

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1976

I

Assembly Documents

W E U

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
KEMPINAIRE André	PLP
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEXHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave	Socialist
de BRUYNE Hektor	Volksunie
DUVIEUSART Etienne	FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
BURCKEL Jean-Claude	UDR
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
de MONTESQUIOU Pierre	Soc. Dem. Ref.
NESSLER Edmond	UDR
President of the Assembly	
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
RADIUS René	UDR
RIVIÈRE Paul	UDR
ROGER Émile	Communist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SCHMITT Robert	UDR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	UDR
VITTE Pierre	Ind. Rep.

Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	UDR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	UDR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	UDR

MM. JEAMBRUN Pierre
LA COMBE René
du LUART Ladislas
MÉNARD Jacques
PIGNION Lucien
SOUSTELLE Jacques
VADEPIED Raoul
WEBER Pierre

Dem. Left
UDR
RIAS
Ind. Rep.
Socialist
Non-party
UCDP
Ind. Rep. (App.)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
DREGGER Alfred	CDU/CSU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
KEMPFLER Friedrich	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
RICHTER Klaus	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP
Mrs. WOLF Erika	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
CARSTENS Karl	CDU/CSU
GÖLTER Georg	CDU/CSU
HAASE Horst	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
KLIESING Georg	CDU/CSU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
OPITZ Rudolf	FDP
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
WALTHER Rudi	SPD
WENDE Manfred	SPD
WÖRNER Manfred	CDU/CSU
WURBS Richard	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AVERARDI Giuseppe	Socialist
BETTIOL Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BOLOGNA Giacomo	Chr. Dem.
COPPOLA Mattia	Chr. Dem.
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
LAFORGIA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
LEGGIERI Vincenzo	Chr. Dem.
MAMMI Oscar	Republican
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI Amalia	Chr. Dem.
MM. PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
PICA Domenico	Chr. Dem.
PRETI Luigi	Socialist
QUILLERI Fausto Samuele	Liberal
TALAMONA Augusto	Socialist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.
VEDOVATO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
ZAFFANELLA Renzo	Socialist

Substitutes

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
ARTALI Mario	Socialist
BONALDI Umberto	Liberal
CASTELLUCCI Albertino	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. CATTANEO-PETRINI Giannina	Chr. Dem.
MM. CAVEZZALI Paolo	Socialist
FARABEGOLI Furio	Chr. Dem.
LA ROSA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
MAGLIANO Terenzio	Socialist
MANCINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
MONETI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
NEGRARI Andrea	Chr. Dem.
PACINI Arturo	Chr. Dem.
PREARO Roberto	Chr. Dem.
PUMILIA Calogero	Chr. Dem.
REALE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
SANTALCO Carmelo	Chr. Dem.
SPORA Ettore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
REIJNEN Johannes	Pop. Cath.
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Antirevolution.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
WALTMANS Henk	Radical

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. Ronald BROWN	Labour
Paul CHANNON	Conservative
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
John HUNT	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John MENDELSON	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
David STEEL	Liberal
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

Mr. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Lord BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Antony BUCK	Conservative
John CORDLE	Conservative
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Conservative
Mr. Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
Mrs. Ann TAYLOR	Labour
Lord WALLACE of COSLANY	Labour
MM. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
John WATKINSON	Labour

AGENDA
of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session
Paris, 14th-17th June 1976

I. Report of the Council

Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council
to the Assembly

II. Political Questions

1. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council
2. Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today
3. Détente and security in Europe

Report tabled by Mr. Péridier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee

Report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General Affairs Committee

Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee

III. Defence Questions

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council
2. Security in the Mediterranean
3. Reserve forces
4. Strategic mobility

Report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

Report tabled by Mr. Buck on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

Report tabled by Mr. Duvieusart on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

1. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council
2. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976

Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

Report tabled by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1976

Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

VI. Relations with Parliaments

Relations with parliaments

Information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session
Paris, 14th-17th June 1976

MONDAY, 14th JUNE

Morning 9 a.m.

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

10 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

11.30 a.m.

Meetings of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives and of the Socialist Group.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Twenty-Second Ordinary Session.
6. Ratification of decisions of the Presidential Committee :
 - (a) Symposium on a European armaments policy :
Order 45 adopted by the Presidential Committee on 12th January 1976.
 - (b) European union and WEU :
Resolution 59 adopted by the Presidential Committee on 1st March 1976.
7. Détente and security in Europe :
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

TUESDAY, 15th JUNE

Morning 9 a.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

10 a.m.

1. Twenty-first annual report of the Council :
presentation by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

2. Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
3. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Périquier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
4. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate on the annual report of the Council and the replies of the Committees.

Votes on the draft recommendations.

At the close of the sitting

Meetings of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. European aeronautical policy — Guidelines emerging from the Colloquy on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 :

presentation of the report tabled by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

3.30 p.m.

Address by Mr. Chabert, Minister of Communications of Belgium.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Relations with Parliaments :

presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

At the close of the sitting

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

WEDNESDAY, 16th JUNE

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

10 a.m.

1. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1976 :

presentation of the report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Vote on the draft opinion.

11 a.m.

Address by Mr. Schmidt, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. Security in the Mediterranean :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Buck on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

3. Reserve forces :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.**1. Reserve forces :**

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Strategic mobility :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Duvieusart on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 17th JUNE**Morning 10 a.m.**

Address by Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

11.30 a.m.

Vote on the draft recommendations not already voted upon by the Assembly.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today :

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

Symposium on a European armaments policy

ORDER 45

*adopted by the Presidential Committee
on 12th January 1976 ¹*

The Presidential Committee,

Anxious to secure widespread recognition of the need for a European policy on the production and procurement of armaments ;

Aware of the interest of such a symposium attended by members of parliament and experts ;

Noting the success of the colloquy on a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe organised by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions,

INSTRUCTS

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to organise a symposium on a European armaments policy as set out in the explanatory memorandum of this order and to submit proposals to the Presidential Committee for approval, including the expenditure to be authorised and the list of persons to be invited.

1. In accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

APPENDIX

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments)

The Presidential Committee has noted the success of the colloquy on a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe organised by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in Paris in September 1973 and the fact that a second colloquy on the same subject is to be held in Toulouse, France, in February 1976.

They consider that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments should be instructed to organise a symposium on a European armaments policy.

I. Aims

1. One of the main aims of this symposium should be to help to define a European armaments policy allowing the Western European countries to take joint action to safeguard and develop their armaments industries, which are now threatened, while increasing their defence effectiveness.

2. The limited resources and market of the European countries often make it necessary for the individual countries to specialise or be sub-contractors. But Western Europe as a whole must avoid being forced to fall back on the production of less sophisticated types of equipment or merely purchasing licences or being a sub-contractor for the equipment it requires. On the contrary, Western Europe must be in a position to take part in the race for technical advancement in research, development and production and at the same time increase the effectiveness of its defence effort through the procurement of standardised equipment. To this end, the European countries must concert their efforts through joint research, development, production and procurement of their defence equipment.

3. By strengthening European industries working for defence, such a European armaments policy would help to lay the foundations for fruitful co-operation with the United States and Canada.

II. Organisation**1. Chairmanship**

The symposium as a whole would be chaired by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; working sessions by distinguished experts.

2. Participants

The 100 to 150 participants would be nationals of the Western European countries as follows:

- (a) members of parliament:
 - (i) the President of the Assembly ;
 - (ii) the members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
 - (iii) the bureaux of the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions;
 - (iv) the Chairmen of the Defence Committees of the parliaments;
- (b) national armaments directors of member countries;
- (c) representatives of armaments industries;
- (d) those responsible for bi- or multilateral armaments programmes;
- (e) Standing Armaments Committee of WEU;
- (f) representatives of member countries' headquarters staffs, NATO headquarters and military agencies;
- (g) one or two members of the Commission of the European Communities;
- (h) persons invited on an individual basis.

3. Date

The proposed symposium should not be held before autumn or winter 1976 at the earliest.

4. Place

The symposium might be held in Paris if the French Government agreed to grant its patronage.

5. Procedure

The symposium would last two or three days. Three or four half-day closed sittings would each be devoted to a different topic introduced by a distinguished expert. One half-day might be devoted to discussions in working groups.

The opening and closing sittings would be public.

The text of the proceedings would be confidential. The last sitting, during which the Chairman and designated speakers would summarise the information emerging from the symposium, would be open to the press.

At a subsequent session of the Assembly, the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-

ments would submit a report on the proceedings and present its conclusions.

6. Languages

Symposium documents would be issued in French and English. Speeches and statements might be made in the official languages of the member States. The secretariat would ensure simultaneous interpretation into French and English.

7. Finance

The cost of organising the symposium would be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly.

8. Preparation

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments would establish a preparatory committee composed of its bureau, rapporteur and experts.

***Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1975***

INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-First Annual Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1975.
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters :

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III. Armaments Control Agency	26
IV. Standing Armaments Committee	33
V. Public Administration Committee	35
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions	37

CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

In 1975, the Council again gave their fullest attention to the maintenance of good relations with the Assembly; they wish to observe, in this connection, that the general remarks contained in Chapter I of their twentieth annual report are still valid.

A. Annual report of the Council to the Assembly

In view of the opening date for the twenty-first ordinary session of the Assembly, the Council made a special effort to forward the report on their activities in 1974 considerably earlier than usual. They appreciated the Assembly's expression of satisfaction on this point.

B. Assembly recommendations to the Council and written questions put to the Council by members of the Assembly

The Council answered the particularly large number of recommendations — seventeen in all — adopted by the Assembly during the second part of the twentieth ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-first ordinary session. These recommendations were numbered 256 to 259, and 260 to 272, and covered a wide range of questions relating to the construction of Europe (foreign policy, defence, scientific, technical and space questions in particular).

The Council also sent eleven replies to Written Questions 152 to 164 put by members of the Assembly.

The Council continue to attach great value to the recommendations and written questions initiated by the Assembly. In their reply to Recommendation 266, moreover, they confirmed their appreciation of the useful contribution which the Assembly makes in drawing attention to and debating questions of European security and integration.

This reply stressed that recommendations and written questions from the Assembly and its members received close and careful attention from governments. It went on to say that whenever possible, the Council would continue to give the Assembly full and substantial replies reflecting the common positions of the seven member governments, even if they sometimes related to matters dealt with primarily by other organis-

ations. During the year 1975 now under review, the Council in fact referred in several cases to consultations between Western European governments in other bodies.

The same reply added that the Council were aware of the fact that for its work, the Assembly needed adequate information on matters relating to European security and the integration of Europe. It further stated that, while the Council were not always in a position to provide full answers to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions, member States remained prepared to make the fullest possible use of other means of communication, such as the participation of government members in Assembly sessions.

C. Speeches by Ministers to the Assembly or its Committees

The commemoration of the Assembly's twentieth anniversary at the sitting held on 26th May 1975 provided an opportunity for member States to pay tribute, through their representatives, to the Assembly's achievements and to confirm their interest in its work (see Annex).

Furthermore, in 1975, as in previous years, several Ministers spoke during the Assembly's debates (see Annex).

In their speeches and their replies to questions put by members of the Assembly, they stated the attitudes of their governments. The Council noted with satisfaction that the participation of Ministers in its work was again appreciated by the Assembly, as is shown by the report accompanying Recommendation 266.

As in the past, representatives of Assembly Committees also had talks with Ministers during visits to member countries.

D. Meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies

The Council met the Presidential Committee as well as the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly at a luncheon given after the ministerial meeting held in London on 20th May 1975.

E. Budgetary questions

The difficulties mentioned in the previous annual report which arose when the Assembly's budget estimates for 1975 were submitted to the Council for opinion, were resolved after discussions between the Council and the Assembly. In this connection, it is recalled that agreement was reached on a new annual time-table for the various stages in the procedure for approving the Assembly budget. This time-table was applied successfully, and to the Assembly's satisfaction, to the budget estimates for 1976.

*
**

As stated in their reply to Recommendation 258, the Council attach great importance to the Assembly's relations with national parliaments which, in their view, contribute to strengthening the spirit of European solidarity. They added that member governments would, as in the past and in accordance with their established practice, continue to inform their parliaments on international developments considered by the Council or the Assembly of WEU, and on the progress of co-operation in WEU. They further observed that members of the Assembly were at liberty to question their governments whenever they wanted a more detailed consideration of various policy matters of particular concern to WEU ; this possibility was also recalled in the reply to Recommendation 266.

ANNEX

Speeches by Ministers of member States made during the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly

First part (26th-29th May 1975) held in Bonn

— Sitting to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly :

Mr. Georg Leber, Minister for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany ;

Mr. Paul Vanden Boeynants, Minister for Defence and Brussels Affairs of Belgium ;

Mr. Emile Krieps, Minister for Public Health, the Environment, Civil Service and Armed Forces of Luxembourg ;

Mr. Frederick Mulley, United Kingdom Minister for Transport ;

Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France ;

Mr. Adolfo Battaglia, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy ;

Mr. P. H. Kooijmans, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

— Other sittings :

Mr. Renaat Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium and Chairman-in-Office of the Council ;

Mr. Karl Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany ;

Mr. Gaston Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium ;

Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France.

Second part (1st-4th December 1975) held in Paris

Mr. Karl Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany ;

Mr. William Rodgers, United Kingdom Minister of State for Defence ;

Mr. Luigi Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.

CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

In 1975, the Council met at ministerial level in London on 20th May, under the chairmanship of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. James Callaghan.

The permanent representatives met thirteen times, and the working group held twenty-six meetings to prepare their discussions.

The declarations made by their representatives to the Assembly in Bonn on 26th May demonstrated that the governments of member States continue to be fully aware of the undertakings which they gave under the modified Brussels Treaty; this is confirmed, moreover, by the Council's replies to Recommendations 266 and 270.

These replies also pointed out that the Council, both at permanent representative and at ministerial level, are and will continue to be responsible for ensuring the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. However, the treaty stresses the undesirability of a duplication of effort. A number of issues of relevance to WEU are also dealt with by the governments of member countries in other international fora: the European Communities, nine-power political co-operation, the Atlantic Alliance, OECD; the Council of course take account of the work done by these organisations in planning their own activities.

A. Political questions

1. East-West relations

— As in previous years, the Council devoted a considerable part of their discussions to this question at the ministerial meeting in London on 20th May 1975.

The German Delegation gave an account of the state of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. There was also an exchange of information and views on recent developments in relations between the other WEU countries and the German Democratic Republic.

In addition, Ministers discussed developments in bilateral political and economic relations between the member countries of WEU and

the other member countries of the Warsaw Pact. In this context, the main points raised were: the visit of the United Kingdom Prime Minister to the USSR in February and that of the French Prime Minister in March; the visit of the Queen of the Netherlands to Romania in May. The German Delegation, in a statement, reported on their relations with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.

Multilateral East-West relations and, in particular, the negotiations for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, were also discussed.

— Exchanges at this WEU ministerial meeting showed that, like the Assembly, member countries are convinced of the need for continuous discussions between the western countries on their bilateral and multilateral relations with the eastern countries. The reply sent in November to Recommendation 263 pointed out that governments of the member countries of the union and those of their partners in the Alliance had held such exchanges in the North Atlantic Council and were continuing to do so. This reply also stressed the special importance of consultations between the member countries of the European Community; those held between the Nine at Geneva during the second phase of the CSCE with a view to concerting their negotiating position set an example to be followed in this respect. They are being continued in a different form to ensure that the Final Act of Helsinki is implemented.

— With regard to the CSCE, the Council stated in the same reply that, apart from minor differences of emphasis which had to be expected, the jointly-adopted positions were supported by all during the Geneva negotiations. In return for certain concessions to the other side, the western powers gained appreciable concessions to which they attached considerable importance. These relate to the first basket, for which they won acceptance of formulations for the declaration of principles in line with their wishes, as well as confidence-building measures which take account of certain military aspects of European security; certain subjects of the second basket are specially worthy of note, such as the improvement of business facilities, the promotion of the exchange of economic and commercial informa-

tion, and the encouragement of industrial co-operation ; and, above all, the western powers attach particular importance to the contents of the third basket : human contacts, spread of information, cultural and educational exchanges.

The communiqué published at the close of the North Atlantic ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 11th and 12th December, referred (point 3) to the high priority attached by the member countries of WEU and their partners in the Alliance to the full implementation of the Final Act of Helsinki by all the signatories.

— In their reply to this same Recommendation 263, the Council also assured the Assembly that the member States would continue, in their relations with the German Democratic Republic, to take account of the special situation resulting from the existence of two States in Germany, and the responsibility of the four powers towards Germany as a whole. They also stated that they shared the Assembly's views regarding strict compliance with, and full application of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, and also considered that there was an essential link between détente in Europe and the Berlin situation. The position of the member countries of WEU and their partners in NATO on this matter was reaffirmed in the communiqué published after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December (point 6).

2. Relations between Europe and the United States

— The Council followed with interest the debates which the Assembly again devoted to co-operation between Europe and the United States, the importance of which is fully recognised by the governments of all member States, particularly as regards the progress of East-West relations.

— In their reply to Recommendation 271, they recalled the part played by co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance which, by ensuring the collective security of the countries party to it during the twenty-six years of its existence, has enabled each of its members to initiate and develop the dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe on both the bilateral and multi-lateral level.

In the spirit of the Harmel report of 1967, which emphasised the importance of the Alliance as a clearing house for the exchange of information and views, frequent discussions of this kind have been held within the North Atlantic Council on the various negotiations which concern some or all of its members, such as the CSCE or

MBFR. The United States have also kept their European allies regularly informed of the state of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

The reply to this recommendation stressed the Council's view that such close and frank consultations between the United States and their European allies are in the vital interest of the Alliance as a whole, insofar as they enable the Europeans to bring their influence to bear on all matters affecting their security.

— On the separate question of the dialogue between the nine member countries of the European Community and the United States, the Council refer the Assembly to the reply sent the previous year to Recommendation 252, which mentioned the informal practical arrangements put into effect in 1974.

3. Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

— In their report for 1974, the Council expressed the concern of member governments at events in Cyprus during the summer of that year, and at the situation to which they gave rise, and informed the Assembly of the positions they had taken in the matter.

— The replies sent in March 1975 to Recommendation 256 and, in November, to point 4 of Recommendation 269, showed the broad measure of agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the question of Cyprus as regards both its humanitarian and political aspects and its consequences for security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Council pointed out that all member countries had contributed substantially to the humanitarian aid being provided for refugees in Cyprus, particularly in response to appeals issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. They further expressed the hope that negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus would eventually result in a long-term settlement for the refugee problem and the rehabilitation of the refugees themselves.

The Council agreed with the Assembly that any lasting solution to the crisis as a whole depended on an improvement in the relations between Greece and Turkey, and between the two communities in Cyprus. They affirmed their continuing concern for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. They recalled the declaration to that effect adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the nine member countries of the European Com-

munity in the framework of political co-operation at their meeting in Dublin on 13th February 1975.

— The course of events in Cyprus was closely followed by the Nine and the North Atlantic Council throughout the year under review. Furthermore, in the United Nations, the United Kingdom, France and Italy took an active part in the debates of the Security Council, and supported the resolutions adopted on 12th March and 13th June 1975. The delegations of the Seven later voted for the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20th November; in this context, the Italian presidency presented the position of the Nine.

The Council were most anxious that the talks between the communities should be resumed without prior conditions under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Waldheim, with a view to reaching a general settlement covering all aspects of the problem.

4. Energy questions

In their replies to Recommendations 259, 260 and 271, the Council expressed views broadly in agreement with those of the Assembly on this subject. As a result of the progress of events over the last few years and the present energy crisis, the economic future of the continent of Europe largely depends on finding a solution for energy problems.

The Council declared that they shared the Assembly's wish for the early definition of a European Community energy policy. They recalled two major developments in that direction: on 17th September 1974, the Council of the European Community declared their political intention of defining and implementing a Community energy policy involving common objectives; these objectives were enumerated in a resolution adopted by the same Council on 17th December 1974. The reply added that efforts are being continued in the Community to implement such a policy and to resolve the main problems involved by appropriate harmonisation of the varying interests of the member countries of the Community.

The Council also recognised the need for real co-ordination by member governments at international level of long-term policy and research into the economic use of, and substitutes for, energy resources. Efforts are being made to establish such co-ordination within the framework of the OECD. The activities of that organi-

sation in the energy sector have been streamlined by amalgamating the former Oil and Energy Committees into a new Energy Policy Committee. In addition, the International Energy Agency, forming part of the OECD, was set up on 18th November 1974; in this connection, the Council recalled that representatives of the Commission of the European Communities attend all meetings of the Agency, and that numerous meetings within the Community provide opportunities for all member countries to exchange views.

Furthermore, the efforts to achieve genuine concertation between energy-consuming and energy-producing countries are of vital importance. In this context, the Council welcomed the positive outcome of the second preparatory meeting for the Conference on International Economic Co-operation as opening the way for constructive discussions on energy questions. This conference was held in Paris from 16th to 19th December 1975 and closed with a joint communiqué which showed clearly that these questions were given the fullest attention.

B. Scientific, technical and space questions

The Council followed with interest the work of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, directed to the progress of European co-operation in the aeronautical and space fields, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They answered four recommendations (257 on the state of European aviation activities, 262 on the state of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects, 268 on the European Space Agency, and 272 on the European aeronautical industry and civil aviation) adopted by the Assembly in December 1974 and May 1975.

1. Aviation

In their replies to Recommendations 257 and 272, the Council referred to the reply to Recommendation 244, the main points of which were recalled in their twentieth annual report.

The views expressed by the Assembly in Recommendation 257 were brought to the notice of the governments of member States. On this occasion, the Council assured the Assembly that all aspects of the important problem about which it was concerned continued to receive the fullest attention of those governments.

In their reply to Recommendation 272, the Council repeated the view they had expressed on several previous occasions, namely, that for the civil aircraft industry to be sufficiently competitive and capable of taking its rightful position among other industries, closer European collaboration is necessary in this field, at both governmental and industrial level.

The Council noted that, following consultations in the EEC, a resolution on member countries' industrial policy in the aeronautical sector had been approved by the Ministerial Council of the EEC on 4th March 1975, and was to be followed by a first report on the functioning of the European aircraft industry.

They further noted that six major companies had decided to co-operate in order to provide the airline companies with a strong industrial basis.

The Council expressed satisfaction at these initiatives and added that they were awaiting further results with interest.

2. Space

In their reply to Recommendation 268 on the European Space Agency, the Council drew the Assembly's attention to the following points :

— Following the decision by the member States of ESRO and ELDO to carry out the extensive common programme approved in 1971 and 1973 within a single European Space Agency, the Convention setting up that agency was signed on 30th May 1975.

— The agency is responsible for a scientific programme, for application programmes (telecommunications, sea and air communications, meteorology), for a heavy launcher programme and for a manned space laboratory programme, as well as for ground support facilities including a launching base at Kourou which is necessary for the development of the Ariane launcher. Its main emphasis will be on elaborating and implementing a long-term European space policy, on co-ordinating the European space programme and national programmes, and integrating the latter progressively, on elaborating and implementing an appropriate industrial policy, and on concerting member States' policies with regard to other international organisations and institutions.

— Meetings of its Council, which can be convened at ministerial level, will assist the agency in fulfilling this mission, the aims of which, as its convention states, are exclusively peaceful.

3. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

— In 1974, the Council set out their views on a European policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in their reply to Recommendation 253.

— Recommendation 262, received in 1975, was concerned with safety problems associated with developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The details given in the reply to this recommendation showed that the governments of all member countries are paying special attention to these problems.

Member States collaborate on nuclear safety matters, including the protection of public health, within the European Communities, through international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD, and in bilateral contacts. The Council consider these existing channels of co-operation to be sufficient at present.

The importance attached by member countries to an adequate civil nuclear liability régime, particularly at regional level, has been demonstrated by their accession to the Paris and Brussels Conventions negotiated under the aegis of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. The Council noted that these governments believe that, at present, their interests and responsibilities are adequately covered as a result.

Lastly, the Council acknowledged it to be of the utmost importance in securing public acceptance of the uses of nuclear power for peaceful purposes that information relating to the siting, construction and operation of nuclear power plants, including information on safety matters, and on their environmental impact, should be available to the public.

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The Council fully recognised the importance attached by the Assembly to the development of co-operation between Europe and Canada in the field of advanced technology, which formed the subject of Recommendation 259 adopted in December 1974 ; their reply enumerated the main features of existing bilateral and international collaboration and concertation on energy and space questions.

Finally, the Council replied to Written Question 162 put by a member of the Assembly concerning the development of mineral resources on the ocean floor. They observed that a number

of industrial firms were already collaborating in such development.

C. Defence questions

Two twentieth anniversaries took place in 1975 : that of the entry into force of the modified Brussels Treaty on 6th May 1955, and also of the inauguration of the WEU Assembly. Both these occasions offered an opportunity for the members of the Council, as well as for the parliamentarians, to stress the importance they attached to defence matters and to the value of the Brussels Treaty in this context.

In the course of presenting the twentieth annual report to the Assembly in May, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Van Elslande, in laying particular stress on the Council's view that defence questions remain a matter of paramount concern, recalled that the Brussels Treaty, with its formal commitments of mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of its members, is one of the keystones in the security of its signatory States. He also emphasised the care taken by the Council to ensure that the protocols concerning the levels of member States' forces and armaments are observed.

The members of the Council noted Resolution 55 on European union and the defence of Europe, adopted by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 11th September and sent to the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, responsible for submitting a report on European union to the European Council.

1. Level of forces of member States

Under the general heading of forces and armaments control, the Council, with the assistance of the Armaments Control Agency, have continued in 1975 to carry out their responsibilities as laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols.

(a) Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member States of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol

No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the levels of forces placed under NATO command by member States of WEU which contribute to the integrated structure. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1974, which was conveyed by this officer at the appropriate time, was presented by him to the Council on 20th March. Information indicating the status as at the end of 1975 was requested in December.

Furthermore, the Council have taken the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

Thus, for the year 1974, a meeting was held in Brussels on 17th December 1974 of the permanent representatives (or their substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The Council examined the report from this meeting on 15th January 1975, and noted that the level of forces of these member States, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Council also took note at the same time of a declaration by the permanent representative of France on the level of French forces for 1974. The same procedure has already been set in train, for 1975, by the end of the year under review.

(b) Forces under national command

The strength and armaments of forces of member States on the mainland of Europe remaining under national command are fixed in accordance with the procedure laid down in the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, implementing Article V of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able to fulfil in 1975 their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe

In accordance with the undertaking given in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 213, the United Kingdom Government declares that the total level of British forces on the continent of Europe at 30th November 1975 amounted to 60,066 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 30th November 1975, there were some 3,700 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, it is expected that these units could be speedily returned to their duty stations in an emergency affecting NATO.

3. Examination by the Council of the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the problems of the standardisation of armaments in Europe

On 20th May in London, the Ministerial Council held a detailed discussion on this subject. Since that time, the permanent representatives have continued to exchange views but no definite conclusions have yet been reached. The matter remains however on their agenda.

As the Assembly is aware, questions of European armaments procurement and standardisation have been much debated by interested governments during the year in various fora where the member governments of WEU have made substantial contributions to the study of the problem.

In their replies to Recommendations 267, 269 and 270, communicated to the Assembly in October and November, the Council set out their views. In particular, they indicated that careful consideration was being given to the tasks which might be taken on by the various bodies capable of dealing with this problem within the Atlantic Alliance and WEU, while bearing in mind the need to avoid duplication of effort.

In December, during the part-session of the Assembly, the Council observed the degree of emphasis put on the need for increased European armaments co-operation.

4. Assembly recommendations and written questions

(a) Defence subjects specifically dealt with in the recommendations adopted by the Assembly in December 1974 and May 1975, and to which

the Council gave as full replies as possible, included :

- European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (256) ;
- conditions of service in the armed forces (261) ;
- the proliferation of nuclear weapons (264) ;
- the application of the Brussels Treaty (267) ;
- the state of European security (269). Replying to the parts of this recommendation that concerned greater defence co-operation in Europe (see also 3 above), the Council stressed the need for the European countries to be able to identify their armaments requirements and to use their own research, development and production capabilities ;
- European union and WEU (270). Here the Council stated in their reply that they were aware of the implications of world-wide security problems for the process of European political unification. Questions arising in connection with adequate provision for the defence of Europe would be discussed in the appropriate fora.

Another three recommendations were drafted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and adopted by the Assembly at the December part-session : 278 on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance ; 281 on European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments ; and 283 on air forces on the central front. The Council have already begun their study of these texts.

(b) In dealing with several written questions on defence subjects, the Council and the member States considered various aspects of this important problem.

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Contacts with other international organisations

In the course of the year, the principal officers of the Secretariat-General, representing Western European Union, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations as observers when questions of concern to WEU were under discussion. As in previous years, the most frequent of these contacts were made with NATO and the Council of Europe.

CHAPTER III

ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

A. Introduction

The Agency has a dual task. Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, it is required :

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective ;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

In 1975, the Agency's activities continued very much along the same lines and at the same rate as in previous years.

Subject to the comments made under point B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the Agency for 1975, the twentieth year of control, was carried out satisfactorily.

B. General problems**1. General operating methods**

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purpose of field control measures being to verify, physically, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

The Agency's operating methods, the main lines of which are set out above, did not change during the year under review.

Although the principles of the present methods, which have proved their worth, remain unchanged, their applications are under constant examination with a view to improvement.

The Agency draws great benefit from the continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member State, of the progress of armament production or procurement programmes, the Agency develops its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

2. Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised to exercise its mandate

The situation described in previous annual reports, regarding certain armaments, remained unchanged in 1975.

In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member State, to what that State calls "strategic forces".

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter therefore concern other armaments.

It is further recalled that only non-production controls are so far applied to chemical weapons.

C. Controls from documentary sources

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held by the member States with the levels fixed by the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Information processed by the Agency

(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member States

The questionnaire sent to member States for 1975 did not differ substantially from those of previous years.

As in all previous years, follow-up action on the replies was twofold. It is recalled that some of the facts reported are checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, and compared with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

(b) Request for annual information

In the case of one of the member States, control of the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

Nevertheless, these measures are partly prepared from a study of documents. This study is based, in particular, on the replies of the country concerned to the Agency's request for annual information.

This procedure applies to long-range missiles, guided missiles and chemical weapons.

(c) Information provided by NATO

See point 2 (a) below.

(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member States stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV)

In 1975, the defence budgets published by member States and their replies to the Agency questionnaire on this subject were studied in the same way as in previous years.

The national authorities also gave additional information, whenever necessary, in response to the Agency's requests.

The scrutiny of budgets confirmed the findings of other studies carried out by the experts to determine quantities of armaments.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command

After receiving and processing the member States' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO International Staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau, on 28th November 1975, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 12th December 1975 under the chairmanship of the Deputy Director of the Agency; this meeting was attended by the representatives of the Director of the International Military Staff of the NATO Military Committee, and of the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Armaments and Administration, SHAPE, as well as by the Agency experts. There were no comments on the total quantities of armaments declared as held by the member States (Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), and presented by the Agency for study by these authorities.

In consequence, the total quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member States for forces placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe can be considered as appropriate levels for the control year 1975 within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe

The quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member States as being required on 31st December 1975 for their forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe have been accepted or approved by the Council, who have taken note of these figures of maximum levels of armaments for these forces in 1975. The quantities notified to the Agency can thus be considered as appropriate levels of armaments for the current control year within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

D. Field control measures

1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution

(a) As recalled in the introduction to this Chapter, the treaty requires the Agency :

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed ;
- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

Field control measures continued during 1975 on the same basis as during previous years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

The Agency's basic assumption in this respect is that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured. Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, control measures would have to be increased. In any case, the measures taken by the Agency must provide a sufficiently high probability of detecting any contravention.

In the case of its primary task of non-production controls, the Agency once again relied, in 1975, on a comparatively small number of field control measures. However, these measures must be viewed in the context of wide and continuing studies and within a continuing pattern of inspections. Taken overall, these provide a solid basis for the Agency's confidence.

For the second of its tasks, the basic information on levels of stocks of the types of armaments subject to control by the Agency is provided by member countries in their replies to the annual questionnaire. This information is cross-checked not only against earlier declarations, but also against other information received from

a variety of sources, including the findings of previous field control measures. On the basis of these analyses, a programme of field control measures is worked out covering an appropriate sample of the various establishments and sources contributing to the overall levels of stocks.

This programme, involving units, depots and factories, varies in composition from year to year as equipment programmes and other defence policies take effect. Care is taken to maintain the correct balance, while ensuring that the Agency's efforts are directed in the most effective manner. For example, inspections at factories are planned for what is considered to be the most informative stage of the production cycle, and a reasonable balance is aimed at in the distribution of control activities between member countries. In addition, due weight is given to such special factors as policies for the concentration of stocks to reduce management costs or for their dispersal for reasons of vulnerability. The final programme is modified to take account of the latest information available. Accounting checks and physical inspections are then strictly applied by experienced teams of experts. As a result of this thorough check of the figures selected for scrutiny, the accuracy of the remainder can be accepted with every confidence.

Although the Agency's two tasks are separate and specific, the field control measures involved are not considered and programmed in isolation. Thus, at a single factory, control of the quantities of arms being produced may be combined with a non-production control of certain proscribed weapons

(b) Article VIII of Protocol No. IV is of considerable assistance to the Agency in carrying out its mission. It states that to avoid duplication of effort, control measures in respect of forces under NATO authority shall be undertaken by the appropriate NATO authorities. The percentage of forces to be inspected by the Agency therefore varies between member countries, and this must be taken into account in the preparation of its programme. Special considerations apply to the depots also covered by the same Article. In peacetime, each country is wholly responsible for the logistic support of forces placed under NATO authority. It is therefore difficult to determine which of the material in depots is or will be assigned to forces under NATO authority and which is or will be assigned to forces under national command. The system of combined Agency-SHAP inspections, introduced in 1957, was again applied in 1975.

(c) As the Convention for the due process of law¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1975, as in previous years, to take the form of "agreed control measures".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld.

2. Type and extent of field control measures

The programme drawn up by the Agency was carried out in full, in accordance with the well-tried procedure of previous years, except for minor modifications for practical reasons.

In 1975, the total number of seventy-two control measures was slightly higher than the average for the six previous years.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories :

- (a) quantitative control measures at depots ;
- (b) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command ;
- (c) control measures at production plants :
 - (i) quantitative control measures :
These control measures were carried out at aircraft and aircraft engine plants, at plants manufacturing armoured equipment, at plants manufacturing missiles and ammunition, and at shipyards.
 - (ii) non-production control measures :
These control measures were carried out at plants producing chemicals and missiles.

3. Conclusions

(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its task of applying control measures. Such problems as arose from the very complex nature of the inspections were dealt with

¹ Convention concerning measures to be taken by member States of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

satisfactorily through good relations with the national authorities.

(b) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1975, the Agency was able to report to the Council :

- the measures taken for the control of the levels of stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures ;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

E. State and problems of control in certain particular fields

1. Armaments for land forces

(a) Current production and purchases

With regard to armoured material, most of the major programmes for renewal of the Leopard I and AMX-30 battle tanks were completed in 1975. Those relating to other armoured vehicles (Marder, AMX-10P and M-113) are continuing in a number of countries. Production of armoured reconnaissance vehicles began in the Federal Republic of Germany and co-production of the Scorpion by Belgium and the United Kingdom was continued.

Two major anti-aircraft equipment programmes are being developed : the Gepard tank and the Roland missile launcher jointly produced by France and the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the field of artillery, the manufacture of Pluton missile launchers continued in France; in addition, several countries have begun to take delivery of Lance missile launchers.

(b) Control activities in 1975

Control measures were carried out at a number of depots, at several units under national command, and at plants manufacturing armaments for land forces.

2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles

(a) Current production

The following modern guided missiles are under production in the member States : Milan

and Swingfire anti-tank missiles; Crotale, Masurca, Blowpipe, Rapier and Sea-Dart surface-to-air missiles; Martel air-to-surface missile; Matra Magic R-550 air-to-air missile; Exocet sea-to-sea missile; Malafon ASW missile.

In addition, the following guided missiles of the previous generation are still being produced: SS-11 surface-to-surface missile; Vigilant and Cobra anti-tank missiles; AS-12 and AS-30 air-to-surface missiles.

Production of surface-to-surface 110 mm. artillery rockets by the Federal Republic of Germany continues and that of Zuni air-to-ground rockets has started in Belgium.

(b) *Exports*

Guided missiles exported include Cobra, SS-11, Exocet MM-38 and Crotale.

(c) *Control of levels in 1975*

Control measures were carried out at a number of depots containing guided and other self-propelled missiles or launchers, at units under national command equipped with these weapons, and at plants manufacturing guided and other self-propelled missiles.

(d) *Verification of non-production undertakings*

As it does each year, the Agency sent a "request for annual information in order to facilitate the Agency's non-production control of guided missiles and long-range missiles" to the State concerned. No production contrary to undertakings was found during verifications which followed a study of the reply received.

3. *Military aircraft*

(a) *Current production and purchases*

Joint production of the Jaguar A/E by France and the United Kingdom is continuing, as is work on another important programme, that of the Mirage F-1, in France. In Italy, production of the G-91Y aircraft was completed in 1975, and work on the F-104S programme was continued.

The German air force has received the majority of Phantom F-4F aircraft ordered from the United States.

(b) *Future prospects*

Two major aircraft construction programmes were mentioned in the previous annual report

as being in train: the MRCA 75, built jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy; and the Alpha-Jet, by France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Four MRCA 75 prototypes are undergoing tests, and the Alpha-Jet will go into production in 1976.

The United Kingdom programme of Hawk trainer aircraft has reached the prototype stage.

(c) *Control activity in 1975*

Control measures were carried out at depots holding aircraft or aircraft engines, at air force units under national command, and at plants manufacturing aircraft or aircraft engines.

4. *Warships*

(a) *Current construction*

Work was continued in 1975 on the new warship construction programmes mentioned in the previous annual report as being in progress in member countries on the mainland of Europe.

(b) *Control activity in 1975*

Control measures were carried out at naval shipyards.

5. *Chemical weapons*

(a) *List of chemical weapons subject to control*

As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to renew in 1975 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council, who noted the fact.

(b) *Control activities in 1975*

The replies given to the questions asked in implementation of Article III of Protocol No. III show that no effective production of chemical weapons has yet been undertaken on the mainland of Europe by member countries which have not renounced the right to produce such weapons.

As in previous years, the Agency also addressed to the appropriate authorities of the State concerned a "request for annual information to facilitate the non-production control of chemical weapons". The reply received to this request was, as in the past, of great assistance

to the Agency in selecting chemical plants at which to carry out agreed control measures in 1975.

The supplementary procedure designed to increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action, which has been tried out since 1973, was again applied successfully in 1975.

For each control measure carried out, a delegation from the national authorities was present.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II of Protocol No. III.

6. Biological weapons

All member countries reported to the Agency their agreement to renew in 1975 the list of biological weapons subject to control. This was reported to the Council, who noted the fact.

However, it will be recalled (see point B.2 of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises no control in the field of biological weapons.

7. Atomic weapons

Since the situation remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercise any control in the atomic field.

F. Technical information visits and other means of improving the proficiency of the experts

1. Technical information visits have long contributed significantly to improving the documentation available to the Agency's experts. Combined with other existing methods, these visits have enabled them to keep abreast of the most recent developments in the technology of armaments production.

With the active assistance of member countries, at whose invitation these visits take place, it is now possible to plan each annual TIV programme as an integral part of a comprehensive long-term project. A clearer picture of the overall value of TIVs is given by the following summary.

TIVs carried out in 1975 include :

— participation in the following events :

- (i) military and air shows, which are held regularly, such as the exhibi-

tion of army weapons and equipment at Satory, and the Le Bourget Air Show, in France ;

- (ii) the Royal Navy symposium in London and the exhibition of naval equipment at Greenwich ;

- (iii) a tactical demonstration of armoured vehicles and anti-tank weapons at Münsterlager in the Federal Republic of Germany ;

— visits to establishments offering programmes specially prepared for the Agency :

- (i) in France, to establishments involved in the European space programme, supplementing earlier visits to factories working on strategic missile projects ;

- (ii) in the Federal Republic of Germany, to the "Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung" (BWB), which is responsible for equipment procurement, and to one of its weapons test centres ;

- (iii) in Italy, to a missile and rocket test range, which was undergoing a major modernisation programme ;

- (iv) in the United Kingdom, to three large factories where the Agency experts were shown current and future national and international military aircraft and missile programmes, and given briefings on modern production techniques.

The chemical and biological TIVs enabled the experts to study certain particular aspects described below, and to hold useful discussions with senior scientists.

Chemical TIVs were made to Italy and the Netherlands. The Agency experts obtained information on the industrial development of new therapeutic substances for treating the effects of chemical agents.

In the biological field, TIVs were made to the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Agency's experts were briefed on the development of general-purpose or specific microbe culture media for the diagnosis of bacterial diseases. In Italy, they were briefed on the

preparation of vaccines against viral diseases, toxins and animal venoms. In the Netherlands, they were more particularly briefed on the large-scale culture of viruses. In the United Kingdom also, they examined large-scale virus culture processes and the culture of pathogenic bacteria by continuous-flow processes.

2. The Documentation Office continued to collect and collate, for the benefit of the experts, both specialised and other published documents dealing with armaments under study, being developed or in production.

This provides the experts with a continuing source of information, enabling them to keep up to date and increase their knowledge ; and they take advantage of the opportunity to compare the information selected by the office, as required, with facts noted *in situ* on the occasion of visits or control measures in the member countries of the organisation.

G. Miscellaneous contacts

1. Contacts with the national authorities

The Agency again maintained its numerous ties with national authorities, through Agency officials sent on mission and through national representatives visiting Paris.

As in previous years, the main object of these contacts was to arrange inspections and technical information visits, or to solve problems relating to control measures. As usual, these contacts were very helpful to the Agency in fulfilling its task.

2. Contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Contacts were maintained with the appropriate NATO authorities in accordance with the provisions of the revised Brussels Treaty.

Mention should be made, in particular, of the two meetings held to fix the level of armaments of the forces under NATO command, already referred to in point C.2(a) of this chapter. The second of these meetings was followed by an unofficial exchange of views on matters of common interest.

3. Visits to the Agency

The staff and students of the Italian Centre for Advanced Military Studies visited the Agency.

The Agency was also visited by several groups of young civil servants from one of the member countries, sent by the European Cultural Agency.

H. General conclusions

In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1975, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV :

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV ; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957 concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1975 and for each of the member States, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for those categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls :

- either the manufacture in these establishments on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of a category of armaments that the government of this member State has undertaken not to manufacture ;
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1975, the Agency again applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it.

In this, relations between the Agency and the national authorities and services of the member States, and also with those of NATO and SHAPE, continued to play an important part.

CHAPTER IV

STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

A. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee**1. Relations with FINABEL**

Co-operation between the SAC and FINABEL continued in line with the conclusions of the joint meeting of May 1973, referred to in the last two annual reports.

2. Co-operation on armaments questions

It will be recalled that the activities of the SAC cover all three services.

On the basis of replies to a questionnaire drawn up at the request of France, information was exchanged in 1975 on the target-drone requirements for the three services in some of the member countries, in order to bring them into line while taking account of the work of FINABEL relating to ground forces.

The SAC instructed Working Group No. 8 on operational research to study a general method for evaluating military equipment, taking account of national studies already completed and of all available information. In the initial phase, the group was requested to carry out a preliminary study based on the example of the heavy recovery vehicle proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Delegation was first asked to present a summary of an earlier study on the evaluation of this recovery vehicle. Following this, with a view to launching a pilot study to test the effectiveness of this general method on some simple piece of equipment not previously evaluated, the group was asked to give its views on the composition of the body it considered most suitable for this task.

3. WEU agreement 4.FT.6

WEU agreement 4.FT.6 on the technical testing programme for wheeled transport vehicles was approved by the SAC and came into force on 31st January 1975.

The SAC decided that this document should be brought up to date by correspondence, under the responsibility of a pilot country. The United Kingdom, which accepted this task, has already started work. The United Kingdom co-ordinator, assisted by the International Secretariat, drafted a document which was circulated early in May 1975, laying down the procedures to be adopted

by the national experts for the two-yearly revision of this agreement. Amendments and comments were circulated early in November as a first draft of the up-dating report for 1975.

The International Secretariat also circulated two vehicle identification schemes, submitted by Belgium and Italy respectively, together with two initial information sheets submitted by the Netherlands.

An interim progress report on this work as a whole was presented by the pilot country co-ordinator at the SAC's meeting in November.

4. Visits

At the invitation of the French military authorities, members of the SAC visited the 5th Exhibition at Satory on 11th June. They saw equipment for ground forces which was manufactured either in France or jointly by French and foreign firms, particularly from European countries.

National delegates to the SAC also paid a visit, on 19th September, to the Helicopter Division of the SNIAS at Marignane where they gained some insight into the activities and potential of this plant which plays an important rôle in European industrial co-operation.

5. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of armaments

On 18th February, a meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of armaments was held in Paris. At this meeting when, as on previous similar occasions, the Chair was taken by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly, the Assembly representatives were given an overall report of the activities of the SAC and its working groups. In reply to questions, additional information on this report was given by SAC delegates and members of the International Secretariat.

B. Activities of the working groups

Member countries' participation in the working groups is not limited to general discussion but also takes the form of studies and the stimulation, or in some cases the exploitation, of research carried out elsewhere. Such studies can

lead to activities being piloted by a single country with the direct involvement of national experts, thereby avoiding the need to set up further working groups.

1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research

In the course of the year, Working Group No. 8 on operational research held two meetings, the first being combined with a symposium and the second with a visit to the Operational Research Centre of the Federal Republic of Germany at Ottobrunn (Munich).

Exchanges of information continued in the form of communication of new subjects for study, declarations of interest and bilateral exchanges of reports. A WEU library of operational research reports has been set up to assist these exchanges.

Reference was made in earlier annual reports to the important work, begun in 1971, on the compilation of a WEU glossary of operational research terms in five languages, on the basis of an existing Anglo-French glossary. Translation of this document was almost completed at the end of 1975, and the International Secretariat was considering the form it should take. In addition to furthering the main aim of standardisation, this work should also make it easier to use the national language of each member country without risk of confusion.

A symposium on the value of battlefield information gave rise to very detailed discussions of the studies presented by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

At the invitation of the German authorities, the group visited the facilities of the Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft (IABG) at Ottobrunn; a series of studies was presented, dealing mainly with air defence, underwater mine warfare, army personnel questions and battlefield surveillance.

2. Working Group No. 9 on hindrances

Working Group No. 9 is responsible for an experimental three-service study of new means of hindering enemy movement. As this group has now completed most of its studies, it has been decided to suspend its activities until new studies are proposed. In the meantime, the studies on sliding agents and liquid and slurry explosives are judged to be sufficiently advanced and have been transferred to FINABEL which will determine the relevant military requirements.

C. International Secretariat

1. Contacts with member countries and the Council

In Bonn in May 1975, the Assistant Secretary-General discussed the SAC's activities with Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the course of the year, the Assistant Secretary-General, at the invitation of the governments concerned, visited armaments factories in Germany, in Italy and in the United Kingdom.

These visits were accompanied by useful discussions with the managements of the companies concerned and by working meetings with government representatives dealing with these matters in Rome and London.

Finally, on 29th April, the Assistant Secretary-General as usual presented his annual verbal statement to the Council on the activities of the SAC and its working groups.

2. WEU Assembly

All references made during sessions of the Assembly to questions relating to armaments co-operation were reproduced in a document prepared by the International Secretariat for the benefit of delegates to the SAC.

3. Contacts with NATO

As usual, the Assistant Secretary-General attended the Conference of National Armaments Directors as an observer; similarly, a NATO observer was invited to attend the SAC's meetings, and a representative of the SAC's International Secretariat attended meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

4. Contacts with FINABEL

Harmonious relations were maintained between the International Secretariat of the SAC and the FINABEL Secretariat. At their annual meeting the chiefs-of-staff of the FINABEL member countries' ground forces, who are concerned by the problem of duplication, noted that the good contacts between the two organisations ensured that neither would duplicate the work of the other.

As in the last two years, the SAC's International Secretariat was represented at the annual meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee in November 1975. These meetings, in which current and planned work is reviewed, also provide an opportunity for exchanges of views and information with the chairmen of all the FINABEL working groups.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

A. Meetings of the Committee

The Public Administration Committee held its two annual meetings in Munich, from 21st to 23rd May, and at Sarlat, from 29th September to 1st October.

At these meetings, the Committee continued its exchanges of information on new developments affecting the administrations of member countries. The subjects dealt with included : the position of unestablished staff (contractual and auxiliary) ; the lowering of the age of retirement ; the access to administrative documents for the public ; the participation of trade unions in determining conditions of employment in the civil service ; the implementation of regionalisation in Italy.

The Committee has studied two subjects in greater detail in recent months. The first concerns the organisation and methods of informing the public about the administration (duties, organisation, co-ordination of information services, etc.). The subject of the second study, now nearing completion, is the remuneration of civil servants and systems of adjusting payment in public administration (elements of remuneration, deductions, criteria and procedures for periodic adjustments, etc.) ; a comparative table, showing the similarities and differences between the systems applied in member countries, will shortly be completed.

B. Multilateral course for government officials

The twenty-fourth course for government officials, organised by the Public Administration Committee, took place in Florence from 10th to 21st November.

For the reasons given in the Council's twentieth annual report, the Committee decided that in 1975, they would make a break from the series of training courses for young civil servants, which they had been organising for some years, and would revert to the study of a specific subject by experienced civil servants. As 1975 was International Women's Year, the Committee thought it appropriate to select for this course a theme fitting in with the numerous other events arranged in this connection. The subject was : The position of women in the civil service.

With this in mind, a majority of the twenty-two officials attending were women. A series of meetings with women representatives of the civil service was also included in the programme.

The various problems of women's employment were considered, not only from the purely statutory point of view, but also with regard to the practical problems raised by the employment of increasing numbers of women staff in the public service. Participants studied the legal and practical aspects of women's position in the traditional civil service (promotion, appointment to senior executive posts, etc.), and their place in departments such as that of justice, the prison service, the police and the social services.

Once again, the organisers noted the interest shown by participants in courses of this kind, which provide them with an opportunity — sometimes for the first time — to exchange views and experiences with their colleagues from other member countries, within a sufficiently small group to allow genuine personal contacts to be made. The fresh knowledge and wider horizons so acquired by the participants confirm the value of this aspect of the Public Administration Committee's activities.

C. Study visits

The programme of study visits arranged under the auspices of the Committee continued as usual during the year.

These visits enable officials to spend one or two weeks studying their own speciality within the administration of another member country. They therefore naturally cover a wide variety of subjects, as can be seen from the following examples of visits during the year under review : administration of and technical problems associated with botanical gardens ; recommended resale prices ; dispersal of government work ; administration of the system of regional financial incentives for industrial developments ; organisation of police agencies at national and regional level in respect of road traffic ; social assistance policy and practice to individuals and families in trade disputes, etc.

A report is prepared after each visit and circulated to all members of the Committee who

forward it to the departments concerned in their own administration. This dissemination of results is undoubtedly one of the special features of visits made under the auspices of the Public Administration Committee.

D. *Secondment of national officials to international organisations*

As stated in the previous annual report, the Public Administration Committee was instructed by the Council in 1974 to follow the implementation by member States of the principles defined by the special working group set up in 1971 to study the secondment of national officials to international organisations. These principles, which the Council transmitted to the member governments with a recommendation for their application, were given in Chapter VI, point F. 1 of the twentieth annual report.

Acting on these instructions, the Committee asked each of its members to carry out a survey in his national administration, on the basis of a common questionnaire to assess how far these principles are applied and to identify the nature of any difficulties encountered.

In their reply to point II of Recommendation 265, sent to the Assembly at the end of November, the Council stated that this survey was in course of completion and that they would shortly be receiving the results. They in fact did so four weeks later. The Council will therefore be able to consider this question afresh at the beginning of 1976, to determine whether the Public Administration Committee should be asked to take their survey any further or to look at the position again after an interval. The Council will keep the Assembly informed of developments in this field, if it so requests.

CHAPTER VI

BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS**A. Budget**

Summaries of the main, revised and total budgets for 1975 and the main budget for 1976 are shown in the appendix to this report.

A revised budget for 1975 was introduced to take account of the effects of increases in salaries and allowances resulting from the 1974 general review which received the approval of Councils in the course of 1975.

The new form of presentation of the WEU budget, which was described in the twentieth annual report, was maintained in the 1976 budget. The time-table for presentation of the budget, however, was rearranged in order to conform with that agreed between Council and Assembly for examination of the Assembly's budget.

A new format, to take account of the anticipated introduction of the pension scheme, was approved by the Budget and Organisation Committee. This would entail the inclusion of two new chapters in the existing budgets of the WEU offices.

B. WEU administrative meetings

To facilitate common application of administrative policies and to examine matters of common interest, administrative officials of the Secretariat-General, the Armaments Control Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Office of the Clerk met periodically in the course of 1975.

C. WEU provident fund

The continued fluctuation in currency parities throughout 1975 much concerned the Secretariat-General and the advisory panel set up in 1972 to make practical arrangements for the administration of the provident fund. In order to protect staff as much as possible against capital losses resulting from the depreciation of certain currencies, the policy of investing on a short-term basis, which had been adopted in 1974, was considered to be the most prudent, while appreciating that interest rates were, in some cases, less beneficial than investment in the longer

term. With a view to mitigating risks and securing higher interest rates, the number of currencies in which the fund was invested was reduced in the course of the year.

D. Introduction of new British social security scheme

The introduction of the new British social security scheme, incorporating an earnings-related pension system in addition to the basic State pension, has given rise to several delicate problems and will, if applied in its entirety to WEU, entail very much higher contributions than hitherto, both from the organisation and staff members serving in the United Kingdom.

Negotiations have therefore been opened between the British Government and WEU in order to determine under what conditions and to what extent (if any), WEU and the staff should participate in the scheme. Pending a solution, provision has been made in the WEU budget for payment of the employers' contributions under the new scales and the contributions from staff members have been deducted from their monthly salaries. These sums will be held by the organisation until arrangements for participation in the scheme have been concluded.

E. Activities within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations**1. Committee of Heads of Administration**

Most of the meetings of the Heads of Administration of the co-ordinated organisations during 1975 were devoted to the pension scheme, the draft rules for which were under discussion in the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, the 1974 general review, and the proposal by certain governments to amend the procedures by which salaries of international staffs are adjusted.

The Administrative Committee on Pensions, which had been set up in 1974 to draft internal instructions for the application of the pension scheme rules, had completed its task by the end of 1975 and the draft instructions now await approval by the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General.

2. Standing Committee of Secretaries-General

The Standing Committee of Secretaries-General held several meetings, both formal and informal, in the course of 1975, in addition to four joint meetings with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations.

As in the case of the Committee of Heads of Administration, the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General was primarily concerned with the pension scheme, the 1974 general review and the proposed changes in the salary adjustment procedures. It also submitted to the Co-ordinating Committee a number of proposals for the exceptional review of salaries for staff serving in several member countries, in accordance with agreed procedures.

3. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts

The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, which met fifteen times in 1975, issued seventeen reports, Nos. 110-126, in the course of the year.

Those which affected WEU were the following :

111th report : Exceptional review of salaries for staff serving in the United Kingdom and United States. (6.1 % cost-of-living increase for staff serving in the United Kingdom)

114th report : Exceptional review of salaries for staff serving in France and Norway. (7.6 % cost-of-living increase for staff serving in France)

116th report : Annual review of rates of subsistence allowance for staff on mission.

117th report : Exceptional review of salaries for staff serving in Japan and the United Kingdom. (5.9 % cost-of-living increase for staff serving in the United Kingdom)

118th report : 1974 general review of salaries for B and C grade staffs of the co-ordinated organisations.

122nd report : Exceptional review of salaries for staff serving in Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. (8.6 % cost-of-living increase for staff serving in the United Kingdom)

123rd report : 1974 general review of salaries for A and L grade staffs of the co-ordinated organisations.

125th report : Annual review of salaries of all staff of the co-ordinated organisations.

126th report : Pension scheme — cost of validating past service.

The main activities of the Co-ordinating Committee focused on the draft pension scheme rules and, among the principal problems which created difficulty were, first, the extent to which pensions should be taxed and, secondly, the amounts required from serving staff for the validation of past service in order to qualify for a pension.

A solution to the taxation problem, which was the subject of the Co-ordinating Committee's 109th report to Councils at the end of 1974 (see twentieth annual report), lies broadly in the reimbursement of 50 % of tax paid by pensioners on their pensions. A centralised taxation unit, to deal with the taxation of pensions of staff of all the co-ordinated organisations, is likely to be set up.

On the question of validation, the inability to reach agreement within the Co-ordinating Committee led to its issuing the 126th report which sought the aid of Councils in finding a solution (see 126th report above).

It is to be hoped that this problem will be resolved early in 1976 to enable the Co-ordinating Committee to submit, for Councils' approval, the full texts of the draft pension rules.

Other questions concerning pensions in which the Assembly has expressed interest, were answered by the Council in their replies to Recommendations 250 and 265.

As indicated in the twentieth annual report, the proposals of the Secretaries-General for the 1974 general review were limited to salary adjustments to take account of standard-of-living trends between 1st October 1971 and 1st July 1974. No modifications or additions to the system of allowances were proposed. These proposals, subject to certain reductions, were approved by the Council in the course of 1975.

The acceleration of inflation in several countries, resulting in frequently recurring exceptional reviews of staff remunerations to meet increases in cost of living, led the Co-ordinating Committee to re-examine the procedures adopted since 1971 for salary adjustments. To this end, the Committee decided to set up a special working group to study alternative procedures, covering exceptional, annual and general reviews. The working group was instructed to report its findings to the Co-ordinating Committee by 31st October, to enable the Committee to recommend

to Councils new procedures which would take effect from 1st July 1976. Pending the introduction of these new procedures, exceptional reviews would be suspended as from 1st July 1975.

The Co-ordinating Committee is currently studying the working group's report and is expected to make its recommendations to Councils early in 1976.

F. WEU Staff Association

The Secretariat-General has, at the request of the WEU Staff Association, brought to the

notice of governments, a number of points which are giving rise to serious preoccupation among the personnel. These concern the proposed rules for the taxation of pensions, the projected modification of salary adjustment procedures and in the case of non-resident staff, the particular difficulties facing them in meeting commitments in their own countries as a result of currency fluctuations.

G. Secondment of national officials to international organisations

See Chapter V, D.

APPENDIX

Summary of WEU main budget for 1975

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	481,305	4,850,790	10,609,960	15,460,750
Travel	13,360	72,700	229,000	301,700
Other operating costs	61,605	270,925	396,620	667,545
Purchase of furniture, etc.	3,210	13,500	18,300	31,800
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	559,480	5,207,915	11,253,880	16,461,795
WEU tax	154,355	1,645,020	3,602,970	5,247,990
Other receipts	7,315	12,000	16,600	28,600
TOTAL INCOME	161,670	1,657,020	3,619,570	5,276,590
NET TOTAL	397,810	3,550,895	7,634,310	11,185,205

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1975

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	39,117.98	1,099,878.49
France	120	79,562.00	2,237,041.00
Germany	120	79,562.00	2,237,041.00
Italy	120	79,562.00	2,237,041.00
Luxembourg	2	1,326.04	37,284.02
Netherlands	59	39,117.98	1,099,878.49
United Kingdom	120	79,562.00	2,237,041.00
TOTAL	600	397,810.00	11,185,205.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of WEU revised budget for 1975

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	+ 17,430	+ 162,663	+ 417,281	+ 579,944
Travel	—	—	—	—
Other operating costs	+ 4,900	—	—	—
Purchase of furniture, etc.	—	—	—	—
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	+ 22,330	+ 162,663	+ 417,281	+ 579,944
WEU tax	+ 7,745	+ 72,743	+ 87,237	+ 159,980
Other receipts	—	—	—	—
TOTAL INCOME	+ 7,745	+ 72,743	+ 87,237	+ 159,980
NET TOTAL	+ 14,585	+ 89,920	+ 330,044	+ 419,964

National contributions called for under the WEU revised budget for 1975

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	1,434.19	41,296.46
France	120	2,917.00	83,992.80
Germany	120	2,917.00	83,992.80
Italy	120	2,917.00	83,992.80
Luxembourg	2	48.62	1,399.88
Netherlands	59	1,434.19	41,296.46
United Kingdom	120	2,917.00	83,992.80
TOTAL	600	14,585.00	419,964.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of total WEU budget for 1975

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	498,735	5,013,453	11,027,241	16,040,694
Travel	13,360	72,700	229,000	301,700
Other operating costs	66,505	270,925	396,620	667,545
Purchase of furniture, etc.	3,210	13,500	18,300	31,800
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	581,810	5,370,578	11,671,161	17,041,739
WEU tax	162,100	1,717,763	3,690,207	5,407,970
Other receipts	7,315	12,000	16,600	28,600
TOTAL INCOME	169,415	1,729,763	3,706,807	5,436,570
NET TOTAL	412,395	3,640,815	7,964,354	11,605,169

National contributions called for under the total WEU budget for 1975

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	40,552.17	1,141,174.95
France	120	82,479.00	2,321,033.80
Germany	120	82,479.00	2,321,033.80
Italy	120	82,479.00	2,321,033.80
Luxembourg	2	1,374.66	38,683.90
Netherlands	59	40,552.17	1,141,174.95
United Kingdom	120	82,479.00	2,321,033.80
TOTAL	600	412,395.00	11,605,169.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of WEU draft main budget for 1976

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	591,510	5,239,270	11,549,010	16,788,280
Travel	15,245	72,700	297,400	370,100
Other operating costs	70,995	349,200	423,120	772,320
Purchase of furniture, etc.	1,915	13,000	20,800	33,800
Buildings	—	—	—	—
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	679,665	5,674,170	12,290,330	17,964,500
WEU tax	192,635	1,771,220	3,925,820	5,697,040
Other receipts	3,750	21,200	34,960	56,160
TOTAL INCOME	196,385	1,792,420	3,960,780	5,753,200
NET TOTAL	483,280	3,881,750	8,329,550	12,211,300

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

European union and WEU

REPORT¹

**submitted to the Presidential Committee *
on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur**

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on European union and WEU

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submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur

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III. European union and defence problems

IV. European union and the WEU Assembly

V. Conclusions

* In accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

1. Adopted in Committee by 17 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers (Substitute: Channon), Mr. Bettiol (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens (Substitute: Margue), Amrehn (Substitute: Alber), Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnion (Substitute:

Weber), Cermolacce, Fioret, Fletcher (Substitute: Mendelson), Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: de Bruyne), MM. Grangier (Substitute: Soustelle), Leynen (Substitute: de Stezhe), Mende (Substitute: Mrs. Wolf), Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Périquier, Porthéine, Preti (Substitute: Magliano), Quilleri (Substitute: Treu), Schmidt, Steel, Urwin (Substitute: Lewis), Van Hoeylandt.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution
on European union and WEU

The Assembly,

Noting the decision by the nine member countries of the EEC to set up a European union by 1980 and to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage as from 1978 ;

Noting the report submitted by Mr. Léo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the members of the European Council in January 1976 ;

Noting further that the modified Brussels Treaty is at present the only juridical basis for a European defence policy ;

Considering that the development of the European union must not be an occasion for weakening the mutual commitments of the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Believing that continuing consultations between European countries on defence policy must be based on recognition of existing reciprocal obligations ;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly, established under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is responsible for supervising the application of that treaty ;

Considering that this Assembly cannot therefore entertain the transfer of its activities to another parliamentary assembly unless the latter has the right and obligation to supervise the application of the modified Brussels Treaty,

INVITES THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

1. To make certain that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are respected in establishing the European union ;
2. Not to infringe the rights of any WEU body unless its full responsibilities have been transferred by treaty to a body of the union ;
3. To examine how to integrate WEU in the union rather than develop new institutions in fields in which WEU has legally-instituted responsibilities ;
4. To maintain at all events a parliamentary assembly with statutory competence for all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Ever since its inception, the WEU Assembly has kept a continuing watch on every aspect of the organisation of Europe. It received its mandate from the modified Brussels Treaty which provided for a joint defence policy between the seven member countries (Articles IV and V) and close co-operation in the economic field (Article I) and in political, cultural and social matters (Articles VIII, III and II). However, as and when new forms of European co-operation developed, particularly the European Economic Community, the WEU Council — and even the Assembly in some cases — stopped dealing with matters which were discussed by all the member countries in other frameworks.

