

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1978

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS

**ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**

**43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32**

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
VAN WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

#### Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
PERIN François	PRLW
VAN AAL Henri-François	Soc. Chr.
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volkunie
VERLEYSSEN William	Soc. Chr.

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BIZET Emile	RPR (App.)
BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
DEPIETRI César	Communist
DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
FERRETTI Henri	UDF
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDP
PELLETIER Jacques	Dem. Left
PÉRIDIÉ Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
PETIT Camille	RPR
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
TALON Bernard	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

#### Substitutes

MM. BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BOZZI Jean	RPR
COUDERC Pierre	UDF
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
DRUON Maurice	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF

MM. LAGOURGUE Pierre	UDF
LEMAIRE Marcel	CNIP
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MALVY Martin	Socialist
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VISSE René	Communist
WAGNIES Claude	Communist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
BARDENS Hans	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
President of the Assembly	
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
PFENNIG Gero	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

#### Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDHUBER Peter	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM	CDU/CSU
Adolf	
UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	DN
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Ind. Rep.
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Soc. Chr.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
KOOPMAN Bram	Labour
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

Mr. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
Mrs. van den HEUVEL-de BLANK Ien	Labour
MM. KONINGS Martin	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Paul CHANNON	Conservative
William CRAIG	Ulster Unionist
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
John WATKINSON	Labour
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

MM. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Alan BEITH	Liberal
Robin COOK	Labour
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
MM. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Lord MORRIS	Conservative
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
Mr. Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
MM. George REID	Scottish Nation.
Frank TOMNEY	Labour



**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 19th June 1978

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 764).
6. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 765, 767 and 769*).
7. Address by Mr. Stirn, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
8. Strategic mobility (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the last session, Doc. 758*).
9. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 768, 777 and 774*).
10. Nomination of members to Committees.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir John Rodgers, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### 1. Opening of the Session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. Tributes

The Provisional President paid tribute to the late Mr. Bouloche and the late Lord Peddie, former members of the Assembly.

### 4. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

### 5. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, and with the exception of the Representatives and Substitutes appointed by

the French National Assembly after the adjournment of the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the Representatives and Substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the following Representatives and Substitutes appointed by the French National Assembly :

MM. Bizet, Brugnion, Deschamps, Depietri, Ferretti, Grussenmeyer, Péronnet, Petit, Pignion, Seitlinger, Sénès, Valleix, Representatives ;

MM. Baumel, Bechter, Bozzi, Couderc, Delehedde, Druon, Koehl, Lagourgue, Lemoine, Malvy, Visse, Wargnies, Substitutes.

### 6. Election of the President of the Assembly

One candidate only was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel took the Chair.

### **7. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The President addressed the Assembly.

### **8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

Six candidates had been proposed for the six posts of Vice-President, namely MM. Mart, Minnocci, Sir John Rodgers, MM. Stoffelen, Tanghe and Valleix.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation and that the Vice-Presidents should rank according to age, namely: Sir John Rodgers, MM. Tanghe, Minnocci, Mart, Valleix and Stoffelen.

### **9. Observers**

The President welcomed nine parliamentary observers: Mr. Steen Nielsen and Mr. Schlüter, members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Vyzas and Mr. Veryvakis, Deputies from Greece; Mr. Helland and Mr. Tungesvik, members of the Norwegian Storting; Mr. Guerra Zunzunegui, First Vice-President of the Spanish Senate; Mr. Mülâyim, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Senate and Mr. Mandalinci, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies.

### **10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session**

(Doc. 764)

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

### **11. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly**

(Presentation by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 765, 767 and 769)

The Report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

### **12. Address by Mr. Stirn, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic**

Mr. Stirn, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Stirn replied to questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Petit, Mrs. von Bothmer and Mr. Roper.

### **13. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

(Questions and replies by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council)

Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, replied to questions put by MM. Müller, Valleix and Mrs. von Bothmer.

### **14. Strategic mobility**

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the last session, Doc. 758)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 758.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to, note being taken of four abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 312) <sup>1</sup>.

### **15. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly**

#### **Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

#### **Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 768, 777 and 774 and Amendment)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Adriaensens, Rapporteur.

The Joint Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Calamandrei and Grieve.

The Joint Debate was adjourned.

### **16. Nomination of members to Committees**

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 bis of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six Committees as follows:

<sup>1</sup> See page 19.

## 1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Tanghe	MM. Van der Elst Lambiotte Verleysen
<i>France :</i>	MM. Baumel Bechter Boucheny Ménard Péronnet	MM. Bozzi Schleiter Jung Koehl Sénès
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Ahrens Handlos Lemmrich Pawelczyk Hermann Schmidt	MM. Büchner Lenzer Klepsch Mattick Vohrer
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Boldrini Fosson Maggioni Pecchioli Roberti	MM. Corallo Maravalle Avellone Calamandrei Urso
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Spautz
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. van den Bergh de Koster Scholten	MM. Koopman Cornelissen van Hulst
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Critchley Grant Hardy Roper Whitehead	Lord Duncan-Sandys MM. Banks Cook Watkinson Craig

## 2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Hanin Mangelschots Perin	MM. Van Aal Van Waterschoot Van der Elst
<i>France :</i>	MM. Berrier Brugnon Deschamps Druon Péridier	MM. Bizet Lemoine Grussenmeyer Seitlinger Couderc
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Gessner Mende Müller Reddemann	MM. Schwencke Hansheinrich Schmidt Amrehn Evers Hermann Schmidt

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Ariosto Gonella Minnocci Sarti Segre	Mrs. Agnelli MM. Pecoraro Calamandrei Treu Rubbi
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Abens	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	Mrs. van den Heuvel de Blank MM. Mommersteeg Porthoine	Mr. Voogd Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mr. Schlingemann
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Faulds Sir John Rodgers Mr. Urwin	MM. McNamara Page McGuire Channon Craigien

### 3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Adriaensens Van Waterschoot	MM. Brasseur Peeters
<i>France :</i>	MM. Malvy Péronnet Talon Valleix	MM. Bizet Wargnies Petit Lagourgue
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Lenzer Müller Schwencke Ueberhorst	MM. Schmidhuber Spies von Büllenheim Scheffler Zebisch
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Pinto Treu	MM. Boldrini Urso Minnocci Pecoraro
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Mart	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Cornelissen Konings	MM. Porthoine Koopman
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Hawkins Lewis Dr. Phipps Mr. Warren	MM. Onslow Bagier Tomney Jessel

### 4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Adriaensens Peeters	MM. Mangelschots Bonnell
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	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>France :</i>	MM. Depietri Jager Jeambrun Schleiter	N... MM. Belin Pignion Lemaire
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Ahrens Alber Evers Vohrer	MM. Schwencke Reddemann Bardens Ueberhorst
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Antoni Bonalumi Del Duca Orsini	Mr. Rossi Mrs. Faccio MM. Tremaglia Giust
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands :</i>	Mr. Koopman Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra	MM. Voogd van Hulst
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Lewis McNamara Lord Morris Mr. Page	Lord Beaumont of Whitley Lord Northfield MM. Kershaw Grieve

## 5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Brasseur Van Aal	MM. Perin Lambiotte
<i>France :</i>	MM. Bozzi Lagourgue Lemaire Pignion	MM. Péridier Bechter N... Talon
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Marquardt Schauble Schmidhuber Zebisch	MM. Büchner Evers Handlos Pawelczyk
<i>Italy :</i>	Mr. Borghi Mrs. Faccio MM. Giust Sgherri	MM. Cavaliere Maravalle Del Duca Romano
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Abens
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. van Hulst Voogd	MM. Cornelissen Stoffelen
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Craigen Grieve Jessel Dr. Phipps	Lord Hughes MM. McGuire Onslow Watkinson

## 6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Bonnel Tanghe	MM. Dejardin Hanin
<i>France :</i>	MM. Delehedde Visse	MM. Ferretti Jeambrun
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Böhm Enders	MM. Müller Bardens
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Arfé De Poi	Mr. Borghi Mrs. Papa de Santis
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	MM. Hengel Spautz	MM. Mart Konen
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Schlingemann Stoffelen	MM. Mommersteeg Voogd
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Kershaw Roper	Mrs. Knight Mr. Reid

**17. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday,  
20th June, at 10 a.m.

*Speaker :* Mr. Roper.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Enders	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Adriaensens	<i>Lemmrich</i> (Evers)	MM. Margue
Bonnel	Gessner	<i>Spautz</i> (Mart)
<i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots)	Handlos	
Tanghe	<i>Lenzer</i> (Lagershausen)	<b>Netherlands</b>
<i>Verleysen</i> (Van Waterschoot)	Marquardt	MM. Cornelissen
	Mende	<i>Konings</i> (Scholten)
<b>France</b>	<i>Spies von Büllenheim</i> (Milz)	Stoffelen
MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet)	Müller	<i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd)
Boucheny	Pfennig	
<i>Wargnies</i> (Brugnon)	Reddemann	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Depietri	Hermann Schmidt	Sir Frederic Bennett
<i>Visse</i> (Deschamps)	Schwencke	Lord <i>Morris</i> (Craig)
Ferretti	Vohrer	Mr. <i>Jessel</i> (Critchley)
<i>Baumel</i> (Grussenmeyer)		Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Faulds)
Jager	<b>Italy</b>	MM. Grieve
Péridier	MM. Arfé	Hardy
Petit	Bernini	Hawkins
<i>Berrier</i> (Pignion)	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Lord Hughes
Schleier	Calamandrei	MM. Lewis
<i>Lagourgue</i> (Seitlinger)	Fosson	Page
Talon	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	Sir John Rodgers
Valleix	Maggioni	MM. Roper
	Pecoraro	Urwin
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Roberti	Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Warren)
MM. Ahrens	Sarti	MM. Watkinson
<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens)	<i>Rubbi</i> (Segre)	Whitehead
Mrs. von Bothmer	Treu	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Hanin	MM. Bonalumi	MM. van Hulst
Peeters	Corallo	Koopman
	De Poi	de Koster
	Minnocci	
<b>France</b>	Orsini	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Pelletier	Pecchioli	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Péronnet		Mr. Channon
Sénès	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
	Mr. Abens	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 312**  
***on strategic mobility***

---

The Assembly,

Noting the great increase in the strategic mobility of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the last decade ;

Stressing the need for the armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance on routine NATO missions to be able to move freely throughout the area of the Alliance, but noting that as yet not all members offer sufficiently convenient arrangements ;

Noting the significance for strategic mobility of decisions to be taken at the Conference on the Law of the Sea,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member governments :

1. Through their representatives on the North Atlantic Council to call on all countries of the Atlantic Alliance :
  - (a) to offer mutual overflight and staging rights for military transport and combat aircraft on exclusively routine NATO missions or agreed exercises, subject only to normal notice through air traffic control or military channels ;
  - (b) to permit routine port visits by warships of countries of the Alliance on normal NATO tasks at not more than two weeks' notice through military channels, and to waive charges on an agreed uniform basis, or consider multilateral funding ;
2. Through their representatives at the Conference on the Law of the Sea to call for :
  - (a) the high seas status, or a status no more restrictive for the operation of warships and military aircraft, of all waters beyond the territorial sea of a maximum breadth of twelve miles to be maintained ;
  - (b) the right of transit passage, as now defined in the informal composite negotiating text, through all straits linking two parts of the high seas as defined in paragraph 2 (a) above, to permit the overflight of aircraft and passage of warships, including the submerged passage of submarines, in normal operational mode.

## SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 20th June 1978

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Security in the Mediterranean (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 776 and Amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
3. Security in the Mediterranean (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 776 and Amendments*).
4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 9.55 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 776 and Amendments)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Grant, Rapporteur.

#### 4. Address by Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom

Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Mulley replied to questions put by MM. Roper, Watkinson, Warren, Cook, Gessner, Lord Morris, MM. Mommersteeg and Mattick.

#### 5. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 776 and Amendments)*

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Mende, Grieve, Périquier, Handlos, Banks, Bernini, Mülayim (Observer from Turkey), Vyzas (Observer from Greece), Veryvakis (Observer from Greece), Druon, Roberti, Ferretti, Müller, Watkinson and Cavaliere.

The Debate was closed.

The replies of the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee and the votes on the draft Recommendation and Amendments were postponed until the next Sitting.

#### 6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Grant, the President, MM. Roper, Fosson, Reddemann and Roper.

On a proposal by Mr. Grant, the Assembly agreed to take item 2, Security in the Mediterranean, as first Order of the Day at the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Evers)	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Adriaensens	Gessner	MM. Cornelissen
Bonnell	Handlos	<i>Mommersteeg</i> (van Hulst)
<i>Lambiotte</i> (Mangelschots)	Marquardt	<i>Konings</i> (Scholten)
Tanghe	Mende	Stoffelen
	<i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Milz)	
	Müller	
<b>France</b>	Pfennig	
MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet)	Reddemann	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Boucheny	Hermann Schmidt	Mr. <i>Grant</i> (Lord Beaumont of Whitley)
Brugnon	Schwencke	Sir Frederic Bennett
Deschamps	Vohrer	Mr. <i>Banks</i> (Channon)
Ferretti		Lord <i>Morris</i> (Craig)
Grussenmeyer	<b>Italy</b>	Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Critchley)
Jäger	MM. Arfé	MM. <i>Craigen</i> (Faulds)
Péridier	Bernini	Grieve
<i>Couderc</i> (Péronnet)	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Hardy
Petit	Calamandrei	Hawkins
<i>Berrier</i> (Pignion)	Fosson	Lord Hughes
<i>Ménard</i> (Schleiter)	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	MM. Lewis
<i>Bozzi</i> (Seitlinger)	Maggioni	<i>Jessel</i> (Page)
<i>Bechter</i> (Talon)	Pecoraro	Sir John Rodgers
Valleix	Roberti	MM. Roper
	Sarti	Urwin
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<i>Rubbi</i> (Segre)	Warren
MM. <i>Mattick</i> (Ahrens)	Treu	Watkinson
<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens)	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Whitehead
Enders	Mr. Margue	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Hanin	Mrs. von Bothmer	MM. Abens
Peeters	Mr. Lagershausen	Mart
Van Waterschoot		
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Bonalumi	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Depietri	Corallo	MM. Koopman
Pelletier	De Poi	de Koster
Sénès	Minnocci	Voogd
	Orsini	
	Pecchioli	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 20th June 1978

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Security in the Mediterranean (*Replies to the speakers by the Rapporteur and by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 776 and Amendments*).
2. China and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 770 and Amendments*).
3. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly ; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment*).
4. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 775*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 2.55 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Replies to the speakers by the Rapporteur and by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 776 and Amendments)*

Mr. Grant, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2), parts 1, 2 and 3, was tabled by Mr. Ferretti :

1. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the principal credible basis" and insert "an essential guarantee" ; leave out "full".
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).
3. In sub-paragraph (c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect" and insert "by taking full account of".

Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Amendment were negated.

An Amendment (No. 1), part 1, was tabled by Mr. Druon :

In the draft recommendation proper :

1. In paragraph 1 (d), leave out "and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey".

Part 1 of the Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Périquier :

In paragraph 1 (d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey".

*Speakers* : MM. Périquier and Mende ; (point of order) : Mr. Valleix.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 1), part 2, was tabled by Mr. Druon :

2. In paragraph 1 (e), leave out "in Turkey in the NATO framework" and insert "with countries bordering on the Mediterranean in a European framework".

Part 2 of the Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Grant :

In paragraph 1 (e) of the draft recommendation proper, before "Turkey" insert "Greece and".

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1), parts 3 and 4, was tabled by Mr. Druon :

3. In paragraph 2 (a), after "remaining" insert "bilateral".

4. Leave out paragraph 2 (b) and insert the following :

"Ensure that no outside interference, in particular from neighbouring countries, jeopardises the resumption of the desirable negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus with a view to furthering the Cypriot state's full exercise of its independence and the unitary and harmonious coexistence of its communities."

Part 3 of the Amendment was agreed to and part 4 was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2), part 4, was tabled by Mr. Ferretti :

4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "all aspects of" ; leave out "NATO countries" and insert "WEU countries" ; leave out "in the appropriate allied forum".

Part 4 of the Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speakers* (explanation of vote) : MM. Valleix and Deschamps.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 313) <sup>1</sup>.

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Valleix.

The Assembly took note of the declaration by Mr. Valleix that the members of the French Delegation present would have voted against the draft Recommendation.

*Speakers* (points of order) : MM. Depietri and Mende.

#### 4. China and European security

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 770 and Amendments)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Mende, Cook, Grieve and Rubbi : (points of order) : MM. Valleix, Deschamps, Mende and Lewis ; MM. Gessner, Périquier, Lewis, Valleix, Mattick and Roberti ; (point of order) : Mr. Druon ; Mrs. Knight, MM. Hardy, Boucheny, Margue, Schwencke, Urwin, Cruz Roseta (Observer from Portugal), Whitehead, Mommersteeg, De Poi, Faulds and Cavaliere.

Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The votes on the draft Recommendation and Amendments were postponed until the next Sitting.

#### 5. Change in the membership of a Committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nomination to a Committee proposed by the Delegation of the Netherlands :

— Mr. Mommersteeg as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Cornelissen.

#### 6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 21st June, at 9 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.*

1. See page 25.

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Evers)	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Bonnel	Gessner	MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (van Hulst)
Mangelschots	Handlos	<i>Konings</i> (Koopman)
Tanghe	<i>Lenzer</i> (Lagershausen)	<i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster)
<b>France</b>	Marquardt	Stoffelen
MM. Bizet	Mende	
Boucheny	<i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Milz)	
<i>Visse</i> (Brugnon)	Müller	
Depietri	Hermann Schmidt	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Deschamps	Schwencke	Lord <i>Morris</i> (Lord Beaumont of
Ferretti		Whitley)
<i>Baumel</i> (Grussenmeyer)	<b>Italy</b>	Sir Frederic Bennett
Jager	MM. Arfé	Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Channon)
<i>Jeambrun</i> (Pelletier)	Bernini	MM. <i>Reid</i> (Craig)
Péridier	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	<i>Grant</i> (Critchley)
<i>Couderc</i> (Péronnet)	Calamandrei	Faulds
Petit	De Poi	Grieve
Pignion	Fosson	Hardy
<i>Berrier</i> (Sénès)	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	<i>Onslow</i> (Hawkins)
Talon	Maggioni	Lord Hughes
Valleix	Pecoraro	MM. Lewis
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Roberti	Page
Mr. <i>Mattick</i> (Ahrens)	Sarti	Sir John Rodgers
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Rubbi</i> (Segre)	MM. Roper
Mr. Enders	Treu	Urwin
	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<i>Craigien</i> (Watkinson)
	Mr. Margue	Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Adriaensens	MM. Bardens	MM. Abens
Hanin	Pfennig	Mart
Peeters	Reddemann	
Van Waterschoot	Vohrer	<b>Netherlands</b>
	<b>Italy</b>	MM. Cornelissen
<b>France</b>	MM. Bonalumi	Scholten
MM. Schleiter	Corallo	Voogd
Seitlinger	Minnocci	
	Orsini	<b>United Kingdom</b>
	Pecchioli	Mr. Warren

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 313**  
***on security in the Mediterranean***

---

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling at the present time of economic difficulties that security will always be a condition of the political freedoms and economic well-being of the allied countries, and that accordingly an adequate defence effort must be maintained ;
- (ii) Believing that the Soviet Union through its continued quest for military bases in the Mediterranean, its interventionist policy in Africa and its reiteration of the dangerously ambiguous "Brezhnev doctrine" presents the greatest military threat in the region ;
- (iii) Aware that one of the greatest risks of major conflict through miscalculation arises in the Mediterranean area where the opposing interests of East and West merge with those of North and South ;
- (iv) Believing therefore that every effort should be made through diplomatic channels to foster : a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East and the differences between allied countries in the area ; the continued independence and integrity of Yugoslavia and the continued denial of military bases to forces of the Soviet Union ;
- (v) Believing that NATO provides for the foreseeable future the principal credible basis for the security of its members in the Mediterranean area and that its effectiveness depends on the full support and participation of all member countries ;
- (vi) Believing in particular that the full and equal participation in NATO of both Greece and Turkey is vital to the security of each and to that of the Alliance as a whole ;
- (vii) Reiterating its view that security in the Mediterranean would be greatly enhanced by the accession of a democratic Spain to NATO, but stressing that such a decision is for a parliamentary majority in that country after the adoption of the new constitution ;
- (viii) Aware of the many conflicting considerations that must be reconciled in any policy on arms supply to non-NATO countries,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS**

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To strengthen the collective position of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean :
  - (a) by the more public identification of all member countries with NATO arrangements in the area ;
  - (b) through the participation of forces of as many member countries as possible in exercises and contingency planning ;
  - (c) by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect the reality of national contributions to NATO in the Mediterranean area ;
  - (d) by taking full account of the respective special requirements of Greece, Portugal and Turkey for the supply of necessary defence equipment and assistance, and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey ;
  - (e) by considering what joint armaments production projects can usefully be established in Greece and Turkey in the NATO framework ;
2.
  - (a) To encourage Greece and Turkey to continue negotiations to settle their remaining bilateral differences ;
  - (b) To urge the two Cypriot communities to resume their direct negotiations in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General without further delay ;
3. To arrange closer links between the integrated military structure of NATO and the Spanish armed forces, and their participation in NATO exercises, while leaving a decision on the accession of Spain to NATO to democratic discussion in the Spanish parliament ;
4. To ensure that non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean continue to see their interests best served by denying base rights or facilities to the Soviet armed forces ;
5. To proclaim the unequivocal support of the West for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status ;
6. To ensure that all aspects of policy on arms exports by NATO countries to any non-NATO country are fully reviewed in the appropriate allied forum.

## FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 21st June 1978

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. International terrorism (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 771 and Amendments*).
2. European security and African problems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 772 and Amendments*).
3. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly ; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment*).
4. China and European security (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 770 and Amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 9 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

Consideration of the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting was postponed until 12 noon.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

#### 3. International terrorism

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 771 and Amendments)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Hardy, Calamandrei, Whitehead, Stoffelen and Guerra Zunzunegui (Observer from Spain).

Mr. Müller, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Calamandrei and others :

In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "anarchist, nationalist, regionalist or other organisations" and insert "organisations of any denomination".

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Calamandrei and others :

In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "only" and insert "also".

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy :

In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. van den Bergh :

In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "through asylum or otherwise".

*Speakers* : MM. Stoffelen and Müller.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was adopted unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 314) <sup>1</sup>.

#### 4. European security and African problems

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 772 and Amendments)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

1. See page 30.

*Speakers* : MM. Onslow, Roberti, Page, Boucheny, Whitehead, Seitlinger, Antoni, Critchley, Cruz Roseta (Observer from Portugal), Pawelczyk, Pignion, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. De Poi.

Mr. Müller, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The votes on the draft Recommendation and Amendments were postponed.

### 5. Adoption of the Minutes

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix, Deschamps and Roper.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to, note being taken of the comments of Mr. Valleix and Mr. Deschamps.

### 6. China and European security

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 770 and Amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 4), parts 1 and 2, was tabled by Mr. Rubbi and others :

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "determination" add ", shared by all the peoples of the world,".

2. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble.

*Speakers* : Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. von Bothmer.

Parts 1 and 2 of the Amendment were negatived.

Amendment No. 1 was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett :

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the third paragraph and insert :

"Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government's continuing efforts to develop good relations with Europe ;"

*Speakers* : Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Roper, Calamandrei, Roper and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4), part 3, was tabled by Mr. Rubbi and others :

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, delete from "and study carefully" to the end of the paragraph.

*Speakers* : Sir Frederic Bennett and Mrs. von Bothmer.

Part 3 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Handlos and Mr. Page :

In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows :

"4. Consider objectively, in accord with already-declared British and French policy, any requests by China to purchase defence equipment."

*Speakers* : MM. Handlos, Margue, Roper, Mrs. von Bothmer, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Margue.

The Amendment was negatived.

*Speakers* (explanation of vote) : MM. Stoffelen and Calamandrei.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 44 votes to 8 with 2 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 315) <sup>1</sup>.

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Faulds.

### 7. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

*The Sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.*

1. See page 31.

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Mattick</i> (Ahrens)	MM. <i>Hengel</i> (Abens)
Bonnel	<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens)	Margue
<i>Lambiotte</i> (Hanin)	Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)
Mangelschots	MM. Enders	
Peeters	Handlos	<b>Netherlands</b>
Tanghe	<i>Alber</i> (von Hassel)	MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (van Hulst)
	<i>Ueberhorst</i> (Marquardt)	<i>Konings</i> (Koopman)
	Mende	Stoffelen
	<i>Spies von Büllenheim</i> (Milz)	
	Müller	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>France</b>	Pfennig	Mr. <i>Beith</i> (Lord Beaumont of
MM. Bizet	Reddemann	Whitley)
Boucheny	Schwencke	Sir Frederic Bennett
Brugnon	Vohrer	MM. Channon
Depietri	Gessner	<i>Reid</i> (Craig)
Deschamps	Hermann Schmidt	Critchley
<i>Lagourgue</i> (Ferretti)		Faulds
<i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer)	<b>Italy</b>	Grieve
Jager	MM. Arfé	Hardy
<i>Jeambrun</i> (Pelletier)	Bernini	<i>Onslow</i> (Hawkins)
Péridier	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Lord Hughes
<i>Druon</i> (Péronnet)	Calamandrei	MM. Lewis
Petit	De Poi	Page
Pignion	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	Sir John Rodgers
Schleiter	Maggioni	MM. Roper
Seitlinger	Orsini	Urwin
<i>Berrier</i> (Sénès)	Pecoraro	Warren
Talon	Roberti	<i>McGuire</i> (Watkinson)
Valleix	Sarti	Whitehead
	Treu	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
Mr. Van Waterschoot	MM. Bonalumi	MM. Cornelissen
	Corallo	de Koster
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Fosson	Scholten
MM. Evers	Minnocci	Voogd
Lagershausen	Pecchioli	
	Segre	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on China and European security (Doc. 770)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	44
Noes .....	8
Abstentions .....	2

*Ayes :*

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Handlos	Mr. Roberti
<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens)	Hardy	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Beith</i> (Lord Beaumont of Whitley)	<i>Onslow</i> (Hawkins)	MM. Roper
Sir Frederic Bennett	Lord Hughes	Sarti
Mrs. von Bothmer	MM. <i>Konings</i> (Koopman)	Hermann Schmidt
MM. Channon	Lewis	Seitlinger
<i>Reid</i> (Craig)	Maggioni	Stoffelen
De Poi	<i>Ueberhorst</i> (Marquardt)	Talon
Enders	Mende	Tanghe
Faulds	Müller	Treu
Gessner	Page	Urwin
<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	Pecchioli	Valleix
Grieve	Peeters	Lord <i>Morris</i> (Warren)
<i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer)	Pfennig	MM. <i>McGuire</i> (Watkinson)
	Reddemann	Whitehead

*Noes :*

MM. Bernini	MM. Depietri
<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Deschamps
<i>Boucheny</i>	Margue
Calamandrei	Schwencke

*Abstentions :*

MM. <i>Berrier</i> (Péridier)
Pignion

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 314**  
***on international terrorism***

---

The Assembly,

Considering the use of terrorist methods by organisations of any denomination to be a challenge to the practice of democracy by Western European countries and liable to jeopardise their security ;

Considering that the growth of modern technology makes the more industrialised countries particularly vulnerable to terrorist organisations ;

Noting that the framework of terrorist action has widened beyond national frontiers ;

Considering therefore that terrorism constitutes a problem which can be tackled also in an international framework, as the Council of Europe did in preparing a European convention covering the matters within its competence ;

Deploring the fact that certain sovereign states have on a number of occasions granted passive and even sometimes active assistance to terrorist operations ;

Noting that these movements have become particularly active since 1970, compelling some governments of member countries to make large-scale increases in their internal defence and police forces ;

Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty gives the Council specific responsibility with regard to the fight against terrorism ;

Welcoming the fact that the Council, in 1970 and subsequent years, took the initiative of exercising its responsibilities with regard to the fight against piracy in the air and the protection of diplomats,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote the ratification by the member states of WEU of the convention on terrorism drawn up by the Council of Europe and already signed by the member governments ;
2. Examine, when approving the tables submitted by member countries on their internal defence and police forces, the reasons justifying variations in these tables ;
3. Seek thereby to co-ordinate the conditions in which such forces may be used to combat terrorism ;
4. Encourage political consultations between its members towards finding international solutions to problems liable to provoke terrorist activities ;
5. Study the means by which Western Europe can effectively dissuade any state from granting assistance to terrorists through asylum or otherwise ;
6. Ask member governments to demonstrate their solidarity towards terrorist threats by applying strictly all agreed measures ;
7. Report to the Assembly by appropriate means on the measures it has taken to meet the challenge of international terrorism.

