June 1950. The first Chinese troops entered Korea on 16th October, and on 23rd June 1951 the Soviet Union proposed holding armistice negotiations which continued until 27th July 1953.

18. The Korean war was a milestone for China since, for the first time since the "unequal peace treaties", it showed its might outside its frontiers and held the world's leading military power at bay and even, through the fiction of a "United Nations", the whole world.

19. Nevertheless, this war interrupted a trend which would almost inevitably have brought Formosa back under Chinese domination because it caused an international security system to be set up in the Western Pacific with the conclusion of a peace treaty and a security pact between the United States and Japan on 8th September 1951. This resulted in the United States opposing all Chinese moves, guaranteeing the security of Formosa and also becoming involved in Vietnam, while at the same time preventing China from becoming a member of the United Nations until 1971.

20. The Geneva conference on Korea was terminated on 15th June 1954 without having brought about either the withdrawal of foreign forces or the country's reunification.

21. Yet, at the Geneva conference on Vietnam being held at the same time, China played a positive rôle in the re-establishment of peace. Peking appears to have feared the internationalisation of the Indo-Chinese war through American intervention in the area and the possibility of a number of new Asian states rallying to the western side. Indeed, the United States' policy of encouraging the formation of national states and seeking bilateral alliances or regional security pacts with such states meant that an anti-communist, anti-Chinese system might develop south of China which would form an effective barrier to revolutionary expansion for a long time to come.

22. The most striking Chinese diplomatic success was at the Bandung conference (18th-24th April 1955), where it was the only large power taking part. Chou En-lai embarked on a course of political neutrality and called for Asian solidarity against colonialism, the nuclear bomb and the United States.

23. However, since there were a number of bilateral problems between China and the United States, relations were established between the two countries through the intermediary of their respective ambassadors in Warsaw, starting on 1st August 1955. The ambassadors met seventy-three times in 1955, 1956 and 1957, but these talks never reached a higher level because of a continuing disagreement about Taiwan. China refused to comply with the United States' request

that it undertake not to resort to force in exchange for the withdrawal of United States' guarantees for Taiwan, insisting that the return of Taiwan is a domestic problem which could be settled only between the two Chinese parties and refusing to discuss the matter with an outside power.

#### (ii) 1958 to 1968

24. As from 1958, China's main aim appears to have been further to isolate the United States as a reactionary, imperialist, capitalist super-power, while Japan, Western Europe and Canada were considered to represent progressive capitalist countries. Discontent in Latin America and even the problem of coloured people in the United States were used as means of fighting the United States. But after 1963 disputes with the Soviet Union became more bitter and soon the two great powers were placed on an equal footing in terms of the distrust voiced by Peking.

25. The crisis in August 1958 caused by the bombing of the Quemoy and Matsu islands by communist forces provoked a warning by the United States and a Soviet intervention, probably to induce China to halt all military action. For the first time, Soviet-American collusion appeared in opposition to China. Hence at that time Mao Tse-tung denounced the paper tigers of imperialism and reaction, simultaneously condemning the Soviet Union for yielding to imperialism, devoid of real strength.

26. On 19th January 1960 the United States signed a military alliance treaty with Japan, leading to new accusations of arming Japan against China, denunciations of United States' nuclear tests and above all of a "two-China plot", aimed at considering Taiwan as a state in its own right.

27. China's attitude towards the Western European countries was more ambiguous since on the one hand it wished to discredit their system of government, their allegedly excessive dependence on the United States, their colonial past, and any signs of a neo-colonial presence; but on the other hand it did not wish to see a *Russian*-dominated Western Europe.

28. France remained an enemy as long as the Indo-Chinese war lasted, but the trend of French policy under General de Gaulle from 1962 onwards led, on 27th January 1964, to the announcement that diplomatic relations were being established between the two countries. The establishment of relations with France appeared to be and was a remarkable success for China but it did create an element of misunderstanding in the Atlantic world since the United States was opposed to it. In fact, the political positions of France and China were then very close on a number of points: refusal to sign a non-proliferation treaty, boycott of the Geneva talks on

the limitation of nuclear weapons, and, above all, common mistrust of twofold Soviet-American hegemony, which they rejected in the name of national independence.

29. Where West Germany was concerned, China initially denounced its rearmament. The German Government for its part refrained from taking any steps towards establishing diplomatic relations but considerably developed its trade with communist China.

(iii) 1968 to 1972

30. After the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party China's main fear continued to be the "twofold hegemony" of Soviet-American imperialist collusion. As long as the Vietnam war lasted, it considered danger from the United States as of first importance. However, during the summer of 1969 it became apparent that the United States had decided to withdraw its forces from South-East Asia. President Nixon's statements on 26th July and 3rd November 1969 showed his intention to restore Vietnam to the situation prevailing immediately after the 1954 agreements. This implied a consequential cut in Soviet military assistance to Hanoi and, it was expected, a corresponding reduction of political influence, so China could envisage becoming the only great power entitled through history and geography to influence Indo-Chinese affairs.

31. President Nixon's new policy allowed discussion of Sino-American differences to be started, particularly through the resumption of talks between ambassadors in Warsaw. Naturally, the ups and downs of the United States' policy of disengagement in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand led to further minor crises in its relations with China, but it steadily multiplied its gestures of goodwill towards China, including removal of trade restrictions and authorisation for American citizens to visit China. On 25th February 1971, President Nixon's message on the state of the union gave a prominent place to relations with China. Contacts with China, he said, should be extended, obstacles separating it from the United States abolished, and account taken of its legitimate national interests.

32. China's main desire was, and is, to prevent new spheres of influence being established in eastern Asia without its own participation. Chou En-lai therefore took advantage of the visit of a team of American table tennis players on 14th April 1971 to announce :

"A new page has been turned ; a new chapter has been started in relations between our two peoples ; your presence opens the door to exchanges of friendly visits between the two countries."

33. On 23rd April, Mr. Rogers, Secretary of State, said he hoped that this really was a new

chapter in relations between the two countries, and the United States lifted the embargo on certain strategic products. On 15th July, President Nixon announced on American television that he would visit China before May 1972 and revealed that Mr. Kissinger had just spent two days in Peking.

34. The essential obstacle to agreement was and remains the American "two-China theory", which held up all negotiations on China's membership of the United Nations ; but in October there was a large enough majority in the General Assembly for China to take the place so far occupied by Taiwan. Once China became a member, it found itself on the same side as the United States on a number of matters, particularly in regard to Indo-Pakistani disputes.

35. President Nixon visited China from 21st to 28th February 1972. The joint communiqué, while noting the existence of major differences between the two countries' foreign policies, recognised the principle of the political unity of China, of which Taiwan formed a part, and wished a peaceful settlement to be found to the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. China thus achieved one of the essential aims of its policy by obtaining recognition as a great power — *the* great power — in eastern Asia.

36. Meanwhile, better relations between China and Western Europe were also developing, interrupted, albeit only temporarily, by the cultural revolution, especially in regard to Hong Kong, the effects of which continued until the beginning of 1968, with strikes, local attacks and frontier incidents. The inevitable result was sharp Sino-British tensions in August 1967.

37. There have since been differences of emphasis in the growing closeness of ties with West European countries, but certainly communist China now adopts a consistently favourable attitude towards the European Community, to which it has accredited an ambassador. It considers the Community has a rôle to play in the potential resistance of European states to the Soviet Union. Similarly, for the same reasons it has shown increasingly strong and positive interest in NATO and all Europe's efforts at co-operation in defence matters.

(iv) 1972 to 1977

38. Thus better relations between China and the United States and Europe began to develop long before the death of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung and the change of administration in the United States. This process started when both sides realised that the Soviet Union was their only serious, aggressive, potential enemy.

39. Hence, while China and the United States have always retained some degree of caution towards each other, they have drawn considerably

closer due to their mutual distrust of the Soviet Union; and the same considerations apply to Sino-European relations.

40. From a political standpoint, China noted that as the United States abandoned Vietnam the Soviet Union sought to increase its pressure in Asia, either directly against China or, through an intermediary power, in Bangla-Desh or the Indo-Chinese peninsula. The United States reciprocated by seeking to strengthen China's rôle in the world.

41. From an economic standpoint, China appears to have reached a turning-point in about 1970. It still needs to build up production in certain industrial sectors (metallurgy, petrochemicals, electronics and aircraft among others) and effective external assistance would be most useful, allowing it to advance more quickly. Furthermore, its agricultural development seems to have reached a limit which cannot be easily exceeded without bringing in fertilisers and agricultural machinery from abroad. Hence China has sought and managed to increase its external trade to a point where it has improved faster than the gross national product. This is due *inter alia* to the Chinese Government applying a more flexible credit policy. In short, China has a demand for more sophisticated capital equipment in greater quantities.

42. From a military standpoint, China's problem has been to develop its defence capability without relying on procurement from the Soviet Union, which hitherto has been its only supplier. It therefore had to obtain more advanced equipment from the Americans and their allies, urging them to produce in China some of the equipment ordered so as to give China the necessary technical capability for modernising both its domestic industrial capacity and the equipment for its armed forces.

43. The question facing the United States has been how far it is worth strengthening a power which ultimately might become a threat. The negligible progress in détente and in the arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States appears to have made the United States Government opt in favour of strengthening China.

44. Nevertheless, anxious in the cause of détente to avoid appearing, in isolation, too unfriendly towards the Soviet Union, the United States has begun also to encourage its allies to develop trade relations with China in the military field, which it had hitherto opposed. The first such step was the \$200 million contract concluded between the People's Republic of China and Rolls-Royce for the British firm to fit out obsolescent Chinese air force MiG aircraft with jet engines similar to those equipping the British version of the Phantom F-4. The contract provided for the subsequent manufacture of these jet engines in

China, thus allowing China a means of developing a modern aircraft engine industry. The United States could have opposed this contract, but wisely did not do so.

45. France has sold helicopters to China and there have been talks between French and Chinese military headquarters with a view to the purchase of Mirage aircraft and AMX-30 tanks. China has also held negotiations with Japan for the purchase of military aircraft. Prospects have recently arisen of sales of British-built warships and the British Government has just announced its readiness and willingness to sell to China Harrier vertical take-off combat aircraft.

46. The new emphasis given to modernising and re-equipping its vast armed forces, so vast in human terms, seems bound to lead to a significant increase in co-operation to that end between China and the West, and there are continuing indications that this process is under way.

47. Such deals and prospective deals with the United States' allies have furthered Chinese as well as American interests. They have allowed Chinese leaders to avoid being accused of reliance only on the United States and thus further irritating the Soviet Union. For their part Americans may have seen these developments as a means of bringing pressure towards the attainment of a *real* détente to bear on the Soviet Union, especially so since in 1976 China announced that it wished to procure a number of weapons available only in the United States, e.g. anti-submarine warfare equipment, sophisticated anti-tank weapons and, above all, very large-capacity computers.

48. There is still a question-mark in Washington whether priority should be given to détente with the Soviet Union or on the contrary to keeping China outside the influence of the Soviet Union, by supporting the former's resistance to becoming part of a Russian-dominated hegemony. Obviously, recent political changes in China have encouraged the American authorities to strengthen the authority of the new Chinese leaders in any way open to them.

49. The United States National Security Council's decision to approve the sale of two Cyber 172 computers to China appears to have been a decisive step in this direction. It was taken less than a week after the arrest of leaders of the "Gang of Four" and three days after a private meeting in New York between Mr. Kissinger and Chiao Kuan-hua, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

50. It is impossible to be more precise about the relationship between the trend in China in 1977 and its policy towards western countries, except to assert that there is every indication that since the communist régime was established in China there has been a steady evolution in relations bet-

ween China and the West which, although at first hampered by the Korean war and the decolonisation struggles and then by the Vietnam war, has increasingly estranged China from its Soviet partner.

51. Nowadays, the latter appears, at least for the foreseeable future, to be its main potential enemy, indeed its only one since the United States is no longer thought even to have the national will to pursue an offensive imperialist rôle. Moreover, the USSR's increasingly blatant intervention directly or indirectly through the use of the Cuban mercenaries, especially in Africa, has forced the Americans and their European allies to reassess détente and appreciate the rôle that China, without weakening or abandoning its ideological stance, can play in preventing détente being exploited in the service of Russian "social-imperialist" expansionism.

## CHAPTER II

### *China and its eastern neighbours (excluding the USSR)*

#### *(i) Japan*

52. Immediately after the communists assumed power in China, Japan was considered a major potential enemy. As time showed that Japan was not seeking to become a great military power again, its economic progress, always faster than that of communist China, in turn was seen as another challenge because it showed that communism did not offer the only practical solution to Asia's overall economic development problems. China has continued to encourage neutrality in Japan, including the denouncement of the establishment of American bases in Japan, particularly nuclear ones. Similarly, all forms of rapprochement between Japan and South Korea, for instance the Japanese-South Korean basic treaty of 22nd June 1965, have been denounced.

53. On the other hand, China has always paid close attention to its relations with North Korea since the treaty of alliance of 11th July 1961.

54. Despite continuing suspicion of Japan, the latter has become an important trade partner for communist China. The first trade agreement dates back to 5th March 1958, but trade relations between the two countries have developed mainly since 1962 and there is every indication that China needs this trade for its own development. Two-way visits have increased in recent years and, provided Japan continues to renounce the idea of regaining a foothold on mainland Asia, China is prepared to accept it as a most important trade partner, and even to take advantage of its capacity to help it to develop its defence potential.

#### *(ii) China and Indo-China*

55. China's policy in the Indo-Chinese peninsula has been shaped by the successive wars in this area. From the outset, China supported nationalist and anti-colonialist movements, such as the Vietminh and the Malaysian guerrillas. However, in 1954 China started to take effective steps to promote the success of the Geneva conference on Vietnam. In the years when United States' influence had replaced that of France in South Vietnam, China, at the same time as France, supported neutral movements, particularly in Laos.

56. In 1958, to counter North Vietnamese infiltration in Laos, the United States threw its weight behind a right-wing government in that country, which led China to support North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao. The more the Americans became involved in fighting in Indo-China, the more China granted assistance to those who resisted the United States and its allies, egged on by its fear of the Americans establishing a permanent presence on the Indo-Chinese peninsula.

57. However, the Chinese Government was careful to avoid direct involvement in the Indo-Chinese war despite the many infringements of its sovereignty committed by the Americans during that war. Ultimately the withdrawal of the Americans from Indo-China was accompanied by reconciliation between the United States and China on the one hand and by tension in relations between China and Vietnam on the other.

58. Similar motives governed relations between China and Cambodia. China, together with France, gave maximum support to King Norodom Sihanouk's neutralist government whose downfall may be attributed to South Vietnamese intervention, encouraged by the Americans, as a result of which the Cambodia communists came to power. The King then took refuge in China.

59. Only after his return to Cambodia did China draw closer to the Cambodian communists because they appeared better able to handle the Vietnamese. China's coolness to a reunified Vietnam, as an ally of the Soviet Union, is therefore the reason why it has been supporting the Cambodian Government in frontier clashes with its neighbours.

#### *(iii) China and India*

60. India was the first non-communist country to establish friendly relations with communist China, ambassadors having been exchanged in 1950. In 1951, Mr. Nehru's government conceded China's pre-eminence in Tibet.

61. While India and China were originally on the same side at Bandung, there were already

signs of some rivalry between the two countries which both sought new and strengthened connections in the third world. This rivalry became more clearly defined when China implemented its historic authority in Tibet in 1956, and the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959.

62. Since then, and following on a series of other incidents causing tension between the two countries, Chinese-Indian relations have continued to be marred by suspicion and China has drawn closer to Pakistan and India to the Soviet Union. In 1963, China concluded an agreement with Pakistan whereby China obtained the Himalayan territories which it had claimed. In 1965, China, short of military involvement, supported Pakistan in its war against India.

63. Very recently, especially since the change of government in Delhi, of less pro-Russian inclinations, there have been welcome signs of a mutual desire for rapprochement.

### CHAPTER III

#### **History of Sino-Soviet relations**

##### **(i) Territorial problems**

64. During the nineteenth century, Russian expansion in Asia raised the problem of sharing central and eastern Asia between Russia and China.

65. Central Asia was mainly inhabited by nomadic tribes of various ethnic origins: Turks, Mongols, Buriats, etc., over which China claimed suzerainty but with little *de facto* control. Russian expansionism, which continued throughout the nineteenth century, led Tsarist Russia to try to have China acknowledge Russian sovereign rights over the regions it in fact occupied. This occupation was gradually accompanied by the settlement of Russians, particularly peasants, in central and eastern Asia, then by the foundation and development of a number of towns, and finally, at the beginning of the twentieth century, by the building of the trans-Siberian railway.

66. The first significant territorial demarcation at China's expense (after the earlier Russian territorial gains embodied in the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689) between Siberia and China was effected under duress in 1858 under the Aigun Treaty. The lands then lost correspond to the boundaries of the territories now being claimed back by China. But as early as in 1860 these encroachments were extended by Russia, which additionally took over Vladivostok ("Master of the East"). The subsequent Peking Treaty recognised Russian sovereignty over the Siberian Far East. Russian advances continued

and in 1881 the Ili Treaty recognised Russian sovereignty over Kazakhstan. However, China never ratified this treaty and even today still regards it as an illegally-occupied territory.

67. Russian expansion continued until 1905, with settlements in Manchuria, Korea, Port Arthur and the island of Sakhalin. The Russo-Japanese war of 1905 brought this to an end, forcing the Russians to leave Manchuria and abandon Port Arthur and part of Sakhalin. The total area of territories occupied by Russia since the Aigun Treaty is 2.5 million sq.km., a very large area but in sparsely-populated regions. Even the 1917 revolution did not put an end to Russian expansion since Outer Mongolia progressively became a Soviet protectorate. It still covers 500,000 sq.km.

68. Initially the Chinese Communist Party depended too closely on the Soviet Union to be able to call openly for the return of all or any of the territories thus annexed in turn by Tsarist Russia and later by the Soviet Union. In 1939, Mao Tse-tung drew up a list of territories taken away from China by imperialists, but without referring to territories occupied by the Russians. Only in 1954 did a history textbook written for Chinese school-children include a map showing "territories snatched away from China by imperialists between 1848 and 1919". This map showed quite clearly that the major part of the nineteen provinces lost by China had been occupied by the Soviet Union.

69. For all these reasons, it may be thought that the frontier incidents between China and the Soviet Union which have occurred since then are merely intended to record the fact that China refuses to recognise Russia's annexations. The Soviets seem well aware that in the result China's claims are levelled at what in fact amounts to a considerable part of Soviet territory today, as defined by the Kremlin.

##### **(ii) Relations between the Russian and Chinese Communist Parties**

70. Marxism originated in highly-industrialised countries of Western Europe and the revolution it envisages is an assumption of power by the working class. Soviet leaders, since Lenin, have always thought that revolution could start only in independent, industrialised countries. But by 1910 communist parties were emerging in many wholly or partially colonised countries, including China. They assimilated the struggle against colonialism with the struggle against capitalism and thought they could achieve national independence and proletarian revolution at one and the same time.

71. In 1924, at the congress of communist parties of colonial and semi-colonial countries in Baku, Soviet doctrine in respect of the prospects of revolution in these countries was laid down.



This congress declared that proletarian revolution should break out in industrialised countries but that the communist parties of the colonial or semi-colonial countries could contribute to world revolution not by taking power but by fighting colonial imperialism so as to weaken capitalism. Since then, the Soviet Union has constantly assisted nationalist parties in colonial countries and encouraged communist parties to ally themselves with such parties. This was particularly the case in China where the Kuomintang was considered the nationalist party which must be helped first and foremost. The Chinese Communist Party was happy to play this game in the days of Sun Yat-sen but the coming to power of Chiang Kai-shek changed its attitude. As from 1926, it opposed the Kuomintang and it was the Soviet Union that impelled it to continue to co-operate with Chiang Kai-shek and thus gave Chiang the possibility of liquidating the core of the then Chinese communist movement in a most brutal manner.

72. After 1930, under the influence of Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist Party in its own right again assumed considerable importance, but this time in rural areas, and showed far greater independence of the Soviet Union, which stopped controlling it through Komintern representatives. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union still intervened in Chinese internal affairs on many occasions, particularly during the Sian incident in 1936. Mao Tse-tung then managed to take Chiang Kai-shek prisoner but he was freed, thanks to Soviet pressure.

73. Right up to the end of the second world war, at least as much Soviet assistance was afforded to the Kuomintang as to the communist party. And, contrary to what certain western observers claimed at the time, it was virtually without external support that the communist party first took power in China in 1949. At that time, Mao Tse-tung appears even to have hesitated between the Soviet and American "models of democracy". For the very least, he sought to rely on the Americans in the hope of thus limiting Soviet influence in the Far East and it was the short-sighted refusal of American political leadership to co-operate with the Chinese Communist Party that compelled it to turn exclusively to the Soviet Union.

74. In the result, and for several years (1949-57), Soviet assistance was very generous and it made a major contribution to China's economic development. However, the price of this assistance was high :

- (i) the Chinese had to soft-pedal, if not to seem to abandon, their territorial claims in mainland Asia ;
- (ii) the Chinese had to accept Soviet domination over their economy and the presence of large numbers of Soviet technicians ;

- (iii) the Chinese had to bow to Soviet policy on several occasions, particularly during the Korean war ;
- (iv) the Chinese had to follow the "Soviet model" of so-called socialist democracy, or Russian revisionism as it is now scathingly referred to in Peking.

75. Stalin's personal prestige and Mao Tse-tung's position of dependence made the latter accept these conditions of continuing economic aid until 1953. The first signs of Chinese dissatisfaction and consequent confrontation emerged in 1954, as indicated by :

- (a) the publication of a new school textbook in 1954 containing the map of historic Russian encroachments ;
- (b) the claim to a Chinese model of socialism, and economic expansion accompanied by the assertion that China would quickly catch up with the Soviet Union (this was mainly in the hundred flower era, when Mao attempted a degree of ideological liberalism, and the great leap forward era in support of these claims to catch up with Soviet economic strength) ;
- (c) China's ever-clearer opposition to the direction taken by Russian and world communism under Khrushchev.

Although the 1954 treaty was designed to strengthen Soviet assistance to China, which supported the Soviet Union in the Hungarian affair (1956) and in the struggle against Tito (1958), Sino-Soviet relations subsequently deteriorated rapidly.

76. In 1960 the Russians responded to Chinese criticism of their policies by withdrawing their technicians (some 1,400) and terminating their economic aid, which probably in the long run left China with more economic independence than it could quickly or easily sustain.

#### (iii) The stages of the conflict

77. The Chinese appear to consider that these tensions had their origin in the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 when Leninist Russia of Stalin's days came into opposition with revisionist Russia of Khrushchev's days. In fact, it is quite clear that the origins go back much further. China's ideological grievances against the twentieth congress are essentially as follows :

- (a) The proclamation of "peaceful coexistence". Whereas Khrushchev's principal aim seems to have been to consolidate Soviet gains and avert the risk of a world war, the Chinese considered that the *status quo* was extremely unfavourable to them and had little fear of a world war at a time when the "massive retaliation" doctrine



meant that only the Soviet Union could be the target of such retaliation. The bombing of the Quemoy and Matsu islands in August 1958 seems to have been intended to demonstrate that China did not accept the *status quo* and therefore refused peaceful coexistence.

(b) The "peaceful movement towards socialism" doctrine was condemned, particularly by Lin Biao in September 1965. Soviet doctrine was based on an interpretation of Marxism which stressed economic determinism. It meant that when the right economic conditions for revolution had been reached revolution became inevitable, but it could not succeed if these conditions did not exist. As opposed to this doctrine, the Chinese followed a doctrine of voluntarism which was more in conformity with Leninist tradition. This voluntarism was based on the very history of the Chinese Communist Party and the methods of war which it had developed. They used the example of the Vietnam war as an argument for showing that a small country could win the day against the largest powers and that the will to win was more important than the material conditions of the struggle.

(c) The condemnation of "Stalinism" was accepted by the Chinese and put into effect in 1956 during the hundred flower campaign, but as from 1957 this gave way to a series of so-called "rectification" campaigns directed against "revisionism" inspired by the bourgeoisie, which just would not die. This implied that Khrushchev, a revisionist, was an instrument of the international bourgeoisie, which explained all the acts of treason towards the communist cause of which he was allegedly guilty.

78. But while ideological factors played an important part in the split between China and the Soviet Union, a series of territorial affairs considerably aggravated their differences, as high-lighted during the Sino-Indian war in November 1962. This was caused by India building roads in territories claimed by China in the Himalayas. During the fighting, Khrushchev clearly showed his preference for India, to which he provided assistance. The Soviets then seem to have elected to play the rôle of defenders of underdeveloped countries rather than endorse a policy of territorial claims by China which they well knew could in due course, and probably would, also be directed against them.

79. Accusations of treason were reciprocal, illustrated by the Vietnam war during which China was able to take advantage of its geographical position to allow or seriously hinder, depending on the case, Soviet assistance to North Vietnam. Moreover, Vietnamese resistance was brandished as proof of the value of Chinese theories on revolutionary warfare.

80. More directly, in March 1969, fighting broke out over ownership of the island of Damansky, an uninhabited island on the middle reaches of the Ussuri River. Soviet and Chinese versions are so contradictory that it is difficult to make an outside objective appraisal of how the problems originated. On 15th March, there was a second attack, certainly this time by the Soviet Union. No estimate can be made of losses sustained by either side but there were certainly several hundred killed, and Soviet and Chinese propaganda referred to atrocities committed by the other side, indicating particularly bitter fighting. The Soviet Union proposed resuming the negotiations on frontiers which had been interrupted since 1964, but China insisted on overall negotiations covering all Sino-Soviet frontiers, to which Moscow did not agree.

81. In August 1971, the Soviet Union signed an alliance with India, which allowed the latter to declare war on Pakistan. China felt threatened by the Soviet-Indian treaty and afforded assistance to Pakistan. However, it was unable to take part in the fighting because the Soviet Union had massed large forces in Sinkiang, effectively inhibiting any Chinese military counter-moves.

82. It was after this war that China adopted the "superpower" doctrine according to which interests common to the Soviet Union and the United States were greater than the interest which the Soviet Union might have in world revolution. This theory, which placed the Soviet Union and the United States on the same plane, was soon interpreted in *realpolitik* as a primarily anti-Soviet doctrine. These were the circumstances in which President Nixon was received in China from 21st to 29th February 1972, and the joint statement stressed the interest of the United States and China in preventing any growth in the Soviet area of influence in Asia or the Pacific area.

83. Consequently, the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations now seems to have reached a point where China considers the Soviet Union as its main potential enemy and is actually encouraging western capitalist countries to organise the most effective defence possible against future aggression by the world's most powerful "imperialists", i.e. the Soviet Union, which Peking believes will begin in Western Europe, expecting the Kremlin only to launch further expansionism in the east when the former is crushed or, at least, "Finlandised", to the exclusion of American support.

#### CHAPTER IV

##### ***The deployment of Soviet and Chinese forces in central Asia***

84. According to the Military Balance 1977-78, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, which gives information covering 1976, the Soviet

Union has total armed forces of 3,675,000 men, of which 1,825,000 in the army. They are divided into 45 tank divisions, 115 motor rifle divisions and 8 airborne divisions. Of these, 43 divisions are deployed along the Sino-Soviet border, including 3 in Mongolia. About one-third of these divisions are almost at full strength and most of the others at over 50 % strength.

85. The Soviet Union has 31 divisions in Central Europe and 64 in European USSR. Where tank divisions are concerned, 5 are believed to be deployed on the Sino-Soviet border, 14 in Central Europe and 20 in European USSR.

86. These figures give more details about and confirm General Haig's statement that for every two divisions deployed in the west there is believed to be one in the east.

87. The Soviet Pacific fleet includes 70 submarines, of which about 30 are nuclear-propelled, and 60 major surface combat ships. Its northern fleet includes 110 submarines, of which 54 nuclear-propelled, and 50 major surface combat ships; its Baltic fleet 35 submarines and 50 major surface combat ships; and its Black Sea fleet 20 submarines and 60 major surface combat ships.

88. Account must be taken of the fact that the Soviet Pacific fleet is not deployed only with a view to a possible clash with China but may also take part in various naval operations against a large number of possible enemies.

89. As regards the air force, the Soviet Union is believed to have about 4,600 combat aircraft, not including strategic nuclear forces, the air defence force or the naval air force. These aircraft are grouped in 16 tactical air armies, of which 4 (with 1,700 aircraft) appear to be deployed in Central Europe and 1 in each of the 12 military districts of Soviet territory.

90. It is impossible to determine against which potential enemy Soviet nuclear forces are deployed since even missiles located on Soviet eastern territory can be aimed at the territory of the United States or its allies.

91. China has 3,950,000 men in its regular forces, of which 3,250,000 in the army. These are divided into 12 armoured divisions, 121 infantry divisions, 3 airborne divisions, 40 artillery divisions and 15 engineer divisions.

92. China is divided into 11 military regions in turn divided into some 30 districts. Divisions are grouped into some 40 armies, generally of 3 infantry divisions, 3 armoured regiments and 3 artillery regiments. A large part of these forces (55 divisions) are believed to be deployed in north and north-east China, 20 in the north and north-west, 28 in the east and south-east, 15 in central China and 18 in the west and south-west, which means that the northern region, where Soviet pressure is strongest, is also

the best prepared by the Chinese Government to defend itself.

93. The navy is wholly deployed in the Pacific Ocean, with about 200 vessels in the north, the same number to the south and about 500 to the east. The air force has about 5,200 combat aircraft whose tasks appear essentially defensive.

94. Finally, China has a public security force and a civilian militia, which has about 7 million men organised into about 75 divisions, plus several million men in other branches of the militia, some of whom are unarmed.

95. No review of the two countries' defence posture would be comprehensive without mention of China's enormous devotion of resources (including a very substantial voluntary element in the labour force) to building a vast nationwide network of anti-nuclear underground shelters in all heavily-populated areas.

### Conclusions

96. The lessons of history, a profound national pride and a widely-held conviction that their adoption of the communist ideology has brought coherence and a sense of purpose back again to a fragmented former empire, have all combined to give a sense of assurance to the present Chinese Government as to the correctness of their analysis of the world situation which, whether one agrees with them or not, is refreshing in this day and age when so many other countries and peoples across the globe are beset with doubts about how best to obtain material progress for their peoples and to safeguard their security from external aggression.

97. It is not difficult to summarise China's aims. There is a need to provide the best possible opportunity for it to develop its long-neglected capability to emerge as a great industrial power without losing the strength that comes from its ability to feed its own people, without recourse to foreign aid. This should lead to the achievement of an overall standard of living for its people, comparable with conditions in other parts of the world with a success story to tell. To this end a maximum period of peace is essential in which to develop its strength to a level where it need never fear aggression again, such as has ravaged it in the past, from any source. The Chinese believe that the only present threats to such a peace derive from the rivalry of the two superpowers — the United States and the USSR. These two they are convinced at some future date must resort to a global contest or the abject surrender of one or the other. This is a struggle from which they wish to be able to stand aloof if that should then be in their own best interests. Conversely they are anxious lest the conflicting interests of the two superpowers should lead them both in order, even temporarily to delay an open confrontation between themselves, to

join together in agreeing to more specific divisions of spheres of interest than exist at present, to the peril of other powers medium and great including, at this stage, themselves.

98. With this thought in mind it is not surprising to find open, indeed enthusiastic, support for the concept of a united Europe powerful enough to defend itself against the Soviet Union even without American assistance.

99. Similarly, both by their own efforts and the development of good relations with other eastern countries on their borders, e.g. notably Japan and Pakistan, to be able to deter a Russian attack on themselves felt to be likely to take place only after Western Europe has been crushed, when the USSR need then no longer fear the same fate that ultimately brought down Hitler — a war on two fronts. In interpreting Chinese thinking on how to thwart Soviet intentions it would be wrong to assume that their leaders do not regard the United States as also an expansionist, imperialist power even though its expansionism takes a different form. However, as regards the near and immediate future, it is felt that whereas the United States possesses the material strength to wage an aggressive war, its people for the foreseeable future have lost the will to do so; and hence, in China's list of priorities of dangers to be faced, any American threat to them seems remote.

100. Indeed one immediate, outstanding impression is the obvious sincerity of Peking's belief that a third world war, if there is to be one, will be best delayed by the continuing presence of American military power to support Western European forces, together with the maintenance of a full updated nuclear capability.

101. It is not only at NATO headquarters that the belief exists in Russia's ability and readiness to launch a sudden war in Europe using conventional weapons if only the Kremlin could first be certain this would not escalate into a mutually-destructive nuclear conflict.

102. Moreover "détente" as it is deemed the Russians interpret it, is as harshly criticised in Peking as being just another way of spelling appeasement as it is in the most conservative circles in the West. The fact that your Rapporteur shares this evaluation does not detract from the accuracy of this analysis of Chinese thinking, as any visitor to Peking would speedily find out within twenty-four hours of his arrival.

103. This does not mean that the Chinese rulers of today have any less faith in communism as the best form of government for their country than their predecessors, although since the departure of the "Gang of Four" from the political scene there is a greater appreciation that an ideology, however excellent in itself, provides no viable alternative also to maintaining an increasing production, rural and industrial,

for domestic purposes but above all to increase their security.

104. Indeed far from turning against communism as a consequence of their dispute with the USSR, it is the conviction of the Chinese that Russia has abandoned the true communist faith in favour of "social imperialism" that is a major bone of contention. Thus those who believe that sooner or later the two countries are bound to get together in renewed amity because of a common political faith are wholly misguided.

105. One other aspect of Chinese policy deserves clarification: that of their own infiltration into various parts of the world thousands of miles from their borders which could at first sight be facetiously interpreted as imperialism along the same lines as the Kremlin pursues. In fact whether it be in Africa or elsewhere abroad, Peking claims — and your Rapporteur believes their assertion — that everything that China does in this context is primarily in pursuit of the same overall central policy-thinking, namely to prevent its presently more powerful neighbour the USSR from extending its hegemony to the future prejudice of China's own national security. With no loss of revolutionary fervour, with no slackening in their belief that true communism provides the best answer to mankind's problems there is therefore, nevertheless, a readiness to accept an identity of interest with all the western powers and third world countries in thwarting Russian "social imperialism". The fact that this identity of interests arises simply and solely from China's determination to look after its own security makes it all the more convincing.


106. With a similar sense of *realpolitik* and with no weakening in our determination to support and advocate our own free democratic way of life as the best for all mankind and to promote respect for human rights throughout the world, Western Europe in general, and WEU in particular, should respond favourably to the growing opportunities to co-operate with China in increasing the latter's defence capacity, realising that with no counter-balancing dangers to our own security, but quite the contrary, the overall deterrent against any Soviet military opportunism can only be reinforced.

107. Surveying the European scene after the final fall of Napoleon and searching to establish a new durable security system, Prince Metternich with his usual perspicacity adapted the old French proverb "*Les amis de mes amis sont mes amis*" to read "The enemies of my enemies are my friends".

108. Although today's politicians, rather than statesmen, are all too often unduly influenced by ideological prejudices at the expense of the national interest and that of western society as a whole, yet the former Austrian foreign minister's adage surely has as much validity in the twentieth as it did in the nineteenth century.


APPENDIX

1. Extension of the Ch'ing Empire in 1759



- maximum extension of the Ch'ing Empire
- boundaries of dependent and associated territories
- - - - -** present frontiers of the People's Republic of China
- .....** boundaries of the area temporarily annexed in the eighteenth century

## 2. Foreign concessions in China



\_\_\_\_\_

1842 - Nanking Treaty - five ports opened

114

1876 - Zhifu Convention - four ports opened

68

1858 - Tientsin Treaty with Great Britain and France  
(ratified by the Emperor of China in 1860)

1890 - Chungking - town opened

1893 - Conference on Sikkim and Tibet



**1898 - New Territories ceded to Hong Kong**

### 1860 - Peking Convention




□

1897 • Franco-Chinese trade convention -  
three towns opened

3. Sino-Russian frontiers



## 4. Sino-Indian frontiers



- State frontiers    - - - - Provincial frontiers    - - - - Kashmir frontier    ..... Kashmir partition line  
 [Hatched Area] Areas claimed by India (occupied by China)    = Main roads    - - - - Railways

***China and European security***

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**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett***

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1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the third and fourth paragraphs and insert :

“Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government’s continuing efforts to develop good relations with Europe ;

Considering that China is now a significant factor in the maintenance of peace and security, not only in the context of Europe, but also in Asia and Africa,”.

2. In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows :

“4. Consider objectively, in accord with already-declared British policy, any requests by China to purchase defence equipment.”

*Signed : Bennett*

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1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment withdrawn).



**19th June 1978**

***China and European security***

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**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett***

---

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the third paragraph and insert :  
“Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government’s continuing efforts to develop good relations with Europe ;”.

*Signed : Bennet*

---

1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***China and European security***

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**AMENDMENT No. 3<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Handlos and Mr. Page***

---

In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows :

“4. Consider objectively, in accord with already-declared British and French policy, any requests by China to purchase defence equipment.”

*Signed : Handlos, Page*

---

1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment negatived).

***China and European security***

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**AMENDMENT No. 4<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Rubbi and others***

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1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "determination" add ", shared by all the peoples of the world,".
2. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble.
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, delete from "and study carefully" to the end of the paragraph.

*Signed : Rubbi, Calamandrei, Bernini, Antoni*

---

1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment negatived).

Document 771

16th May 1978

International terrorismREPORT<sup>1</sup>

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee***<sup>2</sup>  
***by Mr. Müller Rapporteur***

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

## DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on international terrorism

## EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur

I. The problem of the Assembly of WEU's competence

II. International terrorism

III. The fight against terrorism

IV. Internal defence and police forces

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman) ; Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Abens, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate : Page), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bizet, Brugnion, Cermolacce, Faulds, Gessner, Gonella (Alternate : Treu), Hanin (Alternate : Van Aal), Mrs. van

den Heuvel-de Blank (Alternate : Voogd), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate : Van Waterschoot), Mende, Minnoci, Mommersteeg, Müller, Pèridier, Perin, Portheine, Reddemann, Segre, Urwin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on international terrorism***

The Assembly,

Considering the use of terrorist methods by anarchist, nationalist, regionalist or other organisations to be a challenge to the practice of democracy by Western European countries and liable to jeopardise their security ;

Considering that the growth of modern technology makes the more industrialised countries particularly vulnerable to terrorist organisations ;

Noting that the framework of terrorist action has widened beyond national frontiers ;

Considering therefore that terrorism constitutes a problem which can be tackled only in an international framework, as the Council of Europe did in preparing a European convention covering the matters within its competence ;

Deploping the fact that certain sovereign states have on a number of occasions granted passive and even sometimes active assistance to terrorist operations ;

Noting that these movements have become particularly active since 1970, compelling some governments of member countries to make large-scale increases in their internal defence and police forces ;

Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty gives the Council specific responsibility with regard to the fight against terrorism ;

Welcoming the fact that the Council, in 1970 and subsequent years, took the initiative of exercising its responsibilities with regard to the fight against piracy in the air and the protection of diplomats,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Promote the ratification by the member states of WEU of the convention on terrorism drawn up by the Council of Europe and already signed by the member governments ;
2. Examine, when approving the tables submitted by member countries on their internal defence and police forces, the reasons justifying variations in these tables ;
3. Seek thereby to co-ordinate the conditions in which such forces may be used to combat terrorism ;
4. Set up for this purpose a group to co-ordinate anti-terrorist action, on the lines of Interpol ;
5. Encourage political consultations between its members towards finding international solutions to problems liable to provoke terrorist activities ;
6. Study the means by which Western Europe can effectively dissuade any state from granting assistance to terrorists through asylum or otherwise ;
7. Ask member governments to demonstrate their solidarity towards terrorist threats by applying strictly all agreed measures ;
8. Report to the Assembly by appropriate means on the measures it has taken to meet the challenge of international terrorism.

**Explanatory Memorandum***(submitted by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur)***I. The problem of the Assembly of WEU's competence**

1. At its meeting on 27th February 1978, the General Affairs Committee raised the question of the Assembly's competence and wondered to what extent the subject of the present report came within the scope of its responsibilities.
2. It is true that other organisations and parliamentary assemblies, particularly the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, have done a considerable amount of work on this subject. It was the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and not the WEU Council which worked out an anti-terrorist convention now in the process of being ratified by most WEU member countries.
3. It should first be clearly borne in mind that the responsibilities assigned to the Assembly in the modified Brussels Treaty are of a general nature. Furthermore, Article III, which specifies that "the high contracting parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation...", Article VIII, paragraph 1, which defines the prerogatives of the WEU Council based on the will of its members "to [strengthen] peace and security", and the preamble, which calls on member countries "to fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage" make it perfectly clear that the question of international terrorism may be raised in the framework of the Assembly.
4. Admittedly, from the very beginning of WEU the member countries decided to entrust NATO with the exercise of the Council's external security responsibilities and it is NATO that communicates tables to the Council showing levels of forces and armaments assigned for joint defence, except for France, whose tables have been communicated by the French authorities since France withdrew from the NATO integrated military structure. But the responsibilities attributed to NATO in no way affect the exercise of the internal security responsibilities assigned to the Council under Article VIII. Internal security of course remains a matter for each individual country, but the modified Brussels Treaty is the only treaty committing member states to hold consultations in the framework of the WEU Council on questions of internal security, and in this case the Council has relinquished neither its responsibilities nor their exercise.
5. There is another consideration, stemming from the most elementary common sense : when a treaty establishes an alliance intended to organise joint defence, this brings into play the solidarity of its signatories not only in face of any danger from without but also with regard to any internal threat whatsoever. In fact, any attack on one of the partners is necessarily an attack on the alliance as a whole, which is thereby weakened. Joint defence cannot ignore threats to the security of each partner, from wheresoever it may come.
6. It nevertheless remains that insofar as other European parliamentary assemblies have dealt with this subject, without thereby exceeding their responsibilities in any way, it would be a pity to deal among the parliamentarians of seven countries with what has been dealt with in a framework including seventeen countries such as the Council of Europe. It is not therefore because the subject is outside its responsibilities but in the desire to avoid overlapping that the WEU Assembly should probably refrain from discussing the social or juridical aspects of the problems raised by international terrorism.
7. However, the General Affairs Committee noted that WEU had special responsibilities in this field which are not covered by any other international assembly. These special responsibilities derive first from Article V of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, which stipulates that :  
  
"The strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe of the high contracting parties to the present protocol shall be fixed by agreements within the organisation of Western European Union, having regard to their proper functions and needs and to their existing levels."
8. These agreements were signed on 14th December 1957 and specify that member states shall report to the WEU Council on the strength of forces at their disposal and that the Council shall approve this report. These forces include "internal defence and police forces".
9. Insofar as possible, some idea should be given of the nature of "internal defence and police forces". It is relatively easy for internal defence forces : they are armed forces assigned to the defence of home territory, as opposed to those which are assigned to joint defence, whether or not under NATO command. However, in practice each government apparently has its own criteria for defining such assignments. But,

except in times of serious crisis, such forces are not intended for use against terrorism.

10. The case of police forces is different since most countries have several police forces under different authorities, some wearing plain clothes and others uniform; some armed, others not, etc., and their tasks may vary infinitely depending on circumstances and requirements. In general, moreover, their arms are not subject to limitations under the Brussels Treaty. The levels of such forces declared to the Council by national authorities may include certain police forces and not others, depending on whether they come under one government department or another, whether or not they are armed and whether or not they wear uniform. But it is of course these forces which are engaged in the fight against terrorism and the fact that Protocol No. II includes them among forces whose levels have to be declared to the Council, which has to approve these declarations unanimously "having regard to their proper functions", gives the Council the responsibility of examining these functions and the way each country carries them out. It goes without saying that the Council's approval does not have to be granted automatically but implies effective study of member states' reports by the Council and shows what a European policy or will might be in respect of internal defence and police forces as well as all member countries' other forces.

11. However, when it stipulates that the Council must approve member countries' reports on the strength of their internal defence and police forces unanimously, the agreement of 14th December 1957 shows that the authors of the treaty wished the Council to pay attention to these forces. Article 4 of this agreement specifies in fact that the Council "shall accept:

- (a) for the strength of such forces, the levels which shall be communicated annually to it by the North Atlantic Council;
- (b) for the armaments, the levels which shall be communicated annually to it by member states through the Agency for the Control of Armaments."

12. Similarly, Article 5 indicates that the Council shall accept the strength and armaments of its forces stationed on the mainland of Europe and intended for the defence of overseas territories. It is therefore most significant that Article 6 includes "internal defence and police forces" among those forces whose strength and armaments must be considered by the Council which must approve them, not on a compulsory basis, but "unanimously". This would appear to mean that the Council must really deliberate on this chapter in the case of new tasks being entrusted to these forces and in the event of

significant changes in their levels, since it is specified that the Council must unanimously approve any amendment resulting from the reviews of tables submitted by member countries. In short, the treaty, in Protocol No. II and the agreement of 14th December 1957 organising implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II, assigns responsibility to the Council with regard to forces intended to fight terrorism.

13. But information obtained by your Rapporteur about the way in which the Council carries out its duties in this respect indicates that member countries do in fact report on the level of their internal defence and police forces but that these reports are approved by the Council without real discussion. It would therefore appear that on this matter the Council acts in a routine manner, ensuring formal application of the treaty and its appended protocols, but without discussing questions raised by the strength and tasks of these forces.

14. Thus, WEU's responsibilities in the field of international terrorism seem very well defined. They relate first to measures to meet the political or economic challenges stemming from international terrorism and also to police or military action to be taken against terrorist undertakings.

15. The Council's competence to deal with international terrorism has moreover been recognised since it has in practice been doing so since 1970. The Council's annual report for that year indicates in fact that:

"1970 saw an increase in kidnappings of diplomats which are a matter of great concern and, as a number of these distressing incidents involved representatives of member countries of WEU, the Council devoted part of their work to the subject of the protection of diplomatic and consular missions abroad. They also considered the problem of the hijacking of aircraft."

16. In this connection, the Council has been careful to co-ordinate its action with that of other competent international organisations and in particular with the Council of Europe, but nevertheless "thought it would be useful for the Seven to continue working together on all these questions within WEU". *Inter alia*, it set up a special working group to hold "consultations, as required and in the light of experience, regarding practical measures to improve the security of diplomatic and consular missions" and reported to the Assembly on action it had taken with regard to terrorism both at ministerial level and at the level of ambassadors in the annual reports on its activities for 1971 and 1972.

17. All this clearly shows that in tackling the question of international terrorism the Assembly is keeping to the strict limits of WEU's responsibilities as defined in the treaty and until now

interpreted by the Council. The Assembly already accepted this point of view when it adopted the report on political violence and internal security submitted by Mr. Schloesing on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on 16th November 1971.

## **II. International terrorism**

18. The notion of international terrorism is far from clear. Nowadays, it would appear to cover a range of undertakings which differ in any case because of the aims behind them and often too because of the means used. But it would appear to be the aims of these terrorist movements which allow them to be distinguished from each other.

19. There are some indeed for whom terrorism is considered to be a means of achieving a number of political aims. The most typical case is probably that of the Palestinian movements whose aim is clearly the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine and for which terrorist operations are either a means of fighting the state of Israel, or action aimed at making neighbouring Arab states change their policy or, finally, attempts to draw the attention of international public opinion to the problem of the fate of the Palestinian Arabs.

20. In recent years, many national liberation movements, or movements merely making regionalist claims, have used terrorist methods, sometimes with a degree of moderation and sometimes with unreasoning violence. Mention may be made of the Irish Catholics and the regionalist movements in Brittany and Corsica, without forgetting the guerrilla organisations in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

21. But in the last decade movements of another kind have emerged for which terrorism developed without any clear political aims having been defined. These would appear to be reactionary movements of the same kind as those prevailing in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century when the anarchist movement was developing on a large scale. Germany and Italy would appear to have suffered the most from this neo-nihilism in recent years, but similar movements have developed in other countries, including Japan. The recent kidnapping of Mr. Aldo Moro has caused concern and indignation throughout Europe.

22. However, this distinction between movements with specific political claims and anarchist movements cannot be strictly adhered to insofar as these anarchist movements have on several occasions been associated with movements of a more political nature in a number of terrorist undertakings. For instance, the famous massacre at Lod airport was the work of Japanese terrorists, who were in no way directly concerned

with the Palestinian problem but had probably seen Palestinian terrorism to be a movement of protest against contemporary western society and therefore mingled their cause with the political struggle of the Palestinians. Similarly, it would appear that there are close links between the terrorist movement which has developed in Germany and the Palestinian movement since apparently reliable information indicates that German terrorists have often received technical training in camps in the Middle East which makes them particularly dangerous.

23. Thus, although terrorist action often appears to be limited to a single country and the claims made sometimes even limited to regional or provincial problems, it is beginning to assume an increasingly international aspect. The way in which numbers of aircraft have been hijacked in recent years clearly shows — as does the success achieved by the cause of order — that only international action can enable such movements to be overcome, even if they have purely national aims. It is because their own undertakings very soon overstep state frontiers, particularly where the hijacking of aircraft or crimes against diplomats are concerned, that international co-operation on as wide a scale as possible has become essential to counter these terrorist acts.

24. But it is evident that movements acting in accordance with political aims, with which there can be dealings and an attempt made to find solutions to problems which are sometimes very real, cannot be approached in the same way as anarchist-type organisations for which terrorism appears to be an aim rather than a means and which are liable to interpret any attempt at negotiation as a pointless sign of weakness. This is particularly important since methods used in the two cases are not always the same. Some movements of a political nature know how to keep their activities within certain bounds, endeavouring for instance to destroy property without killing wherever possible or taking hostages only with a view to obtaining specific concessions. Conversely, certain anarchist-type movements appear to be waging a relentless war on society. In the first case reactions may be modulated in accordance with the challenge involved, whereas in the second case there appears to be no alternative but to eliminate the peril by any means. It is essential for the WEU Council to assess the nature of the terrorist challenge in its discussions.

## **III. The fight against terrorism**

25. It is clear that the deployment of large-scale police forces in a country, or even in a large part of the world, is not enough to overcome movements which are sometimes based on political or economic claims that are in themselves worthy of



attention. On the contrary, political and economic measures can bring about a transformation of society so that terrorism no longer finds justification in over-flagrant injustice. Such measures can sometimes be taken within states; this applies in particular to movements with regionalist claims or movements resulting from protests against certain authoritarian régimes, particularly in Latin America.

26. In other cases, a search for international solutions can allow the deep-rooted unrest expressed in the development of terrorism to be overcome. This is for instance the case of the Palestinians who are liable to continue to find new ways of endangering both individuals and international order if by some means or another they are not given the possibility of becoming citizens with full rights in some part of the Middle East.

27. As soon as problems of this kind arise, they are of direct concern to the WEU Council in accordance with Article VIII of the treaty, which requests the Council "to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability". But they concern it by virtue of that political co-operation which the governments are currently trying to develop in wider frameworks than WEU.

28. But there is another aspect of the fight against terrorism which must not be neglected, i.e. the defence of persons first but also of economic, military and, nowadays, above all nuclear installations against possible action by terrorist movements. It is this defence which is covered by Article V of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty.

29. In this report there can therefore be no question of considering either long-term preventive measures consisting of eliminating the underlying reasons for revolt which may be found in our society or the international problems which make people find no other means of asserting their national claims than recourse to terrorism. Nor will consideration be given to the form which might or should be taken by a policy of repression with its legal implications, since the Council of Europe is responsible for this. But the Brussels Treaty encourages us to consider the means of action and of coming to grips with terrorism employed by member countries, i.e. defence policy as it appears necessary when confronted with international terrorism.

30. When terrorist acts first began, each country had to take the most appropriate measures to overcome local problems without worrying about co-ordinating their efforts. Use was made of existing police forces which, whenever necessary, were given wider duties and more staff. But the increase in terrorist acts has made a major

development of passive and active defence measures essential.

31. Where passive defence is concerned, it is first a matter of coming to grips with piracy in the air, which grew considerably as from 1970. Airports and runways had to be guarded and passengers searched to prevent them carrying arms and explosives. This required a large number of staff who have been progressively provided with ever more advanced methods of detection.

32. But a number of attacks made it evident that such measures could not suffice if taken in only one country and that they could be effective only if the same measures were taken everywhere. Each time a country lagged behind in applying preventive measures of passive defence, it served as the point of departure for terrorist commando units which could operate in aircraft belonging to airlines from other countries. In turn, France, Greece and Spain, which had not yet felt the direct effects of international terrorism, served as a point of departure for terrorist commando units which were guilty of serious misdeeds elsewhere and in the end they were compelled to adopt measures in line with those taken in other countries.

33. The practice of taking hostages and assassinating politicians raises problems which are far more difficult to solve. Attacks on diplomatic missions have compelled accrediting and host countries to agree to co-ordinate passive defence measures without harming rights and prerogatives on either side. The assassinations carried out in Germany by the anarchist group formerly led by Andreas Baader on the one hand forced an increase in the number of identity control measures and on the other hand the large-scale deployment of heavily-armed police forces in towns, intensified protection of all the country's nerve centres and particularly its capital and finally an increase in the number of bodyguards attached to a very large number of persons.

34. To date, these measures have remained specific to certain countries, but they are tending to grow, particularly since it has become apparent that terrorist groups make use of the ease with which European states' frontiers can be crossed nowadays to organise their attacks from without, to go abroad after the attacks have been carried out and sometimes even to hold hostages abroad. For instance, the body of Hans Martin Schleyer, kidnapped in Germany in September 1977, was found in France and it would appear that the murder of two Swiss police officials near the Swiss, German and French frontiers in recent months can be attributed to terrorist groups. In short, the defence of persons too implies increased measures and agreement between the various European countries to prevent what has become too difficult on the territory of one of them being perpetrated on the territory of another. As far

as possible, such co-operation should be extended beyond Europe's boundaries, as demonstrated by the recent discovery of German and Swiss terrorists in Egypt.

35. Military installations have always been guarded. However, they are now a frequent target of terrorist groups, either because they wish to show their hostility towards the military organisation of Europe and particularly NATO (this apparently explains a number of attacks on American servicemen or NATO installations in the Federal Republic) or because they allow arms, explosives or munitions to be procured. Here too it is important for measures to be adequate everywhere, for arms stolen in one country can perfectly well be used in another in view of the permeability of frontiers.