2. For instance, since the United Kingdom joined the European Community and nine-power political consultations were introduced, WEU has stopped handling economic and social matters and the WEU Council, which now meets only rarely, has relinquished most of its political activities in favour of nine-power intergovernmental consultations. This in no way means that WEU has relinquished the responsibilities assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty, but only that it relies on others to exercise them. It should also be noted that the Assembly has continued, particularly in the political field, to consider a large number of matters not dealt with by the Council and that the latter has undertaken to report to it on the state of European co-operation in all fields relating to the modified Brussels Treaty, even if such co-operation is conducted elsewhere.

3. It is not therefore surprising that the WEU Assembly has followed most attentively all the steps taken by member governments in recent years to organise a European union. European union has been on the agenda of all its sessions for several years and, on 11th September 1975, the Presidential Committee met between sessions and adopted Resolution 55 which conveyed the Assembly's opinion to Mr. Léo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, responsible for submitting a report on the prospects of European union to the nine governments. Mr. Edmond Nessler, President of the Assembly, personally handed this resolution to Mr. Tindemans and thus had

an opportunity of explaining the Assembly's views on matters of concern to it before the Minister submitted his report to the European Council at the beginning of 1976. Resolution 55 specifically urged Mr. Tindemans :

"To facilitate the exercise by the WEU Assembly of its responsibilities in the defence field by recommending that the European Council seek its opinion on any plans it may draw up for the defence of Europe."

4. Mr. Tindemans' report has now been published, and your Rapporteur's aim is to study its implications for WEU.

II. The Tindemans report and prospects of European union

5. Mr. Tindemans' report appears to have two aims. The first, implicit throughout the text, is to pave the way for the constitution of a federal-type Europe in the not too distant future. This overall goal emerges in at least three connections.

(i) The report imposes no limits on the responsibilities which it proposes governments should accord to the European Parliament.

(ii) The report proposes that henceforth only the President of the European Communities be appointed by the Council, i.e. by the representatives of member States. The President of the Commission would then be invested by the European Parliament and would himself form the rest of the Commission in accordance with a procedure which would make him a real European Head of Government.

(iii) The report proposed including at a very early date among the responsibilities of the European union matters not assigned to it by international treaty — defence, for instance, which is of prime interest to WEU and its Assembly.

6. It must be borne in mind that Mr. Tindemans' report does not aim even in part at drawing up the charter of the future Europe and the author says so in the covering letter, but merely at making a series of proposals for consideration by the nine governments in respect of

decisions to be taken fairly soon. In the letter communicating his report to his colleagues on the European Council, Mr. Tindemans invites them to discuss all the matters touched upon in his report.

7. Moreover, it is clear that Mr. Tindemans wished to be realistic and avoid proposing anything which governments would find unacceptable now or in the fairly near future. Thus it is confirmed that the Council still carries greater weight than the Commission, although subsequently the balance may swing more in the Commission's favour. Again, in cases of absolute necessity, in the monetary field for instance, the report makes provision for individual countries to be allowed to delay application of principles defined for the Community as a whole. But since such countries are required to take part in Community deliberations, if not decisions, on matters concerning which they have reserved their rights, their position would be considered exceptional and provisional and consequently it would be taken that they had adhered to the principles although deferring their application.

8. But Mr. Tindemans' proposals about the future European union are far from exhaustive. *Inter alia*, they leave it to the Council to define Europe's policy in at least three fields left open in the report :

9. (i) Quite understandably, the report does not specify the juridical form of the European union. This leaves the Community free to develop outside international treaties. It will be recalled that General de Gaulle based his action in the European Community on the treaties in order to oppose activities extending beyond the treaty commitments and this to some extent paralysed and disorganised the European Community. The union foreseen by Mr. Tindemans would not evade such risks, France not being the only country with reservations about a federal trend in the Community. At the moment, for instance, it is an open secret that the United Kingdom has major reservations in economic and monetary matters and the Netherlands in defence.

10. (ii) Mr. Tindemans mainly indicates where institutional progress may be made but does not — nor was it his task moreover — say what Community policy might be. This is particularly clear in passages on Europe's relations with the United States and defence policy. This approach has the great advantage of allowing parliaments to give their opinions before governments are

committed to final, set positions, leaving it in the long run to the European Council to give substance to the machinery thus created.

11. Tactically, this way of looking at things can be of great value since it allows States, or even parties, to accept progress towards a federal Europe without first adopting a position on the principles which they have to explain to their own public opinion. A risk with this method, however, is that difficulties and differences may be kept in store for the future European union. Finally, the outcome could be just the opposite of what was intended, i.e. certain countries or parties might *a priori* accuse the European union of encouraging what they do not want. This danger is now taking shape in the attitude adopted by certain political forces in several European countries.

12. (iii) The report does not place the European union in its relations with the United States. Although it proposes that the European countries be represented by one person or body when negotiating with the United States, this is not enough to solve the problems raised by such relations. Thus to advocate a European defence policy is unavailing if nothing is said about what it could be in relation to NATO. Similarly, to envisage monetary union calls for an explanation of how it can become more than a mere extension of the present monetary policies of European States, which make Europe dependent on the dollar area, in other words a sector where monetary stability or instability is still governed by the ups and downs of American domestic policy.

III. European union and defence problems

13. A brief sketch of Mr. Tindemans' report had to be drawn in order to bring out the significance of the passages dealing more specifically with defence questions and WEU.

14. Mr. Tindemans recognises that it is impossible at present to advance resolutely towards a European defence policy in view of the very different positions adopted by the European Community countries. At the same time, he has tried to indicate what progress he feels could be achieved now, however limited it may be.

15. There are several reasons for thinking that Europe is still far from being able to define a joint defence policy.

16. (i) France and the United Kingdom are nuclear powers and, as matters now stand, intend

to keep their nuclear weapons and probably, in the case of France at least, exclusive control of them. Conversely, the Netherlands Government has frequently stated that it would not agree to European defence including nuclear weapons. On 22nd January 1976, for instance, Mr. Vredeling, Netherlands Minister of Defence, told the Second Chamber of the States-General in The Hague, when commenting on Mr. Tindemans' report :

"The trend is towards a European union and some form of defence co-operation is desirable, but it is complicated by the fact that France and Britain are nuclear powers. The Netherlands view is and remains that, in the framework of closer European co-operation, unacceptable developments in the nuclear field must be rejected."

17. But it is fundamental for any European defence policy to know whether it can be based on the use of nuclear weapons straight away by some European countries and perhaps later by a European organisation. But at the present juncture the European Council seems to be in no position to give the matter serious consideration.

18. (ii) It should be recalled that eight of the EEC member countries are members of the Atlantic Alliance, but not Ireland. Furthermore, seven of them are members of WEU, but not Ireland and Denmark. Seven are also members of NATO, but although Denmark is a member, France is not, nor, of course, Ireland. This means that defence commitments entered into by the Nine are very unequal and different, and they have a very low common denominator. There is no reason to think that Ireland is about to abandon its policy of non-alignment. The General Affairs Committee completed a recent visit to Denmark with the impression that the Danish Government had absolutely no intention of joining WEU. Finally, although France co-operates with NATO in a number of fields it appears unlikely to return to NATO, at least for some time.

19. (iii) Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty contains a mutual assistance clause which is infinitely more binding than that contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: whereas signatories of the latter agree only to take "such action as it deems necessary" in the event of an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe, the Brussels Treaty on the contrary makes it binding upon the members

of WEU to afford "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" — and thus where appropriate by nuclear means for the countries so able — should any of them be the object of an armed attack. It should be added that in the case of the Atlantic Pact this action is to be taken "in concert with the other parties", which implies a unanimous decision, whereas under the Brussels Treaty it is automatic.

20. Conversely, although not set out in a treaty, NATO military integration is a *de facto* commitment by the member countries to take joint action in the event of war in Europe. The result is that, apart from Ireland, the Community countries are in fact committed to a policy of joint defence, although France and Denmark do not have the same obligations. Europe's defence is therefore ensured only by the coexistence of the Atlantic Pact, the NATO integrated military structure and WEU. The disappearance of one of these elements might dislocate or at least seriously weaken the whole defence system to which Europe owes twenty-five years of peace.

21 (iv) Mr. Tindemans' proposals for a European armaments agency in the framework of the Nine and increased consultations on defence and foreign policy in the same framework, meet an oft-repeated wish of the WEU Assembly. For instance, on 30th November 1971, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 211, submitted by Lord Gladwyn on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, urging the WEU Council to :

"Make a real effort to set up a Western European armaments agency, involving standardisation of European armaments, designed to produce a more efficient defence for the same, or even at reduced cost, thus establishing Western Europe as a valid 'partner' of the United States in a continuing Atlantic Alliance."

22. Again, on 28th May 1975 it adopted Recommendation 270, submitted by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the same Committee, asking the Council to :

"Propose that a future meeting of the European Council study the requirements of a European defence policy in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty ;

With this conference in view, ask member governments to make the necessary preparatory studies now."

23. Moreover, when Mr. Tindemans proposes to make the European Parliament responsible for considering matters relating to European defence

he takes as a basis the *de facto* solidarity between the Nine in the security field.

24. At the present stage, however, great care should be taken to ensure that action taken in the name of the future European union does not lead to machinery being introduced for consultations which are no longer linked with obligations. First, progress towards a European union must not be merely institutional but a real move towards joint political action. It is above all essential that the European union should not fall short of what already exists in Europe. If machinery for consultation does not involve positive commitments, it is highly probable that, in view of the widely-differing approaches to defence matters among the Nine, any joint decision might be blocked at any time the moment one of them failed to agree with certain implications of the joint defence policy. What recourse would then be possible? Provision would obviously have to be made for the special case of Ireland, but it is not easy to see how the Netherlands, with its defence policy, could do other than refuse systematically any European initiative in the nuclear field. Likewise France might oppose any organisation of conventional defence if it were to be more closely linked with NATO. Hence the WEU Assembly has always emphasised that the modified Brussels Treaty is the soundest basis for a European defence policy. As soon as the idea of a European union was mooted, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 226 on a report by Mr. Scott-Hopkins, asking the Council to :

“Examine how best to organise the defence of Western Europe within the Atlantic Alliance using WEU as the nucleus of such an organisation in the context of the European union foreseen for 1980 in the communiqué of 22nd October 1972.”

25. (v) Mr. Tindemans' report does not mention the Standing Armaments Committee but advocates the creation of a European armaments agency. If formed in the framework of the EEC, this would have the advantage of associating Ireland and Denmark with the seven member countries of the SAC, but the armaments production of these two countries does not justify replacing the SAC by a European agency.

26. The problem is therefore to determine what this European agency will be, its position in relation to the SAC on the one hand and Eurogroup and the European programme group on the other. Mention should be made here of the

attempts by several WEU member countries since 1973 to reactivate the SAC. After the ambitious but vaguely-defined proposals by Mr. Jobert in December 1973, Mr. Van Elslande proposed to the Assembly in December 1974 that the study of possibilities for European co-operation in the field of armaments production be taken over by the Standing Armaments Committee. *Inter alia*, he said :

“The industrial problem, and that of exports which is closely bound up with it, are by far the most vast and most delicate. I believe that WEU could devote itself to the study of these questions, to which insufficient attention has hitherto been paid. WEU includes the chief European producers. The first step must be a thorough study of the structures of the military sectors in the economy of each country. We must also ascertain what is their relative importance, what forms of specialisation are possible and what can be done about the pooling and financing of research activities. Finally, we must determine the best ways towards progressive integration, taking account of existing financial structures and of alliances which may constitute an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on circumstances.”

27. The rather vague information since supplied by the WEU Council gives the impression that no real progress has been made in this field, although it has never been officially stated that the study has been abandoned. But perhaps the proposals made by Eurogroup at the end of 1975 imply that efforts in the framework of WEU have failed.

28. Admittedly the Standing Armaments Committee was not established by the modified Brussels Treaty itself but by a decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1955 which can be renounced without modifying the treaty.

29. However, there seems no reason to believe that the stumbling-block now impeding the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, i.e. governmental reluctance to overcome economic and technical obstacles to standardisation and particularly the joint production of armaments by the seven WEU countries, would not still exist for a European agency if the latter were not based on commitments similar to those entered into by the WEU countries. On the contrary, Resolution 55 of the WEU Assembly urged Mr. Tindemans :

"When considering defence, to take account of the fundamental provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols, i.e. :
.....

- the existence of the Standing Armaments Committee which is in a position to make a major contribution to the preparation of a joint European policy in the field of armaments and equipment and thus to pave the way for the creation of a 'European arms agency'."

IV. European union and the WEU Assembly

30. On page 52 of the English version of Mr. Tindemans' report, a footnote reads :

"The extension of the competences of the European union and consequently those of the European Parliament to matters hitherto discussed in the Assembly of Western European Union leads one to question the need to maintain the activity of the parliamentary institution of the WEU."

31. It would therefore seem that Mr. Tindemans is proposing that the WEU Assembly should be wound up as soon as possible and its responsibilities transferred to the European Parliament.

32. Closer scrutiny of this text, however, shows that the existence of the WEU Assembly could be called in question only after "the competences" of the European union have been extended. But the competences of the WEU Assembly are governed by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. The treaty would have to be revised for them to be transferred to another organisation. It must therefore be recognised that Mr. Tindemans proposes winding up the WEU Assembly only in the event of the European Council having actually taken over all the responsibilities assigned to WEU in the Brussels Treaty, i.e. when there is no longer any reason for the Council to report on its work to two different assemblies depending on whether it concerns economic or defence matters.

33. Were he to propose that the modified Brussels Treaty no longer be applied, it would be tantamount to admitting that any of the commitments it contains could be considered a dead letter. Such a point of view would be very dangerous since it might also apply to the limitation and control of armaments and to the British commitment to maintain the Rhine army,

or even to Article V, which is France's main defence commitment towards its European partners. Furthermore, to revise the Brussels Treaty would open the door to negotiations which might cover all these matters, provide one or other country with an opportunity of withdrawing from its commitments and thus disturb the complex balance of commitments on which the treaty as a whole is based. If the treaty were now to be renegotiated it is not at all certain that the Seven would again accept the commitments they were willing to accept in 1954, although there seems to be no strong call to change them.

34. It must therefore be ensured that through WEU, or merely through its Assembly, the whole Brussels Treaty mechanism is not compromised by Community bodies assuming, without formal transfer, the responsibilities exercised by WEU. This in no way means that WEU must, in the long term at least, remain outside the European union. Quite the contrary, the integration of WEU as a whole by merging the Brussels and Rome Treaties in the European union would allow the defence side of the union to be developed without detracting from what has already been achieved by the Brussels Treaty and the organisation built around it. Then, and in the framework of a merger of the treaties, the Assembly's fate might be re-examined.

35. This was the Assembly's view on 2nd December 1975 when it adopted Recommendation 273, submitted by Mr. Leynen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, asking that the Council :

"Implement in the framework of its responsibilities the principles defined in Resolution 55 of the Assembly, and in particular :

- (a) ensure that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied in full until such time as the European union has the necessary powers and means of action to exercise defence responsibilities ;
- (b) maintain all its activities as long as they have not been attributed by treaty to the institutions of the union."

36. Where the Assembly is more specifically concerned, several solutions might be envisaged : one might be for the Assembly to be composed of the representatives of the member countries to the European Parliament and no longer the Council of Europe so that it might continue to

play, in the framework of the European union, the rôle assigned to it by the Brussels Treaty. The election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, planned for 1978, might then be considered as a starting point for extending the powers of the parliament to include the responsibilities of the WEU Assembly, in the framework of a merger of the treaties.

37. However, your Rapporteur is rather cautious towards this prospect: the defence responsibilities which Mr. Tindemans' report foresaw for the future European union are inevitably conservative and clearly for a long time to come all major decisions in this field will be taken by the governments whose normal partners will continue to be the national parliaments. On the other hand, an assembly elected by direct universal suffrage, which would consequently no longer represent these parliaments, would carry little authority vis-à-vis the governments if its opposite number is the European Commission which has no responsibilities in defence matters. Elected by universal suffrage, the European Parliament could be an excellent parliamentary partner for the union's executive in fields in which the union has effective responsibilities but not where true power lies with the government. The great merit of the WEU Assembly in its twenty-one years of existence has probably been to accustom parliamentarians from the member countries to consider defence problems from a European standpoint. Electing the European Parliament by universal suffrage will not allow it to fulfil this task, and your Rapporteur is convinced that at the present juncture it would

be preferable for the WEU Assembly to remain unchanged and for the Council to continue to report to it on the implementation of the Brussels Treaty, even in fields where its responsibilities are exercised by other organisations.

V. Conclusions

38. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that the ambiguity arising from the note on the WEU Assembly in Mr. Tindemans' report must be dispelled. The Assembly should adopt a position on this essential matter before the European Council discusses Mr. Tindemans' report in detail and communicate its opinion to the members of the European Council as soon as possible.

39. In accordance with the arrangements made by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly, he therefore proposes that, without waiting until the next session, the Presidential Committee meet to adopt a resolution which the President might submit to members of the European Council as previously in the case of Resolution 55. The purpose of this approach would be to recall how essential the modified Brussels Treaty is for the European union. At the same time, it would be a warning concerning any institutional procedure destined to simplify and rationalise the organisation of the European union, which might in the long run weaken the defence commitments of the member countries, it being undeniable that the various elements of the modified Brussels Treaty cannot be taken separately, nor can WEU be split away from the treaty which created it.

European union and WEU

RESOLUTION 59

***adopted by the Presidential Committee
on 1st March 1976¹***

The Assembly,

Noting the decision by the nine member countries of the EEC to set up a European union by 1980 and to elect the European Parliament by universal suffrage as from 1978 ;

Noting the report submitted by Mr. Léo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the members of the European Council in January 1976 ;

Noting further that the modified Brussels Treaty is at present the only juridical basis for a European defence policy ;

Considering that the development of the European union must not be an occasion for weakening the mutual commitments of the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Believing that continuing consultations between European countries on defence policy must be based on recognition of existing reciprocal obligations ;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly, established under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is responsible for supervising the application of that treaty ;

Considering that this Assembly cannot therefore entertain the transfer of its activities to another parliamentary assembly unless the latter has the right and obligation to supervise the application of the modified Brussels Treaty,

INVITES THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

1. To make certain that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are respected in establishing the European union ;
2. Not to infringe the rights of any WEU body unless its full responsibilities have been transferred by treaty to a body of the union ;
3. To examine how to integrate WEU in the union rather than develop new institutions in fields in which WEU has legally-instituted responsibilities ;
4. To maintain at all events a parliamentary assembly with statutory competence for all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. In accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council

REPORT ¹
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Critchley (Chairman); MM. Klepsch (Substitute : Alber), Dankert (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Averardi, Beauguitte (Substitute : Delorme), Bizet, Bouloche, Buck, Haase, Hardy (Substitute : Sir Harwood Harrison), Kempinaire, Konen, de

Koster (Substitute : Piket), Laforgia, Lemmrich, Ménard, Pawelczyk (Substitute : Enders), Faulds, Pumilia, Reale, Richter (Substitute : Schwencke), Rivière, Roper, Scholten, Schugens (Substitute : Breyne), Tanghe, Vedovato.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the application of the Brussels Treaty —
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

Welcoming the continued prompt action by the Council which enabled the twenty-first annual report to be communicated by 4th March ;

Believing that when the mutual defence obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy, only then will the time have come to abrogate the arms control provisions of the treaty ;

Again congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried out in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too-limited tasks assigned to it by the Council,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply each year the Secretary-General's new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual report ;
2. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the mutual defence undertakings are effectively incorporated in a treaty of European union, and meanwhile that it :
 - (i) Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited ;
 - (ii) Include in the conclusions of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear statement of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied as it did in earlier years ;
 - (iii) Continue to press for the entry into force of the convention for the due process of law signed on 14th December 1957 ;
3. Report to the Assembly on the rôle it envisages for the independent programme group.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The twenty-first annual report of the Council, covering the year 1975, follows a now familiar set pattern. The activities of WEU having changed little for a number of years, except for a reduction in the necessary level of consultation in the Council which followed the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community in 1973, it follows that the Committee's present report in reply, while welcoming the general trend towards greater European and Atlantic cohesion in other frameworks, repeats many of the reservations expressed in previous years.

2. The Committee again notes with satisfaction however that the new administrative arrangements introduced by the Secretary-General enabled the present report of the Council to be communicated to the Assembly in good time, the last part having reached the Office of the Clerk on 4th March. Committees have thus been able to take full account of the report in preparing their own reports to the Assembly for the first part of the present session.

Annual report of the Council

CHAPTER I

Relations between the Council and the Assembly

3. The Committee notes with satisfaction the Council's continued undertaking, in connection with its replies to recommendations and questions, "to give the Assembly full and substantial replies reflecting the common positions of the seven member governments, even if they sometimes related to matters dealt with primarily by other organisations." While it is a matter of regret that a common position does not always exist, the Committee stresses the importance of substantive replies from the Council on defence matters which the Council by its 1950 decision transferred to NATO for implementation.

4. The reasoned reply to Recommendation 283 concerning air forces on the central front states

the position of "the member countries of the Council of WEU which participate in the NATO integrated system" and the Committee welcomes the Council's willingness to report on mutual defence arrangements implemented in the NATO framework. This reply demonstrates the validity of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty which provides that the member countries "shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation".

5. While the Committee draws satisfaction from the reasoned replies received to recommendations adopted by the Assembly on the proposal of the Committee, some of which are mentioned below, the Committee points out that at the time the present report was adopted, replies had not been received to Recommendations 278 (developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance) and 281 (European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments).

6. The Committee held no joint meeting with the Council in 1975, but has requested that such a meeting be held before the first part of the 1976 session of the Assembly.

CHAPTER II

Activities of the Council

7. As in 1974, the Council met only once at ministerial level in 1975, devoting most of its discussion to East-West relations. This reduced level of ministerial activity reflects the increasing effectiveness of political concertation in the framework of the Nine and the North Atlantic Council in both of which all members of WEU participate.

8. The Committee can only welcome this continuing trend in itself, provided that the credibility of the mutual defence commitment enshrined in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty is not eroded. The Committee is therefore glad to note that the Council "will continue to be responsible for ensuring the application of the Brussels Treaty"¹. Meetings of the permanent

¹ Annual report of the Council, Chapter II, third paragraph.

council, at the level of ambassadors, numbered thirteen in 1975 and sufficed to deal with remaining business covering largely replies to the Assembly, and the force level and arms control functions mentioned below.

Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

9. The full statement of the Council's position concerning Cyprus, in reply to reports emanating from the Committee, reflects the unanimity of the views of the Council and Assembly and recalls the Council's concern for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

Defence questions

10. The Council having transferred to NATO in 1950 everyday responsibility for implementing the mutual defence obligations of the Brussels Treaty, a decision subsequently enshrined in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, the Council in its second annual report¹ defined the scope of its residual defence and related activities: The seven governments considered that the activities of the Council in the field of defence questions and armaments should relate only to:

- "(a) matters which the contracting parties wish to raise, especially under Article VIII;
- (b) the level of forces of member States;
- (c) the maintenance of certain United Kingdom forces on the continent;
- (d) the Agency for the Control of Armaments;
- (e) the Standing Armaments Committee."

11. As far as the Committee is aware, no member State has ever, so far, chosen to raise matters under Article VIII of the treaty ("... any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise,...") so that the effective activities of the Council in the field of defence now relate to items (b) to (e) above. Items (d) and (e) are dealt with separately in Chapters III and IV of the annual report, discussed below.

Levels of forces of member States

12. Under Protocol No. II of the Brussels Treaty, the Council has important functions

1. Document 37, 26th February 1957.

concerning the determination of the levels of forces to be maintained by member countries. The Committee notes that the Council continues to report fully on its procedures which were applied during the year under review. This information has been incorporated in response to Written Questions 130 and 141 and Recommendation 247 of the Assembly.

13. Under Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain specified levels of forces on the continent. In response to Written Question 122¹, the Council stated that:

"... The level of British forces on the mainland of Europe approved by the Council is therefore once more (subject to the temporary redeployment referred to above) 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force."

In response to Recommendation 213², the United Kingdom undertook to state in the annual report each year the current actual level of British forces on the continent. The Committee notes that the level duly reported at 30th November 1975 amounted to 60,066 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force — a level virtually unchanged from that reported for the previous year. According to the United Kingdom Defence White Papers³, the average level of BAOR in the year reviewed in the Council's report was to be only 54,900. With the Berlin garrison of 3,000 the total would still be only 57,900. The corresponding figures for 1976-77 are 54,700 and 57,800.

14. While the Committee is satisfied that the present undertaking (55,000) is being respected in these years, the Rapporteur has called for an explanation of the discrepancy in Written Question 170.

Amendments to the list of prohibited weapons

15. On some twelve occasions since the conclusion of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, the Council has amended the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III which specifies the weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture on its territory. No amendments to this list have been reported by the Council during 1975, the year covered by the annual report.

1. Put by Mr. Vedovato on 13th April 1971.

2. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971, on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 558, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato.

3. Statement on defence estimates 1975 and 1976.

16. The last amendment to this list, made by the Council on 26th September 1973, raised the tonnage of submarines which Germany is authorised to manufacture on its territory from 450 to 1,800 tons. Under the previous limit, Germany had also been authorised to manufacture up to six submarines not exceeding 1,000 tons, and this quota of six submarines had subsequently been exported — four to Greece and two to Turkey — as the Committee has previously reported ¹.

17. It is not clear whether the 1973 amendment was made to permit the export of submarines by Germany, rather than to meet the requirements of the German armed forces assigned to NATO ².

Written questions — the Montreux Convention

18. The Committee regrets that the Council did not take a firmer stand on a correct interpretation of the Montreux Convention which would prevent the passage of Soviet aircraft carriers from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The first of these carriers, the Kiev, is expected to be operational in 1976 ³.

CHAPTER III

Armaments Control Agency

19. The Assembly has always stressed the importance of the application of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty. Article IX of that treaty makes it clear, in fact, that the chief reason why the Assembly was set up was precisely to watch over the way in which the Council carried out its responsibilities in this respect. The provisions of the treaty concerning the control of weapons have been summarised on numerous occasions, most recently by the Committee in an earlier report ⁴. In Recommendation 247, adopted on 18th June 1974, the Assembly called on the Council to "include in its annual reports a prominent, full and clear statement of all aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels

Treaty which are not fully applied..." The following statements are to be found in various parts of Chapter III of the annual report now under review :

"In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member State, to what that State calls 'strategic forces'.

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter therefore concern other armaments.

It is further recalled that only non-production controls are so far applied to chemical weapons.

.....

(c) As the Convention for the due process of law ¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1975, as in previous years, to take the form of 'agreed control measures'.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld."

20. The serious situation arising from the convention not having come into force is made clear by more ample information contained in previous annual reports but omitted from the present report. Thus the eighteenth report for 1972 (Document 598) states, in Chapter III, Section D, that :

"In the absence of a due process of law, it cannot be claimed that the Agency's methods, particularly in the case of chemical weapons, have reached a fully satisfactory state of development."

and earlier reports that "one of the principal reasons for this situation [non-application of

1. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 638, paragraph 11, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

2. See in particular Written Question 139 and reply.

3. See the previous report, Document 673, paragraph 22.

4. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 638, paragraph 15 *et seq.*, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member States of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty as modified by the Protocols signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954. The Convention has been ratified by only six of the seven : Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

controls on biological weapons] is the absence of any legal guarantees to protect private interests”.

21. In connection with the non-production of chemical weapons, the report now under review states that “the supplementary procedure designed to increase the effectiveness of the Agency’s action, which has been tried out since 1973, was again applied successfully in 1975”, but it is clear that the improvement does not compensate for the absence of the proper control powers embodied in the convention.

22. The present report of the Council omits the statement of earlier years concerning the determination by the Council of the appropriate levels of armaments for the forces of the WEU countries :

“... the term ‘armaments’, whenever used with reference to levels in this report, should be understood to mean :

— armaments declared by the member States as being held by their forces on the mainland of Europe, with the exception of armaments with nuclear capability and of the armaments of what one member State calls strategic forces, that is to say, the armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate of controlling levels.”

23. Mr. Zamberletti put Written Question 131 to the Council on 16th April 1973, asking which categories of armaments were covered by the expression “the armaments of what one member State calls ‘strategic forces’”. The Council replied on 14th June 1973 that “the Armaments Control Agency has no knowledge of the categories of armaments included in the expression ‘strategic forces’... The Agency is, therefore, unable to report on them in any way to the Council”. It is thus clear that the Council itself is unaware of the categories of armaments over which it declares itself unable to exercise control by virtue of the foregoing comment. The Committee is aware that the French tactical nuclear surface-to-surface missile “Pluton” became operational on 1st May 1974 and that on 24th January 1976 French ballistic missile submarines were equipped for the first time with thermo-nuclear warheads.

24. The Council’s report concludes with complacency :

“In 1975, the Agency again applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it.”

25. The Committee last year found the Council’s complacency over the failure to apply the arms controls provisions particularly dangerous for two reasons :

- (a) Application of the arms control provisions remains one of the very few activities left to the Council in the defence field. The Council has recently reiterated the importance of the defence provisions of the Brussels Treaty... These will inevitably lose credibility if the Council is unable to take action under the treaty.
- (b) If the member countries of WEU are unable to apply among themselves those arms control measures on which they were agreed in 1954, there is little or no hope of reaching agreement on serious arms control in an East-West context such as SALT, MBFR, and the confidence-building measures associated with CSCE, or in a world-wide context such as the non-proliferation treaty.

Activities of the Agency

26. The Committee’s criticism of the Council is in no way to be construed as criticism of the Agency, which has continued to carry out its task efficiently in difficult circumstances.

27. It may be said that controls are applied in respect of conventional weapons on the mainland of Europe (including aircraft) and various missile systems capable of carrying nuclear bombs and warheads — although, of course, the warheads concerned remain in United States’ custody and are not subject to control by the Agency. The Council confirmed the situation in reply to Written Question 142, put by Mr. Tanghe on 27th May 1974:

“(a) Is it correct that the Agency for the Control of Armaments carried out inspections of certain of these missiles [i.e. missiles with a nuclear capacity], as well as tactical aircraft with a possible nuclear capability ? ”

The Council replied :

“(a) It is correct that the Armaments Control Agency carried out both documentary and field controls on sections of missiles

and on aircraft covered by the terms of Protocol No. III, Annex IV, 2, 3, 4 and 11."

Statement of the number of inspections

28. Annual reports of the Council up to and including the eleventh, covering the year 1965, gave details of the number of inspections carried out by the Agency. Those reported for the years 1961-65 inclusive are summarised in the following table :

*Numbers and types of inspections
carried out by the Agency for the Control of
Armaments
(from the corresponding annual reports
of the Council)*

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Inspections in military depots and central records offices	29	26	35	39	26
Inspections of national units	15	20	13	19	16
Agreed controls of levels at production plants (including shipyards)	12	11	13	13	11
Agreed non-production controls at factories	7	7	10	9	7
TOTALS	63	65	74	80	60

It will be noted that totals do not always tally with the figures given ; it is understood that there are errors in the figures reported by the Council, but they are only minor.

29. Annual reports of the Council covering the years 1966 onwards have omitted figures concerning the number of inspections carried out. The Assembly, in Recommendation 183 adopted in June 1969, demanded the reinstatement of these figures in the annual reports of the Council. It reiterated this demand on a number of occasions in 1970 and 1971¹. The Council finally

1. See reply to the fifteenth annual report adopted on 1st June 1970, Recommendation 213 adopted on 30th November 1971 and Written Question 123 put by Mr. Vedovato on 13th April 1971.

agreed¹ to comply with the Assembly's repeated requests, but on a confidential basis only, and the detailed figures for inspections in the years 1970-75 have been duly communicated to members of the Assembly by the Secretary-General.

30. Officially, the figures for the years 1966-69 have not been communicated, but in fact your Rapporteur understands that the Agency's activities continued unabated as follows :

	1966	1967	1968	1969
Control measures at depots (including central accounting offices)	****			
Control measures at units under national command				
Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)				
Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)				
Total control measures	78	70	79	77

**** Confidential material deleted from the published report.

31. When communicating the (confidential) figures for 1971, the Council reported that the Agency had adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections and was thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections resulted that in fact reflected no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style) for the years 1970 and 1971. The following table shows the numbers of inspections reported (confidentially) for the years 1970-75.

32. The Committee continues to regret that the Council refuses to publish the detailed figures

1. See reply to Written Question 123 dated 1st June 1971, reply to Recommendation 213 dated 20th March 1972, and subsequent letters from the Secretary-General of 17th March 1972, 19th April 1972, 12th March 1973, 22nd April 1974, 26th February 1975 and 15th March 1976 on the same subject.

*Numbers and types of inspection carried
out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments
(Communicated confidentially by the Council)*

		1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Control measures at depots	Old style New style	****					
Control measures at units under national command	Old style New style						
Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)	Old style New style						
Total quantitative control measures	Old style New style						
Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)	Old style New style						
Total control measures (all categories)	Old style New style	82 ****	**** 72	— 66	— 66	— 71	— 72

**** Confidential material deleted from the published report.

of inspections since 1965, because the unnecessary secrecy can only lead the uninitiated to suspect that the activities of the Agency have been curtailed. From the confidential information available to it the Committee is able to state that this is not the case; the activities of the Agency have continued at broadly uniform levels for the last ten years. The apparent fluctuations in the total numbers of inspections is due only to the change in accounting methods. The Committee is of course aware that these figures are administrative and do not give a full picture of the Agency's activities, but in the absence of fuller information they provide the only quantitative indication available.

33. The Committee again recommends that future annual reports state clearly numbers of inspections carried out, both by category, as was done in the years prior to 1966, and by country, so as to give a clear picture of the Agency's activities.

"No effective production of nuclear and biological weapons" statement

34. For some years annual reports of the Council have stated that "the replies received from member countries which have not renounced the right to produce chemical weapons show that no effective production has yet been undertaken on the mainland of Europe". (The countries concerned are all the member countries except Germany.) No corresponding statement is made in respect of bacteriological and nuclear weapons, despite the fact that the provisions of the treaty concerning control of these weapons are identical to those for chemical weapons. In Recommendation 209 the Assembly therefore called on the Council to incorporate in annual reports similar "no effective production" statements in respect of bacteriological and nuclear weapons, but in its replies the Council did not agree to these proposals.

Conclusions on arms control

35. The Committee is of course fully aware of the difficulties adumbrated by the Council which have prevented the arms control provisions of the treaty from being applied. The Committee has stated the dangers of this situation (paragraph 25 above) but recognises that there is little political reason today, as far as the WEU members themselves are concerned, for the arms control measures of the treaty. As the Council says in its report :

"The Agency's basic assumption (in respect of field controls) is that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured. Clearly if any doubt existed on this point, control measures would have to be increased..."

36. The Assembly in Recommendation 269 called for the collective defence commitments of the Brussels Treaty to be retained in any future European union, and in its reply the Council recognised that the setting up of such a union "may well have repercussions on questions of security and defence". The Committee believes that when the mutual defence commitment is effectively incorporated in an instrument establishing a European union, and that union controls all of its external security functions, including defence and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, the time will have come to abrogate the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty.

37. Meanwhile, they should be fully applied, and the Council must continue to report clearly and unambiguously on all areas in which they are not.

CHAPTER IV

Standing Armaments Committee

38. The Standing Armaments Committee was established by a decision of the Council dated 7th May 1955. In this framework governmental delegates meet : "to encourage... agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments".

39. On 18th February 1975, the Committee met the members of the Standing Armaments Committee in the framework of the liaison sub-

committee on which the Committee reported last year¹.

40. As previous annual reports have noted, the Council has been engaged since 15th February 1973 in a comprehensive review of the rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee, on the understanding that there should be no duplication of the work of other collaborative fora. The present report of the Council states that :

"...no definite conclusions have yet been reached..."

As the Assembly is aware, questions of European armaments procurement and standardisation have been much debated by interested governments during the year in various fora where the member governments of WEU have made substantial contributions to the study of the problem."

In its reply to Recommendation 280, received on 13th February 1976, the Council states that "...it is envisaged that additional work among European countries on [European defence procurement] will take place in an independent group open to all the European members of the Alliance..."

41. The Committee welcomes the first meeting of the new independent programme group held in Rome in February, attended by France and European members of NATO. In future it will pay increasing attention to the work of the independent programme group, since an important part of the tasks of WEU is to be handled in that body. The Committee therefore expresses the hope that early progress will be made on the joint production of armaments in Europe and on non-discriminatory mutual procurement of armaments by Europe and the United States. The Council is requested to state its views at an early date on the rôle to be assigned to this group.

Conclusions

42. The Committee's chief conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation :

Preamble

First paragraph

43. The Committee again expresses satisfaction at the action taken by the Secretary-General

1. Document 673, paragraph 42.

to expedite communication of the annual report.
See paragraph 2 above.

Second paragraph

44. The terms on which the arms control functions of the treaty might be abrogated are described in paragraphs 35-37 above.

Third paragraph

45. The sterling work of the Arms Control Agency is described in Chapter III above, paragraphs 26 *et seq.*

Operative text

Paragraph 1

46. See comment on first paragraph of the preamble above.

Paragraph 2

47. The problems of the arms control provisions and the Council's report are described in Chapter III.

Paragraph 3

48. The Committee welcomes the advent of the independent programme group to which the Council has drawn attention. See paragraphs 40 and 41.

Application of the Brussels Treaty

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Haase

At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Welcoming the Council’s replies to Recommendation 281 and to Written Question 167, and the assignment to the Standing Armaments Committee of a study of the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries,”.

Signed : Haase

1. See 2nd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Amendment agreed to).

Application of the Brussels Treaty

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by Mr. Haase

In paragraph 2 of the operative text of the draft recommendation, before sub-paragraph (i) insert a sub-paragraph as follows :

“(i) Include in annual reports, in addition to the present statement of the total level of British forces on the continent at 31st December, a statement of the level of British forces on the mainland on that date, established in accordance with the Council’s definition of the approved level ;”.

Sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) become sub-paragraphs (ii), (iii) and (iv).

Signed : Haase

1. See 2nd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Amendment agreed to).

OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1976 ¹

*submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur*

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submitted by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur

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Draft Opinion

***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1976***

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, de Bruyne, Castellucci, Depietri, Hengel, Kauffmann, de Koster (Substitute : Peijnenburg), Lewis (Substitute : Lord Wallace of Coslany), Moneti, Page, Lord Peddie

(Substitute : Lord Darling of Hillsborough), MM. Prearo, Schleiter (Substitute : Pignion), Talamona, Vohrer, Waltmans, Mrs. Wolf.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on improving the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendations 250 and 265 ;

Deploring the slow progress of work in the Co-ordinating Committee ;

Regretting that the governments have still not introduced a pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations ;

Regretting the governments' decision to abandon present procedure for adjusting salaries before introducing new procedure ;

Noting the ensuing unrest among staff members of the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. Endeavour to have the pension scheme brought into effect before the end of 1976, its provisions being applied as from the date of adoption of the regulations governing its application, but payment of pensions for retired officials still being made as from 1st January 1973 ;

2. Ensure that the scheme includes all necessary guarantees, based *inter alia* on joint management for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the principles set out in Recommendations 250 and 265 ;

3. Amend the Staff Rules to avoid the widow or orphans of an official suffering hardship through a break in income during the period preceding payment of the first arrears of the pension ;

4. Introduce procedure for salary reviews similar to practice in the European Communities ;

5. Improve the speed and efficiency of co-ordination by tightening up procedure ;

6. Change the system of indemnities for loss of job on the lines of regulations in the European Communities and in the meantime improve the pension rights of officials who have become redundant by adding to their entitlement the period for which an indemnity for loss of job is granted ;

7. Make provision for a reinstallation allowance for officials terminating their service and who were granted an installation allowance at the time of recruitment, as is the case in the European Communities ;

II. Ask the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly as soon as available its study on conditions for seconding national officials.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur)

I. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU

(i) Approval

1. I have studied the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1976 and have, for the time being, no comment to make

thereon. I therefore submit the attached draft opinion and draft recommendation to the Committee for its approval.

(ii) The budget

2. The total budget of WEU for 1976 as compared to 1975 is as follows :

	1975 Budget		1976 Budget	
	£	F	£	F
Secretariat-General	397,810	—	483,280	—
Standing Armaments Committee ..	—	3,550,895	—	3,881,750
Agency for the Control of Armaments	—	7,634,310	—	8,329,550
Office of the Clerk	—	6,065,000	—	6,559,000
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU	397,810	17,250,205	483,280	18,770,300

(iii) WEU establishment

3. The total establishment of WEU for 1976 is as follows :

Secretariat-General	48
Standing Armaments Committee	28
Agency for the Control of Armaments	52
	<hr/> 128
Office of the Clerk	28
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1976	156

II. Reviewing procedure for co-ordination in the co-ordinated organisations

4. Comments were made on the cumbersome and inadequate procedure for co-ordination in the report submitted to the Assembly in December 1972 (Document 584)¹. There have still been no changes and the situation therefore remains the same.

1. "3. Delays in taking decisions

48. Over the years, the Assembly has made a number of recommendations in the administrative and budgetary fields. The table at Appendix VIII lists the most important of these, stating how many times they have been put forward and their outcome.

49. The delay in adopting and implementing any decisions taken is more than striking. The Assembly is fully

5. The situation has in fact deteriorated over the last two years and relations between staff and employers in the co-ordinated organisations have gradually worsened, producing a situation of real concern. Recent, almost unprecedented stoppages of work in NATO and the Council of Europe bear witness to this. It must be realised that staff recruited for WEU and the other co-ordinated organisations accept employment not only for the remuneration they will receive but also for the job satisfaction they hope to obtain by working in a European or international body. Furthermore, they can reasonably expect to be informed, on recruitment, of procedure in force for the adjustment of salaries and allowances in line with cost-of-living increases, their pension rights, the possibilities of obtaining housing loans, etc. It is obviously quite wrong that staff either already in service or newly recruited should see themselves suffering serious financial prejudice as a result of governments adopting new procedure without prior consultation.

6. There have been obvious shortcomings in co-ordination procedure in two important fields :

(i) Pensions

7. In 1973, a working party studied conditions for introducing a pension scheme in the co-ordinated organisations and drafted detailed regulations. In January 1974, the Co-ordinating Committee submitted a report to the Councils

outlining the proposed scheme. This report (No. 94) was adopted with little delay by all the Councils and they instructed the Co-ordinating Committee to submit the draft regulations to them; it was decided that the scheme should come into force on 1st July 1974, six months being considered long enough to complete the regulations.

8. The Co-ordinating Committee has since considered the regulations at thirty-two meetings, usually lasting two days, at which they were the only item on the agenda. Only in the first quarter of 1976 was it able to report to the Councils, and it should be noted that on several important points it was unable to make unanimous recommendations. It will be for the Councils to choose between several possible solutions, which are highly technical and should not be raised at Council level.

9. Your Rapporteur will not dwell on the cost of such an undertaking, which involved govern-

aware of the Council's difficulties, which stem mainly from the necessity for unanimity, but much is due to the cumbersome and almost inert complex machinery for co-ordination.

50. Current procedure for dealing with matters subject to co-ordination is as follows:

- (i) A proposal is submitted by a Secretary-General to the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General which, before taking a decision, often seeks the opinion of the Committee of Heads of Administration.
- (ii) The Standing Committee transmits the relevant proposal to the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts.
- (iii) The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, in turn, frequently sets up working groups to study a specific issue.
- (iv) Meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee and the working groups, attended by representatives of the Secretaries-General, are held at fairly infrequent intervals — once a month at most.

51. When the Co-ordinating Committee has formulated its recommendations, the same procedure is followed in reverse order before the question is passed to the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations for decision.

52. It should not be overlooked that any decisions with financial implications taken by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the Councils necessitate the submission of estimates to the Budget Committees of the various organisations. These are subsequently transmitted to the Councils for approval.

53. The Assembly is of the opinion that the Council should give urgent consideration to simplifying the system for examining matters requiring co-ordination. One such matter is the problem of the appeals board and appeals jurisdiction."

ment experts who came from their respective places of employment, members of the administrations of the organisations and the Inter-Organisation Study Section on Salaries and Prices.

10. He will merely note that there are serious shortcomings in the system and that both the negotiations and their results have been far too slow.

11. The most deplorable effect of these shortcomings is that many former officials who have retired are still not drawing a pension, although it is more than two years since it was agreed that they were entitled to one; payment of arrears will certainly not solve the often serious financial problems with which they have been faced during this period.

(ii) *Salary adjustments*

12. Here the problem is quite different. The conclusions reached by a group of experts set up in 1958 were given in the 10th report of the Co-ordinating Committee on 5th May 1960. Since then, there have been only minor changes and the procedure has worked for fifteen years to the satisfaction of governments, the administrations of the co-ordinated organisations and staff.

13. On 6th August 1975, without any new regulations having been introduced or even discussed, the Co-ordinating Committee recommended that existing procedure be purely and simply abandoned.

14. New procedure is now being discussed. It cannot come into force before summer or autumn 1976 at the earliest. In this era of rapid monetary erosion there is thus no provision for adjusting the salaries of international staff to take account of the cost of living, and this situation will have lasted for over a year.

15. Without passing judgment on the reasons for calling existing procedure in question, it may be said that such a step was certainly most untimely from a psychological point of view. It has caused unrest among the staff, who are devoted servants of the organisations. It is important to maintain good staff relations if the organisations are to continue to run smoothly.

16. As an urgent priority, the WEU Council must therefore suggest that the other Councils adopt without delay major changes in co-ordination procedure in order to put an end to the present situation.

17. Since member governments value the present structure of co-ordination and wish to extend it to other organisations such as the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting and the European Patents Organisation, they have the utmost interest in ensuring its efficiency.

18. Such a plan is reasonable and administratively sound and, at least as far as salaries are concerned, co-ordination should be sought with the European Communities. There is in fact no valid reason why such arrangements should not be made ; they would be an effective step towards the still remote possibility of setting up a European civil service and allow decisions to be taken on the basis of common criteria and after thorough discussion.

19. Governments should therefore aim at a completely transformed and wider co-operation procedure by taking the appropriate decisions as soon as possible.

III. Joint management of pensions — guarantees

20. In Recommendations 250 and 265, the Assembly advocated the creation of a joint management body with its own legal status separate from the organisations in respect of which each government would enter into financial commitments which would thus remain unaffected in the event of a country withdrawing from one of the co-ordinated organisations or an organisation being wound up.

21. Such a structure would doubtless offer the best guarantees for a pension scheme where stability is essential. However, it is ambitious and would take a long time to set up, if only in order to obtain the ratification of all member States, but it remains a desirable objective.

22. In this field, the 127th report of the Co-ordinating Committee contributes little. Paragraph 5 provides that :

“... the arrangements for assisting in the actual running of the scheme by a joint administrative unit to handle those tasks where centralisation is desirable should be worked out.”

Moreover, paragraph 34 refers to the event of a country withdrawing from an organisation and invites Councils :

“(i) to decide that the commitments entered into by such country shall not be extinguished, but that it shall be incumbent on it to continue to participate in financing the cost of pensions, and that this problem should be dealt with as part of the general financial arrangements relating to withdrawal ;

(ii) to provide that in such event provisional measures shall be taken in the form of an interim contribution made on a provisional basis, pending final settlement.”

23. Although interesting, such provisions are not very precise.

24. The withdrawal of a country from an organisation would raise many difficult problems and it is even harder to be certain to what extent such a State would continue to co-operate once it had left the organisation.

25. But it is no less certain that centralised management of the pension scheme and perpetual financing are two necessary aims which should be attained by concrete measures to be studied and adopted as soon as possible. Such measures are particularly necessary since the budgetary nature of the scheme and the receipt by governments of sums corresponding to the validation of past service will leave no other resources for running the scheme.

IV. Date of entry into force of the pension scheme

26. Paragraph 23 of the 94th report of the Co-ordinating Committee specifies that in agreement with the Secretaries-General the pension scheme should come into force on 1st July 1974. It was also specified that members of the staff who retired between 1st January 1973 and 1st July 1974 were entitled to pensions.

27. These dates were justified by the fact that the 94th report had been submitted to Councils for approval on 9th January 1974 and it could reasonably be thought that during the first half of 1974 the regulations necessary for its application would have been finalised and approved.

28. As mentioned above, this was not so, and at the end of the first quarter of 1976 these provisions had still not been approved by Councils.

29. It therefore seems that the date of 1st July 1974, considered to be that on which the scheme

would come into force, is absolutely unrealistic. It should be modified so as to avoid a long period of purely arbitrary retroactivity which would give rise to administrative, financial and perhaps legal difficulties.

30. Any such change however should not affect the operative date for paying pensions to retired staff who should not suffer further through delays which cause them considerable hardship and which are none of their making.

V. Date on which emoluments cease to be paid in the event of death

31. On a staff member's death, payment of his emoluments stops on the day of his death. A pension becomes payable to his widow or dependent orphans only at the beginning of the month after his death.

32. There is a strong argument for continuing payment of the emoluments to the widow or orphans until the end of the month in which the staff member died. This gesture would help to keep the family out of financial difficulties at a critical time.

VI. Loans for the purchase of accommodation

33. The problem of loans for the purchase of accommodation in the framework of the pension scheme was mentioned in the report submitted to the Assembly in June 1975 (Document 666) and Recommendation 250.

34. It is satisfying to note that the provisions in the draft pension scheme regulations and the instructions now being worked out provide reasonable solutions for the settlement of outstanding debts.

35. Conversely, it is still necessary and urgent to find another means of financing future loans, particularly since staff members, who are not usually nationals of the country in which they are employed, cannot benefit from the same legislative or statutory provisions as those adopted by most governments for their own nationals. The social aspect of this problem has been recognised by all the member countries of the organisation.

VII. Indemnity for loss of job

36. The rules concerning the indemnity for loss of job¹ provide in certain conditions for the

1. See Appendix VII.

award of an indemnity to staff members holding indefinite term appointments, amounting to one month's emoluments for each year of service with a ceiling of twenty-four months.

37. This rate is considerably lower than that applied in the European Communities.

38. There seems to be justification for reconsidering this indemnity on the basis of the rules applied in the European Community.

39. When the pension scheme is introduced, it would be normal to take the abovementioned period of twenty-four months into account when calculating pension rights, subject of course to the deduction of the 7 % employee's contribution provided for under this scheme. This is now the practice in the European Communities. It would admittedly be a modest step, but would help to improve the situation of redundant staff.

VIII. Transfer of emoluments

40. This question was raised in the report submitted to the Assembly in June 1974 (Document 631).

41. Recommendation 250 recommends that the Council :

"3. Seek a means of allowing non-resident officials to meet financial commitments in their countries of origin by authorising — subject to specific justifications — the payment of a portion of their salaries in their national currencies on the basis of salary scales applicable in the countries concerned."

42. The adoption of such provisions would provide a fair solution to the often difficult problems encountered by staff members in meeting financial commitments in their countries of origin and is most urgent in the present period of instability and monetary disturbances.

IX. Reinstallation allowance

43. The reasons for granting an installation allowance to staff whose place of residence was far from their place of employment when they were recruited would justify granting an allowance to staff members leaving the organisation insofar as their reinstallation involved a similar move.

44. Such a reinstallation allowance would be justified in view of the expense involved when leaving the organisation, and is provided for in

the staff rules of the United Nations and the European Communities.

45. It should be allocated not only to the staff member himself but to his spouse in the event of his death.

46. However, it should be granted only if the staff member has been employed by the organisation long enough — five years, for instance — and provided he returns to his recognised home.

Such a measure would not be appropriate if the former staff member took up another appointment, when any expenditure involved should if necessary be borne by his new employer.

X. Seconded national officials

47. On the basis of the Council's reply to Recommendation 265, the Assembly wishes to be kept informed about the progress of work in this field.

APPENDIX I

WEU BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1976

Proposed expenditure and income

	A*	B*	C*	TOTAL B + C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
Salaries and allowances	591,510	5,239,270	11,549,010	16,788,280
Travel	15,245	72,700	297,400	370,100
Other operating costs	70,995	349,200	423,120	772,320
Purchase of furniture	1,915	13,000	20,800	33,800
Buildings	—	—	—	—
Total expenditure	679,665	5,674,170	12,290,330	17,964,500
WEU tax	192,635	1,771,220	3,925,820	5,697,040
Other receipts	3,750	21,200	34,960	56,160
Total income	196,385	1,792,420	3,960,780	5,753,200
NET TOTAL	483,280	3,881,750	8,329,550	12,211,300

* A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

National contributions

	600ths	A*	B* C*	Office of the Clerk
		£	Francs	Francs
Belgium	59	47,522.53	1,200,777.84	644,968
France	120	96,656.00	2,442,260.00	1,311,800
Federal Republic of Germany .	120	96,656.00	2,442,260.00	1,311,800
Italy	120	96,656.00	2,442,260.00	1,311,800
Luxembourg	2	1,610.94	40,704.32	21,864
Netherlands	59	47,522.53	1,200,777.84	644,968
United Kingdom	120	96,656.00	2,442,260.00	1,311,800
	600	483,280.00	12,211,300.00	6,559,000

Total WEU budget

£483,280

Francs 18,770,300

* A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

APPENDIX II

In accordance with Opinion 9 adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1963, the Council has communicated details to the Assembly regarding the duties of the members of the staff of the ministerial organs of Western European Union.

A. Secretariat-General

Post No.	Grade	Function
1	HG	Secretary-General
2	»	Deputy Secretary-General
3	»	Assistant Secretary-General
4	A6	Legal Adviser
5	B4	Personal Assistant to Secretary-General
6	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
7	B5	Post suppressed
8	B4	Private Secretary to Deputy Secretary-General
9	B4	Personal Assistant to Legal Adviser
<i>General Affairs Division</i>		
10	A5	Head of Division
11	A3	Deputy Head of Division
12	A3	Committee Secretary
13	B4	Assistant/Verbatim Writer
14	B3	Secretary/Assistant
<i>Administration and Personnel Division</i>		
15	A5	Head of Division
16	A3	Deputy Head of Division
17	A2	Administrative Officer
18	B4	Assistant (Personnel)
19	B4	Assistant (Administration)
20	B3	Secretary
<i>Linguist Division</i>		
21	L5	Head of Division
22	LT4	Reviser
23	LT3	Translator F/E
24	LT2	Translator E/F

Post No.	Grade	Function
<i>Registry and Production Services</i>		
25	A2	Head of Registry
26	B4	Documentation Clerk
27	B4	Head of Typing Pool
28	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
29	B3	»
30	B3	»
31	B3	»
32	B2	Shorthand-typist
33	B2	»
34	B2	»
35	B2	Assistant (distribution)
36	B2	Assistant (reproduction)
<i>General Services</i>		
37	B1	Telephonist
38	B1	»
39	C3	Chauffeur Mechanic
40	C3	»
41	C3	Maintenance Supervisor
42	C2	Messenger
43	C2	»
<i>Security</i>		
44	C4	Senior Security Guard
45	C3	Security Guard
46	C3	»
47	C3	»
48	C3	»
49	C3	»

B. International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee

Post No.	Grade	Function
1	HG	Assistant Secretary-General <i>Private Secretariat, Mail, Documentation</i>
2	B4	Assistant responsible for the private secretariat
3	B3	Secretary/Shorthand-typist
4	B4	Archivist, responsible for distributing documents
5	C4	Driver Mechanic <i>Committee Secretariat</i>
6	A5	Assistant to Head of International Secretariat
7	A4	Committee Secretary
8	A4	» »
9	A4	» »
		<i>Linguistic Staff</i>
10	LT4	Reviser
11	LI3	Interpreter
12	LT3	Translator and Minute Writer
13	LT3	» »
		<i>Clerical Staff</i>
14	B4	Assistant
15	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
16	B3	» » »
17	B3	» » »
17 bis	B3	Telephonist
18	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
19	B3	» » »
		<i>Administrative and General Staff</i>
21	B4	Administrative Assistant
22	A4	Deputy to Head of Finance and Administration Section, Head of Finance and Account Office
23	C4	Roneo Operator
24	C4	Storekeeper and Technician
25	C4	Security Guard
26	C3	» »
27	C3	» »
28	C3	» »

C. Agency for the Control of Armaments

Post No.	Grade	Function
1	HG	Director
2	A2	Director's Assistant
3	A7	Deputy Director
4	B4	Assistant
<i>Director's Office</i>		
5	A4	Head of the Office and Assistant to the Director, Security Officer
6	A3	Head of Central Documentation
7	A2	Assistant to the Head of Central Documentation
8	B4	Assistant Documentation Clerk
9	LT3	Translator E/F
10	LT3	» F/E
11	B3	Secretary
12	B2	Shorthand-typist
13	B4	Assistant, Head of Central Registry, Assistant to the Security Officer
14	B3	Secretary
<i>Information and Study Division</i>		
15	A6	Head of Division
16	A5	Head of the Industrial Section
17	A5	Expert on biological and chemical weapons
18	A4	Logistics Expert on armaments for land forces
19	A4	Logistics Expert on armaments for air forces
20	A4	Logistics Expert on naval armaments
21	A4	Assistant to the Head of Division for General Questions
22	B4	Assistant
23	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
24	B3	» »

Post No.	Grade	Function
<i>Inspection and Control Division</i>		
25	A6	Head of Division
26	A5	Expert on artillery and tanks
27	A5	Expert on guided missiles
28	A4	Expert on biological weapons
29	A5	Expert on armaments for air forces
30	A4	Expert on artillery
31	B4	Assistant
32	B3	Bilingual Shorthand-typist
<i>Administration and Legal Affairs Division</i>		
33	A6	Head of Division
34	B4	Assistant
35	A4	Legal Expert
36	A5	Head of Finance and Administration Section
37	B3	Chief Clerk
38	B4	Assistant Accountant
39	B2	Senior Clerk
40	B4	Head of Group responsible for General Services
41	B3	Chief Clerk, Assistant to Head of Group responsible for General Services
<i>Other services and Security Service</i>		
42	C5	Head Designer and Duplicator Operator
43	C3	Driver Mechanic
44	C3	Security Guard
45	C3	» »
46	C3	» »
47	C3	» »
48	C3	» »
49	C3	» »
50	C3	» »
51	C3	» »
52	B3	Telephonist

APPENDIX III

*Office of the Clerk*¹

Grade	Function
HC	Clerk
HC	Clerk Assistant
A5	Counsellor in charge of defence questions and armaments
A5	Counsellor in charge of political questions
A5	Counsellor in charge of scientific, technological and aerospace questions
A5	Counsellor in charge of finance and administration
A5	Counsellor in charge of Press Department
A4	First Secretary/Head of the Publications and Translations Department
A4	First Secretary Reviser/Publications
A3	Secretary Head of Archives and Committee Secretary
A2	Secretary-Translator/Publications
A2	"
A2	Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator
B6	Chief Accountant
B4	Secretary to the President and the Clerk
B4	Secretary to the Clerk Assistant/ Assistant Sergeant-at-Arms Office
B4	Proof Reader and Assistant Translation Department
B4	Assistant to the Archives and Mail Department
B3	Assistants to Committees
B3	
B3	
B3	Assistant to the Administrative and Financial Department
B3	Assistant to the Translation Department
B3	Assistant to the Press Department
B3	Switchboard Operator
C6	Head of Roneo Section/Storekeeper
C3	Roneo Assistant/Messenger
C3	Messenger

1. On 1st January 1976.

APPENDIX IV

Table of establishment
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

	A ¹	B ¹	C ¹	Total A, B, C	Office of the Clerk	
Secretary-General	1	—	—	1	Clerk	1
Deputy Secretary-General	1	—	—	1		—
Director of the Agency	—	—	1	1		—
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	—	2	Clerk Assistant	1
A7	—	—	1	1		—
A6	1	—	3	4		—
A5	2	1	6	9		5
A4	—	4	8	12		2 ^a
A3	3	—	1	4		1
A2	2	—	2	4		3 ^a
L5	1	—	—	1		
L4	1	1	—	2		
L3	1	3	2	6		—
L2	1	—	—	1		
B6	—	—	—	—		1
B5	—	—	—	—		—
B4	8	4	8	20		4
B3	7	7	8	22		7
B2	5	—	2	7		—
B1	2	—	—	2		—
C6	—	—	—	—		1
C5	—	—	1	1		—
C4	1	4	—	5		—
C3	8	3	9	20		2
C2	2	—	—	2		—
	48	28	52	128		28

1. A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications.

APPENDIX V

RECOMMENDATION 265¹***on improving the status of WEU staff²***

The Assembly,

Aware of the effort made by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations to establish a pension scheme for the staff of these organisations ;

Deploing nevertheless the fact that the governments have not yet been able to set up a joint management body for all the organisations, a single appeals board or guarantee the payment of pensions should one of them withdraw or an organisation be wound up ;

Deeply regretting that the Co-ordinating Committee has been unable to agree to a reversionary pension being granted to widowers of female staff in the same way as to widows of male staff ;

Welcoming the action taken on Recommendation 200 and the definition of principles to be implemented with regard to the secondment of national officials to the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. Establish a joint management body for the pension scheme ;
2. Set up a single appeals board ;
3. Guarantee the full and uninterrupted payment of pensions even in the event of a government withdrawing or an organisation being wound up and to this end apply the provisions set out in Recommendation 250 of the Assembly ;
4. Grant widowers of female staff a reversionary pension in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ;
5. Afford officials who have obtained home loans from the provident fund a means of continuing those loans should they opt for the pension scheme ;
6. Ensure that serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme continue to benefit from the social advantages linked with the present provident fund system ;
7. Grant officials of equal grade and length of service, regardless of the date of their retirement, a pension calculated on the basis of salaries payable to serving staff ;
8. Take note of the problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security Act in April 1975 ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 666).

9. Establish a system for readjusting emoluments whereby the co-ordinated organisations may :
- hold general reviews every four years or more frequently if circumstances warrant it ;
 - assess trends in the standard of living in the middle of the period between general reviews ;
 - examine cost-of-living trends every six months ;
 - take the necessary steps to adjust salaries in accordance with the trend of the cost of living as quickly as possible by abolishing the two-month observation period ;
- II. Invite the Public Administration Committee to submit to it as soon as possible a first report on the way member States have implemented the principles defined by the special group of experts set up in October 1971 to study conditions for seconding national officials to international organisations, on the difficulties encountered in this respect and, as appropriate, ways of alleviating such difficulties.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹**to Recommendation 265****I. Measures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations.**

1. It has not so far been possible to reach agreement within the Co-ordinating Committee to establish a joint management body for the pension scheme, as desired by the Assembly, since some organisations do not support this.

However, as indicated in Article 31, paragraph 1 of the draft pension scheme rules, a joint administration unit will be "responsible for such part of the work as can be centralised".

Within this context, the Secretaries-General have proposed the establishment of a "taxation unit" within the Inter-organisations Section (which works at the OECD) if the present draft pension scheme rules are adopted.

2. The full and uninterrupted payment of pensions in the event of a member State withdrawing or an organisation being wound up is guaranteed under the terms of Article 40, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft pension scheme rules applicable to the permanent staff of the co-ordinated organisations :

"In the event of a merger, reconstitution or other transformation or in the event of dissolution of the organisation, the Council or any *ad hoc* body set up, where required in one of the aforementioned cases, shall take the necessary measures to ensure uninterrupted payment of the pension scheme benefits until the cessation of entitlement of the last beneficiary.

Should a country, being a member or ex-member of the organisation, fail to comply with its obligations under this article, the other countries shall meet the cost thereof in proportion to their contribution to the budget of the organisation as fixed annually from and after the said country's default."

3. With regard to the granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff, the Co-ordinating Committee was unable to make proposals to this effect, because some delegations did not support those who favoured such a provision.

4. The possibility for officials who have obtained home loans from a part of their provident fund to continue these loans if they opt for the pension scheme is covered by Article 44, paragraph 3 of the draft pension scheme rules :

"Where a staff member has exercised his right to make withdrawals from his provident fund holding and where, in consequence, the amount standing to his credit is less than the amount he would have surrendered under paragraph 2 if he had not made withdrawals, service prior to 1st July 1974 shall only be credited in the proportion these two amounts bear to each other.

This provision shall not apply where a staff member has, by 1st July 1975 * at the latest, undertaken to repay the difference between the two amounts, plus compound interest at the rate of 4% per annum as from that date.

If the staff member makes only partial repayment, past service shall only be credited in the proportion referred to in the first sub-paragraph above."

5. The Co-ordinating Committee has not yet found it possible or useful to make a detailed study of the question of enabling serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme to continue to benefit from the social advantages linked with the present provident fund system.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1975.

* This date will have to be amended in the final text.

6. The answer to the Assembly's question is to be found in Articles 36 and 49 of the draft rules, which read as follows :

"Article 36

Should the Council of the organisation responsible for the payment of benefits decide on an adjustment of salaries in relation to the cost of living, it shall decide at the same time on an identical adjustment of the pensions currently being paid, and of pensions whose payment is deferred.

