

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1979

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly Documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	Soc. Chr.
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie
VERLEYSSEN William	Soc. Chr.

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BIZET Emile	RPR (App.)
BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
DEPIETRI César	Communist
DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
FERRETTI Henri	UDF
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDP
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
PÉRIDIÉ Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
PETIT Camille	RPR
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
TALON Bernard	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. BAUMÉL Jacques	RPR
BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BOZZI Jean	RPR
COUDERC Pierre	UDF
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
DRUON Maurice	RPR
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF

MM. LAGOURGUE Pierre

LEMAIRE Marcel
LEMOINE Georges
MALVY Martin
MÉNARD Jacques
MERCIER Jean
VISSÉ René
WARGNIES Claude

UDF

ONIP
Socialist
Socialist
Ind. Rep.
Dem. Left
Communist
Communist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

Mr. AHRENS Karl	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
FLÄMIG Gerhard	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
President of the Assembly	
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
WITTMAN Fritz	CDU/CSU
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	DN
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Ind. Rep.
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
MART René	Dem.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
KRIEPS Robert	Soc. Workers
MEINTZ Carlo	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
KONINGS Martin	Labour
LAMBERTS J. H.	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA


UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Andrew FAULDS	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
Fred MULLEY	Labour
Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Robin COOK	Labour
Thomas COX	Labour
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. James HILL	Conservative
Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Mr. Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Keith STAINTON	Conservative
John WILKINSON	Conservative



I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 3rd December 1979

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 813).
5. The balance of force (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session*, Doc. 809).
6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
7. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 819).
8. Changes in the membership of Committees.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 11 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The President announced the resumption of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh Sitting on Thursday, 21st June 1979, were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of Representatives and Substitutes whose names were published in Notice No. 8.

In accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of :

- Mr. Lagneau as a Substitute of Belgium in place of Mr. Perin ;
- Mr. Caro as a Representative of France in place of Mr. Seitlinger.

4. Observers

The President welcomed to the Second Part of the Session as parliamentary observers :

- Mrs. Eide and Mr. Vattekær, members of the Norwegian Storting ;
- Mrs. Lind, member of the Danish Folketing.

5. Tributes

The President paid tribute to the late Sir James Hutchison, former President of the Assembly, and to the late Mr. Chamois, a former officer of the Assembly.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 813)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session.

Mr. Roper proposed that the Report tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on nuclear, biological and chemical protection be withdrawn from the draft Order of Business.

The proposal was agreed to.

Speakers : MM. Roper, Talon, Roper, Valleix, Roper and the President.

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session as amended.

8. The balance of force

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 809)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the amended draft Recommendation.

Speakers (point of order) : MM. Valleix, Roper, Valleix, Antoni and the President.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 336) ¹.

9. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher replied to questions put by MM. Talon, Müller, Valleix and Calamandrei.

10. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 8(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the provisional nominations to Committees made by the Presidential Committee and, in accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes proposed by national delegations :

COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Luxembourg</i> :	Mr. Meintz (vacant seat)	Mr. Glesener (vacant seat)
<i>United Kingdom</i> :	Mr. Mulley (in place of Mr. Hardy)	Mr. Hardy (in place of Mr. Whitehead)

GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

<i>Luxembourg</i> :	Mr. Thoss (vacant seat)	Mr. Mart (vacant seat)
<i>Netherlands</i> :	Mr. Voogd (in place of Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank)	Mr. Lamberts (in place of Mr. Voogd)
<i>United Kingdom</i> :		Mr. Whitehead (in place of Mr. McNamara) Mr. Kershaw (vacant seat)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS

<i>Luxembourg</i> :		Mr. Thoss (vacant seat)
<i>Netherlands</i> :		Mr. Lamberts (in place of Mr. Tummers)

COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION

<i>Luxembourg</i> :	Mr. Krieps (vacant seat)	
<i>United Kingdom</i> :	Mr. Smith (in place of Mr. Page)	Mr. Mulley (in place of Mr. Lewis)

1. See page 16.

COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Glesener (vacant seat)	Mr. Margue (vacant seat)
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Mrs. Knight (in place of Mr. Jessel)	Mr. Cox (vacant seat) Mr. Jessel (in place of Mrs. Knight) Mr. Wilkinson (in place of Mr. Onslow)

COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS

<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Glesener (vacant seat) Mr. Meintz (vacant seat)	Mr. Thoss (vacant seat)
<i>Netherlands :</i>		Mr. Lamberts (in place of Mr. Voogd)
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Mr. Hill (in place of Mr. Kershaw)	

11. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at
3 p.m.

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Roper.

The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. von Hassel Kittelmann <i>Schäuble</i> (Lagershausen) Marquardt Mende <i>Wittman</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt)	Netherlands MM. de Koster Stoffelen Tummers Voogd
France MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) Boucheny <i>Lagourgue</i> (Caro) <i>Couderc</i> (Ferretti) <i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer) Petit Talon Valleix	Italy MM. Bernini <i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini) <i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi) Calamandrei Corallo <i>Borghì</i> (Gonella) <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) Pecoraro Roberti Treu	United Kingdom Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) MM. <i>Cook</i> (Faulds) Grant Grieve <i>McGuire</i> (Hardy) Hawkins Lord Hughes MM. Kershaw Lewis Mullely Onslow Page Lord Reay MM. Roper Urwin <i>Atkinson</i> (Warren) <i>Craigien</i> (Whitehead)
Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders <i>Alber</i> (Evers) Flämig Gessner <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos)	Luxembourg MM. <i>Meintz</i> (Mart) <i>Krieps</i> (Thoss)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium Mr. Mangelschots	Federal Republic of Germany MM. Pawelczyk Reddemann Vohrer	Luxembourg Mr. Margue
France MM. Brugnon Depietri Deschamps Jager Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Pignion Schleiter Sénès	Italy MM. Arfé De Poi Fosson Maggioni Minnocci Pecchioli Sarti Segre	Netherlands MM. Cornelissen van Hulst Scholten
		United Kingdom Sir Frederic Bennett

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 336***on the balance of force***

The Assembly,

Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force ;

Believing that the overall East-West economic and military balance is favourable to the West, but that the Warsaw Pact's superiority in several fields on the central front, combined with the Soviet military doctrine of "daring thrusts" against NATO forces, can be perceived as a substantial threat by the NATO countries ;

Regretting the slow progress of the MBFR negotiations, and the failure so far to elucidate differences in the conflicting assessments of present force levels, but noting with satisfaction that there is some advance towards agreement on the concepts of parity and common collective ceilings ;

Believing that European security can be based only on an approximate balance of forces in the area, and that security will be enhanced if, once a balance is achieved, the collective ceilings on each side are lowered, and associated measures are introduced to increase confidence through improved warning and verification facilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment ;
2. To concentrate allied defence improvement plans accordingly on maintaining military capabilities required for credible deterrence ;
3. To pursue vigorously the MBFR negotiations, and encourage the mutual exchange of more detailed information, with a view to securing agreement on :
 - (i) the assessment of present force levels in the area ;
 - (ii) initial reductions designed especially to redress imbalances ;
 - (iii) the introduction of associated measures to stabilise mutual security by providing better warning and verification facilities ;
4. To examine the possibility of promoting the early start of negotiations between all states concerned with European security with a view to reducing conventional weapons and introducing confidence-building measures covering the whole European continent.

NINTH SITTING

Monday, 3rd December 1979

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>1. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee</i>, Doc. 819).</p> <p>2. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>, Doc. 821 and Amendments).</p> <p>3. Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th</p> | <p>October 1979 (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i>, Doc. 823).</p> <p>4. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation ; Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe ; Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 (<i>Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order</i>, Docs. 819, 821 and Amendments and 823).</p> |
|--|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

Speakers (point of order) : Mr. Roper, the President and Mr. Grieve.

3. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 819)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Antoni and Cavaliere.

Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

4. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 821 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Meintz, Rapporteur.

The previous question was moved by Mr. Druon under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, Document 826.

Speakers : MM. Druon and Roper.

The previous question was negatived.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Bernini, Mulley, Boucheny and Bozzi.

Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers : MM. Baumel and Jung.

Mr. Meintz, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

5. Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 823)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by MM. Valleix and Onslow, Rapporteurs.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

6. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979

(Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 819, 821 and Amendments and 823)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 819.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 337) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 821.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Mulley and others :

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "under the aegis of the industrial policy of the European Community".

Speakers : MM. Mulley, Cavaliere and Meintz.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Baumel :

2. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "endorsed" and insert "examined".

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Baumel :

3. In paragraph 2 (b), leave out "an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment" and insert "a market for defence equipment in the framework of WEU".

Speaker : Mr. Meintz.

Amendment 2 was agreed to.

Amendment 3 was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 821.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 44 votes to 6 with 0 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 338) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Order in Document 821.

The draft Order was agreed to. (This Order will be published as No. 52) ².

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 823.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 339) ³.

7. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 4th December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.

1. See page 21.

1. See page 22.

2. See page 23.

3. See page 24.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Flämig Gessner <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos) von Hassel Kittelmann <i>Schäuble</i> (Lagershausen) Marquardt Mende <i>Wittman</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt) Vohrer	Luxembourg MM. <i>Meintz</i> (Mart) Thoss
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin <i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters Tanghe van Waterschoot		Netherlands MM. Stoffelen Tummers Voogd
France		United Kingdom Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Craigien</i> (Faulds) Grant Grieve <i>Bagier</i> (Hardy) <i>Stainton</i> (Hawkins) Lord Hughes MM. Kershaw Lewis Mulley Onslow Page <i>Jessel</i> (Lord Reay) Roper <i>McGuire</i> (Urwin) Warren <i>Cook</i> (Whitehead)
MM. <i>Baumel</i> (Bizet) Boucheny <i>Lagourgue</i> (Caro) <i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer) <i>Druon</i> (Jager) <i>Jung</i> (Jeambrun) Talon Valleix	Italy MM. Bernini <i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini) <i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi) Calamandrei Corallo <i>Borghi</i> (Gonella) Minnocci <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) Pecoraro Roberti Treu	
Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer Mr. Enders		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Brugnon Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Péridier Péronnet Petit Pignon Schleiter Sénès	MM. Evers Pawelczyk Reddemann	Mr. Margue
	Italy	Netherlands
	MM. Arfé De Poi Fosson Maggioni Pecchioli Sarti Segre	MM. Cornelissen van Hulst de Koster Scholten
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Beith

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe (Doc. 821) ¹:

Ayes	44
Noes	6
Abstentions	0

Ayes :

MM. <i>Van der Elst</i> (Adriaensens)	Mr. <i>Stainton</i> (Hawkins)	MM. Page
Ahrens	Lord Hughes	Peeters
Sir Frederic Bennett	MM. <i>Jung</i> (Jeambrun)	<i>Jessel</i> (Lord Reay)
MM. <i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi)	Kershaw	Roberti
Bonnel	Kittelmann	Roper
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Schüuble</i> (Lagershausen)	<i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt)
MM. Enders	Lewis	Stoffelen
<i>Craigen</i> (Faulds)	<i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots)	Tanghe
Flämig	Marquardt	Treu
Gessner	<i>Meintz</i> (Mart)	Tummers
<i>Borghì</i> (Gonella)	Mende	Vohrer
Grant	<i>Wittman</i> (Milz)	Warren
Grieve	Minnocci	van Waterschoot
Hanin	Mulley	<i>Cook</i> (Whitehead)
<i>Bagier</i> (Hardy)	Onslow	

Noes :

MM. Boucheny
<i>Lagourgue</i> (Caro)
<i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer)
<i>Druon</i> (Jager)
Pecoraro
Valleix

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 337***on political conditions for European armaments co-operation***

The Assembly,

Noting with interest the work of the symposium on a European armaments policy held in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979 ;

Noting that in the opinion of most of the experts consulted only a pragmatic approach is likely to advance European armaments co-operation in the future ;

Convinced, however, that Europe will have to assume increasing responsibility for its own security, particularly insofar as this involves conventional weapons ;

Considering that the production of armaments brings into play a broad spectrum of unequal interests in the various member countries ;

Thanking the Council for having authorised the Head of the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to present to the Assembly his conclusions on the juridical obstacles to co-operation reached as a result of the enquiry conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee in accordance with a wish often expressed by the Assembly ;

Recalling its Recommendation 335 ;

Rejecting the assertions in paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 331 and in the corresponding paragraphs of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 330 ;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly is, as explicitly admitted by the Council, the only European assembly with defence responsibilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Use every means at its disposal to promote co-operation between its members in the production of armaments ;
2. Examine, *inter alia* on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, by what means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specific responsibilities of each institution :
 - (a) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on European supply and demand in the field of armaments ;
 - (b) a body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall financial, technical, economic and social repercussions ;
 - (c) appropriate customs legislation for transfers of armaments between Western European states ;
 - (d) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments ;
 - (e) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries ;
 - (f) legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffic in armaments ;
3. Encourage all member states to co-operate by communicating all the information needed to facilitate this work ;
4. Re-examine and explain the positions expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to Recommendations 325 and 331 and inform the Assembly of developments in the work of the IEPG as it undertook to do in its reply to Recommendation 298.

RECOMMENDATION 338***on the definition of armaments requirements
and procurement in Western Europe***

The Assembly,

Stressing the important rôle it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance ;

Considering the proceedings of the recent symposium on a European armaments policy, and in particular its Working Group I ;

Expressing its thanks to all authors of papers and Rapporteurs who contributed to its success,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To encourage, through their defence procurement policies, the restructuring of the European armaments industry through the creation of permanent international consortia in Europe leading eventually to fully European corporations for the production of the more sophisticated defence equipment ;

2. (a) To foster a policy of European preference for bi- or multilateral European defence equipment projects duly examined by the IEPG ;

(b) To foster creation of an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment so that dependence upon exports to third countries can be reduced ;

3. (a) To keep their national parliamentary defence committees fully informed about future national and allied defence equipment requirements and projects, in particular through the communication to them of the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel I of the IEPG and completed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors ;

(b) To request the Chairman of Panel I to communicate these schedules to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly.

ORDER 52***on the definition of armaments requirements
and procurement in Western Europe***

The Assembly,

Stressing the important rôle it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance ;

Recalling the provisions of its Resolution 15 ;

INSTRUCTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to invite members of the parliamentary defence committees of the IEPC countries to an annual joint meeting to discuss future national and allied defence equipment requirements and projects.

RECOMMENDATION 339***on the industrial bases of European security —
guidelines drawn from the symposium on
15th, 16th and 17th October 1979***

The Assembly,

Considering that only governments can give the necessary impetus to joint European armaments production and procurement ;

Regretting the failure in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s to agree on a joint concept for a European battle tank ;

Aware of the risk that if discussions on the future combat aircraft are too protracted, European nations might be forced, for reasons of a credible defence, to buy a ready-made American aircraft such as the Northrop F-18L ;

Considering the serious crisis in the European ship-building industries and the possible technological decline as a result ;

Welcoming the achievements of existing co-operation in the manufacture of missiles ;

Aware that in tele-informatics — telecommunications, computers, advanced components and data banks — European industry is largely being outsold by the Americans and Japanese ;

Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with defence and armaments responsibilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To promote a continuous dialogue between their commanders-in-chief, lower echelon commanders, armaments directors and industrialists in the most suitable framework, and related to the independent European programme group insofar as this is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance ;
2. To start discussions now on the battle tank of the 1990s ;
3. To bring to a successful conclusion without delay discussions on the successor, for the 1990s, to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German air force and the further development of the British Harrier ;
4. To maintain Europe's warship building capability, to agree on the production of interchangeable components and to promote containerisation ;
5. To continue European co-operation in the production of missiles and to promote specialisation by ordering several versions of the same type of missile ;
6. To promote greater standardisation of telecommunications equipment and to create a joint integrated digital system for the new command communications which are to be developed ;
7. To pursue research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems ;
8. To afford support to co-operation in their countries by maintaining existing structures, particularly in the form of permanent European consortia and, whenever possible, by setting up new ones.

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1979

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 820 and Amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to Committees proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany :

- Mr. Büchner as an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Schwencke ;
- Mr. Scheffler as a titular member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Mr. Schwencke ;
- Mr. Flämig as an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Mr. Scheffler ;
- Mr. Schulte as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Mr. Schwencke.

4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 820 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Grant and Corallo.

The Debate was adjourned.

5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Bernard-Reymond replied to questions put by MM. Jung, Boucheny, Deschamps, Valleix, Roper, Banks and van Waterschoot.

6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 820 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Müller, Deschamps, Dr. Miller, MM. Cavaliere, Jessel and Voogd.

The Debate was adjourned.

7. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Gessner <i>Lemrich</i> (Handlos) von Hassel Kittelmann <i>Schäuble</i> (Lagershausen) Marquardt Mende <i>Wittman</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt) Vohrer	Netherlands MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers Voogd
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin <i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters Tanghe van Waterschoot		
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bizet Boucheny Brugnon <i>Lagourgue</i> (Caro) Deschamps <i>Druon</i> (Jager) <i>Jung</i> (Jeambrun) Petit Valleix	MM. <i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi) Calamandrei Corallo <i>Borghini</i> (Gonella) Minnocci <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) Pecoraro Roberti Treu	Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>McGuire</i> (Faulds) Grant Grieve Hardy <i>Hill</i> (Hawkins) <i>Cox</i> (Lord Hughes) Kershaw Lewis Mullely <i>Wilkinson</i> (Onslow) Page <i>Jessel</i> (Lord Reay) Roper Urwin <i>Banks</i> (Warren) <i>Miller</i> (Whitehead)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders <i>Alber</i> (Evers) Flämig	Mr. Margue	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Pecchioli Sarti Segre
MM. Depietri Ferretti Grussenmeyer Péridier Péronnet Pignion Schleiter Sénès Talon	MM. Ahrens Pawelczyk Reddemann	
	Italy	Luxembourg
	MM. Arfé Bernini Boldrini De Poi Fosson Maggioni	MM. Mart Thoss
		Netherlands
		MM. Cornelissen van Hulst de Koster

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1979

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 (Doc. 815, Addendum and Amendment); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 814 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 815, Addendum and Amendment and 814 and Addendum).
2. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1979 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation*, Doc. 824).
3. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 820 and Amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Stoffelen, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Change in the membership of a Committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nomination to a Committee proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany :

- Mr. Kittelmann as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Mr. Reddemann.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980

(Doc. 815, Addendum and Amendment)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 814 and Addendum)

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 815, Addendum and Amendment and 814 and Addendum)

The Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft budget.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Alber :

Summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1980

Details	Initial estimate for 1980 F	Amended estimate for 1980 F
<i>Head I</i> : Expenditure for staff	5,799,000	5,799,000
<i>Head II</i> : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel	1,682,000	1,682,000
<i>Head III</i> : Expenditure on premises and equipment	367,000	339,000
<i>Head IV</i> : General administrative costs	1,358,000	1,358,000
<i>Head V</i> : Other expenditure	947,000	947,000
<i>Head VI</i> : Pensions	91,000	91,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	10,244,000	10,216,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	406,000	406,000
NET TOTAL	9,838,000	9,810,000

Speaker : Mr. Alber.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 in Document 815 and Addendum, as amended, was agreed to unanimously.

The Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 in Document 814 and Addendum was agreed to unanimously.

5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1979

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 824)

The Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Warren and Adriaensens.

Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation.

The draft Opinion was agreed to unanimously. (This Opinion will be published as No. 26) ¹.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 340) ².

6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 820 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speaker : Mr. Gessner.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers : MM. Beith, Valleix, Urwin, Wilkinson and McGuire.

Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

1. See page 32.

2. See page 33.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others :

17. After the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in violation of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace ;”.

Speakers : Mr. Cavaliere and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Dr. Miller :

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Welcoming the Camp David agreements as a major step towards overall peace ;”.

Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Dr. Miller :

2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “and militate against the underlying causes of the conflict”.

Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others :

16. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Wishing the PLO to recognise Israel’s right to the existence and security of a free and independent state and to stop its acts of terrorism, failing which it is not possible for it to take part in negotiations ;”.

Speakers : Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Urwin.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Dr. Miller :

3. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Dr. Miller :

4. Leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. Urwin and others :

11. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Welcoming" and insert "Noting".

Speakers : Mr. Urwin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amended (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Roper and others :

8. At the beginning of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add :

"Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its membership in European political co-operation among the Nine,".

Speakers : Mr. Roper and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Urwin and others :

12. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "and" in line 2 to the end of the paragraph and insert "call upon all other arms-supplying countries to impose a similar moratorium".

Speakers : Mr. Urwin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 18) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others :

18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy ;".

Speakers : Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Cavaliere.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Dr. Miller :

5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 13) was tabled by Mr. Urwin and others :

13. Leave out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"5. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ;

6. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its acceptance of an independent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders ;

7. Ask its members to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all acts of violence, which call into question the validity of any such declarations."

Speakers : Mr. Urwin, Sir Frederic Bennett, Dr. Miller, MM. Roper, Cavaliere, Corallo and Cavaliere.

The Amendment was agreed to, paragraph by paragraph.

An Amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. Corallo :

9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "valid Palestinian representatives" and insert "the PLO".

Speakers : Mr. Corallo and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Dr. Miller :

7. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "internationally".

Speaker : Dr. Miller.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others :

15. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Ask its members to urge the PLO contemporaneously and reciprocally to declare its acceptance of" and insert "Ask its members to insist that the PLO accept" ; renumber paragraph 6 as paragraph 5 ; and renumber paragraph 5 as paragraph 6.

Speakers : Mr. Cavaliere and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Dr. Miller :

6. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "contemporaneously and reciprocally" and insert "immediately".

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. Corallo :

10. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "terrorist acts of violence which call into question the validity of any such declaration" and insert "any acts of war as soon as the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 are seriously envisaged".

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 14) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett :

14. At the end of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and meanwhile call upon all countries concerned to renounce all acts of military violence."

The Amendment was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speakers (points of order) : Mr. Corallo, Dr. Miller, MM. Lewis, Roper and the President.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 341) ¹.

7. The situation in Iran

(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 829)

In accordance with Rule 43(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the Motion for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. Valleix and others.

Speakers (point of order) : MM. Roper, Urwin, Roper, the President ; Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Grieve, Valleix, Roper, Hanin and Valleix.

Urgent procedure was agreed to unanimously.

The Motion for a Recommendation was referred to the General Affairs Committee.

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Valleix.

8. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 5th December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.

1. See page 34.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. von Hassel Kittelmann <i>Schäuble</i> (Lagershausen) Marquardt Mende <i>Wittman</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt)	Netherlands MM. <i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster) <i>Konings</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers Voogd
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin <i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots) Tanghe van Waterschoot		United Kingdom Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>McGuire</i> (Faulds) Grant Grieve Hardy Hawkins Lord Hughes MM. Kershaw Lewis Mulley <i>Wilkinson</i> (Onslow) <i>Stainton</i> (Page) <i>Jessel</i> (Lord Reay) Roper Urwin Warren <i>Miller</i> (Whitehead)
France	Italy	
MM. Jager <i>Jung</i> (Jeambrun) <i>Berrier</i> (Péridier) Péronnet Valleix	MM. <i>Cavaliere</i> (Bonalumi) Corallo <i>Borghi</i> (Gonella) Minnocci <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) Pecoraro Roberti Treu	
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders <i>Alber</i> (Evers) Flämig Gessner <i>Lemmrich</i> (Handlos)	MM. Margue Thoss	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium Mr. Peeters	MM. Schleiter Sénès Talon	MM. Calamandrei De Poi Fosson Maggioni Pecchioli Sarti Segre
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Bizet Boucheny Brugnon Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Petit Pignion	MM. Ahrens Pawelczyk Reddemann Vohrer	Mr. Mart
	Italy	Netherlands
	MM. Arfé Bernini Boldrini	MM. Cornelissen van Hulst

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

OPINION 26***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for
the financial year 1979***

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

RECOMMENDATION 340
on improving the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff;

Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up to the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions;

Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations * :
 1. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible ;
 2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations ;
 3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy and in particular :
 - to review the structure of grades ;
 - to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy ;
 - to study the type and length of contracts ;
 - to co-ordinate staff rules ;
 - to review the indemnity for loss of job ;
 - to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another ;
 - to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals ;
- II. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officials of all staff vacancies so that they may take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation.

* OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA.

RECOMMENDATION 341***on the impact of the evolving situation in the
Near and Middle East on Western European security***

The Assembly,

Considering that the maintenance of peace in the Near and Middle East is essential for Western Europe's security and economic prosperity ;

Regretting that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, far from establishing internal peace, political stability and a resumption of economic activity in that country, has led to intercommunal and religious strife and created yet another difficult refugee problem ;

Considering that the upheaval in Iran in 1978, inspired by revolutionary principles, has further delayed the introduction of democracy and the restoration of national unity ;

Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in violation of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace ;

Noting that the Camp David agreements, while establishing peace between Israel and Egypt, have so far provided no solution to the main problems in the Middle East, especially the Palestine question ;

Considering that solutions which exclude participation by the Palestinian people do not offer them the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination and militate against the underlying causes of the conflict ;

Considering that the positions adopted by Jordan and expressed by His Majesty King Hussein in the United Nations on 25th September 1979 constitute a positive step towards peace ;

Deploring that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank only makes more difficult a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem ;

Welcoming the fact that the Nine have been able to speak with a single voice on Middle Eastern matters on several occasions, particularly on 25th September 1979 in the United Nations General Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its membership in European political co-operation among the Nine, ensure that consultation between its members is extended to cover matters relating to Afghanistan and Iran ;
2. Ensure that its members refrain from selling arms to Iran as long as internal strife and armed repression continue in that country and call upon all other arms-supplying countries to impose a similar moratorium ;
3. Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy ;
4. Continue to co-ordinate the positions of its members in the United Nations and call for a clarification from the Security Council of the actual implications of Resolution 242 ;
5. Ask Egypt, Israel and the United States urgently to consult with a view to reaching agreement on a mutually accepted interpretation of the implications of the Camp David agreements ;
6. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ;

7. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its acceptance of an independent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders ;
8. Ask its members to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all acts of violence, which call into question the validity of any such declarations ;
9. Use its best endeavours, if these preconditions are met, to promote a broader-based conference than Camp David including representation from all the countries directly involved in the Palestinian dispute.

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1979

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The situation in Iran (*Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 830*).
2. New weapons and defence strategy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Ques-*

tions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doc. 827 and Amendment).

3. SALT II and its implications for European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 816, Addendum and Amendment*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to Committees proposed by the Belgian Delegation :

- Mr. Lagneau as a titular member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Perin ;
- Mr. Lagneau as an alternate member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mr. Perin.

4. Change in the Orders of the Day

The President advised the Assembly that consideration of the draft Recommendation on the situation in Iran would take place when the General Affairs Committee had completed its study of the matter.

5. New weapons and defence strategy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 827 and Amendment)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr.

Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, and Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Pecchioli, Mulley, Cook, van den Bergh, Vattekar (*Observer from Norway*) and Mrs. Eide (*Observer from Norway*) ; (point of order) : MM. Grieve, Roper, Deschamps, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Lewis, Roper and Mrs. von Bothmer ; Mr. Roberti.

The Debate was adjourned.

6. The situation in Iran

(Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 830)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Grieve, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Valleix, Grieve, Lewis, Grieve and Valleix.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

A manuscript amendment was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

At the beginning of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Understanding the legitimate wish of the Iranian people to punish the Shah’s criminal activities ;”.

Speakers : MM. Boucheny, Jung and Grieve.

The Amendment was negatived.

A manuscript amendment was tabled by Mr. Calamandrei :

After the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Recognising the right of the Iranian people to advance, in full independence and democracy, along the path opened by the overthrow of the tyranny of the Shah ;”.

Speakers : MM. Calamandrei and Grieve.

The amendment was negatived.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Corallo :

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “determine” insert “political”.

Speakers : MM. Corallo and Grieve.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

Speaker : Mr. Stainton.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 46 votes

to 2 with 4 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 342) ¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote) : Mr. Pecchioli.

7. New weapons and defence strategy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 827)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : Lord Reay, MM. Boucheny and Gessner.

The Debate was adjourned.

8. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

1. See page 39.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. von Hassel	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens	Kittelmann	MM. Cornelissen
Bonnell	Marquardt	Stoffelen
Hanin	Mende	Tummers
<i>Lambiotte (Mangelschots)</i>	<i>Wittman (Milz)</i>	Voogd
<i>Van der Elst (Tanghe)</i>	Müller	
van Waterschoot	<i>Büchner (Pawelczyk)</i>	United Kingdom
	<i>Lenzer (Reddemann)</i>	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
France	Italy	Sir Frederic Bennett
MM. <i>Baumel</i> (Bizet)	MM. <i>Romano</i> (Boldrini)	MM. <i>Cook</i> (Faulds)
Boucheny	Calamandrei	Grant
Brugnon	Corallo	Grieve
Deschamps	Minnocci	Hardy
Jager	<i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini)	<i>Hill</i> (Hawkins)
<i>Jung</i> (Jeambrun)	Pecchioli	Lord Hughes
<i>Berrier</i> (Péridier)	Pecoraro	MM. Kershaw
Valleix	Roberti	Lewis
	<i>Giust</i> (Sarti)	Mulley
Federal Republic of Germany	Treu	<i>Wilkinson</i> (Onslow)
Mrs. von Bothmer	Luxembourg	Page
MM. Enders	MM. <i>Krieps</i> (Margue)	Lord Reay
<i>Spies von Büllenheim</i> (Evers)	<i>Glesener</i> (Mart)	MM. Roper
Flämig	Thoss	Urwin
Gessner		Warren
		<i>Cox</i> (Whitehead)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. Pignion	Italy
Mr. Peeters	Schleiter	MM. Arfé
	Sénès	Bernini
	Talon	Bonalumi
		De Poi
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Fosson
MM. Caro	MM. Ahrens	Gonella
Depietri	Handlos	Maggioni
Ferretti	Lagershausen	Segre
Grussenmeyer	Schmidt, Hermann	Netherlands
Péronnet	Vohrer	MM. van Hulst
Petit		de Koster
		Scholten

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on the situation in Iran (Doc. 830)¹:

Ayes	46
Noes	2
Abstentions	4

Ayes :

Mr. Adriaensens	Lord Hughes	Mr. Pecoraro
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	MM. <i>Jung</i> (Jeambrun)	Lord Reay
Sir Frederic Bennett	Kershaw	MM. Roberti
MM. <i>Baumel</i> (Bizet)	Kittelmann	Roper
Bonnel	Lewis	Stoffelen
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots)	<i>Van der Elst</i> (Tanghe)
MM. Cornelissen	<i>Krieps</i> (Margue)	Thoss
Enders	Marquardt	Treu
<i>Spies von Billesheim</i> (Evers)	Mende	Tummers
Flämig	<i>Wittman</i> (Milz)	Urwin
Gessner	Minnocci	Valleix
Grant	Mulley	Voogd
Grieve	<i>Wilkinson</i> (Onslow)	Warren
Hanin	Page	van Waterschoot
Hardy	<i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk)	<i>Cox</i> (Whitehead)
<i>Hill</i> (Hawkins)		

Noes :

MM. Boucheny
Deschamps

Abstentions :

MM. *Romano* (Boldrini)
Calamandrei
Corallo
Pecchioli

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 342***on the situation in Iran***

The Assembly,

Considering that the detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran constitutes an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the maintenance of peace ;

Expressing its deep sympathy and solidarity with the government and people of the United States in the emergency thus created ;

Considering the grave economic and strategic consequences which the events now occurring in Iran could entail for European security ;

Noting that the heads of state and government of the member states, meeting in Dublin in the framework of the European Council on 29th and 30th November, issued a statement concerning the situation in Iran,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it draw urgently to the attention of the governments of the member states the Assembly's support for the European Council's declaration ;
2. That consultations should take place either within the framework of the WEU Council or, where more appropriate, through the participation of its members in European political co-operation among the Nine to determine action on this problem.

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1979

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. New weapons and defence strategy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doc. 827 and Amendment*).
2. SALT II and its implications for European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 816, Addendum and Amendment*).
3. Arctic technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 822 and Amendments*).
4. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. New weapons and defence strategy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doc. 827 and Amendment)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : Mr. Tummers, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Pecoraro and Baumel.

Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the first draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cook :

1. In draft recommendation I, leave out subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“(a) by calling on the Soviet Union to agree to an immediate eighteen months’ moratorium on the deployment of further SS-20 missiles ;

(b) in the event of the Soviet Union agreeing to such a moratorium, by postponing for its duration the decision on procurement of the 572 medium-range weapons which NATO plans to deploy in Europe ;

(c) by seeking within that period agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons ;

(d) by deciding forthwith to investigate seriously, on the expiry of the eighteen-month moratorium and in the light of the military and political situation which will then prevail, the need to procure and station a number of medium-range nuclear weapons which NATO intends to deploy in Europe ;”.

Speaker : Mr. Cook.

A manuscript amendment to Amendment 1 was tabled by Mr. Pecchioli :

In paragraph (a) of Amendment 1, before “deployment”, add “construction and”.

In paragraph (b) of Amendment 1, line 3, after “on” insert “construction and”.

Speaker : Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers : MM. Roper, Cook, Roper and van den Bergh.

The manuscript amendment to Amendment 1 was negated.

Amendment 1 was negated.

Speakers (point of order) : MM. van den Bergh, Stoffelen, Boucheny and van den Bergh.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the first draft Recommendation.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the second draft Recommendation.

Speaker (point of order) : Sir Frederic Bennett.

In accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

4. SALT II and its implications for European security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 816, Addendum and Amendment)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Cook, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. Cook, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Resolution.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Lord McNair :

1. In the draft resolution proper, leave out "Calls upon the Senate of the United States To" and insert "Expresses the hope that the Senate of the United States Will".

Speakers : Lord McNair and Mr. Cook.

The Amendment was agreed to.

Speakers (point of order) : Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Roper and Cook.

In accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

5. Arctic technology

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 822 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur.

6. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Thorn replied to questions put by MM. Stoffelen, Konings, Roper, Lambiotte and Treu.

7. Arctic technology

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 822 and Amendments)

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Vattekar (*Observer from Norway*), Hardy and Enders.

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy :

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "for a wide-ranging programme of collaboration in Western Europe".

Speakers : MM. Hardy and Spies von Büllenheim.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy :

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "for example in the building of ice-breakers".

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Hardy :

3. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to draw up mutually-acceptable administrative and industrial guidelines for such collaboration in order".

Speakers : MM. Hardy and Spies von Büllenheim.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Hardy :

4. Leave out paragraph 2 (b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“(b) to welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources ;”.

Speakers : MM. Hardy and Spies von Büllenheim ; (point of order) : Mr. Roper ; Mr. Warren.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Hardy :

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows :

“(b) to welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources ;”.

Speaker : Mr. Spies von Büllenheim.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Warren.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 343) ¹.

8. Personal statement

Mr. Roper made a personal statement.

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Warren.

9. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 6th December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m.

1. See page 45.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Kittelmann	MM. <i>Konings</i> (Scholten)
MM. Adriaensens	Mende	Stoffelen
Hanin	Müller	Tummers
<i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots)	<i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk)	Voogd
<i>Van der Elst</i> (Tanghe)		
van Waterschoot		
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. <i>Romano</i> (Boldrini)	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
	Calamandrei	Sir Frederic Bennett
	Corallo	MM. <i>Cook</i> (Faulds)
	Minnocci	Grant
	Pecchioli	Grieve
	Pecoraro	Hardy
	Roberti	<i>Hill</i> (Hawkins)
	<i>Giust</i> (Sarti)	Lord Hughes
	Treu	MM. Kershaw
		Lewis
		Mulley
		<i>Stainton</i> (Onslow)
		<i>Smith</i> (Page)
		<i>Jessel</i> (Lord Reay)
		Roper
		Urwin
		Warren
		<i>Cox</i> (Whitehead)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
Mr. Ahrens	MM. Margue	
Mrs. von Bothmer	Mart	
MM. Enders	<i>Krieps</i> (Thoss)	
<i>Spies von Billesheim</i> (Evers)		
Flämig		
Gessner	Netherlands	
<i>Wittman</i> (Handlos)	MM. Cornelissen	
von Hassel	<i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. Périquier	Italy
MM. Bonnel	Péronnet	MM. Arfé
Peeters	Pignion	Bernini
	Schleier	Bonalumi
	Sénès	De Poi
	Talon	Fosson
		Gonella
		Maggioni
		Orsini
		Segre
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Brugnon	MM. Lagershausen	Mr. van Hulst
Caro	Marquardt	
Depietri	Milz	
Deschamps	Reddemann	
Ferretti	Schmidt, Hermann	
Grussenmeyer	Vohrer	
Jäger		
Jeambrun		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 343***on Arctic technology***

The Assembly,

Considering that the peoples of the world are justified in examining the use of the earth's natural resources with due regard for the political, technological, economic and ecological implications ;

Aware that decisions on exploration and exploitation can be taken only after solutions have been found to human and technological problems in the polar regions ;

Conscious of the sustained efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field compared to the lack of progress by the Western European countries in spite of their early start and wide experience of polar technology in the past ;

Aware that the WEU member countries have already worked with the Soviet Union and the United States in the framework of the Antarctic Treaty and on certain specified subjects, and would welcome help and assistance from these countries and closer liaison in this field of activity between the USSR, the United States and the WEU member countries ;

Considering that several European countries and industries, working in collaboration, have gained vast experience of various aspects of offshore technology ;

Considering the Antarctic Treaty to be an excellent example of an actively applied treaty for ensuring and verifying a weapons-free area and therefore of major significance for WEU member countries ;

Considering the present state of the Law of the Sea Conference and its possible conclusion in the early 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Draw the attention of member governments to the need for a wide-ranging programme of collaboration in Western Europe for the development of Arctic technology ;
2. Invite member governments :
 - (a) to ensure that Europe plays its part in developing the polar regions ;
 - (b) to welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources ;
 - (c) to make every effort to ensure that the content of the Antarctic Treaty is not changed, distorted or prematurely terminated at the Law of the Sea Conference, thus preserving an important treaty which ensures and allows verification of a weapons-free area ;
 - (d) to adopt a common position at meetings of Antarctic Treaty member states dealing with the exploration for and exploitation of mineral and fish resources.

FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 6th December 1979

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. New weapons and defence strategy ; SALT II and its implications for European security (*Votes on the draft Recommendations and amended draft Resolution*, Docs. 827 and 816).
2. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 817 and Amendments).
3. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 818).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. New weapons and defence strategy

(Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doc. 827)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the first draft Recommendation.

Speaker : Mr. Deschamps.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Session.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote on the second draft Recommendation was postponed until the next Session.

4. SALT II and its implications for European security

(Vote on the amended draft Resolution, Doc. 816)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Resolution.

Speakers : Mr. Deschamps and the President.

The amended draft Resolution was agreed to. (This Resolution will be published as No. 64) ¹.

5. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 817 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Flämig (in place of Mr. Scheffler) and Cornelissen, Rapporteurs.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Valleix.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cornelissen :

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "emphasis" add "on safeguards against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and".

Speakers : MM. Cornelissen and Valleix.

The Amendment was agreed to.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Cornelissen :

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and military".

The Amendment was withdrawn.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Cornelissen :

In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "civil and military".

1. See page 49.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speaker : Mr. Deschamps.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 344) ¹.

Speaker : Mr. Valleix.

6. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 818)

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Speakers (points of order) : Mr. Roper, the President, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper.

7. Close of the Session

The President declared the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly closed.

The Sitting was closed at 11.50 a.m.

1. See page 50.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. von Hassel Kittelmann Mende Müller	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots)		MM. Cornelissen Tummers <i>Lamberts</i> (Voogd)
France	aly	United Kingdom
MM. Brugnon Deschamps Jager Schleiter Sénès Talon Valleix	MM. De Poi <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) Pecoraro Roberti <i>Giust</i> (Sarti) Treu	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) MM. <i>Hill</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) <i>Cook</i> (Faulds) Hardy Lord Hughes MM. Kershaw Lewis Mulley <i>Smith</i> (Page) Lord Reay MM. Roper Urwin Warren <i>Cox</i> (Whitehead)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Flämig <i>Wittman</i> (Handlos)	MM. <i>Glesener</i> (Margue) Mart	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Gonella Maggioni Minnocci Pecchioli Segre
MM. Bonnel Hanin Peeters Tanghe van Waterschoot	Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Evers Gessner Lagershausen Marquardt Milz Pawelczyk Reddemann Schmidt, Hermann Vohrer	Luxembourg
France	Italy	Mr. Thoss
MM. Bizet Boucheny Caro Depietri Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Petit Pignion	MM. Arfé Bernini Boldrini Bonalumi Calamandrei Corallo Fosson	Netherlands
		MM. van Hulst de Koster Scholten Stoffelen
		United Kingdom
		MM. Grant Grieve Hawkins Onslow

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RESOLUTION 64***on SALT II and its implications for European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Conscious of its authority under the Brussels Treaty as the only European parliamentary assembly with statutory responsibility in matters of defence ;
- (ii) Having considered the SALT II texts, and the accompanying agreed statements and common understandings, and the evidence given by the United States Administration to the Senate committees ;
- (iii) Noting that the agreements cannot affect the British and French nuclear forces, both of which make a meaningful contribution to the allied nuclear deterrent, and that the agreements impose no restrictions on mutual assistance in the production of nuclear weapons between the United States and its allies ;
- (iv) Regretting that it has not proved possible in the framework of SALT II to agree on significant mutual reductions of strategic offensive arms of all types ;
- (v) Believing however that the broad parity in all categories of strategic offensive arms which SALT II seeks to bring about will increase the stability of mutual deterrence and cannot provide any unilateral advantage for the Soviet Union ;
- (vi) Concluding therefore that the SALT II agreements should enhance the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance and will not in any way diminish the credibility of the United States strategic deterrent ;
- (vii) Reserving for further consideration in a future report its position on SALT III,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the President and all members of the United States Senate ;

EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Will approve the ratification without amendment of the treaty on the limitation of offensive arms signed in Vienna on 18th June 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 344***on Brazilian-European collaborative ventures
and the consequences for Europe***

The Assembly,

Considering the wishes expressed by the Brazilian Senate and Government officials to strengthen scientific and technological co-operation between Brazil and the countries of Western Europe ;

Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology can but be beneficial for both Brazil and the countries of Western Europe and will help to advance their political and economic positions ;

Aware that in recent years Brazil has advanced more quickly than some Western European countries in finding alternative energy resources ;

Impressed by the progress of technical development plans in Brazil concerning meteorology and communications ;

Conscious of the mutual advantages of collaboration between Brazil and Western Europe in :

- (a) nuclear research and development ;
- (b) alternative energy resources ;
- (c) space research and development ;
- (d) aircraft development,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To improve European co-ordination in respect of existing nuclear research and development programmes in Brazil, with special emphasis on safeguards against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and on security and safety problems ;
2. To co-operate with the Brazilian Government on alternative energy resources ;
3. To instruct the European Space Agency to develop closer relations with Brazil with a view to concluding a co-operation agreement with particular regard to the joint use of launch and tracking facilities and the development of remote sensing and direct television satellites ;
4. To encourage industrial collaboration with Brazil in developing its next generation of aircraft ;
5. To increase exchanges of experts with Brazil in the field of research and the application of technology.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 3rd December 1979

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Examination of Credentials.
4. Observers.
5. Tributes.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 813).
Speakers : The President, Mr. Roper, Mr. Talon, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, the President.
8. The balance of force (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 809*).
Speakers (point of order) : The President, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Antoni, the President.
9. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Speakers : The President, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*).
Replies by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher to questions put by : Mr. Talon, Mr. Müller, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Calamandrei.
10. Changes in the membership of Committees.
11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.
Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Roper.

The Sitting was opened at 11 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

I declare resumed the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 21st June 1979, at the conclusion of the Seventh Sitting.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day now provide for the examination of credentials of the new Representatives and Substitutes whose names were published in Notice No. 8.

The credentials of all but Mr. Lagneau, a Belgian Substitute, and Mr. Caro, a French Representative, were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or its Standing Committee on 3rd October and 22nd November 1979. These credentials were attested, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of our Assembly, by a statement of ratification communicated to me by the President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

In the case of Mr. Lagneau and Mr. Caro it falls to our Assembly to ratify their credentials in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure.

Their credentials have not been contested and have been certified in the usual form.

If the Assembly is unanimous, these credentials can be ratified without prior examination by the Credentials Committee.

Is there any opposition to the ratification of these credentials ?...

Their credentials are agreed to, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Consequently, Mr. Lagneau, as a Substitute of Belgium, and Mr. Caro, as a Representative of France, are authorised to take their places in the Assembly of Western European Union.

I offer our new colleagues a warm welcome.

1. See page 15.

4. Observers

The PRESIDENT. — I also extend a very warm welcome to the parliamentary observers who are doing us the honour of participating in our discussions — Mr. Vattekar and Mrs. Eide, members of the Norwegian Storting; and Mrs. Lind, member of the Danish Folketing and formerly Minister of Justice.

Welcome to the Assembly.

5. Tributes

The PRESIDENT. — It was with great regret that we learned of the death at 85 years of age of Sir James Hutchison, a former President of our Assembly. (*The Representatives rose*) Sir James was only the second of our Presidents, serving as such from 1957 to 1959. As the Assembly will appreciate, these were formative years for us, and Sir James's presidency was an important factor in the development and growing influence of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The President of any parliamentary assembly has to be firm but fair; he has to see that the rules are implemented but in such a way that they are not burdensome; he has to ensure that business is carried through but without abusing the rights of minorities. Sir James exemplified these qualities, and the Assembly prospered under his efficient leadership. Although we must remember Sir James Hutchison for his presidency, we should not overlook his chairmanship of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. This Committee is, of course, central to our work and Sir James was a valued Chairman.

His work in our Assembly, devoted as it was to the defence of a free and united Europe, is one of a piece with his distinguished war service in two world wars. He worked closely with the French resistance forces in the second world war and received a Croix de Guerre for his wartime exploits. He was also made a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour.

We mourn a very distinguished European and, on behalf of the Assembly, I wish to convey our sympathy to his family and also to our British colleagues.

It is with regret that I have also to inform the Assembly of the death last September of one of our colleagues, Mr. Henri Chamois. Since the Assembly was created, he had been in charge of the French sittings office. An extremely cultured man, he was fully acquainted with procedural matters and devoted to duty, and played a very effective rôle in the organisation and conduct of our sessions.

In matters of procedure, the Presidential Committee paid the closest attention to his views. Although already in failing health, at our session last June he made his full contribution to the limit of his strength.

On behalf of the Assembly, I pay a final tribute to his memory.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, Western European Union came into being twenty-five years ago with the signing of the Paris Agreements and in June 1980 its Assembly will be celebrating a quarter of a century of political activity. These anniversaries should encourage us to assess the progress that has been made and to consider how our future security can be ensured in a constantly changing world.

If we compare the problems to be faced today with those which the signing of the Paris Agreements endeavoured to solve, we see that the problems which were then of concern to us are still there, while many others have been added. The facts that are with us today as then are the division of Germany and of Europe, the rapid growth in the Soviet military effort and the Soviet Union's exploitation of the disturbances which recur throughout the world in order to extend its influence.

In short, the factors of tension which produced the Brussels Treaty Organisation and the Atlantic Pact and led to the signing of the modified Brussels Treaty are still present, but the background against which the West is striving to meet the challenges facing it has been changed to its disadvantage. We must therefore assume the task of doing everything that is in our power to ensure freedom in the world and must overlook nothing that is necessary for the solidity of our organisation. Although there is no doubt that the tide is running against us, there is unfortunately no reason for us to relax the efforts we are making to safeguard our organisation.

First, from a military standpoint, the West has lost much of its relative superiority in recent years. The Soviet Union has not only achieved strategic balance, it has succeeded in tipping it in its favour. Soviet superiority in conventional weapons is steadily increasing; its missile potential has also grown; there is no longer a balance.

Furthermore, other centres of power have emerged which are, in turn, taking part in the armaments race. It is just when the spread of technology, the systematic exploitation of all sources of raw materials and the development and increase of trade are tending to unify the world by making the remotest countries participate in the splend-

The President (continued)

ours and the miseries of industrial society, just when all cities are beginning to look alike and their inhabitants are dressing and feeding in the same manner, that the world is falling apart politically. Both the new states which have come into being after the second world war, as a result of decolonisation and the age-old states that have only recently sloughed off their archaic form, are now asserting a sovereignty which is bringing them into opposition with their neighbours or with rival ethnic groups while they invoke — often with violence — a language or a religion in order to affirm their personality.

Because the world is at one and the same time interdependent and divided, any local conflict has repercussions throughout the international community. The effort made since the last war to maintain peace must therefore assume forms adapted to the new circumstances.

The concept of détente plays a leading rôle in the settlement of world problems. Unfortunately, we risk making it the basic principle of all considerations without knowing what conditions must be established if détente is not to be an empty word. This concept can be based only on a position of force and unity. We can ensure the effectiveness of détente only from a position of force which guarantees our security, for any weakness would expose us to a threat whose effect would be to increase tension. Furthermore, concessions over disarmament inevitably lead to a further worsening of the imbalance and hence to fewer possibilities of détente. Accordingly the SALT II agreements, which give a sort of formal status to the strategic balance, can be an element of détente and consequently meet Europe's interests only to the extent that they guarantee deterrence and eliminate all risk of a covert production of armaments that could upset the balance of terror.

Europe must be protected against any attempt at blackmail. The nuclear forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France give these three countries guarantees in this respect, and are therefore a constraint placed on the Soviet Union and a help for Europe.

A divided country, split in two by the frontier between the two Europes, Germany has entered into specific commitments. These commitments are a highly significant part of détente. We shall respect these commitments, but Germany too is entitled to security.

It well knows that in the long run a successful policy of détente might lead Europe towards a peace which would pave the way to a settlement between the two parts of Germany. But once again Germany, which places so much hope in détente, cannot play with the security which is a condition of détente.

(The President continued in English)

The policy of détente depends on a return to the previous strategic balance which has been tipped in favour of the Soviet Union in many fields and above all that of medium-range nuclear weapons. This problem is being followed with vigilance by the member countries of the NATO integrated organisation. Moreover, from my country's point of view, standing on the line dividing Europe, the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons must be considered as the only way of avoiding unacceptable political pressure.

Finally, the effectiveness of deterrence means having enough conventional forces equipped with the most modern weapons to be able to parry a surprise attack and avoid any loss of ground.

This problem, to which should be added that of research and the European armaments policy, was fully discussed six weeks ago at the symposium which our Assembly organised in Brussels last October to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Brussels Treaty.

There have inevitably been some differences of opinion over the aims and means of such a policy. Nevertheless, the merits of having a large number of permanent production groups have been recognised. At the present time, there are no more realistic means — and it is a continuing concern of this Assembly — to allow European countries with limited resources to play a part in the development of new technologies and to meet the cost of development and producing new weapons.

Another idea was put forward which I feel should be investigated: that of European preference. I know that some may advocate low-cost purchases from the United States, and such an attitude, with an eye to saving money, certainly does not further the cause of European preference, which I am not alone in advocating. If we adopt the same position here as at the Brussels symposium, it is not in a spirit of anti-Americanism but merely in the hope of ensuring the survival of European armaments industries and hence millions of jobs in the armaments industry and among suppliers. The United States, for its part, wishes, for perfectly valid security reasons, to produce practically all its armaments requirements on home territory. We, for our part, are urging our countries to bear in mind the need to maintain a sound industrial basis in Europe, since this is one of the fundamental conditions of our security. However, it must also be borne in mind that the arms market is not a normal one, open to unfettered competition, but that government influence and the weight of political arguments must be decisive wherever European preference leads to the adoption of broader positions.

European preference would mean not only that countries participating in a common programme

The President (continued)

would procure the equipment thus produced but that third countries would bear in mind the interest for Europe as a whole of procuring, whenever possible, an item of equipment produced in Europe, whether such arms or equipment were produced by several states co-operatively or by a single country. In the latter case, European preference may foster some form of specialisation by allowing certain countries to continue producing armaments traditionally produced by them and, in exchange, to purchase weapons produced by other European countries.

One further remark. We know that the Soviet Union exploits local conflicts in order to weaken the West's security. In the main, it tries to shake the foundations of Europe, the most exposed part of the world. It is a kind of indirect strategy. By holding up Europe's supplies of raw materials, and particularly energy resources, it is, in fact, jeopardising its growth, thus increasing unemployment and inflation. This procedure undermines our economic strength and therefore inevitably our social order and, in the long run, our defence capability.

As the world's leading importer and exporter, the European Economic Community is particularly exposed to this kind of threat. The United States is less affected because its national resources are greater and its supplies safer, and the dollar's leading rôle as an exchange and reserve currency guarantees an import capacity without the worries our countries may feel regarding deficits in their balance of trade. Japan, too, representing the great industrial power of Asia, whose products are hard to compete with and whose currency is constantly being revalued, seems sheltered from this indirect strategy. Europe, on the other hand, is particularly exposed and is, unfortunately, a centre of interest for the other side ; for the East, our loss is its gain.

The harm caused to our freedom amounts to an extension and a consolidation of regions where freedom is no more. Let us, in our debates, be guided by the fundamental idea of freedom in the future as in the past twenty-five years.

A strong Europe, capable of demonstrating that it can guarantee peace, will be in the best position to help solve the enormous problems which prevail in the third world. A Europe deprived of its freedom could no longer freely assist other countries.

(The President continued in German)

(Translation). — In addition to these problems of freedom and security, and indeed closely linked with them, there is a subject of absolutely outstanding importance, the subject of energy. There

are many recipes for the solution of this complex problem, many of them mere pipe-dreams but most of them bitterly serious. Unfortunately, however, many unpalatable proposals are shelved in the hope that the problems will somehow solve themselves. How they will do so is left to the Almighty. In many cases people lack the courage to propose what is required and to push through what is recognised as necessary.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we have got to find a common energy policy. That will unquestionably mean that the great powers will have to restrict their imports. It will also mean that new sources of energy can be used, that in addition to economising on energy and developing new technologies we will be forced to take our decisions on nuclear energy not, as before, with an eye on the man with a vote but in the light of what has to be done. All democratic parties will have to participate in this long-standing task.

This also calls for maintenance by the western world of solidarity in the Middle East, an area of such importance for the security of Europe. By taking members of the American Embassy staff in Tehran as hostages, and by bombing and setting fire to diplomatic representations in other Islamic countries, irresponsible agitators have broken international laws and flouted the most basic rules of international coexistence.

Freedom in Iran is non-existent. What is happening there is a mockery of human rights. The taking of hostages in the diplomatic offices of the United States is a cynical attack on the leading power of the free world. We Europeans take it as a matter of course that the United States should protect us ; but what is going on in the world surely compels us in Europe to ask ourselves whether we can evade taking a share of the political responsibility and fail to give our moral support.

The solidarity of the free world is the sole factor guaranteeing that we shall remain free.

I am not defending the earlier régime that undoubtedly made serious mistakes. But I do raise my voice against a system that lives on vengeance and disregards the human rights that all of us in this Assembly believe in. We raise our voice against a régime that shows no sign of appreciating international needs and practice, that will lead to the ruin of its own country, and in doing so will constitute a severe threat to the balance of the world.

By their seizure of hostages in Tehran, irresponsible agitators have acted in defiance of international law and disregarded the simplest rules of international life. It is not enough for Europe simply to proclaim its disapproval. It must be capable of coming to the assistance of American diplomacy in a situation which calls not only for

The President (continued)

firmness but also for perspicacity and foresight if the lives of the hostages are to be saved.

Our European identity and the solidarity of the West in all fields of diplomacy, industry, trade and finance must be brought into play. It is not just the maintenance of our standard of living and of our civilisation that are at stake, but our very survival.

When we consider how weighty these problems are, the current squabbles between Europeans concerning lamb and langoustines and the financial contributions made by one member state or another strike one as curious. So too does the controversy over the respective competences of the Assemblies of the Communities and of Western European Union.

The members of our Assembly, who are delegated from amongst the members of the national parliaments, approve the credits for national defence. They are therefore in a position to negotiate with the governments which defend the prerogatives of national independence. When however preserving these responsibilities in the military sphere begins to take on a dangerous character, our Assembly must really set itself the urgent task of sharing its concern over security in Europe with all those who have some measure of influence on the fate of our continent.

In this Assembly we have frequently stressed that security involves all aspects of a nation's life. The social climate, urban planning, economic prosperity and the level of a country's morals all have repercussions on our defence capability. It is therefore desirable that our concern in these spheres should be made known and that it shall not be governments alone which take decisions, but that all parliamentary bodies which carry weight in these spheres should play a part.

I would like in conclusion to make two further points.

First, in connection with the responsibilities I have just mentioned, I initiated in the European Parliament a debate in which warning voices were raised, saying that it is this Assembly and this Assembly alone which is competent for defence and security. I think I have made it sufficiently clear that that is my view as well.

Second, we in this Assembly have discussed whether it would not be possible to interpret the Brussels Treaty in such a way that not all members of the Assembly of Western European Union need also be members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has quite other tasks. Why is consideration not being given to the idea of delegating to our Assembly

a few members from amongst the national quotas in the directly-elected members of the European Parliament? They are just as much elected by the people as you and I. We would then have the best guarantee that our Assembly would not have its tasks disputed. The directly-elected European parliamentarians with their wide-ranging political interests would deal in Strasbourg with everything that came within their competence, while the few who are delegated to sit here in Paris will join us in coping with the tasks arising from the modified Brussels Treaty, tasks for which you and I were sent here. Why not look at this idea, calmly and objectively?

I wish the Assembly success with its work in this session. (*Applause*)

7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(*Doc. 813*)

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day provide for the adoption of the draft Order of Business for this part of the session.

The draft Order of Business is given in Document 813 dated 23rd November 1979.

Is there any opposition to the draft Order of Business as proposed?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr Chairman, I should like to make a request for the withdrawal of one item from the draft Order of Business, namely, the first item of business on Wednesday, 5th December, the report on nuclear, biological and chemical protection, which should have been tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I must apologise to the Assembly but, in spite of the best efforts of Mr. Banks and the Committee, it has not been possible for this report to be completed in time for consideration at this part-session. I would therefore ask whether that item could be withdrawn from the draft Order of Business for this session and tabled in the draft Order of Business of the first part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session.

Secondly, I ask whether you would clarify the Order of Business for this morning and this afternoon. As you will see, Order No. 6 for this morning is Mr. van Waterschoot's report, followed by debate. This afternoon we have Mr. Meintz's report, followed by debate, and Mr. Onslow's and Mr. Valleix's report, followed by debate. It was my understanding that those three reports were going to provide the basis for a common debate. Am I right, therefore, in assuming that the word "debate" after Mr. van Waterschoot's report should not appear and that the

Mr. Roper (continued)

debate will take place on all three reports after the presentation of all three? That, I believe, was the intention of the Presidential Committee when it considered the matter.

The PRESIDENT. — You have made the following proposals, Mr. Roper. The first is to withdraw the report of Mr. Banks and to place it on the agenda for June next year.

What is the opinion of the Assembly?...

The Chairman proposes to withdraw it. We normally acquiesce and, in my view, it must be on the agenda in June next year.

Is that agreed?...

That is agreed to.

The second proposal concerns Item 6 on the Orders of the Day, the report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot. It is proposed to debate it together with the report to be tabled by Mr. Meintz. I must point out that it is a question only of the presentation of the report. There is a mistake in the Orders of the Day. No vote is proposed.

I gather that you wish to combine the report of Mr. van Waterschoot with that of Mr. Meintz, which was set down for this afternoon.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am extremely sorry. I obviously did not make myself clear. The three reports by Mr. van Waterschoot, Mr. Meintz and Mr. Onslow and Mr. Valleix are all reports drawing conclusions from the Brussels symposium. It had, therefore, been my understanding that they would be presented in sequence and be followed by a common debate, followed in turn, as is shown on the draft Order of Business, by a vote on the three recommendations. I merely want your confirmation that that is the order of business you intend to follow.

The PRESIDENT. — I have already pointed out that there will not be a vote on Mr. van Waterschoot's report. If the Assembly agrees, we can have a combined debate on all three together, with the exception that there will be no vote on Mr. van Waterschoot's report.

Is that agreed?...

That is agreed.

Mr. TALON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I want to refer to Rule 32 of our Rules of Procedure in connection with the Order of Business of this session and to urge that an end be put to the apparently deliberate, conscious and intentional violations of our Rules of Procedure, at least where the deliberations of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments are concerned.

The question that seems to be raised by the activities of that Committee is whether we constitute a chamber to record an orthodox view emanating from a power outside WEU, or whether we are a genuine parliamentary assembly, designed to express the whole spectrum of European opinion on the questions with which it deals and which are at the heart of our responsibilities. Now, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments seems to be using our Rules of Procedure in such a way that those of its members whose opinions do not always agree with this orthodox view cannot give proper expression to their disagreement and so to be turning this Assembly, whatever the views of its members, into a mere instrument of propaganda for a particular cause.

Let us look at the facts: at its meeting of 20th June, the Presidential Committee adopted an Order of Business which included five reports from the Defence Committee. On 15th October it adopted another, with only four reports. At its meeting of 20th November it did not go back on that decision. Yet today, we are being presented with an Order of Business which has only three reports from the Committee, and of these three one — Mr. van den Bergh's — has still not been distributed to the members of the Assembly while another, by Mr. Cook, has been presented in a form which apparently requires revision, and nobody knows what points will be revised. The third report, by Mr. Meintz, was adopted by the Committee in conditions which I think impair its validity; I shall return to this later. As for Mr. Banks' report on nuclear, biological and chemical protection which was entered on the Order of Business of this session a long time ago at the request of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it has never been distributed to the members of the Committee, and we now hear, at the last minute, that it has never existed.

As a result our Assembly, whose primary responsibility is for defence matters, is unable to hold the wide-ranging debate on this subject for which it was preparing, either because the reports entered in its Order of Business have not been drafted, or because the Committee concerned has not adopted them in accordance with an approved procedure.

You are well aware that to hold serious debates on questions such as those dealt with by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments means that we have to gather information, to reflect and to study, and this cannot be done in a matter of hours. The reports must therefore be distributed to the members of the Assembly sufficiently long before our sessions to avoid important recommendations being adopted, if one may call it that, by small minorities because of the large number of abstentions. A recent case in

Mr. Talon (continued)

point is Mr. Critchley's report on the standardisation of armaments, which is often used against us to suggest that our Assembly voted against its own right to exist. Or again, many of us stay away for the votes if we have not had time to find out exactly to what they commit us, and then we no longer have the quorum needed for the adoption of our texts.

That might be tolerable if the Assembly's Committees were able to play their part, and to prepare for our debates properly. However, we must admit that that is not always the case with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

At its meeting of 7th November, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments adopted the report submitted by Mr Meintz and entitled "Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in western Europe", although the report had not been distributed to its members in advance and they therefore did not know exactly what the Committee would be discussing. In particular they did not know that the recommendation proposed to the Committee would once again call upon the institution in which we are meeting today to commit *hara-kiri* for the benefit of the European Communities, at least as far as the production of armaments is concerned.

It can be argued that the Rules of Procedure do not formally forbid the use of such methods and that it was up to the French to be present. But surely it cannot be claimed that the use of the Rules of Procedure in order to adopt, after one reading, a lengthy text which the members have not seen in advance, is not a distortion of the purpose of those rules. As for the French Delegation, it realises that those who are absent are always wrong; but you know how demanding parliamentary life is for people who carry the obligations resulting from membership of two European assemblies in addition to their local and national obligations. Can one blame them for not coming in strength to a meeting for which they had not received the working documents? That is why I ask myself about the real intentions of those who organise such meetings in such conditions and who do all they can to ensure that at no point will we really be able to study the documents on which we are to vote. Surely it is not merely coincidence if all the votes directed against WEU are held in such unsatisfactory conditions?

And when the Committee, meeting to discuss a disputed text which has not been distributed to its members in advance, does not obtain a quorum, what does it do? It refers, of course, to a paragraph in the Rules of Procedure and simply decides to make public a text which it did

not have the right to adopt. It has just done so in the case of the recommendation attached to the report by Mr. van den Bergh on new weapons and defence strategy. Rule 41, paragraph 10, of the Rules of Procedure states:

"Unless a Committee decides otherwise ... the only texts which shall be made public shall be the reports that have been agreed to, or statements issued on the responsibility of the Chairman."

Surely it is neither sensible nor fair to claim that a meeting which is not sufficiently well attended to decide a report is well enough attended to decide to distribute it. Be that as it may, a published document constitutes a "text which is to be tabled in the Assembly" within the meaning of Rule 41, paragraph 4 (a) of the Rules of Procedure, which states that the vote shall be taken by roll-call. I think I may say without fear of contradiction that no roll-call was taken in this case. Is this not one more example of picking out from amongst the procedural rules those which will conceal a political manoeuvre intended to obscure the truth and suggest what is not there?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — My friend, you must keep to the Order of the Day and not make a long general speech. Will you please conclude?

Mr. TALON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am referring to the Rules of Procedure and not making a general speech. But since you ask me to conclude I shall do so, despite still having a few comments to make.

For these various reasons, may I ask you, Mr. President, to ensure that in future our Assembly, and in particular its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, applies its Rules of Procedure, less literally perhaps, but certainly more strictly.

For the present, I ask the Assembly to consider that Mr. Meintz's report was not adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in proper form, because it was not distributed prior to its adoption, and to refer this report back to Committee so that it can be discussed afresh before it is submitted to the plenary session for which it is entered on the Order of Business.

Thank you, Mr. President. I am sorry I took rather long.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I was unaware that a statement on the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was to be made at this morning's sitting. I would prefer to read the text of the intervention and reply to it later. If I have your permission, Mr. President,

Mr. Roper (continued)

perhaps I may deal with one of the reports. May I assure you that I have checked on the points that were made, as they were made, and I do not believe that any of the Rules of Procedure of this Assembly were broken ?

To make one point, the reason it was not possible for my Committee to adopt the report of Mr. van den Bergh on 7th November or 21st November was that, due to the French air traffic controllers' strike, we had difficulty in getting a quorum in Paris. Nonetheless, we felt that, because of the importance of Mr. van den Bergh's recommendation once it had been agreed, we should make use of the provisions in the rules, so that members would have it in advance.

The only other point to which I would refer now — and I reserve my right to reply to other points later — is that in relation to the debate on Mr. Meintz's report. It is not correct to say that no member of the French Delegation was present. I have consulted the minutes of the meeting and I see that there was present a member of the French Senate, who voted and moved a number of amendments. I hope, therefore, that that particular allegation will be forthwith withdrawn.

The PRESIDENT. — I must tell the Assembly that the Presidential Committee fixes the whole Order of Business. That Committee meets regularly and at the last meeting two weeks ago the French delegate Mr. Valleix was present. We fixed the whole Order of Business and therefore I would suppose that this afternoon when the Assembly debates the three reports members can table a motion sending this report back to the Committee. It is left with you. We must now continue.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — My point is this : I think you have just set out the essentials, and that might bring this discussion on the Order of Business to a conclusion. As you said, the Presidential Committee has reached a decision and the Order of Business has been proposed to the Assembly in its present form. Consequently, I find it hard to understand, from the procedural point of view, why we should go back on what had been proposed, and proposed, I must add, in the absence of our colleague, Mr. Roper, who was prevented from attending for reasons which I am the first to understand and which I am also one of the first to regret, namely, transport difficulties.

That being so, the Order of Business has been proposed and I hope that we shall stick to it. But from this I draw the following conclusion : that the reports should be presented in succession.

In this way, Mr. Talon will be able to come back to his legitimate observations.

But I also draw the conclusion that the reports should come up separately, seeing that the Rapporteurs were not warned that there might be a joint debate or a possible plan for a joint vote on the substance. Obviously, the subjects of the reports are completely different, and this was clearly reflected in the Order of Business of the Brussels symposium, drawn up by our Assembly in such a way that each report might contribute information, guidance and a slant peculiar to each Committee and to each Rapporteur.

That is the situation today, and in consequence I, for my part, could accept the Order of Business only in its original form, as agreed, Mr. President, by your Bureau and your Committee, so that I in my capacity as Rapporteur, and Mr. Onslow likewise, may be enabled to express our views on a given report about which the Assembly will also come to a given decision ; and I trust that the same will apply to the other reports. If this did not happen, I wonder how the working methods of our Assembly would be judged by outsiders. I do not doubt, however, that order and good sense will prevail.

The PRESIDENT. — The Chairman of the Committee proposed that the three reports should be debated together, so we shall have the presentation of three reports followed by a joint debate and a separate vote.

We should now proceed to the next Order of the Day.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation) — I should like to recall one point from the Rules of Procedure. If, in fact, the debate is to be a joint one, and consequently a debate held in an atmosphere of confusion — we have had some recent experiences of this — I cannot, as Rapporteur, see the value of making a report and that I should regret. Still more important, I cannot see why the Assembly should *in extremis* go back on its decision solely on the proposal of one member, the Chairman of a Committee. Once again, I hope that what has been agreed collectively amongst us may prevail over what is proposed at the last moment by a single person. But you are aware of the conclusions which I, as a Rapporteur, should draw from this.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I certainly would not wish to cause difficulty this afternoon to the Vice-President of the Assembly, the leader of a delegation, or the Rapporteur. I spoke on this merely because my recollection of the discussion we had in the Presidential Committee, which I confirm, was that there should be a joint debate on this matter. I hope that that will be for the convenience of the Assembly. If it is not, I would not wish to embarrass anyone.

The PRESIDENT. — Let me add a word. There are three reports all more or less on the one subject. The reports are different and come to different conclusions. The proposal was that we should debate the whole together, to avoid spending too much time on repetition, so let us take them together.

Mr. Roper is ready to withdraw his proposal. It would be easier for us if he withdraws it, then we go on, as Mr. Valleix proposed, to the report and then the vote, the next report, and then the vote.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry, Mr. President, but, with great respect, that would be a change in the draft Order of Business, because the draft Order of Business is perfectly clear that the votes will come only at the end of the afternoon. If you look at this afternoon's Order of Business, you will see that it says at the end "Votes on the draft recommendations". That makes it quite clear that Mr. Valleix is proposing a change.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry, you are right. The procedure will be : first report, debate; second report, debate ; third report, debate ; and then the vote.

The amended draft Order of Business for the second part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session is agreed to.