36. Finally, economic installations, whatever they may be, are also targets for international terrorism, because they are of considerable value, because money can be stolen directly from them, because their destruction involves very heavy expenditure for the country where they are installed or finally because of the spectacular nature of such acts of destruction which constitute instruments of propaganda in favour of the cause upheld by the terrorists. Thus, in France, regionalist movements have attacked television relay stations, expensive installations whose destruction cannot pass unnoticed by the population of entire regions. There can of course be no question of protecting all economic installations, but the number of protected premises has had to be increased, armed guards surrounding those which are the most sensitive.

37. The increasing number of nuclear installations in Europe since the oil crisis in October 1973 is liable to provide terrorists with choice targets, either to enable them to seize means of carrying out nuclear explosions or in order to make the population tremble at the risk of the plant itself exploding. It would therefore seem essential, even before there has been a serious terrorist attack on a nuclear plant in Western Europe, to surround such plants with powerful security systems. Any government which allowed fissile material to be seized would bear very heavy responsibility vis-à-vis the whole of international society. It is essential for this point to be borne in mind when working out any programme for developing output of nuclear energy or selling power stations abroad: such installations imply permanent and stringent security measures and any seller of power stations must ensure that purchasing countries do not merely take all measures necessary for the technical security of the plant but also all the passive defence measures required by the potential danger of terrorist action against it. Here again, an international "code of good conduct" for both sellers and buyers is essential, even if preparing

and respecting it were to hold up the development of nuclear energy throughout the world.

38. It is to be assumed that the governments' reports to the WEU Council with regard to "internal defence and police forces" have referred to an increase in forces assigned by certain countries to the police for defence against terrorist activities.

39. So far, active defence has not necessitated the deployment of comparable forces, but their importance must not be overlooked. In fact, most western countries have acquired special police forces prepared to intervene at very short notice to destroy terrorist commando units in action. The Entebbe affair, during which an Israeli force of this kind overcame with practically no loss of human life a particularly dangerous terrorist commando unit which benefited from the complicity of an African state, encouraged the spread of such forces which are now available in most of our countries. The Mogadishu affair, when a group of experts from the Federal Republic overcame within minutes the terrorists who had hijacked an aircraft and its passengers, showed the effectiveness of measures of this kind. Their intervention implies considerable logistic resources and may raise special legal problems since the speed and effectiveness of their action in this case takes priority over all other considerations. Moreover, the use of such forces outside national territory involves a number of risks which should be considered, among European countries at least, to ascertain how they might be avoided or limited.

40. The most delicate problems of course stem from attacks on aircraft or diplomatic missions: is it for the country to which the aircraft or embassy belongs to take on the intervention and decide whether it is necessary? On the contrary, should the country on whose territory the attack takes place assume responsibility for this decision and its implementation? There are many examples of various kinds of solution in recent history, but no clear conclusion can be drawn. Each new affair makes consultations between the governments concerned necessary at very short notice, with all the misunderstanding and hazards implied by carrying out such a delicate task. The result is sometimes pointless tension between states which, being victims of the same terrorist act, should stand together to retaliate. But prior consultations covering matters relating to the deployment of these active defence forces should enable fuller and more rapid agreement to be reached when the time comes to act. This is what the WEU Council appeared to have understood when, in 1970, it began to study measures to be taken in the event of attacks on civilian aircraft and diplomatic missions.

41. From all these considerations, it follows that practically no aspect of the fight against ter-

rorism can remain the affair of a single state. Insofar as terrorist acts have no frontiers, defence too must overcome frontiers if it is to prove effective, which is possible only after agreement between governments.

#### **IV. Internal defence and police forces**

42. While the needs of the action require co-ordinated efforts by European countries in this field, there are other considerations which cannot be overlooked in international co-operation in internal defence matters. These include the danger which in itself may be presented by excessive inflation of the numbers of police, uniformed or not, and to an even greater extent an increase in the amount of action taken by the police, however necessary it may be.

43. Everyone knows how a force responsible for keeping order, and above all having an active rôle to play in re-establishing order, may be tempted to give priority to this task over everything else. There have been frequent cases of such forces going too far, which is liable to give rise to an obsession of fear throughout the population due not only to terrorism itself but even more to protective anti-terrorist measures.

44. There is no doubt that a government faced with a serious terrorist crisis is obliged to deploy forces on a large scale to meet it. It is generally encouraged by public opinion, struck by the spectacular aspect of many terrorist attacks. But by doing so it plays the game of the terrorists, who aim at magnifying their own importance, representativeness and power among public opinion. This would appear to endorse the views of those who justify terrorism, accusing the lawful authorities of being excessively repressive and violating the principles which they claim to be upholding by their anti-terrorist measures and the brutality, sometimes exaggerated, of the special intervention forces. Finally, in the long run retaliation which uses over-strong, too visible and too unscrupulous means is liable to lead to results which are the reverse of those sought and sometimes achieved in the short run: far from discouraging terrorism, they encourage it. It is difficult to insist that a government, when dealing with a crisis which the country's public opinion finds serious, show all the care, lucidity and moderation necessary when countering terrorism.

45. Neighbouring countries may sometimes be more composed about and have a more aloof view of the situation, which allows them too to weigh up the dangers involved in these terrorist acts and the danger of such a deployment of forces. Thus, the WEU Council's discussion

should not be limited to approving without deliberation the level of internal defence forces notified by each member state nor consist merely of mutual encouragement to increase such forces but should be a serious study of the problems encountered by each country and the means used to solve them, which in certain cases should not preclude an appeal to moderation in their deployment. Similarly, the tasks entrusted to special groups responsible for active defence work ought to be studied at the same time as their strengths, armaments and methods of action, with a view to possible co-ordination of their work whenever necessary but also in order to put governments on their guard against possible excesses committed by such groups. So in this connection the WEU Council should discuss not only strengths but also the requirements, deployment and tasks of the various elements making up these internal defence and police forces with a view to co-ordinating their activities.

46. The apparently formal and routine nature of meetings of the WEU Council where reports on member countries' forces are "examined" and in any event approved might have been appropriate at a time when these forces and their tasks varied little and raised few problems in view of the rôle played in this respect by NATO, but this is not at all the case nowadays in view of the increase in these forces and the tasks entrusted to them since international terrorism assumed a new dimension in about 1970.

47. For example, the large-scale deployment of police in the Federal Republic following acts by anarchist groups on its territory in recent years has certainly often been misunderstood and ill-appreciated by public opinion in other European countries, less sensitive to the danger represented by terrorism in Germany than the latter's own public opinion and the government, but more sensitive to the terrifying nature of this police deployment. This is a cause of mistrust and misunderstanding between our countries and the WEU Council might help to dispel it if it quite simply played its rôle by applying both the letter and the spirit of the Brussels Treaty.

48. But the aim of this report is not to accuse the Council but to urge and if possible bring about a true dialogue between the Council and the Assembly on a matter which is within their field of responsibilities and competence, where both pursue identical objectives clearly based on application of the treaty. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that the Committee propose that the Council deal with matters relating to measures taken or to be taken to counter international terrorism at the next joint meeting between the Council and the General Affairs Committee.

***International terrorism***

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**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Hardy***

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In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4.

*Signed : Hardy*

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1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

**19th June 1978**

***International terrorism***

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**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. van den Bergh***

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In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "through asylum or otherwise".

*Signed : Stoffelen, van den Bergh*

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1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment negatived).

***International terrorism***

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**AMENDMENT No. 3<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Calamandrei and others***

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In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "anarchist, nationalist, regionalist or other organisations" and insert "organisations of any denomination".

*Signed : Calamandrei, Bernini, Antoni, Rubbi*

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1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***International terrorism***

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**AMENDMENT No. 4 <sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Calamandrei and others***

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In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "only" and insert "also".

*Signed : Calamandrei, Bernini, Antoni, Rubbi*

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1. See 4th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***European security and African problems***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee <sup>2</sup>***  
***by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur***

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APPENDIX

Economic rôle of the South African Republic

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Ariosto, Beith (Alternate: Page), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bizet, Brugnon, Cermolacce, Faulds, Gessner, Gonella (Alter-

nate: Treu), Hanin (Alternate: Van Aal), Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank (Alternate: Voogd), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: Van Waterschoot), Mende, Minnoeci, Mommersteeg, Müller, Périquier, Perin, Portheine, Reddemann, Segre, Urwin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*



***Draft Recommendation***  
***on European security and African problems***

The Assembly,

Considering that co-operation between Western Europe and the African countries is essential to the security of Europe and the necessary economic development of Africa ;

Welcoming the determination constantly expressed by African states to settle problems between themselves free from intervention by powers outside the continent of Africa ;

Noting nevertheless that unrest in the African continent has often provided an opportunity or pretext for external intervention ;

Considering that respect for the sovereignty of African states remains a basic goal of any European policy ;

Regretting that the political framework inherited from the colonial period is ill-adapted to ethnic, linguistic and religious realities ;

Considering that Europe should contribute fully to the economic, social and cultural development of Africa ;

Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms by some African governments ;

Condemning the policy of apartheid pursued by the South African Republic as contrary to the principles of democracy and human rights on which western civilisation is based,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that its members hold continuing consultations in the most appropriate framework with a view to co-ordinating their African policies ;
2. Co-ordinate the efforts of its members to assist in establishing peace and security in southern Africa in order to establish a just and democratic transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, induce the South African Republic to terminate apartheid and promote the independence of Namibia ;
3. Initiate steps to reduce the present level of arms sales from external countries to Africa ;
4. Study means of achieving a strict limitation of such sales, including enforcement of the embargo on arms supplies to the South African Republic ;
5. Approach other arms suppliers with a view to their participating in this undertaking ;
6. Reconsider policies of investment and technology transfer in South Africa and Rhodesia which might render ineffective the embargo on supplies of military equipment in that they strengthen the industrial potential of these countries ;
7. Link the assistance Europe extends to the African states with the respect they show for human rights ;
8. Promote through co-operation with African states their economic and social development, as well as their democratic development, with due respect for human rights ;
9. Foster the development of co-operation between Europe and Africa as defined in the Lomé Convention ;
10. Condemn the repeated military operations across the borders of South Africa and Rhodesia ;
11. Condemn any aggressive military intervention in Africa, particularly the present Cuban operations ;
12. Promote the implementation by European firms operating in Africa of the code of conduct adopted by the EEC.

**Explanatory Memorandum**  
(submitted by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur)

**I. The African continent's importance for Western Europe**

1. Since the nineteenth century, the African continent has been of considerable importance to Europe. In the nineteenth century in particular, Africa's economic value led to colonial expansion by a number of European powers which, by the twentieth century, covered almost the entire continent.

2. The end of the colonial empires after the second world war did not stop the flow of trade, which has developed still further since Africa has proved to be a source of a number of raw materials and foodstuffs consumed in large quantities in Europe. There are vast oil reserves, particularly in the Algerian and Libyan Sahara and in Nigeria. There are uranium reserves in Central and Southern Africa which Europe will find even more essential in the coming years since nuclear energy will be playing a more important rôle in industry. Finally, where non-ferrous metals are concerned, Africa supplies particularly large quantities of gold, copper and manganese, which are in very short supply in Europe.

3. Conversely, the present low level of industrialisation in Africa makes it a worthwhile customer for European industry offering outlets which will increase in time insofar as Africa manages to overcome its economic and technical underdevelopment. Economic association between Europe and Africa is not therefore solely the result of colonial relationships but something of a geographical necessity, particularly as Africa is closer to Western Europe than any other continent.

4. But it is not only for economic reasons that Europe cannot sever its ties with the African continent. Indeed, the latter plays an essential rôle in Europe's security now that military threats are no longer localised. Africa controls the whole southern shore of the Mediterranean, the eastern shores of the Atlantic and the western shores of the Indian Ocean. Its three maritime fronts would thus allow any adversary who might establish air or naval bases there to control shipping in the Atlantic and play an important rôle in the Indian Ocean, an essential launching base for American nuclear submarines which ensure Europe's security through their deterrent effect on the Soviet Union while giving the United States a second strike possibility in the event of the Soviet Union attempting a surprise nuclear attack on American territory.

5. In short, while the positive rôle of Africa in the West's defence policy remains secondary, the negative rôle it might play if it fell into the

hands of other powers would be considerable. For all these reasons, therefore, Europe should keep a close watch on present developments in Africa and ensure that the African continent does not swing over to the side of a potential enemy. Ensuring real independence for the African states concords with the political principles upheld by the West and the economic, political and strategic interests of Europe, now the colonial era is over.

6. This is the view of the EEC, which has constantly sought a policy of assistance to and co-operation with any African countries which so wish, granting them a major proportion of its development aid and concluding preferential trade agreements. In defence matters, on the other hand, the Western European countries have no similar policy since some of them are linked with African states by bilateral treaties which in effect are alliances; this applies in particular to several former colonial mother countries and some of their former colonies, although others considered it preferable not to shoulder any permanent commitments in Africa. Thus, some European countries maintain armed forces ready to intervene at short notice in Africa and which are sometimes stationed on African territory, whereas their European allies contemplate no such intervention whatever may happen. This leads to differences between the WEU countries' concepts of Europe's ability to promote the freedom of peoples and independence of states in Africa. For instance, there were differences when France supplied aid to Morocco for transporting troops and equipment to Zaïre in spring 1977. The French Government's claims to be acting on behalf of Europe were particularly groundless since, as far as your Rapporteur is aware, it had consulted none of its European partners before acting.

7. In short, although to some extent the Western European countries have common views and interests which favour political, economic and social stability in Africa and real independence for the African states, this has produced no joint policy, outside the economic field, nor even mutual support, apparently due to insufficient consultation. On the other hand, in economic matters the Lomé Convention of 28th February 1975, which associates forty-three states with the European Community, thirty-seven of which are African<sup>1</sup>, is a particularly important example of

1. Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zambia, Zaïre.

co-operation because it recognises and develops reciprocal interests. It mainly concerns poor countries largely dependent on agriculture and guarantees them markets at sufficiently profitable prices. For these weaker states, it is their only guarantee against price fluctuations and the only way they can protect their economy.

8. The convention's main provisions covered :

- (i) the granting by the Community of duty-free access to all industrial and to 96 % of agricultural imports from signatory countries ;
- (ii) the creation of an export stabilisation scheme guaranteeing the exporting countries a certain level of income ;
- (iii) increased development aid ;
- (iv) increased co-operation ;
- (v) the creation of bodies to provide the institutional framework for the agreement.

9. The agreement is to remain in force until 28th February 1980, only the provisions on sugar being subject to revision at an earlier date.

10. This agreement meets a number of the African states' requirements. It is certainly not in the short-term interests of the European states but it is in the common interest for the African continent to develop rapidly and in a balanced manner.

11. Clearly the maintenance or re-establishment of close links between Europe and many African countries involves far-reaching economic obligations for Europe, particularly since several countries in Western Africa along the Gulf of Guinea coast from Senegal to Guinea Bissau have been experiencing an unprecedented food crisis for several years due to drought which, since 1973, has repeatedly plagued the Sahel area affecting more than thirty million inhabitants.

12. At the beginning of March 1978, the FAO estimated the food deficit in this area at not less than 600,000 tons and needs are becoming increasingly urgent. Assistance pledged so far falls far short of this figure, yet already in September 1977 countries in the area started to call attention to the tragic situation they foresaw for spring 1978. The most seriously-affected countries are probably the Cape Verde Islands, Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali and Upper Volta, but Niger, Chad, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Cameroun are also threatened by the spread of the desert. Livestock is dying off everywhere and cereal crops and basic produce for the food industries have dropped sharply.

13. For instance, in 1977 the cereal crop in Mauritania was only 30% of its usual volume and in Senegal 50%. Similarly, Senegal's groundnut crop in 1977 was only 40% of its 1976 production. The consequences are twofold : first, the overall population of the Sahel needs immediate assistance in food supplies, particularly cereals ; second, there is an economic loss due to the fact that the economy of these countries is based mainly on agricultural produce, and practically just groundnuts in the case of Senegal.

14. It would therefore be essential for Europe to make every effort to grant these countries compensation for their economic loss which leaves them unable to muster the necessary investments for developing their economy and, as a matter of urgency, it should afford assistance in the form of foodstuffs. Indeed, talk of economic solidarity with Africa is meaningless if not accompanied by large-scale and effective assistance when the African countries associated with the European Communities most need it.

## II. The internal situation

15. The present-day political geography of Africa is strongly marked by the colonial period. Before colonisation by Europe there were few real states in Africa and the present frontiers are a result of the division of African territory between the colonial powers.

16. Very few countries have any ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious unity. Most of them group several peoples and inter-state frontiers often divide the same people, which has been a major source of instability and above all a permanent threat to the stability of the states concerned. Thus, the military operations opposing Zaïre and forces from Angola which invaded the province of Shaba at the beginning of 1977 took place in a region where political frontiers divide several ethnic groups living in both countries. Similarly, many of the difficulties now facing Ethiopia stem from the division of the Somali people between several states and the fact that in certain states several peoples have been brought together who have never been on good terms. Everywhere this fundamental instability makes it difficult to achieve the consensus which is needed for the stability of political régimes in many African countries and is a source of strong temptation to them to intervene in the internal affairs of neighbouring states.

17. Thus, the notion of interference in the internal affairs of states does not mean exactly the same as in other continents since frontiers are often contested, ill-defined and, particularly in regions such as the Sahara, where nomadic customs persist, barely respected by the populations themselves.

18. As soon as they became independent, the African states as shaped by the colonial divisions agreed to base their relationships on the maintenance of states and frontiers inherited from colonial days. This was the basic principle of the constitutive charter of the Organisation of African Unity adopted in Addis Ababa on 25th May 1963. Until quite recently this principle was quite well respected, but it is apparent that it is now being called in question in several regions. For instance, Libya is now occupying a fringe of territory which had been attributed to Chad. Similarly, when Spain withdrew from the Western Sahara, Morocco and Mauritania shared the territory, which led to disturbances which are still far from settled. Many African states therefore no longer feel secure because they know their neighbours can lay claim to one or another portion of their territory and in many cases with the support of part of the population. This has involved them in an arms race which has been most evident in recent years in West Africa, but which is also developing in North Africa, where Morocco and Algeria have acquired considerable military strength.

19. The Organisation of African Unity has constantly tried to impose the principle that the fate of Africa should, whatever the circumstances, remain in African hands. However, the conflicts and mistrust which have developed between African states mean that the OAU no longer affords the African states sufficient guarantees and they have formed other groups within the continent, turning increasingly to non-African powers in order to increase their influence or ensure their security.

### III. External interference

20. This takes very many forms, some being an aftermath of the colonial era in that the former colonial powers endeavoured and in many cases managed to maintain privileged relations with the territories of their former empires. The desire of certain African states to escape from what they considered to be the excessive influence of the former colonial powers led them to seek support elsewhere. Thus, the United States played an important rôle in the fighting which followed the decolonisation of the Congo. But the Soviet Union in turn has intervened to strengthen the positions of those African states which sought to break away more completely from the domination of the former colonial powers and this has resulted in the rivalry between the two great powers being extended to the African continent. Finally, the rapid increase in wealth in certain Arab countries and Iran since 1973 and the parallel development of their military strength give them an increasingly important rôle in the East African balance. In particular, they seem

to have strongly encouraged Somalia's action against Ethiopia in 1977.

21. So far, the influence of the Soviet Union has not resulted in any permanent foothold, and its diplomatic activity in Africa may be considered above all as an attempt to weaken western positions, thus harming world capitalism, rather than an attempt to set up communist régimes. However, the considerable development of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean in recent years gives reason to fear that the Soviet Union may endeavour to set up bases in the area and extend its economic, ideological, political and military influence.

22. In 1977, there was some development in American policy inasmuch as President Carter clearly showed that he did not intend the United States to intervene directly in Africa. Thus, he allowed a government to be set up in Angola which received aid and arms from outside and did nothing to ensure the defence of Zaïre when it was invaded by forces from Angola.

23. However, at the beginning of 1978, in connection with the Ethiopian affair, the American administration showed that it did not intend to allow the Soviet Union to take advantage of political instability to gain a foothold and alter the shape of the map. An understanding was reached between the Soviets and the Americans that the Ethiopian offensive with Cuban assistance and Soviet arms should not be carried into Somali territory but should merely re-establish the *status quo ante*. The Soviet Union, which could perhaps have hoped to take advantage of the Ethiopian offensive to gain their revenge on the Somali Government which had expelled its Soviet technical advisers in 1977, abided by this understanding and there is now a chance that the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia will culminate in a reversion to the frontiers as they were before decolonisation, neither side being the winner. The recent coup d'Etat in Somalia perhaps means however that the Soviet Union is resuming control.

24. The Angolan affair was considered very important by many African governments because they felt it was a challenge to the West's determination to keep Africa free of Russian or Chinese intervention. China too pursues an active policy on the shores of the Indian Ocean. It co-operates closely, particularly with Tanzania, most of whose arms it supplied, although it is not possible to speak of direct military intervention by China, any more than in the case of the Soviet Union which, even in Angola, seems to have relied on Cuban forces to ensure that its side won.

25. In all, and although no official statistics have been published, the number of Cubans engaged in Africa has been estimated at more than 30,000 and sometimes even as many as 70,000, most

being in Angola but some 10,000 in Ethiopia where there are reports that wholly Cuban units have taken part in the fighting against Somalia. In other countries the numbers involved in Cuban co-operation seem to be rather less and restricted to non-military activities. There are certainly far less Soviet advisers but about 1,000 are reported in Ethiopia.

26. According to recent information, a Cuban organisation, "The Che Guevara International Pedagogical Brigade", is believed to have placed 1,000 teachers in Angola when the school term began on 1st April 1978, which would imply ideological penetration in depth by Cuba in Angola.

27. Future relations between Europe and Africa may therefore be in doubt because of external intervention on the African continent and this can but have major repercussions on both the economy and the security of Europe.

28. However, attempts by certain African countries such as Tanzania, Algeria, Tunisia and Mozambique to organise their economies along "socialist" lines adapted to the characteristics of African society must not be considered as the result of external interference. On the contrary, greater economic strength and some balance in the division of wealth are elements of stability and independence worthy of encouragement.

29. It is not possible however to overlook the important advantages stemming from this situation for the African countries which have elected to maintain close co-operation with Western Europe. One of the most remarkable cases in this respect is that of the Ivory Coast which, thanks to the development of its sales of agricultural produce, has obtained one of the highest GNP growth rates in Africa and seems about to emerge from the status of underdevelopment.

#### IV. Southern African problems

30. The most serious problem in present-day Africa arises from the presence and policy of the white-dominated South African Republic at the southernmost tip of Africa. For a long time, it had the support of most western powers, which looked upon it as a major economic partner, a bastion of western civilisation standing in the way of the threats now hanging over the African continent and occupying an essential strategic position between the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic, particularly at a time when oil from the Arabian-Persian Gulf had to be routed via the Cape because of the closing of the Suez Canal.

31. However, the policy of racial discrimination has had effects which jeopardise the very objectives of western policy in Africa. The majority of African states find such a policy intolerable

because they view it as the prolongation and aggravation of the colonial régime in forms most unacceptable to the African peoples leading to permanent opposition between black and white with world-wide repercussions.

32. There are now two things at stake in the unrest in southern Africa. First, there is the question whether the future of the white inhabitants who settled in that part of the world is in remaining in the territories they have been developing for several centuries. But the question also arises as to what extent the black and white populations can cohabit on an equal footing after the minority element has dominated the majority for so long. It is thus a major problem which is raised on the basis of a number of seemingly minor matters. In fact, the fate of the government of Rhodesia and Namibia depends to a very large extent on the strength and will of the South African Republic.

33. It is evident that while all the Western European countries condemn the very principle of apartheid it would be easier to fight it effectively if the governments in power in other parts of Africa showed greater determination to ensure respect for human rights within their frontiers. Recent massacres in Burundi, persecutions and massacres of Christians in the southern Sudan, torture in Equatorial Guinea and despotism in Uganda considerably diminish the strength of any complaints these countries may make about South Africa and to some extent explain why the white population of South Africa is against any move to bring them under the domination of the black majority.

#### A. The Rhodesian problem

34. This problem began twelve years ago. Rhodesia has a population of more than six million, only 270,000 of whom are white. It was the white population that terminated British colonisation and seized power in a country where they formed only a very small minority. The Rhodesian Government succeeded in recruiting among the black population certain units for its army which for several years has been fighting the rebellion of the Patriotic Front, which aims to set up a new African-dominated state on the territory of what is now Rhodesia : Zimbabwe.

35. Without delving into the history of the difficult relations between the Rhodesian Government and its African neighbours and the United Kingdom, your Rapporteur merely wishes to recall that during summer 1977 the United States and the United Kingdom informed Mr. Ian Smith's government of a plan to re-establish peace in Rhodesia. This plan implied the withdrawal of Mr. Smith's government and its replacement for six months by a British administrator in Salis-

bury. The government armed forces and those of the Patriotic Front were to be disbanded and replaced by an independent peacekeeping force in which Nigeria, Canada and India might participate. The British administrator was to arrange free elections based on the principle of equal voting rights for all persons and the government resulting from these elections was to organise a new Rhodesian army. Finally, a fund of \$500 million was to be set up to guarantee the property of the white population while the black population's adhesion to the new régime was to have been facilitated by a \$1,000 million development fund which would have been granted in exchange for a guarantee of constitutional order ensuring freedom for all.

36. This Anglo-American initiative was turned down by the white government of Rhodesia which insisted on special representation for white residents, particular guarantees for the independence of the administration, police and army and restrictions on the application of universal suffrage. But one result was that the Rhodesian Government started its own direct negotiations with representatives of the black majority within the country. Thus, while the British and Americans were negotiating in Dar es Salaam with the exiled opponents of the Rhodesian régime, on 3rd March 1978 an internal agreement was established between Mr. Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole and Chief Chirau. The agreement signed in Salisbury provided for the formation of a four-member executive Council and a ministerial council in association with the British Resident Commissioner to lead the country to independence. In these bodies, blacks and whites were to be on an equal footing pending the end of a transitional period on 31st December 1978 after which a black majority assembly should be set up. The Salisbury agreement was not recognised by a large part of the Patriotic Front forces, nor by the neighbouring states with the exception of South Africa and there is every indication that its application would not put an end to the increasing guerrilla warfare in the country. That is probably why the United Kingdom and the United States have continued their efforts to find a satisfactory solution to the Rhodesian problem in spite of the signing of this agreement.

37. At the beginning of April, Mr. Cyrus Vance, United States Secretary of State, and Mr. David Owen, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, went to Rhodesia to consult the representatives of the Rhodesian executive council and of the Patriotic Front which directs the guerrillas from the outside. Reports following this visit indicate that each side preferred to take part in a broader conference grouping all those concerned. However, the signatories of the Salisbury agreement of 3rd March seem in no way prepared to allow this agreement to be

questioned, whereas the representatives of the Rhodesian guerrilla, Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo, who met Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen in Dar es Salaam, seem firmly opposed to any statute for Rhodesia guaranteeing the survival of the white minority. They are claiming a dominating position for the Patriotic Front in the future Zimbabwe state which means, at least as Mr. Mugabe sees it, a single party system.

38. Thus the prospect of a broader conference at the end of April between the various parties concerned now seems highly unlikely and there is every sign that it will be a long time before a satisfactory agreement can be reached allowing peace to be established in Rhodesia. It should be added that even before its first meeting on 20th April 1978, the Rhodesian executive council ran up against a number of differences over the respective powers of black and white ministers.

39. The Rhodesian Patriotic Front forces have their bases in Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia. This has induced the Rhodesian forces to make several incursions into the territories of the latter two countries causing considerable damage and loss of life. These occurrences were instrumental in making the Zambian Government and President Kaunda, who was one of the leaders of the area who entertained the best relations with the countries of the West, to threaten in turn a reversal of alliances and an appeal to the Soviet Union to obtain the arms they needed to meet this danger. Thus, unless the West is very careful, the evolution of the Rhodesian situation might help to worsen the situation throughout southern Africa by encouraging the birth of a group of pro-communist African states face to face with white South Africa which would in no way facilitate a peaceful evolution in the area towards a political system acceptable to all.

40. In fact, Rhodesia's fate seems to depend essentially on the external support its government receives from outside. Although it was difficult to achieve a united western front to ensure respect for a trade embargo intended to bring pressure to bear on the Rhodesian Government, it seems that Mr. Smith's government can no longer expect direct assistance from any European government, particularly if it rejects the Anglo-American plan.

41. No great results are to be expected however from the boycott measures since they are applied very unevenly by both eastern and western countries. There have even been cases of "socialist" countries serving as intermediaries between western countries and Rhodesia. For instance, it has been claimed that Yugoslavia sold, at world rates, butter purchased at cut price from the EEC, the Soviet Union is said to have sold to the

United States chromium imported from Rhodesia, and China to have sold Rhodesian tobacco.

42. The government's survival therefore depends mainly on South African assistance. But South Africa seems to have two ways of looking at the problems. On the one hand, Rhodesia is seen as the forward bastion of the white cause in southern Africa, which would induce South Africa to give the Rhodesian Government unconditional support. On the other hand is the acknowledged fact that Rhodesia is at present facing problems which are unknown in South Africa and an understanding with the western powers or a certain number of African States which might involve abandoning Rhodesia might strengthen South African positions.

43. There is thus some ambiguity in South Africa's attitude towards the Rhodesian problem and it is anxious to demonstrate that there is absolutely no connection with the problems peculiar to the South African Republic. So far, the South African Government has always refused to bring any pressure whatsoever to bear on the Rhodesian authorities, but it would appear that in April 1978 Mr. Botha, South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, did not refuse Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen the support they requested, since he recalled that South Africa had always favoured a solution likely to secure wider international recognition of Rhodesia and that the South African Government would foster the creation of the right conditions for a peaceful solution.

#### **B. The problem of Namibia**

44. South-West Africa, a former German colony, was entrusted by League of Nations mandate to the then South African Union after the first world war. When the United Nations decided to terminate this mandate and make South-West Africa independent, South Africa unilaterally annexed the territory, thus placing considerable strain on relations between many African countries and South Africa and also between those countries and the western powers, which were accused of being accomplices in the South African action.

45. The result was to further justify the retaliatory measures against South Africa and the boycott recommended by the United Nations General Assembly. Although such recommendations are not binding, they have been respected by certain countries. The fact that several European governments have not respected them, however, has been partly responsible for the deterioration of their relations with many African countries. During his visit to southern Africa in August 1977, Mr. de Guiringaud, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, ascertained that France's policy towards South Africa, to which it has sold arms and where it is to build several

nuclear power stations, has aroused strong hostility among the black states in the region. However, in September 1977 the South African Government decided to take steps to make Namibia independent and appointed an administrator-general for this purpose. But the guerrilla warfare being waged in the north of the country by the SWAPO did not stop and on 27th March 1978 Chief Herero Clemens Kapuuo, Leader of the Democratic Alliance, was assassinated. This led to further tension and on 18th March the South African administrator-general re-established the legal South African régime which had been terminated a few months earlier. Furthermore, at the end of April 1978 the United Nations General Assembly discussed the Namibian affair. A plan for a settlement covering the transitional period leading to independence for Namibia on 31st December 1978 was submitted by five western countries and agreed to by the parties concerned. But on 28th April the SWAPO insisted on the negotiations being reopened since it was against Walvis Bay remaining under South African sovereignty and South African forces being kept in northern Namibia until the election of the future Constituent Assembly. In the circumstances, one may wonder whether it will be possible to organise independence within the prescribed time limit.

#### **C. The South African problem**

46. In South Africa itself the numerical balance between the various elements of the population swings less against the white population than in Rhodesia, there being 4.3 million whites compared with 22 million blacks, Indians or coloured. The latter large minorities further complicate the confrontation between black and white populations.

47. Despite a régime which radically separates the various elements of the population, heightening the considerable economic disparities between them, the South African Government has for many years managed to maintain peace within its frontiers. But it is pursuing an increasingly repressive policy which can but lead to increased tension. To meet demands for independence, the government has set up autonomous black states (Bantustans), which are generally located in the poorer regions where few whites had settled. However, for the last few years South Africa has been having internal difficulties, particularly in the suburbs of large cities, and disturbances are increasingly frequent. In August 1977, a large number of black secondary schools and universities had to be closed by the government.

48. South Africa has such economic and military strength that even with the support of neighbouring black countries the native populations have little hope of achieving even their most



rightful claims without the co-operation of the whole international community.

49. The South African Government's present threat to acquire nuclear weapons would appear to demonstrate its determination to resist any intervention from without and at all costs maintain a régime of white domination over the black element. For the first time, however, this threat appears to have given rise to a unanimous reaction among the western powers, which are showing their radical opposition to the use of this means of intimidation. But there is little doubt that South Africa would use every means available to ensure its security if it found itself completely abandoned by the West. But there are signs that South Africa's aim is now economic autarky which would shelter it from external pressure and the white population, thus hemmed in, would feel itself less influenced by views from outside.

50. Southern Africa is therefore the most important area of tension on the African continent and there is every reason to foresee a considerable increase in tension in the coming months and years to the point that, although South Africa does not seem seriously threatened at present, no guarantee can be given of its longer-term survival.

51. This situation raises a number of problems for all the western powers, particularly as to the steps they can and should take with regard to the South African Republic, which is a major economic partner for many of them and with which some, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, maintain a relationship based on common languages.

52. The "front-line" African states, i.e. those which have frontiers with South Africa, Rhodesia or Namibia, wish the investment and trade boycott of South Africa to be applied in full, very probably not only in order to impose their solution to the Rhodesian problem, obtain independence for Namibia and terminate racial discrimination in the South African Republic, but also to put an end to the domination of whites throughout southern Africa. They have received a certain amount of outside support, particularly from the Soviet Union and China, which have supplied arms to several of them (Tanzania and Zambia, for instance), and they have a strong majority in the United Nations. Moreover, all African countries have affirmed the principle of solidarity with the cause of the black population of southern Africa, although some are afraid that new communist régimes may be set up in southern Africa and stop well short of unconditional opposition to the South African Republic.

53. The western countries certainly agree that a solution should be found in Rhodesia and

Namibia which meets the claims of the African countries. They are not so unanimous when they envisage the consequences of a possible overthrow of the present régime in South Africa. Admittedly, they all feel that the policy of racial discrimination practised by the South African Government is morally unacceptable and endangers relations between Europe and Africa. But none of them has dared to consider openly the consequences of the black population assuming power in South Africa which might mean strongly anti-western forces being moved into this vital area. Thus, on 25th August 1977, Mr. Young, United States representative at the Lagos anti-apartheid conference, did not hesitate to warn the African countries against a policy of over-radical sanctions against South Africa, which he said might kill rather than cure the patient.

54. The principal aim of western pressure on South Africa was to induce it to halt its policy of annexation in Namibia, stop supporting the Rhodesian régime and transform its internal régime by giving equal treatment to blacks and whites. The policy pursued by South Africa in recent months with regard to Namibia and Rhodesia shows that this pressure was to no avail, but the results have also eliminated some of the more serious reasons for continuing to exert pressure. It must be borne in mind that if this pressure were to lead to the total isolation of South Africa and endanger the continued presence of the white element there, it would be going far beyond the intentions of many of those who called on the West to adopt a firm policy towards South Africa.

55. In short, it is most important for all members of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly the EEC countries which are endeavouring to work out a common policy for their relations with Africa, to hold close and frequent consultations on the action to be taken and also on the very aims of their policy so as to avoid hasty action which might compromise the permanent interests of Europe and the West and lead to a situation in Africa liable to harden positions or encourage intervention from without.

### ***V. Equatorial Africa***

56. Equatorial Africa is dominated by the former Belgian Congo, now Zaïre, which occupies a central position, covers a large area and has a population of 26 million. The West, and particularly the United States, made considerable efforts following the decolonisation of the Congo to maintain its territorial unity, which was threatened by a large number of internal and external forces working to break it up.

57. But when Portugal granted independence to Angola, several political organisations fought



for power until the MPLA won with the help of the Soviet Union. The régime set up in this region traversed by most of southern Zaïre's lines of communication with the Atlantic thus received considerable military assistance from the Soviet Union, particularly through the intermediary of Cuba which sent several thousand "volunteers" to Angola (more than 20,000 according to reliable sources). Nor does it seem, despite the presence of these Cuban forces, that the MPLA is able to exercise effective control over the whole country.

58. The régime which has been established in Mozambique moreover does not seem content, as is the case in many African countries, with developing the alliance with Moscow or Peking and purchasing arms from them. Recent information indicates that the aim is to impose a real economic and political dictatorship by authoritarian means.

59. Moreover, since relations between southern Zaïre and the Indian Ocean are controlled either by Tanzania, where there is a considerable Chinese presence, or by Mozambique, the former Katanga, the province with the largest copper and uranium reserves, was in danger of being asphyxiated, which explains why Zaïre assisted the opponents of the MPLA during the Angolan war of independence.

60. At the beginning of 1977, when President Mobuto's government in Zaïre appeared weakened by the effects of the world economic crisis, this province, now known as Shaba, was invaded by forces from Angola which threatened to cause a further split in Zaïre or to overthrow the régime. Finally, the Katanga "police force" seems to have returned to Angola. Zaïre received no direct assistance from the western powers apart from France's help in transporting Moroccan forces to Zaïre. During the crisis the United States did not wish to intervene on the side of the Zaïre régime as it had done fifteen years before.

61. It may be quite a reasonable policy to leave the Africans full responsibility for organising their security. In any event, the West should not act in disarray and through one country's unilateral action find itself involved in a political and military venture about which there had been no consultation or real consensus. Conversely, Europe cannot allow powers outside Africa to exploit internal African conflicts in order to establish an economic, political and military presence. In short, consultations with a view to joint action by the Western European countries should be essential in such circumstances.

## VI. North-West Africa

62. Frontiers between North-West African States are particularly precarious and question-

able because they mainly cut across desert areas inhabited by nomadic tribes over which the governments have little control. Since the end of French control in Algeria, the latter has had clashes with Morocco over the position of its western frontiers, and this dispute flared up again in 1976 after Spain granted independence to the western Sahara.

63. This region was shared between its two neighbours, Morocco and Mauritania, although at least part of the population (the Sahrawis) wished to remain independent. They formed the Polisario, which is waging guerrilla warfare against both Morocco and Mauritania. The latter, mainly desert, has very few armed forces and appears to be having great trouble resisting Polisario raids. Algeria supplies the Polisario with military assistance and also provides a base for the fighting or non-fighting elements responsible for the raids on Morocco and Mauritania. The seriousness of this affair stems *inter alia* from the fact that when Morocco and Mauritania shared the western Sahara they took no account of the principle that frontiers established in Africa during the colonial period should be maintained. Their action would have been justifiable only if there had been very wide agreement from the inhabitants of the western Sahara, which does not appear to have been the case.

64. The covert war being waged in this region is one reason for the serious tension between Algeria and its western neighbours, and the European countries interested in the exploitation of Mauritania's mineral resources may find themselves involved in this problem one way or another. This is particularly true of France, several of whose nationals have been kidnapped or killed during Polisario raids.

65. There is a similar problem in the frontier area between Libya and Chad. The Government of Chad has never had any real control over an immense territory consisting mainly of very sparsely populated desert. Northern Chad (the Tibesti area) and particularly the Toubou tribe have been in constant rebellion since Chad became independent. They are supported by Libya, which has territorial claims to the northern part of Chad of which it occupies a part. For several years France gave Chad military support in putting down the rebellion. It continues to supply Chad with military equipment and advisers and is thus indirectly involved in the conflict.

66. It is extremely difficult to assess how representative the Chad rebellion is compared with the N'Djamene government and to obtain an accurate picture of the positions occupied by the forces on either side. So far, action by non-African powers in the western Sahara and in Chad has been very limited, and it would probably be wiser for Western Europe to adopt a cautious wait-and-see attitude in both areas.

## VII. North-East Africa

67. Ethiopia, which is in the centre of this region, is its largest and most heavily-populated country. It might have been thought that its long history and the existence of a state reconstituted after the collapse of a brief Italian rule would have allowed it to evade the kind of challenges arising in states of colonial origin. This is not so. Ethiopia annexed the former Italian colony of Eritrea, where a major rebellion has progressively developed. As long as there was still a sufficiently strong régime in Addis Ababa, external powers refrained from intervening in Ethiopia. However, there was a growing number of revolts and Haile Selassie's régime proved increasingly incapable of maintaining internal order. When this régime collapsed and was replaced by a military directorate, the situation deteriorated still further. The rebellions spread to a very large part of the territory and in the Somali-populated south-east, support is received from Somalia, which in turn seems to be receiving considerable military and financial assistance from Saudi Arabia after previously having received support from the Soviet Union. In the early months of 1977, the insurgent Somalis and the regular forces of the Somali army occupied a large section of Ethiopian territory, including the Ogaden Plateau.

68. The former Eritrea is in full revolt and the French withdrawal from Djibouti in spring 1977 may give further extension to a conflict which stemmed partly from the wish of the Somali people to reconstitute a vast Somali empire covering present-day Somalia, Djibouti and a large part of Ethiopia. The Somali Government denies such expansionist aims but there can be no doubt that it was involved on the side of the revolt of the Somali people in Ethiopia. The West was not directly involved in the North-East African conflicts but the maintenance of a French force in Djibouti raises the question of how long it could avoid involvement should fighting continue.

69. Following the fall of Haile Selassie, Ethiopia turned to the Soviet Union for technical and military assistance. But until quite recently Somalia was also supported by the Soviet Union which provided it with weapons too. In the circumstances, it is therefore the Soviet Union which is making the greatest effort to re-establish peace between its allies. It announced in September 1977 that it would no longer supply arms to Somalia, but it has supplied increasing quantities to Ethiopia and the Cuban "volunteers" fighting with the Ethiopian army and has sent a large number of technical advisers to Ethiopia. By the beginning of 1978, it at least seems to have managed — in response to American requests — to halt Ethiopian counter-offensives on the Somali frontier, thus preserving the

chances of a return to peace based on the *status quo ante*.

70. Furthermore, in the next few years, all the problems connected with East Africa may feel the repercussions of the considerable development of the wealth and power of certain Middle Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran. The reputation of the Arab countries which for a long time practised slave trading, probably leaves much to be desired in black Africa. But the vast sums they have accumulated from the sale of oil now allow them to provide large-scale development assistance to countries which are still very poor as Saudi Arabia has done in the Sudan and Kenya. They can also supply arms either to states or to insurgents and have very probably done so in Eritrea and Somalia. Finally, Iran is in the process of building up a powerful navy which will probably play a decisive rôle in the Indian Ocean in future years.

71. Such interventions at present favour conservative forces, particularly in Oman, where Iranian assistance has enabled the sultan to overcome the Dhofar revolt and in the Sudan, where Mr. Nemery's government seems to have abandoned its former radical positions.

72. But the indications are that African problems will slip increasingly away from the control of those who envisaged a continental order in Africa and will gradually find a point of balance controlled from outside Africa. The economic progress of certain Middle Eastern countries is already making them a pole of attraction for immigrant workers from Pakistan and Somalia. The control they can exercise over Red Sea and Arab-Persian Gulf issues is thereby becoming ever more real and they will probably soon be able to extend this control along the western shores of the Indian Ocean.

73. The Ethiopian affair may become particularly serious because it might be the start of a challenge to everything that seemed stable in Africa, particularly the principle of the intangibility of states and frontiers inherited from colonial times. Indeed, the situation in Ethiopia where different tribes, languages and religions are grouped together is to be found throughout the whole of Africa and has already led to disturbances and fighting as in Zaïre and Nigeria. But the case of Ethiopia is even more complicated by outside intervention and particularly by the flow of Arab money to Somalia.

## VIII. Western Europe's policy in Africa

74. A rapid review of developments on the African continent in recent years and the problems now facing it demonstrates the extreme complexity of the situation that has developed there. Over-simplified or over-hasty judgments such as

the classification of the African countries into supporters or opponents of the West, the Soviet Union or China are very misleading since the courses followed by those countries are always liable to change at very short notice as has often occurred in the past.

75. There is probably one permanent factor, i.e. the Africans' desire to settle African problems themselves. But even this principle, to which they all claim to be attached, is often infringed by the African states themselves and even more so by revolutionary movements endeavouring to change the status quo.

76. Faced with this extremely complex situation, Europe has the utmost difficulty in defining a meaningful policy. Several European states admittedly have an African policy but rare are those whose policy covers all African problems. Most have special relationships with a specific state or group of states and consider their action in Africa as a development of these connections.

77. In this respect, the EEC was perhaps for too long guided by the fact that, prior to the accession of the United Kingdom, France and Belgium played a major rôle in working out the Community's African policy. The Community was more concerned with northern, western and central Africa than with eastern and southern Africa. Western Europe's policy towards Africa should probably now be reviewed because the links between ex-colonial powers and some of their former colonies are more relaxed and greater interest is being taken in African problems, precisely because of the close relations between the EEC and Africa, by countries which had not played a major rôle in Africa in the early post-war years. Furthermore, the fact that Europe is seeking political unity means it should try to unify the policies of the separate European countries. Encouragement is to be found in the fact that Africa is essential to Europe and will be increasingly so insofar as the latter seeks a place in the economic, political and military balance of the world. The limited area covered by Western Europe, sadly lacking in raw materials, means that industrial and trade activities can be developed only in close association with a larger continent with greater resources but less geared to such activities.

78. Moreover, Europe's African policy cannot be seen in isolation from its general policy be it in economic matters or external policy and defence. A cursory review of Africa's present problems shows that all the forces now playing a rôle in the world have one or more points of contact on the African continent. It therefore seems increasingly difficult to uphold certain principles, in East-West relations in Europe, for instance, and at the same time act in a manner which is contrary to these principles in Africa. This is certainly true of the Soviet-Union's inter-

vention in Angola when it ignored the principles of non-intervention and respect for frontiers which it upheld in Europe in the framework of the CSCE.

79. But it also applies to the Western European countries which, in southern Africa, for instance, can hardly ignore breaches of human rights no less serious than those they denounce in the Soviet Union's application of the Helsinki third basket. Finally, it is quite evident that a European defence policy requires security of access to raw materials and lines of communication, which cannot be guaranteed if external powers install themselves on the African continent.

80. Again, Europe must fully realise the Africans' need for close co-operation. For the African countries, only such co-operation can compensate the disadvantages of very sharp fluctuations in the price of raw materials, exports of which are an essential part of their economy. They also know that their development, including their agriculture, cannot be satisfactorily pursued without continuing technical co-operation or even financial assistance from Europe, whose investments are often essential.

81. Thus, the idea sometimes expressed in the term "Eurafrica" must be retained. There must be no question of resuscitating an obsolete colonial system or again making Africa dependent on or subordinate to Europe. But underlying this notion is the idea of deep solidarity which neither side can avoid. The colonial past certainly still plays a major rôle, both positive and negative, in relations between Europeans and Africans, but it must not veil the fact that there are even earlier, and so to speak permanent, links between the two continents.

82. Nevertheless, while it is possible to define a few principles which should govern relations between Europe and Africa such as respect for human rights or non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, it is very difficult to translate these principles into a common policy.

83. Thus Europe is bound to take account of the special agreements associating certain Community members with certain African states. But because of these agreements it might find itself involved, as France was *inter alia* in the Chad conflict, on the side of established régimes which are also contested régimes and consequently have to take part in defending a political and territorial status quo which the African people find increasingly unacceptable and which would conform neither to the principles it claims to defend nor to its own true interests.

84. Nor, clearly, can it support or allow to develop revolutionary forces which sometimes have considerable ambitions but which may not necessarily be representative of the country as a whole. Naturally, the principle that it is for

the Africans to settle problems concerning their continent fully conforms to the interests of Europe, which would have nothing to gain from a military undertaking whose principal result would be to turn the Africans unanimously or almost unanimously against it. But full application of the principle of non-intervention would also involve dangers which would be the greater since external powers such as the Soviet Union and China have no compunction about intervening directly or indirectly according to the case.

85. Moreover, Europe is still the principal supplier of arms to Africa. Generally speaking, European arms are sold to states and not to insurgents and they should help to maintain a certain degree of stability. But in the event of civil war in those states or hostilities with their neighbours these sales of arms involve Europe in spite of itself in sometimes dubious and morally ill-founded complications.

86. At first sight therefore it seems impossible to define a policy which the European countries should follow in Africa. They must exercise great discernment and above all exchange information on a continuing basis about their respective interests and aims in order to avoid their legitimate interests bringing them into conflict or involving them in differences over which there has been no prior agreement.

87. Such consultations are held in the framework of the EEC where trade and economic and technical assistance are concerned. Views are not sufficiently concerted on political and military matters, as has been clearly demonstrated by events in recent months and the mistrust they have aroused between Western European countries. Now that African problems seem to be taking a more serious turn, it is primordial to call upon our governments to intensify such consultations.

APPENDIX

Economic rôle of the South African Republic

1. Share of South Africa in world mineral production and reserves

	Known reserves			Production			
	Tons	% of world reserves	World rank	Tons	% of world production	World rank	% of African production
Gold	15,000	49 %	1	713	59 %	1	94 %
Platinum and related metals	30,000	86 %	1	125	55 %	1	100 %
Vanadium	14,000,000	64 %	1	8,510	46 %	1	92 %
Antimony	200,000	4 %	5	15,173	21 %	1	87 %
Chromium	3,000,000,000	83 %	1	2,607,000	30 %	2	74 %
Manganese	3,000,000,000	48 %	1	5,900,000	24 %	2	73 %
Diamonds	10	7 %	2	1.5	17 %	3	20 %
Uranium	250,000	17 %	4	2,900	13 %	3	60 %
Asbestos	9,000,000	10 %	5	354,500	10 %	3	56 %
Nickel	5,000,000	10 %	3	20,750	3 %	7	62 %
Fluorine	200,000,000	46 %	1	202,580	5 %	8	62 %
Zinc	12,000,000	9 %	4	61,260	1 %	18	23 %

2. South Africa's customers (%)

1. Western Europe	55.2 %
of which { Federal Republic of Germany	18.2 %
{ United Kingdom	16.6 %
2. Japan	19.6%
3. United States	10.6 %
4. Africa	7.4 %
5. Canada	4.1 %

3. Oil transported via the cape route

596 million tons
65 % of Middle East oil exports
58 % of the oil tankers in commission
42 % of all oil transported by sea
65 % of the oil consumed in Western Europe

***European security and African problems***

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**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***talbed by Mr. Kershaw and others***

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In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, after "of" insert "Zaire".

*Signed : Kershaw, Page, Bennett*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***European security and African problems***

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**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Roberti***

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At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph :

“Ensure that there are not created on the African continent, through the acts of the Soviet Union or its allies, in particular Cuba, military or strategic zones of influence because of the danger of encirclement that such situations would present for Europe and the Mediterranean.”

*Signed : Roberti*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***European security and African problems***

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**AMENDMENT No. 3<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Müller***

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1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following new paragraphs :  
“Welcoming the effort made by several African states to form a force with a view to maintaining peace on the African continent and defending it against any interference from outside ;  
  
Encouraging the member countries to pursue the efforts made in Paris on 5th June 1978 by five western powers and in Copenhagen on 12th June by the members of the European Community to concert their African policies,”.
2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph :  
“Encourage and afford effective support for the steps taken by several African states to combine their efforts with a view to maintaining peace in Africa and defending the African continent against any interference from outside.”

*Signed : Müller*

---

1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Part 1 agreed to ; part 2 amended and agreed to).



***European security and African problems***

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**AMENDMENT No. 4<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others***

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In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 7 and insert :

“7. Relate the economic assistance extended by European countries to the African states to the development of human rights in those countries.”

*Signed : Stoffelen, Roper, van den Bergh, Whitehead*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***European security and African problems***

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**AMENDMENT No. 5<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others***

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In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “particularly” and insert “for example”.

*Signed : Stoffelen, Bagier, van den Bergh*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment withdrawn).

***European security and African problems***

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**AMENDMENT No. 6<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Antoni and others***

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1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 10.
2. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "aggressive"; leave out "particularly the present Cuban operations"; at the end of the paragraph add "and obtain the withdrawal of all foreign military presence in Africa".

*Signed : Antoni, Calamandrei, Bernini*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment negatived).

***European security and African problems***

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**AMENDMENT No. 7<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Cavaliere***

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At the end of paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, add "encouraged by the support of the Soviet Union".