Should salary adjustments be made in relation to the standard of living, the Council shall consider whether an appropriate adjustment of pensions should be made."

"Article 49

.....

4. Benefits under this Article shall be calculated by reference to the staff member's grading when he left the service before 1st January 1973, but on the basis of the corresponding scales in force on 1st January 1973, subsequently adjusted in accordance with Article 36."

7. The problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security Act in April 1975 are under consideration by the appropriate United Kingdom authorities and by the organisation.

8. It is intended to hold a general review of emoluments every *two years*. In the intervening period, salaries could be adjusted every *six months* if the trend of the cost of living made it necessary.

The Council have considered item I, 2 of the Assembly's recommendation together with the remarks in the explanatory memorandum in Document 666 concerning the desirability of setting up a single appeals board. In view of the fact that the other co-ordinated organisations were reluctant, at this stage, to pursue the matter, it is felt that a further invitation by the Secretary-General to his colleagues would be premature. However, since the jurisdiction of the appeals board within each of the co-ordinated organisations should normally include pension scheme matters, the Secretary-General intends once again to draw his colleagues' attention to this suggestion as soon as the pension scheme comes into force.

II. The survey undertaken by the Public Administration Committee, at the Council's request, on the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council for the secondment of national officials to international organisations is nearing completion. The Council will very shortly be receiving the results of this survey and will consider whether the Committee should be asked to go further into certain aspects. The Assembly will, at its request, be kept informed of progress in this field.

APPENDIX VI

*Written questions and replies of the Council***(i) Question put by Mr. Richter on the proposed pension scheme and the reply of the Council**

Question : A pension scheme is now being presented to the staff of the co-ordinated organisations whereby staff members supposedly have a choice between accepting the scheme or opting to continue with the provident fund. Is this choice real since the amount standing to the credit of each member in the provident fund is the figure reached on 1st July 1974 which has already lost 10 to 15 % of its value through inflation and, secondly, since the management of the provident fund has produced interest of merely 7 % on the sum in question for the period after 1st July 1974 ?

What arrangements are being made for the provident fund in respect of staff members who cannot opt for the pension scheme since they have less than 10 years' service ?

Should not a reappraisal be made of the management of the provident fund since the fall in the value of the dollar and the high rate of inflation have deprived the fund of its main purpose which is to provide staff with a means of subsistence during a period of readaptation ?

Reply : The urgent need to introduce a pension scheme, with benefits linked to the cost of living, became increasingly apparent when, in 1973, rising levels of inflation and other factors revealed clearly the inherent weaknesses of the provident fund system, whereby the real value of the fund's assets was being rapidly eroded. The Councils of the co-ordinated organisations consequently instructed the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts to draw up the outline of a pension scheme which was, in due course, submitted to the Councils in the form of the 94th report.

This report, approved by the WEU Council on 20th March 1974, was designed to replace the savings scheme of the provident fund with a system of social security and retirement benefits in many respects better than comparable schemes of some member countries. However, the transitional measures, included in the draft pension rules at present being prepared, provide an option to those officials already in service on 1st July 1974 to continue in the provident fund

although, as the 94th report points out, staff so opting "should be made aware that the provident fund system will, under no circumstances, be improved and that it will retain its character as a pure savings scheme with all the attendant uncertainties of such an arrangement". This represents an effort to improve the conditions of service of officials belonging to the co-ordinated organisations.

The option to join the pension scheme or to remain in the provident fund is open to all staff members in service on 1st July 1974, irrespective of their length of service. It is possible to adhere to the new pension scheme validating retroactively prior service by purchase out of provident fund holdings. Those who opt for the pension scheme but who leave the organisation before completing ten years' service will be entitled to a severance grant amounting to a sum broadly equivalent to that which such officials would have received under the provident fund system.

It is inevitable that, in the current world-wide financial situation, the provident fund should not be yielding the beneficial results that were derived in recent years. The situation has been exacerbated recently because, until the pension scheme is finalised and until it is known how many staff members intend to draw on the fund to validate their pension rights, most of the fund's assets must be kept on short-term, low interest deposit.

To make a reappraisal of the management of the provident fund at this stage would not seem to be appropriate. A portion of the holdings will have to be surrendered to member States as from 1st July 1974 when the pension scheme comes into effect. Furthermore it has never been considered the main purpose of the provident fund to provide staff with a means of subsistence during a period of readaptation. In all organisations the provident fund is deemed to provide for times of old age. Old age benefits in the future will be granted from the pension scheme.

(ii) Question put by Lord Selsdon on the procedure for salary reviews and the reply of the Council

Question : Is the Council aware of the uneasiness felt by staff of the co-ordinated organisations

which recently led to stoppages of work in NATO and the Council of Europe and which may soon become more widespread and serious ?

This uneasiness is due to the governments having denounced, since 1st July 1975, a procedure for adjusting salaries, which had been working satisfactorily for some fifteen years, without any new procedure being introduced in its place, so that there now appears to be a serious threat to the purchasing power of salaries.

Is there not a risk of this unprecedented situation affecting the smooth running of the organisations ?

Would it not be appropriate to seek an early solution to this problem by introducing procedure for reviewing salaries similar to that in force in the EEC, which has been approved by nine European governments including those of all the WEU member States ?

Reply : The Council are fully aware of the situation resulting from the abandonment, since 1st July 1975, of the procedure for adjusting the remuneration of staff of the co-ordinated organisations, which had been in force for some fifteen years.

However, in the light of the incomes policy followed by the member States of these organisations, particularly with regard to civil service salaries, it had become necessary to reform a procedure which had the effect of widening, from year to year, the gap between the remunerations of national civil servants and of international civil servants.

The Council hope that the immediate problem will shortly be solved on the basis of a procedure agreed by governments taking account of discussions with the Secretaries-General of the organisations.

In their view, the grounds for objecting to the parallel movement of salaries paid in national civil services and in the co-ordinated organisations are weakened by the fact that the European Communities have themselves accepted the principle. The member States of the European Communities have, in fact, begun discussions with the Commission on this basis, for changes

in the procedure for cost-of-living and standard-of-living adjustments of Community salaries.

The Co-ordinating Committee is following this example in its efforts to work out a new adjustment procedure.

(iii) Question put by Mr. Dequae on loans for purchasing accommodation and the reply of the Council

1. When the pension scheme comes into force in the co-ordinated organisations, will the Council consider allowing WEU staff members to continue to obtain loans for purchasing or building accommodation ?

2. Would the Council be prepared to set up a fund for this purpose using part of the sums paid by staff for validating past service ?

Reply : The Council recognise that the facility provided by the WEU Staff Rules permitting staff members to obtain housing loans is beneficial both to the employee and even to the employer in contributing to a certain stability among the staff. They are not, consequently, opposed in principle to the continued granting of these loans after the introduction of the pension scheme.

For those staff who opt to remain in the provident fund, this facility will continue to be available, since loans are financed by withdrawals from their holdings in the provident fund.

However, since the pension scheme is not yet in force and since staff will, from its introduction, be allowed a further year in which to exercise their option, it is not possible at present to forecast the financial implications of the introduction of the scheme. Until this is known, any decision on this question would be premature.

Moreover, the Council note that this problem concerns not only WEU but other co-ordinated organisations as well. Although it may be difficult to find a common solution for all the organisations, the Council would welcome a joint examination by the Secretaries-General and the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts of alternative means of financing housing loans which would not entail special demands on government funds.

APPENDIX VII

*Indemnity for loss of job*¹

.....

C. Termination of contracts — indemnity for loss of job

Termination of a contract by the Assembly may, in certain circumstances, give rise to the payment of an indemnity for loss of job. The regulations governing the payment of this indemnity are set out below.

General principles

1. The Clerk following the decision of the Council shall have power to award an indemnity for loss of employment to any staff member² :

- (i) who holds a firm contract³ ;
- (ii) and whose services are terminated for any one of the following reasons :
 - suppression of the budget post occupied by the staff member ;
 - changes in the duties of the budget post occupied by the staff member of such a nature that he no longer possesses the required qualifications ;
 - general staff cuts including those due to a reduction in or termination of the activities of an organisation ;
 - the withdrawal from the organisation of the member country of which the staff member is a national ;

1. See Staff Rules, Article 11, Contracts, pages 21 to 25.

2. For the purposes of these regulations, the term "staff member" shall mean a member of the international civilian staff, whatever the nature of his contract. The present regulations shall therefore not apply to staff of local status, temporary staff, experts or consultants.

3. A firm contract shall be interpreted to mean a contract made with a staff member on completion of the probationary period. It goes without saying that a staff member who has held a firm contract in a co-ordinated organisation and who has subsequently been offered, either in that organisation or in another co-ordinated organisation, a contract involving a probationary period, shall be deemed to satisfy this condition if such contract is terminated during or on completion of such probationary period.

- the transfer of the headquarters of the organisation or of any of its units to another country and the consequent transfer of the whole staff concerned ;
- the refusal by the staff member, where his contract does not cover the point, to be permanently transferred to a country other than that in which he is serving ;
- withdrawal of security clearance on grounds which do not warrant the dismissal of the staff member as a result of disciplinary action ;

(iii) and who

- is not offered a post in the same grade in the same organisation, or
- is not appointed to a vacant post in one of the other co-ordinated organisations at a comparable remuneration, or
- if employed in the public service, has failed to obtain immediate reintegration in his national, civil or military administration.

2. The method of calculating the indemnity differs as between fixed term appointments and indefinite term appointments.

*(a) Fixed term appointments**Amount of indemnity*

3. The amount of indemnity for loss of job shall be equal to half the product of the monthly emoluments of the staff member (basic salary, including cost of living allowances, plus the organisation's contribution to the provident fund and, where appropriate, the head of household allowance and the dependant's allowance) multiplied by the number of months remaining up to the expiry of the term of his contract, provided that it shall in no case exceed :

- five months' emoluments in the case of a contract for three years or less ;

- eight months' emoluments in the case of a contract for four years, or for any term between three years and four years ;
- ten months' emoluments in the case of a contract for more than four years.

4. The emoluments to be taken into account in calculating the amount of the indemnity shall be those received by the staff member at the date of leaving the organisation.

Payment of the indemnity

5. The indemnity shall be paid to the staff member in full at the time he leaves the organisation.

(b) Indefinite term appointments

Amount of indemnity

6. The amount of the indemnity, expressed in months or fractions of a month of emoluments (basic salary, including cost of living allowance plus the organisation's contribution to the provident fund and, where appropriate, the head of household allowance and the dependant's allowance) shall be one month's emoluments for each year of service from the date when the staff member joined the organisation. However, the amount of indemnity so calculated shall be subject to a ceiling. This ceiling is set at eighteen months' emoluments at 1st January 1972 and shall be raised at the rate of one month per year up to a maximum level of twenty-four months. Furthermore, the amount of indemnity shall not represent a number of months, or fractions of a month in excess of the period which the staff member would still have to serve before reaching the age limit specified by the Staff Rules of the organisation.

7. The emoluments to be taken into account in calculating the amount of the indemnity shall be those received by the staff member at the date of leaving the organisation.

Payment of the indemnity

8. The indemnity shall be paid to the staff member in full at the time he leaves the organisation.

Miscellaneous provisions

9. In calculating the amount of indemnity for loss of job under paragraph 6 above, account shall be taken, where appropriate, of any years of service previously performed by the staff member concerned in other co-ordinated organisations and in respect of which he has not received any indemnity for loss of job provided, however, that no account shall be taken of any years of service preceding :

- (i) an interruption of the service of the staff member concerned with the co-ordinated organisations ;
- (ii) the termination for disciplinary reasons of his services with any co-ordinated organisation.

10. Any staff member who has served not less than ten consecutive years with one or more co-ordinated organisations and whose services are terminated in the conditions specified in paragraph 1 hereof shall be entitled to an indemnity for loss of job calculated under the provisions of paragraph 6 and, where appropriate, of paragraph 9 hereof, whatever the nature of the contract held by him at the time when his appointment is terminated.

APPENDIX VIII

Breakdown of staff in the co-ordinated organisations on 1st January 1976

OECD			Council of Europe			NATO						Total NATO - SHAPE			ESA			WEU			Grand total		
						Secretariat Agencies Military Committee			SHAPE														
ALBC	B-C	A-L	ALBC	B-C	A-L	ALBC	B-C	A-L	ALBC	B-C	A-L	ALBC	B-C	A-L	ALBC	B-C	A-L	ALBC	B-C	A-L	ALBC	B-C	A-L
1640	1016	624	724	457	267	2971	2062	909	1361	886	475	4332	2948	1384	1547	608	939	149	94	55	12724	8071	4653

APPENDIX IX

Membership of the co-ordinated organisations

Member country	Organisation				
	OECD	Council of Europe	NATO	ESA	WEU
EUROPE					
Austria	x	x			
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x
Cyprus		x			
Denmark	x	x	x	x	
Finland	x				
France	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x		
Iceland	x	x	x		
Ireland	x	x			
Italy	x	x	x	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x
Malta		x			
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x
Norway	x	x	x		
Portugal	x		x		
Spain	x			x	
Sweden	x	x		x	
Switzerland	x	x		x	
Turkey	x	x	x		
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x
AMERICA					
Canada	x		x		
United States	x		x		
ASIA					
Japan	x				
AUSTRALASIA					
Australia	x				
New Zealand	x				
TOTAL	24	18	15	10	7

***Political activities of the Council
Reply to the Twenty-First Annual Report of the Council***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Périquier, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Bettiol (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. von Bothmer (Substitute: *Schwencke*), MM. Brugnol, Cernolacce, Fioret, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: *de Bruyne*), MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Mendelson

(Substitute: *Channon*), Minnolci, Nessler, *de Niet*, Peijnenburg, *Périquier*, *Portheine*, Preti (Substitute: *Magliano*), Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel (Substitute: *Lord Beaumont of Whitley*), Urwin (Substitute: *Lewis*), Van Hoeylandt.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the political activities of the Council —
reply of the twenty-first annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

Noting the twenty-first annual report of the Council ;

Recalling Resolutions 55 and 59 ;

Noting with satisfaction that the Council “makes no distinction between the Council of Western European Union meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives” ;

Recalling that the Council “is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty” as long as these rights and duties have not been transferred by treaty to another institution ;

Deploring that the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives makes only exceptional use of its prerogatives ;

Noting however that circumstances continue to make it essential to maintain procedure for consultation between the Western European countries on matters affecting their security ;

Noting that the Council’s refusal to reply to Written Questions 158, 159 and 160 and to hold a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee in 1975 shows that the Council is shirking its responsibilities in respect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Recalling that the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty commits its signatories to “preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage” ;

Recalling finally Recommendation 266 to which the Council gave only a very incomplete reply,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by :
 - (a) examining in which framework each question concerning European security should be discussed by the Seven ;
 - (b) dealing effectively with the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty even when it meets at the level of Permanent Representatives ;
 - (c) examining attentively the means whereby it may complement possible action by the Nine in defence matters, particularly in emergencies ;
 - (d) illustrating how the Council’s activities reflect the constantly-repeated statement by the Council and by the member countries that they attach the greatest importance to the full application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. Give the Assembly a precise reply to paragraph 3 of Recommendation 266 ;
3. Report without hesitation in its communications to the Assembly on any differences between the positions adopted by its members, as it did in its reply to Recommendation 283 ;
4. Consider, together with the other powers concerned, how it might follow the political consultations between the nine member countries of the EEC on the one hand and on the other, in view of the study it is undertaking on “the possibility that WEU might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe”, the activities of the European programme group ;
5. Should not invoke the possibility of members using national procedure in order to avoid replying to recommendations and written questions.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Périquier, Rapporteur)

I. General

1. In 1976, it is of even greater importance to consider the annual report of the WEU Council in the light of events in Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance in the past year with particular regard to future developments now taking shape. These events have led observers to ponder the rôle WEU could or will play and perhaps, in some cases, to wonder whether sooner or later WEU will not disappear. Quite obviously consideration of the Council's activities should take such prospects into account in order to ascertain how far the Council's present concept of its work helps to pave the way for a European union which many hope will be established within the next few years.

2. (i) *In Western Europe*, the nine member countries of the European Economic Community have been busy working out the form of the European union they have undertaken to set up by 1980. Two major documents have been published, one by the Commission of the European Communities in June 1975 and the other by Mr. Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, at the request of the European Council, in January 1976. The WEU Assembly responded to these two texts in two resolutions adopted by the Presidential Committee between sessions. The first was ratified by the Assembly at its December 1975 session and the second is to be submitted for ratification at the June 1976 session. Both give the Assembly's views on the place of WEU in the European union.

3. Both Mr. Tindemans' report and that of the Commission had to bear in mind that the governments of the nine member countries of the European Communities do not have a joint attitude towards defence matters and that defence would consequently remain what the Commission called a "potential competence" of the union for an indefinite period, whereas in other fields both texts proposed the immediate development of the union's responsibilities. Consequently, it seems that WEU will remain outside the union for some time even if subsequently it will be called upon to take its place in the union.

4. In its two resolutions, the Assembly indicated very clearly that it intended WEU to retain its full responsibilities during the intermediary period until such time as they could be

transferred to the future European union by treaty. The Assembly has always recognised the WEU Council's concern to avoid duplication of work by not discussing certain matters which its members deal with in wider frameworks such as the nine-power political consultations, but it has never considered that WEU thus lost any of the responsibilities assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty, nor has the Council ever expressed a contrary view.

5. However, there now seems to be some thought of making a distinction between the modified Brussels Treaty, to which all the member countries have confirmed their continuing loyalty, and WEU as an organisation. It should be recalled that the treaty instituted both the Assembly and the Council of WEU, as well as the Agency for the Control of Armaments, and the organisation cannot be touched without affecting the treaty. From a more political point of view, moreover, it is hard to imagine how such a binding alliance as that set up in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty could work without procedure for permanent consultations between member governments allowing them to discuss all problems arising from the operation of the alliance. Nine-power consultations cannot replace those in the WEU Council altogether unless the responsibilities involved in applying the modified Brussels Treaty are transferred to another organisation. Finally, the prospect of a European union makes it essential to establish close contacts between WEU and the Nine and it is deplorable that there are no indications of this in the twenty-first annual report of the Council, which gives the impression that nothing has been done in this connection.

6. (ii) *In the framework of the Atlantic Alliance* a number of problems now make it more important than ever for Western Europe to retain the institutional means for concerting defence efforts. One problem is the possibility voiced a few years ago by certain American authorities of a partial withdrawal of American troops stationed in Europe. Whatever the present position of the United States Government, which in any event is concerned with elections at the end of 1976, this threat will continue to be present in view of the revival of the isolationist trend in American public opinion in recent years. Although there is no indication that the United States Government

has decided or is about to decide on such withdrawals, Western Europe must not leave itself without the means of facing the changed military and political situation which would arise from a reduction of the American military presence in Europe.

7. Furthermore, in the early months of 1976 the highest American authorities and General Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the American forces in Europe as well as of the NATO forces, have said that if there were to be communist participation in the governments of certain Western European countries the United States would give considerable thought to its stake in the Atlantic Alliance. The present political situation in France and Italy leaves the door open to such participation, perhaps even in the fairly near future.

8. It is therefore essential for the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to consult with each other about the possible repercussions of a change in United States membership of the Alliance. This concern was expressed in Written Question 165, put to the WEU Council by Mr. Radius on 8th March 1976, when he asked whether the Council considered :

“that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty would also be jeopardised if communist party members were to join the government of a WEU member country.”

9. At the time of writing, your Rapporteur has not yet heard the Council's reply, but he feels that it can but be negative insofar as the modified Brussels Treaty contains no ideological provisions but constitutes an alliance between sovereign States to the extent that these States endorse the principles set out in the preamble to the treaty, *inter alia* :

“To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage.”

Only if one of the States were to renounce its membership of the modified Brussels Treaty — a most unlikely event — would there be any repercussions on the application of the treaty insofar as the principles set out in the treaty were in fact respected.

10. (iii) *Application of the modified Brussels Treaty.* In these circumstances it was therefore logical that in 1975 some members of the

Assembly should have given thought to the way the modified Brussels Treaty was being applied and asked the Council to give its views on the matter. Your Rapporteur welcomes the Council's full reply to Written Question 156 which he believes gives useful information on the member countries' attitude towards the application of Articles V and VI of the modified Brussels Treaty.

11. However, it is still an open question as to what the WEU Council would do if, after deciding that an act by a third power against one of its members was an “armed attack”, the United Nations Security Council failed to agree with it.

12. Your Rapporteur's opinion is that, although the WEU Council has undertaken to report to the Security Council all collective defence measures taken in application of Article V and to terminate them as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, it is not bound by the Security Council's definition of the term “armed attack”. Therefore, if the WEU Council considered that the Security Council was not taking the necessary measures to maintain or restore international peace, it would be entitled not to terminate the collective defence measures taken. This seems particularly clear since, in its reply to Written Question 156, the WEU Council recognised that the Security Council was not bound by any mandatory definition of an armed attack.

13. Your Rapporteur wishes the Council to discuss this problem and, without waiting for an emergency in which Article V of the treaty might have to be implemented, to consider most carefully all the questions raised by the application of Articles V and VI and inform the Assembly of its conclusions.

II. Political activities of the Council

14. In his reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council, Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, considered how the WEU Council could operate in the new circumstances arising from the development of nine-power political consultations, and the recommendation adopted by the Assembly was largely devoted to this matter. The Council's reply to Recommendation 266, although long and detailed, obliges the Assembly to emphasise certain points which the Council failed to take

up either in Mr. de Bruyne's report or in the Assembly's recommendation. According to its reply :

"The modified Brussels Treaty makes no distinction between the Council of Western European Union meeting at ministerial level and the same Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives."

The Council even specifies that :

"The Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty."

15. This was precisely the starting point for Mr. de Bruyne's argument. He asked that the Permanent Council take over the duties which the Council could not assume at ministerial level because it did not meet frequently enough. In fact — and this can be seen clearly in Chapter II, paragraph A, of the twenty-first annual report of the Council where there is a difference between paragraph 1, dealing with consideration of East-West relations at ministerial meetings, and paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 which, alluding only to meetings of Permanent Representatives, refer to the Assembly's recommendations as the basis for the Council's discussions — it is only when meeting at ministerial level that the Council deals directly with political matters. Conversely, when meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives, it deals only with matters referred to it by the Assembly. Yet Recommendation 266 asked that the Council :

"Include regularly in its agenda consideration of the various problems raised by the application of the modified Brussels Treaty"

and

"Draw up a list of problems connected with the application of the treaty over which the governments of the seven member countries are divided so that they may be considered at ministerial level or that attention be drawn to them in the North Atlantic Council or in the European Council".

16. In its reply, the Council recalled that any member government can propose that a particular matter should be discussed in the Council of WEU and that it was at present discussing the possibility that WEU might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe.

17. It is quite evident that such a reply is most inadequate since if the annual report is to be believed, apart from the one ministerial meeting, no government appears to have proposed to the Council any matter concerning the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. However, these problems exist — the first chapter of this report mentions some — and the Council is not dealing with them. As for the only matter which the Council has actually tackled, i.e. the standardisation of armaments in Europe, this question has taken a new turn since the creation at the end of 1975 of an independent body responsible for armaments programmes and that consequently any decision concerning WEU is at the very least being held back until such time as the governments give a clear idea of the nature and scope of the activities of that independent body.

18. In short, your Rapporteur suggests that the Assembly repeat the requests it made to the Council in 1975 and in particular that it review the problems on which the governments of the seven member countries disagree, even if eventually the Ministers have to consider them in a framework other than WEU.

19. Finally, although it is gratifying that the Council is maintaining relations with other international organisations it is surprising that the twenty-first annual report makes no mention of contacts with those whose activities most affect the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, i.e. the nine-power political consultations and the European programme group whose formation and development directly concern the Council's study of the development of WEU's activities in the standardisation of armaments.

III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

20. While the Council has constantly shown its desire to maintain good relations with the Assembly, the relationship between the two has developed, as is normal, in parallel with the evolution of the Council's activities. The Council has to be thanked for a number of measures which the Assembly finds satisfactory, and first and foremost for having sent the report on its activities in 1975 in time to meet the Assembly's requirements, as was already the case for the 1974 report. It is likewise true that the Council has replied to a particularly large number of recommendations and eleven written questions and at the sitting in Bonn commemorating the

twentieth anniversary of the Assembly ministers from all seven member countries addressed the Assembly. Moreover, seven ministers from five countries addressed the Assembly at other sittings during the twenty-first ordinary session.

21. The Assembly also welcomes the fact that the reply to Recommendation 283 was endorsed by some WEU member countries and not all of them, thus bringing out, indirectly at least, the differences between its members on certain questions. The Assembly had been asking the Council to do this for a long time, such procedure being essential if the Assembly is to be properly informed not only about matters on which the seven countries are unanimous but also those on which they disagree.

22. The Council's statement that :

"Members of the Assembly were at liberty to question their governments whenever they wanted a more detailed consideration of various policy matters of particular concern to WEU"

is of little value since it is contrary to normal government practice to reply to questions dealing with the policy of a third country. For instance, on 7th November 1975 Mr. Krieg put a written question in the National Assembly asking the French Minister for Foreign Affairs whether some WEU member countries were questioning the paragraph of the Ottawa declaration recognising the importance of the French nuclear force. The French Minister's reply merely underlined the importance which France attached to the terms of the declaration on Atlantic relations approved by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19th June 1974, which gave little indication of the position of the WEU Council, which had declined to reply to Mr. Krieg's Written Question 160 put to it on the same subject.

23. Furthermore, Mr. de Stexhe having put several questions on the Assembly's recommendations to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 3rd January 1976 he received the reply that since WEU was dealing with these matters "it would be inappropriate for the Belgian Government to give an individual reply to the above-mentioned questions". These two instances show that the Council cannot leave it to governments to reply to questions put to it by members of the Assembly when they concern the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

24. In general the Assembly is not satisfied with its present relations with the Council.

Although some of the replies to recommendations or written questions have been of importance — reference has been made to some of them — this has not generally been the case and it is difficult for the Assembly to accept replies such as were given to Written Questions 158 and 159 on the effects of United States nuclear strategy on the western defence system. To say that "the Council are not in a position to appraise these matters" in fact amounts to saying that the Council is not in a position to apply the modified Brussels Treaty, which is quite unacceptable.

25. Finally, the General Affairs Committee still feels strongly about not being able to hold a joint meeting with the Council again in 1975. The luncheon to which it was invited after the ministerial meeting in London on 20th May 1975 can in no way be considered equivalent to a joint meeting, since it was no more than a disjointed conversation between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and a number of WEU parliamentarians. The Council was thus in no position to discuss replies which committed only its Chairman-in-Office and consequently there was no real discussion between the Council and the Assembly. It should be added that since no minutes could be drafted after such a talk, it could in no way be likened to a joint meeting, although the members of the General Affairs Committee will remember it as a useful and pleasant encounter.

26. Insofar as the Council considers — as it has constantly asserted and in accordance with the Assembly's wishes — that the Assembly must be kept informed about all questions affecting the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if the Seven use another institutional framework for such consultations, the Assembly cannot agree to the Council continually evading a discussion with the General Affairs Committee on the major political questions set out in the questionnaire transmitted by the Committee for a joint meeting in 1975.

IV. Conclusions

27. In conclusion to this report, it seems difficult to believe that the Council is not shirking its duties in respect of the application of the political provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty. As the Assembly has often stressed, it cannot agree to the Council anticipating the possible integration of WEU in the future European union and evading the tasks assigned to it by treaty, which will remain its responsibility.

ity as long as they have not been transferred to the European union by another treaty. More than any other, the twenty-first annual report of the Council gives reason to fear that this might be the case.

28. Should the Council decide unilaterally to relinquish the rôle assigned to it by treaty, it

would certainly not strengthen the European union but would rather leave it weak and powerless for tackling defence problems which would be assigned to it sooner or later anyway. It should not be forgotten that as matters now stand WEU is still the only truly European body with treaty responsibility for defence questions.

Détente and security in Europe

REPORT¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur**

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on détente and security in Europe

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submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Bettiol (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. von Bothmer (Substitute: Schwencke), MM. Brugnion, Cermolacce, Fioret, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: de

Bruyne), MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Mendelson (Substitute: Channon), Minnoccini, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Périquier, Portheine, Preti (Substitute: Magliano), Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel (Substitute: Lord Beaumont of Whitley), Urwin (Substitute: Lewis), Van Hoeylandt.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on détente and security in Europe

The Assembly,

Affirming that true East-West détente can be achieved only through substantial mutual, balanced and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ;

Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Northern Europe ;

Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ;

Regretting that in three years little or no progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ;

Concerned that the Soviet Union and its allies are still taking advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen their political, economic and military positions in the world ;

Considering that in face of the Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic Alliance no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their collective security ;

Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of détente, as this concept is interpreted in the West, a reduction of military strength in Western Europe has occurred without a lessening in the Soviet military threat ;

Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions in 1975 ;

Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement of persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for détente ;

Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by external military intervention ;

Regretting that South Africa's widely-condemned racial policies provided a pretext, although unjustified, for Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ;
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE ;
3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to re-establish and maintain a secure balance between the forces of the two alliances in Central and Northern Europe ;
4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising outside Europe in order :
 - (a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or its allies ;
 - (b) to deter any further Soviet interference ;
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, economic and military balance in Europe and the world ;
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied should one of the member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Nowadays it is fairly current practice to compare the present phase of East-West relations, generally termed *détente*, with a preceding phase known as the cold war. The change from one to the other, it is said, came at about the time Kennedy and Khrushchev were leading the two great world powers; and these two personalities, each famous in his own way, are generally given credit for initiating measures intended to lead to far-reaching changes in international relations.

2. Fundamentally, one must not be mistaken about the different interpretations of *détente*.

3. The West, until events have forced on them a more realistic appreciation, believed that the introduction of *détente* in place of cold war would lead and was intended to lead through relaxation of East-West tension to meaningful, peaceful coexistence, entailing mutual respect, without approval of each other's differing political, economic and social systems.

4. From the Soviet point of view, i.e. the Marxist-Leninist principle of international relations as interpreted and exploited by the Kremlin for Russian nationalist purposes, there can be no real peace, either externally or internally, in an inexorable thread of contemporary history. Yet for easily-understood reasons it is now considered that this struggle has to be pursued within certain limitations imposed by the necessity to avoid any risk of a nuclear war.

5. Consequently, peaceful coexistence, which is the real basis of *détente*, is in Russian eyes not really peace but a continuing, expansionist imperialism (under the guise, for propagandist reasons at home and abroad, of a "class struggle"), using all means, other than those generally considered to be too dangerous. Even so, in the Soviet view there can be no doubt about the outcome of their strategy: the establishment of a global Russian hegemony, masked, again, as "the victory of the proletariat", an inevitable process which could be jeopardised only if the capitalist powers were provoked into using weapons capable of radically destroying the strength of the countries representing the proletariat. It may even be said that, whereas in the Stalinist era military means were an integral, predominant part of the strategy of the Soviet Union, nowadays they are complementary.

6. This in no way means that the Kremlin is less aggressive or that its military strength has diminished. Quite the contrary; for the safer it feels from a nuclear point of view and in terms of armaments in general, the more it will be tempted to advance as far as possible by other means, avoiding open warfare and so not putting at risk the gains acquired, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe, after the second world war. It may therefore be argued that in one, but only one respect, Soviet foreign policy is first and foremost a defensive policy insofar as the maintenance of existing Soviet colonialism in Europe is a continuing, fundamental aim.

7. Otherwise, as was the case immediately after the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet Union now seems to be pursuing two quite distinct policies by different means. One is conducted with the Soviet State's own resources with a view to consolidating the *status quo* in Europe. The other is conducted through sometimes overt, sometimes covert support of rebel movements abroad, especially in the third world, or through activist, subordinate foreign communist parties, with a view not necessarily to establishing as a first step Soviet régimes in new territories, but primarily to weaken existing western or western-inclined positions and hasten the ruin of "reactionary capitalism", the phrase applied to all who stand in the way of Russian imperialism.

8. Thus the Soviet Union no longer uses the same tactics as immediately after the first world war. Undeniably, its military strength has increased considerably and is still growing fast. On the other hand, the Soviet Union appears to be losing some of its grip on communist parties in countries inside and outside the Warsaw Pact and its influence on nationalist movements emerging throughout the third world. Many in all three categories seem increasingly to be as suspicious of the Soviet Union as of the West, no new country with two possible exceptions not occupied during the last quarter of a century or directly dominated by the Red Army has definitely joined the Soviet side: the first is Cuba, and the second is Indo-China — Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia — whose future allegiance is still in doubt.

9. In reviewing the present state of *détente* we must first examine developments in the balance

of military forces ; then consider the balance of political forces ; and finally review the real progress, if any, in the negotiations which seek to further détente, as we in the West and throughout the uncommitted world understand that diversely-interpreted word ; i.e. a policy of live and let live allowing nations to place higher priority on social advances than on maintaining the military capacity to defend themselves.

II. Balance of military forces

10. At the end of the second world war, the military strength of the United States was overwhelming throughout the world. Thanks to its industrial lead, it had developed the most modern weapons, whereas the Soviet Union had been able to continue fighting only with American assistance. Furthermore, the United States was the only country to have nuclear weapons and for a long time it kept well ahead in this field. This provided it with an ultimate means of direct and indirect pressure on any enemy whatsoever and full security for its own territory.

11. The Soviet Union has since made a sustained effort to catch up with and then overtake American military strength in every field. For instance, in 1974 it was calculated that the Soviet Union had spent the equivalent of about \$103,800 million on defence, i.e. 10.6 %¹ of its GNP, while the United States had spent only \$92,700 million, i.e. 6.6 % of its GNP². In the event, as will be shown, its strength equals or exceeds that of the United States, just as the forces and resources of the Warsaw Pact equal or exceed those of the Atlantic Alliance.

12. The Soviet Union has managed to do this only by maintaining a relatively low standard of living for its whole population and constantly giving priority to heavy industry and weapons industries over consumer goods. In addition it imposes the same constraints on its Warsaw Pact satellites. Conversely, during the same period, the western countries have devoted a far greater proportion of their gross national product to improving living conditions for the population.

1. The British Defence Minister, reaffirming an earlier American report, announced on 18th May that a more accurate updated appraisal indicated a figure of an average 11-12 % over the last ten years.

2. International Institute for Strategic Studies : The Military Balance 1975-76, London 1975, pages 5 and 8.

13. Thus, the Soviet Union now has a comparable nuclear capacity with the United States, greater if one contrasts 1,618 strategic missiles at the disposal of the USSR with 1,054 for the United States ; rather less if one takes into account the more numerous warheads fitted to American missiles and the present undoubted numerical superiority of the United States' nuclear bomber fleet ; greater again if one accepts that the USSR has seventy-five nuclear-armed submarines, the Americans only forty-one.

14. How this uneasy balance will be affected by two new weapons, the Russian Backfire bomber designed for long-range attack from distant bases, on the one hand, and the Americans' low-trajectory Cruise missiles, on the other, it is too early to say.

15. Soviet superiority in conventional weapons is now beyond argument. According to The Military Balance 1975-76, the United States deployed 2,130,000 men in 1975 compared with 3,575,000 for the Soviet Union. The number of Soviet aircraft and tanks was also far greater. This disproportion is most marked in Northern and Central Europe, where the preponderance of Warsaw Pact forces and weapons has steadily increased in recent years. In Central Europe the Warsaw Pact countries have thirty-one armoured divisions, of which nineteen are Soviet, as compared with twelve armoured divisions for NATO. Similarly, in Central Europe the Warsaw Pact has thirty-seven mechanised or airborne infantry divisions, of which twenty-one are Soviet, as compared with fifteen for NATO. Admittedly, the Soviet divisions are less strong than NATO's and the ratio is only 895,000 troops (of which 595,000 are Soviet) to 575,000 for NATO.

16. The summary of the military balance of NATO along the central front vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact is as follows :

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Total soldiers	1	1.3
Soldiers in fighting units	1	1.4
Main battle tanks	1	2.7
Field guns	1	2.5
Tactical aircraft	1	2.3

17. Only in Southern Europe, and for how long is uncertain, NATO still has a slight overall military lead. But if the number of tanks deployed is considered, it can be seen that the Warsaw Pact has 19,000 in Central Europe and 7,250 even in Southern Europe, whereas NATO has 7,000 and 3,500 respectively. The total number

of fighter aircraft in Central Europe is 4,025 for the Warsaw Pact, of which 2,400 are Soviet, compared with 2,000 for NATO, and, in Southern Europe, 930 for the Warsaw Pact compared with 858 for NATO.

18. It should be added that in an address to NATO leaders on 9th December 1975 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, RN, revealed that last spring the Soviet Union had for the first time used aircraft, instead of slower land transport methods, for rotating forces, which had cut rotation time by two-thirds. This means that it can strengthen its armies very quickly on any of its frontiers.

19. In a recent statement to a United States Senate committee, the former Secretary of Defence, Mr. Schlesinger, said that the Soviet military effort was about 45 % greater than that of the United States, and he estimated that there were 4,700,000 Russian troops under arms ; i.e. twice the figure for the United States. This estimate is definitely higher than that given in *The Military Balance* but it may be considered that Mr. Schlesinger, when he said this, was best placed to receive information on the development of Soviet military strength. He also said that in recent years Soviet fighter aircraft production had been 70 % higher than that of the United States and that during the same period the Soviet Union had produced four times as many warships as the United States, in its efforts to reach, then surpass parity.

20. Turning now to the balance of naval forces which for a long time was tipped firmly in NATO's favour, this is obviously no longer so. The volume of current shipbuilding programmes in the Warsaw Pact countries — and particularly in the Soviet Union — suggests that the balance will shortly come down on the side of the Warsaw Pact.

21. All available information about the development of Soviet naval strength shows that although it does not yet outnumber the United States navy, Soviet warships are more modern and are being built at such an accelerated rate that in a year or two the Soviet navy may take the lead, numerically as well.

22. In the Eastern Atlantic the balance of ready naval forces is as follows :

	<i>NATO</i>	<i>USSR northern fleet</i>
Surface ships	1	2
Submarines	1	1.7
Combat aircraft	1	1.5

23. This pressing development of Soviet military and naval strength demands that certain questions be answered. First, what is the purpose of this strength, since the strategic balance is still such that the Soviet Union cannot hope for a total military victory over the United States and its allies ? For it well knows that the United States would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in any direct attack on the West and that Russia could not hope for shelter from unacceptable retaliatory destruction.

24. Again, everything indicates that however strong the Soviet naval force may be, for geographic reasons it can hardly give the Soviet Union command of the seas. Despite the Soviet expansion its access to the open sea is still extremely difficult to maintain. This is, of course, clear in the case of the Mediterranean, where NATO's land positions should subject Soviet ships to destruction quickly after the outbreak of war, assuming that the Soviets still have no permanent land bases. It is common knowledge that they have tried to obtain such bases in Egypt, whence they have been now expelled, may still have some facilities in Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria, and outside the Mediterranean have succeeded in their aim in South Yemen and Somalia. Their lack of permanent harbour facilities still extends to the Atlantic Ocean, to which the Soviet Union has possible access only from the north ; i.e. through the relatively narrow passages between Canada, Greenland, the British Isles and Norway, which could in the event be denied to the Soviet fleet in wartime.

25. However, both Cuban loyalties and events in Angola may well provide future facilities in the South Atlantic : and the longer the Anglo-Icelandic conflict lasts, the greater the danger not just of a break with NATO but instead even positive ties with Russia.

26. It is, therefore, probable that Soviet naval development stems less from a desire to win a war which, in any event, would not remain purely naval, than from its determination to improve its military power and in consequence its political and economic positions throughout the world, without resort to war. Development of the Soviet navy obviously facilitates the establishment of such bases, also in the Indian Ocean, especially in the light of Britain's military withdrawal from the whole area. Such bases might then be used to threaten the lines of communication between members of the Atlantic Alliance and serve as a jumping-off point for expansion in Asia, Africa, or Latin America :

as has already happened in Angola, due to the rôle that Cuba played, at the Kremlin's behest.

27. For a long time, many observers explained the Soviet military effort as being a desire to catch up with and counterbalance American power. But it must now be noted that this aim has been reached and even significantly surpassed in some fields ; but there is still no sign of the Soviet Union even stabilising its armaments efforts. On the contrary, they are still being accentuated. This means that its aim goes beyond its earlier declared purpose of obtaining parity.

28. Even the attainment of parity was not necessary if defence was all the Kremlin had in mind. Western strategists always assert that to defend oneself in conventional weaponry and manpower against a potential aggressor, a ratio of one to three is sufficient. Yet the USSR seems determined, on the Central European front at least, to establish a ratio in excess of three to one and is steadily nearing this objective.

29. Defence needs being irrelevant, therefore, what has the USSR in mind ? There are some possible conjectures other than nationalist, expansionist imperialism cloaked in an ideological, political doctrine.

30. There are, of course, those who seek to explain away the USSR's enormous and still growing expenditure on armaments, conventional and nuclear, by Russia's fear of China and the threat that it presents to the Soviet Union's security. Your Rapporteur does not accept the validity of this point of view. It is, of course, true that Sino-Russian relations are very bad and their mutual hostility is virulent. Peking has never forgiven Moscow for the economic boycott that nearly wrecked their economy at the time of their dependence on the Soviet Union after the nationalists had been finally defeated. It is also true that the Chinese never lose an opportunity, in any age or at any level of society, to stress that large areas of their country have been illegally taken over by Russians during the last two hundred years and more, and in the schools maps still show substantial areas of Russia's eastern provinces as "temporarily occupied" parts of China. Having said this, China is in no economic state, nor are its armed forces adequate for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. Their air force is very small, their capacity to deliver their comparatively limited nuclear weapons is at a very unsophisticated stage of development, and they have vir-

tually no navy at all. Their army is, of course, enormous numerically, but again their equipment does not match up in any way to the Russian armoury. Moreover, the biggest build-up of Russian offensive military might is on the European, northern and central fronts which have no relevance at all to a conflict with China. For their large submarine fleet could hardly be used in a Russo-Chinese war to any advantage, except possibly to deliver nuclear missiles which the Russians could do far more easily and effectively from land bases in their Asian provinces.

31. Moreover, none of the figures given in this report for the Russian and Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO with such an enormous preponderance as against the West include any of the very large concentrations of troops and weaponry along their eastern flanks. If one were to include those forces as being available to reinforce the present menace to the West, the picture would indeed be even more black than it is.

32. Another theory concerns the present economic troubles facing the West. Certainly the Soviet Union is aware of the economic difficulties of the West including the oil energy crisis since October 1973. Hence there may be fears, nonsensical and unreal, that the crisis may induce the West in desperation to use force to regain the economic positions in the third world which it has lost since the second world war ; and the Soviet Union wishes to be able to prevent this.

33. Of course our economic problems undeniably are weakening the capitalist side in the economic, military and even political fields, thus providing the Soviet Union with an exceptional opportunity, at least if the situation remains unchanged, of taking advantage of this weakness to intervene in areas where it had never yet been able to exercise a lasting influence. This has already proved to be the case in Angola where, for the first time, the Soviet Union has found a chance of gaining a firm foothold in Africa. In short, the further weakening of the West would hasten the revolution which is to bring about victory for the proletarian, alias imperialist Russian cause throughout the world.

34. The West as a whole is aware of the growing Soviet military potential, but clearly it does not yet intend to change a defence policy which seems to be more and more restricted by the various internal social and economic problems facing all the western countries ; except in the United States where a political decision to halt and reverse any further reduction in

defence spending has received bi-partisan public support. Most NATO allies earmark less than 5 % and some less than 4 % of their gross national product for defence, as against over 10 %¹ by the USSR. If one uses the criteria of relative expenditure on defence on a per capita basis the West is particularly at a disadvantage compared with the USSR, the latter now even exceeding that of the United States. Problems caused by the economic crisis have hitherto led to reductions in the defence effort throughout NATO, notable exceptions being nowadays the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Most recently France has announced that it will double its military spending during the next five years, devoting a bigger share of its arms budget to conventional forces entailing a rise on total defence expenditure to 22 % of the national budget by 1982 compared with 17 % this year.

35. As was seen during the period just before the second world war, the democratic countries of Western Europe intent on solving social and economic problems, are not ready or willing to assume individual or even collective responsibility for their own defence on a European basis. Instead they seem prepared to risk their long-term security by continuing to rely on the American umbrella for the indefinite future. It should be recalled that if Britain, France and the other Western European countries had shown firmer political determination when confronted with the Nazi danger, and in particular had then made the necessary rearmament effort, they might have managed to avoid a second world war taking place and would certainly have been able to shorten it. As it is, the West's defence is being impaired and it is to be feared that the repercussions could be even more serious than in 1940.

III. Political action

36. If it is accepted that Soviet military strength is not being developed in order directly to pursue a strategy of expansion by means of arms, but only to reinforce one, a rationale can probably be found in its political techniques which vary from one part of the world to another. The Soviet challenge differs from country to country according to whether or not the local communist parties can hope to achieve power by legal means,

whether the countries are more or less developed, whether they have a large or small population or are more or less accessible to Soviet military and naval forces. In this view, there are several exceptionally sensitive areas in the world.

37. Northern Europe offers a major field of activity for the Soviet Union. It contains only sparsely populated countries which could not alone defend themselves for long, if at all, except Sweden. Their territories are of primordial strategic value because they are neighbours of the Soviet Union and dominate, geographically, the Soviet Union's access routes to the Baltic, North Sea and Atlantic Ocean.

38. The Soviet Union would find it particularly worthwhile through political pressure to subordinate them to its hegemonist policy — as it has already managed to do in the case of Finland — or to isolate them from the rest of the western world, then bring sufficient pressure to blackmail them into neutralisation, including the right to use their territories, in times of war, or near-war.

39. In this context, Spitzbergen, Iceland and Greenland are of major importance, although or perhaps precisely because they *are* practically uninhabited. Certainly the Soviet Union has been continuously trying to obtain a share in Norway's influence in Spitzbergen. Norway has so far resisted this ; but the Soviet Union has managed to have this territory, which commands the outlet from its Arctic ports, demilitarised. Iceland's present dispute with the United Kingdom and several other members of the European Community over the claimed extension of its fishing rights has produced very tense relations within NATO, and Iceland has had no hesitation in threatening to withdraw from NATO if a satisfactory solution is not found to the so-called cod war. Although Iceland's position is very weak juridically, cod fishing represents more than 80 % of the country's exports. It is understandable that a country which has no other resources should use every means to protect its fishing interests ; more especially since most other powers are also demanding much expanded fishing limits of their own.

40. Finland has proposed that the whole of Northern Europe be considered as a denuclearised zone for a very long time ; which would place it outside the system of protection, up to now, ensured by the Atlantic Pact.

41. Other countries in that area, notably Norway and Denmark, have consistently refused to

1. See footnote to paragraph 11.

swallow the bait. However, in the last few months the Soviet Union seems again to have taken up the main elements of Mr. Kekkonen's proposals. Its intentions are clear: to deprive NATO of control of the northern outlets of the Atlantic and thus allow the Soviet fleet unrestricted oceanic access to Africa, Latin America and elsewhere at all times.

42. The Soviet Union can hardly hope for the Finlandisation or even the early neutralisation of Western Europe, but it can envisage an advance in this direction: to divide the countries of Western Europe through promoting interne-cine hostility so as to bring them into conflict and prevent the Atlantic Alliance playing its rôle in the event of a crisis. To this end, it not only exploits Turco-Greek differences and the cod war; but after a pause is again accusing unspecified revanchist elements in the Federal Republic of Germany of wishing to use force to change the *de facto* postwar map of Europe, although Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* included an understanding that the Soviet Union should drop the anti-German aspects of its propaganda. However, during the last MBFR talks it transpired that it was, as it has always been historically, German military strength rather than the presence of American forces in Europe which was and remains a basic subject of criticism by the Soviet Union and its allies.

43. On the brighter side, although the communist parties in Western Europe — in Portugal, Spain, France and Italy — used to prove docile allies of the Soviet Union and often allowed themselves to be enrolled in the service of Soviet interests, the Kremlin's grip on their loyalties does now appear to be weakening. While their internal opposition to NATO, the EDC and the rearmament of the Federal Republic should not be forgotten, it would be a mistake to regard the apparent loosening of Russian control as wholly illusory. There is, too, no indication that the Soviet Union is seriously considering the likelihood of Western European communist parties seizing absolute power in their own right at the present juncture. Yet the example of Portugal has shown that local communists could be used to incite as much trouble as possible and seek to precipitate the internal disintegration of an important member of the Atlantic Alliance. Participation, too, by the Italian communist party in a coalition government is a real possibility in the not too distant future. Perhaps the same may be true of France, albeit in a longer time-scale.

44. This is probably the perspective in which we should consider the more open policy of the French and Spanish communist parties, whose political aim, for the time being, seems at the least to weaken their countries' effective participation in the Atlantic Alliance and at the same time to hinder any effective Western European union, which they probably fear might considerably reduce their strength by diluting them in a grouping in which they would represent only a small minority of public opinion. Their Italian counterparts seem, for reasons which it is difficult to decide are genuine or tactical, to be developing a more conciliatory attitude to their country's NATO links. Nevertheless it is anyhow too early and hence dangerous to attach too much credence to recent statements made by these parties according to which they claim to be striking away from the Soviet line and to attribute permanent ideological value to positions which could well be due entirely to tactical considerations of achieving power first, softly-softly, and then show their real hand, as did the Czech communist party, once in office.

45. In this context, the Kremlin may have learned a lesson from its too precipitate attempts at a complete takeover in Portugal. There is little doubt that had their communist followers in Portugal contented themselves with a few ministerial posts while continuing to work for ultimate complete control of the political and military machine, they might well have succeeded. Instead, the violent attempts to impose communism in one stroke on an essentially-conservative people inflicted a serious setback. Nevertheless it would be premature to conclude that the rebuff they have suffered will prevent further endeavours.

46. But the general elections on 25th April 1976 showed that the Portuguese communist party obtained less than 15 % of the votes. With 40 seats out of 259, it is not in a position to exercise a decisive influence on the leadership of the country by democratic means.

47. The Soviet approach in the Middle East since the end of the second world war seems to be inspired by similar aims of emasculating the West, in its capacity and its will to resist further expansion. Bearing in mind the essential rôle of this area in supplying the West with oil, it is clear that the maintenance of a permanent state of friction and confrontation between Israel and its Arab neighbours or between various forces within the Arab world can but weaken western positions and so jeopardise Europe's oil

supplies with all the attendant economic, social and political consequences.

48. In that area, while Soviet military installations have up to now been of a temporary nature, the Russian Government has continued to deliver weapons to the countries with which it was on good terms and has thus at least encouraged them to pursue policies which probably brought it no immediate, direct reward, but from which *per contra* the West has suffered considerably, particularly after the Israeli-Arab war in 1973. Similarly, the prolongation of armed warfare within Cyprus and Lebanon can but continue to improve the Soviet Union's chances of future intervention without risk of promoting a major war. At the same time delicate situations for the West have been created in which the latter can protect its vital interests only by compromising its own desire not to become involved in the quarrels of others.

49. The legacies of old colonialism have also provoked violent anti-European reactions throughout much of the underdeveloped world, and have thus helped to involve the West in a series of confrontations which have come near to exhausting their material and moral strength. In this respect the war on two fronts in Vietnam was particularly disastrous for the free world, since it made even totally committed western societies query the soundness of the values they were upholding.

50. An even more recent case in point is Angola, where the Soviet Union, far from making no effort to hide its military and political assistance to the MPLA, has taken pride in doing so, both through the provision of arms and military advisers and by backing Cuban "volunteers". In the event the MPLA seems to have overcome all other nationalist movements in the country, albeit not necessarily permanently because tribalism in Africa is not amenable to Marxist concepts of society.

51. In this instance the West was even more irresolute than usual, fearing, in spite of some encouragement to the contrary from a number of African States, that it was in danger of being condemned throughout most of the rest of the world for seeming to be propping up an apartheid South African Republic and a white minority in Rhodesia. In San Francisco on 3rd February, Mr. Kissinger recognised the western dilemma in this respect and hence its defeat in Angola but added :

"The United States Government has a duty to make clear to the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that this type of action will not be tolerated again."

52. The stake is now probably high enough for the West henceforth to demonstrate greater determination not to allow the Soviet Union further to exploit the ending of old style colonisation and so advance its influence across the African continent as far as the shores of the Atlantic.

53. Soviet intervention in Angola confirms what Soviet leaders have often said, particularly during President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to the Soviet Union in November 1975. They are not thinking of *détente*, or of peaceful coexistence as we like to regard these aims ; to them, of course, these slogans are a proven successful method of allowing them to keep a grip on the countries they already control, while increasing their military strength and political influence elsewhere ; and of continuing to weaken remaining western positions at no risk. The question now facing the West is to what extent it can allow itself to accede to Soviet proposals and continue to disarm, materially and morally, without risk of losing in advance the third world war which some observers think is already well under way, as Solzhenitsyn does, with never a shot being fired.

IV. East-West negotiations

54. To try to give substance to *détente*, the West instigated or agreed to a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union in fields where it felt significant results *could* be achieved — assuming mutual goodwill — by allowing cuts in military expenditure, by increasing trade and paving the way for political liberalisation within the Soviet Union and its allies. Results have been disappointing but the mere holding of negotiations has encouraged public opinion, in the western countries at least, to believe that *détente* has become a reality and has justified reduced (western) efforts in the defence field. As long as negotiations continue on this "wishing will make it so" basis alone they must remain dangerous for the Atlantic Alliance. The constantly-diminishing proportion of the defence budget in the gross national product, and per capita, of most of the western countries is already proof of the magnitude of this danger. As long as *détente* is interpreted by the Russians as a stepping-stone to further expansion without risk of war, by the rest of us as a gain in terms of relaxation of tension, so shall we disregard at

our peril the advantages which the ever-growing military strength by one, and only one, of the participants in détente puts in the hands of the USSR.

55. This is the critical question in which progress in the various East-West negotiations should be measured.

56. (i) *The strategic arms limitation talks* (SALT) were given fresh impetus by the meeting between President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok. Another round of negotiations has since resumed, but, after a first agreement on keeping at the same level the strategic missiles which each side would have the right to hold, two difficulties have been encountered in drawing up the texts due to the development of new weapons on both sides. The Soviets have long-range bombers (Backfire) capable of reaching targets on United States territory from Soviet Pacific bases. The Americans have very low trajectory and very long range cruise missiles, purported to be capable of piercing any barriers which the Soviet Union might set up to defend its territory, despite their fairly low speed. The latter have agitated the Russians and for several months the negotiations have been in continuing difficulties over the characteristics of these two weapons.

57. The development of Soviet intervention in Angola provoked immediate denunciation in the United States and prompted the American Government to seek political concessions; i.e. respect for the principle of non-intervention in Angola, as a condition for signing the SALT agreement. This appears to have been the main purpose of Mr. Kissinger's visit to Moscow in January 1976. This effort was understandable in view of the Soviet Union's global strategy of using negotiations on armaments to obstruct the West's defence policy while continuing to initiate and adopt actions to undermine western positions whenever conditions permit. The American attempt failed, if only because the move was made too late.

58. Despite this rebuff, Mr. Kissinger appears to have found a way of resuming the SALT II negotiations, without undue loss of face. However, it must be realised that the conclusion of a SALT II agreement would not noticeably alter the situation, nor would it allow, or hopefully encourage any significant reduction in the sums the Americans allocate for the defence of the West.

59. (ii) *The mutual and balanced force reduction talks* (MBFR) are also in difficulties. The Warsaw Pact countries have always insisted that all forces in Central Europe should be covered by the negotiations; i.e. troops and tanks, aircraft and tactical nuclear weapons. For a long time the West wished to limit the talks to land forces in the central sector. In December 1975 it made a new offer, proposing to reduce the number of its tactical nuclear weapons on European territory from some 7,000 to 6,000 in exchange for the Soviet Union withdrawing 1,700 of its tanks and 68,000 men. The United States also offered to withdraw 29,000 men from Europe. There would thus have been a definite move toward levelling out the number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed by both sides, and the overall level of Warsaw Pact forces would have drawn closer to that of NATO forces.

60. The Warsaw Pact did not favour this proposal, although it has not yet been formally rejected. Indeed it now seems that what the Soviet Union and its allies want is not so much just a reduction in American forces in Europe as, even more important, a reduction in the forces of the Federal Republic. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact countries still reject the essential aspect of the European approach, i.e. the principle that the aim of the Vienna negotiations was and is to achieve equality in the conventional force levels of the two alliances in Central Europe. They appear determined to maintain their superiority, basing their argument on the larger number of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO.

61. It seems unlikely that the military negotiations will succeed as matters now stand because of the deep-rooted political differences and suspicions between the two sides. The lack of confidence cannot be overcome by limited military cut-backs. Political problems make any real negotiations on disarmament fruitless because the Soviet Union's apparent sole aim in considering any limitation of armaments is to allow the Warsaw Pact to consolidate its superiority, where it exists, and to attain parity where it does not exist.

62. (iii) It is daily becoming more evident that the overall consequences of *the conference on security and co-operation in Europe* which closed in Helsinki in August 1975, are disappointing. After conducting the negotiations with great care and many precautions, the western countries felt they should give public opinion reason for satisfaction as soon as possible, which led them

to agree to a rather unsatisfactory conclusion of a conference which, less hastily concluded, might have achieved really constructive results.

63. The *essential* Soviet aim was to add a final juridical seal to the changes made to the map of Europe after the second world war which no peace treaty had ratified. Secondly, the Soviet Union sought to increase trade with western countries which in many fields were in a position to supply agricultural produce or consumer goods which the USSR desperately needed, and still needs.

64. The West's aims were less clear, but there appears to have been some intent to take advantage of the favourable situation which might arise from the conference, held at the request of the Soviet Union and its allies, to obtain a degree of ideological disarmament; i.e. to transform peaceful coexistence into a more realistic definition of these words. This is probably why they insisted, or sought to insist, on the one hand on opening frontiers to the movement of persons and ideas, with few steps, if any, yet taken by the USSR to advance these aims, and the other on a number of military confidence-building measures.

65. The compromises reached in the Helsinki final act could be considered acceptable if, and only if, applied identically by both sides, instead of one-sidedly. But in confidence-building measures, the only worthwhile achievement was acceptance of reciprocal notice of military manoeuvres in Europe involving more than 25,000 men and the practice of inviting the other side to send observers to such manoeuvres. Notification of such manoeuvres has been given once by the USSR, seven times by NATO. The latter has, in regard to the major such manoeuvre, invited representatives of all the Warsaw Pact countries to send observers; none accepted. The Soviet Union, on the single occasion of a notified manoeuvre, invited only two NATO countries — Greece and Turkey.

66. (iv) This negative follow-up to Helsinki has been confirmed by *the position adopted by the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union in their relations with the Federal Republic*. This applies particularly as regards Berlin where in some respects there has been even a deterioration and the quadripartite agreement continues to be interpreted by the Russians in a most restrictive fashion.

67. Two matters have illustrated the difficulties being encountered.

68. The first has involved children of former inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic who had escaped to the Federal Republic being handed over by the Pankow government to citizens of the Democratic Republic for adoption. The correspondent of a German weekly who reported on these measures was expelled from East Berlin. However, in the end, the Federal Republic seems to have found a satisfactory solution to this particular problem.

69. Secondly, the government of the German Democratic Republic agreed to sign an agreement to improve access routes to West Berlin only if substantial financial concessions were made by the Federal Republic, which has undertaken on the one hand to pay for the maintenance of these access routes on the territory of the German Democratic Republic itself, in the case of both the motorways and the railways. The Federal Republic has also made a large lump-sum payment to allow western visitors to enter West Berlin. In all, the German Democratic Republic is expected to reap a financial profit of about DM 2,000 million per year from this new "accommodation" with the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic, however, derives some balancing advantages from the quadripartite agreement mainly with regard to transit access, affording a modest improvement in the quality of life for Berliners.

70. Whether these negotiations have achieved anything or not, they clearly demonstrate that the Soviet Union can always count — or believes it can count — on the West to give ground rather than face an accusation of destroying détente!

71. Thus the USSR can and often does achieve its aims whereas once the West embarks on any resistant positive reaction under ever-stronger counter-pressure from public opinion, still bemused by an illusory détente, with the result that in the end it makes generous concessions without any real guarantees that its own aims will be attained, or even its own basic interests preserved. As regards the limitation of armaments, a number of western countries have been making large-scale cuts in their defence budgets and consequently in their armaments since the MBFR talks opened although *no* results have yet been achieved. Similarly, the West accepted the hasty drafting of the Helsinki final act without obtaining the necessary assurances that its views would really be respected in the implementation of the agreement.

72. Consequently, in many ways détente as now practised — in the West — appears to have much the same implications as did appeasement at the time of the Munich agreements. The few Soviet intellectuals who have managed to come to the West in recent years made no secret of the fact that this is how the Soviet Union sees western policy. Solzhenitsyn's protests against détente have been consistently damning. Is it surprising that, in the result, the USSR and its allies have the impression that Europe's position is weak and that the time is ripe for gaining as much ground as possible without resort to war, in order to prepare for the future, final victory of the Soviet Russian cause ?

73. In summing up, must we not assume that it is the Soviet's purpose by the military threat of numbers and weapons and by the internal pressure of western communist parties to bring about the dissolution of NATO ?

74. But the Russians are not supermen ; they too are suffering domestic economic difficulties and social strains. Their hold over Central and Eastern Europe does not seem as all-embracing as it was. The Sino-Soviet split is deep, and, whatever the implications of the recent political events in Peking, these do not seem to herald any early reconciliation. The Kremlin's communist

lackeys within the free world no longer dance 100 % to their tune.

75. In the conduct of its foreign policy, too, the USSR suffers its downs as well as its ups, as we in the West do. The rebuff by Egypt and the setback to their hopes of establishing a communist or communist-dominated régime in Portugal have been recent examples.

76. So the Russians should not in their self-confessed, expansionist aims neglect an important lesson of history — the extraordinary will and capacity of free men everywhere, in the last analysis to resist and ultimately overcome challenges, from any source, to their cherished freedoms.

77. Presently their Achilles' heel is their inability without external aid to feed their own people.

78. In these circumstances and although we should seek to increase, not decrease East-West trade, on fair commercial terms there is a growing number of people in the West not least in the United States who find it difficult to support the export of foodstuffs to the USSR to enable it to continue to divert a disproportionate amount of its resources to armaments — to build more tanks at the cost of fewer tractors.

Détente and security in Europe

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Richter and Lord Peddie

1. In paragraph 4 of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "little or no" and insert "little or insufficient".
2. Leave out paragraph 5 of the preamble and insert :
"Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its political position by military means ;".
3. In paragraph 6 of the preamble, leave out "no longer" and insert "should".
4. Leave out paragraph 7 of the preamble.
5. Leave out paragraph 11 of the preamble and insert :
"Regretting that South Africa's widely-condemned racial policies and later intervention provided a pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola,".
6. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "re-establish and".

Signed : Dankert, Richter, Peddie

1. See 3rd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Parts 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 fell ; part 4 withdrawn).

Détente and security in Europe

AMENDMENT No. 2¹
tabled by Mr. Radius

In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper :

- (a) leave out "re-establish and" ;
- (b) leave out "a secure balance between the forces of the two alliances in Central and Northern Europe"
and insert "a sufficient balance in order to ensure peace".

Signed : Radius

1. See 3rd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Amendment withdrawn).

Détente and security in Europe

AMENDMENT No. 3 ¹
tabled by Mr. Radius

At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "direct or indirect";.

Signed : Radius

1. See 3rd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Amendment withdrawn).

Détente and security in Europe

AMENDMENT No. 4¹

tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett

Leave out the draft recommendation in Document 703 and insert a revised draft recommendation as follows :

“The Assembly,

Affirming that true East-West détente can be achieved only through substantial mutual, balanced, and controlled reductions in armaments by both blocs ;

Considering the growing preponderance of troops and weapons on the side of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Northern Europe ;

Noting that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner ;

Regretting that no recent progress has been made in the SALT and MBFR negotiations ;

Condemning the Soviet Union's policy to take advantage of crises outside Europe to strengthen its political position by direct or indirect military means ;

Concerned that in face of increasingly powerful Warsaw Pact forces the members of the Atlantic Alliance will no longer deploy sufficient strength to guarantee their continuing collective security ;

Noting that while the Soviet Union and its allies fail to accept the main implications of détente, as this concept is interpreted in the West, a relative reduction of military strength in Western Europe has occurred vis-à-vis the Soviet military threat ;

Satisfied that matters emerging from the CSCE have played a large part in the Council's discussions in 1975 ;

Considering that the application of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE on the movement of persons is one of the vital elements by which one can judge the Soviet Union's desire for détente ;

Considering that there is still some uncertainty about the operation of NATO in the event of some members of the Atlantic Alliance falling prey to subversion directly or indirectly sustained by external military intervention ;

Regretting that South Africa's widely condemned racial policies and intervention provided a pretext, although unjustified, for massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the consequences of the CSCE ;
2. Inform the Assembly of any reported infringements of the provisions of the final act of the CSCE ;

1. See 3rd Sitting, 15th June 1976 (Vote postponed to the next Sitting).

3. Examine how great an effort each member country has to make to maintain a continuing adequate balance to ensure peace with security ;
4. Ensure that its members concert their views in the appropriate framework on any crisis arising outside Europe in order :
 - (a) to avoid hasty action which might serve as a pretext for interference by the Soviet Union or its allies ;
 - (b) to deter any further Soviet interference ;
5. Report to the Assembly on any implications for Western Europe of developments in the political, economic and military balance in Europe and the world ;
6. Give timely consideration to the conditions in which the modified Brussels Treaty could be applied should one of the member countries fall prey to direct or indirect military intervention from outside."