8. The balance of force

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 809)

The PRESIDENT. — Now we go on with the Orders of the Day, which provide now for the vote on the draft recommendation in the report presented by Mr. Pawelczyk, Document 809, the balance of force, on which the Assembly was unable to vote last time. This draft recommendation was amended on 20th June at our Fifth Sitting by Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Baumel. The text of this amendment has been distributed this morning.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — As the Assembly was unable to reach a decision at our last session, it appears to me that, when all is said and done, it would be advisable and useful — and this is a brief and restrained reaction, or rather a final reaction — to ask that under Rule 29 of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure the draft recommendation on the balance of force presented on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments be referred back to Committee.

The text of this recommendation is based on the analysis of a situation which has now been

overtaken by events. Several new factors have intervened since it was drafted : the proposal made by Mr. Brezhnev, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, in his address in East Berlin on 6th October 1979 for the unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet soldiers and 1,000 Russian tanks — a proposal which, it is true, was coupled with formal warnings as disquieting as they were unacceptable ; the proposals made by the allies for the withdrawal of 1,000 American nuclear warheads, of 13,000 American soldiers and 30,000 Soviet troops ; and lastly the general context of the negotiations on the modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear weapons.

I wonder whether all these factors do not justify a careful re-examination of the present situation as regards the balance of force in Europe ? Are we to vote on this report ? Would the Committee consider it useful to up-date it and bring it into line with the present situation, or else to take it up again later ?

Such are the reasons which lead me to ask you whether it would not be advisable to decide on reference back to the Committee. But of course I leave it to the wisdom of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, we cannot debate the whole report by Mr. Pawelczyk and the amendments. Now we can only vote. If you propose to send it back to the Committee, we may hear someone in favour of having the final vote now. The proposal is to send it back to the Committee.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry, Mr. President. I am a little confused, and I wonder whether you can assist me. I think that Mr. Valleix was basing his motion to refer the report back under Rule 29 (5). That applies purely to amendments. Now they are under debate. It is not dealing with the reference back of the whole of a text. As Mr. Baumel's amendment, to which you have referred, has already been adopted, it is not possible to refer back Mr. Baumel's amendment to my Committee. Mr. Valleix would, therefore, have to find, I think, a procedural motion somewhere else. I think that it is not Rule 29 (5) that he can use if he wishes to refer back the whole of this report to my Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — There is no doubt that before the final vote takes place someone can propose to send the whole back to the Committee. Then we must first decide on this proposal.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as you have realised, I have no intention of starting a quarrel over procedure. Mr. Roper may be right : Rule 32 of our Rules of Procedure may be more appropriate, and it

Mr. Valleix (continued)

is always helpful to the Assembly and to myself if we try and interpret our Rules of Procedure more correctly.

That being so, the object of my remarks was to bring into our discussions a livelier awareness of the very important new developments which have occurred during the past six months. I do not know how the Assembly wants to decide the matter, but if, in the final analysis, it appeared that the Committee considered it advisable, given the important changes that have occurred in the world situation, to take up again the report which Mr. Pawelczyk was to present today from a different angle than my remarks would not have been in vain.

For I hope, as I have said before, that our decisions will be aligned as closely as possible on the situation as it is today. In other words, I am even prepared not to ask for a vote on my proposal for a reference back to Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — The final remark was, perhaps, "I do not ask for a vote to send it back". Then we vote on the text as a whole

Let us take Document 809.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in the document I have mentioned.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a roll-call vote.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I think that we must vote by roll-call because I counted six abstentions.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — We are not raising points of order, Mr. President, only stating our abstention on the vote, mainly based on the fact that we were unable to attend the proceedings of the Assembly in June and take part in the discussion on this matter.

The PRESIDENT. — I am in a predicament. We have done it this way several times, but I have been asked to watch the Rules of Procedure. If you agree we can try to follow what we have done on former occasions, when there is no roll-call. We have no objections, without the abstentions, and therefore the draft recommendation is agreed to. I do not see objections to it.

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

1. See page 16.

9. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

THE PRESIDENT. — We shall now hear an address by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher.

Madam Minister, I am sorry, this morning at 11.45 we should have had the privilege of listening to your address to the Assembly, but, because of our business, we are late. Our business was very tough.

I beg to welcome you and to ask you whether you would take the floor to address the Assembly.

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — You of course, Mr. President, know quite well, as a parliamentarian, that in a plenary assembly it is not always possible to observe the time-table to the minute.

Forty years ago, Mr. President, the attack by Hitler's Germany on Poland started the second world war, which laid Europe waste — and not only Europe — and brought untold suffering to many peoples. From the endeavour to repair the destruction caused by the war, and to create all the conditions needed if the recurrence of such a catastrophe was to be obviated, sprang — 20, 25 and 30 years ago now — the major treaties and alliances and the common institutions, amongst them Western European Union, whose anniversaries we are celebrating this year. On 23rd October of this year the Permanent Council celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Brussels Treaty, which paved the way for the Federal Republic of Germany to co-operate in the common task of defence and, just over half a year later, enabled it to accede to the North Atlantic defence community.

Mr. President, a quarter of a century later we are facing a world-wide crisis in economic growth and in development and crises in the Near and Middle East, in southern Africa and South-East Asia. We are obliged to live with a rising tide of violence and terror and to witness the appalling suffering of starving people and refugees.

On the other hand, successes have been scored in the efforts to guide the East-West conflict, which overshadowed world policy during the first two decades after the end of the second world war, along the lines of a peaceful and controlled state of rivalry between countries with different social orders. This policy of détente, designed to preserve peace, has acquired particular importance as a stabilising factor in the context of the world crises to which I have just referred. We in the heart of Europe can perform the tasks incumbent on us under the policy of alliance and détente only if we act together with

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

our allies and partners in the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

While the phase of the cold war was characterised by confrontation without dialogue, the discussion between East and West has now become an established part of foreign policy. By definition, any dialogue comprises opposing positions. But it is entirely in line with our liberal western thinking that we see in this a challenge to intensification of the dialogue. In any case, there is no reasonable alternative to the dialogue of détente.

This policy of détente is being pursued under the conditions specific to the East-West relationship. They include the contrasts in the value-concepts prevailing in the several countries, the fundamental differences in the political and social systems, and differences in political interests which have to be seen against the background of the existing political and military potentials. It would be fooling ourselves to believe that any change can be brought about in this situation in the short term.

As long as these contrasts continue to exist, the dialogue of détente will continue to be dependent on an important prerequisite — the maintenance of equal military security for both sides. If this condition is no longer met, there will be the danger of a reciprocal effect: where an imbalance of military potentials creates an unstable situation, this will lead to a keener sense of being particularly threatened. The execution of common political tasks is impeded, the readiness to co-operate inhibited. This danger can be avoided by negotiations on stabilising equal military security at, we hope, an eventually lower level. I shall come back to this, Mr. President, in connection with the topical question of the USSR's medium-range missile potential.

The quality of the policy of détente pursued so far will be shown in no small degree by the extent to which the confidence one is trying to establish can be used to help forward the policy of armaments control. The building of confidence is particularly important in the field of military security.

The Federal Government regards the confidence-building measures of the final act of the CSCE as an exceptionally important step towards meeting this requirement. Concrete proposals for extending the scope and deepening the content of the confidence-building measures have been tabled. The next follow-up conference, to be held in Madrid in 1980, offers a chance to continue the work of confidence-building both in individual practical measures and in an intensification of the general East-West dialogue. The French proposal for a conference on

disarmament in Europe can make a particularly substantial contribution to progress in this field, especially in the direction of extending the application of the confidence-building measures to the whole of Europe.

The Federal Government attaches great importance to the joint German-Soviet declaration of 6th May 1978 made on the occasion of the visit of General Secretary Brezhnev. In this declaration the two sides regard it as important that no one should try to acquire military superiority and that approximate equality and parity should be sufficient to safeguard their own defence. At the same time agreement on further steps in the field of disarmament and armaments control should be expedited, so that the process of détente should not be impeded by developments in the military sphere. The recent visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko to Bonn gave both sides an opportunity to reaffirm the principles of this German-Soviet declaration of 1978.

The Federal Government has from the outset regarded the policy of détente as a policy for people. The East-West dialogue must not confine itself to the international handling of crises, but must lead to practical improvements for ordinary men and women. The Moscow and Warsaw treaties and the treaties between the two German states have contributed to a development which has made Europe somewhat more open. The final act of the CSCE at Helsinki is also a milestone in this development. The citizens of Western and Eastern Europe are coming closer to each other again not only in the reuniting of families and through travel, but also through economic, scientific, technical and cultural interchange. This is the tangible stuff of the policy of détente, and for us Germans it holds a special interest.

The policy of détente could be a success for the countries of the West only because they have developed joint positions and harmonised their views closely at every stage. The work of political consultation in NATO has been given fresh impetus. European political co-operation has developed through the CSCE. Consultation on the further steps in the CSCE process is still today one of the most active components in this co-operation.

The relationship between the two states in Germany exerts an essential influence on the whole fabric of détente in Europe. Unless progress is made in the relations between the two parts of Germany on the basis of the basic treaty of 8th November 1972, it is difficult to conceive of any deepening of the process of détente in Europe. Anyone who wants détente and co-operation in Europe must also want détente and co-operation between the two states in Germany. Both German states bear a very special responsibility in this respect.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

We are glad to see that, after the cooling of relations brought about by the measures which the German Democratic Republic took in the first half of the year against correspondents from other countries, and the stiffer penalties it imposed on its own citizens for contacts with the western world, there are now signs of a more positive trend. But a great deal of further effort will be required before the objective of good neighbourly relations written into the basic treaty is attained in the interests of the ordinary people of Germany.

The aim of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is to work towards a state of peace in Europe in which the German people can regain their unity by a free act of self-determination.

I cannot talk about détente without mentioning Berlin, Mr. President. We can today note with satisfaction that the position in and around Berlin is on the whole stable. An untroubled atmosphere in Berlin is an essential element of détente, security and co-operation in Europe and at the same time a basis for the viability of that city. May I also mention in this connection that the heads of state of the three western powers have, by their visits to Berlin, made a profession of faith in that city, and thereby helped to improve its prospects for the future.

The four-power agreement of 3rd September 1971 did not solve the Berlin question itself. All attempts by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic to push through, by a restrictive interpretation or the dissemination of false versions of the agreement, political positions for which the Russians had been unable to gain acceptance in the four-power agreement, were thwarted by the firm attitude of the three allied powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. In this connection I should like to draw attention in particular to the London statement by the four heads of state or government of 9th May 1977 and to the Tokyo statement by the four foreign ministers of 29th June of this year. In these the three powers confirmed yet again that they will continue to reject any attempt to call in question the rights and responsibilities which France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union still have in respect of Germany as a whole and of all four sectors of Berlin.

Now, Mr. President, to turn to a question of great topical interest. We are all witnessing a heated debate on the build-up of Soviet missiles in Europe and the western response to this. This is raising, on the threshold of the 1980s, together with the many other uncertainties about the coming decade, the question of the future stability of our security. For the Federal

Republic of Germany, as for its allies, the basis of our security is beyond all doubt: the Atlantic Alliance is and remains its sheet-anchor. This Alliance, based on a lasting community of interests and values, has in the thirty years of its existence again and again furnished impressive proof of its vitality, adaptability and capacity for safeguarding peace. This experience justifies our confidence that the Alliance will, even in the face of fresh challenges and in a changing strategic environment, preserve the security of its members no less fully than in the past.

Because of two concurrent developments the Alliance finds that its basic strategic position has changed. By bringing into service a new generation of weapons the Soviet Union has very recently been further increasing its superiority in respect of continental strategic weapons both in quantity and above all in quality. At the same time it has caught up with the United States in its intercontinental strategic capability. The parity reached between the two leading nuclear powers on this central strategic plane is to be stabilised by SALT II. We regard the SALT II agreement signed in Vienna on 18th June by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev as an important step towards the creation of a more stable overall balance of force between East and West. Balance is the decisive principle on which all our efforts in connection with armaments control and disarmament should be based. Our interest in balance in Europe, which is inseparable from overall stability and overall balance, explains the Federal Government's support of SALT II. The continuation of the SALT process is in itself a stabilising factor. SALT II has furthermore not only set limits to further nuclear arming by the great powers but in addition constitutes in treaty form a confirmation and a concrete expression of the principles of equality and parity which inform armaments control and which will be of vital importance for the future.

Mr. President, the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the readiness of the United States further to intensify the SALT consultations within the Alliance. It regards the elaboration by the special group of a proposal on armaments control for decision by the Alliance in December as an important step in developing an Alliance position. But the formalisation of a state of equality and parity at the level of strategic intercontinental systems accentuates disparities at lower levels. There is now the danger that developments in areas not covered by SALT II will give rise to instabilities which in turn will destabilise the overall balance. Here I am thinking first and foremost of the growth in Soviet potential in extremely up-to-date medium-range weapons, which is a threat to the Alliance in Europe and one to which the Alliance has no equivalent response. Soviet potential in these

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

weapons confronts the Alliance with a security problem of the first order.

The Federal Government therefore welcomes the fact that, in accordance with the Alliance's dual aim of displaying a defensive capability and a readiness for détente, the appointment of the high-level group and the special group has made it possible to elaborate, in intensive deliberations, proposals which will form the basis of the decisions to be taken by the Alliance on 12th December.

The Federal Republic, too, has been guided, in its thorough examination of the need for NATO to catch up in the field of medium-range weapons, by the principle that defence and deterrence capabilities must be maintained. NATO, then, is not trying to have exactly the same number of medium-range systems as the Soviet Union. The purpose of the planned modernisation of NATO's potential is rather to create the conditions that will be necessary if it is to continue to rely on its strategy of flexible response. But this strategy will continue to be credible only if the Atlantic Alliance remains capable of deliberate, controlled escalation in response to an attack by the Warsaw Pact countries and thus able to deter them from attacking. A further increase in the Soviet Union's nuclear medium-range superiority might lead the Soviet Union to imagine that it could threaten or even carry out limited attacks on NATO Europe. To prevent the emergence of such a unilateral threat potential on the Soviet side, NATO will have to modernise its medium-range potential so as to prevent the development of a gap in its panoply of weapons for escalation and deterrence. Mr. Genscher, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated the problem neatly when he said — and I quote :

“The problem is not that the West is arming to catch up, but that the East has got ahead.”

Together with our allies we regard armaments control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to ensure the undiminished security of its members and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, predictable and controllable. It is agreed that in future SALT negotiations priority shall, in conformity with the principle of equality and equal security, be given to agreeing on limits for land-based Soviet and American medium-range systems. Whether and how far this is feasible will be shown by the continuation of the SALT process. At this stage, however, it would be a mistake to postpone the necessary decisions in the field of defence, decisions without which our armaments control proposal would lack credibility. Of course, decisions and developments in the field of defence and decisions and developments

in armaments control exert a reciprocal influence on each other. On the relationship between these two areas, Federal Chancellor Schmidt said on 4th July 1979 before the German Bundestag — and I quote :

“The extent to which it will be possible to limit concrete measures for catching up in armaments in response to the build-up that has been going on for years in the Warsaw Pact depends on the degree of success achieved in placing effective limits on the continental strategic systems of East and West in armaments control negotiations, such as SALT III.”

The readiness of the Soviet Union, emphasised several times by General Secretary Brezhnev, to include medium-range systems in the SALT III negotiations, is welcomed by the Federal Government. It is of the opinion that what matters now is to convert into action the political will, stressed by both sides, to work via armaments control towards a more stable balance. The Alliance is prepared to take the Soviet Union at its word when it says that it is prepared to allow itself to be guided, in the forthcoming negotiations, by the principle of equality and equal security.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have today had the honour of addressing this Assembly for the fourth time on matters of foreign policy as seen from Germany. I should like to take this opportunity of stressing once more how greatly my government values and how necessary it considers the work of this Assembly, and in particular the dialogue which takes place here between the governments and parliamentarians from the member states of WEU. These are an expression of the trust and co-operation that exist between the Council and the Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Minister, for addressing the Assembly. I am sure we all followed carefully what you said and we are extremely thankful to you for placing this Assembly in the position in which we would want it to be seen, that is, as an important Assembly. You have said that your government looks upon this as an important Assembly and we thank you very much, mainly for your final remarks vis-à-vis the Assembly.

Madam Minister has agreed to answer questions which representatives may like to put to her for a period of ten minutes. At present I have questions listed for Mr. Talon, Mr. Müller and Mr. Valleix. Does anyone else wish to put a question ?...

I call Mr. Talon.

Mr. TALON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, a major debate was recently held in France on the extent to which a Franco-German entente could serve as a driving force for Euro-

Mr. Talon (continued)

pean defence. In view of the latest German white paper on defence, could Mrs. Hamm-Brücher indicate the German Government's position on this point?

The PRESIDENT. — Madam Minister, do you wish to reply to the questions together, or singly?

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*). — Together.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In connection with the debate in NATO on closing the armaments gap and improving the missiles balance in Europe, the Soviet Union has recently invoked the mutual assistance pact of April 1948 between Finland and the Soviet Union and pointed out that use might be made of the clause which allows the Soviet Union to undertake joint defensive efforts with Finland "if the security of the Soviet Union were to be threatened". What is the Minister of State's view on this statement by the Soviet Union, in the context of the current debate?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would just like to ask Mrs. Hamm-Brücher one question, at the risk of being indiscreet, for it is perhaps a rather delicate subject.

Does she think that the possible implementation of the proposal to modernise NATO's theatre weapons might lead to difficulties in the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and certain Eastern European states?

How does the Federal Government intend to reconcile the perhaps contradictory requirements of security for Germany — which we fully understand — and the development of its relations with Eastern Europe?

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — May I ask the Minister whether in what she said about the matter to which I refer, and more generally the Federal German Government's position regarding it, ratification by the United States is regarded as a precondition, in that final decisions are being taken at the Atlantic Council in mid-December concerning production and deployment of the new nuclear weapons?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Calamandrei.

Are there any more questions?...

Madam Minister, will you please reply?

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to begin with the last question, the one from Mr. Calamandrei.

The Federal Republic does not consider that the ratification of SALT II in any way prejudices the decisions NATO is to take in December.

In reply to the question put by Mr. Valleix, I would like to say that the problems involved in the coming NATO decisions are of course already being discussed with our Eastern European opposite numbers. We hope that the proposals and negotiations for further measures of control and disarmament — of our East European partners as of ourselves — will not hamper us in our intention to push ahead with the process of détente and with confidence-building measures in Europe, and that it will be possible to maintain bilateral relations, which are on the whole developing favourably.

In reply to the question from Mr. Talon — it was, I think, a question about Franco-German co-operation in defence matters — I would like to say that NATO, as Mr. Talon knows, is a collective alliance. There is no place within it for special relationships. This holds good, in particular, for nuclear defence.

To Mr. Müller's question on the Soviet-Finnish pact of assistance I can at the moment give no official answer, for as far as I know the Federal Government has not adopted any particular position on this. But I will be glad to send him a written answer.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you again, Madam Minister, for coming to the Assembly to address us and for replying to questions. Thank you so much. We hope to see you again on the next occasion.

10. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the appointment of members of Committees. Since the last part-session the Presidential Committee has, on a provisional basis, nominated members to fill Committee places which have become vacant. These provisional nominations, which are published in an Addendum to Notice No. 8, are now submitted to the Assembly for ratification, in accordance with Rule 8 (3) of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections to these nominations?...

The provisional nominations are ratified.

The President (continued)

In addition, the Assembly must decide on proposals for changes in Committee membership which have been put forward by certain national delegations. These have also been published in the Addendum to Notice No. 8. These proposed changes are submitted to the Assembly under the terms of Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

The candidatures for Committees are ratified.

11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 819).
2. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 821 and Amendments).
3. Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 (Pre-

sentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 823).

4. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation ; Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe ; Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 (Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Documents 819, 821 and Amendments and 823).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I believe that, following an intervention made by Mr. Urwin at the last part-session on the rights of substitutes, there has been an attempt to clarify this matter and that certain guidance has been given by the Office of the Clerk on the interpretation of Rules 7 and 37. I should like to write to you, Sir, about this in order to clarify the matter, but I am raising this matter as a matter of order on the earliest possible occasion in order to tell you that the guidance which has been given does not seem to me to be in keeping with the rules as I read them.

The PRESIDENT. — I intend to take up the matter at the opening of the 3 o'clock sitting.

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.*)

NINTH SITTING

Monday, 3rd December 1979

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

Speakers (point of order): Mr. Roper, the President, Mr. Grieve.

3. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 819).

Speakers: The President, Mr. van Waterschoot (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. van Waterschoot (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*).

4. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 821 and Amendments).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Meintz (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Druon, Mr. Roper, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Mulley, Mr.

Boucheny, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Jung, Mr. Meintz (*Rapporteur*).

5. Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 823).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Valleix (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Onslow (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*).

6. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation; Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe; Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 (*Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order*, Docs. 819, 821 and Amendments and 823).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Mulley, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Meintz.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. You have just told us, Mr. President, that the names of those substitutes communicated to you under Rule 7 will be printed in the minutes of the Assembly. May I therefore assume that those substitutes will hold the votes of the full members whom they are

replacing for the whole of this afternoon's sitting? That would be my interpretation of Rules 7 and 37 of the Rules of Procedure of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — I regret, Mr. Roper, that you took the floor before I reached my announcement. I tried to tell you but I was interrupted by the point of order. It is your right to interrupt me. I was about to tell the house that at the end of the morning sitting I announced that, at the opening of this sitting, I would make known my views on this problem to the whole Assembly. In the meantime, I received a letter from Mr. Roper. It is not in accordance with my view.

I have decided that the whole matter shall be discussed in the Committee on Rules of Procedure this afternoon. I beg to ask the Chairman, or, if he is not present, the Vice-Chairman, to convene the Committee this afternoon at five o'clock in order not to interrupt proceedings of the Assembly by discussing Rules of Procedure. Mr. Chairman, are you ready to convene the Committee at five o'clock this afternoon?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — By all means, yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — By all means. I am glad to hear that. At five o'clock this afternoon this problem will be discussed in the Committee and, in due course, a report made to the house.

1. See page 19.

3. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 819)

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on political conditions for European armaments co-operation, Document 819.

I call Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Ambassador, Ladies and Gentlemen, when it met in June 1979 this Assembly adopted a recommendation on the political conditions for European co-operation on armaments. The report, presented by the General Affairs Committee of our Assembly, was meant to prepare the ground for the symposium held in Brussels in October last. Today we have to ask ourselves whether the recommendation of June 1979 is still fully valid following the symposium, or whether the General Affairs Committee needs to make additions or alterations to the recommendation.

To make it possible to answer this question, a fresh report on this subject is now being submitted to the Assembly, designed to put before you the conclusions from the Brussels symposium that relate to the area covered by the General Affairs Committee. It has seemed to your Rapporteur and to the General Affairs Committee that the recommendation adopted in June still has all its force today in December. Then we shall, during the examination, also be looking at comments that have been inspired by the reply from the WEU Council of Ministers to this Assembly's recommendation of last June.

First I want, however, to say something about the results of the Brussels symposium in the area that is of more particular interest to us and which was dealt with in the June recommendation. The fact that the General Affairs Committee is not making any fundamental change in the recommendation from last June does not mean that the symposium in Brussels served no useful purpose in charting the political conditions for armaments co-operation. What the symposium has done is to lead our Committee to pinpoint a number of specific areas in which it will be possible to take concrete initiatives, rather than to prompt any basic re-examination of the Committee's overall views. This is why this report is a short one. It is also why your Rapporteur thought it necessary to add an appendix to the report in which Professor Schmidt, who was Rapporteur of Working Group II during the Brussels symposium, draws with a great deal of competence and authority the conclusions that flow from the discussions in Working Group II.

I would like to underline the gist of his conclusions. Mr. Schmidt says that it is unimaginable that one could within the foreseeable future arrive at an overall organisation of European armaments production, let alone a common organisation for arms production. He stresses the conflicting interests that divide our countries. This state of affairs comes from the differing nature of their arms factories, and from the difference in the relative importance that arms production has for the European and the various national economies. The Belgian Prime Minister, too, pointed to this conflict of interests during his opening speech at the Brussels symposium on 15th October. These are facts that are every bit as worthy of respect as the classic Lord Mayor. We may deplore these facts, but we have no right to shirk them if we want to be realistic in what we do.

This is why the recommendation now being put before you in the new report from the General Affairs Committee is a modest one. The Committee discussed the recommendation for a very long time; it was united on the essence of the recommendation, but there was a great deal of detailed argument when it came to the actual words and phrases to be used in the recommendation. I think I might usefully deal with these words and phrases in a moment, in the French language.

The main thrust of the recommendation lies in its paragraph 2. The Committee and its Rapporteur have here based themselves particularly on statements that were made during the symposium, especially the two major statements which gave very precise indications as to the steps that can be taken to bring about more permanent co-operation on armaments production in Europe. First and foremost, there was the important briefing on the juridical aspects of weapons procurement, given by Mr. Plantey. The preamble to the draft recommendation consequently expresses our appreciation of the fact that the Council of Ministers authorised Mr. Plantey, who is head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, to make this important statement. The second important speech was made by Professor Greenwood of Aberdeen University who, speaking with great authority, dealt particularly with the essential economic and social dimensions of co-operation in arms production.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). — I shall now continue in French, my main aim being to clarify the terminology used in the recommendation. In fact, as I said, paragraph 2 really constitutes the backbone of the recommendation and does not take up any position in the institutional quarrels which at times divide European opinion on this subject.

Mr. van Waterschoot (continued)

Paragraph 2 is based on the idea that several organisations exist whose work is directed towards the joint production of armaments, that each of them has powers and responsibilities peculiar to it and that it has not seemed desirable, in the present circumstances, to disregard these realities, either by proposing the establishment of new institutions or by seeking to bring together in a single organisation elements which circumstances have allocated to different bodies.

The enquiry currently being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee should enable the Council to collect the information needed if it is to allocate these tasks among the different institutions in a coherent manner, whereas the parsimony with which it deigns to inform the Assembly on the results of this enquiry scarcely allow us to express an informed opinion.

Any discussion on policy which was not based on such information would, it seems to me, present more disadvantages than advantages. Accordingly, the General Affairs Committee requests that needs be met in terms of activities and not in terms of institutions, because the Brussels symposium has enabled it to see that they were either not being met or were being met inadequately.

The first of these needs is to establish a sort of European armaments market which, it has been found, does not at present exist. In order to do so, both those who can supply armaments and those who are in need of them should have available all requisite information on the supply of and demand for armaments in Europe.

If the term "organisation" has been used in paragraph 2(a), that is not only in order to follow the terminology advocated by Professor Greenwood, but also because the task of collecting this information could scarcely be performed by an intergovernmental organisation. Indeed, only governments are in a position to provide the necessary information concerning demand and, in many cases, concerning supply. But it is hardly thinkable that they would give it to an office that was not under their control. It should be noted that, in its reply to Recommendation 329, the Council suggests that this task might be entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee, the SAC.

In the case of paragraph 2(b), however, the term "body" has been used to describe the organ which should be made responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall repercussions. The need for an analysis of this kind was also forcibly stressed by Professor Greenwood, and on this point I can only refer you to his important paper.

Here again it was he who chose the term "body" to indicate that it might cover either a private institution, remunerated on the basis of a certain number of specific tasks, or a standing inter-state organ. Its purpose would be to provide all the information which possible purchasers of armaments might require on the implications of the choices they inevitably have to make and which they all too frequently have to make with only a partial and imperfect knowledge of the repercussions their decisions may have not only in the financial but also in the technical, economic and social fields.

Sub-paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of this paragraph 2 — the essential paragraph in the recommendation — deal with the legislation which should be promulgated to facilitate both the joint production of armaments and trade in the armaments field between member countries of WEU.

The question immediately arises of who should initiate this legislation. At present, it is obviously the responsibility of states. It is possible, and doubtless desirable, that one day a truly European body of law may be introduced in this sphere. If, however, the WEU Council could contribute to promoting co-ordination of national bodies of law, it would already be achieving considerable progress in comparison with the situation described by Mr. Plantey in his paper.

The General Affairs Committee has noted three specific fields in which it seemed necessary to promote such co-ordination, namely customs legislation, legislation concerning the status of firms and legislation concerning transfers of technology.

In the realm of customs legislation — taking into account the fact that the Treaty of Rome leaves the member states of the European Economic Community free to decide their own customs measures in the armaments field — acts should be promulgated which would facilitate to the fullest extent possible the transfer of armaments among member states.

What is needed, then, is action to fill by agreement among the European governments any gaps which the Treaty of Rome may show in this field.

The second point is the status of firms.

In his paper, Mr. Plantey highlights the fact that when a particular firm is established for the joint production of one type of weapon, it finds that it has to comply with the laws of the country in which its head office is located. That makes it, as it were, a national company of that country, even if its object is to produce European armaments.

The creation of a special European status for firms engaged in the joint production of arma-

Mr. van Waterschoot (continued)

ments might really bring us an effective step forward in the development of joint production.

Our third point is this: we know the difficulties faced by those concerned with transfers of technology between industries producing armaments. Here, too, concerted action to promote further developments in national legislation facilitating such transfers should make possible some development of joint European firms in this field.

Mr. President, I am trying to be brief and to conclude my remarks. I would further point out that sub-paragraph (f) did not form the subject of a paper at the Brussels symposium. It was the Committee which insisted — and your Rapporteur was happy to go along with this viewpoint — that the Council also be asked to ensure the co-ordination of the legislative and executive measures adopted by each of our countries to prevent any illicit production of and traffic in armaments in Western Europe, with all the consequences that this entails.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the recommendation are in the nature of reactions to the replies given by the Council to our earlier recommendations, and in particular to the recommendations put forward last June.

In fact, they concern problems involved in the activities of the WEU Council and its subordinate organs. For one thing, it is apparent that both the SAC and the independent European programme group — IEPG — are having to contend with difficulties caused by the inertia — I would not venture to say the bad will — shown by national administrations when these bodies attempt to collect the information they require if they are to accomplish the task entrusted to them by the governments of our countries. That is the point covered in paragraph 3 of the recommendation, which advocates greater co-operation in this field.

For again and again things happen as though the very governments which are on the one hand launching this or that drive to develop European co-operation are at the same time letting their administrations place administrative obstacles in the path leading to that co-operation. Where co-operation is concerned, the fact that one government department has taken an initiative while another is responsible for following it through is generally enough to induce a sort of paralysis.

It is through the WEU Council that we as members of the Assembly can address ourselves collectively to our countries' governments, but they alone are able to take the necessary measures, each in so far as it is concerned, to ensure that the policies they produce shall have

greater coherence and shall lead on to the co-operation which they recognise, in principle, to be necessary.

And I now come to the fourth and last paragraph. It comments on the replies made by the Council to the recommendations adopted by our Assembly last June. It seems to us that in connection with the replies to Recommendations 330, 331 and 335 certain comments are called for. Moreover, we should associate with these the reply to Recommendation 325, which reached us too late for us to be able to take it into account in the report presented last June.

In its reply to Recommendation 298, the Council, having regard to the fact that a number of activities connected with the exercise of its powers and responsibilities had been entrusted to other organisations, undertook to inform the Assembly about the entire area of competence of WEU in whatever framework it might be exercised.

Well, here we have the Council, in its reply to Recommendation 331, stating — and I quote — that it would be difficult for the Council to inform the Assembly about the activities of the independent European programme group, whose membership was different from that of WEU, with which it, the IEPG, had no organisational links. And, as you are aware, this independent European programme group includes all the European countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance.

We may wonder, Ladies and Gentlemen, what is meant by this absence of organisational links; for in its reply to an earlier recommendation, Recommendation 297, the Council informed the Assembly that — and I quote its actual words — “the Standing Armaments Committee should receive and use certain data which the IEPG had already produced and was willing to supply”.

Accordingly, links do exist and, in particular, information is exchanged between the IEPG and the SAC — the SAC being a subordinate organ of the Council. The question arises: are these links organisational? The term is far from clear. Are there organisational links between the WEU Council and NATO? Between the Council and the European Community? Or again, between the Council and the United Nations?

Yet the Council has always considered that it was among its responsibilities to inform the Assembly of the decisions taken in NATO, in political consultations among the Nine, or at consultations among the delegations of WEU member countries to the United Nations. Why is a procedure of this kind impossible within the framework of the IEPG?

The General Affairs Committee proposes for your consideration both in the preamble and in

Mr. van Waterschoot (continued)

the operative paragraphs of the recommendation a sufficiently lengthy development of this point. And it has made a point of conveying to the Council in particularly strong terms its rejection of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 331.

In fact, it is the very powers and responsibilities of our Assembly which are here at issue, although the Council has on many occasions recognised that it was the only European assembly competent in the defence field.

Its powers and responsibilities are being challenged by this refusal to provide us with information on a body which at present seems — if I am to believe the reply given to Recommendation 329 to which I referred earlier — to be looked on by the governments of our countries as the main instrument of European armaments policy.

It is therefore the actual status of our Assembly and hence the direct implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty which the Council is contesting, and the General Affairs Committee has been at pains to make abundantly clear its very firm rejection of these texts. The Committee hopes that our Assembly will follow its lead on this point.

Let us bring this matter to a close, Ladies and Gentlemen. As you will have observed, the present report has sought to soothe susceptibilities and avoid issues which might divide us. This is not because your Rapporteur or the Committee shrink from political discussions, but because it seemed to him that, in the practical and concrete fields where immediate progress was possible, it was desirable to find the broadest possible majority.

He therefore hopes to rally this broad majority — perhaps a virtually unanimous one — so that the Assembly may lend its full weight to proposals which are based on the opinions of the leading experts and which will perhaps be such as to ensure modest but solidly-based progress in European co-operation in the armaments field and, at the same time, to prove that WEU is not a nonentity, as European public and political opinion too often believes, either consciously or unconsciously. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. van Waterschoot.

I now open the debate.

I have three names on the list of speakers. I start with Mr. Antoni. He will be followed by Mr. Büchner and then by Mr. Cavaliere.

I now call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Rapporteur, as he has confirmed this afternoon, while noting with interest the work of the symposium on a European armaments policy held in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979, considers it to have provided further details and clarification on the guidelines laid down in Recommendation 335 adopted by our Assembly at its June session — which, having undergone no change, are accordingly substantially corroborated.

While gladly acknowledging that the Rapporteur has sought to take the most objective possible view of the work of the Brussels symposium, we nonetheless consider it calls for one or two explanations and additions that we deem essential for the sake of clarity.

In our view the importance of the Brussels symposium was that it pointed out the existing possibilities for a joint armaments policy. But it also underscored the persistent limitations of a highly differentiated situation, and the weighty problems to be overcome in consequence. Actually the symposium brought to light conflicting, often very different, individual viewpoints that have not yet been entirely reconciled, and therefore subsist. Significant in this respect are certain points recognised by the Rapporteur, and also figuring prominently in this afternoon's report.

The underlying problem remains, what kind of co-operation should be adopted, by what means should it be achieved: the experts' majority view was that only a pragmatic approach to the problems in the next few years can lead to progress. Europe is increasingly called upon to assume responsibility for its own defence, especially in conventional armaments. Let me turn finally to this latter remark, which in our opinion largely covers the central political issue of the matter we are discussing.

I emphasise straight away that the draft recommendation, having asserted the need for arms collaboration to be extended to the production phase, calls for measures to overcome the existing constraints on the specific legislation of the international organisations, in customs legislation and technological exchanges among the European industries. We would immediately stress the importance of European armaments co-operation, not only with a view to lower costs but also to Europe's greater competitiveness and self-reliance.

Secondly, we hold that co-operation between the European countries and industries ought to be placed on an equal footing, starting from research and planning right through to production. The latter cannot be confined to the user phase, of purchases and sales among producer countries and those who are necessarily only customers.

Mr. Antoni (continued)

Turning more specifically to the draft recommendation, with particular reference to the hypothesis of an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on European supply and demand in the field of armaments, and that of a body — group or organisation, as the Rapporteur said just now — responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes, we take the view that we should enhance the rôle of the IEPG in relation to the Conference of National Armaments Directors — CNAD — and the European defence industrial group — EDIG — if necessary by strengthening the political responsibility of the IEPG itself, by upgrading its present status from under-secretary to ministerial level. At the same time, in our estimation, the relationship between the IEPG and the EDIG ought to be more clearly defined and institutionalised, to make the latter a consultative body on technical matters leaving the options referred to decision by parliaments and governments entirely within the purview of the IEPG.

European co-operation postulates multiple choices by individual countries; it rejects the idea of a static situation and monopoly in research and advanced studies. This means promoting whatever agreements will allow more advanced forms of general enlargement for joint purposes.

From this requirement — this is our second point — there stems the enhanced importance of the rôle of national parliaments and WEU itself as a European body concerned with defence matters, inasmuch as choices of European preference ought to be assigned to and safeguarded by Europe's political will.

This is another important matter not in our view sufficiently brought out by the report and draft recommendation.

Yet genuine co-operation is still a long way off, as the deliberations and conclusions of the Brussels symposium prove, and the various stances taken by our own Assembly, most recently in the debate on parliaments and defence procurement, Document 807 of 20th June 1979. The reason why we decry such limitation is that we fail to see how, otherwise, any genuine steps forward can in fact be taken towards the desired European co-operation.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we wish lastly to supplement our appraisal by a more comprehensive overview in which we believe the matters we are discussing fall into place. In our view, problems of European co-operation in armaments are to be set in the framework of a policy for peace and détente, and therefore cut-backs in military procurement, and control and a gradual balanced reduction of all armaments.

Other voices than our own have in the past been raised in this Assembly to declare that the first need is to make Europe a great civilised power. Today, in a situation increasingly fraught with tensions and perils, we raise the cry once more. It is indeed a highly civilised and positive step to fight for stability and security in a context of development, co-operation and détente, and to address ourselves to placing impediments in the path of a worsening of existing strains and stresses. The need is, more than ever before, to harmonise all the forces making for peace. It is the only way to secure for mankind, together with peace, enormous resources to be dedicated to progress, co-operation and the development of our peoples. What is wanted is a large measure of international collaboration and co-operation whereby military outlays can be controlled and kept within the needful limits of security and defence. Today's chief need — both in the alliances, WEU itself and our Assembly — is, we believe, for such a choice, whereby Europe will be able to exert itself efficaciously and strive towards peace and détente.

We realise it is no easy path, but we have to look to it whenever, as now, we have to face the problems of weaponry and arms co-operation. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I rise to speak for a brief moment, taking as my text what Mr. Antoni was saying at the end of his speech to the effect that whatever can be done in the matter of European armaments co-operation should be aimed at securing détente and peace, not to say, plainly, a basis for effective action. However, this is in my opinion the political line that the free countries of Europe have always pursued, and that WEU, as, after all, the sole European body competent to deal with defence matters, is still pursuing. The ends of peace and détente will ensue whenever we are in a position to defend ourselves, whenever, that is, we are able to deter other countries or alliances from aggressing us. This is precisely what we are after, and very specific arguments on the subject will be heard at the present session.

At such a delicate stage in our history, at a time when there are so many stresses, new as well as old, abroad in the world, when to motives of political contestation are added motives of fanaticism which kindle highly dangerous fires and involve even greater precaution on the part of Europe, the problem of our own defence, and hence of a defence capability of our own, is posed in categorical terms: especially as we have borne in on us, day by day, the growing difficulties of our United States ally to whom we ought to confirm our solidarity and friendship at this

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

time, and reiterate our interest in seeing that this, our friend, does not stay isolated but can be more vividly aware of the feeling of friendship and willingness to co-operate which we are ready, not to say obligated, to evince at such a time. Europe is and should be concerned to give itself the necessary tools to satisfy this imperious demand of defence of its own existence as a collection of free countries. If this be true, I would think that seeking out the conditions for European co-operation in armaments is becoming increasingly urgent. Hence we should eschew all egotism.

Mr. Gazzo aptly pointed out at the Brussels symposium that legal questions, or tariffs, constitute no real obstacles to reaching an understanding on the topic of collaboration in European armaments policy ; but the real problem, the real obstacle is one of economics, precisely stemming from certain countries' selfishness. In terms of armaments, or arms manufacture, there are in fact countries having substantial interests that still remain oblivious to the necessity, or at any rate advisability, of holding these in check in order to abolish a serious impediment to achievement of the desired ends. Already in June when we turned our minds to the very same problem, we were compelled to criticise with bitterness the attempt by, or rather action on the part of, a certain country, notwithstanding its membership of WEU, to prevent the question of an arms policy from being discussed by the EEC although it does have the necessary powers for doing so : such action was, in sum, directed at Europe itself, at making the allied countries, with joint interests, incapable of fulfilling this essential function of theirs.

Not wishing to overrun the time I have set myself, I conclude by saying that all the promptings of the draft recommendation are absolutely worthy of our support. We have here an altogether commendable recommendation which offends nobody's susceptibilities. However, I still feel some bitterness at the inability, the unwillingness, to pursue the objective mentioned. I trust it will not be too long before every one of us realises the necessity of also forging a European policy on co-operation in armaments. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — The list of speakers is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply ?

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (*Translation*). — I would thank our colleagues for the constructive nature of their remarks on the suggestions contained in the preamble and in the operative paragraphs of the recommendation submitted to you.

With regard to Mr. Antoni's first remark, I would observe that the aim of the recommendation is both modest and realistic. For that reason, we did not wish to incorporate very specific institutional suggestions, thus leaving some room for choice and even for suggestions in a form sufficiently concrete to allow us to move forward along the path of co-operation.

As for his second remark, to the effect that the rôle of WEU has not been sufficiently stressed, I should like all the same to point out that paragraphs 3 and 4 express an energetic attitude, put in very clear terms, to certain replies from the Council which have given rise to censure, without however departing from the language which courtesy demands.

With regard to Mr. Antoni's third remark on the policy of détente and the context of disarmament, it has my full approval. I would nonetheless point out that in the preamble to its report presented last June the General Affairs Committee as a whole stressed the basic importance of these efforts and of the will to achieve détente and reciprocal step-by-step disarmament.

I would also thank Mr. Cavaliere for his constructive remarks. I think we must recognise how completely right he is : in the final analysis, there must be a political will. Nevertheless, the Committee considered that at this juncture it was preferable to help create this will by taking modest but realistic steps rather than by putting forward spectacular suggestions and recommendations which would inevitably weaken that political will.

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Chairman wish to speak ?

Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, on behalf of the Committee I should like to recall briefly how pleased we were that the Assembly planned to have a working group for the Brussels symposium to concern itself primarily with the political implications of the subject discussed at the symposium. It became very clear to us that this must on no account be overlooked : for keenness to produce armaments and to arm is one thing, but placing this in the political context of Europe and demonstrating that it will do no harm to our states and peoples is another.

We had to look at the legislation — as you will see when you look at our recommendation — and we had to consider the information policy that must accompany this. It seemed to us extremely important — and this, too, was included in the recommendation by the Rapporteur — that information shall be passed on, that there will be a centre where people with a practical

Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)

interest in this matter can obtain information. The object of the whole exercise is to put an end to the confusion which still exists despite all our protestations, with a view to finding a reasonable common denominator.

To manage this within the framework of social, economic, legal and human requirements seems to me to be the quintessence of what we have endeavoured to put before you.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

4. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 821 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — We now turn to the next Order of the Day, the presentation of and debate on the report on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe, Document 821 and Amendments.

In a moment I shall call Mr. Meintz to present the report, but I have had notice of a previous question that Mr. Druon proposes to move. Since this previous question seeks to eliminate debate on the first paragraph of the operative text of the draft recommendation contained in Document 821, it must be taken before any debate would normally take place. However, in order to have the report and draft recommendation formally before the Assembly, I now first call Mr. Meintz to present his report. I shall then call Mr. Druon to move his motion. The Assembly will have to decide on Mr. Druon's previous question and we shall proceed from there. I call Mr. Meintz to present his report.

Mr. MEINTZ (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, of the three reports from the Brussels symposium, I have the honour to present the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

The theme of Working Group I, which was the Committee's, was the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe. It was presented in six very important papers, three by government representatives, Mr. Trevor Knapp, Ingénieur-Général Cauchie and Mr. Walsh, and three by representatives of the armaments industry, Mr. Stefanini, Mr. Chevalier and Mr. Striegel. I thank them most sincerely for their contribution to the symposium; their papers provoked a really lively debate.

It was a very substantial debate, which made it no easy task for General Freytag von Loring-

hoven's summary of proceedings appended to my report.

The task was even more difficult for your Committee and Rapporteur because it was left to them to draw the political conclusions of the debate — which was extremely wide-ranging and raised a great many issues. A choice had to be made. From the purely political point of view there were three major themes. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments took these one by one in the three paragraphs of its recommendation. And contrary to what my friend, the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. van Waterschoot, has just said, our Committee did take a position on all three, which has created some stir in the Assembly.

The first paragraph of our recommendation deals with two- and three-way co-operation, and permanent consortia in Europe. Everybody here knows that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has always advocated joint armaments production in Europe. Now, the political question is how to organise the market and production.

For a majority of those attending the symposium and of the Committee, the preferred formula was joint production of a particular weapons system by two or three countries through an international consortium of the member countries' national firms. The days of competitive development of rival military projects by two countries are over, certainly as far as the heaviest-cost projects are concerned.

The Committee considered that the only means of maintaining a viable European armaments industry was through the creation of multinational European consortia; which in fact already exist for some programmes, such as the Hot, Milan and Roland missiles. But such consortia must operate under a concerted action programme.

That is why I, with the support of a majority of the Committee, harked back to paragraph 2 of Recommendation 325 adopted here on 22nd November 1978, calling for the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Economic Community.

I said it was a majority opinion, for a minority in the Committee of course wanted to delete the reference to the European Community — and tabled amendments to this effect — notably on grounds of the latter's powers. Those in favour of deletion relied on three main arguments.

They argued, first, that the European Economic Community has no effective industrial policy; second, that it does not have the necessary technical knowledge to restructure the armaments industry; third, that given its special position, the armaments industry ought not to be

Mr. Meintz (continued)

regarded in the same way as others; all, of course, in the context of the argument of no powers in this field.

But given the real situation of that industry in Europe and all the major economic and social problems involved, referring also to the vote in this Assembly on Mr. Critchley's report of 22nd November 1978 and to your introductory address, Mr. President, at the Brussels symposium, there was nevertheless a majority for retaining the reference to the European Communities in the draft recommendation.

Indeed, Ladies and Gentlemen, this can easily be turned into a contest, a competition between institutions. But in Europe's current economic situation the armaments industry is an important factor and, whether you like it or not, the European Community — precisely by extension of the treaty — cannot in the long run behave as if there is no such thing.

The second paragraph of our recommendation concerns what we call European preference, and exports to third countries. The two topics were discussed at length.

Mainly following Ingénieur-Général Cauchie's report, European preference was defined as follows: where a bi- or trilateral project has been planned and is entering the production phase, other European NATO countries should be expected to give it preference for their future arms requirements — preference, that is, over a possible alternative United States product.

The argument of European preference of course started a debate on a number of closely-related themes, in particular that of free competition, possible price differences and the possible need of trade-offs.

The Committee reached the following conclusion. Where a bi- or trilateral project has been approved by the IEPG it should be arranged for the remaining IEPG countries to give it preference when it reaches the production phase. But to offset this, the production of components or sub-assemblies should be shared among countries having appropriate experience and capability; or else, aid should be given to other sections of the armaments industry as in the case of manufacture of conventional ammunition in Turkey.

During discussion on that same paragraph of our recommendation we also touched on exports to third countries not members of the Alliance.

The principal countries producing sophisticated weapons systems claim, rightly in many cases, that the procurement requirements of a limited number of interested countries do not provide an adequate economic base for production, so that they are compelled to export a

number of such weapons to third countries, which can obviously create political and legal problems in the co-operation agreement.

Some countries make their participation in a multilateral project conditional upon freedom to export without their partners' consent. Other potential participants may make agreement between all participants on exports to third countries a necessary condition for their own participation.

The Committee concludes that the answer surely lies in stronger European preference as just explained, and in the development of the two-way street with the United States so that the market available for the initial products of such a joint project answers the requirements of the Alliance as a whole. In these circumstances the economic necessity of exports to third countries becomes less.

The third paragraph of our recommendation concerns parliamentary control. Here I can be very brief, because the Committee is merely reiterating what it has been saying for years, namely that national parliaments or the appropriate committees must be given full and timely information on defence equipment requirements and research and development projects both in their own and allied countries. Hence it formulates two proposals and a separate draft order.

The first proposal asks the Chairman of Panel I of the IEPG to convey to our Committee the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel I and completed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors.

The second proposal is for the organisation of annual meetings with the Chairmen of the national parliamentary defence committees of the WEU countries and designated members, in order to review the progress of the work mentioned in the IEPG and in the Conference of National Armaments Directors.

Thirdly, the Committee proposes, as it is entitled to do by Resolution 15 adopted in 1959, to invite to its meetings, as observers having the right to speak, members of the parliamentary defence committees of the European NATO countries.

In conclusion, and not to go into too great detail on points that may be raised during the rest of the debate, may I reply to a few that were raised this morning on points of order.

The Brussels symposium ended in mid-October and the meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was held early in November immediately after the All Hallows and All Souls holidays. This gave us a fortnight to draft the report in, have it translated and ensure that it was ready for the Committee meeting. If the point of order raised this morning had been

Mr. Meintz (continued)

raised in the same terms in my national parliament, I would certainly have asked to speak on my own behalf. For it was stated, not just by innuendo but straight out, that this haste had certainly been a ploy to put across somebody or other's particular opinion.

I protest, for it was not the Rapporteur who was in a hurry — he would have been glad to have had more time to draft his report; nor was there any covert intention to deceive any member of the Committee. Nothing of the kind. Every word of the report was written with utter sincerity. Anyone can make counter-proposals or table amendments. The recommendation was duly adopted by 11 votes to 2 with one abstention.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have no more to add to this statement except that we went to a lot of trouble to present you today with a report and that I will be happy if it is adopted by the same majority as it was in Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

As I told you earlier, Mr. Druon has moved a previous question under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure. This has been circulated as Document 826. Under Rule 32, a representative has a prior right to speak if he asks leave to move the previous question or a dilatory motion, and I shall therefore call Mr. Druon now.

Before he speaks, I remind the Assembly that, under Rule 32 (3), the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion and the Rapporteur and the Chairman of any Committee concerned. I further remind the Assembly that, under Rule 31 (7) of the Rules of Procedure, no representative may speak for more than five minutes. This includes the representative who moves the motion.

I call Mr. Druon.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President I did indeed move the previous question on the draft recommendation now tabled under Rule 32 of our Assembly's Rules of Procedure.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are asked to urge the governments of the WEU member states to encourage the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Economic Community and its industrial policy.

For this reason alone, the draft recommendation is in flagrant contradiction with the two treaties establishing the EEC and WEU.

It is contrary to Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome which provides that:

"Any member state may take whatever measures it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security and which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material."

The draft also conflicts with the Brussels Treaty which reserves to WEU the right to examine and adopt at European level joint measures to enable the member states to afford assistance to each other in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression.

Lastly, this text generates a serious legal uncertainty in that it calls into question the international order on which the construction of Europe is based.

To set about restructuring the armaments industries and defining their workload within the framework of the EEC would be letting the latter concern itself with defence matters, which are not within its competence. For armaments industries are not mainly swayed by economic considerations and calculations; they follow strategic and tactical orientations which are the very substance of government defence policies. The definition, production and procurement of weapons are inherently linked to defence options.

Ladies and Gentlemen, if strategy commands armaments policy, I am astonished that such a basic and time-honoured principle should quite recently have been flouted in the European Parliament in an oral question, one of the authors of which was, regrettably, our President with whom I have the honour to sit in Strasbourg. Let me remind you that it asked the Commission of the European Communities to engage in preliminary conversations with NATO and the responsible services of the member states in drafting joint armaments procurement programmes, inviting, in other words, the Brussels Commission to go over the heads of both governments and WEU.

So we must not reduce this debate, as the Rapporteur has just said, to a mere matter of inter-institutional competition. It is a question of definition, and of division of basic responsibilities, and I am astounded that this principle should be flouted here, in the WEU Assembly, whose *raison d'être* is defence matters.

The draft recommendation is contrary to principles. It also conflicts with the facts. Need I remind you that the EEC member states each have their own defence constraints. The United Kingdom and France have nuclear weapons, each with a system of its own; the Federal Republic

Mr. Druon (continued)

of Germany is committed to observe precise limitations; Ireland does not belong to any military organisation; Denmark is part of a denuclearised zone. How then can one fail to understand ...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Druon, will you please conclude.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the matter is serious enough for you to grant me a couple of minutes longer.

The very fact of taking a stance, even under cover of industrial or technological operations, in favour of joint military programmes, outside any legal framework laid down in the treaties, puts the entire European legal order at risk. It is an attitude I consider unwise. It would impair the chances of a proper development of co-operation between states. The proposal before us can only sow discord among Europeans.

If we really wish to examine the merits, we must frankly propose modifying the treaties. If we want WEU to be towed along in the wake of the Brussels Commission like an empty barge, let us say so, and we'll see what happens!

Today, the interest of Europe commands the rationalisation and ordering of what already exists and not upsetting the legal appletart.

I could say a great deal more on the subject, Mr. President, but I am cutting it short.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you, by adopting this previous question, to decide that there are other things to debate besides paragraph 1 of the recommendation which I therefore move we should separate from the text as a whole. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call on one speaker against. There is no representative on the list.

Then I call the Chairman.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I shall try to compensate for the seven minutes taken by the last speaker by speaking for only three minutes. As I believe is well known both in the Committee and in the Assembly, I have opposed the intervention by the European Communities into defence matters. None the less, in spite of that view, which I still hold, I believe that it would be a great mistake today for us to adopt Mr. Druon's motion and prevent this Assembly's debating the subject openly and properly. There is an amendment by Mr. Mulley which will permit such a debate later this afternoon.

In spite of what was said by Mr. Druon, we have already seen that Western European Union has accepted that it has no monopoly in this matter of considering armaments procurement.

We have seen the development of not only the CNAD but the IEPG and we have seen other methods of co-operation. Therefore, I do not believe that this Assembly should accept Mr. Druon's motion.

In particular, I draw attention to the fact that, in spite of my having voted against it, the Assembly has already adopted Resolution 325 on a European armaments policy which makes precise reference to these facts. That has been made even more clear because the Council of WEU, in responding to that particular motion, said that the Assembly's suggestion that it should be involved would imply a wide interpretation of the application of the Treaty of Rome and such interpretation had already been opposed by a number of governments; but the Council did not say that it was wrong for this Assembly to raise the subject.

For that reason, although I happen to disagree with the involvement of the Communities in this matter, I believe that it would be totally wrong for the Assembly to accept Mr. Druon's motion. I hope that it is rejected. I hope that we can continue to debate and will then accept Mr. Mulley's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — The Assembly will now vote on Mr. Druon's previous question, not on Mr. Mulley's amendment. That means that there is no discussion and later we will not adopt paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation. The rest is debatable. I believe I have made the position clear.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The previous question is negatived.

We now go on with the general debate.

I shall call first Mr. Bernini. He will be followed by Mr. Mulley and then by Mr. Boucheny and Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, while I appreciate Mr. Meintz's report and its abundant information on the Brussels symposium, and am agreeable to the draft order, I cannot subscribe to the draft recommendation. There are some points on which my Italian communist colleagues and myself dissent from it.

First, albeit for different reasons from those Mr. Druon expressed just now, we disagree that "defence procurement policies and the restructuring of the European armaments industry should be placed under the aegis of the European Community".

Any such course goes far beyond the material necessity upheld in Brussels of a co-ordinated production by military and civilian manufacturers. As a fact, placing arms procurement

Mr. Bernini (continued)

policy, an essential aspect of defence policy, under the aegis of the Community is tantamount to vesting it in the latter ; and circumventing in this way, by means of the "restructuring of the armaments industry and the creation of European consortia", the obligations of control and limitation of armaments which the Brussels Treaty lays on the Federal Republic of Germany and all the countries of Europe.

Now, we have said it before and will go on saying it, not only is all this contrary to the treaties establishing the Community, but it also gives more power to the elbows of the forces determined, as we have again experienced this week, to press for the creation of a new military bloc in Europe ; and it is therefore bound, as the recent debate in the European Parliament goes to show, to arouse opposition, disputes in the Community and suspicions outside, notwithstanding the urgency, more than ever before, to reduce the causes of tension and mistrust, and allow détente and the spirit of collaboration to prevail in Europe and the world at large.

We therefore believe that such a course will not facilitate, but create new obstacles to, the policy of European co-operation, a risk also highlighted by the Brussels symposium. It was no mere chance that the report on the matter was not debated and that clamorous voices should be raised to proclaim the inescapable duties laid upon WEU, as the sole European Assembly responsible for defence matters, with respect to a policy of arms procurement and co-operation. It is very odd that WEU should itself issue a directive effectively relinquishing its own institutional tasks.

Secondly, we have reservations on the rôle to be assigned to "permanent international consortia" as a means of eventually achieving "fully European arms corporations".

Now, experience has demonstrated the potential value of such consortia, especially in the production of certain weapon systems. But owing to the varying degrees of technological development and production capacity in European industry and differences in arms procurement practices, such permanent bodies and in particular fully European corporations, might favour and privilege the strongest European industrial groups and countries, thus helping to widen differences, accentuate development imbalances, and so ending by hindering instead of promoting co-operation and European preference in arms procurement.

Hence, a policy of European co-operation might truly be advanced, as in our view the Brussels symposium did go to show, provided account be taken of these inter-country differences in the

level of technological capability, and production capacity of their industries, and that the principles of parity of esteem and mutual interest for all European countries be upheld : provided, that is, the greatest number of countries have a stake in co-operation from the most advanced forms of planning and co-production to manufacture of systems components. In this way, we believe, we may effectively help to give Europe more say in the growth of a transatlantic market and the process of replacement of NATO armaments ; and by the same token enhance its capability of international initiative for the control and limitation of the trade in armaments, whose growth daily adds to the threats that hang over security and peace, in Europe and world-wide. Well now, the draft recommendation bears no trace of all this although it did figure in the proceedings at Brussels.

Lastly, and our remark is equally applicable to the proceedings of the Brussels symposium as a whole, the absence in the reference to a European policy of military equipment procurement of any steps towards weapons reductions and disarmament is in our opinion a serious lacuna.

The requirement of steadfastly pursuing such a course is particularly urgent today by reason of the status and size of weaponry, the growing threat arising from their destructive potential and the enormous and increasingly exorbitant financial resources absorbed by them ; we are daily witnesses of the rising tension thus created and the way in which world development problems are rendered more difficult and dramatic.

Standardisation and interoperability, and European co-operation in achieving them, of which we are in favour, are truly called for by a material process determined by the evolving international military relations and the increasing rôle to be played by Europe in NATO to forward its own interests and security. But achieving these ends should in no way help to trigger off a new rearmaments race, but on the contrary form one aspect of an endeavour to maintain existing equilibria at gradually lower levels of armament.

To this end we attach importance to : first, the instruction to hold joint meetings between our Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and national parliamentary defence committees ; second, the rôle of guidance and supervision that should be played by national parliaments in the process of arms procurement as urged by the Brussels symposium.

I say this not only to ensure greater awareness of the work of the IEPG and facilitate choices and preferences in European co-operation, but also in order that options for the replacement of NATO's military equipment may be harmonised with the endeavour to secure a favourable out-

Mr. Bernini (continued)

come in the Vienna negotiations and agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact for a balanced reduction of armaments and for disarmament, in response to the crying need for cutting back military expenditure and releasing growing resources to overcome the problems of the underdevelopment of whole regions which are, as we realise more clearly day by day, inseparable from those of European and world security and peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Mulley.

Mr. MULLEY (*United Kingdom*). — First, Mr. President, perhaps I may express my pleasure at being back in this chamber as a member after an absence of eighteen years — not least because this is the only European parliamentary assembly with competence and responsibility in defence matters. It is, perhaps, a commentary on the subject that we are now discussing that I well recall — as I expect you do, Mr. President — that it was on our agenda twenty years ago. I think that we can say that progress has been extremely disappointing. It is a very important subject and I believe that the Assembly is absolutely right to continue to press its views.

I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the success of the Brussels symposium, which gave us the opportunity of discussing these issues with distinguished representatives of government and industry. I should like also to congratulate our Rapporteur, Mr. Meintz, for his excellent report and summary of Working Group I in Brussels.

There is no question but that there are political, economic and defence advantages in European co-operation and collaboration in arms programmes as long as it is necessary for us to have armaments, and it would be quite wrong for Europe to allow itself to become merely a sub-contractor in the armaments industry.

It seems to me essential that we should retain, for technological reasons, a research and development capability.

It is much easier to talk about European arms collaboration than to achieve concrete results, although, with the bilateral and multilateral programmes that have developed, some progress has been made. I can assure the Assembly that it is not for any lack of political will. As Secretary for Defence I not only devoted a lot of time to this but participated in regular meetings which were started and, I believe, will continue, of the British, French and German Ministers. I only wish that the independent European programme group could also meet at ministerial level, but that has not so far proved possible.

It would be wrong not to recognise that there are real practical problems. We shall not make progress unless we understand that. I do not believe that fancy formulae or new institutions will solve these problems. Responsibility rests and must remain with member governments. I shall try and set out the problems briefly — ten minutes is a long time when one is listening but a short time when one is speaking.

At first, the whole concept has to be long term — ten or fifteen years — because it is clear that we can get collaboration on new generations of weapons that must be European only from the beginning, that is, in the research and development stage. It is too late once production has begun.

Secondly, there is real difficulty about getting agreement among the countries about the military requirements for new weapons. Ministers must press their chiefs of staff to work more quickly on this matter. Since every agreement will be a compromise of the desires and aspirations of the chiefs, they must make compromises that will help the programme without impairing their defence capability.

Thirdly, there is always a time-table problem. No country wants new aircraft, new tanks or whatever weapons are involved at precisely the same time as another. The date of replacement and obsolescence tends to be different in every case.

This is coupled with a fourth difficulty, namely, the rigidity of defence budgets. Naturally, new defence equipment has to be spread over the three services. It is impracticable to get a whole lot of new aircraft, new tanks and new ships all within the same financial period. This tends to be different for each country. Some compromises, again, need to be made.

Fifthly, there is always the problem that members of parliament are subject to political, industrial and trade union pressures to try and maximise employment in the arms industry in our own countries. Several colleagues have told me from time to time that they are not keen on increasing defence expenditure but that if armaments must be bought, they should be bought in their constituencies. Despite what we hear, this is a powerful lobby with which we have to contend.

Finally, as the Rapporteur mentioned, there is the special problem of sales to third countries. I am sorry, Mr. President, if I sound like a foreman in a factory who was once described as a man with a problem for every solution. I believe that we must maintain a momentum and pursue the package of proposals that have been drawn up in exploring the two-way street policy of the United States. I believe that both the present and

Mr. Mulley (continued)

former United States administrations were sincere about this policy. This can best be pursued through the existing machinery, namely, the IEPG and the Committee of National Armaments Directors and not by creating new machinery that will probably bring new problems.

I have one strong reservation about the draft recommendation before us. I have tabled an amendment to delete the reference :

“under the aegis of the industrial policy of the European Community”.

I say straight away, Mr. President, that I have no objection to EEC involvement in principle. In fact, it was that great European, Jean Monnet, who persuaded me of the wisdom and enthusiasm of the European ideal twenty-seven years ago, in 1952 when he had just taken over the presidency of the Coal and Steel Community. I have not changed my view since that time. Indeed, I believe that we could do with a little more of the European ideal today. It seems to me sometimes that it has tended to get lost in the morass of current technical arguments.

I would also not object if the EEC developed a genuine industrial policy. It has always been a puzzle to me how an association of mainly industrial nations comes to spend 90 % of its time and 75 % of its money on agriculture. As part of an industrial policy, defence equipment would play a subsidiary part. I am, however, certain that, apart from having plenty of problems to deal with now, the Commission does not have and cannot have, without a fundamental change in its functions, the competence to take a special rôle in arms procurement.

In particular, it does not have at its disposal the technical and military expertise which I have tried to show are essential prerequisites to progress towards co-operative and collaborative programmes. Nor does it have the funds. I would be strongly opposed to the provision of additional funds to the Community for this purpose. I hope, therefore, that when the time comes, Mr. President, the Assembly will accept the amendment. I shall then be much happier about the draft recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Mulley. I committed a crime in not welcoming you after so long an absence from this house. You will remember it has been eighteen years. Welcome again to this house.

I now call Mr. Boucheny, who will be followed by Mr. Baumel and then by Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the current ideological and political campaign to

increase the military potential of the NATO forces, a prominent place is being given to the standardisation of armaments.

The press is full of speeches about the “Soviet threat”, and the ensuing need for NATO to strengthen itself and drag the world into the infernal cycle of over-armament. The question may be viewed from two angles: technical and economic, as seen by Mr. Davignon at the Brussels symposium, and political, as in our Assembly, and in particular Mr. Meintz’s report.

I should like to begin with the former, and refer to Mr. Davignon’s speech in Brussels on behalf of the European Commission, which was particularly revealing as to the goals set and the means employed by the advocates of European integration.

Under cover of strictly “economist” arguments, Mr. Davignon proposes neither more nor less than establishing a veritable common market of military industries.

In his view a “situation of considerable crisis” is leading citizens to ask for “proof that each category of expenditure is being used to the best advantage, and that states should optimise their expenditure”. There follows from this a kind of logic which leads quite naturally to the conclusion that it is necessary to establish a European armaments industry, to the detriment of the workers who will be its victims.

Mr. Davignon notes, moreover, that there is no longer an armaments industry confined to one exclusive and strictly delimited sector. He says “The manufacture of modern or sophisticated weapons, is, in the high technology industries, closely interlinked with that of goods for civilian use”. He confirms this by saying: “it is therefore no longer the classic situation we had when there were ordnance factories; in the major industries there are departments working on both military and civilian contracts”.

At a time when the French Government and Minister Bourges are attacking workers in ordnance factories and major French nationalised undertakings, the reference to ordnance factories is no mere coincidence. The whole capability of arms construction must be handed over to big capital, whose spokesman Viscount Davignon is. By this kind of standardisation of the armaments industry, Viscount Davignon is trying to demonstrate the tie-up between major civil manufacturers and the armaments industry. At the very same time, moreover, the Rapporteur has been indulging in the same exercise.

As big capital sees it, such standardisation is not simply one element in the economy; big capital is to be given access to the enormous wealth created by armaments and, if possible, at the risk of endangering peace, increasing military

Mr. Boucheny (continued)

manufactures and speeding up international concentration in this sector.

Then in the report by Mr. Meintz, political problems are dealt with much more directly. He asks for "the creation of permanent international consortia in Europe" to be encouraged, which will require greater mobility of labour, at any rate of tradesmen and skilled workers.

Hence, voices are being raised by the champions of European integration, calling for restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community whose purpose is to wreck the national economy and France's defence, and bring the workers to heel.

National defence requirements would be dictated by outsiders. The fate of our firms and our workers' place of employment would be decided by them too. This is unacceptable, and we oppose it with all our might.

Voices are being raised — and you, Mr. President, I regret to say have echoed them — to settle this problem politically by advocating that part of the representatives of the Communities, and not of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, should be directly co-opted into WEU, which would in this way be turned into a sort of shamefully illegal defence committee of the assembly of the European Communities, thus fulfilling the hopes of those who would like a rehash of the European Defence Community which, I remind you, was rejected by the European peoples.

There is a great danger of seeing French high technology, the ordnance factories and nationalised industries sacrificed at European level. All goes to show clearly that we have entered into an active phase of European integration, where results will be the closure of a large number of French firms, and unemployment for the technicians, workers and engineers of the nationalised industries and arsenals. It is a concerted plan, being implemented stage by stage, but it is running up against the national will of the workers, determined to defend our essential defence capability.

Our anxiety is well-founded as is our fighting spirit, knowing that the French Government has in its recent statements come out in favour of armaments standardisation, and that Mr. Bourges, the French Defence Minister, only recently defended the government's policy on armaments standardisation in parliamentary debates in the National Assembly and Senate.

Moreover, the attributes of the French speakers go to prove it; and we are entitled to ask: were they speaking on behalf of the government? But

we shall have an opportunity of putting this question to the French Minister tomorrow.

Armaments firms, as advocated in the report, i.e. of European dimensions, would constitute a pressure group on defence policy and at the same time a grave danger for the peace and security of the workers. And we should note that the pressures to exacerbate tension in Europe through the introduction of Pershing II and Cruise missiles prove how real the danger is.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I hope that you will follow me in asking Mr. Bozzi to speak first. He wants to speak to the vote, but as he is the Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, which is to meet at 5 p.m., I hope that you will agree that he will speak first. Then we shall close the general debate with Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am indeed grateful to you for facilitating the task of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, which is going to meet in a moment. And I will match your gesture by being brief.

For four reasons which I shall state without comment, the Joint Democrat Group over which I have the honour to preside will vote against the report by our honourable friend, Mr. Meintz. However highly we may esteem the quality of the paper, we cannot approve its conclusions.

For one thing, the Meintz report proposes conferring upon the EEC competence in defence matters. We Gaullists have already had occasion to denounce this flagrant violation of the Treaty of Rome. On the other hand, the report is strangely silent about the specific powers of our own Assembly, which would however be the ideal forum, and one designated by the treaties, for co-operation in armaments, which we are far from rejecting as bluntly as our French colleague, Mr. Boucheny, has just done.

Secondly, the Meintz report calls for a lowering of tariffs behind which the armaments industries which Europe needs and, may I add, the Atlantic Alliance also needs, are going to develop.

Now, we should not go about it differently if we deliberately wanted to risk creating a veritable monopoly for the United States, which has the means to develop on a world scale, at any rate on a broadly European scale, a technology in some cases more advanced than our own. We should thus end by allowing a take-over by the United States, our American allies, of all our armaments industries. They are our allies, and we acknowledge them as such, but we refuse their right to take over the whole of our armaments industries.

Similarly, and for the same underlying reasons, we oppose the third proposal in the Meintz report

Mr. Bozzi (continued)

which envisages the formation of permanent multinational consortia which would very quickly become veritable states within a state, would acquire formidable power and behave like supranational bodies, to which we are absolutely opposed and this won't be the last time you hear us say so.

Lastly, the Meintz report seems to us to condemn ill-consideredly any policy of arms exports to countries not members of the Atlantic Alliance.