*Signed : Cavaliere*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

Document 773

17th May 1978

**United States-European co-operation and  
competition in advanced technology**

**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

**submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions<sup>2</sup>  
by MM. Konings, Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel, Rapporteurs**

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Warren (Chairman); MM. Vallet, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaenssens (Alternate: Brasseur), Bernini, Cavaliere, Cornelissen, Hawkins (Alternate: Jessel), Konings, Lewis

(Alternate: Tomney), Mart, Müller, Péronnet (Alternate: Cerneau), Dr. Phipps, MM. Pinto, Schwencke, Talon, Treu, Ueberhorst, Van Waterschoot, La Combe.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology**

The Assembly,

Considering that, notwithstanding the mutual European-United States interest in a common defence system, \$ 10-15 billion is wasted each year on complicated military equipment either already produced or in service on this or the other side of the Atlantic ;

Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology projects is a necessity if the free world is to strengthen its posture vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc ;

Noting the need expressed in industrial circles for more transatlantic co-operation to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance ;

Considering that existing organisations can adequately and actively promote the necessary co-operation ;

Aware of the strong influence the adoption of an American national energy plan will have on Europe's possibilities as regards oil and gas supplies and the dangers which will arise if the oil-producing nations are unable to meet world demand in 1985 by as much as 20 % ;

Aware that several member countries and the United States are independently developing new methods for the gasification and liquefaction of coal and that large sums of money are needed to promote alternative technologies ;

Convinced of the need to relay data from European satellites via the new tracking and data relay satellite system TDRSS ;

Considering that member governments should pursue a policy whereby all Europe's space activities are integrated in ESA and that through ESA they should co-operate with the United States, and with NASA in particular, since there will shortly be new space developments in both communications and energy and both agencies have restricted budgets ;

Considering that the United States Government's new aviation policy and liberal pricing system will have far-reaching repercussions for both the airlines and the aircraft industry ;

Regretting the deplorably slow rate of progress in the Law of the Sea Conference now in its seventh session ;

Noting that :

- (a) marine scientists in the United States and elsewhere are inhibited by the 200-mile limit of the economic zone following the Law of the Sea Conference in their fundamental and applied research on mineral and organic resources of the oceans, and on energy which might be derived from tapping the natural flows of tides, waves and currents ;
- (b) fish supplies in the Mediterranean and oceans can be enhanced by the addition of organic wastes ;
- (c) measures to conserve or destroy certain species of sea fauna can disturb the balance of nature and cause a chain reaction of effects upon other species,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

**Urge member governments :**

A. To establish a high-level European-United States committee to promote European-United States co-operation in advanced technology projects in which the EEC would also participate on the European side, this high-level committee meeting at least once a year and submitting proposals to the governments concerned on :

- (a) how to implement the two-way street policy in respect of advanced military equipment in order to make more efficient use of Alliance resources ;
- (b) how to promote this policy at an early stage in research and development of new advanced weapon systems ;

- (c) how to include military satellites and other military communications equipment in this co-operation whenever possible ;
- (d) how to work together in research and development of alternative technologies such as gasification and liquefaction of coal, solar energy and other new sources of energy and how to improve the productivity of certain nuclear reactors ;
- (e) how to co-operate in civil and military oceanographic activities, especially in seabed mining and the sharing of data on fish conservation, and promote the successful conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference ;

B. 1. To initiate urgent consideration by the United Nations as to means by which fundamental and applied ocean research can continue without restraint whilst providing for the mineral and other rights of each coastal state by sharing and publishing the results of research ;

2. To adopt national fisheries and conservation policies which reflect scientific knowledge in respect of :
- (i) the interrelationships between each species and its prey (e.g. porpoises and tuna) ;
  - (ii) the effect upon fish stocks of organic wastes which when sufficiently diluted are generally beneficial and inorganic wastes which are generally detrimental ;

C. To adopt a common policy in the EEC framework vis-à-vis the new United States aviation policy and not act in a dispersed manner with regard to the new aviation agreements now suggested by the United States ;

D. 1. To instruct ESA to study the possibilities either of participating in the United States tracking and data relay satellite system and building the required European ground station or of building its own TDRS system ;

2. To draw up guidelines for working with the United States authorities on the development of the space shuttle transportation system, with special reference to communications and solar power satellites ;

3. To participate in more of NASA'S scientific space projects through ESA.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

*(submitted by MM. Konings, Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel, Rapporteurs)*

### **Introduction**

1. The Committee wishes to preface its report with its sincere thanks to the Presidential Committee which gave its agreement to the visit which was made to the United States from 10th to 21st April 1978<sup>1</sup>.

2. The outline of the visit was drawn up by the Chairman and the United States Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Arthur Hartmann, who afforded the Committee every assistance in establishing a highly interesting and useful programme. The staff at the Embassy, the State Department and NASA civil servants in charge of the arrangements, the representatives of NASA in Paris, of Boeing, General Dynamics and TRW in Brussels, and many others contributed to making the visit a remarkable success. The Committee expresses its sincere appreciation of their valuable assistance.

3. In order to handle the mass of information and material collected during the visit the Committee decided to appoint four Rapporteurs to cover the various questions as follows :

Mr. Konings : Communications ;

Mr. Treu : Aerospace developments ;

Dr. Phipps : Energy ;

Mr. Jessel : Oceanography.

4. In addition to visits to industries or institutions related to these matters, the Committee had the opportunity of meeting representatives of the City Council of Seattle and the Puget Sound Council of Governments and visited modern developments in urban planning and social housing projects. Modern urban transport planning was discussed with Mrs. Williams, City Councillor, Mr. Stafford, Mr. Power and Miss Rona Zevin.

5. In San Diego, the Committee visited the Salk Institute where Mr. John B. Pinto, Public Affairs Manager, explained the workings of this institute for biological studies<sup>2</sup>.

6. In preparing for its visit the Committee studied a number of questions for use as guidelines for its discussions in the United States, covering matters of concern to the State Depart-

ment, NASA, the Energy Department and the Senate Sub-Committee on Science, Technology and Space<sup>1</sup>.

### **I. Communications**

*(submitted by Mr. Konings, Rapporteur)*

7. The telephone has become such an integral part of our daily lives in Europe and the United States that it is sometimes surprising to recall that this early marvel of communication was invented only 100 years ago, and that there was no telephonic communication between Europe and America by cable until 1956<sup>2</sup>. The radio-telephone links on which transatlantic communications had depended during the previous thirty years were subject to ionospheric disruptions which frequently caused prolonged distortion, fading and even total blackout.

8. The continuous growth in the volume of telecommunications — an important index of growth and development — is no longer conceivable without an ever-increasing use of space techniques. The annual turnover of the world's telecommunications industry is now about \$66,000 million ; it is increasing at an annual rate of 15 % and there is nothing to indicate that this rate may slacken in the near future. Likewise the International Telecommunications Union estimates that the volume of long-distance telephone calls will grow by anything between 15 and 27 % a year in the foreseeable future. Moreover, while the industrial aspect of telecommunications makes them an important sector of economic activity, they also play an important rôle in other essential functions such as production, marketing and administration. The mastery of space communications therefore has major industrial, economic and politico-military significance.

9. It was not surprising that the first widespread use of space was through the use of communications satellites in earth orbit. Beginning by bouncing signals off the Echo I balloon satellite in 1960, NASA in the United States pioneered a series of active research satellites.

10. Communications satellites have revolutionised communications in a very short time and have substantially reduced the cost of world-wide communications ; they have more than repaid the cost of their development and launching. For

1. See Appendix I : Programme of the visit to the United States by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — 10th-21st April 1978.

2. See Appendix II : The Salk Institute for Biological Studies.

1. See Appendix III : List of questions put during the visit to the United States.

2. See ESA publication : "Space — part of Europe's environment", pages 21-23.



example, a decade ago the cost of a three-minute daytime telephone call from New York to London via transatlantic cable was \$12.50 ; now, the same call via satellite costs only \$5.50 in today's currency. The cost of world-wide television transmission has dropped by 80 % from the early satellite broadcasts to the present. Prior to the introduction of satellites, a cable circuit from the west coast of the United States to Japan cost \$15,000 a month ; today a communications satellite offers the same services for \$4,000 per month.

11. Satellites making direct television broadcasts to community receivers are demonstrating their potential for delivering educational, medical and other services to remote and hitherto unreachable populations.

12. The development of operational space telecommunications in the world is ahead of all other applications sectors. Satellites have been providing cost-effective intercontinental links for twelve years, and the first domestic system was commissioned in 1973.

13. Satellite communications are divided into three sectors of activity :

- (i) point-to-point communications (fixed service) ;
- (ii) maritime and aeronautical communications (mobile services) ;
- (iii) direct broadcasting.

#### *Point-to-point communications*

14. The aim of the European Space Agency (ESA) in Europe and of NASA in the United States in this field is to provide the post and telecommunications and broadcasting administrations of the member countries with satellite links capable, as from 1980, of carrying a large part of intra-European and American telephone, telegraph and telex traffic and of relaying television programmes. More specialised services such as data transmission, teleconferencing and off-shore oil-rig communications are also envisaged.

15. Traffic forecasts made by European and American postal authorities show that the operational satellite system needs to be able to carry the equivalent of approximately 5,000 telephone circuits in 1980 (for traffic between points more than the economic minimum of 800 km apart) rising to about 20,000 in 1990. In this programme will be the first launching of the new generation of Intelsat in 1979. Intelsat V will be a co-operative project between ESA and NASA. This satellite will have 10,000 telephone circuits. The basic requirement for TV channels is the permanent allocation of two wide-band repeaters capable of transmitting high-quality television. There will be at least one large earth station handling telephone traffic and TV trans-

mission in each country or state requiring these services. A number of earth stations handling exclusively TV transmission are envisaged for countries (in North Africa, the Middle East and South America, for example) requiring this service only.

#### *Orbital test satellite (OTS)*

16. In Europe point-to-point satellite communications activities began in 1971 with the evaluation of a European regional system. The development of an OTS was started in 1972, based on needs defined in consultation with the European Conference of Post and Telecommunications and the European Broadcasting Union. The programme provided for the launching of this satellite in the middle of 1977 to enable the future users to prepare for the operational phase, but this date could not be maintained. The first, but unsuccessful, launch took place in September 1977.

17. OTS is designed to :

- (i) demonstrate the performance and reliability in orbit of all on-board equipment (payload, spacecraft systems and sub-systems) ;
- (ii) fulfil from an experimental communication system point of view the objectives required by a subsequent operational mission (experiments on propagation, frequency reuse, transmission impairments, time division multiple access, etc.) ;
- (iii) provide an experimental and pre-operational traffic capacity (6,000 telephony circuits and two television channels).

18. Prior to the launch of OTS, several items of equipment developed for the satellite (flexible solar panels, travelling wave-tube amplifier) were successfully flown and tested on board the Canadian Communications Technology Satellite (CTS).

19. CTS is a communications satellite with a new type transmitter with a power of 200 watts with a very large transmitting aerial. It was a co-operative project between Canada and the United States. The satellite has two channels for full-colour TV relays.

20. OTS was the third European communications satellite to be developed in Europe after the experimental Franco-German *Symphonie* and Italian *Sirio* satellites. Unlike its predecessors, however, OTS forms part of a programme designed to lead to the establishment of an operational European regional satellite system. The satellite's capacity falls in the Intelsat IV class.

21. OTS is three-axis stabilised and of modular construction with two main components : a service module, providing all the basic service functions and a communications module containing the payload. The satellite's attitude is controlled to keep the six SHF antennas pointed towards the earth within 0.2° of their assigned direction. The coverage of the antennas (one Spotbeam, three Eurobeam A and two Eurobeam B) include not only the whole of Western Europe but also the Middle East, North Africa and Iceland. The Spotbeam antenna, serving a restricted area, transmits point-to-point telephone communications ; the Eurobeam antennas transmit television signals which normally have multiple destinations. There are plans in the United States to operate with the Spotbeam antenna in very restricted areas such as a town or state. In telephone communications satellites replace the need for cables.

22. As one of the first communications satellites operating at frequencies in the region of 11 and 14 gigahertz, OTS gives experimenters the possibility of testing simultaneously wide-band digital transmissions between large stations and narrow-band signals between small stations. Propagation measurements at up and down link frequencies are also possible. The modular concept of the satellite enables it to be adapted easily and economically to different missions. Various payloads can be carried without costly redesign of the service module and even the communications module can be adapted to carry alternative payloads without major redesign. Further flexibility is provided by the fact that the satellite structure is designed to accommodate a heavier weight than is needed for OTS and thus has significant growth capability for future requirements.

23. Development of the OTS spacecraft and of its derivative Marots was entrusted by ESA to the MESH consortium, with Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics as prime contractor.

24. The communications payload main contractor chosen for OTS was AEG-Telefunken, and for Marots Marconi Space and Defence Systems.

25. An important development is the steadily-growing number of frequencies thanks to the increasing capacities of more sophisticated satellites. The larger satellites cover frequencies of 11-14 gigahertz. The first experiments were made under ESA supervision with the American applications technology satellite ATS-6 which was launched in May 1974. With this satellite frequencies of 20-30 gigahertz were used and the Italian Sirio satellite contains experiments in the range of 12-18 gigahertz. These experiments are still being conducted and important results can be expected in the course of next year. The ATS-6 was the first communications satellite with the

power to broadcast TV images to small local receivers.

26. The OTS was successfully launched on 11th May 1978 at Cape Canaveral by a NASA Thor-Delta 3914 launcher. It will be placed in a geostationary orbit of 36,000 km altitude and its first telephone and television emissions are programmed for the beginning of June 1978.

#### *Europe's regional system*

27. In 1971 the European Space Research Organisation decided to undertake as a major applications programme the development of a European communications satellite system with the ultimate goal of self-sufficiency for Western Europe in satellite communications. Neither the programme nor the needs it was to meet were defined concretely at that time and they were to evolve over the next few years. However, the goal remained to provide an operational satellite system by 1980 which would meet the needs of the European Conference of Post and Telecommunications and the European Broadcasting Union.


28. As currently planned, the European communications satellite (ECS) will be designed to meet the requirements of the European Broadcasting Union. The satellite will also be able to provide specialised services and transmit signals and telex communications, for instance between oil-rigs and land stations.

29. Between 1981 and 1990 four of these satellites will be placed in geostationary orbit by the Ariane launcher and operated by Eutelsat, the organisation which was established by the European Conference of Post and Telecommunications. This will be the decision-making authority and it will be legally competent to implement the wishes of the telecommunications entities concerned.

#### *Telecommunications developments in the United States*

30. During the Committee's visit to the United States it learnt of new developments in the United States defence satellite communications system. This system is a high-capacity super-high-frequency system intended to satisfy the American national security communications requirements for world-wide military command and control, intelligence information transfer and crisis management. Apart from the requirements of the highest civil and military authorities it also covers diplomatic telecommunications needs. Since 1968, the year in which the system was established, a whole series of communications satellites have been placed in orbit, the most recent, to the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, being the Fleetsatcom satellite. This is a major and vital step in improving naval com-

*Naval communications satellite (FLEETSATCOM)*





munications to meet the needs of the fleet in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The satellite system provides protection against jamming for fleet broadcast transmissions and shore commands to ships and is extremely reliable in communications between ships, aircraft and command posts. Four of these satellites are to be launched; they will operate in the ultra-high-frequency belt which allows small, simple antennas aboard ships and other mobile users where size and weight are important considerations. Channels 2-10 will be used by the navy, 11-22 by the air force, and 23 for the command. The channels used will be 12-15 KHz.

31. Based on this type of satellite is the search and rescue mission project which will use satellites as an aid in detecting and locating distress beacons carried by general aircraft and certain ships. The purpose of the project is to demonstrate the feasibility of satellites to provide a significant improvement in the capability of search and rescue forces to detect and locate distress signals during emergencies. The project is planned as an international co-operative effort which will include Canada, France, and possibly the Soviet Union.

#### *Communications services for ships, aircraft, etc.*

32. Long-distance radio connections between ships, aircraft and ground stations use high-frequency signals but often these communications are unsatisfactory as the high-frequency radio wavelengths have a tendency to fade and it becomes impossible to establish permanent communications. As a result of this, 93 % of the communications between ships and ground stations are in Morse and only 7 % by radio telephone. This is one of the reasons why ESA established its Marots system.

33. Nine European nations own about 36 % of the world's shipping tonnage and they felt the need for a faster and more reliable communications system. It takes an average of six hours for a message to reach a ship and an additional six hours for the reply to be received. The United Kingdom was the first to promote this programme and agreed to shoulder the major share — 56 % — of the financing of this maritime communications satellite programme. The other ESA members participating in the development of Marots are Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Norway, though not a member of ESA, is also participating. The member countries anticipate that communications via satellite will greatly increase the speed and reliability of maritime communications. In addition, it is hoped that the Marots system will relieve congestion on the frequency bands currently used, improve the quality of transmissions, extend the geographical coverage of communica-

tions, provide for high-speed data transmission, afford more effective assistance to ships in distress, offer more circuits and allow automation of voice and telex transmissions.

34. The first satellite will be launched from Cape Canaveral in August 1978 and will be placed in a position at 14° east longitude over the Indian Ocean. In ESA's opinion it is possible that Marots and the two Marisat satellites — one over the Atlantic and the other over the Pacific — could provide almost world-wide operational maritime services.

35. The Marisat system is an American system run by Comsat General serving some needs of the United States navy but, above all, providing commercial maritime service. Three Marisats were launched in 1976, the third one serving mainly the United States navy. Comsat General owns 83.6 %, the remainder being owned by the traditional suppliers of ship-to-shore communications such as RCA, Western Union and ITT. Apart from the United States navy the system also serves tankers, passenger ships, oil-drilling platforms, seismic service ships, ice-breakers and a British cable ship.

36. The International Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO), a United Nations' agency, promoted a convention establishing Inmarsat as owner and operator of a global communications system for merchant shipping. The convention was drawn up on 3rd September 1976 and is now open for signature. Whether it will become operational is not yet certain, but the possibility of collaboration with the Marisat Marots system is now being discussed.

#### *Aerosat*

37. The Aerosat programme was originally designed as a co-operative programme under which the United States, Canada and the member nations of the European Space Agency were to develop jointly an aeronautical communications satellite. There have been negotiations concerning this programme since the early 1970s. Several times during the negotiations the Europeans drew up agreements with United States Government agencies concerning Aerosat only to see them negated by other branches of government.

38. In his address to the Committee on 2nd March 1978, Mr. Roy Gibson, Director-General of ESA, declared that this project was a negative example of co-operation with the United States. Originally ESA discussed the programme with NASA but it was then transferred from NASA to the Federal Aviation Agency and was recently abandoned. It proved, according to Mr. Gibson, that space agencies worked better with space agencies than with individual government departments.

39. The history of the Aerosat programme raises many questions of policy. It is quite clear that conflicting interests in the United States — the differences of opinion within government agencies and the interests of the private sector — were not handled in an orderly fashion and the areas of conflict were not properly defined.

#### *Direct television broadcasts*

40. At the present stage in the use of satellites for radio and television broadcasts large ground stations are required. A new development seeks to eliminate the need for such large stations. The orbital test satellite now being developed by ESA will test the possibilities of direct broadcasting first through smaller terminals to be operated by the national postal authorities and at a later stage directly into homes. An experiment in Japan with a 36 cm round antenna has already produced satisfactory results.

41. New kinds of communication links are now being developed. In order to avoid a vast network of ground stations with their antennas scattered across the world and large numbers of satellites in space, especially in low orbit, a new type of satellite is being developed. For budgetary reasons NASA has accepted that this be done by Western Union, which has asked TRW to build the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS). The purpose of this satellite is to function as a ground station above the earth. One of the advantages of operating in space is that the higher the altitude the greater the range.

42. The satellite will have two 16-ft antennas each weighing over 1,000 kg and will generate 1,700 watts of electric power from solar arrays. Western Union, which already owns and operates the first domestic communications satellite system in the United States, expects the communications traffic to grow rapidly and wishes to expand its commercial services to meet demand. Six satellites will be built with an expected life-span of ten years. They will be owned and operated by Western Union for use by NASA, the defence communications satellite system and the fleet satellite communications system, and they will relay data to and from the space shuttle when this system becomes operational.

#### *Solar satellites*

43. A special communications problem will arise when solar power satellites become operational as now proposed by Boeing Aerospace Company. Boeing is studying the possibilities of placing large platforms of solar cells in space for converting solar power to microwave radiation for transmission to receiving antennas. These platforms would measure  $30 \times 5$  km. The satellites are to be located in geosynchronous orbit some

22,000 miles above the earth. In this orbit they would remain in one position over the equator and provide a direct line-of-sight transmission of energy by radio beam to receivers on the earth. Experiments have proved that it is possible to transmit a great mass of energy to receivers placed relatively near the area where the demand for energy exists. The microwave beam which would be used to transmit the energy from space to ground can be made completely safe.

44. Solar power satellites could be operational before the year 2000. In the development of this new source of energy Europe and the United States should collaborate.

#### *Co-operation between the United States and Europe*


45. There are many developments in the field of communications in both the United States and Europe but in the main there is little collaboration whether in research and development or in marketing. There are some collaborative projects, but your Rapporteur has the impression that many obstacles have still to be overcome on both sides of the Atlantic and industry in particular is reluctant to co-operate as it is afraid of losing a competitive edge in advanced technology projects. In Europe the member countries of ESA have agreed to collaborate in space but from time to time individual member countries conclude separate contracts with the United States industry or with NASA without involving ESA as such. The ESA convention stipulates that gradually all European space projects should be channelled through the agency and your Rapporteur regrets that some governments do not always apply this rule.


46. Collaboration between ESA and NASA started long ago with an exchange of technical information. The predecessor of ESA — ESRO — reached the first agreement with NASA on the launching of its satellites in 1966 and this memorandum of understanding is still valid and will be invoked for all launches. Of special importance is the agreement on the space telescope mission. This programme is linked to the use of the shuttle and the idea is that a large telescope will be flown in the shuttle and off-loaded in space. A similar form of agreement is now being discussed on the solar polar mission which is a scientific mission to study the poles of the sun. The most important collaborative programme is of course spacelab and the shuttle.

47. Your Rapporteur hopes that the trend adopted by all European member governments will be towards greater integration of Europe's space work through ESA. The future magnitude of ESA's space programme will depend to a large extent on the future development of Euro-



The tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS)







pean society as a whole. Future space efforts should be extended as it is clear from the Committee's visit to the United States that many new developments will arise in the field of both communications and energy.

## II. Aerospace developments

(submitted by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur)

### *Introductory remarks*

48. In this chapter your Rapporteur wishes to underline that it is not possible to discuss all the aerospace developments which have occurred during the last few years. He will therefore restrict himself mainly to subjects which were discussed during the Committee's visit to the United States. The Committee was able to visit on the one hand the NASA headquarters and several NASA centres such as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the Marshall Space Flight Centre and the Office of Science and Technology Policy of the President's Science Adviser and, on the other hand, the Boeing aircraft factories, General Dynamics and TRW. The general policy of the United States Government and some of its most important aeronautical industries were discussed in great detail during these visits.

49. Your Rapporteur wishes to deal with two main subjects: new developments in aircraft construction and aviation and the space policy and activities of governmental agencies, but he would point out that during the visit the Committee was able to see only a few of the more important and interesting activities in the private or public sectors.

### *Aviation policy*

50. Mr. Michael H. Styles, Director, Office of Aviation, State Department, briefed the Committee on United States international aviation issues and policies. Recent new developments in governmental aviation policy in the United States might have far-reaching consequences for both the airlines and the aircraft industry. Historically the United States Government advocated an open approach to air traffic questions. In the 1930s the government took control of prices and at the same time instituted a system of licences to be granted by the Civil Aviation Board. This system regulated competition and resulted in high prices for air fares. The present government believes that after thirty years the airlines have now reached maturity and that intensive government involvement should be stopped. The CAB is now encouraging a relaxation of air fare regulations. On international routes, the Laker Skytrain between London and New York showed how low fares could be offered to the public.

51. The programme of liberalisation now being pursued is illustrated by greater readiness to accept applications for new operations by existing companies and new ones. Applications accompanied by proposed new low fare options will be given priority. Authorisation to operate certain routes will be given for five years in the first instance and will be renewed only if the airlines continue to offer the low fares they promised. More direct air services between inland towns and foreign countries will be promoted and gateways like New York will be gradually phased out.

52. The United States authorities are convinced that such a system cannot be imposed by one country alone; international agreements are a necessity and the government will try to promote this policy in the new agreements to be concluded. This has already been done in agreements with the Netherlands and Belgium as well as with the United Kingdom. Discussions have started with the European Civil Aviation Conference to formulate common principles towards charter flights; the United States Government wishes to remove its protective mantle from the airlines and feels that management should shoulder its responsibilities in a market economy and face up to the true situation in which capital markets influence the decision-making of airline directors. The United States Government will not grant any subsidies for national or international airlines and will not condone the airlines sharing the market between themselves.

53. In aircraft construction, no major technological breakthrough is to be expected and emphasis is laid on improving existing aircraft. The present approach will provide new opportunities in trade and commerce and will mean a less regulated national and international system. The United States is still at loggerheads with several European governments over the course of its aviation policy and problems will have to be worked out in negotiations.

### *Boeing activities*

#### *(i) Civil aviation*

54. When the Committee was received at the Boeing Company in Seattle the Executive Vice-President, Mr. J.H. Goldie, underlined that the new regulations for international aviation would certainly change the content of the present airline market. He thought that greater international co-operation in this field should be promoted as this would strengthen the posture of the free countries vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

55. In the civil field the Boeing Company is promoting three new aircraft: the 757, 767 and 777. These new aircraft are a continuation of the series which started with the 727; the new parts are the wings and engines. The 757 is a



150-passenger aircraft to be equipped with either two or three engines. The fuel consumption of all three aircraft will be considerably lower than present-day aircraft and the noise level minimal. The 767 and the 777 will be equipped for 180-250 passengers. They also can be equipped with either two or three engines. The number of passenger seats depends on the configuration requested by the airlines, but for the 767 a seven-abreast configuration will be the most economical and the operating costs will be 30 % lower than the current wide-bodied aircraft. Its range of more than 2,000 nautical miles will give it a one-stop transcontinental capability if equipped with two engines and the three-engine model will have non-stop transcontinental range.

(ii) *Military activities*

56. In the military field much emphasis is placed on the mutual interests of the United States and Europe in the North Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Goldie said that in the Alliance enormous sums and great efforts on weapons and logistics were wasted as each country was building weapons which other members of the Alliance were also building or had in service. The Warsaw Pact countries were growing stronger every day with modern well-integrated equipment in vast quantities. The practice of each member nation following its own course in defence equipment had to be reversed if NATO was to remain effective.

57. The United States Senate Armed Services Committee estimated this waste of resources at \$10-15 billion per year. Even more important was the resulting 30 % reduction in combat-effectiveness of the West's military forces. This estimate has been made by General Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The money wasted in duplication could be much better spent in providing our troops with fewer different weapons in greater numbers and in developing new weapons which would improve their ability to fight together. The two-way street policy advocated by the United States Government should therefore be implemented. This would increase opportunities to sell European defence equipment provided it resulted in more efficient use of Alliance resources.

58. One of Boeing's earliest involvements with equipment for NATO forces was the patrol hydrofoil missile ship. The United States, Italy and Germany, the signatories of the original co-operation agreement in 1972, abandoned this programme some years later because of the economic situation and severe budgetary limitations as well as a change in national priorities. All that remained of this programme were the five boats ordered by the United States navy.

59. This was a discouraging start, but the Boeing Company nevertheless co-operated in the

AWACS system, the E-3A airborne warning and control system, designed to support the military forces in many areas of operational interest: air defence operations, tactical air operations, maritime operations, threat assessment and tactical ground force operations. The AWACS will provide NATO commanders with improved force effectiveness and surveillance and control flexibility. The system will normally be used to transmit track and target data to ground- or ship-based command and control centres, where actual deployment decisions will be made. However, it can also act as the command and control centre in the event of the ground control centres being disabled.

60. The NATO airborne early-warning programme is now estimated at \$1.8 to \$1.9 billion for eighteen Boeing E-3A aircraft, spares, flight and mission simulators, maintenance and test equipment, modifications to the existing ground system and establishment of a main operating base. Of this total, about \$1.4 billion is for the aircraft.

61. Dornier GmbH has been recommended by Boeing to be the avionics installation and check-out contractor for the NATO aircraft. This recommendation still must be confirmed by NATO, but is considered fairly certain.

62. The NATO E-3A main operating base is expected to be located near the European installation centre, in Germany or the Netherlands. Approximate cost of activating the base will be \$100 million and the cost of operating it for a ten to fifteen-year period is estimated at \$500 million. Annual maintenance costs of the NATO E-3A are estimated at \$100 million.

63. The AWACS programme has shown that it is rather difficult to introduce into the Alliance an extremely large and complex system that has already been developed and it therefore proved difficult to find meaningful industrial hardware to be manufactured in the other NATO countries. Once a programme is well under way it is difficult and often too late, from an investment and cost standpoint, to add new partners.

64. Another weapons system in which Boeing has a close interest is the Roland air defence system. This is a surface-to-air missile system for short-range defence against aircraft attacking at low level. Hughes Aircraft Company and Boeing are joint licensees to transfer the Euromissile technology to the United States for manufacture and testing. The army's selection of Roland marked the first time a major foreign weapons system design had been procured for production in the United States. The American companies will build the fire units and missiles and deliver them to the army for co-operative tests with European-built systems. During the tests American missiles could be launched from European

fire units and American fire units will launch European missiles. Boeing and Hughes are building the United States Roland from drawings provided by Euromissile. Approximately 90 % of the field replaceable parts are interchangeable between the American and European systems. Four firing units and approximately 100 missiles will be built for the test programme.

65. By using the technology already developed in Europe the army is avoiding duplication of effort and expects to save \$4.5 billion and four years in research and development time. Aérospatiale of France and MBB of Germany will recover some of their development costs through royalties paid to them. United States and European troops will be able to exchange munitions, parts and maintenance. The programme should be a major step towards improved weapon standardisation.

66. The general support rocket system (GSRS) also has a promising potential for transatlantic co-operation. It is a highly-mobile surface-to-surface free-flight rocket system intended to complement cannon artillery and will be used in intense combat conditions. The launcher is designed to be installed on the army's infantry fighting vehicle. It is also adaptable to other vehicles.

67. The United States and Germany have recently signed a declaration of intent on tactical and operational requirements for the system. A memorandum of understanding will be signed in mid-1978. France and the United Kingdom have also expressed interest in the programme and may become official participants by the end of this year. The system might become a joint development programme.

68. Another programme which Boeing recently embarked upon is the anti-surface ship missile (ASSM) which is intended to serve as the next generation Harpoon. The ASSM concept began in late 1974 when the NATO naval armaments group agreed on an objective for a second-generation anti-surface ship missile. Six NATO countries have funded a feasibility study. Boeing is a sub-contractor to MBB of Germany, the design leader.

69. In industrial circles the need for more transatlantic co-operation to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance is widely felt. In industry the initiative should be taken to share the work, seek co-operative agreements and include the common good as part of the profits. Industry should also try to educate the user of its products, i.e. the military, on how to approach international programmes based on its own experiences.

#### *United States Roland missile*

70. The Committee had a special briefing on the United States Roland by Mr. R.L. Brock, Vice-President, General Manager of Boeing's

army systems division. It also visited the assembly area.

71. Following a competition which led to selection of the European-developed Roland, the United States army decided for the first time to select a major foreign weapons system design to be procured for production in the United States. The Roland system comprises both missiles and fire-control equipment; the missiles are about 2.4 m long, 160 mm in diameter and are supersonic. The system can intercept targets during day or night and in any weather. Missile range is about 6 km. The independent fire unit, mounted on a single-track or wheeled vehicle can carry ten missiles and fire-control equipment. It provides protection to troops or armour on the move.

#### *AWACS*

72. Mr. D.E. Graves, Vice-President, Head of the aircraft armaments section, explained the programme history of the NATO AWACS (airborne warning and control system) programme. In 1967 the United States Defence Department came to the conclusion that an airborne early-warning system to detect low-altitude intruders was a security requirement. Three manufacturers — Boeing with its 707-320, McDonnell Douglas with the DC-8 and Lockheed with the C-141 — submitted their entries. The result of the competition was that Boeing became the prime contractor whereas the radar was developed by Westinghouse.

73. In October 1977 the first plane was ready. In the meantime, the NATO Military Committee had accepted the United Kingdom offer of eleven Nimrods as the United Kingdom's share of the NATO airborne early warning force. It decided that a mixed force of eleven Nimrods and eighteen NATO AWACS would satisfy the requirements. The United States programme and the NATO programme are practically the same.

74. The basis of the system is a modified Boeing 707-320 jet aircraft. The investment cost in 1977 dollars is \$80 million and the total cost \$300 million. Maintenance and spare parts over a ten-year period will be \$375-500 million. Potential new markets for this air defence system might be some \$1,025-1,480 million. This means that it will provide some 1,000 jobs over a four-and-a-half-year period. In addition to the flying segment, some fifty-nine communications centres and support operating bases will be built. The aircraft can be equipped with Pratt and Whitney or the French CFM-56 engines. The first planes will be delivered to NATO in late 1981 or early 1982. Final delivery will be at the end of 1984.

#### *YC-14 (AMST)*

75. Mr. J.E. Steiner, Vice-President, Corporate Product Evaluation, briefed the Committee on

the Boeing YC-14 aircraft which the Committee had already seen during the Paris air show in 1977. The aircraft is an advanced medium short-take-off-and-landing transport aircraft (AMST), and has high tactical mobility. It has considerable lift power and can make steep accurate landings at very low speed. It has a global radius with a substantial payload. One squadron deploys sixteen aircraft, each of which can take off with a payload of 12,200 kg from a 610 metre field. Its wide-body compartment can carry tanks, howitzers, trucks and many other types of cargo.

76. Boeing designed, built and tested two prototypes of the aircraft under a \$107 million contract with the American air force. The programme started in 1972 and was concluded in 1977. The first planes will be delivered in 1982 and become operational in 1984-85. Boeing hopes to sell 320 of them over a twenty-year period.

#### *F-16*

77. On 17th April 1978 the Committee visited General Dynamics in San Diego where it was briefed by Mr. Oats Schwarzenberger, F-16 Marketing Manager, of the Fort Worth Division of General Dynamics. Before commenting on the F-16, he gave a general outline of the activities of General Dynamics which has a yearly turnover of \$2.8 billion, 70,000 employees and a very diverse production line. The F-16 is produced in Fort Worth but, as the Committee could not visit the factory because of transport problems, he briefed it on the programme in the San Diego factory.

78. The F-16 is a new generation single-engine, single-seat, multi-rôle tactical fighter aircraft. It is multi-rôle as it can be used in an air-to-air or air-to-ground configuration. It is able to repel air attacks and achieve air superiority, and in its air-to-ground capability it can destroy enemy surface forces and cut supply lines. It can fly at an altitude of 20,000 m. Two prototypes have been built and full-scale production could start immediately. The 1978 fly-away price is \$6.5 million; in 1975 it was still \$4.5 million.

79. The plane is made in two versions, the F-16A single-seat or the F-16B two-place fighter trainer. The two planes are essentially identical except for the aft cockpit; the F-16B carries about 1,100 lbs less internal fuel. The Norwegian version will also have extra floodlighting and a parachute compartment for landing on icy runways.

80. The replacement of F-104s with the advanced F-16 will substantially increase NATO's capability in both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. The F-16 programme calls for an initial delivery of F-16 aircraft to the United States in August 1978. The air forces in Europe will receive their first aircraft in 1979 and other coun-

tries such as Iran will receive F-16 deliveries from 1980 onwards.

#### *Cruise missile*

81. Another important development introduced to the Committee by Mr. G.A. Robertson is the General Dynamics' cruise missile, a multi-purpose missile which can be launched from surface ships, submarines, land platforms, trucks or aircraft. It is a missile similar to a small aircraft placed in a steel capsule and is 54 cm in diameter and 7 m in length. It has a range of 5,600 km and can be equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads and aimed at sea or land targets. In a trial programme it can be equipped with parachutes for recovery. The system has been developed over a three-year period. The cruise missile has a very good chance of reaching its target and as it is rather small it is very difficult to detect during its supersonic flight. It is comparable but superior to the Soviet "Exocet". Some 13,000 of these missiles will be produced in the next few years.

#### *Space developments*

82. On 11th April 1978 the Committee was received at the NASA headquarters by Dr. Lovelace, Deputy Administrator. He welcomed the Committee on behalf of Dr. Frosch and NASA and said that space co-operation with Western Europe, both on a national and multi-lateral basis within ESA, had been a most important element of NASA's programmes in its twenty years of existence.

#### *The shuttle*

83. Dr. Lovelace described the space shuttle as the key element of a versatile economical space transportation system that will provide a wide variety of national and international users with a round trip access to space beginning in the 1980s. The development of the system is proceeding on schedule and operational test flights of the shuttle will take place in 1979. The shuttle will be the first reusable space vehicle and will be designed to carry many different types of payload to and from low earth orbit. It will be able to retrieve payloads from orbit for reuse, service and repair satellites in space and carry space laboratories into orbit, operate them, and bring them back. Finally it will substantially reduce spaceflight costs.

84. The space shuttle has four basic flight elements: the orbiter, the main engine, an external propellant tank and twin solid-rocket boosters, and a launch and landing system. The orbiter is the reusable spacecraft portion. The launch sites are at Vandenberg air force base and the Kennedy space centre. Both bases have the right inclinations to reach the required orbits. Just before the vehicle leaves the earth's atmo-

sphere, the external tank will be jettisoned and will burn up in the atmosphere. The boosters will be separated from the main system at an altitude of about 46 km but will be recuperated by means of a parachute recovery system. The orbiter is roughly the size of a DC-9 aircraft and will be propelled by three liquid-fuelled reusable main engines. These engines will have a thrust of 214 kg and a lifetime of seven-and-a-half hours of flight. The external tank is 46.8 m long and has a diameter of 8.4 m. The solid rocket booster is 45.5 m long with a diameter of 3.7 m.

85. In 1975 dollars, the launch cost of an Atlas Centaur was \$25.4 million and of a Delta 39-40, \$15.2 million; the launch of the shuttle will cost \$16.3 million but its capacity is four times the payload of a Delta launcher. Operations are to start in the middle of 1980 and spacelab will be launched in 1981. 487 flights are already fully subscribed by customers in the period 1980-82. Of this number, 50 % will be taken up by NASA, 23 % by the United States Department of Defence, 12.6 % by commercial interests, 12.1 % by foreign countries and some 5.7 % by foreign governments. For small customers, self-contained payloads can be accepted which would cost \$3,000-10,000 (in 1975 dollars) providing the volume is under 5 cu.ft. and the weight less than 200 lbs. Over 200 small customers have already subscribed.

#### *Collaboration with Europe*

86. The most important collaborative venture is of course the spacelab which is a vital element of the space transportation system. With regard to the possible extent of co-operation, NASA recently established with ESA a joint study group, the "Imagimators", to look at the needs of the spacelab user community for the next few decades with a view to identifying improvements in the shuttle-spacelab system which will increase the usefulness of the system.

87. There is fast-growing collaboration between the United States and Europe in both science and applications satellites. The following agreements in the science field were signed in 1977: (a) the infrared astronomy satellite (IRAS) — the Netherlands will build the spacecraft, NASA will supply the spacecraft instruments and the United Kingdom will provide a ground facility; (b) the Galileo orbiter and probe to Jupiter — the Federal Republic of Germany will supply the retro-propulsion module based on Symphonie apogee motor technology which will place Galileo in orbit around Jupiter. The Federal Republic will also finance the participation of fourteen German scientists, selected competitively, and supply three scientific instruments; (c) the space telescope will make a major contribution to understanding the origin, evolution and scale of the universe, its stars and galaxies. It will be an

automated satellite placed in orbit by the space shuttle. Data from its scientific instruments will be transmitted to earth by the tracking and data relay system. ESA is providing the solar array, the "faint object camera" and extended operational support. This will give the European astronomers about 15 % of the available viewing time.

88. In the field of applications satellites the arrangements with ESA are nearly completed to cover direct reception of satellite data at several European locations from Landsat (Italy and Sweden), Seasat (United Kingdom), the meteorological satellite Nimbus-G and the heat capacity mapping mission (HCMM) of the Explorer satellites (France). Users throughout the European Community will be served.

89. In establishing priorities for both domestic and international activities NASA will in future apply the same criteria as in the past, i.e. usefulness to human life and intellectual importance.

90. During its visit to the United States the Committee visited NASA establishments in addition to NASA headquarters and the nearby ESA office in Washington. In Los Angeles it visited the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and in Huntsville it was able to see the space shuttle.

91. At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory the Committee was received by General C.H. Terhune, Deputy Director, who gave a general outline of the laboratory's work, one aspect of which is deep space automated scientific missions. The laboratory started in the late 1930s when it worked for the United States army on solid fuel and rocket design. After the 1958 Space Act it came under a NASA contract in order to support NASA flight projects. The laboratory also operates the world-wide deep space tracking and data acquisition network. In addition, the laboratory conducts selected projects to develop and apply new technologies to the solution of problems on earth and particularly those aimed at easing the nation's energy crisis.

92. The energy budget is some \$65 million, of which \$35 million is earmarked for solar energy. The total budget is \$280-290 million. It has some 1,450 employees and 1,500 temporary staff.

93. The laboratory passes on much of its work to private industry in so far as possible. It receives patents and licences from the work done.

#### *Scientific space projects*

94. Mr. R.J. Parks, Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects, briefed the Committee on current space projects. The successful Ranger and Surveyor lunar projects, the Mariner missions to Venus, Mars and Mercury, and most recently the Viking Mars mission, are among the laboratory's most significant accomplishments. Two Viking spacecraft landed on Mars in the

summer of 1976 after an eleven month's cruise to the planet. The first pictures ever taken from the surface of Mars were then relayed back to earth. The prime objective of the mission was to search for life on Mars in an attempt to discover extra-terrestrial life.

95. During a tour of the laboratory the Committee viewed the Viking orbiter and lander Voyager spacecraft. Two Voyager spacecraft were launched in the summer of 1977 and are scheduled to fly past Jupiter in 1979 and Saturn in 1981. The spacecraft will explore the two planets and their major satellites to obtain information on their environment and characteristics. The laboratory manages the deep space network with stations in California, Spain and Australia and is continuously tracking and communicating with the spacecraft exploring the solar system. It will take two years to reach Jupiter and four years to reach Saturn.

96. Although the laboratory has a project to search for extraterrestrial intelligence, it has no programme to study unidentified flying objects (UFOs). NASA does not consider that there is a sufficient scientific base to warrant funding such research.

97. The laboratory is also managing the infrared astronomical satellite sponsored by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States; the Galileo project, a joint project with the Federal Republic; and the solar polar mission with ESA. The eventual goal of this mission is to identify and understand the influence of the sun and solar activity on the space surrounding the earth and in turn the influence of the sun on the earth and the other planets. Two identical spacecraft, for one of which ESA is responsible, will be launched by the shuttle on a trajectory towards Jupiter. The gravitational field of Jupiter will be used to deflect the trajectory of each spacecraft, bringing them into an elliptical polar orbit of the sun.

98. On 21st April 1978 the Committee visited the George C. Marshall Space Flight Centre at Huntsville, Alabama. The centre was established as one of the NASA installations in 1960 and Dr. Werner von Braun was named its first Director. During the early years the centre was primarily involved in launch vehicle development. The Saturn I and Saturn V launch vehicles, the Apollo missions and the Skylab programme were all developed at this centre. The centre is now deeply involved in the space shuttle programme as well as the spacelab programme. It has responsibility for managing the first, second and third spacelab payload missions. The primary objectives of the first mission are to verify performance capabilities, verify spacelab/orbiter compatibility, and determine spacelab-induced environments. An additional objective is to conduct meaningful science and applications experiments.

It is important to mention that 222 scientists representing the United States and fourteen other countries have been selected by NASA/ESA to participate in the first spacelab mission. The second spacelab mission will be multidisciplinary but will emphasise astrophysics research. The third mission will be operational with emphasis on materials processing in space.

#### *High energy astronomy observatory*

99. A current science payload programme at the centre is the high energy astronomy observatory, or HEAO programme. The first of three observatories was launched on 12th August 1977. This observatory, which is 4.1 m long, 2.4 m in diameter, and weighs over 3 metric tons, is performing extremely well in its mission of high energy stellar astronomy. The primary objective for HEAO-1 instruments was to survey the sky for X-ray sources. HEAO-1 was able to map the whole of the celestial sphere in six months and has already produced significant advances in knowledge of celestial X-ray and gamma-ray sources. Although this is basically a scanning mission, the observatory is versatile and its rotation can be stopped for pointing at sources of particular interest. A second laboratory will be launched in November 1978. This second mission will point very precisely at X-ray sources identified during the first mission in order to obtain highly-accurate and detailed data on stellar sources for long periods. A third mission, for launch in 1979, will search for gamma-ray sources and study cosmic rays from outer space. This mission will include a cosmic-ray instrument and an experiment developed by the French atomic energy group and the Danish research institute.

#### *Space telescope*

100. The centre is at present developing a 2.4 m space telescope designed for use by the international scientific community to significantly extend man's knowledge of the universe. The space telescope will be placed in earth orbit by the space shuttle and, from there, unhindered by the earth's atmosphere, it will be able to observe objects with a resolution approximately seven times better than that attainable with the largest telescopes on earth and over a wavelength region which reaches far into the ultraviolet and infrared portions of the spectrum. The telescope will be 13 m long, 4.3 m in diameter, and will be a shuttle payload of over 9 metric tons. The launch is scheduled for late 1983.

#### *Inertial upper stage*

101. In addition to the programmes mentioned above, the centre is responsible for the inertial upper stage, which will augment the space shuttle for delivery of payloads (up to 2.3 metric tons) to geosynchronous orbit, and the teleoperator

retrieval system, which is a reusable, low thrust, earth orbital teleoperator that will be deployed from the space shuttle to reboost, retrieve, or place payloads into higher energy orbits. The centre is also responsible for numerous materials processing in space experiments and activities, and in a related field is responsible for solar heating and cooling activities in support of the United States Department of Energy. In addition, the centre conducts a vigorous research and technology programme and is deeply involved in the study and definition of future NASA science and applications programmes.

102. The Committee visited the test facilities area to view the shuttle orbiter, the external tank, and the solid rocket booster, as well as the solar house, the spacelab and Skylab mockups, and the neutral buoyancy simulator.

#### TRW

103. On Thursday, 20th April 1978, the Committee went to the TRW at Space Park, Los Angeles, where it was received by Mr. J.N. Roos, Director of International Relations. TRW has a special interest in electronics and communications and is an important manufacturer of high-quality advanced technological products. From the 1950s onwards it has been working on spacecraft, space communications and other aerospace hardware.

104. Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, Executive Vice-President, pointed out that Europe and the United States had to work together in advanced technological projects such as spacecraft, anti-submarine warfare, digital communications and new forms of energy in order to share the great expense of research and development which was becoming too heavy a burden to bear single-handed.

105. Dr. G.T. Morton, Director of Customer Communications, explained that TRW had started with the production of cap screws on bicycles, engine parts for automobiles and aircraft, spare parts for cars and aircraft, high-quality tools, spare parts built in radios and televisions — all types of products manufactured by a firm called Thomson. The Hughes aircraft group, which had a high percentage of scientists and highly-qualified engineering teams, lost some of its teams when they joined a co-operative industrial effort under the leadership of Mr. Ramo and Mr. Wooldridge. They later joined up with Thomson, going together into energy products, drilling apparatus, cables and submersible pumps and other advanced modern technology ventures. Once united, they decided to call the new firm TRW which now employs 90,000 people; one-third of it is outside the United States including some 20,000 employees in Europe. TRW has fully-owned subsidiary firms, mostly in Germany, with others in the United

Kingdom and France. It also co-operates in Europe with firms such as Matra, Fiat and Hawker Siddeley.

106. Since 1958 the space system division of TRW has built over 110 spacecraft, starting with the Pioneer and Explorer satellites, the earlier types were launched in 1958 and 1960. Six TRW-built satellites were launched in 1965, seven in 1966, eight in 1967, and nine in 1968. It also built Intelsat III, a 293 kg satellite with an apogee engine.

107. One of the first military satellites was the TRW Vela satellite which since 1963 has been monitoring world-wide compliance with the nuclear test-ban treaty by looking for signs of nuclear testing above the surface of the earth and in space. Several advanced Vela satellites have since been built. Much larger detectors than those used in this type of satellite will be built for the NASA high energy astronomy observatory programme. The observatory satellites will scan the entire celestial sphere, systematically locating and measuring every significant source of X-rays and gamma-rays. The first satellite of this type was launched in 1977 and the second is to be launched this year. It will weigh 3.25 metric tons including 1.5 tons of experiments.

108. TRW has also become one of the most important suppliers of military communications satellites such as the Vela, DSCS and the Fleet-satcom satellites. Sixteen of the latter two will be built: twelve for the satellite defence communications system and four for the fleet.

109. As mentioned earlier, TRW is also building the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS) which will be launched in late 1980. Together with the advanced Westar satellite network it will allow NASA to monitor, track and control all its satellites from one point in the United States. The TDRSS introduces a new kind of data relay from and between satellites and spacecraft.

110. TRW has also played an important rôle in the development of the Atlas, Thor-Delta, Titan and Minuteman launchers.

#### *Personal remarks*

111. Your Rapporteur does not wish to conclude this chapter without pointing to the need for a long-term programme for implementing decisions on the two-way street for arms procurement. Genuine transatlantic co-operation must be established. The rôle of the United States Congress is most important — even more so than that of the legislatures in European countries. In this context your Rapporteur wonders why the Americans do not seem prepared to buy European defence material, bearing in mind the success of the sale to the United States of the Roland missile. If the European countries are

to buy the sophisticated hardware they need from the United States, the Americans should buy other products of advanced technology from Europe in return.

### III. Energy

(submitted by Dr. Phipps, Rapporteur)

#### *Introductory remarks*

112. Your Rapporteur will start this chapter by pointing out that it is impossible to discuss the United States energy position and policy in its entirety. He will therefore restrict himself to those aspects which have been discussed during the Committee's visit to the United States, i.e. the national energy plan, its advantages and disadvantages and the efforts made by the Federal Government and industry concerning new sources of energy.

113. The *national energy plan* was presented to Congress on 20th April 1977 ; it prescribes goals and principles to guide the nation's energy future. The administration also submitted legislation to implement the plan. The basic problem in the United States is that domestic demand for oil is now much greater than domestic supply. The national plan focuses on reducing demand for oil and increasing domestic energy supplies. The plan's central theme is to promote energy conservation primarily by moving energy prices towards replacement cost.

114. The need for a national energy plan derives largely from the fact that the United States now meets about 50 % of its oil demand through imports and that percentage is growing. Europe and Japan already have a very high level of oil imports and it is clear that energy waste or conservation by one country affects the supplies available to others. Consequently, the United States has an interest not only in moderating its own demand but in helping other countries to develop new sources of energy and expand their conservation programmes. If United States energy consumption is allowed to grow at historic rates and if domestic production remains stagnant as it has since 1970, oil-producing nations may not be able to meet world demands in 1985. The gap between world supply and world demand could be as much as 20 %, and even the threat of a shortage of this magnitude would lead industrial nations to start bidding up prices sharply in the mid-1980s. The resulting inflation and the impact of actual shortages would set the stage for a recession in strong economies and a collapse of weak economies, involving significant internal and external security risks. The national energy plan therefore proposes that the United States cut oil imports to 7 million barrels a day by 1985.

115. United States domestic oil prices are such that their net price per barrel of oil is below

international level. The same is true for natural gas. This cheap oil and gas policy means that the United States continues to be the world's most profligate user of these scarce resources. Because the price is low the United States consumes liberally, thereby drawing in greater imports than it otherwise would. The need for a national energy plan is generally accepted in the United States but Congress cannot yet decide how and in which way prices should rise. To raise oil prices through taxes would prevent windfall profits to the producers but not give them the price incentive to increase their exploration for new reserves. This is a dilemma which the President and Congress have yet to resolve. Higher energy prices are also unpopular with voters in an election year. The same is true for the natural gas bill which has been languishing in Congress for over a year now.

116. All the additional oil imported by the United States as a result of the cheap domestic oil policy is essentially oil that is being denied to the rest of the world and thus will not be available for other countries in the future. This policy also prevents the price of oil finding its true level in the international markets and, despite claims to the contrary, it is still the United States rather than Saudi Arabia which determines world oil prices.

#### *Federal policy*

117. On 11th April 1978 the Committee visited the Department of Energy where it was addressed by Mrs. Sarah Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Policy Department. She pointed out that alternative technologies to develop natural energy resources were a necessity for both the United States and the rest of the world. It seems unlikely that large enough quantities of oil will be discovered in the United States in the future to make a meaningful impact on the present energy resources situation. The government's policy is to reduce the use of oil and natural gas in energy consumption from 75 % to 60 % by 1985.

118. Exploration for natural gas on the continental shelf might be promising but higher prices for this energy resource will also be inevitable. The problem is not so much to increase production of oil and natural gas in the long term as to manage by 1985 to meet the levels of production which will then be needed. The rate of discovery and development may not be fast enough in the next few years to reverse the downward trend in domestic production.

119. The United States has an enormous reserve of coal but this also involves serious problems. Known coal reserves can meet the production target of the national energy plan without new discoveries. The vast United States coal reserves



amount to three times the energy contained in the Middle East oil reserves and currently account for more than 90 % of the United States proven energy reserves. Yet over the last seventy-five years the United States has switched from using coal for over 90 % of its energy needs to depending on oil and gas for 75 % of its energy. The cost of converting boilers and power plants from oil to natural gas will be extremely high. One major utility has estimated that it will cost about \$4 billion to convert 6,000 megawatts of generating capacity to coal. In order to arrive at this conversion many other new and existing technologies will have to be explored, for instance the production of synthetic gas from coal.

120. One of the main features of the energy plan is conservation of energy. This is possible only if the price of energy in the United States reaches a level where it is advantageous for the individual to save energy. In transportation, for instance, diesel fuel is much more economical than petrol and therefore cars with diesel engines should be cheaper than those with petrol engines. However, for the manufacturers to convert an engine line might cost up to \$1 billion.

121. Dr. James S. Kane, Acting Associate Director for Basic Research Programmes, talked about the Department of Energy's approach to research problems and alternative technologies. He pointed out that the Department is especially interested in the use of coal and is therefore studying the possibilities of liquefaction and gasification. Its budget for fiscal year 1979 for these studies is \$125.1 million and \$186.6 million respectively. Liquefaction and gasification are necessary for distribution reasons. The Department will give all necessary help and incentives so that technologies which are now still in the research and development phase may become operational before 1985.

122. In several areas of the United States geothermal energy might be a solution, especially in a State such as Hawaii which has no other current sources of energy. The amount earmarked for this type of research for fiscal year 1979 is \$22.5 million.

123. In the long term, at least after the year 2000, fusion might be a solution, but it is not reasonable to think that this will make a contribution in time for the national energy plan. The Department's budget for fiscal year 1979 is \$334 million.

124. Dr. Harold Jaffe, Assistant Director, Office of International Programmes, gave a general outline of nuclear power policy. Apart from coal, nuclear power generation will be the most important source of energy. In the words of Mr. Schlesinger, Secretary of State for Energy, "Coal and nuclear energy are the only large-scale alternative for the foreseeable future. This

winter's coal strikes indicate that coal-miners are hardly more reliable than Arabs as suppliers of energy."

125. The decline of nuclear power from the high hopes of the 1960s has been astonishingly swift. Today the United States has sixty-eight nuclear power plants in operation and only a few years ago the United States Government was still officially hoping that 175 additional plants would be operational by 1985, producing 30 % of the nation's electric power. However, since then, thirty-two reactors have been cancelled and contracts for some 150 have been deferred. In most cases it now takes ten or more years for a nuclear power plant to be built.

126. The government still endorses the current light-water reactors. At the same time research is being carried out to find solutions for waste disposal; these might be found in the early 1980s. A waste isolation pilot plant will go into operation in 1984. The Department is also studying the possibility of improving the productivity of light-water reactors as most of them produce at only 60 % of their capacity. A study is also being carried out to improve the quality of uranium being burned.