**European aeronautical policy — guidelines emerging from the colloquy on
2nd and 3rd February 1976**

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren, Rapporteurs**

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman); MM. Warren, Richter (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaenssens*, Boucheny (Substitute: *Cerneau*), Mrs. Cattaneo-Petrini, MM. *Cornelissen* (Substitute: *Portheine*), Craigen (Substitute: *Hawkins*), Gölter, Lenzer, Lewis,

Mammi, Mart, van Ooijen, Pecoraro, Dr. Phipps (Substitute: *Bagier*), MM. *Schmitt*, Schwencke, de Stexhe (Substitute: *de Bruyne*), Treu, *Valleix*.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on European aeronautical policy —
guidelines emerging from the colloquy
on 2nd and 3rd February 1976

The Assembly,

Acknowledging the conclusions of the colloquy on a European aeronautical policy held in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 under the aegis of its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ;

Aware of the difficulties in the aeronautical industry, which employs 400,000 persons, and the airlines, and the threats to the very existence of these sectors which may have serious consequences for Europe's security and well-being ;

Convinced that without an affirmation of political determination the governments concerned will be unable to take joint action to safeguard this industry ;

Regretting that governments have not yet adopted a position on the action programme for the European aeronautical sector proposed by the Commission of the European Communities on 1st October 1975 ;

Reiterating its regret that there is a risk of Eurocontrol being dismantled ;

Aware that the problems cannot be solved through protectionism and the creation of a closed European market ;

Advocating on the contrary an investigation of world markets and of possibilities of co-operation with the United States on a basis of equality and reciprocity and not as subcontractors,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote the creation in each member country concerned of a national aeronautical council associating, for instance, representatives of parliaments, ministries, manufacturers, airlines and trades unions under the chairmanship of the appropriate government representative ;
2. Invite the national aeronautical councils to form a European aeronautical council to :
 - (a) develop together with the Commission of the European Communities a European aeronautical manufacturing programme with a view to developing, producing and marketing large civil aircraft ;
 - (b) arrange for joint financing for marketing these aircraft and study the possibilities of a European Import-Export Bank ;
 - (c) ensure that Concorde remains in production and that Europe is able to benefit from the technical lead thus acquired ;
 - (d) establish a civil aviation agency for Western Europe responsible for European airworthiness certification ;
 - (e) develop in concert with the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) a joint policy for air transport and examine the possibilities of adopting a joint European position in negotiations between Western Europe and the rest of the world on problems such as landing rights and recognition of European airspace ;
3. Create a study group to determine the military aircraft requirements of member countries in liaison with the Standing Armaments Committee ;

FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member States of Eurocontrol :

4. To set themselves as a long-term aim in the future Eurocontrol convention, which will be applied as from 1983, the establishment of a joint agency for the control of air traffic networks, including major terminal areas ;

5. To standardise equipment and systems to the maximum for the sake of efficiency and economy and in particular make a joint study in the Eurocontrol agency of new systems to be brought into service as from 1985 ;
6. To draw up a common industrial policy for applied electronics in these fields, giving priority, when calling for tenders, to industries in the member States of the Eurocontrol community, and maintain a joint investment budget in the future agency with a view to procuring the said equipment through the agency ;
7. To make the maximum use of the Eurocontrol agency in the field of research and development and draw up a joint research and development programme to avoid duplication wherever possible.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by MM. Richter, Valleix and Warren, Rapporteurs)

Introduction

1. For the second time in three years the Committee organised a colloquy on European aeronautical policy, the first being held in Paris and this one in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976. This report will analyse the guiding concepts and approaches which emerged during the two days of discussions between parliamentarians, representatives of the aeronautical industries, airlines, European metallurgical unions and the national government departments concerned.

2. Great changes have taken place in the outlook for the aeronautical industry since 1973. The energy crisis and the consequent need to reduce fuel consumption have obliged industrialists to make fundamental changes in the design of airframes and engines, which are the more difficult because of rising research, development and production costs. In the early 1970s it was believed that air travel would develop by 15 to 18% a year. The present estimate is not more than 3 or 4% a year. This will mean that replacement of aircraft will take much longer than was foreseen some years ago and the next stage of technological improvement might materialise towards 1980 when the airlines will have to replace their then aging fleets of aircraft such as the Boeing 707 and the DC-8. Even quieter and more efficient engines than the RB-211 and CF-6 will have to be developed and NASA in the United States has earmarked important sums in its budget for this purpose which have to be matched by comparable European investment.

3. Although co-operation in Europe should be extended beyond the mere sharing of development and production — which everybody had hoped to achieve long ago — possibilities are now more restricted than in the past when many co-operative projects were concluded. Till 1975 the emphasis was mainly on intra-European co-operation. Now, co-operation with the United States is considered essential for the future of the aircraft industry. The French Secretary of State for Transport, Mr. Cavallé, said in his opening speech at the colloquy that such co-operation was acceptable as a common venture between equal partners. An aeronautical Europe could not be founded on doctrines alone or on

abstract structure but required patience, unremitting application and the will to make progress, no matter how limited, whenever progress was possible, all within the indispensable framework of a realistic picture of the situation.

4. It was generally regretted that no British Minister took part in the discussions and there was therefore no official comment on the nationalisation projects now being submitted to the British parliament. Nor was any German Minister able to attend and give the views of his government on the future structure of the German aeronautical and space industry. The Minister in charge of co-ordinating all Federal aeronautical and space activities drew up a report in November 1975 and it would have been extremely useful if he had been able to comment on his report.

5. The Committee conveys its most sincere thanks to Mr. Vergnaud, President of the Institute of Air Transport and President and Director-General of Air Inter, who acted as General Rapporteur in drawing conclusions from the colloquy and giving the Committee and the other participants the benefit of his wide knowledge and experience.

I. Political aspects

6. All those who attended the colloquy were convinced that Europe had to maintain its civil and military industrial capability and remain a centre of invention and innovation. Europe's security calls for a dynamic approach and cannot be ensured if our countries fail to develop their technology and resources at the same rate as the most advanced countries. At the same time, the individual State is too narrow a framework for the industry, which can exist and develop only in a wider European context.

7. The links between aeronautical and defence policy are obvious, since 60 to 70% of the aeronautical industry is concerned with the production of military equipment. If Europe is to defend its armaments industry it cannot allow its aeronautical industry to become nothing more than a subcontractor for its American counterpart. At the same time Europe must safeguard vital interests — employment, inde-

pendence, balanced trade, technological level — that would be seriously threatened if it were excluded from the aeronautical world.

8. It is regrettable that the Western European countries are taking so long to adopt a common position on a matter which governs the whole future of such an essential industry as the aircraft industry. On 1st October 1975, the Commission of the European Communities submitted its action programme for the European aeronautical sector which is just one of many reports which go unheeded by the Council of Ministers. The national parliaments should demand to know the reasons for the Council's failure to act.

9. It is essential for Europe to have a powerful technological presence on the world stage, not only as a strategic arm for Europe's defence and transportation requirements, but also for Europe's foreign policy. United, Europe will stand to gain, but divided it will fall victim to ruthless competition from elsewhere and in this event European defence and foreign policy will be influenced and dictated by others. However, closer integration and co-ordination of Europe's total aerospace industry will not be easy. Time and again it has been pointed out that there must be a political and industrial desire to bring it about.

10. There is still a great deal of nationalism in Europe as was shown during the Luxembourg summit conference on 2nd and 3rd April 1976. The Federal Chancellor, Mr. Hellmut Schmidt, summed up this meeting by saying: "Those who were expecting nothing, had every reason to be satisfied." In this field, as in many others, nationalism is political as well as industrial. Industry follows the market and, if its market is national, it concentrates on that; if it is European, that market will be its goal, and if it is a world market, it will adjust to that level. Europe may not want or need federalism, but if it is to save itself it has to act in industrial affairs.

11. The Committee's concern is that while there is much talk markets are being lost. This is the more regrettable as all Western European countries are using public money to give increasing support to aircraft production and air transport. With increased government participation with public money to safeguard and redevelop the aircraft industry and airlines there should be a greater effort to work together at all levels for the benefit of Europe and the workers in these advanced industries.

12. A political will to create and develop a European aeronautical market is fundamental. It must assert itself as quickly as possible on specific concrete points. This political purpose must go hand in hand with technological development.

13. There will be no future aircraft market for Europe unless it can assert a European political purpose. This condition is essential although not sufficient in itself. Moreover, the European industry has to build fully-competitive aircraft with guaranteed after-sales support in the framework of programmes involving whole families of aircraft.

II. *Military aspects*

14. In the Committee's report on the European aeronautical industry¹ it was found to be unbelievable that despite all the years of discussion, intelligent analysis, and political debate, so little was achieved within Europe to bring about a unified aerospace market in either the military or commercial fields. A solution to this lack of progress has to be found, certainly in the military sense, if the capability of the Warsaw Pact countries is to be matched by the Atlantic Alliance. Western Europe must pay greater heed to the utilisation of its financial and technical resources in the selection of aeronautical equipment.

15. The military market in Europe is a highly political one because the ultimate customers are the governments of the Western European countries which, although the purchasers, are not the users. The users are the armed forces serving the governments. The distinction between purchaser and user must be clearly observed and the effect of their choices on the economy of Europe evaluated.

16. All governments seek to keep defence expenditure at as low a level as possible and at the same time have to come to grips with the competitive demands of the armed forces. The result is that individual armies, navies and air forces very seldom get exactly what they hoped for.

17. With the multiplicity of governments and their separate fighting services, a united Western European market for defence equip-

1. Document 691, Rapporteur: Mr. Warren.

ment is certainly an ambitious aim. This has been the case now for more than twenty years — ever since Western European Union and NATO set common production and standardisation as their objectives. Yet ambition still remains ahead of reality.

18. Integration of national operational requirements by the various national operational requirements staffs is necessary before harmonising and agreeing on weapons specifications. This is an essential prerequisite of a more unified market. As was pointed out in the above-mentioned report by the Committee, the political power has been available for many years and it is now necessary to show the political will.

19. Machinery should therefore be set up to improve the harmonisation of operational requirements between European armed forces. This could follow from a European study on operational requirements under the aegis of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee.

20. Manufacturers should show their willingness to relinquish some of their individual commercial and technical aspirations. If the governments now decided to pull together politically an effective method of collaborative procurement could be defined. This would improve the defence of Europe, the efficiency of its industry and reduce demands on taxpayers.

21. The lesson learned last year by the decision of four European governments to buy the American F-16 combat aircraft was translated into a reaction of Western European manufacturers which through AECMA's President wrote to a number of Defence Ministers of European NATO countries making broad proposals for closer integration. Greater efficiency would make European defence equipment more competitive internationally, and as a result prospects would be very much improved in two ways: first, because European products would be cheaper and, second, wasteful intra-European competition would be significantly reduced.

22. Although many bilateral and trilateral co-operative programmes such as Alpha-Jet, Jaguar and the multi-rôle combat aircraft have been successful, intra-European competition has often been irrational and has inevitably benefited competition from the United States.

23. Too often European governmental authorities have not realised that the American slogan "time is money" applies to them as well and that their decisions must be synchronised with

the planned unfolding of a project. One of the greatest secrets of American efficiency is the speed with which projects are implemented. It must be fully realised that when Europe buys military aircraft from the United States it is to the detriment of Europe's economy and Europe's aircraft industry.

24. If the volume of purchases increases still further it will be a mortal threat to Europe's aircraft industry.

25. Compensation deals offered by American industry are of only limited interest to Europe's industry and certainly not adequate. Europe's efforts must therefore be explicitly directed towards achieving true reciprocity with the United States. If the United States expects continued freedom to sell in Europe, an equal deal must be available for European industry in the United States.

26. The Assembly of WEU has often pressed for effective joint development and procurement of weapons in Europe. Now at last there are signs of a wider movement of opinion and of the beginnings of action. Attached to the action programme of the Commission of the European Communities of 1st October 1975 is a draft resolution relating to the purchase and development of aircraft weapons systems. In December the European Parliament passed a resolution advocating a European arms procurement agency. At the time of the colloquy a meeting of an *ad hoc* group was held in Rome outside the NATO framework bringing together the members of Eurogroup and France. What is needed now is identification of the organisation in Europe which can found and sponsor the agency.

27. Discussions are now taking place on setting up an international secretariat for a procurement agency. Its tasks are evident: it should procure, where possible, existing European equipment for common tasks and bring together the bargaining power of all Europe in discussions with the United States on procurement deals. It also should identify possible areas for joint development within Europe. Several of the smaller countries of the European Communities, and especially the Netherlands, believe that such an agency should be set up inside the European Community framework in order to establish a link with the Community on industrial policy. However, in view of the special nature of armaments procurement and the political and military weight attached to the manufacture of

armaments, not forgetting export possibilities for the countries concerned, it seems unlikely that the larger European countries would accept Community authority in this field.

28. The question of trying to sort out a unified supply and procurement system for aircraft weapons systems is very complex but unified it has to be if action on the civil aeronautical side is to be taken. In the fields of engines and electronics, it is quite clear that no progress can be made if civil research and development of these systems is not associated with military requirements and budgets.

29. It is obvious that in this field industrial co-operation is totally dependent on co-operation between the armed forces of the various countries. However, since the number of European industries is too large for the practical participation of all of them in a single programme, European-level co-operation is politically conceivable only within the range of a political and military agreement on the entire range of combat, training, transport and special mission aircraft which respond to the defence needs of the continent. It is only in the context of a "domestic" programme of such vast dimensions that the European aeronautical industry can continue to compete on a world scale. In principle, it seems reasonable to conceive that in face of total European requirements it should be possible to create a certain number of industrial groupings, each responsible for the construction of one or more types of aircraft, ensuring that all the firms are assigned a sufficient volume of work to enable the regular performance of industrial activities and satisfactory participation in technological progress. Whether co-ordinated co-operation on such a scale is attainable is still questionable. For many years the Assembly has urged governments to integrate the logistics of all its armies into a European or NATO framework. Not much progress has been made so far; it is again an essentially political and military problem and its solution rests with governments and armed forces and may finally have to depend on the achievement of European political unity.

30. It has often been stated that continuous interference by American Government representatives or by those of American companies has led European governments to purchase American aircraft or other weapons systems. These American successes however are mainly due to Europe's inability to agree on its own military specifications. The continuing sad story of the TSR-2, the Mirage

series, the MRCA and the ACF (*avion de combat futur*) and now again the F-16 is the story of continuous failure to unify the variety of views and national interests.

31. The history of F-104 replacements started already in 1967 when five European nations and Canada more or less reached agreement on the basic requirements for a successor to the F-104, but failed to follow this up. At least five combinations of successive national air staffs and representatives of the economic ministries have been working on this issue and in the end the F-16 was considered the only acceptable choice for the money available. This example shows that it is extremely difficult to bring in under one *European* roof all our diverging tactical and strategic concepts, our different operational views and the converging interests of our economies. But it illustrates that the difficulties could have been overcome if the political will had been present.

32. The most difficult problem facing the European aircraft industry is not how to organise itself or how to finance future projects but to agree on the types of aircraft the industry should restrict itself to. The answer to this question might only be found after some sort of European political union has been established. However, for the European aircraft industry this might be too late and the governments should be well aware of the fact that they cannot continue to evade difficult political and military questions if they wish to remain able to assure Europe's security and to retain a viable aeronautical industry in Europe.

III. The civil aeronautical market in Europe

33. According to the 1st October 1975 study by the Commission of the European Communities, prepared for its action programme, the United States market from 1969 to 1974 represented slightly less than half the western market for civil transport aircraft, the rest of the world and the European continent sharing the remainder almost equally. The Commission also observed that the European aeronautical industry's share of sales in Europe was diminishing whereas the number of aircraft in use or on order throughout the world was steadily increasing.

34. In the last ten years European commercial aircraft manufacturers have lost ground in all

markets including their own domestic market. There has been a marked expansion however in the European markets for civil transport aircraft; it increased from 14.7% of the world market in 1970 to 18% in 1974. Conversely, in the same period the share of European-produced equipment fell from 33% of the European market to 20.2% and from 9.5% of the world market to 5.9%. In the coming ten years Europe will probably spend some \$10,000 million on new aircraft.

35. The views of the European manufacturers vary on the solutions to the possibilities of capturing this \$10,000 million market. The manufacturers of airframes prefer intra-European collaboration whereas engine manufacturers consider it is essential to seek American partners because of the worldwide dimension of the market. The latter feel that the engine requirements of the European airframe manufacturers are insufficient to uphold the European industry. Any new civil engine should gain a foothold in the American airframe market if it is to survive.

36. The airlines believe that even if the home of one product is Europe, capital intensive technology requires not a regional but a world market if one does not want subsidised order production without competition. The logical consequence of each kind of protectionism in the home market would be to completely shut off the world market. It is therefore very difficult to talk about a single aeronautical market for Europe. There is the market of the airframe manufacturers, the market of the engine manufacturers, and the single transport market — the market of the airlines.

(a) *Airframe industry*

37. To quantify the European aircraft market, an approximation indicates that the European market in 1990 will represent the following new requirements for the European fleet:

- 300 short/medium-haul aircraft of the 160-seater type;
- 350 short/medium-haul aircraft of the 200-260-seater type;
- 100-150 long-haul aircraft of the 200-seater type;
- 300 long-haul aircraft of the Boeing 747 type.

38. For the short-haul low-density market and for a distance of not more than 2,000 km, Fokker-VFW is studying the possibility of building a follow-up of the F-28 Fellowship for some 100 passengers with an eye to sales of more than 400 aircraft over a ten-year period.

39. The question is whether the European market is a specific one. The answer is that it could be a specific one and have its own special character, but that for economic reasons a specific European market is not possible. All European airlines want to standardise their equipment and the aircraft industry must sell its products throughout the world. For aircraft production to be profitable, a minimum of some 400 must be built per series. The figures quoted above for the numbers of aircraft required by Europe clearly show that profitability can be achieved only if there is significant penetration in the rest of the world, and if possible in the United States as well.

40. One should recognise that public money is now being used to finance the purchase of much of the equipment for Europe's civil airlines. This public money is supplied by the European taxpayer and he is certainly not satisfied when he notices that his money is being spent to buy foreign aircraft while the home industries are working below their capacity and unemployment levels in Europe are rising. The action programme of the Communities recognised this fact and proposed to establish a common policy for the civil aircraft industry. The proposals by the Community however seem much too radical to be implemented now or in the near future. Their solution calls for a single directorate to surmount present problems. This however seems to go too far beyond the degree of integration actually possible for it to be achieved in the matter of aviation policy and probably for it to be acceptable to national aircraft industries.

41. The key to the Communities' proposals is whether the major governments and industries are prepared to commit themselves to a transfer of competence and authority to the Commission to develop a European programme and to deal with outside countries on a Community basis. If key individual States are going to make bilateral deals with individual major American aircraft companies it will become impossible to organise a common European aircraft industry and everything which has been gained, as for instance in the case of Airbus, will be endangered.

(b) Aero-engine industry

42. For the engine manufacturers any major new civil project must be aimed at meeting the requirements of the United States market. The very nature of the world air transport business will ensure that the American customer sets the standards for many more years to come. The Europeans should not therefore allow themselves to be misled into thinking that they can go it alone on major new civil projects. They might only waste more vast sums of money.

43. For the Americans the rapidly-increasing market opportunities in Europe mean however that they would also prefer the next major commercial engines to be undertaken as transatlantic collaborative projects. This however would entail complete partnership in design, manufacture, marketing and risk-sharing.

44. In order to ensure flexibility of the aero-engine industry so that it can react to market pressures without continued reference to cumbersome multinational bureaucracies a degree of centralised overall policy from the European Communities could be accepted.

45. The Communities could also, basing themselves on national research institutes and organisations, play a rôle in research and development of new aero-engines. Finally the Communities could play a rôle in arranging to finance the customers of the aircraft industries. Such a financial rôle could be a key factor in securing sales. It must be remembered that airframes, engines and equipment each make up one-third of the value of an aircraft. Ground support, including training equipment, adds a further dimension to aviation business opportunity.

46. The present individual systems: ECGD (United Kingdom), COFACE (France), HERMES (Germany), etc., could be used to force a European capability to match the Export-Import Bank by which American support to exporting companies operates. Europe should certainly be outward-looking in evolving its policy and not commit itself to artificial products for artificial markets. In the aero-engine industry, Rolls-Royce, MTU, SNECMA and Fiat have felt the need to enter into collaboration with United States partners for future new engines but, at the same time, they exploit their own existing inventions. What is especially needed is a quicker decision-making process to avoid losing the race. Europe should build on existing companies and amalgamations and not

create new ones. These companies should have proper commercial liberty, free from bureaucratic interference, but encouraged by joint government action.

(c) Air transport industry

47. After the complete failure of Air Union some European airlines realised that by tackling political problems first they had put the cart before the horse. In consequence, they concentrated their co-operative efforts on certain fields that warranted joint forces in order to meet the increasing demand on capital investment. The technical consortia Atlas and KSSU emerged, centred on the introduction of the Boeing 747 and DC-10. It is mainly in the technical traffic and operational field that the airlines suffer from a variety of different legislations and rules. Promising activities in this respect have already started in the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).

48. From the airlines' point of view a single European market for aeronautical products might not be so advantageous if it meant that they would have to order an aircraft for purely national or European reasons. They would therefore not agree with the Committee's report when it expressed the wish that European airlines accept the Airbus in their fleets since this aircraft is a European venture. Here however is a misunderstanding. The report wished to emphasise that European governments should make it attractive for European airlines to buy European products as the United States does.

49. The situation of the aircraft industry is amply illustrated by the report of the Commission of 1st October 1975 from which two facts emerge: (i) the productivity of the United States aircraft industry is twice that of the European industry; times have long since passed when this discrepancy was outweighed by an equivalent wage gap; (ii) the relation of initiated aircraft projects to those finally carried out and brought on the market has been five times as high in Europe as in the United States. The only way in which the Europeans can stand up to the Americans is by arriving at production costs enabling them, if not to undercut, at least to negotiate on roughly the same footing as American manufacturers.

50. The European aircraft industry suffers from over-capacity against indigenous demands when the United States is so successful in selling in Europe and, although there is no lack of

ingenuity in designing new aircraft, they have so far failed to match United States sales achievements. Of the last ten programmes launched in the United States, the average number of aircraft sold was 512 per programme. In the case of the Western European programmes, only 85 aircraft per programme were sold; the latter figure simply means that the European manufacturers are continually going from prototype to prototype without arriving at long production runs when costs would decrease. At the same time, they see the national airlines "buying American" with taxpayers' money.

51. American programmes, moreover, are much longer lived than European programmes primarily because they have taken care to work from a first design to families of aircraft. Because of the longer runs of the American programmes the problems of production organisation and production costs are more effectively dealt with in the United States than in Europe. American manufacturers offer highly efficient product support which lasts until the aircraft type in question is phased out of operation. The high standard of their complete logistic system is not yet sufficiently widespread in Europe — Fokker, Rolls-Royce and Smiths give the same type of service as their American counterparts — and, since the lifetime of today's jets is in the order of fifteen to twenty years, it is absolutely essential for the customers to gain confidence in the manufacturer's ability and stamina in following up a programme. The airlines therefore have the impression that there are rather too many aircraft on the market compared with the money available and that the number of new types of aircraft should be limited to solvent demand.

IV. Special projects

(a) Airbus

52. In discussing civil aeronautical activities special attention should be given to the Airbus, its organisation and future. It has overcome early organisational problems, market problems, product problems and financial problems, and as the Airbus project could be the beginning of an ongoing solvent European programme it is of interest to discuss its accomplishments. The start of Airbus was extremely difficult as there was no world airline which had not already worked with Douglas, Boeing or Lockheed. Therefore, all the Airbus customers were "first

customers". When Airbus started there was an unfavourable trend in the European industry's production, unit costs being generally higher than in American industry. Nevertheless, in 1975, Airbus Industrie sold nearly thirty aircraft in a very difficult market context. The same year Lockheed sold four and Douglas seven or eight. A good structure for international co-operation was established in Airbus Industrie. As the Airbus developed around a family of aircraft, Airbus Industrie was able to move on from the original version to other proposals such as a longer-range version, a four-engined version, etc.

53. Airbus Industrie can now also offer financing terms at least as good as those of the American competitors. It would nevertheless have been advantageous if something like the Export-Import Bank in America had existed in Europe; at least deals could have been concluded much faster. It would be of great importance if part of the United Kingdom's aircraft industry could be further integrated — Hawker Siddeley already supplies the wings — in which case Airbus Industrie could serve as a nucleus for federating the European aircraft industry. This would be possible if Airbus was developed as a 200-seat aircraft fitted with the Rolls-Royce RB-211 engine which would make it well-placed to secure a considerable share of the market created by the need to replace the Boeing 727 and Trident type of aircraft. The immediate American competitors would require more launch cost expenditure and so this European project could lead rather than follow American aircraft. To exploit this opportunity Airbus Industrie needs every encouragement.

(b) Concorde

54. The Concorde SST programme is also of special interest as the collaboration between countries and companies was the first of this type to be established. It was decided that each French and British firm would make the complete plane within its own factories. This arrangement proved to be quite expensive, although the research and development costs for Concorde were far lower than for the American SST programme, which was abandoned.

55. The present-day difficulties encountered by Concorde in its attempts to penetrate the market, especially the American market, might lead one to believe that the United States is not very interested in this type of transport. That is not

the case however. In 1962, and still today, the United States aircraft manufacturers are extremely interested in building a supersonic or hypersonic aircraft. McDonnell Douglas is now working on a Mach 2.2 supersonic aircraft and studying the possibilities of a hypersonic aircraft with a speed of Mach 6. In 1962, immediately after the decision by the British and French Governments to initiate the programme, President Kennedy in person announced the launching of the American SST programme. This announcement was made exactly twenty-four hours after Pan American's decision to take up options on the Concorde. The aim of the American project was to maintain the United States' historic leadership in aircraft development, demonstrate the technological progress which could be made in a democratic system of free enterprise, expand the United States' international trade, and strengthen its aircraft industry and create jobs for thousands of Americans. It is an odd historical coincidence that now the Concorde awaits permission to land at the John F. Kennedy international airport.

56. The Federal Aviation Agency study of the SST market showed that between three hundred and four hundred aircraft should be built. The agency made a lengthy study of what speed to choose between Mach 2 and Mach 3. In the end Mach 3 was chosen despite the challenge which technology of titanium structures represented. Eventually it proved impossible to fabricate these structures. The effort was too audacious and premature. In the study, the environmental problems were not mentioned except for one aspect — the sonic boom.

57. The official Franco-British committee for the construction of Concorde has also been studying this environmental problem. It did not study in much detail the subsonic noise which is the noise of an ordinary aircraft. The anti-Concorde petitioners in America are now fighting the decision by the Transportation Secretary, Mr. Coleman, to allow flights to the United States for a sixteen-month trial period on the grounds of Concorde's noise impact on populated areas adjacent to John F. Kennedy international airport.

58. When the Concorde started its regular flights on 21st January 1976 the same type of financial problem arose as when the first jet liner, the Boeing 707 arrived in 1954. At that time all the world's airlines were equipped for intercontinental flights with the piston-engined

Constellations and DC-4 aircraft. The airlines were then claiming that there should be a big increase in fares because the services offered were very different. Then the United States decided that fares should remain the same. In the end they were nevertheless increased by 2 or 3 %. The outcome for Concorde is rather different as the fares will be up some 20 %, which of course is of great importance for the profitability of the airlines using Concorde.

59. In January 1976, NASA produced and published a new report on the second generation supersonic aircraft, and again it gave a minimum market figure of 300 aircraft to the end of the century. With regard to specifications of the aircraft it calls for about 300 seats and is very much concerned with noise standards which have to be in conformity with the American National Environmental Policy Act. This, of course, raises serious problems in the development of the engine. The speed of the aircraft will be Mach 2.

60. Apart from the French and British airlines, no other airlines have so far bought the Concorde. It is a well-known fact that Lufthansa, for instance, believes that with the present data and economics of Concorde it cannot do business. However, Lufthansa and other airlines should reconsider their position now that Concorde is operational and the Americans are doing their utmost to keep it out of the United States, which would certainly not be their policy if Lufthansa's judgment was correct.

V. Eurocontrol

61. In its previous reports the Committee has paid close attention to Eurocontrol and its problems. In its last report¹ it drew the Ministerial Council's attention to Eurocontrol in its recommendation. It is convinced that the life and development of an organisation such as Eurocontrol depend on the political will to make it effective. When the convention setting up Eurocontrol was ratified in 1963, moves were afoot for increasing European unification in many fields. Since then, there have been many disappointments and what was acceptable in 1963 may now, ten years later, be found too binding.

62. Consequently, the Eurocontrol member States have decided to review the future of the

1. Document 658.

organisation. Discussions are under way on a new convention to come into force in 1983 when the present convention expires. Greater flexibility is considered necessary in view of the respective positions of the member States; at the same time co-ordination of national policies with regard to air traffic control should be strengthened. More importance should be attached to joint planning and the profitability of systems. This is even more important as the Eurocontrol member States have decided to transfer the cost of control services progressively to the users. By unanimous decision they have just decided to raise dues to 75 % as from 1st April 1978. It is therefore particularly urgent for planning to be carried out jointly and for short- and long-term studies to be made by all the States with a view to obtaining maximum compatibility of control systems in order to avoid costly overlapping. Progress should be made towards a certain degree of standardisation based on generally-accepted operational requirements and jointly-established systems concepts. On this basis, common technical specifications can be defined allowing European industry the opportunity of a good domestic base for world exports.

63. When investments are considered it appears important both for the harmonious development of Eurocontrol and for the interest of European industry for Eurocontrol to be made responsible for planning and setting up installations and systems. This should be a gradual process starting at the air traffic control centres, extending subsequently to peripheral installations. The States are still free to entrust all or part of their airspace to the organisation or not. However, the possibility should remain open to establish a common European agency which should be the long-term solution to air navigation control problems and would assure the highest degree of security in European airspace.

VI. Air traffic rights

64. In his opening speech at the colloquy, the French Secretary of State for Transport, Mr. Cavaillé, stated that he found it difficult to understand the connection so often made between the future of the European aircraft industry and the constitution of what has been called a true European airspace, within which the wave of a magic wand would apparently make frontiers disappear and eliminate national control over air traffic rights which are said to be hindering

a rational organisation of the airways and, consequently of the aircraft industry. He did not claim that the present system was perfect or could not be improved. Perhaps a rather more dynamic concept of traffic rights or a somewhat less restrictive attitude to the problems of third level aviation might enable the airways to be improved a little. The already well-served heavy traffic routes could be supplemented by air links between population centres of lesser importance, many of which should be concentrated on the same routes to permit rational operations. A truly regional network could be extended to the whole of Europe. The growth of such a network could provide a complementary market for certain low-level or medium-capacity aircraft already manufactured in Europe.

65. It would only be possible to establish a direct link between the airspace and the aircraft industry if one adopted a protectionist attitude whereby a monopoly of European civil and military markets would be given to European industries by imposing special measures and rules.

66. In the Committee's report¹ it was stated:

"Europe's passengers continue to remain in the hands of airlines which, with the backing of bilateral agreements between governments and the safety net of IATA, are virtually free to set any fare levels they want to."

This paragraph presupposes that an integration of European airlines would really benefit European passengers and eventually European aircraft manufacturers. It is possible that, through restructuring, some European airlines could become efficient operational units with a resulting cost-cutting effect. This effect would pass through to the fare, thus opening up new buyer layers for scheduled air travel.

67. The intra-Benelux talks on joining up KLM, Sabena and Luxair are being undertaken with this purpose in mind.

68. However, the treatment of European airspace as one political airspace in bilateral traffic agreements with extra-European countries might well be a step backwards for the European airlines in sharing the world market. Due to the historical developments which led to individual agreements by each European country

1. Document 658.

with third countries, a very good worldwide stock of traffic rights and market penetration was achieved. Moreover, each national airline draws a considerable demand potential from ethnic groups abroad due to some sort of nostalgic loyalty.

69. In opposition to this assertion it must be pointed out that in Europe traffic rights are still negotiated as they were in 1945. The results of the system of bilateral agreements are not the best that could be achieved if another system were adopted. If one considers the European domestic market and intra-European air transport on the one hand and trade between Europe and the rest of the world on the other, it can be seen that in 1973 intra-European traffic represented something like 80 passenger km per capita in Europe. Over the same period the American domestic market was slightly more than 1,200 passenger km. In other words, per capita domestic traffic is at present fourteen or fifteen times higher in America than in Europe. Of course the per capita gross national product in America is ten compared with six in Europe: distances in America are greater; the European railways network is better than its counterpart in America, but on the other hand the network of motorways in America is superior to the European motorway network. All in all, the different situations in Europe and America do not justify the big gap in the abovementioned air transport figures. Perhaps the fact that United States domestic air fares are only half the European rates has a devastating effect on demand.

70. Looking at the figures for the world network, and especially the Europe-America route, one can see that, on the one hand, three American airlines serve about twenty-five points in Europe and benefit from numerous fifth freedom rights which allow them to transport passengers between cities within Europe. Conversely, nineteen European airlines together serve only a dozen points in America and with no fifth freedom rights. It could therefore be said that organising European transport on a purely national basis has led to an extraordinary asymmetry between Europe and the United States. Judging by these results, there is justification for reviewing this question. This might be in the long-term interests of air transport and also of the aircraft industry which needs room to expand. The interests of airlines and manufacturers are closely linked and necessitate

harmonisation of the European market and probably of European airspace too.

VII. A European civil aviation agency

71. Consideration should be given by member governments to the value of an agency to establish, monitor and negotiate civil aviation standards, airspace control, aviation operations and traffic rights. So far Europe has failed to recognise that the sum of its parts is greater than their national separation. The United States penetration of all our markets is proof of the need to examine not only our objectives but how to reach them.

VIII. General aviation

72. In this field too Western Europe is lagging well behind the United States. According to statistics for 1974, the United States had 170,000 aircraft compared with about 5,200 in France, 5,000 in the Federal Republic, 4,000 in Britain and some 4,000 elsewhere in Europe. Where manufacturing is concerned it should be recalled that in 1974 20,000 aircraft were built throughout the world, 89 % of them in the United States. This is a market which should be viewed with more interest than in the past. For a long time it was the considered opinion in Europe that general aviation was for artisans only. In the United States it has been understood for a long time that general aviation can be properly handled only by large industrial firms with vast resources.

73. In order to promote this type of activity a number of problems should be dealt with in a European framework. Freedom of airspace and regulations for air traffic allowing small aircraft to fly normally should be considered when a European aeronautical policy is being studied.

Conclusions

74. One of the most important questions regarding the aeronautical industry is the personnel question: What will be the future of the industry's employees? Where 435,000 men were still employed in 1969, there were only 400,000 in 1974. This reduction in manpower in Europe, some 8 %, was mainly due to an intentional cutback in the British industry from 234,000 in 1971 to 201,000 in 1974. At the same time

employment in the United States aerospace industry fell by 32 % ; their employees now total 937,000.

75. The 400,000 figure is, however, not evenly divided throughout the various countries. The United Kingdom work force of 200,000 equals half Europe's capability. The French aircraft industry now employs just over 100,000 the German industry about 40,000, the Netherlands industry 8,000. The question now is what influence will future policy decisions have on the work force of the different countries. It is quite clear that the choice of a European programme will have a great influence on the reduction, growth or change in employment. A wide selection of commercial opportunities might offer a better prospect for overall employment in the Community if the main military needs can also be fulfilled by European products.

76. The representatives of the employees, in a memorandum from the European Metalworkers' Federation to the Commission, indicated that they think it extremely urgent to achieve more European co-operation. They fear however that between the manufacturers of aircraft on the one hand and the airlines on the other there is no serious will to collaborate. The different points of view between these two groups are not yet bridged and it might not be much use to propose a plan for after 1980 if today the manufacturers and the airlines are not willing to adopt a joint position and accept a joint organisation within the framework of the Common Market. It is all very well to say that a solution must be found at the political level but this is not the complete answer. The difficulties between manufacturers and users will have to be solved, failing which the number of jobs will be affected and the consequences in different regions of Europe will be serious.

77. On the industrial side one of the weakest points is, or was, in marketing and sales, although much progress has been made to improve standards. Co-ordination of sales might give employees more security. A concerted approach by industry and airlines will not be easy however as the effects of soaring fuel costs, world recession and the reduction in growth of air traffic have affected both manufacturers and airlines. There is no doubt that certain investment or construction programmes have lost much of their impetus. At the same time most of the major military aircraft programmes appear to be already committed and

the volume of military equipment budgets is being reduced in many major countries. This latter trend will have serious consequences for research and development and hence on the level of employment.

78. In the civil transport field the tendency is also to keep to on-going programmes. In design offices especially the employment problem is becoming critical.

79. So far Europe has had the necessary technological expertise. Its capacity for imagination, high standard of engineering, its production potential and its highly skilled 400,000-strong work force have not yet however achieved the same credibility as American manufacturers have in the world and especially the United States market. More effort must therefore be concentrated on the standards of after-sales support. This, too, presupposes that Europe's industry must not disperse its financial and technical resources but must concentrate its efforts on judiciously selected programmes involving whole families of aircraft.

80. The Western European governments are now reaching the point at which they must choose between three possible solutions : a European venture without United States participation, a balanced programme among European manufacturers and one United States manufacturer, and co-operation amongst some, but not all, European firms with a United States firm under United States leadership. The second solution would involve setting up a single European entity to work with a United States manufacturer. There is no doubt whatsoever that no deal will be made which would jeopardise the Airbus or its derivatives.

81. How should co-operation between manufacturing industries be organised ? So far it has been impossible to obtain a unanimous reply to particularly important questions such as : Should co-operation stem from the action of a supranational political authority or from the spontaneous convergence of industrial interest ? Should co-operation be achieved with an eye to confrontation between blocs or collaboration at world level ? Should co-operation be achieved to ensure at any cost the survival of an industry vital for the defence of the continent or in such manner as to place the lowest possible burden on the people of Europe ? And, above all, is co-operation preferable to straightforward competition ?

82. Agreement appears to exist in Europe on the fact that only through multinational programmes is it possible to undertake the development of new civil medium- and large-capacity aircraft. But we must beware of spending time talking across the Atlantic until the Americans are ready to act again, alone as usual.

83. Because of the political, social and economic premises for the development of an integrated European industry, European co-operation can hardly be other than the result of a free choice of the industries and of the countries to which the industries belong.

84. In order to arrive at such a choice, member countries which have not yet established national committees for the protection of their aeronautical industries should be invited to do so. These committees should be composed of senior national civil servants, industrialists and representatives of the airlines. Special attention should also be paid to representatives of the unions working in these industries; they especially have a large stake in the survival of the industries.

85. The attitudes of the manufacturers and of the airlines could be discussed in such committees and convergence of their ideas might be achieved. A concerted effort should be made by the airlines and manufacturers to define aircraft which meet the needs of the carriers, especially from the standpoint of performance, range and capacity. Such aircraft should be competitive not only in terms of technical operating costs but also purchase price.

86. It would seem only fair for European airlines to offer Europe's manufacturers the kind of understanding which, through a clearer picture concerning frequencies, capacities, and technical and operating standards, would ultimately lead to a progressively more homogenous fleet. In this way the European aircraft industry may have some assurance that an aircraft defined jointly will be purchased by the largest possible number of European airlines.

87. An experiment is now being attempted by a tripartite working group of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, to define a medium-range transport aircraft of around 200 seats. For more than a year, three airlines of these coun-

tries have been meeting to try to formulate a joint definition of such an aircraft. They have exchanged traffic forecasts, discussed their policies and are now trying to work out a joint formula for calculating operating costs. Their views have been put to the interested manufacturers who are now considering the project.

88. This initial approach, which could be described as "micro-European", might perhaps be improved by broadening the circle of participants as studies progress.

89. This is what is meant by the Committee's recommendation to form a joint senior European council for the aeronautical industry drawn from the national committees. Other tasks have also been mentioned in the recommendation, mainly concerning the organisation of financial support for research, development, production and marketing of aircraft.

90. In order to evolve an efficient and competitive European industry, AECMA has initiated a number of practical methods of unifying the aeronautical market. It has promoted collaboration in the field of aeronautical research avoiding wasteful duplication and extending bilateral arrangements to three or more countries. Collaborative aerospace research arrangements have been made between the United Kingdom, France and Germany and an organisation has been set up for this purpose.

91. It is clear that AECMA, bearing in mind its limited function and resources, can make progress only if governments and industries make up their minds about the ways in which they wish to penetrate existing and new markets.

92. Europe of course should also work in liaison with the United States and here a pragmatic approach is the only way possible. There should be a deliberate policy to strengthen engineering and other collaboration in Europe. First, because it is necessary if there is to be an effective European aeronautical industry, and second, because Europe's maximum technical strength needs to be developed in order to be able to collaborate with the United States in a satisfactory and constructive manner and avoid the long-term risk of total United States domination of the European market.

Scientific, technological and aerospace questions
Reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council

REPORT ¹
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on scientific, technological and aerospace questions — reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. *de Montesquiou* (Chairman); MM. *Warren*, *Richter* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaenssens*, *Boucheny* (Substitute: *Cerneau*), Mrs. *Cattaneo-Petrini*, MM. *Cornelissen* (Substitute: *Portheine*), *Craigien* (Substitute: *Hawkins*), *Gölter*, *Lenzer*, *Lewis*,

Mammi, *Mart*, *van Ooijen*, *Pecoraro*, Dr. *Phipps* (Substitute: *Bagier*), MM. *Schmitt*, *Schwencke*, de *Stexhe* (Substitute: *de Bruyne*), *Treu*, *Valleix*.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on scientific, technological and aerospace questions —
reply to the twenty-first annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Appreciating the Council's interest in promoting technological collaboration in a European framework ;

Regretting the absence of a medium- and long-term policy to encourage advanced technology programmes, although such a policy is necessary if Western European industry is to maintain a valid civil and military capability,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Include in its twenty-second annual report on its activities guidelines for a long-term European policy in sectors of advanced technology such as space, aeronautics, aviation, nuclear reactors, computers and electronics, taking both civil and military aspects into consideration and indicating how effective decision-making machinery could be set up in Western Europe.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur)

1. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was gratified to read that the Council follows its work with interest. Its work concerns the progress of European collaboration and co-operation in many fields of advanced technology. The Committee is convinced that the notion of security is wider than that of defence. A European industrial capability has to be maintained in order to serve as a basis for our defence effort and provide the highest possible level of employment. If Europe failed to maintain its centres of invention and innovation such as the aerospace industry, the nuclear industry and many others, it would be unable to maintain its civil and military industrial capability.

2. It is regrettable that the Western European countries take so long to adopt common positions on matters which govern the whole future of essential industries in advanced technology. Results in the technological fields in which the European governments have been involved since the early 1950s have been mediocre if not insignificant.

3. In numerous reports on technological collaboration in a European framework, the Committee has pointed out that one of the greatest problems is the lack of proper decision-making machinery. Life in advanced societies is very largely a reflection of the work done by scientists in earlier centuries. Their discoveries, placed in the hands of technicians, have enabled the material world to be mastered but decisions regarding management can rarely be confined within national boundaries. However, the process of decision-making is effective only within these boundaries. The Committee has therefore often pointed out that there is a need for a systematic intergovernmental and ultimately integrated European approach. A more rational policy is required if progress is to be made in European co-operation in research, technology and its application.

4. An international parliamentary assembly can only advise governments on the policy they should follow, but there is a shortage of the necessary staff and experience for making concrete proposals in the different fields of advanced technology.

5. Your Rapporteur believes that one of the activities of the Council should be to formulate

a medium- and long-term policy in the different sectors. The Council can draw on the experience and knowledge of the various ministries of State in the seven member countries. It also has access to outside sources, such as the Community offices or others outside Europe. However, without a proper policy there can be no guarantee of success as your Rapporteur ascertained when he wrote his report on the International Institute for the Management of Technology, which was discussed at the December 1975 session. The long years of preparation for this institute were not used to harmonise the views of the participating governments on precise goals for the institute with the result that it was abandoned.

6. Within the Euratom framework one crisis after another has arisen since 1958 and, even today, there is no unanimity between the governments concerned regarding the establishment of a nuclear fusion centre.

7. The acute energy situation, heightened by the petroleum crisis, indicates the interdependence of countries and the limitations of policy-making at national level. As energy is a key factor in the continuation of world growth and hence in maintaining social and political stability, the Committee has given this problem much of its attention in a succession of reports. Special aspects of nuclear policies in Europe and collaboration with the United States, Japan and Canada have been discussed as well as the security aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the future of second-generation nuclear reactors. The Council acknowledges the great importance of the subject, but no ensuing long- or medium-term policy is formulated.

8. Europe is far more dependent on the export of its technology than countries such as the United States or Canada which have abundant and relatively well-balanced natural resources. Europe is and will be unable to achieve a high degree of independence in energy or in mineral and food resources. It must therefore be able to offset its dependence in this respect by the availability of advanced technology products. Only thus can Europe participate actively in worldwide trade and co-operation.

9. In its report the Council also specifically mentions aviation and space. On both subjects

the Committee has kept itself well informed, and not by documents alone. It has visited many organisations and industries and has been able to discuss with competent authorities and industrialists the problems of aviation and space in order to acquire a wide spectrum of expertise. At the opening of the colloquy on a European aeronautical policy in February 1976, the Chairman of the Committee stated that despite difficulties in the principal sectors of advanced technology the Committee's aim was to ensure that a solution was found through increased co-operation between member countries. He stated that since 1973 the situation in the aeronautical industry had seriously deteriorated and that threats to the European aeronautical industry would become even more serious if we failed to work out an overall policy based on close consultation and real co-operation between governments, manufacturers and airlines. Here again, your Rapporteur would appreciate the Council taking a more active part in promoting such consultations and co-operation.

10. In the field of space, the new European Space Agency has made a successful start and more and more people are convinced that at least here Europe has provided itself with an instrument capable of gaining its rightful place in this sector. There is a general consensus on the tasks which the agency should fulfil in the near future and the necessary budgetary provisions have been made up to 1978. Application satellites will now have to be built since the follow-up of space research lies in exploration of the earth and its environment. Earth resources satellites, satellites for ocean and sea exploration, telecommunications, air traffic control, navigation and many others will soon be built and the industrial phase of space technology will start. As indicated in the report by Mr. de Montequiou¹ both the United States and Europe will have to draw up programmes and they will have to be co-ordinated. An overall European policy on new space application programmes will be necessary in order to ensure future payloads for Spacelab and the shuttle.

1. Document 687, paragraph 18.

Relations with Parliaments

INFORMATION REPORT ¹
submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments ²
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur

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- III. (a) Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments**
(b) Statement by Mr. Wagener, Secretary-General of the Chamber, on the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. Miotti Carli (Chairman); Mr. Enders (Vice-Chairman); MM. Delorme, Farr, Hengel, Jeambrun, Mendelson, Müller, Peijnenburg (Substitute: Schlingemann), Schugens, Spautz, Stoffelen, Tanghe (Substitute: Plasman), Zaffanella.

Also present: Mr. Radius (Vice-Chairman); MM. Konen, Margue, Mart, Rivière.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. This report covers the period November 1975 to April 1976. The texts of interventions in the parliaments of member countries communicated to the Committee secretariat are given in Collected Texts 23.

2. In accordance with Rule 42bis of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the Committee met in Paris on 4th December 1975, at the close of the Assembly's session, to select the texts adopted by the Assembly which it considered should be debated in the parliaments. It selected recommendations :

- 273 on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance ;
- 274 on the European aeronautical industry ;
- 276 on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

3. These three recommendations were transmitted officially to the Presidents of the parliaments of member countries. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments is drawing the attention of the seven parliaments to the texts which it considers likely to arouse their interest and be discussed.

4. It regrets that the texts it selects for transmission to parliaments do not always receive the attention they deserve. It can easily be seen from the table at Appendix II that the texts selected in November 1973 (two recommendations) elicited only four questions and replies ; in June 1974, there were also two texts and four questions and replies ; in December 1974 only one intervention was made on the single text selected ; in June 1974, there were eleven questions and replies on the four texts selected for all seven parliaments (twelve houses).

I. Reports on the activities of WEU submitted to the parliaments of member countries

5. In France, there was a response to the WEU Assembly's last session, held from 1st to 4th December 1975, in both houses of the French parliament : a report on the session was given

in the French Senate Weekly Bulletin 97 of 6th December 1975 and in the National Assembly Bulletin 78 of 9th December 1975. It should be noted that these two bulletins are distributed free of charge to members of parliament and anyone who may ask for it and a preliminary report thus reached thousands of French homes immediately after the session.

6. On 23rd October 1975, in a statement on his country's foreign policy, Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, reported orally on the activities of WEU¹.

7. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the government continues to submit half-yearly reports to parliament on the activities of WEU : in Bundestag Document 7/4355, the government reported on WEU activities during the period 1st April to 30th September 1975. The delegation reported on the December 1975 session in Document 7/4481. It should be noted that contrary to recent practice the texts of recommendations selected for transmission to the parliaments of member countries are no longer appended to this report but are included in the body of the text.

II. Action taken on texts adopted

8. While your Rapporteur noted a total of twenty interventions between June and November 1975, during the period covered by this report and for the first time since 1960 the total rose to near its normal level : fifty-six interventions during the current half-year. Although Collected Texts 23 shows that no texts have been communicated by the German Delegation, there has been a definite increase in all the other member countries : ten in Belgium, seventeen in France, ten in Italy, three in Luxembourg, eleven in the Netherlands and two in the United Kingdom, which proves that Western European Union as a European assembly still plays an important part in parliamentary life.

9. For some time, the Assembly's Press Counsellor has been sending journalists questions and replies likely to interest the larger newspapers.

1. See Collected Texts 23.

This has started to bear fruit, and your Rapporteur thinks such action might usefully be extended to local and regional newspapers, the names of which might be submitted by members of parliament.

Resolution 55

10. Five questions were put on this resolution: one each in Belgium¹, France¹ and Luxembourg¹ and two in Italy¹. According to the Belgian reply¹, the modified Brussels Treaty is important because it provides for automatic assistance in the event of armed attack.

11. The Italian Government¹ considers that WEU has and will have an essential rôle to play because it offers instruments of co-operation meeting defence requirements.

12. Finally, the Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs¹ indicated that the existing structure of WEU might play a useful rôle in joint consideration of European defence. He welcomed the fact that the Assembly discussed these matters and had made proposals to Mr. Tindemans.

Recommendation 262

13. Like last year², four Netherlands members of parliament again put questions¹ to the Minister on the ratification of conventions on third-party liability in the field of nuclear energy. The reply, which was far shorter than the previous one, was also much more vague.

14. In reply to a question¹ put by Senator Bonaldi on the 1960 and 1963 conventions on third-party liability in the field of nuclear energy, the Italian Government stated that they had been ratified and would be implemented shortly.

Recommendation 263

15. The Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cattanei, replied¹ at length to a question put by Mr. Bonaldi and described his country's relations with the Warsaw Pact member countries and the GDR.

Recommendation 266

16. In France, Senators Grangier¹ and Legaret¹ put questions on the two-year delay in appoint-

ing a new Secretary-General for WEU. The Minister for Foreign Affairs trusted steps would be taken to end this situation and was pursuing his efforts in this sense.

17. In the Netherlands, a similar question¹ was put by Mr. Waltmans, and Mr. van der Stoel said that the Netherlands Government was doing all it could to find a way out of the present impasse.

Recommendation 269

18. Mr. Wall¹ put a question during the debate in the House of Commons on 15th October 1975, to which there was a long reply by Mr. Rodgers¹, Secretary of State for Defence, on the problem of standardisation.

19. Mr. Cattanei, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied¹ at length to a question put by Mr. Bonaldi, indicating that his government agreed with Recommendation 269. In his reply, he dealt with the problem of the cohesion of the member countries of the Alliance, the MBFR negotiations, the standardisation of armaments and the defence effort as an element of European unification. On 30th March 1976 Mr. Bonaldi put a further written question¹ to the Italian Government.

Recommendation 273

20. In the Netherlands, Mr. Verbrugh spoke¹ in the debate on the budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs without eliciting an answer from the Minister. He then put a question¹ on the same subject to which the Minister replied¹ that, "without giving an opinion on the debates of the WEU Assembly", his country refused and would continue to refuse a European nuclear force.

21. In reply to a question¹ put by Senator de Stexhe, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation, indicated¹ that the Rome meeting in spring 1976 would determine the future shape of European co-operation in the field of armaments production.

22. On 30th March 1976 Mr. Bonaldi put a further written question¹ to the Italian Government.

Recommendation 274

23. In France, Senator Kauffmann¹ expressed concern about the future of Eurocontrol. The government replied on 19th February 1976.

1. See Collected Texts 23.

2. See Collected Texts 21, page 14.

1. See Collected Texts 23.

24. In Belgium, Senator de Stexhe¹ spoke about the European military aircraft procurement agency set up by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. The Minister did not wish to express a view.

25. On 30th March 1976 Mr. Bonaldi put a further written question¹ to the Italian Government.

Recommendation 276

26. In Belgium, Senator de Stexhe put a question¹ on promoting permanent consultations in the framework of the WEU Council. The Minister replied¹ that where the third basket was concerned joint positions would be defined in the framework of the Nine.

Resolution 59

27. In the Netherlands, Mr. Dankert¹ spoke during a debate on European union and put several questions on WEU's place in that union. Mr. van der Stoep, Minister for Foreign Affairs¹, replied to all the points raised except the possible dissolution of the Assembly.

Other interventions

28. In France, Mr. Krieg put a question¹ on whether the signatory States and members of WEU were respecting the provisions of the Ottawa declaration. The Minister replied on 31st January 1976. Two weeks later, on 14th February 1976, the same Minister replied¹ to a question put on 2nd August 1975 on questions put to the WEU Council on NATO nuclear strategy. Mr. Radius put a question¹ on Eurogroup and NATO and the latter's proposal to set up a European secretariat, despite the existence of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that there was no question of France taking part in the work of Eurogroup and that fears about the creation of an Atlantic organisation were groundless. In the Senate, Mr. Ménard¹ put a question to the Minister of Defence on the procurement of armaments, WEU and Eurogroup. To date, no reply has been recorded.

29. Finally, in January 1976 the Chairman of the French Delegation¹ expressed concern at the absence of replies to questions on WEU. The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave him every

assurance that questions put by members would receive the attention of his Ministry and that he and his staff were at the disposal of members of the French Delegation.

30. In the Netherlands, Mr. Waltmans¹ repeated his anxiety about the Ottawa declaration, and this time the Minister indicated the reservations he had made when the declaration was signed¹.

31. In Belgium, Mr. Tanghe put questions to the Minister of Defence about Belgian membership of bodies seeking greater joint production of armaments and equipment. The Minister, Mr. Vanden Boeynants, said that the name of the body mattered little: what counted was the result, but that nationalism was still a major obstacle.

32. It is interesting to note that in the European Parliament on 10th March 1976, following an oral question by Lord Gladwyn on the repercussions of European foreign policy on defence matters, WEU's ideas on the standardisation of armaments and the maintenance of the WEU Assembly were discussed. Your Rapporteur felt he should add the text of this debate to the texts from the various parliaments issued in the half-yearly collected texts¹.

33. On 13th May 1976, a debate will be held on WEU in the House of Lords at the request of Lord Beaumont of Whitley. Extracts will be given in the next volume of collected texts.

III. Activities of the Committee

34. The Committee visited the Luxembourg Parliament on 11th and 12th May 1976 and was received by the government and the Luxembourg and Vianden town councils. It also visited the dam on the River Our. The principal statement on the work of the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies is given at Appendix III(b) to this report.

IV. Conclusions

35. It is important to recall that apart from work at committee meetings and plenary sessions of the WEU Assembly another important task is to make the Assembly's achievements known. The aim of the Committee for Relations with

1. See Collected Texts 23.

1. See Collected Texts 23.

Parliaments is to foster the publicity, public relations and propaganda aspects of WEU and promote its aims.

36. Your Rapporteur believes that whenever possible the first task is to inform members of the national parliaments. What Western European Union represents, how it came into being and what use can be made of this Assembly should be explained in the national parliaments. This would be an essential lesson in civics which would enhance the reputation of our Assembly.

37. While the Committee has no major problems of strategy and armaments to study, it does have a mission to carry out : propagate the knowledge that Europe turned its thoughts to defence long

ago and has an instrument that asks nothing better than to flourish and be developed and used as an institutional framework which there is no need to seek elsewhere.

38. When solutions are sought in international conferences, they might already have been found in this Assembly of seven nations.

39. That is why the Committee, at its meeting in May 1976, decided to take concerted and concentrated action to promote Resolution 59 on European union and WEU without waiting for its ratification by the Assembly and to put a question in all the parliaments on Document 701 concerning pensions for international officials.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries
(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	4	17	3	11	3	76
1976	2	2	1	0	0	2	0	7
Total	63	153	173	235	16	86	189	915
Annual average	3.15	7.65	8.65	11.75	0.80	4.30	9.45	6.54

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1974

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session			
June 1974	246	x				1				1	15			
	247					2				2				
	248					2				2				
	249									—				
	250	x				1				—				
	251					1				1				
	252					2				2				
	253					2				2				
	254					2				2				
	255					1				2		3		
Dec. 1974	256	x	2	1	1				—	4				
	257								1					
	258								2					
	259								—					
Other action									1					
June 1975	260	x		2		2		4		—	26			
	261									—				
	262									8				
	263					2				2				
	264					1				1				
	265					—								
	266	x		4				2		6				
	267					—								
	268					1				1				
	269	x				2		2		4				
	270	x				2				2				
	271	x		2		—								
	272					2								
Dec. 1975	273	x	2	2		1		3		6	50			
	274	x	2			1				5				
	275	x	2							—				
	276					1				3				
	277					—								
	278	—												
	279	—												
	280	—												
	281	—												
	282	—												
	283	—												
	Res. 55	2	1	3		2	8							
	Res. 56						—							
	Res. 57						—							
	Res. 58						—							
Other action			2	17	4	1	1	2	1	28				
1976	Res. 59		2	2	1			2		2	7			
Other action										5				

APPENDIX III

(a) Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

22nd February 1963	Paris
10th October 1963	Rome
11th-12th November 1964	Bonn
28th-29th April 1965	The Hague
15th-16th December 1965	Brussels
30th October-1st November 1966	London
23rd-24th November 1967	Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin)
2nd-3rd April 1968	Luxembourg
26th-27th March 1969	Rome
27th-28th October 1969	Paris
14th-15th April 1970	Bonn
1st-2nd April 1971	Rome
4th-5th November 1971	Bonn
24th-25th February 1972	The Hague
18th-19th September 1972	Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany)
1st-2nd May 1973	St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States of Jersey)
15th-18th October 1973	Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of Bavaria)
8th-10th July 1974	Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily)
27th-28th October 1975	The Hague
11th-12th May 1976	Luxembourg

(b) Statement by Mr. Wagener, Secretary-General of the Chamber, on the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies

According to the Constitution, the Chamber of Deputies represents the country and exercises legislative powers jointly with the Grand Duke, and deputies are elected by the people.

1. Electoral system**1.1. Principles**

The country is divided into four electoral constituencies : South, East, Centre, North.

The number of deputies in the Chamber depends on the size of the population, in a pro-

portion of one deputy for 5,500 inhabitants. The Chamber now has fifty-nine deputies, twenty-four from the South, twenty from the Centre, nine from the North and six from the East. It should be noted that the number of deputies is determined not only by the number of electors but by the whole population including those without the right to vote, foreigners.

Deputies are elected for five years. The last elections were held on 26th May 1974 so in principle the next ones will be held in 1979.

Voting is compulsory. Proxy voting is not allowed. Those who cannot take part in the ballot

must give their reasons for abstaining to the justice of the peace, with the necessary justification. Unjustified abstention is punishable by fine. The punishment is heavier in the event of repeated abstention. There is no system of voting by correspondence.

According to Article 51, paragraph 5, of the Constitution, "deputies are elected by pure and simple universal suffrage, by list, in accordance with the rules of proportional representation, the principle of the lowest electoral quotient and rules to be laid down by law". This constitutional provision calls for some explanation.

The universal suffrage system allows all Luxembourg citizens, men and women, who fulfil the conditions laid down by the law to take part in electing deputies.

Pure and simple universal suffrage ensures strict equality for all electors in the exercise of their right to vote. Unlike the system of universal suffrage with plural voting, it does not grant several votes to certain electors because of their education or special qualifications or the size of their estate.

Deputies are elected by list, i.e. in each constituency the political groups standing for office must draw up lists of candidates, the total number of which must not exceed the total number of deputies to be elected in the constituency. Individual candidatures are considered as lists on their own.

Seats are shared in accordance with the rules of proportional representation and the principle of the lowest electoral quotient. Unlike the majority system, the system of proportional representation does not attribute all available seats to the majority but ensures fair representation of the minority. Seats are shared among the various lists of candidates in proportion to the number of votes received. The method of calculation will be examined later.

1.2. *Electorate*

In order to vote, it is necessary to fulfil the conditions laid down by law, not be excluded from voting under special legal provisions and be included on the electoral roll.

All electors must fulfil the following conditions :

- (1) be of Luxembourg nationality ; foreigners have no political rights ;

- (2) be at least eighteen years of age ;
- (3) have civil and political rights ;
- (4) be domiciled in the Grand Duchy ; the electoral domicile of a citizen is his usual place of residence, i.e. where he normally lives with his family.

The following are excluded from the electorate and may not vote .

- (1) persons condemned for criminal offences ;
- (2) persons condemned to terms of imprisonment for theft, fraud or breach of trust ; however, the right to vote may be restituted by reprieve ;
- (3) bankrupt persons and persons deprived of rights or in respect of whom a legal adviser has been appointed.

Since the text of the Constitution is in principle applied strictly, this list should be limitative since the Constitution does not specifically authorise the legislative authorities to lay down other cases of exclusion as it does, for instance, in the case of incompatibility between certain duties and election as a deputy. However, the legislature has interpreted Article 53 of the Constitution more widely and extended exclusion to those condemned to terms of imprisonment for receiving, fraud, false testimony, intimidation of witnesses, experts or interpreters, indecent assault or rape, prostitution or corruption of young persons, indecent exposure, adultery, bigamy and adulteration of foodstuffs or drinks. Other persons who may be excluded from the electorate are those who keep or have kept a disorderly house or brothel, who have had their guardianship suspended for misconduct or infidelity or who have lost their parental rights, and certified lunatics.

Inclusion in the electoral roll establishes the right to vote. In order to be able to vote, it is therefore not sufficient to fulfil the conditions laid down by law ; it is necessary to be included in an electoral roll.

1.3. *Eligibility*

Conditions of eligibility for candidates at elections are :

- (1) to be of Luxembourg nationality ;
- (2) to have civil and political rights ;

- (3) to be at least twenty-one years of age on the day of the elections ;
- (4) to be domiciled in the Grand Duchy.

Cases of exclusion are the same as for exclusion from the electorate.

The following posts are incompatible with the office of deputy :

- (1) member of the government ;
- (2) member of the State Council ;
- (3) magistrate ;
- (4) member of the Auditor's Office ;
- (5) district commissioner ;
- (6) income tax inspector or State accountant ;
- (7) regular serviceman on active duty.

Moreover, Article 100 of the electoral law lays down that the following duties are also incompatible with the office of deputy :

- (1) government counsellor ;
- (2) State-paid minister of religion ;
- (3) civil servant or official whose principal duties are State-paid ;
- (4) primary schoolteacher.

All these persons may of course stand for office at elections if they fulfil the other conditions for eligibility laid down by the law. But if they are elected and agree to accept the office of deputy they must resign from their duties, employment or responsibilities. Acceptance is established on being sworn in as deputies.