What, I ask you, would then become of the armaments industry of our friend and ally, Britain? What would become of the French armaments industry — and as Rapporteur for the land forces in the French national defence budget I know what I am talking about — if our British neighbour and ally and we ourselves had no possibility of arms sales that would enable us in a large measure to amortise our own armaments and defence efforts?

For all these reasons, we shall vote against the Meintz report.

(Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Baumel and he will be followed by Mr. Jung.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — I shall add very briefly a few arguments to those already expounded by the French colleagues who have preceded me. I shall not revert to the arguments developed by Mr. Druon concerning the absolute illegality of any attempt by the European Community to intervene in the definition of arms production and procurement. The EEC has no competence for defence, and the proposal is in absolute contradiction to the two founding treaties of the Community and WEU.

For these reasons, I am astonished that in this very forum a number of WEU members and the Bureau of the Assembly should be ready to put to the vote a text fundamentally at variance with what actually established WEU.

I shall not add any argument to that advanced by Mr. Bozzi concerning the associated problems of co-production of war materials. I would simply recall that Mr. Meintz's report, aside from the criticisms already expressed, still carries a few lingering ambiguities about his proposals in the industrial area.

He advocates giving the IEPG the rôle of endorsing — I underline the word — European projects for defence equipment. Now anyone who is at all well informed — and I believe there are

some in this Assembly — knows that the IEPG prepares decisions, but has no decision-making powers of its own. Consequently, endorsement is in any case ruled out. It can consider projects but certainly not endorse them. It is above all for WEU, the institution in which the European countries are able to take decisions of common interest among themselves, to allow such an operation and take decisions.

Lastly, the Rapporteur's proposal to create a market for defence equipment covering the whole Alliance perfectly conveys the real underlying significance of the text. In such a concept, there would no longer be any European solidarity worthy of the name and the European countries would be unable to protect their military industrial potential, i.e. in actual fact their advanced technology, by raising customs tariffs to offset inequalities across the Atlantic. In the event of a unification of the Atlantic armaments market, we should witness a division of work that would inevitably relegate the European industries to the rôle of subcontractors and purveyors of low technology equipment of little added value.

All these trends would be pernicious to Europe. They would weaken it in competition with American industry and technology and would be divisive. There would be an artificial opposition between states exporters of military equipment and those which are not, member states of the integrated military set-up and those which have kept full control over their own means of security, states specialising in a given form of military production and those covering a more complete industrial spectrum.

In the final analysis, the effect of Mr. Meintz's report would be to rob Europe of its ability to secure its own defence. It is therefore a divisive and weakening factor not only in Western Europe but, I am bound to say, in the Atlantic Alliance too.

It would therefore be regrettable if the WEU Assembly were to fall in with it. In any case, some of the French delegates among us will oppose, it, as you have just heard from the lips of Mr. Bozzi.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). — I will be very short. I am one of the French Committee members who voted for the report by Mr. Meintz, which I commend for its excellence. I am indeed surprised by what I have heard today.

First of all, the criticisms about what happened in Committee: many members did come to Paris and, if some of my compatriots were unable to, they had good reasons for it and it is not the Committee's, or WEU's, arrangements that deserve to be criticised.

Mr. Jung (continued)

What is more, I honestly believe that the Committee's favourable vote in no way threatened the immediate future of Europe. We were, on the contrary, convinced of the necessity of some long-term programming. I have heard many complaints from members of France's general staff about the non-standardisation of armaments. And one of the most constructive aspects of the report was that it tried to promote a number of ideas which are not, contrary to what was said by one of the previous speakers — I apologise for contradicting him — pernicious to Europe. I am convinced that they are favourable to Europe for, to judge by our discussions here, one has the impression that there is no realisation of the world situation in which we are. Considering the imminent dangers that threaten us from all sides, it is in our interests to bring together the free countries of Europe. I do not believe that we are endangering the livelihood of French workers in any way whatsoever. And let me tell some of our honourable friends that they would do well to look at what is happening in other countries outside the Community, to see which way the wind blows.

In any case, I cannot say that the Committee did not discuss the problem, and I am very disappointed that some of those who should have been there were unable to attend, because that is when some good work could have been done. I myself shall be voting for Mr. Meintz's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. MEINTZ (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — I was extremely surprised by the unanimous onslaught — with the exception of Mr. Jung — on a report that was quite difficult to prepare, the debates at the Brussels symposium having been difficult too!

My first attendance at a debate of the WEU Assembly has indeed taught me that no credence should be given to votes in WEU. Nearly all the attacks have been directed against this text on the grounds that we have exceeded our rights under our constitution. Now, all I did was to copy a text adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978. I would invite everybody to reread it: paragraph 2 recommends that the Council should call for the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and research.

If therefore quoting a WEU text, voted by the Assembly, infringes the Assembly's principles and rights, I shall take care in future not to reread any of the texts it adopts.

Some speakers have explained their attacks, and I thank Mr. Mulley for stating the reasons for his opposition but beg to disagree.

I believe in fact that if all matters of defence policy come within our purview, we have to define it at ground level and in the political, economic and social context of Europe. It must be translated into real terms, and we need this industry which — whether you like it or not — is an obvious part of the economic context with which the EEC Commission will also have to contend.

I believe that, instead of finding fault with it, we should have every interest in upholding our own competence by defining policy and joining forces with any other institutions likely to be charged with subsequently putting it into effect. And I thank Mr. Jung for having somewhat supported this view.

I regret to have to tell Mr. Mulley and others that, for the reasons I stated just now and have now repeated, I cannot agree to Amendment 1, especially as it has already been voted on in Committee. It is now for the Assembly to decide.

With regard to the amendments tabled by Mr. Baumel, I had entirely failed to grasp the implications of paragraph 2 in the recommendation when I spoke of bilateral or multilateral European defence equipment projects duly endorsed by the IEPG. I meant "endorsed" in the sense that the projects were submitted to governments. I entirely agree to the amendment for leaving out "endorsed" and inserting "examined". It is in my view a terminological point, but Mr. Baumel is right: it is more than that, it is substantive; so I agree to his amendment.

On the other hand, I disagree with Amendment 3, because it would curb the real gist of our proposal for creating a much wider market.

This will certainly not be a divisive factor; it is quite simply a question of co-operation in NATO, to enable a bigger armaments market, which would in the long run bring with it a fall in armaments exports.

I am not opposed to armaments exports, but it is one of the conclusions of the Brussels symposium that these exports create political problems. We only have to open the newspaper or listen to what is being said in parliament: armaments exports to third countries cause controversy. But industrialists say: "What are we to do if we cannot export?"

Consequently, we propose a market encompassing the whole of the Alliance, which is why I cannot agree to Amendment 3.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate on Document 821 is concluded and the vote will be taken at the end of the sitting, after discussion of the third report.

5. Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 823)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979, Document 823.

I call Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, whether it be the interests of the Atlantic Alliance, or Europe too with all its weight of history and its historic responsibilities, or Europe in its specific strategic character, we owe it to ourselves to secure a defence powerful enough to be credible.

Mr. Onslow will doubtless place more emphasis on the topical aspects which I briefly touched on this morning in another context, and will show you how much the international balance or rather imbalance has been developing over the past few months: Mr. Brezhnev's statements and warnings constitute as many new facts which can hardly be ignored.

On the part of the report that concerns me, I shall be referring more especially to the technical aspects, though I conclude on a somewhat political note.

I already had the honour to present to you at the last session a report on the industrial bases of European security. The accompanying recommendation said the report was to be considered as a preparatory paper for the Brussels symposium.

We had hoped that the Council's reply could be conveyed to us before the proceedings of the symposium. Unfortunately, this was not done, since the Council's reply did not reach the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly until 23rd November. In that connection, Mr. President, I should like to point out to the eminent representatives of the Council how difficult it is to work in such conditions. We should like replies to Assembly recommendations to be supplied in future in time for the Assembly and above all its Committees to take the Council's replies or conclusions into account where follow-up action is announced and planned. In this particular case, the reply to Recommendation 332 is entirely instructive. I therefore hope, Mr. President, that procedures can be improved upon.

The introduction to the report singles out the main guidelines for the discussions at Brussels.

It was no easy matter: discussions of a highly technical nature are not always easily translated into political conclusions.

The report deals with six specific subjects concerning future weapons.

So far as the future tank is concerned, the main question will be a decision either to use light tanks supported by helicopters, which involves commissioning armoured helicopters like those already used by the Americans in Vietnam, or the deployment of increasingly sophisticated heavy tanks. The Committee has proposed that we should initiate straight away a discussion and study on this point. Apparently not all experts are of the same opinion on the choice to be made.

In the case of the combat aircraft for the 1990s our forces will clearly require a new ground attack aircraft for the battlefield area. Such an aircraft should have a short landing and perhaps even a vertical take-off capacity. At the Brussels symposium, attention was chiefly focused on this requirement. As pointed out in the report, it will be necessary to reconcile often conflicting requirements, e.g. those of the British and the German air forces.

In the production of new types of aircraft, lasting co-operation amongst our countries is seen as an inescapable need; and governments will have to promote the formation of permanent groups, so as to provide long-term guarantees to convince the participants of the profitability of their investments. But once again the decision is primarily a matter for governments.

For the tactical missiles to equip our forces after 1990 the authorities will have to lay down interoperability standards such as will be increasingly necessary in aerospace. Governments' willingness to carry things through to a successful conclusion is of course a prerequisite. Quite apart from interoperability, intra-European co-operation raises problems that are difficult to resolve in the case of tactical missiles. Indeed, with these very sophisticated systems, it is hard to achieve a satisfactory distribution of self-contained components whose production would be shared by the individual participants. Such co-operation would involve a readiness of each country to specialise in a particular area. That, as you are aware, always means a difficult choice, since it may be considered to involve the risk of a certain loss of independence in national productions — hard to accept in the current situation in Europe.

Shipbuilding — a topic on which Mr. Onslow will have something to say — raises one of the most important problems to be resolved, especially everything to do with the modernisation of industries. You know what difficulties Europe is having to contend with, to produce at a competitive price to enable it to survive. Exam-

Mr. Vallex (continued)

ples have proved that solutions do exist. I mention the minesweeper jointly built in French and Netherlands shipyards. Further experiments on such lines ought not to come up against too many obstacles, and is a *sine qua non* for the survival of our naval shipyards.

To raise quality standards, some standardisation in unit components, modules and greater containerisation must be encouraged.

With conditions as they are at present in the shipbuilding industry, it will be very difficult to persuade the responsible authorities, but we have already seen in some countries that artificial support for an ailing industry is liable to cause a decline and not an increase in production capacity and product quality, so that the choice is a necessary one.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in the report of 21st May which I submitted to you and you approved, I gave a list of the fifteen technologies in which the situation in Europe may be considered critical. Among these are: computer networks, major computer systems and electronic communications. In all these areas, European industry is still too weak and is in danger of losing its competitiveness in respect of Japan and the United States.

It is clearly unacceptable for Europe to remain dependent on imported computer components for its military electronic communications hardware.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has instructed one of its members to carry out a study on the technology of military telecommunications. The report will be presented to our Assembly next June.

Europe owes it to itself, I insist, to win back the initiative in this respect at whatever cost. This is the very special significance of paragraph 7 in the recommendation.

It is unfortunate that the Unidata consortium, comprising Philips, Siemens and CII, is not being reactivated in one form or another, or at all concretely. As I said at Brussels, WEU has a decisive rôle to play in this respect; this holds true from the technological standpoint, and is fundamental from the military one as well. Only when Europe proves itself capable of producing all the equipment necessary to its security can its will to defend itself, and its fitness to be a full-time partner of the United States, become credible.

The European countries have specific armaments requirements not always compatible, as you are aware, with those of our great American allies.

I should also like to dwell upon Europe's successes in space. The launching of Ariane in less than a fortnight will demonstrate Europe's capability, for it does not seem likely that we should run into any snags on that score. What is important is that you should always remain convinced that co-operation is developing very actively in this area and that European production is winning ground. You know how full the order books of the European Space Agency are.

In conclusion, I shall mention the political aspect.

At the Brussels symposium we listened to Viscount Davignon, the Commissioner responsible for industrial affairs in the Commission of the European Communities.

I shall not go back over all that was said this afternoon and should remain basic in our mutual relations, since we conduct our proceedings and fulfil our responsibilities within the framework of treaties that are perfectly clear.

Mr. Davignon himself stressed that the EEC's industrial capacities were not far short of those of the United States in the armaments field. It is an irrefutable observation, but it is not accompanied by an analysis of the European armaments industry.

What I want to emphasise, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that, on any assumption, defence being of course dependent on the competence of states, armaments themselves depend on whatever defence policy is followed. Hence it is for WEU to pinpoint, for the benefit of our governments, individually and collectively, the defence options frequently referred to this afternoon.

I remind you that the EEC has no remit or competence for dealing with defence and armaments. On the other hand, it would be self-evidently desirable — and why should our dialogue not become complementary? — for the European Communities to set about forming a genuine industrial common market, which nobody would be against. But in default of such an industrial common market, let everyone look after his own estate and not trespass on anyone else's.

Ladies and Gentlemen, had I been the sole Rapporteur, maybe I should have laid down some guidelines, if not different, at any rate somewhat qualified and, in certain cases, more precise. But the report of which I am co-author with Mr. Onslow is the fruit both of putting two heads together, and of work done in Committee.

The proposed recommendation we are submitting to you and which, it is my duty to insist, reminds us in the preamble that WEU alone is competent in military matters, emphasises the main orientations our governments will be taking — at any rate we hope so — in

Mr. Valleix (continued)

order to ensure that genuine technological co-operation may be pushed as far as possible in the military area.

Once again, my political and technological conclusion is the extraordinary development of micro-processor and data-processing techniques, and a reminder that we should urge our governments to move in that direction, for otherwise Europe's defence capabilities are liable to be very quickly and fundamentally discredited.

Lastly, with regard to the wish to see the European structures develop — and why not through a consortium? — we must qualify this with two comments: yes, provided the states retain their powers of decision-making; yes, provided the structures, private or otherwise, do not arrogate to themselves such a power of control or guidance as to go beyond the bounds of the right of decision-making in matters of states' defence.

Subject to these remarks, Ladies and Gentlemen, I trust our Assembly will vote in favour of this report, so that we may, together with the other Committees, continue to influence our governments and, in the name of WEU as a whole, labour for the defence of Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

I call Mr. Onslow, the Committee's co-Rapporteur.

Mr. ONSLOW (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, my colleague, Mr. Valleix, has rightly reminded the Assembly that two Rapporteurs producing one report is not necessarily the easiest way for either of us to proceed. I hope that nothing that I say will necessarily be attributed to him, in the same way as I am sure that he understands that his point of view and mine are inevitably bound to differ.

Perhaps I may attempt to add one or two comments to what Mr. Valleix has said in so ably introducing the report. First, in a sense, the problem faced by the whole of the Brussels symposium was that of indentifying correctly the task that was before us. When you come to consider this report, I think that it must be right for you to ask yourselves how one defines European security, because unless we can formulate an agreement among ourselves about the nature of the threats that we face, it becomes rather difficult to be precise about the necessary industrial base.

Therefore, in a sense, my remarks are more directed towards identifying the strategic defence procurement requirements of Europe than to

dwelling on any one or other of the various topics that we studied in Brussels. I am bound to say, however, having listened to discussion on the future tank with increasing scepticism when we were told that it would be two-gun and turretless — which does not accord with my own remote experience with that branch of military activity — that I was driven to ask myself why the Americans should make tanks, anyway, because unless we suppose that there will be some cataclysm that will promote a tank war in the continental United States, there is no strategic industrial requirement for the Americans to make tanks for themselves. This is a point that we might have discussed more profitably four or five years ago and so avoided some of the conclusions to which European nations have now come. I make it to underline what we are talking about when we refer to industrial bases. One of the industrial capabilities that Europe has to retain if it is to defend itself against foreseeable threats is the vertical take-off ability encompassed in the British Harrier. That is why I am particularly glad to see mention of that capability in the recommendation before the Assembly.

In one respect at least we may have been guilty, in writing our report, of looking so far into the future that we lost sight of the immediate prospects. It would be wrong for you to conclude from what we have put before you that there is nothing going on that can encourage us. On the contrary, I have made some researches into British industry. I have learned that work is taking place on a third-generation anti-tank guided weapon system and that the collaboration for the replacement for Swingfire, Hot and Milan is taking place between British Aerospace, in the United Kingdom, Aérospatiale in France, and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm in Germany. In the area of medium-range surface-to-air missiles another collaborative study is in train between British Aerospace, Thompson CSF in France and MBB in Germany. The same is true in other important areas where one can foresee developing defence requirements.

All these, I have to say, are still feasibility studies. Defence industries do not live on feasibility studies alone. It is vital that we resolve to pursue these joint collaborative ventures to the point where European governments underwrite them by procurement decisions.

I hope that it will not be long before we see decisions of that kind coming through. They are really the only effective European commitment to joint defence — a decision by the major industrial powers in the European Community and in the defence community to combine to share out work among themselves and other European nations to meet the defence needs that Europe can identify.

Mr. Onslow (continued)

If that is to be done successfully, we need two things. We need total commitment of all European nations to work together to this end. There is no room for a soft option decision. The decision to produce weapons that Europe collectively needs for its own defence has to be one to which all European nations are totally committed.

The second point I would make is that it needs understanding on the part of our American allies. If a situation arises, either by accident or by design, in which Europe finds itself forced to rely on European purchases of American defence systems, the commitment of our electorates to their own defence will become correspondingly less. There will be no jobs, no involvement and no technological challenge left to us. It will all have gone across the Atlantic. We must not allow that to happen.

For the success of the policies we have been trying to discuss today it is essential that we commit ourselves and that our American friends understand and seek to encourage Europe to act as a full and equal partner in the procurement of its own defence needs. If we do not achieve that, not only will our industry suffer, but so will our ability to defend ourselves. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I have one further name on the list of speakers. I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, in my maiden speech to this Assembly, I wish to address my brief remarks to recommendation 3 in this report, which invites member governments :

“To bring to a successful conclusion without delay discussions on the successor, for the 1990s, to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German air force and the further development of the British Harrier.”

In my judgment, there is no issue of greater importance to the future of the European armaments industry than the development of a new combat aircraft. I welcome very much therefore the attention which your Rapporteurs have drawn to this important matter. I congratulate them particularly on emphasising the crucial strategic context in which this vital procurement decision will have to be taken. In this regard, I ask you to turn to paragraph 13 in which our Rapporteurs emphasise that :

“The local imbalance of ground forces can only be balanced by air power with its flexi-

bility and quick reaction capability in space and time.”

I am convinced, Mr. President, that air power is likely to be a vital determinant in the outcome of any battle in Central Europe.

The only really effective means that the severely outnumbered forces of the Western Alliance will have to counter the overwhelming strength of the armoured formations of the Warsaw Pact will be air power. We can presume, I believe, that the Warsaw Pact will choose the time and the place of aggression if it seeks to pursue its political policies by offensive military action. Air power alone enables the commanders of the Western Alliance to put countervailing forces at the critical spot. This is also a facet of our Rapporteurs' report.

For air power to be effective as a counterweight to armour, air superiority over the battlefield will be absolutely essential. We must therefore ensure, Mr. President, that in looking at this crucial procurement decision a new tactical aircraft has a formidable air combat capability. It will also have an offensive support capability, as our Rapporteurs imply in paragraph 14. In the air environment of Western Europe, which will be extremely hazardous to say the least, and taking account of the weather that prevails over Western Europe, the new combat fighter must have a degree of all-weather capability and navigational attack systems which in an offensive support rôle will enable the aircraft to make single pass attacks from very low altitude. It will therefore need to be a multi-rôle aeroplane. Both operational requirements — the British and the German — contain valid elements.

I well understand the German emphasis on air combat and, in view of the need to ensure that as much of our air forces as possible remains intact on the ground after the first strikes, it is necessary that V/STOL, as Mr. Onslow reminded us, be incorporated in any design.

So both operational requirements have validity. But we cannot expect any such aircraft to be cheap and it will need to be effective against potential opposition well into the next century. Therefore, I say that neither the F-16 nor even the F-18L, which is mentioned in this report, meets the requirements. What is required is a new aircraft with the very latest technology.

But to develop and to build industrially such an aeroplane use should be made of consortia which have experience of constructing multi-rôle aeroplanes. The classic one that comes to my mind, as it did to the minds of the Rapporteurs in paragraph 17, is the Panavia consortium, which has built so effectively the Tornado aircraft in both the interdiction rôle and currently also the air defence rôle.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

If it is to be a genuinely European aeroplane, as we all wish it to be, our Rapporteurs are right to remind us that in June this year this Assembly accepted Recommendation 332, which said that the next generation of fighter aircraft should be a promotion of co-operation between existing management consortia producing the Jaguar and the Tornado, that is, Sepecat and Panavia. Sepecat is a fairly ad hoc industrial organisation, with co-operation between, initially, Bréguet and BAC and, latterly, between Avions Marcel Dassault and BAC, whereas Panavia is a fully institutionalised, trinational collaborative company. For such a truly European fighter to be successful, it will be necessary for less emphasis to be placed on purely national projects than on getting the design for the new fighter right. That is the important thing.

In my concluding remarks I would just say that in our rightful ambition to develop the best possible air combat and offensive support aeroplane for the European air forces for the last decade of this century we should not lose sight of the great potential for the development of the existing national projects of the air forces of France and the United Kingdom. The Jaguar still has considerable development potential, particularly if the Adour engines are fully uprated and if the air-to-air capability of the aircraft in self-defence, which has already been developed for the international variant of the aeroplane with the Magic missile, is utilised.

As for the Harrier, studies are at present in train to see whether a new wing would greatly augment the performance of the aeroplane. That aeroplane would be the Mark 5; and, as we know, McDonnell Douglas has flown a prototype AV-8B with a composite wing, which also offers great potential for the future, and perhaps even for the two-way street. So there is a great potential for both aeroplanes for a considerable time to come.

Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that in the fluid state of any battlefield in Western Europe we would wish to throw every aeroplane we have into the battle against the armoured formations that would face us. It does not make sense necessarily, as Admiral Lygo suggested in his remarks, to throw an £8 million aircraft against a relatively minor military objective. Therefore, it is right that the Luftwaffe should have the Alpha-Jet for a number of its close support rôles, and I suggest that it is equally right for the Royal Air Force to deploy its Hawk aircraft, which are currently used for training, more and more in an offensive support rôle. With those remarks, I should like very much to support the excellent report of our colleagues. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much, Mr. Wilkinson.

The general debate is now closed.

Mr. Warren wishes to speak now.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — The two Rapporteurs clearly demonstrated the value of bringing together two minds on a single complex subject, and it was fascinating to see the way in which their different approaches identified a common strategic concern on which they could readily agree. Mr. Valleix rightly spoke of the need that we have to recognise the threat from the Soviet Union, and his desire to nominate critical industrial areas where European competitiveness is essential is well worth while.

The industry in Europe has courage, but should have more courage to believe that it can sell armaments in competition to the United States of America. But at the same time, in our desire to establish European strength, we must never forget that the Americans are our partners in defence and that without the Americans the Russian threat would now have been a reality in the streets of Paris and the other capitals of the Western European nations.

Repeatedly in recent years we have demonstrated from the industrial bases of Europe that in competition with the United States we are as good as the American industrial bases. The Airbus shows that, the Roland missile shows that and even Scotch whisky shows that.

With the right product sold in the right place at the right price at the right time, there is no problem when one is trying to sell against the Americans.

But in his contribution, Mr. Onslow identified the need that we have in the armaments industry to use the relevant industrial resources that we have in Europe to provide sources for armaments on which we can base European strategy. I agree wholeheartedly with him that the procedure for the acquisition of equipment of all kinds needs considerable improvement in the defence ministries of the Western European Union nations. Those ministries need to define the kind of products which are essential to meet the threat facing us across the iron curtain. Too often we make fantasies about the kind of war that we would fight, with no concern as to the kind of equipment facing us as the threat.

Mr. Wilkinson, whose maiden speech we heartily applaud this afternoon — likewise, his appointment today as a parliamentary private secretary in the British Government — gave a fascinating contribution, based on his experience as a one-time Royal Air Force fighter pilot and as a man who has worked in the aerospace industry. He clearly identified for us the reality of

Mr. Warren (continued)

the overwhelming forces that the Warsaw Pact can deploy at any time against us, at a time and a place of its own choosing, and it was right for him to show that the only flexible response that we have is the manoeuvrability of air power.

In conclusion, I just wonder, at the end of a short debate such as this, which has summed up an enormous amount of work by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, whether our spoken words will be heard outside this parliamentary chamber. Few of the people of Western Europe recognise the danger at the gates. Many want to look away from the forces now massed against us. I think that none will thank us if our voice is not heard across Europe and the world.

(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

6. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

Industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979

(Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 819, 821 and Amendments and 823)

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on the three draft recommendations and amendments.

We shall take first Document 819, the report by Mr. van Waterschoot, and vote on the draft recommendation in this document.

No amendments have been tabled.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ? ...

Are there any abstentions ? ...

*The draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

Before we vote on the draft recommendation in Document 821, we must dispose of the amendments tabled by Mr. Mulley and by Mr. Baumel.

1. See page 21.

We shall take Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Mulley and others :

I. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "under the aegis of the industrial policy of the European Community".

Do you wish to move this, Mr. Mulley ? You referred to it when speaking earlier ?

Mr. MULLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to move the amendment in my name and those of others. I am opposed to the Community's involvement, because I do not think it has the competence, either technical or military, essential to the formulation of a sensible arms procurement policy.

Nor has it the necessary funds, since to fund this would require a great deal of money which I frankly would be opposed to paying.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Mulley.

Does anyone wish to speak on this amendment ? ...

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am opposed to the amendment because, unless we want to remain purely academic and confine ourselves to flat declarations, we are looking for a body that will translate into concrete action our wishes and recommendations. I think that the only body of this kind we can have for the time being is the European Community. That is why I am voting against the proposed amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. MEINTZ (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am not going to revert to what I said just now about the amendment. As Rapporteur, I am of course opposed to it for, as I told you, I quoted verbatim the text of Recommendation 325 of 22nd November 1978, which the Committee approved by a majority.

I therefore ask the Assembly to vote against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Meintz.

I shall now put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)
Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendments 2 and 3 tabled by Mr. Baumel. They read as follows :

The President (continued)

2. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "endorsed" and insert "examined".

3. In paragraph 2 (b) leave out "an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment" and insert "a market for defence equipment in the framework of WEU".

Do you wish to move this amendment, Mr. Baumel ?...

Does anyone wish to speak on the amendment ? ...

What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. MEINTZ (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — The Committee has accepted Amendment 2 but not Amendment 3.

The PRESIDENT. — Then we must vote on the amendments separately. The opinion of the Committee is that we say "Yes" to No. 2 and "No" to No. 3.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously.

We now come to Amendment 3 by Mr. Baumel. The Committee says "No".

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

We now come to the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 821, as amended.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ? ...

I hear quite a lot of "Noes". We must therefore take a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Valleix.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ? ...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹ :

1. See page 20.

Number of votes cast	50
Ayes	44
Noes	6
Abstentions	0

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted¹.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft order in Document 821.

No amendments have been tabled.

The vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is adopted².

The Assembly will now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 823.

No amendments have been tabled.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ? ...

Are there any abstentions ? ...

The draft recommendation is adopted³.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 4th December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 820 and Amendments).

2. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

Are there any objections ? ...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ? ...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)

1. See page 22.

2. See page 23.

3. See page 24.

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1979

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Change in the membership of Committees.
4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 820 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Grant, Mr. Corallo.
5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Bernard-Reymond (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*).

Replies by Mr. Bernard-Reymond to questions put by: Mr. Jung, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Banks, Mr. van Waterschoot.

6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 820 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Müller, Mr. Deschamps, Dr. Miller, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Voogd.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has proposed various changes in its membership of Committees. These changes are set out in Notice No. 10.

Are there any objections to these changes ?...

They are approved.

1. See page 26.

4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 820 and Amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security, Document 820 and Amendments.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, to present the report.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President and colleagues, when I was first invited by the General Affairs Committee to prepare a report on the Middle East situation not purely as a political one, it was rather different from the Council of Europe's work in this context, but, since we are a defence and security Assembly, my purpose was to set out the picture throughout the Middle East and to evaluate the possible or probable consequences which could very seriously affect not only the political but the economic security of Europe.

As I speak today, of course, the situation is worse than it was when I began to undertake this task back in July. However, when I was invited to prepare this report, I must confess, looking back, that although I found it a stimulating task, it has certainly been one of the most exacting that I have ever undertaken, because the more one looks at the problems of that part of the world, the more deep-rooted they

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

appear and the more difficult it is to tie all the loose ends together and to get an objective picture.

At this stage I must emphasise that I realised from the beginning that in regard to at least one part of the report, that of the Arab-Israeli confrontation dispute, I would have to be very, very careful to pursue my researches and evaluate the situation without being subjected to pressures by any of the parties concerned and without allowing myself to be affected by the very strong emotions which for the last few months I have found, obviously, to run right through this whole situation.

It seems to me, as someone who seeks to be a responsible political figure, that objectivity in this report is absolutely basic, not just to its chances of being endorsed by this Assembly, but, even more important, if it could play any part at all, however small, in defusing a situation which is growing almost monthly more dangerous, both to the political and the economic security of the whole western world.

Since the report is, broadly, in three parts, Mr. President, in accord with the mandate given to me by the Committee and by my Chairman, I should like to deal with it also in three sections in my introductory remarks. I shall begin with that of Iran.

Obviously, since I prepared this report, although in the explanatory memorandum I have made perfectly clear our abhorrence of the way in which, to put it mildly, a revolution has turned sour, even I, when I started to prepare the report, could not have contemplated the extent of the worsening of the situation that now threatens the security of a much wider field than purely the political and economic stability of Europe and, in particular, of the countries for which this Assembly is responsible.

During this debate probably many people will want to raise the particular topic of the unlawful detention of the Americans, inside or outside their embassy, which has been, in accordance with the unanimous Security Council resolution, an instance of a total breach of conventions stretching back over centuries — that diplomatic representation abroad had to be left secure or else the whole fabric of international relations would be eroded and very dangerous new tensions would arise.

It is worth noting that not even Adolf Hitler went as far, during the last war, as interfering with the sanctity of diplomatic representation. It is a sorry fact that thirty-five years later we should have an instance of that kind of interference, which must be almost unprecedented in history. Obviously, we condemn it strongly.

However, Mr. Chairman, the Middle East must be regarded by your Rapporteur as a whole. While many colleagues will wish to express themselves strongly, I do not think that this report should be turned into an opportunity to express our abhorrence of a particularly appalling incident that faces us when we open our morning newspapers. I am told, Mr. President, although it may not be in your possession, that a resolution is now being circulated, signed by all the leaders of the national delegations here, with many more signatures to come, in which we express our abhorrence of what is taking place.

That should not be allowed to become confused with the central theme of this report for two reasons. It is much too important to be slipped in as a kind of sub-clause to show what we think about a particular instance. Much more preferable, I suggest, would be a united expression of abhorrence to be issued through the appropriate channels. This would be better than trying to slip in a resolution or recommendation now about a specific incident at a specific time. There are other procedures available. I am happy to leave that matter in the hands of those who are more familiar with the procedures than I am.

When the time for detailed consideration of the recommendations arrives, there is a clear case, not simply in relation to the issue of the hostages, but generally for toughening the paragraph that I inserted as Rapporteur, and which was endorsed by the Committee without qualification. It should be toughened up in regard to the supply of arms from any source while Iran conducts its present policy of terrorism at home and abroad.

I hope, therefore, that through suggestions which I am prepared to accept from any source, we shall make stronger a recommendation drafted last July in which I expressed the hope that at least the member states of WEU would not supply arms. I believe that we should go further and express our abhorrence of any arms supplied from any source to a régime clearly capable, so far as one can see, of using them only for internal repression at home or adventurism abroad of the most deplorable sort. That, Mr. President, is enough about Iran.

I turn next to another of the three items, Afghanistan. This is a much more serious situation than many living in the West currently realise. I point to these factors. First, a new and appalling element of refugees on a huge scale has been caused. The latest figure I have received from authoritative sources is that about 300,000 people have crossed or are trying to cross the border into Pakistan because of what has happened in Afghanistan.

On human rights grounds alone it is abhorrent to me that, at a time when one of the principal

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

problems all over the world is the resettlement of refugees, a new element of disaffection, a new element of resentment and a new element of misery are being introduced gratuitously because of the activities of the present government, if one can call it that, of Afghanistan, sponsored and supported, I regret to say, although it has to be stated clearly, by the Soviet Union.

Secondly, it would appear that a determined attempt is being made to impose a communist government within Afghanistan in gross breach of all the Helsinki provisions about non-interference in the internal affairs of another country; it would also appear that a deliberate attempt is being made to create not only a communist state but a communist satellite, able, willing and ready to try to carry out the further designs of the Soviet Government, which go back a long time, aimed at the penetration of Pakistan and the attainment of a long dream of governments in Russia, whatever colour shirts they wear and whatever colour the flags they wave.

Once the ability to hold a strong position in that part of the world occurs, the fragility of states in the Gulf, on which we are largely dependent — reverting to the theme of my report — for our national security itself, will be under threat. The map shows that the chance of the collapse of Pakistan and the attainment of this Russian aim, to the prejudice of our own economic and political security, is serious. I make no apology for, and nor did the General Affairs Committee make any attempt to inhibit, the strongest condemnation of what is going on in that part of the world as representing a major threat to overall peace and stability, apart from the obvious gross breaches of the Helsinki final act regarding non-intervention in the affairs of another State.

I turn now to the hottest potato of all, the Arab-Israeli dispute. I have been fascinated, although sometimes horrified, reading the unfolding tragedy about how this dispute has arisen and been carried on over the years by apparently unrelated acts, undertaken by countries and statesmen long since dead who, during the first world war, had the aim on the one hand of trying to get maximum American support, through engendering Jewish and Zionist support, and, on the other hand, of trying to get the maximum support of the Arab world against the Ottoman Empire by making promises that were clearly incompatible with the realisation of the former.

However, Mr. President, I rapidly came to the conclusion that to look back so far, except to take note of what took place, was not a very

productive, creative or substantive procedure. If we are now contemplating what can and should and, in the end, must be done, we have to take a starting point and not spend our time arguing once again about the early seeds of this problem, an argument which would never produce agreement. To argue now about the Balfour declaration, the McMahon letters, or the Sykes-Picot agreement would be a wasteful procedure for this Assembly. So I want to concentrate my introduction on what happened at the end of the British mandate in 1947-48 and what followed thereafter. It must be in that light, which is at least one of realism, that we should approach our study of this problem.

As is set out both in the document which contains actual papers relevant to this whole matter and in the body of my report itself, it is abundantly clear that a process of events was set in course by the General Assembly of the United Nations, lawfully and properly, back in November 1947. One was the creation of Israel, and it was at that moment that the state of Israel, from a constitutional and legal point of view, really came into being. It is no good now, even if one wanted to, looking back further than that.

On the other hand — and this is all too often neglected by those who have not studied all the documentation — the resolution of 1947, which said that at the end of the British mandate there would be a state of Israel created in what had been British mandated Palestine, also said that British mandated Palestine would be divided into an independent Arab state and an independent Israeli state. The material is there for all to see. It is very rare that one hears this point made, and yet the very act of creation, legally, of Israel also legally created an Arab state within what had been British Palestine. It really is impossible, if one is to be objective and not affected by prejudice, to read one bit of the United Nations resolution and not the other bit. It is largely because so many people, so many governments, have refused to face facts and realise what that resolution said that we face our difficulties of today.

I do not want today to relate the long series of actual military conflicts and acts of aggression. It is not appropriate or helpful here to chew over this and say that in one war someone was to blame and that in another war someone else was to blame. What one has to do is to follow through the sequence from a constitutional point of view, and I have already mentioned the legal birth of two independent states — one Arab, one Israeli — back in 1947 as being the first pragmatic milestone along this road.

However, after the wars developed there was a whole series of United Nations resolutions applicable in one form or another to what had gone on, some outdated by events. But at least

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

one gets a glimmer of hope in the sense that most of the parties accept that in Resolution 242 there was a genuine attempt by the United Nations to restore a situation in which both states could live with secure frontiers and with peace, by mutual agreement and mutual tolerance.

Where things have gone wrong here is that, unfortunately, the parties do not interpret Resolution 242 in the same way. One of the stumbling blocks is that everybody says "yes, 242", but everybody means something rather different when asked what is meant by Resolution 242. I have noticed in my work on this subject that there is a need now, whatever the outcome, for an act of redefinition to be undertaken by the United Nations Security Council as to what they did, and do, mean by Resolution 242, because one can get no settlement of a dispute in which the parties concerned rely on a United Nations resolution to further their case but do so only on the basis that they understand that section in different ways. That is the next milestone along the road that I have outlined.

I now come to the third in my list of milestones and that is the Rabat agreement in Morocco when, for the first time, the whole Arab world, including King Hussein himself, accepted that the future of Palestine was to be a matter for the Palestinians themselves to choose and not one to be imposed by one party to the dispute or the other. You will remember that on that occasion, although up till then the West Bank had been part of Jordan, the Jordanian delegation and the king himself formally renounced the right to settle the future of the West Bank and said that it must be a matter for the Palestinians themselves.

From that moment on an altogether new series of events was set in course, because until then it had been a matter of argument between other sovereign states what should happen and what should be the fate of a particular course of action. But for the first time it was generally agreed that the Palestine question could not be settled except by the Palestinians themselves, on a basis of self-determination of what they wanted. So another milestone was created, going right back to 1947 when the future of the then declared Arab state was to be a matter for the inhabitants of that area to settle for themselves.

But, of course, it has become much more complicated than that, since, because of the wars and for other reasons, there has been a mass exodus of Palestinians who have since been having families, and their families have been having families, who are now living outside the West Bank and outside the Gaza Strip. Those of you who have found time to read the full body of the report may have taken note of the fact

that of the total population of Jordan at this moment one-half are Palestinians deriving from the other side of the Jordan river.

Therefore, in those circumstances, the Government of Jordan — I think with considerable vision — have treated the refugees well, in the sense that they have given them full rights at home and, if they wish, a Jordanian passport. But they have all been given specific undertakings that this does not interfere with their wish, if that is what they want, to return to their own homeland. There is no attempt here at aggrandisement by Jordan. They can make a clear choice. But it does not even stop at the borders of Jordan, nor even at those refugees who have gone to Lebanon, to Syria and, just a few, to Egypt.

Because of their longer contact with the western world and perhaps because of some native qualities of their own, the Palestinians are a very highly intelligent and able people. In fact, one of the constant impacts that any tour of the Middle East makes upon one is the realisation that the Palestinians have now established themselves in situations of considerable influence, authority, position and, in some cases, dominance right throughout the Arab world down to the Gulf States of Kuwait and elsewhere. None of those rulers could be secure in his position if he did not take account of the fact that there are living in his midst large numbers of highly intelligent and able people who have a dream of a homeland of their own, even if some of them may never wish to go there.

Some of my Jewish friends in America have always pointed out to me, with complete understanding on my part, their feeling that, although they do not necessarily want to go to Israel, they want to feel that they have a homeland. This has been one of the themes of Jewish people throughout the world, even those who live in other countries.

Still they have the wish and the spiritual concept of a homeland and, to their credit, they are always ready to try to support that concept. However, they of all people should understand that the Palestinians now feel exactly the same. It is amazing how many parallels there are between the attitudes of those peoples and yet they are locked in a dispute as to how this important problem should be solved.

When I was in a refugee camp in Jordan, I asked a five year old girl where her home was. Not only she had been born in Jordan but her parents, yet she still gave her address as a village in what had been British Palestine. If one visits these refugee establishments — one can no longer call them "camps", as far as Jordan is concerned ; I did not see the others — one still sees the UNRWA ration card with a

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

photograph on it. Often it is not used to draw food because the people have managed to achieve some degree of economic advance. To them it is a passport and one of their most precious possessions which they will produce almost without being asked to do so, a passport in some ways more valuable than any issued by another government may be. To anyone who doubts this I will merely say that he should go and see it for himself. Whatever his views on the solution of the problem, he will find that what I have said is quite correct.

There are only two more milestones that I have either the time or the opportunity to mention. Obviously, I must refer to the Camp David agreement. As I have said in my report, this was a major step towards averting the threat of a major war in that area for a long time to come. The meetings at Camp David resulted in a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, to their mutual benefit, and no one, least of all your Rapporteur, wishes to detract in any way from that aspect of Camp David. We all welcomed the end of a military conflict which had long threatened.

To be perfectly frank, however — and I consider that this is increasingly the view of western governments as well as of individuals — whilst Camp David represents the attainment of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, it would be folly to imagine that it settles in any way the other burning issue, the Palestine question. It does not. For that there will have to be a separate solution which involves going right back to 1947 and the right of the Palestinian people to express their own wishes about their own future. As far as this problem is concerned, Camp David has actually been counter-productive, because it did not involve the understanding — certainly not one viewed in the same light by both Egypt and Israel — that the Palestine people alone must decide their future and not have it negotiated by other powers with whom they were not directly involved.

Another unfortunate result of Camp David was that it separated from the rest of the Arab world one of the most moderate and sensible states and one of the most moderate and sensible leaders, Sadat. This has meant that less moderate individuals and states in the Arab world have gained influence following on the virtual disappearance of the influence of Egypt, the largest of all the Arab states.

The sorriest aspect of Camp David, apart from the two observations I have already made, is that, quite clearly, Egypt and Israel have two totally different concepts of the future of Palestine. This must be spelt out. The Israeli

Government have made it perfectly clear that for them there can never be an independent Palestinian state as promised in the 1947 United Nations resolution, which has never been repealed. The Egyptians, on the other hand, say that there must ultimately be, however long the time scale, an opportunity for the Palestinian people on the West Bank to decide what they themselves want. It is, therefore, very difficult for us to build on Camp David, which one or two people have suggested to me, when there is not one Camp David but two and possibly three when it comes to interpreting what is supposed to be done.

First, just as in the case of Resolution 242, the parties have to agree just what Camp David meant for the future of the Palestinian people. Only then may it be possible to build on it; until then it is totally unrealistic to talk about building a future Palestinian agreement upon the accord when the two principal signatories involved have totally different ideas on what the accord is ultimately designed to achieve. All this argument about autonomy and the rest of it does not in any way overcome the basic difference of opinion which exists.

I went to Jordan at a time when the King was in New York making a speech which spelt out perfectly clearly the attitude of his government. For the first time in an international forum he actually said that, as far as Jordan was concerned, he wanted the Palestinian people, the inhabitants of the area, to have complete self-determination and the opportunity to express their wishes. He made it clear that they could opt either for complete independence, if that was their wish, or for some kind of federal arrangement with Jordan, if that was their wish, or they could opt for some association of a confederal nature with Israel, if it was their wish. But for the first time, in a speech endorsed by everyone — because the Egyptians themselves did not differ in any way from what was said — it was stated by the leader of an Arab country that a solution could be built only by paying due attention to the wishes of the inhabitants themselves.

It is only by proceeding in that manner that we can see some light at the end of the tunnel, because it is idle to imagine that this problem will go away simply because it is ignored. I have already mentioned that the Palestinians are no longer a small, impoverished people living on the West Bank. They are an influential, and an increasingly influential, people stretching right through the whole of Arabia, and this situation is not going to change simply by the passage of time.

So what have we to do now? What course have we to advocate? First, I must mention the question of the continuation of settlements on

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

the West Bank by the Israeli Government. We had the benefit of listening in Strasbourg to General Dayan defending staunchly his government's policy and being obviously surprised, as he made clear, at the lack of appreciation he received for the point of view he expounded that these settlements should continue. He made other points about the future of that land itself.

There is obviously a difference of opinion whether the Camp David agreement on the cessation of new settlements was to last for three months until the peace treaty was signed or to go on during the period when the future of the Palestinian people was being negotiated. But whatever else is happening one of the most disturbing factors in that part of the world, which makes it difficult for moderate and balanced voices to prevail, is that the settlement areas are increasing. I give the Assembly only one statistic, for the figures are given in the report. At the moment 2% of the population either occupy or have reserved legally 27% of the total land area of the West Bank.

You have given me a warning, Mr. President, but this is a long and intricate report covering three subjects. I have only two other sensitive points to mention. The first is a recognition that the state of Israel is there but the Palestinians, or the PLO, if that is their body for negotiation, are plainly a major factor. Equally, one cannot expect them to negotiate unless the Israelis accept the reality of the possibility of a state of Palestine, an Arab state, emerging in due course of time: recognition has to be a two-way project.

Finally, I appeal here to all sides, Arab, PLO, Israel and everyone else, to accept that at this time it is grossly irresponsible when we are trying to reach some kind of settlement for anyone — and I repeat anyone — under whatever pretext to indulge in acts of violence, terrorism or military action. This is an appallingly difficult situation and only if all sides try to act in an objective and practical way can an end be achieved. I believe that in this instance a united voice from this Assembly, as was expressed by the vote in the General Affairs Committee, by 16 votes to 0, will send out a message of our understanding but also one urging all the people concerned to think in terms of a peaceful settlement of the problem. But peace, to be enduring, has to involve justice. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank the Rapporteur for his report.

The debate is now open.

I call first Mr. Grant. He will be followed by Mr. Corallo and then by Mr. Müller.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — The whole Assembly is indebted to Sir Frederic Bennett for the immense diligence with which he has tackled one of the most difficult problems we have to face today. I congratulate him also on the effort he has made to be scrupulously impartial as between the two sides in this appalling situation. I must say that any differences I have with him are really more of emphasis, because broadly I support the principles behind this report, which is dedicated to the one thing we all want to see achieved — peace in the Middle East.

On the slight differences of emphasis, I want to say a word first about the Camp David peace treaty. I happen to believe that that was one of the most remarkable achievements in the war-torn history of the Middle East. I accept that there are many matters still unresolved. I accept that it is narrowly confined to only the two countries and I accept that its provisions are not applicable to the whole of the Middle East and all the nations therein. I accept also that it still leaves the Palestine problems unresolved. But the fact that Europe played only a passive rôle in this event should not justify our describing the Camp David treaty as a failure. On the contrary, I believe that it was a shining example of what can be achieved given good will between the two sides who were at each other's throats. Who would have thought, for example, only a few years ago, when these two nations were locked in appalling and bloody battle, that what was achieved at Camp David would, in fact, be achieved?

It is arguable, of course, that this should have been extended in some way to other nations in the Middle East, but I believe that if one had sought to broaden the basis of the Camp David agreement, to this day we should never have had any agreement at all, and it was right to proceed as the Americans did in dealing with one basic problem at a time. I accept that there can be no lasting peace until agreement is reached on the Palestine problem and I appreciate the efforts made by responsible Arab heads of state, particularly King Hussein, who has been particularly responsible in this regard — as one would expect, he being an Old Harrovian — but I accept also that it is entirely unrealistic to ignore the Palestine Liberation Organisation. However, we are entitled to ask: "Who are the PLO?" Are they really representative of the people who are so much concerned in this problem?

They have made attempts recently to present a more respectable image to the rest of the world and there are naive but honourable people who now believe that the PLO is a credible and respectable body. But I do not share that view. They still have blood on their hands, and until the blood is properly wiped away, they cannot

Mr. Grant (continued)

be regarded as a body with which civilised people can properly negotiate.

Therefore, a precondition to any settlement of the Palestinian problem is that the PLO should renounce, totally and absolutely, all forms of terrorism, and, secondly, that the PLO should accept unequivocally the right of Israel to exist. These are essential prerequisites.

In exchange for that, I believe that we are entitled to expect, as Sir Frederic wisely said, that the Israelis should cease their policy of settlements on the West Bank. There is by no means unanimity in Israel over this policy, as we have seen over the resignation of General Dayan and from other observations. These are the two essential aspects which both sides must accept before there can be a resolution of the problem.

I want to refer briefly to Iran, because this question is a new element which has emerged in the whole Middle Eastern problem in recent months. The activities of the régime in Iran over the hostages from the American Embassy are not just an affront to civilised modern-world nations; they are an outrage against civilisation itself. To kidnap innocent men and women as a form of ransom in order to enable the régime to wreak bloody revenge upon a former ruler is a course of action not justified in the Koran or any other religious document. The actions of the régime are analogous to those of the hijackers whom we have been condemning for so many years. They deserve the total condemnation of civilised people everywhere.

The action of the Iranian régime also has grave defence implications for the whole of the Middle East — another problem added to the existing difficulties — and, indeed, it will increase the instability among the Gulf states, which I fear will lack confidence in the will or the ability of the United States to sustain peace, on which they have relied for so long. Of course, it is in just this state of affairs that the Soviet Union, although at present lying passive and watching the situation, could be tempted to meddle.

What is the responsibility for this state of affairs in Iran? To a great extent — to use an English phrase — the United States could be said to have been hoisted on its own petard. I have never particularly commended the course of policy that the United States adopted, going back to immediate post-war years, with Mr. Mossadegh, and, to some extent the Americans' equivocal rôle over the Suez problem. In recent times the Americans have suffered from what I call a post-Vietnam depression, which has somewhat emasculated them. They have these

difficulties, but they nevertheless deserve our support.

But I also attach a great deal of blame for the situation in Iran to the left-wing elements in many countries which have kept up and devoted a great deal of energy to an anti-Shah campaign without considering the possible alternatives that would result from their actions. In the report my colleague, Sir Frederic, quotes very appropriately from a British author, Richard Adams. Perhaps I could cap that by reminding the Assembly of what William Pitt, a former British Prime Minister, said at the time of the French Revolution and the reign of terror. He said: "They were men extreme in all save humanity, seeking to use the cry of liberty for the many to become a stalking horse to provide licence for the few". This is what has happened in Iran, and those who encouraged the elements which overthrew the Shah have a heavy responsibility to bear.

What, therefore, do we do in this situation? I believe that the important thing is that the whole of the West, the whole of WEU, the whole of the Community and the Council of Europe should remain absolutely united in their condemnation of what is happening in Iran. If we can do this and show our condemnation in a united fashion on this occasion, that, and that alone, will make some impact on the appalling situation from which the whole world is now in danger. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Corallo.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, at time of serious international tension such as we are now living through, originating in the very same part of the world referred to in the draft recommendation we are now discussing, a peace initiative by Europe would be undoubtedly not only timely but also likely to bear fruit, insofar as Europe is able to play a positive rôle in this dire emergency.

Unfortunately the impression we are being given is that the opportunity is being frittered away out of pusillanimity and inability to speak out what we all think.

We are, let us be quite clear, fully aware that these are complex matters which are getting more and more involved as each day goes by, and we shall not criticise our Rapporteur for failing to pluck a final solution out of his top-hat. What we do criticise him for is getting himself dug in in ambiguous situations, pulling his punches and failing to set out in the draft recommendation the conclusions that naturally flow from some of the apposite remarks in the explanatory memorandum.

Mr. Corallo (continued)

Hence the recommendation remains timorous, ambiguous, incapable of giving a guideline enabling the member states to take positive action in the way of mediation and peace.

Everybody knows that the Palestinian nation is nowadays legitimately and authoritatively represented by the PLO. Our Rapporteur knows it too, and says so in his explanatory memorandum. But paragraph 5 of the recommendation speaks of negotiations with "valid Palestinian representatives" not otherwise identified except that the existence of the PLO is referred to in paragraph 6 in connection with the cessation of terrorist acts. There cannot be, Sir Frederic, any valid peace agreements in the Middle East that do not also involve the responsibilities of the PLO. The most glaring example, as our Rapporteur rightly says, is the Camp David agreements. But is it possible to appeal to one of the parties fundamentally involved while using a circumlocution to avoid legitimating his right to sit at the negotiating table? Can we be listened to by the Palestinian nation if we confuse terrorist acts by the extremist fringe alien to the PLO with warlike acts conducted by the latter on Israeli or Israeli-occupied territory? If the aim of the countries we represent is to seek a fair and lasting peace, we have to appreciate fully the motivations of the contending parties and not distort the nature of political and military action by the Palestinians. Nor can we simply speak of Israel's right to be an independent state with clearly defined frontiers, and then skip airily over the Palestinians' right to their own homeland, state, territory and equally well-defined frontiers. It is just silly to offer the Palestinian people, waging a patriotic war, recognition of its own existence: no need to recognise what is obvious. The Palestinian nation knows that it exists and does not need us to tell it so.

We can ask the PLO to put an end to warlike acts, to abandon the hope of the political solution it seeks — a single Palestinian state, national and non-religious; we can ask them to accept the state of Israel and merely discuss its boundaries; but what can we ask it to forgo in exchange? Recognition of the PLO's right to take part in any negotiation, a Palestinian state and definition of its frontiers — these are questions that cannot be denied if we want to secure genuine and lasting peace. In the contrary case, our countries will not be listened to, nor be able to play any positive rôle.

I also believe that we should recast the section of the recommendation devoted to the Iranian question, which sounds superficial and hollow in the light of the latest developments. Above all I beg the Rapporteur to acknowledge that to mention in the same paragraph Iran and

Afghanistan is an unforgivable howler for anyone who has pretensions to dealing with foreign policy. But that is not the point: it is more serious, one that if we face up to it, cannot be easily got round. The world looks on these days with tremendous apprehension at what is going on in Tehran, and we are all aware that a situation has arisen that might have tragic consequences of incalculable magnitude. I shall certainly not seek to diminish the gravity of the Iranians' gesture. It will be more and more difficult to safeguard world peace if every agreement, every standard of international law is openly flouted. It will be difficult in future to prevent every country from trying to take the law into its own hands by unacceptable methods. Nevertheless I am bound to say that if we wish to understand what is happening in Iran we must have the courage to ask ourselves how so much hatred and fanaticism, which every passing day proves to be more blimpish than religious, can have been stored up.

To be sure, by your leave, Mr. Rapporteur, it is not by raking over the happenings of the third and fourth centuries A.D. that we shall uncover the roots of that hatred, but rather by pondering the more recent fate of Dr. Mossadegh, say, and what he represents; how he was humiliated and trampled underfoot, from abroad and against the will of the Persian nation. The Rapporteur's hurried and mealy-mouthed reference to this dramatic episode tells of unwillingness to make any attempt to understand. Consequently nothing can be done to appease that frightful groundwave of hatred now indiscriminately swamping the West and which rightly preoccupies and dismays us all. The only contribution capable of being given today to defuse the Iranian time-bomb and bring back to rational and political terms a struggle for independence that has assumed a bloody-minded, impassioned, irrational guise, is a merciless self-criticism by the West.

The draft recommendation proposes abstention from sales of arms to Iran, a wise counsel that needs to be more universal, for we ought to prevent the supply of arms to any of the hotspots where there is a risk of a flare-up. But the problem is definitely not a military one and cannot be resolved in this manner. It is not the murderous weapons formerly supplied to the Shah that now threaten to plunge the world into tragedy: it is, I repeat, fanaticism, hatred, xenophobia.

So let us ask Iran, on behalf of all the nations of Europe, to renounce the illegal detention of hostages, and to free them immediately and unconditionally; but let us not present ourselves as lamenting the overthrown tyrant and sneering at the greater freedom there may have been in the heyday of the Savak. Let us not joke about pain, bloodshed, the ordeal of a nation that has

Mr. Corallo (continued)

lost its reason now precisely because it has been tried too far. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. I should like to inform you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that we shall resume the debate later today and continue until noon.

5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, the next Order of the Day is an address by Mr. Pierre Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

I bid you welcome, Mr. Bernard-Reymond. We are very happy that you have come to address our Assembly. May I also thank you on behalf of my colleagues and the members of the Assembly for the most enjoyable reception you and Madame Bernard-Reymond gave last night.

Would you please come to the speaker's rostrum. (*Applause*)

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is with renewed pleasure that I stand before your Assembly today. Last year I had occasion to assure you of the French Government's sustained and close interest in your institution and of course in your activities. May I repeat the importance that the French authorities attach to the work of this Assembly because of the distinction of its members and the specific nature of its powers.

This is a particularly solemn occasion. The year 1979 marks a new stage in the life of Western European Union, its twenty-fifth anniversary. WEU is celebrating this year a quarter of a century of work, of concerted effort, of close co-operation among its members.

As you know, the Council took this opportunity to stress the outstanding contribution made by WEU towards developing such co-operation; it reaffirmed the importance the member states attach to realising the objectives laid down in the treaty, in particular to that of ensuring legitimate collective defence in accordance with the commitments taken. It also welcomed the essential contribution made by the WEU Assembly, the only parliamentary institution in which the representatives of the member states come together to discuss joint security matters.

It is worth stressing this triple rôle played by WEU at the very time that your twenty-fifth

session is being held in a context influenced by the discussions broached by signature of the SALT II agreements and just before an important meeting of the Atlantic Council.

Security problems are constantly at the heart of the preoccupations of governments and peoples. The French Government takes the view that Western European Union is an ideal forum for discussing such matters. It has not aged and its rôle remains unchanged; it is the forum for dealing with security problems in their double aspect of defence and co-operation in the equipment area, and disarmament. We feel that, far from being contradictory, the two aspects are closely complementary.

In this task, WEU has to avoid two pitfalls: that of being over-sensitive to passing events and seeking to give collective expression to concerns that might lead it to trespass on the competence of other bodies; and, conversely, that of abdicating or allowing to be questioned its powers in matters coming within its primary scope. In the specific field of armaments co-operation, certain statements made in the course of your proceedings in 1979 prompt me to recall once again that your Assembly should remain the only forum in which European countries discuss with one another what should and can be done in this area, without prejudice to the responsibilities and activities of the IEPG. I would pay tribute in particular to WEU's Standing Armaments Committee, which makes a most valuable contribution to these problems.

Western European Union's twofold concern in the security area — co-operation for defence purposes and disarmament — also guides French policy.

Our defence policy is clear and constant. Basically it relies on the independence of our forces and the sovereignty of our decisions. This explains why the French authorities are so attentive to the development of defence and devote such great resources to it. We intend to maintain our forces at the requisite level to ensure their credibility as a deterrent and we do not intend to enter into any machinery of discussion that might suggest our going back on the decision we took with regard to the integrated military organisation of NATO or the thought that we agree to let others decide how far we should modernise our national strategic force. It was in this spirit too that we have already announced that we would not be taking part in the SALT III negotiations.

Such independence does not, of course, preclude solidarity with our allies; rather it is the means of ensuring it. The value of our contribution to the deterrent capability of the Alliance is certainly proportional to the volume of our own forces, but even more to their

Mr. Bernard-Reymond (continued)

independence and credibility. It is by carefully preserving both that France will do its allies the greatest service.

The will to defend oneself is not one of aggression. On the contrary, France is able, because it is strong, to set at rest the misgivings nurtured by the piling up of armaments. What is important is that in so doing, it also affirms, as well as its own, the right of every state to security, independence and sovereignty.

This means, as I said last year, that there is not and ought not to be, in the world of today, for a country such as France, any contradiction between security and disarmament. At a time of multiplication of power centres, of the assertion of regional differences, of increasingly worrying threats which are not only confined to the super-powers among themselves, there can be no progress in disarmament talks unless they eventually consolidate the security which is the legitimate aim of every state. In this respect, France must clearly play a major rôle. You will remember the words to that effect by the President of the Republic in his address to the United Nations in May 1978.

But what I would like to say is that France has too much belief in the future of mankind to give way to resignation, and is also too experienced to regard disarmament as easy to achieve. Our endeavour is also to be realistic; our objectives are those of a diplomacy alive to the tangible realities of our day and age.

It can be measured, first of all, by the progress already made, thanks, *inter alia*, to action taken by France in the international institutions in which all the world's states foregather to discuss disarmament. New machinery has been installed, such as the Geneva Committee on Disarmament with refurbished procedures, composition and aims, or the Disarmament Commission in New York. The fact that China is also now contemplating taking its seat at Geneva confirms that this was a necessary and important reform.

France's most innovatory proposals also bear witness to its realism. The proposal for an international satellite control agency to provide a means of monitoring with certainty whether commitments are being honoured, an idea already being taken up by the international community, or the proposal for an international disarmament research institute to mobilise scientists for the cause, whose creation the United Nations' Consultative Council has, as you know, recently approved in principle.

But the best indication of France's realistic approach is in my view the efforts it is making to initiate an effective disarmament process at

regional level. I refer to the proposal put forward in May 1978 for a European disarmament conference.

This proposal, addressed to all the countries of Europe, covering the whole territory of Europe, founding its logic on an exact analysis of the specific threats impending over the continent but largely ignored in ongoing negotiations, should in my view constitute a major element of your deliberations today.

What are the specific threats that are causing Europe disquiet? Not so much those of nuclear war, for such a war, if it did occur as a result of a failure of deterrence, would by its very existence prove that the stakes involved and the protective systems that had given way far exceeded the European dimension alone. Rather, it is the threats engendered by the one-sided increase in numbers and in strike capability of conventional weaponry. It is the threats that might spread by people panicking at the sudden multiplication or increase of military movements and exercises using major conventional weapons.

Aside from a nuclear show-down against which the only effective safeguard is the nuclear deterrent, the risks to the security of our continent are those of potential surprise attacks or demonstrations designed to intimidate: unexplained troop movements, excessively large-scale military exercises, over-frequent manoeuvres, abnormal call-ups.

Such threats are made perilously imaginable by two phenomena: first, European public opinion's becoming accustomed to the virtues of nuclear deterrence and putting its trust in the progress of political détente; second, besides this lowering of its mental guard, the build-up of conventional weapons which political détente does nothing to retard, and the eastern bloc's comfortable lead in this area.

There are two ways of countering these dangers: to regulate the use of conventional weaponry in peacetime, and scale it down in size and fire power.

Regulating the use of conventional weaponry means attempting to draft a code for the political use of force and so prevent surprise attacks; just as nuclear deterrence is couched in subtle semiological terms, a plain language could be evolved among Europeans for reading the true significance, military as well as political, of large-scale manoeuvres, troop movements, etc. To dispel the uncertainties now surrounding such exercises, to prevent a show of ordinary manoeuvres from concealing a will to intimidate or even launch surprise attacks for which the warning would come too late, these are the objectives of confidence-building measures, simultaneously binding, militarily significant, verifiable and applicable on a continent-wide

Mr. Bernard-Reymond (continued)

scale, which France proposes as a first phase in its plan for a European disarmament conference.

This gives some measure of their novelty and effectiveness compared with those put forward in other frameworks so far.

But regulating the use of conventional weapons in peacetime is not enough to avert the threat: too much trust in the confidence-building measures for their own sake would carry the additional danger of anaesthetising public opinion. Even codified, the threat born of the imbalance in conventional weapons which Europe labours under today would still remain.

What we have to change in the final resort is therefore the volume of actual forces confronting one another: an effective reduction in major conventional armaments is essential if we want to ensure Europe's security at a lower and less dangerous balance of forces level. Hence, in its proposal for a disarmament conference, France sees the adoption of meaningful confidence-building measures on the military plane as a preparatory step towards conventional disarmament. Our view is that, while it is unrealistic to seek practical results in disarmament without first taking such confidence-building measures to modify the way in which the states perceive possible threats to their security, it would be equally unrealistic merely to boost confidence whereas the clash of arms was at our doors and we were stopping our ears to it.

Because it takes a step-by-step approach, from the least to the most sensitive issues, while at the same time not losing sight of the final objective of limiting and reducing armaments, the European disarmament conference may today be seen as the best way of opening the door to that genuine dialogue on security to which all our nations aspire. Based on the political headway détente has already made, it is capable not only of consolidating but of extending it further by means of practical results that every citizen of Europe can appreciate.

Such a dialogue and progress are to be accomplished by thirty-five partners — of this France is convinced. The question then is how to link the dialogue we propose with that of the CSCE. For us, the answer is clear: both must be closely interlinked while yet remaining separate. The links must be established at the vital points. First, at the point of departure: it is in our view at the coming meeting in Madrid that we should decide on the principle and define the terms of reference of the European disarmament conference. Then, at the conclusion of the preliminary phase, we believe the next meeting thereafter would assess the results of the confidence-building measures and decide, on the

basis of such assessment, on the transition to the next stage, relating to disarmament. But while the linkage must be secured, we must also avoid confusion.

Several reasons prohibit us from discussing these questions in depth inside the CSCE. First, France wishes an overall and balanced concept to be respected at that conference. What France proposes will avoid throwing the discussions in Madrid out of step with the procedures of the CSCE in general, to the detriment of other equally important sections of the final act, while thinking through, as everyone wishes, the problem of security. Success in this area will redound to the credit of the CSCE just as much as progress in other baskets. Another reason is precisely France's will to prevent atrophy of the CSCE by, on the contrary, opening up a longer-term prospect, both progressive and realistic.

The will to defend ourselves but also precautions to curb threats; ambitious aims and realistic methods: these are the poles on which French policy on security turns.

The reason I have gone into some detail about this policy is, first, that I know I shall find in this Assembly the audience most highly-qualified and therefore the most likely to understand it. But another reason is that in the present economic climate our preoccupations and aspirations are broadly shared, and the ideas of some of us make a useful contribution to those of others. What is at issue for our peoples who have suffered so much from war is the security of their future and peace in our continent. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank Mr. Bernard-Reymond for his address.

The Minister has kindly expressed his willingness to answer any questions which might be put to him by the members of the Assembly on the subjects with which he has just dealt.

Mr. Minister, would you prefer to answer the questions collectively?

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — As you please, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Then you shall give a collective answer.

I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, you have just rightly reminded us that the President of the French Republic has made three concrete proposals: the establishment of a world satellite control agency, the organisation of regional disarmament conferences and the funding of aid to developing countries through a contribution based on states' military budgets.

Mr. Jung (continued)

Could you let us know what world reactions there have been to these proposals, which I am sure our Assembly would be interested to hear about?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, in all the WEU texts the French forces are regarded as components of the allied nuclear deterrence capability. French nuclear weapons are of medium range. They are therefore, according to what has been declared, to be included in the calculation of overall NATO strength.

What does this make of France's independent policy and all-round defence strategy? How are we to reconcile declarations by the French Government that French nuclear arms are central systems, with the reality of their siting, only pointed at the Soviet Union? In fact, any strategic system would seem by its very nature to be all-round, for otherwise it is only one component in higher-level, longer-range system.

What is the French concept of the balance of force?

My second question is this: the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of our Assembly has adopted a serious text recommending the deployment of medium-range missiles on European soil. The WEU Assembly, meeting in Paris, is called upon to ratify this text.

How can the French Government tolerate on French territory an act so damaging to peace? Popular opposition to the missiles is so strong in Europe that Mr. van den Bergh's recommendation had to be accompanied by a proposed moratorium of eighteen months on deployment of the new weapons to allow the Soviet proposals to be discussed. The French Government, in accordance with the nation's will, is in duty bound to supplement these by concrete disarmament proposals rebuffing those who, from outside, advocate rearmament and the cold war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, at the Brussels symposium organised by our Assembly on standardisation of armaments, service officers, senior officials and members of the boards of national enterprises spoke in support of integrating armaments industries. In view of the discretion which French civil servants and military personnel are required to observe, may I ask whether these persons submitted their speeches to the ministers concerned and whether, in that event, they represent the views of the French Government?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I believe that our Assembly will have noted with great interest your confirmation that our organisation is the only one having exclusive responsibilities in defence matters and authentically European in this respect.

You referred to the disarmament problem. We, who carry defence responsibilities, pay great attention to disarmament, but only provided the political will to defend ourselves we have in common is asserted first.

My question was partly answered by the affirmation of the effort you are willing to make for disarmament in a European framework. Is there a contradiction here? According to you, there is not. Are they in the French view parallel cases? Doubtless, but there is also France's will to persevere in a spirit of complementarity with the international effort already embarked upon. I understood your remarks just now as following the lines of such complementarity. It is not simply a matter of giving a boost to an international effort that is flagging but, if I understand aright, it is France's intention to make a very active contribution to such disarmament under the European aegis.

My second question is this. Are we to see in the project you have announced of raising in Madrid the plan for a European disarmament conference a reflection of the fact that the USSR may have renounced or somewhat toned down its earlier position, which seemed highly negative, notably in that it may have agreed to demand that nuclear weaponry be included in such global thoughts on disarmament? Thank you in advance for your replies.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Roper. He will be followed by Mr. Banks.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I would assure the Minister of State that those who have heard him, apart from his French colleagues, appreciate what he had to say. I thank him very much for his kind words about the work of our Assembly and in particular his kind words on the work of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Coming from such a senior French source his remarks were particularly appreciated.

I wonder whether he could tell us, in view of the Ottawa declaration recognising the rôle of British and French strategic nuclear weapons, whether the partners of France in WEU can feel sure that French nuclear weapons have a rôle to play in their defence, or whether they should assume that these weapons have only a national function.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Banks, who will be followed by Mr. van Waterschoot.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — The Minister has made a powerful speech for disarmament. Would he like to comment on the position of the MBFR talks, which have been going on with the Soviet Union for year after year but which have failed to reach any kind of agreement on disarmament? Will he recognise that there is a point of view that believes that the West must rearm and negotiate from a position of strength and parity with the Soviet Union?

Would he finally explain whether it is the position of the French Government, as I understand from what he has said today, that they would be prepared to reduce their forces as a means of strengthening détente, and whether it is the policy of the French Government to reduce their spending on defence?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Banks.

I call Mr. van Waterschoot.

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, the French Government has let it be known that it approved the SALT II agreement. The latter affirms the two parties' intention to open in the near future the SALT III negotiations which are to cover continental-range nuclear weapons. Does the approval of SALT II imply that the French Government may be prepared to act in concert with its allies to ensure the success of SALT III?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Are there no more questions?...

I call the Minister of State.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you will allow me, I shall first answer Mr. Boucheny's question, which will incidentally give me an opportunity of reaffirming the main guidelines of our defence and security policies. In doing so, I shall be replying in advance to other questions put by succeeding speakers.

I repeat to Mr. Boucheny what I said a few moments ago from the rostrum, namely that the French concept is based on what is called "sanctuarisation" and deterrence of the strong by the weak, and that we consequently regard our defence system as a central system quite obviously founded on national independence and sovereignty. Therefore we do not have any so-called theatre forces in our system; they corres-

pond not to a defence concept of massive deterrence but to one of strategic flexibility. Now, we do not take part in such an analysis and accordingly consider our forces to be entirely independent. Consequently, we do not agree that they should be quantified with others. If other states wish to do so, that is their own affair but, as far as we are concerned, we shall not take part in that sort of negotiation, and, what is more, we do not agree that our capability should be regarded as supplementary to, or in any way reinforcements for, another system or other forces.