127. If nuclear power is to provide a significant fraction of new energy sources after 1985, constraints that have led to a virtual moratorium on contracts for new plants will have to be eased. The energy plan recognises this problem and has proposed means to reduce the licensing time. The budget for nuclear energy programmes for fiscal year 1979 is \$1,891.2 million.

128. The administration remains opposed however to breeder reactors as it considers that they increase opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations and terrorists. The President has therefore proposed indefinite world-wide deferment of the use of recycled plutonium together with a delay in the construction of breeders.

129. Dr. Bennett Miller, Deputy Technology Programme Director for solar, geothermal and electric storage systems, declared that the Department is spending \$260.3 million in fiscal year 1978 on solar energy and other alternative sources of energy. This will be increased to \$400 million in fiscal year 1979. This budget increase will be necessary in order to bring the new technology into market readiness within a relatively short time.

130. Your Rapporteur will discuss the new energy resources later in this chapter.

131. Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Special Representative for non-proliferation at the State Department, briefed the Committee on Federal policy on fast-breeder reactors and reprocessing plants. The decision of Presidents Ford and



Carter on reprocessing and breeder reactors do not reflect a special United States commercial or other national interest but deep concern about the present way nuclear power is developing. The question is whether the march of technology and its industrial application should override other concerns such as the SALT discussions or environmental problems. The government's attitude affects the United States industry and utilities as much as other countries' industries.

132. During the London summit meeting on the evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle, a declaration was adopted which stated that increasing reliance would have to be placed on nuclear energy to satisfy growing energy requirements and help diversify sources of energy. This should be done with the utmost precaution in the generation and dissemination of materials that can be used for nuclear weapons. The aim is to meet the world's energy needs and make the peaceful use of nuclear energy widely available while avoiding the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.

133. The principal issue is whether existing or new institutional or other international arrangements are enough to minimise the risks of proliferation. Should technologies such as fast breeding, reprocessing plants and enrichment facilities be contained? The United States Government is convinced that the issues should be studied seriously and that without sound safeguards one should not advance along a road which might be dangerous for future generations.

134. During its meeting with the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, the Committee heard the opinion of Senator Harrison H. Schmitt from New Mexico who declared that one of the problems arising from the President's programme was that it was only a conservation programme and not a production programme. In fact, the only way to offset the economic impact of conservation, such as the loss of car sales, was to increase production of domestic oil. Unfortunately, the programme failed to reach the crux of the economic problems involved. The car industry, including labour, together with many others in the United States, would be interested in a more balanced programme, i.e. a programme which included reasonable increases not only in fuel prices but also in production, so that a drop in petrol consumption would not result in more unemployment.

135. Of particular importance was the pricing of national gas at a more reasonable rate and taxation of oil at the well head. The deregulation of national gas prices would take some seven years, this period of adjustment being necessary after twenty-five years of national gas pricing. The Senator believed that there was still a tremendous potential of gas and oil resources in the United States and incentives should be given to exploit these resources.

136. From the administration side it was pointed out that in Europe petrol prices had been greatly increased during the last five years but nowhere had consumption fallen. At the most, consumption had stabilised.

137. Your Rapporteur considers that the cheap energy policy in the United States puts a brake on any initiative to harness the enormous industrial infrastructure in the development of new oil and gas resources. This also adversely affects the rest of the world as by far the largest single investment in oil and gas research is made in the United States. In addition, the Americans are making no effort to reduce the size of their cars, or the scale of their air conditioning and central heating.

138. In 1976, total oil consumption in the world, excluding the USSR, Eastern Europe and China, was 47,940,000 barrels per day, of which North America used 18,770,000 barrels per day. With such a level of consumption the behaviour of the United States must affect every other nation and in particular the developing countries.

#### *New sources of energy*

139. Nearly everywhere — in Washington, Seattle, San Diego and Los Angeles — the Committee was told about new sources of energy. The Office of Science and Technology is fully aware of the need to promote research and development in new sources of energy. In its studies it does not include only the promotion of basic research but also applied research and development in the transportation field, communications, and the structure of government. Many of the proposals submitted to the President are referred to this office for advice on scientific and technological aspects.

140. NASA's energy programme has a budget of \$3 million which represents a small but significant effort to identify and verify potential energy-related technologies. This programme is aimed at effectively using aeronautical and space capabilities in direct support of national energy research and development and determining how the unique characteristics of the space environment may be exploited to help solve energy problems on earth.

141. These efforts at present cover thirteen specific areas, i.e. wind turbine generators, solar heating and cooling, solar thermal electric systems, photovoltaics, advanced ground propulsion, energy conversion and storage systems, gas turbines, fuel cell and hydrogen systems, magneto-hydrodynamics, advanced coal energy extraction, and finally, combustion, materials, and heat exchanger technology such as heat exchange possibilities in the sea and extraction of methane from geothermic overpressured shales.

142. At the Boeing factories the Committee was briefed on solar power satellites by Mr. D.L. Gregory, Senior Specialist Engineer. He felt that such satellites could provide a solution for re-establishing a sound economy based on national energy resources. The desirable characteristics of such a solution included non-depletability, domestic availability, abundance, environmental acceptability, low cost and a short development/implementation programme. Solar power satellites could tap energy from the sun, beam it to earth via microwaves and provide base load electric power from ground receivers. The satellites could be installed on a sufficiently large scale to provide an electrical capacity to meet foreseeable requirements.

143. Solar power satellite electrical energy may relatively quickly achieve a price of only 4 cents per kilowatt hour ; with additional development the price from new satellites might be only 2 cents per kilowatt hour by the early twenty-first century. This is well below the eventual costs of energy from fossil fuels. Solar power satellites require no fuel. Their useful lifetime, with appropriate maintenance, is indefinite. Thus, after amortisation of the original capital cost the energy price can be extremely low, perhaps 1 cent per kilowatt hour.

144. The United States should move forward with a technical verification programme, including in-space tests using the space shuttle. The cost of this programme is modest in comparison with expenditures on other energy alternatives with the economic potential of solar power satellites. The satellites would be located in geosynchronous orbit some 22,000 miles above the earth. In this orbit they remain in one position over the equator and provide direct line-of-sight transmission of energy by radio beam to receivers on the earth. In this orbit the satellites are nearly constantly illuminated (over 99 % of the time). The source of this energy is solar rays converted to electricity by an array of solar cells. The satellites are very large, with areas of approximately 35 square miles. Their output is, however, proportionate to the size in that approximately 10 million kilowatts of power are provided by each. The satellite would be equipped with two transmitters and serve two earth receiving sites (5 million kilowatts per site). Satellite sizes down to approximately 2.5 million kilowatts per receiver appear economically practical. The constancy of output of the ground receivers, without the effects of night and weather, provides baseload electrical power.

145. Ideally we should have solar power satellites today, but of course we cannot. A development phase remains ahead. Studies have indicated however that expeditious development could lead to initial operation in the early 1990s ; if solar power satellites were then placed in serial produc-

tion, by the year 2000 they could be contributing nearly half of our current electric energy consumption.

146. Recently Congress has been considering the appropriation of \$25 million to test a solar power satellite.

147. Apart from this type of solar energy, Boeing is experimenting with other forms such as industrial waste treatment facilities, a solid waste separation treatment pilot plant, windmills of 100 m diameter, terrestrial solar energy installations and diverse types of nuclear power stations.

148. At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Mr. H.M. Schurmeier, Assistant Laboratory Director for energy and technology applications, said that the laboratory had a ten-year project on low-cost solar cell arrays which converted sunlight to electricity. Its aim was to increase the commercial production of low-cost solar cell arrays for use in the home, farms and factories. This activity, together with studies on geothermal systems, concerned new energy sources. The laboratory had also started a study to improve the fossil energy supply and new methods of extraction in coal-mining ; it also conducted research on energy conservation.

149. The purpose of the study of solar energy was to find a system to reduce cost in such a way that the energy acquired would be economical. When the project started in 1975 the cost was \$25 per kilowatt ; it is hoped that by 1986 the price will be 50 cents per kilowatt.

150. At TRW much attention is being paid to the better use of coal through gasification, the use of oil shale reserves, tar sands and ocean thermal energy. TRW considers that solar energy will never become a major source of energy but that, on the other hand, the gasification of coal is most promising for energy production.

151. At the Scripps Institute, Professor John D. Isaacs is interested in the possibilities of harnessing the energy released when fresh water meets salt water at river mouths. Tidal and wave energy are also under consideration.

152. Your Rapporteur has the impression that, both in government agencies and in private industry, research and development in energy resources has a high priority. These activities show how much importance the Americans attach to research in conventional and alternative energy resources. Compared to the small European efforts this will inevitably lead again to total American domination in new energy technology. This could have the most vital consequences, both political and economic, for the future. A joint European effort matching that of the United States or joint projects with the United States is the principal recommendation of this report.

153. It should be recalled that research into new sources of energy is designed to reduce the cost of such energy to twice that of energy from current sources. The Department of Energy is spending some \$4 billion on research; European expenditure is only one-tenth of this. Whether or not the result of this research is turned over to private industry makes no difference to the energy available.

#### IV. Oceanography

(submitted by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur)

154. In this chapter your Rapporteur will discuss two main questions: first the American attitude to the ongoing Law of the Sea Conference and second the Committee's visit to the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in San Diego.

##### *Law of the Sea Conference*

155. The Committee was briefed in the Department of State on seabeds and law of the sea negotiations by Mr. Alan Berlind, Vice-Chairman of the National Security Council Inter-Agency Group for Law of the Sea.

156. Mr. Berlind indicated an important difference of opinion between the so-called "group of 77" developing countries and the industrialised countries. The group of 77 considers the freedom of the high seas and the notion that the oceans are *res nullius* as a theory which sustains the interests of the industrialised countries. They believe the oceans are the common heritage of mankind and unless there is general agreement nobody can claim their resources. The United States and many other countries, even the Soviet Union, adhere to the system of the traditional freedom of the high seas.

157. There are three areas of negotiation in which these concepts have led to serious disagreement. First, the question of navigation: the industrialised countries say that no national maritime activities should be limited by coastal states or by an international ocean régime. National claims should be reconciled with traditional freedom. The 77 countries consider that in national economic zones, straits and coastal waters or archipelago states free international navigation can be allowed but permission should be granted by the coastal states. The two points of view were more or less reconciled during discussions at the sixth session of the Law of the Sea Conference and a text has been found which appears to safeguard traditional high sea freedoms within the exclusive economic zone, with an exception however for specific resource-related rights. This text has not been finalised.

158. The second negotiating area where a clash has arisen between the 77 and the industrialised countries concerns maritime scientific research within the 200-mile zone which is not permitted unless the coastal states give their explicit consent. A large number of coastal states do not want a liberal research system and in this they are helped by the Soviet Union which also refuses free research in the exclusive economic zone.

159. The third and greatest difficulty has however arisen over the question of deep-sea mining. The 77 countries will not allow deep-sea mining unless the international community gives its agreement. Eight years ago the United States declared that the seabed resources constitute the common heritage of mankind and it accepts that the international community would be given the chance to share in the profits that exploitation of deep-seabed resources may one day produce. Translating this into practical policies, the United States Government has proposed a double or parallel system through which half the resources of a certain area would go to the international community and the other half to the mining states or consortia.

160. The 77 countries have now proposed that a single mining site should net \$750 million for the international community. If this were adopted seabed mining would not be economically possible. This regulation would discourage economically-rational exploitation of the seabed resources. At the present time only a few international consortia are actively prepared to take the risk under reasonable conditions; in these consortia American firms play a prominent part.

161. Since October 1977 there has been a bill before Congress called the deep-seabed mineral resources act. This legislation might be of temporary validity if the Law of the Sea Conference were to meet with success. If it proves impossible to agree on an international treaty the United States will continue with its national legislation. The bill provides for revenue-sharing with an eventual international seabed authority.

162. Another point of discontent, but of minor significance, concerns the access of landlocked states to deep-seabed resources.

163. The United States Government and many other governments are very discouraged that after seven sessions and many months of negotiating the results have been so meagre. Unwilling to pay their expenses, several governments are already withdrawing their delegations. The United States Government would very much prefer a law of the sea treaty to nothing at all. Without an international agreement, industry and marine scientists would run considerable risk in their activities. From all sides in the United States, therefore, the will exists to bring the Law of the Sea Conference to fruition.

*Scripps Institution of Oceanography*

164. On 17th April 1978 the Committee visited the Scripps Institution of Oceanography where it was received by Mr. Charles Merdinger who explained the workings of the institution which is the oceanographic branch of the University of California, San Diego. The institution occupies sixty-four buildings on 230 acres, has a staff of 1,200 and a budget of \$45 million a year. Ten per cent of the money comes from the State of California and some 90 % from the Federal Government through the intermediary of the National Science Foundation.

165. The institution's mission is basic research and development. The research programme originates with the scientists and not with outside interests, whether governmental or industrial. The institution has many sea-going operations and a fleet, the most important ship of which is the Glomar Challenger. The institution has some 185 students who prepare their Ph.D. studying physical, chemical, geological and geophysical aspects of the ocean, as well as conducting biological research.

166. The Woodshole Institution in Massachusetts is of the same type but smaller with a staff of some 800.

167. The Director of the Scripps Institution, Mr. William A. Nierenberg, expressed his concern to the Committee about developments at the Law of the Sea Conference. He said the scientific community was very worried about the different zones which were now being created and which would be detrimental to the freedom of research on currents, climate or weather of the seas and oceans. Especially, the fact that the 200-mile economic zone now being adopted by nearly all coastal states would automatically mean a serious reduction in the possibilities of conducting research in ocean resources.

168. Professor John D. Isaacs, in charge of the Institute of Marine Resources, which is administered from the Scripps Institution, said that this institute provided the basis for studies on organic and mineral materials. It also dealt with methods of harnessing energy from the sea such as ocean wave energy and sought to increase knowledge of other marine resource issues such as recreation, transportation, pollution and waste disposal at sea.

169. During his studies he had come to the conclusion that in many respects knowledge of the oceans was extremely meagre. For instance, it had often been stated that the North Sea was seriously polluted by the waste disposal of coastal

states. Intensive study had shown that North Sea fish had never been so abundant. However, as fishermen catch only certain types of fish there might be shortages of these particular fish, but the overall population was apparently thriving on the organic waste dumped into the North Sea. There were many such instances and he thought it would be extremely dangerous if legislation were adopted which failed to take into account the fact that knowledge of oceans and seas was far from complete. Inorganic waste is a different problem.

170. Your Rapporteur was happy to learn that the Scripps Institution has built a wave energy converter and tested it off Kaneohe Bay, Oahu (near Hawaii). The device called "wave pump", conceived by Professor Isaacs, can be used as a power source for instrumented weather buoys or research buoys and is considered to be economically competitive with other power sources.

171. Mr. Ray F. Weiss said that the manganese nodules found on the seabed had great economic value. Scripps Institution was studying the characteristics of the nodules, their growth, the reasons why they were not buried by ocean sediment which grows 100 times as fast, etc. Moreover it was not at all clear why the characteristics of the nodules differed from one area to another. To extend their knowledge, many geologists and chemists were studying the environment of the ocean; a so-called fixed ocean-bed chamber had been constructed in order to study the chemical substances of sediments. The structure had many features which were also used in spacecraft.

172. The sediment study started in 1970 and is a ten-year programme.

173. One of the most spectacular programmes of the Scripps Institution is the deep-sea drilling project which is managed by Scripps under contract to the National Science Foundation. Scientific planning and further financial support are provided through members of the joint oceanographic institutions for deep earth sampling; this is an international organisation in which, in addition to the United States, participate the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, the USSR and the United Kingdom.

174. On deep-sea drilling, Mr. Melvin N.F. Peterson stated that it started in 1968 with the purpose of increasing man's knowledge of the earth, its age, the history and process of development of the ocean basins, and the structure and composition of the oceanic crust. The Glomar Challenger is drilling up to a depth of 23,000 ft.

## APPENDIX I

***Programme of the visit to the United States by the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions******10th-21st April 1978****Monday, 10th April*

- 11.05 a.m. Arrival at Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C.  
Hotel : Wardman Towers (Sheraton Park)  
2660 Woodley Road  
(Tel. : 265.2000)
- 2.30 p.m. - 4.30 p.m. Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)  
Old Executive Office Building  
17th and G Streets
- Rôle of OSTP in advising the President on science and technology ;
- Science and technology concerns of the administration :
- Mr. Arthur Morrissey, Senior Policy Adviser ;
- Mr. Phil Smith, Assistant Director for Natural Resources and Commercial Services.

*Tuesday, 11th April*

- 9.30 a.m. - 11.30 a.m. NASA  
400 Maryland Avenue  
Washington, S. W. 20546  
(Tel. : 755.2320)
- Moderator :
- Mr. Norman Terrel, Director of International Affairs.
- Welcome :
- Dr. Alan M. Lovelace, Deputy Administrator, NASA.
- NASA space transportation systems programmes :
- Mr. Edward P. Andrews, Deputy Director, Space Transportation Systems, Operations Office.
- NASA's communications, meteorology and oceanographic programmes :
- Dr. Lawrence R. Greenwood, Acting Director, Environmental Observations Division ;
- Mr. Donald K. Dement, Acting Director, Communications Programmes.
- 2 p.m. - 4.15 p.m. Department of Energy  
James Forrestal Building  
1110 Independence Avenue, S. W.  
(Tel. : 252.5000)
- Introduction :
- Ms. Sarah Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Policy Development.
- Department of Energy's approach to research problems ;

## Alternative technologies :

Dr. James S. Kane, Acting Associate Director for Basic Research Programmes, Office of Energy Research.

## A review on nuclear power :

Dr. Harold Jaffe, Assistant Director, Office of International Programmes.

## A review on solar energy :

Dr. Bennett Miller, Deputy Technology Programme Director for Solar, Geothermal and Electric Storage Systems.

*Wednesday, 12th April*

9 a.m. - 12.30 p.m.

Department of State  
2201 C Street  
Washington, D.C. 20520  
(Tel. : 655.4000)

## United States relations with Europe :

Mr. Robert E. Barbour, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

## Seabeds and law of the sea negotiations :

Mr. Alan Berlind, Vice-Chairman of National Security Council Inter-agency Group for Law of the Sea.

## United States international aviation issues and policies :

Mr. Michael H. Styles, Director, Office of Aviation.

## United States foreign policy issues arising from science and technology :

Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy United States Special Representative for Non-Proliferation.

## International collaboration in science and technology : United States preparations for the 1979 United Nations Conference on Science and Technology :

Mr. James Stromayer, Deputy to Co-ordinator of United States preparations for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology ;

Mr. Jack Blackburn, Director of the Office of Technology Policy.

12.30 p.m.

Lunch at the Foreign Service Club.

2.30 p.m.

United States Senate  
United States Capitol  
Washington, D.C. 20510

## Meeting with the following members of the Committee of Commerce, Science and Transportation's Sub-Committee on Science, Technology and Space :

Senator Adlai Stevenson (Democrat, Illinois) — Chairman ;

Senator Harrison H. Schmitt (Republican, New Mexico) — Ranking Minority Member ;

Senator Howard Cannon (Democrat, Nevada) ;

Senator Russell Long (Democrat, Louisiana) ;

Senator Barry Goldwater (Republican, Arizona) ;

Senator Robert P. Griffin (Republican, Michigan) ;

## and with two members of the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives :

Mr. Don Fuqua (Democrat, Florida) ;

Mr. Walter Flowers (Democrat, Alabama).

## Members of staff :

Mr. Charles Mosher, Staff Director, House Committee ;  
Mr. Jim Gehrig, Commerce, Science and Transportation.

8.08 p.m.

Arrival at Seattle Tacoma International Airport.

## Greeting :

Mr. E. P. Molnar  
Boeing Aerospace Company  
International Plans and Operations.

Hotel : The Seattle Hilton  
Sixth & University  
Seattle  
Washington 98101  
(Tel. : 624.0500)

*Thursday, 13th April*

8.30 a.m. - 12 noon

Boeing Aerospace Company  
Seattle.

Arrival at Plan II Theatre.

## Greeting :

Mr. M. R. Paisley, Manager International Plans and Operations.

## Welcome :

Mr. J. H. Goldie, Executive Vice-President.

## Army programme discussions :

Mr. R. L. Brock, Vice-President, General Manager Army Systems Division.

## AWACS discussions :

Mr. D. E. Graves, Vice-President Aircraft Armament.

## AMST discussions :

Mr. J. E. Steiner, Vice-President Corporate Product Evaluation.

## Wind tunnel demonstration/tour :

Mr. G. M. Bowes, Chief, Wind Tunnel Laboratories.

## Roland discussion and assembly area tour :

Mr. L. D. Hagan, Deputy Manager Roland Programme.

12.30 p.m.

Lunch at the Kent Space Centre.

1.45 p.m. - 4.30 p.m. Personnel rapid transit system tour :

Mr. T. M. Davidson, Manager Downtown People Mover Programme.

## Interim upper stage laboratory tour :

Mr. T. C. Carlin, IUS Manufacturing Engineer Manager.

## Space chamber facilities tour :

Mr. E. T. Neal, Operations Manager.

## Solar power satellites briefing :

Mr. D. L. Gregory, Senior Specialist Engineer.

## Energy briefing :

Mr. D. D. Cox, Director of Energy System Development.

6.30 p.m.

Reception at the Seattle Athletic Club.

*Friday, 14th April*

8.30 a.m. - 12 noon    Boeing Aerospace Company  
Seattle.  
Arrival at Renton Complex.  
BCAC briefing and airplane factory tour :  
    Mr. P. M. Condit, Director Programme Management 707, 727, 737 Division.  
Arrival at Everett Complex.  
747 briefing and factory tour :  
    Mr. W. E. Huston, 747 Tour Director

*Sunday, 16th April*

Arrival at San Diego.  
Hotel : The San Diego Hilton  
    1775 East Mission Bay Drive  
    San Diego  
    California 92109  
    (Tel. : 276.4010)

*Monday, 17th April*

9 a.m. - 12 noon    General Dynamics  
    Convair Division  
    P.O. Box 80847  
    San Diego  
    California 92138  
    (Tel. : 277.8900)  
Host : Mr. D. L. Gillespie.  
Convair and its products :  
    Mr. J. A. Robertson.  
Fort Worth and its products (F-16) :  
    Mr. Oats Schwarzenberger.  
Pomona and its products (Cruise missile) :  
    Mr. J. Muse ;  
    Mr. J. McSweeney.  
  
2 p.m. - 3.30 p.m.    Scripps Institution of Oceanography  
    La Jolla  
    California  
Welcome :  
    Mr. William A. Nierenberg, Director.  
Future in the oceans :  
    Mr. John D. Isaacs.  
Manganese nodules :  
    Mr. Ray F. Weiss ;  
    Mr. Kenneth H. Nealson.  
Deep sea drilling :  
    Mr. Melvin N. F. Peterson.



## Tour SIO/Aquarium :

Mr. R. Nelson Fuller ;  
Mr. Jackie Janke.

5.30 p.m. - 7.30 p.m. Reception given by General Dynamics aboard the Reuben E. Lee at Harbour Island.

*Tuesday, 18th April*

9 a.m. - 12 noon Salk Institute for Biological Studies  
10010 W. Torrey Pines Road  
P.O. Box 1809  
La Jolla, San Diego  
California 92112

## Briefing :

Mr. John B. Pinto, Public Affairs Manager.

4.45 p.m. Leave San Diego for Los Angeles International Airport by a Golden West Airlines' flight in a Shorts 330 30-passenger commuterliner.

Hotel : Wilshire Hyatt House  
3515 Wilshire Boulevard  
Los Angeles  
California 90010  
(Tel. : 381.7411)

*Wednesday, 19th April*

1.45 p.m. - 4 p.m. Jet Propulsion Laboratory  
Pasadena  
California 91103

## Committee received at Main Gate by :

Mr. G. Robillard, Assistant Laboratory Director for Planning and Review ;  
Mr. V. L. Melikan, Manager, Legislative Affairs and Protocol.

## Greeting and general outline of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's work :

General C. H. Terhune, Deputy Director.

## Current Space Projects :

Mr. R. J. Parks, Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects.

## View Viking orbiter and lander and Voyager spacecraft.

## Jet Propulsion Laboratory energy programme :

Mr. H. M. Schurmeier, Assistant Laboratory Director for Energy and Technology Applications.

## Biomedical programme :

Dr. D. A. O'Handley, Manager, Biomedical Technology.

## Environmental and waste water treatment :

Dr. R. H. Green, Manager Environmental Technology.

4.30 p.m. Reception given by the British Consul-General.

*Thursday, 20th April*

9 a.m. - 11.30 a.m. TRW Systems and Energy  
One Space Park  
Redondo Beach  
California 90278

**Agenda review :**

Mr. J. N. Roos, Director, International.

**Welcome :**

Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, Executive Vice-President.

**General outline of TRW activities :**

Mr. G. T. Morton, Director, Customer Communications.

**General outline of the activities of the Defence and Space Systems Group :**

Dr. G. E. Solomon, Vice-President and General Manager, Defence and Space Systems Group.

**Space systems division activities ;****Systems engineering and integration division activities :**

Mr. R. G. Williams, Programme Development Manager, Space Systems Division, Defence and Space Systems Group.

**Electronics :**

Mr. M. Beere, Director, Telecommunications Planning, Communications Group.

1.55 p.m.

Leave for Huntsville, Alabama (Flight UA. 700).

Hotel : The Holiday Inn  
3810 University Drive  
Huntsville  
Alabama  
(Tel. : 837.7171)

***Friday, 21st April***

9 a.m. - 12.30 p.m.

George C. Marshall Space Flight Centre  
NASA  
Huntsville, Alabama 35812

**Welcome :**

Mr. J. A. Bethay, Director, Executive Staff.

**Space shuttle review :**

Mr. Lindstrom.

**Mated vertical ground vibration test :**

Mr. Cagle.

**Solid rocket booster short stack testing :**

Mr. Cagle.

**External tank LH<sub>2</sub> tank testing :**

Mr. Cagle.

**External tank LO<sub>2</sub> tank testing :**

Mr. Cagle.

**Spacelab and Skylab mockups :**

Mr. Schorsten.

**Neutral buoyancy simulator :**

Mr. Cagle.

END OF VISIT

## APPENDIX II

*The Salk Institute for Biological Studies****Brief description of the Salk Institute***

The Salk Institute, with a total staff of over 300 and a professional staff which includes nearly 100 Ph.D.s and M.D.s, is one of the world's largest independent centres of biological research, with much of its work focused on the areas underlying the health sciences.

The smallest element of life, the cell, and its interaction with other cells and the environment is one of the Institute's major concerns. Better understanding of this interaction will provide answers to our many serious scientific and medical challenges: cancer, diabetes, growth and development defects, immunology and the brain and nervous system.

Visiting scientists from the United States and around the world come to the Institute to collaborate with resident researchers, or to use the Institute's unusually complete, modern and well-equipped facilities.

To further this national and international cross-fertilisation of science, to keep in close contact with the scientific community and to assure that new research trends are recognised promptly, the Institute has a resident faculty and a group of non-resident fellows whose members include four Nobel laureates.

Members of the Board of Trustees of the Institute and of its National Council include prominent figures in business, industry, government, science and the arts, who provide guidance to the Institute.

The Salk Institute is a free-standing institution which is a "public foundation". Its annual budget comes from many sources including grants from the federal government, support from major foundations including the National Foundation/march of dimes which also provided the \$20 million buildings, voluntary health agencies, as well as research and health-oriented private individuals, private foundations and corporations.

The Salk Institute strives to provide the intellectual climate which fosters new research ideas and collaboration between different scientific groups. At any one time a number of pilot research projects are under way at the Institute which later mature into major laboratories and projects.

***Some current research at the Salk Institute****How cancer starts and spreads*

At the root of all cancer research is the question: Why does a cell, going about its normal

business as a peaceful and productive member of the body's cellular community, suddenly turn renegade? One way they do so in animals, but not necessarily in man, is to fall victim of a virus. By studying how such viruses make animal cells malignant, researchers in the Salk Institute's tumour virology laboratory hope to uncover at least one basic mechanism that leads to cancer — and from it learn truths about the initiation of cancer in general.

*Search for cancer growth factors*

Normal cells growing in a culture dish filled with medium exhibit what scientists call "growth control". They will multiply in the dish — rapidly at first — and then slow this process as the cells become crowded and the growth medium is depleted. Transformed cells, however, will continue to grow, reaching very high densities in the dish. They lack growth control.

One difference between normal and transformed cells seems to be a different requirement for certain growth factors contained in the medium. While normal cells need high levels of these chemicals to continue growing, transformed cells require a much lower concentration. The molecular biology laboratory is searching for further factors that control cell growth and is trying to understand the changes that take place when a cell becomes transformed.

The surface membranes of cells play an important rôle in the control of cell growth. When normal cells are transformed to cancer cells, changes are known to occur in the cell membrane. Salk Institute researchers are giving cancer cells the "bends" inside a pressurised nitrogen flask in an attempt to discover chemical differences between the membranes of normal cells and cancer cells. The treatment ruptures the cells into thousands of minute bags of membrane. These are examined for chemical factors known to be involved in controlling the growth of cells.

*Understanding the nature of language*

To understand the nature of language is to begin to understand the nature of man. But how can one begin to study so complex and deeply rooted a phenomenon as language, which has evolved with man over millions of years? One way is to look at a language which is still young and in the process of being formed. Such a language exists, even though it cannot be heard. It is the sign language used by the deaf to com-

municate and now the subject of one of the most unusual of the Salk Institutes' research projects.

### *Keys begin to fit microbial locks*

Genes are the blueprints of life, containing a coding for each one of the roughly 10,000 different proteins in our bodies. A microbe that is a common inhabitant of the human intestines and a valuable research organism can switch its genes on and off at will, as must all living things. This ability, termed gene regulation, is shown most dramatically when a single set of genes carried in a fertilised egg grows to become a complete human being. Gene regulation is liable to be involved in cancer, too. At the genetic level, all living things work in much the same way. So, studying the microbe's ability to control its genes is leading Salk Institute scientists toward a detailed understanding of one of life's most basic processes.

### *Immunity and auto-immunity*

When under attack by a foreign microbe the body can launch a counter-attack with its immune defences. New theories of the immune response are being tested in one laboratory. Other laboratories deal with instances when the body's counter-attack can be too hasty and misdirected, against not a foreign invader but a component of the body itself. Multiple sclerosis may be such an "auto-immune disease". Institute researchers are studying a model disease in animals called EAE which may give clues about such "auto-immune diseases".

### *Myasthenia gravis*

Myasthenia gravis is a little-known disease that afflicts thousands with a progressive fatiguing of the muscles. Although some scientists have suspected that myasthenia gravis might be an "auto-immune disease", no proof of the concept existed. Now Salk Institute researchers have successfully created a laboratory "model" of the disease. This model is lending new understanding to myasthenia gravis and to the auto-immune diseases in general.

### *The cellular basis of breast cancer*

For women, breast cancer is the most common — and the most frequently fatal — form of cancer. A new laboratory at the Salk Institute has been established to study the disease at the cellular level. Using normal and cancer cells in culture and laboratory animals with chemically-induced tumours, scientists will study the cell types found in the normal mammary gland, their

rôle in gland development and in cancer formation. Using this information from basic research, they hope to develop tools for more effective diagnosis and prognosis of breast cancer in women.

### *DNA packing*

In an attempt to understand the method by which a two-metre strand of genetic code — DNA — can fit into a single human cell, one Institute laboratory is invoking the aid of a computer to unravel this phenomenon. A complex of proteins now appears to be responsible for ordering the DNA molecule into a bundle one ten-thousandth of its original length.

### *How did life begin?*

That is another of the fundamental questions being asked by Salk Institute scientists and one to which it is already possible to give some preliminary answers. After showing how simple gases thought to be present in the primitive atmosphere of the earth could have formed the chemical basis of life, researchers are now turning toward the hub of the problem: how the first "living" molecules achieved their own duplication.

### *Human reproductive agents*

One of the key brain hormones, LRF, is the chemical message that sets off the complex interactions of the body's sex hormones. As such, it plays a rôle in regulating fertility in both the female and the male. Salk Institute researchers are synthesising versions of LRF with slight chemical alterations, which, like misspelled words in a sentence, are useful in throwing off the sense of the message and thus blocking fertility. From such research could emerge new fertility control agents.

### *New brain hormone*

It has become clear over the past few years that the brain is even more in control of our bodies than was once thought. Not only does the brain exert its powers through the nervous system, but it also has a direct rôle in regulating the body's hormones. It does so via hormones of its own. The very first of these to be discovered, TRF, is involved in the control of the thyroid gland, and was found by a research team at the Salk Institute. The latest such hormone, somatostatin, discovered at the Salk Institute, is of great importance in the metabolic processes involved in diabetes.

*The brain and nervous system*

For each of us, control of our thoughts and actions reside in the billions upon billions of connections made between the tens of billions of cells in our brain. Trying to learn something of that “wiring pattern” is one of the most daunting intellectual tasks left to modern science. A modest start on this staggering problem has been made by Salk Institute scientists who have persuaded brain and muscle cells to grow in the same laboratory dish and to form connections with one another. From this system, the researchers hope

to learn some of the rules that govern the “wiring patterns” of the brain.

Deep within the three-pound human brain lie two small bluish specks of tissue weighing less than a millionth of an ounce each. Reaching out from this region are connections to much of the rest of the brain. Researchers in the new Arthur Vining Davies Centre for Behavioural Neurobiology at the Salk Institute are studying this system of connections for its rôle in such key functions as body movement, memory, and perhaps most importantly, reward. Extension of the studies on reward may shed light on the nature of drug addiction and alcoholism.

## APPENDIX III

*List of questions put during the visit to the United States**Questions for the State Department*

The Soviet Union is engaged in a massive modernisation, expansion and character change in its land, sea and air power. Transformation of the eastern military forces from essentially defensively-equipped forces to expanded and offensively-equipped forces has been so dramatic and ominous that substantial increases in NATO forces is becoming a necessity.

What repercussions will this have on the United States defence budget in relation to space, aviation and research and development in other fields of advanced technology?

What will be the consequences for NASA's budget, especially with regard to research and development of new aircraft and space vehicles?

What is the rôle of the United Nations in space?

Could the United Nations play a rôle, as suggested by the French President, by using satellites to verify the execution of disarmament plans?

Would it be possible for the United Nations to have its own reconnaissance satellites?

What is the State Department's attitude towards Soviet surveillance satellites with atomic power plants?

Should the United Nations' Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space discuss this matter and, if so, what action might it be able to take?

What is the position of the United States Government on the Outer Space Treaty and the Limited Test Ban Treaty with regard to military satellites?

The President's 1976 aeronautical and space report indicates that the defence advanced research projects agency is pursuing new technology for strategic surveillance from space. What is the purpose of this research?

What are the latest developments in artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting?

If the plans for Nordic co-operation materialise how will this affect Intelsat?

What is the attitude of the State Department towards inter-Arab co-operation?

Which countries have agreements with the United States for receiving and processing Landsat data?

Which countries are taking part in the international maritime satellite organisation?

When will this organisation become operational?

What are the latest developments regarding further collaboration between the United States and the USSR in space matters?

Is further collaboration foreseen after the Apollo-Soyuz test project?

What progress has been made in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on the question of deep ocean mining?

Is there still a possibility that the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea will reach agreement on a treaty?

What is the Department's opinion on the results of and follow-up to the following treaties:

- (a) The 1958 Antarctic Treaty?
- (b) The 1963 Moscow Test Ban Treaty?
- (c) The 1966 Outer Space Treaty?
- (d) The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty?
- (e) The 1970 Seabed Treaty?

In the framework of the Law of the Sea Conference, the seventh session of which began on 28th March in Geneva, would the Department give its opinion on high seas freedom, fishery conservation and the utilisation of marine living resources, the resources of the continental shelf and sharing revenue with developing countries, the maximum flow of information on marine scientific research, and marine environmental protection?

If no agreement is reached on deep-sea mining, will the United States allow private companies to start mining during the next decade?

The question has been raised of whether a treaty would be preferable to the existing situation. Would a treaty be acceptable to all 150 participating States in view of the differences of opinion which exist between the "77" developing countries and the industrialised countries?

*Questions for the Science Adviser to the President*

How can the political aims of the new Administration's scientific and technological programmes be defined?

What general science and technology policy has been laid down by the new Administration?

What is the rôle of the Science Adviser to the President in the overall development of research and technology ?

What is the relationship between this office, the departments, the universities and other institutes of learning ?

What is the rôle played by the National Science Foundation, the Institute for Fundamental Research and institutes particularly concerned with the well-being of the population ?

How is the overall research budget established and what course is set for it in the near future ?

The Committee is particularly interested in energy problems, new sources of energy, nuclear energy, oceanography, space and aviation research. What are the trends of United States policies in these fields ?

To which of the above sectors did your government give priority during the 1960s and to which will it give priority in the 1970s and 1980s ?

What is the budget trend in the field of oceanology ?

What percentage of the budget is spent on submarine research, experiments in fish ranching in shallow waters, basic research on the resources of the continental shelf, research ships and the operation of marine centres ?

What part of the budget is devoted to new sources of energy, wave, tide, solar and geothermal energy ?

What is being done in the field of radioactive chemistry and the utilisation of radio elements in order to fight air and water pollution ?

#### *Questions for NASA*

What specific guidelines are there regarding NASA's long-range planning ?

What are its plans concerning the concept of supplying solar energy to earth via satellites ?

If these plans are approved, how will they affect the space shuttle programme ?

What plans exist for scientific work and research in outer space ?

Will there be a planetary mission to Venus ?

As the emphasis is now on space applications which are of direct use on earth, is there not a danger that scientific efforts will be diminished ?

Is the potential for inhabiting other planets in the solar system being studied ? If so, which direction will this study take ?

Is it true that the United States has the technology and the tools to tap the resources of space but that for budgetary reasons it is not possible to execute this type of programme ?

What are the possibilities of establishing a permanent manned space station in 1990 ?

Will manned military space stations be required as part of future United States space operations ?

How will the knowledge and data from earth resources satellites such as Landsat be distributed to countries requiring this information ?

Should an international body be set up to transfer data to countries or other customers ?

Will a commercial agency or organisation be established to provide the space services requested by countries or commercial organisations ?

Have the oil companies asked for satellites capable of detecting oil deposits or minerals ? Will such requests be approved ?

How many Seasat satellites will be launched ?

Will an operational Seasat programme be supported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or will a private company be set up to run this programme ?

#### *Questions for the Energy Department*

The commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in the United States will be deferred indefinitely ; what viable and economic nuclear programme could be established without such reprocessing and recycling ?

How will the United States breeder reactor programme be restructured ?

What will be the international consequences of American policy with regard to Europe, Latin America and the developing countries in Africa and Asia ?

Could an indication be given on the future of :

- (a) the advanced gas-cooled reactor ?
- (b) the liquid metal-cooled reactor ?
- (c) the high temperature gas-cooled reactor ?
- (d) the steam generating heavy water reactor ?
- (e) the fusion process ?
- (f) safety studies ?
- (g) applied nuclear work ?
- (h) radio isotopes, radiation techniques ?

What is the trend for electricity generating capacity in the United States, its growth rate and future ?

What percentage of electricity is generated from nuclear sources ?

What is the estimated generating capacity of electrical energy required in 1985 and 1990 and what percentage of this will be provided by nuclear generating stations ?

What is the annual nuclear research budget ?

Is it true that the combined budgets of France, the United Kingdom and Germany for research on fast-breeder reactors represent a total smaller than the annual United States budget for research on this type of reactor ?

#### *Questions for the Senate Space Sub-Committee*

For what reasons did the Senate suppress its Space Committee and establish a Space Sub-Committee within the framework of the Committee for Commerce ?

What are the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee ?

Will parliamentary supervision of the aerospace activities of NASA and the relationships between NASA and the aerospace industries be carried out by the Sub-Committee ?

Can the Congress committees follow the rapid development of technology and what machinery has been established to assist the legislators in their task ?

Is NASA space policy worked out together with the Congress committees ?

What is the Sub-Committee's rôle in the supervision of public expenditure on space research and development ?

How is the Sub-Committee informed of the specific subjects concerning research and development being followed by NASA scientists ?

What will be the consequences of a USSR space shuttle ?

How does the Sub-Committee follow research and development in military space applications ?

Should an international exchange of views on space science and technology be established at parliamentary level ?

How is control exercised by the Sub-Committee on environment problems related to aviation ?

Is the Sub-Committee studying the consequences of supersonic aircraft, high performance VTOL aircraft and civil and military short-haul technology ?

NASA is carrying out important research in the field of solar energy. Is the Sub-Committee of the opinion that this might become cost competitive and, if so, in what form ?

What are the results of the study undertaken by NASA on the feasibility of disposing of radioactive nuclear waste in space ?

#### ANNEX

#### *Brief notes on spacelab (SL)*

1. The SL development in Europe is going ahead without particular difficulties. An important milestone has been completed in March of this year : The critical design review of the programme was considered highly satisfactory, and following this ESA has decided to authorise manufacture of the SL flight unit to be delivered to NASA. This review was the last one before the flight acceptance review which will take place in connection with the delivery of the SL. The next milestone will be the delivery of the engineering model to NASA, planned for mid-1979. The flight unit will be shipped to NASA, in two sets, in *autumn 1979* and *early 1980*, in readiness for the first two spacelab missions for December 1980 and April 1981.

2. One of ESA's main concerns in connection with this development programme is the status of NASA's SL procurement order for the next SL unit. In fact, according to the SL memorandum of understanding<sup>1</sup> concluded between NASA and ESA, NASA should give an initial SL procurement order for at least one SL unit at the latest two years before the delivery of the first SL unit. This means that such an order should have been received by ESA between September 1977 and January 1978, if one takes into account the above delivery schedule for the first SL flight unit.

Whilst the administrators of NASA have on several occasions confirmed NASA's willingness to purchase this additional SL unit (and perhaps more), a formal order has not yet been received from NASA. It is hoped that an offset arrangement between NASA and ESA may help to place rapidly such an order, in that it may assist NASA to overcome a budgetary problem (they used the money earmarked for this purpose in order to keep the main development budget). Such an arrangement would offset payment for services or goods to be exchanged between the two agencies. Hence, we expect a NASA procurement order in October 1978, by which time an offset arrangement should have been concluded. We also

1. Memorandum of understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the European Space Research Organisation for a co-operative programme concerning development, procurement and use of a space laboratory in conjunction with the space shuttle system signed on 14th August 1973.



hope that appropriate long-term arrangements and provisions, on both sides, will be made for the subsequent procurement of further spacelab units, to which the provisions of the above memorandum equally refer.

3. Beyond this, ESA and its member states expect that the United States authorities will fully reply to, and take into account, those provisions of the agreement<sup>1</sup> concluded between the United States Government and certain member states of the agency, which have a direct bearing on their future co-operation in the so-called post-Apollo programme. In particular, the United States undertook :

- to keep their European partners informed of the United States future use of the space shuttle system, and of future concepts which may lead to modifications of the present SL concept, with a view to

expanding and extending this co-operation beyond the agreement (Article 5) ;

- to make the space shuttle available for SL missions of the European partners on either a co-operative or cost-reimbursable basis, consistent with international arrangements ;
- to consult with their European partners with a view to facilitating a continuing and expanding co-operation in the use of outer space, and furthermore to associate them with mission definition planning for the use of the system and with planning and management of the overall development of the system.

It should be underlined that European states attach, on that basis, much importance to being continuously involved in United States or United States/Soviet post-Apollo activities and planning.

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1. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and certain governments, members of the European Space Research Organisation, for a co-operative programme concerning the development, procurement and use of a space laboratory, in conjunction with the space shuttle system signed on 15th August 1973.

**Scientific, technological and aerospace questions  
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council**

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

**submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Adriaensens, Rapporteur**

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on scientific, technological and aerospace questions — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council

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submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Rapporteur

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II. Nuclear energy

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Warren (Chairman) ; MM. Valleix, Lenser (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Adriaensens (Alternate : Brasseur), Bernini, Cavaliere, Cornelissen, Hawkins, Konings, Lewis (Alternate :

Tomney), Mart, Müller, Péronnet (Alternate : Cerneau), Dr. Phipps, MM. Pinto, Schwencke, Talon, Treu, Ueberhorst, Van Waterschoot, La Combe.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**

**on scientific, technological and aerospace questions —  
reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council**

The Assembly,

Appreciating the continuing dialogue between the Council and the Assembly on Europe's energy supplies, European aviation and space questions ;

Noting with anxiety however the increasing tendency in Europe to side-step the Community approach and make bilateral or trilateral arrangements ;

Considering the declaration of the heads of state or of government of the European Community at their meeting in Copenhagen on 7th and 8th April 1978 underlining the urgent need to make Western Europe less dependent on imported energy sources and acknowledging that high priority must be given to large-scale investments in this sector ;

Agreeing with the Council that there is an urgent need for a common energy policy for Western Europe ;

Regretting that the state of European aviation has not improved since last year and that an overall civil and military aeronautical policy has not been formulated ;

Gratified that member countries' approach to ESA's programmes has been more positive recently ;

Gratified also at the Council's statement in its annual report that European nuclear fusion research must be pursued so that Europe can achieve a technological level comparable with that of the United States and the Soviet Union and that it wishes a European civil and military aeronautical industry to be developed capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with the United States,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

**I. Invite member countries :**

1. When defining their industrial policy, to take greater account of security requirements and in particular the need to :

- ensure Europe's energy supplies even in time of crisis ;
- maintain the level of employment which is essential for social peace ;
- guarantee the competitiveness of European advanced industries by a high level of research and investment and thus strengthen the industrial basis of European security ;

2. (a) To continue to strive for a common European energy plan up to 1990 ;

(b) To earmark a major part of their budgets for the development of conventional and new sources of energy and energy production as well as for energy conservation and environmental factors ;

**II. Invite the Governments of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to seek the best means for the firms concerned in their countries to take part in the Airbus programme as full partners.**

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

(submitted by Mr. Adriaenssens, Rapporteur)

### **I. Introduction**

1. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions appreciates the continuing dialogue between the Council and the Assembly on scientific, technical and space questions. It is still worried however about the absence of effective decision-making machinery in Europe and even more about the increasing tendency to side-step the Community approach and make bilateral or trilateral arrangements, although some progress has been made such as the decision to install the Joint European Torus (JET) at Culham in the United Kingdom.

### **II. Nuclear energy**

2. Representatives of member states and of the Commission of the European Communities were among the forty countries participating in the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation conference held under the auspices of the United States. The results of the studies now being carried out in specialised working groups will be known at the end of 1979. This is of the greatest importance for the Community's nuclear energy programme which has now practically come to a standstill. In 1977 the Community's nuclear capacity grew by only 3,300 MWe, not even half the figure put forward only a year ago. At the end of 1977, the Community's total nuclear capacity was 22,400 MWe. This slow growth needs to be examined in the context of its effect on future employment and on social and economic stability in the Community.

3. On 8th April 1978, during the summit conference in Copenhagen, the heads of state or of government of the European Community countries declared that the increase in oil imports by the Community remained a source of great anxiety. If Western Europe is not able to reduce its oil imports between now and 1985 it will become more and more dependent on outside sources of energy. At its meeting on 25th October 1977, the Council of Ministers agreed on certain measures such as the sharing of oil between member countries in case of supply difficulties, controls on coal imports, conservation of energy and aid for Community projects in the hydrogen sector. However, agreement proved impossible on a number of other points, especially on how to settle the Community's refinery problems, promote the use of coal in electric power stations and arrange for sufficient stocks of coal.

4. The Commission in Brussels had submitted an energy plan with detailed programmes and goals for 1985, but the Council of Ministers was

unable to take the necessary decisions and a common energy plan for the period up to 1985-90 could not therefore be adopted.

5. Your Rapporteur particularly regrets this as a lopsided situation has now arisen in that no decisions have been taken on energy production and the development of conventional and new sources of energy, but important measures have been taken which apply only to energy conservation and to security and environmental problems.

6. Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that policy with regard to technological research and development in various sectors, but especially the energy sector, should take account of the following economic criteria : (i) growth of the gross national product ; (ii) increased employment opportunities ; (iii) the balance of payments situation ; (iv) improved conditions of employment.

7. Viewed in this light, it can be seen that energy conservation, although important, is not sufficient to promote the well-being of the people of Europe. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that the situation of relative abundance of oil products prevailing in 1977, and perhaps 1978, is not going to last. This abundance was due only to the economic recession, which was accompanied by a high level of unemployment. Improvements in the economy will involve considerable demand for energy if the goal of the Copenhagen conference for a yearly growth rate of 4.5 % is to be attained.

8. In its report the Council accepts that much still remains to be done both in defining a common European energy supply policy and in developing a nuclear industry with mastery of the fusion cycle and that European nuclear fusion research must be pursued so that Europe can achieve a technological level comparable with that of the United States and the Soviet Union. Your Rapporteur fully agrees with this opinion. The interest in nuclear energy, economic reasons apart, is due largely to the fact that the security of the free world, and of Western Europe in particular, depends on the availability of an adequate energy supply. A growing dependence for its oil supplies on outside sources would jeopardise Europe's security and freedom of action in foreign affairs.

### **III. Aerospace**

9. Where aircraft construction is concerned, your Rapporteur is sorry to say that no real progress has been made. No decisions have yet been taken on the future of the Airbus B-10 and the joint European small passenger aircraft

development. The United Kingdom Government and British Aerospace Corporation have not yet decided whether to participate in the future development of these European aircraft.

10. Your Rapporteur considers it of great importance for all member countries to participate in the European Airbus venture.

11. Where space questions are concerned, a separate report has been submitted by Mr. Scheffler and your Rapporteur will therefore merely mention his satisfaction that since January 1978

all member countries have made real progress towards approving ESA's programmes.

12. The Council finally stated that it shared the Assembly's wish for the development of a European civil and military aeronautical industry, capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with the United States. Here again Europe's independence would also be at stake if it abandoned its aeronautical and aerospace industrial activities. This would also be detrimental to the United States which, by ordering the Roland missile, has shown the usefulness of the European industry.

***Scientific, technological and aerospace questions —  
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

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**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Jager***

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At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph III as follows :

“III. Invite the governments of the member countries to discuss the communication of 31st May last from the Commission of the European Communities on concerted action on aircraft programmes so that they may take a decision on this matter at the next meeting of the European Council.”

*Signed : Jager*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment amended and agreed to).

***Relations with Parliaments***

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**INFORMATION REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the  
Committee for Relations with Parliaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur***

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submitted by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur

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- II. Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since December 1975

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Radies (Alternate for Mr. Delorme) (Chairman) ; MM. Schlingemann, Enders (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Arfé, Bonnel, De Poi (Alternate : Mme Papa de Santis), Hengel, Jeambrun

(Alternate : *Rivière*), Kershaw, Reddemann (Alternate : *Müller*), Roper, Spautz, Stoffelen, Tanghe.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

## Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur)

### I. Introduction

1. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments decided during its meeting in Rome on 27th June to prepare reports on the broadcasting of parliamentary debates and on the laws governing the election of the European Parliament. Your Rapporteur prepared an interim report dated 3rd November 1977 (Document 752).

2. Also in June 1977, consideration was being given to the possibility of rewriting the reports by Mr. Péronnet on regional assemblies and the Assembly of WEU. Developments in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom in recent years provide much additional material. This subject will be tackled when devolutionary bills for Scotland and Wales have completed their passage through the House of Commons, so allowing a pan-WEU review of the situation. It is hoped that this will be possible for the next part-session of the Assembly of WEU in November 1978.

### II. Activities of the Committee

3. On 31st May and 1st June 1978 the Committee met in Paris. It was addressed by Mr. Douvry, Director-General of the public authority of the new town of Cergy-Pontoise, on French new towns, their problems and advantages, and then by Mr. Cabana, Secretary-General of the Paris City Hall, on the methods of work of the administration of the City of Paris.

4. The Committee has selected five recommendations for official transmission to the presidents of the national parliaments :

- 307 on the application of the final act of the CSCE ;
- 308 on communications and crisis management in the Alliance ;
- 309 on WEU's contribution to the development of European union ;
- 310 on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems ;
- 311 on progress in aerospace.

5. The number of interventions during the last six months has become more normal again : 38 as against 15 for the last six months of 1977. Taking

account of the fact that during the period concerned the French Republic had general elections and the Italian Republic a long and difficult task in forming a new government, your Rapporteur feels it is not unjustified to hope that the number of interventions will rise again in the next six months.

### III. Laws governing elections to the European Parliament

#### A. Action by the European Communities

6. Article 138 of the EEC Treaty of Rome commits member states to hold direct elections. At the European Communities heads of government meeting in Paris in December 1974, seven of the nine set a target date for elections in 1978, the United Kingdom and Denmark reserving their position. Following the "yes" vote in the June 1975 referendum, a clear British commitment to direct elections was given in December 1975.

7. Agreement among all member states was reached on 20th September 1976 with the signing of the convention "Act concerning election of the representatives of the assembly by direct universal suffrage" which provides, *inter alia*, for :

- a European assembly of 410 representatives, elected for a fixed term of five years ;
- elections to be held in all member states within an agreed Thursday-Monday period, designated in the first instance by the Council of Ministers. May-June 1978 to be the chosen period ;
- membership of national parliaments not to constitute incompatibility, and each legislature to be free to make its own choice about the dual mandate ;
- the first directly-elected assembly to draw up a proposal for a uniform electoral procedure, and meanwhile governments can choose their own proposals ;
- the 410 representatives to be divided among member states as follows : France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and United Kingdom — 81 each ; Netherlands — 25 ; Belgium — 24 ; Denmark — 16 ; Ireland — 15 ; Luxembourg — 6.



8. The act does not come into force until all the member states have ratified it. In section B your Rapporteur gives a brief sketch of his understanding of what stage legislation has reached in WEU member countries.

#### **B. Action by WEU member countries**

##### **(i) Belgium (24 seats)**

9. The bill approving the Community act of September 1976 was passed in both Chambers. The bill organising European elections in Belgium was tabled on 2nd December 1977 and is under discussion in the three committees concerned with foreign affairs, the interior, and European affairs. Amendments have already been tabled by the government, the majority and the opposition.