Conversely, if a member of the Chamber is appointed to duties, employment or responsibilities which are incompatible with his office of deputy, he is bound to give up this office when he accepts such duties, employment or responsibilities.

1.4. *Nomination of candidates*

Political groups must draw up lists of candidates nominated for elections. The number of candidates on these lists may not exceed the number of deputies to be elected in the constituency. Individual candidatures are considered as lists on their own.

1.5. *Elections*

Ordinary elections to replace outgoing deputies must be held every five years, on the

first Sunday in June. Should this fall on Whit Sunday, elections are held on the last Sunday in May.

Should the Chamber be dissolved, new elections are held not later than three months after dissolution.

By-elections are held in the event of a seat becoming vacant if there is no substitute on the relevant list.

1.6. *Voting*

Each elector has as many votes as there are deputies to be elected in the constituency. Votes may be cast in various ways, as follows :

(1) List vote. By placing a cross in the appropriate place at the top of a list, an elector may vote for the whole list and give one vote to each candidate thereon. In this event, he may cast no other vote under penalty of invalidating his vote.

(2) Nominative vote. An elector may vote nominatively by placing either one or two crosses in the appropriate place after the name of each candidate of his choice. In this event, he may not place more crosses than there are deputies to be elected in the constituency. An elector who votes nominatively may choose his candidates on the same or different lists, being careful not to vote more often than there are seats available (split vote).

1.7. *Division of seats*

Seats are shared between the lists in proportion to the total number of list and nominative votes obtained by each list.

The method of calculation is governed by Articles 136, 137 and 138 of the electoral law.

1.8. *Verification of credentials*

It is for the Chamber alone to decide whether elections are valid.

The Chamber verifies the credentials of its newly-elected members and settles any disputes which may arise. Any complaint about the elections must be made before the credentials are verified.

2. *Organisation of the Chamber*

2.1. *Situation of individual deputies*

Newly-elected deputies take office at the first ordinary or extraordinary meeting of the Chamber.

So that they may carry out their duties without hindrance and in full independence, the Constitution guarantees parliamentary immunity for deputies. Immunity has two aspects: unaccountability and inviolability.

(1) *Unaccountability*

No deputy may be prosecuted or be the object of enquiries in respect of opinions and votes expressed by him in the exercise of his duties (Constitution, Article 68). Deputies must be able to speak freely in the interests of the country. They may not be prosecuted or arrested for statements made by them in the Chamber, even when such statements infringe penal law, i.e. slander, insult, libel, exhortation to riot, etc.

Parliamentary unaccountability is permanent, i.e. it protects a deputy during and outside sessions. It also covers former deputies for opinions expressed during their term of office.

(2) *Inviolability*

A deputy who commits a crime, misdemeanour or offence may not be arrested or prosecuted during the session without the authorisation of the Chamber except *in flagrante delicto* (Constitution, Article 69).

If the Chamber so requires, the arrest or prosecution of a deputy may be suspended during the session and for its whole duration.

Parliamentary inviolability does not protect a deputy outside sessions.

A term of office is legally terminated if a deputy :

- accepts a post as civil servant, State-paid official or State-paid minister of religion ;
- fails to attend regularly as required by the law. If the minutes of sittings show that a deputy has been absent for more than half the sittings of two consecutive ordinary sessions, his term of office is legally terminated.

Candidates from each list immediately after those elected are asked by the President of the Chamber to complete the term of office of deputies on the same list whose seats become vacant by choice, resignation, death or any other cause. They are notified within fifteen days of the event leading to the vacancy.

A deputy who, by accepting the duties of a Minister, had to give up his seat as a deputy, is fully reinstated as first substitute on the list on which he was elected when his term as Minister is over.

2.2. *Procedure in the Chamber*

The Chamber meets in the city of Luxembourg.

Sittings are public, except as laid down in the rules of procedure.

A summary record of debates is published and circulated free of charge to all households on the electoral roll.

Each year, the Chamber meets in ordinary session in accordance with the law and without being convened on the second Tuesday of October at 3 p.m.

Sessions are opened and closed by the Grand Duke in person or by a representative appointed for the purpose, who is generally the Prime Minister.

The Grand Duke may convene the Chamber in extraordinary session and adjourn or dissolve it. The Grand Duke is bound to convene an extraordinary session if one-third of the deputies so request.

Ordinary sessions are those which begin in accordance with the law each year at the time laid down in the rules of procedure of the Chamber, i.e. the second Tuesday in October.

Under the rules of procedure of the Chamber, deputies have the right to form political groups. A political group must have at least five members in order to be recognised.

To facilitate and rationalise the work of the Chamber, the rules of procedure make provision for a working committee and standing committees and special committees may be formed.

The task of the working committee is to assist the President of the Chamber in conducting proceedings and in particular to concert with the political groups on the best way of expediting the work of the Chamber. It consists of the President of the Chamber or his representative and representatives of the political groups. Each political group is represented by one delegate and each delegate has a number of votes equal to the number of members in his group. The working committee has therefore been

defined as a concentrated emanation of the Chamber, which gives its opinion on the order of business of the Chamber and, where necessary, decides how long debates should last and the time limit for taking votes.

Standing committees are generally responsible for certain specific matters. They are set up by the Chamber at the beginning of each legislature, i.e. after each full election. The Chamber decides how many there should be, their titles and duties. Standing committees consist of at least five and not more than eleven members appointed by the Chamber at the beginning of each session. When setting them up, account is taken of the proportional representation of political groups. There are at present nineteen standing committees.

Special committees may be set up by the Chamber or, at its request, by the President of the Chamber, in the same conditions as for membership of standing committees. Special committees are responsible for studying specific bills or motions. They are normally dissolved when they have tabled their reports on the bills or motions before them (Rules of Procedure, Article 16).

Standing and special committees may set up sub-committees for which they determine the membership and responsibilities. If necessary, they may consult persons or bodies outside parliament and obtain information from them.

Votes on bills or motions are always taken by verbal roll-call. In other cases the Chamber expresses its opinion by sitting and standing unless five members ask for a vote by roll-call.

Each deputy may ask one or more colleagues to vote on his behalf in his absence. Proxy votes are taken after the votes of members present. No deputy may represent more than one of his colleagues (Rules of Procedure, Article 42).

(3) *Legislative procedure*

Like the Grand Duke, the Chamber has the right to initiate legislation. The parliamentary or the Chamber's proposal is called a motion for a bill, whereas the Grand Ducal or governmental proposal is called a bill.

The normal procedure for governmental proposals is as follows :

The preliminary bill drawn up by the Ministry concerned is first submitted to the State Council for consideration. It is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum.

The opinion of the State Council is transmitted to the government in the form of a reasoned report containing conclusions and, where appropriate, alternative proposals.

Before submitting a bill to the State Council, the government may ask for its opinion on the principle. The State Council may draw the government's attention to the advisability of new laws and existing regulations. In both cases, if the government and the State Council agree on the principle, the government may ask the State Council to prepare the bill or regulation.

Any changes to the initial bill must be submitted to the State Council for its opinion.

The government submits the final text to the Grand Duke, with the opinion of the State Council, with a request for authorisation to table it in the Chamber of Deputies.

When the Grand Duke authorises the government to table the bill in the Chamber, this is done in public sitting by the Minister concerned.

The printed text of the bill and its appendices is distributed to the members of the Chamber.

The bill is referred for examination to one of the following :

- a standing committee ;
- a special committee set up for the purpose ;
- two or more standing committees which will meet jointly.

The public debate is divided into two parts : the general debate and the debate on the articles.

The general debate covers the principle and the bill as a whole. It is followed by a debate on the articles taken separately and any relevant amendments. Each member of the Chamber may speak and deputies may table amendments during the debate.

Amendments must be submitted in writing to the bureau of the Chamber. They must be signed by at least five deputies. If the Chamber decides that amendments should be considered, the amended texts are referred to the State Council. In this case, the debate may be suspended until the State Council has given its opinion.

The Chamber votes no less than four times on each bill. It should be recalled that votes are taken by verbal roll-call or by sitting and stand-

ing. A vote on a bill as a whole must always be taken by verbal roll-call.

(a) *Voting article by article*

No bill may be passed by the Chamber until it has been voted on article by article (Constitution, Article 65).

(b) *The second statutory vote*

When the State Council has given its opinion on the new provisions introduced during the debate, on amendments adopted, on initial provisions which are negatived, on articles amended in any way whatsoever and on all additional provisions accepted and on which the State Council did not give its opinion before the first vote, the Chamber votes a second time, after another debate, on all the modifications introduced.

(c) *Vote on the bill as a whole*

Immediately afterwards, the Chamber votes on the bill as a whole.

In countries with a bicameral parliamentary system, the vote on the bill as a whole expresses the final decision of each chamber and concludes their part in the legislative procedure. This is not so in Luxembourg. Because it is such a small country, it has only one chamber: the Chamber of Deputies. The moderating element which would be provided by a second chamber, perhaps elected at two levels, is therefore lacking in the Luxembourg legislative system. The authors of the Constitution realised this and endeavoured to offset this drawback by introducing procedure for a second constitutional vote.

All bills are subject to a second vote, unless the Chamber, in agreement with the State Council, meeting in public sitting, decides otherwise. There is an interval of at least three months between the two votes.

After voting on a bill as a whole, the Chamber thus in principle has to vote on the same bill a second time, after a period in which it has time for reflection.

The Constitution admittedly allows the Chamber to dispense with this second vote, but the State Council must agree.

To compensate for the absence of a second chamber, the Constitution thus allows the State Council to go beyond its purely consultative rôle and grants it a true right of suspensive veto in

the legislative procedure. Here, the State Council does not merely give an opinion, it takes a decision.

The legislative work of the Chamber is concluded when a second vote is dispensed with or after the second constitutional vote three months later.

Once a bill has been finally passed by the Chamber, it requires the assent of the Grand Duke. It cannot come into force until it has been promulgated by him and published in the *Mémorial*.

Assent, i.e. approval, by the Grand Duke of the text of a bill passed by the Chamber is the essential rôle played by the Grand Duke in the exercise of legislative powers.

The implementation of the law after promulgation and publication is the task of the executive.

In practice, the Grand Duke gives his assent to and promulgates the law by signing the text of the law, together with the promulgating text. In this case, he therefore exercises legislative and executive attributions with one signature.

(4) *Parliamentary supervision of the government*

In financial matters, the Chamber supervises the government through the annual vote on the budget and taxes, the right to close the State accounts each year and by some supervision of the management of the common inheritance.

Supervision by the Chamber of Deputies would be illusory if confined to consideration of budgetary estimates and not the financial operations carried out by the government on the basis of these estimates. The Chamber's right to close the State accounts is a corollary to its right to adopt the budget (Constitution, Article 104).

Each year, therefore, the government submits general accounts to the Chamber showing income and expenditure during the financial year before last. These general accounts are first audited by the Auditor's Office and are accompanied by its opinion. The Chamber of Deputies closes the State accounts by a law (Articles 58 and 59 of the law of 27th July 1936 on the State accounts; Constitution, Article 104).

The Chamber also has a say in certain appointments, it receives and considers petitions and has the right to initiate enquiries and to supervise the government through parliamentary questions, interpellations and motions.

Reserve forces

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. *Critchley* (Chairman) ; MM. Klepsch, Dankert (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Averardi, Beauguitte (Substitute : *Delorme*), Bizet (Substitute : *La Combe*), Boulloche, *Buck*, *Haase*, *Hardy*, Kempinaire (Substitute : *Breyne*), Konen, de Koster (Substitute : *Piket*), Laforgia, Lemmrich, Ménard (Substitute : de

Montesquiou), Pawelczyk (Substitute : *Müller*), Pumilia, Reale, *Richter*, *Rivière*, Roper, Scholten, *Schugens*, Tanghe (Substitute : *Duvieusart*), Urwin (Substitute : *Whitehead*), Vedovato.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on reserve forces

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that improved organisation, recruitment and training of reserve forces would allow :
 - (a) a considerable strengthening of the deterrent potential of the field forces of the European armies ;
 - (b) European defence to be based to a substantial extent on recourse to the widest possible mobilisation of the people's energies in the event of attack ;
- (ii) Considering that the defence of Europe must not be based solely on nuclear deterrence and a modern and effective field force but must also be ensured by a people's deterrent, expressing the will of the peoples of Europe to remain responsible for their own destinies ;
- (iii) Aware of the importance of the rôle which reserves can play in strengthening the links between the European peoples and their armies, particularly in keeping public opinion better informed about the importance of defence problems ;
- (iv) Underlining the financial advantages of forming large-scale reserves, as opposed to an equivalent active force, when the proportion of national budgets devoted to defence tends to remain constant or even diminish and when personnel costs linked with the maintenance of active forces are continuously increasing to the point of sometimes jeopardising the implementation of certain equipment programmes ;
- (v) Considering it necessary to harmonise the concepts which govern the organisation of reserves in Europe, in the framework of a common strategy for all the Western European States,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. (a) Together with the member States of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU, specify the type of tasks entrusted to the various components of the European defence system : nuclear forces, combat forces, internal defence forces ;
- (b) Consequently define requirements in respect of internal defence forces and combat forces with a view to harmonising the concepts of European States in this field ;
2. To this end, set up a group of experts consisting of senior defence officials to study measures likely to develop the contribution by reserves to the internal defence of European territory and *inter alia* consider the possibility of :
 - (a) increasing the number of reservists who could be called up for internal defence, particularly where there is no system of conscription ;
 - (b) producing special equipment for reserves for internal defence forces, combining power, simplicity and robustness, and ensuring that it is made available immediately in the event of mobilisation ;
 - (c) improving training of reserve officers responsible for commanding the units forming internal defence forces, such training to include on the one hand periods of training in active units and on the other hand periods of training together with reservists in the ranks ;
 - (d) adapting compulsory military service, where this exists, to the requirements of internal defence and consequently provide for a short but intensive period of active service followed by a number of training periods at regular intervals ;
 - (e) organising internal defence forces on a territorial basis by assigning the necessary number of national servicemen and the essential reservists, according to their place of residence ;
 - (f) paying reservists undergoing periods of training at an appropriate rate ;
3. (a) Study measures likely to increase the availability and effectiveness of reserves for combat forces and *inter alia* seek means of improving the training of such reserves and the speed and efficiency of their mobilisation ;
- (b) Pay particular attention to the question of the time required for the mobilisation and immediate use of reserve units in the field forces ;
4. Consider setting up a European defence college where those responsible for Europe's defence and reserve officers would discuss their experiences and endeavour to define joint principles which might govern the use of reserves in Europe.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that this report is a wide-ranging review of the rôle of reserves and the spirit in which they should approach their task in order to achieve the best results for defending the nation and Europe.

2. In conclusion to this study, the report will see what lessons can be learned from the position of the opposing forces and from the present use of reserves and propose improvements which might be advocated for strengthening the potential of WEU forces.

3. In an appendix, the forces on both sides are examined :

- Warsaw Pact ;
- Atlantic Alliance.

4. For each side, it then defines the characteristics of their land forces in peacetime and their possible strengthening (M+1, M+7, etc.) in wartime.

5. The study forecasts the future shape of war — attack with or without warning, lightning or long-drawn-out, conventional or nuclear war — and then consideration is given to NATO doctrines, the French concept, etc.

6. In an appendix, the Rapporteur also gives a comparative table of the position of professional armies (United Kingdom, United States, Canada) and conscript armies (France, Germany, Italy, etc.) in terms of co-operation with their own reserves.

7. Special cases such as Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, Vietnam and Yugoslavia are also studied and attached to the present report.

General

8. The purpose of this part of the report is to study the contribution made by reserve forces to Western Europe's defence effort. Your Rapporteur felt that this matter had not yet been considered with sufficient care and attention either by politicians or by the military authorities.

9. There is an explanation for this lack of interest in such a serious subject : the very idea of reserves does not seem to belong to the stra-

tegic context of European defence. According to traditional strategic thinking, the usual rôle of reserves is to bring field forces up to strength and provide replacements in the event of large-scale conventional operations. Nowadays, this would imply widespread hostilities in Europe using conventional weapons (or at the most very low-strength nuclear weapons) after the fashion of the campaigns during the first and second world wars.

10. But in the case of the European theatre of operations, in view of the number of nuclear weapons of all types available on the battlefield, wars of this kind are almost unimaginable in present circumstances. In any such event the belligerents could not avoid resorting to strategic nuclear weapons at a very early stage.

11. Hence, preparation for widespread conventional fighting has lost some of its interest : large-scale mobilisation of reserves seems out of the question in the event of war.

12. The strength of an army no longer depends on numbers. As many observers have underlined, the army will have a diminished requirement for millions of men, but a growing requirement for new, mobile, immediately available combat-ready forces, at full strength, trained and coherent.

13. The present strategy of the European countries which are members of WEU is based on two elements : (a) nuclear deterrent forces, whether American, British or French ; (b) combat-ready forces. These combat-ready forces have a twofold rôle: to deter any limited attack launched by conventional or tactical nuclear means and to resist any widespread conventional offensive for long enough to allow the political authorities to manage the crisis so as to ensure that the nuclear deterrent is as effective as possible.

14. Reserves can play no rôle in the nuclear deterrent forces, which must be prepared to intervene at any time without outside support.

15. Combat-ready forces may be brought up to strength only by a very limited number of reserves which must be on call at all times and at short notice (within 24 to 48 hours), and they must consequently be fully trained.

16. However, your Rapporteur believes it is essential for Europe's security to pay the price

to have such reserves capable of increasing the deterrent capability of combat-ready forces. Additional or replacement reserves to bolster combat-ready units can prolong resistance to attack which is important in view of the rapid attrition of front-line forces in modern warfare waged with particularly sophisticated and destructive weapons. Response to an attack would thus be as flexible as possible by raising the threshold of strategic nuclear deterrence.

17. Reserve forces also have an even more important rôle to play in the field of defence : internal defence by mobilising the population in the event of invasion or occupation following the failure of nuclear deterrence. Recourse to arming the nation can be based only on a defence effort with the support of all sections of the civilian population who are fit to fight, i.e. mainly reservists. This people's deterrent aims at preventing foreign occupation by the threat of losses and destruction far greater than the gain the invaded country may represent. Internal defence based on mobilising the population is necessary for three reasons :

- (i) it gives tangible shape to the people's desire to defend itself without which the nuclear deterrent loses its credibility ;
- (ii) it offers an alternative should the nuclear deterrent fail ;
- (iii) it demonstrates the close link between the army and the people from whom it is drawn.

Both the majority and the opposition in France share a wide measure of agreement on this notion of deterrence by the people.

18. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes to underline the political importance of the problem of reserve forces. Consideration of the rôle of these forces does not merely imply raising a technical problem but also deciding whether the inhabitants of our States wish, in the event of emergency, to make an effective contribution to the defence of Europe.

19. Your Rapporteur therefore feels that any study of the rôle of reserves in a modern defence policy inevitably raises two questions :

- How can European public opinion be made more alive to defence matters despite the deep-rooted feeling of security which it now seems to have ?

- How can the army be brought closer to the people and general misunderstanding and prejudices be dispelled as being harmful to Europe's defence and perhaps in the long term dangerous for its security ?

20. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, your Rapporteur will first deal with the rôle which reserve forces can play in a modern defence system. He will then make an objective assessment of existing reserve systems and examine the possibilities afforded by reserves for establishing closer links between the army and the nation. Lastly, he will make a few proposals for improving recruitment, training and organisation of reserves at European level bearing in mind that reserves are an essential, but not a sufficient, instrument for deterring an enemy from launching a limited attack or parrying the possibility of operations based on ambiguity. Only mobilisation of the population on a strictly local and regional basis can muster the necessary and effective forces to oppose the enemy.

1. The rôle of reserves in a modern defence system

21. Reserves still have a place, and probably an important one, in a modern defence policy. However, their rôle appears radically different to what it was during the first half of this century.

22. Taking defence as a whole, the military side can be divided into three functions : nuclear deterrence ; maintenance of a permanently combat-ready force ; the preparation of internal defence based on mobilisation of all the nation's human and material resources in the event of invasion or foreign occupation.

23. In each of the defence systems corresponding to these functions, reserves play a very different rôle which must be defined in greater detail.

24. (i) *Nuclear deterrence* is based essentially on strategic nuclear weapons. Their rôle is : "Potentially and continuously to deter an aggressor by means of a threat which is intolerable in view of what is at stake." The importance of this element must not be taken lightly, in any defence policy, even in countries which have no nuclear weapons, since the effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance in keeping the peace in the last twenty-five years is mainly due to the existence of American nuclear weapons.

25. In terms of nuclear deterrence, the rôle of reserves seems practically non-existent, first because nuclear weapons can be used only by highly-specialised and qualified staff and secondly and above all because such staff must be kept in a state of alert at all times. For everything related to nuclear weapons, the distinction between peacetime and wartime tends to fade. Such weapons must therefore remain in the hands of professional servicemen under the close control of the political authorities who must retain power of decision on the use of such weapons.

26. (ii) *A combat-ready force* is also essential for the reasons which your Rapporteur has already given. It allows greater flexibility in deterrence and averts limited attacks by conventional means.

27. For restoring or maintaining peace as the case may be, it is useful for the Western European countries to be able to send forces to certain parts of the world at short notice, to ensure respect for decisions taken by the United Nations, for instance. It should thus be possible to use part of the combat-ready force, equipped solely with conventional weapons, for distant and limited operations.

28. To carry out the tasks just mentioned, the combat-ready force must be a conventional one, ready to intervene at any time with the latest equipment and with tactical nuclear weapons if necessary but ready to fight without them if they are not essential. It must therefore include a large proportion of regulars.

29. Your Rapporteur considers it essential to pursue a policy of maintaining a fairly high level of reserves in order to be able to reinforce combat-ready units¹.

30. As in the United Kingdom, reserves for reinforcing combat-ready forces might mainly be former regulars proficient in the use of the equipment and weapons with which combat-ready forces are equipped and whose contracts might include specific obligations to keep their knowledge up to date and to be available for call-up at short notice.

31. The rôle of non-regular reservists drawn from conscripts who have completed their com-

pulsory military service, where this exists, is important, though limited.

32. A policy of building up a relatively high level of reserves for the field forces might therefore draw on two types of reservist: ex-regular servicemen and national servicemen who have completed their full period of active military service:

- regular servicemen for combat-ready forces might be recruited for a relatively short period (one to three years), but remain on the reserve list for quite a long time. During their period of service, they would receive intensive training;
- national servicemen for combat-ready forces should be carefully selected and also have very advanced training. For a certain period after release, they would form a reserve capable of using the most up-to-date equipment.

33. Such a policy of quick turnover and building up a high level of reserves would allow personnel to be kept up to date with the fast-succeeding developments of new military technology on a continuing basis. This would help to eliminate the routine and technical conservatism which often jeopardise the efficiency of units which should be constantly operational.

34. Moreover, the rotation of personnel together with the formation of a large reserve is said to lower the maintenance costs of personnel in the field forces. The sums thus saved might be allocated to improving equipment and weapons.

35. The use of reserves also improves fighting efficiency. In a conventional war, even limited, the attrition of front-line forces is now extremely high. Progress in armaments has produced terrible destructive power. For instance, in the October 1973 war, Arab and Israeli forces lost almost all their armoured divisions in less than a fortnight.

36. Finally, there is a considerable political advantage in building up reserves. In view of their specialisation and permanent availability, there might be a tendency for combat-ready forces to form a military class aloof from the nation. To preclude any risk of a "Praetorian army", it would be advisable to develop the rôle of reserves in combat-ready forces in order to form a closer link between the active forces and the civilian world. Here it would be necessary to organise an easy transition from military to

1. Reserve forces are useful mainly for reinforcing the land elements of combat-ready forces. They play only a marginal rôle in strengthening sea and air forces for which mobilisation at very short notice is difficult.

civilian tasks, encouraging a relatively quick movement of personnel from combat-ready forces to reserve units. This would mean changing the status of military personnel in order to facilitate conversion to civilian life. Thus, the concept of a military career might be changed to one of military duties exercised for a limited period during which professional qualifications might be obtained for use in civilian life. Moreover, in France, for instance, the equivalence of university and military grades might be recognised. Your Rapporteur will deal with these matters in greater length in another chapter¹.

37. This would also justify an important rôle being given to civilians called up for military service in field forces and then transferred to the corresponding reserve.

38. (iii) *The people's deterrent* should be a fundamental element of any defence policy. According to the white paper on defence published by the French Government in 1972: "The people's deterrent is the modern form of the national will to survive". The principle is based on the simple idea that there can be no real defence without the support of the people.

39. The rôle of the people's deterrent force may be defined as follows: "To materialise the whole population's will to defend itself and to organise its active resistance to any attempt at disintegration, aggression or even occupation."

40. The nation must be organised in arms in such a way as to make it possible at all times to mobilise a large force everywhere on the territory.

41. Reserves play an essential rôle in the organisation of such a force. They consist mainly of persons who have had military training which allows them, when the time comes, to oppose occupation by the enemy and rouse the people's resistance to aggression. In peacetime, personnel on active service in the people's deterrent force must be mainly concerned with instructing and training duties. Basically they form a framework for receiving and organising future recruits.

42. Reserves for the people's deterrent forces must be very large. The men involved in internal defence duties through mobilisation of the population must constantly be replenished by new intakes from the same source.

43. Moreover, apart from their military training, there must be no difference between reserves for the people's deterrent force and the rest of the population. Once called up, these reservists must be able to count on the support, solidarity and assistance of the whole population. They must therefore merge with it and identify themselves with it mentally and socially.

44. People's deterrent force reserves will admittedly only have relatively simple weapons. For them all to be armed and equipped adequately, they must not be given very complicated weapons which are expensive and difficult to handle. Consideration should be given to adapting weapons to the operational requirements of the people's deterrent forces which will mainly be responsible for harassing tactics and guerrilla operations.

45. There are four main reasons for an internal defence system based on large numbers of reserves:

(i) Nuclear deterrence itself is meaningless without the backing of a people's deterrent. Political determination to resort to nuclear weapons will be credible only if there is an effective system for mobilising the population as an expression of the whole population's will to defend itself. In peacetime, large reserves organised to combine efforts in the event of war to fight the invader are the very leaven of nuclear deterrence and a guarantee that it will be effective.

(ii) Secondly, an army of reservists, mobilised on the spot, might prove extremely effective in a "non-battle" strategy. This theory is that a modern, mobile, powerfully-equipped army with the most up-to-date weapons will be forced either to concentrate and be a primary target for tactical nuclear weapons or to disperse, which is essential if it is to avoid nuclear destruction but would make it a target for dispersed mobile forces practising harassing tactics or guerrilla warfare. A limited attack by a conventional force might thus be harassed and eventually compelled to withdraw in face of a widespread popular uprising, organised flexibly, well dispersed and determined to repel the invader, even if the combat-ready force were wiped out and nuclear deterrence came to naught. Losses inflicted on the enemy by mobilising the population might be more than the territory is worth. The Vietnam war is a striking example of the success of a strategy of this kind, based on mobilising the wish of a whole nation to defend itself.

1. Chapter III: Reserves, a link between the army and the nation.

(iii) Thirdly, it is increasingly evident that deterrence does not depend on nuclear weapons alone but is the result of firm determination to defend oneself with as full a range of weapons as possible, as was recently written :

“Military history is full of these ups and downs : firearms deterred the combatants from using projectiles. But the latter did not disappear and demonstrators still throw stones at the police who do not shoot back.

More recently, war gases appeared harmful enough for each side to be deterred from using them, but this did not prevent them from fighting by other means.”

We must therefore be prepared for all conceivable types of war. The possibility of “changing wars” is in fact a great asset in a political and military emergency involving several nations. Should a strategy of conventional or nuclear deterrence fail, it must be possible to have recourse to non-conventional forms of warfare.

(iv) Furthermore, the formation of large reserves in the framework of a people's deterrent strategy is a way of making the most of all the defence resources available in the countries of Western Europe, with democratic régimes. With these régimes, the people have before them an example of the kind of society to be defended. Should there be a move towards greater social justice, the people's devotion to their nation and to the democratic community of European States would certainly increase considerably. In a defence system based on mobilisation of the people, reserves are one of the institutions in which the people's accession to Western Europe's democratic heritage can best be expressed. They allow everyone to take part in defending values which are dear to them and thereby show their devotion to a type of society and way of living together. Only defence of this kind would be capable of mobilising all the energies of the European nations in the event of attack or invasion.

II. Objective assessment of existing reserve systems

46. In the light of the foregoing considerations, your Rapporteur has endeavoured to make a brief review of policies followed with regard to reserves in certain Western European countries.

47. Countries with compulsory military service have a large number of reservists with military training : there are 1,700,000 in the Federal Republic of Germany¹ and even more in France, which considers as reservists in the broadest sense all men aged between 18 and 35 who have completed their military service. Each year, the 271,300² French conscripts who have completed their military service are placed on the reserve list for a period of from fourteen to eighteen years. The theoretical reserve level is thus very high. For the army, it counts more than 80,000 officers, almost 300,000 non-commissioned officers and 2,500,000 other ranks.

48. The number of reservists who can be used immediately in case of mobilisation is difficult to assess but in countries with compulsory military service it is apparently very small compared with the total number of reservists.

49. In France, in the event of the most widespread mobilisation, the military authorities expect to recall about 20 % of the theoretical number of reserves within four to five days, i.e. at the most some 500,000 men. The Military Balance published by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London estimates at 400,000 the number of army reservists who could actually be mobilised within a few days. The fighting ability of some of these reservists would also be questionable since many of them would have had no training at all since demobilisation and about half of them would have completed their military service more than three years earlier.

50. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the field troops (*Feldheer*) would have to be strengthened in case of mobilisation by a maximum of about 210,000 men. The territorial army would have to be increased fivefold, which would mean calling up about 300,000 reservists³.

51. In a professional army as in the United Kingdom, the number of reservists who could be integrated quickly into the defence system is even smaller. There are only 69,000 men in the territorial and army volunteer reserves who carry out regular periods of training and can be mobilised at short notice⁴.

1. German Government white paper on defence, December 1971.

2. Military Balance, 1975-76.

3. Source : German Government white paper on defence, January 1974.

4. Statement on the defence estimates 1975.

52. The territorial reserve is one of the two components of the British reserve system. The other is the regular reserve. These are professional soldiers who, after completion of their active service, may be recalled at any time by Queen's Order. There are only about 58,700 non-commissioned officers and other ranks¹. To reach the total regular reserve strength, 20,000 officers who can effectively be mobilised must be added to this figure. As members of the regular reserve have no training periods, their ability to carry out the duties which would be assigned to them on mobilisation may sometimes prove inadequate. In the event of mobilisation, British military headquarters apparently expect to call up about 70,000 men to bring the army in Germany up to strength. These would be drawn in equal proportions from the regular reserve and the territorial reserve.

53. The number of reservists on which military headquarters in the Western European countries can really count is thus very low compared with available resources. This is true not only in France and the Federal Republic of Germany but perhaps also in the United Kingdom, where it might be possible to extend recruitment for the territorial reserve and also make better use of the regular reserve.

54. The low level of reserves which could be committed in the early stages of a war is easily explained. The generally accepted view in Europe is that reserves are mainly intended to bring combat-ready forces up to strength. But the equipment and weapons available for these forces do not allow a large number of reservists to be called up. The contribution which reservists can make to combat-ready forces is perhaps underestimated: in Chapter I, your Rapporteur indicated why he felt it desirable to form larger reserves, even for combat-ready forces.

55. Nevertheless, as matters now stand, the organisation of reserves appears to correspond to a certain extent to the requirements of these combat-ready forces whose rôle is to meet at very short notice a conventional-type offensive using conventional or even tactical nuclear weapons.

56. In the Federal Republic, for instance, the ninth law amending the law on compulsory military service introduced a system concerning the organisation of reserves which seems very

suitable for the requirements of combat-ready forces. Since this law came into force on 1st January 1976¹, a number of servicemen have special commitments on completion of their active service. For twelve months, they have to accomplish periods of training and must be able to rejoin their units at any time on notification of their call-up by press, radio, television or other means. This availability system (*Verfügungsbereitschaft*) is to allow reserves to be formed for immediate assignment to the field troops (*Feldheer*) which, in Germany, constitute the major part of the combat-ready forces.

57. There is a similar system in the Netherlands, where demobilised servicemen may be called up at any time and without warning during the six-month period following the end of their legal active service.

58. In the United Kingdom, reserves are organised in accordance with three principles:

- it is assumed that any attack on Europe would be preceded by a period of political tension long enough to allow the combat troops to be brought up to strength;
- internal defence of British territory is not one of the essential tasks of the armed forces;
- reserves must be adapted as far as possible to the requirements of the order of battle.

These principles led the British to make the territorial reserve mainly responsible for bringing the order of battle up to strength. In the event of mobilisation, four-fifths of this territorial reserve, organised locally into units at regimental or battalion level, would be required to go to Germany or other NATO forward positions. The regular reserve would be assigned to territorial reserve units or to active units in order to bring them up to strength. Most of the British reserves therefore seem to be earmarked for combat-ready forces and they are organised almost exclusively in the light of the requirements of these forces.

59. In Belgium, the 30,000 reservists, who receive minimum training and are capable of forming a mechanised brigade and a motorised

1. Army Department "Abstract of Army Manpower Statistics", No. 84, December 1975, page 45.

1. German Government white paper on defence, 8th January 1975.

brigade, would also for the most part, in the event of mobilisation, be responsible for strengthening the combat-ready units.

60. In France, combat-ready forces are brought up to strength by reservists who remain available to their units six months after the end of their military service.

61. While reserves seem largely intended to bring combat-ready forces up to strength and replace their losses, their rôle (although capital) in the establishment of a real system of people's deterrence has been widely underestimated. But it is in organising internal defence by calling up the people that the best use could be made of the considerable resources available to the European countries which have a system of conscription. At the beginning of this chapter, your Rapporteur underlined the large number of reservists with military training available in Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

62. However, if the governments decided to organise a balanced system of reservists to meet the requirements of both combat-ready and internal defence forces, they could make use of certain structures which already exist.

63. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, the basic elements of a people's deterrent force exist in the form of the large number of reservists. The German army includes field troops (*Feldheer*) and internal defence forces (*Territorialheer*). Reserves play a leading rôle in internal defence forces which are responsible for protecting German territory against amphibious or airborne operations and guaranteeing the free movement of the field troops. The territorial army consists mainly of security troops (*Sicherungstruppen*) 85 % of whom, after mobilisation, would be reservists. The basis of the territorial army structure is the security companies (*Sicherungskompanien*) which in peacetime consist of only a few men responsible for maintaining weapons and equipment for a wartime strength of about 150. The security companies, of which there will soon be about 300, are to be formed in the framework of the administrative areas (*Kreis*). Security regiments (*Sicherungsregimenter*) may be formed by mobilisation at the level of administrative districts (*Bezirk*). They are to be equipped with tanks, anti-tank weapons and artillery. There is also provision for the formation of six internal defence groups (*Heimatschutzkommando*) in the event of mobilisation, organised in the framework of the

military regions. These internal defence groups are equipped with tanks, armoured vehicles for transporting troops and heavy anti-tank artillery.

64. The method of training reservists is moreover fairly well adapted to the requirements of internal defence. Courses for reservists in the territorial army correspond to the duties which would be assigned to them in that army in the event of mobilisation. Training exercises and courses followed by reservists are organised on a local basis. Exercises are either individual, to improve their level of instruction, or by unit at the various levels of territorial defence (area, district and military region) to ensure the cohesion of the future internal defence units. Exercises are relatively frequent, since they are held at least four times during the six-year period after the end of the period of military service. They last from four to twelve days.

65. There is also a voluntary reservist association (*Reservistenverband*) which provides more advanced training for its members. The association is organised on a regional basis and is in permanent contact with the territorial army authorities responsible for reserves.

66. In France, operational defence of the territory (DOT) is responsible for internal defence. The DOT, whose most recent organisation was set up in 1973, has active forces in the form of commando-type regiments, equipped with heavy arms and good communications equipment. Their task is to protect crucial military and civil areas whose operation is necessary for defence¹. With the support of the gendarmerie, well organised and receiving a large number of reservists, their strength can be multiplied by four on M-day thanks to the extension of existing active regiments and the creation of divisional infantry regiments formed solely from reservists recruited locally. Every year, one-third of the DOT reserve forces has two days' training. The system of mobilisation corresponds quite well to the requirements of internal defence forces. It is organised so as to allow decentralised mobilisation carried out with the participation of regular units, even if the latter are already partly engaged. Moreover, the mobilisation infrastructure seems sound. It consists of a network of mobilisa-

1. DOT units are also responsible for :

- (a) co-operating with combat corps to ensure their freedom of movement ;
- (b) in the event of occupation, forming a starting-point for national resistance.

tion bodies and centres covering the whole territory. The mobilisation bodies are regular units responsible for their own mobilisation and for setting up other units (including twin units). Their capability is reduced to make their mobilisation responsibilities compatible with their peacetime tasks. The mobilisation centres are specialised in mobilisation questions. They consist of small detachments of regulars and have installations for stockpiling equipment.

67. In Britain, the territorial army, reorganised since 1961, might be a first step towards using reserves in the framework of a people's deterrent strategy. It is essentially made up of associations (one per county) each member of which has a fortnight's training every year plus one week-end per month and some evenings. Specially qualified personnel are in rather a different position: they are called up to their units only once a year for a fortnight. Recruitment is on a national basis. The territorial reserve is a very modest nucleus of people's defence in that it consists entirely of volunteers.

68. It must be underlined, however, that the territorial reserve is not very large, nor are the tasks assigned to it real internal defence tasks. In the event of mobilisation, most of the territorial reserve would be required to bring the British combat forces up to strength.

69. As a result of this study of reserve systems in the Western European Union countries, your Rapporteur feels that a real people's deterrent system has yet to be organised although the basic elements of such a system are in place in many countries, including France and Germany.

III. Reserves, a link between the army and the nation

70. Existing reserve systems seem unsatisfactory. They do not always attach sufficient importance to establishing a proper internal defence system.

71. The consequences are negative in that the people do not see themselves as potential defenders of the society in which they live. The need for an army therefore eludes a growing number of people, particularly the young.

72. Reserves could be an answer and promote closer links between the army and civilians. Reservists are an integral part of civilian life but insofar as they keep in touch with the army

they can play a very useful rôle as intermediaries. They should keep the public informed of defence matters. They should also give active servicemen a better understanding of the trend of thinking and activities in the civilian world.

73. But this assumes that there are plenty of reservists who realise what their rôle is, regularly conduct certain exercises and that they are generally recognised as being the basis of a people's defence system.

The need for large numbers of reservists aware of their rôle

74. Large numbers of reservists are essential for bringing the army and the people closer together. In a country like France, which has compulsory military service, all men between the ages of 18 and 35 who have completed their legal period of military service are considered to be reservists. But this status should be accompanied by awareness of the rôle and responsibilities it implies. Time spent in the army should not therefore be remembered as a bad dream. For instance, for the operational defence of the territory, a short period of military service (six months) on a territorial basis would be enough for training conscripts. This shorter period should be used very intensively so that the future reservists realise the usefulness and effectiveness of the defence effort.

75. Moreover, the most should be made of the technical specialities of reservists. If they are posted to a duty station where they can use their professional abilities, they would feel they were playing an effective part in the defence effort.

76. The number of reservists practising a profession during their military service might also be increased by introducing shorter periods of service. The technicality of the duties assigned to national servicemen and satisfactory material conditions of service should improve the future reservist's attitude towards the army. From this point of view, the situation of regular servicemen in the *Bundeswehr* provides a noteworthy example.

77. For reservists to be fully aware of their rôle, they must not see the army as an oppressive organisation. Whatever their rank in the army, citizens must be protected from abuse of power in every form. Here again the *Bundeswehr* provides an interesting example: According to the 1973-74 white paper on "The security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the develop-

ment of the Federal armed forces", "the concept of the citizen in uniform shapes the spirit and morale of the armed forces. It is at the same time the connecting link between military service and the civilian way of life."

The need for reserves to keep in touch with the regular army

78. Large numbers of reservists, aware of their rôle, must also carry out certain exercises regularly. Their obligations are not only of military interest. They allow them to keep in constant touch with the army and also, if the practice of self-instruction is developed (as in France), convey certain lines of thought and action peculiar to civilian life insofar as they are not in conflict with the requirements of warfare.

79. In the Federal Republic, reservists have to undergo periods of training every two or three years up to the age of 30. The total duration is a maximum of forty-eight days, as being the least necessary for maintaining a link between the army and reservists. This link is the only way of ensuring that reservists effectively carry out their rôle of intermediary between the army and civilian society.

The civilian view of reserves

80. Finally, the population should consider reserves as the basis of a people's defence system. This seems to be so in Yugoslavia, where the constitution provides that the whole population must take up arms against an invader whatever the circumstances. The reserves, which are very large (1,500,000 men) are organised in such a way as to mobilise all the resources of the population. They are decentralised and identified with the country's administrative and economic structure. The people thus feel that reserves are an essential guarantee of Yugoslavia's security and independence. Thanks to its reserves, the Yugoslav army is thus far better integrated with the nation than in many other countries.

Adapting the regular army

81. Your Rapporteur considers that to increase the weight of reserves in the army in the framework of a strategy of people's deterrence would prevent the army becoming an inward-looking body alien to civilian life.

82. This means the regular army changing as well in order to adapt itself to the needs of people's deterrence. On the one hand, in certain

countries such as France and Italy its structure must allow subordinates to take part in organising military life. On the other hand, regular servicemen must be able to move more easily from military to civilian duties. In this connection, the situation in the German army is interesting. There is a high degree of technical training: in 1972, 10,690 soldiers followed full-time courses and more than 3,000 followed correspondence courses; two universities are being set up in Munich and Hamburg reserved for officers but little different from civilian universities and lectures are given by non-military staff.

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83. To conclude this chapter, it should be underlined that, in the framework of people's deterrence, it is probably necessary to merge the nation and its military institutions completely. To entrust responsibility for defence to citizens through the appropriate organisation of reserves means giving national sovereignty control of weapons. In a defence system where technical means assign a larger rôle to regulars, the maintenance of compulsory military service for all and the existence of a large number of reservists among the civilian population guarantee the protection of democratic régimes. Britain admittedly does not seem to fall into this generalisation, but is this not due to the fact that its army has always been considered as an integral part of the national structure, however it may be recruited?

IV. Proposals for improving the training, recruitment and organisation of reserves

(i) Combat-ready forces

84. The present organisation of reserves seems particularly adapted to the requirements of combat-ready forces. As your Rapporteur has already underlined, they are mainly destined to strengthen field forces.

85. However, an effort still needs to be made in three particular respects: training reserves, reducing mobilisation time and transporting mobilised units to the theatre of operations.

(a) Training reserves: For financial reasons, periods of training are often too short in the reserve forces of the WEU countries and do not allow reserves to be prepared for the type of warfare which must be waged by combat-ready forces. Members of the British regular reserve, for instance, are given no training. The often

very high level of ability reached during their active service thus drops after a few years. In France, periods of training are intended more to verify the smooth operation of mobilisation procedure than to provide real training for reservists.

(b) *Reducing mobilisation time* : Effective and speedy mobilisation procedure is essential if reserves are to be used to any great extent. But military headquarters would probably have enough time for mobilising reserves if the war were preceded by a period of political tension. The contrary assumption is unlikely, although allowance must be made for it. Moreover, governments already seem to be aware of the need to reduce mobilisation time. In the United Kingdom, mobilisation plans were recently modified to reduce by some 30 % the time needed to deploy reserve forces in Europe. In the Federal Republic of Germany, mobilisation time is relatively short (from a few hours to three days). In France, military headquarters consider that units for the combat-ready forces can be 100 % operational within a maximum of five days.

(c) *Transporting reserves to the theatre of operations* : This question mainly concerns the United Kingdom with the problem of crossing the Channel. A possible solution might be to change legislation concerning the requisition of its civil, air or naval fleet.

86. Your Rapporteur considers that there should be fairly strict requirements as regards technical qualifications and training for the recruitment of reserves for combat-ready forces in view of the very nature of the operational conditions to which combat-ready forces are exposed (conventional warfare using the most advanced techniques, permanent availability).

87. Finally, since the combat-ready forces of Western European countries have to operate together, could not consideration be given to organising exercises mobilising reservists from all the European countries in the framework of a co-ordinated plan ?

(ii) *People's deterrent forces*

88. Your Rapporteur considers that people's deterrent forces constitute an area in which reserves can make a decisive contribution to the defence of Western Europe.

89. Reserves for people's deterrent forces must be *large* since, in the event of mobilisation, their task is to organise resistance by the whole popul-

ation. The system of conscription therefore seems particularly suited to the needs of deterrence by the people since it allows large reserves to be built up. In Britain, the extension of the territorial army by campaigning for volunteers might be a way of building up the necessary reserves.

90. Reserves should be *organised locally*. Mobilisation would thus be easier. Reservists would be keener to fight since they would all feel they were defending their home territory. Moreover, it would be easier to hold regular periods of training if reserves were organised locally and this would also allow the management of reserves to be decentralised which is essential for preparing non-conventional warfare consisting of harassment and guerrilla tactics.

91. Research and investment should be made in respect of *equipment specifically designed* for the people's deterrent forces to produce powerful, simple and reliable arms. In this connection, the eastern countries seem to have managed to produce very effective equipment for guerrilla warfare, as can be seen from the success of the forces using it in Indo-China and Africa.

92. Moreover, apart from the simplified weapons just mentioned, recent progress in weapons technology offers a particularly suitable range of equipment for the people's deterrent forces. *Precision-guided weapons* have been considerably improved in recent years ; they can be used very efficiently against tanks and fighter-bombers flying at low altitudes. Furthermore, despite unit costs which are still high, they are economical in terms of arms and munitions supplies and require neither the nerves nor the ability involved in handling slow conventional type wire-guided missiles. Although at present many of the prospects offered by these weapons are still purely speculative, quite possibly their development might result in a reduction in the rôle of large armoured units, which are costly and vulnerable, and lead to a new type of army organised more flexibly and based more than in the past on mobilisation of the people.

93. *Recruitment* of reserves for people's deterrent forces will be mainly from conscripts who have completed a short period of active service to prepare them as efficiently as possible for internal defence. In countries which have no conscription, recruitment will be difficult and always very limited, which makes a strong argument for a conscript army.

94. Particular attention should be paid to training *reserve officers* responsible for com-

manding units of the people's deterrent forces. Training should include periods in regular units and periods with other rank reservists.

(iii) Indemnities for reservists during periods of training

95. In industrial societies, mobilising reserves raises the problem of remuneration for reservists. While in most countries young men still agree more or less willingly to make financial sacrifices during their legal period of service, they are unwilling to spend any time training on low pay. Since such training periods are necessary, they must be remunerated, within the limits of the salary lost, either from the national budget or by a joint contribution from the budget and from firms. For instance, collective conventions might be drawn up for the difference between military pay and the salary of the worker called up to be paid by the firm.

(iv) Establishment of a European defence college

96. Your Rapporteur considers it would be desirable to establish a European defence college; it would improve harmonisation of strategic and tactical concepts in Europe, particularly as regards the rôle of reserve forces. In view of the diversity of the tasks and methods of organising reserves, co-ordination seems necessary and for this it might be useful to set up a European college open to civilian and military defence officials and experts. It would be above all a research centre quite distinct from the NATO college, whose functions are essentially pedagogic.

Conclusion

97. Reserves can make a very valuable contribution to the defence of Europe by allowing a defence system to be established on the basis of a people's deterrent force.

98. There is now a growing tendency among the countries of the Atlantic Alliance to base their defence policy on regular forces alone. In all these countries, the principle of conscription and compulsory military service is being chal-

lenged despite the advantages in training and recruiting reserves. In periods of economic difficulties, governments everywhere are trying to cut their defence budgets and therefore give priority to sophisticated weapons for field forces rather than training reserves. This policy is one of the main reasons for the increasing "conscription crisis" in all the Western European countries.

99. It is essential for the governments and hence the military authorities of the Atlantic Alliance to specify what place they intend to give reserves in a national or collective defence policy. Your Rapporteur is convinced that they should be given a prominent place in the framework of a strategy of people's deterrence and that governments are wrong to sacrifice this deterrent in favour of a far more risky element, a powerfully-armed field force.

100. Your Rapporteur feels that the training of reserves for territorial defence should be considered in the framework of WEU. The deterrence constituted by Europeans' desire for independence and their determination to defend their territory in case of attack primarily concerns Europeans themselves. It is therefore normal for them to consult each other on this aspect of their defence policy.

101. While questions affecting the deployment of combat-ready forces and nuclear deterrence should be worked out at Atlantic level, those affecting people's deterrence should be tackled mainly at European level.

102. The United States has far less need of a strategy of people's deterrence than Europe since its geographical situation and the strength of every aspect of its defence system preclude the possibility of invasion.

103. If there is no European co-ordination of reserve training policies for organising a real people's deterrent system, this aspect of defence would have to be dealt with at national level and there would consequently be a lack of co-ordination, however essential this may be if this type of deterrence is to be made as effective as possible.

APPENDIX I

The balance of forces in Europe

In spite of détente, which seems irreversible because it meets the innermost interests of the nations concerned, Europe is still divided into armed blocs.

Until these blocs become a thing of the past, and without prejudice to the search for understanding and co-operation between European countries on either side of the iron curtain, your Rapporteur considers that some balance of conventional forces is still essential in Europe.

In the event of conventional war, the armed forces of the WEU countries must be capable of prolonged resistance to attack, thus allowing governments time to wield the threat of recourse to first tactical and then strategic nuclear weapons, if necessary.

The ideas expressed below are intended to provide food for thought in the WEU Assembly on :

- (a) the position of forces in Europe ;
- (b) the contribution which can be made by reserves to maintaining the defence capability of Western Europe.

A. The position of forces**1. Ground formations¹**

To compare the respective size of the forces of the two coalitions of States, it is useful to refer to the number of divisions on either side. This is a very approximate basis of comparison, since there are often differences in the organisation, size and equipment of divisions and some combat units are outside the normal divisional structure.

TABLE I.A

Central and Northern Europe

	NATO	France	Warsaw Pact	of which : divisions in Soviet Union
Divisions available in peacetime	27	2	68	30

1. Source : Military Balance 1975-76.

France : Only the divisions stationed in Germany are included, four other French divisions are stationed on national territory.

United Kingdom and Portugal : Forces stationed on British or Portuguese territory are not included in the table.

Warsaw Pact : German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Soviet troops stationed either in these three countries or in Soviet western military regions (Baltic countries, Byelorussia, Carpathians).

NATO : Belgium, Denmark, United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, United States, Federal Republic of Germany.

TABLE I.B

Southern Europe

	NATO	Warsaw Pact	of which : Soviet Union
Divisions available in peacetime	39	31	8

NATO : This table includes the ground forces of Italy, Greece and Turkey and British and American forces which would be committed to the Mediterranean theatre.

France : French formations are not included in this table.

Warsaw Pact : Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Soviet troops stationed in Hungary and Southern Soviet Union.

2. Manpower¹

TABLE II.A

Central and Northern Europe

	NATO	France	Warsaw Pact	of which : Soviet Union
Troops available in peacetime (thousands)	625	50	895	595

1. Source : Military Balance 1975-76.

TABLE II.B
Southern Europe

	NATO	Warsaw Pact	of which : Soviet Union
Troops available in peacetime (thousands)	575	345	115

The above figures are approximate. Tables II.A and II.B were drawn up on the same basis as Tables I.A and I.B.

Troops from American brigades based in the United States, who could be transported to Europe at very short notice, are not included in Table II.A.

3. Equipment¹

The number of tanks may be considered as a particularly significant indication of the degree of equipment of a modern army. This is the figure used in the following table to compare the equipment of forces located in Europe.

TABLE III
Northern and Central Europe

	NATO	Warsaw Pact	of which : Soviet Union
Main battle tanks in operational service in peacetime	7,000	19,000	11,500

Tanks in service in the French forces should be added to those in Table III (325 in the Federal Republic of Germany; 485 in Eastern France).

Although the Warsaw Pact armies appear to have far more tanks than the countries of the Atlantic Alliance, it must be underlined that they are probably of inferior standard. Moreover, the NATO and French anti-tank artillery is superior in number and efficiency to that of the Warsaw Pact countries.

4. Aircraft¹

Comparisons of aircraft are difficult. A superficial glance might give the impression that

there is a major imbalance of fighter, interceptor and light bomber aircraft. In Northern and Central Europe, NATO has only about 1,750 aircraft whereas the Warsaw Pact has 3,550. But western aircraft are very superior. Account must also be taken of French aircraft (more than 500) and the large-scale reinforcements which the United States could bring in to Europe at very short notice (more than 5,000 aircraft). The Soviet Union has a reserve of only 4,000 units, only some of which could be transferred to Europe in case of war.

5. Conclusion

It is not enough to compare the number of ground formations, their standard of equipment or troop levels to assess the respective force of each side. In some respects the Warsaw Pact is undeniably better placed, in others the Atlantic Alliance has the advantage. Although the East has more troops, tanks and perhaps aircraft, it must not be forgotten that the Atlantic Alliance has about 7,000 tactical nuclear missiles, not including the French Plutons, whereas the Soviet Union has less than 3,500. Moreover, the forces stationed in Western Europe have more efficient anti-tank weapons in greater numbers. Finally, the standard of equipment in the Atlantic Alliance is generally far higher.

It may be concluded from the above that the balance of forces in Europe is sufficient at present to make attack impossible. Defence arrangements cannot be broken down without setting off a very large-scale conventional attack with incalculable consequences.

B. Contribution of reserves to the balance of forces

The balance guaranteed by available forces in peacetime can be consolidated by a judicious use of reserves.

Mobilisation time then becomes an essential parameter for assessing forces.

Within a few days, the units of most member States of the Atlantic Alliance can be raised to wartime level. This reinforcement of the combat force takes less than three days in the German army and five in the French army. Moreover, two American brigades and two divisions stationed in the United States, whose equipment is in Europe, can be transported to Germany at very short notice.

1. Source : Military Balance 1975-76.

The following table shows the level of European forces stationed in Central Europe and their possible reinforcement.

TABLE IV

Forces permanently stationed in Central Europe

Country	Troop level	Description
<i>Regulars</i>		
Federal Republic of Germany	250,000	<i>Feldheer</i>
United Kingdom	52,000	British Army of the Rhine Combat forces (First Army) Forces in Germany
France	60,000	
Belgium	32,000	
Netherlands	33,000	
<i>Reserves</i>		
Federal Republic of Germany	200,000	<i>Feldheer</i> reserves
United Kingdom	35,000	Territorial and army volunteer reserve
France	30,000	
Belgium	10,000	
Netherlands	10,000	

Forces providing support and replacements for field forces in Central Europe

Country	Troop level	Description
<i>Regulars</i>		
Federal Republic of Germany	63,000	Territorial army
United Kingdom	10,000	
France	120,000	
Netherlands	30,000	
Belgium	20,000	Mobile force Remainder of combat force
<i>Reserves</i>		
Federal Republic of Germany	440,000	Territorial army
United Kingdom	—	
France	150,000	Combat force reserves (approximate figure)
Belgium	30,000	

There are three levels for Warsaw Pact divisions. Mobilisation of reserves must bring all units up to maximum strength within a few days. In Central Europe, eight Czechoslovak divisions, six German divisions, thirteen Polish divisions and twenty-seven Soviet divisions are at maximum strength. Two Czechoslovak divisions and two Polish divisions are at intermediate strength. A number of Soviet divisions at intermediate or minimum strength can intervene fairly rapidly. They would probably not upset the balance of forces.

Your Rapporteur considers that the present organisation of reserves for the combat forces of WEU countries more or less meets the requirements of the balance of forces in Europe. On M+7, mobilisation would in fact not noticeably modify the present situation. It would be absurd to envisage the state of forces after several weeks' mobilisation: should there ever be a war in Europe it would be of very short duration.

Your Rapporteur also considers that it would be most useful to have greater recourse to the reserves of the internal defence forces. In this way a people's deterrent could be established which, particularly in critical areas such as Norway, would considerably strengthen Europe's defence. In Norway, moreover, a system for mobilising all the country's human and material resources has been organised to ward off any attack. A large well-equipped internal defence force, speedy and effective mobilisation procedure and exploitation of the difficult and rugged countryside should allow Norway, with the help of American and British reinforcements, to resist attack long enough for the Atlantic Alliance to resort to nuclear deterrence. The Norwegian defence system might have greater assistance from the European countries; it might also be applied in other sensitive areas of Europe.

Use of reserves in the framework of a strategy of people's deterrence has a decisive advantage: it guarantees the balance of forces on which peace in Europe is based but cannot be interpreted as a threat or an expression of aggressive aims. Indeed, people's deterrence is by definition defensive only. It therefore encourages détente and affords protection against possible attack.

APPENDIX II

Reserves in three countries with conscription (France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy) and three countries with a professional army (United States, Canada, United Kingdom)¹

	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
Population	52 470 000	62 600 000 (with West Berlin)	55 500 000
Length of compulsory military service	12 months	15 months	<div> Army Airforce Navy </div> <div> } 12 months 18 months </div>
Total strength of armed forces	502 500	495 000	421 000
of which conscripts	271 300	227 000	299 000
Strength of army	331 500	345 000	306 500
of which conscripts	216 000	177 000	254 000
<i>Reserves</i>	400 000	1 056 000 Feldheer : 615 000 Territorialheer : 441 000	550 000
Strength of navy	69 000	39 000	44 500
of which conscripts	16 500	11 000	18 600
<i>Reserves</i>	50 000	27 000	65 000
Strength of airforce	102 000	111 000	70 000
of which conscripts	38 800	39 000	26 400
<i>Reserves</i>	—	100 000	30 000

1. Source : Military Balance 1975-76.

	United States	Canada	United Kingdom
Population	215 810 000	22 920 000	56 460 000
Total strength of armed forces	2 130 000	77 000	345 100
Strength of army <i>Reserves</i>	789 000 630 000 Army National Guard : 405 000 Army reserve : 325 000	28 000 15 000	174 900 169 500 Regular reserve : 108 500 Territorial army and volunteer reserve : 53 300 Ulster Defence Regiment : 7 700
Strength of navy <i>Reserves</i>	536 000 115 000	14 000 2 700	76 100 36 300
Strength of airforce <i>Reserves</i>	612 000 148 000	35 000 700	94 100 31 900
Strength of Marine Corps (United States only) <i>Marine reserves</i>	197 000 33 000		

APPENDIX III

*Reserve systems in countries using various forms
of people's deterrence***A. Sweden**

Sweden's defence is based on the maintenance of a sufficiently large and well-equipped army to ensure the country's neutrality. The aim of the Swedish Government is to deter invasion by the threat of losses and destruction far greater than the stake, i.e. the conquest of Sweden.

Consequently, large sums are spent on national defence. The 1976 budget allocated 11 % for defence, i.e. 4.4 % of the gross national product.

Very wide use of conscripts and reservists in the defence system avoids the high personnel costs involved in maintaining a large regular army. Expenditure on equipment, conventional only, represents about 30 % of the annual defence budget (compared with about 20 % in France). In armaments research and development, priority is given to equipment adapted to the requirements of prolonged resistance to aggression. Sweden also spends large sums on preserving and expanding its national armaments industries, particularly in sectors of advanced technology, thus retaining the wherewithal to remain independent. It has, for instance, produced its own light tanks, which are remarkably effective and excellent fighter aircraft.

Swedish armed forces are organised on a total defence basis which implies compulsory military service and the formation of vast reserves drawn from former conscripts.

The purpose of compulsory military service is to train conscripts to a very high level. The duration varies from seven and a half to fifteen months according to the branch.

On completion of full-time military service, Swedish citizens between the ages of 18 and 47 have to accomplish periods of training and mobilisation exercises which are conducted at battalion level.

During their period of service in the reserve, Swedish citizens attend five training periods of just under a month.

Thanks to this militia system, the Swedish army can call up 700,000 men in seventy-two hours. The 500,000 strong reserve constitutes 9 % of the population. In the event of mobilisation, it provides all other ranks and four-fifths of the officers and non-commissioned officers.

A large proportion of the regular army has the duty of training conscripts on compulsory service and reservists attending training periods. Each year, 10,000 officers and non-commissioned officers train 35,000 conscripts and 100,000 reservists.

It is probably thanks to its defence policy that Sweden has managed to remain independent and neutral. The Swedish defence system can thus provide a wealth of lessons for Europe. It must be pointed out however that Sweden is in a very special situation :

- (a) the aims of its defence policy are modest: to prevent attack by threatening to inflict damage on the attacker out of proportion to expected gains ;
- (b) because of its geographical position in Northern Europe, Sweden could not be attacked without automatically sparking off a generalised war.

B. Switzerland

Switzerland's defence is based on the same principle as that of Sweden, i.e. "deterrence by the price of entry". By attacking Switzerland, an aggressor would have to expect :

- very heavy losses of men and equipment ;
- a fairly long campaign giving third powers time to intervene ;
- heavy destruction ;
- stubborn resistance by the people ;
- loss of prestige which no country could take lightly.

Participation in national defence is a matter for the whole population. The basic principle is compulsory military service (Article 18 of the Constitution). A strong point of Swiss defence

is the full application of the principle of military service. The country thus has a relatively large armed force thanks to ample use of reservists.

In principle, there is no exemption from military service. Only a medical examination determines whether a man is fit or not. If unfit, he must pay a compensatory tax, known as the military tax.

Other ranks and non-commissioned officers are liable for military service for thirty years and officers for thirty-five years. There are three categories in the army :

- the *élite* from the age of 21 to 32, for twelve years ;
- the *Landwehr* from 33 to 42, for ten years ;
- the *Landsturm* from 43 to 50, for eight years.

After the age of 50 or 55, citizens join the civil defence services.

The Swiss army is a militia. The militia system is distinguished by the special form of training — a fairly large number of short periods of service — and almost no career soldiers and officers (there are only 5,000 professionals : 3,000 instructors and 2,000 frontier guards).

The Swiss military organisation is thus based solely on conscription and the mobilisation of reserves.

The training system is quite original and remarkably effective; there are two elements : basic training and annual refresher courses.

(a) *Basic training* is given in a recruit training unit set up for the purpose and dissolved at the end of the period of training. The future soldier usually remains there four months. Once basic training is over, the soldier is incorporated in a given unit where he thenceforth carries out his call-up periods.

(b) *Annual refresher courses* in the questions studied at the training units and necessary additional training are given in the framework of army units. During the *élite* stage, i.e. from 21 to 32 years of age, privates and corporals attend eight three-week refresher courses and during the *Landwehr* stage three additional two-week courses. During the *Landsturm* stage, there are two weeks of courses in all. In peacetime, there-

fore, men must accomplish 331 days of service, not including numerous weekends. The total comes to about a year if inspections, compulsory shooting and "special services" are included.

The whole defence system is based on the mobilisation of reserves. About 625,000 men can be mobilised in 48 hours. Specialised officers are responsible for mobilising at unit level. They too are generally reservists. The mobilisation unit is located near the homes of the reservists concerned.

The system is well adapted to the tasks of the Swiss army, which is mainly infantry. Equipment generally seems satisfactory although some modernisation is necessary. Switzerland spends about 5 % of its gross national product on defence, which allows quite a lot of equipment to be procured. (For instance, it has more than 800 battle tanks).

The Swiss army consists of a mobile group formed of four army corps, with supporting aviation and air defence troops, and static defence responsible for the immediate defence of frontiers and the protection of certain routes towards the centre of the country. The mobile group or "campaign army" is formed from *élite* troops whereas the brigades which ensure static defence are made up of *Landwehr* units. *Landsturm* troops carry out civil defence tasks.

Although it may seem particularly difficult to introduce the constraints inherent in the Swiss militia system in Western European countries, Switzerland nevertheless provides a successful example of the systematic application of a strategy of people's deterrence.

C. Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia's defence is organised in the light of past experience (the war of liberation against German invasion from 1941 to 1945) and a desire to preserve its own identity in spite of pressure from other countries (particularly the Soviet Union).

Like Sweden and Switzerland, Yugoslavia's defence is based on the "high price of entry" doctrine. It aims at discouraging attack by showing exceptional ability to resist invasion.

The defence system is being reorganised, following the adoption of the law on national defence on 12th February 1969 after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The strategy to be implemented in the framework of this new defence system may be twofold :

- in the event of a minor attack by a neighbour with the support of a larger power, the Yugoslav people's army (YPA) formed mainly of servicemen recruited by conscription must halt the invader. The YPA has 190,000 ground forces and an airforce and navy of 20,000 each. The YPA can be reinforced by reserves but their rôle is limited. At present, fewer than 20 % of conscripts join the YPA reserve at the end of their fifteen-month period of service ;
- in the event of a full-scale attack by a great power, the YPA's rôle would be to halt the enemy's advance in order to allow mobilisation of the "general people's defence", which consists almost entirely of reservists. There are about 500,000 men in the "general people's defence" forces. They may be assisted by internal defence forces (1,000,000 men). Once mobilisation has been completed, the YPA and the general people's defence forces together ensure the in-depth defence of the territory.