**RECOMMENDATION 315**  
***on China and European security***

---

The Assembly,

Noting China's continuing determination to safeguard its own security and ensure respect for its fully independent nationhood and its frontiers ;

Considering that total resistance to external aggression from any source is a fundamental element in Chinese political thinking as it is in Western Europe ;

Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government's continuing efforts to develop good relations with Europe ;

Considering that China is now a significant factor in the maintenance of global peace and security,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Examine attentively the rôle China may play in regard to European and global security and study carefully the views expressed by the Chinese Government on matters relating to threats to international peace ;
2. Encourage member governments both to develop their bilateral trade relations with China and continue to concert their approach especially within the framework of the EEC with a view to increasing trade between Europe and China ;
3. Favourably consider China's requests for increased industrial technology.

## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 21st June 1978

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 773*).
2. Application satellites (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 766*).
3. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 775*).
4. European security and African problems (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 772 and Amendments*).
5. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

Consideration of the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting was postponed.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

#### 3. United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology

##### *Application satellites*

*(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 773 and 766)*

Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, proposed that the reports on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology and on application satellites be presented and debated jointly.

The proposal was agreed to.

Part I of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Konings, Rapporteur.

Part II of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur.

Part III of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Dr. Phipps, Rapporteur.

Part IV of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on application satellites was presented by Mr. Ueberhorst, in place of Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur.

The Joint Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Craigen, Valleix, Onslow and McGuire.

Mr. Konings, Dr. Phipps, Mr. Jessel, Rapporteurs, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Joint Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 773.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 316)<sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 766.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 317)<sup>2</sup>.

*Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

1. See page 38.

2. See page 40.

**4. European security and African problems**  
**(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 772 and Amendments)**

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 1, was tabled by Mr. Müller :

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following new paragraphs :

“Welcoming the effort made by several African states to form a force with a view to maintaining peace on the African continent and defending it against any interference from outside ;

Encouraging the member countries to pursue the efforts made in Paris on 5th June 1978 by five western powers and in Copenhagen on 12th June by the members of the European Community to concert their African policies,”

*Speaker* : Mr. Müller.

Part 1 of the Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others :

In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 7 and insert :

“7. Relate the economic assistance extended by European countries to the African states to the development of human rights in those countries.”

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 6), part 1, was tabled by Mr. Antoni and others :

1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 10.

*Speakers* : MM. Antoni, Müller and Reddemann.

Part 1 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Kershaw and others :

In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, after “of” insert “Zaire”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Müller.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 6), part 2, was tabled by Mr. Antoni and others :

2. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “aggressive” ; leave out “particularly the present Cuban operations” ; at the

end of the paragraph add “and obtain the withdrawal of all foreign military presence in Africa”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Müller.

Part 2 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others :

In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “particularly” and insert “for example”.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere :

At the end of paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, add “encouraged by the support of the Soviet Union”.

*Speakers* : MM. Cavaliere and Müller.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Roberti :

At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph :

“Ensure that there are not created on the African continent, through the acts of the Soviet Union or its allies, in particular Cuba, military or strategic zones of influence because of the danger of encirclement that such situations would present for Europe and the Mediterranean.”

*Speakers* : MM. Roberti and Müller.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 2, was tabled by Mr. Müller :

2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph :

“Encourage and afford effective support for the steps taken by several African states to combine their efforts with a view to maintaining peace in Africa and defending the African continent against any interference from outside.”

Mr. Roper proposed a manuscript amendment to Amendment No. 3 to leave out “afford” and insert “provide where requested”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Müller.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

Thus amended, part 2 of the Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speaker* : Mr. Boucheny.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 44 votes to 4. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 318) <sup>1</sup>.

**5. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

**Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment)*

The Joint Debate was resumed.

*Speakers* : MM. Bernini, Konings, Roper, Valleix and Hawkins.

Mr. Treu, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, replied to the speakers.

The Joint Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 768.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 319) <sup>2</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Order in Document 768.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Voogd :

Leave out the operative text of the draft order and insert :

“To ask the authorities concerned to promote the appointment of an appropriate number of parliamentarians interested in defence matters to the delegations of WEU member countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.”

*Speaker* : Mr. Treu.

The Amendment was agreed to.

1. See page 41.

2. See page 43.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Roper and others :

In the draft order proper, leave out “the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe” and insert “its Assembly”.

Mr. Roper proposed a manuscript Amendment:

Leave out “to the delegations of WEU member countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe” and insert “to the delegations of member countries to the WEU Assembly.”

Thus amended, the Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Order in Document 768.

The amended draft Order was agreed to unanimously. (This Order will be published as No. 48) <sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 777.

An Amendment (No. 2), parts 1 and 2, was tabled by Mr. Treu :

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the beginning of the first paragraph up to “recommendations and”.

2. In the third paragraph of the preamble, leave out “and that the usefulness of those that are applied is contested”.

*Speakers* : MM. Treu and Roper.

Parts 1 and 2 of the Amendment were agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others :

In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of the second paragraph insert “making use of the resources of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and its Standing Armaments Committee”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Tanghe.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2), part 3, was tabled by Mr. Treu :

3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 2 and insert :

“2. Encourage the Standing Armaments Committee to pursue and develop the study it has undertaken to improve co-operation between European armaments industries and

1. See page 44.

provide the Agency for the Control of Armaments with the means it needs to enable the modified Brussels Treaty to be applied in full ;”.

*Speakers* : MM. Roper and Treu.

Part 3 of the Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 777.

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix and Calamandrei.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to, note being taken of 2 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 320) <sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 774.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Jager :

At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph III as follows :

“III. Invite the governments of the member countries to discuss the communication of 31st May last from the Commission of the European Communities on concerted action on aircraft programmes so that they may take a decision on this matter at the next meeting of the European Council.”

Mr. Adriaensens proposed a manuscript Amendment :

After “Communities”, insert “to the Council of Ministers of the EEC”.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to

The amended Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 774.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 321) <sup>1</sup>.

## **6. Relations with Parliaments**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 775)*

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Craigen, Kershaw and Beith.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

## **7. Adoption of the Minutes**

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

## **8. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 22nd June, at 10 a.m.

*Speakers* (correction of vote) : Mr. Calamandrei ; (points of order) : MM. Roper, Calamandrei, Valleix, Kershaw, Calamandrei, Roper and Calamandrei.

*The Sitting was closed at 7 p.m.*

1. See page 45.

1. See page 46.

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>MM. Ueberhorst</b> (Marquardt)	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Adriaensens	Müller	Mr. <i>Beith</i> (Lord Beaumont of Whitley)
Bonnell	Reddemann	Sir Frederic Bennett
<i>Lambiotte</i> (Hanin)	Schwencke	MM. Channon
Peeters	<b>Italy</b>	<i>Reid</i> (Craig)
Tanghe	MM. Arfé	Lord <i>Morris</i> (Critchley)
<b>France</b>	Bernini	MM. Faulds
MM. Boucheny	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	Grieve
Brugnon	Calamandrei	Dr. <i>Phipps</i> (Hardy)
Ferretti	De Poi	Mr. Hawkins
Jager	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	Lord Hughes
Pignion	Maggioni	MM. Lewis
Valleix	Pecoraro	<i>Jessel</i> (Page)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Roberti	Sir John Rodgers
Mr. <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens)	Treu	MM. Roper
Mrs. von Bothmer	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Urwin
MM. Enders	Mr. Margue	Warren
Gessner	<b>Netherlands</b>	<i>McGuire</i> (Watkinson)
Handlos	MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (van Hulst)	<i>Craigen</i> (Whitehead)
<i>Alber</i> (von Hassel)	<i>Konings</i> (Koopman)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Sénès	MM. Minnocci
MM. Mangelschots	Talon	Orsini
Van Waterschoot	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Pecchioli
<b>France</b>	MM. Ahrens	Sarti
MM. Bizet	Evers	Segre
Depietri	Lagershausen	<b>Luxembourg</b>
Deschamps	Mende	MM. Abens
Grussenmeyer	Milz	Mart
Pelletier	Pfennig	<b>Netherlands</b>
Péridier	Hermann Schmidt	MM. Cornelissen
Péronnet	Vohrer	de Koster
Petit	<b>Italy</b>	Scholten
Schleiter	MM. Bonalumi	Stoffelen
Seitlinger	Corallo	Voogd
	Fosson	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on European security and African problems (Doc. 772)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	44
Noes .....	4
Abstentions .....	0

*Ayes :*

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	MM. <i>Jessel</i> (Page)
Arfé	Grieve	Pecoraro
<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens)	Handlos	Peeters
<i>Beith</i> (Lord Beaumont of Whitley)	<i>Lambiotte</i> (Hanin)	Reddemann
Sir Frederic Bennett	Dr. <i>Phipps</i> (Hardy)	Roberti
Mr. Bonnel	MM. <i>Alber</i> (von Hassel)	Sir John Rodgers
Mrs. von Bothmer	Hawkins	MM. Roper
MM. Channon	Lord Hughes	Schwencke
<i>Reid</i> (Craig)	MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (van Hulst)	Tanghe
Lord <i>Morris</i> (Critchley)	<i>Konings</i> (Koopman)	Treu
MM. De Poi	Lewis	Urwin
Enders	Maggioni	Valleix
Faulds	Margue	Warren
Gessner	<i>Ueberhorst</i> (Marquardt)	<i>McGuire</i> (Watkinson)
	Müller	<i>Craigien</i> (Whitehead)

*Noes :*

MM. Bernini
<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)
Boucheny
Calamandrei

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 316*****on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology***

The Assembly,

Considering that, notwithstanding the mutual European-United States interest in a common defence system, \$10-15 billion is wasted each year on complicated military equipment either already produced or in service on this or the other side of the Atlantic ;

Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology projects is a necessity if the free world is to strengthen its posture vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc ;

Noting the need expressed in industrial circles for more transatlantic co-operation to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance ;

Considering that existing organisations can adequately and actively promote the necessary co-operation ;

Aware of the strong influence the adoption of an American national energy plan will have on Europe's possibilities as regards oil and gas supplies and the dangers which will arise if the oil-producing nations are unable to meet world demand in 1985 by as much as 20 % ;

Aware that several member countries and the United States are independently developing new methods for the gasification and liquefaction of coal and that large sums of money are needed to promote alternative technologies ;

Convinced of the need to relay data from European satellites via the new tracking and data relay satellite system TDRSS ;

Considering that member governments should pursue a policy whereby all Europe's space activities are integrated in ESA and that through ESA they should co-operate with the United States, and with NASA in particular, since there will shortly be new space developments in both communications and energy and both agencies have restricted budgets ;

Considering that the United States Government's new aviation policy and liberal pricing system will have far-reaching repercussions for both the airlines and the aircraft industry ;

Regretting the deplorably slow rate of progress in the Law of the Sea Conference now in its seventh session ;

Noting that :

- (a) marine scientists in the United States and elsewhere are inhibited by the 200-mile limit of the economic zone following the Law of the Sea Conference in their fundamental and applied research on mineral and organic resources of the oceans, and on energy which might be derived from tapping the natural flows of tides, waves and currents ;
- (b) fish supplies in the Mediterranean and oceans can be enhanced by the addition of organic wastes ;
- (c) measures to conserve or destroy certain species of sea fauna can disturb the balance of nature and cause a chain reaction of effects upon other species,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Urge member governments :

A. To establish a high-level European-United States committee to promote European-United States co-operation in advanced technology projects in which the EEC would also participate on the European side, this high-level committee meeting at least once a year and submitting proposals to the governments concerned on :

- (a) how to implement the two-way street policy in respect of advanced military equipment in order to make more efficient use of Alliance resources ;

- (b) how to promote this policy at an early stage in research and development of new advanced weapon systems ;
- (c) how to include military satellites and other military communications equipment in this co-operation whenever possible ;
- (d) how to work together in research and development of alternative technologies such as gasification and liquefaction of coal, solar energy and other new sources of energy and how to improve the productivity of certain nuclear reactors ;
- (e) how to co-operate in civil and military oceanographic activities, especially in seabed mining and the sharing of data on fish conservation, and promote the successful conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference ;

B. 1. To initiate urgent consideration by the United Nations as to means by which fundamental and applied ocean research can continue without restraint whilst providing for the mineral and other rights of each coastal state by sharing and publishing the results of research ;

2. To adopt national fisheries and conservation policies which reflect scientific knowledge in respect of :

- (i) the interrelationships between each species and its prey (e.g. porpoises and tuna) ;
- (ii) the effect upon fish stocks of organic wastes which when sufficiently diluted are generally beneficial and inorganic wastes which are generally detrimental ;

C. To adopt a common policy in the EEC framework vis-à-vis the new United States aviation policy and not act in a dispersed manner with regard to the new aviation agreements now suggested by the United States ;

D. 1. To instruct ESA to study the possibilities either of participating in the United States tracking and data relay satellite system and building the required European ground station or of building its own TDRS system ;

2. To draw up guidelines for working with the United States authorities on the development of the space shuttle transportation system, with special reference to communications and solar power satellites ;

3. To participate in more of NASA's scientific space projects through ESA.

**RECOMMENDATION 317*****on application satellites***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the Council's statement that Europe needs to develop and apply overall aeronautical, space and energy policies and that European industry's capacity and technical level should be maintained ;

Considering that the ESA convention was signed on 30th May 1975 but that of the original ten members of the former ESRO only the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland have ratified it ;

Regretting the unwillingness of several member countries' governments to adopt and finance an extended overall communications satellite programme as well as the Ariane launcher programme ;

Aware of the need to enable the European aerospace industry to supply a satisfactory share of satellite systems intended for European countries, international organisations and domestic and regional systems in third world countries ;

Noting the lack of a long-range European meteorological satellite programme and an earth resources programme apart from ESA's earthnet programme ;

Considering that, although some member countries support their military forces, or realise the need to do so, through military application satellites, there are no plans for a proper European programme to terminate Europe's total dependence on United States satellites in spite of the fact that many European satellites are, technically speaking, on a par with American satellites ;

Considering further that the European aerospace industry should be given a fair share of orders for military application satellites from NATO countries and the Alliance as a whole,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

I. Urge the governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to accelerate ratification of the ESA convention and address a similar request to the Spanish Government ;

II. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate steps to assure a substantive European presence in the exploitation of space and in particular :

(a) to adopt a three-year ceiling for compulsory expenditure ;

(b) to adopt and finance an extended overall communications satellite programme ;

(c) to decide on the production of a first series of five Ariane launchers ;

(d) to make sure that Europe will be associated with future development of the United States space transport system as it has been associated with its present development in financing the spacelab ;

(e) to ensure the pursuit and development of European activities in earth observation including meteorology and remote sensing by satellites ;

(f) to promote the Europeanisation of the French project Spot (*satellite probatoire d'observation de la terre*) ;

(g) to offer European industry a fair share of NATO orders for military application satellites,

with a view to further strengthening Europe's industrial potential in aerospace matters and, in the light of the early prospect of world markets being opened, thus promoting Europe's position in application satellites which is of major importance for employment in this industry.

**RECOMMENDATION 318**  
***on European security and African problems***

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The Assembly,

Considering that co-operation between Western Europe and the African countries is essential to the security of Europe and the necessary economic development of Africa ;

Welcoming the determination constantly expressed by African states to settle problems between themselves free from intervention by powers outside the continent of Africa ;

Noting nevertheless that unrest in the African continent has often provided an opportunity or pretext for external intervention ;

Considering that respect for the sovereignty of African states remains a basic goal of any European policy ;

Regretting that the political framework inherited from the colonial period is ill-adapted to ethnic, linguistic and religious realities ;

Considering that Europe should contribute fully to the economic, social and cultural development of Africa ;

Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms by some African governments ;

Condemning the policy of apartheid pursued by the South African Republic as contrary to the principles of democracy and human rights on which western civilisation is based ;

Welcoming the effort made by several African states to form a force with a view to maintaining peace on the African continent and defending it against any interference from outside ;

Encouraging the member countries to pursue the efforts made in Paris on 5th June 1978 by five western powers and in Copenhagen on 12th June by the members of the European Community to concert their African policies,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that its members hold continuing consultations in the most appropriate framework with a view to co-ordinating their African policies ;
2. Co-ordinate the efforts of its members to assist in establishing peace and security in southern Africa in order to establish a just and democratic transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, induce the South African Republic to terminate apartheid and promote the independence of Namibia ;
3. Initiate steps to reduce the present level of arms sales from external countries to Africa ;
4. Study means of achieving a strict limitation of such sales, including enforcement of the embargo on arms supplies to the South African Republic ;
5. Approach other arms suppliers with a view to their participating in this undertaking ;
6. Reconsider policies of investment and technology transfer in South Africa and Rhodesia which might render ineffective the embargo on supplies of military equipment in that they strengthen the industrial potential of these countries ;
7. Relate the economic assistance extended by European countries to the African states to the development of human rights in those countries ;
8. Promote through co-operation with African states their economic and social development, as well as their democratic development, with due respect for human rights ;
9. Foster the development of co-operation between Europe and Africa as defined in the Lomé Convention ;

10. Condemn the repeated military operations across the borders of Zaïre, South Africa and Rhodesia ;
11. Condemn any aggressive military intervention in Africa, particularly the present Cuban operations encouraged by the support of the Soviet Union ;
12. Promote the implementation by European firms operating in Africa of the code of conduct adopted by the EEC ;
13. Ensure that there are not created on the African continent, through the acts of the Soviet Union or its allies, in particular Cuba, military or strategic zones of influence because of the danger of encirclement that such situations would present for Europe and the Mediterranean ;
14. Encourage and provide where requested effective support for the steps taken by several African states to combine their efforts with a view to maintaining peace in Africa and defending the African continent against any interference from outside.

**RECOMMENDATION 319*****on the political activities of the Council —  
reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Gratified that in the presentation of its annual report for 1977 the Council has in many respects reverted to the practice it followed prior to 1976 ;

Noting with satisfaction that the Council has met most of the commitments made on its behalf for improving its relations with the Assembly ;

Regretting that there is still much ambiguity about the nature of the "informal meeting" with the General Affairs Committee in November 1977 ;

Noting that in several respects the Council falls far short of giving the Assembly sufficient information on the political aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by member countries ;

Recalling that the Council's responsibilities are defined in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Examine regularly, at whatever level it may be meeting, the questions connected with the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by other organisations ;
2. Provide more extensive information on consultations between member countries on matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
3. Organise a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee during the second half of 1978 ;
4. Improve participation by Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member countries in plenary sessions of the Assembly.

**ORDER 48*****on the appointment of members of the WEU Assembly***

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The Assembly,

Considering that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty confers a very heavy burden on parliamentarians already exercising duties in their national parliaments ;

Noting that the future election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage will lead parliaments of member countries to re-examine their participation in the European parliamentary assemblies ;

Considering it desirable for the largest possible number of parliamentarians interested in defence matters to take part in the activities of the WEU Assembly ;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty as a whole forms an irreplaceable basis for any European security and defence policy ;

Considering it highly desirable for work to be shared out between the European parliamentary assemblies on the basis of the responsibilities conferred on them by treaty or by statute,

**REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY**

To ask the authorities concerned to promote the appointment of an appropriate number of parliamentarians interested in defence matters to the delegations of member countries to the WEU Assembly.

**RECOMMENDATION 320*****on the application of the Brussels Treaty —  
reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Recalling the procedure whereby NATO may in appropriate cases provide material for replies to recommendations ;

Noting that the annual report of the Council still makes no mention of the level of British land forces on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR although the basic figures are given in the British white paper on defence ;

Noting that the armaments control provisions of the Brussels Treaty are incompletely applied ;

Anxious to maintain and make the best use of the expert knowledge of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and of the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Indicate in future annual reports the number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. Set up a European centre for defence studies at the disposal of intergovernmental defence bodies and the Assembly making use of the resources of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and its Standing Armaments Committee ;
3. Delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments which may not be produced on German territory.

**RECOMMENDATION 321*****on scientific, technological and aerospace questions —  
reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Appreciating the continuing dialogue between the Council and the Assembly on Europe's energy supplies, European aviation and space questions ;

Noting with anxiety however the increasing tendency in Europe to side-step the Community approach and make bilateral or trilateral arrangements ;

Considering the declaration of the heads of state or of government of the European Community at their meeting in Copenhagen on 7th and 8th April 1978 underlining the urgent need to make Western Europe less dependent on imported energy sources and acknowledging that high priority must be given to large-scale investments in this sector ;

Agreeing with the Council that there is an urgent need for a common energy policy for Western Europe ;

Regretting that the state of European aviation has not improved since last year and that an overall civil and military aeronautical policy has not been formulated ;

Gratified that member countries' approach to ESA's programmes has been more positive recently ;

Gratified also at the Council's statement in its annual report that European nuclear fusion research must be pursued so that Europe can achieve a technological level comparable with that of the United States and the Soviet Union and that it wishes a European civil and military aeronautical industry to be developed capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with the United States,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL****I. Invite member countries :**

1. When defining their industrial policy, to take greater account of security requirements and in particular the need to :

- ensure Europe's energy supplies even in time of crisis ;
- maintain the level of employment which is essential for social peace ;
- guarantee the competitiveness of European advanced industries by a high level of research and investment and thus strengthen the industrial basis of European security ;

2. (a) To continue to strive for a common European energy plan up to 1990 ;

(b) To earmark a major part of their budgets for the development of conventional and new sources of energy and energy production as well as for energy conservation and environmental factors ;

II. Invite the Governments of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to seek the best means for the firms concerned in their countries to take part in the Airbus programme as full partners ;

III. Invite the governments of the member countries to discuss the communication of 31st May last from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers of the EEC on concerted action on aircraft programmes so that they may take a decision on this matter at the next meeting of the European Council.

# SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 22nd June 1978

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

Disarmament (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 778 and Amendments*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. Disarmament

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 778 and Amendments)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Antoni, Cook, Valleix, Kershaw and Hawkins.

Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Cook :

At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a paragraph (*viii*) :

*“(viii) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments.”*

*Speakers* : Mr. Cook and Sir John Rodgers.

The Amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Valleix proposed a manuscript Amendment :

In paragraph 1 (*a*) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “comprehensive”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

The manuscript Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3), beginning of part 1, was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

1. In the draft recommendation proper, paragraph 1 (*d*), leave out “restore” and insert “safeguard”.

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix, Roper and Valleix.

The beginning of part 1 of the Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cook and others :

At the end of paragraph 1 (*e*) of the draft recommendation proper, add “which recognises the special responsibility of the major arms-producing countries to exercise restraint in their sales policy”.

*Speakers* : MM. Cook, Tomney and Cook.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 3), end of part 1, was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

Between paragraphs 1 (*g*) and 1 (*h*) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “if possible”.

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix, Roper and Valleix.

Mr. Roper proposed a manuscript Amendment to the Amendment :

Between paragraphs 1 (*g*) and 1 (*h*) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “if possible concurrently” and insert “concurrently if possible”.

The manuscript Amendment to the Amendment was agreed to.

The end of part 1 of the Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 2, was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

2. In paragraph 2, leave out "without reducing its effectiveness" and insert "and of all states on an equal footing".

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix and Roper.

Part 2 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 3, was tabled by Mr. Valleix.

3. Add a new paragraph 4 as follows :

"4. To have a European conference convened grouping all the powers interested in disarmament on the continent, *inter alia* through appropriate consultations between the member states of WEU in the Council of this organisation ;".

*Speaker* : Mr. Valleix.

Mr. Calamandrei proposed a manuscript Amendment to the Amendment :

Leave out "powers" and insert "countries" ; leave out "*inter alia*" and insert "also".

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix, Roper, Valleix and Calamandrei.

The manuscript Amendment to the Amendment was negatived.

Part 3 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3), part 4, was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

4. Add a new paragraph 5 as follows :

"5. To institute in the framework of the United Nations an international development fund financed by contributions levied according to the level of armaments of the member states of the organisation."

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix, Tomney and Roper.

Part 4 of the Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speakers* (points of order) : MM. Roper, Valleix and Roper.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

#### **4. Adjournment of the Session**

The President addressed the Assembly and adjourned the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

*The Sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Alber</i> (von Hassel)	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Adriaensens	Mende	Mr. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (van Hulst)
Bonnel	Pfennig	
<i>Lambiotte</i> (Hanin)	Reddemann	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Mangelschots		Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Peeters	<b>Italy</b>	Sir Frederic Bennett
	MM. Arfé	MM. Channon
<b>France</b>	Bernini	<i>Beith</i> (Craig)
MM. Brugnon	<i>Antoni</i> (Boldrini)	<i>Onslow</i> (Critchley)
Jäger	Calamandrei	Faulds
Péridier	De Poi	Hardy
Pignion	Maggioni	Hawkins
Valleix	<i>Ariosto</i> (Minnocci)	Lord Hughes
	Pecoraro	Mr. <i>Kershaw</i> (Page)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Roberti	Sir John Rodgers
Mrs. von Bothmer	Sarti	MM. Roper
MM. Enders		Urwin
Gessner	<b>Luxembourg</b>	<i>Tomney</i> (Warren)
Handlos	Mr. Margue	<i>Cook</i> (Watkinson)
		Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Tanghe	MM. Ahrens	MM. Abens
Van Waterschoot	Bardens	Mart
	Evers	
<b>France</b>	Lagershausen	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Bizet	Marquardt	MM. Cornelissen
Boucheny	Milz	Koopman
Depietri	Müller	de Koster
Deschamps	Hermann Schmidt	Scholten
Ferretti	Schwencke	Stoffelen
Grussenmeyer	Vohrer	Voogd
Pelletier	<b>Italy</b>	
Péronnet	MM. Bonalumi	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Petit	Corallo	MM. Grieve
Schleiter	Fosson	Lewis
Seitlinger	Gonella	
Sénès	Orsini	
Talon	Pecchioli	
	Segre	
	Treu	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.



**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 19th June 1978

## SUMMARY

1. Opening of the Session.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Tributes.
4. Address by the Provisional President.
5. Examination of Credentials.
6. Election of the President of the Assembly.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.
8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
9. Observers.
10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 764).
11. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Docs. 765, 767 and 769).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Forlani (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).
12. Address by Mr. Stirn, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Stirn (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*).  
*Reply by Mr. Stirn to questions put by*: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Petit, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Roper.
13. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (*Questions and replies by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).  
*Reply by Mr. Forlani to questions put by*: Mr. Müller, Mr. Vallex, Mrs. von Bothmer.
14. Strategic mobility (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the last session, Doc. 758*).
15. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 768, 777 and 774 and Amendment*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Treu (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Tanghe (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Adriaensens (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Grieve.
16. Nomination of members to Committees.
17. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir John Rodgers, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### 1. Opening of the Session

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Tributes

The PRESIDENT. — I now ask you all to stand please while I pay tribute to two of our late members. (*The Representatives rose*)

1. See page 18.

Two of our colleagues have died since the last session. On 16th March our French colleague, André Bouulloche, met a tragic death in a plane crash at the age of 62. A former student at the Ecole Polytechnique and a civil engineer, he was one of the first to join the resistance. On his return from deportation, he held high office in the French civil service.

A man of proven courage, his high moral and intellectual work quickly attracted the attention of several heads of government of various parties. In 1958 General de Gaulle made him a minister. In 1965 he was elected Mayor of Montbéliard and in 1967 socialist member of parliament for that constituency. He became a leader of the Socialist Party and spokesman for financial matters on behalf of the Socialist Group in the French National Assembly.

During his five years in our Assembly, he was an active member first of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and then of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. From 1974 to 1976 he was Chairman of the Socialist Group.

*The President (continued)*

André Boulloche enjoyed widespread esteem during his life. His early and tragic end gives us great sorrow.

On behalf of the Assembly I express our very sincere sympathy to Mrs. Boulloche and her children.

Let us pause for a moment now to remember Mr. Boulloche.

*(The Assembly stood in silence)*

Another member of the Assembly who has died since we last met is Lord Peddie who died in April and who had been a member of our Assembly for nearly four years.

As many here will know, he was a very distinguished member of the co-operative movement and it is in this field that he made his mark both at home and internationally. He was also a distinguished economist who was appointed to serve on many boards and committees in the United Kingdom. One of his principal interests in recent years was the post office.

He became a life peer in 1961 and was an assiduous member of the House of Lords, where he often contributed to debates on the economy and on industrial affairs. He was not, I think, nor do I believe that he would have claimed to be, an expert on defence or security matters, but on his appointment to this Assembly his sense of duty ensured that he contributed much to our deliberations during the relatively short time he was a member.

During the whole period of his membership of the Assembly he was an active and expert member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

I am sure that the Assembly would wish to place on record its sense of loss in Lord Peddie's death and to send our sympathy to his family.

I ask you to stand for a few moments in his memory.

*(The Assembly stood in silence)*

#### **4. Address by the Provisional President**

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, as *doyen d'age*, it is my great pride, privilege and pleasure to sit here for a brief butterfly moment of glory as the Provisional President of the Assembly who has already declared this twenty-fourth session now open.

On his eightieth birthday Sir Winston Churchill is said to have made the remark: "The young sow their wild oats but the old grow sage". I feel I must live a lot more years to claim such

wisdom and sagacity as Winston Churchill possessed. But the fact that I have been following the work of our Assembly and participating for a great number of years does perhaps allow me to share with you a few reflections inspired by recent developments in the institution which brings us together today.