I therefore reaffirm here the wholly independent character of our forces, founded on national sovereignty. This independence is, I repeat, itself founded on the concept of nuclear deterrence and consequently does not entail any modernisation of theatre forces.

You have also expressed the hope that France should make concrete proposals on disarmament. This subject took up a good deal of my address, and I think I explained to you in detail our proposals for a European disarmament conference.

You will remember that, speaking in the United Nations, the President of the French Republic formulated a whole series of proposals concerning disarmament, based on each state's right to security. One of the characteristics of these proposals was to approach the problem in a regional context, and we are implementing that approach by proposing a disarmament conference in Europe.

I believe therefore that both by the proposals it has made, to which Mr. Jung alluded just now, and this even more specific and more wide-ranging proposal for a European disarmament conference, France has shown its determination and anxiety to participate in the disarmament effort. Needless to say, based as it is on every state's right to security, this effort is no incitement to reduce our defence effort.

In saying this, I am answering the question put to me just now as to whether we did not think it expedient to negotiate from a position of strength, and as to our intentions regarding the reduction of our own forces. Well, I assert that France has no intention of diminishing or slowing down its defence effort, and will modernise its own forces in a manner commensurate with whatever threats it may consider to be impending.

Since I have started to answer one of your questions, I will venture to answer the first, relating to MBFR. As you aware, we shall not be participating in the MBFR negotiations. The fact is, we consider they have little chance of

Mr. Bernard-Reymond (continued)

succeeding. I do not know whether I should say "alas", but — hitherto at all events — developments over several years have unfortunately proved us right, for the negotiations are marking time. Moreover, we consider that MBFR do not cover a sufficient area; they are too restricted and, as you know, in our proposed European disarmament conference, we suggest that the area be considerably extended compared with the MBFR area, to take in all European countries from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Mr. Jung mentioned the proposal made by the President of the French Republic at the United Nations.

So far as a satellite control agency is concerned, it will from now on, at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, be kept under review by a group of experts which has been meeting regularly. Hence, our initiative has reached the stage of contacts among experts, which we hope will be continued, since they have not yet come up with any satisfactory formal and concrete proposal. Nevertheless the contacts have been positive, and we are glad to note that the proposal is being taken very seriously by the nations which have been good enough to send their experts to attend the discussions.

With regard to the establishment of a fund for development aid financed by contributions based on military outlays, my answer is that this question too is now the subject of talks among experts, more especially to see how it could be integrated or co-ordinated with other existing initiatives or organisations with similar or parallel aims.

Consequently, if I had to cast a balance-sheet, I would say that France is pleased that the proposals made at the United Nations have been taken into account and that the experts are putting their heads together on all these issues. Admittedly, we should perhaps like to see faster progress; but the talks are proceeding at the pace of international diplomacy, which insists on caution but also compels us to arrive at concrete results, which is no easy matter.

Mr. Deschamps referred to the Brussels symposium. I should like to reassure him that the persons taking part were invited in a personal capacity. Consequently, the positions they may have taken in no way commit the French Government.

Mr. Valleix spoke of our proposal for a European disarmament conference and asked about the position of the Soviet Union on such a conference and, more especially, whether the nuclear issue would be on the agenda.

As you know, we are not in favour of including nuclear problems at the conference. Indeed, as I reminded you just now, we consider that the imbalance of conventional weapons in Europe is such that it alone confronts us with a very important problem that must be studied and discussed with the Eastern European countries.

For one thing, we hope this conference may be enlarged in area to cover all the countries of Europe; and we also hope that it may form part of the CSCE process, because we do not want to see this wither away. We believe that the possibility of agreeing at Madrid terms of reference for convening a conference at which confidence-building measures would be studied at an initial phase, but would then lead on — we attach great importance to this sequence — to measures for the limitation and reduction of armaments, is a good way of ensuring progress in CSCE without at the same time upsetting its balance.

For that reason, we do not think Madrid a suitable venue for such a conference. What we hope is that terms of reference may be defined at Madrid for a later conference, for we do not want Madrid to be just the forum in which only security and disarmament problems would be discussed.

We hope, as no doubt do most nations participating in the conference, that the baskets will be evenly balanced in respect of both the time taken up by them and the results likely to be obtained.

I was also asked a question about SALT II and SALT III. The French Government does not take a negative view of SALT II and trusts the agreement will be ratified. That does not automatically mean it considers it should be a party to the SALT III negotiations, a position that follows quite naturally from the reply I gave Mr. Boucheny just now. We consider that France has a central defence system and consequently it does not need to intervene or take part in negotiations that mainly concern the two major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Therefore, we shall not be participating in these negotiations, nor, either directly or indirectly, in any peripheral consultations in their respect.

I believe, Mr. President, I have answered all the questions put to me. If not, I am at your disposal to answer a final question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for replying to the questions put to you by the members of our Assembly.

I also thank you for coming here and look forward to the next occasion. (*Applause*)

6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 820 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall now resume the debate on the report by Sir Frederic Bennett.

I now call Mr. Müller. He will be followed by Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Sir Frederic Bennett has, in a comprehensive survey, presented a picture of the situation in the Middle East. It would be very tempting to touch upon all the problems he has mentioned. That is not possible, however, as time is short, so I shall confine myself to a few essential points and so leave out items such as the question of Israel, that of the Palestinians, and the special problems in this area.

When one looks at the Middle East, one thinks of a barrel. I am thinking in this connection not so much of a barrel full of oil — though this might well be the first picture to spring to mind — as of a barrel full of gunpowder, which can easily explode because strategic interests have clashed for centuries in the Middle East area and because developments in the area have heightened tensions instead of reducing them.

Sir Frederic shows this very clearly by taking the example of Afghanistan and that of Iran. In Afghanistan for instance, the strategic interests of Russia and Britain have clashed — one might almost say for centuries, but at least for decades — in such a way that since 1826 Afghanistan has come to be a kind of buffer state between the two. The situation in Iran was similar. It is interesting to note that at a difficult time during the second world war a joint intervention from north and south by the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States made it possible to solve one Iranian problem — this was in 1941. It was by no means a simple matter to reverse this interim solution, for the Soviet Union had as you know actually established in the north of Iran a people's republic of its own — Azerbaidjan. This is in fact the only example in history of the Soviet Union's having relinquished, under the pressure of circumstances after 1946, a people's republic, a Marxist-Leninist state, that it had established.

That the situation in the area became so explosive in the last two decades is because there were signs that a cultural revolution was developing in the area as well. Here one has to wonder whether the wealth which countries such as Iran drew from their exports of oil has always been a blessing for them. The population of Iran has undoubtedly lost its cultural identity through the leap from the Middle Ages into the present. The response to this development has been a

reaction which has led in turn to a cultural counter-revolution such as we are seeing in the present situation in Iran. But, I repeat, we must understand that the leap from the Middle Ages into the Coca-Cola and MacDonal'd culture of 1978 is not something that can be coped with without problems.

The special rôle of the Soviet Union in this area is glaringly evident. It is pursuing a policy which goes right back to the time of the Czars. I will merely recall that in the talks between Molotov and Ribbentrop after the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin pact it was expressly laid down that the Soviet Union's sphere of interest reached southwards into the area of the Persian Gulf and that the principle was indeed observed at the time by the national socialist régime. Here we can see the long-standing nature of the Soviet Union's interests in this area. It is fascinating to re-read the notes made by the German ambassador, von der Schulenburg, on his talks with Molotov in the years 1940-41 about Soviet policy in this area.

One sees the Soviet Union behaving in the area as a typically imperialist power, making and breaking alliances to suit its own immediate interests. There is, for instance, no commitment to common ideological aims, but action is based on immediate interests ; if it is possible to replace an ally which proves to be not strong enough by another which is stronger, this is done without batting an eyelid. The old ally is dropped. A notorious example is the relationships of the Soviet Union with Somalia then with Ethiopia. Somalia was of interest only so long as Ethiopia was not available as an ally. The Eritrean Liberation Front, which the Soviet Union had previously been supporting, was dropped in Ethiopia as soon as the immediate leaders in the area had been won over. Even questions of ideology have no part to play here.

The same thing is to be seen today in Iran, where the atheistic Tudeh party is fighting for the theocratic Islamic state in precisely the same way the French Communist Party defended Hitler's pact with Stalin in 1939 and 1940. It was also possible to form an opinion on this subject in the Israel-Palestine area, when the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognise the state of Israel immediately after its creation. The long-term build-up of a Soviet intervention force in the Middle East, especially in the South Yemen area, has a long tradition behind it, for the first agreement on trade and friendship between the Soviet Union and an Arab state was the 1928 treaty with Yemen. If there are now, as is surmised, 40,000 troops from the Soviet Union, East Germany and other eastern bloc states in South Yemen, this constitutes an available offensive potential — one, furthermore, which corresponds precisely with the military

Mr. Müller (continued)

structure of the Warsaw Pact — which could be the fuse that will ignite this veritable powder-keg in the Middle East.

There are also a few remarks that might be made about the special rôle of the Soviet Union in Iran. If the Soviet Union regarded itself as a civilised country — and this is a matter for it to decide itself, not just a question of my view — then there would surely be a possibility of concerted action against cruelty and brutality in this area, without involving imperialistic interests from whatever side. Today I feel that the real rôle of the Soviet Union in this area is different. I would be inclined to describe it as a sort of master of ceremonies — if I may use that term — of the Iranian revolution, a kind of master of ceremonies cherishing the hope that he may some day become the successor of a theocratic state in this area.

And what do we, the western nations, want in this area? I do not think that our aim can be to acquire influence or allies or actual dependencies. It must be in our interest to have in the area independent, free nations with which we can discuss trading conditions and exchange ideas on reciprocal transfers of information, of know-how and also of raw materials. We want co-operation with countries which are certainly of great importance for Western Europe and also for North America. But we want these states to be independent. We want them to be able to make their decisions freely, and to dispose freely of their resources.

We in the West have common interests with regard to this area; we ought, then, to pursue a common policy towards it, forgetting our past rivalries. It is scarcely credible that a mere ten years ago there were clashes of interest between America and Britain, the interests, in fact, of Esso and BP, about an oasis located between Oman and Saudi Arabia. That time is now past. Today there can be a common western policy in the Middle East, a common policy of the civilised world, aimed at preserving peace in this area for a long time to come.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We now go on with Mr. Deschamps, who will be followed by Dr. Miller and then by Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, three problems are discussed in the draft recommendation and the report by Sir Frederic Bennett, Document 820: the situation in Afghanistan, Iran and the Camp David agreements.

I shall not discuss Afghanistan except to say that Sir Frederic's report and draft recommend-

ation are gross meddling in that country's internal affairs. On the other hand, I should like to say rather more about Iran and the Camp David agreements.

It is not the situation in Iran which is aggravating the world's tension, but the aggressive attitude of the United States. For, whatever one's views of the methods of fighting used by the Iranian people, what is essential is the validity of their struggle to free themselves from feudalism, exploitation and the plundering of their wealth.

As we have said before, the French communists are certainly against the taking of hostages and for the respect of diplomatic immunity. The fact remains that the methods by which a people fights are always imposed on them by the conditions they have to contend with.

Remember that the Shah was restored to power in 1954 by a coup d'état which overthrew Mossadegh, the man who nationalised Iranian oil. That coup d'état was planned and financed by the CIA and the United States ambassador at the time. It was also the CIA that recruited, trained and financed the political police, the Savak, which, for twenty-five years, under its control, arrested, tortured and murdered tens of thousands of patriots.

Still under the direct control of the United States, in 1954 and until the end of the Shah's rule, the Iranian army became a powerful tool of the American Government. With American support the Shah systematically plundered the wealth of Iran.

What wonder is it therefore that there should be widespread hostility in revolutionary Iran towards the United States and its official representatives? As for the Shah, torturer of his own people, guilty of mass crimes, it is understandable that the Iranians should demand that he be extradited and put on trial. More than ever therefore we must show solidarity with the Iranian people and its fight for freedom. That is what guides us French communists in our action.

As for the Camp David agreements, far from bringing peace to that part of the world they have aggravated the situation. As stated in the resolution recently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, the agreements flout, usurp, violate or deny the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Now, there can be no settlement unless it takes account of the national rights of the Palestinians and recognises the PLO as its authentic representative.

The draft recommendation in Document 820 recognises that "the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank only makes more difficult a just and lasting solution to the

Mr. Deschamps (continued)

Palestinian problem". In fact, the Israeli Government is continuing its colonisation of the territories occupied after the 1967 war. The Israeli occupation is not only military, it is primarily aimed at making life impossible for the population and forcing it into exile.

At the same time the domestic economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is being increasingly adapted to the specific requirements of the Israeli economy, so that some 50,000 more Palestinians have left their native land over the last five years.

The Israeli occupation is also repression. Five thousand Palestinians are rotting in Israeli jails. The latest of these repressive measures, the decision to expel the Mayor of Nablus, one of the most outstanding representatives of the Palestinian resistance, has been unanimously condemned by the Security Council.

That is why our Assembly would do well to condemn the expulsion of the Mayor of Nablus, to recognise the PLO and to support the United Nations resolution reaffirming that there can be no just and lasting peace in the Middle East until a just solution is found to the problem of the Palestinians, founded on the realisation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people including the right to return to their homeland and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine.

That is, in our view, the only policy likely to lead towards a settlement of current problems in the Middle East and to consolidate peace in Europe and world-wide. Since the draft recommendation does not follow these lines, the French communist members of parliament will vote against it. Such is the policy we, French communists, freely ordain, refusing all external interference.

That is why I vehemently protest at the statement just made by Mr. Müller who dares here in Paris to pass judgment on the policy of the French Communist Party. Do not count on us, Sir, to follow the injunctions of German imperialism.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I confine my remarks to the Middle East. I say right away that I do not consider Sir Frederic's report at all objective. The whole tone of it was anti-Israel, with a very strong underlying implication that Israel really has no right to exist, but that if she cannot be eliminated, pressure must be brought to bear upon her to recognise the magnanimity of Sir Frederic and others who might, grudgingly, accept her exist-

tence and for this wonderful gesture Israel must quietly agree — if it is in the interests of Sir Frederic and others — to commit suicide.

Sir Frederic's speech was even worse than his report. Except for the fact that his words were devoid of emotion, they could have been delivered by Colonel Kadhafi himself. The report is highly selective and shot through with inaccuracies. Since when, for example, did Jordan cease to be part of the original British mandate of Palestine? Jordan is part of Palestine. Jordan is two-thirds of Palestine. Jordan is, therefore, an independent Palestinian state, and the other independent Palestinian state, for the benefit of those who perhaps do not recognise it, is Israel.

I shall not go over Sir Frederic's report or his brief. The brief went back to 1945. He might have gone back just a few years earlier and mentioned the horrible crimes committed against the Jewish people in Europe, going on to the holocaust between 1939 and 1945 which, according to some people, never happened — six million Jews did not die.

I will just say this: those who believe in religion should be very pleased that the people of the Book are back in their ancient homeland; those who believe in democracy should be happy that Israel is a genuine democratic state in the Middle East; and those who admire effort should not be grudging in their praise of what the Israelis have achieved.

Mr. Begin cannot count me amongst his supporters; he is not a favourite of mine. Nor do I have any time for the religious extremists, the fanatics, who invoke the Bible to advocate and push for a greater Israel. However, they are a very small minority of the people of Israel and of the Jewish people in general. I may say now that I deplore the settlements on the West Bank. Although the number of settlers is small, it constitutes a reason for fear on the part of the Arabs that Israel is bent on expansion. It would not be a difficult gesture for Israel to dismantle them. The Israelis, however, are very poor propagandists. With the assurance — some people might miscall it arrogance — of individuals who are convinced that they are right, they do not feel it necessary to embellish or even to explain their case.

I do not agree that the nub of the Middle East problem is the Palestinian Arabs' right to an independent state, because the problem began long before the pressure for such a state. The nub of the problem is that the Arabs simply refuse to accept Israel's right to exist as an independent state. I appreciate that there are other problems, but the greatest difficulty stems from the refusal from the very beginning of the Arabs to accept Israel's right to exist. The PLO's covenant has

Dr. Miller (continued)

not been repudiated. It states : no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no peace with Israel.

Far from belittling the Camp David agreements, I think they represent a major step on the way to overall peace in the area. I pay tribute to the courage of President Sadat in taking the step he took two years ago. Israel still has a large number of good friends, in spite of the vast amount of money spent by propagandists against Israel. I believe that that is looked upon as very largely propaganda. To those who are genuine friends of Israel, who genuinely admire her, I would say "Criticise, of course, but be fair in your judgments and do not judge her by the yardstick of perfection. No country is devoid of faults. Above all, do not be patronising by claiming to know better than the Israelis what is in their own best interests. After all, Israel has fought four wars for survival. She needs to lose only one and she is totally obliterated".

I have spent the major part of my political life fighting for the rights of minorities, particularly the coloured minorities in the United Kingdom. I would never advocate policies meant to help them without first consulting the people offended. If you want to be a genuine friend of Israel, you ought to consult the Israelis before you pass motions of condemnation or severe criticism. I understand Arab grievances and have considerable sympathy with the Arab case. Of course, if they had not begun the war against Israel in the first instance, the problems would probably not have arisen. However, there is no point in denying their present case, and I believe that self-determination will come. Nevertheless, it must come slowly and must certainly not be achieved by means of the elimination of another state in the area, Israel. Israel's existence is not negotiable.

I shall conclude with a quotation which is an appropriate comment on the present situation. It is a letter from the playwright, Alan Sillitoe, which appeared in this week's Sunday Times.

"The assumption... that the troubles in the Moslem world would go away if only Israel and the PLO settled their differences is so naïve that one is led to suspect some deeper mischief.

It is difficult to imagine that the book-burning mobs of Rawalpindi, and the hostage-takers of Tehran would be satisfied with Judaea and Samaria — or even with Samarkand and Sarajevo.

In the 1930s the rantings of the deranged High Priest of national socialism... led to similar noises of appeasement, and the craven

sacrifice of one piece of territory after another in an attempt to satisfy his aggressive demands did not in the end placate him. Israel will never take on the rôle of scapegoat in order that the West may obtain a few more barrels of oil, and it seems obvious to me that continuing support for Israel in the face of the 'resurgence of Islam' — no matter from what quarter it comes — means greater security in the long run for us all." (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you Dr. Miller.

I now call Mr. Cavaliere, who will be followed by Mr. Jessel.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, events in the Near and Middle East command our interest and concern. Our direct interest, I may say, because as they endanger world peace we obviously cannot be caught unarmed and they leave us no room for drifting into a partisan stance : if we in fact want to help towards a solution and the pacification of those countries and, by the same token, of European and world peace, we have to be extremely objective. Precisely because of this need for objectivity, I immediately draw attention to one first factor that ought to engage us : even though the Soviet Union is not directly, or not solely, responsible for what has happened and is still going on in those countries, the wind is certainly blowing from the East throughout the area. As I say, we ought to be perturbed. Soviet Russia, the communist bloc in general, are being quite unabashed about it. So long as the Shah was of some use to them, and they were wooing his friendship, they had no hesitation in even heaping honorary degrees upon him. Let me remind our communist colleagues that none of the countries represented in our Assembly ever dreamed of conferring an honorary degree, which is one of the highest marks of consideration and esteem, upon His Imperial Majesty. But it was left to the communists to do that, those same countries which are now trying to get their way by other means, adding a little fuel to the fires raging in that region, especially Iran, in the belief that substituting one dictatorship for another can serve the interests of the USSR's expansionist aims. This is why we are not defending what the Shah has done nor what the new régime is doing. Rather, we deplore what he did and, with a very real concern, deplore the blast of violence and derision for every standard of international law we now behold, the work of this new charismatic ruler who has possessed the souls of his fellow-countrymen and seeks to use them to the utmost in order to challenge not only the United States but the whole of the civilised world.

And for the same reason we unreservedly condemn the latest act of real international piracy perpetrated against the employees of the United

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

States Embassy at Tehran, and have tabled two amendments inviting the Council to demand immediate release of the hostages.

On the situation in the Arab countries and Israel, I share the Rapporteur's appraisals and political conclusions. However, let me tell him I am unable to share a certain partisan spirit he shows in respect of the PLO and the Palestinians, almost as if he wanted — perhaps I am mistaken, but there is certainly a hint of it — to condemn the Israelis who, as was said a while ago, have simply had the moral and material strength to defend themselves, who have never been the aggressors, who have fought for their nation and their lives, for had they been unable to defend themselves the state of Israel would certainly no longer exist.

This is why I think that a precondition to any solution must be recognition by the Arab states and the PLO of the state of Israel. It is also why, as I shall show more clearly when we discuss the amendments, I have tabled an amendment to invert the order of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the recommendation: otherwise it would look as if we were inclined to give precedence and greater priority to recognition of the PLO, a movement representing a nation that does not, legally or materially, exist, over the interests, existence and reality of a state like Israel.

I should like to say just one last thing about the Camp David agreements. It is almost as if we wished to condemn them. Yet they ought to be extolled, for while as the Rapporteur notes, there has been a certain softening of the PLO's position as a direct consequence of Camp David, in fact the PLO, the Palestinians and the Arab countries did not want to take part in the negotiations, nor sit down at the negotiating table with Israel — let us remember they were invited to do so — while they have become less unyielding, and evince some willingness to negotiate with Israel, the reason is that Egypt had the courage to break through the barrier of solidarity and intransigence, creating a feeling that something was giving, or rather the certitude that Israel does exist and has to be reckoned with if the Palestinian problem and that of peace in the Arab world are ever to be solved. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

I now call Mr. Jessel. He will be followed by Mr. Voogd.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Cavaliere has said many interesting things. I shall not immediately follow him. I would like first to comment on a remark by Mr. Deschamps of the French Communist Party, who was highly

critical of the régime of the Shah of Iran. Whatever one may say about the Shah, Iran under him was surely an immensely better-run country than we see today under a bunch of uncivilised barbarians who are now dragging Iran back into the Middle Ages.

I turn now to the Middle East. Like other colleagues who have spoken, I shall speak with a somewhat different emphasis from my colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett, the Rapporteur. I am rather sad to be differing from him. This is not easy for me, as he is the leader of my delegation and we all greatly respect him, but I believe that Sir Frederic would be the last person who would want any member of his team to say anything other than what he believes. I turn to the title of the paper that has been put before us by the General Affairs Committee — the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security — I repeat, Western European security.

Surely, the foremost interest of all our countries in Western Europe is to avoid the risk of a world war. We are all familiar with the risk that an outbreak of war in the Middle East between Israel and its neighbours could escalate into a situation into which the great world powers felt they had to enter, leading to a world war. It is almost too obvious to state that our main interest is to avoid that, and it is in that context that what was said by Mr. Grant about the importance of Camp David is surely highly significant. The Camp David agreement was between Israel and Egypt — the most powerful of the Arab states — countries that had been at loggerheads, and frequently at war, over the last twenty-five years. That was a great and historic achievement and we must endeavour to build on it.

It has never been claimed by anyone that Camp David would solve all the historic problems but, as Mr. Cavaliere said, the Arab countries had a somewhat inflexible attitude to it because they argued that it did not relate to the Palestine problem. I should like to quote from a letter that was sent to President Carter from President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin of Israel on 26th March 1979: they wrote:

“For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with the above-mentioned frameworks, Egypt and Israel will proceed with the implementation of those provisions relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations within a month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty. In accordance with the ‘framework for peace in the Middle East’, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is invited to join the negotiations. The Delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include

Mr. Jessel (continued)

Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed."

So, had the will been there, what could have emanated from the Camp David agreement and the situation that was there achieved was the promotion of peace for the Palestinians. Only the intransigent attitude of some of the interested parties prevented this from happening.

I hope that in the remainder of the debate no one will play down, deride or disparage the importance of the Camp David agreement, which is crucial to the maintenance of the purpose that is embodied in the title of our report: the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security.

I turn to the question of the Palestinian state. The case for it has been very strongly put this morning. I believe that the case against it has been less strongly put. It has been said that there can be no peace without it. I fear that there can be no peace with it. It is not just that it is unlikely to be viable economically — that, in itself, would produce a new source of instability in the Middle East; it is more a strategic matter. It would be dominated by the PLO, which is a terrorist organisation which has had close links with the murderous Irish Republican Army. The PLO is dedicated to the destruction of Israel.

I shall quote from the Palestinian national covenant, which is its only official basic document. That says:

"The Arab Palestinian people... reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine."

It says:

"The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal."

It says:

"The liberation of Palestine... aims at the elimination of Zionism."

In 1977 the PLO office in Oslo put out a statement saying:

"There is no new policy by the PLO to recognise Israel... The declared programme of the PLO is to bring about the destruction of the Zionist entity of Israel."

Anyone who imagines that the declaration that has been put before us in the recommendations can change basic attitudes in a short space of time is asking too much, because he is asking the

PLO, which would dominate a new Palestinian state that came into being, to go entirely against the historic motivation of all that it has been campaigning on hitherto. Anyone whose right to exist is questioned is bound to feel prickly about it. We would all feel prickly. Any of us in this chamber would feel prickly if his right to exist and to survive were questioned. Of course, the Jews are no exception to this, especially after their experience thirty or forty years ago.

Let us look at the geography. If a Palestinian state were set up on the West Bank it would extend westward to within about twenty kilometres of the Mediterranean, leaving a long thin neck of Israel, about fifteen to twenty kilometres wide which would be the link between the two parts of that country. Through that neck comes the water supply from north to south — as the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions saw on a visit to Israel two years ago. What the Israelis are being asked, by this recommendation, to accept is to have an enemy thumb on their windpipe. Like any people concerned with their own survival — which all peoples must obviously be — they cannot realistically accept a threat of that kind.

Thank you for listening, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Jessel.

I now call Mr. Voogd, who will be the last speaker in this morning's debate.

Mr. VOOGD (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I want to begin Mr. President, by making my position as plain as possible. I am a sworn friend of the state of Israel and of the Jewish people. I am committed, and I admit the fact. One's sorrow at the fate of a people who have been persecuted over the centuries is deepened by the fate that six million of them had to suffer through what one Dutch writer has so strikingly called the "crushing of a people". Seeing the monument of Yad Vashem in Jerusalem entered deep into my soul, and was something I shall never forget. My colleagues in this Assembly have a right to know with what depths of feeling, and perhaps with what partiality, I am speaking here. My comments on the Middle East ought to be seen and considered in this light.

Yet there is another side, too. One of the reasons why this subject is so complicated is that anyone who does not declare himself unconditionally in favour of one side is almost automatically counted as being the most purblind supporter of the other. This gives a distorted picture on both sides. This hampers the finding of solutions. It is not true that those who feel a deep bond with Israel, as I do, ignore the existence of the Palestinians.

In 1969, at a time when I had still not set foot in Israel, I attended an anti-Israel conference in

Mr. Voogd (continued).

the then very belligerent Egypt of Nasser, in order to compare my feelings with those of the Palestinians. In those days the Palestinians were not yet as popular in Europe as they are today ; there was of course — and I say this cynically but I think with justification — still no energy crisis. I have alas to say that for some people in Europe — and not least within the EEC — the Palestinians only took on human form when the Europeans became afraid that their cars were going to have to stay in the garage.

The talks I had in a hotel room in 1969, lasting many hours, with young members of El Fatah both impressed me and taught me a lot. These people were not really recognised by anyone ; not by Israel, nor by the Arab countries. Their bitterness against the Arab countries was no less than their bitterness against Israel. They were the forgotten generation — young men torn between a little hope and deep despair. A fertile ground for anyone who wanted to make wrong and wicked use of it. There was someone who did : his name is Yasser Arafat. Yet in spite of him and of the deeds for which he is responsible — deny them as he may — we must not lose sight of the fact that there are people, there are human beings called Palestinians.

Then there is something else. The best friends of Israel are not those who nod their heads at anything and everything Israel does. As a foreigner, one is almost shocked in Israel itself at the harsh criticism of each other that is very clearly voiced. That for me is the marvellous thing about Israel ; constantly in a war situation, constantly threatened, economically in desperate straits — but nevertheless having freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and a real parliament. How many European countries, even on this side of the iron curtain, would be willing or able to allow this under such circumstances ? Even an outsider can dare to voice criticism, and I shall do so. The policy of establishing settlements, as this has developed, is a bad policy. The policy followed by the Begin government is a bad policy ; and I am not saying this from a party-political viewpoint. One step towards peace will have to be putting a stop to the spread of the settlements.

If the Israeli Government takes this step, and I fervently hope that it will, what will the next step have to be ? Probably contact — direct or indirect — between Israel and the Palestinians. But this will be totally impossible and intolerable as long as the PLO sets itself up as the voice of the Palestinians, and keeps the PLO charter. The main step here will have to be withdrawal of the charter as it now stands, which in every one of its, I believe, thirty-two articles has only one

motif — Israel must disappear from the face of the earth, and by force.

One cannot expect Israel to have any official contact with the PLO as long as this charter remains as a pistol aimed at Israel's heart. Anyone here who has not read the PLO charter ought to do so ; some of Israel's reactions would then be more readily understood and would seem more reasonable.

All this does not however rule out talks between people on the two sides. Such informal contacts are perhaps the most fruitful way of ever getting out of the impasse. A long road, certainly, but perhaps the only road.

There is of course infinitely more that could be said about this question. What I have been saying contributes nothing fresh, but I really had no pretensions that it would. I did however think that I was duty bound to show where I stand, because this is going to determine how I vote on the amendments and on the recommendation. The first version of Sir Frederic's report was a reasonably well-balanced document. Unfortunately I had to miss the meeting at which the recommendation was discussed. The recommendation as it now stands does not meet my views to the extent I had hoped it would. The fate of the amendments will determine what my final vote will be. I shall not be forgetting the Palestinians, either their human or their political problems. But what must be unassailable is the secure and continued existence of the country that I will call here by its name of Eretz Yisroel. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Voogd.

We shall now adjourn the debate.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 (Document 815, Addendum and Amendment) ; Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Document 814 and Addendum) (Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Documents 815, Addendum and Amendment and 814 and Addendum).

The President (continued)

2. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1979 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Document 824).
3. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (Resumed Debate on the

Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 820 and Amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1979

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Change in the membership of a Committee.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 (Doc. 815, Addendum and Amendment); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 814 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 815, Addendum and Amendment and 814 and Addendum*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Alber (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper, Mr. Alber (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).

5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1979 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 824*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Kershaw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren, Mr. Adriaenssens, Mr. Kershaw (*Rapporteur*).

6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 820 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Beith, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. McGuire, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett, Dr. Miller, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Urwin, Dr. Miller, Mr. Roper, Sir Frederic Bennett, Dr. Miller, Mr. Roper, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Corallo, Sir Frederic Bennett, Dr. Miller, Mr. Cavaliere; (points of order): Mr. Corallo, Dr. Miller, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Roper, the President.

7. The situation in Iran (*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 829*).

Speakers: The President; (point of order): Mr. Roper, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Roper, the President, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Hanin, Mr. Valleix.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Stoffelen, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Change in the membership of a Committee

The PRESIDENT. — The Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has proposed a change in the membership of the Committee on

Budgetary Affairs and Administration by appointing Mr. Kittelmann as an alternate member in place of Mr. Reddemann.

Are there any objections ?...

It is agreed to.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980

(Doc. 815, Addendum and Amendment)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 814 and Addendum)

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 815, Addendum and Amendment and 814 and Addendum*)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980, Document 815, Addendum and Amendment. With this it

1. See page 31.

The President (continued)

will be convenient to take the presentation of the auditor's report on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 and the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 814 and Addendum.

I call Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. ALBER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the length of my speech will be in proportion to the volume of the budget, that is to say it will be very short.

Today we are dealing with two documents, with the accounts for 1978 and with the draft budget for 1980. I shall discuss them together.

As regards the accounts for 1978, the original amount provided for was 7,979,000 francs. In the end actual expenditure amounted to 7,723,279 francs, meaning an unexpended credit of 255,721 francs for 1978. So we have underspent by 255,000 francs. This is partly because receipts were 89,650 francs higher than expected. I do not want to discuss in detail the items which led to this underspending, but only to call attention to the fact. It shows that our accounting is really very sound.

That is why we should also point out to the Council of Ministers that we consider it petty if small amounts are then lopped off. If we do not spend some of the money, we give it back; our accounts show this.

We are submitting a very reasonable budget, but instead of our frugality being respected, the amounts in the estimates for the future are to be reduced, partly on the grounds that we would not spend the money anyway. That is not quite fair. And here I should like to say immediately that in 1979 we will in fact spend the entire amount because costs have risen.

And that brings us to the 1980 draft budget. I shall deal only with the four items where the Council's Budget Committee has made reductions, taking them in the same order as in the draft budget.

Firstly, there is Head II, Sub-Head 3.5, miscellaneous expenditure during sessions. An amount of 51,000 francs was earmarked for this item. The Budget Committee felt it had to reduce the sum by 5,000 francs to 46,000 francs. In the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and the Presidential Committee it was argued that a question of principle was involved. We do not see why a committee should concern itself with such ridiculously small sums, especially when the salaries of the people concerned are higher than the amounts that are saved. One really should concentrate on

items of importance. The 1978 accounts show that we give back money if we do not need it. So we cannot see why such ridiculously small reductions are made. As a matter of principle we reject this deletion.

We now come to Head III, Sub-Head 4.2, work on this building. This amount is to be reduced by 28,000 francs. We agree to this because the work will be spread over two years. So it is justified to reduce this sub-head somewhat.

As for Head V, Sub-Heads 17 and 18, expenditure on information and the expenses of political groups, the Presidential Committee feels that we must not and cannot accept the proposed reductions. That is why I have tabled an amendment which provides for a return to the figure in the draft.

May I briefly remind you that in 1978 we had practically nothing for these two items. In the past we had 36,000 francs for information and 17,000 francs for the political groups. We then asked for these two amounts to be increased to a total of 500,000 francs. This was not accepted for the current year 1979, so that for this year the sum of 142,500 francs is available for each of these two items. We think — and that is why we are again making this request for 1980 — that the means made available should be increased to a total of 500,000 francs. The Budget Committee wants to approve an increase of only 18,500 francs in both cases, bringing each sub-head up to 161,000 francs. We think this is too little. We are of course aware that in percentage terms, these represent major rates of increase. But if in the past I have spent one franc and now spend two francs, that is a 100 % increase. It would therefore be fair to look not at the percentages but at the absolute amounts. We must take into account the fact that so far we had provided little or nothing for these two items. If we now enter appropriate amounts, it is only in order to rectify what we failed to do before. These are political items, and so we should enter the means to do the job.

For the sake of comparison I would like to quote the amounts spent by the European Parliament. The European Parliament spends 3.5 million units of account for the political groups. One unit of account is about 5.60 francs. So it spends 19.6 million francs, nearly 20 million, for the political groups. That is more than twice our entire budget.

And then there are the 147 staff posts, which from 1st January 1980 are to be increased by another 123 posts to a total of 270 posts — for the political groups alone !

The European Parliament's expenditure on information is difficult to identify because it is

Mr. Alber (continued)

included under administrative and staff expenditure. But 150,000 units of account, or 840,000 francs, are set aside for press conferences alone. And 250,000 units of account, about 1.34 million francs, are set aside for publications. In addition, 1.41 million units of account, or some 7.89 million francs, are earmarked for visiting groups. We do not even have such an item in our budget; you will not find a single franc for visiting groups.

It is not that we want to catch up with the European Parliament. That would be ridiculous. I have simply given you these figures so that you can place the matter in perspective. Compared to the amounts I have just mentioned, our budget amounts are really no more than a drop in the ocean. Seen from this point of view, it is hardly surprising that no one knows what Western European Union is. If you ask someone in the street what Western European Union is, he will say it is a private association to promote the European ideal. We should consider our budget from that angle too.

I believe that we owe it to our work, our reputation and our importance to make adequate resources available. The importance of our task for such matters as the security of the citizens of Europe calls for a budget which enables us to work in the political field as well. That is why I ask you to adopt the amendment which I have tabled on behalf of the Presidential Committee. As I said, this amendment calls for re-establishing the original version of the draft budget, except for the amount of 28,000 francs which I mentioned above and to which we agree.

As for the 1978 accounts, I ask you to accept my report and to discharge the President of our Assembly of his financial responsibility. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank Mr. Alber, Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee, for his statement.

(The President continued in English)

The debate on Documents 814 and Addendum and 815, Addendum and Amendment is open.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am glad that you are combining the debates, Mr. President, and that I can, therefore, say something about Document 814 as well as 815.

I should like to express my thanks and, I believe, the thanks of the Assembly to Mr. Alber for once again undertaking the difficult task not merely of presenting this report to the Assembly — that is the easiest part of his duty — but of carrying out the work throughout the

year of the Chairman of our Budgetary Committee. It may well be that if there are elections to the Bundestag in the coming year he will not be with us on the next occasion of our consideration of these matters. The Assembly owes him a very great debt of gratitude for all he has done over the years as Chairman of the Committee and indeed as Rapporteur on so many occasions. I was very glad to read in Document 814 the remarks of the Comptroller and Auditor General about the provident fund and pension scheme. Over the years, Mr. Alber has done a great deal to ensure that that has become a reality, and the staff of WEU in years to come will appreciate the work he undertook.

Although it is not normal to refer to officers of the Clerk's Office, I should like, if I may, to express our appreciation of the work of Miss Cohen in this area. She is an extremely tough lady and she will not allow people to get anything past her without good argument.

I do not think we really need an external auditor while we have Miss Cohen doing this job for the Assembly. However, once one has persuaded her that one has a case, she will move heaven and earth to find a way to provide the funds required. The Assembly owes her, too, a particular debt of gratitude for what she has done this year and in the past to make sure that the limited sums that we have available are spent as efficiently and as effectively as possible.

I should like also to thank our external auditor, Sir Douglas Henley, the Comptroller and Auditor General in the United Kingdom, for the work he has done again in auditing our accounts. I am particularly pleased that he allowed us to deduct from our underspending the sum of 100,000 francs in order to break through the door on the first floor between the Wilson building and the rest of the building. That was a very useful act and something which I am glad has been not only carried out but legitimised financially as well.

Turning to the budget for the coming year, I should like to refer to the point made by Mr. Alber about our expenditure on information. It has, of course, increased fairly drastically — 36,000 francs in 1978, 142,500 francs in the current year and a proposal for 250,000 francs in the coming year. As with the European Parliament, this is not a very helpful figure because, together with the 250,000 francs shown under Sub-Head 17, one must also take the salary of the Press Counsellor, which appears as the salary of one of the counsellors under Sub-Head 1 (a) and, I suppose, amounts to a similar sum if one divides 1.3 million francs by five. We should also add the cost of the printing of brochures and other matters which appear under Sub-Head 8 of the budget. One must, therefore, bring quite

Mr. Roper (continued)

a number of sub-heads together if one wants to get a correct figure for the total available for information.

None the less, the Chairman of the Committee was quite right when he said that it was not an adequate sum. I am a little concerned, however, that the Assembly, unlike those of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, has not devised a totally efficient method of discussing and considering how we can make the best use of the limited sums available. As an Assembly we are not, I suspect, very well informed — and I have made some inquiries — about on what this 250,000 francs is to be spent. Nor are we terribly clear on what the 142,500 francs available this year has been spent. Of course, we shall not know until we get the auditor's report. We should find a mechanism whereby our Assembly or its Committees could discuss rather more satisfactorily the work of promoting Western European Union and this Assembly.

It is a difficult task because, unlike the others, we are an Assembly without, as it were, a particularly active executive body. In the Council of Europe, the intergovernmental work is naturally promoted. In the European Community the work of the Commission is naturally promoted.

With great respect, I am delighted to see so many members of the Council present this afternoon. The work of the Council is not something which grips the headlines every day of the week. Therefore, if we are to bring our Assembly to the people of our countries it must be done by a fairly clearly worked out programme of public relations, fairly closed linked to the work of the Assembly.

Mr. President, I may be running out of my time. As there are not a great many other speakers on the list, may I have another two minutes?

The PRESIDENT. — If you are sure that it will not be more than a couple of minutes and you really need it for the debate and since you are the only speaker, I can give you that permission.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am most grateful, Mr. President, for your co-operative attitude in responding to my request. I was about to make the point that in the Council of Europe the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations is charged with not merely the responsibility of relations with national parliaments but with an overview of the promotion of the Council of Europe and particularly its Parliamentary Assembly in the member countries. Although our Rules of Procedure do not give such a mandate at present to our Committee for Relations with

Parliaments it would be very valuable if in the near future that mandate to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments could be widened so that members of this Assembly could address themselves to what is a very important, difficult and serious problem — how with the limited resources provided for us can we best promote the work of our Assembly.

It is not in any spirit of criticism of what has been done with these trifling sums or what may be done with slightly more substantial sums but because I believe that parliamentarians could contribute to the discussion and policy formation in this area that I hope that at an appropriate time ways will be found whereby our Assembly and its Committees can discuss much more adequately than in the past the reasons this money is required and what we can do with the money for which we have asked

I thank you very much, Mr. President, particularly for the extension of time.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

Does anyone else wish to speak? ...

Does Mr. Alber wish to reply?

Mr. ALBER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I am very grateful to Mr. Roper for what he has had to say, and especially for his question on how the information funds are spent. As you know yourselves, this year is the first in which we have had available an amount which makes it possible to work in this sector. We now have 142,500 francs, against 36,000 francs last year. It would indeed be desirable if when resources are further increased — as is planned — the Presidential Committee of WEU could give at least our Committee an exact idea of how it is intended to spend this money. That would certainly make the voting easier on all sides, both for us and for the Budget Committee. I certainly agree.

Mr. Roper will understand from my hesitant reply that I cannot answer his question fully because I do not yet know the details of this year's accounts. To the best of my knowledge, the money is spent, first, on temporary staff appointed for the duration of these sessions — three people for press work and one messenger — secondly, for invitations to journalists and, thirdly, for press conferences and missions by our press officer here, for press receptions and the purchase of newspapers and journals. That is the situation in brief. I cannot at present say what amounts are allocated to each of these activities, for here too I must wait for this year's accounts.

May I also join Mr. Roper in expressing special thanks to Miss Cohen and our colleagues in this Assembly who are responsible for these important budgetary matters. I think Miss Cohen could

Mr. Alber (continued)

equally well be head of a CID or president of a bank ; head of a CID because, when there is a problem over the quorum or over attendance at meetings, she works like a detective finding out where individual members are at that given moment, in what country, at what conference centre. She does this in a matter of seconds, like a computer. Certainly she can find me much faster than my wife can ; my wife says that if she is looking for me she need only telephone Miss Cohen, who always knows where we are to be found. She could be the president of a bank because she keeps as tight a rein on our money as if it were her own. But I think this is all to the good. We therefore owe Miss Cohen a debt of gratitude and we thank her sincerely. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — The debate is closed.

The Assembly has to vote on the draft budget for 1980 in Document 815 and Addendum.

An Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. Alber giving a summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1980.

I call Mr. Alber.

Mr. ALBER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I have already said that this amendment is based on a decision by the Presidential Committee which I am tabling in my name. Its purpose is to re-establish our draft budget, with the exception of the 28,000 francs which are deducted for building work, because this expenditure will only arise a year later. I therefore ask you to adopt this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Alber.

Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment ? ...

The Assembly will now vote on Mr. Alber's Amendment 1.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is agreed to.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 in Document 815 and Addendum, as amended.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ? ...

Are there any abstentions ? ...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980, as amended, is adopted unanimously.

The Assembly must now vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 in the Addendum to Document 814.

Are there any objections to the motion ? ...

Are there any abstentions ? ...

The motion is adopted unanimously.

5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1979

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 824)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1979 and votes on the draft opinion and the draft recommendation, Document 824.

I call Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — Last year I had the honour to present a report about these matters to the Assembly. This year I do not find it necessary to change greatly the subject matter of my speech, though I am happy to be able to report modest progress along the lines I then advocated. May I start by calling attention to the figures on the third page of the report, Document 824, which is before us. The Assembly will note that the Western European Union budget for 1979 is £786,660 plus 25,745,795 francs.

By the standards of government today those sums are small. Many small towns or districts in our countries spend much more. This comparative smallness in our enterprise, on the one hand, must commend itself for its cost-effectiveness, but, on the other, it brings problems for those who work for us. Small may be beautiful but it cannot always provide the wider opportunities and benefits which the more lavish arrangements of a large organisation permit. These restrictions can arise in two ways : first, in regard to current employment conditions, and, secondly, in regard to pensions.

Concerning current conditions the opportunities for promotion within "such a rigid, indeed virtually unchanging establishment", to use the Council's own words, are small.

Mr. Kershaw (continued)

Eighteen out of twenty-six officials who serve us have already reached the last step in their grade, some of them several years ago. The Assembly has twice in the past recommended that the Council should establish a committee of experts to review the possibility of action. It would surely be desirable to review the grading system, to study the types of contract, and to liaise with our co-ordinated organisations, such as OECD, the Council of Europe and so on, whose problems as larger organisations are not the same as those of WEU but which, nevertheless, may have lessons for each side. We ought also to discuss the possibilities of transfer from one co-ordinated organisation to another.

The problem of training new staff, or indeed, old staff for new posts, in a small and busy organisation is one of special difficulty. No doubt the Secretaries-General of the Council review these matters as closely as they can, but they should not lose sight — I am sure that they do not lose sight — of the need in personnel matters to carry staff with them in their work. If promotions are few, for example, the Council must make sure that those which do occur are made known to staff so that they may apply, and due weight also should be paid to the experience that staff acquire during their years of work. The Council will realise that the existing staff sometimes become impatient with criteria based upon nationality and expertise which the staff feel are now largely out-dated.

For these reasons I ask the Council to consider yet again whether scrutiny by an outside body might not be in the interests of all concerned. After all, Western European Union, after twenty-five years, though it is entitled to say that no new problem of staff can now present itself, by the same token must bear in mind that twenty-five years is a good anniversary to choose to take a fresh look at accepted practices.

I turn to matters concerning pensions. I am happy to record that a start will be made next month by the appointment of the head for the joint section for the administration of pensions. For this, Sir, WEU can take the credit, because it was in this house that the urging of this proposal took place and the post was finally made.

In our recommendation we say that this section, which is to be established next month, should be complemented by the creation of a single appeals board for the co-ordinated organisations. The reason for this will be obvious to those who have studied pension matters. Often the problems of pensions, which always have a particular poignancy for the individual concerned, are complicated — sometimes extremely so. It would certainly be

a heavy blow to staff confidence if decisions in apparently comparable cases were to be different in different co-ordinated organisations and if there were to be no appeal against those decisions.

I think that we are fully justified in asking for a system to be set up which would avoid this danger to morale and good order, and we do so in the recommendations before us.

The sums involved in these pensions are not small. The Assembly will note that when WEU changes from a provident fund to a pension scheme, our governments receive back 24 million francs. This is in respect of 144 employees of WEU. The Assembly will note from Appendix VI of the report that 5,715 staff of co-ordinated organisations are involved in the full arrangements. For the time being, therefore, our governments will receive a substantial windfall, although, of course, the pensions to which the staff contribute 7% of salary will amount to important expenditure in the long run.

Last year I suggested that part of this windfall should be devoted to making housing loans available for staff, but there was such a deafening silence from governments and the Council that I think it idle to persist. In any case, the money either has been or very shortly will be transferred to our governments and so is no longer available.

Finally, the amount of money involved leads me to suppose that an independent joint management fund would be a sensible way to proceed. I refer to this in paragraph 6 of the report. It is, perhaps, premature to put in a recommendation to this effect, but no doubt the Council will wish to study the proposition in the light of the events and in the light of the progress which has already been made organisationally.

I beg to recommend the opinion in Document 824 to the Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Kershaw, for that presentation.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate Mr. Kershaw on his very succinct presentation of the report. I should like to take up with him and the Budgetary Committee, however, a particular issue which concerns me. It was raised, very appropriately and correctly, by Mr. Kershaw in the course of his dissertation when he spoke of the need for us to make sure that the morale and good order of our staff were maintained.

I heartily endorse the presentation given by Mr. Alber. I was one of those who, together with all the rest of us present, voted unanimously that the committee of experts should be told to accept

Mr. Warren (continued)

our total WEU budget as our commitment for the coming year.

I want to question exactly what this committee gets up to, and to illustrate it by one specific instance in relation to the staff here at WEU. The committee of experts is, I understand, responsible for considerations relating to the salaries of the staff in relation to other organisations similar to WEU, such as OECD, the Council of Europe, NATO and so on.

As is well known to you, Mr. President, and to the Budgetary Committee, several times in the past it has been pointed out to the Assembly in discussion in this chamber and in written questions to the Council that the Co-ordinating Committee of Budget Experts in the national governments has never been able to decide a time for the necessary adjustments to the salaries of personnel which had been recommended by the Secretaries-General. It is quite normal that the recommendation of the Secretary-General should be acted upon at the appropriate time and in a proper manner, because at a time when inflation is soaring all across Europe it is wrong that our staff should suffer because this vast organisation of budgetary experts cannot organise itself.

If one looks at the deliberations of that committee over the last year, one finds that although it has adopted new rules, it has still not been able to apply those rules itself and that the general review of remunerations to take effect from 1st July 1979 submitted to the committee by the Secretaries-General of the OECD, NATO, the Council of Europe, WEU and the European Space Agency has not yet been approved.

One is given the impression from the way in which the members of this committee are acting that they are a law unto themselves. They are responsible to the national governments, and I hope that members of this Assembly will put some parliamentary questions to their national governments about what this committee is up to and how much it is costing the national governments to operate the system.

One is certainly given the impression from their antics and how they have been operating that they are trying to circumvent new rules that have been adopted by them. They appear to be using them against our staff maliciously. I illustrate how this strange committee acts.

Into my possession have come a couple of examples of the minutes of this committee. It held its 199th meeting in sunny Frascati on 18th October last. At that meeting 37 people were present from 11 nations plus nine organisations. They produced pages of minutes, 15 in all.

The meeting must have cost national governments many thousands of pounds to mount. If one reads through the minutes one finds no decisions on instructions they have been given by the Secretaries-General. They come from Norway, Sweden, the United States, NATO, our own WEU and even include an observer from the European Patent Office.

The 200th meeting, three weeks later, finds them in Brussels. It is a little colder and the minutes are even longer. This time there are 17 pages of minutes but still no decision. Thousands of pounds are spent and yet staff salaries of WEU are not agreed. The key matter they need to agree is that a 2% adjustment of salaries proposed by Secretaries-General as far back as July should be accepted. They have not accepted it. Endless meetings and discussions are going on. The 201st meeting took place on 27th November. I expect that they will have a happy Christmas in a pleasant place spending thousands of pounds more but refusing to accept the 2% increase required.

This is happening at a time when our staff are having to meet increasing expenses and trying to accept that at some time their salaries will be put right. To have 30 or 40 officials romping around Europe meeting every three weeks at the taxpayers' expense and not accepting the instructions of the Secretaries-General must cause us to consider whether we have any confidence in this quango. I do not know, Mr. President, whether you are aware of quangos. We have hundreds in Britain. The good Conservative Government is getting rid of as many as possible as quickly as possible. You, Sir, as a good socialist, may not applaud that. But this quango is one to end all quangos. It is the best one romping the world.

I have no confidence in the committee of experts. I ask the Budgetary Committee to make the strongest representations through their member governments and direct to the organisation itself to tell them to do their job, to get out of the way of our staff and to let our staff get on with the job, as Mr. Kershaw said, with good morale and in good order.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Warren.

I call Mr. Adriaensens.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank Mr. Kershaw for the report he has submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. This gives us a number of facts about pension matters, career planning and ways of improving the position of the staff of WEU.

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

On the matter of pensions I would emphasise that the pension scheme has been adopted by the Councils of Ministers of each of the co-ordinated organisations — that is to say the Council of Europe, the European Space Agency, NATO and its twenty-seven subsidiary organisations, OECD and WEU. These Councils of Ministers usually consist of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, but also from time to time include the Ministers of Finance and, where staffing is concerned, the Ministers for Home Affairs or of other departments which deal with the affairs of government officials.

The rules for implementing the pension scheme have been promulgated by the Secretaries-General of the organisations just mentioned. Now we are finding that the Committee of Budget Experts is trying to interfere with some of the provisions that have been enacted by these authorities. I believe that this Assembly must protest at this with the utmost vigour. When the highest political and administrative authorities have laid down rules and arrangements for implementing them, these rules should not be brought into question again by budget experts who by doing so are encroaching on the legal security of the members of staff. I can see that it is sometimes difficult to apply general regulations and implementing provisions in individual cases, but what is going on now can to my mind only be described as malevolent interpretation of these rules. Very often it is really only a matter of dogmatic obduracy on the part of a few national civil servants. I find myself wondering, too, whether the time and trouble devoted to these futile exercises really justify the cost.

Where improvements in the position of the staff are concerned I would comment that it has already been pointed out repeatedly in this Assembly — as a result in particular of the reports presented by Mr. Kershaw's predecessor Lord Selsdon — that improving the salaries of the staff takes far too long, and that it involves far, far too many experts and officials travelling to and fro all over Europe to meetings to examine the proposals put forward by the Secretaries-General of the international organisations I have listed.

Now there is another general review of staff salaries dated 1st July 1979, with proposals from the Secretaries-General which in my opinion are very balanced and are moreover based on rules laid down by the Co-ordinating Committee of Budget Experts itself. These new rules were adopted by this committee last year, and as a result of these rules the committee itself was enabled to work more speedily than in the past. But now we find that after almost six months

there have still been no decisions taken on these proposals for a review.

The pay of the staff of our international organisations is based on two general criteria : on the one hand the average of salaries in the other international organisations, in particular the European Communities and UNESCO, and on the other an average of the salaries in the twenty-three countries involved. The difficulty now seems to be that the officials of the European Community had a rise eighteen months ago, and that Italian and British civil servants too have had a substantial increase in salary.

The conclusion reached by the Secretaries-General was that because of this the staff of the co-ordinated organisations ought to have a 2 % increase, to prevent them falling too far behind on the one hand the average of national salaries and on the other the European Communities salaries. This fully justified proposal, based on rules adopted by the Co-ordinating Committee itself, is now not being honoured by that committee.

It is obvious that the interests of the staff of the co-ordinated organisations are being dealt with in a very offhanded way. There is no reason at all why they should be looked upon as second-class international civil servants, but one has to conclude that this is what is being done when one sees yet again the salary increases proposed by the Secretaries-General being left endlessly waiting on a decision. Apart from the 2 % I have just mentioned, the remaining percentage of the increase is no more than the inflation factor ; this will mean for those working in France or Britain a matter of 12 or 15 %. Once again, seven or eight thousand officials are having to wait six or seven months for their rise in salary. I think this is extremely unfair, and the Assembly ought once again to call the attention of the Ministers to this fact. I would suggest therefore that you, Mr. President, should on behalf of the Assembly point out this state of affairs to the Ministers concerned, and ask them to do something about the continuing delay in reviewing the salaries of the staff of the co-ordinated organisations. I would also ask you, Mr. President, to call the attention of the Ministers concerned to the high costs that are being incurred by innumerable meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee of Budget Experts, despite the fact of new and objective rules being adopted last year. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply ?

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, perhaps I may just say that I appreciate very much the comments of both speakers. But perhaps it would be worth while for me to

Mr. Kershaw (continued)

point out that the proposals about the committee which examines salaries form no part of the recommendation now before us. The recommendation before us, the second paragraph of the draft recommendation in Document 824, is for the creation of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy. The Assembly will note that the responsibility for fixing salaries is nowhere mentioned there. Therefore, the proposal which I have made for, perhaps, the appointment of three wise men is not the target at which the last two speakers have so eloquently been casting their darts.

I think it very satisfactory, nevertheless, that we have such a full bench of the Council of Ministers here to hear what has been said, and no doubt when they take the opportunity to consider these matters further they will consider the eloquence of my two honourable friends, who have put the matter so well. But for the moment we are dealing with another proposition, which is that we should concentrate rather more on the personnel policy as set out in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation, which I again commend to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Kershaw.

I notice that the Chairman does not want to speak.

The debate is closed.

We shall now vote, first, on the draft opinion in Document 824.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections? ...

Are there any abstentions? ...

The draft opinion is agreed to ¹.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 824.

No amendments have been tabled.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections? ...

Are there any abstentions? ...

The draft recommendation is agreed to ².

1. See page 32.

2. See page 33.

6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 820 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — We now resume our debate on the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security, Document 820 and Amendments.

At the end of the debate there will be votes on the draft recommendation in Document 820 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, up till a few years ago no one would have believed a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was possible. Yet now it has been signed. I am very pleased that this peace treaty has been concluded, because I see this step as a chance to help bring peace to that part of the world.

I believe that the road taken is the correct one, and I am convinced of the need to continue along that road. I realise, however, that it will not be possible to solve this problem unless other Arab states also take part in the dialogue and in its follow-up, namely the conclusion of treaties.

I am also convinced that the western industrial countries must make it clear that they welcome the direction taken. A hesitant attitude would help to discourage those Arab states which are still standing aside from taking the same road.

In my view the only principle that applies in conflicts is that of non-violence. It is a principle which cannot be abandoned. It does not affect the right of individual or collective self-defence but is one of the recognised principles of international law, to be found, for instance, in the United Nations Charter.

Assertion of the right to self-determination does not, however, imply a right to use force. What, for instance, would this Assembly say if someone were to hit upon the criminal idea of trying to reunify Germany by force? If anyone put forward such an idea, he would have to be put promptly behind bars, because that would be the kind of policy which would not solve problems but lead to fresh problems against a background of human misery.

The principle that political problems cannot be solved by the use of force is indivisible. It applies to every people, every state, every region of the world, wherever such problems arise. Even the motives for which a people is denied the right of self-determination, which may vary, do not justify the use of force. In this matter there can be no exception.

Mr. Gessner (continued)

That is why I cannot accept the operations mounted by the Palestinians. True, there are many groups within the PLO, and it is certainly not easy to define what the PLO is ; but by now I have learned one thing : that terrorist attacks have been perpetrated from within this PLO. I do not believe that setting off a bomb on the market place in Jerusalem is a military act. Nor do I believe that it can be claimed that hijacking an aeroplane from some western country is a military act. The bloodbath we saw at the Olympic games in Munich a few years ago was certainly not a military act, but an act of terrorism.

Another reason why I am concerned about this is that at trials in the Federal Republic the German terrorists always claim that they are in a state of war with the Federal Republic of Germany and that they are therefore prisoners of war and not terrorists. When I recall that German terrorists have been trained in Palestinian camps and go to ground there when we are searching for them, then I see a connection between terrorism in our country and terrorist operations by the PLO.

I am sure everyone here will agree with me that the bombardments in Lebanon are a terrible business. Many people are affected and innocent people die. We can only hope that this gruesome business in this small country will soon be over. But I am also aware that terrorists are operating from Lebanon and provoking counter-attacks, with the result that the war is carried into that country.

In considering the problem of the PLO there is an important point which some people may long since have forgotten. I well remember that there was a time when the Israelis did not reply to the PLO's acts of terrorism by acts of reprisal. But it very soon became apparent that this did not make the PLO cut down on its activities ; they continued apace.

Many people say that the solution to the problem could lie in establishing a Palestinian state. If I myself believed that this was the root of the problem, and that it could defuse the situation, I would be in favour of founding such a state. Each time I think about it I come to the conclusion that such a state would certainly not contribute to pacification. Rather I fear that it would become a source of new military operations. So the problem cannot be solved by founding a Palestinian state. It would simply lead to fresh demands. I think it would merely provide the embryo of a state that would generate further attacks. I do not believe that that road leads to peace.

May I in this context add that I consider it most unfortunate that the Israeli Government is

continuing with its settlement policy. This is a bad business ; a policy like this is not going to help resolve the difficulties, but will only make matters more complicated.

If ever there is to be a solution, it can lie only in negotiation. I think the Arab states and the PLO must — as Egypt has already done — recognise Israel as a state. The Palestinians would be doing themselves a great favour if they worked on the basis of the realities of the situation as they actually are. Israel exists as a state. As we discuss this problem I am often reminded of the discussions we used to have in the Federal Republic about whether or not the German Democratic Republic existed as a state. I will not disguise the fact that for years we found it very hard to grasp that a state had come into being which we had to recognise if we were to make pacts and agreements. It is difficult to come to an agreement with someone whom one looks upon as not existing. It can't be done.

Unfortunately, today the PLO still wants to eliminate the state of Israel. Recently, before visiting an Arab country, I read the PLO's charter very carefully and realised that annihilation of the state of Israel is still one of the PLO's objectives. When I say "still" I am referring to the fact that even very recently the PLO and Arab states have been repeatedly confirming the principles of this charter. If we wish to make any progress, if we want to make it clear that there is some good will, this charter, this founding document of the PLO, will have to be amended.

Furthermore, I believe that the Palestinian problem would not be so threatening if in the past the camps had not been kept in existence artificially. There is not the slightest doubt that the reason why these camps were not dispersed was to have a source of young recruits for military operations. These camps are like ulcers that have been fostered around Israel in the hope that dangerous matter would collect there to be used one day in the fight against Israel. People now complain that these camps still exist. I do not consider that logical or consistent. I myself have spent some time in a refugee camp. After the second world war I lived in one for some months. I know how people feel when they have to live in very cramped quarters and in extremely difficult conditions. I know it from personal experience. I can very well appreciate how people who live in these camps think, how they become charged with emotion. But it must be pointed out that these camps would no longer be necessary today if they had not been preserved artificially. I am absolutely convinced that over the years the western industrial nations would have made available large sums of money with which to help the people in these camps to be integrated in the Arab countries.

Mr. Gessner (continued)

I am convinced that the Palestinian problem cannot be solved by force. As I see it, at least, there can no longer be any question of doing so now that there is a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, for everyone is aware of the rôle played by Egypt's military strength in the Arab world.

That is why in my view there is but one answer. On all sides there must be a readiness to compromise, and that means an attempt to solve the problem by negotiation. I am certainly not one of the most pious people in my country. Yet I believe in a truth to be found in the Bible, a truth which has been confirmed again and again over the centuries: "They who take the sword, shall perish by the sword". (*Applause*)

(*Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Beith and after him Mr. Valleix.

Mr. BEITH (*United Kingdom*). — It is at least partly to the credit of the Rapporteur that we have had such an interesting debate on Middle East questions today. It has been a wide-ranging debate, although it has not yet touched on some of the issues included in the report which went even wider and is a very stimulating document. We should not let the occasion pass without some reference to the very interesting analysis of Soviet intentions in Afghanistan, for example, and the involvement of the Soviet Union in proping up a very precarious and unsatisfactory régime there. I was also very struck by the Rapporteur's references to Pakistan and to the need, in the interests of Pakistan, of the West and of the democracies, to try to seek a stronger, more stable and more acceptable régime there.

It is ironic and perhaps a little worrying that if it had not been for the recent experiences of Iran we should have thought that Pakistan had seen the worst of what could happen if fanaticism took off from the better side of a Muslim revival. In Pakistan we saw some of the beginnings; Iran has since demonstrated how much worse things can become.

As far as Iran is concerned, I have always been surprised by the naïvety of those who imagined that the removal of the Shah would bring about the installation of a liberal and democratic régime. I recall one of my parliamentary colleagues saying in response to this kind of comment that if those who made it were in Iran they would probably be amongst the first to have their hands cut off when the kind of régime for which the Ayatollah stood was eventually installed. He was not altogether inaccurate in his prophecies about what that régime would involve.

It is a very depressing sight and leads one to wonder how long a country can run on frenzy and the excitement of political passion and the paying off of old political scores. It is a particularly worrying prospect for us when we see innocent civilian employees still held as hostages in the United States Embassy. Has the time come when the nations, not just of the West but of the world, must consider withdrawing all their diplomats from Tehran to make quite clear that diplomacy cannot be conducted between nations of however different views when this kind of treatment is meted out to those who are responsible for the day-to-day work of missions abroad? It must surely be considered, not as a unilateral step by one or two countries but as a measure of the world's inability to operate in this way. One hopes that over the passage of time there can be some stabilisation in Iran and that those within that country who had hoped to see a better and freer way of life will not finally be disappointed, though their prospects at present look very grim.

Much of the debate has been concerned as its main subject matter with the affairs of Israel and its neighbours, and in that debate it has become noticeable that Israel does not lack friends in this Assembly; and I speak as one who would want to be counted among them although I shall have critical things to say, as the Rapporteur has been reminded, in these discussions. By the way in which he has phrased his report he seems to betray a certain unwillingness to accept a certain lack of enthusiasm for the existence of the state of Israel, a certain feeling that the circumstances of the birth of the nation of Israel cast doubt upon its right to continued existence. We should dispel that feeling. That idea should not be present in anything said by this Assembly.

The Rapporteur also failed to recognise the emotional force and power behind the conclusion of the Camp David agreement, emotions that surround the achievement of peace in the minds of the Israelis and the Egyptians. Seeing such emotions brought into play to achieve positive results we must welcome them and not discourage or criticise them. It was a gratifying sight for those who want peace all over the world to see the peoples of two nations who had fought now genuinely desirous of concluding a lasting peace with each other, and, whatever the shortcomings of the limited agreement and whatever we may feel it lacks. I do not think we should turn aside the forces for peace which are clearly present in those countries and which have such emotional power and strength behind them.

Who, after all, ever expected the conclusion of a separate peace between Israel and Egypt would do more than that? Whoever expected that it would bring many Arab nations into an acceptance of Israel's position? Whoever expected that it would lead Arab nations to turn

Mr. Beith (continued)

on Palestinians and deny claims that they had hitherto supported? I did not entertain such unrealistic hopes about the agreement and I would not wish its merits to be questioned because it cannot bring about those results. There has, however, been a certain air of unreality in part of the debate about the nature of feelings in the Arab world, the importance of the Arab world and the difficulties confronting moderate leaders there in the face of extreme militant pressure among others of that world.

It is a very hard position to be in at the present time and one in which the claims of the Palestinians and their rights have a very crucial and important place. Those who are friendly towards Israel ought to be the first to remind her that she, too, must recognise the facts. But having said favourable things about Israel and asserted her right to continued existence, believing that the building up of that state has been a miracle of human achievement, I would still say to her leaders that their policies are shortsighted in the extreme in their failure to recognise the aspirations of the Palestinians and the lack of any sense of urgency about those aspirations.

I criticise them for their territorial ambitions as a nation, for their indefensible policy of settlement on the West Bank. The West must continue to be the friend of Israel and cannot desert a nation which, with the support of countries like the Soviet Union, we created in the first place; but it is the right of friends to criticise. I do not believe that the present Israeli Government, its leaders or their policies, can last for ever. The resignation of General Dayan underlines the dissension existing within the state of Israel. The most recent public opinion poll showed that Mr. Begin has a 27.5 % rating, his lowest ever. I should like to believe that eventually better forces will come to responsibility there and that they will recognise what we in western democracy must see as vital — that surely it is in Israel's long-term interests to see Palestinian aspirations satisfied in some considerable degree; because until the Palestinian people gain an opportunity for self-determination, an opportunity to have a place of their own, every Arab government except Egypt will feel it necessary to support and sustain the Palestinians.

The presence of Palestinian pressure inside those countries will make the further development of peace between Israel and her neighbours quite impossible, and if Israel cannot see that, her western friends must tell her.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Valleix, who will be followed by Mr. Urwin.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — May I first express my gratitude to our Rapporteur who, on these thorny topics, has, in his report and recommendation, presented the problem with the utmost clarity.

Unfortunately, our debate on Sir Frederic's report is taking place against the dramatic backdrop of what may be called a barbaric threat, in contempt of the most elementary rules of the rights of man, by the Iranian state, or at any rate with its connivance, against a large part of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran.

This event makes abundantly clear the extent of the hidden dangers in the current development of the political situation in the Middle East. While the Rapporteur carefully and very aptly analyses the historic, ethnic and cultural roots of the conflicts which are at present causing upheaval in this region, he does not perhaps sufficiently question the nature of the dangers to which Europe is exposed by the situation he describes.

First the economic dangers: I do not need to tell you that Iran supplies a significant proportion of our oil. But we must also realise that the possible impact of the Iranian crisis on the political equilibrium of the Persian Gulf states is an even more direct threat to oil exports to Europe. It is very difficult to grasp today the scope of recent events in Saudi Arabia. At any rate they concern a country which is of considerable importance for Europe's oil supplies. Moreover, the continued smouldering of the Israel-Arab conflict still holds out the threat of a fresh embargo.

There are also political and military dangers in the Middle East situation. Hitherto the intervention of the great powers has been a factor both of moderation and of exacerbation in the conflicts, the former fortunately outweighing the latter. The October 1973 war was certainly encouraged by Soviet-American rivalry. But pressures from the USSR and the United States did also put a fairly rapid end to the fighting.

Perhaps I should also speak of the rôle of the great powers in such varied crises as those caused by the internal problems of Iraq and Lebanon in 1958, the fall of the Mossadegh government in 1954, or Egyptian intervention in the Yemen in the early 1960s.

Today, however, we are faced with a new fact. We no longer have two states, or two factions within a state, confronting one another with the direct or indirect support of one great power. In the Iranian crisis, a significant proportion of the population is clashing with the United States head-on. Instead of being a major power involved by proxy, the United States has become a direct protagonist in the Iranian drama. Thus an extremely disquieting risk of direct conflict

Mr. Valleix (continued)

between the West and the Islamic world is looming on the horizon.

It is to be feared that, in future crises in the Middle East, confrontations will increasingly turn into trials of strength with the industrialised countries of Western Europe or America — North America notably — although these do have many close ties of solidarity with the state of Israel and the Islamic developing countries, whether oil-producers or those having to grapple with grievous economic difficulties. In such a context the true problem is that of North-South relations. The question of Soviet intervention takes second place compared with the danger of the emergence of a global anti-western movement from Pakistan to the Maghreb.

The recent flare-up of anti-American feeling in Libya and Pakistan can only cause misgiving. The political colouring of an integralist Islamism which rejects all western influence is a potential factor of crises and conflicts that would have unforeseeable results. Faced with this danger, and perhaps also with the worst military scenario, it is up to Europe to adopt a prudent and reasonable, but lucid and firm attitude.

Above all care must be taken to prevent the fomenting of a new crusading spirit. The breach which threatens to open up between Europe and the Islamic countries must be filled.