10. All parties in Belgium are agreed on a system of proportional representation. There have been disagreements, however, on how the country's 24 seats are to be distributed between the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking communities, with Brussels also asking for separate treatment. The Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, has suggested national lists for the whole country, while the former Minister of the Interior, Mr. Michel, has proposed a repartitioning of the 24 seats into three "regions": 12 for Flanders, 8 for Wallonia and 4 for Brussels. The Egmont agreement of May 1977 provided for 13 seats to be allocated to the Dutch-speaking and 11 seats to the French-speaking list; residents in the Brussels area would be able to designate which list they vote upon.

11. The bill organising European elections provides for two electoral bodies, one French, the other Dutch, to be formed further to the decision reached in the Egmont agreement. However, the kingdom would be divided into three constituencies: one French-speaking, one Dutch-speaking and one for Brussels.

12. In the Brussels constituency, all candidates would be listed on the ballot paper, which would be printed top to bottom, the Dutch-speaking candidates on one side and the French-speaking candidates on the other, so that electors in the Brussels constituency may choose between the two linguistic groups of candidates.

13. However, the boundaries of the Brussels constituency still have to be fixed.

##### **(ii) Federal Republic of Germany (81 seats)**

14. The Community act was ratified by the Bundestag on 16th June and by the Bundesrat on 24th June 1977 and came into force on 11th August 1977.

15. The electoral bill, however, has been facing certain difficulties. A bill was tabled by the

government on 30th March 1977 which provided for proportional representation through national lists with a minimum of 5 % of the votes needed for election. On 6th May, however, this was rejected by the Bundesrat in favour of Land (regional) lists. The latter proposal is intended to translate the federal nature of West Germany to the European assembly. On 16th March 1978 the Bundestag unanimously adopted the electoral bill which now provides for the optional use of either national or Land lists. Bundesrat consent was given on 21st April 1978. An amendment by the christian democrats to allow eligibility of members of the Länder governments was rejected. The bill defining the status of German members of the European Parliament was introduced on 30th March 1977. It is still under consideration in the competent committees.

16. The Government of the Federal Republic has declared that, in view of the special situation of Berlin, the House of Deputies there will elect representatives to those seats (three) within the German quota which fall to Land Berlin.

##### **(iii) France (81 seats)**

17. At one time it was widely thought that France would face considerable difficulties in passing the necessary European elections legislation. In the event, France is the first country to complete both ratification and the passage of the electoral bill. In the face of possible opposition to the elections from both the communists and the Gaullists, President Giscard d'Estaing referred the issue in 1976 to the French constitutional court. They ruled that no constitutional objections existed, since no increase in the European Parliament's powers was involved. In the spring, the communists declared support in principle for the elections. A large body of Gaullists, however, continued to have doubts. When the ratification bill was presented to the National Assembly on 16th June, Article 49.3 of the French constitution was therefore invoked: the opponents of the measure declined to table a motion of no confidence, and the act was ratified. On 24th June the Senate voted by 220 to 0 with 23 abstentions in favour of ratification.

18. On 25th May an electoral bill was tabled by the government providing for proportional representation by national lists (as opposed to the single-member seat system used for National Assembly elections). The *plus forte moyenne* system of proportionality will be used, with seats going to candidates in order of presentation on their party's list. This bill was passed with minor amendments by the Assembly on 21st June (474 votes to 2) and by the Senate on 29th June (256 votes to 0).

19. French citizens resident in other countries will be able to vote for a French member if they

are inscribed in the national election lists. Also voting as part of France will be the five French overseas departments (Guyane, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, St. Pierre and Miquelon) and the French overseas territories (Polynesia, New Caledonia, Mayotte).

(iv) *Italy (81 seats)*

20. Italy was the first country to ratify the Community act. It was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 17th February by 384 votes to 16, and by the Senate on 24th March, unanimously.

21. There is general agreement on proportional representation by the list system, but so far no electoral bill has been published.

22. Discussion in committee and among the parties has revealed support for national lists, for lists covering all twenty existing regions, and for a division of the country into three — north, centre, south and islands. The government of the autonomous region of Val d'Aosta has tabled its own bill in the Italian Senate, seeking its own representative in the European assembly.

(v) *Luxembourg (6 seats)*

23. The Luxembourg Parliament ratified the Community act on 5th July, by 54 votes to 5. A draft elections bill is currently being discussed between the parties.

24. The system of election will be proportional representation, though it is not yet decided whether there will be more than one constituency, there being support both for a single one and for two: Luxembourg city and the rest of the country. Whichever is decided, the outcome is not expected to be different. The return of two social christians, two socialists and two liberals is predicted.

25. Three questions seem very important: the number of constituencies, the election of substitutes and voting rights for Luxembourg nationals living outside the country. Incompatibilities and conditions for election will be the same as for national elections. Dual mandates will probably be accepted.

(vi) *Netherlands (25 seats)*

26. The Community act was ratified, by acclamation, in the *Tweede Kamer* (lower house) on 23rd June; and by the *Eerste Kamer* (upper house) on 28th June. The elections bill will provide for proportional representation in a single national constituency. The elector will be able to vote for any given candidate on a list, but if this candidate collects less than 380,000 personal votes he will not be elected, and his votes will be

distributed in order of party preference (i.e. list order). "Left-over" votes and seats will be distributed according to the d'Hondt system. Immigrants from other EEC countries who do not have the vote at home will probably be able to vote in the Netherlands.

(vii) *United Kingdom (81 seats)*

27. The first European assembly elections bill was published on 24th June 1977 and given a second reading (a favourable vote on the principle) by the House of Commons on 7th July by 394 votes to 147. The great majority of the Conservative Party, together with the Liberal and Scottish Nationalist Parties, were in favour, the Labour Party split (132 for, 124 against) and the majority of the Ulster Unionists opposed.

28. The bill failed through lack of time and a virtually identical one was introduced on 9th November 1977. This bill received a second reading on 24th November by 381 votes to 98, the divided Labour Party again providing the bulk of the opposition (73 votes). It was hotly contested in the House of Commons, and it was found necessary to impose a time-table motion on its progress. It was substantially amended, and was agreed to in that House by 159 votes to 45 on 16th February 1978. No amendments were made by the House of Lords and the bill received Royal Assent on 5th May 1978.

29. The act divides the United Kingdom into its constituent nations: of the total 81 seats, England gets 66, Scotland 8, Wales 4 and Northern Ireland 3. The original bill was curious in format in that it proposed voting by the regional list system for Great Britain while allowing the Commons to replace this with single-member constituencies ("first past the post"). On 13th December 1977 the House of Commons rejected the government's recommendation of the list system by 319 votes to 222, and subsequently reaffirmed its preference for "first past the post". The proposal for Northern Ireland, that voting should be by single transferable vote, was left unchanged.

30. The seats will be based on an amalgam of two or more parliamentary constituencies with an electorate as near as possible the area's electoral quota (e.g. total Scottish electorate divided by eight). Boundary Commission reports are expected shortly.

31. Candidates will be listed alphabetically and the "winner takes all" regardless of the percentage size of his vote.

**C. Impact on the WEU countries**

32. Before commenting on the detailed provisions of national legislation on direct elections, your

Rapporteur feels that it may be helpful to set out a table showing the statistical effect of the

allocation of seats on the population of member countries :

Country	Population	Electorate	Seats	Voters per representative
Belgium	9,883,302	6,416,662	24	267,000
France	52,655,802	33,752,779	81	417,000
Federal Republic of Germany	61,832,000	41,600,000	81	514,000
Italy	55,812,000	?	81	?
Luxembourg	356,400	205,817	6	34,000
Netherlands	14,000,000	9,500,000	25	380,000
United Kingdom	56,042,000	40,960,843	81	507,000

33. These figures show a substantial “weighting” in representation towards the smaller member states (and, in your Rapporteur’s opinion, rightly so). They also conceal disparities within “national” totals. Within the British figures, for example, there is a similar “weighting” towards Scotland (population per representative 473,000 compared to 514,000 for England), but Scotland is disadvantaged in seats per head of population in comparison to the Benelux countries. This is a subject on which your Rapporteur has had representations from groups in Belgium, France and Italy and to which he returns under section D.

D. The disfranchised Europeans

34. As direct elections to the European Parliament will take place at the same time throughout the whole Community, and as more and more nationals from one member country are now residing in another without changing their nationality, how widely can the EEC franchise be extended ? Such persons belong to one of the nations which will vote, live in one of the others, and have vested interest in the outcome of the election and the composition of the parliament.

35. Your Rapporteur first attempted to establish the size of the problem, and requested an estimate from each WEU assembly of how many nationals are currently living in another EEC country. He received the following information on the number of expatriates living elsewhere in the EEC :

Belgium .....	250,000
France .....	299,571
Federal Republic of Germany	235,000
Italy .....	1,400,000
Luxembourg .....	Unknown
Netherlands .....	300,000
United Kingdom .....	285,800

36. Given the fact that over 2,500,000 Europeans fall into this category, he then attempted to establish what voting rights they currently have.

37. In *Luxembourg*, citizens who reside in another Community country have no right to vote in home elections. In *Belgium*, citizens who are abroad for professional or military reasons, together with the members of their family and their household residing with them, have the right to vote by proxy, and their names are entered in the electoral roll of the commune where they last lived. In the *Federal Republic of Germany*, members of the public service and armed forces and their spouses who are posted to any country abroad are eligible to vote (*Bundeswahlgesetz*, Section 12). In *France*, all citizens resident abroad have the right to vote by proxy or by post. In the *United Kingdom*, members of the public service and armed forces and employees of the British Council, and their spouses, are eligible to vote by proxy. Similar provisions have recently been adopted in the *Netherlands*. In *Italy*, citizens living abroad can, if registered on the electoral roll there, vote in their home commune.

38. In recent years certain immigrants’ councils have obtained the right to be consulted at municipal level in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands. There have also been proposals in the Belgian and Italian parliaments to extend voting rights to immigrants in local elections : they have not yet been discussed in committee however.

39. The imminence and special nature of direct elections to the European Parliament have led all WEU member countries to take a fresh look at the problem. Broadly, their response falls into two categories :

- to extend the franchise to nationals living in another EEC state by giving them the vote in their home country, either by returning there to vote, by proxy or postal vote, or by voting in the nearest embassy or consulate ;
- to allow such nationals voting rights in the host country.

40. In *France*, citizens will have the right to vote provided they are inscribed on the national election lists ; no voting will be possible inside *France* for nationals of other EEC countries. In the *Federal Republic of Germany*, all citizens living within the European Communities will be enfranchised ; those who live outwith the EEC will not, nor will other EEC nationals living within the *Federal Republic of Germany* be allowed to vote there. In the *United Kingdom*, the Select Committee on Direct Elections (of which your Rapporteur was a member) recommended that the right to vote at home in Community elections be extended world-wide to all nationals who satisfied the 1971 Immigration Act. This was subsequently refused by the government.

41. In *Italy*, the permanent committee for emigration met on 12th July to consider the problem : reciprocity was suggested — if the franchise were extended to Italians in a host country, then similar rights might be given to citizens of that country in *Italy*. The matter of bilateral agreements, or of writing such a clause into the elections bill, will be considered later this year.

42. No final decision has yet been taken in the *Netherlands*. Your Rapporteur is informed, however, that Dutch nationals resident in other EEC countries will probably be entitled to vote at home, provided they sign a declaration stating that they will not make use of any voting rights in their host country. Immigrants to the *Netherlands* from other EEC countries will probably be allowed to vote if they have no voting rights in their own country.

43. There are three problems here : the first is to ensure that all citizens of EEC member states, resident within the Community, have the right to vote ; the second is to avoid double voting ; and the third is to avoid different practices being established in different states.

44. Since this is a matter which falls within the competence of the national legislators of the EEC, your Rapporteur trusts that the Council of Ministers will take steps to co-ordinate proposals for enfranchisement. It is his personal view that *all* the potential 181,000,000 electors in the Community from the Shetland Isles to Sicily and from Brittany to Berlin should have the vote, and that if all member states enabled their citizens resident abroad to vote in their home

country by one means or another, adequate control of double voting could be exercised.

#### E. Regionalism and direct elections

45. To what extent should the ancient nations, regions and provinces of Europe be represented through the agency of direct elections ? As power and decision-making are concentrated at the centre, to what extent should there be a corresponding growth of decision-making at the periphery ? What can direct elections do for the cultural, linguistic and economic identities of Europe's "regions" ? When the elections are held, will candidates say "I am a Fleming — and a European", "I am a Scot — and a European", leapfrogging their own "national" legislatures ? What links can be established between the European Parliament and regional assemblies in member states ?

46. As a Scot, it is inevitable that your Rapporteur should be interested in this area. But it is worth noting that the regional/national approach to direct elections has been part of the discussions leading to draft bills in most WEU countries.

47. The question of the separate representation of the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities has dominated proposals in *Belgium*, and the solution will probably lie in the direction of regionalisation. The *United Kingdom* bill is openly regionalist in approach, in response to political developments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland : no matter which voting system is chosen, a separate number of seats has been reserved to each of them. In *Italy*, proposals to base direct elections on the twenty regions, or on three super-regions have been steadily canvassed. On 20th June 1977 the government of the Val d'Aosta region tabled a draft bill in the Italian Senate, seeking one locally-elected European representative, and your Rapporteur understands that a similar proposal is under active consideration in the Trentino-Alto Adige. The problem does not arise to the same extent in the *Netherlands* or in *Luxembourg* (though, in the latter case, there is a vigorous debate about separate constituencies for Luxembourg city and the rest of the country). In *France*, the government has steadfastly followed a unitary approach to direct elections : Bretons and Corsicans for example are to vote on exactly the same kind of ballot paper as Alsatians and everyone else.

48. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the issues of regional identity and the self-determination of national minorities is largely a matter for the legislatures of individual WEU countries. Nonetheless, he believes that these are important threads in the direct elections skein (and with

the return of the Generalitat to Catalonia, they are likely to become more important still). He asks the Assembly to note the growing importance of regionalism, and to commission further work in this area.

#### **F. The dual mandate**

49. With minor modifications (in the United Kingdom, for example, peers and certain ministers of religion will be able to stand), qualifications for candidature in direct elections are the same as for national elections. How possible, in reality, will it be for someone to be a member of both? And what links are envisaged between representatives in the European Parliament and their national parliaments?

50. Article 5 of the Community act stipulates that "membership of the European Parliament shall be compatible with membership of a parliament of a member state". Individual members may therefore decide whether, in addition to their European mandate, they also wish to belong to their national legislatures. These legislatures may also lay down conditions and rules governing simultaneous membership, for example:

- members of the European Parliament might also be members of national parliaments with or without voting rights;
- members of the European Parliament might be released from active participation in national parliaments;
- members of the European Parliament might delegate their voting rights in their national parliament to another member.

51. At the moment such rules are under active consideration in the member countries of WEU. From information available to your Rapporteur, there seems general agreement that — for a transitional period at least — the dual mandate must continue for a number of members. This argument is advanced on two grounds: the need for a personal link between the European Parliament and national parliaments, and the political unacceptability in certain countries of a substantial number of members resigning to contest direct elections. In the opinion of your Rapporteur, however, the pressures of work, travel, voting (and in those countries with single-member seats, constituency interest) will in time force representatives to choose which mandate they hold. The dual mandate will wither away.

52. It is already clear that a considerable number of candidates in direct elections will wish to stand for the European Parliament only. If in addition, as your Rapporteur suggests, the dual mandate in time "wither away", how are links to be maintained — and, possibly, institutionalised — between European representatives and their national legislatures? It should be obvious

that reams of documentation and published decisions will not be enough. There will need to be face-to-face meetings and discussions.

53. This is a matter which has provoked some discussion in WEU parliamentary circles. In most countries it is forbidden to speak in national assemblies, let alone vote, if one is a non-member. Constitutions and standing orders would have to be re-written.

54. Preliminary talks between the parties in the United Kingdom are indicative of the general approach being adopted. Some members have advocated that European representatives should become members of a reformed House of Lords; others have suggested that they should have speaking, but not voting rights, in the Commons; another grouping is resolutely opposed to European representatives having any right to sit in the national parliament, and propose instead a joint standing committee of national and European members.

55. Since such talks are at a preliminary stage throughout WEU, it is too early for your Rapporteur to draw any conclusions. He does, however, advocate further study of this area.

#### **G. Electoral procedures**

56. In the absence of published bills in some WEU countries, your Rapporteur can only pinpoint subjects on which the subsequent publication of comparative tables might prove helpful.

(i) *Deposits*: No deposit is foreseen in the *Belgian* bill, but candidates must be presented by a minimum of ten parliamentarians, or by a minimum of 5,000 electors. Candidates will have to furnish a deposit of £500 each in the *United Kingdom*, "sufficient to deter frivolous candidature without unreasonably inhibiting candidates", as the government put it. In *France* the sum is 100,000 French francs per list. In the *Netherlands* 18,000 Dutch guilders per list. In the *Federal Republic of Germany*, no deposits are required. The deposit will be forfeited in the *Netherlands* if a list collects less than 75 % of the votes corresponding to the electorate per representative, i.e. about 285,000 votes. In *France*, the deposit will be returned only to those lists which obtain more than 5 % of the votes cast. In the *United Kingdom*, the deposit is forfeit from the individual candidate who polls less than 25 % of the electoral quota or from the group candidate where none of the group has been elected and the group has polled less than 25 % of the electoral quota.

(ii) *Ballot papers*: In the majority of WEU countries, these will be familiar in form to the elector. The main difference lies between those countries where the electorate chooses simply between lists drawn up by the parties, where

the precedence of candidates has already been determined, and those countries (e.g. the Netherlands) where the electorate can choose between candidates of the same party. In the United Kingdom, the choice will of course be simply between individual candidates. In Northern Ireland, the parties will field teams of three candidates (but standing as individuals rather than as a list); electors will number their candidates in order of preference (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.) and the seats will be allocated according to the "droop quota" method of single transferable vote.

(iii) *Returning officers*: Once all the bills have been published, it will be possible to issue a comparative table.

(iv) *Decisions yet to be taken*: In most countries, the power is given to make adaptations to national electoral rules by order: registration rules and election expenses being mentioned specifically. Governments will also have to decide on a formula for limiting campaign expenses and on the possible use of public funds to assist candidates. Likewise, rules will have to be drawn up for the premature resignation of representatives from the European Parliament.

(v) *Cost of elections*: Your Rapporteur has sought to calculate a total estimated cost for direct elections. From financial memoranda published by WEU governments, he has obtained the following estimates: Federal Republic of Germany — 40 million DM; Netherlands — 16 million guilders; United Kingdom — £10 million. If your Rapporteur be permitted to extrapolate these figures to other WEU countries, the following table results:

	F. frs (million)
Belgium	31
France	85
Federal Republic of Germany (DM 40m)	86
Italy	85
Luxembourg	1
Netherlands (G 16m)	32
United Kingdom (£10m)	85
	<hr/> 405

for 379 representatives

57. The estimated cost to national governments, per elected member of the European Parliament, is therefore of the order of 1,068,600 French francs, 497,000 Deutschmarks, 503,500 Dutch guilders, £125,720, 194,300,000 Italian liras, and 7,828,600 Belgian francs.

58. As the Federal German Government will reimburse the political parties a sum of 3.50 Deutschmarks per elector a further 147,204,000 Deutschmarks should be added, making a grand total of 187 million Deutschmarks. The estimated cost for each of the 81 German members would therefore be 2,309,000 Deutschmarks.

59. On 8th April 1978, the EEC heads of state or of government noted with satisfaction that the legislative procedures in the member countries for holding direct elections to the European Parliament were now nearing completion. After examining dates suitable for the elections, they agreed that they be held from 7th to 10th June 1979.

APPENDIX I

*Table of action in the parliaments of member countries*  
*(Totals by country for each session)*

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	16	4	7	1	1	14	47
1978	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	4
Total	83	209	193	258	19	88	211	1,061
Annual average	3.77	9.41	8.77	11.73	0.86	4.00	9.14	6.87

## APPENDIX II

*Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since December 1975*

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
Dec. 1975	273	x	2			1		3		6	54
	274	x	2	2		1				5	
	275			4						4	
	276	x	2			1				3	
	277									—	
	278									—	
	279									—	
	280									—	
	281									—	
	282									—	
	283									—	
	Res. 55		2	1		3	2			8	
	Res. 56									—	
Other action			2	17	4	1	1	2	1	28	
June 1976	Res. 59		2	4				2		8	49
	284									—	
	285	x	2	5	2	2				11	
	286									—	
	287			2	2	1		1	2	8	
	288	x								—	
	289	x	4	5	2	3				14	
Nov. 1976	290	x	4	2		2				8	47
	291									—	
	292									—	
	293	x	2	2		2				6	
	294									—	
	295	x			2	1	2			5	
	296			2		2				4	
Other action			5	15	5	1			6	32	
June 1977	297									—	20
	298	x				1				1	
	299	x				1			2	3	
	300					1			2	3	
	301					1			2	3	
	302		1			1			2	4	
	303									—	
	304					1			2	3	
	305					1			2	3	
	306									—	
Nov. 1977	307	x								—	27
	308	x					1			1	
	309	x						1		1	
	310	x		1						—	
	311	x								1	
Other action			4	14	4				2	24	
1978			2	2						4	4



## *Security in the Mediterranean*

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### REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Grant, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 2 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Roper (Chairman) ; MM. de Koster, Pawelczyk (Alternate : *Büchner*) (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens*, Beauguitte, *van den Bergh*, Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny (Alternate : *Jung*), Critchley (Alternate : *Grieve*), *Dejardin*, Fosson, *Grant*, *Handlos*,

Hardy, Konen, Lemmrich (Alternate : *Vohrer*), *Maggioni*, Ménard, Nessler, Pecchioli, *Rivière*, *Roberti*, *Schmidt Hermann*, Scholten (Alternate : *van Hulst*), *Tanghe*, Whitehead.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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### **Introductory Note**

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows :

*London, 12th January 1978*

**Ministry of Defence**

Mr. Charles Henn, Head DS 12 ;  
Commodore Richard Hill, Director Defence Policy C ;  
Mr. Prest, DS 13 (Arms Sales) ;  
Mr. Leycester Coltman (Southern Europe Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) ;  
Miss Kate Mollins, DS 12.

*London, 17th January 1978*

H.E. Mr. Zivan Berisavljevic, Ambassador, Yugoslav Embassy, and Colonel Surlan, Defence Attaché.

*Athens, 8th - 9th March 1978*

Mr. Hawthorne Mills, Minister, United States Embassy, Athens, and Mr. Morton Dworken, (Political and Military Affairs) ;

H.E. Mr. Anghelos Chorofas, Ambassador, Director for NATO, CSCE and MBFR Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs ;

Mr. Oliver Miles, Counsellor (Political) British Embassy, Athens, and Mr. Tim Everard, Counsellor (Economic) ;

Admiral John Mineos (Rtd.), (New Democracy), Chairman of the Defence Committee, Member of the Greek National Assembly ;

Mr. Kosta Gondikas (New Democracy), Member of the Greek National Assembly ;

Mr. Katsadimas, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defence, and Major-General Simon Vimblis.

*Ankara, 12th - 14th March 1978*

H.E. Sir Derek Dodson, British Ambassador ;

Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowry, United Kingdom Permanent Military Deputy to CENTO ;

H.E. Mr. Hamit Batu, Ambassador, Secretary-General in charge of International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ;

Mr. Gunduz Ökçün, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

Mr. Ali Hikmet Alp, Director, International Security Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs ;

Mr. Hasan Isik, Minister of Defence ;

Major-General G.A. Young, CENTO Chief of Staff, and Air Commodore Scannell ;

Mr. Ekrem Esat Güvendiren, Director, Greece and Cyprus Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ;

Lt.-General Güneral, General Staff.

*Belgrade, 11th - 13th April 1978*

Mr. Mikhaila Javorski, Chairman, International Committee, Federal Assembly ; H.E. Mr. Lazar Latinovic, Ambassador, Adviser ; Mr. Bosko Srdanov, Adviser ; Professor Vidosova Jankovic ;

Mr. B. Franges, Director, Institute for International Affairs, and Professor Acimovic ;

Mr. Dragan Bernardic, Assistant Federal Secretary in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, and H.E. Mr. Djuro Vukolic, Ambassador ;

H.E. Mr. R.A. Farquharson, British Ambassador, and Wing Commander Armstrong, Air and Naval Attaché ;

H.E. Mr. L.S. Eagleburger, United States Ambassador.

The Committee as a whole met in Rome on 15th March 1978, where it was addressed by Mr. Attilio Ruffini, Italian Minister of Defence, and met with members of the Defence Committees of the Italian Parliament. On 16th March, the Committee visited Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, where it was briefed by Admiral Shear, United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe ; Major-General di Lorenzo, Italian Army, Deputy Chief of Staff ; Major-General Pirozzi, Italian Air Force, Deputy Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe ; Vice-Admiral R.D. Macdonald, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, and members of their staffs. On 17th March the Committee visited the Italian helicopter carrier "Vittorio Veneto" in Taranto, and was received by Vice-Admiral Fantoni, Chief of Staff Italian Fleet, and by Admiral Mario Bini, Commander-in-Chief Naval Department, Taranto. It was briefed by Captain Vandini, commanding the "Vittorio Veneto".

The Committee met again in The Hague on 8th and 9th May 1978, and was addressed by Dr. W.F. van Eekelen, Netherlands Secretary of State for Defence. It visited the SHAPE Technical Centre on 9th May and was briefed by the Director, Dr. Wiekhorst and his staff. The Committee also met with members of the Defence Committees of the Netherlands Parliament.

At the Committee meeting on 31st May 1978 held at the seat of the Assembly in Paris, the Committee discussed and adopted the present report.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on security in the Mediterranean**

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling at the present time of economic difficulties that security will always be a condition of the political freedoms and economic well-being of the allied countries, and that accordingly an adequate defence effort must be maintained ;
- (ii) Believing that the Soviet Union through its continued quest for military bases in the Mediterranean, its interventionist policy in Africa and its reiteration of the dangerously ambiguous "Brezhnev doctrine" presents the greatest military threat in the region ;
- (iii) Aware that one of the greatest risks of major conflict through miscalculation arises in the Mediterranean area where the opposing interests of East and West merge with those of North and South ;
- (iv) Believing therefore that every effort should be made through diplomatic channels to foster : a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East and the differences between allied countries in the area ; the continued independence and integrity of Yugoslavia and the continued denial of military bases to forces of the Soviet Union ;
- (v) Believing that NATO provides for the foreseeable future the principal credible basis for the security of its members in the Mediterranean area and that its effectiveness depends on the full support and participation of all member countries ;
- (vi) Believing in particular that the full and equal participation in NATO of both Greece and Turkey is vital to the security of each and to that of the Alliance as a whole ;
- (vii) Reiterating its view that security in the Mediterranean would be greatly enhanced by the accession of a democratic Spain to NATO, but stressing that such a decision is for a parliamentary majority in that country after the adoption of the new constitution ;
- (viii) Aware of the many conflicting considerations that must be reconciled in any policy on arms supply to non-NATO countries,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS**

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To strengthen the collective position of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean :
  - (a) by the more public identification of all member countries with NATO arrangements in the area ;
  - (b) through the participation of forces of as many member countries as possible in exercises and contingency planning ;
  - (c) by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect the reality of national contributions to NATO in the Mediterranean area ;
  - (d) by taking full account of the respective special requirements of Greece, Portugal and Turkey for the supply of necessary defence equipment and assistance, and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey ;
  - (e) by considering what joint armaments production projects can usefully be established in Turkey in the NATO framework ;
2.
  - (a) To encourage Greece and Turkey to continue negotiations to settle their remaining differences ;
  - (b) To urge the two Cypriot communities to resume their direct negotiations in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General without further delay ;
3. To arrange closer links between the integrated military structure of NATO and the Spanish armed forces, and their participation in NATO exercises, while leaving a decision on the accession of Spain to NATO to democratic discussion in the Spanish parliament ;

4. To ensure that non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean continue to see their interests best served by denying base rights or facilities to the Soviet armed forces ;
5. To proclaim the unequivocal support of the West for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status ;
6. To ensure that all aspects of policy on arms exports by NATO countries to any non-NATO country are fully reviewed in the appropriate allied forum.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

(submitted by Mr. Grant, Rapporteur)

### **I. Introduction**

1.1 The Rapporteur was asked to study the security problems of the Mediterranean area as a whole, following previous reports of the Committee on this subject. In particular the report is to study the relationship of Yugoslavia to the NATO, Warsaw Pact and non-aligned European countries, and the consequences for the security of Europe of various scenarios that could arise in the event of a change in the country's leadership. The report was also to follow developments in the Iberian peninsula.

1.2 The Committee has regularly reported on the security situation in the Mediterranean in its various aspects, most recently in May 1976<sup>1</sup> — a report that dealt in particular with the Soviet navy, and the situation in Spain and Portugal. The Rapporteur has accordingly devoted more attention to the Eastern Mediterranean in the present report.

1.3 Since the previous report was adopted there have been a number of changes in the Mediterranean area, but more significantly many outstanding problems remain unsolved. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean itself has not changed greatly but, since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1975, the Soviet Union has been the second most important user, and the projection of Soviet military power, both directly and through its proxy, Cuba, has had a decisive effect in the Horn of Africa. The consequential increase in Soviet air and naval activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, coupled with the still unsolved problems of the Middle East and Cyprus, provide ever-present sources of potential conflict. The unsettled differences of Greece and Turkey which have a debilitating effect on the Alliance, and the crucial importance of the continued non-aligned status of Yugoslavia, decided your Rapporteur to concentrate in particular on these last three countries, all of which he has been able to visit through the courtesy of the national authorities. The Committee as a whole visited Italy for briefings both by the national authorities and by the NATO military command at Naples. At the other end of the Mediterranean the political scene in Spain has been transformed since the last report was adopted, with the holding in June 1977 of the first parliamentary elections for forty-one years, opening the way for Spanish membership of the western organisations.

1.4 These are the topics chiefly covered in the Committee's report.

### **II. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean**

#### **(a) Soviet military effort**

2.1 Although the economic resources of the Soviet Union (GNP in 1976 \$856 billion — United States State Department estimates) do not match those of the United States (GNP in 1976 \$1,692 billion), and are considerably less than the total of the NATO countries combined, the Soviet Union has consistently devoted a far higher proportion of its national product to military expenditure — current estimates by western sources range between 11 % and 13 % (over 15 % according to a Chinese estimate). A comparable figure for the United States is 5.5 %, while for the WEU countries it ranges from 1.1 % (Luxembourg) to 4.9 % (United Kingdom)<sup>1</sup>.

2.2 The conclusions of experts of the NATO countries at the spring 1978 meeting was that, although since 1972 the Soviet GNP has risen by less than 4 % each year, Soviet defence expenditure, to NATO definition, grew in real terms by 4 % to 5 % each year from \$53 billion in 1970 to almost \$73 billion in 1976, 50 % being devoted to capital expenditure including weapons procurement, 20 % to research and development and only 30 % to personnel and operating costs. If space research and civil defence is included the 1976 defence budget would be \$80 billion.

2.3 In recent years the Soviet Union has increased its armed forces to the present level of 3.7 million. Since the 1960s Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border have been built up to about forty divisions without any reduction in forces facing the NATO countries.

2.4 A particularly disturbing trend of the last five years has been the steady introduction of more modern and sophisticated equipment by the Soviet Union which has steadily eroded a technical superiority on which NATO forces had previously relied to offset the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in numbers of tanks and tactical aircraft.

2.5 In this report, concerned with the Mediterranean area, the potential threat from Warsaw Pact forces to the countries of the Mediterranean area, is described. In view of the general mobility of forces, and the extreme mobility of the Soviet air forces which benefit from the central position of the Soviet Union in this respect, it has to be borne in mind that any measure of force ratios in the Mediterranean region cannot be divorced

1. See Appendix I. On a per capita basis comparable figures would be Soviet Union \$ 492; United States \$ 481; while WEU countries range from \$ 82 (Luxembourg) to \$ 296 (Germany).

1. Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. Buck.

from the overall ratio between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

2.6 While the Soviet Union shows no sign of relaxing its relentless defence effort, it would however be misleading to suggest that all trends in recent years have been to the military advantage of that country. A long land frontier with China and still unsettled border disputes must be a continuing cause of concern to the Soviet military command. Mr. Brezhnev's surprise visit to Soviet military forces in the area of the Chinese border in early April has drawn attention to this aspect of the Soviet defence posture.

**(b) Warsaw Pact land forces in the Mediterranean area**

2.7 In considering Warsaw Pact land forces in the area covered by the report, the Committee is concerned with those which can be considered a potential threat to the NATO countries of the region, and to non-aligned countries — chiefly Yugoslavia — whose continued non-alignment is as vital to the peace and security of the area as is the active participation of the NATO countries in the collective security system of the Alliance. For these purposes the report considers force levels in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as the Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus military districts of the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly the unclassified sources of information on which alone this report will draw are not in full agreement: there is some discrepancy between unclassified briefings in different NATO headquarters; the authoritative "Military Balance" of the International Institute for Strategic Studies quotes slightly lower figures than those used in unclassified NATO briefings. The divergencies are no doubt accounted for by the differing strengths of military formations of

the Warsaw Pact which range from category one, combat-ready, formations to third category cadre formations. The following figures are derived from all sources, using NATO briefings to complete blanks in "Military Balance" figures where these are insufficiently detailed.

2.8 In Hungary there are five Soviet divisions (including two tank divisions) and six Hungarian divisions (including one tank division) making a total of eleven divisions (including three tank divisions). No Soviet formations are stationed in either Bulgaria or Romania. Romanian ground forces amount to the equivalent of eleven divisions (including two tank divisions), and the Bulgarian forces to the equivalent of ten divisions (including two tank divisions). In the Odessa military district of the Soviet Union there are six divisions, of which only four or five may be combat-ready and in the North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus military district there are twelve divisions and one airborne division with a further six divisions available at a later stage.

2.9 From the point of view of North-Eastern Italy the divisions in Hungary represent a primary threat. From the point of view of Greek and Turkish Thrace and the Turkish Straits, the divisions in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Odessa military district of the Soviet Union have to be taken into account. The divisions in the Caucasus military districts are a threat to Eastern Turkey where the Turkish third army is deployed, but it must also be remembered that Syria and Iraq together possess some eighteen divisions, many of which are well-equipped — better equipped than those of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Iraq has AMX-30 tanks in its inventory; Syria is due to receive Milan anti-tank missiles. The Turkish second army is deployed in South-Eastern Turkey.

**Balance of land forces in Southern Europe<sup>1</sup>**  
(from "Military Balance")

		NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)	Derived ratio
Ground forces available in peacetime (division equivalents)	Armoured	4	6	(2)	1 : 1.5
	Mechanised	7	24	(7)	1 : 3.4
	Infantry and airborne	26	3	(2)	1 : 0.1
Total		37	33	(11)	1 : 0.9
Combat manpower all formations (thousands)		560	390	(145)	1 : 0.7
Operational main battle tanks		4,000	6,700	(2,500)	1 : 1.7

1. Stated to include Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces; United Kingdom and United States forces committed to the Mediterranean, and land forces of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and Soviet units stationed in Hungary and South-Western USSR that might be committed to the Mediterranean theatre. [Understood to exclude many Soviet divisions in the Trans-Caucasus region.]

2.10 When the ratios between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are considered, the discrepancies between unclassified briefings in NATO military headquarters, and the "Military Balance" are greater. The following table shows the information made available to the Committee.

**Area land force ratios**  
(from NATO military headquarters unclassified briefings)

Italy/Soviet Union, Hungary	1 : 1.4
Greek and Turkish Thrace/Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria	1 : 1.5
Eastern Turkey/Soviet Union	1 : 3.6

2.11 The discrepancy is accounted for in part by the particular military districts in the Soviet Union which are included in the force balance, and the importance which is attached to cadre divisions which may be below one-third of their official strength. There is little doubt in the Committee's mind that the NATO forces enjoy a manpower advantage in the southern region as a whole ; this advantage however is more than offset by the overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces in both tanks and in mechanised divisions. Moreover much equipment of some NATO countries in the region — especially Turkey — is obsolete.

**(c) Warsaw Pact air forces in the southern region**

2.12 The "forward aviation" is concerned with close support ground attack local air defence and reconnaissance. In addition there is the long-range aviation, the medium bombers of which must also be assumed to be assigned to tactical military targets. The long-range strategic air threat is not discussed here, in the context of the Mediterranean area, as it can obviously be brought to bear on any large military or civilian target anywhere in the NATO area. Soviet air defence aircraft in the Soviet Union are organised in a special command (PVO) which is entirely separate from the foregoing.

2.13 A Soviet tactical air army, possibly amounting to two hundred and fifty combat aircraft and

one hundred transports, is stationed in Hungary, to which must be added the Hungarian air force of some sixty tactical fighters (excluding air defence aircraft). There are no Soviet air force units stationed in Romania or Bulgaria, but the indigenous Romanian tactical air force amounts to some seventy-five tactical fighters, many obsolescent, and some fifteen reconnaissance aircraft. Bulgaria has about one hundred tactical fighters, less ancient than those of Romania, and some thirty reconnaissance aircraft. One Soviet air army is understood to be deployed in each of the military districts of the Soviet Union, but unclassified figures concerning numbers of aircraft are not available.

2.14 The extreme mobility of air power in any case makes the precise location of aircraft at any time largely irrelevant. Of more importance is the number of aircraft which the Warsaw Pact command might be able to assign to hostilities in the southern region, and here NATO military headquarters expect to be confronted with a total of some 1,200 Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft, including about 270 medium bombers, but excluding air defence interceptors, of which about 60 % might be a serious threat. About two-thirds of the total threat might be concentrated against Greek and Turkish Thrace and the Turkish Straits and the remainder against Eastern Turkey. Soviet surface-to-surface missiles based in the Crimea are in range of the whole of Turkey. Soviet strategic rocket forces dominate the whole area.

2.15 Again in considering the south-eastern flank of the NATO area the air forces of Syria and Iraq have to be taken into account. Exclusive of air defence interceptors, the Syrian air force possesses some 170 tactical attack fighters and that of Iraq about 180. Attention was particularly drawn to the build-up of the Libyan air force which includes 30 MiG-23, 30 Mirage IIIE and 50 Mirage V.

2.16 As far as the balance of force in the area is concerned the following table is presented from the same sources as those used above for ground forces.

**Balance of air forces in Southern Europe**  
(from "Military Balance")

	NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)	Derived ratio
Light bombers	—	50	(50)	1 : 0.5
Fighter/ground attack	625	325	(125)	1 : 0.5
Interceptors	200	1,000	(425)	1 : 5
Reconnaissance	125	200	(150)	1 : 1.6
Total	950	1,575	(750)	1 : 1.7



Area air force ratios

(from NATO military headquarters unclassified briefings)

Italy/Soviet Union, Hungary	1 : 1.1
Greek and Turkish Thrace/Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria	1 : 1.8
Eastern Turkey/Soviet Union	1 : 3.5

(d) Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean

2.17 The historical pattern of Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean has varied considerably over the last twenty years. In 1958, when the Soviet fleet had no significant air protection, only Soviet submarines, based at Vlone in Albania, were to be seen in the Mediterranean but were withdrawn in 1961 when Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. By 1964 the Soviet fleet was equipped with surface-to-air missiles and surface vessels began to be deployed systematically, making use of bases in Egypt, formalised in an agreement in March 1968, which permitted a dramatic increase in the Soviet naval presence. Alexandria was the headquarters of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, and the main repair base especially for submarines. Use was also made of Mersa Matruh where the Soviet Union built naval and air facilities, of Sollum, and of Port Said where Soviet amphibious units were based. From 1970 to the middle of 1972 the Soviet air force had virtually exclusive use of some seven airfields in Egypt, basing some 150 aircraft for the defence of the Nile delta area while smaller numbers of reconnaissance aircraft and maritime patrol aircraft operated from Cairo West and Mersa Matruh airfields, from which they followed closely movements of NATO navies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

2.18 In July 1972, President Sadat expelled his Soviet military advisers and the bulk of the Soviet air force units. Surface-to-air missiles and airfields were taken over by Egyptian forces. Port facilities for the Soviet fleet continued to be available however until May 1975 when access to Mersa Matruh and Sollum was curtailed. Maintenance of submarines in Alexandria was permitted until 15th March 1976 when President Sadat abrogated the Egypt-Soviet Union friendship treaty since when the Soviet Union has enjoyed no naval or air force facilities in Egypt.

2.19 At the present time the only port facilities available to the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean are limited ones or under restricted conditions of demilitarisation, repair facilities in Tivat in Yugoslavia — facilities which are equally available to (if little used by) NATO navies as is mentioned in the section on Yugoslavia below. From its heyday in 1972 and 1973 when the average daily strength of the Soviet

fleet in the Mediterranean reached fifty-six vessels (the peak on any one day was ninety-eight at the height of the 1973 Middle East war) the average has declined to about forty-six in 1977. The following tables show the historical trend.

1. Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean : 1964-1977

	Annual ship days	Average daily strength
1964	1,500	5
1965	2,800	8
1966	4,400	12
1967	8,100	22
1968	11,000	30
1969	15,000	41
1970	16,500	45
1971	19,000	52
1972	18,000	49
1973	20,600	56
1974	20,200	55
1975	20,000	55
1976	18,600	50
1977	n. a.	43

2. Soviet naval transits of the Turkish Straits : 1964-1975

	Auxiliary transits	Surface combatant transits	Total transits
1964	56	39	95
1965	80	49	129
1966	71	82	153
1967	149	93	242
1968	113	117	230
1969	142	121	263
1970	149	122	271
1971	154	123	277
1972	140	114	254
1973	159	126	285
1974	145	93	238
1975	146	79	225

Source : Robert G. Weinland : "Land support for naval forces — Egypt and the Soviet escadre 1962-1976", Survival, March/April 1978 (updated).

2.20 The Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean is rotated largely from the Black Sea fleet, so that it is this fleet as a whole which has to be taken into account when assessing potential Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean. Although the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits limits the number of vessels that may be in transit through them at any one time, and requires prior notification of passage to be given, in practice it is understood that the Soviet Union as a matter of routine gives block advance notifi-

cation to Turkey of large numbers of transits, most of which are not taken up — so that while technically respecting the terms of the convention as far as notification is concerned, the Soviet fleet is in fact free to transit the straits at will, subject only to the limitation on total numbers of vessels in transit in the straits at any one time. Under the terms of the convention however submarines are not allowed to pass through the straits except for repair, and the Soviet Union is understood to respect this provision, hence Soviet submarines operating in the Mediterranean make the relatively long transit from the northern fleet bases together with escort vessels which account for most of the surface combatants to be found in the Mediterranean from the Soviet northern and Baltic fleets.

2.21 Largely deprived of port facilities the Soviet naval presence, concentrated chiefly in the Eastern Mediterranean, represents a considerable feat of afloat support. The Soviet navy has been forced to make greater use of sheltered anchorages in international waters beyond the territorial sea of various Mediterranean countries. The average daily strength of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron in 1977 was made up as follows :

8-9	submarines
10-12	surface combatants
15-20	auxiliary vessels
5-7	intelligence and special-purpose vessels
43	average total

and on a typical day Soviet vessels might be found distributed between the anchorages in international waters as follows :

*Soviet fleet anchorages — typical day*

Gulf of Cadiz (Spanish Atlantic coast)	1 AG1 (intelligence)
Melilla (Spanish enclave in Morocco)	1 AO (tanker) 1 auxiliary
Hammamet (Tunisia) (chief anchorage)	3 DE (destroyer) 1 AO 1 auxiliary (submarine support) 1 SS (submarine)
Kithira (Greece)	1 CCG (guided missile cruiser) 2 DG (destroyer, guided missile) 1 AO 1 auxiliary
Bunbah (Libya) (Sollum anchorage)	1 CLG 3 DE 1 MGF 6 auxiliaries (supply)

Cape Andreas (Cyprus) 2 LSM  
and

Port of Tartus (Syria) 1 floating dock  
1 MSF  
4 auxiliaries  
1 SS  
1 submarine  
supply ship

2.22 While total numbers of Soviet vessels operating in the Mediterranean have declined since the heyday of 1972-73, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron remains a modern formidable force which has recently compensated to some extent for its previous lack of air support with the entry into service of the Kiev aircraft carrier to be followed by the Minsk (commissioned in 1977) and the Sharkov to be launched shortly in the Black Sea. At the end of March Western sources announced the keel had been laid of the first of three new aircraft carriers, and speaking at Devonport on 21st April, Mr. Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, claimed that a total of ten Kiev-class carriers were to be built.

2.23 The Soviet Kiev-class aircraft carrier is a formidable acquisition for the Soviet navy. 273 metres overall and 50 metres beam, it has a 183 metre flight deck angled at 4° and displaces 40,000 tons. It is equipped with surface-to-surface missile launchers for the SSN-12 missile, having a range of 500 km at mach 2 to 5. Surface-to-air missile SAM-3 has been sighted on board the vessel which is also fitted with multiple anti-submarine warfare rockets. The Kiev carried about twelve vertical take-off interceptor aircraft Forger and can carry some twenty-four anti-submarine warfare helicopters Hormone.

2.24 The Soviet Black Sea fleet as a whole comprises some twenty-five submarines and seventy major surface combatants which include the two helicopter carriers Moskva and Leningrad, some eight cruisers, thirty destroyers and thirty frigates.

2.25 Soviet diplomatic pressure continues on various Mediterranean riparian states, obviously including Yugoslavia, Malta, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria in search for permanent naval bases, particularly for submarines the operation of which is hampered by the long transit passage from the northern fleet. These pressures have so far been generally unsuccessful ; it is in the interests of security that non-aligned countries in the Mediterranean should continue to see their interests as best served by excluding Soviet naval vessels except for courtesy visits. There are also reports of Soviet approaches to Turkey for fuelling and other port facilities at ports such as Iskenderun.

*(e) The Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean*

2.26 Following its entry into the Mediterranean in 1964, units of the Soviet fleet began to operate

permanently in the Indian Ocean in 1968, as the Committee has previously reported. Until June 1975 when the Suez Canal was reopened, these vessels came largely from the Pacific fleet as well as occasional transitting units from the northern and Baltic fleets. From the start in 1968 the level of activity in the Indian Ocean built up steadily to a peak in 1973 of about 2,800 ship days and then declined steadily to about 2,000 ship days in 1976. Typically, the Soviet presence amounts to an average of some sixteen to twenty vessels at any one time, comprising occasional cruisers, about two destroyers, several escorts, one or two minesweepers, an LST, one submarine, one or two submarine supply ships and about five auxiliary and supply vessels. During and since the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, this force has been considerably expanded, particularly in amphibious ships, but numbers are now declining.

2.27 The Soviet Union had constructed extensive naval and air facilities at Berbera in Somalia for the support of its activities in the Indian Ocean, but in November 1977 these were lost to the Soviet Union following the change of alliances and the Soviet Union's full support for the régime in Ethiopia. Naval facilities still available to the Soviet Union are Umm Qasr and Al Basrah in Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and Aden. As in the Mediterranean, extensive use is made of anchorages in international waters, particularly off Aden, Massawa, Assab (Ethiopia), off the island of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea and infrequently off the Seychelles (Mahé island) and the Chagos islands.

2.28 The United States presence in the Indian Ocean has been much smaller, amounting to about three surface ships on a permanent basis with visits by carriers or other major vessels from the Pacific Seventh Fleet every three months or so. The United States will rely on facilities which are now being constructed on the island of Diego Garcia, but also has facilities at Manama in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.

2.29 Of the WEU countries France has the most substantial permanent presence in the Indian Ocean<sup>1</sup>; the United Kingdom sends naval ships into the area occasionally on exercises and visits.

2.30 Non-aligned countries in the United Nations General Assembly succeeded in having Resolution 2832 "Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" adopted on 16th December 1971, which was supplemented by Resolution 2992, adopted on 15th December 1972, establishing an ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean. Resolution 2832 called on the great powers to consult immediately with the littoral powers to halt escalation of their military position in the ocean and to

eliminate all military bases and manifestation of great power military presence there "conceived in the context of great power rivalry". The NATO and Warsaw Pact countries (except Iceland and Romania) did not support the resolution, some claiming that it would limit their legal rights and the coastal states of the area have not been in a position to enforce it — nor would all of them necessarily prefer domination of the sea by the major powers of the region rather than the present situation. Saudi Arabia, although possessing negligible naval forces itself, has been an instigator of proposals for a permanent Arab naval force to control the Red Sea and Persian Gulf; while Iran has a major naval programme including the construction of a naval base and shipyard at Bandar Abbas.

2.31 In September 1976 there was an indication that the Soviet Union was interested in controlling the level of naval presences in the Indian Ocean when it introduced a working document in the United Nations claiming that it would "be prepared to seek, together with other powers, for ways to reduce, on a reciprocal basis, the military activities of non-littoral states on the Indian Ocean and directly adjacent regions". With the advent of the Carter Administration in the United States, a joint Soviet-American working group was established in March 1977 which meets periodically in Bern to discuss ways to limit the military activities of the countries in the Indian Ocean. At the end of the third round of these talks on 12th December 1977, a joint statement was issued describing the talks as "positive" and expressing the view that an agreement to curb their military activities in the ocean "would be in their mutual interests". At the conclusion of the fourth round on 17th February 1978, however, it was stated merely that the date for resumption would be fixed by mutual agreement — further progress does not appear to have been made since the escalation of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia.

#### (f) *Soviet intervention in Africa*

2.32 In its report on strategic mobility<sup>1</sup> the Committee reported on the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola, noting in particular the scale of this demonstration of strategic mobility concerned chiefly with moving Soviet equipment and ammunition and Cuban forces to Angola.

2.33 In May 1977, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with the Ethiopian régime then battling with Somali insurgents, later reinforced with regular Somali army units, in the Ogaden.

2.34 By September 1977, there were reports of a build-up of Soviet equipment and Cuban forces

1. See Document 708, 19th May 1976, paragraph 36.

1. Document 748, 4th November 1977, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

in Ethiopia which continued at least until mid-March 1978. The March 1977 agreement was later reported to provide for the supply of 48 MiG-21 aircraft, some 200 T-54/55 tanks, and surface-to-air missiles SAM-3 and SAM-7, to a total value of \$380 million. Ethiopian pilots are now trained in the Soviet Union. From various reports it appears however that the total of equipment known to western sources to have been delivered amounted to 400 T-34, T-54 and 55 tanks, 250 other armoured vehicles, 400 artillery pieces including 28 multiple rocket-launchers, about 50 MiG-21 aircraft and three fast patrol boats including one missile-armed. Most of this was delivered by Soviet merchant ships to the Ethiopian port of Assab on the Eritrean coast. A large-scale airlift directly from the Soviet Union was reported to have been operating between November 1977 and April 1978, involving some 100 flights. Various press reports have referred to overflight of Turkey and the Suez Canal; of Pakistan and the Indian Ocean (a long detour); a very few flights are reported to have overflown Yugoslavia, Libya and the Sudan.

2.35 The airlift of Cuban military personnel from Angola was undertaken by Ethiopian airlines flying at night, presumably overflying Zaïre and the Sudan. It involved a total of forty-eight flights from November up to the last flight on 12th March 1978 by which time 12,000 Cuban troops were reported to be in Ethiopia, as well as 1,000 Soviet military advisers. In a speech on 5th April Dr. Owen, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, claimed that there were 16,000 Cuban military in Ethiopia and more than 46,000 Cubans in Africa as a whole, most of them military personnel. United States sources in February had claimed only 3,000 Cubans in Ethiopia, 23,000 Cuban soldiers in Africa as a whole — but the call-up of 5,000 reservists had been ordered to increase the forces in Ethiopia.

2.36 Unlike the reaction of the previous United States Administration to the situation in Angola, the Carter Administration and other western powers have not as a reflex immediately supported the local opponents of the régime backed by the Soviet Union — which in this case would have been Somalia. It was made clear that armaments would not be supplied so long as Somali regular forces remained on Ethiopian territory. Strong representations made to the Soviet Union to the effect that the atmosphere of détente could not remain unaffected by opportunist Soviet intervention in Africa may still succeed in imposing some restraint on the Soviet Union, but indications are still contradictory. On 10th February Mr. Vance, the United States Secretary of State, said he had received assurances from the USSR that Ethiopian forces would not cross the frontier into Somalia. On 13th March the Soviet Union is reported to have notified the United States that Cuban military forces would

be substantially reduced in Ethiopia once Somali troops had withdrawn from Ethiopian territory — and the last Somali regular troops left on 15th March.

2.37 On 26th April however President Castro said in Havana during the visit of Colonel Mengistu, the Ethiopian leader, that Cuban forces would stay in Ethiopia indefinitely. It was reported that 500 Cuban military had been moved from the Ogaden to Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, but it is not yet clear however whether or not Cuban forces will be engaged in the Ethiopian offensive against the Eritreans announced by Colonel Mengistu on 15th May. The Eritreans themselves in the past received assistance from Cuban military advisers. Having lost significant naval and air facilities in Berbera, the Soviet Union will no doubt be tempted to seek alternative arrangements in the Eritrean port of Massawa or Assab. A Pravda commentary on 15th March said that western and Arab support for the separatists was aimed at depriving Ethiopia of outlets to the Red Sea.

2.38 Certainly the Soviet commitment to intervention in Africa is unimpaired. Just before the arrival in Moscow of Mr. Vance, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Brezhnev received President Agostinho Neto of Angola and promised "all-out support", adding that the Soviet Union would continue to help national liberation forces in their effort to liquidate colonialism and national oppression. All-out support has always meant military assistance.

2.39 The Committee again draws attention to the serious threat to détente and stability caused by the projection of Soviet military power into various parts of Africa. Through its opportunist support first of Somalia and then of Ethiopia, the Soviet Union has fostered and increased the intensity of the Somali-Ethiopian hostilities and with its current support of the Ethiopian drive to reassert its authority in Eritrea, virtually ensured that the writ of the pro-Soviet régime in Addis Ababa runs throughout the former imperial territories.