Among the various international parliamentary assemblies, ours may seem to be something of a poor relation. WEU has fewer member countries than most of its rivals. Its sessions are not very frequent and, above all, it is experiencing increasing difficulty in finding authorised government representatives with whom to hold a dialogue.

Some people even go so far as to suggest that our organisation's technical staff should be transformed into a diplomatic and military academy. It must be admitted that the Council of Ministers' inertia — if this does not offend those on the front bench — encourages the idea that henceforth our technical experts could be put to no better use than that. Notwithstanding this, we must remember that the Western European Union Assembly — and I stress the word "Assembly" — is a tribune which is listened to. Its debates often draw the attention of the international press. Its work seems to interest a growing number of governments, even amongst those not represented in the Council of Western European Union.

Before the report of Sir Frederic Bennett had secured a majority for its acceptance and agreement was reached on the recommendations, there was positive evidence that the Soviet Union had seen the report and made a *démarche* to the United Kingdom Government — and I assume to the governments of the other six countries that comprise WEU — urging our government to exert pressure on the delegate members of parliament to reject this report, which had been adopted by the General Affairs Committee, of which I am a Vice-Chairman, by 14 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions. As I would expect, the United Kingdom Government pointed out that the recommendations by members of the WEU Assembly were not an appropriate subject for internal governmental discussion and that these recommendations represented the views of parliamentarians and not necessarily those of their governments.

One might be astonished at such an interest in an assembly whose powers are undeniably limited, since the only sanction that we can impose upon the Council of Ministers is a motion to disapprove; and let us realise it did not cause serious difficulties for our countries' governments the one and only time it has so far been used. The full interest and value of our sessions, therefore, stems from our debates; and these debates themselves are of value only in so far as they

*The President (continued)*

reach the heart of the problems concerned and are tackled with the will to speak the truth and the courage to hide nothing. We are, after all, the only body of European parliamentarians that discusses in open forum the problems of defence.

We are representatives from parliament. It is no part of our task, necessarily, to defend or promote our government's defence policy or strategy. We must at all times defend our colleagues' rights to express their views sincerely and without fear. Indeed, we must all remember Voltaire's remark that while he disagreed with a certain point of view, he would fight to the death for the right of the speaker to express it. This is surely the task of this Assembly. We are not necessarily supporters of the government. The ability to advance policies not adopted by governments is the distinguishing mark of the difference between autocracy, whether from the left or the right, and democracy.

As my old friend Denis Brogan once said "The difference between autocracy and democracy is this: autocracy is like a splendid ship moving majestically until it hits a rock and then sinks for ever; democracy is like a raft — it never sinks but, damn it, your feet are always in the water."

This session, because of the standard of the reports presented to us, should provide us with an opportunity of showing our courage. We must expect no help from without, nor from the always-appreciated contributions of a number of ministers in advancing what can in present circumstances be achieved only by ourselves. The existence of the WEU Assembly will find justification in the political courage that we show when we handle the major questions to be debated in these coming days.

There are many forms of political courage but the main one is probably our determination to face the truth and refuse to take refuge behind words that allow unpleasant and unpalatable facts to be avoided. Whether in connection with Africa, the Mediterranean or China, our Rapporteurs have evoked clearly, and I believe remarkably objectively, the considerable military effort deployed by the Soviet Union, and especially the political activities in which that country is engaged in Europe and on all the seas and continents today, and in particular in Africa now.

The threat constituted by this vast political operation, of changing aspect but constant aims, and the accumulation of ever-greater numbers of ground, naval and air armaments, conventional and nuclear, make it blatantly obvious that there are no longer many fields in which the West, even when united, can claim to be superior

in the balance of forces. In particular, the very division of the West with all its attendant uncertainties further weakens it in face of this threat. These facts must, therefore, be borne in mind when dealing with matters such as détente and disarmament. Admittedly, these are aims which we all sincerely share; but we must not regard them as words to conceal the existence of a challenging and real threat to our preservation. On the contrary, we must analyse the implications in great detail.

It is not enough, however, to perceive this reality. We must also have the courage to draw the full consequences from what we see and not allow ourselves to take the easy way out in espousing political views based on noble-sounding ideas rather than on facts; for let us never forget that facts speak louder than words. We must, therefore, pay due attention to the views offered us today by several Rapporteurs, be it Mr. Grant when he speaks of the Mediterranean, Mr. Müller when he deals with the question of balance and stability in Africa, or Sir Frederic Bennett in his examination of the implications of the Soviet threat to China.

Naturally, not all of us will share the views of the Rapporteurs, but no one can deny their courage in having said and written what they believe and for having drawn the full deductions from the situations that they have analysed. Those who do not share their opinions should follow their example and not take refuge behind rules of procedure to smother a debate which now appears essential for the survival of Europe and our civilisation. Let us have a frank and fearless debate in which all members can equally participate.

When it comes to the vote our votes must testify to our courage to pursue these ideas through to the end and to avoid contradictions. Nothing could be more harmful to our Assembly and its authority than to adopt at one and the same time recommendations that fail to follow the same course, that is, towards the full application of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to ensuring to the greatest possible extent Europe's security and world peace. Nothing runs more contrary to parliamentary ethics than a policy that seeks to overcome opposition before it has ever been expressed. On the contrary, we must resist the temptation we may sometimes feel to evade the debate and make concessions to the friendship that binds many of us across frontiers by adopting, or acquiescing in, policies that are not our own, or not contesting ideas and analyses that we do not share.

We must even have the courage at times to resist our own governments. They may express themselves in many ways, but they do so through the voice of the WEU Council of Ministers. This Assembly is the voice of the people, the voice of

*The President (continued)*

our electorates. In an assembly such as ours expressing disagreement with the policy of one's own government and *a fortiori* with the policy that the seven governments claim to pursue together does not have serious repercussions on the internal stability of our countries. In democratic political life there are many occasions when such considerations may quite rightly urge silence over certain disagreements, for a time at least. That hardly applies on this occasion. If we do not approve the WEU Council of Ministers' action, it seems that we have no means of reaching that Council. We must, at least, therefore, clearly say when we disapprove of the Council, if indeed we do. An accommodating approach would show unjustified weakness and bring discredit on our work.

However, it is not only our own governments that we must, if necessary, be able to resist. I have stressed the interest of certain governments outside the organisation in the activities of the Assembly. This interest is, of course, not uninfluenced by other considerations, as has been shown on several occasions and again recently in demonstrations or through pressure on our governments to which I have already referred.

It is, of course, for our governments to react to this external pressure as they themselves think fit. We parliamentarians, however, do not have the responsibility of conducting diplomacy. By setting up a parliamentary assembly to ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, the signatories of the Paris Agreements intended traditional diplomacy to be relayed to the public by a responsible, democratic assembly. It is only by having the courage to resist any form of pressure to conceal what we know, to please a few states — particularly if the state concerned is one of the great powers — that we can fulfil the mandate entrusted to us. I am glad, therefore, that my own government's response was to point out that the report on China represents the views of parliamentarians and not necessarily those of their governments and that there was, therefore, no need for a *démarche* to say that irreparable damage would be done to the Soviet Union's relationship with the West if this report were to be carried.

Finally — and this is probably the greatest form of courage that we parliamentarians possess — we must resist the occasional temptation not to make use of our complete freedom to say what we truly think and pay too much heed to the possible repercussions on our own electorate, which is not always as well informed on international and defence matters as it should be. Our only inspiration should be concern for the truth as we see it. This does not mean that we are neglecting the interests of those who voted for us if we prove exacting and severe in our anxiety

to ensure Europe's common security. Our job is to inform public opinion, to make it definite and decided. Governments are strong only when public opinion is strongly behind them. It is our job to express the will of democracy. This requires vocal members of parliament and strong ministers; otherwise, the people are like an army without capable officers and with no generals.

I consider this to be the main aspect of the political courage that is essential to democracy in any parliamentary framework and even more in an Assembly such as ours, which continues to exist only because of what we can contribute and which must continue to deserve the respect which up to now it has managed to command. I am convinced that the debates that start today will afford us an opportunity of proving this, without which freedom of expression is but an empty phrase.

I am convinced that this session of the Assembly will rise to the occasion and show statesmanship, wisdom and courage. (*Applause*)

### 5. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day provide for the examination of credentials.

The list of Representatives and Substitutes attending the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the credentials have been ratified by the action of 24th April 1978 taken by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and communicated to us by the President of that Assembly.

However, in the case of the French Delegation, twelve Representatives and twelve Substitutes were appointed by the National Assembly on 18th May last, following the general elections of 12th and 19th March 1978. Their names are set out on page 4 of the Notice.

Their appointment being after the adjournment of the Council of Europe's session, it falls to our Assembly to ratify their credentials in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

During their meeting on 5th June, the Presidential Committee made a provisional ratification, in accordance with Rule 14 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, which allows the Presidential Committee, subject to ratification by the Assembly, to take such steps between sessions as are necessary to ensure that the activities of the Assembly are properly carried out.

The credentials received from and certified by the French Foreign Office show that the appoint-

*The President (continued)*

ments were properly made by the National Assembly. No credentials have been opposed.

The Assembly will certainly wish to ratify the provisional ratification made on 5th June by the Presidential Committee.

Is there any opposition to this ratification ?...

The credentials of the twelve French Representatives and twelve Substitutes appointed by the National Assembly are ratified, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I offer our new colleagues a warm welcome.

**6. Election of the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day now provide for the election of the President of the Assembly.

In accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, no Representative can be a candidate for the position of President unless his nomination is supported by at least three Representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau of the Assembly.

Furthermore, Rule 7 (2) lays down that Substitutes may not be elected members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel. This nomination has been properly made in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that Mr. von Hassel should now be elected by acclamation. (*Applause*)

Thank you, I take it that it is the unanimous decision of the "body of the kirk" that I now vacate this chair and hand it over to our new President, Mr. von Hassel.

(*Mr. von Hassel then took the Chair*)

**7. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. — First, I should like to thank you for the confidence you have shown in me by re-electing me President of this Assembly. I hope that I shall be able to justify that confidence as I pursue my task.

Secondly, I should like to thank Sir John Rodgers who, as the oldest member, opened the first part of the twenty-fourth session. I thank him for what he said and for presiding over the Assembly.

*(The President continued in German)*

(Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by expressing to the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Forlani, the sympathy we felt when we heard of the cowardly murder of Aldo Moro. I should like to add that the Assembly has set itself the task of making a contribution to the fight against terrorism by placing on its agenda a report on the subject.

The draft recommendation which has been submitted to us aims at setting up a group to co-ordinate anti-terrorist action. It is, in any case, imperative that we act quickly, energetically and jointly in the face of this plague of the modern world.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Europe is threatened not only militarily but politically. On the one hand armies, of ever-increasing offensive capacity, are jostling each other along its frontiers; on the other, its interests and security are affected by the growing instability of what is called the third world. Only by increasing our solidarity in the framework of Europe and in that of the Atlantic, and by proving our determination at national level, can we meet these threats. These are the conditions for our continued survival in freedom. The Assembly of Western European Union would not be carrying out the tasks allotted to it if it did not recall this fact to the Council, to our governments and to our parliaments, which are debating the direction for our defence policy and the conditions of our security.

Of the two particular dangers threatening Europe the military threat is the more obvious, as the strategy of the East is quite definitely offensive. Unfortunately, the military theories propounded in Moscow and the accumulation of Soviet weapons on this continent of ours are proof of this. There is not one military expert in the free world who does not describe the military potential of the Warsaw Pact as being several times greater than is necessary for its security.

It is the duty of Western European Union and its parliamentary Assembly to preserve our security, peace and so our freedom. The Warsaw Pact — despite its constant protestations of a desire for peace — has increased its land forces facing our countries in the central sector of Europe by one million men, its tanks by 40 %, its artillery by 100 %, and has already introduced the third generation of post-war fighter aircraft — in the West it is the second — so we must always bear one thing firmly in mind: those who wish to keep the peace in Europe must be capable of preventing war by means of a credible deterrent. We do not want the world to be destroyed by our weapons, but equally we do not want to be subject to blackmail by the other side. We have faith in the Atlantic Alliance. Its

*The President (continued)*

firmness has prevented the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact's military forces in Europe from leading to political blackmail. Up to now we have always been able to make it quite clear that there could be no victory in Europe for any possible aggressor, and that is exactly what we mean by a deterrent.

Recently there has been, in connection with the review of the credibility of this deterrent, world-wide discussion of an advanced weapon popularly known as the neutron bomb. The pros and cons of this weapon are the subject of often passionate debate. In the wider context of the whole range of weapons we must therefore devote some time to a careful discussion of this matter. Such an examination will show that the new weapon greatly increases the credibility of the deterrent and gives a corresponding boost to the chances of peace, thus contributing to the maintenance of peace.

It is a fact that deterrence forms a single whole, combining the conventional, the nuclear and the psychological. All three factors are indissolubly bound up with each other. We must not forget that the conventional aspect of the deterrent is inseparable from its nuclear aspect. Because the allied armies possess the means of holding up any offensive — including one carried out with limited forces — they can compel an enemy who tried to overcome the conventional obstacle to undertake large concentrations of forces. The fact that these concentrations would then be exposed to the devastating effects of the nuclear weapon brings out the importance of seeing the conventional and the nuclear aspects as one.

We therefore cannot but welcome the fact that the European will to resist, without which there can be no deterrent, has been reflected in the decision taken by most of the members of the NATO Defence Planning Committee to raise their annual expenditure on defence by 3 % in real terms. The figure for France's effort is of the same order.

Our defence effort, then, is exemplary, but if it is to be effective the will to co-operate must be strengthened. The increasing cost of weapons, including new weapons, and our desire to achieve military efficiency compel us to make great financial efforts. The need to contain them, coupled with technical and many other reasons, obliges us to introduce standardisation or interoperability of our weapons, to develop joint production, and so to rationalise our armaments policy. As I said a year ago — I feel that I must say it once again — this must be one of the main concerns of Western European Union.

The symposium which we held last year on a European armaments policy not only showed the

difficulty of European co-operation, but also the need for it if we are to maintain and strengthen the industrial basis of European security, and in particular the armaments industries of our countries.

During my visits to the capitals of our member countries after my election as President, those with whom I spoke generally made the point that it is in fact less expensive to fall back on American mass-produced equipment. But it cannot be denied that it is in the interest of Europe to maintain and strengthen to the extent necessary its own capacity in research and industry. This means that a decision must be taken on grounds of policy even if it be more expensive. Such decisions are justified both by the desire to maintain employment and by the need to preserve Europe's inventive genius, without which there can be no genuine armaments industry. And this must be done against the background of continued good co-operation with the United States.

The task of Western European Union, of this parliamentary Assembly is, then, to watch over the defence of Europe, and our governments must be kept constantly aware of the fact that we in this Assembly have the will to unite, and that we invite our governments to work towards this end.

Finally, our determination must become the basis of our policy in the various negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation. Every concession on our side must be met by equivalent concessions by the other side. In particular we call upon those nations taking part in the negotiations at the United Nations disarmament conference to be watchful, but at the same time to show imagination in order that the burden being borne by the peoples of the whole world may be reduced.

We are under no illusions, however. There can be no disarmament till there is an atmosphere of trust and détente. Political developments, however, suggest that throughout the world tensions are increasing and conflicts continue to smoulder.

It is especially in Africa that tensions are increasing and conflicts smouldering. Yet Africa is bound to Europe by special ties, as a result both of the Lomé Convention and of the technical assistance which the member states of Western European Union make available to the African states.

I would like to express our conviction that this continent must no longer be looked upon only as a source of raw materials. Our security depends on its political stability and on the ability of our European civilisation to be in Africa the standard-bearer of the democratic ideals which have made us strong and with which we feel that our future too is bound up.

*The President (continued)*

It is therefore all the more regrettable to have to note that there is in Africa neither a European nor a western policy, and that even two states as close in every way as Belgium and France were not able to overcome their differences of opinion concerning the grim situation in Zaïre and agree instead on joint action.

In Mauritania, in Chad, in Angola, in Ethiopia, in Rhodesia, in Namibia and in South Africa the political situation is fraught with danger. Yet our governments do not think of applying the provisions of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty which would enable them to "consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise". They do not do so because they are at present well aware of their lack of unity.

However — and this is something positive — we must note with satisfaction the passage at the beginning of Chapter II B (Defence questions) in the Council's annual report, where it says :

"The Council remain ready to play a full part in any developments likely to assist member states in maintaining international peace and security."

The problem for us is really to strengthen both the western alliance and European union. Both these forms of solidarity are essential to our security. We must avoid unnecessary differences and ideological controversies within the Atlantic Alliance. What matters is what we actually do.

That is why it is no use spending a lot of time discussing France's withdrawal from NATO. We must rather appreciate its contribution to the common defence of the Alliance. And in doing so we shall find that its commitment to afford military assistance under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty has been confirmed time and time again.

It is equally fruitless to question America's will to defend us, as is sometimes done. The United States provides evidence of its solidarity with Western Europe every time the situation becomes difficult. This solidarity is not only based on common interests and a common civilisation on both sides of the Atlantic, but is even more evident in an attitude of mind which is of greater importance than just a treaty.

In Europe, too, we must utilise every available means of achieving unity. One merit of Western European Union is that at the present time it offers the only legal basis upon which we can build a Europe with power to act in defence matters. That is why everything should be done to avoid anything which might weaken this body on the pretext that its possibilities are not being

fully exploited. For nobody can be unaware that at the present time there is a certain malaise in our Assembly as regards the form of relations between the Council and the Assembly. In practice a parliamentary assembly can effectively take decisions and arouse interest in its work amongst the general public only if it deals with a governmental authority which accepts its responsibility and reports to it.

In spite of the good will of most of the governments and the great efforts made by the Secretary-General of our organisation, Mr. Longerstaeck, this Assembly is obliged to note that the Council at present does not conform to this definition of the debating partner which this house would like to see and to which it would gladly turn, as it is indeed entitled to do.

Under these conditions the credibility of the Assembly is suffering, particularly in view of the fact, to which we must constantly draw attention, that no other organisation places upon its members obligations comparable with those assumed by the signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty.

The obligation to afford automatic assistance, as laid down in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, is one of the legal bases which must in all circumstances be preserved for the Europe of the future. Article VIII of this treaty makes it possible for the Council to take a vote which one must hope — and I repeat what Sir John Rodgers has said to us — it will never have to take, but which one day it may indeed be compelled to take.

Since first being elected President of this Assembly, I have visited five member states of the modified Brussels Treaty. I took the opportunity which this afforded me to express in some detail my views on the situation of Western European Union and seized the occasion to voice in particular the misgivings I have just described to you. To summarise these talks, I would say that Western European Union still has a task to perform, that it has maintained its importance, that changes in the treaty are not being contemplated, that there is no question of its responsibilities and powers being transferred to other organisations, and that national governments will not cease giving their support to the Council, nor parliaments to this Assembly.

If such be the undoubted and welcome result of my discussions, then the member states of Western European Union must for their part also be ready to provide this Assembly with appropriate working conditions. We have repeatedly had occasion to point out that this parliament must itself decide on its budget and cannot accept that it be told how it should arrange it. I would hope that the Council will be prepared to meet such a demand by our parliamentary Assembly.

*The President (continued)*

Western European Union and we, its consultative Assembly, deplore the lack of publicity for our organisation and the fact that the citizens of our various countries do not properly appreciate our work. If, however, we are given practically no funds for public relations work, this shortcoming is not to be wondered at.

These problems urgently need to be solved by appropriate changes in the composition of the budget. I find it intolerable that the Council of Europe has over F 2,200,000 at its disposal for information purposes, of which 130,000 are allocated solely for the purchase of newspapers in order to keep the staff of the Council of Europe informed; for this one item in the budget they have almost four times the total sum which we have for all our information work.

The highly desirable personal visits which you all favour as much as I do, and particularly visits by the young people of Europe to the centres of European development, cannot be promoted because there is not one penny available for them. As a result there are no information visits.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the twenty-fourth session of the WEU parliamentary Assembly which is now opening will again have much work to get through. The Committees, in particular, have lengthy agendas to complete. In the interest of our work I wish us all every success. (*Applause*)

**8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that no Representative may be a candidate unless his nomination is presented in writing by at least three Representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau of the Assembly.

Furthermore, under Rule 7 (2) Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau.

I can inform the Assembly that the following candidates have been nominated as Vice-Presidents: Mr. Mart, Mr. Minnocci, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Tanghe and Mr. Valleix. The number of nominations is equal to the number of vacancies.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that the election of the Vice-Presidents should be by acclamation. I should make clear that in the case of election by acclamation the seniority of the Vice-Presidents would be decided by age.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, in the following order of precedence: Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Minnocci, Mr. Mart, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Stoffelen.

**9. Observers**

The PRESIDENT. — I wish to welcome nine observers to the first part of the twenty-fourth ordinary session. I welcome Mr. Steen Nielsen and Mr. Schlüter, members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Vyzas and Mr. Veryvakis, Deputies from Greece; Mr. Helland and Mr. Tungesvik, members of the Norwegian Storting; Mr. Guerra Zunzunegui, First Vice-President of the Spanish Senate; Mr. Mülayim, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Senate, and Mr. Mandalinci, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies.

On behalf of the Assembly, I wish to thank them all for having willingly accepted our invitation to attend. (*Applause*)

**10. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session**

(*Doc. 764*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The draft Order of Business is given in Document 764 dated 15th June 1978.

Are there any objections to the draft Order of Business ?...

The draft Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-fourth ordinary session is agreed to.

**11. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly**

(*Presentation by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 765, 767 and 769*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the twenty-third annual report of the Council of Western European Union by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Documents 765, 767 and 769.

Mr. Minister, I welcome you. We are extremely glad that you are here and that you will address us.

Mr. FORLANI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Mr. President, it is a great honour for me to be able to congratulate you most warmly, on my own and the Council of WEU's behalf, on your election for the second year running as President of the Assembly. Your parliamentary experience and your personal ability, acknowledged by all the political groups, and the attentive care you bring to the proceedings of our organisation, have today been given a further confirmation and constitute a sound guarantee of success. I should like to add to my congratulations my thanks for the sincere and friendly words with which you have welcomed me to these precincts.

It is for me, Ladies and Gentlemen, an honour and a privilege to place before this parliamentary assembly in my capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council of WEU, the latter's twenty-third annual report on its activities in 1977. Allow me to accompany this with a few brief remarks on the content of our labours.

The report tabled here today sets out clearly and concisely the activities pursued over the past twelve months by the Council and other organs of WEU, who watch over the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and its annexed protocols.

The first point on which I wish to dwell is the relations between the Council and the Assembly. This is a matter much canvassed by both, conscious as they are that only the maintenance of a deep and constructive relationship can validate our joint efforts and justify the very existence of WEU, founded like its constituent member countries on a basis of democracy. Careful evaluation of what has been accomplished shows that our relations have not only been maintained at a satisfactory level but have, compared with the past, been developing continuously. At the same time we have taken care to establish the right premises for pressing onward in the chosen direction during the months ahead. Your own Rapporteur, Senator Treu, clearly acknowledged the truth of this in Chapter I of the General Affairs Committee's reply to the report. I esteem we owe this tribute to my predecessor, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, who by her personal commitment and endeavour enabled these wider forms of collaboration to be established. I would assure the Assembly that I intend, in the same spirit that has informed the action taken by my predecessor, to pursue the good work.

Besides expressly paying tribute in general to the spirit of collaboration that has pervaded the Council's relations with the Assembly, your Rapporteur singled out one particular aspect whose significance I fully endorse. I refer to budget matters, which you yourself, Mr. President,

touched on at the meeting of the Council with the Presidential Committee in Bonn on 5th June 1978, expressing the hope that appropriations could be increased. It is indeed a requirement that has already been aired in other international bodies and, although never given sufficient importance in our debates on past occasions, now merits more attentive consideration. The economic and financial events that have in recent years marked the changing conjuncture in various member states are too familiar for me to recall them here. Let it suffice to mention the inflation which erodes the purchasing power of the funds placed at our disposal. The steady rise in costs is not at present matched by a proportional increase in funding, so that it will, in view of the difficulty encountered by some member states in making ends meet, be necessary to avert the negative consequences of the financial shortfall. We shall all strive to hold down expenditure in order to safeguard what ought to be the centre of our common preoccupation, namely the maintenance and expansion of the activities of our statutory organs, which body forth the vitality of our union.

I would also dwell briefly on the reasons for perplexity about sundry transactions of the Council. I refer in particular to regrets at our Assembly's having so far failed to pay heed to the words of the foreign and defence ministers of some member states, and about other governments not being represented in the past at suitable levels in our joint meetings. The Council can only concur in this matter. The current incumbent of the office of Chairman will do everything in his power to meet the expressed wishes of the Assembly.

Another aspect of relations between Assembly and Council at which your Rapporteur levelled criticism is that of "informal meetings", on the ground that this type of meeting does not give parliamentarians the chance to dialogue as they would wish with the Council as an entity and hear its views and position on the subjects discussed. The reasons which prompted this type of informality in the past have already been authoritatively stated. The Council felt that extending and intensifying informal contacts was the best way of fostering relations with the Assembly while at the same time making for a smooth and expeditious dialogue between the two bodies, in full respect and maintenance of formal contacts proper in which stipulated conditions have to be observed to conform with the rule of unanimity. I think, moreover, that the alternative has been accepted as being both clear-cut and logical, by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee himself who, in putting forward on 21st May a request for a meeting with the Council during the latter half of 1978, said he agreed that it could be held under the procedure approved by the Assembly in 1971 — in which case it would be for the Chairman to

*Mr. Forlani (continued)*

forward in due course to the Council a list of questions it was wished to put — i.e. the "informal" procedure followed at the previous meeting on 3rd November 1977 in Bonn. The Council would duly consider the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee's request in the course of the next few months. I wish to conclude by an assurance that the Italian Chairman-in-Office will spare no efforts to broaden the existing dialogue between the two bodies.

In the same connection we may also briefly touch upon the activity of the other WEU organs. In the sphere of armaments co-operation the Standing Armaments Committee initiated in the second half year 1977 the study of member countries' armaments industries in accordance with the Council's mandate of April 1977. However, to meet the comments made in the Council and shared by the Assembly to the effect that any duplication of the work in hand in the independent European programme group was to be avoided, the Standing Armaments Committee had preferred to begin its drafting with the part concerning the legal status of the industries and national legislations. The Council is fully cognisant of the very keen interest taken by the Assembly in the work in hand and the different phases of the study. It was wished to make a favourable response by transmitting to the Assembly the text of the mandate of 31st May 1976 and conveying the gist of the decision on the matter adopted on 20th April 1977. The Assembly has also been kept informed of the phases in the work and of the way in which the tasks were shared between the Standing Armaments Committee and the independent European programme group. Lastly, an outline was given of the main topics dealt with in this part of the study, now complete, on the legal status of industries, and national legislation. The next combined meeting with the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments, on which the Council has pronounced itself favourable in principle and which will be held on a date to be agreed by the Italian Chairman, will, I feel sure, provide another opportunity of keeping the Assembly abreast of the latest progress in the work.

The activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments which assists the Council in its tasks in this sector are set out in detail in Chapter III of the report. In 1977, as in previous years, the Agency has thoroughly fulfilled the functions entrusted to it.

Let me conclude this opening section of my address by a short reference to the Council's own direct activities. In 1977 the Council had on numerous occasions been able, more especially through its Chairman-in-Office, to reassert the importance attached to the modified Brussels

Treaty and protocols, and the resolve of the member countries' governments to fulfil their commitments. The Council has continued to keep a close watch over the application of the treaty and its protocols, bearing in mind that the clause of automatic mutual assistance laid down in Article V of the treaty allows this to be regarded as one of the fundamental elements in the member countries' system of security. In the specific sector of political activities, the Council has gone more deeply into East-West relations and those between WEU countries and Greece, Turkey and Spain. Nor has it failed to assess the consequences of the prolonged hostilities in the Lebanon for the security system in the Eastern Mediterranean. If not in the specific framework of WEU, at any rate in that of political co-operation in Europe, the member countries have been duly consulted in the matter of the tragic events in Zaïre. Within WEU the governments of Paris and Brussels, particularly concerned because of the large numbers of their own nationals living in the theatre of operations, kept their partners informed of the actions taken by each to safeguard their own and other European citizens and promote a restoration of peace in the area.

This brings me to the end of the first part of my address. I also wish to express my thanks for the words of appreciation I read in the reports by Mr. Treu and Mr. Tanghe. They are an encouragement along the road which we tread together and in our common efforts to accomplish the purposes we have set ourselves.

Now, Mr. President, as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, I should like to expound some aspects of my country's current foreign affairs commitments and in particular, taking up your invitation to do so, to present Italy's position on security in the Mediterranean.