By the national defence law of 12th February 1969, organic links were created between the YPA and the general people's defence forces. The latter are organised independently, however, at three levels :

- municipal level in company-sized units ;
- at the level of firms or groups of firms in defence units of various sizes ;
- at the level of the republics in battalion-sized units.

Thanks to this sound, flexible and decentralised structure, the general people's defence forces can be mobilised in twenty-four hours.

They are armed with light anti-personnel weapons and some anti-tank equipment.

Reservists in the ranks and non-commissioned officers of the general people's defence receive a total of about 100 hours' training each year from reservists of the YPA. Reserve officers in the people's defence are trained by regular officers of the YPA.

The general people's defence system is independently financed, not by the federation but by the republics or local authorities.

This defence system thus depends on the local authorities for financing and organisation in the framework of the Yugoslav concept of self-management.

The Yugoslav people's army is an interesting example for Europe insofar as it is based on mobilisation of all the material and moral resources of the nation and embodies the desire for independence of a whole nation. However, although Europe may draw ideas from such a defence system, it can in no way transpose it as it stands. Yugoslavia is not a very industrialised country and is in a very rugged mountain area. The conditions of Yugoslav defence therefore are very different to those of Western Europe.

D. Vietnam

To describe the North Vietnamese military system in this report may seem to be introducing into the panorama of various methods of using reserves different considerations to those presented for other countries.

However, this brief study may be of interest, although the emotional feelings which for various reasons Europeans may have towards events and fighting in the Indo-Chinese peninsula for thirty years must be set aside.

From a strictly military point of view, much is to be learned from the war waged by North Vietnam and the resulting organisation of armed forces in that a deterrent at people's level was successful in pitting the weak against the strong.

While Israeli experience allows an assessment to be made of the rôle of reserves in the framework of a war between two balanced sides, experience in North Vietnam shows that it is possible to adapt defence to the presence of an enemy superior in both numbers and means. In case of attack, would this not be the position in Europe ?

The North Vietnamese army (in the widest sense, including Vietcong forces operating in South Vietnam) started as a revolutionary guerrilla force. Its origins and tactics transformed it into a powerful conventional army but at the same time institutionalised the use of forces which, in the western countries, would be reserve forces.

The Vietnamese forces are certainly imposing since they consist of 700,000 men, 685,000

in the army alone, with an impressive array of heavy armaments.

This most conventional army — and here is the originality of the North Vietnamese system — depends on the existence of numerous reserve forces with continuous training in local militia units. There are one and a half million men and women in these forces in North Vietnam and when fighting came to an end there were 60,000 active fighting forces in South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese command conducted fighting on the basis of this structure, which it made particularly effective in three ways :

- by adapting equipment to the rôle appropriate to each type of force ;
- by a precise chain of command and deployment of the various types of forces ;
- by tactics to obtain the best practical results from the combination of these forces in the light of weaknesses observed in the enemy system.

Forces deployed by North Vietnam in the last stage of fighting were no longer a result of revolutionary improvisation but the result of extremely advanced and coherent reflection and strategic and tactical organisation. Results were obtained by the optimum use of all the human resources which can be furnished by a nation involved in a fight for its existence.

(i) *Appropriate armaments*

There are probably few armies in the world which have tried harder to adapt their equipment to the type and tasks of the various forces available. Here, attention should be drawn to research in the socialist countries, and particularly the Soviet Union, to develop equipment suitable for a form of people's, and thus rustic, war. This equipment effort is fourfold :

- increasing the individual and collective fire-power of small units by the use of the most up-to-date light arms in terms of weight/rate of firing/weight of munitions. They can be carried for long distances, are reliable in operation and have effective but economical fire-power ;
- increasing the number of collective anti-concentration and anti-heavy equipment weapons which are portable and undetectable. The North Vietnamese infantry and

artillery had certainly mastered the use of anti-tank rocket launchers and artillery rocket launchers, which caused the heaviest losses among the United States and South Vietnamese armies ;

- ensuring powerful anti-aircraft defence even at lower echelons to offset the absence of air cover ;
- ensuring high-quality and ample communications equipment, particularly for commando groups operating behind enemy lines.

(ii) *Chain of command*

The chain of command reflects what a country seeking in-depth defence can achieve. There are three main categories of units :

- a powerful but flexible conventional corps capable of dispersing into smaller operational units but nevertheless retaining strong fire-power ;
- regional units recruited on the spot, responsible for protecting combat force movements but also capable of hindering enemy deployment, making dispersal necessary and maintaining a permanent feeling of insecurity ;
- militia or local guerrilla units whose main purpose is to create a permanent feeling of insecurity behind enemy lines without engaging in large-scale fighting, inform regional and combat forces and prevent the enemy forces taking over the population.

Setting aside the factors peculiar to the Vietnam war, such a chain of command sets an example for the combined use of regular and reserve forces by European countries in organising the ground defence of their territory, which would make way for the idea of people's deterrence. In the war in question, it proved its worth.

As has been stressed by several observers of the Vietnam war¹, the effectiveness of this chain of command is based on two main factors :

- the technical and moral value of the combatants, their physical resistance and sense of discipline ;

1. For instance, Colonel Gabriel Bonnet in *La guerre révolutionnaire du Vietnam*, Paris, Payot, 1969.

- the ability of officers, combining leadership with a detailed knowledge of all combat techniques.

These two fundamental values can be obtained only by continuous training and keeping in condition in an organised framework. In 1970, General Giap therefore wrote: "Our army gradually passed from the volunteer system to compulsory military service."

(iii) *Strategy and tactics adapted to the enemy*

The principles of action by forces on the lines described above were defined by General Giap under the heading "military art" in a book published in 1970 entitled *Guerre de libération*. The principles are simple and well known to strategists in all countries. But we must be convinced that they still apply in modern warfare.

- The first is the unity of defence, not only at political level but at strategic and tactical level, which combines the use of all possible forces:

"It is only by closely combining the operational activities of regular troops, regional troops and self-defence militia, by combining guerrilla with normal warfare, minor engagements with large and medium-scale engagements that we can maintain and intensify war."

- The second is the spirit of offensive which seeks to exploit all the enemy's weak points, account being taken of the technical means used by the defence.

— The third is a continuing search for possible ways of the weak overcoming the strong, a principle which is apparently contrary to that of traditional strategy, but involves action to break up enemy forces, prevent them using their material superiority and finally reversing the proportion.

- The fourth is a continuing search to destroy enemy units in all circumstances and wherever this can be done with success.

— The fifth is the spirit of initiative, determination and flexibility in action based on the co-ordinated use of all forces, in-depth defence, by infiltrating the enemy's formations to paralyse them and make them passive, and increasing simultaneous but well-chosen offensive actions.

- The sixth principle is that armed forces responsible for such tasks do not just happen, they have to be shaped by a policy to make them permanently efficient both technically and tactically.

In conclusion, General Giap affirms, and this is the question now facing Western Europe, that a "large country, a powerful attacking army with modern equipment may well be beaten by a small but determined nation with ingenious and effective methods of warfare".

Expressions such as "victory depends on troop levels", "victory depends on equipment and weapons", "it is superiority in the air that counts" can be rendered meaningless if the nation attacked has the willpower.

E. Israel

The example of Israel is frequently quoted when assessing the effectiveness of reserve forces. However, conditions in Israel are very different to the situation in Western Europe. Israel's strategy is not purely defensive; its armed forces are organised for carrying out lightning preventive offensives.

Israel has a total population of 3,200,000 within its 1967 frontiers. 85 % are Jews. Except for the Druses, the remaining 15 % do not fulfil military service. There are more than 15,000 regular servicemen and 110,000 conscripts, including 12,000 women, but a strength of 375,000 can be achieved at short notice by mobilisation.

Israeli army regulars form the combat units and are also responsible for fast, efficient and sometimes secret mobilisation.

The period of compulsory service, which varies from two to three years depending on call-up age, is mainly devoted to training. In the reserve, a Jewish citizen who has completed his compulsory service must occupy the post for which he was trained. He has regular training periods (31 to 38 days a year according to rank, plus monthly commitments) and thus retains a high degree of combat-readiness.

Men are called up for compulsory military service between the ages of 18 and 29. Women may be called up in certain conditions between the ages of 18 to 26. Jewish Israeli citizens remain in the reserve until the age of 49 (men) and 34 (women).

The basic unit of the Israeli reserve is the brigade. Three factors help to keep the units in a high state of readiness :

- geographical proximity of the reservists concerned ;
- maintenance of equipment by regular servicemen ;
- card index of reservists which allows them to be reached within a few hours.

It should also be noted that civil means of transport may be requisitioned at any time.

The Israeli example can teach Europe much about the organisation of reserves and the flexibility and effectiveness of mobilisation procedures. But the Israeli experience is taking place in a very special context. Fortunately, Europe has neither the tension nor the mutual misunderstanding and mistrust which are features of international relations in the Middle East.

APPENDIX IV

Bibliography

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Source: The Military Balance 1975-76, Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Security in the Mediterranean

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 2 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. *Critchley* (Chairman) ; MM. *Klepsch*, *Dankert* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Averardi*, *Beauguitte* (Substitute : *Delorme*), *Bizet* (Substitute : *La Combe*), *Boulloche*, *Buck*, *Haase*, *Hardy*, *Kempinaire* (Substitute : *Breyne*), *Konen*, *de Koster* (Substitute :

Piket), *Laforgia*, *Lemmrigh*, *Ménard* (Substitute : *de Montesquiou*), *Pawelczyk* (Substitute : *Müller*), *Pumilia*, *Reale*, *Richter*, *Rivière*, *Roper*, *Scholten*, *Schugens*, *Tanghe* (Substitute : *Duvieusart*), *Urwin* (Substitute : *Whitehead*), *Vedovato*.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- Chapter V : The NATO commands
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- I. Spanish/United States "geographical area of common interest" under the treaty of 24th January 1976 and NATO command areas
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Introductory note

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows :

Toulon, 4th February 1976

Vice-Admiral Yves Bourdais, Préfet Maritime de la Troisième Région and (French) Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean ;

Captain Chaigne, Commander, Centre d'Essais de la Méditerranée.

Malta, 2nd to 5th April 1976

Rear-Admiral O.N.A. Cecil, RN, Commander, British Forces, Malta and (NATO) Commander Allied Naval Forces South-Eastern Mediterranean ;

Lt. Col. K. Wilkins, Commander 4th RM Commando ;

H. E. Mr. W. R. Haydon, British High Commissioner and Mr. A. H. Wyatt, Deputy High Commissioner.

Gibraltar, 12th and 13th May 1976

H. E. Marshal of the RAF, Sir John Grandy, Governor of Gibraltar and Commander-in-Chief ;

Rear-Admiral S. R. Sandford, Flag Officer, Gibraltar and (NATO) Commander Allied Naval Forces Gibraltar Mediterranean, and Captain B. R. Longworth, Chief-of-Staff ;

Brigadier J. R. D. Sharpe, Deputy Fortress Commander, and staff ;

Air Commodore C. Fountain, Air Commander, and (NATO) Commander Maritime Air Forces Gibraltar, and staff ;

The Hon. Maurice Xiberras, Leader of the Opposition ;

Sir Joshua Hassan, Chief Minister ;

Mr. E. H. Davis, Deputy Governor and Mr. J. H. Greenfield.

Madrid, 13th to 15th May 1976

Mr. Robert Wade-Gery, Minister, British Embassy and Mr. R. D. Wilkinson ;

Mr. Jorge del Pino, Deputy Director, European Affairs, Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Carlos Fernández Espeso, Counsellor and Mr. Luiz de la Torre ;

General Fernández Vallespin, Chief of the General Staff ;

Major General Lopez Saez, Chief of the Air Staff and Rear Admiral Martinez-Canavate ; Colonel S. Gonzalo de Benito de Sola, Captain Gonzalez Aller, Spanish Navy, Colonel Martin de Santiago ; Major Elety ;

Mr. Marcelino Oreja, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs ;

Mr. Luiz Yañez, Foreign Relations Committee, Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) ;

Dr. Jaime Cortezo, Secretary-General of Izquierda Democrática.

The Committee as a whole met in Toulouse on 2nd and 3rd February 1976 where it attended a colloquy on a European aeronautical policy, organised by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

The Committee then met in London on 15th and 16th March 1976 when it was briefed by :

Brigadier Kenneth Hunt (Retired), Deputy Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies ;

Mr. Richard Burt, Assistant to the Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies ;

Mr. Frank Judd, M.P., United Kingdom Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy.

The Committee next met in Rome on 6th April 1976 where it was briefed by :

Mr. Brooke-Turner, Civilian Deputy Commandant of the NATO Defence College and by Captain O. K. Wang (Norwegian Navy), Captain R. A. Darlington (Canadian Armed Forces), Captain B. Benvenuti (Italian Navy), Mr. J. Coene (Belgian Foreign Office) of the directing staff ;

Mr. Arnaldo Forlani, Italian Minister of Defence ;

and in Naples on 7th and 8th April where it was briefed by :

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, and staff ;

Brigadier-General Lamberghini (Italian Army), Assistant Chief-of-Staff Operations ;

General Wilson, USAF, Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, and staff ;

Vice-Admiral Sir J. Ernle Pope, RN, Chief-of-Staff, HQ Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe.

The Committee as a whole met finally in Lisbon from 17th to 19th May 1976 where it was briefed by :

Mr. Adelino Amaro da Costa, Vice-Chairman of the CDS party and Mr. Fausto de Quadros ;

Dr. Mario Soares, President of the Socialist Party, PSP ; Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes ; Mr. José Medeiros Ferreira ; Mr. Mario Sottomayor Cardia and Mr. Antonio Guterres ;

Admiral Frank Corley, USN, (NATO) Commander, Iberian Atlantic Area and Captain Lacy, USN, Chief-of-Staff ; and staff ;

General Ramalho Eanes, Chief of Army Staff ;

General Morais e Silva, Chief of Air Force Staff ;

Dr. F. Sá Carneiro, Secretary-General of the PPD and other members of the party : Mr. Rui Machete, Minister for Social Affairs ; Mr. Franco Sousa.

The Chairman and two oldest members were also received by Mr. Melo Antunes, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At the Lisbon meeting, the Committee discussed and adopted the present report.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

Draft Recommendation
on security in the Mediterranean

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world naval power presents the Soviet Government with new options for extending its influence if the Atlantic Alliance weakened in its determination to defend its freedom ;
- (ii) Aware that the many political uncertainties and local disputes and conflicts that afflict both allied and non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean area present an ever-present danger of major conflict arising through miscalculation or escalation ;
- (iii) Calling for the broadening and strengthening of the Alliance, based on freely-elected parliamentary democracies and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis ;
- (iv) Willing to see other appropriate countries such as Australia, New Zealand and, to the extent that it progresses to democracy, Iran associated with Alliance defence planning ;
- (v) Welcoming the advent of a freely-elected parliament in Portugal and the announcement of free elections in Spain ;
- (vi) Recalling and reaffirming its earlier recommendations for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prohibit the passage of aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits ; for the provision of diplomatic advice from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders ; and for the NATO Gibraltar command to be transferred to the IBERLANT command,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

1. Call on the North Atlantic Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of the Alliance :
 - (a) by negotiating with the Government of Spain that emerges from free elections the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty, and an appropriate rôle for the Spanish armed forces in the integrated military structure ;
 - (b) by fostering the accession of Malta to the North Atlantic Treaty, should a Maltese Government so request, or the conclusion of bilateral defence arrangements between Malta and Italy ;
 - (c) by recognising the value of NATO military facilities being located on a basis of territorial diversity in the Mediterranean area ;
 - (d) by more publicly identifying all the member countries and the Alliance as a whole with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area ;
 - (e) by providing military assistance to modernise the armed forces of Portugal to enable them to play a new and more vital rôle in allied defence plans ;
2. (a) Call on the North Atlantic Council to declare that the Alliance will take appropriate measures to resist any external political or military pressure designed to change the government or policy of Yugoslavia ;
 - (b) Join with the other governments of the Alliance in making clear to the Soviet Union and to the country concerned the serious disadvantages for normal relations and détente if the *status quo* were changed through the granting of new military bases or facilities for Soviet forces in the Mediterranean area ;
 - (c) Call on the North Atlantic Council to have full political and military contingency plans prepared to meet any of the foregoing eventualities, with no more secrecy than that required for their success ;
3. Propose that the European programme group issue an annual defence white paper incorporating a joint assessment of the threat and statement of allied strategy, combined with separate chapters on national defence programmes.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The Committee has reported regularly on various aspects of the security situation in the Mediterranean. In the last five years it has submitted five reports devoted in whole or in part to the southern flank of NATO. Chapter IV of the report on European security and East-West relations¹ dealt in particular with Turkey and the southern flank of NATO, following the Committee's first visit to Turkey in that year. The report on security and the Mediterranean² was adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The report on European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean³ dealt in particular with the hostilities in Cyprus in 1974. In the spring of last year Chapter IV of the explanatory memorandum of the Committee's general report on the state of European security⁴ surveyed the Mediterranean area in general, and followed the Committee's visit to Greece and Turkey in that year. At the last part-session, the Committee reported in particular on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance⁵.

2. The many changes that have occurred in the Mediterranean in the last five years have focused attention in particular on the growing naval strength of the Soviet Union, yet not all changes have operated to the disadvantage of the Western Alliance. Today, in many countries of the Mediterranean littoral, significant political changes, or the imminence of political changes, have introduced many factors of uncertainty typical of the multipolar world. The uncertainties apply both to NATO countries and to non-aligned countries; to European countries as well as to those on the African shore. The uncertainties are a cause of anxiety as they appear to many to threaten changes of alignment. More serious still

in the last five years, is the increase in local sources of conflict. If the probability of renewed Israeli-Arab hostilities is lower than for some time past, the conflict in the Lebanon, the 1974 hostilities in Cyprus and the very unsettled relations between various Maghreb countries are both regrettable in themselves, and may always hold the seeds of wider conflicts into which the superpowers and their allies could be drawn.

3. NATO strategy in the Mediterranean has undergone some change to meet the uncertainties of the new situation. More effort has now to be concentrated on crisis control through the assertion of a peacetime presence, rather than on exclusive preparation for a major war, although the Alliance must always show its capability to wage the latter if only in order to deter it.

4. The Committee believes that there will be no permanent solutions to the problems of the Mediterranean. The price of security is perpetual vigilance and the maintenance of an adequate defence effort at all times, which must be demonstrated by a no less visible physical presence in the area than that of any potential rival or adversary.

CHAPTER I

The Mediterranean today

5. The Mediterranean is a vital maritime trading link of nearly all NATO countries. Of 1,500 merchant ships at sea in the Mediterranean on any typical day, no fewer than 1,200 belong to the NATO countries. Turkey, Greece and Italy depend entirely, and France to a large part, on seaborne supplies through the Mediterranean.

6. Western Europe as a whole is dependent on seaborne imports from both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Its annual imports of petroleum amount to some 649 million tons, of which 140 million cross the Mediterranean from North African suppliers. A further 10 million tons from North Africa transit the Mediterranean to the North American NATO countries. With the closing of the Suez Canal following the 1967 Middle East war, the bulk of oil supplies — 444 million tons from the Middle East — now go by sea round the Cape.

1. Document 537, 12th May 1971, Rapporteur: Mr. Boyden.

2. Document 624, 7th November 1973, Rapporteur: Mr. Jung.

3. Document 651, 14th November 1974, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley.

4. Document 671, 29th April 1975, Rapporteur for Chapter IV: Mr. Duvieusart.

5. Document 682, 10th November 1975, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley.

7. The reopening of the Suez Canal in June 1975 may not have immediately affected the pattern of oil shipments to any great extent, but daily shipping through the Canal has steadily grown from some ten ships a day to an average of thirty or forty. Up to 1st March 1976, nearly 8,000 ships have passed through the Canal. Greece, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in that order appear to have been the largest users, followed by Liberia, whose flag is flown by many vessels destined for the ports of NATO countries. A further increase in merchant shipping through the Canal is to be expected, particularly if some of the larger container ship operators switch to the Canal route. Meanwhile, Egypt is confidently proceeding with plans to enlarge the Canal to enable it to take ships up to 150,000 tons by the end of 1977.

8. Freedom of passage for merchant shipping throughout the Mediterranean is of vital importance to Western Europe and the NATO Alliance.

CHAPTER II

The Soviet navy

9. The Soviet Union emerged from the first world war, the 1917 revolution and the subsequent civil fighting with virtually no fleet and damaged shipyards. It was not until 1926 that the Defence Council approved a new construction programme of some 65 vessels, and the first five-year plan of 1928 laid heavy emphasis on the construction of submarines. The navy then planned had a largely defensive rôle designed chiefly for the protection of the seaward flanks of the land army. A decision announced in 1938 to build a fully ocean-going fleet was overtaken by the 1939 war at the beginning of which the Soviet Union already had 160 submarines — nearly three times the number possessed by Germany.

10. The Soviet navy did not play a large rôle outside Soviet waters in the course of the second world war. Following the invasion by Germany in 1941, half the Soviet fleet was lost and all its shipbuilding capacity destroyed. Significant naval operations were conducted on the southern flank and in the rivers — already under the command of Admiral Gorshkov, later to become Commander-in-Chief.

11. With the acquisition of German U-boats and German scientists at the end of the war, a new shipbuilding programme was embarked upon,

still with heavy emphasis on submarines. The first of the W class postwar submarines appeared in 1950, followed by the Sverdlov class of cruisers and the Skory class of destroyers. By the mid 1950s, there were 240 fleet submarines, designed largely for operations in the Baltic and Black Seas, together with some 25 Zulu class submarines of longer range, 14 Sverdlov cruisers and 85 Skory destroyers.

12. In 1956, the Soviet strategic deterrent first went to sea with the Zulu class submarine which carried two relatively short-range cruise missiles, to be followed by the G class and, in 1959, the nuclear-propelled Hotel class, still carrying cruise type missiles. The first American Polaris submarine — although infinitely superior — was not operational until December 1959.

13. Following the death of Stalin and Mr. Khrushchev's arrival in power in 1953, Admiral Gorshkov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet fleet and set about an immediate modernisation programme, scrapping 300 older vessels but retaining nevertheless 14 of the Sverdlov cruisers. By 1957, the Krupny class of missile destroyer appeared with surface-to-surface missiles SSN-1 with 150-mile range, probably requiring mid-course correction. Eight of these vessels were in service by 1961. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, in the course of which the Soviet Union had to back down in its confrontation with the United States, and withdraw its missiles from Cuba, demonstrated the inability of the Soviet Union to exercise world-wide power in the absence of an ocean-going fleet. No doubt the Soviet Union had earlier felt the lack of such a fleet, particularly in the course of the Franco-British-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, when the Soviet Union had been powerless to support its ally Nasser, and to a lesser extent in the course of the Korean war, when it was unable to provide assistance to China, then an ally. The period 1962 to 1973 has seen the appearance of three different classes of cruiser ranging from the Kynda class of some 6,000 tons, to the Cresta and Kara classes, the latter of 10,000 tons. These vessels carry surface-to-surface missiles as well as surface-to-air missiles and modern anti-submarine equipment and helicopters, providing a fully ocean-going capability.

14. The nuclear deterrent at sea reached the level of Polaris technology in 1968 when the first Y class nuclear-propelled submarine of 9,000 tons, carrying 16 SSN-6 strategic missiles of 1,300-mile range came into service. Like Polaris, these missiles can be fired when the submarine

is submerged. Today, there are 34 Y class submarines in service. They were followed by the Delta class of 9,000 tons in 1972 carrying 12 SSN-8 missiles of 4,200 nautical mile range — roughly equivalent to the Polaris 3, but probably not fitted with multiple warheads as is the latter. One Delta II class submarine carrying 16 missiles was reported in service by 1973. With a displacement of 16,000 tons, this is probably the largest submarine ever built by any country.

15. For naval air power the Soviet Union remained totally dependent on land-based aircraft until 1967-68 when the 15,000-ton Moskva and Leningrad helicopter carriers (described as anti-submarine warfare cruisers) came into operation. Carrying helicopters suitable for an anti-submarine rôle, it is argued that these vessels could also carry VTOL air-defence fighters when these enter service. A larger class of aircraft carrier is now reported operational in the Black Sea. This is the Kiev, variously reported at 35,000 or 45,000 tons, fitted with an angled flight deck of 180 to 200 metres in length. This

has no steam catapult or arrester gear facility, and is said to be capable of operating only VTOL or STOL aircraft. A sister ship, the Minsk, is nearing completion in the Black Sea and a third is under construction there. Press reports in February¹ quoting French intelligence sources said the Kiev had been equipped with the Yakovlev 36 VTOL fighter and would shortly be sent to the Indian Ocean. It has not yet, however, left the Black Sea.

16. The amphibious capability of the Soviet fleet remains limited by the standards of many western navies. The only sea-going amphibious ships are the 5,000-ton Alligator class of LST which entered service from 1965 onwards — there are now twelve. The capability is completed with some 60 smaller LCT of some 700 tons. A Soviet force of marines is said to number only 12,000.

17. In summary, the principal combat units of the Soviet fleet today are as shown in the following table :

Soviet navy combat vessels 1975

Description	Number in service (and being built)	Hull age (years)
<i>Strategic submarines</i>		
Nuclear-propelled, ballistic missile (Polaris equivalent SSBN)	49 (+ 11)	0-8
Smaller SSBN (2-4 missiles)	9	14-18
Nuclear-propelled, cruise missile SSGN	40	0-13
Conventionally-propelled, ballistic missile SSB	23	15-18
Conventionally-propelled cruise missile SSG	28	10-18
<i>Fleet submarines</i>		
Nuclear-propelled SSN	32 (+ 3)	0-18
Conventionally-propelled SS	220	0-20 +
<i>Surface units</i>		
Cruisers, guided missile	20 (+ 2)	0-15
Cruisers, gun	11	20-25
Destroyers, guided missile	47 (+ 2)	0-20
Destroyers, gun	59	~ 20 +
Frigates	111	7-20 +
Corvettes, guided missile	26 (+ 2)	0-7
Corvettes, gun	135	8-20 +
Osa and Komar missile patrol boats	135	up to 15
<i>Amphibious</i>		
Landing ship (sea-going) LST Alligator class	12	up to 10
Landing craft (small)	140	up to 20

Source : The Soviet navy today, J.E. Moore, 1975, and press reports.

1. *Le Monde*, 26th February 1976.

18. While the Soviet Union has startled the world with its large naval shipbuilding programme, and its sudden eruption into the oceans of the world from the mid-1960s onwards, it remains a navy inferior in size and quality to that of the United States. The standard of comfort on the Soviet ships is universally reported to be lower than that of modern western navies and some experts doubt the standard of maintenance. Soviet crews enjoy less access to shore-leave than their western counterparts are accustomed to. Reports from Riga in January said that the crew of a Kronstadt corvette (380 tons dating from the early fifties) with serial number 628 had mutinied on 8th November 1975, some twenty of the crew and the communist party political officer having seized the ship and made for Sweden to demand asylum. Helicopters and aircraft were said to have fired on the ship and diverted it to Leningrad.

19. The United States Navy Secretary, Mr. William Middendorf¹ who recently drew attention to the massive Soviet naval building programme, nevertheless pointed out: "Although these 45,000-ton carriers are not nearly as capable as ours since they are equipped primarily with a VSTOL and helicopters, they do pose a considerable threat. In the meantime, we have fourteen aircraft carriers... (to be reduced to thirteen until the 1980s)." Mr. Middendorf could have added that three of the United States carriers are nuclear-propelled and all operate fixed-wing nuclear strike aircraft with ranges up to 800 nautical miles.

Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean

20. From the negligible presence in the Mediterranean in the 1950s, the Soviet Union began to maintain a permanent presence in the 1960s which increased from a total of about twenty ships in 1965 to an average of about forty by 1968 with peak numbers rising at times as high as sixty. The mean total of some forty vessels comprises typically fifteen surface combatants and twelve submarines, the remainder being fleet auxiliary ships. The Mediterranean squadron, as far as the surface units are concerned, is maintained from the Black Sea fleet which at present totals one aircraft carrier, two helicopter carriers, seven cruisers, thirty destroyers, fifty frigates and about forty-five submarines. Under

the terms of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits, the submarines are not allowed to enter the Mediterranean except for refit. The Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean are rotated from the Northern and Baltic fleets.

21. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union was able to base a squadron of submarines in Albania but with the withdrawal of that country from the Warsaw Pact in 1962, the Soviet submarines were removed, apart from two which were seized at the time by Albania. With the advent of Nasser in Egypt, the Soviet Union was able to develop Alexandria as a naval base, which it has still retained after the expulsion of Soviet military personnel by President Sadat in 1972. With the abrogation by Egypt of the Soviet-Egypt friendship pact in March 1976 however, press reports¹ quote American intelligence experts as expecting Alexandria to be closed to Russian vessels — a denial which will be particularly prejudicial to the operation of Soviet submarines. The only base in the Mediterranean remaining to the Soviet Union would then be Latakia in Syria. While vessels of the Soviet fleet are able from time to time to make courtesy calls in various ports on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, for supply and refit purposes, they have to make use largely of anchorages in various shallows and practise at-sea resupply from fleet auxiliary vessels. A Soviet submarine is usually to be found refitting in Yugoslavia which, maintaining a scrupulously non-aligned position, has offered similar facilities to warships of any country provided they discharge their ordnance before putting into port. The press earlier in the year reported that Mr. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, had failed to secure naval base and air base rights in Libya during his visit in 1975².

22. Soviet military supplies to Angola during the hostilities there were despatched both by air from Odessa, using staging facilities at Colomb-Béchar in Algeria, as well as by sea from Black Sea ports, with some trans-shipment taking place in the sheltered anchorages in the lee of the Spanish island of Alboran in the Western Mediterranean.

23. During the crisis in the Lebanon in March 1976, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet demonstrated off the coast with some two guided-missile cruisers and several submarines. At the same time, the United States Sixth Fleet deployed ten

1. Speech to National Aviation Club in Washington, reported in *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 8th March 1976.

1. Daily Telegraph, 24th March 1976.

2. International Herald Tribune, 2nd February 1976.

surface units in the same area, including the aircraft carrier *Saratoga*¹.

Soviet naval deployment in the Indian Ocean

24. 1968 saw the first Soviet naval movements in the Indian Ocean with a visit to many countries in the area by units of the Pacific fleet. By 1970, extensive exercises were being held in the area. By 1974, the Indian Ocean squadron was being rotated with units both from the Pacific fleet and from the Northern and Baltic fleets which had rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Press reports suggest that at its peak the deployment in the Indian Ocean area may reach some eighteen to twenty vessels; it has included major units such as the helicopter carrier, *Leningrad*, and a *Krupny* class destroyer. Ships' crews are frequently rotated from the Soviet Union by air to points such as Aden, Berbera in Somalia and to Mauritius.

25. Following the conclusion of the Soviet-Somali treaty in 1972, the Soviet Union constructed a major naval base at Berbera in Somalia which now has an airfield with a 5,000-metre runway, and installations for storing and maintaining naval surface-to-surface *Styx* missiles. Russian families are in residence. The base is said to be protected by surface-to-air missiles and the Soviet Union has been busily modernising the Somali army. The permanent Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf is principally based on Berbera, but many other facilities are in use. Further south, along the Somali coast, the port of Kismayu has been enlarged. The island of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea has a Soviet naval radio communications station and a rudimentary airstrip. Permanent mooring buoys have been laid in the lee of Socotra as they have in other anchorages around the Indian Ocean, off Mauritius, the Seychelles, and the Chagos Islands. The Soviet Union enjoys certain naval facilities in Aden where there is a shore party of some ten naval personnel and the port is used for refuelling and minor repairs — as it is occasionally by the French navy.

CHAPTER III

The countries of the Alliance

Italy

26. Italy has an effective navy of some three cruisers, eight destroyers, ten frigates, seven cor-

vettes and ten submarines. The mean age of these vessels ranges from about ten to sixteen, but some hulls are thirty years old. There is a steady building programme — one cruiser, two destroyers, two frigates and four submarines are less than ten years old. Apart from the submarines, the Italian navy alone is more powerful than the mean size of the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean. A fleet modernisation programme of 1,000 billion lire has recently been voted in the Italian parliament and is to be implemented in the years to come. It will provide for considerable new building.

27. Italy is the most important single country to the Alliance on its southern flank. It houses the main NATO headquarters subordinate to SACEUR — Allied Forces Southern Europe at Naples which the Committee visited in April — together with four subordinate headquarters. Italy provides important air bases, naval facilities, nuclear ammunition storage and communications installations, as well as missile-firing ranges which are used by NATO countries of the central as well as the southern region.

28. The vital and loyal contribution of Italy to the mutual defence arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty make it natural that the political uncertainties of that country should be of concern to other members of the Alliance. The outspoken comments of Dr. Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, have however caused some resentment. Most recently for example, on 13th April, addressing the annual meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Dr. Kissinger said¹:

“As Secretary of State, I have the obligation to make clear what I feel the consequences of certain events are, even if we cannot necessarily control them. I believe the advent of communists in Western European countries is likely to produce a sequence of events in which other European countries will also be tempted to move in the same direction.

This, in turn, is going to produce governments in which the degree of co-operation that has become characteristic of Atlantic relations will become increasingly difficult, in which their own internal priorities are going to be away from concern with defence, which will produce new opportunities for outside pressures and a move

1. *Le Figaro*, 15th April 1976.

1. *International Herald Tribune*, 15th April 1976.

towards a more neutralist conception of foreign policy."

Dr. Kissinger's views were contested by Mr. George Ball, a former Under-Secretary of State, and other Democrat officials at the conference.

29. Dr. Kissinger's is a transatlantic view that regards all communist parties in any country as an alien institution posing a threat to democracy. It is a perception of communism that is at variance with that of the friendly neighbourhood communist immortalised in the world of Don Camillo. The Committee notes that the Secretary-General of the Italian communist party, Mr. Berlinguer, addressing the twenty-fifth congress of the Soviet communist party in Moscow on 27th February spoke in favour of :

"...an Italian foreign policy which, in the framework of our countries' international alliances, would contribute actively to détente and defend firmly the sovereignty of the Italian people against any foreign interference in our internal affairs."

Mr. Berlinguer's allusion to NATO echoed around the world.¹

30. In interviews in Rome on 18th April, Mr. Giorgio Amendola, a member of the executive committee of the Italian communist party, said :

"We accept a NATO defensive policy and NATO bases."

While Mr. Giovanni Cervetti, a senior economic expert of the Italian communist party, said:

"Actions towards withdrawing from NATO would create instability in Europe, we want to work toward doing away with the system of military alliances and blocs. Until this can be accomplished, we do not favour changes forced by a unilateral Italian action, including budget spending and the nuclear presence."

Mr. Cervetti conceded, however, that the Italian communists would hope to push NATO more in the direction of co-operation and collaboration with the rest of the world. He said that NATO should take the lead in seeking a ban on nuclear weapons in Eastern and Western Europe.

31. Far more serious is the attempt on the part of the Italian communist party to make a spurious and dangerous distinction between

NATO bases and United States bases in Italy — which are present under NATO agreements and are an essential part of Alliance defence planning — and to call for the dismantlement of the latter. In the draft recommendation, the Committee calls for all member countries and the Alliance as a whole to be more publicly identified with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area. Ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council could be held more frequently in Italy, Greece and Turkey; at permanent level, the ambassadors of all the NATO countries should publicly visit the headquarters and defence installations in Italy; naval and air contingents from northern countries should participate in exercises in the Mediterranean area as much as possible.

32. The Brussels Treaty is a mutual defence treaty, and the Committee has a duty to express its views on the defence and foreign policy of the countries of the Alliance, inasmuch as they may affect the security of the Alliance as a whole. The Committee does not believe that it should attempt to comment on the internal politics of member countries. As the Committee has urged in a previous report¹, NATO should be composed exclusively of democratic countries whose governments emerge from free elections and enjoy, and are seen to enjoy, the support of the majority of the population. The Committee notes that in Europe communist parties have never secured control of governments in free elections, control has resulted only when Soviet armed forces have been present in their country.

France

33. France has an important navy which includes two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, nineteen destroyers, twenty-four frigates and nineteen submarines. Since the Soviet fleet became more active in the Mediterranean, it has been French policy to concentrate a growing proportion of its navy at Toulon rather than Brest. In 1976, vessels in the Mediterranean will include two aircraft carriers and a cruiser. Mr. Yvon Bourges, the French Minister of Defence, speaking to the Navy Academy on 24th March, drew attention to the age of many French vessels :

"Most of our boats will be twenty-five years old at the end of the decade and will be progressively withdrawn from service... quantity counts less than capability

1. International Herald Tribune, 28th February 1976.

1. Document 682, 10th November 1975, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley.

provided by modern weapons. A choice has to be made to meet our priority tasks.”¹

It is anticipated that the next long-term defence plan in France will devote more resources to conventional forces, following a period during which most emphasis has been placed on nuclear forces.

34. Following French withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966, the French Mediterranean commander in Toulon ceased to hold the NATO subordinate command of Commander Western Mediterranean (COMEDOC), and the French Mediterranean fleet ceased to be earmarked for assignment to NATO. Admiral de Joybert, former Chief of Naval Staff, has frequently drawn attention to the growing power of the Soviet navy and the vulnerability of western countries to submarine attack because of their large dependence on seaborne imports. Speaking at the *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche de Défense d'Aujourd'hui* (CERDA) recently, Admiral de Joybert, after pointing out that France received 85 % of its supplies by sea, said :

“France is incapable of protecting its merchant ships beyond mid-Atlantic and Western Mediterranean landfalls... it is within the Atlantic Alliance and European union that allied naval power could be established to counter any blockade.”²

35. French co-operation with the NATO southern command in Naples is in fact reasonably close, within the limits of present French policy, to NATO. French naval vessels regularly participate in joint exercises, and maritime patrol aircraft also co-operate with the NATO maritime patrol headquarters, COMAIR-MED. There is a permanent exchange of liaison officers between the NATO Naples headquarters and the French naval headquarters at Toulon. Various contingency plans have been agreed with NATO.

36. Over the last two years, France has built up a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, based chiefly on the Island of Reunion. While some reports have spoken of a force of eighteen to twenty vessels, it seems that combat surface vessels may usually number about five, and will include from time to time a cruiser or an aircraft carrier and two submarines. A fleet

auxiliary oiler has been adapted to serve as command ship. Press reports have spoken of the possible installation of French naval facilities on other Indian Ocean islands, including Les Glorieuses, Tromelin, Europa, Bassas da India and Juan de Nova. Following the decision to grant independence to Djibouti at the mouth of the Red Sea, this port will presumably become less important for the French navy.

37. While the possibility of communist participation in an Italian government has attracted much comment in the Alliance, there has also been some interest in statements by spokesmen for the French communist party concerning defence problems. The French communist defence expert, Mr. Louis Baillot, took part in a discussion on 8th April at the *Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale*. The French communist paper *L'Humanité* on 19th April found it necessary to deny earlier press reports according to which Mr. Baillot at the conference had said that the communist party recognised the existence of the deterrent force as a phenomenon which one could not fail to take into account and which in present circumstances could be considered an element of political independence for France. According to participants in the conference, Mr. Baillot is supposed to have said that it was not sufficient to have nuclear weapons to have a national defence : the problem was that of the tasks to be assigned to the strategic nuclear force rather than its physical existence.

Greece, Turkey and the problem of Cyprus

38. The Committee has reported fully in earlier reports¹ on the important contribution made by Greece and Turkey to NATO mutual defence arrangements, and on the unfortunate disputes between the two countries, involving, in particular, operations in Cyprus in 1974. Both Greece and Turkey have common frontiers with Warsaw Pact countries ; their geographical position, in particular the control of the Black Sea exit and Turkey's proximity to the Middle-East, make them vital members of the Alliance.

39. Following the events in Cyprus in 1974, and the return of Greece to a democratic régime, that country had announced the withdrawal of its armed forces from NATO command, and demanded negotiations with NATO on its continued relationship with the organisation. As the

1. *Le Figaro*, 25th March 1976.

2. *Le Monde*, 9th March 1976.

1. Document 651 and Document 671, Chapter IV.

Committee pointed out at the time, the Greek step, while much to be regretted, was in no way as dramatic as would have been a complete withdrawal from the integrated military structure of the Alliance. Greek officers continued to serve in all integrated NATO headquarters, except the combined 6th ATAF and Land South-East headquarters at Izmir in Turkey. NATO communications and other facilities in Greece continued to be available to the Alliance.

40. Following the 1974 decision, Greece approached the problem of negotiations with NATO in a calm and constructive spirit, submitting in October 1975 proposals as a basis of negotiation which suggested that :

- (i) in peace, Greek armed forces would be placed exclusively under national command ;
- (ii) in the event of a general conflict, there would be total defence co-operation ;
- (iii) the arrangements to cover such co-operation in a crisis should be worked out immediately ;
- (iv) any large-scale operations on Greek territory, in peace or in war, would require the prior agreement or permission of the Greek Government ;
- (v) the Greek Government would reserve the right to decide when Greek armed forces should participate in NATO manoeuvres ;
- (vi) Greece would offer NATO three advantages : (a) NATO would continue to control and use the early warning, communications and other defence infrastructure installations built on Greek territory with NATO resources ; (b) there would be continued exchange of information ; (c) nuclear weapons would be maintained on Greek territory.

NATO counter-proposals for a basis of the forthcoming negotiations were worked out during the winter and after approval in the North Atlantic Council were formally submitted to Greece on 9th March 1976.

41. In addition to the agreements with NATO, Greece has a number of bilateral arrangements with the United States concerning defence arrangements, and Greece demanded their re-negotiation in 1974. On 15th April 1976, a

new four-year defence agreement between Greece and the United States was initialled which provided for \$700 million worth of defence aid and United States assurances, expressed in a letter of 10th April, to the effect that the United States would "actively and unequivocally oppose" military moves by either Greece or Turkey in the Aegean, and stating the United States belief that "the present dividing lines in Cyprus cannot be permanent". Greece at the same time was said to have given assurances that it would not extend its territorial sea in the Aegean from the present six to twelve nautical miles, which Turkey had stated would be a *casus belli*. In exchange, the United States will continue to enjoy the use of four important bases in Greece — the Athens air base ; the communications station at Nea Makrio ; the very important port and air base at Suda Bay in Crete and the electronic listening post at Heraklion in Crete. This agreement, like the parallel one concluded with Turkey, is subject to approval by the United States Senate, which has not hitherto approved military aid on a longer-term basis than two years.

42. As far as relations with Turkey are concerned, the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Karamanlis, on 17th April expressed his opinion that differences with Turkey could be settled peacefully, and proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Mr. Caglayangil, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on 19th April welcomed the constructive Greek proposals and suggested in due course a meeting between the two Prime Ministers.

43. Meanwhile, Greek armed forces still do not participate in NATO exercises, nor are NATO exercises being held on Greek territory. The Committee hopes that the forthcoming negotiations with NATO can be successfully concluded to provide for the resumption of such necessary activities.

44. Following the Turkish occupation of parts of Cyprus in 1974, the United States Congress, in February 1975, imposed an embargo on United States defence assistance to Turkey, an embargo which has seriously handicapped the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces, particularly the air force. Turkey countered by restricting the operation of and threatening to close the twenty-six United States defence bases in Turkey. On 26th March this year, a new defence agreement was however concluded between the United States and Turkey which provides for defence assistance to the value of

\$1 billion in exchange for the continued use of the bases under Turkish authority; the agreement is to cover a four-year period and, like the parallel agreement with Greece, will require the approval of Congress.

45. Unfortunately, little or no real progress can be reported towards normalising the situation in Cyprus. The February round of talks between representatives of the two communities in Vienna under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General proved abortive and on 17th April, following an exchange of proposals for a basis of the next round to be held in May, the Greek-Cypriot Government stated that the Turkish proposals were "unacceptable", containing no concrete territorial offer. The United Nations peacekeeping force remains in place and there are reports that the 40 % of the island taken by Turkish forces in 1974 has been partly settled by immigrants from Turkey. Mr. Denktash, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus in the pre-existing situation, unilaterally proclaimed the existence of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975, and has now announced that elections will be held in May, prior to the resumption of the talks in Vienna between the two communities.

46. The British defence bases in the two sovereign base areas in Cyprus have not been an issue in the inter-communal dispute. The British defence white paper, issued in March 1976, reports that :

"Substantial reductions have been made to our forces in Cyprus; RAF fixed-wing aircraft are no longer permanently based on the island."

The white paper for 1975 had reported :

"We will retain our membership of CENTO, but will no longer declare any forces to the organisation: the CENTO-assigned Canberras and Nimrods will be withdrawn from Malta by 1979 and we will no longer permanently station Vulcans on Cyprus."

47. The headquarters of British Forces Near East, and of the British Near East Air Force, previously based in Cyprus, were closed on 31st March 1976. British forces at present in the sovereign base areas are: one armoured reconnaissance squadron; one infantry battalion; two infantry companies; some helicopters. Headquarters Near East Air Force remains there. Britain also contributes forces to the

United Nations force on the island, the contribution being one armoured reconnaissance squadron, one infantry battalion less two companies and a flight of helicopters. The third report of the British House of Commons defence and external affairs sub-committee, issued on 25th March 1976, expressed concern for the security of service property in Cyprus where the army has now to protect ninety-nine square miles with fewer than two thousand men. It reported the withdrawal of all fixed-wing aircraft, including Vulcans, Lightnings and Hercules from the island, as well as the withdrawal of all anti-aircraft missiles. It stated that the very expensive airfield at Akrotiri would henceforth be open for only a few hours a day. The airfield, radar installations and the important electronic listening post which, among other things, can provide valuable data about Soviet naval communications in the Eastern Mediterranean, now remain without provision for air defence, although the Commons sub-committee was assured that the base could be reinforced in time of tension to make a significant contribution to the southern flank of NATO.

48. It is clear that, whereas in the 1950s British forces in Cyprus were regarded as potential reserves for the Middle East, the island is today more important for the defence of NATO interests. Addressing the sub-committee on Cyprus in February, Mr. Callaghan, then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said that although it was not the time to strengthen the sovereign base areas, Britain had no intention of leaving them. They were still a British base, not a NATO base, but it was "more of a NATO interest today than it was when we went there"¹. Britain also finds the sovereign base area of use for army training, particularly of commandos.

49. The Committee believes that while the political situation in many NATO countries of the Mediterranean seaboard holds uncertainties, the value of a diversity of bases in the area under different sovereignty must not be overlooked.

Malta

50. Malta was an important British naval base during the war, and in the early years of NATO accommodated the headquarters of the NATO Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean — a British

1. The Times, 28th February 1976.

command in the days when the British navy was still present in some force in the Mediterranean. Following the independence of Malta, and under the Prime Ministership of Mr. Borg Olivier of the Nationalist Party, some proposals were made in 1964 to evolve some sort of associate membership of NATO for the island, but the proposals came to nothing. When Mr. Dom Mintoff of the Malta Labour Party won the elections in 1971, the NATO headquarters, by then down-graded to the status of subordinate headquarters to CINCSOUTH in Naples, was transferred from the island to be co-located with CINCSOUTH headquarters. The British naval commander remaining in Malta still has a NATO wartime function as commander of naval forces in the South-East Mediterranean.

51. In March 1972, Malta signed a new seven-year defence agreement with the United Kingdom, underwritten by NATO, to expire on 31st March 1979. In exchange for annual payments of £14 million (of which £5.25 million are provided by Britain and £8.75 million by NATO) Malta granted the United Kingdom in peace and war the right to station armed forces in Malta and to use facilities for the defence purposes of the United Kingdom and of NATO, and further undertook not to permit the forces of any party to the Warsaw Pact to be stationed in Malta or to use military facilities there. On the signing of the agreement, Mr. Mintoff was quoted as saying that Malta would become politically and economically independent on the expiry of the seven-year agreement "in the sense that there will be no bases... we will give them free or not at all". Referring to Malta's good relations with Libya, Mr. Mintoff added that Britain had given an assurance that the base would not be used against any Arab country.

52. The British defence white paper of March 1976 states that :

"resulting from the concentration of our resources in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas, Britain's naval forces will cease to be assigned to NATO in the Mediterranean from April 1976. Our only permanent ship presence in the area will be the Gibraltar guard ship. However, HM ships will continue to visit the Mediterranean from time to time and will participate in exercises there with our NATO allies as well as contributing to periodic activations of the NATO naval on-call force Mediterranean. The naval headquarters and facilities in Malta will be reduced

gradually, prior to a total withdrawal when the military facilities agreement expires in March 1979... part of the Canberra and Nimrod force based in Malta will remain declared to the Central Treaty Organisation for the time being..."

British forces at present in Malta in addition to the naval headquarters amount to one Royal Marine commando group including a commando artillery battalion and the Canberra and Nimrod aircraft.

53. Malta is an island between Europe and North Africa, its people speak a Semitic language akin to Arabic, although English is also widely spoken. Through the Knights of St. John, it had long historical links with Italy and since the Napoleonic wars with the United Kingdom. The population of some 300,000 is large for the very small area of the island — about 240 square kilometres — with few indigenous resources beyond its excellent natural harbour. The Maltese economy was for a long time essentially that of the military base, and Mr. Mintoff has been at pains to secure assistance from many quarters in an endeavour to achieve economic independence. China has provided some £17 million in economic aid and China's experts are engaged in building a dry dock capable of taking 300,000-ton ships which is scheduled to be ready for 1977-78. The Maltese dockyard has benefited from the reopening of the Suez Canal, and provides the major single source of employment on the island. Officially unemployment amounts to 5,000 out of a working force of some 100,000, but unemployment in real terms has been estimated to be as high as 12 to 13 %, concealed in part through government-organised pioneer corps. In December 1975, Mr. Mintoff re-negotiated the association agreement with the Common Market which provided for aid of some 26 million units of account. It does not appear to be Mr. Mintoff's policy to seek full membership of the European Community ; it is felt that Malta might wish to apply for regional aid if it does not succeed in establishing sufficient industry to replace total foreign assistance of some £30 million per annum by 1979.

54. Maltese defence forces were recently reorganised to provide cadres which run the pioneer corps and another labour corps. The forces provide some helicopter patrols and man some anti-smuggling ships, and provide guards for diplomatic missions. The professional forces amount to some seven hundred officers and men of the Royal Malta artillery (which continued

to serve in the British army up to 1971 when it was withdrawn from BAOR to Malta). Proud of its traditions, the Royal Malta artillery still wear the badges of the British Royal artillery.

55. Elections are due in Malta later in 1976. There is speculation in some circles that if the Nationalist Party won the elections, there might be interest in seeking eventually full membership of the Common Market, and possibly resurrecting the 1964 proposals for associate membership of NATO — a policy which would amount to a reversal of Mr. Mintoff's policy of seeking to play a bridging rôle between Europe and the Arab world, especially Libya. The possibility of such a reversal of policy is discounted in other circles in Malta.

56. With adequate bases in Sicily only fifty-eight miles away, NATO has no requirement to maintain a peacetime presence in Malta. After the expiry of the defence agreements in 1979, it will be highly desirable however that NATO vessels should continue to show their presence in Malta from time to time, and that Warsaw Pact forces should continue to be excluded from the island. Unlike Cyprus, the military facilities in Malta are not on the sovereign territory of a NATO country and would not provide the territorial diversity that the Committee sees as an advantage in the case of Cyprus, unless of course Malta were to join NATO or conclude a bilateral defence arrangement with Italy.

United Kingdom forces in the Mediterranean

57. The present status of British forces in Cyprus and Malta has been described above; that of those in Gibraltar is described below. The 1976 defence white paper is quoted in paragraph 51 above describing the reduced British naval effort in the Mediterranean, which amounts to the occasional presence of groups of ships which may take part in NATO exercises while in transit through the Mediterranean, and in the British contribution of a frigate to the NATO naval on-call force in the Mediterranean which is usually activated for about a fortnight twice a year. Britain contributes one battalion and one attack squadron of aircraft to the Allied Command Europe mobile force, the land element of which is of brigade group size, and is deployed periodically on exercises in the Mediterranean area.

58. The United Kingdom contributes specialised units to SACEUR's general strategic reserve which provides an optional deployment

capability to North Italy. The British 1976 defence white paper describes forthcoming changes in the organisation of the British contribution :

"By April 1978 the land element of the United Kingdom mobile force will be reduced from the present division of three brigades (nine battalions) to a new formation of five battalions which will be known as the Sixth Field Force and based in South-East district. This new force will contain a limited parachute capability of one battalion group, will be provided for deployment to such areas of allied command Europe as are agreed with SACEUR. It will be equipped with the latest anti-tank and air-defence weapons. It is further understood that the option is also retained of deploying two air force strike squadrons to Italy if required by SACEUR. The Royal Air Force also uses NATO airfields in Southern Europe for training purposes."

Gibraltar

59. British forces in Gibraltar amount to one frigate, one infantry battalion, and a number of Hunter aircraft which, among other functions, provide close surveillance of the Straits of Gibraltar and movements of Soviet warships through them. The defence white paper of March 1976 states that :

"As a result of the 1974 defence review, there will be a 10 % reduction of service manpower by April 1978, although the garrison will continue to be based upon an infantry battalion."

There is also a locally-raised territorial army company and artillery battery. The British naval commander in Gibraltar assumes NATO functions in the event of hostilities as commander Gibraltar Mediterranean area. Since 31st March 1976, there is no mine counter-measure capability and no prospects of any being available.

60. The political situation in Gibraltar, a British colony since the treaty of 1713, now with internal self-government, was reported on by the Committee in November 1973¹. Since then, there have been no significant changes in the situation concerning Spanish claims to the territory, or the attitude of the Gibraltar population which,

1. Document 624, paragraphs 60-63, Rapporteur : Mr. Jung.

in September 1967, voted by 12,762 votes to 44 in favour of retaining the present links with the United Kingdom. Both government and opposition parties are in favour of the British defence presence. On 25th February 1976, Mr. Areilza, the Spanish Foreign Minister, in a television interview, hinted at the possibility of a "new approach" to Gibraltar. Press reports¹ following his visit to London on 2nd March suggested that in his talks with the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Areilza gave the impression that a democratic Spain would be able to take a more flexible attitude than previous governments. The frontier with Spain has been completely closed since 1969 however. Although the Spanish Government has permitted telephone communications to be restored briefly at Christmas 1975 and Easter 1976, there appears to be no immediate prospect of change in the situation.

61. An economic study of Gibraltar² undertaken by a private British consultant company in collaboration with a Spanish firm, maintained that fundamental political changes would have to take place in Spain before any choice could be put to the people of Gibraltar, but concluded that integration with Spain offered the best long-term prospects for economic prosperity. The barren rock is totally dependent on imports for its food supplies and British defence expenditure on the island accounts for £8 million of the total GNP of £18 million. The Gibraltar dockyard has a regular naval refit programme for Leander class frigates and minesweepers.

62. In its 1973 report referred to above, the Committee made no recommendation concerning Gibraltar. In its report at the end of 1975³, the Committee expressed the view that the usefulness of Gibraltar would be enhanced if the dispute with Spain was settled, and that if Spain were to become a full member of NATO, Gibraltar would cease to be militarily relevant. The Committee suggested that the NATO Gibraltar command should be transferred from NAVSOUTH in Naples to the IBERLANT command in Lisbon, thus coming under SACLANT's control. IBERLANT is in practice the major NATO command with which the Gibraltar staff

has operational contact and communications between the two are being improved.

63. In paragraph 49 above, the Committee draws attention to the value of territorial diversity of NATO bases in the Mediterranean area under different sovereignty. If Spanish bases should cease to be available to United States aircraft for any reason in the future, Gibraltar can provide facilities for maritime patrol aircraft at a strategic point for surveillance of both the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

United States forces in the Mediterranean

64. The United States Sixth Fleet permanently based in the Mediterranean normally comprises two aircraft carriers, fourteen surface combat vessels and a number of submarines. The marine amphibious unit with the Sixth Fleet comprises some six amphibious ships with one battalion of marines embarked. The Sixth Fleet is fully capable of resupply at sea and includes a number of auxiliary vessels for the purpose. In early April, during the Lebanon crisis, when two cruisers and several submarines of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron were off the coast, the Sixth Fleet concentrated about a quarter of its force in the area, including the aircraft carrier *Saratoga*. From time to time, vessels of the Sixth Fleet cruise in the Black Sea to demonstrate the right of passage through the Turkish Straits in accordance with the Montreux Convention. The missile destroyer *Sellers*, the gun destroyer *Vesole* were there for four days in the third week of April. The Sixth Fleet is earmarked for assignment to NATO and comes under command of CINCSOUTH in Naples in the event of hostilities.

65. CINCSOUTH's subordinate air commander, Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, is concurrently commander of the United States Sixteenth Air Force based in Spain which commands all United States aircraft in Southern Europe. Staff estimates of United States aircraft currently in the South European theatre, including Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey, amount to forty-eight of the F-4 C, D and E variants; twelve F-111E; and some ten reconnaissance RF-4C. Considerable further reinforcements of United States aircraft for the southern region are earmarked for assignment in the event of hostilities.

66. The United States army units in the southern theatre account for some 3,000 men in Italy, 800 in Greece, and 1,200 in Turkey.

1. Daily Telegraph, 19th March 1976.

2. Gibraltar: British or Spanish? The Economic Prospects (Wilton House), quoted in the Times, 15th March 1976.

3. Document 682, paragraphs 40 and 42, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley.

Among other functions, the army units maintain the stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons in the area, which, in the event of hostilities, can be released to the nuclear capable delivery systems in the hands of the forces of the NATO countries in the area.

Portugal

67. The Committee reported fully on the situation in Portugal and that country's contribution to NATO in its last report in November 1975¹. Since that report was adopted, the crisis of authority in Portugal has been overcome; moderate elements of the armed forces have been in effective control of them since November 1975 when the army largely went back to its barracks, and a new pact between the armed forces movement and the five leading political parties was signed on 26th February, providing for a four-year transitional phase during which Portugal would live under "supervised freedom". The pact finally fixed the date of the parliamentary elections at 25th April and that for the election of the President at 25th June. The pact provided that the President of the Republic, who will be simultaneously President of the Council of Revolution and supreme commander of the armed forces, will have the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister after consulting the Council of Revolution and the political parties represented in the legislative assembly, taking into account electoral results. The atmosphere created by the pact permitted the constituent assembly to complete work on the new constitution according to schedule, and the parliamentary elections held on 25th April were conducted in a more satisfactory atmosphere than those for the constituent assembly the previous year, intimidation of parties right of centre being significantly reduced. The elections confirm the leading positions of the Socialist and Popular Democratic Parties, but reversed the order of the third party, giving the Democratic Centre (CDS) a narrow lead of one seat in the Assembly over the communist party. Consultations to lead to the formation of the new government which would be based on the political parties in the legislative assembly were in progress during the Committee's visit. The previous government under Admiral Azevedo as Prime Minister with Major Melo Antunes as Foreign Minister was to remain in power until after the presidential elections in June.

1. Document 682, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley.

68. In its previous report mentioned above, the Committee noted in paragraph 32:

"... the Portuguese armed forces, if they overcome their present problems of discipline and authority, must in future face problems of motive and objective... the army is clearly too large for any conceivable external defence rôle. It is tempting to think that although in the past Portuguese forces have not been directly assigned to NATO, a smaller streamlined force with more modern equipment might make a useful contribution to some particular NATO function such as the ACE mobile force, or other mobile reserves — such projects could provide useful training objectives for a modern professional army. In the present situation, there is no sign of political support for any increased or high-profile contribution to NATO."

The press now reports discussions with NATO countries for the creation of an air-mobile armoured brigade equipped with German or United States tanks¹.

69. On 1st January, the government announced a 78 % reduction in the defence budget to 2,000 million escudos for 1976 (about \$70 million) which compares with some 17,000 million escudos in 1975, which was already 40 % lower than the 1974 defence budget.

70. On 24th January, General Ramalho Eanes, Chief-of-Staff of the Portuguese army, announced a "national military project" for its reorganisation. The size of the army was to be reduced by 40 % from 45,000 men to some 26,000. The period for military service would be reduced from twenty-four months to twenty-one months in 1976 and fifteen months in 1977. The plan provided for an operational corps of 10,800 men, highly trained and with modern equipment, having a deterrent rôle responsible for the defence of the territory against external aggression and, in exceptional circumstances, to assist in ensuring internal security. A territorial corps would comprise 6,500 men for administration and 9,600 responsible for training and local defence. It could be used when necessary to provide internal security².

71. Defence questions and Portugal's contribution to NATO do not appear to have been a

1. International Herald Tribune, 30th April 1976.

2. *Le Monde*, 27th January 1976.

significant issue during the recent election campaign. Mr. Cunhal, the communist leader, was reported as saying on 21st April that the communists had no intention of pressing for Portugal's departure from the Atlantic Alliance if they became part of a left-wing coalition :

"The question of NATO membership will eventually have to be considered in the general context of East-West détente and European security. But we are not impatient to tackle this issue."

At the same time, Mr. Cunhal claimed that the naval and air exercise Open Gate 1976, which the NATO-IBERLANT headquarters outside Lisbon had announced was to be held off Portugal during a period of some four days beginning on the Monday following the elections, was a measure of outside pressure aimed at influencing the elections. The IBERLANT spokesman pointed out that the exercise had been planned two years previously.

72. Portugal has a small but relatively modern navy comprising sixteen frigates less than ten years old with a further two under construction ; fifteen corvettes and four submarines, as well as lighter forces. The air force, apart from counter-insurgency aircraft left over from the colonial wars, is equipped with largely obsolete aircraft : two squadrons of G-91s and one squadron of F-86Fs. One hundred M-47 tanks in the army are similarly antiquated.

73. Portugal makes a most important contribution to NATO mutual defence arrangements, notably in the naval field, and in the base facilities that it provides on its territory. The major problem facing the young democracy in Portugal is of course the economy which has suffered heavily from the world depression, the drop in production and loss of tourist trade during the politically unsettled period of the last two years. The Committee welcomes the emergence of democracy in Portugal with a freely-elected parliament. It expresses the hope that stable government will ensue. It calls for full political and economic support for Portugal from the countries of the European Community and of NATO.

CHAPTER IV

Other countries

Spain

74. In its last report, the Committee examined the situation in Spain in some detail and expres-

sed the belief that "the Spanish people must shortly take their place in NATO and the European Community..." and added that any formal agreements between NATO and Spain concluded before the emergence of democracy in that country "... would so alienate public opinion both in the NATO countries and in Spain that the very existence of the Alliance and any possibility of lasting future agreement with Spain would be jeopardised..." The report was adopted shortly before the death of General Franco on 20th November 1975.

75. Today, prospects for the emergence of democracy in Spain are brighter, but the outcome is far from certain. Reportedly under pressure from the King, Mr. Arias, the Prime Minister, in an announcement on 28th April obviously timed to forestall May-day demonstrations, because detailed bills were not ready at the time, said that a referendum on constitutional reforms would be held in October. The parliamentary reform bill published in the Spanish press on 14th and 15th May¹, during your Rapporteur's visit to Madrid, provides for the present Cortes to be replaced by a two-chamber parliament. Congress, the lower house, is to be composed of 300 members directly elected by universal suffrage ; the Senate will be composed of 285 members, of whom 200 will be elected by universal suffrage from candidates nominated by local authorities and trades unions, 40 will be the present life members of the Cortes, 25 appointed by the King and 20 by academic institutions. The two chambers are said to have equal powers, but amendments to the constitution and matters affecting human rights must be approved in the Senate before they can be discussed in Congress, while the reverse process will apply to finance bills. The life of Congress will be four years, that of the Senate six years ; no provision is made for earlier dissolution.

76. The Council of the Realm under the new bill would be composed of eleven members, five chosen by each of the Senate and Congress and six ex-officio members from military and ecclesiastical posts. There have been no proposals to change the method by which the government is formed — the Prime Minister is at present appointed by the King from three names proposed by the Council of the Realm, while the other Ministers are chosen by the Prime Minister with the approval of the King. Opposition cri-

1. Ya, ABC.

tics of the new proposals suggest that the government might not be representative of the majority in parliament; moreover the Senate's pre-eminent rôle in matters of constitutional amendment and human rights is not considered democratic. The King has recently received members of the christian democrat and socialist opposition when doubts of this character were expressed and it appears that a sympathetic attitude was adopted by His Majesty.

77. In his announcement on 28th April referred to above, Mr. Arias said the reforms would result in the "full recognition of political freedoms with no exclusions except those who want to conquer power to impose a tyranny". The communist party would therefore not take part in elections which were promised for early next year, the draft electoral bill to be published by 15th July.