2.40 In a welcome display of their military capability outside the NATO area, naval vessels from France, the United Kingdom and the United States conducted an exercise in the Red Sea off the coast of Ethiopia in the early days of April. The forces involved were two French frigates, a British cruiser, five frigates and four auxiliary support ships, and two American destroyers. The Committee stresses the importance of NATO countries with the appropriate resources being able to deploy naval forces outside the NATO area. The Committee notes that the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) also carried out small-scale exercises in the Indian Ocean area involving the five member states (Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United

States); and whilst co-operation in both the political and military fields between NATO and CENTO is inhibited at present because of objections from Pakistan, nevertheless the Committee consider this aspect of the overall situation needs to be recorded, with a view to further examination of the problems affecting NATO/CENTO co-operation being undertaken at an appropriate time. (See further comments in paragraphs 3.96-3.99.) In an interview with *Newsweek* at the beginning of January 1978, General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, suggested that NATO should have regional military capabilities which could be employed as deterrent forces to prevent the escalation of third world dynamics into major world conflict. Europe in this way should display its determination to resist threats on the flanks or periphery of NATO.

### III. The Alliance

#### (a) Validity of the Alliance

3.1 The great economic importance of the Mediterranean Sea to the NATO countries has been impressed on the Committee on many occasions by those who have addressed it. According to NATO there are 1,500 ocean-going ships at sea in the Mediterranean every day (excluding coastal vessels) and other sources suggest that 1,200 of these belong to NATO countries. Italy, Greece and Turkey are almost entirely dependent on the sea for their supplies, and France is to a large extent. Italy in fact imports 90 % of its requirements and exports 65 % of its produce through the Mediterranean Sea. It is estimated that some 150 million tons of goods pass through the sea each year of which some 120 to 140 million tons represent fuel, and includes one-quarter of all European petroleum requirements.

3.2 NATO estimates that to sustain the NATO Mediterranean countries in war 1.5 million tons of supplies would be required each week, amounting to a convoy of twenty ships every day.

3.3 Apart from France, the NATO countries in the area — Italy, Greece and Turkey — are largely isolated peninsulas with slender or no land links between them. The indigenous resources of these countries would not permit them alone to provide a defensive structure capable of balancing the military might of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries with which Greece and Turkey have common frontiers.

3.4 The Committee believes that by associating the other NATO countries and their armed forces with the defence of the Mediterranean NATO provides the only credible basis for security in the area, and its effectiveness depends on the cohesion of the Alliance in political terms, and on the full support and participation of all member countries in defence arrangements.

3.5 While the preponderant contribution by NATO countries outside the Mediterranean comes from the United States, there are still significant contributions of forces to NATO exercises and to reinforcement capabilities in war by many other NATO countries, including all WEU countries. The NATO common infrastructure projects provide essential military installations which would be beyond the resources of the local countries and all NATO countries (with the exception of Iceland which has no armed forces) contribute to these through the agreed cost-sharing formula.

#### (b) NATO structure

##### (i) Command structure

3.6 The NATO command structure in the Mediterranean, with the location of the various headquarters, is shown at Appendix II and on the map at Appendix III "Naval striking and support forces Southern Europe" is the title assumed by the United States Sixth Fleet when under NATO command. With the exception of the maritime air surveillance headquarters MARAIRMED which is an integrated NATO headquarters in peacetime, the bottom row of subordinate naval commands in that diagram — i.e. all others subordinate to COMNAVSOUTH — are in reality national commands which would only be activated as NATO headquarters at an advanced stage of alert. The remaining headquarters are permanently manned by staff officers drawn from all NATO countries contributing forces to the area of the command including those that might provide reinforcements in the event of hostilities.

3.7 Problems affecting the LANDSOUTHEAST and Sixth ATAF Commands are discussed under Greek-Turkish relations in paragraphs 3.46 *et seq.* The present situation of two of the subordinate naval commands is anomalous, being directly exercised "temporarily" by the superior headquarters NAVSOUTH: the Western Mediterranean Command was originally the responsibility of a French admiral in Toulon; the South-Eastern Command that of a British admiral in Malta. The former command lapsed on the withdrawal of French Mediterranean naval forces in 1965, the latter on the withdrawal of permanent British naval presence in the Mediterranean in 1974 and the closure of the last NATO headquarters in Malta (see paragraph 3.82).

3.8 The Committee feels that to be effective command arrangements have to reflect the reality of national force contributions to NATO in the area. If Spain accedes to NATO (see paragraph 3.92) and French forces do not return to the integrated military structure of NATO as a majority of the Committee urges (paragraph 3.78), there could be a case for the Western Mediterranean Command being exercised by a Spanish admiral.

3.9 In previous reports<sup>1</sup> the Committee has recommended that the subordinate naval command “Gibraltar Mediterranean area” should be transferred to become the responsibility of SACLANT, the Atlantic commander — it would then come directly under IBERLANT at Oeiras near Lisbon. Following the Committee’s briefing at Headquarters AFSOUTH and the Rapporteur’s visit to IBERLANT, the Committee does not renew this recommendation. The essential point is that the GIBMED area is the point at which the Mediterranean command has to liaise with the Atlantic command. Much of GIBMED’s day-to-day business is with IBERLANT, partly because of the withdrawal of French naval forces from NATO command in the Mediterranean. Direct communications between IBERLANT and GIBMED are being improved and satisfactory liaison with both IBERLANT and NAVSOUTH appears to be assured with the present command structure.

3.10 In normal circumstances the air defence forces of the NATO countries are permanently assigned to NATO in peacetime and NATO commanders are responsible for the operation of the NADGE radar early-warning and control system, and have the authority to order take-off of air defence aircraft to intercept unidentified aircraft overflying the territory of NATO countries.

3.11 Otherwise in peacetime national forces are not permanently under the command of NATO headquarters. They may be “assigned to” NATO in which case their peacetime location is determined by NATO defence plans negotiated with the national authorities, and the forces come under command automatically when the appropriate state of alert is declared by the North Atlantic Council. Forces which are “earmarked for assignment” come under command and have to be able to reach agreed locations within a specified time of alert being declared (M + 3, etc.). Forces do however come under NATO commands for exercise purposes during manoeuvres, and the standing naval forces STANAVFORCHAN and STANAVFORLANT operate permanently under NATO command. Apart from air defence therefore, and maritime surveillance, the primary function of NATO headquarters in peacetime is planning, preparation, training and operation of communications. NATO commanders visit assigned national forces in peacetime and are responsible for reporting on the extent to which their training and equipment meets the agreed requirements of NATO air defence plans.

(ii) *Infrastructure*

3.12 A large number of military installations in the Mediterranean area have been jointly financed by all the NATO countries through the

1. Documents 682, 708.

NATO infrastructure programme which incorporates a cost-sharing formula whereby the contributions of the different countries are calculated partly according to the ability of the country to pay, and partly according to the value of a particular project to its own forces. In the case of the NATO Mediterranean countries — France, Italy, Greece and Turkey — and Portugal the value of NATO infrastructure projects constructed in the country exceeds the contribution of that country to the infrastructure programme, thus resulting in net economic benefits to the host country. Rough secretariat estimates of the infrastructure programme to the end of 1971 show the ratio of value to contribution to be nearly 2:1 for Italy and 10:1 for Greece and Turkey.

**NATO infrastructure programmes**  
**Cumulative expenditure to 1971 — £ million**  
**pre-devaluation**  
*(Rough secretariat estimates)*

Country	Country contributions to programmes	Value of projects constructed in country
Belgium	76	53
France	215	255
Federal Republic of Germany	142	307
Italy	87	150
Luxembourg	2	*
Netherlands	62	38
United Kingdom	178	68
TOTAL WEU	762	880
Canada	83	*
Denmark	42	38
Greece	10	105
Norway	34	105
Portugal	3	15
Turkey	18	195
United States	548	38 <sup>1</sup>
Miscellaneous	—	120
TOTAL Non-WEU	738	620
TOTAL NATO	1,500	1,500

\* Small, not estimated.  
1. Not necessarily on United States territory.

3.13 Infrastructure projects constructed in the Mediterranean NATO countries include many airfields, the early-warning radar system (NADGE), the various communications systems now being integrated into the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS), storage for fuel and ammunition including nuclear ammunition, and naval facilities. There is a requirement for

up-dating the communications system and the early-warning system would be greatly enhanced if AWACS aircraft were available in the Mediterranean area.

(iii) *Combined NATO forces*

3.14 In addition to the national forces assigned or earmarked for NATO command, there are a number of combined forces that can operate under NATO command, which contain elements contributed by several different member countries. In 1969 the Naval On-Call Force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) was set up, with a ship from each of the powers contributing forces to the southern region — Greece, Italy, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. This force is activated twice each year through the period of a month and during that time operates under the command of NAVSOUTH.

3.15 Directly under the command of SACEUR, as a political deterrent force which can be deployed in a period of tension to provide an immediate demonstration of allied solidarity, is the mobile force of Allied Command Europe (AMF). The land component of this force when deployed is a brigade group in size, constituted from specially trained and equipped battalions made available from Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States, each with an associated artillery battery, and together with a headquarters logistics support element provided by the United Kingdom. The air component comprises squadrons of tactical aircraft supplied also by Canada and the Netherlands. This force is frequently and very successfully deployed on exercises in the Mediterranean area in North-East Italy, Greek and Turkish Thrace and Eastern Turkey, and is practised in working in liaison with national forces of all these countries.

(iv) *NATO exercises*

3.16 NATO exercises during which forces from several NATO countries come together for joint manoeuvres under command of NATO headquarters for periods of a week or two are the essential means of proving the effectiveness of NATO defence plans as well as the state of training and maintenance of equipment of the assigned forces. Your Rapporteur is grateful for the opportunity extended by General Haig, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, which enabled him and certain other members of the Committee to observe various exercises in the Mediterranean area in the course of the last year. Exercise Display Determination from 25th September to 4th October 1977 brought together land, sea and air forces of Italy, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States for operations in the area of Italy and Turkey, in the course of which the Rapporteur

and another member were able to visit an aircraft carrier at sea.

3.17 Exercise Open Gate from 3rd to 8th May 1978 was a naval exercise involving ships from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States conducted off the coast of Portugal and Spain. Your Rapporteur in the course of it was briefed both at IBERLANT headquarters and on board the United States nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier Nimitz.

3.18 Lastly, exercise Dawn Patrol from 16th to 29th May, conducted under the command of CINCSOUTH, brought together air, naval and amphibious forces from France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Committee particularly welcomes the participation of French and Greek naval forces in this exercise, since these countries are not at present part of the integrated military structure of NATO. It regrets to note however that when the naval operations moved into the Aegean, Greek and Turkish forces were obliged to operate outside each other's territorial waters and air space. The exercise included amphibious operations in Sardinia, Southern Greece and Western Turkey, as well as operations in the Aegean. One phase of this operation was also observed by a member of the Committee.

3.19 Members attending these exercises have been impressed by the good standard of training of NATO forces, and the ability of forces from many countries to operate together. The Committee welcomes the present policy of SACEUR to attract more attention to joint exercises and stresses their importance as a means not only for improving the training of NATO forces, but for demonstrating the political solidarity of the whole Alliance, particularly in areas of potential conflict.

(c) *The countries of the Alliance*

(i) *Greece*

3.20 Greece, with common frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey, is strategically and delicately situated. Apart from the narrow Greek-Turkish frontier in Thrace it has no other land links with countries of the Alliance. The narrow band of territory that is Greek Thrace, only 28 kilometres at its narrowest point, is all that separates Bulgaria from the Aegean.

3.21 The Greek armed forces total 200,000 men, 160,000 in the army organised in some thirteen divisional equivalents, including one armoured division. Tanks include 275 M-47, 650 M-48 and 75 more modern French AMX-30 (95 more on order). The air force includes 6 attack squadrons comprising 37 Phantoms, 60 Corsairs and 15



F-104 Starfighters, with a further 18 Phantoms on order from the United States. There are 5 interceptor air defence squadrons with 40 Tigers, 15 Starfighters and 40 Mirage F-1. The navy comprises 6 submarines, 11 destroyers, 4 escorts and 9 fast patrol boats including 7 with the Exocet surface-to-surface missile. Six more patrol boats are on order from France together with 20 Exocet missiles. Seven destroyers and 2 landing ships are also on order from the United States.

3.22 While the defence co-operation agreement with the United States, referred to below, has not yet entered into force, the Greek economy having suffered less than that of its neighbours from the economic downturn since 1973, the country has been in a position to procure military equipment from various allied countries including France (Mirage aircraft and AMX-30 tanks), West Germany (submarines) and Belgium (FN machine gun), and other tank orders from European countries are pending. Some communications equipment and small arms are understood to have been procured from Israel.

3.23 Mr. Karamanlis's New Democracy Party won the November 1977 elections with 172 seats in the Chamber compared with 93 seats for Mr. Papandreou's Pasok Party, the Democratic Centre of Mr. Mavros having been reduced to 15 seats. Mr. Papandreou campaigned for the withdrawal of Greece from NATO, the abolition of western bases in the country, no membership of the European Community and a policy of non-alignment. Thus while Mr. Karamanlis has substantial parliamentary support for his policy, the bipartisan support for NATO that is to be found in most member countries is at present lacking in Greece.

3.24 The previous reports of the Committee<sup>1</sup> have described the reaction of Greece in 1974 in withdrawing its forces from NATO commands. The Committee stresses that, unlike France, Greece has not completely withdrawn from the integrated military structure of NATO. Greece, like France, remains represented on the North Atlantic Council, but has withdrawn its representative from the NATO Defence Planning Committee. Unlike France, Greece remains represented on the Military Committee (comprising the Chiefs of Staff of the NATO countries or their representative) and Greek officers continue to serve in the integrated military headquarters of NATO — SHAPE, AFSOUTH and its subordinate commands — where they were previously present except for the two headquarters located at Izmir in Turkey (Headquarters Allied Land Forces South-East Europe

and Headquarters Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force) from which it should be noted Greek officers had been withdrawn on a number of occasions prior to 1974, when Greek-Turkish relations were strained.

3.25 Greek forces have resumed participation in NATO exercises since autumn 1977 but NATO installations on Greek territory (communications, five NADGE early-warning stations, firing ranges in Crete, etc.), although functioning, continue to be available to NATO only on a limited basis, and early-warning data is not transmitted to NATO.

3.26 Prior to 1974 Greek army, navy and air force units (other than air defence) were "earmarked for assignment" to NATO — i.e. at the latest they would come under command of NATO headquarters at the stage of "reinforced alert" when declared by the North Atlantic Council. Only Greek air defence forces were "assigned" to NATO command in peacetime, coming under the effective operational command of Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, in Naples, through Headquarters Sixth ATAF in Izmir. NATO air defences operate under NATO command twenty-four hours a day. As Mr. Karamanlis in withdrawing Greek forces in 1974 asserted among other things that there would be total defence co-operation with NATO in a general conflict, it is possible to minimise the Greek action by saying that it amounted in practice to the withdrawal of the air defence forces, since only these forces had previously been under NATO command in peacetime. This withdrawal of air defence forces does however in itself leave a serious breach in the collective NATO air defences. The withdrawal of remaining air forces, and of ground and naval forces from their previous "earmarked for assignment" status has also had a debilitating effect on all allied defence arrangements in the area. It is understood that Greek army deployments no longer correspond with allied defence plans, and there have been no joint Greek-Turkish exercises since 1974 (although forces from both countries have individually participated in NATO exercises).

3.27 Mr. Averoff, the Greek Minister of Defence, visited Belgrade in the fall of 1976 (a visit which has not yet been returned) and the service chiefs of each country have made reciprocal visits. There was some speculation at the time that a secret defence agreement had been reached with Yugoslavia. The Committee understands that no such agreement exists. The closer Greek-Yugoslav relations, which the Committee can only welcome, have however permitted a reduction in the number of Yugoslav troops stationed in the vicinity of the Greek frontier, and a corresponding reduction of Greek forces on the other side. Greek Thrace opposite Bulgaria has not been denuded of forces.

1. Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. Buck; Document 651, 14th November 1974, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley.



3.28 Following the 1974 withdrawal of Greek forces from NATO command, Greece sought to negotiate a special relationship for its forces with NATO. It put forward proposals in October 1975 suggesting :

- (i) in peace, Greek armed forces would be under exclusively national command ;
- (ii) there would be total defence co-operation in general conflict ;
- (iii) arrangements for co-operation in a crisis to be worked out at once ;
- (iv) large-scale operations on Greek territory in peace or war would require prior agreement with the Greek Government ;
- (v) the Greek Government would retain the right to decide when its forces would participate in NATO manoeuvres ;
- (vi) NATO would continue to enjoy three advantages :
  - control and use of early-warning, communications and other defence infrastructure built on Greek territory with NATO funds ;
  - continued exchange of information ;
  - nuclear weapons could remain on Greek territory.

3.29 Negotiations have proceeded slowly in a NATO open-ended group of thirteen members for the last two years ; Turkey in particular has objected to any "special status" being granted to Greece. An attempt now is being made to speed up the negotiations.

3.30 Mr. Karamanlis called on Mr. Luns, the NATO Secretary-General, in Brussels on 19th January when the press was given to understand that the Greek Prime Minister supported eventually "the complete reintegration of Greece into the military wing of NATO" but that "a re-examination of the Greek position on NATO depends on developments in the Cyprus solution..." and that "a complete solution to Cyprus" would be required. Greek-NATO negotiations, it was hoped, could be concluded by June 1978.

3.31 Your Rapporteur during his visit to Greece was given to understand that Greece put forward detailed proposals to the NATO military authorities in February 1977 for what would amount to an "interim" arrangement to cover Greek relations with NATO until such time as a complete solution to the Cyprus problem would make the reintegration of Greek forces politically acceptable to the country ; Greece is no longer seeking a "special" relationship with

NATO. These proposals have to be discussed both by the NATO military authorities and by the open-ended group and the Defence Planning Committee. The particular problems of command structure are discussed below under Greek-Turkish relations.

3.32 Greek relations with the United States have also suffered with the events of 1974, but the important United States defence installations in Greece function normally. These include the important naval and air force base in Suda Bay in Crete which also houses NATO fuel and ammunition storage, an electronic surveillance station at Iraklion in Crete, a communications centre at Nea Makri and air force facilities at Athens airport. There are a number of other communications facilities. The United States completed negotiations on a new defence co-operation agreement with Greece which was initialled in 1977 and is now referred to the governments ; this will provide military assistance to the extent of \$700 million over four years for Greece (80 % as *credit* sales, 20 % as grant aid). It is probably for domestic political reasons that the United States has wished to maintain parallelism between its defence co-operation agreement with Greece and Turkey ; certainly the provision of defence equipment is less urgent in the case of Greece than in that of Turkey. Greece now considers the new co-operation agreement to be an integral part of its relationship with NATO and is unlikely to proceed to its ratification until agreement has been reached on its new interim relationship which Greece is now eager to conclude with NATO as rapidly as possible.

3.33 Your Rapporteur left Athens with the clear impression that Greece sees the rôle of NATO as essential to ensure stability in the area which would inevitably be dominated by the Soviet Union if the Alliance did not exist. Greece is anxious that its importance to the Alliance should be clearly understood, and wishes to normalise its relationship with NATO as rapidly as possible. It is clearly the policy of the present government to seek eventually the reintegration of Greek forces into NATO. At the same time the overwhelming preoccupation of the Greek leadership, in addition to its application for membership of the European Community, is with relations with Turkey and the Cyprus problem.

#### (ii) Turkey

3.34 Following the defection of some ten members of parliament from Mr. Demirel's Justice Party, Mr. Egevit, leader of the Republican People's Party, formed a government which secured a vote of confidence by 229 to 218 on 19th January. Ten government posts in the new administration went to the defectors from the Justice Party and three to two small parties that supported Mr. Egevit, but all important portfolios including defence and foreign affairs

remain with the Republican People's Party. The Defence Minister, Mr. Isik, held the same position in Mr. Ecevit's previous government in 1974, and Mr. Isik, a former ambassador, is one of the few civilians to have held the post of defence minister in Turkey. Compared to Mr. Karamanlis in Greece therefore Mr. Ecevit's parliamentary position is less strong; on the other hand there is bipartisan support from both the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party for membership of NATO, although NATO is no longer seen by Mr. Ecevit's administration as a necessarily sufficient basis for Turkish security.

3.35 Unlike Greece, the very severe economic depression in Turkey makes external assistance for the supply of modern defence equipment essential, and the United States embargo on supplies imposed since 1975 has generated universal bitterness in Turkey which considers itself to have been betrayed by an ally. Speaking in the Senate on 23rd March, Mr. Ecevit said Turkey "has reached the point where it would no longer fully depend on the United States and NATO for its security" because Turkey "could no longer trust the United States in certain situations". Turkey occupies an extremely important strategic position for the Alliance. Turkish territory lies astride the Turkish straits which provide the only exit from the Black Sea for the Soviet fleet. It has a common frontier with Bulgaria in Turkish Thrace the flat terrain of which would provide very good going for an armoured thrust from Bulgaria to seize the straits, or an outlet to the Aegean. Turkey has a long Black Sea coast and in the east a long land frontier with the Soviet Union, with Iraq and Syria.

3.36 Despite its difficult economic situation Turkey devoted 5.7% of its GNP to defence based on 1977-78 figures. The armed forces total 465,000, of which the army amounts to 375,000 organised in some 23 divisional equivalents including one armoured division and some three mechanised infantry divisions. Tanks include 2,800 obsolescent M-47 and M-48. The air force includes 14 fighter attack squadrons including 40 Phantoms and 70 F-5As. The navy includes fourteen submarines, twelve destroyers, two frigates and twenty fast patrol boats; two submarines and six fast patrol boats are on order.

3.37 Turkey's relations with NATO were theoretically unaffected by the events of 1974, as Turkey has not sought to withdraw from the NATO command. The thirteen NATO NADGE early-warning stations remain fully operational as does the NATO headquarters at Izmir, although the Greek officers have been withdrawn. In practice however the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations after 1974 have inevitably reduced the effectiveness both of the Greek contribution to NATO — through the decision of that country to withdraw

from NATO command — and of the Turkish contribution because Turkish reporting to NATO, whether of intelligence or the status or movements of its own forces, has been virtually suspended at any level where it is thought that Greek officers might have access to the information. The new arrangements for the Izmir command are mentioned below.

3.38 Under a number of agreements concluded from 1952 to 1969 the United States was able to install a considerable number of important defence facilities in Turkey. There are electronic intelligence-gathering stations in the Sea of Marmara, along the Black Sea coast and in South-East Turkey; there are numerous communications facilities, three airfields and four naval facilities. In July 1975, following the imposition of the United States arms embargo on Turkey by Congress, the Turkish Government said the 1969 and other agreements had "lost their legal validity", the four intelligence-collecting centres were closed down and the Incirlik air base could be used only for direct NATO purposes. These United States facilities are currently stated to have a "provisional status", which amounts to a virtual, although possibly not a total, closure. A new four-year defence co-operation agreement between the United States and Turkey was signed on 26th March 1976 providing for closer Turkish control over United States facilities than hitherto, and for Turkey to provide up to half of all personnel on the facilities if it so wished. The agreement covered a total of twenty-six United States defence installations. At the same time the United States was to provide defence assistance to Turkey of \$1 billion over four years — or \$250 m a year of which \$800 m (\$200 m a year) were to be *credit* sales and \$200 m (\$50 m a year) grant aid. The limited relaxation of the embargo agreed by Congress in March 1976 — authorisation for \$175 m a year of cash sales, i.e. sales involving immediate payment — falls far short of the provisions of the defence co-operation agreement because of the present economic situation in Turkey. As a consequence of the embargo the effectiveness of Turkish forces, particularly of the air force, has been jeopardised.

3.39 The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, irked the Turkish Government by saying prior to the Ecevit-Karamanlis meeting that the United States Administration was awaiting the outcome before deciding whether to submit the Defence Co-operation Agreement to Congress for ratification. But on 3rd April 1978 the State Department announced that the agreement would be re-negotiated "in order further to strengthen our bilateral relations with Turkey and the NATO defence posture in the East Mediterranean. President Carter will ask the Congress to take action to repeal Section 620(X) of the Foreign Assistance Act which

imposes restrictions on military transfers to Turkey...". The Administration at the same time requested foreign military sales credits for Turkey of \$175 million for fiscal year 1979, the same as provided as an emergency in each of the previous two years, with a further \$50 million security assistance loan. At the same time Congress was asked to provide \$5 million refugee assistance for Cyprus and was informed that a request would be made for \$150 million in foreign military sales credits for Greece in financial year 1979 (which begins on 1st October 1978).

3.40 The United States Administration thus demonstrated that its request to Congress for a removal of the embargo was not linked to the submission of new proposals for a solution of the Cyprus problem by the Turkish Cypriot community. At the same time it was obviously known that these proposals would be forthcoming some days later. The urgency of providing military assistance to Turkey had been made clear by the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Zeiner Gundersen, addressing the NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels on 6th December 1977. There were some signs of support in Congress for raising the embargo in a letter in early March from the Chairman, Mr. Zablocki, and eighteen members of the House International Relations Committee addressed to the Secretary of State which said: "You can be assured that the undersigned will give sympathetic consideration to a request for assistance to both [Greece and Turkey] providing the President gives his unequivocal support to such action." On 4th April Mr. Egevit welcomed the administration's approach to Congress, saying: "We are on the verge of a new and positive development in Turkish-American relations" but that negotiations on re-opening United States bases in Turkey would begin only after "a positive result emerges from Congress". The administration's request of 3rd April for the restrictions on military transfers to Turkey to be repealed was approved in the United States House of Representatives International Relations Committee by 18 votes to 17 on 3rd May, but on 11th May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected the request by 8 votes to 4. It did however approve the \$175 million foreign military sales credits and \$50 million security supporting assistance loan for fiscal year 1979.

3.41 The United States arms embargo on Turkey has been heavily criticised in NATO as damaging to both Turkey and the Alliance. On 19th May the communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee stated:

"In this connection, Ministers noted the initiative under way for the complete removal of existing United States restrictions on the procurement of defence equipment by Turkey and emphasised the impor-

tance for the security and solidarity of the Alliance of a speedy and positive outcome to these initiatives."

and Mr. Simonet, the Belgian Foreign Minister, and Mr. Apel, the German Minister of Defence, both voiced their concern.

3.42 Your Rapporteur left Turkey with the strong impression that Turkey considers itself a loyal ally of NATO that has been let down over the supply of armaments and totally misunderstood by most members of the Alliance when forced to take action to protect the Turkish Cypriot population in 1974. As in Greece there is considerable preoccupation with the problems that divide the two countries, as well as with Cyprus. Turkey has need to diversify its sources of armaments but it is in no economic position to make large purchases in foreign currency. It has received some defence assistance from Germany, and there is the possibility of 193 Leopard tanks and Milan anti-tank guided weapons as well as Italian helicopters and the Franco-German Alpha-Jet training aircraft being supplied, but the economic situation in Turkey makes cash purchases difficult or impossible. Turkey is anxious to build its own industrial strength and to become more self-sufficient in arms production by the creation in co-operation with its allies of its own defence industry, with co-production projects on its own territory.

3.43 There is perhaps in certain circles close to the present administration a tendency to believe that a non-aligned status for Turkey may be more attractive if the two superpowers were not present in the region, but as Turkey shares a common frontier with the Soviet Union as well as the Black Sea occupied by the powerful Soviet Black Sea Fleet, the precondition of such a change of policy cannot arise. There is certainly no disposition to envisage a change in alliances, but Turkey is concerned to maintain correct relations with the Soviet Union. It is reliably reported that much of the Soviet air supply to Ethiopia in November 1977 overflew Turkey, but Turkey was later successful in securing some reduction in the size of this airlift. General Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief of Staff, paid an official visit to Turkey from 25th to 28th April 1978, the first such visit for forty-five years. After his meeting with Mr. Egevit, General Ogarkov said to the press that the two countries should "benefit from the possibilities offered by a military relationship". Commenting on the visit on 1st May Mr. Isik, the Defence Minister, quoted the General as having said that "Russia does not harbour any ambitions over Turkey except those of mutual friendship... should Turkey require arms Russia could examine ways and means for giving aid".

3.44 Mr. Egevit has let it be known that Turkey does not intend to leave NATO or to accept Soviet

arms. On the other hand the failure of the United States to raise the arms embargo has naturally embittered Turkey's attitude — both to the United States and to Greece. In London on 15th May Mr. Egevit said Greece had "obviously for years been arming against her ally, Turkey", and that he saw no progress on the Cyprus problem if the United States embargo continued. At the NATO summit in Washington on 30th May Mr. Egevit said that NATO "should seek to replace alienation with increasing dialogue with the Warsaw Pact". In an interview with the New York Times, Mr. Egevit revealed that he intends to sign a political document in Moscow that will stress the friendship between the two countries. Turkey felt "no threat" from Russia and there had been "no indications in recent years of Soviet ambitions on Turkey or Soviet intent to interfere in Turkey". Turkey's defence policy dated to the time of the cold war, he said. "We ought to have a new defence concept that fits the period of détente better." The Committee recommends that the Council and member governments call on the United States to remove the embargo, and consider the possibility of establishing certain joint production programmes in Turkey to prevent the present unfair discrimination against the country over access to defence equipment.

(iii) *Greek-Turkish relations*

3.45 The previous reports of the Committee have documented the events of 1974, and the Greek-Turkish dispute which involves in effect the status of the Aegean Sea as well as Cyprus. There is of course a long and tragic history of Greek-Turkish conflict which has inevitably left a popular tradition of mutual suspicion in both peoples and indeed in many political circles. Fortunately in more recent times through courageous political leadership in both Greece and Turkey, starting with the historical meeting between Ataturk and Venizelos, and repeated a number of times since, most recently with the meeting between Mr. Egevit and Mr. Karamanlis on 10th March 1978, direct conflict between these two peoples has been avoided. The Committee welcomes the improved atmosphere that followed that meeting, but regrets that the better relations that it heralded have not materialised — largely because of the failure of the United States to raise its arms embargo on Turkey, and because of the failure of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to resume negotiations. The Committee applauds the determination of the leadership of both countries to settle their disagreements by negotiation and notes that talks will be resumed in Ankara on 4th and 5th July. The Committee draws attention to some aspects of the dispute that affect directly the relationship of the two countries to NATO.

3.46 Except insofar as the movements of aircraft and control of air space are concerned, the Izmir NATO command is not of course a matter of dispute between the two countries, but new arrangements have been announced by NATO with a view to facilitating new and better defence arrangements in the area. The two NATO headquarters at Izmir are Land Forces South-East Europe — under an American general with Greek and Turkish deputies. In the event of hostilities this headquarters commands the land forces assigned to NATO in Greece (First Hellenic Army with headquarters at Larissa, concentrated chiefly along the Bulgarian and Albanian borders), the Turkish First Army (headquarters in Istanbul, deployed in Thrace and across the Turkish straits); the Turkish Third Army (headquarters Erzincan) defending the eastern frontier with Turkey); and the Turkish Second Army (headquarters at Konya, defending the south-eastern border). The other NATO headquarters at Izmir — Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force — again commanded by a United States general with a Turkish and Greek deputy, commands the Greek and Turkish air forces — the Hellenic Twenty-Eighth Tactical Air Force with headquarters in Larissa; the Turkish First Tactical Air Force with headquarters at Eskisehir, south-east of Istanbul and the Turkish Second Tactical Air Force with headquarters at Diyarbakir in south-eastern Turkey. In the event of hostilities the NATO land and air headquarters form a joint operations centre in a protected war headquarters which would include a liaison officer from the United States Sixth Fleet.

3.47 With the withdrawal of all Greek forces from NATO command in 1974 and the subsequent cessation of any Turkish reporting of force status or location to headquarters at this level, Izmir ceased to be an effective headquarters, and indeed the morale of the military staff which includes United States, Italian and British officers as well as those of Turkey and (before their withdrawal) Greece, has been undermined. On 30th December 1977 General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, announced that from 1st July 1978 the two commands — LANDSOUTHEAST and Sixth ATAF — would be taken over by Turkish generals, who would have United States deputies. With the withdrawal of the Greek forces it had become anomalous that American commanders should be commanding only Turkish forces. The two commands in Izmir will thus become in July "Turkish-NATO" headquarters — the land commander being directly subordinate to Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) in Naples, and the air commander coming under CINCSOUTH's principal subordinate Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, also located in Naples.

3.48 The inevitable corollary to the reorganisation of the Izmir headquarters is the establish-

ment of a "Greek-NATO" headquarters on Greek territory, possibly at Larissa where there is already a NATO-financed airfield and where Greek army and air force commands are located, and these arrangements will be negotiated in the context of the Greek-NATO negotiations which are now proceeding. It is obviously unfortunate that in an area where the closest co-ordination is necessary, an integrated command should in effect have had to be split in two, but the arrangement only recognises the political facts of life. As far as the land commands are concerned, insuperable difficulties should not arise with the establishment of two land headquarters, but the same is not true of the problems of the air command. If new headquarters are established in Greece (which for the purposes of this report might be referred to as Seventh ATAF and Land-South-Centre) it will be essential that the closest possible relationship be established between Sixth and Seventh ATAFs, with the exchange of liaison officers and arrangements for "cross-tasking" of sorties which will not have to take account of any theoretical geographical boundary between Sixth and Seventh ATAFs. Naval liaison through a joint operations centre in wartime must also be ensured.

3.49 One of the Greek-Turkish differences has arisen over civilian as well as military airspace in the Aegean. Under ICAO agreements, the civilian airspace is divided into "flight information regions" (FIRs); the diagram<sup>1</sup> shows the international boundary under ICAO regulations between the Athens and Istanbul FIR. While Sixth ATAF exerted operational control over an area embracing both the FIRs there was no particular problem for the operation of the two national air forces. As it happens until about 1964 the boundary between the Hellenic Twenty-Eighth Tactical Air Force and the Turkish First Tactical Air Force was drawn down the Aegean Sea along a line to the west of the FIR boundary. In 1964 it was agreed however for reasons of air control convenience to adjust the boundary between the two tactical air forces to coincide with the FIR line<sup>1</sup>. "Crosstell" (the reporting of aircraft locations) between sector operations centres located in Turkey and Greece broke down in the heat of the 1974 events, and at the same time the Aegean air space became closed to civilian traffic. Turkey issued a Notam requiring any aircraft flying in the Eastern Aegean (although within the Athens FIR) to report their locations to Turkish air traffic control. Greece refused to allow this arrangement unless the movements of Turkish aircraft on the eastern side of the FIR boundary were reported to Greek air control, and this the Turkish authorities refused. It is understood

that in the course of Greek-Turkish negotiations on Aegean air space one proposal advanced was for all aircraft within thirty nautical miles east or west of the FIR line to report their movements to both Athens and Istanbul air control.

3.50 Turkey has not sought a modification of the internationally agreed civil air space boundary, the Athens/Istanbul FIR line — but with the establishment of new air command arrangements, presumably involving the creation of a new Headquarters Seventh ATAF, a geographical boundary will have to be agreed between Sixth and Seventh ATAF — i.e. in reality between the Greek and Turkish air forces — which may not coincide with the purely civilian FIR line. From an operational air force standpoint the important point will not be the location of the boundary, but detailed arrangements for liaison, co-operation and cross-tasking as stressed in paragraph 3.48 above.

3.51 At present the local naval commands under NAVSOUTH in Naples are COMEDEAST — a Greek command with headquarters in Athens covering part of the Ionian Sea; the Sea of Crete and the Aegean — and COMEDNOREAST — a Turkish command with headquarters in Ankara covering the Black Sea and the Turkish Mediterranean seaboard.

3.52 Mutual suspicion has persisted between Greece and Turkey over the possible military intentions of the other country in the general area of the Aegean. With the exception of the two islands at the entrance to the Turkish Straits, virtually all islands off the Turkish Aegean coast are Greek territory; under the Lausanne Agreement of 1928 those close to the Turkish coast are demilitarised. In 1974 Turkey created a fourth national army command — the Fourth Turkish Army, known as the "Aegean" Army, which Greek military authorities regarded as a threat to Greek islands in the Aegean. The Turkish authorities point out that this army is purely a planning headquarters with only administrative units, but no operational troops, under its command. There are now military installations on certain of the demilitarised Greek islands and radar stations which, taken together with the modernisation of the Greek air force, which has outstripped that of the Turkish air force, are regarded by the Turkish military authorities as a threat to the Turkish mainland.

3.53 The delimitation of rights to the Aegean seabed is a separate issue which should not have defence connotations. Given goodwill, a solution can be found through negotiations between Greece and Turkey, recognising the high seas status of the Aegean, and an equitable zone for each country.

1. Appendix IV.

(iv) *Cyprus*

3.54 The Committee reported at the time<sup>1</sup> on 1974 events in Cyprus. In its last report<sup>2</sup> the Committee noted that :

“Unfortunately little or no real progress can be reported towards normalising the situation in Cyprus. The February round of talks between representatives of the two communities in Vienna under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General proved abortive and on 17th April, following an exchange of proposals for the basis of the next round to be held in May, the Greek Cypriot Government stated that the Turkish proposals were ‘unacceptable’, containing ‘no concrete territorial offer’.”

That was 1976.

3.55 Two years later the situation at first sight seems little different. Strictly speaking the Cyprus problem is not a direct matter of Greek-Turkish relations. President Kyprianou has himself stressed recently in Athens that a constitutional solution on the island has to be negotiated by the two communities concerned. Greece and Turkey are however there to advise the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively<sup>3</sup>, and there is no doubt that the two communities look to the two countries for moral and material support — especially the Turkish community which for ten years prior to 1974 led for the most part a permanent minority existence in a number of scattered enclaves. In its advisory rôle the Turkish Government has appointed Professor Mümtaz Soysal as adviser to the Turkish Cypriot negotiators. Professor Soysal has an international reputation as a member of “Amnesty”.

3.56 The *de facto* situation in Cyprus is unchanged since the Committee last reported two years ago, except that the two independent administrations have consolidated their positions and the level of Turkish troops in the Turkish part of the island has been reduced to 29,000. The Turkish Cypriot population amounts to some 18% of the total on the island and the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed unilaterally in 1975 and held parliamentary elections in May 1976. It administers the approximately 36% of the territory into which the Turkish Cypriot community was consolidated in 1974. The Turkish Cypriot administration has not of course received any international recognition as

an independent state, nor has it sought to claim such recognition although it is assiduous in attending some international conferences such as Islamic meetings.

3.57 Some progress was made at a meeting in Nicosia between President Makarios and Mr. Denktash, in the presence of Mr. Waldheim, on 13th February 1977 when the following guidelines for resumed talks in Vienna were agreed :

- The aim was to establish an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic.
- The size of the territory under the administration of each community would be negotiated in the light of economic viability, productivity and property rights.
- Questions of principle such as freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and property rights would be open to discussion, taking into account the fundamental principle of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which might arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
- The powers and functions of the central federal government would be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the state.

3.58 The Greek Cypriot administration, having accepted the concept of a federation of two states, is pressing for a strong federal government and significant territorial concessions to permit the re-establishment of the Greek Cypriots which it claims are refugees from territory now administered by the Turkish Cypriot community. The Greek Cypriots recognise that 1,200 of the refugees come from an area within the immediate vicinity of the present dividing line.

3.59 It is hoped that negotiations in Vienna between the two communities under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General can be resumed as soon as possible. The Turkish community submitted detailed proposals to Mr. Waldheim on 15th April 1978 which have already been rejected by President Kyprianou as a basis for talks. The Turkish Cypriot proposals offered certain small territorial concessions, and provided weaker powers for a federal government of Cyprus than are to be found in other contemporary federal systems in the world. But the issue is not an exercise in political science ; the fundamental issue is one of mutual trust between two communities, and the Turkish Cypriot proposal contained provisions to “ensure the progressive integration of economic and financial functions of banking, foreign exchange, monetary

1. Document 651, 14th November 1974, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley.

2. Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. Buck.

3. And Mr. Eçevit in fact said in London on 15th May that he saw no progress being made on the Cyprus problem if the United States embargo continued.

affairs, imposition of federal charges and fees, customs duties and tariffs" ...and of securing "with the growth of mutual trust, co-operation and confidence, the progressive transfer to the Federal Republic of the above powers and functions". Whatever form of federation can be agreed at the outset, it can only function through mutual trust and confidence, which once established can lead progressively to a strengthening of the federal government as experience of its functioning grows. Mr. Denktash submitted certain new proposals to Mr. Waldheim on 22nd May 1978 which the United States State Department publicly welcomed as "very constructive and forthcoming".

3.60 Union with Greece or "Enosis" is no longer advocated by any responsible elements of the Greek Cypriot community, but the Turkish Cypriot proposals would permit each community to enter into agreements in particular with their respective motherlands. The Republic of Cyprus will remain an independent non-aligned state, and there are no proposals to change that status.

3.61 The existence of two British sovereign base areas on the island, which do not form part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, is not an issue with either community or with Greece or Turkey. From time to time there is newspaper speculation in Turkey that if Britain were to give up Dhekelia, the eastern sovereign base areas, the Turkish Cypriots would be prepared to see it occupied by the Greek Cypriots. In these areas Britain at present maintains an infantry battalion, two infantry companies, an armoured reconnaissance squadron and a flight of Alouette helicopters. In addition Britain contributes to the United Nations force in Cyprus (UNIFCYP) one infantry battalion (less two companies), an armoured reconnaissance squadron, a flight of Alouette helicopters and logistic support. A squadron of Whirlwind helicopters in Cyprus provides both support for UNIFCYP and operates in the search and rescue rôle. A squadron of the RAF regiment is deployed at the Akrotiri airfield. British Vulcan bombers were stationed on the island until 1975 and Headquarters British Forces Near East and British Near East Air Force were located there — all in support of CENTO. These were withdrawn in 1975 and 1976, the British 1975 white paper on defence making it clear that the membership of CENTO would be retained, but forces would no longer be declared to the organisation.

3.62 Addressing the British House of Commons Sub-Committee on Cyprus in February 1976, Mr. Callaghan, then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said that although it was not the time to strengthen the sovereign base areas, Britain had no intention of leaving them. They were still a British base, not a NATO base, but it was "more of a NATO interest today than it was when we went there".

The Akrotiri airfield in fact provides one of the most easterly airfields available to a NATO country in the Mediterranean. The high mobility of air power means that aircraft to provide air support for naval forces in the area, or maritime reconnaissance, or longer-range strike functions, could be flown in with very little notice as long as the airfield remains operational.

3.63 The Committee has previously noted the changing attitude of the Soviet Union to events in Cyprus; it swung from tacit support of the Turkish intervention in 1974 to support for the Greek Cypriot position after the fall of the colonels' régime. The Soviet Union has consistently sought, so far without success, to transfer the constitutional talks to the Security Council framework, where the Soviet Union would participate directly. In an article in Pravda in December 1977 the commentator Vladislav Drobkov criticised discussion of the Cyprus issue in the NATO framework, claiming that "progressive circles on Athens" thought they were designed to circumvent the withdrawal of foreign forces "from the territory of Cyprus". United Nations resolutions have in fact of course referred to the withdrawal of forces from the territory of the "Republic of Cyprus". The Pravda commentator claimed that "big NATO military units and their bases remain on Cypriot soil". Worded this way the article appears to be an attack on the presence of Turkish forces and on forces in the British sovereign base areas. It can be compared with the opportunist Soviet Government statement of July 1974 which claimed that "the Greek military are seeking to turn the island into a NATO military base".

#### (v) *United States*

3.64 The United States maintains important naval and air force units in the Mediterranean which because of their nuclear capability and modern equipment must be considered the single most powerful force in the Mediterranean area. The United States Sixth Fleet normally comprises two aircraft carrier groups, and totals, in addition to the two carriers, some fifteen surface combatants ranging from cruisers down to escorts and one marine amphibious unit of about six amphibious craft carrying one embarked marine battalion. The aircraft carriers will each carry some eighty to ninety aircraft, most assigned to a nuclear strike rôle with a combat radius of 600 or 800 kilometres bringing land targets in the southern part of the Soviet Union well within range. The carriers provide air superiority fighters and anti-submarine warfare aircraft as well.

3.65 The United States Sixteenth Tactical Air Force is concentrated at Torrejon air base in Spain and is capable of executing attack missions staging through forward air bases at Incirlik



in Turkey and Aviano in Italy among others. As well as some important electronic intelligence gathering facilities, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, the United States maintains a dense communications network throughout the area with numerous terminals in Morocco, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey — the system provides in practice an important back-up to the internationally-financed NATO communications system. The United States air force also provides the most substantial reinforcement capability with units that can be flown in to the NATO Mediterranean countries at an early stage of an alert.

3.66 The United States also provides tactical nuclear warheads stockpiled in Italy, Greece and Turkey for both its own air force units and the air forces and tactical army weapons of its NATO allies.

3.67 The bilateral arrangements under which United States forces are based in the NATO countries and in Spain have been described under the countries concerned.

(vi) *Italy*

3.68 The Italian peninsula and the islands of Sardinia and Sicily occupy a central place in the Mediterranean, effectively dividing it into the eastern and western basins. While it has no common frontier with the Warsaw Pact powers, it has with Yugoslavia, and the Hungarian frontier is only some 250 kilometres away through the Ljubljana gap. To the north neutral Austria, although offering more mountainous terrain, might, because of its indifferent defence capability, provide a tempting route for any Warsaw Pact aggression.

3.69 In 1977 Italy devoted 2.4% of its GDP to defence — the lowest percentage of any WEU country except Luxembourg (1.1%) or of any other NATO country except Canada (2%). A restructuring plan of the Italian armed forces initiated in 1976 has led to a reduction in the size of the army by about 22,000 men in an attempt to make more finance available for modernisation of equipment, which has been provided for in special promotional laws for each of the three services voted by parliament in addition to the normal defence budget.

3.70 Normal consultations on the restructuring of the armed forces were undertaken within NATO and in December 1977 the NATO Defence Planning Committee issued a communiqué welcoming the efforts undertaken, and concluding: "The allies have nevertheless expressed their disquiet at the scale of the reductions in the size of the Italian armed forces, particularly with regard to manpower in the army... The allies consider it of vital importance that the Italian Government should take all possible steps

to achieve early completion of the outstanding equipment modernisation programmes for the Italian armed forces. They have therefore urged the Italian authorities to maintain in real terms the levels of defence expenditure under the normal budget and also to ensure that the funds initially allocated to the restructuring plan for the three services will be adequately adjusted in order to compensate for price increases."

3.71 The Italian army, deployed in particular in the north-eastern part of the country, now amounts to 218,000 men organised in some sixteen divisional equivalents including three armoured divisions and the equivalent of some ten mechanised or motorised divisions. There are some 700 M-47 tanks, 200 M-60s and 600 modern Leopards. The air force comprises some 336 combat aircraft including 140 F-104s and 54 G-91s. Italy participates in the MRCA Tornado programme with Britain and Germany, first deliveries of which are expected in 1979. According to the annual report of the WEU Council the Lance tactical nuclear missile became operational with the Italian army in 1977 — it replaces the Sergeant and aging Honest John and in the course of 1978 is scheduled to enter service with the Belgian, German, Netherlands and British armies.

3.72 The Italian navy is the largest navy assigned to NATO in the Mediterranean and has a reasonable proportion of modern ships. The Committee was particularly impressed by the new helicopter carrier Vittorio Veneto which through the courtesy of the Italian authorities it was able to visit in Taranto. In addition the Italian navy comprises some eight submarines, six guided-weapon destroyers, twelve destroyers and escorts and eight coastal escorts.

3.73 Italy plays an important rôle as host to the main NATO headquarters in the Mediterranean — Allied Forces Southern Europe — and to four of its five subordinate commands. It is located, together with its subordinate air, naval and maritime air headquarters, in Naples. There are many NATO-financed infrastructure installations in Italy including airfields and ten NADGE early-warning stations. Under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, and a specific bilateral agreement of 20th October 1954 together with later annexes, the United States has a number of defence facilities in Italy which include airfields at Aviano in the north-east and Sigonella in Sicily — the latter being an important maritime reconnaissance airfield. There are naval facilities in Naples and Catania, an intelligence-gathering facility at San Vito near Taranto and numerous defence communications sites. The United States army provides defence support functions of various kinds through the Southern European task force (SETAF), which operates a base complex at Vicenza and Livorno.



*(vii) United Kingdom*

3.74 Since the 1974 defence review the United Kingdom has significantly reduced its permanent forces in the Mediterranean area, the Vulcan bombers having been withdrawn from Cyprus. There is today a destroyer or frigate stationed as guard-ship at Gibraltar together with one infantry battalion and a detachment of two Hunter aircraft. In Malta a Royal Marine company group and army elements will remain during the withdrawal period. Canberra bombers and Nimrod maritime reconnaissance squadrons will have withdrawn by the end of 1978, and all British forces will leave the island when the present military facilities agreement with the Maltese Government expires on 31st March 1979. The army and air force units stationed on Cyprus have been mentioned above. British naval forces continue to exercise with NATO forces in the Mediterranean from time to time and maritime patrol aircraft may in turn participate in such exercises. Normally a helicopter carrier or equivalent vessel exercises in the Mediterranean each year.

3.75 Britain retains the following reinforcement capabilities for assignment to NATO in the Mediterranean area :

- (i) a land force which can be deployed to North-East Italy, probably of two or three battalions ;
- (ii) two offensive support squadrons of aircraft for North-East Italy ;
- (iii) reinforcement options of the special air service regiment ;
- (iv) the United Kingdom component of Ace Mobile Force comprising a battalion group, support troops, 12 Harrier aircraft and four Wessex helicopters.

*(viii) France*

3.76 France remains in a special position as a member of NATO in having withdrawn from the integrated military structure in 1966. France nevertheless remains fully represented on the North Atlantic Council and on various NATO bodies such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors concerned with the joint production of equipment. French liaison officers are maintained at all major NATO military headquarters, although French officers no longer serve on the integrated staffs.

3.77 France makes an important naval contribution to security in the Mediterranean, having increased the proportion of its naval forces which are based in the Mediterranean compared with the Atlantic in recent years. These forces now amount to two aircraft carriers, two cruisers,

twenty destroyers, twenty-two frigates and twenty-one submarines and an important naval air force including thirty-five maritime patrol aircraft. French naval forces regularly participate in allied manoeuvres, normally on a bilateral basis and there is close co-operation with the NATO maritime air surveillance headquarters in Naples which notably in 1977 continuously tailed the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev throughout its voyage in the Mediterranean. The Committee was informed that France also has an intervention force consisting of one parachute division and one airborne marine infantry division ready to move into action on very short notice after an alert in areas far removed from France as was recently the case when units were sent to Lebanon under the auspices of the United Nations and to Zaïre. But in the present state of relations between France and NATO the intervention of this force depends on the decision of the French Government alone. Moreover, a major part of the French air force can intervene in the Western Mediterranean from bases in metropolitan France or even Corsica, and under a bilateral agreement French and Spanish forces have, largely through joint manoeuvres, laid the foundations for close co-operation. The Committee noted in its previous report that French naval co-operation with NATO in the Mediterranean area was closer than normally understood. The welcome French participation in joint allied manoeuvres in the Red Sea has been noted above. Some Committee members claimed that France's absence from the integrated command in no way diminished the effectiveness of its contribution to security in the Mediterranean and that further theoretical quarrels should be avoided.

3.78. The majority of the Committee nevertheless regrets the continued French absence from the integrated command structure — previously the subordinate naval command of the Western Mediterranean (COMEDOC) was a French responsibility, but is now exercised directly by the Italian admiral, Commander Naval Forces Southern Europe in Naples.

*(ix) Portugal*

3.79 Portugal, not strictly a Mediterranean country, contributes more directly to the NATO Atlantic command, but it is convenient to refer to this allied country in a report on the Mediterranean partly because the subordinate NATO headquarters at Lisbon — IBERLANT — has to maintain close liaison with the Mediterranean command, in particular with the subordinate command GIBMED located at Gibraltar. Portuguese defence links with Spain will become more important as that country moves closer to NATO as mentioned below.

3.80 In its previous report the Committee drew attention to the need to provide defence assistance

to Portugal to help with the modernisation of its defence equipment, which the critical state of the Portuguese economy makes it impossible to modernise from national resources. In particular an air mobile armoured brigade is being formed in the Portuguese army, to be equipped with German or United States tanks, and which can form part of the mobile reserves immediately available to SACEUR in periods of tension.

3.81 Your Rapporteur visited Portugal for briefings at IBERLANT prior to observing Exercise "Open Gate" (see paragraph 3.17).

(x) *Malta*

3.82 Although not a NATO country, Malta was a NATO headquarters from 1952 until 1971 when the Malta Labour Party under Mr. Mintoff won the elections. The headquarters at that time — Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, the naval command subordinate to AFSOUTH in Naples — was moved to Naples leaving only the remaining British NATO naval command — COMEDSOUEAST — based in Malta. This command, subordinate to NAVSOUTH, was responsible for the Mediterranean area from the Straits of Sicily to Suez; with the reduction in British naval presence in the Mediterranean following the 1974 defence review this command was transferred to the direct responsibility of the Italian admiral who is Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe.

3.83 In March 1972 a seven-year defence agreement between Malta and the United Kingdom, underwritten by NATO, was concluded to provide continuing use of the military facilities for NATO purposes in exchange for annual payments of some £14 million — 5.25 million provided by Britain and 8.75 million by NATO. Under the terms of this agreement Malta further undertook not to permit the forces of any party to the Warsaw Pact to be stationed in Malta or to use military facilities there. This agreement expires on 31st March 1979, and there is no British or NATO intention to renew it.

3.84 Mr. Mintoff, the Maltese Prime Minister, has in public sought to pursue a non-aligned policy, claiming that on the expiry of the defence agreement in 1979 there will be no more military bases on the island. The Maltese economy remains strongly dependent on external trade and assistance, and Mr. Mintoff has actively sought foreign investment from all quarters including in particular China and Libya. Diplomatic relations have not however been established with the Soviet Union and it is understood that Soviet approaches concerning possible naval facilities after 1979 have been rebuffed by Malta. Despite Mr. Mintoff's expressed desire to form a bridge between the Arab world and Europe, typified by his quest for closer relations with Libya, the Maltese

population identifies itself with Europe, and it is understood that supplies of Libyan oil have recently been suspended pending settlement of the demarcation line for the seabed rights of the two countries.

3.85 Despite the publicity given to assistance and trade links with China, Czechoslovakia and Libya, it is understood that British commercial investment provides three times as many jobs as any other nation, and that the Federal Republic of Germany comes second in this respect. The Maltese tourist trade still relies on British tourists for 65% of its customers.