The essential term of reference of Italian foreign policy is commitment to the widest possible international co-operation, starting from the European Community movement and the guarantees of balance and security afforded by the Atlantic Alliance as well as by WEU. Italy participates in the Atlantic Alliance in the awareness, shared with all the allies, of the value of having a defensive organisation for determining the deployment of our own forces too. In such an international situation as the one in which we find ourselves, fraught with uncertainties and the possibilities of conflicting trends, the alliance remains an instrument of safety and equilibrium. It expresses a solidarity which has recently received confirmation at the Washington summit meeting and is manifest not only in the area of joint defence but also in the permanent consultation about the progress of East-West relations.

For the other fundamental aspect of our commitment, that of European integration, we shall

*Mr. Forlani (continued)*

during the current phase be working upon the election by direct suffrage of the European Parliament, and appropriate updatings — of structures, functions and planning — of the communities and their enlargement by accession of the Mediterranean countries applicants for admission. We aim to make full use, in a joint and progressive union of the nations of Western Europe, of the communities' achievements on the economic and social planes and, in developments of effective and growing actuality over the past few years, on that of the common foreign policy of the Nine.

Italy's relations with its geographically closest neighbouring countries afford an example of collaboration and the conscious harmonisation of reciprocal interests. Thanks to the Osimo Agreements our trustful relationship with Yugoslavia has been enriched by fresh possibilities of growth that will enable deeper gains and achievements that will redound to the benefit of the populations in the frontier areas and on either side of the Adriatic.

Political and military equilibria in the Mediterranean area are still characterised by considerable fluidity, with continuing focal matters of obvious relevance to security: this particularly applies to the situation in the Middle East, that which prevails in the Eastern Mediterranean and the controversies that embroil various countries on the Northern African littoral.

In a wider context, with an indirect and hardly as yet computable but nonetheless tangible incidence, we are witnessing pressures liable to make the Mediterranean theatre the most sensitive area of widespread unrest and disruption. The threats to détente may rapidly become more dangerous through what is happening now in the Red Sea and on the African mainland.

In practical terms, the central importance of the Mediterranean is becoming accentuated, and we also notice that, besides contingent and specific factors, the very nature of the area as a sort of hinge between continents, systems of alliance and non-aligned elements, between strongly differentiated stages of economic and social growth, finally applies real stimuli to focal points of crisis, and their concomitant opportunities for external interference.

We are leaving nothing untried for creating a new atmosphere, and a credible negotiating context for resolving the conflict between the Arab countries and Israel, including the endeavour to reciprocate Egypt's gesture of willingness, by initiating in return political overtures and parallel steps towards defence concepts not solely based on strategic depth and as a consequence permanent occupation of territories. Similarly, against a back-cloth of other emer-

gencies, starting with that of Cyprus, which beset the Eastern Mediterranean and unfortunately also involve friendly countries to which we are bound by alliance, we address our earnest appeal and a discreet but pertinacious shared commitment to the search for fair solutions and far-sighted vision. And as it seems plainer than ever that development targets are inextricably bound up with security requirements, just as stability in Europe tangles with that of the Mediterranean basin, we have, in agreement with our Community partners and a spirit of open-mindedness, continued along more and more convergent paths to strive after potential solutions that seek to multiply channels of collaboration and modify the factors impeding the establishment of a more homogeneous basis of operations in the Mediterranean region. This is the sense of our commitment to enlargement of the Community, the global approach to Mediterranean issues, the dialogue between the Arab countries and Europe and projection on to the Mediterranean of the CSCE, which has been given new momentum by the conclusions of the Belgrade proceedings and the prospects of the forthcoming meeting of experts at Malta, which it is now our concern to reinforce for the purposes of appropriate preparatory activity by way of bilateral contacts.

In the context of the complex developments of the situation in the Middle East, there are a few encouraging signs: on the one hand the Israeli Government's decision to withdraw its troops from South Lebanon, and on the other the meritorious and essential presence of the United Nations contingents which has made it possible to make a move towards a return to normal.

The disturbing spread of warlike conflagrations on the African continent gives an edge to the need to promote agreed international efforts to block the increasing urges towards interference and external military interventions, and to avoid polarising the continent into opposing ideological and political and military blocs.

In the Horn of Africa the withdrawal from the Ogaden of the Somali forces has not been followed by a similar withdrawal of the foreign Soviet-Cuban troops, a fact which may portend a risk of their being deployed in Eritrea, where a negotiated solution must be found, because of all the historical, international and human aspects of the problem too.

Italy has left no stone unturned, and it is our intention to go on doing so, in support of initiatives for the peaceful settlement of problems in the Horn of Africa by negotiations instigated by the African countries themselves in observance of the principles of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations and in accordance with the aspirations of the populations concerned.

*Mr. Forlani (continued)*

The latest emergency in Shaba, which has tragically afflicted innocent peoples, African as well as European, also poses once more the problem of safeguarding the sovereignty and integrity of all African states and seeking after political solutions to the issues at stake between countries of that region. This also renders it more urgent than ever to reach in southern Africa peaceful and internationally-recognised solutions to the problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and to pursue international action to overcome the policy of apartheid, to which Italy will contribute in particular by full observance of the military embargo laid down by the United Nations and all the steps taken in the framework of political co-operation among the Nine.

In East-West relations we shall pursue a policy of détente, given tangible form in Europe by wholehearted implementation of the Helsinki final act. At the Belgrade Conference our contribution was firmly based on guidelines applicable to the CSCE in all its aspects. Despite however our ardent hope and unstinted endeavour to bring the Belgrade Conference to positive conclusions, our expectations of concrete results under the various sections of the final act were in part disappointed, especially as regards human rights, and the rôle of individuals and private organisations in assisting governments to be punctilious in their guardianship of them. We regard ourselves as henceforward committed to ensuring a more fruitful outcome to the conference in Madrid in 1980, and to the success of the meetings of experts provided for in the concluding document to the Belgrade Conference. Indeed the continuing process of the CSCE and the implementation of the provisions of the final act will go on playing an essential part in the development of détente, which figures prominently among the tasks for which we should now gird ourselves anew.

We stand now boldly arrayed to secure effective and balanced measures towards progressive general disarmament. The Italian Government will encourage every initiative to achieve decreasing, balanced levels of nuclear and conventional armaments. Italy, which is one of the countries having requested the convening of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, is now playing an active part in the latter's proceedings and together with the other European and allied countries is in any event endeavouring in every way to ensure concrete and meaningful progress and, with the agreement of all states, arrive at adoption of a final document comprising an action programme affording positive and realistic indications.

Italy, having already been three times elected to the Security Council, and remaining attentive

to every effort by ordinary and special sessions of the General Assembly to consolidate world peace, intensify international collaboration and tangibly promote economic and social development of the nations, has decided accordingly to continue to assume its responsibilities in this matter in the comity of nations. With this end in view and deep conviction, it fosters every possible active undertaking by the United Nations in favour of disarmament and the safeguarding of human rights, including that of life and international security today, ever more and more often exposed to indiscriminate onslaughts of international terrorism. To combat the latter, it is not enough to condemn it as we all do, forcefully and serenely: we also need to act more resolutely. That is, we must all do our duty, in every appropriate forum, to ensure that the comity of nations has suitable weapons against the bane of terrorism. The ongoing effort by the United Nations to widen support of the system governing the security of action by the individual internationally and frame an acceptable draft convention against the taking of hostages, is beyond all doubt a big step in the right direction.

The current world economic conjuncture is characterised by a moderate growth rate, and forecasts for the coming month are unfavourable. This has negative consequences in the general political sphere, and disturbing effects in the social area as regards the safeguarding of rates of employment. Such a situation calls for clear-cut action by governments to encourage economic recovery world-wide. We are persuaded of the need for a global approach, and deem it essential that there be a co-ordinated effort in terms of growth of the overall area of the industrialised nations, by means of which every one of them may in relation to its capacity contribute to the substantial increase of domestic demands. In this respect we must also bear in mind the development — we hope, more decisive — of the policy of co-operation with third world countries. The interdependence of the different economic areas involves the necessity of also bringing the developing countries within the compass of the dynamics of recovery.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in corroborating the action which Italy is contemplating in collaboration with the other countries to achieve a context of international relations satisfying above all the aspiration towards peace, I should like to conclude by noting that the uncertainties and difficulties of the present situation, fraught with contrasting possibilities for development, compel us to be attentive and cautious, though we must not allow ourselves to be discouraged. We should bend every endeavour towards developing as constructively as possible the favourable opportunities that exist for achieving a future of greater security.

*Mr. Forlani (continued)*

No one more than yourselves, WEU parliamentarians, who, in assessing political problems, do not overlook their military aspects and implications, is better placed to recognise that the only alternative there can be to détente and disarmament spells disaster and failure. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your presentation of the annual report of the Council and for the presentation of the policy of your country, including its policy towards fighting against terrorism nationally and internationally.

We shall now proceed as follows. We shall first listen to a speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. Later, we shall follow the usual custom of putting questions to the Ministers. But we must start by hearing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, and then return to Mr. Forlani, because our French colleague has to leave early.

## **12. Address by Mr. Stirn, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I welcome the Secretary of State and give him the floor.

Mr. STIRN (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my presence at your Assembly today, like that of my predecessor, Mr. Jean-François Deniau, in November 1977, bears witness once again to the interest that the French Government takes in your activities. We do not forget that you are the oldest-established of the European institutions, and we are in addition particularly interested in the deliberations of your parliamentary Assembly.

I could deal with a great many issues of topical interest in the international field and with the dangers of the present moment, but I have in mind that the primary task of Western European Union is to study security problems. Now for France, as you are aware, there is no contradiction, and can be none, between security and disarmament. I therefore think it highly desirable that in the circumstances of today — circumstances which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy has just recalled — I should spell out the lines along which France intends to act in a sphere where, as you know, it has defined a doctrine and worked out concrete proposals — namely, the sphere of disarmament.

Naturally, it cannot be the purpose of my remarks to go once again through the list of our proposals. You will, I am sure, have them in mind in the form in which Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the President of the French Republic,

himself spelled them out at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly held on 25th May last, and in which they are now being studied at New York in the specialised working groups.

I should simply like to try and elaborate on the three principles that underlie our disarmament policy. The first principle is that disarmament must be everyone's concern. The second is that each state has a right to security and that this security can be appraised only if we take regional realities into account. The third principle is that the disarmament effort must bear, as a matter of priority, on the most destabilising elements, in other words on the quantitative and qualitative competition between the superpowers, the dangers of proliferation in areas without a nuclear capability, and on the factors of imbalance constituted by the accumulation — which in certain regions is at least disproportionate, particularly in Europe — of conventional armaments that naturally give an advantage to offensive operations.

The first principle — that disarmament must be everyone's concern. Between complete general disarmament — which incidentally is no longer credible — and the exclusive dialogue between the superpowers — which in fact serves first and foremost to maintain their own positions — there is, as it seems to France, room for an approach which would make disarmament everyone's concern.

We must take the world as it is, a world which has ceased to identify itself with superpowers and blocs. The majority of states consider that disarmament problems generally depend just as much on rivalry between North and South as on competition between East and West, and so the international community, of which you form an essential part, must draw the lessons of this world-wide trend towards a pluralist system, both in the realm of procedures and in the means to be employed.

If we take procedures first, the failure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is self-evident since that institution, over which, as you know, the United States and the Soviet Union preside jointly, has become a mere chamber for recording proposals worked out elsewhere. Adaptation of the existing procedures cannot therefore be sufficient. The international community must not hold aloof from the negotiation of treaties or conventions banning the deployment of certain types of armaments or seeking, for example, to bring about changes in the environment or in space. Yet, whether we like it or not, we find that these talks have, at least hitherto, remained the preserve of the two superpowers.

Yet what meaning can the word "disarmament" have for virtually all the countries of the world, when they themselves have no means to check its application ?

*Mr. Stirn (continued)*

Everyone must be given access to the most advanced methods, and monitoring by national means must no longer be the technological monopoly of the few. A link should be established between disarmament and development by allocating to the least-developed countries a part of the resources released by disarmament. Lastly, it is important that the problems of disarmament and its implications should be the subject of objective studies in the framework of the United Nations, as indeed was suggested by several countries — including France — when they proposed the establishment of a specialised institute.

While then disarmament is to become, or to be once again, everyone's concern, the second principle is that we must not fail to take regional realities into account. In our pursuit of disarmament, we must not succumb to the illusion that the world will be a safer place because it has been disarmed or stripped of nuclear weapons. Each state's imprescriptible right to security should be considered according to the nature and type of aggression with which it could feel threatened.

I will make two remarks about the second principle. Most countries are concerned over threats at regional level, and so it is in the regional context that free participation by the various countries concerned in the organisation and safeguarding of their right to security can, it seems to me, most fittingly be assured. Moreover it seems to me that we must draw a fundamental distinction between the areas covered by the deterrent and the non-nuclear zones.

In the case of the former, it is obvious that the nuclear deterrent plays a paramount rôle in maintaining the balance. Let us not forget that this has, in particular, been the case in Europe for the last twenty years. In seeking security with a lower level of armaments we must accordingly bear in mind the need to avoid destabilisation.

In the case of the latter, i.e. countries without a nuclear capability, the main dangers liable to affect the safety of nations in the area are, on the one hand, those that could arise if one or more of them should take the military nuclear option and, on the other, those inherent in intervention by powers outside the area.

While disarmament is to become, or to be once again, everyone's concern and must in future be dealt with at regional level, our efforts — and that is the third principle — must also bear, as a matter of priority, on the most destabilising elements.

The goal to be attained cannot, at least at this stage, be that of a world devoid of weapons. On the other hand, it is not unrealistic to want to

reduce the factors of disequilibrium wherever they exist. I am thinking, in particular, of the excess capacity of the two superpowers for mutual destruction and of the accumulation of conventional offensive armaments in Europe. Nor is it unrealistic if we seek to prevent the appearance of these factors in those areas where, fortunately, they do not yet exist.

In the regions which have not gone nuclear, it is for those who are themselves concerned to take such steps as are desirable with everyone's support — including, of course, that of the Security Council, to which the United Nations Charter has assigned a special rôle.

It is in the interests of the community of nations as a whole, as well as of those countries or continents where nobody possesses nuclear weapons, that this situation should not be upset.

Destabilisation can moreover exist, as you are aware, in the absence of any actual nuclear explosion. It may, for example, result from the simple fact of some country announcing that it possesses the weapon. This unquestionably justifies the negotiation of treaties or, at any rate, regional security arrangements which may include the establishment of nuclear-free zones — on condition, however, that all the countries concerned are agreed and that the rules and customs of international law are not affected.

Similarly, it is in the regional framework that the conclusion of agreements to limit the transfer of armaments may be envisaged, subject to the twofold condition that no discrimination between suppliers is introduced and, naturally, that here too all states in the region are in agreement.

We should give our support to such regional initiatives in the sphere of control and in connection with any legitimate *quid pro quo* which the countries involved may expect in return for their commitment not to become nuclear powers; one way would be to ensure that they would have access to the economic advantages of atomic power for civilian purposes.

In areas where, on the contrary, the deterrent exists — as, for instance, in Europe — the main factor of instability results primarily, as you know, from the qualitative and quantitative competition of the superpowers. The idea that the United States and the Soviet Union bear a responsibility commensurate with their excessive armaments is not, I believe, contested by anyone, including moreover the superpowers themselves. We are therefore continuing to call, in the firmest possible manner, for a significant reduction in the arsenals of these two countries, and it is with this in mind that we are favourable to the SALT negotiations. But the quest for stability by the two superpowers at a lower level is highly involved, as the strategic armaments race is now shifting from quantitative factors to qualitative factors.

*Mr. Stirn (continued)*

Obviously, the problem presents itself in a quite different way to the medium-sized nuclear powers like France ; their only aim, as you know, is to have at their disposal a deterrent capacity sufficient to ensure that the credibility of this retaliation is maintained.

So far as Europe is concerned — and let us never forget that it is here that détente was first conceived, and here that it has been developed — we may observe that the nuclear deterrent has played and, indeed, continues to fulfil an essential rôle in maintaining balance and, above all, peace on the continent.

We also consider that in the search for an undiminished degree of security with a lower level of armaments, the need to avoid any destabilisation must be taken into account. Now in making an accurate appraisal of existing political realities and strategies we cannot disregard the factor of instability — I would even say the factor of asymmetry — created by the accumulation of conventional armaments on the continent.

As you know, the French Government is not participating in the Vienna negotiations and does not intend to do so. Its reasons are well known.

We noted as a start that the MBFR talks involve only certain countries, that they are designed to establish in the heart of Europe an area with a special status, and that they are being held in the rigid framework of the military blocs, thus contributing to strengthening these blocs. We are sceptical about the results that are likely to be achieved there. Certain current developments tend, if anything, to confirm our view on this point.

In the circumstances it seems to us preferable to begin by promoting confidence among all those who, from the Atlantic to the Urals, are concerned with the security of the continent. As a second stage, specific restraints on the most destabilising factors in the present situation might be envisaged, but naturally on the understanding that if such an undertaking is to succeed, it must associate all those states which, by signing the final act at Helsinki, bound themselves to promote both security and co-operation in Europe.

In presenting this set of proposals France, together with its partners and friends as well as other countries, is endeavouring to act with realism and effectiveness. Indeed, if others consider, as we ourselves do, that every state should see its imprescriptible right to sovereignty recognised, then the priority task on the road to disarmament comes out clearly : that of creating a world in which the temptations of destabilisa-

tion and the possibilities of aggression would be progressively discouraged. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary of State. As you have to leave the Assembly soon, we shall begin with the questions prompted by your address.

I first call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — While endorsing, congratulating and thanking the Secretary of State for what he has said, and not disagreeing with anything that he has said, I wish to ask him one specific question.

In regard to the debate on the report on China and European security, which I have the duty to present tomorrow, I wish to know whether the recent exchanges of military missions between France and China indicate that the French Government are willing, as the British Government have already announced they are, objectively to consider Chinese requests for the sale of defence equipment on their merits and with due regard for international obligations.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Petit to ask the second question.

Mr. PETIT (*France*) (Translation). — Happily, the French Government seems so far to have given favourable attention to the activities of WEU's Standing Armaments Committee.

How does the French Government picture the further work of this Committee once its study on the European armaments industries is completed?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In reply to a question, the French Government has said that it has not manufactured the neutron bomb. Does this mean that it considers this weapon useless for deterrence and the defence of Europe, or that it is adopting a position of principle against the use of such a weapon ?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper to ask the last question.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As the Assembly's Rapporteur on the subject of disarmament, I am particularly grateful that the Secretary of State has provided such a useful trailer for the debate that the Assembly will have on this subject on Thursday. I wish to ask him three questions explicitly related to disarmament.

First, the Secretary of State referred to new structures for discussions and criticised the CCD, with which many would agree. Would he agree that if the First Committee of the General Assembly could be transformed into a deliberative body it would still be necessary to have another body

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

to carry on negotiations? Secondly, how big should such a body be, and should it operate by consensus? Thirdly, would he say something more about the memorandum which the French Government has submitted to those countries participating in the CSCE on future disarmament negotiations within the European region?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Will the Secretary of State reply?

Mr. STIRN (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I shall answer the questions in order, Mr. President, and will deal first with that of Sir Frederic Bennett, who asked me about China and European security.

I would make three remarks. The first is that China — it may be trite to say this, but we must bear it in mind — is playing an increasingly important part on the international scene. The second is that we do not of course need an anti-Soviet motivation in order to concern ourselves with China. The third is that the Chinese leaders do in fact want, as you have said, to develop their economy and their country as well. They have apparently chosen to make use of western technology. We, for our part, are disposed to contemplate co-operation in all fields.

Mr. Camille Petit put a question about the future of the Standing Armaments Committee. This Committee is at present carrying out a study on the European armaments industries. The legal section of the study has already been transmitted to the Council and, at its last meeting in Bonn, the Council brought out the importance of the work by expressing the hope that the SAC would be able to complete the second section of the study — the economic section — as quickly as possible.

The conclusions which emerge from this study will undoubtedly be important, if they bring out the strong points and threatened sectors and if in addition they lead the member governments of WEU to make a joint diagnosis of the measures to be taken in order to maintain a viable industrial and technological base in Europe.

In that connection, it is probable that our governments will wish to continue to use the excellent working instrument provided by the Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union, and that they will instruct it to undertake any additional studies which may be considered necessary.

Mrs. von Bothmer has spoken of the neutron bomb. I would like to tell her that, as the President of the French Republic has himself stated, the French Government has in fact had occasion

to point out that the neutron bomb does not at present have a place in its programmes. In another connection, there can be no doubt that, like all nuclear weapons, this enhanced radiation bomb can be one of the deterrents that could be used in such an event as an attack by tanks.

Mr. Roper thanked me for the fuller details I was able to provide on our disarmament policy. I, in turn, would like to thank him for his remarks and would tell him that it does indeed seem to us that we cannot pursue a policy which would consist of simply tinkering with what already exists, and so we shall have to have another and larger body, one of whose tasks would be to study problems from a regional angle. It is obvious, however, that we need a change of body, and that is, indeed, one of the points we have made in the memorandum sent out after the speech by the President of the Republic. This memorandum contains a number of concrete and detailed proposals.

These concrete and detailed proposals concern all continents, including the continent of Europe. We hope that, at the end of this session and afterwards, due regard will be paid to the comments we have made, comments which, I repeat, are a fresh contribution to the disarmament problem. It seems to us that these proposals are such that they should overcome a number of difficulties. They appear to us realistic and concrete, and really tailored to fit all the practical problems which face us both in the nuclear zones and in the others. It is the hope of the French Government that this by no means negligible contribution will be an important milestone on the road to effective disarmament, which seems to us to be unquestionably the best guarantor of security.

I think that I have answered all the questions, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Once again, I thank the Secretary of State for having come to our parliamentary Assembly, for addressing us and for answering questions.

### **13. Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

*(Questions and replies by Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council)*

The PRESIDENT. — We revert to the speech by Mr. Forlani on behalf of the Council of Western European Union. I shall now call members of the Assembly who wish to put questions to the Chairman of the Council.

I call Mr. Müller, who will be followed by Mr. Valleix and Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Forlani is a citizen and minister of a state which, like my own, has recently been suffering from the scourge of terrorism. Having regard to what he has said about a resolute struggle against terrorism, I would like to ask him whether he, whether his government, is convinced that European and international co-operation in the struggle against terrorism is adequate, or whether further measures and better co-ordination of these measures are necessary.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, is it the intention of the Council of Ministers, as a complement to the communication made to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in Bonn on 5th June last, to inform our Assembly of the detailed results of the investigations undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee in the course of the study which it has been called upon to make concerning the legal problems connected with co-operation among the European armaments industries?

I put this question to Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, who suggested that the Chairman-in-Office would be prepared to provide some material in reply. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, I should like to thank the minister very much for his declared willingness to pursue the dialogue with us further in the autumn. Returning to the questions put to the Council of Ministers in Bonn at the last meeting on 5th June, I should like to ask for rather more precise and more relevant answers. Could the minister say when they can be given?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mrs. von Bothmer.

Could you reply to the questions, Mr. Minister?

Mr. FORLANI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — In answer to Mr. Müller's questions about the vexed question of combating terrorism, I believe we can all agree that our countries, all of them were to some extent caught unawares by the new and complex characteristics the phenomenon has now assumed. I therefore think we can all agree that something more and something better can be done to stamp out this evil in our midst. More can be done in the way of systematic co-operation between our ministers of the interior and of justice, and falling in with President Giscard d'Estaing's proposal on the need to set in hand preparations for a new Euro-

pean area of law enforcement. We are all working along those lines in that terrorism is a phenomenon which, potentially and actually, threatens our democratic institutions in every land, and therefore calls for a co-ordinated and unified response from our governments and peoples.

Mr. Valleix asks whether there is to be a communication to the Assembly on the legal portion of the study by the Standing Armaments Committee: I should like to inform him that some elements of that part of the study have already been conveyed to the Assembly by the Assistant Secretary-General, Ambassador Planthey. I will point out that at this juncture submission and examination of only a part of that study would be of limited use and, I think, unsatisfactory, since the various parts are complementary to one another, and mutually illuminating. I realise that the question proceeds from a genuinely-felt need, and I undertake to give it the best possible consideration in the Council.

Let me assure Mrs. von Bothmer that continuous consultations are held among the Nine on the whole range of United Nations topics and we may claim that over the past few years there has not been a single major rendezvous at the United Nations to which we have not gone with an agreed and unambiguous stance concerning highly important matters on which successive Chairmen-in-Office have been our spokesmen. In the case of Zaïre, I will refer you to the passage of the address I pronounced a short time ago concerning that tragic event. Consultations were held, and above all the representatives of the Belgian and French Governments kept their partners punctiliously informed in the framework of political co-operation within the community.

The PRESIDENT. — I thank you, Mr. Minister.

#### 14. Strategic mobility

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the last session, Doc. 758)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the amended draft recommendation on strategic mobility, Document 758.

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on strategic mobility was debated by the Assembly at the end of the last session, during the eleventh and twelfth sittings on 30th November 1977.

After the adoption of an amendment tabled by Mr. Dejardin, the vote on the amended draft recommendation could not be taken for lack of a quorum at the last sitting of the previous session and it was postponed until this session.

*The President (continued)*

If there are no objections to the amended text, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Antoni and Mr. Rubbi have declared their abstention from the vote, without seeking a vote by roll-call.

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to, note being taken of four abstentions*<sup>1</sup>.

**15. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly**  
**Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**  
**Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 768, 777 and 774 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT. — We now come to the debate on the twenty-third annual report of the Council.

I call Mr. Treu, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, to present the report on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly, Document 768.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it occurs to me that we are taking part in a kind of relay race; Minister Forlani has had the baton handed on to him by his predecessor, and had to give us a retrospective review that singles out for mention subjects of discord and proposals for their remedy. Without getting carried away by obvious sentiments of friendship and fellow-feeling, I should like to say that the report I have the honour to submit on behalf of the General Affairs Committee is not altogether convincingly favourable to the one Mr. Forlani has tried to present. The long exposition in the twenty-third report of the Council to the Assembly — I say, "long": just think that it deals with fourteen meetings of standing committees and thirty-one of "officials", as they are called — is both voluminous and substantial. But the underlying reason for a certain reserve concerning attitudes on relations between the Council

of Ministers and Assembly of WEU — I am still speaking in the name of the General Affairs Committee — remains the same, even if we are bound to acknowledge a little backsliding, albeit an improvement over the situation for the 1976 report.

Allow me to read you Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, because it will be the text for the second part of my report. Part one concerns activities of the Council, that complex labour of ministers themselves to which the Rapporteurs of the Committees on scientific, technological and armaments matters will be referring in particular. The task that devolves on me is a kind of general appraisal.

Part two of the report, which I consider the more important, deals with the future of WEU, what it will be like in one, two or three years' time, in view of the past and especially of what may happen if we fail to clarify relations between the Council and Assembly. Articles IX and VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty are crystal-clear: the former states: "The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe". Well, then, is the Assembly or is it not, solely competent in matters of defence and armaments?

Why do I bother to ask? Leaving aside the protracted discussions of the activities covered by the report of the ministerial Council — East-West relations, the Belgrade conference, Cyprus-Turkey-Greece, whether or not Turkey and Greece on the one hand and Spain on the other shall be admitted to alliance with WEU — what sort of thing is WEU today and what is it likely to become having regard to direct elections to the European Parliament?

At what I consider the crucial session in Bonn on 3rd-4th November 1977, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher and the United Kingdom Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Tomlinson, together with the Under-Secretary of the German Federal Government — the only government representative attending the meeting — were impelled to furnish notable facts concerning the functions, tasks and mutual relations of WEU and the ministerial Council. But we wondered at one time whether these distinguished representatives were speaking on behalf of the Council or in a personal capacity. And when the minister had to repeat in these precincts certain statements about WEU being recognised as the only international body competent to deal with defence and armaments, we wondered again, without spite, whether they were formal statements by the Council of Ministers or simply promises, pious hopes.

I have no wish to enlarge upon this, to emphasise the importance of the Council's activ-

1. See page 19.

*Mr. Treu (continued)*

ities. What is past is no fault of our friend Mr. Forlani, even if he were to carry the blame for it in the future. But I ask specifically whether in the general political tasks laid upon WEU as heir to, or substitute for, the 1954 European Defence Community, it ought or ought not to be more or less obnubilated by the prospect of a European Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage. In fact, going back to what I was saying, we have in the draft recommendation indicated the need for a precise definition of such powers. It does not matter whether the lengthy list of answers to the various queries in the Assembly or in national bodies finally reaches us. Last year, on a similar occasion, I expressed on behalf of the General Affairs Committee disappointment that in the national parliaments, governments should so often, when faced by questions on military policy or general defence and armaments matters, entrench themselves behind the impossibility of replying as the matters fall within the competence of the Assembly or Council of Ministers. In the report for 1977 are listed numerous ministers of various countries, including Belgium and the United Kingdom, who had always resisted the appeals of the individual national parliaments and given replies that still left one "last ditch" of reservations about community decisions.