Respect for international law is an absolute precondition. So long as a solution has not been found to the problem posed by its violation in Iran, there can be no substantive negotiations with that country. Sooner or later, however, Iran will probably resume its place in the international community, for no state can isolate itself for ever, as shown by the example of Indonesia. Hence, it will revert to being just another case in the overall problems of the region, to the solution of which Europe should actively contribute.

A dialogue must be started between Europe and the Middle East countries, while there is yet time. It would fit into the framework of the general relations to be established between the industrialised and developing countries. Its primary aim will be to relieve the atmosphere and reduce mutual misunderstandings; it should cover energy, raw materials and industrial and technical co-operation. It is essential that the West, more especially Europe, should no longer be seen by substantial proportions of the Arab, or, more generally, Islamic population as a hostile external force destructive of traditional social structures.

The establishment of a new climate in relations between Europe and the Middle East also presupposes extirpating once and for all the terrible canker of the Israel-Arab conflict. Unfortunately

the progress made to date is admittedly inadequate. The Camp David agreement is a partial one. Surely the plain objective, for an Egypt exhausted by warfare, is to win at long last a truce which it hopes will be a lasting one, and for Israel, whose situation is hardly any better, to contrive a future still often conceived as the accomplishment of a myth rather than a realistic and necessary adaptation to a hostile environment.

The international community should aspire to another, wider settlement, an overall settlement, associating all the parties concerned, guaranteeing the integrity and unity of all the states of the region inside secure and recognised frontiers, while effectively recognising the right of every nation, and in particular the Palestinian people, to self-determination.

WEU can play an unequalled part in warding off these threats and promoting the achievement of lasting solutions. And it can only be a matter for regret that the Council should have, yet once more, demonstrated an astonishing inertia. As the sole European organisation with specific responsibility for debating security matters and organising co-operation between governments in this area, with a view to reaching, where appropriate, joint decisions, WEU, whose Assembly has always, as you know, paid very great attention to the Eastern Mediterranean, cannot fail to recognise the grave dangers of the current political situation in the Middle East. Its duty should be to prepare a united response by Europe in the event of an emergency, such as an oil blockade. It should also encourage, by joint action with the other European institutions at the United Nations and other competent international organisations, the formulation of lasting solutions. The member states of WEU could also, individually or collectively, act as guarantors of any satisfactory settlement that may be reached of the many conflicts by which the Middle East is torn.

The policy I have just outlined undoubtedly goes farther than the report tabled, notably as regards the rôle which WEU can play in defining a European policy in respect of the Middle East. It is however guided by analyses analogous to, if not identical with, those of the Rapporteur, and implies no fundamental divergence of opinion — quite the contrary — and in the end conveys a reasoned acceptance of the Rapporteur's proposals.

I am therefore happy that in the name of the Assembly at least we may in a few moments have a very clear majority in favour of the recommendation before us. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Urwin. He will be followed by Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President. I, too, want to congratulate Sir Frederic Bennett on having presented for us such an interesting report and, in addition, on the invaluable briefing material that accompanies the report.

I want to deal first and briefly with the subject of Iran, merely to record that the régime of the Shah was not one that was universally supported — certainly not in the western world. It represented a regressive and oppressive régime and there was an all-too-late awakening to the need to democratise the country. Sadly, perhaps, the democratisation progress gathered momentum much too quickly in what was clearly a rather desperate attempt to liberalise national laws on a western basis.

I have convinced myself that this was one of the factors which led to the advent of the Khomeini régime, which, despite all the things that were expected of it, has turned out to be even more vicious than that of the Shah, leading to bloodbaths and the present situation in which the country is rapidly becoming ungovernable.

The recent example of the seizure of hostages from the American embassy in itself causes a great deal of concern, allied with the threat to arraign the hostages before the so-called peoples' court. This, clearly, would be a violation of international law, and the situation is fraught with very great danger. One must not exclude the possibility of armed conflict as a result of the sad events now taking place in that unhappy country. This is essentially the reason why I have seen fit to table an amendment to the recommendations concerning the supply of arms.

It is coincidental that the Bennett report is presented to us at a time when there are intense activities within the Council of Europe concerning the affairs in the Middle East. There we have had in the plenary session the appearance of Mr. Bhutros-Ghali, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and Moshe Dayan, the then Foreign Minister of Israel, making their presentations to the plenary session of the Assembly. We have a sub-committee which has visited Israel, Egypt and, latterly, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, on what can be described as fact-finding tours, in preparation for the major report and debates in the Council of Europe that will follow. I am sure that we shall have just as interesting and as absorbing debates there on the highly controversial subject of the Middle East when those reports are completed.

No one should seek to denigrate or underestimate the importance of the Camp David agreements. They are having and will have a highly influential effect on relationships between Israel and Egypt. At the time I accorded a

warm personal welcome to the progress that had been made. At the same time I expressed the fervent hope that this accord would be the forerunner of future and wider agreement possibly including and involving not only Israel and Egypt but Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

We have realistically to face the fact that, helpful though Camp David undoubtedly was, it simply could not provide a solution to the deep-seated, long-standing disputes between Egypt and Israel, or between Israel and the Arab nations as a whole, because of the simple fact that the Palestinian problem always has been and always will be the basic cause of the Middle East dispute.

Without a solution it is inevitable that the dispute will continue. In these circumstances lasting peace and stability in the Arab world cannot be assured. As a praiseworthy objective, it will remain as distant as ever. This is a matter of history. The Middle East has for too long represented a seething cauldron of political unrest, all too frequently boiling over and spreading into active physical war between nations.

We are entitled to say that the Rapporteur has genuinely addressed himself to the main argument, for provision for the future of the Palestinians is at the heart of this difficult problem. Here he has captured and recapitulated the opinion widely proclaimed by the international community that the Palestinians must be involved in any negotiations aimed at reaching a settlement and that without their acceptance of the results of negotiations any prospect of a lasting peace will recede further into the long and distant future.

The report and recommendations are contrary to some expressed beliefs that the existence of the state of Israel is under direct threat. Sir Frederic Bennett seeks to encourage the two factions to come together and to negotiate and sensibly and properly calls on the PLO to recognise the sovereignty of Israel and on Israel to abandon a deeply entrenched position regarding the problems of the Palestinians and their right to national independence and their own sovereignty.

This has been a good debate. Understandably, some acrimony has been introduced. There are positions of deep intransigence which have become manifest during the debate. That is understandable on such a highly emotive subject as the Middle East.

New initiatives are being advocated in the paper before us and in the recommendations. I appeal to my colleagues in the Assembly to study the recommendations with the utmost objectivity. They are capable of some slight amendment and I hope to get the accord of the

Mr. Urwin (continued)

Rapporteur to all the amendments that I have personally tabled in my name and those of two others. The report and the recommendations should not give offence to either side in this dispute when they recall the texts of United Nations Resolutions 242, 337, 338 and 3236.

My one criticism of the report is based on the content of paragraph 152 on the last page. Sir Frederic has ventured on a wholly needless criticism of the United States of America and the presidency's present incumbent. This adds nothing to the report and makes no contribution towards a successful conclusion by this Assembly based on the recommendations and the report. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Wilkinson.

He will be followed by Mr. McGuire.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — I welcome, Mr. President, this wide-ranging report so painstakingly prepared and so thoughtfully introduced by Sir Frederic Bennett. It draws attention not only to the shocking events in Iran, not only to the threat to peace inherent in the Arab-Israeli dispute, but to the situation in Afghanistan which, for all its calamitous consequences for human rights and the lives and liberties of the traditionally most responsible elements in Afghan society, has received far too little attention in the West.

The vital strategic significance of Afghanistan has also been largely overlooked. This is perhaps due to the fact that Afghanistan, in spite of two British military expeditions in the last century, was not colonised by the European powers and, perhaps since the demise of the Central Treaty Organisation, Middle East regional security matters have enjoyed too little consideration by West European military planners and statesmen. Afghanistan has remained largely a forgotten land.

However, its importance to the USSR has not been overlooked in Moscow, both to underpin the Islamic Soviet republics in the southern Soviet Union, especially at a time of Moslem fervour in neighbouring Iran, and to support the historic Russian objective of direct access to the Indian Ocean. That objective has become more significant in view of the Soviets' new-found global naval capacity and in view of the Soviet Union's increasing dependence on imports of oil from overseas.

Freddie Bennett was right to remind us of the dimensions of the human tragedy which the repressive policies of the Soviet-backed régime in Kabul have unleashed. The elimination of so-called class enemies, religious leaders, pro-

fessional people, tribal chieftains and officers of the armed forces loyal to the Afghan royal family has proceeded ruthlessly. Political prisoners in Afghan jails have multiplied.

The active involvement of Russian-flown jet fighters and helicopter gunships and the widespread deployment of Soviet military personnel have characterised the punitive missions of the Revolutionary Council's forces in support of Hafizullah Amin's programme of Marxist-Leninist social change. The suffering and deprivation imposed on a people who already had one of the lowest living standards in the world have been appalling. They are a tragic advertisement to the world of what can be derived from a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.

The overspill of this calamity into Pakistan has been admirably documented in Sir Frederic's report. Although there has always been movement of Pathan tribesmen across the Durand Line, the sudden irruption of 200,000 to 300,000 refugees into the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan poses serious problems for the Pakistan Government. Pakistan affords sanctuary to its persecuted Moslem brethren from Afghanistan but the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan are its poorest provinces in Pakistan and the national economy is already weak. Both the NWFP and Baluchistan have always been the provinces most prone to separatist sentiments.

Following the execution of the former Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the regrettable postponement last month of parliamentary elections by the martial law administration in Islamabad, the internal politics of Pakistan are potentially explosive.

The Pakistan Government has rightly been careful not by any provocative action to give pretexts for hostile intervention by the USSR or its Afghan proxies in Pakistan's internal affairs.

Following the dissolution of both the Central and the South East Asia Treaty Organisations, no other effective means of preserving western interests and the security of our friends in these areas have been found. CENTO provided a consultative machinery for the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. At a time when the stability of Pakistan is jeopardised, we Western European allies cannot afford not to consult about these matters and our Rapporteur was quite right in the first recommendation to suggest that we initiate consultation urgently.

If we do, I suggest that we launch three initiatives, the first of which is diplomatic. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan imperils détente and is a flagrant breach of the principle of non-intervention in neighbouring states which is

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

enshrined in the Helsinki final act, and that must be made clear.

Secondly, we must ensure that Pakistan has an adequate conventional military capacity to contain any overspill of the conflict in Afghanistan and adequate economic assistance from the West to sustain the financial strains of looking after the many thousands of Afghan refugees. Indo-Pakistan relations are now, fortunately, good and there is even a Pakistan cricket side touring India without riots ensuing.

Thirdly, European nations, and particularly the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, should deploy a permanent naval presence, including, preferably, an aircraft carrier task force, in the northern Indian Ocean to secure the sea lanes from the Gulf and to assert political influence on the littoral states. It would be a grave error if a combination of parochialism on the part of the Western European allies and isolationism on the part of our American friends allowed our joint crucial economic interests in the Gulf to be subverted and human rights in the Middle East to be flouted with impunity. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. McGuire.

Mr. McGUIRE (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I want to join with all my colleagues who have paid tribute to Sir Frederic Bennett for the comprehensive report which he has presented to us and, even more, for what I might call the index. It is considerably bigger than the report, but it is most helpful.

I do not want to deal with some of the other matters in the report, such as the question of Pakistan, which my colleague has just developed to this Chamber, nor the question of Iran, except to say that I think we all condemn the conduct of the Iranian Government in taking innocent hostages to further their attempt to get the Shah to stand a trial the like of which I should not want to contemplate. I think we all condemn them and I am glad that everybody who has so far spoken has done so.

I want to get to what I consider to be the heart of this report, that is, justice for the Palestinian people. This question is tempered by another which is whether helping to do justice to the Palestinians will injure the long-term existence of the state of Israel and its claim to what it considers to be world justice, especially in view of the tragic history of the Diaspora.

Tragically, but perhaps understandably, leaders of Jewish opinion inside and outside Israel argue that the claim of the Palestinians to a homeland of their own and the setting up of an independent state would be but a prelude to the destruction of the state of Israel. Because of that feeling, which is understandable, we cannot have a dialogue between the Israeli Government and whoever will represent the Palestinian people.

We argued a little over "accredited", "valid" and so on, but in the report we have left the wording sufficiently vague. However, we understand that some group will speak on behalf of the Palestinian people. It will be recognised as such and it will sit down, I hope, with the leaders of the state of Israel to discuss what should happen, that is, the creation of a Palestinian homeland, a Palestinian state. But, as I have said, we cannot have that dialogue because of this understandable fear.

How we were all uplifted when President Sadat in, I think, November 1977 said in a speech that he was ready to go to Israel and discuss their problems. We were also all uplifted by the outcome of those talks. But at the heart of those talks there was a commitment to justice for the Palestinian people and, because Sadat has been seen to give away if not an ace, one or two trump cards, he has almost entirely lost the good will of his Arab neighbours. His was a courageous act, but we must understand that the consequences for him personally have been very bad.

The humiliation and the terrible injustices perpetrated against the Jews in recent times will not be assuaged by continuing to deny justice to the Palestinians, for they can rightfully argue that they were not responsible for those events, and the guilt of the western nations cannot be expiated at the expense of innocent people now dispossessed of their homes and their lands.

This report states that as a prerequisite of any dialogue between the state of Israel and whoever will represent the Palestinian people there has to be a recognition by the PLO — which, so far as we now know, is the only body internationally recognised as spokesman for the Palestinians — and an unequivocal declaration by it that it recognises the right of the state of Israel to exist. It is in this report. Equally, there has to be that same commitment from the state of Israel that it, too, recognises that an injustice has been done to a people.

As my colleague Sir Frederic Bennett said, no people on this earth should have more deeply burned into their souls the injustice and the longing for a homeland than the Jewish people. It is something which kept alive their faith and their hope over countless generations, so they

Mr. McGuire (continued)

should feel much more clearly than any other group the burning injustice that must be felt by the Palestinians.

While we are sometimes prone to exaggerate the importance of the Assembly of WEU, there is equally a tendency for us sometimes to depreciate what we say in this Chamber and how it will be taken outside. But we have taken a step today to discuss something which — and I speak as a labour politician — we have been reluctant to speak about because of the terrible injustice that the Jewish people suffered over many years, particularly in the recent past. That has clouded our judgment about another injustice to an innocent people to whom we have said: "We shall wipe the slate clean by not raising our voices." We have said that we shall act in a peaceful way and encourage their representatives. We have told them that they have made their case, that it is recognised and that we shall help them.

If this Assembly passes this report — my colleague has said that he has one or two textual amendments, but I do not think that they will rob the report of its message and viability — we shall have taken a small step. The Chinese have a saying that the greatest journey in the world begins with but a single step. We shall have taken one of those steps and done something good.

I must tell my Jewish colleagues and friends that it is not my wish, nor, I believe, the wish of any of my colleagues who support this report, to see the state of Israel wiped off the map, not even so as to give justice to the Palestinians. To use that argument, a very emotional and powerful one, to block any sensible dialogue on this question, however, is to do the Jewish people a very great disservice and does not demonstrate those qualities which I believe the Jewish people have shown over the years.

I hope that this report is carried in all but one or two of the textual amendments, which will not rob it of any vitality. I hope, too, that we shall have done something positive and that the result, as this report demands, will be a just and a lasting settlement in a part of the world which, if we are not careful, could explode in our faces in the not too distant future. We should then regret that we had not taken whatever opportunity we had to discuss the matter sensibly and calmly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

We are now at the end of the list of speakers. Before I ask the Rapporteur and Chairman whether they wish to speak, I should like to point out that we shall have a good many votes

on at least eighteen amendments. In order to ease the situation for members, I have distributed a paper showing how the voting will be conducted.

In view of the time available, I cannot allow more than three minutes to anyone who wishes to move his amendment. A good many amendments have already been discussed, so perhaps we can make do with a shorter time.

I must, however, point out that after the votes on the amendments we have to decide on a motion for a recommendation, which has been tabled and which will be distributed within the next ten minutes, with a demand that the Assembly meet urgently on the question of Iran.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I have already received your request that I be brief. You have given me a maximum time which I hope not even to use fully, let alone exceed. If I make a reply which is more than merely formal, it will, I think, shorten the debate, since I wish to devote the second half of my remarks to helping with the amendments. One useful feature of today's break was that I was able to discuss them with my Chairman and other members of the Committee. I shall, therefore, be able to say that on behalf of the Chairman and myself and, I believe, of other members of the Committee, we can accept a pretty wide range of the amendments as they stand. This might save time in the long run, because if I indicate support some amendments could be moved formally.

Before that I should like to refer to two or three things which have emerged from the debate and which are of major significance to my own attitude. I would say to my friend and colleague, Mr. Beith, that I do not believe that there is any part of the report itself, for which I am responsible, as opposed to the recommendations, which are those of the Committee as a whole, which shows any grudge towards the state of Israel. In fact, I went to a great deal of trouble in my opening remarks this morning to say that the 1947 resolution which set up the state of Israel was a fact. The only other part of that resolution which has not been fulfilled concerned the setting up of an Arab state in Palestine. That is the only comment I would make in regard to that matter.

One or two speakers have criticised the fact that in one report I have tried to cover Afghanistan, Iran and the Arab-Israeli dispute. I make no apology for that. I am the servant of my Committee and the mandate which it gave me was not to concentrate wholly on one aspect of the Middle East.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

One or two of the communist speakers remarked on the deep hatred of the western world and the xenophobia in Iran. There is a myth growing up that this xenophobia is directed solely towards the Americans. That is something that the communists are trying very hard to put across. In fact there are just as many anti-Soviet and anti-communist slogans in Iran at the moment as anti-American ones and when the Shah was in office he was fêted just as much in Moscow and East Berlin as he was in the western capitals. This myth must not be allowed to get off the ground.

I have also been accused of interfering with the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Coming from a communist, that really is rich. I shall not make any further comment as to who is interfering in Afghanistan.

I have not resented anything said in the course of this debate except for one personal attack. At the time it was made I almost rose. There is nothing either in this report or in my past which indicates that I have feelings of anti-semitism or have in any way sympathised with Colonel Kadhafi. I shall let my record in peace and war demonstrate that.

I say straight away that those amendments that deplore the situation of the hostages in Iran and ask for their release are perfectly acceptable to me, but I do not know what your advice will be, Mr. President, if we are to have a special debate. It might not be appropriate to put them in. However, my Chairman has not and nor have I any objection.

I accept now with qualification the amendments by Mr. Urwin and Mr. Voogd. They improve the clarity of the report and we need not have one of the usual arguments over them.

After consultation with the Chairman and others, I cannot accept either what I would call the pro-PLO amendments by the communists who have spoken nor Dr. Miller's amendments, any of which would entirely upset the balance of a report which, at least in the opinion of most people in this Chamber, is objective and tries to strike a balance between forces.

I would oppose amendments from either extreme and I have my Chairman's support for saying that.

There are one or two procedural amendments which Mr. Roper is to move. I am also happy to accept those.

The report is my own as far as the actual text is concerned and I would not wish to change anything. I must point out that the recommendation already represents a consensus of people with widely differing views within the General

Affairs Committee. In the long time I have been a member of this Assembly and of the Council of Europe I can scarcely remember an occasion when the debate on a controversial subject in Committee has ended with a vote of 15 to nil in favour of the report, precisely because it was thought to strike a sensible and objective balance. As Mr. Urwin and Mr. McGuire have said, we should do nothing to upset the balance, because if we did so we could do more harm than good and make me regret that this subject was ever introduced into this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we are very glad indeed that the report covers not only the Levant but the whole of the Middle East, because developments in recent months show how necessary it is for us to concern ourselves with the Persian Gulf area. We are today, you might say, taking the first step. The question which we have so far not even touched on, namely how much of a political power Islam actually is and how far it is in a position to set a trend for the future, is still wide open. That Islam has played and is still playing a rôle in this region cannot be denied. I would guess that we shall be having to discuss this again in the future in connection with the questions of Afghanistan and Iran, which were of course included in their report by the General Affairs Committee.

As regards the Middle East, may I say this on behalf of the Committee: the Committee reflects a variety of opinions and on political matters it certainly does not speak with a single voice. Yet we have managed to agree on the present draft recommendation. The approach repeatedly taken in the debate on the Middle East is astonishing. Those who are prepared to admit the injustice that has been done to the Palestinians, but who while doing so are certainly not saying that they want to minimise the injustice done to the Jews, are often represented as enemies of the Jews. Here a variety of concepts are being jumbled up together indiscriminately. Jews and Zionism are not quite the same thing. None of us has said that the state of Israel must be wiped off the map. This is not in the report or in the recommendation. No one wants this.

I have already said that we must be prepared to recognise that we cannot improve the situation by introducing a further injustice. So we call for the involvement of the PLO and thereby of the Palestinians.

Various speakers have said that the problem should be resolved by negotiation. I hope they agree with me that the Palestinians must be

Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)

allowed to take part in the negotiations. In the long term it will surely not be possible to negotiate over the heads of adult human beings.

It has been said that the PLO is a band of murderers, that they have blood on their hands, etc. Should we not be a little more reticent with such expressions, Mr. President? I cannot help reminding you that Mr. Begin, too, has blood on his hands and that a great many liberation movements throughout the world have blood on their hands. I do not think it is very useful or very constructive to keep saying that one or other side has blood on its hands. Both sides have used force. If we are calling on one side to stop doing so, we must certainly say the same to the other side, which is also using force and which — it is a point that I do not propose to sweep under the carpet — has been doing so from the start.

People complain about the charter of the Palestinians, saying it is aimed at destroying the Jews. That is not true. At best, or at worst, its attack is directed against the Zionist state. As I have said, Jews and Zionism are not quite the same thing. No one tells us that the records of Zionist meetings were saying decades ago: we Jews want Palestine, the whole of Palestine — without the Arabs; they must go. Here we have two conflicting statements, one from each people. I think it would become us Europeans better if we tried to build a bridge between them. There is no point in constantly harping on what divides them. It is the purpose of our report and of our recommendation to attempt to build a bridge.

May I end with the following comment. It is a new experience for me in this Assembly to find people who do not agree with another speaker turning to personal invective. That is what we have had from one quarter. As a way of conducting political discussions, this is I believe unfair and ineffective. I hope that in future it will not be used again in this Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The debate is closed.

Before we vote on the draft recommendation in Document 820 we must dispose of the amendments which have been tabled. As I have told the Assembly, eighteen amendments have been tabled. They will be taken in the order in which they refer to paragraphs in the preamble and the recommendation. Therefore, I start with Amendment 17 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere. It reads:

17. After the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in

violation of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace;”.

We have already spoken on this amendment. Need it be moved? May the Assembly proceed to a vote?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Just a very short remark.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that if this Assembly did not pronounce upon what has been going on in Tehran it would be positively scandalous and downright equivocation. Therefore I insist on having a vote on my Amendment 17 and the next one, 18, and hope if possible they will be adopted unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Rapporteur?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I thought I had already indicated that Mr. Cavaliere's amendments on the Iran situation were acceptable both to the Chairman of the Committee and myself.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall therefore vote on Amendment 17.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 17 is agreed to unanimously.

We now turn to Dr. Miller's Amendment 1.

Dr. Miller, do you wish to speak to it?

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Amendment 1 reads:

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Welcoming the Camp David agreements as a major step towards overall peace;”.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — One should not underrate the peace which now exists and is developing between Israel and Egypt. Although it ought to lead to a much wider peace, one should not make the good the enemy of the perfect. In any case, I do not believe that the Palestine “question”, as it is referred to in the report, is the cause of the problem. It is the result of non-acceptance by the Arabs of the right of Israel to exist. In my opinion it is Arab propaganda which maintains the idea that is the main cause of the problem.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Dr. Miller.

Mr. Rapporteur?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Once again, after consultation with the Chairman I have indicated that this particular amendment cannot be looked at, as Mr. McGuire has

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

said, from one paragraph to another. It is a very carefully balanced approach and it is our view that anything that upsets the very fine balance that has been drawn by a consensus vote within the Committee would not be helpful to the prospects of this report making any useful contribution to solving this difficult problem.

For that reason, just as I propose to resist amendments from the other side, it is the view of the Chairman and myself that we should resist this amendment, because we have to look at the balance which has been drawn throughout the whole recommendation and not seek to shift the balance from one sentence to another.

The PRESIDENT. — As far as I can learn from your speech, you are against it.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall therefore vote on Amendment 1 by Dr. Miller.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 2 :

2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "and militate against the underlying causes of the conflict".

Will you move it, please, Dr. Miller ?

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — For the same reasons that I believe the words "and militate against the underlying causes of the conflict" actually do not explain the position — the reason that I gave before, that the underlying causes of the conflict are really the results of the initial activities of the Arabs against the Israelis — I move the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Rapporteur ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I shall try to convey my meaning more clearly. After consultation with the Chairman, I must ask that this amendment, too, be rejected on precisely the grounds that I put forward last time.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on Amendment 2 by Dr. Miller.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 16 :

16. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Wishing the PLO to recognise Israel's right to the existence and security of a free and independent state and to stop its acts of terrorism, failing which it is not possible for it to take part in negotiations ;".

I think, Mr. Rapporteur, that you have already said that you agree to this amendment.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Cavaliere must move it.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — I think it is a sound amendment, and that it is to be approved. Whereas in the preamble of the draft recommendation there is some reference to the conduct of the Israelis on the West Bank and the establishment of settlements is deplored, whereas we do speak of the advisability, nay, necessity of Palestinian participation in the negotiations on their subject, no notice whatever is taken of the need, if the Palestinians and Israelis are to be brought together, for the PLO to recognise Israel's right to exist, for not only have they failed to do so hitherto but they have opposed it, saying that Israel should be abolished. So if the amendment is not included I believe we shall have laboured in vain.

The PRESIDENT. — I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — This is always the difficulty when one gets a large number of amendments. I am opposing Mr. Cavaliere and, indeed, have asked him not to move the amendment not because I did not agree with him but because of what I would call the Urwin-Voogd list of amendments, which come later and which make exactly the same point, leaving out such emotive words as "terrorism". If the amendment were carried, it would be a pity, because we have all agreed on two amendments which spell out the right of Israel and everything else more strongly in the recommendations part. Mr. Urwin is to move his amendment shortly, supported by a wide range of members. I should prefer Mr. Cavaliere not to move this amendment but to seek to make the point he wishes to make on the later amendments. It is no wish of mine to say "no". It is because I think it better to handle the problem by supporting the Urwin amendments.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. It is with some temerity that I rise to try to assist you in what appears to be something of a dilemma, if only because of the fact that in the summing-up it was said that Amendments 12 and 13 would be accepted. To a large extent they cover the points made by Mr. Cavaliere. Would it not assist the Assembly

Mr. Urwin (continued)

and the speed of voting if you were allowed to put my amendments to the vote?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Cavaliere, are you content to withdraw your amendment, and then we vote in favour of Mr. Urwin's amendment?

(Mr. Cavaliere indicated assent)

Mr. Cavaliere withdraws his amendment and we shall come in due course to the amendment by Mr. Urwin.

Next we have Amendment 3 :

3. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Dr. Miller to move the amendment, please.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I honestly cannot see how the Rapporteur considers that the speech made by His Majesty King Hussein on 25th September 1979 constitutes a positive step towards peace. I understand the King's problems and I have read his speech thoroughly several times. However, reading it several times one finds, clearly, that it is an anti-Israel diatribe, standing the truth on its head, the other way around exactly. I know that King Hussein would love to acknowledge the state of Israel and believes that it would be a great advantage to him if there were a rapport between Jordan and Israel. I think that Sir Frederic Bennett realises that as well. It is merely a question of how that comes about, but I cannot agree with the statements in the paragraph, and I move my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I think that members must make up their own minds. We never had any argument within the whole of the General Affairs Committee about the useful rôle that one of the few remaining moderate and long-sighted members of the Arab world, the King, is playing. I think that it is totally untrue that he did other than recommend the only way forward, which was to renounce territorial claims in relation to the West Bank in order to give the people of Palestine the right to choose their own future.

There was no argument about this in the Committee. I ask that the balance is not upset and that we pay a tribute to someone who will be a success in this part of the world and who must play an essential rôle.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We shall now vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

The next amendment is :

4. Leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I would say as a preamble that I do not welcome the Nine speaking for me in any matter. Some of the spokesmen of the Nine, here in this Assembly, appear to be trying to square the circle. On the one hand, they appear to be indicating that the state of Israel has to be allowed to live and, on the other hand, to permit another state to develop its avowed intention to destroy the state of Israel.

As a Jew, I do not want people to weep over the demise of the state of Israel and its people with whom I have a great deal in common. I do not want the western world to be put in a position of once again wailing over the deaths of many millions of Jews. I move the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — The Rapporteur please.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — That is a totally inaccurate interpretation. We should surely be pleased that nine European governments, including seven represented here, should have made a balanced appraisal of this subject. To claim that what they have said amounts virtually to asking Israel to commit suicide is standing reason on its head and is a gross reproach of the member governments who are members of this Assembly for what they did. With considerable force, I ask you not to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 11 :

11. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Welcoming", and insert "Noting".

I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — To some extent I endorse the sentiments expressed by my colleague, Dr. Miller, about the Nine. I strongly object to any prospect of the Nine speaking on my behalf. My amendment is simply to leave out the word "welcoming" and to insert "noting". There are essentially different meanings to these two words. It would meet with the wishes of many of our colleagues in this Assembly if we simply "noted" rather than "welcomed".

The PRESIDENT. — The Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I do not feel as strongly about this amendment as I did about others. I think personally, and

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

I have also spoken to my Chairman, that we should welcome the fact that European governments have adopted the line that they have taken up. I do not wish to emphasise opposition too strongly over what we would call in England a free vote. I do not think that this is of great significance and although I shall vote against the amendment, because I consider that "welcoming" is more significant than "noting", I do not feel strongly about the matter.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 11 is negatived.

Next we come to Amendment 8 :

8. At the beginning of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add :

"Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its membership in European political co-operation among the Nine,".

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I shall be brief, Mr. President, as Sir Frederic Bennett has indicated that he will accept the amendment.

The amendment is to some extent consequential to the last paragraph of the preamble. I believe that some of the seven paragraphs that follow in the recommendation touch upon matters that go beyond the collective capacities of the wise people sitting in the front row before me who are the Council of Western European Union. In some matters it is better for our governments to act indirectly through European political co-operation of the Nine. I believe that this amendment is proposed in the spirit of asking the right body to handle the matter and that it will be accepted by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I confirm that I accept Mr. Roper's amendment in the spirit in which it was moved.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 12 :

12. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "and" in line 2 to the end of the paragraph and insert "call upon all other

arms-supplying countries to impose a similar moratorium".

I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — As the Rapporteur has expressed his willingness to accept this amendment, I do not need to address myself to it at length. It simply seeks to delete all the words after "country" in the draft recommendation, and in view of the difficult situation in Iran to "call upon all other arms-supplying countries to impose a similar moratorium".

The PRESIDENT. — The Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Urwin was good enough to consult me and I was able to consult the Chairman. In view of the difficulties experienced, it would be wise to make this paragraph stronger. We accept unreservedly what Mr. Urwin says.

The PRESIDENT. — The Rapporteur and the Chairman accept.

We shall now vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 12 is agreed to.

I now call Amendment 18 :

18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy ;".

I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I hope that Mr. Cavaliere will not move the amendment. I think it is covered by other amendments that are coming shortly. I oppose it, not in principle but because of what Mr. Cavaliere has already said.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Cavaliere, do you maintain your amendment ?

(Mr. Cavaliere indicated assent)

I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — There is a misunderstanding. I thought we had already dealt with that. Of course, I accept the amendment, but I think we have already had this same discussion.

The PRESIDENT. — We were slower than you thought. The Rapporteur is in favour of Amendment 18.

We shall now vote.

The President (continued)

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 18 is agreed to.

I now call Dr. Miller to move Amendment 5 :

5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I am afraid that the words “continue to co-ordinate the positions of its members in the United Nations” do not mean very much to me. I cannot understand what exactly is implied by that. But as regards calling for a clarification from the Security Council of the actual implications of Resolution 242, what the Rapporteur should have done was to ask Arthur Goldberg and Lord George-Brown, who framed Resolution 242 in English, not in any other language. It was framed by an American and by an Englishman in the English language, and if Sir Frederic were to read some of the comments at the time, and even read some of the comments made later by Lord George-Brown and by Arthur Goldberg, he would see that Resolution 242 was deliberately drafted in such a manner that it could be acceptable to everyone. So that to call for its implications now, after twelve years, is doing what this report is doing — trying to put the clock back.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The Rapporteur, please.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Once again I must ask the Assembly to reject this amendment, whatever the language. This is one of the sterile arguments that has been holding up progress towards peace. There is no doubt that different parties, whatever language they are speaking, interpret Resolution 242 in a different manner and it is obviously essential, if we are to get any kind of understanding, that we all at least agree on what Resolution 242 means. There is a need to redefine it. My Committee agreed with me unanimously on this, and I ask the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on Dr. Miller's amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 13 :

13. Leave out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“5. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people

and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ;

6. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its acceptance of an independent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders ;

7. Ask its members to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all acts of violence, which call into question the validity of any such declarations.”

This amendment is tabled by Mr. Urwin and others. I must point out that if we agree to this amendment, Amendments 9, 15, 6, 7 and 10 fall, with the exception that I shall have one amendment if this is carried.

I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — Again, the Rapporteur has indicated his willingness to accept this amendment. Briefly, it deals with paragraphs 5 and 6 of the recommendations proper and embodies almost all the terminology used in those two paragraphs. But at the same time it extends them to include a third paragraph without very much interfering with the objectiveness of the recommendations in paragraphs 5 and 6.

As you say, Mr. President, this would have an effect on other amendments. Therefore, as there are several of us thinking along the same lines, I do not expect any difficulty in having the amendment accepted.

The PRESIDENT. — The Rapporteur ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Urwin has already consulted me over this amendment. I have indicated, with the Chairman, that we accept his amendment in full and the consequences that follow, including the fact that I shall then withdraw my own Amendment 4. So I should now like formally to advise the Assembly to accept Mr. Urwin's amendment, plus the consequences for the other amendments which you, Mr. President, have just listed.

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, the situation is as follows : I have been informed that if Amendment 13 is carried, Mr. Corallo will ask to have his Amendment 9 voted upon. According to Rule 29, I must first ask for a vote on Amendment 13. There is a difference of opinion.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — May I put a point of order ? I have no objections to Amendment 13, but I wonder why my Amendment 7 will fall. What I am concerned about

Dr. Miller (continued)

is the word "internationally", which appears in the amendment tabled by Mr. Urwin. I wonder why my amendment is not acceptable and will fall.

The PRESIDENT. — Amendment 13 differs most from the original text and replaces paragraphs 5 and 6. Your amendment is concerned with one of the paragraphs which are amended. We cannot have another debate.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — If you look carefully at paragraph 6 to which Dr. Miller's amendment refers, and the new paragraph 6 which Mr. Urwin introduces, the word "internationally" appears in exactly the same place in both texts. I hope, therefore, that if Mr. Urwin's amendment is carried, you will permit Dr. Miller subsequently to move his amendment to the amended text.

The PRESIDENT. — I agree to vote first on Amendment 13, and then to call again Amendment 9 and Amendment 7 which deals with paragraph 6.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — I crave indulgence for taking up a few moments more of our time. I have two reasons. First, my Amendment 15 attempts for the sake of fairness to invert the order of paragraphs 5 and 6. I trust my honourable friend Mr. Urwin, the mover of Amendment 13, will agree to this.

I seize the opportunity of commenting on my vote on part of Amendment 13. May I draw your attention to paragraph 7. This places on the same footing acts of violence by the PLO — or the Palestinians — and by the Israelis. It is right to make it clear that the Israelis have always reacted to violence by the other side, never the other way round. So, to say that both sides should abandon violence is putting the Israelis and the Palestinians on a par, which in my view is unjust, and even, if I may say so, unhistorical.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Corallo, please.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — I should like a clarification. I proposed leaving out "valid Palestinian representatives" and inserting "the PLO". The form of words recurs in the Urwin amendment and I therefore regard my amendment as a sub-amendment to his, to be voted on first. If Amendment 13 were to be adopted I cannot see how it could be subsequently amended. Hence I think it proper to vote on Amendment 9 first, in which case, subject to your agreement, Mr. President, I should like briefly to speak to the sub-amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — It might be that I was not clear enough. I said that the amendment which differed most was 13. We are to vote on Amendment 13, and afterwards we shall take up again your amendment and Dr. Miller's amendment. Later, after 13 has been voted on, Amendment 15 may be on the agenda again. Please look at the notes that I gave you.

We now come to the vote on Amendment 13, which has also had the support of the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee. Who is in favour of Amendment 13 by Mr. Urwin and others?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — I made a statement explaining why I am against Amendment 7, for the reasons stated. If therefore we put the whole of Amendment 13 to the vote, I shall have to vote either against 5 or 6. This is why I request a separate vote.

The PRESIDENT. — There is a subsequent question, if I have it correctly. Mr. Cavaliere has asked for a separate vote on the three sections of Amendment 13. Is this correct? It is. Let us have separate votes then.

We shall vote on the first paragraph of Amendment 13.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The first paragraph of the amendment is agreed to.

We now turn to the next paragraph of the same amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The second paragraph of the amendment is agreed to.

We now come to the third paragraph of Amendment 13.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

That paragraph is agreed to.

Amendment 13 is accordingly agreed to.

As I told you, we now come to Amendment 9 : 9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "valid Palestinian representatives" and insert "the PLO".

I call Mr. Corallo.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to say, in a nutshell, that my amendment is intended to clear up a misunderstanding, to enable the Assembly to take a stand. If what is wanted is a negotiation with the representatives of the Palestinian

Mr. Corallo (continued)

peoples, we should say "PLO". If what you want is to tangle with ghosts or puppets, then throw out my amendment.

But in that case I shall be curious to know how you can "urge the PLO", having refused to recognise it as a spokesman. This, and this alone, is the intention of my amendment.

Allow me, in conclusion, Mr. President, to protest to yourself in person. The Rapporteur stated his views on a number of amendments, in each case referring to the proposer by name. Whenever the Rapporteur referred to my speech and amendments he spoke of "amendments by a communist speaker" not otherwise identified.

I should like to tell him that I am here on the same basis as the other parliamentarians and, anyhow, if he wanted to disparage me, let him know that I amply share and reciprocate such feelings.

The PRESIDENT. — I must inform you, Mr. Corallo, that such remarks as you have just made must be made at the end of the sitting and not in the debate or during the voting. Please remember that.

We shall now take the amendment by Mr. Corallo.

I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I shall not comment on the last remark because of what you have just said, Mr. President: that may come later.

I do not wish this amendment to be carried. This was the unanimous view of the members of the General Affairs Committee. We were extremely careful not to prejudge who would be the proper representatives of the Palestinian people. The phraseology which we have used has been deliberately framed to express the fact that negotiations must be carried out with valid Palestinian representatives. It is not for our Assembly to say that we must accept one body or another: it is for the people concerned to say.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

We now vote on the amendment.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 9 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 7:

7. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "internationally".

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not wish to appear carping but it is the word "internationally" to which I take exception, as I believe it to be both superfluous and inexact. If an agreement is reached between two states, obviously it must be an international agreement. If the Rapporteur wished to give the word "internationally" a much wider connotation, he ought to have said so.

Having made that point, however, I am quite prepared to withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Am I correct in believing that you intend to withdraw this amendment?

Thank you, Dr. Miller.

Amendment 7 is withdrawn.

We now come to Amendment 15:

15. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Ask its members to urge the PLO contemporaneously and reciprocally to declare its acceptance of", and insert "Ask its members to insist that the PLO accept"; renumber paragraph 6 as paragraph 5; and renumber paragraph 5 as paragraph 6.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as Amendment 13 on paragraph 7 has been adopted, I think my amendment can be confined to this single point: paragraph 5 of the preamble to the draft recommendation shall be renumbered paragraph 6.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Rapporteur, please?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I cannot see the point of going back to this. We have had the vote on Amendment 13. It was a package deal and was taken as a package deal by the Assembly. It was voted on in the order in which it stood. It had been thought out and it replaced some words in Mr. Cavaliere's amendment, such as "reciprocally" by "immediately". We are really reopening Amendment 13 and as this has been agreed by an enormous majority, I ask the Assembly to stand by Mr. Urwin's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on Amendment 15.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 15 is negatived.

From the paper which has been distributed members will see that other amendments fall. I believe Amendment 14 was withdrawn.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — As far as I can see, we have now covered all the amendments and must now take a final vote on the draft recommendation as amended.

Is it the wish of the Assembly that we take a roll-call vote ?

Is there any objection ?

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — I merely want to vote against. I wish, I repeat, to be allowed to vote against the motion. I do not insist on a vote by roll-call.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I thought we were talking of something else. I do not intend to support this report.

The PRESIDENT. — Is Dr. Miller asking for a roll-call vote ?

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — No. My attention was drawn to the fact that if I did not indicate that I intended to vote against this report it could have been voted for unanimously. I am not asking for a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT. — Two votes against have been declared and that will be in the Minutes. Therefore, the Assembly can vote by sitting and standing.

Does the Assembly agree to vote by sitting and standing or must we have a roll-call vote ? Is that agreed ?

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I have made quite clear that I am voting against this.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry but I must be absolutely clear and therefore we will take a roll-call vote.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. As I understand it, no one has called for a roll-call vote. The President keeps asking and everyone says he does not want a roll-call vote. Two members want to signify by sitting that they are against the report, as they are entitled to do ; but no one wants a roll-call vote. That is quite clear.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Rule 34.

The PRESIDENT. — I do not understand you, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Doubtless your officials are now bringing the same point to your attention, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I must read Rule 34, paragraph 3 :

“The vote on the draft reply to the annual report, on a motion to disagree to the annual report, or to any part of it, and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole, shall be taken by roll-call.”

These are the Rules of Procedure. While the Assembly is of the opinion that we can vote by sitting and standing, and we often do so, I will not have any trouble.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. You have frequently said that you believe that the rules should be interpreted pragmatically. I understand that if it is the unanimous view of the Assembly that there should not be a roll-call vote, those who are opposed should be allowed to record their vote against in the Minutes. You might wish to give a ruling in that direction, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I will ask the Committee on Rules of Procedure — though not today — to go through the whole of the rules and it may be found that we must amend some of them, including those on the roll-call. We have two members saying they are voting against but the rest want to vote by standing and sitting. My view is that in the next six or twelve months we must revise our Rules of Procedure so as to avoid such troubles as we could have had today, for instance.

Therefore, I invite the Assembly to vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The draft recommendation, as amended, is agreed to¹.

7. The situation in Iran

(*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 829*)

The PRESIDENT. — As I informed the Assembly, I have received from Mr. Valleix and others a request for the adoption of urgent procedure in respect of a motion for a recommendation which those members have tabled.

The Assembly must now decide on this request in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure. I would remind members that a debate on urgent procedure may not enter into the substance of the question. The only point at issue is the need for urgent procedure. I would also remind members that in such a debate the following only shall be heard : one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the Chairman of the Committee concerned — in this case the General Affairs Committee — and a representative of the Bureau speaking in its name. The request for urgent procedure refers to the motion for a recommendation on the situation in Iran, Document 829.

1. See page 34.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. It would help the Assembly if, before we start this discussion, you were to indicate whether you intend in this matter to operate the proceedings under Rule 43 (6) or whether we shall follow the proceedings under Rule 43 (5). There is an important distinction.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall follow Rule 43 (5).

Is there any problem about this? Mr. Valleix, will you please move the motion, and then I shall call someone who wishes to speak against it.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President,

The PRESIDENT. — I asked Mr. Valleix. He already has the microphone.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. This is rather to seek information from you. Having decided that the request for urgent procedure will be determined under Rule 43 (5) ...

The PRESIDENT. — It should be Rule 43 (6).

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — May I ask you, then, Mr. President, to inform members of just precisely what Rule 43 (6) says?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — With great respect, Mr. President, and further to that point of order, I asked very clearly...

The PRESIDENT. — You have not yet been called, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order, Mr. President. As I said to you, I was very concerned whether we were following the procedures under Rule 43 (5) or Rule 43 (6). The difference, as you will perhaps explain, is that under Rule 43 (5) the matter goes to the Committee and we have it at the next sitting as the first order of business. Under Rule 43 (6) we would have to proceed immediately to a debate. It is worth noting that in order to get Rule 43 (6) we need to have an absolute majority of the representatives to the Assembly present and voting in favour.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper, I think that this is not a difficult problem. We ask the Council to meet while they are here in Paris to debate this problem and to report to us before we close the session at noon on Thursday. It is a question of Iran, and I think there is no sense in postponing it until June, because it is now an urgent matter for today.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I am very anxious that we come to a conclusion on this matter, but I believe that if we are taking important matters

calling into question the competence of the Council, this should be done in proper form and with opportunity for debate and for amendments to be tabled. If we follow Rule 43(5) and grant the urgent procedure — as I hope you will — it is possible for the Committee concerned to meet either at the end of this sitting or tomorrow morning before the sitting, and to present an oral report as the first business for tomorrow's sitting. It would then be possible for us to adopt it as our first business tomorrow morning. It would not inhibit the Council at all. With great respect, Mr. President, I do not believe that the Council are likely to meet between now and 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. Therefore, I think that the procedure under Rule 43(5) — which is what you said to me earlier — would be the appropriate procedure.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President...

The PRESIDENT. — Perhaps I may ask, beforehand, Mrs. von Bothmer, more especially, and then you will have the floor — first Mr. Grieve and then Mr. Valleix.

There is one problem, Mr. Roper. The Council cannot sit from now to tomorrow morning because I have invited them for dinner — for part of the time. Mrs. von Bothmer, as Chairman, may I ask you whether you will be ready tomorrow morning at the meeting to deal with the matter and to table it at the beginning of the sitting at 10 o'clock? Would that be a compromise for all?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we could meet equally well either this evening or tomorrow morning. I think half an hour would be enough. That will still leave enough time for the Council to be informed of our decision.

The PRESIDENT. — Mrs. von Bothmer is prepared to have her Committee sit tomorrow morning and discuss the matter which is now tabled.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want to take up too much time of the Assembly this evening. There are objections to the wording of this resolution which merit the consideration of all those concerned overnight. I would strongly recommend that the suggestion of Mrs. von Bothmer be acceded to and that we have time to sleep on this matter and that tomorrow morning, possibly, if it is the desire of the Assembly that urgent procedure should be implemented, we consider the matter in terms which are within the powers of both this Assembly and our Council.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me first thank Mrs. von Bothmer for shouldering this extra work.

But above all, Mr. President, I would remind you that, under Rule 43 of our Rules of Procedure, and without wishing to emulate the talents of Mr. Roper, we have first to decide on urgent procedure.

The rule reads as follows: "At the request of the Council, of the Committee concerned, or of ten or more Representatives..." — and we are in the third case — "... the debate on a request for urgent procedure shall not enter into the substance of the question other than to justify the request or to reject the urgent procedure".

Consequently, as things stand I move that the Assembly decide on the request for urgent procedure.

Paragraph 6 of the same rule should also be applied. Let me read it to you :

"Exceptionally, when urgent procedure is adopted by an absolute majority of representatives to the Assembly, the motion may be debated without prior reference to a Committee".

Ladies and Gentlemen, we have in fact to decide on the motion for urgent procedure, and that is what is at issue this evening. For, once we agree to urgent procedure by a large majority, we ask the Council to adopt a position on this matter. If that is physically impossible during the ensuing twenty-four hours, as we are at the end of the session, we then rely on the Council to inform us very promptly of its deliberation of the matter within a week. That will be the upshot of our vote.

Our Assembly cannot remain indifferent to this dramatic Iranian problem which, by placing human lives and interests in jeopardy, will have consequences on which I need not dwell.

So, when we have reached a decision, I should like the Council, speaking on behalf of WEU within the scope of our responsibility for security, to show our European countries that our attitude is consistent. I believe we shall be serving a useful purpose.

Certainly, if we did have to debate the substance of the matter in a moment, we should do so, but, I beg of you, let us confine ourselves to applying Rule 43 (1) of the Rules of Procedure for deciding on urgency.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper, please.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want to delay the House but some of us, in voting on urgent procedure, will be anxious to know in

advance whether you intend to use the exceptional powers under paragraph 6. It is a matter on which the President should give some ruling before we vote on the question of urgency. As my colleague, Mr. Grieve, has said, a number of us are concerned about this matter and are also anxious that we should have the chance to amend this text. I strongly prefer the procedure under paragraph 5.

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, I think, first, that there is unanimity in this House that we deal with this problem. Secondly, I think that we are glad that the Chairman of the Committee is ready to work on the whole matter tomorrow morning. Thirdly, I do not believe we need consider the matter of urgency now, because the Committee has to discuss this tomorrow morning. After its decision, we can table it at the beginning of tomorrow morning's sitting or during the session after they have prepared their proposals.

I call Mr. Hanin.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, it seems to me that it is perfectly clear from the rules which have been read out that the Assembly should first decide on the urgency and, once the decision has been taken, one or other of the procedures envisaged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Rule 43 will be chosen.

I therefore think we should decide on urgent procedure, because if we fail to do so we could do nothing subsequently.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Hanin asks us to decide whether we want to have it done this way. We shall now vote on urgent procedure, send the motion to the Committee and have it back tomorrow before noon.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to unanimously.

The problem will therefore be dealt with tomorrow morning at 9.30 in the Committee.

I call Mr. Valleix on this point.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am not moving a point of order, but I feel entitled to refer to the use of these Rules of Procedure.

Now that our Assembly has decided on urgent procedure, the situation arises that it — or the President — under paragraph 6 of Rule 43 which states that "the motion may be debated without prior reference to a Committee" has the option of choosing, from the moment urgent procedure was adopted by an absolute majority of the Assembly.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

If this is so we have a choice, as I remind you, under paragraph 6, allowing the motion to be referred for implementation.

But we are within thirty-six hours of the end of the session. Will the Council be able to meet at such short notice? If the Committee, which has agreed, can usefully sit tomorrow, that will be a good job done.

The PRESIDENT. — I think the situation is clear. We decided about the urgency. The Committee will work on the motion and, in due course, we will have a report back and deal with it tomorrow.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 5th December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. The situation in Iran (Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 830).
2. New weapons and defence strategy (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Document 827 and Amendment).
3. SALT II and its implications for European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 816, Addendum and Amendment).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1979

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Changes in the membership of Committees.
4. Change in the Orders of the Day.
5. New weapons and defence strategy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 827 and Amendment).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Roper (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. van den Bergh (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Mulley, Mr. Cook, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Vattekar (*Observer from Norway*), Mrs. Eide (*Observer from Norway*); (point of order): Mr. Grieve, Mr. Roper, Mr. Deschamps, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Roper, Mrs. von Bothmer; Mr. Roberti.
6. The situation in Iran (*Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 830).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Grieve (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Valleix, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Jung, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Corallo, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Stainton; (explanation of vote): Mr. Pecchioli.
7. New weapons and defence strategy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 827).
Speakers: The President, Lord Reay, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Gessner.
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. — The Belgian Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the General Affairs Committee: Mr. Lagneau as an alternate member in place of Mr. Perin; and in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Lagneau as a titular member in place of Mr. Perin.

Is there any opposition to these changes ?...

They are approved.

1. See page 38.

4. Change in the Orders of the Day

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, following the decision of the Assembly yesterday afternoon, we have as the first Order of the Day at this sitting a debate on the motion for a recommendation on the situation in Iran tabled by Mr. Valleix and others, Document 829.

Members will recall that the matter was sent to the General Affairs Committee for its consideration. The Committee is still sitting. It is not yet ready. We go on to the next item on the agenda. We shall return to the situation in Iran later.

5. New weapons and defence strategy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 827 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on new weapons and defence strategy and votes on the two draft recommendations, Document 827.

There are two parts to this report: the first, on modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons, has been submitted by Mr. Roper, Chairman, and, in this case, Rapporteur of the Committee, and the second, on the impact of technology, has been submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur. I shall call them both to present their parts of the report.

The President (continued)

I first call Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, members of the Assembly. I think, Mr. President, that you have already explained that, as a result of the discussions in our Committee, as is pointed out in paragraph 4 of the introduction to the report, I find myself at a somewhat late date as one of the Rapporteurs on this subject. Part I of the report from the Committee which I am introducing to you this morning dealing with the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces has emerged finally from the Committee over my name.

In some sense I am a reluctant Rapporteur on this occasion. I am not reluctant because I disagree with Part I of the draft, or with the draft recommendation we are considering, which I believe is a reasonable compromise and which was supported in the Committee by eighteen votes to three with only one abstention, as can be seen from the front of the document. I am reluctant and somewhat nervous on this occasion because, inevitably, I was not personally responsible for the detailed preparation of the report as a whole in its earlier drafting stages. I took over these responsibilities only when I was appointed formally as Rapporteur by the Committee at its meeting earlier this week. None the less, this is an extremely important debate.

The subject we are considering is clearly a matter of active political debate in all our countries and in most of them of parliamentary debate as well. Our discussions today come at a particularly appropriate and topical time in view of the decisions that will be taken a week today on 12th December in the North Atlantic Council.

We are dealing here with what have come to be called long-range theatre nuclear forces. We attempt on the fifth page of the report to explain some of the technology and terminology. There has been a good deal of confusion in discussion about whether TNF stands for theatre or tactical nuclear forces and questions have arisen over the difference between theatre and battlefield nuclear forces and the difference between medium- and long-range theatre nuclear forces. We are dealing broadly here with what have come to be known as long-range theatre nuclear forces.

The matter is topical not merely because of next week's meeting of the North Atlantic Council. It is topical also because of the interest and intervention shown by the Soviet Union and its allies in this matter. This began with the speech of Mr. Brezhnev on 6th October, the subsequent interventions of Mr. Gromyko and the fact that there is today, I understand, a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Council in Berlin at which Mr.

Gromyko is symbolically to lead Soviet tanks and 2,000 Soviet men out of East Germany.

The issue is, therefore, topical and of course controversial, and this controversy is reflected in the amount of time that we as a Committee have devoted to the preparation of this report which, as you can see from the introductory note, has been discussed in draft at no fewer than five successive meetings of our Committee, while a further four meetings were devoted to taking evidence from a variety of experts, Ministers and senior officials. They are listed at the beginning of the explanatory memorandum.

In addition, our original Rapporteur, Mr. van den Bergh, has devoted a great deal of time, and has obtained a good deal of very useful information which is now reflected in the report, to interviewing officials in many countries. I should like, on behalf of all my colleagues on the Committee, to take this opportunity of paying tribute to the very hard work which he has undertaken in gathering a great deal of the information on which the part of the report which I am now introducing is based. I am basking in his reflected glory so far as that is concerned.

It is, of course, because of the topical and controversial nature of the problem, and because of some difficulties which, as I explained to the Assembly earlier, we had in obtaining a quorum in Paris earlier last month, owing to the strike of French air traffic controllers, that the Committee continued to discuss this matter up to its meeting on Monday of this week.

But the Committee makes no apology for taking this subject so seriously and for debating it for so long. I believe that when this Assembly fulfils its proper and essential rôle of debating urgent and topical issues of allied defence, it is inevitable, if not necessarily totally desirable, that the politically most important reports emerge at the last minute, after a fairly controversial period of gestation. But I stress that, while fulfilling its political responsibility of investigating, reporting and then debating these key defence issues, the Committee has been scrupulous in respecting the Rules of Procedure.

The report which the Assembly now has before it was distributed late on Monday night and the clear day referred to in Rule 26(5) duly elapsed before this debate began. Moreover, in order to enable members of the Assembly to have every opportunity to study the text, the Committee decided at our meeting of 21st November, in accordance with Rule 41(10), to make public the preliminary draft recommendation as amended by the Committee at that meeting. If you study that document, you will see that the differences between the draft recommendation which was adopted by the Committee on Monday night and the earlier text which we distributed about ten

Mr. Roper (continued)

days ago are very small and concern little more than details of drafting.

I would add for the information of the Assembly that the decision to make the earlier text public on 21st November was taken by the Committee as a whole, without any objection, at a meeting attended by fourteen members, including members from all four of the larger countries and, incidentally, two French members. I make this point in view of the remarks made in the Assembly on Monday by a French Representative who was not a member of our Committee, to which, with your permission, Mr. President, I wish to reply on behalf of the Committee in due course.

I turn now to the substance of the draft recommendation which you have before you, and which is the first draft recommendation in the document. The preamble of the draft recommendation deals, first, with the deterioration of the military balance arising, in particular, from the deployment by the Soviet Union of new long-range nuclear weapons — the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber. In the view of the Committee, with the employment of these weapons the balance has tilted against NATO. But, of course, the truth about balance in a number of these fields is that it is asymmetrical in different weapons systems and the Committee, in its discussions, has always leaned in favour of considering the balance, particularly the nuclear balance, as a whole, rather than try to single out individual elements.

Of course it is the case that, going back in history, NATO was not unduly concerned about the long-range theatre nuclear balance when the Thor and Jupiter systems were scrapped and the SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems were deployed by the Soviet Union, as you will see from paragraph 7 of the explanatory memorandum. It is, of course, perfectly true that the SS-4 and SS-5 systems were considerably more vulnerable than the SS-20 systems with which they have been replaced.

It is also for consideration whether, even if long-range theatre nuclear forces are now considered in isolation, the balance is on one side or another. The Soviet Union has argued that the balance is in NATO's favour when it considers the figures given in the second part of Appendix II to the report and when including quite a number of systems which are not generally considered part of the theatre nuclear force balance in the West, and, in particular, the aircraft from five United States carriers which are deployed in the Second and Sixth United States Fleets. Indeed, there are also some difficulties about doing this arithmetic in knowing just how many SS-20 missiles are in fact deployed

at the moment. Our information about deployment comes very largely from United States sources, which at the moment have a monopoly of western military observation satellites.

The presentation of the data has varied from time to time to suit the audience being addressed and the purpose underlying its release. The different estimates of the numbers of SS-20s currently deployed have been stated at various times as ranging from 100 to 150, with 120 being the most frequently quoted figure. But it is not always made clear that of these 100, 150 or 120 SS-20 missiles at present deployed, a significant proportion, estimated by different authorities as ranging from one-quarter up to nearly one-half, are deployed against Far Eastern targets, presumably China, in positions where they are out of range of Europe. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, if you look at paragraph 7 you will see that we have assumed that there are, perhaps, some 80 SS-20 missiles currently deployed against Europe.

Similarly, estimates of the rate of additional SS-20 missiles being deployed vary from four to five. But this is a fairly significant build-up if one considers that four to five per month means between 50 and 60 additional SS-20 missiles every year. But the Committee, although it felt it important to bring before the Assembly some of the arithmetic which I have just outlined, does not contest that there has been a deterioration of the balance so far as NATO is concerned, particularly because of the much greater reliability, the greater accuracy, the three warheads of the SS-20, the fact that the systems are reloadable and the fact that they are mobile and, therefore, very considerably less vulnerable than the systems which they replace.

The Committee stresses the need for NATO both to maintain and to update where necessary a complete range of weapon systems in order to ensure a credible military balance. It is also important, we believe — and we make this clear in the recommendation now before the Assembly — for the political responsibility and the risks of this policy to be shared by all the countries of the Alliance. This is the point we make in paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the recommendation.

At the same time, the Committee points out very clearly in paragraph (v) that the Alliance has always sought security through détente as well as through deterrence: they are the two parts of a common policy, a common goal, for achieving security.

In paragraph (vi) we note that Mr. Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin on 6th October may well be a sign that the Soviet Union now understands that the NATO countries consider the deployment of the SS-20 missiles a serious threat and, indeed, that the Soviet Union is prepared for negotia-

Mr. Roper (continued)

tions, although, of course, on this much of the Soviet position remains to be clarified.

I turn now to the operative text of the recommendation in the document before you. Here, of course, the Committee was faced with a choice. This is the difference of opinion, which is reflected in some of the amendments which will come before the Assembly later, between the position put forward by the original Rapporteur, Mr. van den Bergh, and that of the majority of the Committee. Should NATO call for arms control negotiations, for a moratorium on the deployment of the SS-20, but defer, until after it has discovered whether those arms control negotiations are successful, the decision on production or deployment of the long-range theatre nuclear forces, the Pershings and the ground-launched cruise missiles; or should it — the other extreme, I suppose — rearm without making any proposals to discuss disarmament further?

Those were the two extreme positions. The Committee has attempted to come down in the middle, when we recommend in paragraph (a) that the North Atlantic Council should, at its meeting next week in Brussels, take the decisions necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course. In paragraph (b) these are the two sides of the same decision, to use the phrase of Chancellor Schmidt yesterday in Berlin, the decision to deploy and procure and the decision also to make a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployment on both sides. The Committee recommends, therefore, negotiation but also decision on production and deployment.

The meaning of the necessary decision is made clear in paragraph 33 of the explanatory memorandum — that the North Atlantic Council should decide forthwith to procure and station long-range theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. A substantial majority of the Committee called for a decision next week on the deployment and production of these weapons, but, in calling at the same time and in the same decision for the opening of negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit the numbers of these weapons, the Committee also points out in paragraph 34 that the production programmes for Pershing IIs and for the ground-launched cruise missiles make it possible to adjust the numbers to be deployed, depending on the progress of any of the negotiations, once opened.

Again, therefore, as was made clear in speeches yesterday, it is possible that if the arms control negotiations succeed, one may not need to deploy a single one of these weapons. None the less, it is

considered by a majority of the Committee that it would have been a mistake not to be clear but to make a firm decision next week in the event that the arms control negotiations do not prove satisfactory and do not reach a successful conclusion.

I should point out to the Assembly that in the text you have before you these negotiations are not explicitly referred to as SALT III, the opening of which may be delayed for many extraneous reasons, including the succession to leadership in both the superpowers. In any case, the Committee has not fully satisfied itself that the framework for those negotiations should necessarily be that of SALT III. We believe that this is a matter to which further consideration should be given — we trust, urgently — in the North Atlantic Council.

Finally, in paragraph (d) and, indeed, in paragraph (iv) of the preamble, the Committee has stressed the seamless nature of NATO's deterrent forces and of NATO's response to aggression described in paragraph 30 of the explanatory memorandum, which again points out that NATO overall is still in a reasonably strong position both to deter and to negotiate, provided that the whole range of nuclear weapon systems is taken into account. The Committee is very strongly of the view that it would regret any attempt to try to establish partial balances at different particular levels.

To try to establish a particular balance in long-range theatre nuclear weapons by themselves would, I believe, serve only to isolate Europe from the much larger weapons capacity of the United States. Not only is that capacity far greater than Europe's in long-range strategic or central nuclear systems but a number of countries in Europe rely on the United States for the shorter-range battlefield nuclear weapons and their essential modernisation, discussed in part in paragraph 61 of the report.

I move the report as a Rapporteur who has come to this document somewhat late in the day. None the less, having seen the recommendation through the Committee, I felt that, as Chairman, I had a responsibility to submit it to you on behalf of the overwhelming majority of the Committee who feel that the proposal to link a decision next week on deployment and procurement with a very clear proposal for arms control negotiations is the right way for the Alliance to go forward and to be commended by this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

I now call Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I must thank our colleague Mr. Roper for his kind words on my

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

account. I felt it was right, when the majority of the Committee had removed the essence of my ideas from the recommendation, to withdraw as Rapporteur where the first part of the report was concerned.

The second part of the report has to do with the impact of new technology on weaponry and on NATO strategy. In NATO and the Warsaw Pact — though we really have to concern ourselves only with our own responsibility for our democratic countries — there is a very substantial reliance on the strategy of deterrence; this is very fiercely discussed, and it comes down to the possible use of nuclear weapons serving to frighten potential adversaries off the idea of precipitating a conflict. That is the essence of what is known as flexible response. This does not mean that we should not give thought to other important and even negative aspects of this strategy. I believe that at the present moment we cannot dispense with nuclear weapons — we have to be realistic and say so; but we must do all we can to cut back on these weapons, if not entirely do away with them. There are, we feel, real possibilities of scaling down the possible use of nuclear weapons in favour of using, or threatening to use, conventional weapons — though of course we hope that that would not actually happen either.

I sincerely believe that one of the shortcomings of members of parliament in the democratic countries is that they do too little to keep abreast of developments in modern weapons technology. An exception to this is the United States, where in both the Senate and the House of Representatives people are much more aware of developments in weapon technology than they are in the parliaments of Western Europe. In the American Congress people are much better equipped to keep track of developments of this kind. During our trip to the United States we noticed that in various laboratories in America developments are under way which make it possible for our present-day nuclear weapons — and if these are used they are invariably extremely dangerous weapons; everyone will agree that this is so — to be replaced, not by “nicer” weapons — even conventional weapons are not that — but by weapons the dangers of which are at least less than those of nuclear weapons. We as parliamentarians do not know enough about these new technological developments, which make it possible to reduce nuclear weaponry in favour of conventional weapons.

Some of us are aware that this is already playing a part in current NATO planning. It seems to me to be essential that, wherever possible, nuclear weapons should be replaced with conventional weapons. I myself would go so far as to say that in my opinion there needs

to be a consistently pursued programme in NATO to examine how conventional weapons can be substituted for nuclear weapons wherever this is feasible. At the present time I would not go so far as to say that we can do without nuclear weapons entirely. The basis for our thinking has to be that nuclear weapons entail very great risks, that we naturally have a duty to defend our democracies, but that it is certainly not our duty to do so with weapons that are more dangerous than they need be.

A further point concerns the conflicting aspects of quantity and quality in weapons, looked at in the light of discussions on the control of armaments. In recent years, one is sad to say, only very limited results have been achieved in this area. The talks have been between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the limited success they have had relates mainly to control on the numbers of weapons. I am certainly not seeking to belittle this success, and I would certainly emphasise its political significance; but it still remains a limited success. The discussions not only dragged on, but they concerned mainly control on the numbers of weapons.

At the same time, however, technological development of weapons forged ahead. Personally I think one could say that in a number of areas the successes achieved in controlling the quantity of weapons have been overtaken by the enormous strides made in the quality of weapons — in other words any progress we may have been able to mark up in quantitative weapons control may well have been reduced to naught by the “falling behind” in the quality of weapons.

If we can agree with each other on these two main points, then they lead us to a number of recommendations which the Committee, too, has accepted. The first recommendation is — this is difficult, but we have to give thought to it — that developments in modern technology should be taken into account during the negotiations on armaments control. We can no longer tolerate control over quantitative developments being totally negated by developments in quality over which at the present we still have no control. If, for instance, we look at what the years ahead are going to bring in the field of laser technology and satellite technology, then we must wonder what meaning there is in what we have been able to achieve so far when this is set against everything that is still on the drawing boards. We are therefore urging that in the negotiations already under way, and those still to come, there should be greater emphasis in the discussions than in the past on the fact that technology is on both sides an essential factor in making progress in armaments control. We must be prepared to exchange far more precise information on these advances with each other than we have so far. I need not tell you that each side

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

knows very accurately what has been happening on the other in this field of technology, not only through using techniques of all kinds that I do not have at my command but also through the fact that 80 % of scientific and technological development can be monitored via what are known as open sources. Given these circumstances, what is there against including qualitative advances in technology in the discussions?

The second recommendation is about developing a programme for replacing nuclear weapons technology as far as possible with conventional weapons, while still of course maintaining the deterrent elements on which sadly we are at the moment still dependent.

The third recommendation is about the position of our parliaments, that is to say our own position. It would be going rather too far for a Dutch parliamentarian to offer any opinion about the procedures used in other countries. I will not presume to express such an opinion, but I would like to offer the Assembly the comparison with what happens in the American Senate and House of Representatives. Over there, people are able to keep a far closer eye on what is happening in this area than we can in any of our Western European parliaments. I say this with great regret, because I believe that one of our prime tasks as parliamentarians ought in fact to be keeping a close eye on what is going on in this area, not just in the broad outlines — because we are told about those — but on points which are significant for the longer-term developments. I must say that in general we are not able to do this. This means not only that our parliaments need to equip themselves very much better, but also that our governments should have to give us a lot more information in this area, as is the case in the United States; hence our final recommendation that there should be a system of "arms control impact statements", meaning that the governments would make annual reports to their parliaments.

If this were to happen, I would consider it an extremely important step. The governments would have to tell their parliaments — not in detail but in broad outline — about both the short- and long-term significance of technological developments and of the introduction of new weapons systems, and about what prospects there are for armaments control. I do say this very sincerely, because I believe that we as members of parliament have to take on this task more than we have in the past; in saying this I do not mean that nothing at all has been happening, but I am convinced that in Western Europe there is a great deal still to be done in this area. The parliaments will have to put far more emphasis than before on ensuring that members of parliament have far more oversight than in the past

on qualitative advances in weapons technology and on the significance of the introduction of new weapons systems. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is now open.

I first call Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will run over quickly, within the statutory time-limits, the aspects of modernisation of theatre nuclear forces. In a day or two the Atlantic Council will be deciding on the American proposal to site 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles in certain European countries. There has been a great hubbub about this, as you know, throughout Europe, involving governments, parliaments, political, religious and social factions, and public opinion as a whole. Because of all this, we have a hard, and a highly responsible, choice to make.

The choice we have to make is, in substance, whether to take a decision that somehow perpetuates the time-honoured logic of the armaments race, the quest for an equilibrium, essential to be sure, but at steadily higher levels, or to strike an attitude which, albeit in different ways, aims to checkmate that evil logic and arrive at the necessary balance of military powers at decreasing levels. I was horror-stricken to find that one earlier proposition for a recommendation distributed by our Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on 29th October, and accompanying a valuable report under the sole authorship of Mr. van den Bergh which gave it to be understood that our Assembly wanted to prepare to explore the second path mentioned, had been literally hacked to pieces. This original draft proposed an attitude of encouragement for the impending negotiations, so it ran, after seeking and obtaining from the Soviet Union an immediate eighteen-month moratorium on deployment of the new SS-20 missiles, and deciding in consequence upon an equivalent holding back in procuring the 572 weapons NATO proposed to deploy in Europe. Well, this draft recommendation was torn to tatters, in spirit and in form. I should like to say very plainly that we confirm our sincere appreciation of Mr. van den Bergh's original report. But the new one now tabled bears no relation to, and indeed flagrantly contradicts, it. The proposed moratorium was deleted. The Atlantic Council is now simply and crudely called upon to provide for an increase in theatre nuclear weapons. It is a mystery to nobody that for this kind of proposal, which for us is a negative one, efforts and actions have been deployed in this Assembly by exponents of political groups operating from rigidly entrenched positions. In support of their stand, these people adduce the existing variance in theatre nuclear weapons to the benefit of the

Mr. Pecchioli (continued)

Warsaw Pact countries. Now, aside from more general considerations, I think they fail to grasp certain truths I will venture to bring to their notice.