3.86 While the possibility of a special associate status for Malta within NATO was explored at one time in the past, it is clear that Mr. Mintoff's non-aligned policy now rules out that possibility. It is no part of NATO's policy to seek to include any countries in the Alliance against the wishes of their own population. NATO is not lacking in naval, communications or air base facilities in this part of the Mediterranean; Sicily is only forty nautical miles away. The strategic interests of NATO are limited to ensuring that Warsaw Pact forces are excluded from the island, while Malta's interests lie in securing external assistance for its economy. It is likely that the current defence agreement on its expiry on 31st March 1979 can be replaced by an economic assistance agreement being tentatively discussed between Malta, Italy, Germany and France to which Malta wishes to link Algeria and Libya; a non-aligned clause in such an agreement, it is hoped, would specifically exclude the stationing of any external armed forces.

(xi) *Gibraltar*

3.87 The rock of Gibraltar has been a British naval base since the beginning of the eighteenth century, the status being confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Under NATO naval plans for the Mediterranean the resident British naval and air commanders assume regional command under AFSOUTH in the event of hostilities, the admiral becoming Commander Gibraltar Mediterranean Area (COMGIBMED). This command is responsible for the sea area from about 20 miles west of the straits to some 150 nautical miles east which bridges the boundary between NATO's Southern Europe Command at Naples and the IBERLANT Command near Lisbon, a subordinate command of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). The Gibraltar command is involved in any naval movements into or out of the Mediterranean and the closest possible liaison and good communications between Gibraltar and Naples on the one hand and Gibraltar and Lisbon on the other are obviously essential. It is understood that the Gibraltar-Lisbon communications hitherto deficient are being improved. SACLANT has proposed in the past that GIBMED should

become a subordinate command of IBERLANT, but this proposal has been strongly resisted by the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe. It is one of several outstanding command problems in the Mediterranean referred to in paragraph 3.9.

3.88 Administratively Gibraltar, with a population of about 30,000, is a British colony with internal autonomy, but Spanish claims to the territory are of long standing. In the past the Committee has expressed the view that from a NATO standpoint the usefulness of Gibraltar would be enhanced if the dispute with Spain were settled, and the Committee welcomes the improved atmosphere at the talks between the British and Spanish Foreign Secretaries held in Paris on 15th March 1978, which were attended also by Sir Joshua Hassan, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, and Mr. Maurice Xiberras, the Leader of the Opposition. Gibraltar's economic future must certainly lie in closer links with Spain; if Spain were a full member of NATO, the issue of sovereignty would not be relevant from a NATO point of view. The situation at the present time is less clear and the Committee has previously drawn attention to the advantage of diversity in the sovereign status of territories on which NATO military facilities are installed.

**(d) Other allied countries — Spain**

3.89 Spain is not a NATO country, but because of its defence arrangements with three NATO countries — France, Portugal and the United States — it must rank as an allied country. Spain spends 1.7 % of its GNP on defence and has significant armed forces totalling 309,000 of which 220,000 are in the army. There is some modern equipment including 200 AMX-30 tanks (more are being produced inside the country), a navy with a helicopter-carrier and Harrier vertical take-off aircraft, thirteen destroyers and some frigates equipped with surface-to-air missiles. The air force includes some Phantoms.

3.90 The Committee has followed for some five years the evolution of the situation in Spain and the possible contribution that Spain could make to European security in the framework of NATO. Three Rapporteurs have visited Madrid from 1973 to 1976 and been courteously received by the Spanish authorities. The previous report of the Committee<sup>1</sup> described the very close defence links established with the United States, considerably strengthened by the conclusion of the bilateral treaty of friendship and co-operation signed on 24th January 1976.

3.91 The United States has extensive military facilities in Spain including major air bases at Zaragoza (with a fuel pipeline crossing Spain to

Cadiz), Torrejon, Moron and Rota near Cadiz; and naval facilities at Rota although the Polaris submarine squadron currently operating from there is to be withdrawn between 1st January and 1st July 1979 (by which time the longer-range Trident submarines will be operational). Nuclear weapons are not now stockpiled on Spanish territory. There are also a number of important United States communications facilities in Spain that complete the Mediterranean-wide communications network, and link in with the two communications stations at Bouknadel and Kenitra in Morocco due to close by 30th September 1978.

3.92 General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in his other capacity as Commander of United States forces in Europe, participates directly in the planning arrangements established under the United States-Spanish treaty, and direct links with NATO to arrange co-ordinated defence planning were discussed when the Spanish Foreign Minister, then Mr. Areilza, called on Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, on 16th February 1976. In its previous report the Committee recommended that the Council:

“call on the North Atlantic Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of the Alliance:

- (a) by negotiating with the Government of Spain that emerges from free elections the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate rôle for the Spanish armed forces in the integrated military structure.”

3.93 Since that report was adopted Spain has held free parliamentary elections on 15th June 1977 and was admitted as a member of the Council of Europe on 24th November 1977, with the approval of that body's parliamentary assembly which was voted on 12th October that year. At the same time Spain acceded to the European Convention on Human Rights. A new constitution for the country is now being elaborated by the parliamentary authorities; its adoption is expected in the autumn.

3.94 While Spain's priority in foreign relations now is membership of the European Community, the present government is giving secondary consideration to accession to NATO and the proposal is under active debate in Spanish political circles. Although the Spanish Defence Minister, Mr. Gutierrez Mellado, was reported as saying in early February that the issue was not an immediate problem, “considering that we have remained outside the organisation for so many years, one can wait a little longer before solving this problem”, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Mr. Oreja Aguirre, in the most positive statement so far, said on 7th April that “Spain is a country firmly installed within the Atlantic system. Its

1. Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. Buck.

government considers favourably moreover the possibility of joining NATO soon", adding that a decision could be taken only after "a national debate which will begin only after the adoption of the constitution" — i.e. in autumn 1978. The Spanish Socialist Party, PSOE, and the Communist Party, have not supported proposals for joining NATO; the Communist Party has called for the dismantlement of the two military blocs — Mr. Carillo, its Secretary-General, speaking at Yale University on 16th November 1977 added however that his party would not call for the removal of American military bases from Spain if Soviet bases in Eastern European countries were not also evacuated. Dr. Luns, the Secretary-General of NATO, answering a question in the North Atlantic Assembly at its meeting in Paris on 21st September 1977 said that the matter of Spanish accession to NATO was one for Spain, to be decided after the constitution has been adopted; he believed however that if the request was made the other members of NATO would welcome Spanish accession. Eleven members of the Cortes — ten from the UCD (Democratic Centrist Union) and one from the AP (Popular Alliance) — attended as observers at Committee meetings of the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels on 25th and 26th May.

3.95 The Committee recommends that active encouragement should be given to the accession of Spain to NATO after the adoption of the new constitution, provided that such accession has majority support in the Spanish parliament. Meanwhile it calls for the establishment of closer co-ordination between the Spanish military forces and the NATO military commands, and the participation of Spanish naval and air forces in NATO exercises. It is recalled that Spain has defence links with France through the protocol of collaboration which provides for staff talks and joint exercises, and with Portugal through the bilateral Iberian Pact which is due for renegotiation — a bilateral treaty of friendship was signed on 5th May 1978.

#### (e) *Extra-NATO activities*

3.96 During his visit to Ankara the Rapporteur was briefed at the headquarters of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) which is located there. The present members of CENTO are Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom; the United States, technically an associated member, is in practice a full participant. The twenty-fifth annual ministerial meeting of the CENTO Council was held in London on 19th-20th April with the participation of the five foreign ministers, when the continuing usefulness of the organisation was stressed.

3.97 CENTO has inevitably been a tenuous organisation, lacking the political cohesion necessary to a functioning mutual defence organisation. The foreign policy of Pakistan at times has

led to differences between that country and other members of the organisation; nevertheless Pakistan remains a member. The disparity of the political systems of some member countries inhibits close co-operation. CENTO does not have a permanent command structure, nor does it have forces assigned to it. Nevertheless there is a Permanent Military Deputies' Group, composed of representatives of the five chiefs-of-staff, which can meet in Ankara in permanent session, and a small military staff under a United States general who acts as chief-of-staff. Contingency defence planning is possible and exercises are organised about four times a year, the most important of which are the Midlink naval exercise, in which substantial naval forces from the five countries participate in the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, and co-ordinated air exercises. Arrangements have been made for certain NATO operational procedures to be communicated to CENTO forces which would permit co-ordinated naval operations if the necessity arose.

3.98 The Committee has previously welcomed arrangements for crosstell of air defence information between CENTO and NATO — an arrangement which in practice would provide for early-warning information from air defence radars to be exchanged between Iran and the NATO NADGE system installed in Turkey. Iran is rapidly acquiring a highly sophisticated early warning system, which will include AWACs aircraft. The Committee believes that arrangements should be made for tracks to be reported directly to NATO Sector Operations Centres in Turkey, and vice versa, and calls for the early implementation of the crosstell agreement. Warning time of air movements beyond the eastern borders of Turkey could be considerably increased at no extra cost to military budgets, and no political significance need attach to such a purely technical arrangement. The usefulness of pragmatic defence arrangements with Iran is heightened with the present uncertainty surrounding the policy of its eastern neighbour, Afghanistan, where a new government under Mr. Taraki was installed by a military coup in May 1978. The Soviet Union has built the strategic road tunnel 3,400 metres above sea level through the Salang Pass, at a cost of \$640 million, to provide a permanent road south from the Soviet frontier to the capital, Kabul.

3.99 Reference has been made in paragraph 2.40 above to the combined naval manoeuvres of French, British and United States warships in the Red Sea which the Committee has welcomed.

## IV. *Non-NATO countries*

### (a) *Yugoslavia*

4.1 On a number of occasions in the past the Committee has reported in general terms on the

situation in Yugoslavia — a communist but non-aligned country since President Tito broke from Moscow in 1948. The continuance of the non-aligned status of Yugoslavia is vital to NATO — any realignment with Moscow could provide the Soviet navy with much sought-after port facilities on the Adriatic, and place Warsaw Pact land forces in direct contact with Italy, separating that country from its next NATO neighbour, Greece. Anxious to report on the situation in the country at first hand, the Rapporteur accordingly asked to visit Belgrade, and is happy to report that he was courteously received there by the Yugoslav authorities in April — the first time that a Rapporteur of the Committee had been able to visit the country — although it did not prove possible to meet any representative of the Ministry of Defence or the armed forces.

4.2 The foreign policy of Yugoslavia — to demonstrate to all the world its non-aligned status by maintaining active relations with both superpowers, all its neighbours, and particularly the non-aligned countries in the world — is very closely linked with the person of President Tito who was 86 in May this year. This remarkable statesman who is a political contemporary of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, and who founded the Third World Movement with Nasser and Nehru, all long departed from the political scene, has in the last nine months visited Peking, Moscow, Paris, Washington and London. There is every reason to believe that there will be continuity in his foreign policy when President Tito eventually hands over to his successors. A brief description of the domestic scene is relevant when considering present arrangements for the succession.

(i) *Domestic scene*

4.3 Yugoslavia is a federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces; the population of 21.7 million is composed of six different nations and eighteen different nationalities. In various parts of the country there are up to five official languages and at least six others are spoken in certain districts. The constitution has been amended and adjusted on a number of occasions to ensure a proper representation of all the republics and nations at federal level, and a balance between them. It has been said that Yugoslavia is more like an international organisation in this respect than a country. The latest constitution, introduced in 1974, carefully institutionalises this balance and provides for consultation and discussion of policy at many different levels within the republics and at federal level, the system being described as “democratic centralism”.

4.4 The constitution also provides for the succession to the President of the Republic to be assumed by the State Presidency — a body

comprising nine members, eight elected by the assemblies of the six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces, and President Tito who combines the offices of President of the Republic, President of the Presidency, President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Under the constitution the State Presidency is to act as the collective leadership when the succession to President Tito arises, and the chairmanship of the presidency will rotate among the eight other members, as the vice-chairmanship does at the present time.

4.5 Current policy is thus discussed in three main bodies: the State Presidency which President Tito himself has claimed has already assumed many of his duties; the Federal Executive Council composed of the government ministers; and the Praesidium of the Communist Party (“League of Yugoslav Communists”). But it is understood that the Presidency meets only at some six-weekly intervals, and the forty-eight-member Party Praesidium only infrequently. The 1974 constitution is still in its infancy, the elective bodies are only now coming to the end of the first term of their existence and already certain changes are being discussed in the light of experience. The forty-eight-member Praesidium of the Communist Party is expected to be reduced to twenty-four members in June with a view to making it a more effective and authoritative body. As there is no precedent for presidential succession in the post-war history of Yugoslavia it is hardly possible to predict how the constitutional arrangements will be found to work in practice.

4.6 The 1974 constitution provides an increased rôle for the armed forces, compared with the previous situation. They are under the direct authority of the Defence Minister, General Ljubicic, who is responsible directly to the State Presidency. There are three generals in the Party Praesidium and Executive, and military representatives make up 12 % of the Central Committee of 166 members. President Tito has described the army as the force for unity and continuity in Yugoslavia, but at the same time has made it clear that it could not take over the administration of the country. The Communist Party is to remain the ideological guiding force, and most senior army officers are members of the Communist Party. Yugoslavia remains a communist country, but a communist country that is unlike the members of the Warsaw Pact. “Self management” is the much-publicised basis of the economic system which delegates management decisions and supposedly permits the operation of market forces. Ideologically there is strict insistence on Marxism and the single-party system, and deviation from the prevailing “democratic centralism” whether in the direction of closer links with Moscow (“centralism” *tout court*)

or political pluralism ("anarcho-liberalism") is no more tolerated than are independence movements in the constituent republics. Western sources believe there to be some 550 political prisoners at the present time, and Belgrade remains very sensitive to the activities of dissenting emigrés from abroad. On 13th April 1978 Mileta Perovic, a "cominformist" who was reportedly enticed from Paris to Switzerland where he was kidnapped in July 1977 to stand trial in Yugoslavia, was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment after a trial *in camera* lasting three weeks.

4.7 At the same time Yugoslavia remains an open country; its people are free to travel and work abroad, and western publications are freely on sale. Popular cultural identity today, particularly of the younger generation, is unmistakably Western European. In all these respects Yugoslavia is totally unlike the Warsaw Pact countries.

(ii) *Relations with the Soviet Union*

4.8 While President Tito broke with Stalinist Russia in 1948 he probably retains sentimental attachments to the country that was the first to practise communism — attachments that are unlikely to be shared by a younger generation of Yugoslavs. With the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, with its ambiguous reference to "any socialist country" and its revendication of the right to use armed force in the interests of "the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole" Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union became severely strained. The communiqué issued after the visit of Mr. Brezhnev to Belgrade on 25th September 1971 did not in retrospect clarify the situation to the satisfaction of Yugoslavia, but the authorities consider that in the communiqués issued after the subsequent visit to Belgrade by Mr. Brezhnev on 17th November 1976, and that issued after President Tito's visit to Moscow on 19th August 1977, the Soviet authorities have recognised the non-aligned status of Yugoslavia. Mr. Brezhnev on his 1976 visit to Belgrade is said to have demanded port facilities for Soviet naval forces, in particular for submarines at Kotor, a very sheltered inlet some sixty kilometres south of Dubrovnik, and unlimited overflying rights for Soviet military aircraft. Both of these requests were reportedly refused by the Yugoslav authorities.

4.9 Yugoslavia is prepared to undertake repairs to Soviet naval vessels, but only under restrictive conditions — vessels have to enter Yugoslav ports without their principal armaments and remain without most of their crews. Conscious of its non-aligned status Yugoslavia's ship law allows for similar repair facilities to be available to other countries including NATO countries and it is

possible that the United States will endeavour to take up this facility. A good deal of Yugoslav military equipment is still supplied by the Soviet Union, and some Yugoslav officers still receive training in that country.

4.10 The deliberately ambiguous Brezhnev doctrine is still however very much alive. General Yevgeni Ivanovski, commander of the group of Soviet forces in Germany, in an article in the East German newspaper *Neues Deutschland* of 20th February 1978 said: "The USSR is still prepared to intervene on a military level in Eastern Europe when it is a matter of defending socialism in this part of the world." Where does Eastern Europe end?

(iii) *Soviet overflight of Yugoslav territory*

4.11 From the Soviet main air transport base at Odessa on the Black Sea the only convenient routes to the Mediterranean involve overflight of Turkey, Greece or Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia being a communist and non-NATO country is in many cases the preferred route. It is understood that Yugoslav policy in this respect is to refuse blanket clearance for overflight, but to consider requests on an ad hoc individual basis, and to authorise them only if Yugoslavia considers the request justified by the situation, and if it is made by the country of destination as well as by the Soviet Union. Thus Yugoslavia permitted overflight of arms-carrying Czechoslovak aircraft to the Haganah in Israel at the beginning of the 1948-49 war. It authorised overflight from the Soviet Union to the Middle East in 1973. The airlift of Soviet arms to Angola in 1976 is also understood to have involved overflight of Yugoslavia. Unhappy with Soviet intervention and Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Yugoslavia is understood to have refused most Soviet requests for overflight for supplies to that country — fewer than five have been reported. As the Committee records above supplies to the country in November 1977 are understood to have overflown Turkey. It can be concluded that Yugoslavia exercises its own judgment in this very sensitive area and can at times be very resistant to Soviet requests.

(iv) *Relations with the United States*

4.12 While the United States supplied some armaments in the early 1950s after the break with the Soviet Union, relations became difficult during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Yugoslavia interpreted Dr. Kissinger's policy as too concerned to keep the world divided into two blocs. The remarks by Dr. Kissinger's principal adviser, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, to a meeting of United States ambassadors in London in late 1976, whether inaccurately reported or misinterpreted, caused some offence, the official Yugoslav paper *Borba* on 14th April 1976 describing the Sonnen-

feldt doctrine as another attempt to revive the spirit of the 1945 Yalta conference to impose relations based on spheres of influence. Negotiations with the United States at that time for the supply of armaments were broken off by Yugoslavia, partly perhaps because of the Sonnenfeldt incident and partly because it became known that supply of the Tow anti-tank missile was under discussion. The United States at that time had included \$1.5 million for cash sales in the security assistance programme from 1st October 1976. Relations with the present Democratic Administration have improved significantly. United States policy to Africa as manifested in recent representations to Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, are considered a great improvement on Dr. Kissinger's reflex support of any indigenous African movements opposed to those supported by the Soviet Union in Angola.

4.13 Mr. Harold Brown, United States Secretary of Defence, visited Belgrade on 13th October 1977 to discuss "a modest extension of military relations", in the words of a United States official. Weapons sales, training exchanges and port visits were discussed. Following President Tito's visit to Washington the official communiqué issued on 10th March 1978 said that President Carter informed him of "continuing United States support for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia". References to "unity" were particularly welcome in Belgrade.

(v) *Other aspects of foreign policy*

4.14 For its size Yugoslavia probably conducts its foreign relations more intensely than any other country, seeing its continued existence as an independent state made possible by the widest possible international recognition of its non-aligned status. It encourages foreign visitors and tourism on which its economy partly depends and has no-visa agreements with more than sixty countries. It endeavours to maintain good relations with all its neighbours. There are no problems with the two NATO countries Greece and Italy — with the latter there is a completely open frontier around Trieste with many daily Italian visitors who require only an identity card to enter Yugoslavia.

4.15 With the Warsaw Pact countries relations are closest with Romania with which there are joint arms production projects. Bulgaria, which maintains the closest links to Moscow of any Warsaw Pact country, presents Yugoslavia with some problems. Bulgaria does not recognise the significant Macedonian minority in Bulgaria as a distinct entity, and Yugoslavia interprets this non-recognition as implying renewed Bulgarian claims to territory of the Macedonian Republic of Yugoslavia which for a few brief months after liberation from the Turks in 1878 was once the territory of a greater Bulgaria. While the Soviet

Union has not overtly encouraged Bulgarian claims, Yugoslav officials are suspicious at the failure of the Soviet Union to prevent them being made — all other aspects of Bulgarian foreign policy are closely dictated by Moscow. Relations with Albania are in many ways disappointing to Yugoslavia, which might have expected closer cultural relations particularly in view of the Albanian-speaking population of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. But Albania remains a closed country, its population cannot travel abroad nor are visitors welcomed and visas are still required for travel in that country. The Stalinist régime of Mr. Hoxha in Albania has been highly critical of the present Yugoslav version of communism. However, these ideological differences do not prevent correct relations between the two countries. Although Belgrade would probably hope that there will eventually be a process of "democratisation" in Albania, but in the Yugoslav sense of that word, such a development, it is thought, will be faster without external pressure. It is Yugoslav policy to ensure the permanent independence of Albania which it believes could not remain independent were it not for Yugoslavia whose territory separates Albania from the Warsaw Pact countries. President Hoxha is on record in 1968 as saying that he would regard an attack on Yugoslavia as an attack on Albania and would not permit Albanian territory to be used for an attack on Yugoslavia.

4.16 Yugoslavia continues to be a leader of the non-aligned movement which President Tito was instrumental in establishing together with Pandit Nehru of India and President Nasser of Egypt in 1961. But co-operation with those two countries is no longer as close as when the movement was founded and Yugoslavia's closest non-aligned partners change from time to time. Cuba played an important rôle in President Castro's earlier days, but Yugoslav circles now appear sceptical to say the least of Cuban claims to non-aligned status. Within the non-aligned movement Yugoslavia is now closer to Algeria, Libya, Zambia and Nigeria, and has established closer relations than most countries with the present régime in Ethiopia. President Tito has been a voice for moderation in the affairs of that country and Somalia: "I have advised [the Ethiopians], in the spirit of the decisions of the United Nations, to grant autonomy to Eritrea, that is a federated status. Besides it should not be permitted that Ethiopia be isolated from the sea. I discussed this also with the President of Somalia, Siad Barre, when he visited our country... [he] must withdraw his troops if he wishes a lasting resolution of the conflict..."<sup>1</sup>. Yugoslavia remains unhappy with the trend of Soviet and Cuban intervention in

1. Interview with James Reston, *International Herald Tribune*, 6th March 1978.



Ethiopia which does not conform to a policy of non-alignment for Ethiopia.

4.17 As far as trade is concerned Yugoslavia is anxious to establish a proper balance with the European Community; with imports of \$3.8 billion against exports to them of \$1.4 billion, it has a deficit of \$2.4 billion — 70 to 80 % of the total trade deficit — with the EEC countries of which Yugoslavia is the eighth most important trading partner. Except for Romania with which it has agreements on mutually advantageous joint ventures, Yugoslavia is concerned, because of the political implications, with the pattern of its trade with the remaining Warsaw Pact countries involving as it does the export of consumer goods against the import of important raw materials. Yugoslavia's aim in trade relations is to establish long-term mutually-beneficial agreements on a sector-by-sector basis. It is interested in undertaking joint development projects in third world countries using Yugoslav engineers and Yugoslav political entrée as a non-aligned country, in partnership with the technological expertise of Western European countries. While Yugoslavia has no wish to apply for membership of the European Community, which it is felt would be incompatible with its non-aligned status, and which in any case would be ruled out by the Copenhagen declaration of 8th April 1978 defining the Community's philosophy as "a political system of pluralist democracy", nevertheless Yugoslavia feels it is entitled to special consideration by the Community, with long-term sector-by-sector trade agreements defining a division of labour which would provide guaranteed outlets for Yugoslav products in the Common Market.

(vi) *Yugoslav views on security*

4.18 Yugoslavia bases its security on a policy of non-alignment, and proclaims its opposition to the manifestation of two opposing military blocs dominated by the superpowers. Yugoslavia was largely instrumental in having the 1971 Resolution 2832 "Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" adopted in the United Nations General Assembly<sup>1</sup>, and maintains that a similar status for the Mediterranean should be sought.

4.19 The Yugoslav authorities nevertheless regard it as unrealistic to call for the departure, for example, of United States and Soviet naval forces from the Mediterranean in the short term. It is recognised that a true military balance is an element of stability, and Yugoslavia's most immediate preoccupation is with the incipient sources of conflict both in the Middle East and in the Greek-Turkish dispute; in both areas Yugoslavia has sought to help in finding a solu-

tion. In the Middle East it believes that there must be a joint Arab approach and a home for the Palestinians in any valid solution; President Sadat's personal peace initiative on which Yugoslavia was not consulted is viewed with some scepticism. Yugoslav endeavours to reduce tension in the Greece-Turkey dispute are felt in Yugoslavia to have had some success. In the framework of the CSCE Yugoslavia has played an active rôle and is particularly interested in the confidence-building measures included in the Helsinki final act. It has made proposals for strengthening existing CBMs, proposing in particular that the movements of naval forces should be subject to compulsory notification.

(vii) *Yugoslav defence policy*

4.20 The complement to non-alignment is self-defence, and Yugoslavia has frequently made it clear that the country is fully determined to resist by force any attempt to occupy it, from whatever direction it might come. It is felt that it is well understood in the Soviet Union that there would be no "tourist occupation" of the country as occurred in Czechoslovakia. There is certainly no wish to dramatise the situation or to speak of any threat from the Soviet Union which is now believed to have accepted the non-aligned status of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless defence arrangements are carefully publicised, and have recently been described by President Tito: "When we speak about the army, we are not thinking about the regular army only, but about all the people, which is encompassed by the system of all-people's defence, which has become law in our country and covers several millions of persons. Today we already have close to a million armed men and women, within the framework of that system, who are engaged in military exercises together with the regular army units. In a word, all the people, all the able-bodied persons, will be in the battlefield in case of need... within the framework of the all-people's defence and within our available possibilities, the people are constantly being armed... even factories have been procuring anti-aircraft guns and other weapons for possible defence, the all-people's defence will be supplied with all types of weapons, of course under the command of the regular army."<sup>1</sup>

4.21 The 1974 constitution specifically prohibits capitulation in the event of an invasion of Yugoslavia and provides that no one is authorised to sign an instrument of capitulation.

4.22 Yugoslavia spends between 5 and 6 % of its GDP on defence and its regular armed forces

1. See paragraph 2.29.

1. Interview with James Reston, *International Herald Tribune*, 6th March 1978.



total 260,000, including 193,000 in the army. There is a mixture of largely obsolescent Soviet and American tanks including the T-34 and T-54/55 and the American M-47. Aircraft include the obsolescent American F-84G and the Soviet MiG-21. There are some SA-2 and SA-3 Soviet surface-to-air missiles. The navy comprises one destroyer, five submarines (two building) and ten Soviet OSA-class missile-equipped fast patrol boats.

4.23 The organisation of people's defence is realistically undertaken. An exercise in Croatia in April 1976 was reported to have mobilised one million people. Smaller-scale exercises and regular training of factory units, etc., is regularly undertaken.

(viii) *Arms supply*

4.24 Yugoslavia claims to produce some 80 % of its own arms requirements, but these are essentially in the less sophisticated areas. The country is particularly interested in diversifying its sources of supply. A strike aircraft is being developed jointly with Romania, using British aircraft engines, and there are plans to construct a second-generation aircraft in Yugoslavia.

4.25 Yugoslavia is very much in the market for the procurement of the most sophisticated equipment from western countries, but its military authorities are particularly sensitive about any publicity being given to particular projects. It is not of course normally possible for a western country to supply armaments to a third country without details becoming known, at least once manufacture has commenced. The level of sophistication sought by the Yugoslav authorities undoubtedly poses certain security problems to western countries. The consultative co-ordinating committee (COCOM) exists to harmonise the views of NATO countries and Japan on security criteria when exports to Warsaw Pact countries or China are under consideration; it has recently relaxed its strategic criteria in favour of China in order to reflect current political and economic realities. There is certainly a case for harmonising attitudes of the Alliance countries for supplies to countries such as Yugoslavia as well. But the vital importance of ensuring alternative sources of military equipment and military training for Yugoslavia must be the over-riding consideration in this connection.

(ix) *The future of Yugoslavia*

4.26 Qualified observers believe that the unity of the country is now better assured than at times in the past. The younger generation, or certainly the urban younger generation, identifies with Yugoslavia as a country, and the two main themes of Yugoslav policy — self-management at home and non-alignment abroad — have wide

support among the population that will ensure continuity after a succession to the presidency (constitutional provisions for which are described in paragraph 4.4). In terms of popular culture and trends of consumer goods the country can be said to be western-oriented and this tendency is unlikely to be less marked in the future. Indeed any temptation for the Soviet Union to seek to interfere in the internal policy of the country might arise not from a desire to influence the succession, but at a later stage if the present trends of internal Yugoslav economic policy were to prove too attractive to neighbouring Warsaw Pact countries.

4.27 The continued non-aligned status, independence and unity of the country is vital to the West. For that reason a strategic factor must be taken into consideration in trade relations, especially as far as negotiations with the European Community are concerned, to ensure that Yugoslavia has always the genuine option of substantial balanced trade with the West. The leadership of the country believes that its non-aligned status is accepted by the Soviet Union as well as by the world at large, and would not welcome provocative military contingency plans from any side. The Committee calls for an unequivocal statement of western concern for the continued non-alignment, independence and unity of the country as the best means of securing the interests both of Yugoslavia and the western alliance.

4.28 If at any time present expectations of Soviet policy should not be fulfilled, at any signs of Warsaw Pact military concentrations on Yugoslav frontiers such as occurred on the Czechoslovak frontiers in 1968, the NATO crisis management machinery would necessarily come into play. Reference has been made in paragraphs 3.14, 3.15 and 3.75 above to various NATO reinforcement capabilities in the area of North-East Italy — this capability could readily be deployed for example in Italian territory in the area of Trieste.

(b) *Albania*

4.29 Under Mr. Enver Hoxha, a French-educated man of bourgeois origins, Albania is the most Stalinist of any communist country and the most closed to outside influence. As recently as 1973 and 1974 there were drastic purges of the Politburo and Defence Ministry to remove possible rivals to the leadership. With Mr. Hoxha's continued and outspoken criticism of "revisionism" in the Soviet Union there is little likelihood of any rapprochement in that direction, even now that the change of régime in China has reduced to a trickle the assistance Albania previously received from its only friend abroad. Mr. Hoxha is 68 and again a succession must seem in prospect, but in Albania there is no

provision to ensure it. If relations with Yugoslavia have been described as disappointing but correct (despite Albanian criticism of the status of the Albanian-speaking minority in the Macedonian Republic of Yugoslavia), there has recently been some improvement in Greek-Albanian relations, with the opening of a new air route from Athens to Tirana — the only scheduled service to any western capital other than Belgrade. The Greek Trade Minister in March signed an agreement for some \$30 million trade in 1978. The Albanian declaration of support for Yugoslav independence has been noted above.

4.30 Albania may now be forced to seek better relations with western countries, but is inhibited from doing so because of the danger of wider contacts with the West for its population which can only give rise to dissatisfaction with present internal conditions. The past policies of Albania seem to indicate little danger of any restoration of port facilities for Soviet submarines in Valona which were available in the 1950s.

#### (c) *The Middle East*

4.31 The Middle East is not discussed in this report in any detail. The 1973 conflict has been examined in previous reports. The Committee stresses the danger of any renewed hostilities spreading beyond the immediate area of the countries directly involved, and endangering the security of the Alliance as a whole. If attainable, a lasting settlement acceptable to the principal parties concerned is obviously in the interests of those parties; it would also be the greatest single contribution that could be made at the present time to security in the Mediterranean. Diplomatic means only are available to the member countries here.

4.32 The Committee notes the implicit approval by a vote of 55 to 44 in the United States Senate on 15th May of President Carter's proposal to supply 60 F-15 tactical fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia and 50 F-5Es to Egypt at the same time as supplying 15 F-15s and 75 F-16s to Israel. It has been noted in paragraph 2.9 above that European allied countries have supplied certain armaments to the less moderate Arab countries Syria and Iraq. Clearly in this region the supply of armaments by allied countries raises issues of policy affecting military balance as well as that of technological security mentioned in paragraph 4.25.

#### (d) *The Maghreb*

4.33 Libya and the Maghreb countries are not discussed in the present report<sup>1</sup> beyond a reference to the build-up of the Libyan air force in

paragraph 2.15. Despite permanent speculation, particularly in the case of Libya, there are no Soviet military bases in this area. Morocco, as mentioned in paragraph 3.91, provided communications facilities for the United States.

### V. *Conclusions*

5.1 The Committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation (the following paragraph numbers refer to those of the draft recommendation):

#### *Preamble*

(i) The Committee makes the general but vital point that security will always be a condition of the way of life of the western democracies, and that the price of security is an adequate defence effort.

(ii) The situation concerning Soviet military bases in the Mediterranean is reported in this explanatory memorandum in paragraphs 2.17 to 2.25; Soviet military intervention in Africa in paragraphs 2.30 to 2.39; the Brezhnev doctrine and its recent reiteration in paragraphs 4.8 and 4.10.

(iii) and (iv) The Committee is acutely aware of the dangers of local conflicts spreading and involving countries external to the area of the original conflict. The Middle East is not discussed in any detail in the present report but clearly remains the most unstable area in the Mediterranean at the present time and a lasting settlement, acceptable to all the countries directly involved, must accordingly be a priority objective of allied diplomacy — in the interests both of the local populations and of the security of the Alliance. The Greek-Turkish differences, the Cyprus problem, and their impact on the Alliance are described in paragraphs 3.20 to 3.63. The importance of ensuring the future independence and non-alignment of Yugoslavia is discussed in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.30; the question of Soviet bases in paragraphs 2.17 to 2.25.

(v) The NATO structure in the Mediterranean area is described in paragraphs 3.60 *et seq.*, the participation of member countries under the corresponding heading from paragraphs 3.20 to 3.81. The Committee welcomes the present extent of French participation; a majority regrets however that France is still absent from the integrated command structure (paragraphs 3.76 to 3.78).

(vi) The Committee stresses the need for full and equal Greek and Turkish participation in NATO (paragraphs 3.20 to 3.53).

(vii) The position of Spain is referred to in paragraphs 3.89 to 3.91, and the advantages of

1. See the previous report, Document 708.

Spanish accession to NATO have been explored in earlier reports<sup>1</sup>.

(viii) The problems of arms supply to Yugoslavia for instance are mentioned in paragraphs 4.24 and 4.25. There are many conflicting interests to be considered where exports of armaments by allied countries to third countries are concerned. There are strategic interests in making armaments available from a western source rather than the Soviet Union, but a danger that technological secrecy may be breached if the latest weapons are supplied. There is the problem of regional military balance — particularly in the Middle East (paragraphs 4.32 and 2.9) where both Israel and many Arab countries receive armaments from western sources. There is a danger that the interests of the Alliance as a whole may be overlooked in the straight commercial competition between western countries seeking export orders in those countries that can afford to pay for their armaments. The Committee recommends that all aspects of arms exports be reviewed in the North Atlantic Council and in the co-ordinating committee referred to in paragraph 4.25.

*Operative text of the draft recommendation*

The continuing need for NATO is stressed in paragraphs 3.1 *et seq.*

(b) The NATO structure in the Mediterranean and the extent of participation in joint operations and exercises, is described in paragraph 3.2 *et seq.* and under the country which is a political danger in the context of collective defence in the Mediterranean appearing in paragraph 3.3. The bilateral United States-Soviet relations in the eyes of the Committee calls for the need to have as many NATO member States as possible in the arrangements for participation in the NATO Force and the visits by the North Atlantic Council or

*et seq.* and 3.79 to the elimination of the embargo on Turkey, which is detrimental to the Mediterranean, and disastrous to the Alliance.

1. (e) Turkey is anxious to establish on its territory a defence industry using its own defence technology; the Committee believes that the development of such projects in the future could reduce the unfortunate dependence of the present dependence on the United States as a single source (paragraphs 3.34 to 3.40).

2. The problems of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus are discussed in paragraphs 3.45 and 3.54 *et seq.* respectively.

3. The position of Spain is discussed in paragraphs 3.89 to 3.95.

4. The situation concerning Soviet bases in the Mediterranean is reported in paragraphs 2.17 to 2.25.

5. The importance of the future independence and non-aligned status of Yugoslavia is discussed in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.30.

6. The policy aspects of arms exports is referred to above in these conclusions in the reference to paragraph (viii) of the preamble.

**VI. Opinion of the minority**

6.1 The report as a whole was adopted by 14 votes to 2 with 0 abstentions. Two members of the Committee would have deleted the expression of regret at the continued absence of France from the integrated command structure of NATO in paragraph 3.78 of the explanatory memorandum. In the draft recommendation two members would have deleted the reference to the Soviet Union in paragraph (ii) of the preamble; two members objected to the word "principle" in paragraph (v); three members would have deleted paragraph (vii) and two would have deleted therein the word "greatly". In the operative text one member would have replaced the words "in the Mediterranean" with the words "of the Mediterranean countries" in paragraph 1 (c) and had objections to paragraphs 1 (d) and 1 (e); three members would have deleted paragraph 3; in paragraph 4 one member would have replaced the words "the Soviet armed forces" with the words "foreign armed forces" and two would have deleted at the beginning the words "with respect to sovereignty". One member objected to the end of the report as a whole as favouring disarmament more than disarmament.



FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency) current prices					Defence expenditure (US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GDP in purchasers' values (US \$ million) <i>a</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values <i>a</i>					Defence expenditure per head <i>a</i> (US \$)					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 <i>f</i>	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 <i>f</i>	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 <i>e</i>	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 <i>e</i>	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 <i>ef</i>	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 <i>ef</i>	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 <i>f</i>
(0)	(1)	(— 5)	(— 4)	(— 3)	(— 2)	(— 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium .....	Million Frs.	48,941	57,395	69,936	81,055	91,350	1,258	1,474	1,902	2,100	2,549	45,604	53,409	62,250	65,909	77,863	9,742	9,772	9,801	9,818	9,847	2.8	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.3	129	151	194	214	259	3.37	3.54	3.86	4.25	4.64
France .....	Million Frs.	42,284	47,878	55,873	63,899	71,830	9,466	9,944	13,035	13,869	14,619	249,438	264,158	335,294	346,757	379,581	52,120	52,460	52,700	52,890	53,120	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	182	190	247	253	275	25.35	23.87	26.43	27.08	26.59
Federal Republic of Germany .....	Million DM	31,908	35,644	37,589	38,922	40,890	11,928	13,775	15,267	15,457	17,612	343,402	381,499	418,032	445,473	513,912	59,922	60,020	59,825	59,564	59,455	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.4	199	230	255	260	296	31.95	33.06	30.95	31.31	32.04
Italy .....	Million Lire	2,392	2,852	3,104	3,608	4,199	4,106	4,391	4,756	4,335	4,759	141,616	155,355	174,957	170,768	194,688	54,913	55,413	55,812	56,156	56,446	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.4	75	79	85	77	84	11.00	10.54	9.64	8.78	8.66
Luxembourg .....	Million Frs.	601	710	836	983	1,044	15	18	23	26	29	1,869	2,184	2,197	2,241	2,596	353	357	359	356	355	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.1	42	51	64	73	82	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands .....	Million Guilders	5,465	6,254	7,246	7,817	8,588	1,954	2,324	2,865	2,957	3,499	60,093	70,718	82,608	89,524	105,780	13,439	13,545	13,654	13,770	13,853	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.3	145	172	210	215	253	5.23	5.58	5.81	5.99	6.36
United Kingdom .....	Million £	3,512	4,160	5,165	6,162	6,823	8,611	9,736	11,476	11,131	11,909	176,455	191,727	229,162	220,317	243,874	56,023	56,066	56,031	55,959	55,959	4.9	5.1	5.0	5.1	4.9	154	174	205	199	213	23.06	23.37	23.26	22.54	21.66
TOTAL WEU .....							37,338	41,662	49,324	49,375	54,976	1,018,477	1,119,050	1,304,500	1,340,989	1,518,294	246,512	247,633	248,182	248,513	249,035	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	151	168	199	199	221	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada .....	Million \$	2,405	2,862	3,127	3,589	4,133	2,403	2,926	3,075	3,640	3,886	124,438	151,856	163,914	194,598	196,943	22,125	22,479	22,831	23,025	23,316	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	109	130	135	158	167	6.44	7.02	6.23	7.37	7.07
Denmark .....	Million Kr.	3,520	4,439	5,281	5,680	6,255	582	728	918	940	1,042	27,251	30,166	35,441	38,526	42,267	5,022	5,045	5,060	5,073	5,089	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.5	116	144	181	185	205	1.56	1.75	1.86	1.90	1.90
Greece .....	Million Drachmas	19,866	24,126	43,917	..	..	670	804	1,363	..	..	16,329	18,970	20,894	22,053	25,770	8,929	8,962	9,046	9,167	9,231	4.1	4.2	6.5	..	..	75	90	151	..	..	1.79	1.93	2.76	..	..
Norway .....	Million Kr.	3,505	3,938	4,771	5,333	6,076	602	713	910	977	1,141	19,191	23,566	28,274	31,304	36,126	3,961	3,985	4,007	4,027	4,044	3.1	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.2	152	179	227	243	282	1.61	1.71	1.84	1.98	2.08
Portugal .....	Million Escudos	16,736	25,108	19,898	18,845	21,094	651	985	780	624	551	10,931	13,255	14,774	15,737	16,727	8,978	9,218	9,633	9,694	9,733	6.0	7.4	5.3	4.0	3.3	73	107	81	64	57	1.74	2.36	1.58	1.26	1.00
Turkey .....	Million L.	12,192	15,831	..	..	..	870	1,140	..	..	..	21,077	29,496	35,717	41,051	46,211	38,072	39,036	40,025	41,039	41,983	4.1	3.9	..	..	..	23	29	..	..	..	2.33	2.74	..	..	..
United States .....	Million \$	78,358	85,906	90,948	91,008	104,226	78,358	85,906	90,948	91,008	104,226	1,302,135	1,406,777	1,526,457	1,702,023	1,880,906	210,410	211,901	213,559	215,142	216,817	6.0	6.1	6.0	5.4	5.5	372	405	426	423	481	209.86	206.20	184.39	189.32	189.58
TOTAL NON-WEU <i>b</i> ..							82,596	91,258	96,631	97,189	110,846	1,483,946	1,625,620	1,768,860	1,982,188	2,172,969	250,496	252,628	255,090	256,961	258,999	5.6	5.6	5.5	4.9	5.1	330	361	379	378	428	..	..	..	..	..
TOTAL NATO <i>b</i> .....							119,934	132,920	145,955	146,564	165,822	2,502,423	2,744,670	3,073,360	3,323,177	3,691,263	497,008	500,261	503,272	505,474	508,034	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.5	241	266	290	290	326	..	..	..	..	..

*Note a :* GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

Prior to 1977 tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower than the percentages of GNP previously published.

For the period 1973-77, the following rates of exchange have been applied :

Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$	Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$
<i>Belgium &amp; Luxembourg</i>	Franc			<i>Italy</i>	1,000 Lire		
— 1973		0.02571	38.90	— 1973		1.71649	0.58258
— 1974		0.02567	38.95	— 1974		1.53952	0.64955
— 1975		0.02719	36.78	— 1975		1.53183	0.65282
— 1976		0.02590	38.60	— 1976		1.20151	0.83229
— 1977		0.02790	35.84	— 1977		1.13329	0.88239
<i>Canada</i>	Canadian Dollar			<i>Netherlands</i>	Guilder		
— 1973		0.99945	1.00055	— 1973		0.35746	2.80
— 1974		1.02248	0.97802	— 1974		0.37163	2.69
— 1975		0.98313	1.01716	— 1975		0.39539	2.53
— 1976		1.01416	0.98604	— 1976		0.37822	2.64
— 1977		0.94034	1.06345	— 1977		0.40745	2.45
<i>Denmark</i>	D. Kroner			<i>Norway</i>	N. Kroner		
— 1973		0.16523	6.0522	— 1973		0.17169	5.82
— 1974		0.16408	6.0947	— 1974		0.18106	5.52
— 1975		0.17392	5.7499	— 1975		0.19073	5.24
— 1976		0.16543	6.0450	— 1976		0.18327	5.46
— 1977		0.16658	6.0082	— 1977		0.18785	5.32
<i>France</i>	Franc			<i>Portugal</i>	Escudo		
— 1973		0.22387	4.467	— 1973		0.03889	25.71
— 1974		0.20770	4.815	— 1974, 1975		0.03922	25.50
— 1975		0.23331	4.286	— 1976		0.03309	30.22
— 1976		0.20922	4.780	— 1977		0.02613	38.28
— 1977		0.20352	4.913				
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany</i>	Deutschmark			<i>Turkey</i>	T. Lira		
— 1973		0.37383	2.68	— 1973		0.07133	14.02
— 1974		0.38647	2.59	— 1974		0.07199	13.89
— 1975		0.40616	2.46	— 1975		0.06936	14.42
— 1976		0.39714	2.52	— 1976		0.06229	16.05
— 1977		0.43070	2.32	— 1977		0.05555	18.00
<i>Greece</i>	Drachma			<i>United Kingdom</i>	£		
— 1973		0.03373	29.65	— 1973		2.4520	0.408
— 1974		0.03333	30.00	— 1974		2.3401	0.427
— 1975		0.03103	32.23	— 1975		2.2219	0.450
— 1976		0.02734	36.58	— 1976		1.8062	0.554
— 1977		0.02714	36.84	— 1977		1.7455	0.573

*Note b :* Defence expenditure figures for Greece and Turkey are not available for the most recent years ; for purposes of comparison all data relating to these two countries have been therefore excluded throughout from Total non-WEU and Total NATO.

*e* = Preliminary estimate.


*f* = Forecast.

GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices.

*Source :* Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M/DPC/3(77)18.

APPENDIX II

NATO military command structure — Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area




APPENDIX III  
*Commands in the Mediterranean*



..... Original limit of 6 ATAF area

## APPENDIX IV

*Flight information regions (FIRs) in the Aegean*



19th June 1978

***Security in the Mediterranean***

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**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Druon***

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In the draft recommendation proper :

1. In paragraph 1 (*d*), leave out "and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey".
2. In paragraph 1 (*e*), leave out "in Turkey in the NATO framework" and insert "with countries bordering on the Mediterranean in a European framework".
3. In paragraph 2 (*a*), after "remaining" insert "bilateral".
4. Leave out paragraph 2 (*b*) and insert the following :  
"Ensure that no outside interference, in particular from neighbouring countries, jeopardises the resumption of the desirable negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus with a view to furthering the Cypriot state's full exercise of its independence and the unitary and harmonious coexistence of its communities."

*Signed : Druon*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 20th June 1978 (Parts 1, 2 and 4 negatived ; part 3 agreed to).

***Security in the Mediterranean***

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**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Ferretti***

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1. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the principal credible basis" and insert "an essential guarantee"; leave out "full".
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).
3. In sub-paragraph (c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect" and insert "by taking full account of".
4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "all aspects of"; leave out "NATO countries" and insert "WEU countries"; leave out "in the appropriate allied forum".

*Signed: Ferretti*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 20th June 1978 (Amendment negatived).

**20th June 1978**

***Security in the Mediterranean***

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**AMENDMENT No. 3<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Grant***

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In paragraph 1 (e) of the draft recommendation proper, before "Turkey" insert "Greece and".

*Signed: Grant*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 20th June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***Security in the Mediterranean***

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**AMENDMENT No. 4<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Périquier***

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In paragraph 1 (d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey".

*Signed : Périquier*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 20th June 1978 (Amendment negatived).

***Application of the Brussels Treaty***  
***Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**  
***submitted on behalf of the***  
***Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>***  
***by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Roper (Chairman) ; MM. de Koster, Pawelczyk (Alternate : Büchner) (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, Beauguitte, van den Bergh, Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny (Alternate : Jung), Critchley (Alternate : Grieve), Dejardin, Fosson, Grant, Handlos,

Hardy, Konen, Lemmrich (Alternate : Vohrer), Maggioni, Ménard, Nessler, Pecchioli, Rivièrre, Roberti, Schmidt Hermann, Scholten (Alternate : van Hulst), Tanghe, Whitehead.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***

***on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Congratulating the Council on the content of its replies to Assembly recommendations and recalling the procedure whereby NATO may in appropriate cases provide material for replies to recommendations ;

Noting that the annual report of the Council still makes no mention of the level of British land forces on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR although the basic figures are given in the British white paper on defence ;

Noting that the armaments control provisions of the Brussels Treaty are incompletely applied and that the usefulness of those that are applied is contested ;

Anxious to maintain and make the best use of the expert knowledge of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and of the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Indicate in future annual reports the number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. Set up a European centre for defence studies at the disposal of intergovernmental defence bodies and the Assembly ;
3. Delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments which may not be produced on German territory.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

*(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur)*

### **Introduction**

1. Broadly speaking, the twenty-third annual report of the Council, covering 1977, follows the same lines as other recent reports. Once again, the Council's own activities were relatively limited, as they have been in fact since the United Kingdom joined the European Community in 1973. Insofar as this cutback in activity merely reflects the strengthening of European cohesion in a wider framework, the Committee can but welcome the fact, provided however that the fundamental commitments of the Brussels Treaty are not jeopardised.

2. But the Committee has to note that so far the enlargement of the EEC has unfortunately not been accompanied by greater cohesion. It therefore seems particularly necessary to maintain in force the undertakings entered into by the seven signatories of the Paris Agreements, and the Assembly must continue to play its rôle of ensuring that the treaty is respected and encouraging governments to overcome their differences in order to be able to express a European will in all fields covered by the modified Brussels Treaty.

3. The present report replying to the Council's report is therefore mainly devoted to the statutory activities which the Council has retained in defence matters — control of the level of forces and armaments, Standing Armaments Committee — the others having been entrusted to NATO in accordance with Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty and the earlier decision of the Council.

4. The Committee notes that the Council's report did not reach the Assembly until the end of March and regrets that it was communicated late. The chapter numbers in the present report correspond to those in the Council's report.

### **CHAPTER I**

#### ***Relations between the Council and the Assembly***

5. The Committee finds the Council's replies to Assembly recommendations in 1977 very satisfactory. In particular, in answering Recommendation 299 the Council affirmed that "in reply to Assembly recommendations the Council will continue to take account of the work in hand in other international organisations to which the member states of WEU belong, endeavouring to ensure that whatever information is provided to the Assembly is as precise as possible". Answering

Recommendation 309, the Council again confirmed that "there could be no doubt as to the binding character of this provision [Article V of the Brussels Treaty]. In the same reply, the Council noted that "the consultations which take place within these bodies [nine-power political co-operation and the North Atlantic Council] are complete and thorough and have sufficient continuity to make it unnecessary, in present circumstances, to repeat such contacts in the more limited framework of WEU". The Committee for its part agrees with the Council about the efficiency of this division of work; at the present juncture, the Council's principal rôle is in fact to stress the validity of the commitment in Article V of the Brussels Treaty and to demonstrate its existence — which it does for example by maintaining its relations with the Assembly — so that it may immediately resume the tasks now exercised in other international organisations should one of them, for one reason or another, stop effectively dealing with the responsibilities defined in the Brussels Treaty.

6. The Committee registers its satisfaction with the Council's decision to accede to its request to organise an informal joint meeting — planned for 5th June 1978 — and a meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments — a meeting which in principle should be held in about October 1978.

7. The Committee notes that in 1977 the Council, when answering recommendations and written questions on defence matters, did not avail itself of the procedure whereby it may send NATO a text to obtain additional information when the matters concerned are actually dealt with by NATO. The Committee considers that in appropriate cases recourse should still be had to this procedure, however cumbersome, which demonstrates the application of Article IV of the Brussels Treaty which provides that in order to avoid duplication "... the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters".

### **CHAPTER II**

#### ***Activities of the Council***

8. The Committee is gratified to find the following statement in the Council's annual report:

"They [the Council] recalled that the clause in Article V providing for automatic mutual assistance made the treaty a vital element

in the security of WEU member countries. The Council continued to pay close attention to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols. They were also concerned to avoid any duplication between their activities and those in which the governments of WEU member countries participate elsewhere. In this context, they took particular account of work in the framework of political co-operation between the Nine and within the independent European programme group",

and that

"the governments of the WEU member countries co-ordinated their position closely, in the framework of nine-power political co-operation, in advance of the Belgrade meeting. They played an active part in the work of the North Atlantic Council which prepared for this meeting very thoroughly."

9. With regard to relations with Greece and Turkey, the Council's report asserts that :

"they felt it was too soon to consider the possibility of associating the Greek and Turkish Governments with the work of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee."

The Rapporteur preparing the report on security in the Mediterranean<sup>1</sup>, who has had talks with government circles in both Athens and Ankara, saw no signs of interest in these countries in being associated with WEU or its organs in any way ; the matter was not raised with the people he met.

**(a) United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe**

10. Under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the mainland of Europe, "assigned to SACEUR", a number of troops which the Council has now fixed at 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. This duty to fix the level of the British commitment is undeniably one of the most important parts of the Council's present activities.

11. In its reply to Recommendation 213<sup>2</sup>, the Council stated that the United Kingdom undertook to state in the annual report each year the current level of British forces on the continent. The Committee notes that the level duly reported at 31st December 1977 was 61,474 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. But in its reply

to Written Question 170<sup>1</sup> and Recommendation 284<sup>2</sup>, the Council recognised that "the United Kingdom's commitment (under Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty) to maintain a certain level of forces on the mainland of Europe relates not to the total level of United Kingdom forces on the mainland (which includes personnel in Berlin and Gibraltar) but only to those which are assigned to SACEUR. For the purpose of this commitment the level approved by the Council is still 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force" and that "the figure of 60,066 men on the continent of Europe is, as stated in the twenty-first annual report, the total level of ground forces manpower. It therefore includes personnel in Berlin and Gibraltar, which are not reckoned in the commitment to maintain 55,000 men 'assigned to SACEUR' ". The same remark applies to the figure of 61,474 men on 31st December 1977 reported in the twenty-third annual report.

12. The Assembly has twice recommended<sup>3</sup> that future annual reports indicate not only the total troop strengths of British land forces on the mainland but also the level of British land forces included in the definition of the commitment : "The figure of 55,000 includes not only BAOR but those United Kingdom personnel in the various allied headquarters and command organisations such as HQ NORTHAG and HQ AFCENT who may properly be reckoned as being 'assigned to SACEUR'."