But let me repeat, this is not the reason for our misgivings. We want to be given explanations regarding the movements of nuclear vessels in the Mediterranean or relations between Turkey and Cyprus, or military service in overseas territories; but the real general problem is the political appreciation by the WEU Assembly of the countries concerned, not only the Seven, but others as well. On all the problems I have mentioned the Assembly ought to be given precise indications by the ministers. We have no intention of divesting ourselves of our independence of judgment.

To sum up, what will become of WEU when the European Parliament is elected by direct universal suffrage? Three propositions are advanced by the Committee: first, amending Articles IX and VIII of the Brussels Treaty laying down the powers of the Assembly and of the Council of Ministers; second, electing separately in the national parliaments the representatives to WEU as compared with those to the Council of Europe; third, and this is the case your Rapporteur begs to support, sounding out the various parliamentary representatives — let us bear in mind we are parliamentary and not government representatives — for nominating a different set of members for the WEU Assembly and for the Council of Europe.

If it is true, as we argue, that the Council of Western European Union has plenary powers in respect of defence and armaments, the individual parliamentarians, invoking Article 25 of the Council of Europe statute which, for functional purposes, make no difference between titular members and alternates, may quite well designate as substitutes parliamentarians with some experience in the matter. It is a slightly far-fetched solution; but when the European Parliament is elected by direct universal suffrage, the duties of those who are also members of national parliaments — I do not know whether any provision is made for incompatibility — will also have to be suitably regulated. This is statutorily possible. WEU should, in the armaments and defence sector, have its own representatives and its own function. It cannot go on living in a kind of cloudy limbo in which statements, not so much Minister Forlani's as those of all the ministers for foreign affairs or defence — who are only a handful, after all — who have come before us to speak, refer to the exalted importance of this Assembly, whereas in the end the meetings are subsequently dubbed "informal". At the end of the Council meeting, it is true, the Committee Chairmen did convene; but with all respect to Mrs. von Bothmer, they are not the Assembly. We insist on a meeting being at long last convened that will be truly competent to deal with these questions of general armaments policy.

Mr. Tanghe will, in respect of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, propose another organisation. I ask whether, over and above organisations, committees, study groups, it is not necessary to determine once and for all the powers of the Assembly and the Council of Ministers, at a definitive meeting that will distinguish between the duties of the Council of Europe and those of WEU. Actually, this organisation, if it be true that it is to continue in existence, is the only one that deals with defence and armaments.

This is, in a few brief words, our opinion. I appeal to all our colleagues who feel involved in this sense to ensure that the Council of Ministers review the situation once and for all, and say "Yea" or "Nay" to WEU. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to present the report on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council, Document 777.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this is not the first time I have had the honour of submitting a report to this Assembly on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; I have already, in the past, presented a similar report. As is usually

*Mr. Tanghe (continued)*

the case with venerable institutions, one finds that the general course of the activities of these institutions has not changed all that much. The problems that get studied are on the one hand of course linked to current events, but on the other I must say that since 1974, when I first presented a report, things have happened that have had repercussions on the work of the organs of Western European Union.

First of all, and in particular, there has been the setting up of the Rome group in February 1974. Secondly, there has been the study mandate given by the Council of Ministers to the Standing Armaments Committee: this has, so to say, breathed new life into that Committee.

I shall return to this, Mr. President, but for the present I would like, if you will allow, to venture a few comments on the draft recommendation being put forward by the Committee.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

In the first paragraph of the preamble, the Committee recalls the procedure whereby NATO may in appropriate cases provide material for replies to recommendations by the Assembly. I must also remind my colleagues that in 1950 the Council of the day decided to leave it to NATO — in order to avoid duplication with this more comprehensive organisation — to exercise collective defence measures in line with the obligations set forth in Article V of the Brussels Treaty. Now our Assembly, as soon as it was established some five years later, urged that the WEU Council should report to it on all measures taken in application of the treaty, whether these were carried out strictly within the WEU framework or, as the result of a Council decision, elsewhere.

After an exchange of views with the Assembly, the Council finally recognised that it should comply. As far as the tasks performed by NATO are concerned, it established in 1958 a liaison procedure with NATO for that organisation to provide it with the information to enable it to reply to those recommendations and questions from the Assembly which refer to the collective defence measures no longer exercised by the WEU Council itself.

Now, for some two years past this procedure does not seem to have been used by the Council, and the Committee considers that it should not be allowed to fall into abeyance.

In the second paragraph of the preamble, as well as in the first paragraph of the recommendation proper, the Committee refers to the position of British forces on the continent assigned to SACEUR. This obligation is set forth in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the treaty,

whereby the United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw its forces from the continent against the wishes of its partners, as expressed by the WEU Council. That constitutes a basic element of the treaty.

In response to recommendations made by the Assembly, we had managed to ensure that the Council's annual reports would record the numbers of British forces stationed on the continent at the end of each year. Nevertheless, it was only when we elicited replies to written questions that we discovered that the figures appearing in the annual report do not correspond with the terms of the undertaking set out in the treaty. The figures recorded in the annual report are overall figures, including all British forces on the European continent, whether or not they are assigned to SACEUR, whereas the obligation specified by the treaty covers only those forces assigned to the latter.

The Committee accordingly urges that the true figure, which would meet the obligation so defined, should be given in future annual reports.

As is shown in paragraph 13 of the explanatory memorandum, it seems that these figures can be deduced from the British white paper on defence, but the Committee would like to be able to find confirmation of these figures in the annual reports.

I would note in passing that, according to the press of 20th May, the real level of British forces is allegedly far lower than the figure of 55,000 approved by the Council. According to the military sources quoted, the true numbers are said to lie between 48,000 and 50,000, whereas an estimate by the Congressional Budget Office speaks of only 40,000. The Committee hopes that the Council may be able to clarify this situation.

In the third paragraph of the preamble and in the third paragraph of the recommendation proper, the Committee tackles the issue of armaments control.

The problems experienced by Germany in building oil tankers to supply its fleet are described in paragraph 26 of the explanatory memorandum. Now the list of conventional weapons which Germany agrees not to construct on its territory still includes, even today, a reference to "permanent auxiliary vessels of more than 6,000 tons displacement". The Committee recommends that this stipulation should be deleted from the list in question.

I think it would be useful to recall here that the commitment to which Germany subscribed, namely not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons on its territory, is part of another list. It cannot be changed by the Council. There is no question of wishing to modify this

*Mr. Tanghe (continued)*

list of ABC weapons. A change of that kind is neither asked for by Germany nor proposed by our Committee. So far as the list of conventional weapons is concerned, I would recall that this list has already been modified on some ten occasions by the Council since the conclusion of the treaty, and that it would seem most timely to modify it anew along the lines proposed by the Committee.

I now come to the fourth paragraph of the preamble and to the second paragraph of the recommendation proper. So far as the Standing Armaments Committee is concerned, we may note that, according to the Council's annual report, its main activity at the present moment is the study on the European defence industries, which the Council had instructed it to carry out. Well, at the present time all seven member countries of WEU are co-operating within other bodies concerned with the joint production of armaments. Those involved are the independent European programme group set up in 1976, the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, and FINABEL, so far as land armaments are concerned. Since the governments have agreed that the Rome group will be the chosen body for working out the future joint production programme, they have taken care to avoid any duplication of this work in other organs. It is with the intention of maintaining the Standing Armaments Committee's activities beyond completion of the present study — which will seemingly be concluded during 1979 — that the Committee proposes the setting up of a European centre for defence studies, which might make use of the Standing Armaments Committee's secretariat as well as the expert knowledge of the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

So far as the Standing Armaments Committee is concerned, I would mention, among the subjects for studies that it might be instructed to carry out in the future, the problem of logistics, especially in the area of the Northern Army Group and on the central front, where the forces of four WEU countries — Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom — have to co-operate very closely and where, in the future, a single system of logistical support might be envisaged.

So far as the Agency for the Control of Armaments is concerned, we must consider that its experience is greatest in analysing the budgets of member states and checking the information communicated by the governments against other sources of information. Now among the concrete proposals studied at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, we find the analysis of military budgets specifically mentioned. Three member countries — Belgium, the Netherlands and the United

Kingdom — have volunteered to submit their defence budgets to United Nations experts for examination, subject however to the condition that the sample of countries volunteering should be representative on a world-wide scale. It would be extremely helpful to see the experience that has been gained by our Agency for the Control of Armaments made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for a pilot study, which he is to undertake as soon as a sufficient number of countries' representatives have volunteered for this experiment in analysing military budgets.

Mr. President, I was pained by a statement made by a member of the Committee at a recent meeting, which I seem to have seen echoed in the press, although the meeting in question was held in camera. The Committee was, in fact, accused of neglecting the interests of European defence and of WEU. I can assure you that such is in no way the intention of the Committee in the present report, which was adopted by 13 votes to 3. Indeed, the Committee considers that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty — the article guaranteeing automatic mutual aid and assistance in case of attack — retains and must retain its full validity. The Committee would recall, however, that unlike the Western Union defence organisation, which was transferred to NATO by the Council in 1950, the Western European Union set up by the modified treaty of 1954 is not in itself a defence organisation.

Article IV of the modified treaty provides in fact that: "In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" and that: "Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters".

It is with full respect for the treaty that the Committee is submitting the draft recommendation to the Assembly, and it is in the hope of seeing the effective work of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments followed up in the future that the Committee is proposing that a European centre for defence studies should be set up.

On re-reading the text of the speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. Stirn, who has just addressed us, I observe that I am, in fact, in good company together with the Committee, since he also says himself: "the primary task of Western European Union is to study security problems".

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, that is all I wished to say.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

*Mr. Tanghe (continued)*

I hope the recommendation, passed by a large majority in the Committee, will also meet with the approval of this Assembly. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank the Rapporteur for his report.

I call Mr. Adriaensens, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, to present the report on scientific, technological and aerospace questions — reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council, Document 774.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, in presenting this report from the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, I would like first if I may to offer two comments of a general political nature.

First of all, I want to draw the attention of the minister and of the Council to the fact that European unification — which under the Brussels Treaty is what we are working towards — is not helped by rivalry between European organisations, such as we have at present. By this I mean especially the European Parliament, the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly and Western European Union. These three bodies each have a science and technology committee, yet the activities of these parliamentary committees do not in any way represent a duplication of effort. I have been a member of this Committee in the WEU Assembly for a number of years, and I have followed closely the work of the other two committees. The reports coming from these committees differ markedly, and complement each other to a quite exceptional degree; but there is never duplication of effort.

Now, however, one gets the impression that the European Parliament in particular is trying to establish a kind of hegemony that is bound to produce resentment. It is dealing, among other things, with military matters which do not concern it. And this is leading to undesirable reactions. I would in this context refer to the proceedings of the French National Assembly of 8th June 1978, which records the French Minister for Foreign Affairs as stating expressly that the powers of the European Parliament are fixed by the Rome Treaties themselves, and cannot be changed or extended other than by a revision of those treaties. Such a revision would require unanimity among the nine governments. This does nothing to help the European cause: it causes bad feeling, and it causes adverse reactions. This must be avoided, so that further progress can be made towards a united Europe. I hope the minister, and the WEU Council, will

endorse these comments in the quarters concerned.

A second comment of a general political kind concerns the great importance of the Brussels Treaty and of the organs of WEU. The Federal German Chancellor made a major speech on 25th May 1978 to the United Nations special session on disarmament in New York. In this speech he said that the Federal Republic, which since 1956 has been subject to inspection by the Agency for the Control of Armaments of Western European Union in respect of the manufacturing of chemical weapons, had sound and useful experience of this. In particular, he said that from the economic viewpoint these inspections did no harm, and the cost of them was acceptable. The Federal Chancellor expressed his readiness to make the Federal Republic's experience in this field available to any country that was interested. The first recommendation he made at the end of his speech was that German experience with the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments in connection with the manufacture of chemical weapons should be made available to other countries.

I think this is an important political fact, Ladies and Gentlemen, precisely because it has been proposed by one of the leaders of the government of one of the most important member countries of WEU, and one most subject to inspection. This is a clear demonstration of the usefulness of Western European Union.

Coming to the points dealt with in this report, Mr. President, I would first draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that there is still too little heed being paid to the military security aspects when industrial policy is decided in our member countries. This applies to energy supplies, nuclear energy, and aircraft construction just as much as to steel production and shipbuilding. The Belgian premier, my fellow-countryman Mr. Tindemans, spoke not long ago of the danger of a Finlandisation of Western Europe. This danger is all the greater if our countries are over-dependent not only politically but also industrially on sources of production outside Western Europe. The supply of raw materials for producing energy can very easily be threatened, or even cut off. Western Europe would then very quickly be brought to a position of depending on others. So it is important that a larger part of research and development budgets should be allocated to safeguarding energy needs.

At the end of May this year the Common Market in Brussels published figures on the research and development budgets for the years 1970-77. These show that 38 % of the budget went towards developing knowledge in general, 24 % to technological knowledge, 22 % to the military sector, 10 % to the social sector and 4 % to agriculture. Where research in the energy

*Mr. Adriaensens (continued)*

sector is concerned, it was found that over 60 % is devoted to the saving of energy and to environmental protection measures, while only a small share goes towards developing new energy sources.

I believe this is a mistaken policy, Mr. President, not only for reasons of security but from the viewpoints of employment and economic development in general in our countries, as well. Not long ago the governing body of the German nuclear industry, the KWU, said that unless it had foreign orders this industry was doomed to disappear, and forty to fifty thousand men would have to be sacked. Whether we like it or not, the economic and social strengths, of our member countries need to be bolstered and expanded, while the will to meet foreign competition must be maintained. If one accepts the objectives of the Brussels Treaty, then the means will have to be created for actually putting this treaty into effect. One means to this end is a constant improvement of the opportunities for technological research and development for all industries that can help to strengthen the military, political and industrial potential of our member countries.

One of the aims of Western European Union and of the Common Market is to strengthen the aerospace industry. I am delighted to find the European Commission on my side, saying that the time has come to produce in Europe a family of civil aircraft, one that ought to be based on the Airbus and in which all European manufacturers ought to be involved. The governments which have not yet done so — meaning the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom — should offer the guarantees needed, so that the necessary expansion of the Airbus programme can take place. For the first time in the past ten years, we have a programme that Europe can be proud of, and that gives the taxpayer something for his money. Ninety-three Airbuses have been sold to date, and on top of this there are a further sixty-three options. This means that when these 156 aircraft have been sold, about half the amount spent on developing the Airbus will have been recouped. As we know, about 300 will have to be sold if the Airbus is to be able to start making a profit. Every effort must therefore be made in Europe to make a success of this programme, so that the European aviation industry is given a chance of getting a firm foothold in the world market — something that is essential if the European aerospace industry is to become a prosperous industry.

Finally, Mr. President, I would ask the Assembly to adopt the recommendations in the report, and ask the Council to take notice of them in the future. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

In the joint debate, I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this current session of our Assembly, with such a heavy agenda of questions already important in themselves, assumes, I apprehend, an interest all the greater in the international juncture in which we come together, one in which every problem, every factor in the dynamic of relations among states and between blocs, and therefore also in the fulfilment by WEU of its function in the orientation of its activities in general and in respect of the individual items on our agenda, stand out in even starker relief and potential repercussions.

Indeed, the international situation today is, as Minister Forlani said himself, characterised by a persistent uncertainty of behaviour and mutual relations on the part of the two superpowers, which tends to multiply reciprocal suspicions and accusations, threaten to induce general tension and is at all events liable to create peripheral vacuums in which, less controllably, local tensions are generated and conflicts are kindled that are nonetheless liable to set off wider chain reactions.

The superpowers are, at the level of political decision-making, alert to these dangers and try to circumvent them, like President Carter in some of the pronouncements of his speech at Annapolis and the Soviet Union for its part in the relatively new stances taken at the Vienna conference. Yet the overall uncertainty remains, and the overall risk of a loss of stability. The primary task of Western Europe, our task, is therefore in such circumstances to contribute what is within our power to preserve the equilibria on which stability rests, to help to obviate any kind of dislocation and perturbation of that pattern of balance, which has one of its main loadbearing elements in the alliances, the Communities, and the existing treaties, with their respective regional dimensions and declared institutional ends and powers.

While in my view it seems more illusory than ever to hope for any prospect of rapidly doing away with conflicting blocs, it is on the other hand possible and, especially, necessary to avert any stiffening of their opposition, any clutterment and overweight of their machinery, any involvement of them in more extensive areas than they have institutionally assigned to themselves.

In this context and circumstances, by analogy and in collaboration with the Atlantic Alliance in its defensive ends and regional horizons, recently reaffirmed at the Washington summit meeting, the modified Brussels Treaty and

*Mr. Calamandrei (continued)*

Western European Union as an expression of it, might today be given a renovated and constructive function on the defensive and territorial basis established by Article V of the Brussels Treaty. Also for the purpose of encouraging the search for effective and balanced measures of armaments control which the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Andreotti, again invoked in his speech at the Washington summit as one of the functions of NATO in addition to its responsibilities for defence and security, I believe WEU might, in and by its specific dimension, set itself to bring its own contribution besides what it is basically concerned with, the defence of Western Europe. In this respect it is difficult to grasp the institutional and political rationale of the resolution adopted last week by the European Parliament for elaborating a European armaments programme within the framework of the EEC: a step — in my view misguided, and all the more premature in the current status of the Community — that can only lead to a dispersive duplication of programming initiatives by the EEC and WEU in the defence area, greater complication in the transatlantic two-way street for defence supplies, whose requirement is, to the contrary, the endeavour to simplify it by contacts between the North American allies, the independent European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU, and can only — this step on which the EEC seems bent — serve to feed the misunderstandings and suspicions on the respective aims assigned to the western alliances and communities.

The preoccupation, so necessary in such a delicate international phase as the present, with helping to maintain existing equilibria and so a strict functional observance of treaties and alliances, seems to me to have been given due force in Minister Forlani's address, both in his presentation of the twenty-third annual report by the Council of WEU and in the wider considerations of international policy he entered into as our country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, reflecting too the guiding ideas of, in any case, a majority of the existing government in which convergence on the chief underlying aims of security, détente, disarmament, co-operation, the respect and affirmation of the rights of the individual and of nations against terrorism in its international as well as domestic aspects, is nowadays acknowledged as the precise immediate objective of the maintenance of that stability and those equilibria, failure in which might seriously jeopardise the whole prospect for the disarmament debate in the special session of the United Nations General Assembly at which the principles of Helsinki have been laid down.

I should like therefore to express, on behalf of the Italian communist representatives, our

agreement with what Foreign Minister Forlani has said as a declaration of general intent on which we mean to say our own word.

On the recommendations formulated by the various committees concerning relations with the Council and other items on the agenda for this session, we shall justify and express our votes according to whether each does or does not in our opinion correspond to the purposes of stability which WEU should more than ever set itself to accomplish in our continent and in this Europe of ours. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call the last speaker, Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating all three of our Rapporteurs on their pertinent and constructive approach to the problems of Western European Union. Through all three reports there runs a thread of disappointment, disappointment which we all feel at the slow progress — perhaps, in some ways, inevitable but nevertheless slower than it ought to be — of the Council and of this Assembly in its relationships with the Council in furthering the purposes of the modified Brussels Treaty.

One aspect which I have always considered of peculiar importance and which, in my view, is something in which we fall sadly short of what we ought to be doing is the co-ordination of armaments. It is lamentable that after all these years so little should have been done in this particular regard in our respective countries.

I mention that in passing and I do not propose, in this short contribution to our debate, to discuss the matter in depth.

We are all grateful to you, Sir, for the efforts that you have made in your first year of office — which I have no doubt you will continue in subsequent years — to further the work of the Assembly, to make it more dynamic and, if I may say so, put more dynamism into the Council of Ministers. You have done a great deal and I commend in particular, because it is to that to which I am now going to address myself, your efforts to see that national delegations include more men and women who are expert in defence and armaments, so necessary for the work of this Assembly.

That is not to say that over the years we have not had from all countries many experts of great value and considerable experience, and it would be to denigrate the work of these members to say that we have not. Nevertheless, I respectfully agree entirely with the view which you, Mr. President, have taken, that it is incumbent on the governments of our respective countries to ensure that there are people here who are experts in the matters with which we have to deal.

*Mr. Grieve (continued)*

Having said that, I want to address myself to the particular part of Mr. Treu's report which is concerned with this very matter. Chapter II, "Appointment of members of the WEU Assembly", in paragraphs 39 to 59 of the report. I think it right to bring to the notice of the Assembly, if it is not already known, that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, over which I have the honour temporarily to preside — because I am not the Chairman but merely the interim Chairman — took the view that it would not be possible for different substitutes to attend here from those who are substitutes to the Council of Europe. As a lawyer, I think I ought to explain the reason for that, because I believe that, if we chase this particular hare, we shall perhaps be undermining the efforts that we might make in other directions to see that substitutes and representatives to both assemblies include a sufficient number of people who are expert in defence and armaments.

I say that because, as Mr. Treu himself pointed out in his report, Article IX of the treaty provides that "the Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe".

Nothing could be clearer than that. There is no mention at all of substitutes, but again, as Mr. Treu points out, substitutes are provided for in the Statute of the Council of Europe. I am not going to read that out, because it is common knowledge to the members of this Assembly.

The point I desire to make — a point which commended itself to your Committee on Rules of Procedure and which I think is good law, although some may differ from that view — is that it seems to me that substitutes, when they sit in the place of representatives, become representatives.

It therefore seemed to the Committee that you could not have different substitutes to the Council of Europe from the substitutes who attend here, for that very reason, that the report under Article IX of the treaty would not be made to representatives to the Council of Europe if it were made to a gathering consisting in part of substitutes who were different from those attending the Council of Europe.

It seems to me that that is plain and good law. It may be that there are differing views. It certainly ought to be canvassed in the legal departments of the Foreign Ministries of our respective countries. My own view — it was the view which commended itself to the Committee

— is that without any question this is not a viable way of dealing with this particular problem.

You, Mr. President, know that I expressed this view in the Committee and also the other day in the Presidential Committee, and I think it right to make the point this afternoon. It is therefore all the more important that you, Mr. President, if I may say so, should continue your efforts and that we should back you with such influence as we have in our respective parliaments to ensure that the responsible authorities in our respective parliaments include in the delegations to this Assembly a sufficient number of those who are expert in the work of the assembly to continue that work for the benefit of all the countries concerned. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

May I ask you, Mr. Minister, whether you want to make any comments on the reports of the Rapporteurs? You have no remarks? Thank you, Mr. Minister.

The joint debate is adjourned.

## **16. Nomination of members to Committees**

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the nomination of members to Committees.

The candidatures for the six Committees of the Assembly have been published in an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 39 (6) and Rule 42 *bis* (2) of the Rules of Procedure, these candidatures are submitted to the Assembly.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted?...

The candidatures for Committees are ratified.

The Committees of the Assembly are thus constituted.

## **17. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 20th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Security in the Mediterranean (Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 776 and Amendments).

*The President (continued)*

2. Address by Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
3. Security in the Mediterranean (Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 776 and Amendments).
4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Documents 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment).

Does anyone wish to comment on the Orders of the Day for tomorrow?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I appreciate your difficulties, Mr. President, but what you have just proposed to us is slightly different from what you proposed to the Assembly a little earlier. You proposed earlier that we should continue tomorrow morning with the debate that we have just interrupted. You have now proposed that it should take place after the debate on security in the Mediterranean. From what I

know of the content of that debate and from the fact that we are to have a speech by a Minister, my guess is that it will be difficult for us to complete that debate and the ministerial speech within three hours tomorrow morning. Effectively, it now appears unlikely that we shall reach the resumption of the debate which we have started today until tomorrow afternoon, when there will be competition from the item on China and European security.

I wonder whether the Presidential Committee might perhaps consider when it has a little more leisure a more realistic place in which to put the remainder of the debate on the twenty-third annual report. It seems to me at the moment we are very unlikely to reach it tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDENT. — I intended to start tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. with the follow-up of the debate of today. There is the difficulty that no one knows whether at 10 a.m., after several meetings of Committees, we shall have the necessary quorum for taking a number of votes. That was why I thought it would be advisable to take the votes on security in the Mediterranean and the votes on this debate together at, say, between 11.30 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. tomorrow.

Let us start on time and be short in our speeches in the debate, and then I think we can proceed as proposed.

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)*

## SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 20th June 1978

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Security in the Mediterranean (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 776 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Grant (*Rapporteur*).
4. Address by Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Mulley (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*).  
*Replies by Mr. Mulley to questions put by*: Mr. Roper, Mr. Watkinson, Mr. Warren, Mr. Cook, Mr. Gessner, Lord Morris, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Mattick.
5. Security in the Mediterranean (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 776 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Mende, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Péridier, Mr. Handlos, Mr. Banks, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Mülayim (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Vyzas (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Veryvakis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Druon, Mr. Roberti, Mr. Ferretti, Mr. Müller, Mr. Watkinson, Mr. Cavaliere.
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Grant, the President, Mr. Roper, Mr. Fosson, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Roper.

*The Sitting was opened at 9.55 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

#### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### 3. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 776 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on security in the Mediterranean, Document 776 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Grant, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — This report follows the excellent reports on the Mediterranean in recent years by our colleagues Mr. Jung, Mr. Critchley and more recently, in May of 1976, my colleague Mr. Buck. Drawing on this previous work it seeks to update the information and to make recommendations in the light of modern circumstances in the area.

Although it has had a long history of conflict and warfare, the Mediterranean area is probably associated in the minds of the public with sunshine, glossy brochures and with most pleasant tourism ; but near the sun lie clouds that contain great potential dangers to peace and stability unless they are vigilantly watched and unless the necessary actions, militarily and politically, are taken.

In the course of preparing this report I have visited Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, Portugal and Malta. In all these countries as well as in my own I have had most helpful discussions with prominent people, who are mentioned in my report. I am grateful to them, and my conclusions are largely based on what I have learned from them. I am glad to report that after lengthy deliberations the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments approved the report by fourteen votes to two. In my speech I propose to draw the attention of the Assembly only to what I consider to be the most important aspects. Obviously, a most important aspect—perhaps the most important — is the Middle East. A lasting settlement there would be the greatest single contribution that could be made to security in the Middle East ; but that conflict has been examined in previous reports and probably merits a special study on its own,

1. See page 21.

*Mr. Grant (continued)*

certainly one too long for this speech of mine, at any rate.

I believe there is no doubt that the Soviet Union, through its quest for Mediterranean bases, through its interventionist policy in Africa and through its reiteration of the dangerous Brezhnev doctrine presents the greatest threat to security in the Mediterranean. Its imperialist adventures in Africa, through its proxy Cuba, create the danger of free nations of the Mediterranean area being outflanked. For the foreseeable future, NATO is the principal basis of security in the Mediterranean. On paper, in strictly military terms, NATO is strong — though we should note the improvement in quality, particularly naval, of the Soviet bloc, to which I draw attention in the report. It is vital that NATO continues to be strong, effective and united.

However, there are certain points which are of largely political conflict and which are endangering the cohesion of NATO as a whole and which can well be exploited by the Warsaw Pact. These are primarily in the Eastern Mediterranean. That is why I have devoted much of my report to that region.

First and foremost I refer to Greece and Turkey. Here are two great countries, both democracies, both dedicated to the cause of freedom, both essential partners in NATO, yet not working fully and properly within the Alliance because of local, and to some extent historical, reasons. There are, of course, the problems of the Aegean and of airspace, which I analyse in the report and which must be resolved. There has been a history of conflict, as there has been with Britain, France, Germany and most European nations. However, these should be relegated to the past as they have been in the rest of Europe.

But the difficulty turns largely on the problems of the small but lovely island of Cyprus. It is not for this Assembly to say how those problems should be resolved or how detailed negotiations should be conducted. That is primarily for the communities of Cyprus themselves, but we as an Assembly are entitled to say that in the interest of the security of the Mediterranean and, indeed, of the world as a whole the problem must be resolved through negotiation under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as possible, because time is not on our side and we are entitled to say that the settlement of the dispute, or any local dispute, should not impede Greece's becoming once again fully integrated into the NATO structure and should not impede the lifting of the United States armaments embargo on Turkey.

From my visits I believe the fears of both countries of each other to be exaggerated. I can understand the anxieties of Greece, and we would expect Turkey to give assurances that the lifting of the United States arms embargo would be solely to enable the Turks to fulfil their commitments in NATO, and for no other purpose. The longer this is delayed, the greater will be the delight of the communist bloc and the greater the despair of friends in the West.

We are entitled to point out that, if a major conflict were to break out as a result of disarray among NATO allies and partners, there would be no human rights, no property rights and no boundaries other than an iron curtain. I shall be moving one small amendment in due course on this subject in my recommendations. I have tabled an amendment to include Greece in the proposal to consider what joint armament production projects can usefully be established. It has been represented to me that Greece as well as Turkey should be involved in this, and I gladly table that amendment.