First of all, then, they forget that NATO is by general admission, incidentally illustrated by the van den Bergh report, in a comparative situation of strength for both deterrence and negotiation by reason of the current superiority of its overall strategic systems. Secondly, they fail to observe that an immediate negotiation on theatre nuclear weapons on the basis of a suspension of any decision to manufacture and deploy new American missiles or SS-20 missiles would allow a balance to be reached at a lower ceiling, compelling the United States or Russia to accept a cutback. Thirdly, no account is taken of the fact that the latest proposals by the Soviet Government — as was also said in the original van den Bergh report — point to a genuine wish to negotiate, clear enough for it to be in NATO's interest to accept.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have to face capital issues. When we talk of measures for peace, disarmament, détente, we should make every endeavour to reject any partisan calculation, any prior conditions of a cold war character. Mankind needs peace, work, civilised progress. An annual \$400 billion are spent on armaments instead of on purposes useful to human progress, to the solution of problems also confronting the developed countries because of the economic crisis, to the overcoming of the dramatic evils that batten on the developing world: hunger, disease, failure even to provide the basic minimum for human survival. Obviously in this historical phase the balance of military forces between the two blocs is one of the factors governing security. No one can wish, or even tacitly accept, that inequalities or dangerous differences would arise. What matters, though, and is in my view the heart of the matter, is that we should work for greater détente in every field so as to fulfil the conditions for a mutual gradual reduction of the levels at which a balance is needed.

Well, starting from these general premises the Italian Communist Party has, off its own bat, produced a proposal which may be summarised as: first, suspending or rejecting, for a period of not less than six months, any decision on the fabrication and commissioning of Pershing II and cruise missiles; second, inviting the Soviet Union to suspend the fabrication and commissioning of SS-20 missiles; third, opening an immediate negotiation between both parties for putting a ceiling on the military equilibria in Europe, at reduced levels and calculated to ensure mutual security.

This is our position, as currently tabled in the Italian Parliament and, through my intermediary, brought to the notice of WEU.

In conclusion, let me say a couple of words on other stances by European political factions sincerely concerned at the widespread armaments race. We take a favourable view of the socialist and christian democrat parties' views in favour of détente, calling for the opening of negotiations and consequently deferment, on their conclusion, of any decision on the deployment of further missiles. We appreciate, I say, this stance but at the same time observe its limitations. These lie in the fact that, in any event and in the immediate prospect, it allows production of such missiles, forgetful, I think, of what the United States administration has very firmly maintained through the pronouncements of the Secretary of State, namely, that the United States will not, at enormous cost, put in hand the manufacture of fresh missiles unless it has the immediate certitude of siting them. Nevertheless these stances by the European socialist and christian democrat parties are in equal measure signs of sincere preoccupation, alarm and anxiety in people's minds.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I affirm that, for the reasons I have given, our group will be voting against the draft recommendation on the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Mr. Mulley, please. He will be followed by Mr. Cook.

Mr. MULLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Together with the related question of SALT II, which we shall be discussing later on with the excellent report of Mr. Cook, the subject now under discussion is the most important we shall be debating this week. It is both complex and difficult. But we cannot avoid our responsibility to debate it as the only European assembly with special responsibilities for defence questions.

It is probable, Mr. President, that no one in the Assembly finds the recommendation or the report exactly representing his own position. We should express our debt to the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Roper, and to the Rapporteur, initially Mr. van den Bergh, and to the Secretary of the Committee for the immense work — obvious from reading the report — that has gone into their clear presentation of the issues.

There are, and will be, divisions between political groups and national delegations and, indeed, within them. That is no bad thing so long as we all recognise that those who differ from us hold their views with sincerity and often with passionate conviction.

Mr. Mulley (continued)

Inevitably when we come to talk of nuclear weapons there is an emotive element. The horror that would occur if there were any form of nuclear war is beyond my comprehension. Those of us who have consistently accepted and advocated that NATO should have nuclear weapons in its armoury have done so only because we believe that it is the best way of ensuring that there will be no nuclear war. It is essentially the element of deterrence. Just as NATO's strength derives a great deal from the indivisible character of the Alliance whereby a threat against one member is a threat against all, so it is the responsibility of all members to share the provision of the necessary deterrent forces.

At the same time, I am bound to say that the division that is sometimes sought to be made between the use of so-called smaller or tactical nuclear weapons and the larger or strategic is a false distinction. I believe that the use of any form of nuclear weapons involves a decision of incomprehensible magnitude. I would not imagine that anyone would take that decision without at least being fairly sure that it would not stop at that level. That is a position I have held for over twenty years. It is a position I presented for the first time in a report to this Assembly some twenty years ago.

If we rely, as I believe we must, on the NATO deterrent made up of the three elements of the triad, conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces, we should believe that all three are necessary in existing circumstances. I also believe that they must be linked and that each must be credible. It seems logical, as we are modernising the other elements of the triad, that we should seek modernisation of the theatre nuclear element as well. I would not say necessarily that the particular package that I understand is to be proposed is the one that I would personally prefer. But we are concerned more with matters of principle than the actual details.

There is no doubt that the increased threat and capability of the Warsaw Pact has been enhanced by the increased technology at its disposal, not only the SS-20 and the Backfire, but new weaponry right across the military spectrum. It is therefore necessary for NATO ministers to take the necessary decisions for the future about theatre nuclear forces as they have already done for conventional forces. Two considerations have to be borne very much in mind. First, it would take at least three years, probably longer, before any of the new theatre nuclear weapons could be available for deployment. Secondly, it is possible, and I believe certain, that the outcome will mean fewer nuclear warheads in NATO Europe. A lot of obsolescent weapons can be

taken away when the modernisation programme, if it comes to that, is undertaken.

But the matter is necessarily and properly complicated by the linking of the issues with the whole question of arms control and, in particular, the speech of Mr. Brezhnev and the undertaking by the Soviet Union to reduce — not in large numbers, it is true — its forces in Central Europe. Some see this as a divisive move to divide us in Europe in some way, probably because of its unfortunate presentation. The issue arose in connection with the so-called neutron bomb, the enhanced-radiation reduced-blast weapon which was very much in our minds a year ago.

Whether or not it is propaganda, I do not believe that we should ignore this development. This may be a triumph of faith over experience. I believe that we should explore every possibility before any question arises of the weapons being in position. We have, as I say, three years. We should see whether we can produce some breakthrough in the whole of the arms control negotiations. I believe that at some time this has to come, if only to prevent the human race from committing suicide. We have to seek every possible means, and it seems to me that it is possible to do this and at the same time to take the necessary decisions to procure and, in principle, to deploy the modern weapons to replace those that are already there.

Finally, I would just say — because I do not want to trespass on to a further debate — that SALT II is absolutely crucial to these matters. It is not only important that it should be ratified on its own merits, putting a stop to the nuclear arms race and giving hope for real reductions in future negotiations, but it is absolutely essential to get the ratification of SALT II — and I know that this is the profound conviction of Secretary Vance and Secretary of Defence Harold Brown — if we are to make the further progress that all of us wish.

I am sure that our American friends understand the benefit of our expressing our views for Europe today. They should understand that, unless SALT II is ratified, we shall have no chance of going forward on further negotiations, whether on conventional or theatre nuclear arms reductions. I am sure also that if SALT II is not ratified, that is bound to influence views in Europe about these other matters that we are now discussing.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Mulley.

I now call Mr. Cook and he will be followed by Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Mulley began with what can only be described in military terms as a pre-emptive strike by offering

Mr. Cook (continued)

some kind of words of appreciation about my report which is next in the order of business. I am sure that he will not be offended or surprised that, despite such words, I find it impossible to agree with his conclusion that we should proceed with modernisation of these theatre nuclear forces.

In disagreeing with his conclusion I do not disagree with what has been said by Mr. Roper about the capacity of Soviet weapons. Indeed, it is precisely because the SS-20 demonstrates the ability of nuclear weapon designers continually to produce new weapons that are more sophisticated, more accurate and more lethal than the systems that they replace that I and some of my colleagues feel that it would be more sensible to call a halt to this continual production of more sophisticated and more lethal weapons instead of responding to them with a similar development on our side.

Of course, there are those in this hemicycle who disagree with this. They cling to what might be termed the Newtonian theory of the arms race: that a development on the eastern side calls for an equal and apposite response from our side. But it does not appear to me that the SS-20 represents a new threat. It is more sophisticated and more accurate, but it is not a new threat. The Soviet Union has for a long time maintained weapons which were explicitly targeted at Western Europe.

The position was summed up aptly but sombrely by Secretary of State Harold Brown who said:

"The deployment of the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber does not initiate — though it modernises and expands — the threat. That threat has been and remains a grim fact of international life."

Nor do I believe that the SS-20 represents a new capability on the part of the Soviet Union. There have been some in the West who have talked of the SS-20 as a counter-force weapon, an accurate weapon which would be aimed at military targets. Those who talk in those terms do not understand the size of this weapon. Its warhead is ten times the strength of the Hiroshima bomb. It is inconceivable that such a weapon could be aimed at military targets in Western Europe without causing an enormous number of civilian casualties and severe strategic destruction in Western Europe. To doubt that we would respond in those circumstances with a strategic strike is to doubt the theory of deterrence. There are grounds for doubting that theory, but those doubts will not be removed by merely deploying an additional weapons system.

There is a more fundamental question, which is whether it makes sense to rope off the SS-20 and its sister systems into a separate category. As Mr. Roper candidly said in his opening address, if you take the overall nuclear balance there is still a significant — to put it no higher than that — superiority in the West. If you break down that overall nuclear balance into strategic systems and into battlefield systems, whether you regard the SS-20 as a strategic system or as a battlefield system, you are still left with a significant western superiority in both categories.

Only if you rope it off on its own into a separate class of weapon is it possible to argue that there may be an eastern superiority, and even there, as the Rapporteur candidly admitted in his address, there is room for doubt. Indeed, as the independent International Institute for Strategic Studies — and it is worth emphasising that that institute is independent; it depends on western intelligence sources for its information, but it does not have the same political axe to grind in interpreting that information — put it in a recent report, "it would certainly require some very major displacements of the figures to show any substantial imbalance" in theatre nuclear systems.

The argument for the modernisation of the theatre nuclear forces has turned on a fear, which has not been spoken of so far in this debate but which has been mentioned in other centres and in other forums — that the American nuclear guarantee can no longer be guaranteed. I believe that those fears are mistaken. I believe that the important question is not whether we can be sure that the Americans would respond with a nuclear strike in the event of Western Europe being attacked, but whether the Russians can be sure that they would not. Nevertheless, even if those fears are well grounded, even if they have a basis, that basis will not be removed by deploying in Western Europe additional American systems which will be under complete American control and command and capable of being fired only on American orders.

I understand those who take the view that we should modernise, who hold the position that the Russians might be less likely to attack the American homeland in response to a strategic strike from weapons situated in Western Europe and that because the Americans know that they might not be attacked in their homeland, in response to an attack by them from Western Europe, they might be more likely to use those weapons. I regard that argument as groundless. It seems to me manifest that if Russia were to see some of its cities or major military installations destroyed by attack by American weapons, it would not hesitate to destroy American targets simply because those weapons were based in Britain or elsewhere in Europe.

Mr. Cook (continued)

It also seems to me that, precisely because any American President is likely to know of the possibility of the Russians responding thus to an attack, that same American President, if he is deterred from using missiles from across the Atlantic, will be deterred from using missiles which are situated in East Anglia. But if that theory is right, if it is indeed the case that the Americans would feel freer to use their missiles in Western Europe because they cannot be attacked in response by the Russians, I suggest that there is cause for us to consider carefully before we invite those missiles to be situated in Western Europe.

After all, there are some in this Assembly who, particularly when we have discussed SALT, have taken the view that the Americans and the Russians are seeking to protect their own homelands as sanctuaries against nuclear attack, while regarding Europe as a free-fire zone. I do not believe that that is what the Americans are doing, but, if it were, it would be egregious folly on our part to invite missiles on to our territory that would enable the Americans to make a strategic nuclear strike against the Soviet Union while leaving their own heartland a sanctuary against attack. That would put Western Europe in the forefront of a nuclear war without necessarily giving us a veto on the waging of that war, because it has certainly been made plain to us in the British Parliament that not only will these missiles be under the complete command of the Americans, in that they and they alone will choose when to fire them, but the British Government will have no power to veto the firing if the Americans chose to use them.

For all these reasons, therefore, the modernisation of our theatre nuclear forces is not necessarily either a logical or a desirable response to the deployment of the SS-20, however much we deplore this. Furthermore, even if it were logical and desirable to deploy them, is it necessary to deploy them now? My answer is a very definite "No".

As I understand the position, the Rapporteur and Mr. Mulley favour a decision to deploy them as soon as possible coupled with an offer to negotiate. I am bound to say that any offer to negotiate arms control which came in the wake of a decision to deploy the weapons would be meaningless. At the very best, it would be a cosmetic gesture designed to attract public opinion and support.

The tragedy is that we have passed this way before. In the late 1960s, when the SALT talks began, we had the opportunity to include the "grey area" systems, the theatre nuclear systems. We passed that by because then we thought we were strong in the system and we did not want

to jeopardise that strength in exchange for equality. Now we are declining to negotiate because we believe we are weak. It is paradoxical that we cannot get arms control negotiations when we are in a position of strength because we fear they would end in equality and cannot get them when we are in a position of weakness because we fear the arms control agreement would consolidate that position of weakness.

The history of the arms race is littered with missed opportunities for arms control negotiations. It is my fear that we are about to miss one more such opportunity and that we shall learn too late that we cannot escape the arms race by running faster. If we are serious in our offer of negotiations, we should make that offer before we rearm, rather than rearm first and then say that we are willing to talk about it.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to put forward my own views.

I want to start by saying that I think that the Soviet Union's development, production and deployment of the SS-20 missile is a mistake. Just as the western countries ought in my opinion to take a risk so that the arms race between East and West can be slowed down, so the Soviet Union ought a few years ago, when it was planning to put the SS-20 into production and deploy it, to have offered to talk this over with the West.

The reactions of NATO are, as we see in this Assembly, quite predictable. Where the arms race is concerned, we are caught in a pattern of action and reaction, with one side reacting whenever the other does or says something. The essence of the viewpoint that I put over in the original recommendation is that we must make an attempt to slow down this race, and to break this vicious circle of action and reaction. The question is whether this is in fact possible; I say that it is. I share with Mr. Cook the view that militarily we can afford, at least at the present time, to take some risk. I think that we must, where the various kinds of weapon we have are concerned, avoid thinking in watertight categories. We have always taken the view that the security of the West is guaranteed not by one single weapons system, but by a whole range of weapons systems, from conventional to strategic nuclear.

I am very worried indeed that up to now so many people have been too quickly — I will not say too easily — ready to introduce new systems on our side. This comes about, among other things, because of this thinking in categories. I am afraid that one of the results of this will,

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

as Mr. Roper too has said, be that we shall start thinking about a Euro-strategic balance, if NATO now decides to introduce new weapons systems. I blame the Soviet Union for not properly recognising the political effects that introducing the SS-20 would have. Nevertheless I feel we ought, in the first place, to react politically to these developments. There are three reasons for this.

First, I believe that there is both a quantitative and a qualitative balance between East and West. If the Federal Chancellor Mr. Schmidt — surely not one of the most radical among us — said in a joint statement with the Russian President in Bonn last year that a general balance exists, who are we to say that there is a need to bring in fresh nuclear weapons systems?

Second, why should we for political reasons sour the climate of détente that does exist at the present time by developing new weapons systems?

Third, there is in my opinion an opportunity for taking some risk. Why? Well, in the first place I think that the dependence on nuclear weapons has to be reversed. The catastrophe that would engulf us all if nuclear weapons systems were used — God forbid that they should, I say, and I am an unbeliever — would go far beyond what happened in Hiroshima. This is why we must take a risk.

Furthermore, I believe that politically and tactically NATO is acting unwisely. We all know about the speech by Brezhnev in Berlin; a speech, indeed, which has its doubtful aspects. Yet why has not there been a similar speech in reply from the NATO side, a political reply to the challenge from the Soviet Union, saying that we are prepared to exercise restraint and to make a gesture similar to that of the Soviet Union? This was why I made the suggestion — one that has been taken up by Mr. Cook — of having a moratorium that might lead both sides towards a major political and diplomatic breakthrough. The Assembly will be making a great mistake if it does not issue this challenge to the Warsaw Pact, a challenge to achieve a political and diplomatic breakthrough.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call an Observer from Norway, a member of the Storting, Mr. Vattekar.

Mr. VATTEKAR (*Observer from Norway*). — First I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for having given me the floor in this important debate. An intensive public debate has taken place in Norway on what our attitude should be to the production and installation of medium-range atomic missiles in Europe. All political parties as well as other groups have taken part. Of course, some opposition has been

witnessed. This is one of the many aspects of life which distinguishes the western world from the Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet Foreign Minister himself took advantage of the tradition of free and open debate in our societies when he spoke out recently against NATO's plans. No statesman from the western world is given a similar opportunity in Eastern Europe.

This is one of the reasons why there has been no public opposition in Eastern Europe to the Soviet nuclear rearmament which has been going on in Eastern Europe over the last decade. This lack of opposition to the Warsaw Pact rearmament applies also to many of those in Western Europe who are now most outspoken in their opposition to our western attempt to reach a stage of approximate parity.

Of course none of us favours nuclear weapons, but is it not rather strange that these western opposing forces have not raised stronger voices against USSR nuclear rearmament? They have had plenty of time to do so, because this rearmament has been going on for ten years. I would also suggest to those same quarters that they ought to give some thought to the fact that as soon as the USSR learned that NATO had examined the possibility of updating its nuclear defence, the Soviet Union accelerated the production and installation of its nuclear weapons. We are all in favour of a lessening of political tensions and a reduction in armaments combined with effective control measures.

In the opinion of Norway's Conservative Party, and to the best of my knowledge as of today, also in the opinion of a majority in the Christian People's Party, the Centre Party and the Labour Party — although I am aware that on this very day a severe discussion is taking place in the Labour Party — the choice of means is relatively simple if we base our decision on experience. This has so far made it abundantly clear that it is not only from a position of approximate parity that one can hope to move in the direction of a reduction in armaments, be they nuclear or conventional. This is why, with the majority that I have just mentioned, the Norwegian Parliament and Government, as far as I can judge it here and now, are in favour of a positive decision on 12th December 1979, combined with and based on an offer to open negotiations: I repeat, combined with and based on an offer to open negotiations.

It should also be emphasised that it is a condition of such a Norwegian standpoint that the countries on whose territories the new weapons will be placed come out in favour of modernisation. It should also be stressed that since none of these weapons will be placed on Norwegian territory, we do not feel that we should moralise for others.

Mr. Vattekær (continued),

In the public debate in Norway two essential facts are, in my view, all too often forgotten: first, it is a question of replacing outdated with new weapons; secondly, we are doing this to catch up with the USSR, which during the last decade has been installing new nuclear medium-range weapons while disarmament negotiations in other areas have been going on. In so doing we aim at attaining approximate parity, which is a situation which has proved to be a prerequisite for meaningful, realistic and successful disarmament negotiations.

Experience shows us that the mere western proposal to start production of new weapons has brought about a Soviet response. We must take advantage of this by offering to start negotiations during the period between the decision and actual deployment of new weapons. Only such an approach will make the USSR interested in reducing its already existing arsenal of weapons.

Since I am speaking as a representative of a non-member country of Western European Union, I should like to take this opportunity to show that the debate in my country does not mean that the Norwegian people do not fully appreciate the importance of our membership in NATO. That the Norwegian nation is strongly in favour of NATO is evident from a recent opinion poll, according to which 65% of the Norwegian population is of the opinion that Norwegian membership in NATO contributes to the safeguarding of peace. Only 9% thought that NATO membership did not mean a thing in one way or the other, and 14% replied that they did not know.

A comparison of this with earlier polls shows an interesting development. It shows that since these polls started, in 1966, NATO support in Norway has steadily increased. I trust that on 12th December the NATO Council will take a positive decision in favour of modernisation of NATO's tactical nuclear forces in Europe. Such a decision will increase the possibilities, as all experience shows so far, of the opening of a period of meaningful arms reduction negotiations.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Vattekær.

I now call Mrs. Eide, an Observer from Norway.

Mrs. EIDE (*Observer from Norway*). — I apologise, Mr. President, for not having asked to be allowed to speak in this forum. It is because I was totally unaware that my dear colleague and fellow parliamentarian from the Conservative Party would deliver so long and carefully prepared a statement of that nature. I should not like to leave this audience with the notion that

there is this degree of certainty in the feelings of the Norwegian people on this matter. It would be unfair to have the Assembly believe that there is not a serious, increasing, knowledgeable and sophisticated opposition in our country on this matter.

There is no need to repeat what has already been so well and logically presented by Mr. Cook this morning, but I should like to add that I thought it remarkable that statesmen with so much experience should have this degree of faith and trust in the willingness of our opponents on the other side to negotiate with us in a period when we have not been able to say that our chief ally, the United States, can ratify the SALT II agreement and when that same ally invites us all to violate part of the protocol of that very agreement by having us accept the production and deployment of new weapons in Europe.

The sincere hope of all of us, including, I realise, my dear colleague, is that we shall have success not only in arms control but in disarmament negotiations in our part of the world and that, as has been stated this morning, we shall be able to use our resources for the purposes of mankind. At this moment it is our duty to make every effort first at having negotiations, then in negotiating over a long time in good faith, and then halting the arms race which we are now in the middle of accelerating.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Last night the Assembly, under Rule 43, adopted the urgent procedure on the situation now prevailing in Iran, as a result of the invasion of the United States Embassy in Iran and the detention of the diplomats therein as hostages. That was moved at the instance of my colleague, Mr. Valleix. You will recollect that last night the matter was referred as a matter of urgency to the General Affairs Committee this morning. The Committee met at 9.30 and adopted unanimously, with one abstention, the text of a recommendation to the Assembly. I have the honour of being appointed Rapporteur to present that text to the Assembly as a matter of urgency as soon as possible.

The situation is that it has taken some time for the text to be printed. I did not think that it was right to bring it before the Assembly until a printed text was available. The text is now being circulated, and I think that it is before all of my colleagues.

The Assembly will be aware that at the meeting of the heads of state or government in Dublin last week the action that has taken place in Tehran was most strongly condemned and a communiqué was issued following that. I think that it would be right for me to refer to the communiqué issued in Dublin because...

The PRESIDENT. — I beg your pardon, Mr. Grieve, but you first asked for the floor in order to raise a point of order.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — That is to say, that you propose that we now go into this matter which we put on the agenda last night, for reasons of urgency.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — Well, you cannot go into details now. Are you the Rapporteur for the Committee?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Mr. President. I would ask that the Assembly hear this matter and determine it straight away.

The PRESIDENT. — First, the point of order is that we now discuss the matter and go into details of the text. Unfortunately, only the English language text has been distributed. The French version is not yet ready. Anyhow, is there any objection to our dealing with it immediately? We still have a long list of speakers on the subject which has been started this morning.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As Chairman of the Committee whose report is now under debate, I can understand Mr. Grieve's point, but I feel that in the interests of the Assembly, if the French text were to be available within a short period, it would be only courteous for us to await the French text, Mr. President. Could your services advise you when the French text will be available?

The PRESIDENT. — I would suggest that according to our Rules of Procedure we must have the text, Mr. Grieve, in order to hold a debate on it. Let us wait for thirty minutes. I hope that by then we shall have the French text. The machinery is going at full speed.

We shall continue the debate on the present order of the day. As soon as the text is ready, is it agreed that we go into matters concerning Iran and then resume this debate after having decided on the Iran issue?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, of course I shall await the arrival of the French text before asking the Assembly to turn to this matter, because the whole purpose of the urgent procedure...

The PRESIDENT. — That is fully understood, Mr. Grieve. I see that the Assembly agrees.

I call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I asked for the floor on a point

of order concerning the very question that has just been raised.

In fact, I was told on my arrival this morning that the General Affairs Committee, of which I am a member, had just been meeting to consider the motion for a recommendation on events in Iran tabled by Mr. Valleix, Mr. Berrier, Mr. Pecoraro and others. Well, I was not requested to attend the meeting.

I have made inquiries, Mr. President, and found out that only those actually present yesterday afternoon were warned about the meeting. I was sitting in the French Parliament at the time. I was therefore given no notice of the meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

This is completely undemocratic and unacceptable. Yet it could have been arranged to send a message to me at the French National Assembly. It is all the more regrettable in that at yesterday morning's sitting I had taken the floor to convey the French communists' opinion on the situation in Iran and to state that in our eyes, whatever forms the struggle of the Iranian people may take and whatever opinion we may have of them, that should not blind us to the justice of their cause. I added that it was not the Iranian people who were aggravating the risk of war, but the aggressive attitude of the United States which is defending the Shah.

Not having been given notice of the meeting, Mr. President, I was unable to defend this opinion in Committee. That is why — and it is my object in raising this point of order — the text to be tabled in a moment was approved by 15 votes to none, whereas we French communist members of parliament condemn it in the strongest possible terms.

The PRESIDENT. — I call the Chairman of the Committee, Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am sorry that Mr. Deschamps feels that he has been undemocratically treated. That was not the intention at all. As you will all know, it was not until yesterday evening, very shortly before the sitting was closed, that it became necessary to convene the Committee for this morning. I am sorry, Mr. Deschamps, if you were no longer present at that time. I did not know you could be reached.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — The French Parliament is in session.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I did not know that, nor was I to know that after the end of the sitting here you were still in your parliament.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Written convocations were distributed, after all!

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I was not to know that you are in session there in the evenings. That was when the convocations were given out. They were distributed at the President's evening reception, to which, to the best of my knowledge, everyone had been invited.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Quite right!

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I am sorry that you did not attend. You doubtless had your reasons; you were perhaps unable to come. But that is how it happened. So please do not take it as a deliberate insult. It is just that things happened that way because matters had to be dealt with very quickly.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Lewis, please.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — I think that this has been unfair to the chair. The President has a difficult job to do. Yesterday he had a difficult problem. The full Assembly decided what should happen. If a delegate cannot be here, that is not the fault of the President or of the Assembly. If that delegate wants to be in the French Parliament, as some of my colleagues wanted to be in the British Parliament, he should make arrangements to see that he is notified. One of my colleagues had to return to Britain. He did not complain that Mr. President or Mrs. von Bothmer did not get in touch with London. He left it to his colleagues.

It is taking advantage of the Assembly to make a point of order when it is the delegate's job to be here and, if he is not here, to make his own arrangements. Had that delegate done that, he could have been properly notified. I think that it is an insult to the chair for anyone to raise this matter as a point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — I think that the Assembly is in agreement that I reject the suggestion that we acted undemocratically. Last night whoever was present followed the debate on the problem of urgency. We decided that the matter would be handled as a matter of urgency and sent to Committee, and here in the chamber I gave notice that this morning, at 9.30 a.m., the Committee would sit, as the Chairman, who is present now, informed the whole Assembly.

Therefore, if French members are absent, they must tell the secretary of the French Delegation to inform them. It is not the fault of the Chairman of the Committee or other members of the house, or the administration.

We now go on with the debate pending the arrival of the French text.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I really believe that it would be in the interests of the

Assembly, Mr. President, if you could take one or two more speakers in my debate so that members have a chance to read the text.

The PRESIDENT. — I fully agree. I think that we ought to take one or two more speakers in this debate so that members may study the English and French versions of the text.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to ask that Mr. Grieve be allowed to take the floor at 12 o'clock. As far as I know, Mr. Grieve will not be available to present the report later. Can we arrange things this way?

The PRESIDENT. — We will make a compromise. We will hear Mr. Roberti and then take Mr. Grieve's report on the Iranian question.

I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, after this interlude we resume our debate on an important subject. Let me first stress that it is a good job our Assembly has to pronounce upon a matter which, as authoritatively stated by our Committee Chairman Mr. Roper, is to be discussed on 12th December by the Atlantic Council, which will be required to take a decision on it, and in all the European countries public opinion is greatly engrossed by it. Consequently, if this Assembly, the only body institutionally empowered to deal with European defence and security, had been unable to pronounce its views clearly it would have been a sort of dereliction of duty, and a breach of trust.

Coming to the matter which concerns us, let me begin by positing the theoretical stand the Assembly has always taken on security and the maintenance of peace in Europe. The security angle is governed by two main principles, deterrence and détente. We have always thought that complementarity in the observance of these principles was essential, since deterrence without a search for détente may lead to an armaments race, while détente unaccompanied by an attempt at deterrence inevitably leads to hegemony of one or the other side, endangering security itself. For deterrence to operate effectively it has to meet the essential requirement of credibility, and to be credible there has to be a military and political balance of forces between the two sides.

Now, it is incontrovertible — and I think the reality of this is undeniable, as has been acknowledged in many unanimous decisions by the Assembly and by the representatives of those political groups that have more reasons than ourselves to trust the declarations of the Warsaw Pact countries — it is, I say, incontrovertible that an imbalance of forces has developed to the detriment of the western line-up and the Atlantic Alliance. There had already been such an imbalance in conventional armaments, and it has

Mr. Roberti (continued)

been dangerously enhanced by the production, use and deployment of the two theatre nuclear weapons SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. Some speeches have argued this case, and it is a conviction of certain political alignments more deeply attached to the aims of defence. But I must say such an opinion is widespread — I need only recall the statement made two days ago by no less an authority than the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, who said the emergence of an ultra-modern Soviet capability of medium-range missiles was a menace to the Alliance, to which the response should be the decisions taken on 12th December, on the basis of the propositions discussed in today's debate.

I think therefore that we are not in our last bastion or an extremist stance. The fact is conducive to the necessity of our restocking ourselves in weapons capable in some manner of restoring the balance and making the western deterrent force credible. This has been the Committee's finding, and we should give the Committee and its Chairman credit for the fact that it was arrived at by a reasonable compromise, for at the same time as a recommendation to provide for the qualitative rearmament and refurbishment of theatre nuclear weapons, there is a proffer of negotiations. And note that the axiom followed was not "rearmament first, talk later". No: we tried to follow the principle — precisely to arrive at such a reasonable compromise and prove our absolute good faith — of calling for modernisation and at the same time initiating negotiations.

What was the opposing proposal raised in Committee, rejected there and upheld in the Assembly by Mr. Cook, and in different terms by Mr. Pecchioli, on the honesty of whose intentions I have no doubts — but in this political juncture it is not intentions that count but hard facts? A moratorium was asked for. But it would be a one-sided affair, gentlemen, because the West is asked not to produce modernised weapons while the other side already has them and is only being asked to refrain from using them now.

Should the negotiations fall through, where would this leave us? The Warsaw Pact would have the weapons already produced and be able to use them directly while the Atlantic Alliance would have to wait the two or three years it would take to produce them. We should be consecrating a disproportion and imbalance.

Furthermore, there is no doubting the West's good faith, in having proved its willingness not to strengthen armaments. Was the decision to suspend production of the neutron bomb maybe not taken to encourage disarmament? Was not

deferment of the construction of the B-1 bomber to offset the Backfire ordered by the President of the United States to do just that? There is a real desire to make it impossible for us to negotiate.

The other aspect that must be borne in mind is political. Should the West not so decide, it would see growing up throughout the world and within the Atlantic Alliance a lack of trust of its ability to defend itself and conviction of the existence of a hegemony of the other side, whose consequences we should have to pay for.

So, I deem it essential that we proceed with modernisation of our weaponry, and believe the Assembly — with all due respect to opposing opinions — would be failing in duty unless it followed our Chairman Mr. Roper's proposal to approve the draft recommendation and report tabled by him. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We shall now adjourn the debate.

6. The situation in Iran

(Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 830)

The PRESIDENT. — I call the Rapporteur for the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Grieve, to present the oral report on the situation in Iran, Document 830.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I shall not repeat the few words which I uttered earlier, when I raised a point of order. The matter which now comes before the Assembly under the urgent procedure rule is, I should have thought, as appropriate to that rule as any matter which we have discussed in this Assembly. There is a manifest danger to the peace of the Middle East and, who knows, to the peace of the whole world which arises from the present events in Iran, the very root cause of which is something which strikes at the heart of international understanding and the rules by which over centuries we have preserved the comity of nations. It is not for nothing that for centuries, ever since mankind became civilised and lived in cities and created states, the persons of diplomats have been sacred to the states receiving them.

While in recent times we have seen the lives and the safety of many members of the diplomatic corps of the world put in jeopardy by chance terrorism, by criminals and by terrorists acting on behalf of splinter groups in society, in one shape or another, I venture to suggest to this Assembly that the events in Iran which have arisen as a result of the invasion of the United States Embassy there and of the taking prisoner of those diplomats who were living within the enclosure and their detention under

Mr. Grieve (continued)

the most appalling conditions as hostages are shocking. Whatever may be said, that decent human beings should be bound day and night, as apparently they are, is a shocking thing to happen to anyone. But here it is plain that it is being done with the connivance of those in authority, and it behoves all the assemblies of the free world to express their horror at what is being done and their urgent desire that this situation should be brought to an end, because the longer it lasts, the more is peace endangered.

As a politician, but speaking in an Assembly where we are honoured by the presence of distinguished diplomats, I repeat — and it cannot sufficiently be repeated — that what is happening is an outrage. It is for those reasons that my colleague, Mr. Valleix, moved the urgent procedure yesterday. These are matters of great moment. These are matters on which we must weigh our words with the utmost care. We do not want at such a critical conjuncture to appear to put one foot wrong or to say one word that is inappropriate.

It was in those circumstances that a number of us thought that it was not opportune that we should consider this matter last night, but that, if I may quote my own words, we should consider it with the utmost care. You, Mr. President, had the happy idea that this matter should be referred to the General Affairs Committee this morning, and overnight we all considered it. We met in the General Affairs Committee this morning, and I have the honour of having been appointed Rapporteur to bring the unanimous conclusion at which we arrived, with only one abstention, before the Assembly this morning.

Before I draw the attention of the Assembly to what we decided and to the draft recommendation, which I hope will meet with the unanimous approval of everyone here — there may be room for differences; there always is room for differences in a matter of this kind — may I say that I hope I am within the sense of all my colleagues about the way in which we have put this matter. We have done so in the light of the fact that other international assemblies, and the heads of all our states and the heads of government, have already considered this matter.

It would not be right to say that our Council has been idle, when the Nine — and we are seven of the Nine — met in Dublin last week and dealt in the strongest terms with the situation which has arisen in Iran. I hope that the Assembly will bear with me if I read the communiqué which was issued with regard to Iran after the meeting of the heads of state and heads of government in Dublin last week. It said :

“1. The heads of state or government and the Foreign Ministers of the Nine meeting in the European Council considered the grave situation created by the occupation of the Embassy of the United States in Tehran and the holding of members of its staff as hostages in flagrant breach of international law.

2. The European Council strongly reaffirmed the statement which was issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine at their meeting of 20th November in Brussels. It is fundamental that diplomatic missions should be protected. The failure to uphold this principle and the taking of hostages to exert pressure on governments are totally unacceptable. It is the duty of all governments to oppose energetically such a breach of international law.

3. The nine member states of the European Community fully respect the independence of Iran and the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future. They are conscious of the importance which the Iranian people attach to the changes which have taken place in their country, but in the same measure as they respect the rights of Iran they call on Iran to respect fully the rights of others and to observe the established principles that govern relations between states. Respect for these principles is essential to the effort to secure order and justice in international relations which is in the interest of all states including Iran.

4. The governments of the Nine, supported by public opinion in their countries, expressed in particular by the European Parliament, solemnly appeal to Iran to respect these fundamental rights and duties so long established in international law. They urge most strongly that the Iranian authorities take action immediately to release the hostages in complete safety and allow them to return to their own country.”

That epitomises the issue which we are facing. If diplomats' lives are to be endangered in this way, if their safety and security are to be invaded by the very states to which they are accredited, it is an end of the institution which has been responsible for the civilised conduct of business among states during the history of the modern world, and indeed of the ancient world, when the persons of diplomats in Greek city states were protected and when, in the Middle Ages, the heralds had the rights of diplomats and their immunity was considered inviolable.

It is in those circumstances, and having regard to the communiqué issued last week, that we thought in our Committee this morning — and I submit most earnestly to this Assembly that this is the right way of dealing with the matter — that we, too, should mark our disapprobation

Mr. Grieve (continued)

of what is happening, our deep concern for the future and appeal to Iran at once to secure the release of these hostages.

It is in those circumstances and with those ends in view that we in our Committee this morning adopted the following draft recommendation.

"The Assembly,

Considering that the detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran constitutes an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the maintenance of peace ;

Expressing its deep sympathy and solidarity with the government and people of the United States in the emergency thus created ;" —

It is difficult to imagine the anguish which the relations and friends of these people must be suffering and the enormous anxiety which must weigh on the President of the United States in this critical matter —

"Considering the grave economic and strategic consequences which the events now occurring in Iran could entail for European security ;" —

Indeed for world security, but we are concerned here with the security of Europe —

"Noting that the heads of state and government of the member states, meeting in Dublin in the framework of the European Council on 29th and 30th November, issued a statement concerning the situation in Iran,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it draw urgently to the attention of the governments of the member states the Assembly's support for the European Council's declaration ;" —

By this recommendation, therefore, we put ourselves solidly behind what the European Council did last week —

"2. That consultations should take place either within the framework of the WEU Council or, where more appropriate, indirectly" —

The word "indirectly" has been put in there by mistake ; it was in an earlier draft and I ask my colleagues to eliminate it —

"through the participation of its members in European political co-operation among the Nine to determine action on this problem."

It behoves me to make only one reference to the French text where the translation of the words "where more appropriate" is, I think, too weak. I would suggest that in the French text

where the words "*le cas échéant*" occur we should substitute the following words "*si cela s'avérait plus approprié*".

I do not think I can add anything to what I have already said or to the wording of this draft recommendation.

I must point out that no drafting of this kind, done in such a hurry, can be perfect, but I hope that we have arrived at a wording that meets the necessities of the situation and shows how strongly we, united here, representatives of the Seven from the parliaments of the Seven, feel about this grave danger to the peace of the world and this appalling breach of all the rules on which international comity is founded.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The matter we have discussed was originally to be found in Document 829, tabled by Mr. Valleix. I see that Mr. Valleix was present at this morning's Committee meeting and that he voted for the new recommendation when it was considered in the Committee. Is it his wish and that of his colleagues that the original recommendation, Document 829, be withdrawn ? If not, we must debate the two.

I call Mr. Valleix to open the debate.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I would like to make one remark, actually a reference to the Rules of Procedure, since, I believe, these put the French and English languages on an equal footing.

While thanking Mr. Grieve for the quality of his report, in spite of having to draft it in such haste, and the Committee Chairman for having expedited the matter, I wish it to be recorded that the French text is the one I spoke to this morning. Things must be clear. Obviously the phrase "*le cas échéant*" is one thing and the translation which you have just proposed in French, "*si cela s'avérait plus approprié*", in paragraph 2 of the recommendation, is quite another.

If the Rapporteur retains the French version he has just proposed, then in spite of my desire to be associated in the debate in Committee, I shall ask for my "yes" vote to be declared void, for the following reason.

I had proposed that we should adopt the French text in the following version : "*de procéder à des consultations dans le cadre du Conseil de l'U.E.O...*" and I tabled an amendment to replace "ou" by "et" : "*et, le cas échéant,*" thus reverting to the original French.

What is important in this matter, Mr. Rapporteur, is that the two organisations should speak each within their own sphere of authority.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

That is why I consider it quite impossible to allow the expression: "*si cela s'avérait plus approprié*". On the contrary, I hope the amendment I just mentioned will be adopted by the Assembly so that WEU on the one hand, and the European Communities on the other, can each take a stand within their own area of competence.

That is what I wanted to make quite plain, on the French version of the text, before going any farther.

The PRESIDENT. — The Rapporteur, please?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to consult the Chairman of my Committee. I shall go and sit next to her. This is a disadvantage of having the Rapporteur up here and the Chairman down there. I think I could accept the proposed change.

The PRESIDENT. — In the meanwhile, I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — While Mr. Grieve is consulting his Chairman, I thought it would be as well to put on record for members of the Assembly that only yesterday, after some fifteen days of backstair negotiations and diplomacy, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a similar resolution to this. I want to emphasise the word "unanimously" because it is not often that one has a unanimous opinion from the Security Council.

If, therefore, anyone here has any doubt about this recommendation because of a word or a comma, I ask him not to debate it, not to argue about it but to follow the good example of the Security Council and help us to pass this recommendation unanimously with acclamation and without any debate.

I can see that some of my friends are shaking their heads. I do not know what one could object to in this. After all, the Security Council does not often offer a unanimous opinion. To have some parliamentarian from some part of Europe trying to raise an objection to something like this would be setting the clock back.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you for your information, Mr. Lewis. In the meanwhile, the "Big Two" seem to have come to an agreement. Mr. Rapporteur, will you please tell us what conclusion you have reached?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I have consulted the Chairman of the Committee. We should be prepared to leave the French version as it was settled in the Committee this morning, with the translation "*ou le cas échéant*", but we are not prepared to accept "*et le cas échéant*" because that would give a duplicate result.

I hope that we shall not allow ourselves to be bogged down here in what are really points of drafting.

It is the principle of this document that really matters. As I said in rising to introduce my report, we could argue for hours about the precise wording in a matter of this kind. Surely, the principles on which we are seeking to act and to advise and to move our Council are luminously plain from what we have been able to achieve by way of wording this morning, and I very much hope that we shall not condescend to the minutiae of drafting points.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — After what Mr. Grieve, our Rapporteur has said, and Mr. Roberti who made it quite clear that we absolutely must come to a decision on this matter of such importance to the whole world and for the specific responsibilities of WEU, we must manage to adopt a text approved by a large majority in our Assembly, and if possible unanimously.

I note with satisfaction that the Rapporteur has taken account of what I said on the translation of the draft recommendation, and thank him for sticking to the French text. It raises once more the interpretation of WEU's exact rôle and I make no secret of the fact that in this particular respect I hope WEU will have a position of its own, parallel of course to that of the European Council.

So, having myself been merely an outsider in the Committee, invited by the Chairman, I hope no account will be taken of my participation in the voting as would be only proper under the Committee's rules. Nevertheless, the essential being that our Assembly's decision is adopted, unanimously if possible, I will in my turn make an effort, and even if the Rapporteur maintains his text with the word "*ou*" in it I shall still vote for it.

The PRESIDENT. — That means that you withdraw your Document 829 and we concentrate on Document 830, the report of the Committee. Thank you very much, Mr. Valleix.

The debate is closed.

I now open the debate on the three amendments. I call first the manuscript amendment which has been tabled by Mr. Boucheny.

At the beginning of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Understanding the legitimate wish of the Iranian people to punish the Shah's criminal activities";

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we have always condemned the seizure of hostages, but in this case the seizure of hostages is being used against the people of Iran, whose crime is attacking the privileges of big capital.

We are, therefore, against this text, because it does not take into account the legitimate desire of the Iranian people to bring the Shah, who has blood on his hands, to justice for his crimes.

Even in the United States — as reported in today's newspaper — the democratic candidate, Senator Kennedy, has spoken out to condemn the way in which this seizure of hostages is being exploited against the Iranian people. You here are helping to sustain the hysterical reaction of some American circles against the Iranian people.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). — I shall vote against the amendment moved by Mr. Boucheny.

I am very surprised at his change of ground, for if my information is correct the Shah was made doctor *honoris causa* in three universities in the Soviet Union. So I fail to understand how the French Communist Party can now adopt such a position.

The PRESIDENT. — We have one positive and one negative. What is the view of the Committee?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — If the amendment is unacceptable we are not concerned either with what the Shah may or may not have done but with that is happening to United States citizens of that country's diplomatic corps who are prisoners in their embassy in Tehran.

The PRESIDENT. — You do not wish to speak, Madam Chairman? ...

Then we shall vote on the amendment tabled by Mr. Boucheny.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The manuscript amendment is negatived.

I now call the second amendment.

After the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Recognising the right of the Iranian people to advance, in full independence and democracy, along the path opened by the overthrow of the tyranny of the Shah ;”

I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the amendment of which I

am the first signatory speaks for itself. The Rapporteur, Mr. Grieve, has recalled the tenor of the declaration by the nine EEC governments. Well, it embodied an appeal to the Iranian people's right, subject to the principles of democracy and rules of international conduct being observed, to advance along its chosen path without let or hindrance. All our amendment does is to add to the draft recommendation, to the other parts on which we are agreed, the call for a similar appeal to that of the Nine, in default of which a key element would be missing.

The PRESIDENT. — Who wishes to speak?

What is the view of the Chairman of the Committee or the Rapporteur?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, we have a good deal of sympathy with what is proposed in this amendment, in that obviously everyone here hopes that the Iranian people will advance in independence and democracy. But that has absolutely nothing to do with the essential point before us today. What we are seeing today is something which is as undemocratic as it could be — the taking of hostages in an embassy of one of the three great powers of the world. In those circumstances we do not consider that it is appropriate to accept this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Now we shall vote on the amendment tabled by Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Corallo and Mr. Romano.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The manuscript amendment is negatived.

I now call the third manuscript amendment. It reads as follows :

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “determine” insert “political”.

Who is to move the amendment?

I call Mr. Corallo.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I do not know whether some mistranslation has crept into the documentation, but I just want to say that our amendment is to insert “political” after “determine”. In short, it should be clear that “political” and not any other kind, e.g. military, action is being referred to.

So that is what our amendment is about. But may I just add something else? Many speeches have sung the praises of unanimity, emphasised the importance of having it. I am also sure that it carries its own profound significance in cases of this kind. But may I say that unanimity also results from efforts to secure it? I do not believe the United Nations Security Council achieved

Mr. Corallo (continued)

unanimity in two minutes flat ! Actually it took an effort at mutual understanding, a bridging of gaps : in this respect, however, I think what we are up against here is an unwillingness to make such an effort. For instance, I think the previous Calamandrei amendment could have been quietly accepted in such a spirit to help reach a unanimous vote, which would have a great impact on the country we are referring to, on relations with the Iranian Government. I would like to hope that at any rate for my amendment which simply clears up the fact that political and not any other kind of action is being referred to, a comparable effort will be made to reach the unanimity we all say we want but are unwilling to do anything to achieve.

The PRESIDENT. — May we hear the Rapporteur ?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, this amendment is unacceptable to the Rapporteur and the Chairman. We cannot limit the fields of action. "Political" is a very narrow word. I hope very much that there will be a great deal of diplomatic action taking place. To put in the word "political" is shackling the freedom of the Ministers in their respective powers to do all that they can in this matter. Such a shackle is completely unacceptable.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We come to vote on the manuscript amendment in the name of Mr. Corallo.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The manuscript amendment is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 830, to which amendments have been proposed but not accepted.

If the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Mr. Boucheny, do you want to have a roll-call vote ?

Mr. BOUCHENY and Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — We demand a roll-call vote, Mr. President.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I was wondering whether you would accept comments on this recommendation before you put it to the vote, anyway.

The PRESIDENT. — We have dealt with all the amendments and there was no further demand by a member to speak. Are you taking

the floor for your vote, or what is your intention ?

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). — With respect, Mr. President, the comments so far have been confined to specific enumerated amendments. As yet, no one has discussed the general theme underlying this recommendation, apart from the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. — Some have already spoken to it. For instance, Mr. Lewis asked the Assembly to have a unanimous vote on this more or less very clear-cut situation and problem. However, if you would like to speak as in a general debate, please take the floor for two or three minutes.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you very much, Mr. President. It is certainly my intention to vote in favour of this recommendation. In fact, I was one of the signatories of the initial draft. However, that said, I should like to make four very brief observations.

My first observation turns on the point that was so emphatically made by my colleague, Mr. Lewis, earlier this morning. I think that paragraph 1 would have been immeasurably strengthened had reference been made to the United Nations Security Council resolution and the fact that Russia and China have both assented to the condemnation of the invasion of the United States Embassy and the taking of the hostages.

Secondly, paragraph 2 of the recommendation before us reads : "expressing its deep sympathy and solidarity with the government and people of the United States". With sympathy I agree unreservedly, Sir, but is not solidarity perhaps entirely open-ended in terms of whatever unilateral, possibly military, action the United States Government might take ? There is no gain-saying that situation in the wording, as it is now presented.

Thirdly, while I consider it is entirely outside the prerogative of this Assembly to pass any judgment whatever on the Shah or his conduct, I think that there should at least be some recognition, somewhere in the wording — alas, it is now too late — of the rights of self-determination and democratisation among the Iranian people themselves for themselves. Finally, in terms of the recommendation and those to whom we, as an Assembly, address ourselves, I am somewhat at a loss to know — perhaps it is naïvety on my part — why those responsible for the drafting did not recommend that the Iranian Government should have a copy of this resolution deposited directly with them instead of relying exclusively on the two channels enumerated here. With those reservations, I vote warmly in support of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

A vote by roll-call has been requested.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Beith.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹ :

Number of votes cast	52
Ayes	46
Noes	2
Abstentions	4

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted*².

Two members wish to explain their votes.

I call Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we Italian communists would have preferred our Assembly to have reached unanimity on such a delicate issue. This has proved impossible because our reasonable amendments have come up against a blank wall. I would insist that we condemn the taking of hostages as an unacceptable breach of law : let there be no doubt on the matter. Nevertheless, as a majority has rejected both our substantive amendments, for recognising the rights of the Iranian people to independence and taking its own decisions, and on the other hand for making it plain that any action taken would have to be political, we have abstained from voting on the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Calamandrei.

I understand that he does not wish to speak.

7. New weapons and defence strategy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 827)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on new weapons and defence strategy, Document 827.

I call Lord Reay. He will be followed by Mr. Boucheny if there is time.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). — We are now discussing an exceptionally important matter on which NATO will have to take a decision.

1. See page 39.

2. See page 40.

NATO has either to decide to modernise its forces in the face of growing military imbalance between its theatre nuclear forces and those of the Soviet Union's equivalent systems or to postpone such a decision in the hope that, in the meantime, military concessions can be extracted from the Soviet Union.

While I certainly believe that we should continue to seek further measures of arms control through negotiations with the Soviet Union, I also believe that we shall be more likely to make progress in this direction if, at the same time, we set out to establish equality in the military relationship, equality being, as Mrs. Hamm-Brücher reminded us in this Assembly on Monday, the decisive principle on which our safety depends. If we allow the present slide into imbalance to continue, we shall be presenting the Soviet Union with a situation which is developing satisfactorily for them and, therefore, one in which, while they may have an interest in negotiation, they will not have an interest in making concessions. But also, if we allow the imbalance to develop further, we shall be contributing to the dangers that we face, for it is a corollary of the principle of deterrence that weakness itself constitutes a provocation. Therefore, it is to reduce the risks of war that we must set out to redress the imbalance as soon as possible, and the need to reduce those risks seems to be a more important consideration, from the moral point of view, than whether we rely on nuclear or conventional means of doing so.

Some have argued that the decision to produce new theatre nuclear weapons should be taken but that the decision to deploy them should be postponed. This would be wrong, for two reasons. First, such a deferral of the decision would appear to indicate a weakening of will on NATO's part, which would undermine the credibility of the Alliance's deterrence, for the effectiveness of deterrence depends on credibility and credibility depends ultimately on will.

Secondly — and perhaps in this context more importantly — it would open up the risk of a divergence of interest and perhaps of policy between ourselves and the United States. It would be dangerous for us to assume that the United States will maintain its commitment to manufacture these enormously expensive systems if we are not at the same time willing to commit ourselves to deploy them. It would be wrong for us to ask the United States to do so. We should seize and cement the opportunity that the United States offers us of weapons that are suitable for our defence, and the further commitment to our defence that this offer represents, for in doing so we shall strengthen the commitment of the United States to defend us. A Europe that is apparently losing the will to defend itself is a Europe that the United States itself will lose the will to defend.

Lord Reay (continued)

Finally, I should like to say something about the solidarity of NATO. NATO is indivisible. It exists to defend the independence and the democratic freedoms of the member states that compose it. It would surely be wrong for members to expect the defence that it offers and yet believe that they can remove their share of the responsibilities and the risks associated with that defence. At the same time, it would surely be foolish to assume that NATO can be weakened with impunity, without putting at peril the freedoms that all of us in the West enjoy.

For those reasons, I hope that the NATO Ministers will be able to take a decision, with the unanimous support of the NATO members, to modernise NATO's deployed forces of theatre nuclear weapons, but that if such a decision cannot be taken unanimously it will, nevertheless, be taken and that NATO will go ahead with that decision. In retrospect, it may well turn out to be one of the most important decisions in the political life of all of us.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Boucheny, for only five minutes.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor. Today voices are being raised in Atlantic-minded circles concerning the need to develop armaments in quantity and quality. Just at a time when extension of armaments limitation and détente ought to be the order of the day after signature of the SALT II and preparations for the Madrid conference in the framework of CSCE.

What is crucial for us is disarmament. Now, WEU is playing a particularly negative rôle in recommending — and I quote Mr. Roper's report — "that political responsibility for and the risks of this policy must be shared by all countries of the Alliance". In plain language this means that WEU recommends all European countries to allow the stationing of Pershing II ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on their territories. Such an attitude is utterly unacceptable to us. It smacks of escalation, terror and over-armament. It applies pressure and lends encouragement to the leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, who are to meet in Brussels from 12th to 15th December.

In a press statement yesterday the French communists protested strongly against the rôle that WEU is playing. The attitude of the French Government, which without turning a hair tolerates that this kind of recommendation should be adopted at Paris by a supranational organisation, is quite unacceptable.

We all know that if NATO installs new weapons, toppling a balance that is already

precarious, the Warsaw Treaty countries will take counter-measures to re-establish the strategic parity recognised by President Carter on conclusion of the SALT II agreement, which NATO is now going back on.

We must stop the escalation, and only negotiation can get us out of the deadly spiral of a vain quest for military supremacy.

Fortunately, the French communists are not alone in fighting for a policy of wisdom, disarmament and peace. We are optimistic, for the people's struggle finds echoes even in this Assembly: the Rapporteur, Mr. van den Bergh, was forced to resign, doubtless because of the struggles in which the Dutch people are engaged. We are sorry, though, that a fellow socialist should take up a proposal that runs counter to the interests of peace. The Soviet Union has put forward proposals of undoubted interest for reduction of the armed forces in Europe. Why do we not discuss them? We have asked the French Government to urge all the signatory states of the Helsinki final act to support the idea of a negotiation on freezing armed forces and armaments in Europe at their present level and gradually reducing them while respecting the equal security of each country concerned, and also to abstain from any fait accompli before detailed negotiations are begun.

Instead of launching from Paris by way of WEU an appeal to pursue the armaments race, we advocate convening a conference there, whose arrangements, level and aims could be defined among the interested states, that would review the whole range of disarmament problems.

We protest against WEU's presumptions in pressuring national parliaments into accepting the deployment of missiles on their territories, which would create a grave danger for world peace.

We shall not emulate the attempts by certain leading social democrats, who go through the motions of talks in Berlin, like Chancellor Schmidt, whereas in his speech to the SPD congress he in fact advocates the strengthening of armaments in Europe.

However, we make bold to place on record the fact that many social democrats, especially in Northern Europe, are taking a more realistic attitude on these questions.

This is why we advocate the balance of force, the establishment of world peace and new international relations based on trust and negotiation.

The recommendations tabled to not contribute to these objectives. We shall therefore vote against them.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The President (continued)

I now call the last speaker in this morning sitting. Mr. Gessner, please.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have in many Western European Union debates and in the Council of Europe always pleaded the need for détente. My attitude on this question is beyond all doubt. I am in favour of the policy of détente, and shall continue to take this line in the future.

But in all the speeches I have made I have always been mindful of the fact that the link between the Alliance's defence capability and the possibility of taking concrete steps towards détente is indissoluble. This is also the background against which I view the proposal made by Mr. Brezhnev, the Chairman of his party and head of his government. I must say that I regard this proposal as a positive sign. We should not reject out of hand everything that has been proposed.

Similarly I regard it as quite remarkable that the United States has announced its readiness to withdraw a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe. This is a clear indication of our readiness to respond with commensurate measures to measures taken by the Soviet Union.

If we wish to grasp the problem properly, however, we must have a clear understanding of the following state of affairs. Soviet strategy, the teaching of the Soviet Union's military academies, is based on the axiom that the Soviet Union must be capable of always fighting an offensive battle. But those who advocate this strategy must also draw the relevant conclusions with regard to armament, since it is a long-established fact that the side which takes the offensive must always be stronger than its adversary. You will recall the rule of thumb of a ratio 3 to 1 in favour of the attacker.

The Soviet Union has in the past always stressed that peace in Europe is safeguarded by the superiority of the Warsaw Pact. The balance theory to which we subscribe was till recently always rejected by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union drew from its different theory the corresponding conclusions as regards the number, armament and training of its troops.

It is not long since Brezhnev changed this theory by saying that peace in Europe is based on the balance of force. This means he has ceased to assert that peace is based on the superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces. We do not find, however, that acceptance of this correct appreciation of the situation has led the Soviet Union to draw the conclusions it involves for armaments policy.

We should bear in mind that though there are many who do not wish to recognise this fact, a very considerable additional threat has been created by the SS-20 missiles. Missiles of this type, unlike the earlier ones, have become mobile. The launchers can be reloaded three times. Each missile of this type contains three warheads. All things considered, this makes them considerably more dangerous. This missile has become less vulnerable and its added yield has made it more dangerous. Its increased accuracy, too, should not be underestimated.

Now a colleague, whom I hold in great esteem, namely Mr. van den Bergh, has asked whether nuclear weapons might not be replaced by corresponding conventional weapons. I shall be plain about this — if the possibility existed, I should be in favour of it. But I know of no such alternative offered by armaments technology. The ideal would be, of course, for there to be no nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. Unfortunately, however, anyone who is a realist knows that creating such a state of affairs does not depend on us alone.

I want to make it clear beyond all doubt that we must not endeavour to engage in an arms race. What we are doing is catching up in armaments, that is, we are closing a gap. If our intention had been to engage in an arms race, our measures would have had to be quite different. They would then have had to be aimed at getting ahead of the Soviet Union. But this is not what we want, and this must be said here with absolute clarity. What we are trying to do, rather, is to establish a link between the possibility of catching up in armaments on the one hand and the limitation of armaments through control measures on the other. In other words, the extent of the modernisation which is being discussed depends on the Soviet Union's willingness to place a corresponding limit on the production and deployment of SS-20 missiles. This means that it would be possible to abstain from modernising if a corresponding concession were made by the Soviet Union. Chancellor Schmidt made it clear that we are, at any rate, not rejecting this so-called zero solution out of hand. Now the Soviet Union is afraid that the link between modernisation on the one hand and armaments control negotiations on the other places it in something of a dilemma; for it is no longer able to play for time as it has done in the past; it has been deprived of this possibility.

In other words, there will be no progress in negotiations unless the Soviet Union submits matching proposals acceptable to us. This explains why the Soviet Union is trying very hard to get rid of the link we have established and this in turn means that it is trying to prevent the forthcoming decision on the part of the Alliance.

Mr. Gessner (continued)

This is one more reason why I am opposed to a moratorium. The prospects for armaments control measures would be made not better, but worse. We should merely lose valuable time, because the Soviet Union would doubtless play for time. I ask myself : where then is the progress in all this ?

It must unfortunately be said that the Soviet Union has not in the past been particularly good at matching our advance concessions. The Americans' B-1 bomber and the neutron weapon are eloquent examples of this. Although the Soviet Union was aware of the problem, it has nevertheless built the Backfire bomber.

It would therefore be logical for those who advocate a moratorium to say straight away that they renounce this link and that the talks should be continued in the same way as before.

Experience has however shown that it took us, for instance, eight years to arrive at a SALT agreement, and that negotiations on MBFR have gone on for years without showing any great results. From this, I think, we must draw our conclusions.

All this leads me to conclude that the NATO decision will have to be taken. It is not just a matter of closing the missile gap. The Alliance also has to show that it is still able to take decisions when these have to be taken. We must now prove that we can. Failure to do so would be putting at risk major elements in our security.

At the same time I do not wish to lose sight of the fact that the very earliest that deployment could take place would be in three years' time. I even assume that the period of three years will be exceeded. But during this period — and this can surely be accepted — there can be many rounds of negotiations, which will make it clear what the Soviet Union's real intentions are.

I do not think — and I say this quite plainly — that the government of the Soviet Union wants a war. But we do not know, of course, what the ideas of the leadership in the post-Brezhnev period will be. No one amongst us can foretell this.

And there is a further point. The gap which now exists in the defence capability of the western states may one day make them vulnerable to political blackmail. I ask you all : can we possibly wish this to happen ? Of course not. But if we do not wish it, we must have the courage to draw the necessary conclusions.

The Soviet leaders have long been aware of our fears about the SS-20. We have talked with them about this, and they know our arguments. I wonder what it really was that led the Soviet Union not to draw the necessary conclusions from its knowledge of our positions and fears ? It has not done so. That being the case, we are forced to take the decision to modernise.

I should like to express the hope here that it will not prove necessary to catch up in armaments. I wish also to state unambiguously that the necessary will exist on our part. The ball is now with the Soviet Union. We hope that its decision will be dictated by the courage to display political good sense. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now adjourn the debate on new weapons and defence strategy.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. New weapons and defence strategy (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Document 827 and Amendment).
2. SALT II and its implications for European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Resolution, Document 816, Addendum and Amendment).
3. Arctic technology (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 822 and Amendments).
4. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1979

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. New weapons and defence strategy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doc. 827 and Amendment*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Tummers, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Pecoraro, Mr. Baumel, Mr. van den Bergh (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Cook, Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Roper, Mr. Cook, Mr. Roper, Mr. van den Bergh; (point of order): Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. van den Bergh, Sir Frederic Bennett.

4. SALT II and its implications for European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 816, Addendum and Amendment*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Cook (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Cook (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*), Lord McNair, Mr. Cook; (point of order): Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Roper, Mr. Cook.

5. Arctic technology (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 822 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (*Rapporteur*).

6. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Thorn (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).

Replies by Mr. Thorn to questions put by: Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Konings, Mr. Roper, Mr. Lambiotte, Mr. Treu.

7. Arctic technology (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 822 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Vattekar (*Observer from Norway*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Enders, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim; (point of order): Mr. Roper; Mr. Warren, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim; (point of order): Mr. Warren.

8. Personal statement.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Roper; (point of order) Mr. Warren.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 44.

3. New weapons and defence strategy

(*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doc. 827 and Amendment*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations, Document 827 and Amendment.

In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — What is the background, Mr. President, against which Dutch socialists — for whom I am speaking for the first time here this afternoon — look at the recommendations in the report before us, a report based on highly complex developments? First and foremost, that of the control of armaments. What do we need to achieve genuine arms control? We need negotiations to set out the criteria for arms control. In our view, we should not derive these criteria from, on the one hand, sophisticated opinions about modernisation and on the other the fictions

Mr. Tummers (continued)

of military theorists. These parodies on progress conceal within them the germs of disaster. They have already led to our vying in weapons production, and thus to a speeding up of the arms race and a sombre overkill potential that is not only more of a threat than the danger of war at the present moment, but is in itself quite insane. This insanity threatens to upset any rational approach to this question. It is a kind of insanity that also has risks because of the potential threat that already exists in the balance of arms. I shall not go into the need for giving priority to developments that have to do with people over the development of weapons; the first speaker has already mentioned this, as did the Norwegian observers.

The public has already seen through this insanity. The public whom, in whatever way, we represent here has by its overwhelming opposition shown how the dangers of the arms race are bringing fear and anxiety into people's everyday lives. How would you, Mr. President, give an answer to the question of why, if there is already the potential to destroy the world fifty times over, we need to do something to raise this to fifty-two times? This is the question people ask us when we address meetings. It needs answering, but here and now we need to see to it that the question no longer needs to be asked. This can be done by ensuring that before any discussions on the production and/or deployment of the Pershing II and the cruise missile there are negotiations with the Soviet Union so as to arrive at yardsticks for the arms control I have mentioned. The first counter to the SS-20 needs to be just such a consultation on arms control. Developing any other kind of counterweight is a way of hotting-up the arms race; and so is a decision giving priority to production and deployment.

What ought our contribution to be to such a discussion? First, in response to Brezhnev's statements in Berlin, 1,000 warheads should be withdrawn from the territory of WEU, followed by a further 1,000. Second, the calling of a halt on the production and deployment of modernised weapons, because anyone undertaking production and deployment is ruling out any possibility of negotiation; this is a very important point. Third, it must be made clear to the USSR that it must make a reduction, a very drastic reduction, in its menacing weapons potential including in particular the SS-20.

On the subject of the recommendation in the report before us, and against the background I have just sketched out, I would comment that all of this means for us that — apart from our support for the amendment from Mr. Cook — there will need to be vast changes in the first

part of the draft recommendation if we are to be able to give it our support. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — In an interrupted and varied debate I want in the shorter than average time for which I have asked to concentrate on the basic essentials behind the report.

We are facing another example of what I believe China has called Soviet creeping hegemony. One continues to go so far advancing one's imperialist interests, diplomatically, militarily, and in every other way, and when eventually the apprehensions and doubts of those one wishes to absorb are threatened and awakened, one makes a series of gestures designed to alleviate their fears temporarily and a new groundswell of creeping hegemony takes over again.

There exists in Britain a game, which I imagine takes place in France, perhaps under another name, called grandmother's steps. One child stands while the others seek to advance upon him. When the child turns, the other children freeze instantly until the child turns his back upon them again.

The Russians, to use more down to earth terms than creeping hegemony, have been indulging for a long time in a game of grandmother's steps with the free world and with Europe in particular. We are seeing another example. When the first attempt was made to get WEU on its feet through the Brussels Treaty and when an attempt was made later to set up NATO, the same voices were heard from Moscow asking us not to take such steps until a reasonable opportunity had been given to them to show that none of our suspicions was justified. We are now going through another exercise of *déjà vu*. This was seen the other day in Brussels. We are seeing it in some quarters here again.

The bid recently was small. It was the generous one that out of 21,000 stationed along the iron curtain, 1,000 obsolete or obsolescent tanks would be removed, leaving the Russians still with 20,000 to our 6,000 or 7,000. Yet there were those in Europe who were saying that this showed that the Russians were interested in genuine disarmament and genuine *détente*.

The offer was then made to withdraw 20,000 out of a little over 900,000 men actively deployed against us along the whole European front. Again, there were those in Europe who said that serious attention must be paid to this proposal.

Since then, Russian ambassadors, ministers and plenipotentiaries have been rushing around

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

Western Europe like commercial travellers trying to sell the latest package, namely, that we should stop any efforts towards any form of modernisation of our tactical nuclear weaponry providing that in their turn the Russians agreed, out of their generosity, not to increase the number of SS-20s they have now deployed — 130 of them, many multiple-headed. The offer is that the Russians should keep those weapons, that we should do nothing during the next eighteen months, and that in return for their gesture they would not increase their overwhelming superiority.

It is a sorry fact that, whereas there are 130 SS-20 weapons facing us that could destroy any part of Western Europe, we have not a single tactical nuclear weapon that could do other than inflict grievous damage on the satellite countries of Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary and the rest. This is the latest proposal that the commercial travellers of the Soviet Union are trying to sell to what they hope will be the gullible West.

I am proud to say that my own country and my own government with, I believe, the support of the official opposition have said that we are not prepared to be gullible and that we are prepared forthwith to take the earliest possible opportunity to play an active part in the modernisation of our tactical nuclear weaponry in Europe and the stationing of such modernised weapons on our own territory. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I call Mr. Pecoraro.

Mr. PECORARO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, even though our Assembly has no decision-making powers, the positions to be taken in this debate will have far-reaching repercussions at the bar of public opinion. Never, indeed, more than in a situation like the present are public institutions, and in a very special way WEU, called upon to convey the peoples' feelings and requirements and translate them into consistent and responsible political action.

I have tried to ascertain the underlying reasons, now as heretofore, of the majority opinion in the WEU Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and on the other hand, the minority political stance, supported in each case by arguments that deserve an honest hearing from us and undeniable respect. The fact that I take the majority view by no means signifies that I spurn certain arguments, well deserving of our consideration and esteem, advanced by those who hold opposing views.

However, I am moved to rehearse, clinch and support some of the reasons adduced by the majority, or at all events some of its conclusions. Everybody postulated two requirements: first, for a necessary balance of forces, second, a gradual but effective and general disarmament. The practical difference dividing the majority from the rest of the Committee is that in its view the problem of an articulated balance of forces is on the necessary prerequisite of all-round disarmament, whereas for the minority the disarmament must be tackled without fail by ad hoc negotiations, freezing the current status of theatre nuclear weapons.

Now, this situation seems to us obviously to be a paradox. Let me make an elementary comparison: the minority view suggests the case of two people, one armed with a revolver and the other weaponless, in which in order to ensure there is no imbalance between them the referee decides to leave the one with a revolver armed, and the other disarmed. Obviously any attempt at fair play would be upset and falsified by such material inequality.

Let me add that, whereas in the case of the Warsaw Pact countries the decision-making machinery is largely controlled at the summit, with no provision for public debate or democratic institutional procedures, in the Western European countries and the West in general the procedure is for wide-ranging debate in parliament, and government decisions reproducing the deep-felt sentiments and demands of public opinion in each country.

Hence, while abstaining from any judgment on the procedure followed in the eastern bloc, we cannot think that the position of the democratic western world should be deemed reckless, strained or thoughtless, nor that the felt requirement of negotiating with the Warsaw Pact countries from a balanced stance can be termed disingenuous and arrogant. Consequently my colleague speaks my opinion too, and I also believe I am interpreting the views and feelings of Italian parliamentarians and public opinion.

Mr. President, it may be the last time I have the honour of addressing the Assembly because in a few weeks time the Italian Delegation is to be replaced, and I shall no longer be included in it. I am glad that the last occasion of my attending the Assembly should have been used to make one last contribution to democracy and peace. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In view of your final remark, Mr. Pecoraro, may I express on my own behalf and I think in the name of all our colleagues the hope that you will remain with us for a few more sessions and, if not, depending on what the Italian Delegation decides, may I express the respect and

The President (continued)

friendship our Assembly and each individual member has for you.