78. The new legislation would provide freedom of assembly and demonstration, legalise political groups and reform the penal code to abolish restrictive provisions against political parties and political activities. The Committee in its previous report described the emergence of tolerated political groupings in Spain and noted the creation of the "Platform for democratic convergence" grouping various christian democrat and socialist parties active in Spain. It also noted the formation of the Junta Democrática around the then exiled communist party and small splinter socialist groups. The report noted that: "As there seem no prospects of the communists being recognised, the final touchstone [of democracy] may be the official attitude to the PSOE" (main socialist party). The announcement in the spring of a merger between the platform and the Junta thus providing a common front between the main socialist party and the communists among others may now lead to an impasse if the present authorities maintain their attitude of non-recognition of the communist party.

79. Spain is now living in a half-world between toleration of political activity and the arrest or continued imprisonment of selected political activists. For the first time in forty-four years, the congress of the General Workers' Union (UGT) was held in public in Madrid, concluding on 18th April. The congress of a christian democrat party (UEDC) was also held in public. Yet the press conference arranged to announce the common front between the "platform" and the "Junta" was stopped and led to selective arrests.

80. While numerous political figures are emerging on the Spanish scene, it is probably too early to speak of political "parties" as, except for the reportedly well-organised communist party, the grass roots organisation of the newly emerging parties can hardly get under way until their existence is legalised. Though tolerated political activity will remain technically illegal at least until the announced, but as yet undefined, constitutional reforms are promulgated.

81. Since its formation on 11th December last year, the new government under the former Prime Minister, Mr. Arias, including Mr. Areilza, a noted liberal, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, has lost no time in establishing closer links with the European Community and NATO. By 15th March, Mr. Areilza had completed visits to the nine countries of the European Community; on his return from Bonn, Luxembourg and Paris, he said in Madrid on 10th January that:

"Spain's fundamental objective is to achieve integration into the Community; then, in second place, integration into the Atlantic Alliance might take place."

82. Talks aimed at full membership of the European Community might "get under way this year, provided the last of the reservations and political stumbling blocks which some groups in some Community countries have, disappear."¹ The Council of the European Community is clearly divided over the speed with which negotiations with Spain should be undertaken. On 20th January, a statement was issued saying that:

"The present situation no longer prohibits the renewal of contacts with Spain concerning the negotiations which were interrupted last October" [i.e. negotiations on association.]

Mr. Callaghan, then United Kingdom Foreign Minister, added afterwards that application for full Spanish membership could not be entertained until Spain was: "Well down the road towards a pluralistic democracy."¹

83. In Brussels on 16th February, Mr. Areilza called on Mr. Luns, the Secretary-General of NATO, reportedly to discuss the co-ordination of Spanish defence arrangements with NATO — the first time the Secretary-General had received a Spanish minister.

1. The Times, 12th January 1976.

2. The Times, 21st January 1976.

84. Traditionally, the three services in Spain have been represented in the government by three separate service officers. In the government formed on 11th December, for the first time, a service officer, Lieutenant-General Fernando Santiago Diaz de Mendivil, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister with special responsibility for co-ordinating the affairs of the three services. This is seen by some Spanish defence experts as a step on the way to the necessary creation of a modern defence ministry in Spain.

85. In a sudden change of policy after General Franco's death, the Spanish Government decided as rapidly as possible to liquidate the residual colonial commitment in the former Spanish Sahara, and arranged for the rapid withdrawal of the 10,000 troops there. Hitherto committed to arrange a consultation with the (very few) inhabitants of the territory, Spain preferred in the event to sign a rapid agreement with Morocco and Mauritania providing for the partition of the territory between them.

86. In a television interview on 25th February, Mr. Areilza pointed out that the recently concluded defence agreement with the United States provided for the withdrawal of the American nuclear submarines from the base at Rota because of danger of pollution and explosion, as well as the fear that Spain could become a nuclear target in the event of war. He believed, however, that nuclear weapons might have to be used for the defence of Europe and added:

"We have not signed a non-proliferation treaty. We want our own capability one day — we do not want to be the last in line if that is to be the tendency in the years to come."¹

87. Service officers who held senior command in the civil war have long retired from the Spanish armed forces, not all of whom today can be considered conservative elements. Many of the middle-ranking officers have received periods of training in military schools of various NATO countries, particularly the United States, especially as far as training of sophisticated aircraft, surface-to-air missiles is concerned. The withdrawal from the Sahara is reported to have caused some resentment in the army. On 8th March, the trial opened in a military camp to the North of Madrid of nine service officers accused of sedition and belonging to the illegal

Democratic Military Union (UDM) formed some two years ago to press for democratic reforms in the country. It is reported to have 1,000 members in the armed forces. A tenth officer, Captain José Ignacio Domínguez of the air force escaped to France and had been acting as an external spokesman for the movement. Significantly in March he held a press conference in Algiers to protest against the "betrayal of the Saharan people."

88. Perhaps the chief success of Mr. Areilza's foreign policy in the defence field so far was the conclusion of the treaty of friendship and co-operation between Spain and the United States of America on 24th January 1976, which includes mutual defence commitments which hitherto have been covered only by less far-reaching executive agreements between the two governments not subject to ratification. Article I of the treaty establishes a Spanish-United States council under the chairmanship of the Spanish Foreign Minister and United States Secretary of State. Supplementary agreement No. 1 provides for the chief-of-staff of each country to be the permanent military representative on the council and to form a joint military committee which will set up a combined military co-ordination and planning staff to be established in Madrid "to facilitate co-ordination between the Spanish armed forces and the armed forces of the United States, as well as other forces dedicated to North Atlantic defence". The Spanish-United States council, as one of its basic objectives, will work toward development of appropriate co-ordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

89. Article V of the main treaty recognises that co-operation of the two parties "has strengthened the security of the western world" and establishes "a defence relationship between Spain and the United States of America". Supplementary agreement No. 5 provides that the combined military co-ordination and planning staff shall prepare plans "for actions which could be taken... in case of an attack against Spain or the United States in the context of a general attack against the West". The supplementary agreement defines a "geographical area of common interest" within which the planning staff is to work. It covers the area of the Atlantic westwards from the African and European coasts lying between latitude 23 degrees north (i.e. virtually the same as the Tropic of Cancer to which the North Atlantic Treaty applies) up to latitude 48 degrees north (i.e. the latitude of Brittany), reaching

1. *Le Monde*, 27th February, Daily Telegraph, 26th February 1976.

westwards to 23 degrees west (just short of the Azores). The area covers the whole of Spain and extends into the Mediterranean as far as 7 degrees west longitude (i.e. a little short of Corsica and Sardinia). The supplementary agreement envisages the possibility of command headquarters being established under the combined staff as it provides that "Spanish liaison officers shall be assigned to such headquarters as are agreed upon."

90. Supplementary agreement No. 6 provides for the United States to continue to use its military facilities on Spanish territory which include the Rota naval base and airfield, the Torrejon and Zaragoza air bases, the Bardenas Reales firing range and the Moron air base, together with eighteen other minor installations elsewhere in Spain. Tanker aircraft based in Spain are to be reduced to a maximum of five aircraft at Zaragoza. The nuclear submarine squadron will be withdrawn from the Rota base progressively between 1st January and 1st July 1979. The United States undertakes not to store nuclear devices or their components on Spanish soil.

91. Supplementary agreement No. 7 provides for co-operation in the acquisition and production of military equipment. It provides for guaranteed loans of \$120 million a year, the gift of military equipment to a value of \$75 million and training to a value of \$2 million a year. \$50 million is donated towards modernising Spanish radar and air control facilities, 72 F-16 fighter aircraft are to be made available as soon as possible; pending their delivery 42 F-4E aircraft are to be leased to Spain at a price of \$53 million — \$2 million less than the United States pays Spain for the return of 34 F-4C aircraft. The United States will also consider providing data and equipment for the production in Spain of specific defence items subject to detailed agreements. The treaty and its supplementary agreements will come into force when ratified by Congress and the Spanish Cortes and will then remain in force for five years, subject to its extension for additional five-year periods by mutual agreement. The total of loans and grants covered by the agreement is \$1.22 billion, of which \$735 million are devoted to defence and \$485 million to other forms of co-operation, including nuclear energy plants.

92. The Committee notes that the geographical area defined in supplementary agreement No. 5 referred to above overlaps with several existing NATO command areas. In the Atlantic, of the

commands that come under SACLANT, the new Spanish-American area includes the whole of the IBERLANT command (headquarters Lisbon) and smaller parts of WESTLANT (headquarters Norfolk, Virginia) and EASTLANT (headquarters Northwood, United Kingdom). In the Mediterranean, the new command includes the whole of the Gibraltar Mediterranean area and virtually the whole of the former Western Mediterranean command which, prior to French withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure, came under the French admiral at Toulon. General Haig, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in his capacity as commander of United States forces in Europe, has now been invited to visit the Spanish forces.

93. The signature of the treaty was widely welcomed in the Spanish press but criticised in opposition circles. The main socialist party (PSOE) published a communiqué protesting that the treaty would commit the Spanish people for five years, although it was to be submitted for ratification to the Cortes which was not elected through universal suffrage.¹

94. The Committee recognises that Spain makes a valuable contribution to western defence, at present through its association with the United States and in more limited ways through certain arrangements with other NATO countries. It calls for the negotiation of a protocol for the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty, with the government that will eventually emerge following free elections to a reconstituted parliament. This timetable is necessary to ensure the full support of the majority of the population of Spain and of the other NATO countries for this accession.

95. In the previous report of the Committee² the Rapporteur noted four proposals for co-operation with NATO which Spain would seek at the present time. Your Rapporteur now understands that the Spanish authorities would appreciate receiving formal notification of all NATO exercises held in proximity to Spanish territory; he himself suggests that there would be mutual benefit in permanent links between Spanish and NATO early-warning radar systems.

Austria

96. Not strictly a Mediterranean country, Austria is mentioned in this report because its

1. *Le Monde*, 27th January 1976.

2. Document 682, paragraph 14.

territory provides several obvious access routes for an attack on Italy, and because it is a neutral country, precluded by its peace treaty from taking part in a military alliance. The Austrian defence capability has been criticised as being totally out-of-date in an article in *Die Presse* of 1st March, based on a secret defence report. An Austrian officer, Major Hans Aehrenthal, was arrested on 2nd April charged with communicating the report to the press.

Yugoslavia

97. Since President Tito's break with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc in 1948, Yugoslavia has followed an independent line and in 1961 took the initiative in organising a third world movement stressing Yugoslavia's independence of either bloc. Yugoslav leaders stress the virtues of their particular form of communism which they refer to as a socialist system of self-management, and stress their independent non-aligned position in foreign affairs. But President Tito, 83, is now an old man and the succession cannot be long delayed. The Yugoslav communist party continues to discover pro-Moscow cells in its midst. Most recently, on 14th April, nine pro-Soviet dissidents were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of up to twelve years, having been found guilty of organising a "Marxist-Leninist communist party of Yugoslavia" to overthrow the President and bring Yugoslavia under foreign control. They were particularly charged with establishing contacts with pro-Soviet Yugoslav émigrés in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Altogether, since the beginning of 1976 alone, a total of 23 Yugoslavs have been sentenced to imprisonment for similar offences.

98. At the same time, a Soviet submarine can usually be found under repair in a Yugoslav port, although Yugoslavia has offered similar facilities to warships of any country, provided that ordnance is unloaded before entry into Yugoslav territory. Yugoslav military equipment is a mixture of Russian and American. Following the break with the Soviet bloc, the United States supplied considerable military aid between 1951 and 1961 to a value of some \$1.75 billion. This includes the M-47 tank and F-84 aircraft which can be considered obsolete today. From the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia has received T-54 and T-55 tanks (its total tank inventory being some 1,500), some anti-tank guided weapons and 110 MiG-21 fighter bombers. The United States is now preparing a new and signi-

ficant arms deal with Yugoslavia and has included \$1.5 million for cash sales in the security assistance programme beginning 1st October 1976. Yugoslavia is expected to receive the very latest TOW anti-tank missile which is in short supply in the West. It is suggested that enough missiles would be provided to counter a possible Soviet airborne occupation of Yugoslavia which would inevitably use lighter tanks than would a land attack across Romania — which could hardly be undertaken without Romania's consent. Yugoslav military leaders in January were quoted as saying that they would need to destroy at least 2,000 tanks in such a situation and that anti-tank missiles were required for the purpose.

99. Last October the press carried reports¹ of a document reputedly smuggled out of Russia, signed with the pseudonym "Samokhin", claiming that Romania and Yugoslavia had speeded up joint construction of a fighter bomber with British engines and a Swiss missile. Significantly, the document claimed that the Soviet leaders regarded Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Austria as their "rightful property", but that Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania were "socialist" countries considered as "defectors". Pointing out that the United States had failed to intervene in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, the commentary suggested that any American action in Yugoslavia would be limited to the evacuation by helicopter of the American Embassy and the Yugoslav communist party central committee, if there was fighting in the streets of Belgrade.

100. Yugoslavia has a small indigenous arms production capability, and it has frequently been reported that Romania for some years has had no access to Soviet arms supplies since Romanian foreign policy became increasingly independent. President Sadat of Egypt visited Yugoslavia in April, reportedly in search of arms assistance, but it was subsequently reported that Yugoslavia would be unable to overhaul Soviet MiG aircraft in Egyptian hands, but that Yugoslavia was considering the delivery of unspecified weapons to Egypt.

101. Yugoslavia has an army of some 400,000 men, but following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries in August 1968, it has set up a sort of large-scale home guard termed a "peo-

1. Daily Telegraph, 15th October 1975.

ple's defence" which can reportedly mobilise some three million citizens within forty-eight hours ready to defend specific targets and conduct guerrilla warfare. In an exercise in the Northern Republic of Croatia over the weekend 24th-25th April 1976, a million people were mobilised, including both men and women of all ages. Organised by local communist party officials, the exercise was said not to have involved the regular army, and to have been aimed against invasion and natural disasters. The "no surprises" operation was the largest held since the second world war.

102. The "Samokhin" document referred to above is a reminder of the uncertainties and dangers inherent in the so-called Brezhnev doctrine to which the Committee has frequently called attention. "... When the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to turn back the development of any socialist country to restore the capitalist order, when a threat emerges... to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole, this is... a matter of concern for all socialist countries. It goes without saying that ... military aid to a fraternal country to thwart the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary ... measure" said Mr. Brezhnev on 12th November 1968 in explanation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia has always been considered a "socialist country" by the Soviet Union.

103. The senior United States State Department adviser, Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, gave a private talk to a meeting of United States/European Ambassadors in London in December 1975. Garbled reports about that talk received wide publicity and in April an official non-verbatim summary of the remarks was issued to the press.¹ The summary says :

"The Soviets' inability to acquire loyalty in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate historical failure, because Eastern Europe is within their scope and area of natural interest. It is doubly tragic that in this area of vital interest and crucial importance, it has not been possible for the Soviet Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power.

It is, therefore, important to remember that the main, if not the only, instrument of Soviet imperialism has been power.

1. International Herald Tribune, 12th April 1976.

... With regard to Eastern Europe ... This inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West ... So it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationships between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one ... So, our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence. This has worked in Poland. ... A similar process is now going on in Hungary ... The Romanian picture is a different one ... The Romanians have striven for autonomy, but they have been less daring and innovative in their domestic systems. They remain among the most rigid countries in the internal organisation of their system ...

Finally, on Yugoslavia, we and the Western Europeans, indeed, the Eastern Europeans as well, have an interest which borders on the vital for us in continuing the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet domination. Of course we accept that Yugoslav behaviour will continue to be, as it has been in the past, influenced and constrained by Soviet power. But any shift back by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would represent a major strategic setback for the West. So we are concerned about what will happen when Tito disappears, and it is worrying us a good deal.

So our basic policy continues to be that which we have pursued since 1948-49, keeping Yugoslavia in a position of substantial independence from the Soviet Union. Now at the same time, we would like them to be less obnoxious [i.e. to the United States] and we should allow them to get away with very little. We should especially disabuse them of any notion that our interest in their relative independence is greater than their own and, therefore, they have a free ride."

104. There were strong Yugoslav (and Romanian) objections to reports of Mr. Sonnenfeldt's talk. Mr. Cornel Burtica, Secretary of the Yugoslav communist party central committee, in an article in *Scinteia* on 13th April, rejected the proposed "organic relationship" with the Soviet Union, adding "relations between the Socialist countries are based on a new revolutionary concept, on a new type of unity, which

supposes the perfect equality in rights, and the rigorous observation of the principles of independence and national sovereignty.”¹

105. The Committee notes in passing that Yugoslavia was among the countries invited to send observers (along with Turkey and Greece, Bulgaria and Romania) to Soviet manoeuvres held in the Caucasus — the first to be notified under the Helsinki agreement. Iran, not a party to the agreement, was not invited although the manoeuvres which began on 25th January were near the Turkish and Iranian frontiers.

106. Yugoslav relations with Italy are normalised; agreement has now been reached on the residual border problem in the Trieste area. Yugoslav relations with Albania have recently been strained, however, because of the problem of ethnic Albanians on Yugoslav territory in the province of Kosovo on the Albanian frontier. Thirty-one persons were sentenced to imprisonment by a Yugoslav court at the end of February for organising a clandestine movement advocating the unification of Kosovo with Albania.²

107. The Balkan conference held in Athens on Greek initiative from 26th January to 5th February 1976 was attended by representatives from Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. Albania, although invited, refused to attend. Turkey was reported sceptical about the possibility of achieving concrete results on subjects proposed by Greece for practical co-operation in the Helsinki spirit — transport, telecommunications, energy, environment and agriculture — with a view to tightening Balkan solidarity as a guarantee against possible Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia when the régime in that country changes. Significantly, Bulgaria was reported to have blocked any attempt to institutionalise multilateral co-operation between the countries and the final communiqué said merely that conference proposals would be referred to the governments for selection of those considered “useful or acceptable to them”.

108. In view of the uncertainties surrounding the future of Yugoslavia, the Committee calls for a clear declaration on the part of the NATO countries to the effect that no external intervention will be tolerated in this country.

Albania

109. Albania in the 1950s was a member of the Warsaw Pact and provided a base for a squadron

of Soviet submarines, two of which were reputedly seized by Albania when that country broke with the Soviet Union in 1962. Since then, Albania has taken a rigidly anti-Soviet line in all its foreign relations, having sided with China in its dispute against the Soviet Union. On 20th April, the Albanian newspaper *Zeri I Popullit* carried yet another denunciation of Soviet attempts to “wipe out all traces of national sovereignty” in the countries of Eastern Europe which had become mere provinces of the Soviet State.¹ The third purge in two years has just been announced of those described by the Albanian leader Enver Hodja, as “... traitors who sought to weaken our friendship with China, to bind Albania to Soviet revisionism”.² There is no likelihood of Albania returning to the Soviet sphere in present circumstances, but it could again provide very useful submarine bases if its policy were to change as a consequence of successful Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia.

The Eastern Mediterranean

110. The Committee has reported twice on the situation in the Middle East since the October 1973 war³. Since that time, the prospect of renewed Egyptian-Israeli hostilities has diminished, especially since the signing of the September 1975 agreement, while in general the influence of the Soviet Union has been declining ever since July 1972 when Soviet military personnel were expelled from Egypt. But the failure so far to find a lasting settlement, and one that will find a place for the Palestinians, has been at the root of the internal fighting in the Lebanon with the inherent danger of wider hostilities.

Syria

111. Syria has a long common frontier with Turkey, a NATO country, as well as with Israel and the Lebanon. The Soviet Union gained considerable influence in the 1960s, it has the use of the port of Latakia for its Mediterranean squadron, there are 2,500 Soviet military advisers in the country and the Syrian armed forces have been heavily equipped with Soviet equipment which, at one time, was more modern than any possessed by Turkey. There are now reported to be seven hundred modern T-62 tanks, as well as

1. *Le Monde*, 15th April 1976.

2. *International Herald Tribune*, 2nd March 1976.

1. *The Times*, 21st April 1976.

2. *Le Figaro*, 3rd May 1976.

3. Document 624, 7th November 1973, Rapporteur: Mr. Jung; Document 651, 14th November 1974, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley.

many anti-tank and surface-to-air guided weapons and forty-five modern MiG-23 fighters as well as 250 MiG-21s. Press reports speak of Soviet military deliveries to the value of over \$1 billion since the 1973 hostilities with Israel. Nevertheless, the extent of Soviet influence has been declining since 1970, President Assad being less pro-Soviet than his predecessor. Apart from the use of Latakia, there are no Soviet military bases in the country.

112. Syrian intervention in the Lebanon civil fighting, although it initially appeared to foster intervention by Palestine liberation forces in favour of left-wing Arab elements, has in fact been a carefully controlled operation. The United States on 20th April recognised it as such when the White House press secretary, Mr. Nessen, saying that the United States remained opposed to military intervention in the Lebanon "that could lead to a military confrontation or a Middle East war" added "if you look at the nature and the intent of what Syria is doing in the Lebanon, overall they have played a constructive rôle."¹ On 14th April, Mr. Rabin, in an article in *Maariv* said that Israel would intervene in the Lebanon if Syrian forces passed a certain "red line" — considered by most observers to be the river Litani which flows into the Mediterranean some twenty-five kilometres north of the Israeli frontier. Iraq, Egypt and Libya have made it clear that a Syrian conquest of the Lebanon would not be tolerated.

113. Since 1975, Syria has been seeking to widen its sources of armaments. It was reported to have bought fifteen helicopters and two thousand anti-tank missiles from France. It was also said to be attempting to buy from North Vietnam American tanks and artillery captured during the fighting there.² United States "security support assistance" for 1975-76 included the sum of \$90 million for Syria.

Lebanon

114. Soviet influence has never extended to the Lebanon whose small armed forces have been supplied with American, British and French equipment. These forces have never been involved in the various Israeli wars, but the toleration of Palestinian bases in the territory has been the cause of conflict and reprisal strikes by Israel. Finally, the failure to find a solution to the

problem of the Middle East as a whole has led to the civil fighting in the Lebanon initiated by left-wing Arab forces sympathetic to the Palestinians. While the integrity of the country appears to be uneasily assured by the policies of both the Arab countries, Israel and the United States, it is unlikely that internal political stability can be achieved so long as the Palestinian problem remains unsolved.

Israel

115. The Israeli-Egyptian agreement of 1st September 1975 makes a great contribution to stability between Israel and Egypt, although the document does not claim to be more than a limited step — the parties "...are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by the security council Resolution 338, this agreement being a significant step towards that end" (Article 1). With the creation of a demilitarised buffer zone between the two countries in the Sinai desert, equipped with early-warning stations, some of which are manned by United States personnel, albeit civilian, the agreement virtually incorporates a United States guarantee to supervise the peace. An unpublished agreement between Israel and the United States provided for extensive military and economic assistance to Israel and a similar understanding in connection with the agreement guaranteed economic and (smaller) military aid for Egypt.

116. While there is no prospect of Soviet influence extending into Israel, a lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict, including a settlement of the Palestinian problem, remains an overwhelming western interest.

Egypt

117. Soviet influence has considerably and steadily declined in Egypt since the expulsion of most Soviet military personnel in July 1972 but there is still a Soviet presence in the country. The Soviet military bases and aircraft manned solely by Soviet personnel have gone, but military advisers remain in certain technical positions, while civilian co-operation continues with many Russian experts in the Helwan steelworks, over three hundred in a new aluminium works and others in the areas of electrification, the Aswan dam, etc. The press reports a total of between one thousand and three thousand military and civilian Soviet technicians remaining in the country, a figure that compares with some

1. International Herald Tribune, 21st April 1976.
2. Daily Telegraph, 15th October 1975.

two hundred technicians from France. In March 1976, Egypt finally denounced the Egyptian-Soviet treaty of friendship and, on 16th April, it was announced that twenty persons had been arrested, alleged to be part of a communist network. Simultaneously, five Russian technicians from the Helwan steelworks were expelled. Following the abrogation of the treaty, Egypt announced that the remaining naval facilities at Alexandria, which housed Soviet submarines, would be withdrawn effective on 14th April.¹

118. It would be wrong to consider the present trend in Soviet-Egyptian relations as realignment of Egypt with the West. Following its emergence from quasi-colonial status under the British, Egypt under Nasser was glad to accept Soviet support, especially after the 1956 British-French-Israeli invasion. Yet after a decade during which the Russians made themselves too much at home, the Egyptians found Soviet technology to be inferior to that of the United States or Germany, Russian culture inferior to French, and Russians more arrogant than the British.² Egypt now wants "normal" relations, both with Moscow and the West, which will not place Egypt in a subservient position to either. Heavily dependent on money from the Arab oil States, Egypt cannot make further concessions towards Israel for a permanent peace settlement until the Palestinian problem is settled, and Israel makes territorial concessions to Syria and Jordan.

119. Meanwhile, Egypt is seeking to broaden its sources of arms supplies. In March, the purchase of three military hovercraft from Britain was announced and Egypt has examined the possibility of fitting Rolls-Royce Spey engines to the MiG-21 aircraft now that spares are no longer available from the Soviet Union. The project was abandoned as too expensive but Aviation Week reports proposals for an Egyptian designed aircraft which would take the Spey or the RB-199 engine. Egypt is discussing with British, French and United States companies the possibility of installing helicopter production facilities in Egypt³. On 20th January, Mr. Fahmi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, announced in parliament that France had agreed to compensate Egypt for the loss of military equipment in the 1973 war. France had previously concluded a contract for the supply of Mirage

F-1 aircraft — reportedly forty — to Egypt. Egyptian approaches to Yugoslavia in this connection have been reported above. On 21st April, Egypt signed a military protocol with China understood to cover the provision of spare parts for Egypt's MiG fighters. China had previously supplied eighteen replacement engines for MiGs.¹ On 13th April, the United States House of Representatives cleared proposals for the sale of six C-30 aircraft to Egypt under an agreement which is said to include provision for the training of some twenty Egyptian pilots. This appears to be the first instalment of the limited United States military assistance offered privately in connection with the Egyptian-Israeli agreement of 1st September 1975.

Libya

120. Under Colonel Kadhafi, oil-rich Libya with a gross national product of some \$6,000 million for a population of only 2.25 million is the unpredictable *enfant terrible* of the Arab world, at loggerheads with most of it. But the fall in the demand for oil since 1974 has reduced Libya's oil revenue, leading the country to co-operate more closely with other oil producers. Libya has ideological disputes with its two neighbours — Egypt and Tunisia — in both of which countries conspiracy trials are in progress of individuals charged with conspiring to overthrow the governments at Libyan inspiration. Libya's military equipment has been supplied by both the Soviet Union and France and includes fifty modern Soviet T-62 tanks and 280 older models. The French-equipped air force has some ninety Mirage III-E and Mirage V aircraft.

121. At the end of 1975, disagreements were reported within the ruling revolution command council (CCR), leading to the arrest of two members of that body and the flight to Tunisia of Major Al-Mhaichi accused of organising a plot against Colonel Kadhafi because of the Islamic nature of Libyan policy. A purge of the Libyan armed forces is reported to have followed. But Colonel Kadhafi's position does not seem to be threatened at the present time.

122. Libya for some time has appeared a possible base for Soviet forces, although hitherto Colonel Kadhafi has maintained that he will not allow any foreign bases to be installed in his country. Thus, United States intelligence sources are said to have reported that Mr. Kosygin, the

1. Daily Telegraph, 15th April 1976.

2. William E. Griffith: "Soviet influence in the Middle East", *Survival*, January-February 1976.

3. The Times, 3rd March 1976.

1. The Guardian, 22nd April 1976.

Soviet Prime Minister, failed to secure naval and air base rights in Libya during his visit to the country in 1975¹. But now the press reports² that Colonel Kadhafi has handed over the former United States Wheelus air force base (now called Okba Ben Nafie) to the Soviet Union, Libyan personnel having been ordered off the base. The Russians were reported to have built hangars in Tripoli and Benghazi for planes that were "carrying out wide-scale reconnaissance missions over the Tunisian borders, which affirms that Kadhafi is planning to move militarily against Tunisia". Aviation Week of 22nd March 1976 reported the appearance of Soviet MiG-25 Foxbat reconnaissance aircraft carrying out high-level reconnaissance missions over Western European NATO countries, the Mediterranean and the Near East. The Committee understands that these aircraft have been detected in the Mediterranean area. Aviation Week reported that with a ceiling of 95,000 ft. Foxbat was beyond the reach of present allied surface-to-surface missiles. Your Rapporteur has put a question to the Council, asking it to confirm or deny this report³.

123. Mr. Mintoff, the Prime Minister of Malta, was successful in securing some Libyan assistance for his country, in particular the loan of a number of helicopters with Libyan pilots.

124. The Committee would view with great concern any establishment of Soviet bases in Libya which could only lead to a deterioration of the situation in the Mediterranean.

The Maghreb

125. Of the three Maghreb countries, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, Algeria has always had somewhat closer links with the Soviet Union. Algeria's modest armed forces of some 63,000 are equipped with semi-obsolete Soviet T-34 and T-54/55 tanks but also with anti-tank guided weapons and reportedly surface-to-air missiles. The air force has some thirty-five MiG-21s and older MiG-17s. Following the abrupt Spanish decision at the end of 1975 to withdraw from the former Spanish Sahara, handing over the major part to Morocco, there was a serious deterioration in relations between Algeria and Morocco, the former country supporting the *Polisario* move-

ment of the Sahara population which, from demanding independence from Spain, had turned to resisting the occupation of the territory by Moroccan forces in January. On 25th January, the Moroccan authorities announced that one of their F-5 aircraft had been shot down over Mauritania by a Soviet Sam-6 surface-to-air missile. Without naming Algeria, the announcement claimed the incident as proof of foreign intervention in the area.

126. The Organisation of African Unity was chiefly responsible for mediation between Algeria and Morocco, and its Ministerial Council meeting in Addis Ababa on 1st March failed to support publicly the *Polisario* movement, although some twenty out of forty-seven members were said to have spoken in favour of it. Partly as a consequence of the Saharan conflict, Algeria's relations with France have also deteriorated, Morocco having commenced a programme of modernisation of its equipment with the signature of a contract for the purchase of twenty-five Mirage F-1 fighters from France in December 1975, with an option for a further fifty. Deliveries begin in 1980¹. Morocco is also to purchase twenty-four F-5E fighters from the United States — Morocco is reported to be among the first ten foreign countries in receipt of military equipment from the United States.

127. Algeria has had some support in its dispute from Libya which has stationed some of its French Mirage F-1 aircraft in Algeria.

128. The isolation of Algeria, which has obviously been in recent receipt of Soviet military equipment, as Sam-6 missiles had not been previously reported in its possession, leaves Algeria open to approaches from the Soviet Union. On 20th January, Algeria denied yet again that it had threatened to open the former French naval base at Mers-el-Kébir to the Soviet Union. But the Algerian air base at Colomb-Béchar is reported to have been used for staging by Soviet planes flying military supplies to Angola².

129. One possible stabilising factor in the unsatisfactory situation in the area was the signature at the end of April of new association agreements between the Common Market and Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, which are expected to be followed by similar agreements with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Libya.

1. International Herald Tribune, 2nd February 1976.

2. The Guardian, 29th April 1976, quoting the Cairo newspaper Al-Gomhouria.

3. Written Question 169.

1. *Le Figaro*, 15th January and 23rd February 1976.

2. *L'Express*, 25th January-1st February 1976.

CHAPTER V

The NATO commands

130. The NATO headquarters in the Mediterranean area have been mentioned in connection with the various NATO countries described above. The command structure as a whole is shown at Appendix II. The Committee draws attention to the great achievement of the allied countries in establishing a coherent command structure with assigned and earmarked forces and all its associated infrastructure. For more than thirty years, there has been no major conflict in the area of the Alliance; the validity of the defence commitment lies in the daily demonstration of the preparedness of the Alliance manifested by the integrated military structure. It is inconceivable that the two world wars of the twentieth century could have broken out if the allied powers had been able to establish in peacetime a coherent operational structure on the lines of that maintained by NATO today.

Integrated headquarters

131. In the six major integrated headquarters in the southern region, military staffs drawn from the countries assigning forces to the area have full plans for the use of the forces that come under command in the event of hostilities, and in addition regularly command these forces in inter-allied exercises from time to time; they are ready at any time to assume operational control in the event of hostilities, and the air defence structure already assumes such functions in peacetime on a 24-hour basis, manning the radar early-warning stations, and exercising the power to scramble fighters to intercept unidentified aircraft.

132. The existence of integrated staffs drawn from countries whose armed forces have different traditions and, to a certain extent, different objectives, is a success in itself which has remained largely intact, despite disputes between participating countries that have been noted above. The Committee expresses the hope that with the opening of negotiations between Greece and NATO, it will be possible for Greek officers to return to the joint headquarters of 6th ATAF and Land South-East.

133. On its visit to headquarters AFSOUTH in April, the Committee noted the presence of a political adviser from the United States foreign service, as is usually the case in NATO headquarters where, as in this case, the commander

is a United States officer. In its previous report¹ the Committee noted that such advisers were not to be found in all NATO headquarters, and recommended that political advice be institutionalised, and the political authority of the Secretary-General, Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, recognised at the same time. It was suggested that the Secretary-General should assign political advisers, from his political affairs division, to all NATO headquarters. The Council has not yet replied to Recommendation 278 in which the Assembly made this proposal.

NATO infrastructure

134. On the recommendation of the integrated headquarters, NATO has collectively financed and constructed a large number of military installations throughout the Mediterranean area, which include in particular the airfields, the early-warning radar and communications system, storage for fuel and ammunition including nuclear ammunition. There is today a requirement for updating the communications system and the early-warning system, the first is being undertaken through the NATO integrated communications system project, the latter would be considerably enhanced if airborne warning and control aircraft become available (AWACS).

Exercises

135. Joint exercises by allied forces under NATO command play a vital deterrent rôle, both in improving the readiness of the forces and in demonstrating publicly the ability of the Alliance to act together in the event of aggression on one of its members. In an area where the land forces of the three main NATO countries indigenous to the area — Italy, Greece and Turkey — are not in a position to provide mutual support for geographical reasons, arrangements for joint naval and air operations, as well as airborne and amphibious land operations are of particular importance. The NATO naval on-call force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) is a particularly valid demonstration of allied unity. It was last brought together on 9th April for exercise "Dynasty Form" off Izmir in the Aegean Sea. On this occasion, it comprised destroyers, frigates and support ships from Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States in an exercise that lasted for about a month under the command of Commander Allied

1. Document 682, paragraph 43.

Naval Forces Southern Europe, Admiral Luigi Tomasuolo (Italy). The mobile force of Allied Command Europe provides a land component of a brigade group size, comprising battalions from Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States which can be deployed very rapidly to any threatened area on the southern flank, providing an immediate demonstration of allied solidarity as well as useful local reinforcements.

Problems of naval command areas

136. The Committee notes that the headquarters of South-Eastern Mediterranean area located in Malta (the commander is traditionally a British admiral) would have to leave the island when the defence agreement with Malta expires in 1979. This command could no doubt be exercised from the British sovereign base areas in Cyprus but these cannot provide port facilities. Alternative sites would be either Suda Bay in Crete, or Izmir in Turkey where headquarters 6th ATAF and Land South-East are already located.

137. Command of the Western Mediterranean (COMEDOC) was previously exercised by a French admiral from Toulon prior to the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure in 1966. The Committee notes that the Spanish-American command area established under the treaty signed in January covers the whole of the former Western Mediterranean. It would be logical to assign this command to a Spanish admiral, after conclusion of negotiations for the entry of Spain into NATO in the manner the Committee has suggested above.

138. The Committee in an earlier report¹ has drawn attention to the problems of co-ordination associated with the Gibraltar-Mediterranean command, and has proposed that primary responsibility for this area be transferred from SACEUR to SACLANT, the Gibraltar command becoming subordinate to the IBERLANT headquarters in Lisbon. It reaffirms this recommendation now.

CHAPTER VI

Contingency planning for future crises

139. While deterrence on the central front is exercised by the presence of comparatively large

and modern military forces in clearly-defined positions devoid of geographically grey areas, the situation on the southern flank of NATO is one where the indigenous forces are smaller and less heavily armed, but where geographical and political uncertainties, and the ever-present possibility of localised conflicts result in a greater risk of major conflict by miscalculation. The Committee recommends that careful contingency planning should be undertaken by NATO to provide against, and therefore deter, any misjudged action on the part of the Soviet Union which could lead to conflict.

Yugoslavia

140. In the section on Yugoslavia and Albania above, the Committee has called for a clear declaration on the part of the NATO countries to the effect that no external intervention would be tolerated there. It is important that careful plans should be made to deal with the situation that might arise when President Tito leaves the political scene. It is not impossible that the Soviet Union would claim at that time that the Yugoslav leadership had ceased to be representative, and in defence of "socialist" principles seek to intervene in the interests of the Yugoslav people and of what it calls the socialist commonwealth as a whole. In justification, it might seek to show that its assistance was called for by some Soviet puppet figure in the country. Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces might initially be massed on the frontiers of Yugoslavia and airborne units standing by, as they were prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

141. The defence arrangements of Yugoslavia which have been described above are certainly capable of offering considerable resistance. In such a situation, the NATO countries, at the request of the recognised Yugoslav authorities, should be prepared, severally and jointly, to fly in additional supplies of equipment, especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems which would be most needed to deter a blitzkrieg. If these measures, together with the NATO declaration for which the Committee has called above, should prove insufficient to deter an armed penetration into the country, a further immediate measure of support could be provided by allied tactical aircraft which could operate from bases outside Yugoslavia and from carriers of the United States Sixth Fleet. NATO forward air control units with appropriate communications equipment could be flown or parachuted into Yugoslavia in such a situation to join Yugoslav forces

1. Document 682, 10th November 1975, Rapporteur : Mr. Critchley.

in the field and provide accurate terminal guidance for allied air strikes. The existence of such preparations in peacetime should be sufficient to deter miscalculations on the part of the Soviet Union. Such contingency plans would ensure that the onus of initiating hostilities would rest at all times on the adversary.

Other non-aligned countries

142. Malta, Libya and Algeria are all countries where, at various times and in various situations, there is speculation about the possible installation of Soviet military bases which would pose a serious threat to the interests of NATO countries. The essence of realistic contingency planning is to ensure that the onus of initiating hostilities always rests on the potential adversary. Plans for such contingencies therefore can be designed only to demonstrate to the Soviet Union as well as to the country concerned the disadvantages of permitting the *status quo* to be changed through the installation of further military bases. Economic measures affecting the countries concerned as well as the provision of military assistance to any third countries that might consider themselves threatened by such a development are among the measures to be considered.

A future Angola

143. It is appropriate to consider here the implications of the Soviet-inspired and supported intervention by Cuban forces in Angola. Soviet supplies and military advisers were transported by sea and air through the Mediterranean on that occasion. Contingency planning by the NATO countries against further intervention in Africa must start first with much closer political co-ordination within the North Atlantic Council. In the particular case of Angola, there was probably a mistaken appreciation by certain western countries, in particular the United States, concerning the need to support particular factions among the three Angolan independence movements. United States financial support for certain factions in Angola proved ineffective, and hence counter-productive, because it could be portrayed as justification for Soviet and Cuban intervention.

CHAPTER VII

Conclusions

144. The Committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation :

Preamble

145. (i) The growing naval power of the Soviet Union is described in Chapter II of this explanatory memorandum. (ii) Paragraph 2 of the introduction lists some of the local conflicts in the Mediterranean area, which are referred to in the sections on the countries concerned. (iii) Chapter VI describes certain contingency plans the Committee has in mind.

146. (iv) Australia and New Zealand, since the 1975 elections, have taken a closer interest in mutual defence plans. Australia will make available to United Kingdom and United States warships the enlarged Cockburn Sands naval base, and examine the possibility of lifting the previous ban on nuclear-propelled warships using Australian ports. New Zealand places no limitation on the use of ports by allied warships. Both countries have stressed the importance of the ANZUS defence pact, and on 1st May a twelve-day naval exercise "Valiant Heritage" was held off California involving 41 ships, 200 aircraft and 18,000 men from the forces of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States ; Iran has become an important military power in the Middle East, perceived by many as a factor of stability in the area.

147. (v) Developments in Spain and Portugal are described in the respective sections. (vi) The Committee has frequently drawn attention to the fact that aircraft carriers, defined in the 1936 Montreux Convention as "...surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea...", are not among the categories of warship that are authorised to pass through the Turkish Straits under the terms of the convention ; most recently in Recommendations 254 and 256, the Assembly has called for the convention to be correctly applied. The proposal concerning political advice for NATO headquarters is mentioned in paragraph 133 above, that concerning the transfer of the Gibraltar command in paragraphs 62 and 138.

Operative text

148. *Paragraph 1 :* (a) Spain. The position of Spain has been described in the section on that country. The overlapping of the new United States-Spanish defence planning area with the NATO area is mentioned in paragraphs 88-92, the Committee's proposal in paragraph 94. (b) Malta. See paragraphs 50-56 above. (c) The advantages of territorial diversity for NATO

military facilities is mentioned in the case of Gibraltar (paragraph 63), Cyprus (paragraph 49) and Malta (paragraph 50). (d) The need for more public identification of all member countries with NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean area is stressed in paragraph 31. (e) The possibility of a new specific rôle for Portuguese forces is mentioned in paragraph 68.

149. *Paragraph 2:* (a) The need for a clear declaration on Yugoslavia is stressed in paragraphs 97 *et seq* and 108. (b) The situation in Libya, the Maghreb countries and in Malta is described in the respective sections of the explanatory memorandum, and the contingency envisaged in the recommendation is mentioned in paragraph 142. (c) Political and military contingency plans are discussed in Chapter VI, paragraphs 139-143.

150. *Paragraph 3:* The Committee has noted that the two-yearly defence white paper issued by Germany is also published in English and French; the German Government has been kind enough to make copies available to all members of the Committee. The Netherlands defence white paper of July 1974 was also issued in English. Most member countries now have a tradition of publishing regular statements of this nature on their defence policy, in many cases prefaced by a (national) assessment of the threat and statement of allied strategy as perceived by the country concerned.


151. The Committee now proposes that in order to provide the new European programme group with a vehicle for the necessary concertation of European defence policies, while at the same time providing valuable documentation for parliaments and the public, the group should be requested to publish a defence white paper comprising a joint assessment of the threat, and a joint statement of allied strategy to counter the threat. The white paper could then incorporate separate national chapters describing the defence effort and forces of each country. The Committee envisages that this white paper would be published in all national languages of the participating countries.

Opinion of the minority

152. This report was adopted in Committee by eleven votes to two with two abstentions. A minority of the Committee would have preferred, in place of the present text of paragraph 1 (a) of the draft Recommendation, to have recommended the WEU Council to follow the evolution of the situation in Spain, and to negotiate the accession of that country to WEU when its internal régime had been made genuinely democratic. In place of paragraph 1 (d), the minority would have recommended the WEU Council to study the question of European security in the Mediterranean, in order to bring together the political and strategic concepts on which the defence of the various WEU countries is based in the Mediterranean.


APPENDIX I

*Spanish/United States "geographical area of common interest"
under the treaty of 24th January 1976 and NATO command areas*



APPENDIX II

NATO military command structure Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area



A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency) current prices					Defence expenditure (US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GNP at factor cost (US \$ million) <i>a</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GNP (f.c.)					Defence expenditure per head <i>a</i> (US \$)					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 <i>f</i>	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 <i>f</i>	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 <i>e</i>	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 <i>e</i>	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 <i>f</i>	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 <i>f</i>	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 <i>f</i>
		(— 5)	(— 4)	(— 3)	(— 2)	(— 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million Frs.	39 670	44 140	48 941	57 395	69 791	814	1 003	1 258	1 474	1 998	25 758	32 129	41 527	48 557	61 072	9 673	9 711	9 742	9 772	9 801	3.2	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.3	84	103	129	151	204	3.19	3.26	3.36	3.52	3.88
France	Million Frs.	34 907	37 992	42 284	48 153	56 495	6 285	7 435	9 466	10 001	13 510	134 987	164 831	213 759	231 765	292 887	51 250	51 700	52 135	52 577	53 050	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.6	123	144	182	190	255	24.62	24.18	25.32	23.88	26.25
Federal Republic of Germany	Million DM	25 450	28 720	31 908	35 644	38 095	7 291	8 912	11 928	13 775	16 228	192 158	227 368	305 421	339 946	393 746	59 204	59 599	59 923	60 041	59 439	3.8	3.9	3.9	4.1	4.1	123	150	199	230	273	28.57	28.98	31.90	32.88	31.52
Italy	Million Lire	1 852	2 162	2 392	2 852	2 961	2 990	3 705	4 106	4 391	4 677	92 013	108 168	126 770	135 438	157 908	54 005	54 411	54 901	55 361	55 749	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.0	55	68	75	79	84	11.72	12.05	10.98	10.48	9.09
Luxembourg	Million Frs.	442	517	601	710	786		12	15	18	23	1 021	1 253	1 671	1 955	2 294	345	348	353	357	360	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	26	34	44	51	63	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Netherlands	Million Guilders	4 466	4 974	5 612	6 423	7 266	1 275	1 535	2 006	2 387	3 011	33 152	40 574	53 416	62 709	76 064	13 194	13 330	13 438	13 541	13 690	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	4.0	97	115	149	176	220	5.00	5.00	5.37	5.70	5.85
United Kingdom	Million £	2 815	3 258	3 512	4 207	5 070	6 853	8 145	8 611	9 845	12 033	119 889	138 058	157 055	172 728	216 191	55 712	55 891	56 033	56 068	56 236	5.7	5.9	5.5	5.7	5.6	123	146	154	175	214	26.86	26.49	23.03	23.50	23.37
TOTAL WEU							25 517	30 747	37 390	41 891	51 480	598 978	712 381	899 619	993 098	1 200 162	243 383	244 990	246 525	247 717	248 325	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.3	105	126	152	169	207	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million \$	2 131	2 238	2 405	2 862	3 113	2 111	2 259	2 403	2 926	3 082	79 764	90 224	104 119	124 623	130 800	21 595	21 848	22 125	22 479	22 771	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.4	98	103	109	130	135	8.27	7.34	6.43	6.99	5.99
Denmark	Million Kr.	3 195	3 386	3 520	4 439	5 130	431	487	582	728	932	14 474	17 424	23 051	26 019	31 208	4 963	4 992	5 022	5 045	5 075	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.8	3.0	87	98	116	144	184	1.69	1.58	1.56	1.74	1.81
Greece	Million Drachmas	15 480	17 211	19 866	24 126	43 917	516	574	670	804	1 464	9 788	11 317	14 658	17 897	20 375	8 831	8 889	8 929	8 962	8 998	5.3	5.1	4.6	4.5	7.2	58	65	75	90	163	2.02	1.87	1.79	1.92	2.84
Norway	Million Kr.	3 022	3 239	3 505	3 938	4 589	430	491	602	713	916	10 896	12 807	16 485	20 330	25 887	3 903	3 933	3 961	3 985	4 013	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.5	110	125	152	179	228	1.69	1.60	1.61	1.70	1.78
Portugal	Million Escudos	14 699	16 046	16 736	25 108	26 552	511	589	651	985	1 041	6 284	7 768	10 111	12 668	14 503	8 632	8 590	8 564	8 782	8 712	8.1	7.6	6.4	7.8	7.2	59	69	76	112	120	2.00	1.92	1.74	2.35	2.02
Turkey	Million L.	8 487	9 961	12 192	15 831	..	585	718	870	1 140	..	11 910	15 291	19 822	27 958	35 083	36 221	37 150	38 090	39 348	40 371	4.9	4.7	4.4	4.1	..	16	19	23	29	..	2.29	2.34	2.33	2.72	..
United States	Million \$	74 862	77 639	78 472	85 906	88 983	74 862	77 639	78 472	85 906	88 983	967 018	1 064 012	1 190 989	1 286 030	1 359 720	207 053	208 846	210 410	211 894	214 013	7.7	7.3	6.6	6.7	6.5	362	372	373	405	416	293.38	252.50	209.87	205.07	172.85
TOTAL NON-WEU ...							79 446	82 757	84 250	93 202	..	1 100 134	1 218 843	1 379 235	1 515 525	1 617 576	291 198	294 248	297 101	300 495	303 953	7.2	6.8	6.1	6.1	..	273	281	284	310	..	311.34	269.15	225.33	222.49	..
TOTAL NATO							104 963	113 504	121 640	135 093	..	1 699 112	1 931 224	2 278 854	2 508 623	2 817 738	534 581	539 238	543 626	548 212	552 278	6.2	5.9	5.3	5.4	..	196	210	224	246	..	411.34	369.15	325.33	322.49	..

e = Preliminary estimate

f = Forecast

GNP (f.c.): Gross national product at factor cost, current prices.

a. Figures affected by change in exchange rate.

Source: Defence expenditures according to NATO definition from NATO press release M/DPC/2(75)18.

Notes: GNP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GNP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1971-75, the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$	Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$
Belgium & Luxembourg	Franc			Italy	1,000 Lire		
— 1971		0.02052	48.74	— 1971		1.61438	0.61943
— 1972		0.02272	44.01	— 1972		1.71347	0.58361
— 1973		0.02571	38.90	— 1973		1.71649	0.58258
— 1974		0.02567	38.95	— 1974		1.53952	0.64955
— 1975		0.02863	34.93	— 1975		1.57937	0.63317
Canada	Canadian Dollar			Netherlands	Guilder		
— 1971		0.99037	1.0097	— 1971		0.28565	3.50
— 1972		1.00943	0.9907	— 1972		0.30864	3.24
— 1973		0.99945	1.0005	— 1973		0.35746	2.80
— 1974		1.02248	0.9780	— 1974		0.37163	2.69
— 1975		0.98990	1.0102	— 1975		0.41439	2.41
Denmark	Kroner			Norway	Kroner		
— 1971		0.13491	7.4122	— 1971		0.14230	7.03
— 1972		0.14390	6.9495	— 1972		0.15168	6.59
— 1973		0.16523	6.0522	— 1973		0.17169	5.82
— 1974		0.16408	6.0947	— 1974		0.18106	5.52
— 1975		0.18163	5.5056	— 1975		0.19956	5.01
France	Franc			Portugal	Escudo		
— 1971		0.18004	5.554	— 1971		0.03478	28.75
— 1972		0.19570	5.110	— 1972		0.03670	27.25
— 1973		0.22387	4.467	— 1973		0.03889	25.71
— 1974		0.20770	4.815	— 1974, 1975		0.03922	25.50
— 1975		0.23914	4.182				
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Deutschmark			Turkey	Lira		
— 1971		0.28647	3.49	— 1971		0.06889	14.52
— 1972		0.31030	3.22	— 1972		0.07207	13.88
— 1973		0.37383	2.68	— 1973		0.07133	14.02
— 1974		0.38647	2.59	— 1974		0.07199	13.89
— 1975		0.42599	2.35	— 1975		0.07149	13.99
Greece	Drachma			United Kingdom	£		
— 1971, 1972		0.03333	30.00	— 1971		2.4342	0.411
— 1973		0.03373	29.65	— 1972		2.5000	0.400
— 1974, 1975		0.03333	30.00	— 1973		2.4520	0.408
				— 1974		2.3401	0.427
				— 1975		2.3733	0.421

B. MANPOWER CONTRIBUTION

	Country	Period of compulsory military service — Months —	Total in armed forces (thousands)	Total employment (millions)	Total in armed forces as % of total employment
		1975-76	1975-76	1974	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1	Belgium	12 ⁷	87	3.80	2.3
2	France	12	502	21.10	2.4
3	Germany	15	495	25.69	1.9
4	Italy	12 ^a	421	18.72	2.2
5	Luxembourg	nil	0.55	0.15	0.37
6	Netherlands	16-18 ^a	112.5	4.58	2.5
7	United Kingdom	nil	345.1 ^b	24.77	1.4
8	TOTAL WEU		1,963.15	98.81	2.0
9	Canada	nil	77	9.14	0.8
10	Denmark	9	34	2.36	1.4
11	Greece	24	161.2	3.17	5.1
12	Norway	12 ^b	35	1.66	2.1
13	Portugal	24 ^a	217	3.08	7.0
14	Turkey	20	453	14.87 ^c	3.0
15	United States	nil ¹	2,130	85.94	2.5
16	TOTAL NON-WEU		3,107.2	120.22	2.6
17	TOTAL NATO		5,070.35	219.03	2.3

1. Selective draft calls were terminated on 27th January 1973; those previously drafted complete 24 months service.
2. Navy 18.
3. Air force 18-21; navy 18-21.
4. Navy 48; air force 36.
5. Including forces enlisted outside Britain (8,900).
6. Air force 15; navy 15.
7. If serving in Germany 10 months.

Sources : Numbers in armed forces and period of military service : Institute for Strategic Studies “The Military Balance, 1975-76”.
Labour Force : OECD Labour Forces Statistics, 1963-74, total employment.

^c - Estimate.

Security in the Mediterranean

AMENDMENT No. 1¹

tabled by Mr. Dankert, Mr. Sieglerschmidt and Lord Peddie

1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "if the Atlantic Alliance weakened in its determination to defend its freedom".
2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "freely-elected parliamentary democracies and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis" and insert "parliamentary democracy and human rights and the preparation of NATO contingency plans designed to meet any crisis in the treaty area".
3. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
4. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "announcement of free elections in Spain" and insert "signs of democratic developments in Spain".
5. Leave out paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert "by negotiating in due time with a democratic Spain the accession of that country to the North Atlantic Treaty".
6. Leave out paragraph 1(d) of the draft recommendation proper.
7. Leave out paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper.
8. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Dankert , Sieglerschmidt, Peddie

1. See 5th Sitting, 16th June 1976 (Part 1 agreed to ; part 2 amended and agreed to ; part 3 agreed to ; part 4 agreed to ; part 5 amended and agreed to ; part 6 withdrawn ; part 7 agreed to ; part 8 negatived).

Security in the Mediterranean

AMENDMENT No. 2¹

tabled by Mr. Radius and others

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after "Alliance".
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "appropriate" and replace "Iran associated with Alliance defence planning" with "Iran associated with the Alliance".
3. Leave out paragraph 1 (c) of the draft recommendation proper and insert "by recognising the value of NATO military facilities located in several countries of the Mediterranean area".
4. In paragraph 2(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "détente" and insert "of any installation of new Soviet bases or similar facilities in the Mediterranean area".

Signed : Radius, de Montesquiou, Burckel, Valleix

1. See 5th Sitting, 16th June 1976 (Part 1 negatived; part 2 fell; part 3 agreed to; part 4 agreed to).

Security in the Mediterranean

AMENDMENT No. 3¹

tabled by Mr. Valleix and Mr. de Bruyne

In the draft recommendation, before the words "RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS", insert the following :

"RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

(a) Examine regularly all questions relating to the security of Europe in the Mediterranean and thus foster a rapprochement of political and strategic concepts underlying the defence of the different member countries of Western European Union in the Mediterranean basin ;

(b) Follow the evolution of the situation in Spain and examine the conditions and possibilities for that country joining Western European Union when its internal régime conforms with the principles on which the modified Brussels Treaty is based ;"

Signed: Valleix, de Bruyne

1. See 5th Sitting, 16th June 1976 (Amendment agreed to with the deletion of paragraph (b)).

Strategic mobility

PRELIMINARY REPORT¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur***

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submitted by Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur

Introduction

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Conclusion

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. *Critchley* (Chairman) ; MM. Klepsch, Dankert (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Averardi, Beauguitte (Substitute : *Delorme*), Bizet (Substitute : *La Combe*), Boulloche, Buck, Haase, Hardy, Kempinaire (Substitute : *Breyne*), Konen, de Koster (Substitute : *Piket*),

Laforgia, Lemmrich, Ménard (Substitute : *de Montesquiou*), Pawelczyk (Substitute : *Müller*), Pumilia, Reale, Richter, Rivière, Roper, Scholten, Schugens, Tanghe (Substitute : *Duvieusart*), Urwin (Substitute : *Whitehead*), Vedovato.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Order
on strategic mobility

The Assembly,

Noting that the armed forces of the Soviet Union enjoy worldwide strategic mobility based on a modern navy and a large air transport fleet, complete with bases and facilities acquired through political penetration of key countries in all the oceans of the world ;

Aware that it is of vital importance to the security of Europe that the armed forces of all countries of the Atlantic Alliance should have strategic mobility throughout the area of the Atlantic Alliance and to other areas where they exercise responsibilities,

REQUESTS THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

To continue its study of the problems of strategic mobility and report at an early date.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Davieusart, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. Your Rapporteur was instructed to report on the material and political difficulties of securing strategic mobility, including refuelling facilities and overflying rights for air forces, and bunkering facilities and rights of passage for warships, both within the NATO area and worldwide.

2. Preliminary enquiries have revealed no collected body of information on arrangements for moving military forces which are largely made by the foreign ministries and movements control departments of ministries of defence in the member countries. The present report is therefore an interim progress report, because more time is required to collect all the relevant information.

3. The subject covers many issues which are being debated in the framework of negotiations on the law of the sea, the next session of the United Nations conference being due to open on 2nd August. It is not only a possible universal agreement on a twelve-mile territorial sea, with its impact on many international straits, that could affect the movement of forces, the implications of an even larger exclusive economic zone have also to be borne in mind. Arrangements for international movement of forces are of close concern to NATO countries both for the movement of forces within the NATO area, whether on exercises for training purposes or as reinforcements in a crisis (and there appear to be no uniform arrangements for the passage of allied warships or military aircraft among the NATO countries), as well as to enable member countries to be able to deploy forces outside the NATO area in the parts of the world where the Soviet Union and its allies are deploying considerable military force — the Indian Ocean and Southern Africa are particular cases at the present time.

4. Your Rapporteur proposes to study in particular the following aspects of strategic mobility. To provide an information basis for Chapters I, II and III below, he is preparing a questionnaire for circulation to ministries of defence of the allied countries.

I. Military movements within the NATO area

5. The report will study existing requirements for military movements within the NATO area,

including deployment of forces to battle positions ; special commitments such as the air and land components of ACE mobile force ; the movements of other joint forces such as the standing naval forces Atlantic and Channel, the naval on-call force Mediterranean ; the movement of troops, aircraft, etc., to training areas outside their own country ; arrangements required for the movement of reinforcements in an emergency. The report will attempt to show the diversity of existing arrangements between different NATO countries and recommend suitable standardised arrangements which should desirably be agreed upon by all NATO countries.

II. Military movements outside the NATO area

6. The report will discuss the requirement and facilities which exist for moving military forces by air or sea to other countries of the world, where member countries of the Alliance have defence commitments, or where it may be desirable that member countries should be enabled to deploy military forces. The Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the African continent will be examined as well as the possible contribution of contingents to United Nations peacekeeping forces. A relatively small number of countries can provide the key for transit arrangements for access to these areas.

III. Military capability and strategic mobility

7. The report will examine the existing capabilities of Soviet and allied forces to deploy in various parts of the world, including air transport capability ; the range and autonomy of naval forces ; amphibious capabilities — provided for example by helicopter carriers and landing ships.

Conclusion

8. A definitive report will be submitted as soon as the necessary information has been assembled. In the draft order attached to this interim progress report the Committee asks the Assembly to note the importance of the subject and to request the Committee to pursue its study and report back.

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 273 to 283***RECOMMENDATION 273¹*****on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance
— consideration of current problems²***

The Assembly,

Considering that, however Europe's defence may be organised, the Atlantic Alliance remains the essential guarantee of European security ;

Noting with interest the views expressed by the Commission of the European Communities in its report on European union of 26th June 1975 concerning the defence responsibilities of the European union ;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with defence responsibilities ;

Underlining that accession to the modified Brussels Treaty is still open in particular to any country called upon to take part in a European union ;

Noting that "the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty" and that "the Council are at present discussing the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe" (Reply to Recommendation 266) ;

Considering the Council's refusal to reply to questions put by members of the Assembly on nuclear strategy and NATO defence plans to be contrary to normal parliamentary democratic procedure and consequently unacceptable (Written Questions 158 and 159),

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Implement in the framework of its responsibilities the principles defined in Resolution 55 of the Assembly, and in particular :
 - (a) ensure that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied in full until such time as the European union has the necessary powers and means of action to exercise defence responsibilities ;
 - (b) maintain all its activities as long as they have not been attributed by treaty to the institutions of the union ;
2. Ensure that no member country enters into any international undertaking liable to limit its participation in a European union with responsibilities covering external policy and defence matters ;
3. Explore and implement here and now the possibilities afforded by the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in the field of arms policy ;
4. Consider forthwith how to make truly European bodies responsible for preparing a defence policy to be implemented by the forces of the member States ;
5. Invite the European Council, as an organ of the EEC, to consult the WEU Assembly on any plans it may draw up concerning the defence of Europe.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (9th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Leynen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 680).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 273

1. The Council are aware that they have a continuing responsibility to examine problems of solidarity and defence arising for European countries. At the same time, it is their view that when these problems are studied, progress towards the unification of Europe should be taken into account. In this context the Council recall paragraph 9 of the Ottawa declaration, with which they are in full agreement. They reaffirm the validity of the modified Brussels Treaty, the provisions of which are binding on member States, and constantly follow its application with care. In this connection, the Council are of the opinion that close consideration should be given to the recent proposals on the establishment of a European union and in particular to those relating to the long-term prospects for achieving a common defence policy as a logical completion of the union.

2. The Council and the member governments of WEU in their international policy are constantly guided by the principle that no member country should accept any undertaking liable to limit their participation in the process of the unification of Europe.

3 and 4. Defence problems are a major concern of the Council and the modified Brussels Treaty which commits the member States to come to each other's assistance in the event of aggression forms a fundamental element in the security system of Europe. The Council therefore attach great importance to the application of the provisions of the treaty and of the protocol relating to the levels of member States' forces and armaments. In the case of armaments policy, the Council will continue to follow closely and to facilitate all work in progress on the standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment which is carried out in WEU and other competent bodies.

5. The problem of European security is of fundamental importance and of immediate concern. The subject may come up for consideration in the framework of the Nine and it is to be hoped that when such matters are examined, account will also be taken of ideas and work originating outside the Community.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 274¹
on the European aeronautical industry²

The Assembly,

Welcoming the action programme for the European aeronautical sector submitted by the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers ;

Likewise welcoming the activities of the European Civil Aviation Conference, the association of European airlines and the Association Européenne des Constructeurs de Matériel Aéronautique ;

Aware of the formation of the Group of Six by the main European aircraft manufacturers ;

Regretting that the range of Eurocontrol's activities is being diminished,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call upon member countries to recognise :

1. That it is essential to ensure the unified civil and military aerospace manufacturing and user market without which divergent national policies will continue to prevail ;
2. That a European military aircraft procurement agency as proposed by the Assembly and later by the Commission requires the juridical basis of the modified Brussels Treaty on which the Standing Armaments Committee is also based ;
3. That the weakening of Eurocontrol would be detrimental to Europe and that the organisation should be developed in accordance with its Charter and that there is no point in defining European air space if a European organisation which is working effectively is downgraded to the task of co-ordinating national air traffic services.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 691).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 274

1. The Council, like the Assembly, welcome the activities of those European bodies within which manufacturers and users consult together, with regard to their actions in the field of aviation.

On the military side, the Council would welcome any efforts designed to create in Europe a single military market which would benefit manufacturers and users equally.

Such a development would improve the prospects of the European aeronautical industry. Duplication of work should, however, be avoided where other European organisations are engaged in similar activities.

The European programme group, set up in Rome on 2nd February 1976, is competent to deal with the entire field of armaments co-operation. The European programme group can therefore deal with matters relating to the military aeronautical industry.

2. If a military aircraft procurement agency were to be established, it would be necessary to consider very carefully beforehand how the modified Brussels Treaty might be affected by the setting up of such an agency.

3. The Council do not see themselves in a position at present to state their views on Eurocontrol whose importance is rightly emphasised by the Assembly, since the problems involved in the further development of that organisation vary greatly among the individual member countries. Moreover, the future of this organisation is at present under consideration (since, in fact, the convention by which Eurocontrol was set up terminates in 1980). It is therefore premature to express a view on this point.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th May 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 275¹

on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology²

The Assembly,

Aware of the political and technological necessity for Western Europe and the United States to co-operate in such fields of advanced technology as space, nuclear energy, oceanography, computers and electronics ;

Conscious of the fact that the Soviet Union has a highly-developed industry for civil and military products of advanced technology which makes it the greatest power on the Eurasian continent ;

Satisfied that joint European-American space ventures undertaken to date have been successful and that the Spacelab project is progressing smoothly ;

Fearing that the space shuttle flight will constitute the end of the European Space Agency's participation in the Spacelab programme ;

Fearing, further, that in the absence of new major space programmes in the United States or Europe there will be no further activities for this association ;

Considering the budgetary restrictions in both the United States and Western Europe ;

Regretting that in many other fields of advanced technology Western Europe has not organised itself so well as in space matters and that co-operation with the United States has therefore proved to be far more complicated,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. After reviewing the present policies and varying approaches of member countries, promote and develop an overall European policy in advanced technology in order to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and foster fruitful co-operation with the United States ;
2. Give active consideration to Europe's need for an oceanographic authority of its own and arrange for such a body to be formed in the framework of an existing European organisation ;
3. In liaison with the European Space Agency, join the United States Government in working out an advanced space programme for future joint payload development for the Spacelab and the shuttle.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 687).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 275

1. The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to seek an overall policy designed to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and to foster fruitful co-operation with the United States on an equal footing.