The other point I wish to make on the subject of Greece and Turkey is that I welcome the application of Greece to join the EEC and wish it well, but I am also glad that Turkey is, by recent announcement by the EEC, to be kept informed of political developments by what may be called a troika of the present and next Presidents of the EEC and that an exchange of views as Greece is brought in stages into full participation in the EEC political machinery will take place. This is a move very much in the right direction.

Next I refer to Yugoslavia. Bordering on the Warsaw Pact countries, Yugoslavia is in an important strategic position. One of the most remarkable features of post-war history has been the robust way in which Yugoslavia, although a communist country, has detached itself from Soviet dominance and maintained its independence. The architect of this policy and the unifier of that country has been President Tito, who this year has reached the age of eighty-six. When at last he goes question marks may hang over Yugoslavia which may tempt the Soviets to make mischief. I am certain that the determination of the Yugoslav people to maintain their independence, territorial integrity and unity is as strong as ever. This was confirmed to me by everyone I met on my visit.

I believe, too, that it is in the interests of security in the Mediterranean and of the West as a whole to proclaim unequivocal support for this policy of Yugoslavia both now and in future and that Europe should co-operate to the full with Yugoslavia economically and in the supply of arms, if necessary, so as to prevent its becoming over-dependent on the Soviet bloc and thus unbalancing its courageous neutral stance.

*Mr. Grant (continued)*

Thirdly, I refer to Spain. One of the most important changes in the Mediterranean area since the last report has been the return of Spain to democracy. I suspect few people imagined that this great country would achieve the transformation so effectively and so peacefully. This change has been recognised by the historic decision of the Council of Europe last year to admit Spain as its twentieth member. Spain is seeking membership of the EEC and I hope that in due course, after democratic debate in its parliament, it will seek membership of NATO.

In this connection, I refer to a statement made only the other day by Spain's Foreign Minister, Mr. Oreja. He said that if Spain were to decide to integrate into NATO, the Canary Islands and the Spanish possessions of Ceuta and Melilla would automatically be included in the Atlantic Alliance. I believe it would be very useful, from a security point of view, to have something like a Gibraltar on both sides of the Straits.

Meanwhile, Spain has an important rôle to play in the security of the Mediterranean and it is in our interests and those of everybody else concerned to forge closer links between the Spanish armed forces and the integrated military structure of NATO. For the same reasons as I advanced about Cyprus, arguments over Gibraltar, essentially a local problem, should not impede progress in this respect, because we are all on the same side, all facing a common threat.

In the Mediterranean the Soviet Union is continually seeking military bases. It is essential that these be denied if a balance is to be preserved. The most useful base for the Soviet navy would be Malta, when the current defence agreement with Britain ends in March next year. With their close ties with Britain and indeed with Europe, I believe that the very last thing the people of Malta want is to be embraced by the Russian bear. It is in the interests of the allied countries in the Mediterranean to help them resist such an event.

Security in the Mediterranean is not an abstract theory but a reality. It is the security of the individual countries and peoples within it. It is life and death. NATO is that security and NATO needs both Greece and Turkey and, indeed, all its countries as full and effective partners in a common purpose but so, too, do all those countries need NATO. Any weakening of NATO for any reason whatsoever endangers the peace and stability of the area, of Europe and of the world as a whole. It would put in jeopardy those principles of freedom and democracy which we all, in this Assembly and elsewhere, hold so dear.

It is in that spirit that I commend my report to you and ask you to support its recommendations. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur, for your excellent report.

#### **4. Address by Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT. — Before we continue the debate on Mr. Grant's report, for which I already have sixteen speakers, I should like to invite Mr. Frederick Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, to address the Assembly.

Mr. Mulley, I welcome you very cordially. We are extremely glad to have you here. Would you please take the floor?

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your kind words of welcome. I am appearing a little earlier than I thought, but perhaps it is as well to get over this ordeal.

It is both a privilege and a pleasure to be invited to address this Assembly. It is a privilege because the Assembly of Western European Union is a unique institution as the only European parliamentary forum for the discussion of defence questions. It is also a particular pleasure to me as one who spent some time as a delegate and Rapporteur here nearly twenty years ago. Indeed, it was my membership of your Defence Committee which rekindled my interest in defence matters which had been somewhat discouraged by five years as a prisoner of war.

As a result of being your Rapporteur for three years, I wrote a book on the subject and, in a sense, your Assembly is probably responsible for my serving as Deputy Secretary for Defence in 1964 and for my present position. While much of my book is no longer up to date, I am still firmly of the view that we need much more informed debate on defence issues in all our countries than is usually the case and that your Assembly has an important rôle to play in this connection.

The security of Western Europe and that of the western world generally are, of course, inseparable. The defence of Western Europe depends to a very great extent on the links we have with the United States of America. It is primarily, therefore, in North Atlantic terms that I wish to look today at the state of European defence.

The North Atlantic Alliance is now a pretty venerable institution, not quite as long established as WEU but nevertheless nearly thirty

*Mr. Mulley (continued)*

years old. As an institution it has had its problems, but I believe that it is still in good shape and, indeed, its strength has recently been enhanced in both political and military terms. At the meeting in Washington at the end of May, attended by nearly all NATO heads of government, foreign ministers and defence ministers, the Alliance prepared itself for the challenge of the 1980s by agreeing a very important, new, long-term defence programme, designed to remedy the deficiencies in its own defences against the background of the continuing increase in the quantity, and particularly the quality, of the forces of the Warsaw Pact. All the countries represented in the Defence Planning Committee have signed a commitment to modernise our forces and to adapt our national plans to the overall priorities of the Alliance as a whole.

Underlying the whole summit was the clear determination of the United States to commit itself wholeheartedly to the defence of Western Europe. President Carter made absolutely clear the firm commitment of his administration to our defence. This determination has been demonstrated by a number of practical decisions which the Americans have taken to strengthen their forces in Europe in a variety of ways.

The situation we now have in the Alliance is, therefore, very different from that of a few years ago and, with the exception of the problems on the southern flank, which you will be discussing as a result of the excellent and informative report of Mr. Grant, the change is, to my mind, entirely for the better. The call is no longer for the Europeans to take an increasing share of the burden of collective western defence. The Americans have set the Europeans an example by deciding, in line with the aim of a 3% increase in real terms in defence expenditure in each of the next five years, agreed by the Alliance, to increase their own defence expenditure next year by this amount and to devote, within their total expenditure, a greater proportion to the defence of Europe.

As you know, the British Government was quick to follow this lead by deciding to increase our defence budget by 3% in real terms in each of the next two financial years. In addition, we made full allowance for inflation, which means that during the year we regularly submit to parliament supplementary estimates to cover pay and price increases which have arisen since the estimates were drawn up. We have also made a number of force improvements: more men for the army, more ships and, particularly, more aircraft and helicopters.

Most of the other European members of the Alliance have already decided to increase their

defence projects, despite the economic difficulties which many of them, like us in Britain, still face.

There is no clearer way of showing the determination of individual nations to play their full part in the common defence than to find the money for it in the face of competition from all the other calls on the national resources which democratically-elected governments are expected to meet.

As you will know, in the United Kingdom we are currently devoting 4.9% of our gross domestic product to defence expenditure, and this is well above the European NATO average. It is my government's policy that our contribution should move to be more in line with that of our European allies. While we have accepted the aim of a 3% annual increase, I am bound to say here, as I have said within the Ministerial Defence Planning Committee, that I feel that those whose expenditure is below the average could well aim for a higher percentage increase than that expected from those above it.

There is no doubt, therefore, of the collective European determination to pull our weight in the Alliance. The resources having been allocated, the next step is to ensure that they are used to the best effect. Indeed, the essence of the long-term defence programme is not so much on extra resources as on getting the best value we can in Alliance terms from the money and resources available.

There is still a good deal of improvement needed here. I would identify four areas where Alliance co-operation is absolutely essential if we are to make the best use of the very considerable resources of men, money and materials that each of us contributes.

The first of these lies in the realm of planning. We have to ensure that in the planning process there is co-ordination to see that resources are allocated where they are most needed. Alliance defence plans should not simply be a collection of national plans any more than they should be some ideal of force goals set out by military planners without any regard to national wishes or to the resources likely to be made available.

This is the first, and perhaps most important, aspect of the work of the long-term defence programme which was approved at the summit and which we now have to work to put into effect. It underlines Britain's own recent decisions to concentrate our contribution to NATO on areas where it will have the greatest effect.

It is for this reason that Britain in particular concentrates her maritime forces in the Eastern Atlantic and the Channel and devotes a good deal of her air forces to the defence of the United Kingdom base and the waters immediately around it.

*Mr. Mulley (continued)*

But this aim of concentration has to be qualified by another very important aspect of NATO's military planning. Within the general strategy of forward defence and flexible response, it remains important for individual countries to share tasks in order to demonstrate to potential enemies, as well as to our allies, the collective nature of western defence, since it is this collective nature that is one of the main pillars on which the deterrence rests.

This is why it is right for Britain to maintain an army and tactical air force on the continent of Europe. We do this not just because we have an obligation to Western European Union to do so but for two reasons that are as valid today as they ever were — first, because the central region is the area where NATO forces face a very large concentration of Soviet Warsaw Pact forces and, secondly, because the presence of forces from a wide range of Alliance countries on the central front is a physical demonstration of the Alliance's collective will to resist aggression.

The second area where Alliance co-operation is of particular importance is that of readiness and reinforcement. Having decided where we can best contribute to the overall Alliance defence, we next have to fashion our forces so that they can respond quickly to any threat. Speedy response is a vital element of deterrence. One cannot afford to allow a potential aggressor to think that he can win a quick and cheap victory, or that he could gain some political or military objective before anyone had sat up and taken notice.

Here Britain has a particular rôle to play as a bridge between the United States and Canada on the one hand and the continent of Europe on the other. We ourselves provide reinforcement forces available to go wherever needed and trained in particular to support the northern flank, where NATO's forces on the ground are greatly outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact. Britain is also a staging post for the very large reinforcements that come across the Atlantic.

The third area of co-operation is armaments collaboration among the European countries. This is a matter, Mr. President, which I know occupies a great deal of the attention of members of this Assembly. This collaboration can take many forms, ranging simply from the ability to communicate with forces of another European country, through interoperability of fuel, ammunition and so on, to fully co-operative equipment projects of the most advanced kind.

We tend to think of armaments collaboration as having benefits primarily in the spheres of technology and employment. We may hope also

that they will save us money. But we should not overlook the military benefits which collaboration can and should bring. By combining the best technology to be found in each of our countries we are likely to be able to produce a more effective weapons system. We are also preserving technological capability for the future. By providing employment for our industries we are helping to secure not only the health of our own economies, on which our ability to contribute to the common defence ultimately depends, but public support for our defence procurement expenditure. Money saved by combining research and development is money available to meet other pressing needs.

Finally, there are the obvious advantages of using common fuel and ammunition and other consumer logistics. It is, however, much easier, for a number of obvious reasons, to state general principles about standardisation and interoperability than to achieve the detailed agreements necessary to give them practical effect.

This brings me to the fourth area for co-operation, which is transatlantic. This, of course, depends on effective European collaboration, since it is only by maintaining high technology and a solid industrial base in Europe that we can hope to collaborate with the Americans. The American forces will take European-designed equipment only if it is at least as capable of doing the job required as is the American competitor.

Our chances of interesting the Americans in equipment are even better if there is no competitor, if as, for example, with the vertical take-off and landing Harrier aircraft, a European country has developed a unique product.

Another way of interesting the Americans in European equipment is to show that its adoption would improve the overall military effectiveness of NATO forces. This is where the concepts of standardisation and interoperability have such importance. We cannot really expect the United States Administration and Congress to take European equipment simply for political reasons. The effectiveness of the two-way street in armaments between Europe and North America therefore depends on Europe's producing the right equipment to the right standards at the right time.

This requires a good deal of co-operation among the European countries themselves. One way in which progress in transatlantic co-operation might be made is through the concept, developed recently in Washington, of equipment packages. The aim would be to build on the particular technological strength of Europe and North America and to improve prospects for standardisation.

*Mr. Mulley (continued)*

There are, of course, a whole host of practical difficulties that have to be overcome before such a concept can be put into effect. But, on the face of it, the idea offers greater scope for financial savings than the more traditional method of collaborative development in which each country develops one part of a weapons system and each country assembles the whole. In fact, an arrangement much like the package system has worked before, although on a smaller scale. Britain and France had a successful collaborative arrangement in helicopters, when each country agreed to adopt three particular helicopters, one of which was primarily French, one a joint development, and the third primarily British.

Much work remains to be done in this difficult area. It would be wrong to expect rapid results. While each of us, both in Europe and in North America, has a common interest in defence and has to plan to face a common adversary, there is yet no unanimity about a number of important matters. The first is our military appreciation of how best to deal with the threat. This leads to fundamental differences in operational requirements, although I am glad to say that these differences are being narrowed down all the time. It is particularly important that the military staffs concerned, as well as the politicians, should regularly meet to review operational requirements and concepts.

The second difficulty is somewhat harder to overcome. It is that we all have an inventory of weapon systems that has to be replaced in different timescales. I shall give two examples. We in Britain do not have to replace our main battle tank, the Chieftain, until the end of the 1980s, while the Americans and the Germans need new tanks now. On the other hand, we expect to need a new tactical combat aircraft rather sooner than our French and German partners.

Again, there are differences in equipment requirements that reflect the different rôles that each country plays in the Alliance. For instance, it would be unlikely that the same type of naval weapons capability is required for the Eastern Atlantic as for the Baltic. Each country has its own industrial problems. It might make military sense for one country to give up a design and development, or even a production, capability in a particular area in the interests of standardisation. But if the result is that a factory has to close, or a skilled design team is made redundant, governments will think twice about it.

My conclusion, therefore, is that improvements in armaments collaboration will come only slowly. Recent years have seen great progress on the political side. There is undoubtedly great

good will to collaborate, both within Europe and between Europe and North America. There is now excellent machinery at all levels for considering how best we can collaborate.

So far I have spoken only about improving the military capabilities of the Alliance. But, of course, the Alliance concerns itself with much more besides. The search for effective arms control and disarmament measures is much at the heart of NATO's activities. After all, it is because the arms race still goes on that we are obliged to devote extra resources to defence. We need to pursue disarmament and arms control both to reduce the burden of defence on our economies and to secure a more stable relationship between West and East so that our security is enhanced and stability preserved.

I shall not touch this morning, Mr. President, on the strategic balance between East and West and the efforts being made to stabilise strategic weapons at a lower level. We all fervently hope that a SALT II agreement can be reached soon.

I should, however, like to say a few words about the conventional balance in Europe. Recent trends have tended to tilt this balance against the West. The quantitative superiority which has long been enjoyed by the Soviet Union and her allies has been enhanced by the increasing qualities of Soviet equipment. If the Soviet tank is inferior, it does not perhaps matter too much if there are more of them. But as the Soviet Union catches up with the West in technological skills in defence, through the allocation of the cream of its resources of skilled scientific and technological manpower to military needs, and the quantitative superiority remains, there is grave risk that the security of the West may be imperilled.

We do not need to match the Soviet Union tank for tank or aircraft for aircraft. But we cannot allow the Warsaw Pact to build up a commanding lead, either in quality or in numbers. We must seek to control the arms race by agreement, and we should seek to reach that agreement on a basis that is fair to both sides if we are to preserve and, indeed, enhance the security of Europe.

This is why the concept of parity is so important in arms control negotiations. There have been some recent signs that the Soviet Union and its allies are beginning to acknowledge the West's overriding concern with parity of outcome.

The eastern side recently has made a significant move in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna — in my view, the most significant move that it has made since the negotiations began nearly five years ago. The eastern proposals are complex and require detailed study.

*Mr. Mulley (continued)*

They highlight the importance of agreement on data on forces in the area as a prerequisite for an agreement on reductions. But they represent a positive move forward in negotiations which have been static for too long — at least, static on the eastern side — because the West has consistently moved to meet concerns expressed by the East. For instance, as recently as April the West made important new proposals designed to meet specific eastern concerns. We have shown that our position, while firm on fundamentals such as parity of outcome, is nevertheless a sensible and flexible one consistent with our sincere wish to see the level of military confrontation in Central Europe substantially reduced.

Progress in arms control and disarmament is indispensable to a durable improvement in East-West relations. We do not want a return to the cold war. I cannot, of course, speak for the Soviet leaders — it is always difficult to understand what is going on within that closed society — but it would be a reasonable inference to conclude that they recognise, as we do, the advantages to be gained from further progress in détente and further improvement in relations between East and West.

My conclusion, Mr. President, is therefore an optimistic one. I do not share the views of those who believe that the era of détente is slipping away and that we are about to return to cold war conditions. I believe that there are good prospects of successful arms control negotiations and I do not consider that we should abandon our hopes simply because of recent events in another continent. I believe also that the Alliance has demonstrated to the world that it has plenty of life left in it, that we are prepared to stand up for ourselves, to preserve the democratic values of our society, and we have shown the political will to preserve the security on which those values ultimately depend.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. I do not know the practice, but if you wish me to try to answer questions, I shall of course be happy to place myself at your disposal. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State, for your address to the Assembly.

I now invite members of the Assembly to put questions to the Secretary of State for Defence.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I say to the Secretary of State how glad we are that he has come back to WEU this morning? He is, of course, one of the most distinguished *alumni* of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly.

I wish to put to him three questions related to the problems of defence co-operation in Europe which concerned the Committee when he was a member, and of course, still concern it today.

First, is he satisfied with the progress that has been made in the European programme group over the two years since it was established? Secondly, does he feel that more can be done to give a political dynamic to the work of that group? Thirdly, can the concept of equipment package to which he referred in the context of transatlantic co-operation also be applied within the framework of European procurement co-operation?

The PRESIDENT. — I invite Mr. Mulley to reply.

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I would not say that I am satisfied with the progress of the work of the independent European programme group, because I tend not to be satisfied about things very easily. But, on the other hand, it has been in existence for about two years only. It would have been unrealistic to have expected definite concrete results by now. It is, of course, in our view extremely important, because it brings France into the discussion and work whereas the Eurogroup did not. It do not believe that it is possible to have any real far-reaching co-operation in Europe without the full involvement of France, Germany and of course ourselves as the major technological countries.

I think that it has a sufficient ministerial political input. I know that there has been some discussion of whether we should proceed as we do in the Eurogroup, which meets at ministerial level twice a year, but I believe that it meets at a sort of deputy ministerial level. There is very largely at this stage a technical and military need for collaboration.

An element in all these discussions is the failure to reach agreed military operational requirements. The old system, when each of us produced an aircraft or a tank and then hoped that the other member countries would buy or have some kind of competition, clearly is too expensive and unlikely to succeed. What we need beforehand is a commitment, as we have had with helicopters and in the Tornado collaborative project, where there has been an agreement beforehand as to the characteristics required of the equipment and a firm commitment on the part of member countries to buy.

The package concept has many advantages. It is extremely difficult to put together a package that will give an exact amount of work comparable with the exact proportion of purchase. Also, of course, selling stuff, particularly if it were on a transatlantic basis, would be very bad

*Mr. Mulley (continued)*

in cost-effective terms. But in Europe — because none of us really has a sufficient demand to justify the research and development for advanced projects — we may have to put our part of the package together collectively. If, for example, with missiles we could get Europe to produce, as we are doing now, joint anti-tank guided weapons, we might be able to sell those to the United States and in return we would buy from them, say, air-to-air weapons.

It is this kind of concept that I think is the way ahead. It depends partly on political will but also on a military willingness to agree a common military requirement ahead of the actual research and development progress.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Mulley.

I call Mr. Watkinson.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — Would the Secretary of State agree with me that in the heated and probably overcharged relationships between East and West at present the significance of the contribution of the USSR — the Warsaw Pact — to MBFR talks has been undervalued? Would he agree that this has been a very significant contribution towards cutting back on the imbalances which exist within the central front?

Can he also tell the Assembly the present state of play regarding the British Government's initiative to raise the impact of the MBFR talks to foreign ministers' level? Can he say whether this has met with any approval within Europe and whether there has been any acknowledgement at all from the USSR?

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — In reply to my colleague, Mr. Watkinson, as I tried to indicate in my remarks, it is perhaps the only really significant response that we have had from the Warsaw Pact members in Vienna. It is extremely encouraging, but there is still a problem in sorting out the data. We are still having great difficulty in reconciling what we consider the present state of Warsaw Pact forces to be, and they have not agreed our figures. Of course, unless one can get agreement about the present level, it is very difficult to get agreement whether a particular number has been taken away in a reduction formula. But there is scope, and the work is going on in Vienna.

I hope very much — and it is the first time there has been a response, an acceptance, by the Warsaw Pact countries — that it should be reasonable for them to trade off conventional arms and manpower against the offer that we made to reduce nuclear weapons in Central Europe. That again is very significant. There

was agreement, not only within Europe but in NATO, that following Dr. David Owen's proposal to push things forward in Vienna, there should perhaps be meetings at foreign minister level. This was accepted as being a very constructive proposal, but it was thought that it would be best to try to pick for this a time when some progress had been made so that the meeting of foreign ministers would have some substantial issues to discuss. We have not, as far as I know, had a positive response from the Soviet Union and her allies, although in a sense we may say that these proposals which have just come forward on the suggestion of Dr. David Owen show some form of response; but it would probably be better to sort out the technical problems of the current proposals before a meeting was held. The British Government is most anxious and will take any steps to try to expedite things and to get constructive conclusions from Vienna.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I welcome the statement of the Secretary of State for Defence on the sale of European arms to the United States. However, would he be prepared to bring the strongest possible pressure on the United States Government to get it to agree to NATO specifications rather than that European companies should be required to bid into the United States Department of Defence against American specifications whilst the Americans are allowed to bid into the whole of Western Europe on any specifications they choose? This has nothing to do with operational requirements but concerns details of equipment that we seek to sell.

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — European firms have been at substantial disadvantages as a result of the different methods of tendering and the rest. A great breakthrough was achieved by my predecessor, Mr. Mason, with the then United States Secretary of Defence which has since been carried through. Not very long ago there was a very firm United States buying policy and it was not possible to get Congressional approval for any foreign purchases. The Harrier was the only significant overseas purchase the Americans had made, but, whilst we have at top level broken through, it takes a very long time for the idea of European participation in collective defence projects and bidding for work to get right down the system, as I suspect that in their own countries, too, there is an unquoted preference for doing business with their personal friends from other companies and with people with whom they have been doing business before.

There are, however, signs that a number of British companies on the equipment side, as Mr. Warren will know, have broken into impor-

*Mr. Mulley (continued)*

tant American contracts for aircraft like the F-15 and F-16. I hope very much that this process will continue. But while it is very valuable to have European participation at the component level, it is essential that we in Europe retain a technological basis so that we can also produce aircraft, helicopters and tanks ourselves. Therefore, while the component element is important and we shall continue to press for this, it is probably more a Congressional problem than an administration problem to get their procedures on a basis for fair competition. I still believe that we have a lot to do to bring our own European collaboration into order before we can do business in the way both Europe and the United States need to do business for the strength of the Alliance in future.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Robin Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — In concluding his very comprehensive review Mr. Mulley indicated, for reasons that we appreciate, that he did not wish to go into details of strategic nuclear balance. However, as Britain is one of the two countries which are members of WEU having an independent nuclear deterrent, may I press him to comment on his view on the contribution of those independent deterrents to joint European defence and in particular, in view of the constraints on expenditure, to say whether he believes that Britain could replace its deterrent in the course of the 1980s without any derogation of its contribution to the conventional defence of Europe?

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — In a sense, as Mr. Cook knows, our deterrent is independent in the sense that, like American nuclear forces, it can be used only with the approval of the government, and the Prime Minister has to sanction its use. On the other hand, it is fully integrated in NATO's planning and targeting system and so is fully part of the Alliance procedure and in that sense is not independent. The current cost of maintaining a nuclear capability is a very small part of our total defence budget of nearly £7,000 million, but, as I well understand, if it were a question of developing a successor, the cost would be a significant demand on the future defence budget. Partly because we believe that we can sustain the effective contribution of the Polaris weapons system and our existing submarines until the early 1990s, and not being unaware of other cost considerations and taking account also of the political and strategic factors, we have taken no decisions about any successor system and do not expect to do so in the immediate future.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Secretary of State has told us that the Soviet Union is closing the technological gap between West and East in regard to weapons quality. I have no doubt that the Soviet Union is concerned to catch up and keep level with the western states.

Now, the situation is that weapons manufactured within the Alliance are sold not only to allied states but also to states outside the Alliance. We heard some time ago that a jointly-developed anti-tank missile, the Milan, had been sold to an Arab state which we believe — indeed we know — maintains very friendly relations with the Soviet Union. It does not require much imagination to see how such a weapon might leave the country concerned and find its way behind the iron curtain, where it would of course be exploited technologically.

In view of the risk, of which the Secretary of State has just spoken, that we might lose our technological advantage — and this would also have a whole series of repercussions as regards the quantity of our weapons — I should like to ask him whether it would not perhaps be more sensible for us to observe some measure of restraint in connection with sales of weapons to countries outside the Alliance, failing which what the Secretary of State is afraid of, namely the closing of the technological gap by the Soviet Union, might well come to pass.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Mulley.

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I understand the anxiety that perhaps some weapons of value to the Alliance would be imperilled by their being sold to countries where security is not very great. In considering sales of British equipment this is a factor we always have very much in mind. I am not familiar with the details of the Mirage sales. That was a Franco-German development, as the member will know. I do not believe that we ourselves are buying from the Franco-German consortium and then producing the main requirement of the British forces in British airspace at home. We were not involved in that kind of decision to sell, although in tanks there is a big difference in philosophy between the Soviet forces with large numbers of rather lighter weight tanks than the NATO forces generally, and probably they depend much more on their weapons as fitted to tanks rather than helicopter-borne weapons, on which we tend to concentrate. There is, therefore, always this risk, but I would not have thought there were any great technological losses, because it is clear that the Soviet missile capability is extremely well developed and obviously care has to be taken.

In certain areas there is the co-ordinating committee of the Alliance members to whom sales

*Mr. Mulley (continued)*

have to be submitted, but I take the point that the security of the Alliance as a whole, as well as other considerations, is a factor in foreign policy and so on, certainly in our case. We have to apply a national decision either when we sell our own equipment or ask colleagues in collaborative arrangements whether they would agree to selective sales of the Tornado to third parties.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Lord Morris.

Lord MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). — First, I should like to thank the Minister for his most interesting, comprehensive and wide-awake address.

From a strictly defence standpoint, what significance does he place on an early settlement of the Gibraltar sovereignty issue?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Mulley, please.

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — The Assembly, of course, is going to discuss Mr. Grant's excellent report and recommendations. I do not wish to be involved in presenting views which might impede that debate. I remember that when I was a Rapporteur I did not find it entirely to my taste that the then Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Spaak, came and denounced my report before I had had the opportunity of presenting it.

We attach importance to the settlement of the Gibraltar problem, because it has been the cause of great difficulty between ourselves and Spain and, of course, has caused much hardship to the people of Gibraltar. We therefore very much want to procure a settlement, certainly have the frontier opened and the rest. In the longer run, of course, it is bound to have defence implications. It is for the Spanish people to decide, but clearly there would be advantages if a democratic Spain were to be a member of the Alliance, and Gibraltar, in that sense, would have an additional NATO involvement with a neighbouring Spain or as a part of some collective arrangement with Spain.

However, I do not think that the discussions have gone far enough, either on the defence side or on the Spanish/British side, to predict the exact outcome. Whilst we want very much to solve the problem, we also have responsibilities towards the people of Gibraltar, and they cannot be ignored, either.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). — In his address, Mr. Mulley was quite optimistic about détente. I should like to ask whether, in

his opinion, the activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa impair the possibilities of détente.

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — There is no doubt at all that the activities of the Soviet Union and its friends in Africa have made the achievement of détente more difficult. This, of course, was made very clear by the NATO heads of government meeting in Washington and in subsequent statements by the President of the United States.

On the other hand, as my own Prime Minister sought to make clear, I do not think that we should get too excited about it in the other sense. I believe that it would not be wise to have or to try to develop large plans for a NATO involvement in African affairs. In the longer term, we believe that the only solution to many problems of territorial frontiers and so on in Africa lies with the African countries themselves, although, of course, among outstanding problems we should very much like to see a solution to the Rhodesian question, which has bedevilled successive British Governments for many years.

This is a source of difficulty and I agree very much with the delegate that recent events have made other aspects of détente more difficult to achieve.

The PRESIDENT. — One more member wishes to ask a question. I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to ask the Secretary of State whether the British Government, in view of its relative degree of responsibility, has any idea how the Cyprus problem can be solved, or whether it feels itself under no obligation at all in this respect.

I should also like to ask whether, in this connection, there is any recommendation to lift the embargo on Turkey.

Finally, has the British Government any plan for how it, as an intermediary between Turkey and Greece, can bring about a settlement in Cyprus?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Mulley, please.

Mr. MULLEY (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I find myself in very great sympathy with much of what my colleague, Mr. Grant, had to say. Although we are on opposite sides of the chamber, there is no great difference between us about the proposals and the information he put forward.