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is difficult for a French parliamentarian to take part in a debate from which his own country has been deliberately, and as it were on principle, excluded.

The report on new weapons and defence strategy, in particular the section dealing with the modernisation of theatre arms of the Atlantic military organisation, seems, paradoxically, to make France a blank on the map of Western Europe.

Although Mr. Brezhnev's speech receives a most friendly echo in the report and Denmark, which is not even a member of WEU and lies in a denuclearised zone, is discussed with great attention, one may search in vain through the text put out by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for any presentation, however brief, of the official French theses on nuclear balance and its military implications for Europe. A curious omission, unless it was intentional!

True, France does not belong to the integrated military bodies of NATO, but I must repeat that it is a member of the political organisation of the Alliance and that its governments have always and with constant emphasis expressed their profound solidarity with their allies in the free world.

During the Berlin and Cuba crises, did not France display greater firmness than many distinguished Atlantists and Europeans who talk a great deal about the defence of Europe?

The French members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments tried to put some of their views to their colleagues. Unfortunately no trace of their statements can be found in the report that has been distributed. I need say no more on that subject.

First I should point out that the French Government quite rightly refrains from any assessment of the decisions which the member countries of the integrated military organisation of NATO might take to correct potential imbalances. We all share the desire to maintain an overall balance between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Yet we must reach agreement on the concepts, now disputed, of imbalance, parity and balance, for many of our colleagues are unaware of the rethinking which today is radically transforming our views on nuclear strategy problems.

Whatever the figures put forward by one or other of the two camps, one cannot regard as equivalent 300 rockets on one side and 300 rockets on the other without also taking into account a number of scientific and technical aspects, relating in particular to the mobility of armaments and to the fact that the USSR could, by a kind of surgical operation which involves pinpointing selected targets, completely strip the western defence set-up without touching a single one of our towns.

Today the West is like a mediaeval knight, helmeted and armed, who at a wave of the magic wand could be shorn of all his armour and stand naked. What would he do then? Would he bow to this blackmail and accept it, or would he fight? And in what conditions would he fight, faced with the very person who stripped him naked?

These are entirely new ideas, which seem to be beyond the understanding of many of our colleagues. In any case France, for its part, considers that it is by establishing a national and independent deterrent force, whose credibility is linked to the fact that it is both European and national in character, that it may best contribute to the precarious balance and, thereby, to the security of Europe; it can do so much better than some of our partners who seek a chilly refuge under the tattered American umbrella in order to disguise, however poorly, their decision no longer to take an active part in defending Europe, thus producing a curious cocktail made up of a kind of exaggerated Atlantism mixed with a snivelling neutralism.

Yet France does understand the preoccupation of other countries and will not weaken the sense of solidarity by condemning such efforts as may be made by others.

Our thinking should concentrate on the following point: one of the most worrying aspects of the installation of American theatre weapons in certain NATO member countries is undoubtedly the increased risk that the American nuclear forces in Europe may be dissociated from the American nuclear forces in the United States and, as a result, the risk of a battle which would be fought almost solely on European territory and not on the national territory of the two major adversaries, who would protect themselves by a mutual policy of "sanctuarisation".

What we are seeing is a rather interesting reversal of the strategic theses propounded in turn by the United States and by the USSR.

Originally, the United States was in favour of a counter-force policy in order to avoid an anti-city policy and this strategy was therefore imposed on the world. Today, by a strange reversal, the USSR is developing counter-force strategy, thanks to its SS-20s and the precision

Mr. Baumel (continued)

with which they can attack, and it is thereby forcing the United States either to yield or to use an anti-city strategy. What a strange reversal!

The USSR has developed and is deploying two modern systems: the SS-20 and the Tupolev 22. These weapons place it for years to come in a position to disarm by selective and limited attacks the allied forces in Europe without any chance of retaliation on a comparable scale. The strategic submarines capable of attacking the USSR cannot make a counter-force attack that is as precise as that of the SS-20 or the Tupolev 22. The FB-111A bombers have a limited penetration capability. The other theatre arms cannot reach Soviet territory. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that Europe must have new American arms which are of longer range, with a higher degree of precision and a greater penetration capability.

Yet there is one implicit premise that has not been stated. An American attack launched from Europe, even if it is directed against the Soviet Union, is never equivalent to an American attack from the United States. There is nothing to prevent the United States from assigning some of its intercontinental ballistic missiles to cover the European theatre in response to the new threats. This would be possible with the deployment of the MX missile. The reason why this idea is rejected without any real discussion is because it is considered preferable to strengthen a nuclear apparatus in Europe which increases the risk of a limited confrontation on our own territory, sparing the American territory and hitting only pinpointed military objectives in the Soviet Union.

In this way, the possibility of Europe being transformed into a Soviet-American battlefield seems to be written into the programme for modernisation of NATO's theatre forces and the report submitted to us on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which we have not accepted.

Without wishing in any way to influence the choices which each of the countries concerned will make in complete independence, any representative of France who respects the interests of his own country is bound to express his grave concern about the accumulation in Europe of weapons designed more for war than for deterrence.

France's nuclear weapons cannot be assimilated to NATO theatre forces. They are central systems designed to protect France and therefore, though our colleagues do not find it easy to accept this, to a great extent designed also to protect Europe from armed confrontation, whatever the form it might take. Unlike Per-

shing II and cruise missiles, these are not arms that one includes for possible use in an actual plan of campaign which, if implemented, would mean the total destruction of Europe.

Strengthening a nuclear potential the use of which would be determined on the basis of non-European interests does not seem a satisfactory solution to the problem of security in Europe.

Better solutions could perhaps be found if the states of Western Europe took more autonomous concerted action and co-operated more closely without rejecting *a priori* any policy of independence vis-à-vis the United States.

As for France, the reason why the development of its deterrent force does not give rise to the same difficulties as those encountered by other countries as regards the modernisation of the nuclear arms situated on their territory is, perhaps, that it is easier for a European state to defend European interests by means of a national military policy than to rely for its security on protection from outside.

The report submitted by Mr. Roper does not try to evolve a genuine European approach to the problems arising from the deployment of new weapons in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately it confuses the WEU Assembly, as do other colleagues and other responsible members of our Assembly, either with the North Atlantic Assembly or with the Assembly of the European Communities. This attitude seems unlikely to further that rapprochement between the defence policies of our European states to which we are committed under the charter of our Assembly.

I think our Assembly should give priority to the objectives of European security rather than adopting this or that position too favourable to an Atlantic Alliance which makes it possible to justify the absence of any real efforts on the part of some of our European partners.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are no more speakers on the list.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. van den Bergh has one point to make in reply to something raised on his recommendation. I should like him to reply as Rapporteur for that part. I shall then reply to the first part as Chairman of the Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — As you know, Mr. President, I have remained Rapporteur for only the second part of the report. Mr. Gessner has commented on this second part of the report, and in particular on the second paragraph of the recommendation. If I understood him properly, he said that replacing nuclear weapons systems with conven-

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

tional systems, as called for in the report, could lead to the strategy of the West towards a potential enemy being jeopardised. I can only assume that this comment is based on a misunderstanding. It certainly runs counter to the views I have put forward in my report, and it also runs counter to the facts. Mr. Gessner said that he could see no developments that would lend support to my views on this point.

I would like very briefly to set out once again the essence of our standpoint. While still admitting the need for nuclear deterrence, we ought so far as possible to try in a planned way to replace nuclear weapons systems with conventional systems, for the very simple reason that this gives us greater security. I surely cannot take it that any one here would be in favour, where it is possible to be satisfied with conventional weapons systems, to keep nuclear systems instead. Developments along these lines are in fact under way. I will offer three examples, which are also mentioned in the report.

First of all, I must point out that it is today no longer necessary to use nuclear weapons in anti-submarine warfare. There has been so much progress in target acquisition techniques that there is now no need to use nuclear weapons, and this is a development we ought to support.

Second, there is the field of surface-to-air missiles. Up to now we have had the Nike system, which so far has been nuclear because we did not have any conventional weapons in this sphere; but here too we are gradually, in target acquisition, changing over to conventional systems. Although this still keeps the option of fitting a nuclear warhead, everyone in NATO is now convinced that it is very definitely reasonable, if not desirable, to rely from now on solely on conventional systems.

The third example is that of anti-tank weapons. We all remember the discussion about the neutron bomb. People will also remember that in the Federal Republic in particular the point was made that introducing the neutron bomb would bring about a lowering of the nuclear threshold, something that none of us would want.

Because of these technical reasons — the political reasons must of course continue to tip the balance — there is the possibility of not using nuclear weapons alone, because at the present time we have access to conventional weapons such that we could, in the future, rely on these entirely even though they are not yet completely ready and would involve higher costs.

The gist of my contention is thus as follows. We must accept that at the moment we unfortunately still need the factor of nuclear deter-

rence. This does not however mean that wherever it is possible nuclear weapons systems should not be cut back — because of the dangers they entail — in favour of conventional systems. In other words I believe that the democratic countries should use their fund of technical knowledge to this end, so as to follow a programme of reducing the number of nuclear weapons as far as possible in favour of conventional systems. It seems to me that the political ideal that should unite us all in this is that however much weapons are to be deplored, however much it is to be deplored that we still have to possess weapons, we should never make the dangers greater than they need be. And I consider the dangers of nuclear weapons to be very substantially greater than those of conventional weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I would like to reply to the debate on the first of the recommendations, as Rapporteur for that part and as Chairman of the Committee.

We have had a very useful debate on what is obviously one of the major subjects of concern not merely in our Assembly but in our countries and in the countries of the Alliance and of Western Europe. We have seen quite clearly differences of view in the Assembly today. On the one hand, there are those who are extremely sceptical of any proposals for arms control and feel that the proposals of Mr. Brezhnev should be totally disregarded. On the other hand, there are those who feel that we should make immediate efforts for arms control and postpone decisions on the deployment and production of modernised thermonuclear weapons. In the middle there are those who believe that we should be confined to a decision in principle on the modernisation of our weapons, in view of a disturbing trend in the balance, but link this with firm and clear proposals for arms control with the Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Pecchioli, the first speaker this morning, brought to our debate a very lively picture of a recent parliamentary debate in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and we were glad to know of that debate only in the last few days in the Italian assembly. I believe that there will be general agreement with him on the need for disarmament. Where perhaps we would disagree is on the exact process by which we reach disarmament.

In passing, may I say that one of the things I would have said, had I spoken as an individual and not as a Rapporteur, is that I very much regret that in the United Kingdom the British Government have not found time for the House of Commons to debate this important matter before decisions are taken in Brussels next week.

Mr. Roper (continued)

Mr. Mulley was the second speaker and I believe that the Assembly gained a great deal from his wisdom and experience in what he had to say on this subject. My colleague, Mr. Cook, then intervened and I should like now to deal with one or two points he made. He said that the SS-20 was not a new threat but merely a replacement of an existing threat.

The difficulty we have here is when a qualitative change becomes a quantitative change in the threat. Clearly, there is a difference in perception among members of the Assembly as to the impact of the SS-20 in terms of the balance of forces in these fields. As a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies I was glad that he quoted so widely, if somewhat selectively, from the most recent IISS Military Balance. By including some of the Poseidon submarines which are assigned to SACEUR, the IISS managed to show on a rather complicated assessment that the Warsaw Pact has only a 13 % advantage in these weapons over NATO, which is the figure that Mr. Cook was quoting. If the Poseidons are left out, there is a 58-59 % advantage to the Warsaw Pact over NATO.

The IISS goes on to say that while it concludes that something close to parity now exists, including the Poseidons on the NATO side, between the thermonuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it is moving in favour of the Warsaw Pact. One must acknowledge that the introduction of new and more capable systems on the Soviet side, if unconstrained, could begin to produce a thermonuclear advantage which would legitimate a NATO response. It is not really right to take the report of the IISS as proving that there is no case for modernisation. The trends are pointing to an improvement of the Warsaw Pact forces in this area.

Mr. Cook suggested that if a decision were made next week, arms control proposals would be merely a cosmetic. I am afraid I do not agree with him. I do not share his belief. I am quite convinced that the determination of the Federal German Chancellor to go to the Soviet Union next year and start serious discussions on these matters shows how he takes this. Although it may be more difficult to be convinced of the enthusiasm of some NATO governments, both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany as well as a number of smaller members of the Alliance are very concerned. The decision next week should be one in two parts, one on deployment and procurement linked with a clear firm decision for arms control. No one is re-arming first because, as Mr. Mulley has said, these weapons would not become available for three or four years at the earliest.

We were particularly interested to have interventions from our colleagues from Norway and we saw from the different interventions of Mr. Vattekar and Mrs. Eide that there is a livelier debate in Norway than in other parts of the Alliance. I must draw Mrs. Eide's attention to the fact that we are not altogether convinced of her view that the introduction in two years' time of ground-launched cruise missiles by the United States and Europe would be an infringement of the protocol to the SALT treaty, because we understand that the protocol would have expired at that time, and therefore such introduction would not be a violation.

Mr. Roberti and Lord Reay supported the view of the Committee, while Mr. Boucheny took the view that we ought to consider much more seriously the proposals of Mr. Brezhnev. I have already explained why I believe that they should be taken seriously, and here I disagree with some remarks by Sir Frederic Bennett. In paragraphs 17 and 18 of the explanatory memorandum we discuss the Brezhnev proposals and say the West needs to explore them to see what can be done to extend and develop what has been put forward by Mr. Brezhnev.

We are not sure that there will be a successful outcome of these negotiations, but we plainly have an obligation to our people and the people of the world to explore any proposals for disarmament as seriously as we can. No one should write off any disarmament proposal without considering it.

Mr. Pecoraro, in his final contribution to our debates in the Assembly, produced an interesting analysis, though I was not altogether sure that I followed every detail.

I was glad to hear the contribution of Mr. Baumel and his interesting development of French philosophy in this field. Although he was present in the debates of our Committee, I am sorry that he did not at that time ask for the inclusion in our explanatory memorandum of a statement of the French view. In the memorandum we have attempted to include the views of the minority, and we would have been glad to include in the memorandum the views of France on this matter.

Mr. Baumel went on to discuss the question of both the United States' and the French nuclear forces. I was tempted to repeat to him the question that I asked yesterday — whether one could consider that there was a French nuclear umbrella available for the rest of the signatories of the Brussels Treaty. When Mr. Baumel went on to discuss strategic theory, I felt that one had to be a little careful in making these ready distinctions between counter-force and counter-value weapons.

Mr. Roper (continued)

I know that at one time it was fashionable to make this distinction and, as Mr. Cook said in one of his interventions, the size of even the smallest nuclear weapons about which we are talking is considerably larger than that used at Hiroshima, and as well as dealing with military targets they would certainly cause a great deal of devastation and a great deal of what is known in the trade as collateral damage to the surrounding civilian areas. Therefore, a lot of the theory based upon an academic distinction between counter-force and counter-value weapons has to be examined again.

Certainly, if I am right, the theory that Mr. Baumel put forward, of the United States and the Soviet Union being able to make Europe a nuclear battlefield, would not hold water, because one would not have the degree of precision which Mr. Baumel suggested existed. The Soviet Union would clearly be seriously attacked and would not in those situations leave the United States in a sanctuary.

There is, of course — and this was clear in the remarks of Mr. Baumel towards the end of his important contribution — a difference between how he sees the problems of defence and how many of his compatriots see them and how they are seen by the majority of this Assembly. But it is worth recalling that we are working under the modified Brussels Treaty which, under Article IV, makes it clear that :

“In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.”

It goes on :

“Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”

That is still the treaty as it stands and it is therefore not at all inappropriate for us as an Assembly that discusses the work of the Council of WEU also to base our discussions on plans going on within the Atlantic Alliance. I do not feel that we are in any way failing in our tasks in doing this.

This has been a valuable and useful debate on one of the major subjects of our day. It has shown the value of our Assembly in being able to hold within a week of the critical debates in Brussels a discussion here among parliamentarians from seven European countries. It has been a good debate. We have a clear difference of opinion in the Assembly, but I trust that at

the end of the day the majority will support the Committee's recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendations on new weapons and defence strategy, Document 827 and Amendment.

We shall consider in succession the two draft recommendations corresponding to part one of the report on the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces and to part two on the impact of technology.

Amendment 1 to the first draft recommendation has been tabled by Mr. Cook. It reads as follows :

1. In draft recommendation I, leave out subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

- “(a) by calling on the Soviet Union to agree to an immediate eighteen months' moratorium on the deployment of further SS-20 missiles ;
- (b) in the event of the Soviet Union agreeing to such a moratorium, by postponing for its duration the decision on procurement of the 572 medium-range weapons which NATO plans to deploy in Europe ;
- (c) by seeking within that period agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons ;
- (d) by deciding forthwith to investigate seriously, on the expiry of the eighteen-month moratorium and in the light of the military and political situation which will then prevail, the need to procure and station a number of medium-range nuclear weapons which NATO intends to deploy in Europe ;”

I call Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I shall be brief. I would not have spoken to my amendment at all but would have rested on my speech had it not been that our debate has been interrupted, first, by another debate on Iran and then by lunch. It is now five hours since I made my initial speech, and whilst I am sure that members of the Assembly listened with care to what I said, I hope that they will forgive me if I make a few remarks in explanation of my amendment at this stage, now that we have reached the vote.

The effect of my amendment is to restore the text of the recommendation to the original text submitted by the Rapporteur to the Committee. It gives the Assembly the flexibility to make a

Mr. Cook (continued)

choice. The choice facing the Assembly is between the text as submitted by the Committee and a text which in effect supports the consensus within NATO — that we should take a decision now to modernise and couple that decision with an offer to negotiate on arms control.

Despite the remarks of Mr. Roper, I do not find that a credible arms control position. It seems to me inevitable, and, in the light of all the evidence we have of the history of arms control, most likely, that if we first take a decision tomorrow to modernise and then negotiate on it, any subsequent agreement will incorporate and legitimise that decision to modernise. We shall end up with more nuclear weapons on the western side. We shall also end up with more nuclear weapons on the eastern side, because it is implicit in any negotiation on that western position that it cannot take effect until after 1983 when our own weapons are deployed. Between now and 1983 the number of SS-20s deployed in the Soviet Union will treble.

The proposal that we make as an alternative to that is that we start arms control negotiations now. That would have the effect, if we are successful, that the nuclear weapons on the western side will be smaller, because we shall not have embarked on a programme of expansion, and if we can succeed in a short space of time, the number of nuclear weapons on the eastern side will also be smaller.

I do not underrate the difficulty of obtaining such an agreement. I do not underrate the problems that we face in such negotiations. But the fact is that we have not even tried to negotiate an arms control settlement for this class of weapon. We are being asked to embark on a decision now to deploy a weapons system that does not exist, for which there are no troops trained to operate it and for which there has never at any time been an arms control proposal put for negotiation between East and West.

It would appear from the statement of President Brezhnev that the Russians are interested in negotiations. I entirely accept the point made by Sir Frederic Bennett that the offer made by President Brezhnev is not, in itself, satisfactory. If Sir Frederic were here, I would say to him that it would be amazing if President Brezhnev's offer, the first offer in the course of negotiations, was satisfactory. I think that I might add that it would be amazing if any offer that President Brezhnev made was satisfactory to Sir Frederic Bennett.

But this is, nevertheless, an earnest which is worth pursuing in negotiations to see whether we can push further and achieve the resolution

of the issues to which Sir Frederic Bennett pointed. It would appear most unfortunate in terms of international public opinion if the West were now to proceed with its development without at least making a gesture for arms control similar to that of President Brezhnev.

Finally, members of this Assembly, both in the Assembly and in our domestic parliaments, have often committed themselves to supporting disarmament negotiations and disarmament measures. We are now faced with an important choice. We are faced with the choice of solving the imbalance that members of the Assembly perceive either through expanding our forces or trying to seek an arms control solution to that perceived imbalance.

That is the nature of the choice before us. I have no doubt — I do not think that anyone in this Assembly should have any doubts — that if we pass beyond this choice and if we accept the approach of rearmament rather than arms control, we shall find that once we have gone down that path to rearmament there will be no room on it for turning back and that we ought, for that reason, therefore, to begin by exploring the path to disarmament before committing ourselves to rearmament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Pecchioli has tabled a manuscript amendment to Amendment 1 by Mr. Cook as follows :

In paragraph (a) of Amendment 1, before "deployment", add "construction and".

In paragraph (b) of Amendment 1, line 3, after "on" insert "construction and".

I call Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I want to add two phrases, one in sub-paragraph (a) and the other in sub-paragraph (b) of the draft recommendation. The former would read : "an immediate eighteen months' moratorium on the construction and deployment..." which would mean adding the reference to construction. Similarly, in sub-paragraph (b), I would insert after "decision on" the phrase, "construction and", to read "decision on construction and procurement". In short, I would insert "construction" at both places.

(*Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. — Does Mr. Roper wish to speak ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I wonder whether Mr. Cook should have a chance to say whether he accepts the manuscript amendment before I have a chance to speak. It is a manuscript amendment to Mr. Cook's amendment.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — The manuscript amendment is acceptable to me and I am willing to co-operate in the amendment. It has the effect of strengthening the demand by the western side of any arms control agreement. It extends the moratorium from mere deployment of missiles to procurement and construction of missiles.

Those who drafted the amendment had always intended to include construction and procurement within the term "deployment". I am sorry that there is ambiguity. We are happy to accept the manuscript amendment if it helps to clarify the intention of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Rapporteur agree ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I shall be opposing Mr. Cook's amendment as a whole but I advise the Assembly that there are some defects in this manuscript amendment. While it is possible to monitor fairly well by satellite whether deployment is taking place and a moratorium followed, it is much more difficult by the technical means that have been used in SALT I and SALT II to be able to ensure that a moratorium on the production of weapons is followed for eighteen months.

I have to advise that on technical grounds this would not be a particularly helpful amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — On this point I am only speaking as the ex-Rapporteur, Mr. President, yet I need to say something about this manuscript amendment so that there shall be no misunderstanding. From the outset my view, like that of the minority on the Committee, was that where the idea of a moratorium is concerned this implicitly covers both the decision on production and the decision on deployment. I am making this point because I do not want there to be any misunderstanding.

The PRESIDENT. — We must first vote on Mr. Pecchioli's manuscript amendment to Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Cook :

In paragraph (a) of Amendment 1, before "deployment", add "construction and".

In paragraph (b) of Amendment 1, line 3, after "on" insert "construction and".

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The manuscript amendment to Amendment 1 is negatived.

We now come to the vote on Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Cook.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). — I should like to raise a point of order. Would you be so kind as to make clear to members of the Assembly the exact result of the vote and which members were in favour and which against.

The PRESIDENT. — It is not usual, Mr. van den Bergh, to give that information. You must rely on the President and those sitting beside him. It is unusual to do it.

We continue with the first draft recommendation in Document 827 which is not amended.

This is a draft recommendation on the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — Many members of the Assembly will vote against the recommendation, but we do not ask for a roll-call. It is up to you, Mr. President, to interpret the rules but there are some votes against.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — For reasons we have repeatedly expressed, we shall vote against the recommendations.

If you, Mr. President, think that it would expedite matters, we agree that our vote against the recommendations be recorded and no roll-call vote be taken.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Unfortunately, Mr. President, we lost a lot of time this morning discussing another matter, which to my mind we need not have done. Everyone looks on the present question as a very important one, perhaps the most important topic of this week and one of the most important political decisions that our countries have to make. I must therefore press for a roll-call vote, so that it is made plain exactly what the proportion of support in this Assembly is.

The PRESIDENT. — We have more than one who asks for a roll-call vote or who hopes to have one. Therefore, we shall take a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Lewis.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

Rule 36 of our Rules of Procedure states :

The President (continued)

"A vote by roll-call shall in no circumstances be valid, nor the result be made public, if the vote shows that a majority of Representatives was not present."

We had no quorum. Therefore, the vote will be postponed until the next sitting, which is tomorrow morning.

We have voted only on the first draft recommendation and we must now vote on the second draft recommendation in Document 827, to which no amendments have been tabled.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call on the second draft recommendation.

Does anyone wish to take the floor ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — This is a dual report and, so far as I am concerned, the report is a whole. If we had a roll-call on one part, I shall certainly require a roll-call vote on this.

The PRESIDENT. — A roll-call vote has been demanded by Sir Frederic Bennett. As there was no quorum for the first draft recommendation, there will be no quorum now and we shall therefore also postpone the vote on the second draft recommendation until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

4. SALT II and its implications for European security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 816, Addendum and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on SALT II and its implications for European security and vote on the draft resolution, Document 816, Addendum and Amendment.

I call Mr. Cook, Rapporteur, to present the report.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — The report and resolution which are before the Assembly today were originally adopted by the Defence Committee last September and transmitted to the Presidential Committee for urgent action by that Committee, with the request that this urgent action should take the form of transmission to the United States Senate. As you will be aware, Mr. President, the Presidential Committee took the view that this matter ought to be debated in

the full Assembly at this part-session. I can understand why the Presidential Committee took that view, and, as the Rapporteur, I certainly agree that this is an important issue which ought to be debated by the full Assembly.

However, I regret the consequence of the delay since last September, which is that we are now debating a resolution which we propose to send to the United States Senate long after the United States Foreign Relations Committee has reported to the Senate and long after its debate on that report has commenced. Indeed, it is worth recalling that the North Atlantic Council was represented before the United States Foreign Relations Committee to give a European view on the SALT treaty.

This Assembly is frequently jealous of its own rôle as a unique interpreter of the opinion of Western Europe on defence matters. In the very first paragraph of our resolution before the Assembly we state :

"(i) Conscious of its authority under the Brussels Treaty as the only European parliamentary assembly with statutory responsibility in matters of defence ;"

One of the unfortunate effects of the delay in our discussion of this and in reaching a decision on the resolution is that we have allowed that unique responsibility of interpreting Western European opinion to pass to the North Atlantic Council. I hope that today we shall at least be able to remedy the problems caused by that delay by reaching a clear and unequivocal decision on the SALT treaty.

I hope that that will be the most controversial remark that I have to make to the Assembly, because my recommendation contained in the resolution before the Assembly is that the SALT treaty be ratified.

That should not prove a particularly controversial recommendation since every member state of Western European Union has formed the view that the SALT treaty should be ratified by the United States Senate. I quote in the addendum which I presented in support of the report the statements by Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt in which they both emphasise the importance of SALT as a contribution to détente and disarmament. I am happy to say that it is also the policy even of Her Majesty's Government of Great Britain that the treaty be ratified, and in these days, which are difficult ones for some of us in the British Parliament, we are, of course, very anxious to seize whatever limited opportunities come our way of supporting the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government.

The fact that the Western European states have found unanimity in urging ratification of

Mr. Cook (continued)

SALT demonstrates that over the few months since the treaty was initially signed in June of this year the two major areas of anxiety to Western Europe have been substantially resolved. The first of these related to the protocol on ground-launched cruise missiles, in which the United States gave an undertaking that it would not deploy such missiles until after 1981. It was feared at the time by some Western European observers that the United States would subsequently find it difficult to deploy weapons on which it had accepted a temporary prohibition.

As members of the Assembly will be aware from my contribution to the last debate, I am not at all sure that I want to see these missiles deployed at all, but there can be no doubt, in the light of the movement of opinion in the debate in the last few months, that the Americans are willing to deploy such missiles if the Western European states request it and do not feel in any way constrained by the temporary prohibition contained in the protocol.

The other area of anxiety of Western European countries was the article on non-circumvention, which provided that the United States or the Soviet Union would not seek to circumvent the terms of the treaty through any other state. It was suggested that this might inhibit the transfer of technology that has taken place in the past between the United States and particularly Great Britain over the joint production of nuclear weapons. Again, in the course of the past four or five months those fears have proved groundless.

In paragraph 25 of my report I quote at great length from what was said by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, when he made it plain that the United States did not accept any interpretation of the non-circumvention agreement that would inhibit assisting Britain with nuclear weapon systems. Again, I quote in the addendum a statement of the United States Foreign Relations Committee, giving its view that such an interpretation should not be placed on the article on non-circumvention.

Once more, actions speak louder than words, and it would appear that already there are negotiations between the Government of Great Britain and the administration of the United States aimed at the replacement of our present nuclear weapons systems, and again it would appear plain that the United States does not feel constrained by the non-circumvention article from entering into these negotiations with Great Britain.

Having said that, and having made the point that the particular areas of concern to Western Europe appear to have been resolved in the last

few months, I would not wish to suggest that the SALT treaty is perfect. Far from it! I myself am greatly disappointed that it makes such little progress towards disarmament. In paragraph 9 of the report I mention the disarmament — such as it is — that is contained in the treaty, and I point out that on the Soviet side it will mean the dismantling of 254 warheads, mostly obsolete intercontinental missiles; on the American side it will mean the dismantling of 46 heavy bombers, mostly mothballed in the south of America. That is a totally negligible proportion of the arsenal on both sides and, as a step towards disarmament, very disappointing indeed.

The reason why I believe that we must support SALT and why I believe that it is important that we achieve its ratification is that it has been influential not in obtaining disarmament but in making progress in the building up of confidence between East and West. We can see this if we look beyond the actual agreement to some of the more detailed agreements in respect of verification.

It is a fact that the United States has offered not to encrypt the telemetry from the test missiles, so the Soviet Union can listen to the transmissions from those missiles and assure itself about their capability. On the other side, it is also the case that the Soviet Union has given an undertaking that it will give notice of any occasion when it carries out test firing of a missile in order that the United States can get a plane up to monitor that firing.

Agreements of that detail and frankness ten years ago would have been unthinkable. However, it is exactly because the SALT process has been so successful in building confidence between East and West on these matters that it is vital that it be ratified. If we were to regard SALT merely as a substantial measure towards disarmament, the failure to ratify is something we could live with, because we could afford to forego the very small amount of disarmament contained within it.

As we have come so far in building up confidence, I do not believe, however, that we can afford to inflict on that confidence the trauma that would follow from a failure on the part of the West to obtain ratification of the SALT treaty. Sadly, there are some who, minority though they are, nevertheless appear to argue that it would be in western interests not to ratify SALT II. I say to them, almost in a mood of despair, "If you will not accept disarmament in this limited form, what form of disarmament, what agreement, will you accept other than unconditional surrender by the other side?" I ask them also to consider the awesome capacity for destruction represented by the nuclear arsenal on both sides. Unless we can contain that capacity for destruction within the diplomatic and poli-

Mr. Cook (continued)

tical framework, we risk the very serious danger that we shall be unable to contain that destructive force, with an effect that will undoubtedly end civilisation in Europe as we now understand it.

When we were at the Council of Europe last May some of us attended a meeting organised by the Stockholm Institute at which a speech was delivered by Lord Mountbatten. Sadly, as it turned out, it was to be his last major public speech. I understand that afterwards he indicated to a number of press people that he was disappointed that so little attention had been paid to what he said in Strasbourg on that occasion. I should like to read the conclusion he reached in that speech on the nuclear arms race. He said in Strasbourg :

“As a military man who has given half a century of active service I say in all sincerity that the nuclear arms race has no military purpose. Wars cannot be fought with nuclear weapons. Their existence only adds to our perils because of the illusions which they have generated. There are powerful voices around the world who still give credence to the old Roman precept : If you desire peace, prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense... the world now stands on the brink of the final abyss. Let us all resolve to take all possible practical steps to ensure that we do not, through our own folly, go over the edge.”

It is against that sombre background that we must reach a decision on whether SALT II should be ratified, a decision on whether we decline to ratify and risk a break in the traditional pattern of the relationship that has been painstakingly built up over the past two decades ; or accept ratification, accept the SALT treaty as an inadequate, faltering, hesitant step towards disarmament, but nevertheless an important basic further step.

I do not believe we should honourably discharge our responsibility to our electors, and the children of our electors, if, given that choice, we were to fail to adopt a policy of ratification.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cook.

The debate is open.

I call first Mr. Calamandrei. He will be followed by Mr. Gessner.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Cook's report and the draft resolution based on it are, in the Italian communists' view, a positive formulation of the Assembly's function deriving from its status as sole European parliamentary body with statutory responsibility in matters of defence : the function and responsibility referred to in

paragraph (i) of the preamble to this resolution on SALT II. Wherein does the political clout of such statutory responsibility of our Assembly reside ? It lies in the function of assessing, within the scope of the Atlantic Alliance to which every one of our countries is attached for its defence, the incidence that choices having strategic implications for the Alliance as a whole are likely to have, through Europe's security, precisely upon the overall defence of Western Europe as an inseparable but nonetheless specific aspect of the defence strategy to be safeguarded by the Alliance. Today, in view of the new importance attached to problems of Eurostrategic equilibria in the balance of forces between the two blocs, the growing weight which, as I was saying, is likely to be carried by the appraisals and actions of a body like WEU becomes glaringly obvious.

Unfortunately, as my honourable friend Mr. Pecchioli has mentioned and as we saw in the way the voting went, the proposals concerning new weapons arising out of the original van den Bergh report have been weakened and obstructed at the hands of those increasingly riled by the powers of our Assembly as expressed in this kind of proposal. Nevertheless, the appreciations in the Cook report still stand, as do the conclusions and requests embodied in his resolution on SALT II concerning the general strategic context in which the Eurostrategic problems created by the new weapons are to be seen, in all their specific nature.

I do not, indeed, believe it can be denied that a solution of Eurostrategic problems calculated to maintain or, if need be, refurbish at the lowest level the balance of forces by giving priority to negotiation will be any less hard to find, even if in point of fact ratification and enforcement of SALT II ensure in a general context a substantial support for a balance, if not yet a freezing, still less a reduction, of nuclear forces between the blocs, and even if they open the way to a SALT III agreement, i.e. a much more organic negotiating link between the level of an Atlantic Alliance/Warsaw Pact strategic balance and that of a Eurostrategic balance between them in the continental theatre.

On the contrary, it happens that the terms of the problem, of the relation between SALT developments and Western European defence, have been turned upside down by the crisis reached in ratification by the United States of SALT II.

Opponents of United States ratification have argued that SALT II would detract from America's overall strategic capability, but have attributed to the question of Russian intermediate weaponry, SS-20 and Backfire, an incidence not originally recognised, and above all — hence the reversal — have posed, and still do so, more and more outspokenly and intransigently, as one of the preconditions for ratification of SALT II,

Mr. Calamandrei (continued)

the Eurostrategic decisions demanded of its allies by the United States in respect of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

The Cook report has the merit of keeping the whole process, so to say, with its feet on the ground, by challenging the overall strategic objections by the opponents of ratification of SALT II with arguments drawn from actual statements by the Atlantic Council, asserting that at the level of Eurostrategic equilibria there is in the immediate prospect no lack of an Atlantic counterpart of Russia's intermediate weapons, and concluding, as is also done in the draft resolution, that ratification without amendment by the United States Senate of SALT II remains a qualifying condition whose fulfilment our countries are bound to regard with legitimate expectation among the circumstances to be appraised for any new decision to be discussed by the Atlantic Council in Brussels next week.

We Italian communist representatives will therefore be voting in favour of the resolution, against which, let me say by-the-by, it would not be surprising if there were last-minute manoeuvres, including objections on points of order, to block in yet another instance any initiative by our Assembly. We shall vote for the resolution, in which, as I said at the start, we see a sign of how, notwithstanding delaying action and obstacles, the interests of democracy and the peace of our countries in such a critical international phase are able to bring to fruition, in the functioning of WEU, opportunities for independent initiative in opposing another armaments race and lending support to negotiation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak ?

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to respond briefly to Mr. Calamandrei. I am grateful to him for indicating that he supports the report. If he will forgive me, I shall not pursue him down the path of debating again the previous report, although I am glad that he finds the conclusion that he has come to is that the report should be supported and should be presented from the Assembly.

I would simply emphasise one of the points that Mr. Calamandrei made. That is that it is very important that the Assembly reach a view on this matter. We cannot claim adequately to represent Western European belief and Western European thought on defence matters if we cannot reach a decision capable of being transmitted to our colleagues in the United States on

this vital issue, an issue that will not recur for another three or four years until a SALT III treaty comes forward for ratification.

I therefore very much hope, as Mr. Calamandrei does, that we shall not find procedural difficulties placed in the way of this Assembly coming to a decision when we end this debate.

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Chairman wish to speak ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). —

"SALT II is an important step in the continuing process of arms control which aims to stabilise the strategic balance while safeguarding the essential security interests of the North Atlantic Alliance ; its non-ratification would represent a serious check to this process. Western defence planning would, therefore, have to be undertaken against a background of greater unpredictability in East-West relations."

I quote the remarks of Mr. Francis Pym, the Secretary of State for Defence in the United Kingdom. I believe that that view is absolutely right and that therefore the Assembly should give this report unanimous approval.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The debate is closed.

Before voting we come to Amendment 1 by Lord McNair.

Will you please move Amendment 1 ?

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). — I beg to move,

1. In the draft resolution proper, leave out "CALLS UPON THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES To" and insert "EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Will".

I think that it is more or less self-explanatory.

One can look at this question on two levels — either that of legality or simply that of courtesy. The legality I would rather leave to others who are more versed in international law and know their Brussels Treaty better than I do. But I somewhat doubt whether we have any right to "call upon" the United States Senate to do anything. I prefer to base the case for my amendment on the level of courtesy.

As I understand things, in the USSR if a treaty has the approval of Mr. Brezhnev its ratification does not present any grave problems. But in the United States the position is very different. As I understand it, the ratification of treaties is one of the most prized prerogatives of the United States Senate. One could almost call it one of its most sacred duties enshrined in its

Lord McNair (continued)

constitution. Therefore, when we ask it to do this, we should do it politely and practically.

Therefore, I hope that the Assembly will agree with me that it is better that we should "express the hope" that it will approve the ratification, rather than, in this somewhat peremptory way, "call upon" it.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak on this amendment ?...

What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I am quite happy to accept this amendment. The Committee discussed it on Monday. We are willing to accept the amendment if it removes any misconception about the peremptory call on the United States Senate. If it appears more courteous done in this way, we are willing to accept the amendment — although I understand that the use of the term "call upon" is not only conventional but is one that we have frequently used in addressing messages to people other than those contained within the Council of WEU. Indeed, I am advised that on one occasion we even addressed a resolution to the King of Spain which "called upon" him to do something.

Nevertheless, if there are members of the Assembly who are unhappy with the term and prefer the term put forward by Lord McNair, we are perfectly willing to accommodate them.

The PRESIDENT. — The Rapporteur agrees to this amendment.

We can vote on Amendment 1 tabled by Lord McNair.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is agreed to unanimously.

We come now to vote on the draft resolution in Document 816 as amended. I shall request members to vote by sitting and standing.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I have taken advice, and in the context of developments during the last hour, when two reports, one of which was the report of the Rapporteur, Mr. Roper, which I fully supported, were defeated by the lack of a quorum, I believe that I am entitled, even though this is a draft resolution, to ask you whether you would now ascertain whether in fact the necessary attendance is now present in this chamber. If I have been wrongly advised, I do not press my point, but I have been advised that this is my right, and I think that if we are to have votes tomorrow morning on reports, we should not be selective and that all votes should be tomorrow morning.

Therefore, I formally ask you to ascertain whether half of those entitled to be in this Assembly are present to enable the vote to proceed.

The PRESIDENT. — Sir Frederic Bennett asks whether there is a quorum — that is, forty-five members must be present. I must state that there are not forty-five members in the house, and we shall have to vote on this draft resolution tomorrow morning, with the others.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want to prolong the matter but I wonder whether the bells have been rung in order to bring members into the hall since Sir Frederic requested that the quorum be counted, because I think it is important that those in the building should have the chance to be here before this decision is made by you.

The PRESIDENT. — The bell was ringing when Mr. Cook, as Rapporteur, took the floor — that is to say, within three or four minutes the bell was ringing. We can wait a moment or two, and get a deep breath of fresh air here in the house, waiting until someone arrives. But we are still a long way from a quorum.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — In that case, I shall not bother. There is no point. I would not wish to delay the proceedings of the Assembly if we are a long way from a quorum.

The PRESIDENT. — It is a long way away. We shall postpone the vote until tomorrow morning with the other votes that we have to take.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I do not propose to delay the Assembly. We have other business to complete but I hope that tomorrow it will be possible to have a quorum or to reach a decision, if necessary, without a quorum. We are not deciding policy on this occasion for ourselves. We are taking a decision that affects our relationship with another body to which we are expressing an opinion. If we are unable to express such advice to another body, there is little point in meeting twice a year to express any Western European belief.

The PRESIDENT. — I fully agree. I can only ask all those present to inform their colleagues and to ask their secretaries to see that delegations are informed that tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock we are to have a couple of votes. I cannot do more than ask as many of the Assembly members as possible to be present.

5. Arctic technology

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 822 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-

The President (continued)

logical and Aerospace Questions on Arctic technology, Document 822 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur, to present the report.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the polar regions have always been a subject of general interest, and of particular interest to explorers. The polar regions were mysterious. From our childhood days we all remember the adventures of the great polar explorers, Amundsen and Scott. Man simply wanted to get to know the whole of his world, including these mysterious polar regions. As the only remaining unallocated parts of the world, these regions naturally also aroused the interest of various nations. Moreover they have always been a challenge to man, to his endurance, his strength, his intelligence, his inventive spirit and to his psychological capacity to put up with the privations faced in a polar region.

No secrets were in fact found during the many voyages of discovery, nor indeed anything of real value. People began to realise the enormous technical obstacles to developing and exploring the polar regions. That is why, compared to other regions and especially other land masses, exploration of the polar regions proceeded very slowly.

The international geophysical year 1957-58 gave a special impetus to the interest shown in these regions. Countries which had been weakened by the second world war were once again in a position to pay greater attention to problems beyond their frontiers. Enormous technical advances had been made during the second world war. The aeroplane, the helicopter, wireless, nuclear propulsion for ships had all been developed or were on the horizon. The opposition between East and West also brought military questions to the fore again.

The early sixties brought a dawning awareness that while man in the modern world may today live very well, he needs a vast amount of raw materials and energy to do so, and that in the long term it might be possible to draw materials, energy and even food — proteins — from the polar regions. That is what has finally aroused the interest of all countries.

When I was asked to take on the report on Arctic technology for the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, I knew that the Arctic is in the north and the Antarctic in the south, and I had heard of Amundsen and Scott. I had a rough geographical picture, but knew nothing else. I assume that you are all more cultured than I am. Neverthe-

less, I should perhaps give a brief sketch of the situation and the basic facts.

The Arctic, that is the northern polar regions, can be described roughly as follows: it is a floating mass of ice which is reduced by half in the summer. It is surrounded by the large continents of America and Eurasia. It has areas of tundra where no trees grow. There are fairly clear national frontiers in the Arctic, but these normally run through the sea. There are only two land frontiers, between America and Canada and between Finland and the Soviet Union.

The United States owns the province of Alaska, which until only a few decades ago had a mere 50,000 inhabitants. It has enormous oil and gas resources, other raw materials and the famous trans-Alaska pipeline.

In Canada, the North West Territories and Yukon, which form part of the Arctic, have only 22,000 inhabitants. Here too, substantial raw material and energy resources still lie untouched or are only beginning to be exploited.

Greenland has 39,000 inhabitants, and achieved autonomy in 1979, under Danish sovereignty.

Norway has 450,000 inhabitants in its three Arctic provinces. The Norwegian territory of Spitsbergen has a special status; by the treaty of 1920, signed by thirty-one states, it remained under Norwegian rule but all military activity was prohibited. Otherwise the thirty-one signatory states may undertake any activity they wish, from mining to exploration. For example, the Soviet Union operates a large coal mine in Barentsburg. No oil has yet been found there.

Then there is the enormous Arctic area of the Soviet Union, with 700,000 inhabitants. It is presumed that oil and gas are to be found there too. The Soviet Union is attempting to exploit these resources and is also trying to interest the Japanese and Americans in the project.

Lastly there is Iceland, which is geographically a part of the Arctic but which does not really belong to it.

The situation in the Antarctic is different. Instead of floating ice masses we have a large land mass, covered by a sheet of ice between 2,000 and 4,500 metres thick. This land mass also has large, very precipitous mountains with deep valleys. Antarctica has no permanent inhabitants. A number of states have claimed areas of Antarctica, but these areas have never been inhabited, at least not permanently. Thus the Antarctic is an enormous uninhabited continent, remote from other continents; the nearest land mass is Cape Horn, 950 kms away.

It is a territory on which the states, with their national interests, have still managed to reach

Mr. Spies von Büllersheim (continued)

agreement. The Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959 for a period of thirty years. A distinction is made between two kinds of member, the signatory states and the consultative members. The smaller group of consultative members consists only of states with a permanent scientific station in Antarctica. These states are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Africa, Poland, the USSR and the United States. On 5th February 1979 the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the treaty as a consultative member, and it will invest DM 100 million — which shows the magnitude of the sums involved — in establishing an Antarctic research station and building a research ship.

The Antarctic Treaty is unique in that even the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have submitted their activities in the Antarctic to overall inspection. Checks are made to ensure respect for the ban on all military activity or the building of military installations in Antarctica. There are also controls — and any state can carry out an inspection — to check that no nuclear tests are being made and no radioactive materials stored there.

For the rest, the Antarctic Treaty does not affect any of the rights that have been claimed by states. The treaty formally states that it neither denies nor supports such claims, and that no new claims can be founded on it.

Today it would probably no longer be possible to sign the Antarctic Treaty which was concluded twenty years ago, because today we know, or at least assume, that Antarctica has vast raw material deposits, which according to estimates by the United States amount to no less than 45,000 million barrels of oil, although they will be difficult to extract.

The famous krill, this 4 cm long shrimp weighing only 1.2 g, has become important as a possible major source of protein.

The Antarctic could be of interest to industries which require clean water and an unpolluted environment.

It is also an area of great interest in that it is the only large ecosystem in the world that is totally intact. That is why all states have an interest in preserving this major ecosystem — not least because of the fear of climatic changes. It is impossible to foresee what might happen if this ecosystem were destroyed.

But like everywhere else in the world, there are of course problems in the Antarctic. True, we can today expect that as a result of the vast scale of the activities undertaken by the industrialised countries, the Antarctic will have been

fully explored by the year 2000. But the 1959 Antarctic Treaty contains no offshore provisions, for example, so the states are not sure who then is entitled to drill offshore or even to extract oil, or even whether such a right exists at all.

As for the krill, there is a danger that this small crustacean will be overfished in spite of its countless numbers. It forms an essential basis for the food chain which extends through many species of fish as far as the whale. What would happen to the ecosystem if the krill were overfished? At the Antarctic Conference in 1978, the signatory states unfortunately did not reach agreement on a provision to regulate the fishing of krill. Even if agreement is reached, the question arises of who is to supervise the observance of this agreement. The signatory states, and in particular the smaller group of consultative states, will not accept without further ado that nations which have not acceded to the treaty should wield a decisive influence through the United Nations.

For we all know — and this is the most important fact — that the International Law of the Sea Conference, which has been going on for years, is encountering great difficulties. We have cause to fear that this Law of the Sea Conference could undermine the Antarctic Treaty by establishing general regulations.

I will not discuss the military aspects of the Arctic and Antarctic here, because the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will submit a special report on this. And since it is getting rather late I will make no further comments except to say the following: the Antarctic Treaty is a civil treaty, but it is also a military treaty, in fact an anti-military treaty, an anti-armaments treaty, a "peace treaty". If the Antarctic Treaty were undermined at the Law of the Sea Conference because of the various nations' economic interests, then its military section would not be effective either, and that cannot be in our interest.

As I have said, the Antarctic is a great challenge to man, to his body, to his intellect, one might almost say to his soul. One need only read books by the people who had to live there for months in the snow, in solitude, in the terrible cold. But there are more practical, technological aspects too, such as the difficulties of transport and the problems facing the modern ice-breakers which have been developed specially for the Arctic. Work is being carried out on a number of projects on entirely new systems for the building of ice-breakers.

New materials are being tested in the Antarctic and it is a centre of oceanographic exploration, research into climatic conditions and deep-sea currents.

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

The most important project is of course the one on which all the states are working: to discover a new drilling technique which will make it possible to drill bore-holes through floating ice or ice which is moving above a land mass down to the oil deposits at a depth of 2,000 or 3,000 metres. This is a problem which seems almost insoluble. But when we look at the progress made it is astonishing how advanced this technology already is. Think of the problems involved. For instance, there is ice which no power on earth can halt, there are enormous icebergs which float about at random and are difficult to divert. Moreover, even if one drilled down to the oil deposits, there would be incredible transport difficulties, as we saw during the construction of the Alaska pipeline, which after all is above ground and runs across tundra areas. So both the human and the technological aspects of Antarctic exploration are a challenge to mankind.

Mr. President, I have nearly finished. Looking at the two polar regions, one finds that the Arctic is divided up into territories, and to some extent settled, while the Antarctic remains a relatively untouched continent. The Antarctic is not as much involved in any power-play. It is remote from the superpowers. It has no human history. The Antarctic is covered by this Antarctic Treaty which we should maintain, promote and develop. As stated in the treaty, the aim should be an area free of military activity, a vast continent on which states can collaborate in science and research, in which man may perhaps find food, raw materials and energy, and where the ecosystem as a whole should be preserved. We European states must collaborate because we have common interests here. The signatory states, that is, most of the states represented in this Assembly, are in agreement with the consultative states on this point. So we should adopt a joint European position here.

I therefore ask the Assembly to adopt the draft recommendation which we have submitted in Document 822. Its ultimate objective is that the European states should collaborate more closely in this area than hitherto, that they should adopt a common position in the Antarctic conferences, and that they should work together to ensure that at least the main substance of this Antarctic Treaty, which is unique in modern history, shall be preserved. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

As members know, we are to hear an address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and I am sorry that we have caused him to wait for a few minutes. I am sure that the Assembly

will agree to the postponement of the business now under discussion in order that we may hear Mr. Thorn.

6. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

The PRESIDENT. — We are extremely pleased, Mr. Minister, to welcome you here again to our proceedings. Will you please come to the rostrum to address the Assembly?

Mr. THORN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am particularly happy that it should fall to my lot to address you as Chairman-in-Office of the Council in a year when we are celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Paris Agreements modifying and completing the 1948 Brussels Treaty.

The event was duly commemorated by the symposium on a European armaments policy arranged by your Assembly in Brussels last October.

I said on that occasion, and reiterate now, how pleased I was that the symposium, thanks to the excellence of its participants and the guidelines you set for it, should have made a positive and important contribution towards European co-operation in armaments.

At a time when our countries are once again beset with all manner of uncertainties, the choice of topic for discussion at Brussels was particularly judicious.

Aside from the conclusions, at times perhaps unduly pessimistic, of your proceedings, the most important thing in my opinion is that members of parliament as well as diplomats, but also those responsible for defence and industry, were able to meet to discuss the matter together. Once these men, directly or indirectly involved in armaments and defence questions, get into the habit of consultation and co-operation, an important step forward will have been taken.

During the twenty-five years it has been in existence, WEU has encouraged efforts towards a European union, the ultimate objective which the authors of the modified Brussels Treaty had assigned to themselves. It has done so by action deployed throughout the various fields within its sphere of competence, according to the circumstances and requirements of the moment, and by constantly guarding against any duplication of effort.

The Council has watched over the full implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and has kept the Assembly constantly informed.

Throughout these years the dialogue between the Council and your Assembly has been kept

Mr. Thorn (continued)

in being and developed by way of replies made to your recommendations and written questions, the report on its activities presented to you each year by the Council and the joint meetings organised at the request of your Committees.

May I also take this opportunity to emphasise the importance of the rôle played by the Standing Armaments Committee, especially in recent years, when under its remit from the Council it undertook the protracted and intricate task of the study on the situation in the armaments sector of industry in the member countries. To date, only the legal portion has been forwarded to the Council. At the ministerial meeting in Rome last May, the Council confirmed the mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee and hoped that the first part of the second, "economic" portion of the study would be completed with all dispatch and under optimum conditions with the co-operation of the administrations concerned.

It decided not to disseminate the study chapter by chapter; however, as I have already had occasion to tell you, when the SAC's final report is to hand, the Council will not fail to examine the substance and form of an adequate communication for the Assembly's information.

Speaking only as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and member of the Council, I will now pass on to you a few thoughts on topical questions. Your Assembly is of course interested in the major debate on theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe. As you know, decisions on the production and deployment of such modern weapons have been taken in readiness for the Atlantic Council of 12th, 13th and 14th December; parallel proposals on arms limitation are being finalised so that negotiation on the subject can be initiated with the Warsaw Pact countries at the earliest opportunity.

You are similarly fully apprised of the formal speech by Chairman Leonid Brezhnev in Berlin on 6th October. He declared he was fully disposed to negotiate, and even announced unilateral disarmament measures, but he warned us against the proposed reinforcement of theatre nuclear arms, arguing that they would destroy the existing balance and thus render any East-West disarmament negotiations more difficult if not impossible.

Now, what do we find when we examine the current ratio of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States, to take only the two most interesting examples? Quite simply, that the balance which had existed until fairly recently has been upset following the manufacture of new Soviet theatre weapons and their stationing within range of the territory of Western Europe.

These are essentially the SS-20 missiles each with three independent nuclear warheads, additionally highly mobile and with twice the range of the systems they replace, so that they are able to reach their targets anywhere in our countries with substantially greater accuracy. Moreover the USSR has developed the new Backfire bomber, more sophisticated than its predecessors in both range and penetration capability.

Mr. Leonid Brezhnev states that there has been no change in the number of medium-range nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union in the last ten years, and this may be true in purely numerical terms, but appears in a different light if the operational quality of the new SS-20 and Backfire systems is considered. And the Alliance has no missile comparable to those recently deployed by the USSR and the currently available systems are, into the bargain, more vulnerable and even, it has been said, in some cases obsolete.

For these reasons the leaders of the member states of the Atlantic Alliance decided to commission studies on the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces in Europe. These studies, which are right up to date, led to the conclusions and proposals that you know of, the production and deployment of two new nuclear weapon systems, the Pershing II and cruise missiles.

The discussions to be held in a few days' time between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the member states of the Alliance will be based on these such widely canvassed proposals. In my opinion, clear decisions will have to be taken now and leave no doubt about the twofold objective of, as a first phase, production by the United States of the Pershing II and cruise missiles and, in phase two, towards 1983, the deployment of these weapons in some European countries of the Alliance. The two measures are being taken under the basic NATO policy founded mainly on deterrence as the basis of détente.

They will be supplemented by equally important proposals for limitation of nuclear systems in the European theatre which we propose to discuss with the Soviet Union. Depending on the outcome of these discussions, which should begin as soon as Washington has ratified the SALT II treaty, a consummation which is proving difficult but devoutly to be desired, the existing or planned number of European theatre nuclear weapons could be curtailed, I hope substantially, by both sides. What is essential for the West is that the balance which formerly existed in this area between the United States and the Soviet Union before the stationing of the SS-20s be restored. Fruitful negotiations can be conducted only from a position of equilibrium, for

Mr. Thorn (continued)

to negotiate balanced reductions while starting out from an original imbalance would seem to me to be pretty difficult.

In his speech of 6th October last Mr. Brezhnev also announced the withdrawal of 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks at present stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic. This announcement is without any doubt a laudable, if limited, step, since it is in the right direction. The Vienna negotiations on forces reduction in Central Europe, which have been for too long bogged down in controversy over numerical data, may be given fresh impetus; it is a hope I share with many of our partners in Vienna.

As for the Soviet leader's proposals about new confidence-building measures in the military area, they show the increased interest Russia and its allies are currently taking in such specific matters, an interest shared by nearly all the signatory states of the Helsinki final act. The meeting to be held in Madrid, starting in November 1980, as part of the follow-up to the CSCE will provide an appropriate forum for discussing these Soviet proposals and any which the western states have already presented, or will present in Madrid. In this context I am thinking in particular of the more than interesting, indeed highly important, proposal by France for convening a European disarmament conference which should in its initial phase discuss significant confidence-building measures on the military plane.

May I repeat the two principles underlying this proposal. Both sets of measures could be capable of being monitored and be made applicable to the whole territory of Europe. That is why they merit all our attention.

I pass now to a few more general remarks.

The reactions of European public opinion, the press and many members of parliament to Mr. Brezhnev's speech of 6th October clearly showed that we are still easily hoodwinked by a little smooth patter or a magic spell. To take only our own newspapers, what caught our attention most if it did not close our eyes entirely in the speech of 6th October was the announcement of the withdrawal — which has apparently begun today — of Soviet troops and tanks, and the proposal to negotiate a limitation of missiles with nuclear warheads. These ideas happily figure in that speech but, I repeat, they have to be treated with the utmost seriousness.

However, they must not be taken in isolation but carefully placed in the general context in which they were spoken. They then take on quite a different meaning. You realise that at no point

in the proposals is there any question of giving up the unilateral advantage which the SS-20 missiles confer on the Soviet Union, and therefore of giving up the idea of entering into the negotiations on the limitation of theatre nuclear forces. In addition there is even the threat of a new arms race if we do not accept the discussion in the chosen terms, within the chosen framework, and therefore if we speak of redressing the balance of forces.

That is what I want to underline and oppose to some of our critics who want quite simply, and, shall we say, too simply, to allow the other side to have the exclusive choice of the area of negotiation and its framework. As soon as it is a question of disarmament and negotiations, we let ourselves be cornered too easily and think we have to apologise for our refusal to comply entirely with the adversary's wishes although in fact the attitude of most if not all of us is in positive terms exceedingly firm.

For what could be more logical or more consistent than categorically to affirm our determination to restore the balance and, in parallel, enter into negotiations with a view to the limitation of nuclear weapons, or even a balanced reduction at the lowest possible level? This should and must be said.

The only conclusion I personally have reached is the one I hope will be accepted at the Atlantic Council meeting on 12th, 13th and 14th December, namely a go-ahead for production of the Pershing II and cruise missiles and the offer to negotiate. I am weighing my words: such decisions should be taken in parallel and as soon as possible. To wait six months, a year or two years would, I feel, be bound to be construed as an admission of weakness, and exploited as such. Now, it has been known from time immemorial that it is useless to try to obtain the right results if compelled to negotiate from a position of weakness.

The second remark I would like to make is more wide-ranging and goes beyond the subject of armament and disarmament. I am speaking of the instinctive hostility which is aroused among many people by anything closely or remotely associated with the term nuclear. Far be it from me to want to minimise the gravity with which both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy must be handled. Indeed, I would almost be tempted to think that we all too often forget the destructive power of nuclear weapons. When people mention without batting an eyelid devices whose power is expressed in kilotons or megatons we seldom remember that a small tactical atomic weapon is the equivalent today of the Hiroshima bomb.

Similarly, I personally am far from happy about the current jargon referring to theatre

Mr. Thorn (continued)

nuclear weapons. Such a term testifies to what I dare call an all too military insensitivity towards the concerns of ordinary mortals for whom the theatre is a place of relaxation, escape or edification, but assuredly not of destruction. It is but a detail, but I would above all put you on your guard against going to the other extreme and waving the red flag as soon as the word nuclear is uttered.

So, as far as the military aspect is concerned — and I have now spoken about it enough — what is to be done above all is not to let ourselves be forced back into a situation of nuclear imbalance to the detriment of the Atlantic Pact. That would run us straight into the catastrophe that we want to avoid at all costs.

As for the civil aspect of nuclear energy I fully appreciate that the peaceful use of nuclear energy involves risks. But each day that passes, events in the Middle East show us what uncertainties loom over our oil supplies. Surely, not many of us would find it easy to accept a reduction in our economic wealth, and therefore in our personal wellbeing, due to a shortage of energy? So, I think that the problem of energy from nuclear sources must be looked at in a general context, as the heads of state and of government have just done in the Community framework, in Dublin, petroleum being regarded as one among other components of our energy supply and consequently a big factor in our countries' economic policy. It is not to be viewed with the eyes of the exorcist, and banished in whatever form or manifestation it takes.

Conversely, what is of the highest importance, and is the other facet of a truly realistic approach, is that any questions relating to civil nuclear plants should be given the attention they deserve. It seems to me to be self-evident that security measures must satisfy the highest requirements of modern technology. Equally, it seems self-evident that the sites must be selected in such a way as to minimise the potential risk to the local populations. In an international assembly of members of parliament, I shall put special emphasis on the international responsibility incumbent on all our states in regions — of which there are many in our diminutive Europe — in which countries adjoin one another.

Wherever the risks and potential damage are international, the various sovereignties are involved, and, above all, any genuine European concerted action for the choice of sites, plant conditions and protective measures would be a big contribution to a rational treatment of whatever has a bearing on nuclear engineering as well as industry in general; it would be a step on the road to the independence of Europe.

The third point, which I would like to touch upon briefly, concerns relations with all the countries which do not form part of the two major political and military groupings. We consider the nuclear non-proliferation treaty a benefit to mankind and that everything must be done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. It is by-the-by a point of view common to the Atlantic Alliance and even the Warsaw Pact, a fact which is worth emphasising.

I will try to add a few more debating points not unrelated to the discussion on theatre nuclear weaponry.

The atomic arsenal has never been used since the two bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 which hastened the end of the second world war. Since then, although there have been many opportunities and temptations to do so, none of the big powers has resorted to its nuclear strike force. The approximate balance in existing means of destruction, together with the leaders' sense of responsibility, has invariably inspired them to consider that in the final analysis, using nuclear weapons would in any case pay off less than refraining from doing so. While this approximate balance subsists, I am convinced that none of the superpowers will use its nuclear weapons.

In that case why should other countries go to the considerable expense of acquiring a weapon which in the end they will not be able to use, especially with the aggravating circumstance that the more countries possess a nuclear weapon the greater is the risk of its being rashly used, with all the catastrophic consequences this would not fail to have. And the more chances there are that the person with his finger on the button will be a crank, a fanatic or a lunatic.

However, there are three corollaries to this theorem.

In my view, countries which have nuclear weapons must in no circumstances wield them as a threat or a means of exerting pressure on countries which do not have any. The inevitable result of such a policy would be to impel the latter to try and acquire the means of escaping the threat or the blackmail, whether or not their attempts could be crowned with success. A responsible attitude by the atomic powers is therefore an essential prerequisite of any attempt to prevent excessive proliferation.

Secondly, the non-nuclear countries should not be denied access to the purely peaceful benefits of nuclear technology. It is in this area, no doubt, that the stipulations of the non-proliferation treaty have been implemented the least effectively. Only fairly recently have serious attempts been made to differentiate properly

Mr. Thorn (continued)

between civil and military applications of nuclear energy. Rapid progress must be made in this direction, for it is obviously hard to convince anyone that an advanced civil technology should be reserved to those who are already the strongest militarily.

Thirdly, I deem very important the attempts being made to improve our relations with the developing countries. We should do even more to speed up development throughout the world, even, or rather especially, in times of crisis like those we are living in now and will certainly have to put up with for several years to come.

The world has entered into a dangerous phase. And the debate on nuclear balance in Europe, important as it is, should not let us lose sight of the wider objectives of world equilibrium. What good would it do us, Mr. President, to win a battle on our continent if it meant losing the war world-wide? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your address to the Assembly.

You were kind enough to agree to answer questions. Are you prepared to reply to them separately, or to all the questions at the end?

Mr. THORN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). — At the end.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call first Mr. Stoffelen. He will be followed by Mr. Konings.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — Mr. President, I shall speak in my own language, Dutch.

(*The speaker continued in Dutch*)

(Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to ask Mr. Thorn, as Chairman of the Council, whether he shares the view that co-operation in Western Europe is based on mutual trust, trust in the readiness of countries to look further than what might be seen as narrow national interests, trust in the possibility of making agreements with other countries? If his answer is in the affirmative, is he aware that the French Government's decision not to put to the French Parliament for ratification the treaty on salt pollution of the Rhine — signed in 1976 by the Governments of France, West Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands — is dealing a serious blow at the credibility and future of Western European co-operation, including co-operation in Western European Union?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Does the Minister share the view that the concluding of treaties between free and independent states, treaties under which in particular freedom and independence are to be guaranteed and defended jointly and in association, represents an institution and a way of thinking and acting within which the deliberate inflicting of damage of whatever kind by one contracting party upon the others is an inadmissible breach of the trust on which the WEU treaty, among others, is based? And how does the Minister judge, from this viewpoint, the French Government's going-back on the 1976 treaty on salt pollution of the Rhine?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roper now. He will be followed by Mr. Lambiotte.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate the Minister on his speech. Will he accept that I was most grateful to the Council for the answer to Written Question 199 on the appointment of different substitutes to serve in the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union, which I received just at the beginning of this Assembly? The Minister will note that in that reply the Council say:

"Like the Assembly, they [the Council] consider it desirable that an adequate number of parliamentarians with special interest in defence questions should take part in the activities of the Assembly."

Is the Chairman-in-Office aware that this afternoon fewer than forty-five members were present in order to take decisions on the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces and on SALT II, and that there are perhaps not all members present to listen to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers? Does he believe — as I do, as one who has worked in the Assembly of this organisation and of the Council of Europe — that the Council and the Assembly should look again at the problem of the umbilical cord linking the members of the Council of Europe and WEU Assemblies? Will he give me an assurance that the Council will look again at the question in view of the very disappointing events of this afternoon?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Lambiotte. He will be followed by Mr. Treu.

Mr. LAMBIOTTE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — The Chairman of the Council of Ministers alluded during his address to the Brussels symposium.

The question I would like to ask is the following: can the Assembly take it that the paper

Mr. Lambiotte (continued)

read at the symposium by Mr. Plantey constitutes information by the Council to the Assembly on the results of the inquiry undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, one simple general question reflecting the recurrent waverings, doubts and self-questioning by which our Assembly has for some time past been beset. In its latest annual report the WEU Council confirmed that it regards this Assembly as the only, repeat: only, European assembly having statutory responsibility in matters of defence. The message issued on the occasion of WEU's twenty-fifth anniversary simply states that it is "the European parliamentary body in which the representatives of the peoples of the member states discuss their common security problems". This change of formula, which may at first sight appear purely terminological or stylistic, is I think a good deal more important and significant. Let me explain: does it imply that the Council queries the principle of the Assembly's being the only European assembly with statutory responsibility in matters of defence? Thank you in advance for an answer on this.

The PRESIDENT. — Do any more members wish to put questions to the Minister?...

Mr. Minister, will you reply, please?

Mr. THORN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — I am sorry, Mr. President, if I may have allowed my attention to wander, it was partly due to technical difficulties.

The two first speakers, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Konings, spoke of difficulties about pollution of the Rhine.

It will not come as a surprise to anybody that this is an area in which I do not feel myself particularly competent either in my personal capacity or as Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council. We know it concerns five countries, one of which is not even a member of WEU. How, then, could I have the slightest authority, I who have the further advantage or disadvantage of coming from a country that does not border on the Rhine, to give any answer on the subject?

I believe that all the governments concerned will consider this problem with the greatest concern. Dare I say — but in a strictly personal capacity — that I hope the French decision, of which I was informed like everyone else and with whose ins and outs I am unfamiliar, will not put an end to a dream dating, I believe, back to 1950, and that this decision will still

leave room for finding an appropriate solution. But I cannot go further than that and take up any other position, Mr. President.

Then I was questioned about the problems which all assemblies run into as regards regular attendance.

You understand, Mr. President, that a member of government, who is no longer a member of parliament, would not venture to meddle in such a delicate question as this. Believe me, this anxiety of yours is not confined to the WEU Assembly: it crops up in nearly every country. My feeling is that trying to cope with the problem by the solution proposed by our honourable friend would be tantamount to modifying the treaties. Now, you know what that means and what a hornet's nest it would stir up.

I think — and it is also an answer I am giving without having officially consulted the other governments — no government would, for the time being be inclined to contemplate a change in the treaties, even on such a pragmatic and useful point as was mentioned just now.

Mr. Lambiotte asked me whether the Assembly thought that Mr. Plantey's paper at the Brussels symposium was to be regarded as information provided by the Council to the Assembly on the results of an inquiry undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee.

It is certainly a very interesting paper, emanating from a particularly able senior international official, who has all our esteem, for it is he who heads the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. That Committee is continuing its work on the study assigned to it by the Council. As soon as it has been completed, our Council will certainly ensure that your Assembly is formally and duly apprised of its conclusions, which has not been the case as yet.

With regard to the last question, I am glad to be able — at any rate, I hope so, Mr. Treu — to dispel a misunderstanding.

I did not know all the texts and statements emanating from the Council were subjected to such elaborate exegesis.

Believe me, this is all solely attributable to the fact that on occasion terms have to be slightly modulated and changed. The spirit, attitude and substance of our thinking remain unchanged; pray accept whatever apology may be called for. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I should like to thank you again, Mr. Minister, for your readiness to reply to the questions that members have put to you. Thank you so much. We hope to see you in due course again in this Assembly.

Mr. THORN (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Allow me, in my turn, to thank you, Mr. President, for I am always pleased to come back before your Assembly. I will also take advantage of these concluding remarks to thank your Assembly for the interest it has taken in the positions adopted and decisions taken by the European Council in one particular area. I shall not fail to see to it that the WEU Council takes note of your Assembly's recommendation. But we very much appreciate the attention your Assembly has devoted to this problem. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minister.

7. Arctic technology

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 822 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on Arctic technology and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 822 and Amendments.

The debate is open.

I first call Mr. Vattekar, a member of the Norwegian Storting. As you will recall, we invited members from the Norwegian Storting and the Danish Parliament. We are looking forward, Mr. Vattekar, to what you will have to say on the issue reported to us by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. VATTEKAR (*Observer from Norway*). — Thank you very much, Mr. President. You will understand that discussion of the subject of Arctic technology at this meeting is of particular interest to me as an observer from Norway. I am, therefore, grateful to you, Mr. President, for having given me the floor once more.

As presented in the report and in the particular recommendation that has been proposed for consideration, the subject is not limited to the northern Arctic region but includes the situation in the southern Antarctic region as well. Development in both polar regions is a matter of concern to my government and to my people. Norway is one of the two Western European countries with national territories in the Arctic. The other is Denmark, with Greenland. Norway is also one of the three Western European countries with national territories in the Antarctic, the others being Great Britain and France.

We are the only nation holding jurisdiction over territories in both polar regions and prob-

lems relating to the Arctic as well as the Antarctic regions touch directly upon Norwegian national interests. I should therefore like to make a brief comment.