European policies on advanced technologies are co-ordinated through several existing international bodies such as the EEC and the European Space Agency. European policies are already formulated through these organisations which provide the opportunity for strengthening Europe's technological base and co-ordinating with other States.

The work done in these various organisations represents a not inconsiderable effort in the direction sought by the Assembly.

2. The Assembly's recommendation has been forwarded to the appropriate departments in member States.

The Council wish to point out, however, that suitable machinery for the regular co-ordination of oceanographic research between European countries already exists within the EEC (particularly the Scientific and Technical Research Committee) and the group on co-operation in scientific and technical research (including nineteen Western European countries) and is capable of being further developed.

Moreover, at international level, a programme of oceanographic studies has been launched by NATO in its Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society; several member countries of WEU are taking part. Finally, several European countries are members of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), of which the United States is also a member.

3. Among the tasks entrusted to the European Space Agency when it was set up was that of co-ordinating member States' space policies and programmes. The Agency is carrying out this task in full agreement with its member States, which include six of the WEU member countries. The Director-General of the Agency is in constant touch with the competent United States authorities, and, in particular, with NASA, for the purpose of implementing the Spacelab programme as at present laid down and ultimately of establishing permanent co-operation based on the practical results of the first joint space experiments.

The Spacelab arrangement between European Governments and the European Space Agency provides for further studies on how to develop Spacelab principles and technology after the first flight (projected for 1980). Therefore it would be premature to apply more than preliminary thinking to the problem raised in the recommendation.

In conclusion, the fear expressed in the preamble that European participation in the shuttle system might cease would appear to be unfounded. It is true that budgetary restrictions in the various States necessitate strict economy, but implementation of the programme should not be threatened. The sharing of work on the payload programme between the participating countries is an important contribution to ensuring viability of the system and to concentrating the available financial resources where they are of most use.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 276 ¹

on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ²

The Assembly,

Hoping that the Final Act of the Helsinki conference may lead to considerable progress in détente, understanding and co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe ;

Noting furthermore that the principles set out in that text concern relations as a whole between all the signatory countries ;

Deploring that the positions adopted by the Soviet Union and other member countries of the Warsaw Pact in the months following the conference indicate an excessively restrictive interpretation of certain principles laid down in the Final Act ;

Underlining the need to reach early agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction in the level of forces of the two alliances in Central Europe ;

Considering that such a reduction should not result only from a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union but must take account of the interests of all the European countries ;

Considering further that the balance of military forces remains the principal guarantee of security and peace in Europe for the foreseeable future,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure the maintenance of continuing consultations between its members on all matters raised by the application of the Final Act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ;
2. Ensure furthermore that any negotiations on force reductions do not lead to a weakening of Western European security and the creation of further imbalance in that area ;
3. Ask member governments to define, for instance in the framework of nine-power consultations, a joint position for its members on matters raised by the third basket of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ;
4. In no event accept any principle contrary to that of the sovereign equality of States defined in the Final Act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ;
5. Ensure that the quadripartite agreement on Berlin is strictly applied.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mrs. von Bothmer on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 683).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 276

1. The maintenance of continuing consultations between members of WEU on all matters raised by the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE is assured by the regular meetings of a working group set up for this purpose within the framework of the political co-operation of the Nine, as well as through the discussions on the subject within the North Atlantic Council and its committees.

2. Those member governments of WEU which are involved in negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions in Central Europe can state that they have consistently refrained from any step during these negotiations that could lead to a weakening of Western European security and will continue to do so in the future.

3. Member countries will insist on the application of the recommendations in the Final Act of the CSCE, which formed part of the "third basket". They intend to pursue the objectives which were theirs in this sphere in the course of the CSCE negotiations, concerting their policies and harmonising and co-ordinating their positions.

4. The principles set forth in the "declaration on principles" guiding relations between participating States are all of primary significance and each of them will be interpreted taking into account the others.

There exists no intention on the part of member States of WEU to adopt any position or accept any interpretation contrary to any of the principles listed in the declaration.

5. The Council share the Assembly's view regarding strict compliance with and the full application of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 277¹
on second-generation nuclear reactors²

The Assembly,

Considering the need to continue research and development for peaceful purposes in respect of advanced nuclear reactors ;

Aware of the tremendous financial outlay required for the successful conclusion of this research and development ;

Recognising the vast industrial complex required for the construction of these nuclear reactors and power plants ;

Conscious of the political and economic advantages deriving from the installation of multinational regional nuclear fuel centres ;

Aware of the advantages of such installations for better guaranteeing peace, security and control in respect of nuclear materials,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member governments

1. To formulate a long-term common nuclear energy policy, act immediately on decisions already taken in the Community and the OECD, and define the extent of co-operation with the United States ;
2. To promote the further development of the European nuclear power industry to meet the increased requirements for nuclear power plants on the world market ;
3. To make known in national parliaments and European assemblies their opinions on the United States proposal for multinational regional nuclear fuel centres.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 686).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 277

1. As regards the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the member countries of the European Community are pursuing a common policy based on the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. Decisions taken by the OECD Council or the Steering Committee of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD are carried out by member countries with due regard to their obligations under the Euratom treaty. Co-operation between the member countries and the United States of America and between the Community and the United States has been resting for years now on the basis of co-operation treaties. Under the present circumstances and in the light of experience, the member governments deem the extent of that co-operation to be adequately defined.

2. The member governments have for many years been promoting the further development of the nuclear power industry so as to meet the growing requirements of the rest of the world as well. Firms in the individual countries are perfectly capable of meeting the requirements for nuclear power plants on the world market.

3. The United States proposal to operate fuel centres under multinational direction and at regional level must be welcomed as a possible further step towards diminishing the dangers of nuclear proliferation. But it also raises a number of political, ecological, legal and management problems which need to be closely examined. The IAEA has begun a study on the question of fuel centres. As soon as its findings are available, and as soon as the debate that has arisen in the United States on this set of problems has produced some clarification, the member governments will be able to express well-grounded views on the United States proposal both to the national parliaments and the Assembly.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th May 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 278 ¹

on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the undiminished military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries, in particular the continued modernisation and world-wide operations of the Soviet fleet, call for an adequate defence effort based on a viable economy ;
- (ii) Believing that NATO and the European Community are the twin institutions through which the countries of WEU, by pooling their resources, can retain their freedom and secure decent living standards for their people ;
- (iii) Believing further that the strength of NATO and the European Community lies in the freely-expressed support of the peoples of the exclusively pluralist democracies that compose them, and that membership of countries with totalitarian régimes should not be tolerated in the future ;
- (iv) Expressing its support for the present government in Portugal as a first step towards a fully democratic government, stressing the importance of Portugal's membership of NATO and its contribution to the defence of Europe, and expressing the hope that close links can now be established between Portugal and the European Community ;
- (v) Welcoming the growing public expression of demands for political freedoms in Spain, and believing that the Spanish people must shortly take their place in NATO and the European Community, to both of which they can make a valuable contribution ;
- (vi) Recognising that formal defence agreements between NATO or the member countries and Spain could provide ephemeral practical advantages, but believing that any such agreements concluded before the emergence of democracy in Spain would so alienate public opinion both in the NATO countries and in Spain that the very existence of the Alliance and any possibility of lasting future agreement with Spain would be jeopardised,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. State clearly that although, unlike the Soviet Union, the western democracies will never intervene by force to change the internal régimes in any country, it is of importance to them that democracy should flourish in all countries that are naturally part of Western Europe ;
2. Urge member countries to ensure through their representatives in the European Community and in NATO :
 - (a) that no formal agreements are concluded with totalitarian régimes in Western Europe ;
 - (b) that financial, economic and technical help is provided for Portugal with a view to encouraging progress towards a truly democratic pluralistic parliamentary system of government ;
 - (c) that an examination of the problems of the Alliance's naval forces command structure in the IBERLANT and NAVSOUTH areas be made ;
 - (d) that diplomatic advice be provided from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 682).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 278

1. It is the guiding principle of the western democracies in their foreign relations not to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries. They have at all times adhered to this principle and, whenever they have deemed it advisable, have incorporated it in the text of agreements and declarations governing their international relations. At the same time, this attitude cannot constitute an obstacle to, or be regarded as in any way inconsistent with, any expressions of sympathy by the western democracies for trends of opinion now emerging in favour of a pluralist democracy in countries where it has not yet been fully established.

2. (a) The Council welcome developments which have taken place or are becoming apparent in those Western European States previously under authoritarian régimes. The Assembly's recommendation must be considered in the light of these developments which they recognise are not the same in each country.

(b) In October of last year, the member countries of the European Economic Community approved emergency economic aid to Portugal through the European Investment Bank, to the extent of 180 million units of account including interest rebate. This Community aid does not exclude the possibility of additional bilateral aid. The main purpose of the emergency EEC aid is to help Portugal through a difficult period in advance of the conclusion of negotiations on additions to the EEC/Portugal free trade agreement. These additions will include a financial protocol.

(c) Member nations participating in the integrated military structure of NATO are satisfied that the NATO military authorities are conscious of the need to ensure that the military organisation remains effective and efficient at all times. To this extent, the structure is under continuous review.

(d) The North Atlantic Council and the Defence Planning Committee ensure that the NATO military authorities are provided (through the Secretary-General and the international staff) with political and diplomatic guidance.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th May 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 279¹***on the International Institute for the Management of Technology²***

The Assembly,

Noting with regret the situation of the International Institute for the Management of Technology which was established in Milan in 1971 ;

Considering this situation as a step back on the path of European collaboration and wishing to rescue as much as possible of this joint venture ;

Conscious of the fact that Belgium, Denmark and Ireland have not signed the convention setting up the International Institute for the Management of Technology but participate in the European Council and that Austria, which is not a member of the European Council, has signed it,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Study, together with all the governments concerned, the possibility of using the institute's premises and other assets in Milan for alternative purposes in the interests of Europe ;
2. Submit the findings of its study to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and eventually to the European Council for implementation.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 685).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 279

In the event of the International Institute for the Management of Technology being wound up, a problem would arise concerning the future use of its premises and other assets in Milan.

Member States are fully aware of this problem. The question of using these premises and assets for alternative purposes in the interests of Europe is at present under review within the Communities.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 280¹
on Northern European countries and the prospect
of European political union²

The Assembly,

Considering that by their civilisation, culture and political, economic and social system, the Scandinavian countries belong to Western Europe ;

Noting that economic, political and military factors imposed by the situation of Northern Europe now prevent these countries taking their place in a European union with responsibilities which include foreign policy and defence matters ;

Considering that the European Community (which includes Denmark) cannot wait for these countries to be in a position to take part in the undertaking before forming a union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider, in the framework of its study on "the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe", how countries of Northern Europe might be associated with this undertaking both in the Atlantic Alliance and in WEU ;
2. Invite the Scandinavian countries to send observers to an *ad hoc* meeting to study any project for the joint production of armaments.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Steel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 684).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 280

Norway, Denmark and Iceland are members of the Atlantic Alliance and play a full part in discussions in the North Atlantic Council and in the Defence Planning Committee of matters relating to the procurement of defence equipment. In addition, Norway and Denmark are members of the Eurogroup and participate actively in its activities in the European defence procurement field. Furthermore, it is envisaged that additional work among European countries on this subject will take place in an independent group open to all the European members of the Alliance including, of course, its Northern European members. None of the Northern European countries, however, has so far expressed interest in any form of association with the activities of WEU.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th February 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 281 ¹

on European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Having considered the present situation of research, development and production in the field of armaments in the light of the report by its Defence Committee ;
- (ii) Informed of the important statements made to it in Paris on 5th December 1974 by Mr. Van Elsandé, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, on a joint European armaments policy ;
- (iii) Aware that, despite progress made in this field in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, for instance the principles on co-operation in the field of armaments laid down by Eurogroup on 23rd May 1972, new concrete possibilities exist, particularly among the member countries of WEU, for a decisive improvement in co-operation where the active collaboration of France would be a great advantage ;
- (iv) Noting that the serious economic situation affecting most member countries of the Alliance and the ensuing budgetary difficulties have repercussions on the defence potential ;
- (v) Underlining consequently the urgent need to rationalise the defence effort of all the member countries in order to avoid waste due to the multiplication of projects for weapons or weapons systems and the wide diversity of models produced for one and the same defence task ;
- (vi) Aware that, in view of the geographical situation of Europe, deterrence, if it is to be credible, also requires conventional forces and that national armed forces should be able to operate jointly to achieve a strong defence potential with chances of success ;
- (vii) Considering that a growing awareness is developing among governments, parliaments, public opinion and national and international groups and that a flow of ideas is developing which should allow the necessary measures to be taken in the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance ;
- (viii) Aware of national interests in the field of armaments and their importance for security of employment, but convinced that they do not preclude either bilateral or multilateral co-operation and, on the contrary, make it appear far more rational ;
- (ix) Noting the initiatives and suggestions from across the Atlantic seeking to establish new means of co-operation between the United States and the countries of Western Europe in the field of armaments ;
- (x) Noting also the proposals made by the Commission of the European Communities in its report on European union dated 26th June 1975 ;
- (xi) Aware of the agreement in principle reached by the Defence Ministers of the European countries on 5th November 1975 to establish a European defence procurement secretariat open to all European members of the Alliance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Recognise that the aims which member countries are committed to pursue in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance on a basis of equal rights and obligations are :
 - (a) to strengthen the defence potential of the Alliance as a whole, especially in Europe, so as to establish, in the face of the continuously increasing armaments of the Warsaw Pact, the balance of forces which is essential to the security of free Europe and the progress of East-West relations ;
 - (b) to maintain a technical potential in the countries of Western Europe and develop a competitive European armaments industry with sufficient means for research and production ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Lemmrich on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 689).

- (c) to seek a better balance between the means available on both sides of the Atlantic and establish reciprocity in respect of the procurement and production of armaments ;
 - (d) to promote a European identity and the idea of European union by implementing effective and lasting co-operation in the fields of research, development, production and logistics which are still a national responsibility and hence require governments to take decisions based on defence requirements and the joint interest of the Western European countries ;
2. Welcome the decision of the North Atlantic Council that, at its spring meeting, a special meeting should be held at ministerial level to study Atlantic and European co-operation in the field of armaments, and give it its full support ;
3. (a) Take up on behalf of WEU the declaration on principles of equipment co-operation adopted on 27th May 1972 by the Ministers of Defence of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom ;
- (b) Organise the development of new weapons allowing a high return to be ensured and economic solutions to be found ;
- (c) Establish within the Atlantic Alliance detailed political guidelines covering the following fields and take a decision on them :
- harmonisation of military tactical concepts ;
 - definition of military requirements of the Alliance ;
 - alignment of equipment, calibres, fuel, etc., in order to ensure the interoperability of arms and equipment and improve logistics in the armed forces of the Alliance ;
 - the standardisation of future armaments and equipment programmes ;
- (d) Pay particular attention to the problem of destandardisation of armaments due to the proliferation of projects in each country and above all to the creation of new weapons systems accompanied by the use of older systems ;
- (e) Examine the means of reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee ;
4. Urge member governments :
- (a) with regard to research, development and production, to endorse fully the measures necessary for carrying out joint undertakings with as many partners as possible ;
 - (b) to seek means to avoid the economy of a country being affected by giving up an armaments programme in favour of a joint undertaking ; to this end, consideration might be given to setting up a burden-sharing body ; this should be decided with other appropriate bodies ;
 - (c) to draw up a list of programmes for armaments which might be procured jointly both by European countries and by the North American allies ; WEU should launch this idea and the decision should be taken with the Atlantic Alliance ;
 - (d) to give active consideration to the practical possibilities in Western Europe of establishing in the long term a two-way transatlantic flow of trade in armaments, ensuring that this becomes possible only when the countries of Western Europe co-operate in the development and production of armaments as real partners carrying the same weight as the United States ;
 - (e) to pay particular attention to the export of armaments to non-member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and endeavour to ensure an early settlement of outstanding questions ;
5. Report to the Assembly on the results of its study on the possibility of giving WEU additional tasks connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe ;
6. Give absolute priority at political level to problems of co-operation in the field of armaments and the standardisation of armaments and not become discouraged in the short or long term by the difficulties involved ;
7. Transmit the present recommendation to the North Atlantic Council.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 281

1. The rapidly increasing strength of the Warsaw Pact's ground, naval and air forces, which exceed discernible defence requirements, compels the member countries of the Alliance, and hence the members of WEU, to maintain and improve the efficiency of their armed forces. Only a balance of power between East and West can guarantee the security of all members of the Alliance, in particular the European countries, and make possible a policy of relaxation of tension aimed at stability.

Since all member countries of the Alliance have an equal interest in security it must be the duty of each to make an adequate contribution towards meeting the requirements of the Alliance.

In the long term, the countries of Western Europe will be able to make an effective defence contribution only if they have the means and capability of equipping their forces in keeping with modern standards. Special importance should therefore be attached to building and maintaining a sound and sophisticated armaments industry in Europe.

This industry can only survive and expand if it is competitive and has sufficient means for research and production. Its survival further supposes a better balance between the procurement and production of armaments on both sides of the Atlantic. Smooth co-operation within Europe in the field of armaments will moreover provide impulses for further European unification.

2. The WEU Council support any actions which promote co-operation in the field of armaments and further interoperability within the Alliance and particularly among the European members of that body.

3. The Council recall that guidelines for equipment collaboration were adopted by the Conference of National Armaments Directors of NATO in February 1973 as a basis for its work.

The Council welcome the results achieved at the first meetings of the European programme group for co-operation in the field of armaments held in Rome and consider them to be a step in the right direction.

Avoiding destandardisation will be as important as promoting standardisation. The phasing-out of old weapons systems should be co-ordinated, so that the foundation is laid for joint new procurements on a more rational basis.

4. The problems involved in greater standardisation and co-operation in the field of armaments are being dealt with in WEU, NATO, the Eurogroup, and now also in the programme group for European co-operation in the field of armaments. All governments in the Alliance are at present seeking to participate as far as possible in joint multilateral projects in which national interests will also have to be taken into consideration. It is of great importance, therefore, that compensation mechanisms should be developed to take account of national interests on a case by case basis.

The programmes for armaments which are at present being planned and developed by the various members of the Alliance are discussed in the competent bodies. There is at this juncture no need for a new special list to be drawn up.

The member governments of the Alliance start from the assumption that a two-way transatlantic flow of trade in armaments cannot be established until the European NATO countries are able to bid on favourable cost-benefit terms. The European countries will seek to achieve this by undertaking joint projects.

5. The Council have instructed the Standing Armaments Committee, as a task for the immediate future, to produce a detailed outline programme for a study which, in the form of a descriptive analysis of the situation of the armaments industries in member countries, would help to give a clearer insight into the industrial and economic implications of the standardisation of armaments.

6. Since co-operation and standardisation in the field of armaments lead to a strengthening of the defence potential and rationalisation of procurement, the governments of all member countries attach particular importance to these activities. The competent political bodies are aware of the difficulties involved in co-operation in the field of armaments but will not let themselves be discouraged by delays or temporary failure.

7. The Council have forwarded the text of this recommendation to the North Atlantic Council, as requested.

¹. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th June 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 282 ¹

***on the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
on 10th November 1975 ²***

The Assembly,

Underlining the importance for European security of maintaining peace throughout the Mediterranean basin ;

Alarmed by the threats to peace arising from the recent increase in hostilities in the Middle East between various national and religious communities ;

Noting that the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 can but contribute to the deterioration of the situation in that area,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that its members consult each other in the framework of WEU, without prejudice to their action in the framework of the European Community or the Council of Europe, in order to define a joint policy in the United Nations and prevent any sectarian use of the second decade for action to combat racism ;
2. Promote the development of economic, cultural and political co-operation between Western Europe and all the Eastern Mediterranean countries with a view to helping these countries progressively to terminate their division into opposing blocs.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Draft recommendation submitted by Sir John Rodgers on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 693).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 282***

The Council wish to point out that close co-operation was established in the United Nations between the nine member countries of the EEC when the General Assembly voted on Resolution 3379 on Zionism. Considering the equation of Zionism with racism unacceptable, these nine countries, which all voted against the resolution, will seek to ensure that the adoption of this text does not jeopardise the legitimate struggle against racism and racial discrimination, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the 1965 International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. In so doing, they will seek to prevent abuse of the decade for action to combat racism. They also agreed to hold close consultations with a view to adopting a joint position whenever reference is made to Resolution 3379 in connection with the work of the United Nations.

Member countries attach great importance to the early achievement of a negotiated settlement in the Middle East. Aware that the development of economic, cultural and political co-operation between Western Europe and all the Eastern Mediterranean countries could have a favourable influence on the course of events in the region, the Council are following attentively the efforts which the EEC is making, as part of an overall Mediterranean approach, to establish close economic relations with the countries concerned. In May 1975, for example, an agreement was signed between the EEC and Israel; other agreements have been concluded with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Negotiations are also in progress with a number of Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Finally, the Euro-Arab dialogue, bringing together the EEC countries and the members of the Arab League, is developing satisfactorily and the two sides have already begun work on the practical definition of areas of co-operation. This is of general political significance as is demonstrated by the joint decision to convene the first meeting of the General Commission for the dialogue (to be held in May).

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1976.

RECOMMENDATION 283 ¹
***on air forces on the central front* ²**

The Assembly,

Aware that both organisational shortcomings and the lack of interoperability in equipment still prevent the aircraft now available to allied commanders on the central front from being used to optimum effect ;

Welcoming, however, the establishment of the new command Allied Air Forces Central Europe which has already resulted in some organisational improvement,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, through their representatives on the North Atlantic Council :

1. To recall the provisions of the resolution to implement the Final Act of the London Conference, adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 22nd October 1954, which "confirms that the powers exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in peacetime, extend not only to the organisation into an effective integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training ;" to ensure that this resolution is effectively applied, in respect of both training and command integration, especially to ensure that the decision of the Defence Planning Committee of 14th June 1974 to establish a new air force command structure headed by Commander AAFCE is applied at all levels ;
2. To foster arrangements, bilateral if necessary, to make all appropriate airfields available to assigned and earmarked central front air forces ;
3. To call for substantial improvement in the interoperability of assigned and earmarked air forces on the central front, the further development of common tactical concepts and, in the longer term, the establishment of an integrated logistics system ;
4. To give urgent consideration to the multilateral financing of improved communications and appropriate early warning systems.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975 during the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 690).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 283

The question forming the subject of Recommendation 283 is primarily a matter for the integrated organs of the Alliance. For their part, the member countries of the Council of WEU which participate in the NATO integrated system recognise that the establishment of the new Command Allied Air Forces Central Europe is a valuable measure in the continuing implementation of the Final Act of the London Conference 1954. These countries will do all in their power to ensure the success of the new structure.

The question of the availability of all appropriate airfields to assigned and earmarked central front air forces has already been the subject of bilateral discussion in relation to reinforcements, and the requirement for airfield availability is kept under review by the air force planning staffs of the member nations concerned in conjunction with SACEUR.

The member countries of the Council which are part of the integrated structure of NATO generally support the call for improvement in interoperability, the further development of common tactical concepts and the establishment of an integrated logistics system. It must be recognised, however, that total uniformity is not always desirable. A suitable mixture of operating concepts could have the advantage of creating additional problems for an aggressor.

As regards full interoperability, that is, the ability to operate aircraft of one Allied Tactical Air Force from the airfields of another, the WEU countries which are part of the integrated structure of NATO recognise that this must be a longer term aim and requires a much greater degree of standardisation. The same is true of an integrated logistics system. In view of current financial stringency these countries believe that it would be wrong to spend large sums of money pre-stocking Allied Tactical Air Force airfields with the stores required by another ATAF for the sake of a short-term solution.

Finally, while agreeing that there is an urgent need for improved communication and early-warning systems, the countries concerned are aware that there are technical and financial problems to be overcome. These are currently being studied in NATO.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th February 1976.

Rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur***

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on the rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today

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submitted by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman) ; Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Bettiol (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn, Sir Frederic Bennett (Substitute : Critchley), Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Bruggnon, Cermolacce, Fioret, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute : de Bruyne),

MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Mendelson (Substitute : Lord Wallace of Goslany), Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg (Substitute : de Koster), Périquier, Portheine, Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel (Substitute : Lord Hughes), Urwin (Substitute : Lord Peddie), Van Hoeylandt (Substitute : Schugens).

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the rôle of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today

The Assembly,

Recalling the decisive rôle constantly played by the United States (and Canada) in ensuring security and peace in Western Europe ;

Considering the maintenance and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance to be the only military guarantee of lasting peace in Europe ;

Considering that its maintenance and cohesion require continuous and frank consultations in many fields between the European and American members of the Alliance ;

Considering that it is the duty of the European and American members to help each other effectively avoiding any policy or undertaking contrary to the principles of democracy ;

Considering that since the second world war member States of the Atlantic Alliance have not always managed to fulfil the obligations to adhere to such principles ;

Recalling, finally, that next to the alliance for the necessary military defence a genuinely comprehensive policy for security and peace should consist of relevant and fully adequate components in the field of social-economic solidarity between the rich and the poor parts of the world population, as well as in the field of elimination of all discrimination on grounds of race, colour or creed,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage its members to initiate or consistently afford their support in the appropriate frameworks to the following policies which are essential components of a comprehensive security policy :
 - necessary military defence and mutual, balanced and controlled disarmament ;
 - defence and the promotion of parliamentary democracy ;
 - respect for the equivalence of men and peoples ;
 - recognition of the fact that all men are entitled to a fair share of this earth's wealth and its possibilities of well-being ;
2. Constantly remind its partners in the Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere (notably in the OECD) of these guidelines ;
3. Ensure that NATO, like the Council of Europe, WEU and the European Communities, groups only countries with democratic régimes ;
4. Give the Assembly a fair assessment of relevant difficulties and dangers facing the Atlantic Alliance as such or individual member countries and, if possible, the means for meeting them.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The subject is a *mer à boire*. This paper cannot contain more than a rather superficial and necessarily subjective choice out of innumerable facts and trends, relevant to the relationship between Western Europe and the United States (and Canada). It is bound to be controversial, political, non-scientific.

2. History has once again made it abundantly clear that the two sides of the Atlantic cannot survive as parliamentary democracies without some sort of alliance between them. Whatever the differences — and there are many, some of them deeply rooted — they have somehow enough in common in terms of civilisation, interest and potentialities to bring them together every time a vital crisis of worldwide proportions threatens mankind. And as we have been living since the second world war under the aegis of “one world or none”, such crises will remain with us for a long time to come. By our own vices and our own failures of vision and by those of others.

3. Given the situation in the world today, it is also simply common sense that we should all require an institutionalised and lasting Atlantic Alliance; of course not a rigid but a flexible one. An honest paper about the relationship between the United States/Canada and Western Europe should therefore be based on solidarity between them and the conviction that they belong together.

4. The realisation of interdependence and the conviction of solidarity should by definition include frank exchanges on all relevant subjects and topics between the members. Relevant differences of opinion and outlook about actions, statements or policies within the Alliance should be discussed among the members without endangering the Alliance as such. The same is true of certain things or procedures in one country or a group of countries that are not understandable for the others.

5. When one of the member countries has to deal with a problem situation that threatens to become an obsession and make government and people blind to objective analysis, fellow members of the Alliance should feel free to start a dialogue without fear lest it be taken as an unfriendly gesture.

6. For example, the Rapporteur is thankful to the United States for the fact that, in the late forties (Indonesia) and again in the early sixties (West Irian), they made it clear to the Netherlands authorities that military action, however good their intentions might have been initially, had to stop in the interest of all concerned.

II. World War I and World War II

(i) World War I: 1914-1918

7. During the first world war, the central powers included Bulgaria, (imperial) Germany, (imperial) Austria, Hungary, Turkey. Allied and associated powers included Belgium, Brazil, China, Cuba, France, Italy, Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, United Kingdom, United States (since April 1917: resumption by Germany of unrestricted U-boat warfare); Soviet Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Turkey concluded successively an armistice before the allied powers proper signed the armistice of November 1918 and the peace treaty of Versailles¹ in June 1919. The treaty provided for the creation of the League of Nations. A guarantee was also given by the United States and United Kingdom to France in the event of an unprovoked German attack. These factors were the reason for the United States Senate refusing to ratify (August 1918). Germany lost its colonies and became a republic. The peace conditions were disastrous for German economic recovery; mainly because of the influence of Clemenceau and Lloyd George: President Wilson was forced to accept many compromises, deviating from the principles laid down in his “Fourteen Points” of January 1918. Keynes (“Economic consequences of the peace” 1919) criticised the reparations clause (132,000 million gold Reichsmark)² as a disaster.

8. The Battle of Verdun (February-December 1916, 300 days and nights) employed three-quarters of the entire French army (Pétain); the two sides lost 700,000 men each during this battle alone. The Germans lost, as they did the battle of the Marne in 1914.

1. By the “peace of Versailles” of 1783 (Britain, France, Spain and the United States), the United States was recognised as an independent State.

2. i.e. about \$ 500,000 million at current value.

(ii) World War II : 1939-1945

9. Seven axis powers (Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, fascist Italy, etc.) against forty-nine allies (France, United Kingdom, United States, USSR, China, etc.). The axis powers were defeated.

10. During this war the allies decided to form the United Nations Organisation (San Francisco, April-June 1945) ; on 28th April 1945, Mussolini was killed by partisans and on 30th April 1945 Hitler was dead.

11. On 7th May 1945 the German forces surrendered finally to General Eisenhower.

12. After the first two atomic bombs in history (dropped by the United States on 6th August 1945 on Hiroshima and 9th August 1945 on Nagasaki ; 106,000 killed, 110,000 injured) Japan surrendered on 2nd September 1945.

13. The Government of France concluded an armistice with Nazi Germany on 22nd June 1940 and with Italy on the 24th : on the 16th Marshal Pétain had replaced Paul Reynaud as head of the French administration, the so-called Vichy-Government. The Free French carried on with the war against the axis : leader General Charles de Gaulle.

14. Eight European countries on the allied side (now members of one or more western alliances) lost a little less than 2,000,000 people (military + civilians), about 1.5 % of their populations (1940 figures) ; six European countries on the allied side (now communists) lost about 25,000,000 people, approximately 8 % of their combined populations (1940 figures). For the USSR alone, the number is estimated at 20,000,000 (almost 10 %). The relatively largest toll of human lives was paid by Poland, more than 5,500,000 were killed, more than 10 % of its 1940 population. Of course the most terrible massacre was that of Jews all over Europe by the Hitler régime ; four or five million (i.e. about 75 % of the Jewish population of Europe in 1940) were slaughtered for no other reason than that they were Jews. The United States : 230,000 killed. China : 26,000,000 killed (4.5 %). Casualties on the axis side : Germany 3,500,000 (5 %) ; Italy 575,000 (4.5 %) ; Japan 2,500,000 (3 %).

15. Why are these facts included in this paper ? In the first place more and more parliamentarians are of a generation with no personal experience of war, occupation, prison, concentration camps and torture. But, more important

even, many of the older generations no longer realise acutely enough what hell it was, how many casualties there were, what a burden the war effort was and the price it cost.

16. Rationally speaking, Hitler would have won if he had not attacked the USSR, and if the United Kingdom had not stood its ground during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Or perhaps even if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbour ; although the massive United States lend-lease operation before Pearl Harbour might have been an indication that it would not have allowed the axis to win in the end anyway.

III. The post-war phenomenon

17. The post-war phenomenon is the fact that in a very few years the defeated (axis) powers in Western Europe and Japan were accepted in western alliances as practically equal partners and had instituted parliamentary democracies. The lessons of Versailles and the period between the wars had been learned, although of course with the help of Soviet expansionism and well-understood self interest. But, nevertheless, it seems quite unique in history, and should be presented as such to all younger people and future generations.

18. The example and impetus were given by the United States : on 5th June 1947, in a speech at Harvard University the Secretary of State, George Marshall, introduced the Marshall Plan :

"It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos... The initiative, I think, must come from Europe... the programme should be a joint one, agreed to by a number of, if not *all*, European nations."

19. On 27th June 1947, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the USSR met to discuss the offer. Later the USSR rejected the offer. No communist country accepted. Czechoslovakia first accepted, but later withdrew its acceptance. Finland and Spain did not participate. Sixteen countries accepted : eight of the present nine Common Market members (except West Germany) ; on 15th December 1949,

West Germany joined the Marshall Plan¹; five other European countries, which are now members of NATO; Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, now members of the Council of Europe. Together they outlined the European Recovery Programme, which was handed to Marshall on 22nd September 1947. In 1948 these sixteen set up the OEEC in response to the Marshall Plan (the Federal Republic of Germany joined the OEEC in 1955).

IV. NATO

20. Already in 1948 the Brussels Treaty Organisation was formed as the first post-war international defence treaty in Western Europe (between the three Benelux countries, France and the United Kingdom). It still embodies the most strict obligations of mutual military and other assistance in case of attack. On 6th May 1955 the organisation was renamed Western European Union; Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany also became members.

21. As already indicated, in Eastern Europe the USSR started immediately after the war to transform the countries that had been occupied by Nazi Germany, and were located between the USSR and Germany as well as the Soviet zone of Germany, into communist-ruled countries. One after the other they were forced to accept minority régimes in their fear of Soviet troops and Soviet civilian staff. In 1948 Czechoslovakia received the same treatment, and this was the last straw: plans were made in Western Europe and North America to establish an Atlantic defence organisation. During the preparatory negotiations there were some objections to the inclusion of dictatorial Portugal, but they were dropped when it became clear that others would withdraw altogether if Portugal was not accepted as a member: they estimated that the Portuguese territories were absolutely essential strategically.

22. The year 1949 saw the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (4th April): the members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation together with Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and the United States². Later

the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece and Turkey joined NATO.

23. In 1949 it became known that the USSR had made progress in developing the atomic bomb and on 8th March 1950 it announced that it had such a bomb.

24. Clearly NATO was prepared and formed just in time and there have since been no threats on the European continent by communist countries to annex or bring a non-communist country under such a rule.

25. Because of its success, NATO's existence as generally accepted originally by the democratic parties in the member States and its task within its area have increasingly become a subject of public and parliamentary discussion. New generations were not aware of the threats of the past and did not fully realise that if the balance of power in Europe disappeared the threats might be revived. The membership of dictatorial Portugal and, later, also of Greece after it had turned into a dictatorship as well (1967) became, for many groups within the democratic member countries, a serious obstacle for the credibility of NATO. This feeling was enhanced by the fact that United States forces and bases on the territory of Franco Spain would no doubt be part of the NATO defence system in time of crisis. Criticism finds strong backing in the first paragraphs of the treaty; the second paragraph reads as follows:

"They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability, and well-being in the North-Atlantic area."

26. Defenders of its membership have always pleaded geo-military reasons; some going so far as to state that the quoted sentences are not part of the treaty, that the treaty as such contains only the numbered articles and that the first three paragraphs are nothing more than a preamble and as such not binding upon any signatory while only the numbered articles (1 to 14) contain the treaty proper, which obviously is not true. Such statements and the mentality that they demonstrate have not been helpful in silencing the critics or increasing credibility. Acceptance of one dictatorial member allowed another member to be kept, even when it was turned into a dictatorship (Greece), and to agree to certain United States forces being based on the territory of Franco Spain — forces that no

1. On 1st June 1948 the United Kingdom, United States and France called for German representation in the European Recovery Programme and for drafting a federal constitution in West Germany.

2. Ireland declared that it was impossible to join as long as it was divided.

doubt in times of crisis will be part of the NATO defence system.

27. Other factors quoted to diminish NATO credibility among groups in the member countries have been for instance :

(a) The development of independent nuclear forces in two European member countries.

(b) The colonial war in Algeria, although until 1963 France's Algerian departments came within the treaty area. Fortunately it was historically de Gaulle's greatness that stopped the war once and for all without creating a civil war at home. (A French member of the Committee was wholly opposed to this and some other comparable paragraphs.)

(c) The Suez war in 1956 with the participation of two NATO members : the United Kingdom and France. The Suez crisis coincided more or less with the Soviet aggression in Hungary. That was the main reason why Western Europe, or NATO, was unable to do or say anything relevant or plausible.

(d) The inability of the member States to find peaceful and lasting solutions for serious quarrels between themselves (Greece/Turkey over Cyprus ; United Kingdom and Iceland over cod fishing, etc.). In C.L. Sulzberger's article in the International Herald Tribune of 31st January 1976 entitled "The cancer along the edges of NATO", written in Brussels, he considers the question "Is a little NATO as originally favoured (Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and the Benelux) not better?". Furthermore Sulzberger states NATO has not proved useful as a club within which disputes can be settled".

(e) The fact that one of the major European members, France, has left the military structure of NATO and ordered the NATO military headquarters to leave French territory (1966).

(f) Indo-China ; this will be dealt with in a further chapter.

(g) The inability so far to co-ordinate the manufacture of standardised armaments deemed necessary for NATO to maintain a balance of power apart from nuclear weapons, although military experts continuously state that such measures would make a difference of thousands of millions of dollars a year and would considerably increase the defence potential. The measures necessary to solve this problem have not materialised in the twenty-seven years of the Alliance's

existence. That seems due to lack of political courage and will. Behind this lack is the power and the pressure of vested interests of individual member countries and of military industrial complexes within those countries. No wonder the continuous call for higher defence budgets does not sound very credible. To enlarge on the level of forces and armaments would go entirely beyond the scope of this report.

(h) Adding to NATO activities the so-called new dimensions, for instance environmental questions (at the suggestion of President Nixon). This does not conflict with the treaty but the treaty dates from 1949 and in the meantime other international agencies have been created that are better suited and equipped than NATO. If NATO thinks that "new dimensions" will increase the acceptability of its organisation, then it is wrong : NATO is judged by what it does or does not do in the military defence field.

28. Since World War II and the creation of NATO, discussions in Western Europe on the desirability or necessity of some sort of *institutionalised European co-operation for defence* have never stopped. Many plans and suggestions have been made. So far WEU is the only idea to have materialised¹. Its creation on 5th May 1955 as the successor of the Brussels Treaty Organisation was due to the fact that the planned *European Defence Community* had been stranded in the French Parliament (1954). The Eurogroup within NATO is entirely unofficial and has no charter of any kind. France does not take part in this group.

29. The latest proposals are that when the Common Market develops into the *European union*, *foreign policy and defence* should become an essential part of its fields of activity and competence. The report of the *Belgian Premier* for the Council of the EEC (December 1975) tries to indicate how, step by step, the target of such a European union can be reached. So far it does not seem likely that there will be enough support to speed up all the necessary measures and decisions. As long as the UDR in France is strong enough to block every substantial step towards making the EEC supranational and every attempt to obtain full French participation in the integrated NATO forces, there will be no clear indication of what the priorities of other EEC and NATO members ultimately will be when final decisions have to

1. See paragraph 20.

be taken. Very often a number of members may seem to be one hundred per cent and unconditionally in favour of speedy progress when they feel sure that a veto from one or two other members will block the proceedings anyway.

30. Since 1955, NATO has had a North Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly composed mainly of parliamentary defence specialists from the member States. The status of the Assembly is vague and weak. Its existence is not founded on any treaty, but on an *ad hoc* decision of the parliaments of the member countries.

31. Every civilian and every military senior executive of NATO should have an undisputable record as an unswerving advocate of parliamentary democracy. Otherwise NATO's *raison d'être* will become more and more undermined.

32. *The presentation of NATO*, its structure and deeds and what is known about other military blocs to public opinion in the member countries in general and to parliamentarians and their constituencies, should be fair, 100 % truthful, modern and overt. Why not lay the facts on the table publicly? Facts that are known in any case wherever relevant. Especially in military matters there is too much *unnecessary* secrecy, on the childish assumption that things are unknown in highly-interested quarters outside the Alliance. We all know that classification of secrets and top secrets is often used to make duties and individuals look more important than they are. Let us never forget that parliamentarians (and the electorate) of the member countries decide whether NATO will live or die.

33. Since there is a *balance of power* in nuclear weaponry — perhaps with a difference in percentage of over-kill capability — superpowers will not start a war, unless one or more of them have rulers who are too ill, physically and/or mentally, to think rationally, realistically and conscientiously. We know that it is not sure whether this condition will always be fulfilled. We also know that it will become increasingly easy to produce nuclear weapons in a growing number of countries. The world therefore has a right to know what structures and safeguards exist in the countries and alliances to minimise the possibility of an Armageddon being started by a lunatic, criminal or a totally irresponsible person or group of persons. Even in the western world there reigns an almost complete silence about these things.

34. Assuming that the above condition is fulfilled, then the situation sooner or later allows the superpowers new freedom to assume political

and perhaps military commitments outside the area of mutual guarantees, by "helping" befriended régimes or groups (minorities or not). That may first happen covertly through intelligence services and later overtly. It has been practised for a long time by the USSR and probably to a lesser extent by the United States in the NATO treaty area and the Warsaw Pact area respectively. The United States has been very active in Latin America and Indo-China, the USSR in Angola and elsewhere. Smaller countries have the same appetite in the Middle East and in Africa. There is nothing new under the sun. The risks of small and not so small wars, with so-called conventional weapons (almost a blasphemy) will be with us for a long time.

35. Delay in the inevitable decolonisation process and the fact that decolonisation occurred, at least initially, against the free will of the colonial rulers contributed to the risks of war. But apart from these factors, decolonisation could not be a smooth process. The difference in standards of living, the ever-growing gap between rich and poor and the arbitrary frontiers drawn between the new nations shaped by colonial conquests are only some of the factors that made a smooth and peaceful transition in many cases impossible.

36. In Eastern Europe events were the reverse of decolonisation as has been previously recalled. The countries of the Warsaw Pact are still satellites of the USSR. They know that deviation from the Moscow line may be stopped at any time by Soviet military interference as has happened several times.

37. The recently-expressed deep indignation of the United States Secretary of State about the consequences of these developments (for instance in Africa) is rather astonishing. It is, of course, an alarming development, but one that could and should have been anticipated. It calls for careful thought, research and new policies, not initially military ones, because they will not cure anything basically.

V. *Détente*

38. NATO's accepted tasks are not only defence in the strict sense of the word, but also the promotion of disarmament (MBFR, Vienna) and détente (CSCE, Helsinki), all three in the context of avoiding war.

39. After three years, the MFBR negotiations have still not reached a conclusion. The parties seem to have come to a stalemate.

40. The conference on security and co-operation in Europe (35 countries : 6 communist and 27 non-communist European countries, the United States and Canada) opened on 3rd July 1973 and was concluded on 1st August 1975 in Helsinki. The final act was signed by Heads of Government. It consists of about 55 printed pages and deals with a great variety of subjects. It is not a treaty and therefore it does not need to be ratified by the parliaments. It is a declaration of adherence to many very high-minded standards of behaviour and a statement of very noble intentions. Of course, such an act does not include sanctions. The chapter about trade and industrial co-operation includes a recommendation for arbitration ("an appropriate means of settling such disputes").

41. If all parties which signed the act had one and the same interpretation of each and every clause, and if all parties were from now on to behave in accordance with the final act and with one and the same interpretation of its text, paradise would no longer be lost in greater Europe. Nobody expects such a future. Everybody knows the semantic problems and the everlasting ability of individuals and governments to read into such a text what seems most expedient for their own interests. Even then there is a choice of interests : in the short, medium or long term (in totalitarian States it is often easier to emphasise longer term interests than in democratic States with their periodical free elections). The fact that the USSR took the initiative of convening the CSCE makes the conclusion of the conference endorsed by all participating parties primarily a success for the Soviet Union. The degree of agreement among all non-communist European participants (including the United States and Canada) during the negotiations was remarkable. Generally speaking, all participants are convinced that it was right to hold this unique conference and many think that the final act potentially has a positive value for the future. It is perhaps not impossible that the high standards professed may be useful for dissidents within communist countries in promoting some progress towards less repression. Some signs are already visible. Nevertheless it will be a very long process and there will be setbacks. The recent report of Amnesty International on the USSR is terrifying. It is, of course, easier in the western world to remind democratic governments successfully of the high standards to which they have reaffirmed their adherence whenever there is an appropriate opportunity of doing so.

42. It seems obvious that if communist countries were to comply with the intentions of the final act in the western democratic interpretation, totalitarianism would splinter and that cannot be the plan ! Conversely, if the western world were to accept all the consequences of the act — for instance in the fields of trade, economic and technical co-operation — according to the Soviet interpretation, the communist régimes would be free to choose one important sector after the other — for example the consumer industry or transport — in the western world and take over such sectors by fixing prices on a low enough level. Free trade between countries with a market economy and countries with a State economy (or "command economy") has dangerous aspects for the first category if the second category is able to be selective, patient and stubborn. Of this there have already been examples, for instance in the shipping sector.

43. The impact on NATO of détente as shaped by Helsinki will not be felt immediately, but it could develop favourably or just the opposite, also depending on the wisdom of such bodies as the Common Market and the OECD, as well as of individual countries.

VI. United States/Indo-China

44. United States involvement in the war in Indo-China was a result of the *Truman doctrine* (12th March 1947) : the United States ought "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure". This doctrine was primarily meant as a basis for aid to Greece and Turkey. The doctrine was reaffirmed by the Eisenhower doctrine (5th January 1957) and by President Kennedy's inauguration speech (20th January 1961). By these repeated reaffirmations the doctrine has outlived its relevance and usefulness far too long in its worldwide shape. They suggested that the possibility of carrying the doctrine into effect by action would last forever notwithstanding changes in the world. That illusion is still not entirely dead.

45. The interpretation and application of those principles have been influenced gravely by the plague of *McCarthyism* that afflicted United States public opinion and politics in the late forties and the fifties. It was a gulf of intolerance of any liberalism marked by wild accusations and prosecution of every adversary as a communist. In February 1950 Joseph McCarthy

(1909-1957), Senator since 1946, announced that there were 205 communists in the State Department alone. In December 1954 the Senate censured him for bringing the Senate into dishonour and disrepute. But his impact lasted a long time: "many Americans suspected most liberals, and even suspected those who tried to be politically impartial, of being sympathetic to the communist cause"¹. Witch-hunting deprived several government agencies — primarily the State Department and the Pentagon — of South-East Asia experts, and it continued while McNamara was Minister of Defence during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

46. It seems that President Kennedy sensed that the escalation of the Vietnam war under his responsibility was ill-advised, but that he was convinced that he should wait to make a radical change in policy in Vietnam and in his collaborators until he was re-elected in the autumn of 1964, presuming that he would obtain a good working majority. He was assassinated on 22nd November 1963. (Part of the files of the Warren report on the assassination will remain inaccessible for a long time to come; Gerald Ford was a member of the Warren commission.)

47. The effect of all this was apparently that, to a large extent, the results of the "expert research" in the department and in the CIA became more and more what the civilian and military executives wanted rather than an independent basis for the executives to reconsider the viability of new courses — a phenomenon that is not a monopoly of the United States, nor of governments. The fact that the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was mentally and in ambition not a "State Man" but a "Pentagon Man" contributed considerably to this development².

48. American involvement, no doubt initiated by worthy intentions and not by ambitions of conquest, became — as we all know — a big and endless tragedy for the American people and more lasting for the people in Indo-China with tremendous losses of human lives, vast devastation, tragic uprooting of population and waste of enormous sums of money. The alarming factor for the future is that some top Americans, civilian and military, still maintain that the Vietnam war could have been won if only Congress and the media had not made it impossible to give

the executive and the military the tools they needed. Even in the last moments President Ford and Mr. Kissinger asked for sufficient means to prevent a Vietcong victory in Hanoi although many non-communist experts had known for a long time that the war was already lost.

49. Such weaknesses are to be found in many other places in the western world; many who were not prominent during the war and the occupation and, for instance, who failed to see in time that decolonisation was inevitable, have nevertheless been able to continue their careers in public office, proudly claiming infallible expertise in analysing the present and future political trends.

50. These paragraphs are not written with pleasure or satisfaction; nor is there any touch of anti-Americanism to nourish extremists of one side or the other. There is no justification for European haughtiness; European nations were no better when they were powerful rulers in the world; rather the opposite, as the United States will well remember in this bicentennial year.

51. Here it is only fair to recall that the whole Vietnam involvement was thrown into the lap of the United States by the French. They had fought the Vietminh of Ho Chi Minh (since 1945) until they were defeated in Dien Bien Phu (7th May 1954). Before that they had (14th June 1949) installed Bao-Dai as ruler of the whole of Vietnam. Recognised experts maintain that if France had accepted an independent Indo-China with Ho Chi Minh the situation might have developed as in Yugoslavia under Tito. It was hardly realistic to expect that the Geneva agreement (20th July 1954) would be respected. The same seems true of the Paris agreements of 1974¹; every careful reader of the text must have recognised, for instance, that the very short terms, mentioned for reaching the different phases for implementing the agreements were already technically totally unrealistic.

52. The justification for including a chapter on Indo-China is that the Vietnam war had and will continue to have for a long time to come a tremendous impact on the American nation,

1. Penguin dictionary of politics, 1973.

2. "The best and the brightest", David Halbertam, 1969.

1. This also applies to the case in 1949 between the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies (except West Irian) when the latter became independent with the name Indonesia and accepted a constitution as a federal State and a Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

on the status and image of the United States as such and on its capability to function adequately as the only superpower in the western world. A lost war is very hard to stow away as every nation and many western nations know. It is the more so, the more powerful and proud the nation concerned. The impact is in fact world-wide. Television, other media and many documentary books have contributed to the propagation of this impact. The publication of books such as "The Pentagon Papers" and "The end of a Presidency" should not be deplored. That such large parts of "everything" about the Vietnam war, the Watergate affair, the Nixon nightmare, the CIA, the FBI, Lockheed, Gulf, etc., can be published, is one of the greatest contributions of the United States to freedom, democracy and other human rights these days. Its value and its challenge may be wider and deeper than any one of us can anticipate.

VII. The United States and Western Europe

53. Disquieting aspects of Watergate and the Nixon drama seem to be that it was even possible for a person, well-known for his characteristics from the very beginning of his political life, to be elected to the most powerful office of President of the United States, the second time even with a landslide victory ; that so many collaborators kept silent for such a long time ; that many of them after dismissal and/or even conviction were offered non-public, well-paid jobs of their choice ; that without the tapes there would not have been a majority in Congress for impeachment, or even if the very last tape had not become publicly known ; that several of the top people opposed impeachment until the last moments, and that some of them still hold very high office. Nevertheless, the decision of President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger to end the negation of the existence of the giant People's Republic of China will remain famous as a policy of necessary realism and of great historical importance.

54. It is to be deplored that the United States is not prepared or able to come to a solution about the Panama Canal, nor to foster dynamic co-operation and solidarity with Latin America as a whole without showing preference for dictatorial régimes. Nor has it offered a Marshall Plan for all, as in Europe in 1947, with a view to ending the monopoly of big companies in that hemisphere.

55. There is an acute danger of major war in *Southern Africa*. It seems almost sure that the

MPLA in Angola will remain in charge of the whole territory. Non-recognition helps nobody but the more extremist elements within the MPLA. This makes the position of Ian Smith's minority régime acutely untenable and on a somewhat longer term that of Vorster in South Africa as well : in Namibia and on its own soil. Western powers and the United States have been too lenient for too long towards those régimes. It is now five to twelve, and obvious that this western policy has not been a genuine brother service to the white minorities. The EEC's recent statement that it objects to any foreign interference is hardly helpful without the strongest possible pressure on both régimes to prepare without delay for at least a very radical change in attitude towards the justified ambitions of majorities. With that condition, every possible assistance should be offered.

56. The case of Soviet missiles in Cuba as handled by President Kennedy was a blessing for mankind. It was a shock to realise that all military chiefs had advised the opposite decision. The wisdom of the permanent boycott of Cuba ever since seems doubtful.

57. Going further back in history, the allied airlift (America had the lion's share) during the Berlin blockade by the USSR from 24th July 1948 until 21st May 1949, with 277,264 flights, was not only a master operation, but also a definite sign of solidarity among the NATO partners which should never be forgotten. The treaty had been signed fourteen days before the beginning of the airlift.

58. The fall of President Nixon has created a vacuum of power, credibility and cogency that will last at least until a new and irreproachable administration is firmly in the saddle with a workable majority in Congress. The present government is understandably very busy at home with the elections but at the same time seems too much in a hurry in many sectors of foreign policy, anxious to round these off before the transfer.

VIII. Miscellaneous notes

59. Many totalitarian communist countries call themselves "socialist" and/or even "democratic". It is deplorable that western media and even governments also complicate the semantics by not always using the words communism or communists when talking about those countries and by not reserving words like socialism and socialist for non-totalitarian and democratic

systems, groups or parties. But, of course, there are people for whom it is all tweedledum and tweedledee.

60. The recent tendency of some socialist parties in the western world to accept or to consider a coalition with communists in national governments or even before elections is a new phenomenon in the postwar epoch. The French socialists were the first to accept such a coalition as they had done before World War II. The French communist party is one of the strongest in Western Europe and is proclaiming loudly that it is not a satellite or obedient subordinate of the USSR. But at the same time newspapers reported that the leader *Marchais* accused the Federal Republic of Germany of shameless and greedy imperialism and of seeking the destruction of the French economy; basically he is against the Common Market.

61. In Italy the situation is different. Elections being very near now, it seems best not to enlarge upon the situation further in this report but to wait and see.

62. It should be clear from the beginning that whenever a member of western alliances turns totalitarian or dictatorial it has to leave those bodies. In the meantime the other western countries and their political parties are challenged to avoid any such development at home by demonstrating flexibility, creativity and wisdom, adequate to the requirements of an ever-changing world.

63. It is rather significant that *The Economist* is pleading for consideration of the desirability of coalitions with communist parties in some of the western countries. The journal suggests that perhaps it is better to have a try with the communist party in Italy heading an alliance of the left¹.

64. If renowned commentators such as Sforza are right, the era of supreme power of Brezhnev in the USSR is over, but he is being allowed to carry on for a time, because he has apparently accepted defeat in his struggle for emphasis on more consumer goods instead of giving priority to technological and military investments in the new five-year plan. That does not sound hopeful for SALT and MBFR, nor for stability at the top of the USSR.

65. The death of Chou En-lai and the age of Mao mean that the giant and potential superpower China will possibly undergo important changes as well. A virtual second cultural revolution is a possibility and the anti-USSR policy is bound to continue for some time. The non-communist world would be wrong, however, to assume that the antagonism between the two will last forever. It is not impossible that, in time and in certain circumstances, the two will come to an understanding and join forces.

66. Evidently Yugoslavia has been tightening its grip in recent years on all groups of ideological or political dissidents. When in January 1976 the United States decided to renew the sale of arms, with the professed aim of bolstering Yugoslavia's independence, it was aware that the weapons might be necessary for internal purposes at the end of President Tito's life as well as for avoiding any interference from outside during the struggle for stability and against disruption of this federal republic. Whether the announced visit of Brezhnev to Yugoslavia will mean a more lasting rapprochement remains to be seen.

67. An unknown — but certainly important — percentage of "the state of the world" (and that of the United Nations) is determined by the distribution of wealth, well-being and power. That distribution, especially between continents and countries is intolerable. That has been a fact for a very long time. But it is only recently that, through wars and the modern media, the realisation of that intolerable situation has been brought home — even visually — to very substantial and fast-growing parts of the world population. It has not only become intolerable, but it will not be tolerated much longer unless the world community is given a real prospect of a fairer share.

68. This prospect is not yet in sight. The poor, the less privileged proposed some sort of "new world economy". Some exponents of the well-off nations (among them Mr. Kissinger) reacted with the view that the existing order had served us well and there was no need for a new one. Who are meant by "us"? Not the world population as a whole!

69. It is true that the proverb "Don't throw old shoes away before you have new ones" is a sound one. It is true that the decline of the OECD community as a prosperous and a dynamic one would not automatically make other communities better off. But these truths do not make the

1. See *International Herald Tribune*, 18th February 1976, and *The Times*, 10th February 1976.

statement that the present economic world order "has served us well and that there is no need for a new one" also true. Why should our first reaction so often be entirely negative? This is not the place to enlarge on this subject. This part of the memorandum does not call for a new dimension of activity for NATO. It only wants to contribute to awareness of the fact that this dimension is an existential one of the context within which the Atlantic community and NATO have to find their proper places and attitudes.

70. The present state of the world calls for vigilance and preservation of a certain "balance of power" on the part of the so-called "free world" and primarily of the wealthy part of it. But we should at last realise that a relevant *security policy* cannot serve its purpose any longer when it is monolithic. It has different components. The three most important ones are :

- (i) (military) defence ;
- (ii) social — economic solidarity of the rich with the poor ;
- (iii) banishment of discrimination (race, colour, religion, etc.).

71. The first has been tackled quite adequately since 1949 ; but it is the only one, with the consequence that too much of our thinking about security, our industries and our economies has become militarised. The second component is lagging far behind and the gap between rich and poor is still widening. In the period 1960-74 the NATO countries spent \$2,600,000 million ; in 1973, \$122,000 million. In 1973 the Warsaw Pact countries spent about \$75,000 million according to the statistics available. Over the same periods (1960-74 and 1973) the NATO countries spent \$125,000 million and \$7,000 million on foreign economic aid, i.e. one twentieth and one seventeenth respectively of the amount spent on defence. The Warsaw Pact countries spent just \$1,000 million : one seventy-fifth ! The third component (banishment of discrimination) has not been tackled adequately and consistently either ; several of the previous paragraphs have explicitly

or implicitly dealt with that. It is tragic that the initiatives of the one western superpower, the United States, of the first postwar years have come to an end. Let us never forget : October 1945 United Nations ; July 1946 independence of the Philippines and a policy of promoting decolonisation everywhere ; March 1947 Truman doctrine ; June 1947 Marshall plan ; January 1949 "Point four" ; April 1949 NATO. All the components of a genuine and comprehensive security policy are present !

72. Let us hope that the awareness and creativity of leadership will be revived in a shape that is truly of our times.

73. And what about Europe ? For decades, Europe and its partners on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean have faced the challenge of finding the right policies in very diversified sectors of life. They are co-operating in many postwar international bodies. If Europe was more united and integrated, this co-operation would be more effective and less sensitive, because they would be more equal instead of one big brother dealing with several kids. Alas, even the smaller Europe of the EEC has so far not been able to integrate to form a genuine European union. Too many people do not realise that many segments of their national sovereignty have already disappeared because of the interdependence of the modern world. Just disappeared, while in an integrated Europe several of those lost segments would revive as vital European decision sectors of the supranational entity, visible and under real parliamentary control. Such a Europe could develop an identity of its own, each of its components undoubtedly keeping its own national identity, unless it has already an identity not worth the name. What would be lost would be the present *nationalistic* identity, but that would evidently mean a gain for all.

74. Amazingly, Europe has still time to come to its senses, also because of the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. How long or how short that time will be, nobody knows for certain.

Security in the Mediterranean

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur***

ADDENDUM

***to the draft recommendation on
security in the Mediterranean
contained in Document 708***

Add new operative paragraphs as follows :

1. (f) by advising the Secretary-General to assign political advisers from his Political Affairs Division to all significant NATO military headquarters ;
- (g) by transferring the Gibraltar Mediterranean Command from the Command of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe to that of the Iberian Atlantic area ;

1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. Critchley (Chairman) ; MM. Klepsch, Dankert (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Averardi, Beauguitte (Substitute : *La Combe*), Bizet, Boulloche, Buck, Haase, Hardy (Substitute : Lord Peddie),

Kempinaire, Konen, de Koster, Laforgia, Lemmrich, Ménard, Pawelczyk, Pumilia, Reale, Richter, Rivière, Roper, Scholten, Schugens, Tanghe, Urwin, Vedovato.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Buck, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The Committee adopted its main report on security in the Mediterranean¹ in the course of its visit to Portugal from 17th to 19th May and for that reason was unable to take full account of all the information obtained from the visit. Since then, the Committee has also received the Council's reply to Recommendation 278, which the Assembly adopted on the Committee's previous report on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance²; the communiqué issued after the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo on 21st May has been issued and the Committee has held an informal meeting with the Council in Brussels on 31st May, following the ministerial meeting of the Council earlier that day.

2. In this short supplementary report, the Committee takes account of these more recent developments, and proposes an addendum to the draft recommendation embodied in the main report.

Portugal

3. At the conclusion of its visit to Lisbon, in the course of which it was briefed by leading representatives of the government, political parties and armed forces whose names appear in the introductory note to the main report¹, and to all of whom it expresses its thanks, the Committee proposes no change to relevant passages of the draft recommendation in the main report — paragraphs (v) of the preamble and 1 (e) of the operative text — and confirms for the most part the relevant parts of the explanatory memorandum (paragraphs 67-73).

4. As far as paragraph 72 on the Portuguese armed forces is concerned, the Committee implied that priority should be given to modernising the equipment of the army and air force. It is important, in view of Portugal's serious economic situation, and the very important contribution it makes to NATO in providing base and communications facilities at strategic points on its mainland and in the Azores and Madeira, that

the Alliance as a whole or those countries in a position to do so, should assist Portugal in providing not only the modern equipment the armed forces need, but also the necessary training, both to operate technical equipment and to co-operate with other NATO forces. After the long years of the colonial wars there is a feeling in the Portuguese armed forces that they are neither equipped nor trained to co-operate with other NATO forces in the very different type of operations that NATO defensive contingency plans provide for.

5. Among Portugal's requirements are the right armour and anti-aircraft armament for the air-transportable brigade mentioned in paragraph 68 of the main report and aircraft for air defence and other rôles. In due course, the Portuguese navy will need more modern equipment by way of ocean-going frigates and other vessels.

6. The Committee was impressed by the firm resolve to maintain Portuguese commitments to NATO that was expressed by both political and military authorities which addressed it, and the wish for Portuguese participation in NATO to be a full and equal one. The Committee supports that wish, knowing that the obstacles raised by a communist presence in many sensitive posts have now been overcome.

Reply of the Council to Recommendation 278

7. The Assembly adopted Recommendation 278 on 4th December 1975, on the previous report of the Committee. The Committee welcomes, as far as it goes, the statement in paragraph 1 of the reply asserting the right of the western democracies to express sympathy with trends of opinion favouring pluralist democracy in countries where it is not established.

8. As far as paragraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d) of the reply are concerned, the Committee finds that they do not take account of the precise points concerning political advisers for NATO commanders and the transfer of the Gibraltar command that were contained in the explanatory memorandum to Document 682. Accordingly, the Committee proposes an addendum to the draft recommendation contained in the main report¹,

1. Document 708.

2. Document 682.

1. Document 708.

which adds to the operative text an explicit statement of the two points the Committee is now seeking to make, an explication of which is to be found in paragraphs 133 and 138 of the main report.

***North Atlantic Council final communiqué of
21st May 1976***

9. Referring indirectly to events in Angola to which the Committee has drawn attention in the main report, the communiqué states :

"... the pursuit of a genuine and durable détente is possible only if all States concerned exercise restraint both in their relations with each other and in their actions in other parts of the world. The necessary confidence could not be established between East and West if crises and tensions were to be avoided in Europe only to appear elsewhere. In this regard, Ministers underlined that all signatories of the CSCE final act have recognised the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole."

In its main report, the Committee has called for contingency planning by the NATO countries against further intervention in Africa.¹

10. On the Mediterranean, the communiqué states :

"7. Ministers took note of the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions. They emphasised the importance they attach to maintaining the balance of forces throughout the Mediterranean area. They requested the Council to continue its consultations on this subject and to report to them at their next meeting.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress made regarding new defence co-operation agreements that will open the way to enhancing allied defences in the South-Eastern region.

They expressed concern at the serious situation arising from the continuing instability in the Middle East and reaffirmed that rapid progress must be made towards a just and lasting settlement of the conflict."

The allusion to defence agreements in the second paragraph refers to the bilateral United States-Greek and United States-Turkish agreements described in the Committee's main report¹. The Committee regrets that the communiqué does not make mention of progress towards democracy in Spain, as by implication the WEU Council has done in paragraph 1 of the reply to Recommendation 278 mentioned above. It was left to Dr. Kissinger in his press conference at the end of the North Atlantic Council meeting to say : "We have always thought, and still think, that Spain should be brought as rapidly as possible into the western institutions."

1. Document 708, paragraph 134.

1. Document 708, paragraphs 41 and 44.

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