We are, of course, vitally interested in the settlement of the Cyprus problem, but it has very largely to be brought about by the com-

*Mr. Mulley (continued)*

munities there. We have two sovereign bases and are contributing the greater number of the men and the whole of the logistic support of the United Nations force in Cyprus and, indeed, we have been doing so for fourteen years, so naturally we are anxious for a settlement. In the wider context, of course, although problems in the Aegean might remain, it would be of immense help to NATO if this difficult problem were resolved.

We have made it quite clear to both parties that we should be willing to help any way we can. The existence of our sovereign bases there would not be an impediment; if we could achieve a settlement by giving up part — or, if necessary, the whole — of those areas, we would be very willing to consider any such arrangement. However, it is essentially a matter to be solved by the Cypriots themselves, taking into account the interests of the Greeks and Turks.

As for the question of the arms embargo, we share the general wish of the Alliance that not only for Turkey but for Greece and Portugal there should be assistance in increasing their NATO capability in southern Europe. Whilst this is a matter for the United States Congress to resolve — and I suspect that it, like the British Parliament, does not take kindly to advice offered from outside — we have noted and support the United States Administration's attempt to have that embargo lifted.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Mulley. There are no further questions for you.

I should like to thank you very much for coming to address the Assembly and for remaining to answer questions. (*Applause*)

### **5. Security in the Mediterranean**

*(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 776 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now take the debate on the report on security in the Mediterranean, Document 776. We shall come later to the draft recommendation and amendments.

I now call Mr. Mende to open the debate. He will be followed by Mr. Grieve and Mr. Périquier.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we discussed the Cyprus question in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in the last week of April, on the basis of a report by our Australian colleague, Mr. Karasek. The first speaker in the Strasbourg debate was Mr. Grant, who today in Paris is our Rapporteur on the

question of security in the Mediterranean. Just as Mr. Grant called on us in Strasbourg not to look back but to go forward and gradually lead the Greeks and Turks out of their present quarrel, so today's report by Mr. Grant is an objective and balanced one, for which he deserves our gratitude. This report should be adopted unanimously if possible, or at least by a large majority.

Security in the Mediterranean and the solution of the differences of opinion between Greece and Turkey, particularly about the Cyprus issue, are in fact interdependent.

Anyone who was an observer on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles twenty-five years ago knows what a sensation it was if a Soviet ship went through. It only happened about once a day. Nowadays about sixty Soviet ships a day pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. We know how generously Turkey has to interpret the Montreux Convention because of the ever-greater influence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean.

We are also aware of the problems the Greek Government has had to face after the difficult period of the military régime and the many wrong decisions taken.

We know, too, that the Cyprus issue has left both sides with many wounds that are hard to heal. However, we have to look at the chain of cause and effect. In the last analysis the events in Cyprus were set in motion under the Greek colonels' régime. The Turkish invasion was a consequence of those events. Attention to cause and effect should help towards an objective appreciation of the situation and contribute to the solution of Greek-Turkish difficulties and the Cyprus problem.

The American Congress was not exactly clever in the way it handled the Turks. It reminds me of a remark by Konrad Adenauer that some American Senators conduct foreign policy like cowboys in the saddle. The American Congress has made great mistakes in its dealings with Turkey. I can only agree with what has already been said: I hope the embargo, which was decided against the will of the former President, Mr. Ford, and that of President Carter today, will soon be lifted. In this matter too much attention has probably been paid to considerations of American domestic politics.

It is a good thing that Western European Union is making every endeavour — as the report points out — to ensure balanced aid in armaments for both sides, Greeks and Turks, and to help in reducing the discrimination that has existed. I hope this debate will help towards this.

May I once again thank Mr. Grant for the balance shown in his report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I shall endeavour to help my colleagues in the Assembly by making my remarks as brief as possible.

I congratulate my friend and colleague, Mr. Grant, on a most comprehensive and useful report. It is so full that it is difficult to concentrate on any particular item of it, but at the same time it would not be useful if any speaker were to attempt a comprehensive review of it. I therefore propose to concentrate on one aspect only and say how much I welcome the third recommendation of the draft recommendation with reference to Spain :

“To arrange closer links between the integrated military structure of NATO and the Spanish armed forces, and their participation in NATO exercises, while leaving a decision on the accession of Spain to NATO to democratic discussion in the Spanish Parliament.”

I hope very much that such democratic discussion will result before long in the accession of Spain to NATO. We live, as Mr. Grant's report clearly shows, in a highly dangerous world in which one of the greatest dangers is Soviet naval expansion, not only in the Mediterranean but throughout the world. We need all the allies and all the members of the free world to give their utmost to the common cause of the defence of the free world.

When in October 1977 I spoke at the Council of Europe in support of the accession of Spain to the Council of Europe, I said six words, and I should like to say them now in this Assembly : We need Spain ; Spain needs us. This is as true in defence as it is in the general development of the free and democratic world.

Spain occupies geographically and strategically a position of the greatest importance, looking outwards to the Atlantic and inwards to the Mediterranean. She also plays, as an ally, a very important part in western defence. This is set out in some detail in Mr. Grant's report in paragraph 3.95, and so on. Paragraph 3.95 states :

“The Committee recommends that active encouragement should be given to the accession of Spain to NATO.”

May I, Mr. President, as a British individual, a British conservative and a member of this Assembly, warmly endorse that recommendation? I hope very much that the problem of Gibraltar will not inhibit that accession or delay it in any way. I believe that once Spain has determined to accede to NATO, the problem of Gibraltar will, if it exists — and it may well by then have been solved — be of much less importance.

I also welcome paragraph 3.88 of Mr. Grant's report, in which the Committee :

“welcomes the improved atmosphere at the talks between the British and Spanish Foreign Secretaries held in Paris on 15th March 1978.”

I do not believe that there could be a more important development in the defence of the free world than the accession of Spain to NATO, and I hope that it will occur before very long. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

I call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PERIDIÉ (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall in no circumstances vote in favour of the report presented to us, because I find it inadequate and biased and because it completely misrepresents the problem of genuine security in the Mediterranean, above all in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is inadequate because there are at least two countries concerned with the problem of security in the Eastern Mediterranean : there is Greece and there is Cyprus. Now it is indisputable that not only have the representatives of those countries not been questioned, but it must in addition be said that there has been a complete disregard for their viewpoints — and it would, after all, have been valuable for us to learn them.

Even worse, the report disregards an earlier report which has already dealt with the question of security in the Eastern Mediterranean, prepared on the initiative of our General Affairs Committee, a Committee which went to Greece, which went to Turkey, which held discussions with Greek and Turkish parliamentarians and which asked our former colleague, Mr. Burckel, to draw up a report. This report might, then, at least have been taken into account — but not at all, there is not a word about it.

I would next say that this report is biased, because it is too much in favour of Turkey. I must say that I was surprised to hear at least one previous speaker say that there was in practice no discrimination between the Turks and the Greeks ; such a statement shows complete ignorance of the present situation in that part of Cyprus which is illegally occupied by the Turkish army. Yet Turkey has no national sovereignty over this island, since it is indisputably a Greek island, it is Cyprus, and we really must not forget the fact. It also implies a lack of concern for the fate of the 200,000 refugees, who are refugees in their own country and whose only crime is that they wish to live in their own homes, in their families and in the country in which they have always lived. All this, as you are very well aware, is thanks to the Turkish army.

*Mr. Périquier (continued)*

It shows little concern for the 2,000 Greek Cypriots who have disappeared and about whom Turkey, despite all the representations made by international organisations, has always refused to give the smallest piece of information.

It is really to belittle the newspaper articles which were recently published in a Turkish paper over the name of Mr. Basile Koutchu, who is not a mere nobody, since he is a former Turkish Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus and one of the leaders of the Turkish community. In two articles which he published — and particularly in one entitled "Let them go" — he concluded on the following note: we ask the government not to turn the island of Cyprus, which it has liberated, into a graveyard. It is not when Cyprus has been turned into a graveyard that we shall be able to ensure real security in this part of the Mediterranean.

Above all, however, no account is taken of all the reports that have condemned Turkey. No account is taken of the United Nations decisions on which there was a unanimous vote — that is, by all the countries represented here in WEU, which decided that nothing should be done so long as the Turkish army failed to evacuate the island of Cyprus, which it is occupying illegally.

Should we then really do nothing to try and insist that these decisions, for which we have voted, are applied? No account has been taken, however, of the reasons for which, in the name of human rights, the United States Congress has refused to raise the embargo; I will remind you of those reasons at the end of my speech. But, even more importantly, I say that we are disregarding the real problem in this part of the world, the problem of security in the Mediterranean.

It is not true that security in the Eastern Mediterranean can be assured so long as the situation in Cyprus remains unchanged. Security in the Eastern Mediterranean will come about through the unification and independence of the whole island of Cyprus under an impartial régime. Maintaining the present situation would constitute the most handsome gift we could hand to the USSR, for if we do so, the Soviet Union will, if need be, have no scruples about beleaguering the island of Cyprus tomorrow and this takes no account of the fact that we, we who wish to defend Europe, are jeopardising the military base in Greece that was granted by Cyprus — the Cyprus of Makarios. All that should give us food for thought.

As for ourselves, we do not at this juncture have to show indulgence towards Turkey; and I would add: "Yes, we must discriminate". What is necessary — and that is my conclusion,

Mr. President — is that we should ourselves accept the reasons which induced the United States Congress not to agree to raise the embargo. I would remind you of these reasons, since our Rapporteur has not done so.

The first reason given by the United States Congress is that a decision of this kind would destroy the rules of law which should inspire their foreign policy. Can it perchance be that these rules should not inspire the foreign policy of WEU?

Again, such a decision would give rise to serious doubts about the credibility of the United States commitment to defend human rights. Can it perchance be that human rights are no concern of WEU?

Furthermore, the decision would call in question a national commitment to control the sales of American arms abroad. Are we, just when we are about to discuss a report on disarmament, are we to advocate the arming of this or that country?

A decision of this kind would in addition make it more difficult to solve the Cyprus problem and to find a just solution for the problem of the refugees.

Congress felt, too, that it would encourage the pressure exerted by anti-American forces in Greece — that Greece upon which we here would be far wiser to count for the defence of security in that part of the Mediterranean, should the need arise, although it has only 9 million inhabitants and Turkey has 37 million.

A further reason was that the decision would make it practically impossible to normalise relations between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, and also between those countries and the United States.

And finally, the attempt to bring about a resumption of United States arms sales to Turkey, despite the lack of substantial progress in solving the Cyprus problem, would mean that President Carter had ignored the promises made to the American people and to its representatives in Congress during his campaign for election to the Presidency and after taking up his duties.

That is what I had to say, Mr. President. It may be that it does not please certain people...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Please bring your speech to a close, Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PERIDIÉ (France) (Translation). — Forgive me, but I wanted to finish the list of reasons. That being said, I hope that WEU will support the point of view adopted by the United States Congress. (Applause)

The PRESIDENT. — I must ask members of the Assembly to cut their speeches from ten minutes to eight.

I call Mr. Handlos.

Mr. HANDLOS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report on security in the Mediterranean certainly provides an excellent picture of the present balance of military forces. Such reports, however, suffer from the disadvantage — for which the Rapporteur is in no way to blame — that in the military sphere it is difficult to compare quality and quantity. Let me give a few examples. Even amongst the NATO states themselves the differences between strength on paper and strength on the ground are such as to make any comparison practically impossible. An example as regards quality: some armies consist of regular soldiers and others of conscripts. In the Warsaw Pact countries compulsory military service lasts up to three or four years, while in the NATO countries it starts with six months. Different divisions are equipped with material of vastly differing quality. There is on one side a patriotic fighting spirit, on the other there is pacifism of the western type. I would also mention the toughness of the soldiers: for example the Siberian troops who take part in four to eight-week marches across the steppes, while some NATO soldiers in Western Europe sleep practically every night in their own homes.

One further comparison: the soldiers of the one side parade proudly on 1st May, while those on the other take part in communist demonstrations in uniform without any action — not even disciplinary action — being taken against them. These are the kinds of qualitative difference to which I wish to refer here.

I must now make one or two points about Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Spain. We all know that Hungary is becoming more and more a kind of a military concentration area, on the one hand so that pressure could be exerted on Yugoslavia, if one day Tito quits active politics. In addition, Hungary could serve as a possible springboard for a move against the oilfields in the Middle East. A considerable shift could take place in the balance of forces in the Mediterranean area if the build-up of Hungary — which is not in the MBFR reduction zone — as a launching-pad continues. This would mean a decisive change in military emphasis.

As previous speakers have pointed out, the relationship between Greece and Turkey is causing the Alliance great concern in the Mediterranean sector. A few examples of the instability of the military situation will illustrate this. Greece has left the Defence Planning Committee. It has withdrawn from the NATO headquarters on Turkish soil. It is no longer delivering data

in the framework of the early-warning system and the NADGE air defence system. The Philippos '77 exercise in autumn 1977, in which more than 100,000 Greek soldiers took part, was held on the border with Turkey and was no longer geared to a possible attack from Bulgaria. The assumption was rather that an attack could come from Turkey. I would remind you that Greece is no longer represented at Izmir for the air force manoeuvres; in practice, command is now exercised only from Naples. I would also mention, as I have pointed out a moment ago, that the monitoring facilities of the NATO early-warning system covering the three hundred kilometres beyond the Greek border are no longer available. The Turks claim that the Greeks have broken the 1928 Lausanne Treaty which stipulates that the islands off the Turkish coast are to be kept demilitarised. Ankara asserts that Athens is in massive breach of the treaty, and that this will result, whether one likes it or not, in a new Turkish defence strategy: while Turkey will certainly remain in NATO, there is a new priority — defence of the Aegean coast — which means a transfer of Turkish combat forces from the USSR border to the "Aegean front". Furthermore, Turkish forces are being reduced by 150,000 men in order that those that are left can be provided with modern equipment.

Particularly dangerous in this connection are the recurrent moves by the USSR towards a rapprochement with Turkey. I would remind the Assembly of the ten-year agreement concluded between Moscow and Ankara in early 1977, which covers economic aid, and of the visit by Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, to Ankara in April 1978. This recent visit was not purely coincidental; its purpose was to exploit Turkey's defence weakness. I would remind you that in early 1978 the Turkish air force was at no more than half operational strength because of the United States embargo on supplies, and that much the same is true of the tank units. I should mention in particular that Mr. Eçevit has informed President Carter that he would not sign the declaration on the future of the Alliance at the end of May. It is now being said that he intends to sign a political document on Soviet-Turkish co-operation at the end of June.

The instability of the situation in the Mediterranean sector is really a cause for the greatest concern, Mr. President. I think it is sufficient reason for Western European Union to consider how it can help both Greece and Turkey more, militarily and economically, than in the past. May I remind you that a number of NATO countries have been making some contribution towards this, a contribution that must, however, be increased if the growing Soviet influence in Turkey is to be pushed back.

I would like to conclude with a word about the situation in the Western Mediterranean and

*Mr. Handlos (continued)*

about Spain in particular. All our efforts in the Alliance must be directed towards bringing Spain into NATO. This year's NATO exercise Open Gate showed once again the importance of Spanish accession to the Alliance. The exercise clearly illustrated the need to include the Spanish combat forces, with which — and this is a point that must be stressed repeatedly — we have practically no links in overall planning for the security of the western exit from the Mediterranean. For this purpose NATO needs firm agreements on the military use of Spanish territory and the readiness of Madrid to grant allied aircraft general overflying rights. In this respect Spain has an important contribution to make to the security of Europe's southern flank, a contribution that should not be underestimated. As we know, Spain is already a member of the Council of Europe. We should therefore make every effort to bring Spain into NATO too, in its own interest as well as that of the Alliance. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Banks. He will be followed by Mr. Bernini and then the observers from Turkey and Greece.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — I shall be as brief as I can, because I know of your difficulties, Mr. President, in curtailing the length of the debate.

First, I congratulate Mr. Grant on his excellent report. I believe that he does a great service to the Assembly in presenting the report today. He has included in it many factual details of great value to us in our deliberations.

Overriding the report I hope will be the new will and determination which I believe we as members of Western European Union should exert to ensure that the Mediterranean remains in its present peaceful existence. I believe it is immensely important that we should put down markers to show our determination and our political will to ensure that there is no further Soviet intrusion in the present status quo that the Mediterranean countries now enjoy.

In this context I particularly welcome the two statements in the conclusions of the recommendations in the report. The first is :

"1. To strengthen the collective position of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean."

The second, and more special, is :

"5. To proclaim the unequivocal support of the West for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status."

It is significant that we should agree that today, because it is extremely important — it is the linchpin of the Mediterranean — that Yugoslavia remains in its unaligned condition, irrespective of what may happen in the future. It is for the security of the whole of Europe and it is of supreme importance that we in Western European Union acknowledge that fact and seek now to establish it as a marker to forestall any activity that may be in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union.

It is important that we also go beyond the boundaries of NATO, and in this context Mr. Grant has drawn attention to exercises that have taken place in the Red Sea. In paragraph 2.40 he says :

"The Committee stresses the importance of NATO countries with the appropriate resources being able to deploy naval forces outside the NATO area."

This is important, and I hope that governments will give keen consideration to including land forces as well as naval forces in any activities deemed to be important to secure the Mediterranean outside the immediate boundaries of NATO. I have just returned from a visit to Sudan and the country is anxious to establish close links with my country, Great Britain, and with our friends in Europe. That is significant and important, because we have in the Sudan an ally which stands as a bulwark against the Soviet activity that we are daily witnessing in Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa. We must put down these markers firmly and with confidence if we are to secure for ourselves the peace that we at present enjoy and that is so vital to the safety and livelihood of everybody.

Much of importance has been said of recent problems. Let us say to our friends in Greece and Turkey merely : "Continue your efforts for peace ; you must never relax from trying to find a peaceful solution." Members of this Assembly would gladly give their assistance in bringing forward new talks to settle the problem of Cyprus and to bring about talks to settle other outstanding problems. We must not relax our determination to do all we can to ensure that the unity of our forces in the Mediterranean is maintained — and it has to be improved, particularly with regard to the forces of Greece and Turkey.

I end by calling upon our member governments of Western European Union to put action behind the words in the recommendations in this report, that is, to strengthen our forces in the Mediterranean and to ensure that collectively we are determined to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing naval bases that could upset the balance of power and lead to a situation in

*Mr. Banks (continued)*

the Mediterranean which, since it is the soft under-belly of Europe, could be reflected throughout all Europe and bring instability and probably the beginning of a war we are all determined to forestall. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Banks.

I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the impression one derives from examining the draft recommendation and even more so, Mr. Grant's explanatory memorandum which is, for the rest, not without its interesting sidelights, is of an extremely blinkered vision, a bias which has already in the past caused prejudice to NATO, internal injuries and blows to the prestige of the Alliance, and is nowadays more than ever out of date, contradictory of and inadequate to the new realities and the ongoing controversies, running a risk of helping to aggravate rather than alleviate the differences and dangers for security in the Mediterranean and Europe.

We have two particular comments on it: first it gives a very one-sided and partial analysis of existing tensions in the Mediterranean area, with no enquiry into causes, or close research into the questions broached and for fair solutions to be looked for; second, it indicates a rôle for NATO more intent upon extending its intervention beyond its own geographically defined area than establishing a tight correlation of defence and security problems and a policy of positive proposals for co-operation, development and independence among Mediterranean countries in which Europe has vital interests.

We can fall in with the report's statement that all NATO countries should be included in its arrangements in the Mediterranean. But to what purpose and with what aims? Those which emerge from Mr. Grant's explanations and, in part, his recommendations too, do not appear to us to answer appropriately the preoccupation that ought to be uppermost, as Minister Forlani reminded us yesterday, of not upsetting the existing military balances that are our shield of stability and security. The absence of such a preoccupation testifies, we think, to the existing context of practically exclusive military confrontation between East and West, to which are reduced, in both recommendation and memorandum, North-South relations and in particular Europe's relation to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and parts of Africa; also, the significance attached to the presence of foreign powers in that area, whose list is longer than that quoted by the Rapporteur and which in fact tend to evade the real issues and be of no help in understanding the time lags, responsibilities of various

kinds, all the whys and wherefores that ought to be looked into and all the limitations to be overcome.

Furthermore, the solution of the conflict in the Middle East, the settlement of differences about Cyprus, the misgivings about possible concessions of bases to the Warsaw Pact countries, and even the need to safeguard the independent status of Yugoslavia as a non-aligned state — and as an Italian I should like too to emphasise the way in which my own country positively resolved its problems with Yugoslavia by the Osimo Treaty — all these matters seem rather to be seen as aspects of a set purpose to break away from the existing ratio of military force than as phases in, and problems of, a complex, contradictory process loaded with tension and threats to be averted and not aggravated, the favourable development of which we can and should seek after not by any unilateral shift in such relations but much more, by helping to forward a balanced solution.

In this respect, too, some of the problems of military organisation or adaptation of the NATO command structure, as mentioned by some previous speakers, cannot fail to puzzle one by the way they are presented: I refer to the new placement of Greece and Turkey in the southern command and the fact that what is being endeavoured is to squeeze reality into shape rather than evaluate and understand it.

But the most enlightening case is the prospective place to be made for Spain, just at a time when following the Belgrade conference the need is felt more keenly of an attempt to settle divergences, overcome differences, not create any new ones, restore confidence and take action to ensure favourable prospects for co-operation and security at the Madrid conference, Spain is being invited not only to strengthen links between its armed forces and the NATO integrated command structure but also to join NATO: thus choices are being pressed for that solely concern the Spanish nation, to alter that country's present military aloofness without possibly adding very much in substance to the defence purposes of the West but involving a risk instead of creating fresh misunderstandings and added tensions.

To conclude, in the recommendation and even more so in the explanatory memorandum, problems of security in the Mediterranean are viewed, and faced up to, almost solely in terms of military deployment and comparison before being seen as defence problems, and above all political issues and a search for agreed solutions to which we think WEU should lend its support.

Hence our reservations: certainly, problems of military organisation ought to be suitably resolved by action by WEU, but in the context

*Mr. Bernini (continued)*

of a purpose which, proclaiming the defensive nature of the alliance and by joint international endeavours, facilitates the processes of independent nationhood, averts every foreign presence, extends relations of international co-operation and consolidates détente, ensuring by balanced actions the dismantling in equipoise of blocs, disarmament, stability and security in the Mediterranean, Europe and throughout the world.

To this end, we consider that the recommendation and the explanatory memorandum stand in need of further investigation, as other speakers too have said, and of more detailed elaboration. Accordingly, given the importance and intricacy of the problems, we ask that the papers be sent back for reconsideration by the Committee; otherwise, if they remained unaltered in tone and substance, I am bound to say, on my own behalf and that of the other Italian communist representatives, that we are unable to vote in favour of them.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call our guests from Turkey and Greece. They have been allotted eight minutes between them and I would ask them to adhere to five and three minutes. We cannot exceed this time. I call Mr. Mülâyim.

Mr. MÜLAYIM (*Observer from Turkey*). — First of all, I should like to present my warm thanks to you, Mr. President, and to the members of this august Assembly for giving me the privilege and the opportunity to express my views here as a member of the Turkish Parliament and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I have studied with great care and attention the extensive report on security in the Mediterranean submitted by the Rapporteur, Mr. Grant, on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

This report, dealing especially with the problems existing in the Eastern Mediterranean, not only analyses with great competence and the utmost objectivity the present and potential questions and dangers in the Mediterranean region, commonly described as the "soft belly of Europe", but at the same time sets forth very positive and constructive proposals for the solution of these questions.

In this connection, I should like to present my sincere congratulations to Mr. Grant, the Chairman and the members of the Committee on this substantial, important and detailed study. Before referring to certain concrete aspects of the report, I ask your permission to make some basic observations.

Throughout history, all the crises that have arisen in the Mediterranean region have affected Europe and, equally, the Mediterranean region

has been directly influenced by disputes and rivalries in Europe. Thus, we are all subject to the open threats and potential dangers that persist in the Eastern Mediterranean and that jeopardise our peace and security.

I believe that our countries have a special mission in today's troubled world. The pluralistic way of life, which reconciles human dignity and the basic individual liberties with the urgent and grave requirements of economic and social development, seems to me a unique hope for a better future. As we are all aware, democratic states for a small group, a minority among the community of states, and so the individuals living in pluralistic societies constitute a happy few in the world.

As members of parliament in our respective countries, we may take our place on the left or right of the political spectrum, but we all have the common task of defending vigorously our values and our philosophy of life against serious threats and dangers. We should go beyond even that by trying to strengthen and to extend to other parts of the world our democratic system as a viable alternative to totalitarianism. I believe that democracy should not and cannot be seen as a privilege of the happy few. Turkey, as a developing country, constitutes a complete and encouraging example, because it has been able to live in uninterrupted democracy for a considerable time.

Apart from the fact that they are members of the western community, common factors such as geographical notation, social affinities and similarities in their individual way of life happily force Turks and Greeks to be friends and to co-operate.

The present situation between the two countries constitutes an anomaly. However, if the political will to find equitable and lasting solutions to actual problems exists and a spirit of mutual understanding and moderation, as well as respect for each other's legitimate rights, prevails, the present disputes can rapidly be solved. Bearing these factors in mind, I strongly believe that this long-cherished aim can be achieved.

The report on security in the Mediterranean reflects an impartial, objective and constructive approach to these questions. As far as Turkish-Greek relations are concerned, it tries to achieve a synthesis which reconciles, in a balanced and rational way, the interests of Greece and Turkey, in particular, and those of the western community as a whole. For that reason, I warmly congratulate once again the Rapporteur, the Chairman and the members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

On this occasion I should like to remind you that Turkey will always be ready, as in the

*Mr. Mülayim (continued)*

past, to do its best to assume its share of responsibilities, with all inherent rights and duties, as long as this sort of comprehensive and balanced approach prevails in the western community. It is a fact that the outcome of the Cyprus question constitutes a very important element of Mediterranean security. We are of the belief that the Turkish and Greek Governments should encourage and stimulate their respective national communities in the island to reach a rapid, equitable and lasting solution. Each of our allies, for its part, should help towards the creation of an appropriate negotiating atmosphere between all the interested parties.

As far as Turkey is concerned, Prime Minister Egevit has made persistent efforts to create the necessary climate and conditions for a rapid solution.

Just two minutes, Mr. President.

The Montreux summit, which was held at Mr. Egevit's request, and the follow-up of this summit — the meeting of the general secretaries of the Turkish and Greek foreign ministries in July — reflects this constructive attitude. The proposals made by the Turkish Cypriots, described by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, as concrete, substantial and voluminous, are another proof of the good will of the Turks. Let me remind you that these proposals are submitted as a negotiating position and are open to discussion. This flexibility constitutes further evidence of the good intentions of the Turkish side. I must add that the constructive attitude adopted by all our allies during the Washington NATO summit has further increased our hopes that the way will be opened for fruitful negotiations.

I must stress once again that Turkey sincerely wants the maintenance of the delicate political balance established by the Lausanne Treaty, which forms the basis of the friendship and mutual confidence between Turkey and Greece. In this context Turkey is ready, by peaceful means and in a spirit of compromise, to look for mutually-acceptable solutions to all existing problems.

We Turks want to forget the sombre days of our common past and revive the happy period inaugurated through the efforts of those two great leaders Atatürk and Venizelos. I repeat that Turkey neither needs nor seeks any territorial gains; nor does it make any unjustified or irrational demands whatsoever. We hope to hear the same feelings voiced by our Greek friends.

I regret that I am obliged to add one last remark. A distinguished member of the Assembly

has made unjustified and misplaced accusations against my country. As he spoke on the Mediterranean problems with extreme vigour and close interest, I prefer to express my views on this, not in English but in a Mediterranean language.

*(The speaker continued in Italian)*

(Translation). — I think sterile accusations will get us nowhere. It is neither the time nor the place in this Assembly to discuss in detail the problem of the island of Cyprus. If Cyprus were to be discussed, we should also have our word to say, going back to 1963.

I think that without bandying criticisms to and fro, Cyprus is a problem for the Cypriots to resolve, aided if need be by Turkey and Greece.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Mülayim. I agreed to eight minutes for your statements, which you wanted to divide into five plus three. Unfortunately, you consumed the entire time.

I now call Mr. Vyzas. Please be careful not to exceed the time of five minutes.

Mr. VYZAS (*Observer from Greece*). — I should like first to express our deep appreciation of the honour extended to us through your kind invitation of January this year. We are thus given the opportunity to attend the present session of Western European Union as observers, hoping, of course, that in the very near future you will accept us as regular members of WEU.

We have listened carefully to Mr. Grant's report on security in the Mediterranean, which was in every way comprehensive, remarkable and useful. We should like, however, to state certain reservations regarding some points in the report, and in particular the recommendations in paragraphs 1(c), 1(d), 1(e) and 2(a), and request that they be amended in the following specific way.