13. Yet in reply to Recommendation 299 the Council stated in this connection that "in view of the security requirements of the governments concerned, however, the Council consider that such additional information would not be suitable for inclusion in future annual reports to the Assembly". The Committee notes however that the figures in question are to be found in the British white paper on defence, a public document. According to the February 1978 edition, the British garrison in Berlin totals 3,100 men, the Gibraltar garrison one battalion — probably between 500 and 700 men — i.e. a total of some 3,700 not assigned to SACEUR to be deducted from the total of 61,474, which leaves some 57,800 to be included in the framework of the definition of the commitment to maintain 55,000 men on the mainland assigned to SACEUR. The Committee renews its insistence that this figure be given correctly in the Council's annual report.

1. Put by Mr. Haase on 15th April 1976.

2. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1976 on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 700, Rapporteur Mr. Haase.

3. Recommendations 284, 15th June 1976, and 299, 21st June 1977.

1. Mr. Grant, Document 776.

2. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971 on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 558, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato.



14. The present annual report adds: "The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 31st December 1977, there were some 4,096 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units could be speedily returned from their duty stations in an emergency affecting NATO." The Committee notes that the corresponding figure for last year was 4,419.

**(b) Amendments to the list of prohibited weapons**

15. On some twelve occasions since the conclusion of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954 the Council has amended the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III which specifies the weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture on its territory. No amendments to this list have been reported by the Council during 1977, the year covered by the annual report. This question is considered hereafter (Agency for the Control of Armaments).

### CHAPTER III

#### **Agency for the Control of Armaments**

**(a) Non-application of controls**

16. Regarding the control of armaments in member states in accordance with the treaty, the present annual report shows no change in the situation. The Committee has always underlined the inadequate application of Protocols Nos. III and IV of the modified Brussels Treaty on the control of armaments. It is surprising to read in the same report of the Council that :

"The Council continued to pay close attention to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols<sup>1</sup>... The different aspects and stages of implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared on the agenda for Council meetings thirty-one times",

whereas the same report mentions fields where the Agency does not exercise these activities :

"The situation described in previous annual reports, regarding certain armaments, remained unchanged in 1977.

In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member state, to what that state calls "strategic forces".

1. Rapporteur's italics.

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place ; no quantitative controls are made since none of the member states have declared possessing such armaments."

17. The annual report subsequently adds :

"(d) As the Convention for the due process of law<sup>1</sup> has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1977, as in previous years, to take the form of 'agreed control measures'.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld."

18. The Committee has noted many cases of shortcomings in the application of controls referred to in earlier reports by the Council<sup>2</sup>, two of which are worthy of mention : the "strategic" forces not covered by the Agency's work include not only the nuclear warheads of French strategic forces but also their means of delivery — nuclear submarines, strategic missiles, Mirage IV aircraft. With regard to the control of the non-production of chemical weapons in Germany, in the absence of the guarantees provided for in the convention mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency is not authorised to take samples, essential for any control worthy of the name.

**(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments**

19. Although the attitude of governments, or of some of them, limits the Agency's scope, it is active and efficient in the fields open to it and deserves the Committee's praise. The number of inspections carried out each year by the Agency shows no reduction in its activities, as shown in the following table :

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, but ratified by only six states : Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

2. Document 700, paragraph 20 *et seq.*

Numbers and types of inspections  
carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

	Control measures at depots	Control measures at units under national command	Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)	Total quantitative control measures	Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)	Total control measures (all categories)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	77
1970	a b	a b	a b	a b	a b	a b
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	82 72
2	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	82 72
3	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	66
4	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	66
5	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	71
6	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	72
1977	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	71
						70

Note a, b : from 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style — a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971.

Sources : Figures for 1961-65 are derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1977 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213 of the Assembly, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

\* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report.

20. The Committee finds particularly interesting the lists of armaments currently being produced given in Section E : "State and problems of control in certain particular fields."

21. It may be asserted that controls are applied on the mainland in respect of aircraft and non-strategic missiles capable of carrying nuclear bombs and warheads. No controls are applied in respect of the French strategic force and the other European mainland countries have no strategic forces. The bombs and warheads, being in United States custody, are not subject to control by the Agency. The Council partly con-

firmed this situation in reply to Written Question 142, put by the Rapporteur on 27th May 1974. As stated in the annual report :

"The Agency again worked on the basic assumption, which is supported by the observations of previous years, that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured."

The previous annual report added :

"Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, control measures would have to be increased."

22. The Committee notes that the usefulness of the few controls now applied is disputed, particularly in the case of the non-production of certain conventional armaments on German territory. It is not by chance that the present annual report does not state that non-production controls are the Agency's "primary task" as was the case in earlier annual reports.

23. In the past year, there have been press reports<sup>1</sup> of the supposed production and testing in Zaïre by a West German firm of medium-range ballistic cruise-type missiles with a nuclear warhead capability. In fact, these would appear to have been cheap satellite launchers tested by the firm Orbital Transport and Rockets<sup>2</sup> which, in March 1978, announced that it had moved from Zaïre to Brazil. The German Ministry of Defence described the supposed nuclear capability of these missiles as "absurd". Again according to press articles, such activities are forbidden under the Brussels Treaty.

24. The Committee confirms the absurdity of these reports (a liquid-fuelled launcher could have no military application as a nuclear warhead carrier) and notes that under Protocol No. III of the treaty Germany's renunciation of the production of certain conventional weapons applies only to its own territory. The controls and restrictions provided for in the treaty have no application outside the territory of member states.

25. More important for Germany, because of its economic spin-off, is naval shipbuilding. According to press reports on 2nd March, it is believed that an agreement has been concluded with Iran for the supply of six class 209 submarines (990 tons on the surface ; 1,290 submerged) and some fifty other warships. But on 26th September 1973 the Council changed the list of conventional armaments not to be produced on German territory, raising from 450 to 1,800 tons the upper limit for submarines. Previously, Germany had been authorised to build up to six submarines not exceeding 1,000 tons, a quota which had then been exported, four to Greece and two to Turkey. According to the treaty, any change of this nature must be made on the recommendation of a NATO supreme commander "in accordance with the needs of the armed forces *assigned to him*"<sup>3</sup>. The Council has been unable to confirm to the Assembly that the 1973 change was made to meet the needs of German armed forces assigned to NATO or whether it was intended

rather to meet export requirements<sup>1</sup>. Whatever may be the provisions of the treaty, the Committee sees no reason why Germany should be deprived of export possibilities available to other WEU countries.

26. A greater handicap for Germany resides in the restrictions on "permanent auxiliary vessels of more than 6,000 tons displacement"<sup>2</sup> which may not be produced on German territory. According to the press (*Handelsblatt*, 24th October 1977), the German navy, in order to procure two 10,000-ton oil tankers, had to convert two former tankers rather than build new ones in German shipyards, which would have cost less. Informed of these facts, the Ministries for Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs found these restrictions most untoward and the Deputy Chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee, Mr. Buchstaller, considered that it was very unfortunate that the Federal Republic should still be subjected to the restrictions of the WEU treaty when the latter no longer corresponded to present-day realities or to the need for joint efforts in the defence field.

27. The Committee recalls that the list of conventional weapons whose production is banned on German territory may be amended by the Council by a two-thirds majority. The Committee recommends that the Council make greater use of this provision to delete "permanent auxiliary vessels of more than 6,000 tons displacement" from the list of conventional armaments which may not be produced on German territory. It is recalled that the commitment entered into by Germany not to produce atomic, biological and chemical weapons on its territory cannot be amended by the Council.

#### *European centre for defence studies*

28. In the draft recommendation submitted to the Assembly, the Committee proposes that better use be made of the considerable expert knowledge of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. While the application of the controls provided for in the treaty is necessarily being reduced, the governments might create, with the resources of the Agency, a centre for defence studies, an official centre on an intergovernmental level, to which the various intergovernmental defence bodies having at present no such resources of their own might have recourse. For instance, the independent programme group has no international secretariat and it might be to its advantage to call on a truly European body to conduct any specific studies it might need rather than use the services of a national delegation.

1. December 1977 advance press reports of an article due to appear in *Penthouse*, American monthly, March 1978.

2. The Committee was informed that Orbital Transport and Rockets was no longer a German company, that its offices were leaving Germany, and that it had no link with the Government of the Federal Republic.

3. The words in italics do not appear in the English text of the treaty.

1. See *inter alia* Written Question 139 and the reply of the Council.

2. The initial 1954 text placed no limitations on auxiliary vessels. This restriction was added by the Council on 24th May 1961 at the same time as the upper limit for certain warships was raised to 6,000 tons.

Moreover, unlike the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the WEU Assembly has no access to research facilities in the organisation outside the Office of the Clerk; from time to time its committees call on the services of outside experts. A European study centre in the framework of WEU might very usefully meet the Assembly's own needs at the same time. However, in view of the independence of the Assembly, which is a parliamentary body independent of governments, and of the diversity of member countries of intergovernmental organisations likely to call on the study centre, it should be stipulated in the centre's statutes that the political direction of any study undertaken would be the sole responsibility of the body requesting the study.

#### CHAPTER IV

##### *Standing Armaments Committee*

29. The Committee notes that the primary task of the Standing Armaments Committee at the present time is the study of armaments industries in member countries. In this connection, the SAC has prepared a draft outline which was transmitted to the Council on 25th January 1977 and approved by the Council of Ministers on 26th April 1977. The Committee is pleased to note that the mandate given to the SAC is in the process of being implemented and it wishes to be regularly informed of the progress of the study undertaken.

30. The Committee was satisfied to receive the note prepared at the request of the Council by the Head of the International Secretariat of the SAC on the division of work between the independent European programme group and the SAC on studies dealing with European co-operation in armaments matters.

31. It appears from the note that in drawing up its outline study programme the SAC took into account the setting up of the IEPG, and in particular its Panel III (economic questions and procedures) under German chairmanship and its Sub-Groups 4 (study on industrial co-operation and rationalisation of the European defence industry) and 5 (collected legislation, regulations and agreements on the export of armaments) for which the pilot countries are France and Italy respectively. In authorising this study the Council recalled that overlapping, particularly with the IEPG, was to be avoided, and with this in mind asked that the SAC be informed of the progress of work of the IEPG. The SAC therefore co-ordinated with Sub-Group 4, receiving information from the two pilot countries, Germany and France. A common definition of armaments and the industrial sector

was drawn up and for the compilation of economic data the SAC is awaiting the results of the questionnaire circulated by the IEPG. The reports of the SAC are also being sent to the Chairman of the IEPG.

32. The Council has agreed to the principle of a meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments (this will be a joint meeting between the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly and the Standing Armaments Committee) and notes that this would provide a suitable opportunity for informing the Assembly on the progress of the study of the armaments industries in member countries. The Committee trusts that it will be possible to hold this meeting in autumn 1978.

33. The study on armaments industries is at present the main activity of the SAC to which governments have hesitated to entrust projects for the joint production of armaments. The Assembly has frequently asked that better use be made of the expert knowledge acquired by this body, which must in no circumstances be left without a constructive task to accomplish. The Committee therefore suggests that, once the study on armaments industries has been completed, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee be associated with the creation of the European centre for defence studies referred to above.

##### *Conclusions*

34. The Committee's principal conclusions are set out in the draft recommendation. As far as the preamble is concerned, the Committee recalls in paragraph 7 above the procedure whereby NATO may supply information for replies to Assembly recommendations. The problem of publishing the level of forces of BAOR is mentioned in paragraph 13. The problem encountered by the application of controls is referred to in paragraphs 16 to 18.

35. Regarding paragraph 1 of the operative text, the reference to publishing the level of forces of BAOR is mentioned in paragraph 13; the proposal in paragraph 3 to establish a European centre for defence studies is mentioned in paragraphs 28 and 33 of this explanatory memorandum. Paragraphs 25 to 27 explain the proposal to relax the restrictions on Germany's production of conventional armaments.

##### *Opinion of the minority*

36. Three members of the Committee would have deleted operative paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation; one was unable to support the first paragraph of the preamble and would have replaced "Noting" by "Regretting" in the third.

***Application of the Brussels Treaty —  
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

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**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others***

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In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of the second paragraph insert “making use of the resources of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and its Standing Armaments Committee”.

*Signed : Stoffelen, van den Bergh, Urwin, Mrs. von Bothmer*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***Application of the Brussels Treaty —  
Reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

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**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Treu***

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1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the beginning of the first paragraph up to "recommendations and".
2. In the third paragraph of the preamble, leave out "and that the usefulness of those that are applied is contested".
3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 2 and insert :  
"2. Encourage the Standing Armaments Committee to pursue and develop the study it has undertaken to improve co-operation between European armaments industries and provide the Agency for the Control of Armaments with the means it needs to enable the modified Brussels Treaty to be applied in full ;".

*Signed : Treu*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 21st June 1978 (Parts 1 and 2 agreed to ; part 3 negatived);.

**Disarmament**

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in Committee by 19 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Roper (Chairman) ; MM. Bonnel, Roberti (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens (Alternate : Büchner), Baumel, Bechter, van den Bergh, Boldrini (Alternate : Antoni), Boucheny, Critchley (Alternate : Banks), Dejardin (Alternate : Lambiotte), Fosson,

*Grant, Handlos, Hardy, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, Maggioni, Ménard, Pawelczyk, Pecchioli, Péronnet (Alternate : Bozzi), Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate : Cook).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on disarmament**

The Assembly

- (i) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached \$400 billion per annum and that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to defence ;
- (ii) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament ;
- (iii) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete disarmament under effective international control ;
- (iv) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability ;
- (v) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation ;
- (vi) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations : "Armaments Year Book" and "Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition" ;
- (vii) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control measures to be concluded in the next five years, including :

- (a) a comprehensive test ban ;
- (b) a chemical weapons treaty ;
- (c) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation régime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear countries ;
- (d) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe ;
- (e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international transfer of conventional arms ;
- (f) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the CSCE final act ;
- (g) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional weapons and incendiaries ;

and, if possible concurrently with the first agreement providing for independent verification :

- (h) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible *inter alia* for publishing, on the basis of its own sources of information as well as mandatory reports by all countries, annual reports on the forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries ;

2. To make such changes to the present principal disarmament negotiating forum as will secure the participation of all nuclear weapon powers without reducing its effectiveness ;

3. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by the present special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further special disarmament session in 1981 to review progress.



## **Explanatory Memorandum**

*(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur)*

### **Introduction**

1. World military expenditure in 1978 has been estimated at \$400 billion, of which 70 % is accounted for by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and 18 % by the countries of the third world including China<sup>1</sup>. The greatest increase in expenditure over the last decade has come from the third world countries — excluding China their share of total world expenditure rose from 6 % to 14 %, whereas the expenditure of the two military blocs is estimated to have been roughly constant in real terms but to have decreased from 80 % to 70 % as a proportion of world expenditure. In 1976 total world military expenditure was estimated at \$325 billion — as much as the world spent on health and more than was spent on education. In absolute terms at constant prices world military expenditure has increased by 13 % over the last ten years and by 77 % over the last twenty years.

2. Thus the early hopes of the United Nations — Article XI of the Charter of which empowers the General Assembly to consider “the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” and to make “recommendations with regard to such principles” have not been fulfilled. Since the first meeting of the General Assembly in 1945 the level of armaments throughout the world has steadily increased and there has been no agreement on *disarmament* in the sense that none of the agreements so far concluded since the second world war (with the exception of the 1972 biological warfare convention) provides for existing levels of armaments to be reduced or for weapons to be destroyed. It is true however that in the last twenty years a number of arms control measures have been agreed which have had the effect of codifying an existing situation, and some of which may have imposed restraints on some of the signatories in the sense that they may have been inhibited from developing or deploying certain weapons systems that they might otherwise have done — four agreements are probably significant in this respect: the antarctic treaty; the partial test ban treaty; the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and the seabed treaty.

3. The history of disarmament and arms control negotiations since the second world war can be considered in two phases — the first largely fruitless up to about 1958 when negotiations were conducted in subsidiary bodies of the United Nations Security Council — the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional

Armaments, later merged into the Disarmament Commission, which had a sub-committee composed of the permanent members of the Security Council and Canada. By 1958 the membership of the United Nations had increased from the original fifty-one to over eighty, and the voting power of the non-aligned countries in the General Assembly was becoming predominant. The Disarmament Commission in that year was enlarged to include the whole membership of the United Nations and, true to Parkinson's law on committees, ceased to be an effective negotiating forum — since then it has met only twice in 1960 and in 1965.

4. In the course of 1958 a number of exchanges of letters between President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev led to a certain rapprochement between the views of the United States and the Soviet Union on approaches to disarmament which resulted in the setting up of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (five NATO and five Warsaw Pact countries). This met for three months in 1960 and, with a year's interruption caused by the U-2 incident in 1960, led on 20th September 1961 to a joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States on “agreed principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations on disarmament”. While these stated that the goal of negotiations was a programme to ensure general and complete disarmament accompanied by procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes they contained a reference to efforts to ensure early agreement on measures of disarmament — i.e. limited measures of disarmament or “collateral measures”. In December that year the General Assembly endorsed the agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to establish new negotiating machinery known as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) which met for the first time in Geneva in 1962.

5. As originally constituted, the ENDC comprised five NATO countries: Canada, France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States; five Warsaw Pact countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union; and eight non-aligned countries: Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Sweden (France however did not take up its place in the conference). The membership has been progressively enlarged over the years, still maintaining roughly the same balance between aligned and non-aligned countries, and its title was changed in 1969 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Its present membership is as follows: western-aligned countries: Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States; Warsaw Pact and Soviet-aligned

<sup>1</sup> World armaments and disarmament yearbook 1978 — Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union; non-aligned countries: Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Zaïre.

6. The CCD which meets normally in two longish sessions each year in Geneva is not strictly speaking part of the United Nations machinery, but is in fact serviced by its secretariat, and a special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General participates in its sessions. The conference operates under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union who reserve the right to determine the agenda and dates of sessions of the conference although in practice these are invariably settled through private negotiations with the other participants. The daily chairmanship of working sittings rotates among the membership. The CCD, like its predecessor the ENDC, reports on progress made each year to the General Assembly of the United Nations; they have been the forum where initial multilateral agreement has been reached on the partial test ban treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, the convention banning biological weapons, and the convention on the prohibition of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

7. Over the last eight years there have of course been important developments in strictly bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control issues, in particular in the SALT talks, but also five others: limitation of armaments in the Indian Ocean (Berne, from March 1977, latest meeting 17th February 1978); agreement on radiological weapons — i.e. employing radiation from radioactive material in the absence of a nuclear explosion — (last meeting 4th May 1978); limiting international transfers of conventional armaments (Helsinki, from December 1977, latest meeting 4th-8th May 1978); a ban on anti-satellite satellites (Helsinki, 8th June 1978), and an agreement on chemical weapons. There are also the trilateral Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States talks on a comprehensive test ban in Geneva, and the negotiations between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the MBFR talks in Vienna. Except as they affect the issues discussed at the United Nations special session, these "bloc to bloc" negotiations are not discussed in this report, nor are the broader confidence-building measures agreed in the CSCE framework which include also the European neutrals.

8. There has always been a contradiction between the need for a restricted number of countries to participate in any forum where actual negotiations on disarmament can be conducted, and the desire of all members of the

United Nations to discuss the subject — and the membership of the United Nations is now 149. There is also the often-expressed frustration of many non-aligned countries at the failure to reach any agreement at all on actual measures of disarmament as opposed to measures of arms control; moreover, since the non-proliferation treaty was concluded in 1968, in their view the agreements reached in the CCD framework have had little more than cosmetic value, meaningful negotiations on arms control have shifted to the restricted frameworks listed in the previous paragraph.

9. At the 1976 ministerial session of the non-aligned countries' groupings, held in Colombo, proposals were made by Yugoslavia for a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to be devoted specially to disarmament and the proposal was agreed to unanimously at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly in December 1976. Drawing on the experience of the 1974 and 1975 special sessions devoted to the "new international economic order" the special session is invited to agree on a declaration of principles and on a programme of action. A fifty-four-member preparatory committee has been discussing the agenda and other proposals for the special session since March 1977. While it is recognised that the special session will not be a negotiating forum for reaching an agreement on specific measures of disarmament, it is hoped by many of its principal sponsors that it will be able to re-orientate the general approach to disarmament as conducted in other fora.

10. The special session opened in New York on 23rd May and is to continue until 28th June. From 6th to 9th June your Rapporteur was able to discuss with the heads of various delegations in New York their initial impressions of the special session. The present report deals with the main proposals that have so far been presented to the special session or preparatory committee.

### ***United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament***

#### ***General arrangements***

11. It was agreed in the preparatory committee that after a general debate and a review of the present disarmament situation work will concentrate on three main areas — the adoption of a declaration on disarmament, the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament and a review of international disarmament negotiating machinery including the rôle of the United Nations itself. This report will summarise proposals already tabled in the preparatory committee, or so far presented to the special session, first by various WEU countries, and then by certain other significant countries or groups.

**Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the United Kingdom**

12. These five WEU countries, together with six other aligned countries — Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway and Turkey — tabled a draft declaration on disarmament on 13th December 1977, and with the exception of Turkey, a draft programme of action on 1st February 1978.

13. The *draft declaration* stated in its general objectives that the ultimate goal of disarmament is to ensure the survival of mankind through strengthening peace, security and stability. An integrated disarmament programme should ensure that disarmament is general and complete under effective international control and accompanied by procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security. Such disarmament would permit states to possess only those non-nuclear forces and armaments that are necessary to maintain internal order and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. A further goal would be the release of resources a significant proportion of which should go to satisfying the economic and social needs of developing countries.

14. Principles governing disarmament negotiations should ensure the active participation and support of all states, particularly nuclear weapon states and militarily significant states, and for agreements to be effective it must be apparent to states that they serve their best interests, and agreements should be reached wherever possible on a basis of consensus. Disarmament measures must be balanced to provide undiminished security at lower levels of armaments and forces and progress will depend upon agreement on effective methods of verification. Negotiations on limited measures of disarmament should not preclude negotiations on a treaty of general and complete disarmament.

15. The draft declaration proposes by way of priorities that specific multilateral disarmament measures should contribute to progress towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. While the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons is the most important challenge, partial agreements, in particular universal adherence to the non-proliferation treaty, would be a vital contribution accompanied by measures to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation<sup>1</sup> and the establishment where appropriate of nuclear-weapon-free zones. While recognising the right of all states to nuclear

energy for peaceful purposes there must be international nuclear safeguards in particular those of the International Atomic Energy Agency which as a minimum must apply to international transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology. The elimination of chemical weapons and any new weapons of mass destruction are of great importance. Lastly the declaration points out that most of the world's military expenditure is devoted to conventional military power. All states should make efforts in parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament to halt the diversion of resources to conventional weapons, the international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control and the reduction of military budgets in all countries could provide undiminished security at a lower level of armaments.

16. The *draft programme of action* tabled by the same ten countries first reaffirms that the ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament and then sets out priorities in negotiations for the next few years with proposals for concurrent studies to prepare future negotiations towards general and complete disarmament. The immediate measures proposed are the halting and reversal of the nuclear arms race especially through a second SALT between the United States and the Soviet Union to be followed by further negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons; it calls for the earliest conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions to be adhered to by all states; it calls for further measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime based essentially on the non-proliferation treaty and IAEA safeguards; it calls for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in suitable regions through agreement between all states in the region and the effective co-operation from nuclear weapon states.

17. Secondly the programme calls for appropriate assurances by nuclear weapon states to increase the confidence of non-nuclear weapon states in their own security from nuclear attack. In this connection your Rapporteur notes that the so-called "negative security assurances", whereby non-nuclear weapon countries are to be assured that nuclear weapons will not be used against them will of course require special conditions which exclude the present arrangements for ensuring the security of the allies and associates of nuclear weapon states. It is understood that this particular proposal may secure support from both the Soviet Union and the United States.

18. The third proposal dealing with other weapons of mass destruction calls for conventions to ban chemical weapons and radiological weapons and agreements to ban any new weapons of mass destruction that may be devised.

1. By "horizontal proliferation" is meant, in the disarmament negotiations, the spread of weapons systems to more countries; by "vertical proliferation" is meant the acquisition of more and improved weapons by a country already possessing a weapons system.

19. Fourthly in the field of conventional weapons there are proposals for bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements to restrict the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons ; conventions to prohibit or limit the use of certain indiscriminate conventional weapons ; and lastly agreements on a regional basis to strengthen peace and security and urgent efforts to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe. The concept of regional disarmament is particularly favoured by Belgium.

20. The programme next proposes various measures to strengthen international security and confidence to be undertaken in addition to the specific disarmament measures. These include proposals for all countries to publish detailed information about their armed forces, the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries ; to supply full information on military budgets in accordance with the standardised scheme to be prepared by the Secretary-General on the basis of a present pilot study. This would be a step towards verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure. In this connection your Rapporteur understands that the United Kingdom has volunteered to participate. It is understood that in such a pilot study of national military budgets by the United Nations Secretary-General a representative sample of other countries would have to include both underdeveloped countries and "planned economy" — i.e. communist — countries. Lastly the section proposes that confidence-building measures of the type included in the Helsinki final act should be extended to other regions possibly with broader parameters — it proposes twenty-one days' advance notice of major military movements or manoeuvres ; invitations to observers from other countries to attend manoeuvres and improved communications between governments particularly in areas of tension by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods to reduce the risk of conflict due to miscalculation.

21. Among the studies proposed to facilitate future negotiations on further disarmament measures the proposals place emphasis on the need for the United Nations peace-keeping rôle and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes to be regarded as complementary to disarmament. There should be studies of ways to limit the build-up of conventional weapons regionally taking into account the international transfer of conventional weapons and the possibility of a reciprocal limitation of the levels and types of conventional weapons ; and the establishment of a United Nations register of weapons transfers<sup>1</sup>. Your Rapporteur points out

1. It is recalled that such a register of arms transfers was maintained by the League of Nations up to the outbreak of the second world war.

that as a general rule recipient countries have been opposed to proposals for publicising or controlling in any way the international transfer of conventional weapons, but that India which has been among the opponents may now be taking a more favourable view of such proposals. Other studies would include the relationship between disarmament and development on the basis of the report of the present *ad hoc* group of governmental experts — a subject in which the Nordic countries are interested, to include the conversion of armaments industry to other purposes — and studies of all regional aspects of disarmament designed to increase confidence and stability — an aspect in which Belgium is particularly interested. Lastly studies are proposed of various technical measures to contribute to confidence building such as demilitarised or limited force zones and early-warning systems. Such systems have been tried out effectively in the Sinai since the 1973 hostilities ; the United Kingdom proposes that the technical expertise should be acquired by a United Nations body and extended to other areas of the world.

#### Belgium

22. Speaking at the special session on 2nd June, Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on regional aspects of disarmament. He said that parallel attention should be devoted to conventional weapons and to weapons of mass destruction. In the latter case, the non-proliferation régime should be strengthened by the accession to the non-proliferation treaty of countries that were not yet parties and by strengthening the IAEA safeguards. But conventional weapons represented more than four-fifths of all world military expenditure and should be given equal attention ; here agreements between the countries of a particular region on desirable levels of armaments would have the effect of limiting transfers into the region, and Belgium would support consultations to control the transfer of weapons in the world. He also proposed a balanced and verifiable reduction in military budgets.

#### Denmark — and the Nine

23. Mrs. Ostergaard, Danish Minister without Portfolio, spoke in the special session on 25th May first on behalf of the nine European Community countries, by virtue of Denmark's chairmanship. (The countries sponsoring the western proposals outlined in paragraph 12 *et seq* above include six of the Nine, but not France, Ireland or Luxembourg.) She pointed out that the Nine were particularly interested in the strengthening of security in Europe by establishing a more stable relationship at a lower level of military potential ; a principle which involved the inter-relationship between disarmament and national security including the inherent and balanced

right of states to individual and collective self defence which the Nine hoped to see included in the declaration to be agreed by the special session. For the programme of action the Nine stressed that measures to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons were of fundamental importance, while parallel action should be taken on a regional and multilateral basis to limit and reduce the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons and forces. The Nine supported an in-depth study of the relationship between disarmament and development and also suggested that confidence-building measures of the type contained in the CSCE final act, including prior notification of military manoeuvres and invitations to observers to attend them, might be applied to other regions in the world. Finally, on behalf of the Nine, she mentioned further use of modern technology including observation satellites for the international verification of disarmament agreements, although she made no direct reference to the specific French proposal.

24. Turning to machinery, she recognised the need for a negotiating body of limited size and a deliberative body open to the whole membership of the United Nations, but made no specific reference to French or other proposals in this connection. The Nine felt however that the rôle of the United Nations should be strengthened in the disarmament field and effective follow-up to the special session might take the form of a second special session to generate continuing pressure for productive negotiations.

25. Speaking on behalf of Denmark, Mrs. Ostergaard noted the connection between international efforts to reduce military expenditure and the commitment to a new international economic order, and endorsed the Nordic proposal for an in-depth study of the relationship between disarmament and development. She gave very high priority to a strategy of nuclear non-proliferation, and referring to conventional disarmament, endorsed the objective of limiting production and procurement of conventional weapons and limiting international arms transfers.

#### **United Kingdom**

26. Mr. Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, addressed the special session on 2nd June when he mentioned in particular prospects of agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty, saying that the United Kingdom was about to put forward (unspecified) new proposals in the tripartite United Kingdom-United States-Soviet Union negotiations in Geneva with the aim of achieving a ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments. Inspection under agreed rules would be necessary and an international system of seismic stations was proposed which would

enable some non-nuclear weapon countries to participate directly in the ban. Referring to strategic nuclear weapons, Mr. Callaghan welcomed clear references by the United States and the Soviet Union to their readiness to negotiate on the significant reduction of the numbers of strategic weapons systems and to constrain improvements in such systems which he saw as the objective for a third round of negotiations to follow the yet-to-be-concluded SALT II. But nuclear armouries in Europe would also have to be further restrained. He reiterated the western group's proposals for security assurances for non-nuclear states which the United Kingdom would be prepared to enter into with other nuclear powers, and would support the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones such as that established in Latin America by the Tlatelolco treaty. On the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the United Kingdom hoped that more than the present one hundred states would adhere to the non-proliferation treaty, but recognised that countries could renounce nuclear weapons in other ways, in particular by accepting the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA.

27. On MBFRs the western powers were awaiting Warsaw Pact replies to the proposals put forward by the West in April, and the NATO countries had agreed with the United Kingdom that more impetus should be given to the negotiations by proposing a meeting at the level of foreign ministers. Recognising that MBFR covered a limited area in Europe, he welcomed and called for careful consideration of the French proposal for extending the geographical scope of negotiations on military forces in Europe.

28. The United Kingdom had taken the lead in proposing that confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Helsinki — such as advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, exchanging observers at manoeuvres, and exchanging military visits — should be adopted in other regions, and modern technical means of surveillance such as those installed in the Sinai peninsula after the 1973 cease-fire could also be applied in other regions of the world. Verification of arms control agreements was seen as another confidence-building measure and the United Kingdom had accepted voluntarily international inspection of civil/nuclear facilities and would play a full part in verifying a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons convention in which case the United Kingdom would accept inspection of relevant chemical manufacturing plants in Britain. Mr. Callaghan pledged the United Kingdom to accept on its territory whatever further measures of verification, including international inspection, were needed. Turning to the conventional arms build-up, Mr. Callaghan recognised the special responsibility of countries which supplied arms and said that the

United Nations should consider ways of restricting the sale of conventional arms, possibly on a regional and multilateral basis, with the involvement on an equal footing of both suppliers and recipients. On military budgets, he said that some states published defence budgets which were known to be very incomplete and urged that the system of measuring and reporting military budgets devised under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General should be tested by a representative sample of states. (In reply to a question by the Chairman, it was stated in the House of Commons on 26th May that eight states, including the United Kingdom, had so far indicated their willingness to participate in a private test of the United Nations reporting scheme. An agreed standardised United Nations system of reporting military budgets was seen as an essential prerequisite of international agreement on the balanced and verified reduction of military budgets.)

29. Mr. Callaghan commended the United States proposals for the establishment of a stand-by United Nations peace-keeping force which the United Kingdom was very ready to examine. He also mentioned negotiations to control chemical weapons and the relationship between disarmament and development.

30. Turning to disarmament machinery, Mr. Callaghan said that the negotiating rôle belonged to the CCD in Geneva but its co-chairmanship system could be reformed and France and China, it was hoped, would participate. There might be a case for adding some more members to make the CCD more representative and there should be a close relationship with the United Nations and fuller arrangements for non-members to participate in the work of the CCD. He called for a more important rôle for the United Nations Secretariat, suggesting that the Disarmament Centre should be responsible for collecting data on disarmament.

31. In conclusion, Mr. Callaghan reiterated his belief that agreement on disarmament had to be reached by consensus and proposed that there should be a further special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1981 to review action that had been taken meanwhile.

#### Germany

32. The Federal Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Schmidt, addressed the special session on 26th May. He identified four elements for a more stable peace: a policy of political, strategic and military balance; a policy of détente, conflict containment and reconciliation of interests; a capacity for effective crisis management; and lastly predictability of political and military conduct. Military balance implied parity over all in terms of security policy rather than arith-

metical identity of all kinds of armed forces, but balance could not be confined to the military sphere, it must also be sought in foreign policy and in economic and social fields. Discussing arms control proper he said the non-proliferation treaty had been valuable in limiting nuclear armaments but it must not be an obstacle to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the growing use of which required strengthened international measures to prevent misuse, especially of plutonium. Broad international consensus was required to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. As for arms limitation in Europe the aim of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna was to establish parity by means of balanced reductions to result in common collective ceilings on both sides. The joint communiqué signed after Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Bonn on 6th May<sup>1</sup> stated for the first time that approximate equality and parity were sufficient to ensure defence — a statement that was also welcomed by Mr. Callaghan in his speech.

33. Chancellor Schmidt described specific German contributions to international security, recalling, although without specific reference to the Brussels Treaty or WEU, that from 1954 Germany had renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Germany's experience of international control of the non-production of chemical weapons showed that it could be effective, without economic harm and at reasonable cost; he invited interested states to visit the Federal Republic to see how it was possible to verify adequately a ban on the production of chemical weapons, an agreement on which he considered particularly urgent. Germany was also prepared to make its institutions available for seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban. He proposed further that the confidence-building measures agreed at Helsinki should be made binding upon all states in Europe and welcomed the proposals of the French President. Measures such as the notification of military exercises, exchange visits of members of the armed forces, invitations to observers to attend military exercises could be extended to other regions of the world and regional agreements could form the basis of a future world-wide convention on confidence-building measures. But beyond the sphere of military security, mistrust between peoples had to be eliminated and Germany would contribute to a United Nations programme to foster understanding among the young generation of all nations, and would be presenting specific proposals later.

1. "The two sides consider it important that no one should seek military superiority. They proceed from the assumption that approximate equality and parity are sufficient to ensure defence. In their opinion, corresponding disarmament and arms limitation measures in the nuclear and conventional fields meeting that principle would be of great importance."

34. The Chancellor mentioned the relationship between the limitation of armaments and development and agreed with Vice-President Mondale that efforts should be made to regulate the international transfer of armaments to achieve which both suppliers and recipients must agree to exercise restraint. He called for all exporting countries to undertake to disclose their arms deliveries. In this field Germany's policy was to refuse on principle to grant aid for the export of weapons and only very exceptionally to export weapons to countries outside its own alliance. None were exported to areas of international tensions. At the same time Germany had massively increased its development aid budget.

#### Netherlands

35. On 5th April 1978 the Netherlands submitted a paper to the preparatory committee proposing specifically that in the final document of the special session all countries should be invited to give their views on the establishment of an international disarmament organisation. The paper acknowledges earlier proposals advanced both by Sweden and the Netherlands in 1973.

36. The international disarmament organisation is envisaged as the operational framework for the implementation of disarmament treaties, responsible mainly for verification but also acting as a clearing house for disarmament information and for organising review conferences provided for in disarmament treaties. The paper notes that the pending conventions — to ban chemical weapons and to ban nuclear tests in all environments — will both require their own type of inspection and verification machinery, including seismic arrays in the latter case, and that the French proposal for a United Nations observation satellite capability is also relevant to the functions that could be incorporated into an international disarmament organisation. Among data such an organisation might handle could be information on stockpile destruction, seismic data and the results of inspections. Such an organisation might be set up in the first place for the implementation of a particular disarmament treaty, its member countries being parties to that treaty, and then given more functions to assume responsibilities provided for in further disarmament treaties as they are concluded. Its membership would therefore be open-ended.

#### Italy

37. In a paper presented to the preparatory committee on 18th April 1978 Italy made proposals concerning disarmament machinery. The General Assembly would remain the forum for universal consideration of disarmament matters with prior consideration in its First Committee

but *ad hoc* committees could be set up for special issues. The rôle of the Security Council is recalled with the suggestion that it might establish a committee with regional sub-committees to control the international transfer of conventional weapons. The CCD is seen as the best forum for substantive negotiations but its rôle would be enhanced if the two absent nuclear weapon states (France and China) joined it. The following proposals for improvements are made :

- limited increase in membership to provide better geographical and political balance ;
- participation of any country interested as an observer empowered to submit written proposals and take part in their discussion ;
- plenary meetings might be open to the public.

The paper makes no recommendation about the present system of co-chairmanship by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Italian paper also proposes the establishment of a permanent international organ for verification employing technological verification methods such as sensing, sampling, recording, communicating and interpreting devices.

#### France

38. On 23rd February 1978 France submitted in the preparatory committee a paper containing outline proposals for the declaration, the programme of action and the machinery for negotiations. The proposals were elaborated in President Giscard d'Estaing's address to the General Assembly on 25th May and in four specific memoranda. The French Delegation to the special session included among its members Mr. Jules Moch who had been leader of French disarmament delegations up to 1960 when France had participated fully in multilateral negotiations including the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee which met from 1959 to 1960. In 1961 when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was established, France decided not to take up its seat on that body, and has not since then participated in the multilateral disarmament negotiations which led to the conclusion of the partial test ban and non-proliferation treaties among others.

39. In his speech to the special session President Giscard d'Estaing described disarmament as having been a failure so far ; the world was over-armed — in reality at a level of wartime rather than peace. The ultimate objective of real disarmament, general and controlled, had to be based on reality and France approached it on the basis of three fundamental concepts : every state had the legitimate right to security ; disarmament was the affair of all countries, not the monopoly of the few ; approaches to disarma-



ment must take account of special regional situations. Among concrete proposals for disarmament France introduced detailed memoranda on a world institute of disarmament research and on a United Nations observation satellite agency, and is to circulate a third on a special disarmament fund for development.

40. President Giscard d'Estaing considered the world in two separate headings — the non-nuclear regions where encouragement should be given to the conclusion of specific non-nuclear agreements such as that on the denuclearisation of Latin America (Tlatelolco treaty), and nuclear weapons powers should renounce the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against states party to nuclear-free-zone agreements. The conventional arms race should then be controlled by agreements between the countries of the region fixing armaments ceilings or successive levels for reductions. France would be ready to facilitate such agreements by adapting its policy on the sale of armaments accordingly. The rest of the world, largely the northern hemisphere, was covered by the nuclear deterrent, and controlling the nuclear arms race depended in the first instance on the two superpowers because there was considerable disproportion between their nuclear forces and that of France. If after successive reductions the disproportion changed, France in its turn would consider drawing its conclusions therefrom. But in the area covered by the nuclear deterrent the visible disproportion of conventional weapons was a hindrance to the reduction of nuclear weapons, and France was making specific proposals in a memorandum to the countries participating in the CSCE for a European disarmament conference covering the area from the Atlantic to the Urals.

41. The French memorandum on an *international observation satellite agency* observes that at present only two countries have military observation satellites which they use to gather information from any point on the surface of the earth that they determine, and which play an important rôle in verification of their bilateral arms agreements. France proposes that this method of verification should be made available to the international community as a whole. The agency would be responsible for collecting, processing and disseminating information from earth observation satellites and would participate in the verification of existing and future international disarmament and security agreements; international security organisations could also apply to the agency for its services; the agency could also act at the request of a state to investigate an alleged infringement of an international agreement by another state provided the consent of that other state was obtained. The Security Council, it is suggested, could also make use of the agency under the terms of Article 34 of the United Nations Charter which empowers it

to "investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute...". The agency would be a specialised agency of the United Nations open to all members and specialised institutions.

42. The agency's technical resources could be developed in three phases: in the first, be responsible for interpreting and disseminating data from existing nationally-owned satellites; in the second phase, the agency would have its own ground terminals for collecting data directly from nationally-owned satellites; in the third phase, the agency would own its own observation satellites as well as the ground terminals and the necessary processing capability. Three sources of finance are suggested — compulsory contributions of members; voluntary contributions including contributions in kind by way of technical services provided by states possessing observation satellites; and finally, contributions for services rendered where states apply to the agency for verification of disarmament or security agreements concluded by them. France proposes that a committee of experts be established to submit to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly (i.e. opening in September 1979) detailed proposals for the establishment of the agency.

43. It should be noted that France has recently earmarked Frs. 700 million for a military observation satellite programme to be operational by the end of 1983 or early 1984. These "*satellites probatoires d'observation terrestre*" (SPOTs) would be powered by solar panels and launched by the European Ariane launchers. It is no doubt envisaged that the satellite observation agency could draw on resources of these satellites as well as those of the superpowers.

44. The concept of a United Nations satellite observation capability in order to provide strictly independent data for the verification of international disarmament agreements was originally put forward by the WEU Assembly in Recommendation 227 adopted on 8th December 1972 on the report of the Committee<sup>1</sup> which proposed the establishment of an arms limitation verification agency under United Nations aegis — the report envisaged that such an agency might be equipped with its own technical means of external verification such as observation satellites and seismic arrays. Subsequently in Recommendation 254 adopted on 20th June 1974 on a further report of the Committee<sup>2</sup> the Assembly proposed a United Nations satellite observation capability as an adjunct to United Nations peace-keeping capability — a proposal made with particular

1. Document 587, East-West relations and defence, Rapporteur Mr. Destremau.

2. Document 637, Security and the Mediterranean, Rapporteur Mr. Jung.



reference to the need to verify positions of troops on particular dates when establishing the cease-fire line in the 1973 Middle East conflict.

45. In its memorandum on an *International Disarmament Research Institute*, France proposed the establishment of an autonomous institute similar to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The institute would be independent under an executive director appointed by the governing body which, in turn, would be composed of independent persons known for their contribution to peace and disarmament or their expertise in security matters. They would be appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Presidents of the General Assembly and of the Disarmament Committee. Research conducted by the institute while being useful for current negotiations would not necessarily be directly linked to them, subjects suggested include: military technologies; comparative analysis of different systems of verification of disarmament agreements; the concept of the right to security and its regional application. Initially the institute might employ some ten experts and would be financed through a contribution from the United Nations budget and voluntary contributions from governments, inter-governmental organisations, foundations and other private sources, provided the independence of the institute was conserved.

46. The French proposals continue with the establishment of an *international disarmament fund for development* to be devoted in the first place to the economic and social development of the poorest countries. Initially a fund of \$1 billion is proposed, through voluntary contributions — 50 % from the nuclear weapon countries in proportion to the numbers of nuclear delivery systems they possess and 50 % from wealthy and heavily-armed countries in accordance with criteria to be agreed. Contributions could be counted against the 0.7 % of GNP which has been fixed internationally as a target for industrial countries to devote to the development of the poorer countries.

47. In its memorandum to the twenty-three countries participating in the CSCE (the European countries plus the United States and Canada) proposing a *conference on disarmament in Europe*, it is understood that France proposed a conference of the CSCE countries giving priority to increasing security through confidence-building measures and the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. The negotiations would apply to the European territories of all participating countries — thus extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiations would cover major conventional air and land weapons with a high offensive capability, the forces servicing these weapons, and their logistic support when within the zone covered by the

negotiations. The definition excluded naval forces and nuclear weapons which could not be dealt with in a conference limited to European territory.

48. The conference could proceed by stages, first drawing up anti-surprise and stabilisation measures based on mutual information corresponding to the aims of the confidence-building measures agreed in the CSCE. In the second phase, when the first had made sufficient progress to increase confidence, the conference could turn to measures of limitation and actual reduction of conventional weapons and forces which would apply to all military powers attending the conference whether or not they were members of a collective defence organisation. Specifically the conference would not be an obstacle to more limited agreements with more far-reaching provisions — presumably therefore it is intended to work in parallel with the MBFR. After an exchange of views with the countries to whom the memorandum is addressed, France envisages the convening of a preparatory committee for the conference on disarmament in Europe and is prepared to make concrete proposals for its organisation, but its procedure could be based on that of the CSCE.

49. In annexes to the memorandum it is understood that France proposed the following confidence-building measures involving multilateral mutual information measures: the exchange of data on command structure and the location of forces limited to major formations; exchange of data on military budgets using a Swedish proposal as a basis — this data could be collected and disseminated by the executive secretariat of the conference. Bilateral mutual information measures based on reciprocity could be the exchange of observers for manoeuvres in accordance with the rules agreed by the CSCE; visits and calls; the exchange of military instructors and lecturers; the development of facilities accorded to military attachés including freedom of movement. Secondly, anti-surprise measures would be based on one month's advance notification of manoeuvres and movements including air and land manoeuvres involving joint operations by land, air and amphibious forces, at a level of one to two divisions, notice to cover not only the forces involved but also the major equipment as defined in the second annex. Thirty days' notification could also be given of mobilisation exercises and movements of land and air forces covering movements of one to two divisions over distances greater than 200 kilometres. Notification could be accompanied by the designation of principal points of passage, especially for the crossing of frontiers. Thirdly, stabilisation measures more constraining than the foregoing might involve a ceiling on land-air manoeuvres of, for example, 60,000 men within defined conditions of space and time; and the

establishment of air or satellite surveillance systems which could be covered by a European agreement.

50. In the second annex on the limitation and reduction of forces, it is understood that France suggested that they should apply to conventional equipment combining mobility with great fire power including medium and heavy battle tanks ; infantry armoured vehicles ; field artillery and multiple rocket launchers ; combat aircraft (fighters, fighter bombers and reconnaissance aircraft) ; armed helicopters ; and the forces associated with the foregoing equipment and their logistic support. Agreements on reduction should lead to the demobilisation of the units concerned. The verification measures necessary for such agreements could be carried out by the satellites of the international agency proposed by France, and by the system of air surveillance as well as observers for on-site inspections.

51. In its proposals for *disarmament negotiating machinery* the French paper submitted to the preparatory committee observes that the United Nations remains the natural framework for debates on disarmament, and that in the deliberating body all member states should be able to participate on a basis of equality. France proposes that the First Committee of the General Assembly (a committee of all members) should be enabled to sit as a disarmament commission<sup>1</sup> and thus constitute the universal deliberating body. There should then be a new negotiating body replacing the present CCD, which would be responsible directly to the Disarmament Commission. The new body entitled the "Disarmament Committee" would have from thirty to forty members including states with a particular interest in disarmament, the members of the Security Council and would be representative of all regions of the world. The chairman would be elected for two years from among any participating state other than the permanent members of the Security Council. Decisions of the Disarmament Committee would be taken by consensus and it would be the forum for disarmament negotiations based on recommendations from the Disarmament Commission to which it would report. Countries not members of the Disarmament Committee would be free to attend its meetings as observers.

#### United States

52. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has played a prominent rôle in the special session on disarmament. President Carter did not attend the special session in person, but

1. There is an existing United Nations body known as the Disarmament Commission which last met in 1965 (see paragraph 3).

Vice-President Mondale addressed it on 24th May when he stressed the unprecedented communist military build-up in Europe and the increased nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union which required the western allies to make moderate increases in their defence budgets. On disarmament, he forecast what he called two historic achievements : for the first time agreement could be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the combined total of delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons ; secondly, a comprehensive test ban would be produced controlling nuclear explosions by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. He proposed nine points for inclusion in the action programme to be adopted by the special session : reduction in the number of strategic weapons and increasingly stricter qualitative restrictions on their later development ; a ban on nuclear tests ; international co-operation to ensure that no further nuclear powers emerged ; a ban on weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons ; reduction in the constant rise in conventional weapons ; strengthening arms control agreements (and the United States offered to provide specialists for technological means of verification — what he called "the eyes and ears of peace" — understood to include aerial photography and early-warning devices) ; development of institutions and expertise on arms control ; the creation of a United Nations reserve force for the maintenance of peace ; the release of new resources from armaments to economic and social development. He proposed a new extraordinary session of the General Assembly in 1981 to review progress.

#### Soviet Union and its allies

53. On 7th September 1977 the Soviet Union, together with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland submitted a working paper to the preparatory committee outlining basic provisions for the programme of action. It appears to include no new ideas but lists eleven well-known disarmament topics on which, it is asserted, agreement is essential : cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament ; measures to avert the danger of nuclear war ; complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon threats ; consolidation in every possible way of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ; prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles ; prohibition of the development of new types and systems of mass destruction ; establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace ; limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons ; reduction of military budgets ; complete demilitarisation of the seabed and the ocean floor ; and regional measures for military détente and disarmament.

54. It is significant that in its comments on negotiating machinery the Soviet paper says that the existing multilateral, bilateral and regional systems are suitable but continues its support for a world disarmament conference. Some countries feel that now that China has joined the United Nations and that indeed that organisation's membership is virtually universal, a world disarmament conference holds little advantage over the present special session of the General Assembly.

#### *Fifteen non-aligned members of the CCD*

55. On 4th April 1978 the fifteen non-aligned members of the CCD submitted a working paper on organisation and procedures of the CCD which made the following succinct proposals. To strengthen the existing link with the General Assembly, all member countries of the United Nations would be free to submit proposals on any subject being negotiated in the CCD and to participate in the proceedings when those proposals were discussed. The rôle of the United Nations Secretary-General's special representative and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be enhanced; the co-chairmanship system should be replaced by a system "to be agreed upon" — the following alternative proposals being listed — chairman by monthly rotation among all members of the CCD; monthly rotation among all non-nuclear members of the CCD; a bureau of four members comprising a chairman rotating either monthly or on a sessional basis and three vice-chairmen. Two members of the bureau would be selected from states belonging to the military blocs and two from non-aligned countries.

#### *China*

56. Mr. Huang Hua, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed the special session on 29th May when he implied that China was prepared to take part in future disarmament negotiations. The speech was otherwise devoted to criticism of the two superpowers for their "colossal military potential", but more particularly of the Soviet Union: "social imperialism, a lately arrived superpower, is undertaking a threatening offensive... the Soviet Union by the scale of its uncontrolled expansion of armaments, puts the other superpower in the shade". He said that disarmament had made no progress because the two superpowers were not sincere, and he condemned the partial test ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty as having tied the hands and feet of many non-nuclear countries; the history of SALT was one of a strategic arms race. He called first for the prohibition and complete destruction of all nuclear weapons and the convening of a world summit conference for that purpose. He called for the two superpowers to take the following measures: undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or

denuclearised zones; repatriate all their armed forces and dismantle their foreign military bases; stop the nuclear and conventional arms race and begin the progressive destruction of nuclear weapons and a massive reduction of conventional weapons; undertake not to station large forces or conduct military manoeuvres in areas close to the frontiers of other countries and undertake not to attack other countries; undertake not to export arms to any country for the purpose of exercising control, provoking war, or threatening war.

57. China subsequently confirmed its commitment to participating in a disarmament negotiating forum and circulated a working paper calling for the abolition of the CCD in favour of a new negotiating body to be truly free from superpower control, composed on a fair and equitable basis.

#### *Conclusions*

58. The Committee concludes that there is a good case for trying to reach agreement in the special session on a medium-term programme of four to five years on practical proposals, designed to give impetus to realistic measures of disarmament, and possibly to modify slightly the existing negotiating machinery which at present is the CCD.

59. Unfortunately all desirable features of a negotiating (as opposed to deliberating) forum cannot be reconciled — it is significant that the Soviet Union and the United States have so far been publicly silent on or have opposed any modification to the CCD. It is possible that these countries might now be prepared to give up the co-chairmanship, and the susceptibilities of many countries, including France, would be soothed if the system were replaced, for example, by a chairmanship rotating among all members on a fairly short-term basis (one month) supported say by a four-nation balanced bureau as proposed in the non-aligned paper quoted above. Membership cannot however be much increased: with thirty participating members it is already less effective than originally when it had only eighteen. It is however important that France should take up the vacant seat that has always been reserved for it, and that China, the only other absent nuclear power, should join. Consideration might be given to permitting other countries to submit proposals to the CCD, and possibly attend sessions as observers with the right of participation when their proposals are discussed. Such a body would be much the same as the "Disarmament Committee" proposed by France and a change of title and status would be a relatively small price to pay if the participation of France and China were thereby secured. It would however be important to maintain the consensus principle as far as decision-making is concerned.

***Disarmament***

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**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Cook and others***

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At the end of paragraph 1 (e) of the draft recommendation proper, add “which recognises the special responsibility of the major arms-producing countries to exercise restraint in their sales policy”.

*Signed : Cook, Sir John Rodgers, Faulds, Schwencke, Craigen, van den Bergh, Watkinson, Lewis, Whitehead, Mrs. von Bothmer, Stoffelen, Reid*

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1. See 6th Sitting, 22nd June 1978 (Amendment withdrawn).

***Disarmament***

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**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Cook***

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At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a paragraph (viii) :

“(viii) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments,”.

*Signed : Cook*

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1. See 5th Sitting, 22nd June 1978 (Amendment agreed to).

***Disarmament***

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**AMENDMENT No. 3<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Valleix***

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1. In the draft recommendation proper, paragraph 1 (*d*), leave out "restore" and insert "safeguard"; between paragraphs 1 (*g*) and 1 (*h*), leave out "if possible".
2. In paragraph 2, leave out "without reducing its effectiveness" and insert "and of all states on an equal footing".
3. Add a new paragraph 4 as follows :  
"4. To have a European conference convened grouping all the powers interested in disarmament on the continent, *inter alia* through appropriate consultations between the member states of WEU in the Council of this organisation ;".
4. Add a new paragraph 5 as follows :  
"5. To institute in the framework of the United Nations an international development fund financed by contributions levied according to the level of armaments of the member states of the organisation".

*Signed : Valleix*

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1. See 6th Sitting, 22nd June 1978 (Part 1 withdrawn ; parts 2, 3 and 4 negatived).