Our direct involvement over a long period of time in the exploration of Arctic and Antarctic areas and in the exploitation of natural resources in those regions, in fishing and whaling and in mining on Spitsbergen, as well as our more recent experience with continental shelf development, has given us a clear understanding of the potential that the polar regions hold for economic development.

Our experience has also given us a fair understanding of the technical and economic problems that are involved in such development. In particular, Mr. President, we have become aware of the risks that development and exploitation of resources under the difficult conditions of the Arctic and the Antarctic may involve for the vulnerable environment in polar regions. Consequently, we understand the need for developing technologies that will cause a minimum of disturbance and ecological damage.

There cannot be any doubt that closer international co-operation should help us solve many of the problems involved, and I regard the report and the discussion today as an encouraging sign of growing interest in such co-operation. At the same time, however, it must be clear that such co-operation can be effective only if it is carried out within the existing legal framework of the polar regions.

In the Arctic, all land areas are recognised as part of the national domain of the five Arctic states — the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, under the continental shelf convention of 1958, and according to the new concept of national economic zones, the continental shelf and the waters of the north are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Arctic states in regard to exploration and exploitation of natural resources.

In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how countries other than the Arctic states themselves can develop any wide-ranging programme for co-operation, or adopt administrative and industrial guidelines to ensure that Europe will play a part in developing the Arctic. Collaboration for Arctic development must and can only be carried out with the active participation of the Arctic states themselves. The terms and conditions will and must be negotiated in each case with each country.

Non-Arctic states may encourage their companies and agencies to show an active interest in participating in the development of Arctic resources. Such participation will no doubt be welcomed by Arctic states, but I doubt whether

Mr. Vattekar (continued)

a basis for a common Western European development programme can be found. So far as I can see, the pattern that has emerged from the offshore oil development in the North Sea will probably offer the best model for future co-operation in the development of resources in the far north.

As for Antarctic development, the situation is both similar to and different from the situation in the Arctic. The situation is similar in the sense that some European countries — Great Britain, France and Norway — as well as non-European — Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Argentina — assert sovereignty over the major part of Antarctica.

They claim exclusive jurisdiction and rights of resource exploitation. The situation in Antarctica is different from that in the Arctic, because these rights have not been generally recognised by other states. On the other hand, under the Antarctic Treaty a delicate balance has been established and claimant states and non-claimant states work closely together towards the solution of the many problems of the region, including the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.

At the present time, the parties to the Antarctic Treaty are negotiating a convention that will regulate the exploitation of marine living resources, other than whale, in Antarctic waters. The parties are also actively negotiating to set up a régime to regulate the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica, if and when such operations become economically and technically feasible.

Co-operation under the Antarctic Treaty has so far proved quite effective. However, difficulties have also arisen. Consequently, any major effort or programme that is not developed within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty will involve a risk of upsetting the delicate balance and should, I think, be avoided.

To sum up, Mr. President, allow me to say that while we should encourage co-operation for a solution of technical and other problems in the Arctic, as well as in the Antarctic, the recommendation of any broad programme or of any specific guidelines seems premature.

At the present time, the area in which the Western European countries might indeed demonstrate an interest is scientific investigation. There is a great need for further research and study of the polar regions, and here non-polar states could make a major contribution that no doubt would be welcomed by the polar states themselves and would eventually contribute to the rational and safe use of these areas.

In this connection, I find it appropriate to mention that an International Arctic Committee has recently been established. This committee has the broad participation of specialists from several European countries, as well as from Canada and the United States, and it is hoped that the Soviet Union will also soon have representatives in the group. The committee is privately organised and has its formal legal base in the Principality of Monaco. Its major purpose is to contribute to a broader understanding of the Arctic region, its problems and its promises and, in particular, to ensure that the new development is carried out with methods that involve minimum risks to the environment. In its work, the committee will organise conferences and encourage research in close co-operation with existing institutions and agencies. I hope that an initiative of this nature will contribute to fruitful and mutually beneficial co-operation and collaboration in Arctic development. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Vattekar.

I now call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, this is an interesting report, and I believe that the subject is a very important one. I feel it necessary to propose amendments, as colleagues will have seen, even though I accept that there is a great deal with which one can agree in the report and that it contains a good deal of information which is to be welcomed. However, while I welcome the report and, certainly, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim's comments, particularly the final comments in his speech, I am not sure that the report should contain quite such substantial concern for Antarctic matters, nor that it should do so in ways that the treaty states might resent.

In the preamble, it is regrettable that all the Arctic states have not been mentioned, because all of them have been involved in the effort for progress, not only Russia and the United States. In that regard, we welcome the presence here of a member of the Storting. It is quite right for him to remind us of Norway's interest, concern and contribution in this matter.

Also, in the preamble and in the recommendations there is reference to the Law of the Sea Conference. I understand that there is no attempt to distort, change or prematurely terminate the Antarctic Treaty at the Law of the Sea Conference, and it may be regrettable that this is suggested, since it might induce suspicion, which could be quite harmful. Indeed, it might have been better to stress the fact that France, Belgium and the United Kingdom are to be commended for their favourable views in regard to Antarctic marine living resources.

I believe that this is an important step forward — a step that has not yet been properly acknow-

Mr. Hardy (continued)

ledged — in the protection of the entire ecological system, which is worthy of fuller reference in the report, though I certainly welcome the fact that in his peroration Mr. Spies von Büllenheim demanded that that ecosystem be properly conserved.

The question of minerals is, I recognise, rather different and is perhaps a more difficult question. However, this Assembly should recognise that sovereign rights are involved in these matters and that these are too complex to allow any transition of responsibility to this Assembly or to any other European forum. Certainly, I do not believe that a swift and not fully prepared demand for such a transition could be helpful.

I should like to offer one or two corrections to the main body of the report. In regard to paragraph 35, the Antarctic Treaty is not merely in force for a period of thirty years; it is renewable after that period and not limited to it. Similarly, in stressing the need for caution in any international consideration of these matters, we ought to be equally prudent in our assessments of the economic potential. It seems to me that there is some excessive optimism in the report, as with the reference in paragraph 68 to the oil resources in Antarctica. I believe that this estimate may be slightly larger than it should be, although I share the optimism and determination expressed by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim in believing that man will conquer the intemperate climate and rugged conditions of our polar regions.

It is appropriate for a British politician to comment on the Antarctic, for while paragraph 42 contains information about the history of German interest, there is only passing reference to British involvement, which has been substantial since Captain Cook reached Antarctica in 1820. It is right for us to remind this Assembly that with the exception of a four-year period between 1939 and 1945 British presence and research activity in the Antarctic has been continuous for the last fifty-four years.

I was also alarmed by paragraph 45, on the potential of marine resources. The last sentence refers to the possibility of the commercial exploitation of fish, whales and krill. Unfortunately, as the world is increasingly aware, the commercial exploitation of whales has already been carried beyond reasonable limits and on a very extensive scale, to the point where some whale populations may not survive. There is no recognition in the report of the massive concern and anger felt by millions of people in Western Europe about the exploitation — almost annihilation — of the whale population. It is therefore essential that we do not regard the remaining population as a potential source of further exploitation.

Mr. President, I am taking a little longer than I should because I do not wish to speak at length to the four amendments in my name. I am perfectly prepared to finish now, but this will require me to make longer speeches when I move the amendments. So, with your permission, I will finish my remarks as quickly as possible.

The PRESIDENT. — Yes, I agree to that.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I believe, therefore, that paragraph 46 should refer to maximum limits rather than quotas in terms of our future exploitation of these resources.

As for paragraph 62, it seems to me that the very important questions posed in the report are already being considered in a responsible way by the states concerned. For this reason, there ought not to be an over-emphasis on the urgency of Western European involvement. I do not believe that we can justify our rather peremptory demand for an involvement by the WEU states in the development of ice-breaker construction consortia. Since most of our states have no territorial responsibility for the Arctic, it is surely for the Arctic states themselves to decide to take, or to appear to take, the appropriate initiatives. I suggest, therefore, that we need to amend recommendation 1 along the lines that I have suggested.

The report also concerns itself with what it sees as a parallel between Antarctica and the international seabed. Since over 80 % of Antarctica has a land surface, this parallel is perhaps a little over-stretched. To press it further might increase strain and suspicion at the very time when unity of purpose could be achieved. It means that the report could be seen as somewhat self-defeating.

One thing that might have been included, and that I feel is relevant, is that before further development, especially of oil and mineral resources, takes place in the polar regions, the design and structure of our ships ought to be improved. Many of the world's vessels, particularly the large tankers, are too thinly constructed. There really is a case for the more robust construction of ships and this seems as relevant as the construction of ice-breakers where such vessels sail towards the permafrost. Moreover, to suggest that ship construction be developed is perhaps more useful for our countries and particularly for our steel industries.

Clearly there is a great deal to be done, and, insofar as this report urges progress, it is to be welcomed; but we should not underrate the actual attainments so far achieved. Inasmuch as the report recognises both what has been attained and what is possible, therefore, it deserves approval, but, since I believe it to be imperfect, the amendments that I have proposed are

Mr. Hardy (continued)

necessary and justified in the interests of reality and factual accuracy.

At the same time, I believe that we could perhaps more properly appreciate and more fully commend the working of the existing institutions inside Western Europe concerned with polar study, and insofar as the report endorses their work and commends their attitude, I believe that it requires our congratulation and support. I hope that the amendments that I have proposed will be accepted. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Spies von Büllesheim on his excellent report, which will induce not only European parliamentarians but also European scientists and economists to turn their attention once more to the two polar regions of our globe. The fundamental difference between the two regions, namely that the Antarctic is a land mass, a continent, and the Arctic an ice-bound sea where the ice is six to ten metres thick, points to their different possible uses. Apart from the natural resources to be exploited, there are lines of communication which offer great advantages in view of the shorter distance between the continents, but which are also exposed to considerable difficulties. I should like to draw particular attention to the latter, and to include them in the debate.

It is about a hundred years since the Norwegian Nordenskjöld, in the course of a three-year voyage of exploration, sailed round the north of Siberia for the first time, thus demonstrating the possibility of using the West-to-East passage. The employment of modern ice-breakers is making this sea route — usable only in the summer months — into a link which, apart from its value for the internal traffic of the Soviet Union, has become a major transport route and is still gaining in importance. Goods — both merchandise from Siberia and consignments on their way into the interior — are conveyed by this route.

The counterpart to this northern route round the old world is the East-to-West passage to the north of Canada and Alaska. This, too, has been shown to be navigable, though with greater difficulty. Nevertheless plans have already been put forward for transporting Alaskan oil by this route in containers floating below the surface of the sea. These containers would be towed by submarines, which have already been tested to see if they can be used for this purpose beneath the polar ice.

For airlines the shortest route from central and northern Europe to eastern Asia is over the

pole. The technical difficulties have been overcome, so that the use of this route is now a matter of routine. But what applies to civil aviation also applies in the military sphere. Here the frontiers of the power blocs virtually meet, and consequently their weapons systems, too, are face to face. The Soviet Union is known to have carried out nuclear testing in Novaya Zemlya. And this is doubtless not the only place where missile bases have been established.

I should also like to talk about the climatic effects of the polar ice-caps. These, the earth's cryogenic plants, are sources not only of sub-zero temperatures but also of ocean currents, and influence the atmospheric humidity. Plans for using icebergs as reservoirs of fresh water or for the irrigation of arid regions open up prospects which are not entirely utopian. That is why I appeal to the countries of Europe, too, to work towards better co-operation in research into and development of the resources of the polar areas and the establishment of communications providing access to them. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We are at the end of the list of speakers. There is now a problem on which I should like to have the advice of the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee. We have four amendments tabled by Mr. Hardy. He has already spoken to them, but we have them on the agenda for tomorrow. I do not see any problems, but I should like to have advice on the question whether we could deal with the amendments today, so as to ease the situation for tomorrow. If there are some who are against doing so, we must deal with them tomorrow.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank Mr. Vattekar from Norway, Mr. Hardy and Mr. Enders for the supplementary points they have made.

The observer from Norway drew attention in particular to the fact that in the Arctic the co-operation called for is possible only if the state that exercises sovereignty over the area concerned, that is, one of the Arctic states, agrees to such co-operation. This is a matter of course, and the point is also made in my report.

Mr. Hardy wants the reference to ice-breaker technology to be deleted from the draft recommendation. This was specifically intended as a reminder of the fact that there are a number of Arctic technologies that can be jointly developed and applied in both the Antarctic and the Arctic without any infringement of sovereign rights. I should like, however, to say straight away that

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

I am fully in agreement with Mr. Hardy's proposal that the reference to ice-breaker technology in paragraph 1 should nevertheless be deleted.

I wanted to explain, however, that the reason for its inclusion was in fact exactly what came out in the position taken up by the Norwegian representative. The object was to show that there are a number of possibilities for co-operation which do not affect sovereign rights. Our colleague from Norway has in fact told us — and this is also clear from a study of the documents — that the Arctic states in particular are interested in co-operation with other countries and in widening the basis of this co-operation.

The Norwegian observer felt it was premature for the WEU states to collaborate in this matter. I do not share this opinion. It was pointed out that a committee of the Arctic states is currently being set up with the object of bringing together the parties concerned. This fact in itself shows that here there is a need for things to be organised. We know from other fields of activity that when there is no formal framework for such collaboration a problem can very easily be investigated simultaneously by several countries. We shall make much faster progress if we collaborate in the field of polar technology as in others. That is why I should like to keep this part of the draft recommendation.

Mr. Hardy was sorry that the Law of the Sea Conference has been mentioned in the recommendation. He believes that the Law of the Sea Conference has so far made no reference at all to the Antarctic Treaty; he said that the conference did not impinge upon it, and had no wish to do so. At least that is what I understood him to say. If this is Mr. Hardy's opinion, then I am afraid that I must put him right on this point. I have studied the problems and deliberations of the Law of the Sea Conference.

True, the Antarctic Treaty was not in itself a subject of discussion at the Law of the Sea Conference, but it was in fact mentioned, and put to one side. The view was taken that agreement must first be reached on the acute — offshore — problems. It was felt that discussion of the Antarctic Treaty should be deferred until such time as a preliminary draft of the agreements was available. That would be the time to examine how the agreements and the treaty fitted in with each other. It was also possible, for instance, that the offshore provisions — a problem not covered by the Antarctic Treaty — would then be taken over from the general provisions of the Law of the Sea Conference and applied to the Antarctic. But if this were to happen the Antarctic Treaty might be undermined by the general provisions of the Law of the Sea Conference. I therefore consider that the

reference to the Law of the Sea Conference is necessary. It is the WEU states in particular which should have a special interest in ensuring that the Antarctic Treaty remains intact.

Mr. Hardy has pointed out that nothing is said in the report on the particular concern which is felt about the whale population. Perhaps his eye skipped the relevant passage in the report; but I also said in my speech that krill were of special importance for the entire food chain, which means that they are also of special importance for the survival of the whale.

Mr. Hardy expressed doubt as to whether it was proper to deal with the Arctic and the Antarctic together in one report. He rightly pointed out that the Arctic is a floating iceberg, while the Antarctic is a land mass. But the two regions have much in common. They are both composed of moving ice. They are both polar regions. They are the world's two cryogenic plants. They both present the same technological and scientific problems. I therefore feel strongly that a report on the technological aspects must cover both regions. The experience gained in the two regions is the same.

I should like to express my thanks to Mr. Enders for the additional points he made, many of which I too found interesting. But a Rapporteur is always faced with the problem of having to try to avoid making his report too bulky; he always has to think what he can leave out.

Mr. President, may I also briefly express my views on the proposed amendments; I have already touched on some of them.

In Amendment 1 Mr. Hardy suggests that in paragraph 1 the words "for a wide-ranging programme of collaboration in Western Europe" should be left out. I think these words should stay in. They do mean something, and I cannot understand why they should be deleted.

I have already said what I think about Amendment 2. This suggests that the special reference to ice-breakers should be omitted. I agree with Mr. Hardy that this is quite a small subsidiary problem in the immense field of Arctic technology. I would recommend that Amendment 2 be accepted.

Amendment 3 proposes that in paragraph 2 (a) the reference to collaboration in the drawing up of common guidelines be deleted. I have already talked about this in connection with Amendment 1. Amendment 3 is virtually a rider to Amendment 1, and I would recommend that this, too, be rejected. I consider it essential that guidelines for collaboration be drawn up.

Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Hardy is a useful addition. It returns to the subject of paragraph 46 of the report, in which it is pointed out that the consultative states were unable to reach

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

agreement on a convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. I think it would be a useful addition if his wording were incorporated in the recommendation as paragraph 2 (b). On the other hand, I think the content of the present paragraph 2 (b) — the reference to the Law of the Sea Conference — should also be retained. I regard this as particularly important. I would suggest, therefore, that the version proposed by Mr. Hardy be incorporated in the recommendation as paragraph 2 (b). The present 2 (b) would then become 2 (c) and the present 2 (c) would become 2 (d).

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President. I should like to pay tribute to the work of Dr. Colin Phipps, who is no longer a member of the British Parliament, who was the previous Rapporteur for this report, and to Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, for that which he took over as his report.

This, Sir, is my very last speech to you as a member of Western European Union. It is probably appropriate that we should end part of this session on something which is far removed from the immediate cause of our deliberations. The Arctic is a long way from us. It is not the prerogative of any one of the states of WEU, nor is it the prerogative of any Arctic state. I say that with great respect to our Norwegian colleagues — my sister-in-law is married to a Norwegian. However, we must recognise that across the Arctic will come the intercontinental ballistic missiles of tomorrow which could destroy the whole of our world. The Arctic is the open door of the North. It was right for our Committee to look at that door and to observe that it was open and bare of defence.

In the balcony, Mr. President — which I am probably not allowed to observe for parliamentary reasons — is your son. I should like to say that I think that we in this chamber through this one report are trying to defend this world today and to make sure that his world will live tomorrow. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that you paid a tribute to the following generation when you said that what we are doing here is for them. The tribute to you as Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions must be outstanding, because you have done great work and you supplied us with a lot of documents on this tremendous field of today and tomorrow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the service that you have done this Assembly. (*Applause*)

The debate is closed. I told the Assembly previously that the final vote on the recommendation is on the agenda for tomorrow, but in order to ease the situation tomorrow I have proposed that we vote on the amendments today.

The Rapporteur has given the Committee's views on the four amendments. If I am correct, the Committee is against Amendment 1, in favour of Amendment 2, against Amendment 3, and in favour of Amendment 4.

I must now call the amendments.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Hardy reads :

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "for a wide-ranging programme of collaboration in Western Europe".

Mr. Hardy, do you wish to speak?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry that the Rapporteur cannot accept Amendment 1. What I am suggesting is merely that we do not overstate our demand for involvement or assume that there is a right of involvement, since this Assembly was not created to appear disdainful of sovereign rights. But yet the amendment would leave our interests very clear, and it would therefore be an acceptable version for recommendation 1 to read : "to draw the attention of member governments to the need for the development of Arctic technology".

I accept that it would be simpler, but it would not be in any way presumptuous, and I am sorry that the Rapporteur opposes it.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Rapporteur.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLENSHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I first suggest — and you have in fact put the matter correctly — that Amendments 1 and 3 be dealt with together, as they are on the same subject.

To turn now to Mr. Hardy's proposal. If his amendment were carried, that would mean that we are calling on governments to bear in mind the need for the development of Arctic technology. That is not the decisive point. What we want, and what we as WEU must demand, is collaboration in Arctic research. I cannot give my agreement to the call for greater collaboration contained in the version before us being deleted from the recommendation.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I shall not press the amendment, Mr. President, in view of the Rapporteur's reluctance, although I may wish to press a further amendment. I withdraw Amendment 1.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Amendment 1 is withdrawn.

I now call Amendment 2.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I formally move Amendment 2 :

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "for example in the building of ice-breakers".

The PRESIDENT. — The Committee has agreed to this amendment.

We shall now vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously.

I call Amendment 3.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I beg to move Amendment 3 :

3. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to draw up mutually-acceptable administrative and industrial guidelines for such collaboration in order".

I move the amendment very briefly because I believe that it would be far better for a very simple resolution to appear, which simply read : "to ensure that Europe plays its part in developing the polar regions". We already have a great deal of mutually-acceptable arrangements. We already have four important polar institutions in Western Europe. But I believe that this insistence on mutual collaboration among Western European nations can cause a great deal of resentment on the part of the Arctic states. I regret that we have this apparent insistence upon such involvement. I hope that this amendment will be accepted, too.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Now that Mr. Hardy has withdrawn his Amendment 1, Amendment 3 takes on a different aspect. We agree to this proposed amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — The Committee agrees.

We shall now vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is agreed to unanimously.

I now call Amendment 4 :

4. Leave out paragraph 2 (b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"(b) to welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources ;"

The problem, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Rapporteur, is that you can agree to the new text but cannot agree to leave out paragraph 2 (b). What does Mr. Hardy want to say ?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I firmly believe that paragraph 2 (b) should not be in

the report. It is dangerous, it is not necessarily accurate and it could be extremely prejudicial to the future of the Antarctic and current negotiations. It would be appropriate for us to welcome that which is good and not to incur the risk of that which is already present. While I am delighted that the Rapporteur is prepared to accept my proposed additional sub-paragraph, I am not happy that sub-paragraph 2 (b) as it stands should remain in the report. I must insist on pressing this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Rapporteur, please.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — First, Mr. President, I should like to repeat that we agree to the addition. The point proposed by Mr. Hardy as paragraph 2 (b) is acceptable in the opinion of both the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee. On the other hand, the deletion of the present paragraph 2 (b) can on no account be accepted. Nor has its subject matter anything to do with this. I would therefore ask that the two be voted on separately.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper, please.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not wish to raise unnecessary points of order, but before you proceed to the first contested vote — all the others have been unanimous — I think you should perhaps reconsider your earlier announcement. Members of the Assembly were told earlier this afternoon that votes on this matter would be taken tomorrow. Some members may not be present. They may have left the hemicycle. Would you say that it is fair to proceed to a contested vote when some members may have left on the assumption that votes would not take place?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Chairman, please.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I understand what Mr. Hardy is trying to put forward. He has perhaps not appreciated the paragraph that he is seeking to delete is in no way related to the amendment he has put forward. I understand fully what he is getting at, but it would be ridiculous to take out that which we have proposed and replace it by something else that we might be willing to add to the whole report. Will he be kind enough to accept that it could be added? He has raised an important issue but it is also an important point that we wish to sustain and the Committee unanimously endorsed it in its consideration.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — Although I deeply regret this injudicious clause, I am prepared to accept, in view of the time, that the words shall remain in. I am delighted that the new sub-paragraph is acceptable. I shall not oppose it.

The PRESIDENT. — That is to say that Mr. Hardy only moves the second half of the amendment.

Mr. Rapporteur, please.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I suggest that Mr. Hardy's re-formulation as proposed in Amendment 4 should become the new paragraph 2 (b), and that the present paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c) become paragraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d), that is, that they be moved down and that the addition be inserted above them, as by virtue of their subject matter the former paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c) belong together.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Hardy's manuscript amendment reads as follows:

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

"(b) to welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources;"

We shall now vote on this manuscript amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The manuscript amendment is agreed to unanimously.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be taken tomorrow morning.

We are now practically at the end of the sitting and before I close with my remarks about tomorrow, Mr. Roper, according to our Rules of Procedure, asks for the floor to make a personal statement.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order. I sound like Mr. Roper because I would hate my swansong to be a point of order. Can we have the vote on our report now?

The PRESIDENT. — I must ask the Assembly. I have no objection. There is more or less unanimity.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Would you be kind enough to ask whether there is unanimity on the report in order to save time in the morning?

The PRESIDENT. — You are extremely kind in endeavouring to save time tomorrow.

We shall therefore vote on the draft recommendation in Document 822 as amended.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

1. See page 45

8. Personal statement

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Roper to make his personal statement. Will members please remain for a couple of minutes?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments...

(Mr. Roper then read a statement too quickly for the members of the Assembly, the interpreters and the verbatim reporters to be able to grasp the meaning)

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, I cannot understand this English.

The PRESIDENT. — I could not follow it. Will you please hand in your remarks, Mr. Roper, so that I can read them carefully? No interpreter was able to follow; nor could the shorthand reporters. You will have to let us have the script of your remarks.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I understand that that would not be in order. I gave notice to the interpreters and the shorthand writers of the speed at which I was going to speak. They are both prepared to cope with this situation, and I will hand in the full text so that the record can be complete, but in terms of the Rules of Procedure I have to continue.

The PRESIDENT. — Please go on. You have five minutes in which to contain a twenty-minute speech, perhaps.

(Mr. Roper continued his statement which remained unintelligible)

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — No, wait a moment please. I should inform the Assembly that the Presidential Committee decided at noon to revise the Rules of Procedure, and what we have just witnessed might cause the Committee on Rules of Procedure to go into details about personal remarks. I shall look carefully at the text of your speech, Mr. Roper, which I did not follow and could not understand. If there is something in it on which to remark, I shall refer to it at the next sitting.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I regret rising on this matter. I am sure that Mr. Roper would not wish to give offence to the Assembly. I am sure that he meant to be humorous and would not wish to cast any aspersions on either the Presidency or members of any of the Committees of this Assembly. I hope that in due course it will be possible for us to examine what he said, for which there was no translation in any language.

Mr. Warren (continued)

I am sure that he would not wish to leave behind what was a very odious impression of the way in which he, as Chairman of an important Committee in this Assembly, wished to contribute to the Assembly. He may wish to discuss that with you, Sir.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I would not wish to worry Mr. Warren in this respect. A most insulting attack was made upon my Committee on Monday by a member of the Assembly. I wanted to have a chance to put on the record my reply. If I had spoken at the length or at the speed at which I normally speak, it would have detained the Assembly for a considerable period this evening. I thought, therefore, that it was better to fulfil the letter of the rules. What I said is on the record, and Mr. Warren, Mr. Talon and you, Sir, will have a chance to read and study it.

The PRESIDENT. — No doubt we shall carefully study the remarks that you made.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow

morning, Thursday 6th December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. New weapons and defence strategy; SALT II and its implications for European security (Votes on the draft Recommendations and amended draft Resolution, Documents 827 and 816).
2. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 817 and Amendments).
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 818).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m.)

FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 6th December 1979

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. New weapons and defence strategy (*Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doc. 827*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Deschamps.
4. SALT II and its implications for European security (*Vote on the amended draft Resolution, Doc. 816*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Deschamps.
5. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 817 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Lewis (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Adriaensens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Flämig (*for Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur*), Mr. Cornelissen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Valleix (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Valleix.
6. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 818*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. De Poi (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper, Mr. De Poi (*Rapporteur*); (point of order): Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper.
7. Close of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. New weapons and defence strategy (*Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doc. 827*)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is to vote on the texts on which we were not able to vote yesterday for lack of a quorum.

First, the draft recommendation on the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons, Document 827.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I request a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Deschamps asks for a roll-call vote. We shall therefore hold a vote by roll-call in the hope that some members will be coming in from outside so that we may have a quorum.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

Gentlemen, there is not a quorum. We should also hold a vote on the draft recommendation on the impact of technology, Document 827, but since there is not a quorum this vote will also have to be postponed until the next session.

4. SALT II and its implications for European security

(Vote on the amended draft Resolution, Doc. 816)

The PRESIDENT. — We now turn to the vote on the amended draft resolution on SALT II and its implications for European security, Document 816, which was postponed from yesterday since there was not a quorum when the chair was asked to count the numbers present under Rule 36.

If anyone asks for a roll-call vote now, we must have one, yet there is no quorum. If no one asks for such a vote, we can decide it by sitting and standing.

1. See page 48.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I request a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Is your request supported by ten members of the Assembly?

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — I venture to invite you to take a vote on this question, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — For your request to be admissible it must be supported by ten members of the Assembly. Who are these ten members?

(The President continued in English)

May I read the paragraph?

“All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of representatives present, unless, before the voting has begun, the President has been requested to ascertain the number of those present.”

If you are asking me to ascertain whether we have a quorum, I must tell you that we have not. If you are asking for a roll-call vote, you must have a sufficient number. I think we could proceed by sitting and standing. We shall do so.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft resolution. This is not a draft recommendation but a draft resolution, which is slightly different. I shall therefore put the question by sitting and standing.

(A vote was taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft resolution is adopted¹.

As members who were present last night will know, we have already voted on the draft recommendation on Arctic technology.

5. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 817 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 817 and Amendments.

The report is presented by Mr. Lewis, Mr. Adriaensens, Mr. Scheffler and Mr. Cornelissen as Rapporteurs.

I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — This report, the joint work of four Rapporteurs, has the unanimous support of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. The Committee is unanimously recommending it to the full Assembly in the hope that members will unanimously accept it. I keep emphasising that word “unanimously” because we do not seem to act scientifically or technologically in this Assembly. We seem to waste so much time on questions of roll-call votes and so on, but I think our Committee ought to investigate a better method of going about it. We hope, therefore, that this non-political but most important report will be accepted.

I shall begin by referring to what is said in the first four paragraphs of the introduction to the report, where we have paid tribute to the various persons and organisations involved. I must pay particular thanks to you, Mr. President, and your Presidential Committee, because we know that, had it not been for your own efforts and those of the Committee, this visit could not have taken place. We are very grateful to you for facilitating it.

It is very difficult to think of Brazil as a developing or backward country, because in so many respects, and certainly in industrial and economic progress, it is doing even better than the so-called “advanced countries” of the western world. Whilst it is, of course, a backward country with still a great deal of leeway to make up, it has made rapid progress economically — and, to a lesser extent, scientifically and technologically — in a relatively short time.

Most of us in the West, especially if we are men, tend to think of the Brazilian football team and to regard the country as small as well as backward, but it has a rapidly growing population of some 115 million people and a land mass of some 8.5 million square kilometres. I know from long experience that when figures are quoted they mean very little; they tend to go in one ear and out of the other. However, when we consider that the whole of Europe, including the Russian portion as far as the Ural Mountains, covers only 10.25 million square kilometres, we realise that the two areas are almost the same but, in the case of Europe, there are some 628 million people.

It can be seen, therefore, that there are great possibilities for exploiting the land and mineral wealth. People can be encouraged to go and settle there. The land is there, the mineral wealth is there, almost everything else is there, with one great exception: this exception presents a problem similar to that of Europe, only worse: energy or, rather, the lack of it. That lack is probably hitting Brazil harder than it is any other country, because 85 % of the whole of its economy is dependent upon imported oil.

1. See page 49.

Mr. Lewis (continued)

The cost last year, before the recent increases, was seven billion United States dollars. That was the cost of imports of oil to keep the country's economy going, and I am not talking of the situation we see in places like Paris and London where people are driving round in cars unnecessarily, just for pleasure — that is happening in every capital city. That was simply the cost of keeping Brazil's economy going. Therefore, we can understand and appreciate what an increase of a few dollars on a barrel of oil means to such an economy.

Notwithstanding these great difficulties, from 1974 to 1979 Brazil's economy was such that the gross national product of the country was raised from \$65 billion to more than \$100 billion. When one realises that that was done in the relatively short period of five years, and that the per capita income of each Brazilian was raised to \$1,000 per annum, not high by our standards, one sees that that was proportionately a big step forward. It has increased its rate of growth by 12 % a year over the past five years. I only wish that we in Britain and the rest of Western Europe could have increased our production along those lines.

As can be imagined, that has meant an enormous increase in Brazil's capital plant and equipment and has brought terrific attacks upon her balance of payments so that the country is now in great economic difficulty. We are hoping that the International Monetary Fund and the western world will come forward to help the Brazilians economically. This report, however, deals with the possibility of Western Europe trying to help the Brazilian economy forward and at the same time helping ourselves.

There is the possibility for every country in Europe to produce the capital equipment and plant that is so necessary to that country.

I have said that Brazil is short of oil and fuel. Amazingly, the Brazilians have successfully developed a pure alcohol fuel, made from cane sugar, on which their vehicles are driving. Cane sugar grows almost wild in that country, virtually anywhere, and internally costs virtually nothing to produce. Mr. Warren, the Chairman of our Committee, who is not present at the moment, was fortunate enough to be able to drive round in a car driven wholly on pure alcohol—not whisky or vodka — and the amazing thing was that there were no exhaust fumes or deterioration in power. The speed and getaway were better than with petroleum. This is a development that we might follow up.

I would not suggest that we should try to do it with cane sugar, for we cannot grow that, but potatoes can be produced almost everywhere

in the western world and I am told that the Russians are able to produce vodka from potatoes so perhaps we could solve our energy problem to some extent by producing potatoes on every piece of waste land. Whisky is not pure enough: one has to use pure alcohol — I am not talking about de-natured whisky.

Our report makes five recommendations for developing the science, technology, trade and economy of Brazil with the rest of Western Europe. We are proposing this because we believe that there should be a great development of trade between Brazil and the countries of Western Europe. We see a lot of competition between Britain, France, Germany and the rest of Europe all trying to sell one another the kinds of goods that the other country produces, with one or two exceptions, better and cheaper.

Of course, no one else can produce whisky, not even the English. Only Scotland can do that. If any of our Irish friends are present, I would tell them that they make a good imitation but it is not as good as the original. However, this is a serious matter.

Here we are at each other's throats trying to compete, for example, in selling to the Germans things which they can produce as well if not better and the Germans trying to sell things to Britain. In Brazil we have a country that is crying out for our commodities and manufactured goods which they urgently need and which we ought to try to develop, both for our own sakes and certainly for the sake of the Brazilians. If we do not do that, someone else will and that someone else may not be among the democratic countries of Western Europe.

Therefore, from a military and western defence point of view it would be wise for us to try to encourage the development of the economy of Brazil and its scientific and technological development. I am sure that no one can object to these five recommendations. They are all positive and proposals to which everyone could subscribe.

On behalf of the Committee, I move the report and would ask the Assembly to give some help to the chair by accepting this proposal with acclamation, without any need for sitting and standing.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now call Mr. Adriaensens, if he wishes to supplement your remarks.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). — The part of the report I am going to deal with, Mr. President, is connected with energy problems in Brazil. Since this is a pressing problem throughout the world, I would advise

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

those who have not yet read the report to do so straight away.

I shall not be talking today about alternative sources of energy such as solar energy, bituminous shale, subterranean coal gasification and tests with eucalyptus wood. Where these are concerned, I would refer members to the report.

The two major problems with which Brazil has to grapple are those of petroleum and of electricity. While we were in Brazil, the President declared a "war economy", and with this in mind I would like to call members' attention to a few figures. Brazil's total import of oil in 1979 will be costing around \$ 7,000 million, about half the total value of its exports. 85 % of the total consumption of oil has to be imported, and consumption is running at 1.1 million barrels a day. Only 15 % of this consumption can be covered by domestic production. During the next five to six years oil requirements are expected to increase by about 10 % a year. The government has now decided to peg oil imports at their present level, that is to say around one million barrels a day. Unless one wants to put a brake on the normal growth in the number of vehicles and consumption of oil, this will mean finding a substitute.

Brazil is looking for a way of making up the deficit, first by increasing its own oil production, a task being dealt with by Petrobras, and second by using alcohol as an alternative fuel. At the present moment this involves alcohol obtained from sugar cane; thought is being given to other raw materials as well, but the main raw material is sugar cane. The first experiments began in 1974, and today there are some 200 distilleries with a total production of 3,800 million litres of alcohol a year. Petrol is already being mixed with 18 % alcohol. During our visit to Brazil we had the opportunity of travelling in a car fuelled with pure alcohol, and experiments are going on using about 1,500 cars. The programme for the next six years is costing some \$ 5,000 million. Production will have to be increased by a factor of 2.5 by the year 1985, meaning an annual production of 10,000 million litres, equivalent to the consumption of 1,700,000 cars; by that time the number of vehicles in use is expected to be between eight and nine million. But there are still innumerable problems to be solved before this is achieved. First and foremost there will have to be new sugar cane plantations, and ways will have to be found of simplifying production, with an eye particularly to the air pollution the distilleries cause. Smell, in particular, is a problem. Furthermore, engines that can be fuelled with alcohol will have to be manufactured on an industrial scale, and the smell of the burnt

alcohol still presents a problem; it is less poisonous than carbon monoxide, but the smell is a great deal more unpleasant.

Now I come to the problem of electricity. If the Brazilian Government is on the one hand to raise living standards and on the other to allow industrial development to progress further, it is obviously going to need more electricity. At present a great part of the electricity comes from hydroelectric power stations, and the number of these will have to be substantially expanded in the near future. Major work is currently under way on this, particularly at Itaipu. The Amazon region has infinite resources for running these power stations, but one problem is still transporting this over long distances to the triangle between Brasilia, Rio and São Paulo, where industry is concentrated. No solution has yet been found to this problem, which is why thought is being given to generating electricity in nuclear power stations.

The intention is to have the eight nuclear power stations currently planned ready for use by 1990, when they will be able to supply a total of 15 % of electricity production. Members will know that the first nuclear power station was designed by Westinghouse, and will be ready in 1982, while the other power stations will be built in co-operation with West Germany on the basis of the famous agreement of 1975. In this connection I want to make the point that it was impressed upon us in Brazil that they want to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. I will not go here into the problems that arose in 1975 over this agreement.

The Brazilian Government has two major organisations for expanding the use of industrial nuclear power. First, there is the National Nuclear Energy Commission, which takes care of the planning side; this commission includes experts, and looks after rules on the plants, the raw materials and the treatment of nuclear waste, which is a very important problem. The commission also encourages scientific research and acts as a go-between. On the operational side the government relies on Nuclebras, which is responsible for implementing the government's plans and nuclear energy policy in the industrial sector. This body deals in particular with the production and enrichment of uranium, contracts for which have been signed with a French firm. Until these plans come to fruition, the enriched uranium will come from Europe. Nuclebras is also concerned with the construction of the power stations, and although it is a government body it has contracts with many private undertakings for building the "Angra", the name given to the various power stations. When I add that Nuclebras at present employs 4,000 people, of whom one-third are university graduates, you will see at once what an important organisation it is.

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

Since I assume that everyone will have read our report, at least in its broad outlines, I have been very brief. I would refer anyone who wants to learn more about the subject to the report. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Adriaensens.

I now call Mr. Flämig to speak in place of the Rapporteur, Mr. Scheffler.

Mr. FLÄMIG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like, if you will allow me, to begin by making a minor personal observation. I am very glad to have an opportunity once again, ten years almost to the day since I last presented a report to this Assembly, of speaking here once again in place of my colleague Mr. Scheffler, who apologises for his absence.

I am dealing with Parts III and V of Document 817, which you have before you.

Part III discusses the development of space activities in Brazil, and here Mr. Scheffler wishes to express his thanks to all the persons with whom he talked in Brazil for the readiness and openness with which they supplied him with information.

Space activities have been going on in Brazil for fifteen years, with sounding rockets and launching facilities at Natal. It is proposed to launch a first small meteorological satellite in 1985. Owing to its agriculture and because of its structure and size, as well as its geographical position, Brazil of necessity attaches particular importance to high-grade weather forecasting.

Furthermore, the Brazilians are endeavouring to combat environmental pollution in their own country. They therefore attach particular importance to reconnaissance by aerial photography. Accurate monitoring of such an immense country as Brazil is hardly possible otherwise than by satellite observation. Until 1985 information of this kind will be obtained from NASA's Landsat satellite. It is intended that at a later stage the French Spot satellite shall be used for the exploration of earth resources. Arrangements to this end have already been made with France.

The technical organisation of Brazilian space activities is clearly illustrated by the charts in Part III of the document before you.

Today, Mr. President, a staff which already numbers about 1,000, including 400 graduates and 200 with doctorates, is engaged in the development of a Brazilian satellite system. The relatively high budget appropriations of \$ 30 to

40 million per year show the outstanding importance which the Brazilian Government attaches to this development work.

One gains the impression that the organisation covering all the institutions concerned with space activities is fully capable of carrying out the tasks involved. Furthermore, these institutions are taking steps to familiarise a body of scientists belonging to the rising generation with questions of space technology.

As you all know, Brazil has special problems in the energy sector. Mr. Adriaensens has reported, in the section dealing with energy questions, on the ways in which the Brazilians are endeavouring to overcome the bottleneck in oil supplies. Extensive experiments, some of which have produced very favourable results, are being carried out with a view to the use of sugar cane and manioc for the production of fuel. The Brazilian Government is therefore calling for the development of engines which can be converted to run on ethanol and other fuels.

The report presented in Part V about the Ariane launch base was of particular interest to the members of the Committee. Many of us still recall the development and building of the rocket launching base in Kourou in 1966. I then had the opportunity, Mr. President, of belonging to the WEU delegation which went to Kourou.

At that time the equatorial launch base for ELDO was built on land belonging to the French space centre in Guiana. The base was provided with all the plant and equipment required for implementation of the project. After development of the European launchers had been discontinued, the installations at the Kourou launch base were transferred to ESA. The facilities which were later adapted for the development of Ariane also became the property of ESA.

The Rapporteur does not wish to go into the details of the financing of the project. It should be pointed out, however, that while the Agency is responsible for this programme, over 60 % of the 700 million units of account which it costs has been borne by France.

The Committee was able to satisfy itself on the spot as to the excellent siting of the space centre and the launch base. The ideal siting of the launch base in the vicinity of the equator and the utilisation of the sling effect of the earth's rotation ensure optimum technical conditions for each launch, in that larger satellites can be put into orbit with less fuel.

In French Guiana there are no great differences between high and low tide. The weather is relatively stable and the population is small. There is not very much air traffic, and few

Mr. Flämig (continued)

shipping lanes pass near by. The area available to the space centre is 55 km long and 25 km wide.

Three main requirements had to be met there. Firstly, the necessary logistic support for the launch had to be ensured. As already stated, all the necessary ground installations already exist. Secondly, all the technical, electronic and optical equipment for the launches and for flight tracking had to be prepared and made operational. Thirdly, preparations were made to enable the risk, in the event of accidents, to be minimised or completely excluded.

The first launch, planned for November but now to take place on 15th December, has naturally aroused great public interest. Around 600 persons from France and from French Guiana itself are employed at the launch base. Over 50 firms from the ESA member countries are involved in one aspect or another of the building of the launcher. The facilities provided for observation of the launch consist of telemetry stations in Salinópolis, radar stations in Natal (Brazil) and on Ascension Island, plus the equipment of NASA and the United States Defence Department, so as to enable the third stage of Ariane, too, to be properly observed.

The fact that the world's confidence in the soundness of the project is now sufficiently well-established for the contract for putting Intelsat V into space with the Ariane launcher to have been placed has given a great boost to the morale of the team engaged in the project.

Although mistakes can never be completely ruled out, the members of the Committee had the impression that with care and precision and with the positively fanatical zeal and the good will of all concerned, the conditions for the success of the project are as good as they could possibly be. I need hardly stress to you all again the great political and economic importance of success with this project. Allow me to conclude by expressing the hope that the efforts of everyone concerned may this time, for the first time, be crowned with success.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I also ask you to accept the recommendation and the report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank Mr. Flämig for presenting Mr. Scheffler's report.

(The President continued in English)

I now call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, after the comments from my co-Rapporteurs I want to say just one or two things about Part IV of the report. In the

relatively short time — in my opinion too short a time — we spent in Brazil, we were able to gather a great deal of information thanks to the willingness of the Brazilian authorities.

A good transport system is obviously very important for developing an enormous country like Brazil: roads are needed and waterways, railways and an air network. We had the pleasure of visiting a factory belonging to the Brazilian aircraft manufacturers Embraer. This factory, which recently celebrated its twentieth anniversary, now has a workforce of 5,000 producing a large number of different aircraft types. Virtually all the staff have been trained in the factory itself; their average age is under thirty. Productivity is, certainly for a developing country, extremely high, because of modern machinery and of course because of the keenness of those working in the factory. The output from the factory makes a sizeable contribution to the exports that Brazil needs so much. The Bandeirante transport aircraft in particular sells well abroad. Our visit demonstrated to us how quickly a developing country becomes capable of manufacturing high-technology products. I felt that the production is destined mainly for the home market, partly because Brazil has not all that highly developed a railway network. There are now besides, because of the energy shortage, plans for a major expansion and modernisation of the rail network. It is obvious, however, that air transport must continue to play a major rôle.

The second point I would like to touch on is the developments in the Amazon region. Here too particularly interesting work is being done, even though on a modest scale, using modern methods. For many centuries the Amazon was a mysterious and inaccessible part of South America, which no doubt all of us still remember from the books we used to read as children.

During the last century the harvesting of rubber undoubtedly made some contribution to opening up the Amazon region, yet it is only over recent decades that economic development has really got under way. The famous Trans-America Highway has only very recently been completed. The Brazilian Government is now devoting a great deal of attention to developing this enormously large area.

It is obvious, however, that extreme care is called for in dealing with five million square kilometres of forest, and the institute in Manaus, which we visited, told us about this. I got the impression that this was a very well managed scientific centre. It has already put forward a great many proposals to the government, including some on the setting up of national parks and forests. It will be obvious however than an institute of 200 workers is not really able to cope adequately with the develop-

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

ments including those in the scientific sphere going on in this vast underdeveloped area.

I think therefore that it would be extremely interesting if the Western European countries, with their great experience in tropical forestry, were to make a number of people available to this fascinating scientific centre in Manaus. The people we met there were without exception extremely enthusiastic about the work they are doing. We in Western Europe increasingly have to face the problem of young graduates who cannot find work, so it seems to me obvious for our governments and the organisations involved to look at the possibilities there are in this very exciting part of the world.

The third point I want to mention is the development of nuclear power in Brazil. You will all know that nuclear reactors, processing plants and the supplying of enriched uranium by the German/British/Dutch consortium Urenco are on the agenda. There is great concern in the Netherlands that supplying nuclear reactors, processing plants, enriched uranium and the associated know-how creates a danger of more and more countries in the world being in a position to manufacture their own nuclear weapons. Our concern is all the greater since this involves countries which, like Brazil, have not signed the non-proliferation treaty. There are of course a number of arguments for this, but this does not get away from the fact that these countries have unfortunately felt no need to sign the non-proliferation treaty. In this connection I might point to recent developments in such countries as Pakistan, India and South Africa. We must surely all agree that these are cause for great concern.

I would just ask you to think what might have happened, or might still be going to happen, if the American Government had a number of years ago supplied nuclear know-how, factories, processing plant and uranium to the "friendly government" of the Shah of Iran! I think we should try to look a little further than the morrow. Certainly, the countries that have this nuclear know-how carry an enormous responsibility for the whole of mankind.

As my colleagues have already pointed out, the problem of energy is extremely important for Brazil currently exports — totalling some \$12 of this there is the fact that Brazil has the largest foreign debt of any of the developing countries — about \$50 thousand million. Everything that Brazil currently exports — totalling some \$12 thousand million — is needed to buy oil and to pay off the country's foreign debts. Brazil will therefore certainly try more and more to increase its exports. If we realise that three

quarters of the oil imported by Brazil comes from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran and if one also realises that technology in Brazil is, far more than in the wealthy countries, matched to the level of countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran, then there is I believe every reason to pursue a very cautious policy.

Certainly countries like Iraq and Iran will show a great deal of interest in the nuclear know-how of their Brazilian "customer", a customer who would find it very difficult indeed to go without their oil. I think that we must recognise that this situation contains very real dangers. I think it is well, therefore, for this to be reflected in the recommendation. I shall however have great difficulty with the recommendation if the European countries are to co-operate with Brazil unrestrictedly in the nuclear field and in the development of military aircraft, as the recommendation urges. For these reasons I have felt the need to put before this Assembly a few amendments to the draft recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

This concludes the presentation of the report and the debate is now open.

I have no one on the list of speakers.

Do the Rapporteurs wish to say anything further or shall we listen to what the Chairman of the Committee has to say?

I see that the Rapporteurs do not wish to say anything further.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I should first like to inform the Assembly — for you yourself, Mr. President, have already been informed — that I am speaking in place of Mr. Warren, who was until this morning Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. I do so not without some emotion, since it is the first time that I am speaking as Chairman of that Committee, following the voluntary withdrawal of Mr. Warren under that tacit understanding which we have undertaken to respect: the expiry of a three-year spell as Chairman of the Committee.

I should like to pay a tribute to the example Mr. Warren has set in this matter, but even more to make our Assembly appreciate the qualities he has displayed in carrying out his mandate during those three years. I was the first to be conscious of them, the first to see them at work, for he has mapped out for me the wisest courses to follow in the endeavour to maintain the activities undertaken by our Committee. I am accordingly speaking this morning

Mr. Valleix (continued)

after the three Rapporteurs, whilst apologising for the absence of Mr. Scheffler.

Mr. President, may I say that you and the Committee were right to agree to the project for a visit by your Committee to Brazil and French Guiana, despite all the expenses and difficulties involved in such a mission.

The quality of the reports you have been able to read — and the quality of the reports is nothing, for it is the quality of the Rapporteurs that I want to stress — bears witness to the importance of this official visit.

Brazil is a country which, because of its natural characteristics, is already the foremost country, and by the end of the century it will be even further in the lead, because it will continue to be the pace-setter for the whole of South America: 115 million inhabitants, demographic growth of 3% — just reckon that out — a population in full expansion, a very dynamic economy — with 12% growth, as Mr. Lewis has reminded us, in the industrial and economic fields in the last few years. What we must also know, however, is that the country has sources of dynamism such that these figures, revealing as they are in themselves, contain a coefficient of drive that makes of Brazil the very model for countries in full development, being less hit than others by the energy crisis. The reason for this lies precisely in the possibilities of substitution brought out by your Rapporteurs.

In these circumstances the report which has been presented to you this morning deserves, to my mind, some sort of follow-up action, since its conclusions, in particular as reflected in the recommendation, place the emphasis squarely on those essential points which inspire the deliberations of our Committee, as the report ranges over space, nuclear, energy and aeronautical questions.

As an example of what we ourselves discovered in Brazil, I should like to add an anecdote to the mass of facts crammed into the reports. In a Brazilian aeroplane I met a Frenchman who was a representative of the CNRS — the *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique* — on an official visit to Brazil. He had been sent by the Brazilian Institute of Agronomy, of which he is a foreign member, to represent it at Manaus in Amazonia in connection with work being done at Brazilian national level on the study of soils. This testifies to the open-mindedness of the Brazilians in welcoming European technicians — I say “European” advisedly, in the broad sense of the term — but with a predilection for Europe rather than for North America. This shows clearly the great value Brazil attaches to European technology as found in such men.

For that reason, having for my part already drawn a conclusion in respect of my own country, I have invited my government to re-examine its choices, so clearly does it appear to me that Brazil is the privileged partner in South America with whom we can dialogue and with whom we must promote trade.

In other words, if the conclusions presented by Mr. Lewis, Mr. Adriaensens, Mr. Scheffler — represented today by Mr. Flämig, whom we would thank for a contribution as spontaneous as it was effective — and Mr. Cornelissen are adopted by the Assembly, I should like it to be not just an ephemeral exercise in fact-finding, but suggest that a meeting be fixed to ensure that the findings are followed up by developments in the future. For I am convinced that it is the whole of that Europe which is modern in its intentions, and the whole of that Europe which is loved by South America for its history and its culture, that must pursue, deepen, improve and breathe life into a close co-operation along the lines mapped out in the recommendation.

How can I refrain from saying a few words to you about the impressions we gathered in French Guiana? I was able to appreciate them more than others. But the Rapporteurs provide an admirable outline of the lessons learnt from our stay in Kourou. What is of paramount importance is that Kourou has become European and that, by its becoming European, Europe is being given a chance in eight days' time — I am counting the days exactly, and it will be on Saturday week — to gain its independence in the realm of space launchers.

You know that the programme for which ESA is at present responsible is a source of envy. You even know that NASA intends to call for help of this kind from Europe in carrying out some of its programmes, which have been suffering from delays that have occurred, especially with the shuttle.

It is for all these reasons that, from the technical standpoint, we place our faith in the experimental launching on 15th December next and in the ESA team. From that day onwards, and with developments which will come about later, I believe that Europe will really have reached a milestone on the road to complete success in space achievement at world level.

In this connection, I should like to draw a simple technical lesson. Just now, Mr. Flämig was good enough to stress this point. It is possible that so far as this project is concerned the burden borne by France has been greater than that of our partners in the European Space Agency. This is not the point I wish to stress. What I want to bring out is the lesson which we must remember, namely that co-operation is

Mr. Valleix (continued)

all the more effective where it includes firm leadership by one partner. I believe that this is a concrete lesson which we should draw: co-operation is all the better for being broadly based, but nevertheless all the more effective when one partner is responsible for seeing the work through. And once again this observation is only of general validity on the basis of this concrete example.

I do not want to hold the floor any longer. I shall merely venture, with regard to Amendment 2, to suggest to its author, Mr. Cornelissen, that in the interest of that co-operation which he desires — and that is the reason for his submission — this amendment may perhaps be untimely. Would Mr. Cornelissen agree to withdraw it or, alternatively, to propose deletion of the words “civil and military”? If I say this, it is because I know of the co-operation that already exists, especially with Aermacchi, an Italian industry, and Embraer; and I am inclined to fear that this amendment, owing to its conciseness, might upset arrangements which are already functioning and must not be brought to a halt. If Mr. Cornelissen would agree to take these remarks into consideration, I should be grateful to him.

Once again I would like to thank the President and the Presidential Committee for having taken the risk involved in this mission. It was a considerable expense for WEU, but I believe that the Rapporteurs — and you will have been convinced of this by now — have derived the greatest possible intellectual benefit from the journey, and there are even greater benefits for Europe, for the extremely promising prospect of co-operation with South America and with Brazil in particular — and why not, in space activities, with Kourou? Benefits too for South America, which needs to develop its resources, and for Europe, which must remain a beacon of civilisation, through its development and through the upsurge of its technical, scientific and, why not, space achievements. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add, on behalf of the whole Assembly, that we congratulate you on your election as Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

(The President continued in English)

Your predecessor in the Chair in your Committee, Mr. Warren, has already left, or I would have thanked him on behalf of the Assembly for the work he has done for us in this Assembly for years as Chairman of your Committee. We fully agree with what has been said about the results of this voyage to Brazil and Guiana,

which has been disputed in the Presidential Committee. I beg to thank all who have participated in preparing these extremely valuable reports for us.

The debate is closed.

Before we can vote on the draft recommendation in Document 817 we must dispose of the two amendments which have been tabled to it.

Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. Cornelissen. Will you please move it, Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I want only to speak to my Amendment 2. Here I will very gladly go along with the suggestion from Mr. Valleix, Chairman of our Committee, to add the word “civil”.

The PRESIDENT. — Then will you please speak to that amendment now.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — To make things quite clear, Mr. President, I would point out that the modified text of my Amendment 2 should read in English as follows:

In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “civil and military”.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I would thank the Rapporteur for his open-mindedness. I believe we are proceeding along the right lines in avoiding any action that would conflict with, and thereby perhaps prejudice, an existing form of co-operation on the pretext of encouraging co-operation tomorrow.

I therefore thank Mr. Cornelissen for his understanding, and I of course accept his amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — The Assembly must first vote on Amendment 1:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “emphasis” add “on safeguards against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and”.

There have been no remarks upon it.

What is the view of the Committee?

We shall vote on Amendment 1.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to unanimously.

We now have problems with Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Cornelissen. It reads:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “and military”.

I do not quite understand the situation between Mr. Cornelissen and his Chairman.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — To make things quite clear, Mr. President, I would once again point out that the modified text of my Amendment 2 should read in English as follows :

In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "civil and military".

The PRESIDENT. — I fully realise that the original proposal was to leave out the words "and military" but now you agree to have the words "civil and military" left out.

The Assembly must vote on the altered amendment, which is to leave out "civil and military" and which is supported by the Committee.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The manuscript amendment is agreed to.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 817, as amended.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — I am voting against the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — *The draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

I congratulate the Committee.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, having complimented the Rapporteurs, allow me to associate the Secretary of the Committee with these compliments, since without his contribution we should have been unable to achieve such good results.

6. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 818)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the information report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 818.

I call Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur, to present the report.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report I have the honour to present to you on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments does not claim to be an exhaustive report on relations

between our Assembly, the Council of Europe and the new parliamentary assembly of the European Economic Community.

It is simply an information report that will enable us to broach a complex subject, to be expatiated on during the summer session and studied in greater detail by our Committee within the strict scope of its terms of reference.

It is a response to the desire for a more clearly defined continuing dialogue between these assemblies that will not be confined to meetings between senior officials or to the exchange, however invaluable, of documents and information, or even to the all-too-infrequent meetings between the bureaux of these assemblies.

I will, if I may, come back to the contacts our Committee very recently had with the national parliaments concerning certain activities, such as the replies to the questions put by the Chairman of our Committee on Recommendation 329 on the industrial bases of European security, Recommendation 333 on parliaments and defence procurement and Recommendation 335 on the political conditions for European armaments co-operation.

I note that he has received replies from Belgium, France and — here I make a small correction — the United Kingdom.

To mention positive events in our relations, it should be said, as regards my own country, that this is the first time that a committee has, after due consideration, taken a stand on a text adopted by the Assembly. The Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Italian Chamber of Deputies not only discussed Resolution 63 but also accepted a text endorsing the ideas contained in that resolution. Incidentally, a short summary of the meeting and the text adopted will be reaching you very shortly in the usual languages.

I would like to add a few words to bring out the spirit in which this report was drafted.

The election by direct suffrage of the European Parliament is an outstanding political event which will encourage that parliament to take upon itself a more decisive image and rôle compared with the other Community institutions, and convince the electorate that they have not been performing an empty charade of no real significance. It is at the same time a call that should be heeded for a better definition of the rôle of our own Assembly.

Vis-à-vis the European Parliament and at a time of growing misgivings about the prospects of the defence of freedom and independence in Western Europe, reflected even in the debates now being held in our national parliaments — one such debate is now under way in the Italian Chamber of Deputies — the Assembly of WEU

1. See page 50.

Mr. De Poi (continued)

must not have any inferiority complex. On the contrary it should make people realise the specific rôle which the treaty has conferred upon it and which must be safeguarded.

Meetings between the Bureau of our Assembly and that of the European Parliament and also of the Council of Europe Assembly, as well as meetings between the three Clerks, are already seen as a useful way of maintaining contact and rendering yeoman service in each of the three organisations, with no duplication of effort, for the unification of Europe.

Further details will be given to this Assembly during the summer session after completion of the Committee's work on the subject.

But it must be made clear here and now that these contacts must not only bring about a wider and more regular exchange of information; they must also produce a deeper mutual respect, with the eventual object of conferring the most appropriate institutions in every respect upon a European union worthy of the name, which is the ultimate aim of our political efforts and our hopes as free men.

We do not want to tread on the preserves of the other committees, but we cannot avoid underscoring the fact that reports and information that could in the past be given to the European parliamentarians through the national parliaments in which they sat as dual mandate members, should be more directly channelled now that the new European Parliament has many members who are not members of national parliaments. We say to these newcomers that such a dialogue ought not to be regarded as any kind of encroachment but as a proper and authorised distribution of responsibilities.

In pressing its just demands upon the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament should not, in its hurry to consolidate its powers, exceed its own competence by laying claim to an area which belongs to our Assembly.

Rather, what we have to do is exercise our imagination as politicians to provide a general framework in which these reciprocal responsibilities run parallel to one another and are harmonised. Nothing is immutable in the treaties or in the will of men, but we must also bear in mind that politics is the art of the possible, and not of the impossible. So let us not run before we can walk, but begin by taking short steps in respect of information, close liaison and a clear definition of respective rôles.

The interesting speech by the Belgian Senator, Mr. Lahaye — which is printed in the document tabled — and the reply by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Barre, on 29th September 1979 to a question put by Mr. Odru throw a clear light

on parliament and government opinion in the member states on the responsibilities of the various assemblies.

These are the facts we really have to face. And, Mr. President, if the work of our Committee for Relations with Parliaments can contribute to such an effort of imagination and good neighbourliness, starting out from practical facts and situations, we can say that we have not wasted our own time or trespassed on yours. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I begin by congratulating Mr. De Poi on his report. I think that we have all been particularly interested in the way in which he has elaborated the political level on which there should be contacts between our Assembly and the European Parliament. I shall have more to say about that in a few moments.

I was also particularly glad that Mr. De Poi recognised that time has progressed since the preparation of this report and that he said that the question mentioned in paragraph 10 has also been posed in the United Kingdom Parliament.

Mr. President, the question of our growing relationship with the European Parliament is a matter that you raised in your opening speech to our Assembly this week. It is a matter that we should watch and follow with great interest. I hope that our Committee for Relations with Parliaments can find an opportunity to meet in Strasbourg at a time when the European Parliament is meeting there. It will then be possible for us to follow more closely its work, to be introduced to its members, and to explain to some of them the complementary work of our Assembly, with its unique responsibilities in the sphere of defence. This would be of interest and value and might provide a basis for further co-operation in the future.

The Committee for Relations with Parliaments sees its task not merely in relation to contact with national parliaments but also with the directly-elected European Parliament. In the absence of our Chairman, Senator Jeambrun, I should like to pay my respect to him for the work that he has done in the past six months in directing our Committee. I pay particular tribute to the remarkable meeting that he organised in Besançon earlier this year, a meeting marked by a lively debate with parliamentary and journalist representatives of that region, in which some of the misconceptions about Western European Union were, I hope, corrected. It was a very lively debate.

Mr. Roper (continued)

It shows the value of our Committees, particularly the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, meeting in places away from national capitals. This applies also to the Committees of the Council of Europe. When we go to towns that are not national capitals, more notice is taken of our Committees. When we go to a national capital, we are regarded as yet another parliamentary committee. When we go to a smaller place, like Besançon, more local interest is created and we fulfil a useful function in informing the local population about the rôle of our Assembly and organisation.

I am also glad, Mr. President, that our Committee for Relations with Parliaments is to study, in the coming six months, the methods used in each of our national parliaments to inform the parliaments of the work of Western European Union. We have always assumed that our arrangements were perfect. I do not think that this is the case. The synthetic comparative analysis to be undertaken with the co-operation of the secretaries of national delegations and the Secretary of our Committee will permit the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to consider what improvements could be made.

Clearly, one cannot have a single model of the way in which national parliaments should study and follow the work of Western European Union. That will vary from place to place. But we would benefit from the drawing up of a balance sheet showing what is done in each national parliament. A number of us will be able to learn from the example of some who do things better than us.

This will be valuable. It will continue the work that you, Sir, have attempted during the three years of your presidency to ensure that we are more effective in making known in national parliaments the work that is done here.

I come now to the penultimate part of my remarks. It is by making our work better known in national parliaments that we might persuade more of our colleagues to attend and take part in these debates. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments, or somebody, clearly has an important task to ensure that parliamentarians who are appointed to this Assembly take part in its activities.

You will not be surprised, Mr. President, that having spent a long time in my Committee on the preparation of a report on theatre nuclear forces I was very disappointed, yesterday and today, to discover that we could not find a quorum of members of this Assembly to vote on what is perhaps the most active currently discussed issue in our national parliaments. These matters are being discussed in national parlia-

ments. We have here the sole Assembly in Western Europe competent to discuss matters of national defence, and not half of its members can attend to vote on a resolution. That is not a particularly good reflection on us.

I should like to draw attention to paragraph 11 of the report of Mr. De Poi and a long extract from Senator Lahaye, a Belgian Senator, who is not a member of our Assembly. At the suggestion of one of my colleagues, the speech by Senator Lahaye is incorporated in Appendix IV of the document. Much of it is a very objective analysis of our work, but the final paragraphs, referring to the dialogue that goes on between the Assembly and the Ministers, could be found rather insulting by the Ministers and their permanent representatives, who have been rather better in attending this Assembly than members of the Assembly this week. There has usually been a quorum of them present, if not a quorum of us. I believe that a useful dialogue takes place at the regular meetings with the Ministerial Council at the level of Ambassadors or Ministers. It is not shadow boxing.

I would not want it to be thought that, because Senator Lahaye's speech has been incorporated in a document by this Assembly and that the Committee has said that it feels it deserves wider circulation, we, as an Assembly, consider that we are chasing shadows when we engage in discussions with the members of the Ministerial Council or their deputies. This could be misconstrued. We must obviously try to improve our working relations with Ministers, but this can be done in a constructive spirit and not in a slightly negative spirit. I hope that my Belgian colleagues will excuse me when I say that a slightly negative approach occurs in Senator Lahaye's speech.

Mr. President, I have exhausted my time. I hope that you will excuse me if my speech was slightly longer than I intended, but I felt that these remarks should be made. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply ?

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I thank our eminent colleague, Mr. Roper, for his most interesting comments and I also want to thank you in particular since you have during your term of office precisely tried to define more clearly our Assembly's rôle compared with the others. This will prove invaluable to the action we have in prospect and to the spirit imbuing my report.

I think some of Mr. Roper's suggestions are very useful, and I also think that if in future we improve our exchanges of information with the national parliaments, there will no longer be any reason for misunderstandings even such

Mr. De Poi (continued)

as have been commented on in Senator Lahaye's concluding remarks — in a speech excellent in other respects — to be pointed out from the floor of the Assembly.

With specific reference to our relations with the European Parliament, certain procedures will of course have to be worked out and I wonder if it would not be useful to propose a hearing of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, in whatever forms and organisational arrangements the European parliamentary assembly may consider the most appropriate for such contacts.

The new European Parliament has barely begun its activities. We know full well that it is now engrossed with budget problems, but once these have been solved, one way or another, it would no doubt also be able to turn to other matters which it has wanted to raise in the past. I am referring to the Gladwyn report which could be re-tabled more properly in respect of our Assembly.

To avoid friction, we should right from the start establish a form of contact which, just as in the case of our relations with the national parliaments, would not in future create any misunderstandings with the European Parliament.

These are the remarks I wanted to make, Mr. President. I also thank the officials of our Committee for their admirable assistance and hope that the corresponding report to be made by the Committee during the summer session will be fuller than the one I have presented to you today.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

I think the whole Assembly agrees that we must look carefully ahead, with close co-operation between this Assembly and the national parliaments of the countries of Western European Union. We fully agree that this is one of the most important things for the future in order to have a clear-cut situation on all sides, both here and in the national parliaments. I fully agree with what you have said.

The debate is now closed and the Assembly takes note of the information report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 818.

We are now near the end. I thought that there would be a point of order. Mr. Roper?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am reluctant, although perhaps it is not uncharacteristic, that what is probably my last intervention in the Assembly should be on a point of order. There was, unfortunately, an error made in the transcription of my original amend-

ment to the report submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett. I failed to verify that this was the case in the printed version, assuming that mistakes of this kind could not occur. I think, however, that I made clear in my speech in the debate on the amendment the intention of my amendment, and I know that Sir Frederic Bennett agrees with my proposal that in the printed text of the resolution it should be incorporated in the form in which it was submitted and which he accepts. I hope, Mr. President, that you will agree with this change being made. It has been discussed with your advisers.

The PRESIDENT. — Indeed, Mr. Roper. It has been discussed with those responsible for the administration, but I must inform you that there is a problem of principle, and I shall tell you the story. On Tuesday afternoon, we considered the report on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security. An amendment, No. 8, was tabled in the handwriting of Mr. Roper. It was signed not only by Mr. Roper but by others, and was adopted. It had been intended to be added after the words "Recommends that the Council" and so to refer to the whole draft recommendation, which was adopted by the Assembly. As a result of an error, the amendment was circulated in a form that referred only to paragraph 1.

When such a mistake occurs, attention must be drawn to it before the Assembly deals with the amendment, because no one knows whether he will support the amendment or vote against it. This was not done, and no comment was made yesterday morning on the Minutes of Proceedings. When I asked whether there were any remarks, no comments were made about those proceedings that contained the text of the amendment as circulated, so that if I stuck to the rules I should not be ready to rectify the error. If you carefully read the proposal, you find the words "Recommends that the Council" and in Mr. Roper's writing :

"... either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its membership in European political co-operation among the Nine."

Then there is paragraph 1, "Ensure that consultation." That is Mr. Roper's intention and it makes more sense. There is no doubt about that. I want to say only that if something happens here, those responsible must look carefully into the minutes and say "There is a mistake. Please rectify it." As I do not want to finish my three-year term with a dispute, I take note of Mr. Roper's request.

I now have a final demand for a personal remark. I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I would not like us to conclude this session on a

Mr. Valleix (continued)

note of controversy, but I take advantage of Mr. Roper's presence in the hall — had he not been present I would not have mentioned it — to remind him that it was only this morning that I personally was able to take cognisance, through the English official report, of the speech he made yesterday afternoon.

I do not wish in any case to engage in any kind of polemics, and we all — he and I, and you, Mr. President — have better things to do. Mr. Talon's speech made sound sense. He expressed surprise at the repeated upsetting of the orders of the day of the session, occasioned, we note, by our common difficulties. And he wondered whether it was proper for a report distributed a few minutes beforehand to be immediately adopted by a Committee. It is a procedural matter and I raise it as a point of order. I want everyone to rest assured that it was in no way a personal attack, and I am sorry that Mr. Roper should have taken it as such, if indeed he did. May I add that I dispute any such interpretation, which is quite unfounded. You proposed that we should undertake an overall review of our Rules of Procedure: it is an important and serious matter, and I hope that account can be taken, in so doing, of any reasonable comments designed to improve our Rules of Procedure, and I think some of Mr. Talon's remarks are to be considered. I think we may thank him in advance.

I thank Mr. Roper for having had the kindness to hear and understand me.

The PRESIDENT. — Well, Mr. Roper? Only one minute.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I would not want Mr. Valleix or my good friend, Mr. Talon, to think that my remarks yesterday were in any way personally directed or that I assumed that the criticism was personal to me. I have re-read this morning what is said in the Official Report and I want to make sure that in the final version it will read, "A most insulting attack was made on my Committee on Monday...". I did not regard it as a matter for myself; I was concerned because I felt that the procedure in my Committee had been questioned.

I would, however, like to point out that I did notify the French Delegation office yesterday morning that I was going to make these remarks yesterday afternoon, in order that, if Mr. Talon and Mr. Valleix wanted to be present, they would be informed that I was going to speak on this matter. If they had been present, I would have ensured that the remarks were made in a way which they would have been able to follow.

Thank you very much indeed, Mr. President.

7. Close of the Session

The PRESIDENT. — We are about to bring our proceedings to an end in complete harmony. The Assembly has now come to the end of the business for the second part of this session.

I declare closed the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 11.50 a.m.*)

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