The first is to delete completely paragraph 1 (c), as it is vaguely phrased and concerns absolutely technical aspects for which the competent military services of the Alliance should be involved.

Secondly, paragraph 1 (d) should also be deleted, or at least substituted in accordance with paragraph 13 of the recent communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, which met, with the participation of heads of state, on 30th-31st May this year, reading as follows :

"The Alliance reaffirmed the importance they attach to the strengthening of cohesion and solidarity especially in the south-eastern flank. They expressed the hope that existing problems

*Mr. Vyzas (continued)*

will be resolved, and that full co-operation among members of the Alliance in all aspects of the defence field would be resumed."

Thirdly, regarding paragraph 1 (e), I wish to thank Mr. Grant for accepting a request to add Greece to the wording as to joint armaments production projects which can usefully be established in our area — in the NATO framework, of course.

Fourthly, we should like to have paragraph 2 (a) amended, by adding, after the word "differences", the word "bilaterally". If the word "bilaterally" is not added, it means, in effect, that the problem of Cyprus is included in the direct differences between Greece and Turkey.

The only acceptable procedure for the solution of the problem of Cyprus is the intercommunal talks in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but for the activation of a sincere and effective dialogue between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots it is necessary to have a substantial improvement in the Turkish proposals. For the time being, from what we know, the Turkish proposals do not give much hope of a resumption of the negotiations between the interested parties. Perhaps that is why Dr. Waldheim has not called for a new cycle of negotiations. Maybe he believes that under the present conditions he cannot undertake any initiative, because he fears that this would prove unviable. His statement of 8th June reads as follows :

"There was no indication of a diminution of the gap between the positions of the parties as set forth in the report with regard to the basis for a resumption of the intercommunal talks."

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Vyzas.

I now call Mr. Veryvakis, to speak for three minutes.

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). — Mr. President, distinguished members of the Assembly. I appreciate the efforts of the Rapporteur of the Committee on such a crucial and difficult problem as that of security in the Mediterranean.

Putting aside reservations of other kinds on the report and the draft recommendation, I shall comment only on the subject of the embargo which, in my mind, and after the justification of the amendments referring to it, continues to be dangerous for the safety of the whole area and for the safety of Greece itself.

In today's circumstances, with the dispute in the Aegean Sea, proclaimed by Turkey in 1974, and with the Cyprus issue unsolved, the arma-

ment of one part — in spite of the resolutions of the United Nations and the efforts of the Secretary-General — in my mind, and I dare say in the minds of the Greek people, stands against the other part politically and even militarily.

In my mind — and, I dare say, in the minds of the Greek people — collective defence of any kind cannot stand without taking into consideration the crucial problems of the safety of each of the people belonging to the Alliance. If you will not answer effectively, Mr. Rapporteur, on the question of the guarantee of safety of each of the peoples alone, you cannot hope to ensure collective defence. In particular, on the question of the embargo, if you cannot guarantee that arms given to Turkey will not be used for the political aims of Turkey today, I am sure that you will not be able to have a common defence.

In my mind — and, I dare say, in the minds of the Greek people — after the invasion in Cyprus in 1974, it is difficult to give this guarantee. It is for that reason that we ask the Assembly to put aside this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Veryvakis.

Continuing with the list of speakers, the first will be Mr. Druon. If every speaker will cut short his speech, we should be able to complete our business.

(*Mr. Mandalinci, Observer from Turkey, indicated his wish to speak*)

I gave the other Turkish speaker eight minutes. You have not the right to speak.

Mr. MANDALINCI (*Observer from Turkey*). — Thank you very much for your generosity.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Druon.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the great failing of people who sit for the first time in an assembly is that they take things that are done there very seriously ; and why, for a start, should there be so many distinguished persons gathered together, such a competent staff assembled at so much cost in time and money if it were not to deal with serious matters ?

First then, I have read the draft recommendations submitted to us with very close attention, and in particular the one that is being discussed this morning. I must confess that this draft recommendation caused me some surprise and at times even feelings of stupefaction.

I recognise that the report is very remarkably documented — and for this we must be grateful to Mr. Grant — but it also seems to me to call forth strong reservations. So far as I am concerned — and I am not alone in this, to judge

*Mr. Druon (continued)*

by what some of the previous speakers have said — I found both a certain lack of realism and a certain lack of balance in the report.

I consider this report on security in the Mediterranean somewhat unrealistic, because it envisages setting up a fully-integrated military structure, encompassing all the western states bordering on that sea, as the sole solution to Europe's difficulties in the region. So it will be no surprise to you when I say that it is extremely improbable that France would associate itself with such a venture in any foreseeable future — regardless, moreover, of the political complexion of its government.

With regard to the integration of Spain into these arrangements, that depends for the moment on speculation or on indications which might perhaps discourage the Spaniards from joining the Atlantic Alliance rather than bringing them closer to it.

Lastly, so far as the problems of armaments production and supply are concerned, it also seems improbable — and indeed undesirable — that NATO organs will ever be the only ones competent to deal with them, to the exclusion of all others, whether national or European.

That is none the less what the Rapporteur is calling for, when he proposes among other things that all aspects of the armaments export policies pursued by the member states of NATO should be harmonised within the framework of the Alliance. So there would, then, no longer be any national autonomy or European autonomy in the selling of military equipment. How could Europe respond to the requests for assistance addressed to it, sometimes because of the very fears inspired by the power of the American protector?

And then how could the various states fulfil their commitments to assist certain other countries? And again, how could our states accept that they would have to share responsibility for selling arms to countries engaged in conflicts in which we might have no grounds for getting involved, directly or indirectly?

This lack of realism seems to me rather dangerous, and I fear that here again it may lead to a weakening of the Alliance rather than to the desired strengthening, for it would impair the flexibility that is necessary in Atlantic relations.

We must take into account the legitimate divergences of interest which separate the United States and Europe. And if the report proposed by Mr. Grant were acted upon, it might involve us, under the pretext of military efficiency, in conflicts or tensions which we would do well not

to exacerbate, but which we should try to resolve by peaceful means. In the final analysis, then, this plan would be prejudicial to the Alliance itself.

The way in which the report deals with the situation of Greece and Turkey, as well as with the Cyprus situation, justifies my previous remark; and it is here that I find it shows evidence of a certain lack of balance. The Rapporteur, by taking up a position that is too openly favourable to Turkey and by apparently endorsing all the arguments and grievances put forward by that country, obliges people who have a relatively long and intimate knowledge of this region of the Mediterranean to put forward what I would venture to call a fairer version of the situation. I regret, because I personally harbour no animosity towards the Turkish people — let me make that quite clear — I regret, I say, having to recall the facts of which I am going to remind you. In doing so I am, moreover, echoing the words of other speakers, and in particular of Mr. Périquier.

Turkey is depicted in the report as a loyal ally of NATO which was abandoned, so far as armament supplies are concerned, because it had to take action — and I quote — “to protect the Turkish Cypriot population in 1974”.

Really is it possible to describe as measures for the protection of nationals — and I am surprised that the term “nationals” is applied to Cypriots of Turkish origin — is it possible, I repeat, to describe as measures of protection the occupation by force of 40 % of an independent territory, the expulsion of Greek Cypriots from the entire area, for we have been reminded that 200,000 of them are still wretched refugees? And is it possible to describe as measures of protection the forced integration of the conquered region into the Turkish economy, the maintenance of 29,000 men on the island of Cyprus, despite the censure of the community of nations and, lastly, what we may term an act of colonisation, of which it has been said that it has provoked feelings of indignation on the part of certain leaders of the Turkish community itself, which have found expression in the press?

The embargo on arms supplies to Turkey decided upon by the United States in 1975 does not constitute discrimination, which is how the report describes it. The embargo was decided upon because the United States observed that the armaments supplied by them to Turkey had been used for purposes other than those for which such weapons had been approved. And it is this conflict with — if one should not say violation of — United States law which led to the embargo decision. It was decided that the embargo would be lifted once the Cyprus problem was settled: it is only too clear that it has not been settled.

*Mr. Druon (continued)*

It is therefore up to the United States, and to that country alone, to determine whether it wishes to flout its own law. But it does not seem to be one of the tasks of WEU to give directives to a sovereign body.

With regard to the disputes between Turkey and Greece, there is likewise a lack of balance which seems to me flagrant. Mr. Grant looks for a solution to these disputes quite simply in granting Turkey rights over Greek territorial areas.

The President is pointing out to me that I have exceeded the time allowed me. I shall therefore shorten my conclusion.

The report pays tribute to Mr. Karamanlis and his policy. I am happy to associate myself with that tribute by saying that thanks to Mr. Karamanlis democracy has been restored in Greece and two wars averted, a civil war and a foreign war.

The fact that democracy has been restored must not, however, lead us to forget that an opposition exists which, as everyone is aware, advocates Greece withdrawing from NATO completely.

Accordingly, any recommendation that might appear to show somewhat undue favour to a country, which is at present engaged in disputes with Greece and whose head of government said in Moscow that the only potential enemy was Greece — for that is what Mr. Eçevit said — but who in Washington said there was no reason for a non-aggression treaty between the two countries since they are both members of NATO, any recommendation of that nature, I repeat, would be just the sort of thing that could provide powerful arguments for those in Greece who advocate withdrawal from NATO — and that would be running counter to the aim we are pursuing. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like first of all to convey to Mr. Grant, our Rapporteur, on this topic of such vital importance to all the countries of Europe, my complete agreement and thanks for having by his report made a noteworthy contribution towards a depiction of the real strategic and political situation prevailing in the Mediterranean.

I have heard just now several preceding speakers who levelled criticisms at his report, and am bound to confess myself baffled by them, inasmuch as it is a fact known to everyone that the situation in the Mediterranean today is

dangerous for Europe: the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Forlani, openly said as much yesterday, with the full concurrence of the Italian communist group.

The Mediterranean, which has for thousands of years been the point of impact between East and West, forms the southern flank of the Atlantic forces and Europe's south. It is the most exposed area and, as history has shown, the easiest path for invading Europe. We must also bear in mind certain existing danger-spots in the Mediterranean today: above all, whereas the central and northern theatres of the Atlantic disposition of forces are undisturbed despite inferiority to the opposing military set-up of the Warsaw Pact, the Mediterranean is seething with any number of serious problems. There is first the divergence of opinions between Greece and Turkey on the Cyprus question, and I disliked hearing in this Assembly voices which, instead of attempting to improve matters, seemed to me to be intent on widening the gap between the two nations, which are both part of Europe and vitally interested in maintaining and intensifying the defence of Europe against a foe common to us all, and therefore to Europe as a whole.

There is the problem of Tito's Yugoslavia when he is gone. There is the Arab-Israeli conflict; there is above all the problem of Soviet pressure in Africa, on which I myself have submitted an amendment, to be discussed on the next report: a pressure rendering dangerous and unstable the equilibrium in the Mediterranean, especially remembering that Africa lies on the farther seashore of the Mediterranean and that many African states are economically essential, too, to Europe's supply of raw materials for its defence and armaments.

Then there is the threat posed by the incursion of the Soviet fleet into Mediterranean waters. In this respect let us also revive the Montreux Convention preventing warships from passing through the straits.

Nobody can argue that Russia's navy sails into the Mediterranean to establish a state of peace. If their ships come, they do so with aggressive intent. What would the Soviet Union say if NATO warships sailed in through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea, in breach of the Montreux Convention?

All these situations necessitate our combining every effort to activate Europe's defence, and we are not forgetting that this is the Assembly for the defence of Europe. These are the elements that ought to carry most weight.

One last destabilising factor: let it not be forgotten that the countries with the biggest communist parties in the western world abut on the Mediterranean: Italy, France and Spain. I have no wish to cast a slur on the loyalty of

*Mr. Roberti (continued)*

the leaders of these parties in doing their duty as citizens of Europe, but they undoubtedly have ideological and political links and shared doctrines with Soviet Russia, which now through the Warsaw Pact represents the threat overhanging Europe's future.

Hence, for all these reasons, I believe this Assembly ought to lend its full backing to Mr. Grant's admirable report, to which I am delighted on this occasion to bring my total gratitude and backing. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Ferretti.

Mr. FERRETTI (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, clearly the report presented by Mr. Grant, despite its qualities, is surprising in two respects: although the aim is to deal with the problems of European security in the Mediterranean, the report at no stage considers the conditions and means for achieving the necessary harmonisation of the policies pursued by our several countries in that region.

Moreover, although the Rapporteur affirms that he is seeking to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, he adopts an attitude towards a number of conflicts — in particular towards the dispute between Greece and Turkey — that might seriously endanger the Alliance's cohesion and solidarity.

Mr. Grant does not state the real problems of a European security policy in the Mediterranean: his sole concern seems to be to revert to a long outmoded state of affairs, which is doomed by the way relations between our states have been developing. Mr. Grant wishes to take us back to the time when all the armies of Europe were integrated into structures dominated by a foreign hegemony. Well, that era has come to a close. Since 1966, there has no longer been and can no longer be a European bloc placed under an integrated military command either in the Mediterranean or in other regions. Why, therefore, is it proposed that the Assembly should accept sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the first paragraph in the draft recommendation proper? Is it the intention to censure a member country, whose contribution to European security is none the less decisive? Is it the intention to exert pressure on public opinion in that country, although all the trends in thinking which reflect that opinion have taken an unequivocal stand against any return to military integration?

Gratuitous and unrealistic proposals of this sort are more likely to discredit our Assembly than to promote unruffled work on a joint policy in the Mediterranean. Such a policy would however provide an opportunity for streng-

thening considerably the individual and collective positions of our countries.

The Mediterranean region is essential to the economies of the member states of WEU; it represents an indispensable source of agricultural products, of manpower and of energy; and nearly 20% of the crude oil consumed by the nine member states of the EEC comes from the Maghreb countries, not to mention the oil from the gulf which passes through the Mediterranean.

These economic links which unite WEU member states and the Mediterranean countries are all the more important because they are threatened: crises and conflicts, indeed, follow closely on each other's heels in the Mediterranean regions — domestic crises of which the events in Portugal, Spain and even Italy have provided spectacular examples and international conflicts, which are constantly flaring up between Israel and the Arab countries, between Greeks and Turks and among the Arab countries themselves.

If Europe is intent on safeguarding its interests in the Mediterranean, it seems to me important that it should make its voice heard not in order to exacerbate conflicts but to contribute to their solution, and so to establish the climate of peace and stability essential both for economic development and for the security of our states.

Now Mr. Grant, far from outlining European initiatives likely to preserve and strengthen the links maintained by the WEU countries with the different Mediterranean states, devotes his attention to quite another problem: how to strengthen integrated NATO structures and extend the influence of that organisation. The Rapporteur thus puts forward a hotchpotch of proposals, including the return of France to the NATO Mediterranean command, the accession of Spain to NATO and the reintegration of Greece into the Alliance's military structures. At no stage does the Rapporteur question whether these proposals, which are often glaringly unrealistic, are really in conformity with European interests and likely to foster harmony among the states bordering on the Mediterranean.

Integration of the forces belonging to WEU countries and of the largest possible number of Mediterranean states seems undesirable. Their positions are too varied and inter-state relations assume too many different forms for it to be possible for one and the same politico-military organisation to resolve all the region's problems. Besides this, the United States and the WEU countries sometimes have divergent interests in the Mediterranean region. For one party, the Mediterranean is only one of the squares on the chess-board in a strategic game of world-wide scale, whereas for the others it constitutes an area of vital economic importance in which

*Mr. Ferretti (continued)*

upheavals and crises bear the seeds of very serious and very immediate dangers to their prosperity and security.

The interests of Europe do not therefore lie in constituting a Mediterranean military bloc. Nor do Europe's interests lie in taking up a unilateral position in opposition to one or other of the parties engaged in the various conflicts which set the Mediterranean countries one against another. It is not, in particular, by wholeheartedly espousing the Turkish cause, as the Rapporteur proposes, that Europe will be able to bring about that peaceful solution of disputes in which it has such a lively concern. And here I would associate myself with what my colleagues, Mr. Druon and Mr. Périquier, said just now.

Mr. Grant's report, in the form in which it is submitted to us, is clearly neither realistic nor well-advised nor really useful. It is, in fact, unrealistic because it proposes solutions derived from a bygone era, that of Dean Rusk's "pactomania" and of building up reputedly unshakable military structures in a context of confrontation between the United States and the USSR.

Nor is it well-advised, because instead of advocating a European policy of peace and mediation, it adopts extreme and unbalanced viewpoints.

Lastly, it seems to me that it is not useful, since it provides no reply to the basic problem of Mediterranean policy: how to fit the European economic co-operation which has already begun into a more general framework that should be able to cope with the concerns and the needs of Europe in the realm of security?

In my eyes, therefore, it is clearly desirable that the Assembly should either reject this report or else adopt it only after it has been transformed by the adoption of a number of amendments. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Ferretti.

I now call Mr. Müller. He will be followed by Mr. Watkinson and then by Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Mediterranean area has always been of exceptional importance for Europe. I would therefore take issue with the last speaker when he says that the Mediterranean is only one area among many others. From 480 BC to 1571 AD, from Salamis to Lepanto, the decisions that governed the fate of Europe were all taken in this area.

The presence of Russian squadrons in the Mediterranean today reminds us that, since Prince Orlov's fleet first penetrated into the Mediterranean under Catherine the Great, Russian expansionist desires have always had a bias towards warmer seas.

And when we look at the present situation in Europe we can see that the main areas in which conflicts may flare up are in the south, in the Mediterranean, not in the northern, indeed not even in the central sector where, thanks to the policy of détente, some measure of balance has been reached. On the other hand we are witnessing a clear attempt to shift the balance in the Mediterranean sector.

Here we have a string of crisis areas. All of them have been mentioned today. Whether we are talking about the Cyprus question, the problems in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states or, again, the crises in North Africa — just think of the tension between Algeria and Morocco over the former Spanish Sahara — everywhere we find conflicts and potentially explosive situations.

I should like to deal with one further aspect, which in my opinion is neglected — indeed, is not even mentioned — in the report although it is part of the problem. I am referring to international terrorism. Many of the terrorists in Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany were trained in the Mediterranean area. There is no secret about the fact that a statesman in one of the Mediterranean countries is the financial backer of international terrorism from Northern Ireland to Mindanao in the Philippines. It is not all that long ago that hijackers from Japan were granted asylum in a Mediterranean country, which did not even return to the other state the ransom money that had been extorted.

This harks back to the period, which lasted till the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Christian states of Europe were plagued by pirates from North Africa.

That period can also teach us something for the present. Only joint measures and joint action can help to ensure that in the Mediterranean area as elsewhere we keep in mind the security of the whole of Europe and achieve for the near future security in Europe. Our goal must be to keep the potential for conflict in the area as low as possible, whether in Cyprus or in the Middle East. Our goal must be — and here I agree with the previous speaker — to intervene in such a way as to contain the conflicts and prevent them from escalating, that is, to exercise a calming influence and avoid exacerbating them. But this naturally means that we must prepare ourselves for all possible contingencies. For only he who is armed against all contingencies is nowadays really in a position to pursue an independent policy in his own interest.

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

May I, in conclusion, make a comment about the arms embargo on a member of NATO, that is to say Turkey. It seems to me that our honoured and respected colleagues in the American Congress too closely resemble a provincial parliament in their unawareness of the significance of the embargo. Security in the Mediterranean will depend, among other things, on the efficiency of the Turkish army, which is part of NATO. Of course, Turkey bears a special responsibility in regard to the Cyprus issue, but it is also a member of the western defence alliance, and you cannot slowly disarm such a member, as is being done with this arms embargo.

I think Western European Union is well advised to pay particular attention to the Mediterranean sector. It is precisely from the south that the security of Europe is threatened, and we are certainly right to be on our guard in this area. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I now call Mr. Watkinson.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — First, I should like to congratulate my colleague, Mr. Grant, on his comprehensive and factual report which I believe has great value to this Assembly. I wish briefly to make four points.

First, whilst I support the spirit of the majority of the recommendations which have been made by Mr. Grant, I find some of the language which is used in those recommendations somewhat stronger than I myself would wish to endorse. I want to make clear that I wish to see non-NATO countries encouraged and supported, but I believe we should be careful not to over-pressurise or embarrass those countries. It is well known, for instance, that a very sensitive debate is now going on in Spain whether Spain should become a member of NATO. I believe it is incumbent on us to respect the sensitivity of that debate in Spain.

Secondly, whilst the Alliance faces problems in the Mediterranean, and many members have referred in particular to the problem of the Turkish-Greek dispute over Cyprus — and here I would endorse a lifting of the embargo — nevertheless it is possible that we can too easily become too despondent. If one considers Soviet policy in the Mediterranean and the aspirations of the Soviet Union there, one can see that matters have not gone entirely its way. For instance, Soviet policy in the Middle East remains in tatters. We know from the report of the difficulties which the Soviet navy has over bases for its fleet. Italy remains a firm and integral part of the Alliance and any hope the Soviet Union had of being a dominating influence in the Iberian Peninsula has foundered.

I now wish to turn to a part of the report which is not dealt with in any great depth — I appreciate that this would not be possible — the whole question of the Middle East. However, the Rapporteur acknowledges the enormous significance of the Middle East in the Mediterranean area and the fact that it is a tinderbox that could be ignited at any time.

It is both right and appropriate that this Assembly should comment on what I consider to be the failure of the Israeli Government and Mr. Begin to respond adequately to the historic visit by President Sadat to Israel some months ago. The Israelis have singularly failed to capitalise upon that visit.

What has been the result so far? Admittedly, the Israelis had endured an insufferable attack in Tel Aviv from the Palestinian guerrillas, but the response to that, the invasion of Lebanon, was, in my view, grossly exaggerated. Secondly, we have seen the extension of settlements in the most inflammatory manner. Thirdly, the question of a future homeland for the Palestinians is even now unresolved. It would appear from the announcement which has just been made that the hard right wing of the Likud Party has secured yet another triumph.

By their policy of intransigence in this area, the Israelis are in danger of failing to make the most of the peace overtures which have been made, and already, sadly, President Sadat is talking once again in terms of war. It is incumbent on all of us to ensure that Israel is aware of the vital importance of the pursuit of these peace negotiations.

I turn briefly to the question of the Horn of Africa, as this is mentioned in the report. Here one can see the importance of not panicking or over-reacting to Russian and Cuban involvement in Africa. My right honourable friend, the Secretary of State, has expressed the view this morning that it would be better if African problems were solved by Africans, and I agree. If we look at the result of Soviet-Cuban adventurism in the Horn, we see that, in fact, the Soviet Union has betrayed one country in that part of Africa to support another. We see that it is now saddled with an internal civil war in Ethiopia over Eritrea and this weekend we read of internal disputes within the Government of Ethiopia itself, disputes between the incumbent President and the Soviet-backed forces in Ethiopia. From this I believe we can learn the lesson that involvement brings dangers. The principal lesson to be learned is that African nationalism is stronger than Russian communism.

I congratulate Mr. Grant on producing this report and thus throwing open to debate these vital aspects of the security of the Alliance.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much.

I call the last speaker, Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I did not wonder at Mr. Bernini's speech on behalf of the Italian communists, convinced as I am that they go on talking for the benefit of interests having nothing to do with Europe's defence and security. But I did wonder at, and was grieved by, other speeches, which, starting from particular situations that can also be singled out for mention, ended by declaring Mr. Grant's report to be unacceptable. On the contrary, I think — and I believe I can speak for the Italian christian democrat representatives in this Assembly — that Mr. Grant has really produced a splendid report that will add to the lustre of WEU by what I may call its novel and highly-effective way of dealing with such an important and vital matter for European security.

Time is too short for me to make a long speech and fully justify my own and my christian democrat colleagues' support for the report; let me simply make one observation: why on earth does all talk of security in the Mediterranean and therefore Europe get more and more jittery as the years go by? The issue has been faced many a time in the past by this Assembly, and was faced only last year, but today much more nervously than yesterday. Yet it ought to have evolved the other way round, at any rate because of developments in Greece, Portugal and Spain, in favour of the democratic cause, that is, the principles for which WEU exists in these countries essential to the Mediterranean. The reason why such talk is getting more and more anxious is that we have always given way too much in the past, and are incapable of facing reality in the terms in which it crops up. We have taken the term *détente* to mean always giving way, a continuing concern not to provoke protests and indignation by treading on our adversary's toes.

WEU is the natural opponent of another group, another alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Failure to realise that in what we have to say we should not worry about displeasing Russia, in the sense of not making a stand against all that its policy asks for and does, but should take every step to secure Europe's defence and not allow to happen what has happened in practice, i.e. the numerical build-up of the Warsaw Pact forces, and, as the United Kingdom Minister of Defence emphasised this morning, precisely a disquieting upgrading of technology such as to put us in real and very serious difficulties now, is extremely serious.

I am truly grateful to the Rapporteur for having, in speaking of Greece and Turkey, and of Portugal and Spain, in the terms in which he used, grasped the true meaning of the situa-

tion, but I am especially grateful for his expressing the whole of his preoccupation by referring in appropriate terms to Yugoslavia, when in paragraph 5 of the recommendation he asks the Assembly to proclaim the unequivocal support of the West for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status. These are the stances that are of use to Europe's defence.

In conclusion, Mr. President, in yesterday's speeches certain worries about the future of WEU kept coming to the surface. It was asked whether or not we should continue to exist. Well, I say a reply to the question might well be to see how the problem is solved today. Certainly, should a solution such as Mr. Grant propounds be rejected, or approved by a narrow majority, I should really begin to worry about the future of this Assembly, and might say that we whose duty it is to defend it had ourselves ordained its end. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

We have come to the end of the list of speakers.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

If not, with the exception of the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee, who are to speak this afternoon, the debate is now closed.

#### 6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. China and European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 770 and Amendments).
2. Security in the Mediterranean (Replies to the speakers by the Rapporteur and by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 776 and Amendments).
3. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Com-

*The President (continued)*

mittee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Documents 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment).

4. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 775).

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. May I express some dissatisfaction with arrangements that you are making for this afternoon? We have had this important debate delayed once already, for the best of all possible reasons, and were delighted to hear the Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom. His address took us on to broader themes. Now that we have got into the debate, it would be most unsatisfactory, I submit, when we resume this afternoon, for us first to have to switch our minds to the problems of China before again resuming our debate on security in the Mediterranean.

The Assembly might find it more convenient to pursue the debate on security in the Mediterranean and then to proceed with the remainder of the agenda. May I suggest that when we resume this afternoon we should first have my winding-up speech and then the Chairman of the Committee, dealing with the amendments, in order to bring the debate to a conclusion?

The PRESIDENT. — I must tell you, Mr. Grant, that we have a lot to decide later on with the documents and therefore we must have sufficient time in which to take your speech and the speech of the Chairman of the Committee before deciding on all the amendments and so on. It will take a long time. The whole preparation has been so arranged because at 3 o'clock there will be many press and television people here. I spoke with Mr. Roper and he agrees to the proposal.

It is my proposal, therefore, that we have the debate on China at 3 o'clock, and then the resumption of the debate on security in the Mediterranean, with the amendments, and votes. Then we shall resume yesterday's debate on the annual report of the Council.

I do not see any other possibilities, but I can ask the Assembly for its opinion. Mr. Grant proposes that at 3 o'clock we should continue the debate on security in the Mediterranean and have the amendments and the votes before starting the debate on China and European security. I point out that Sir Frederic Bennett, who is to present the report on China and European security, is not present at the moment.

Will those in favour of Mr. Grant's proposal please show ?...

There are six in favour.

Will those who are against the proposal, in other words, those who agree with my proposal that we start at 3 o'clock with the debate on China and European security, please show ?...

There are six who are in favour of my proposal.

As the numbers are equal, we must take the debate on China at 3 o'clock.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — With respect, Mr. President, I think that the voting is a little unclear. It would not waste too much time if you were to ask delegates to stand when voting to make it quite clear.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Grant, I hope that we can agree to my proposal, for the following reasons. Sir Frederic Bennett is not here at the moment, and those who have amendments to your report are also not here, because they thought that, according to the published agenda, we should be taking the debate on China and European security at 3 o'clock, resuming later the debate on security in the Mediterranean. When we resume the debate on your report, my proposal is that you as Rapporteur should first say a few words in order to bring us back into the picture. Could you not agree to that?

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — With the greatest respect, Mr. President, I am not at all happy about this. The amendments are not nearly as substantial as you appear to think and will not take as long as you might anticipate; nor will my response be very long. In addition, I do not think my colleague, Mr. Roper, will be very long. Those who have amendments and those who are interested in the subject ought to have the opportunity to follow it all the way through, without having the debate on China and European security interposed. I am not concerned about the press or television people. It is for them to adapt themselves to our procedure. I believe that we should continue the debate on security in the Mediterranean at 3 o'clock without further interruption. I can undertake to be very short in winding up.

On that basis, Mr. President, I ask you once again to take the vote on my proposal, which is that at 3 o'clock we carry on with the debate on security in the Mediterranean and conclude it before starting on any other items. Would you care to ask those who are in favour of my proposal please to stand so that we may be clear about it?

The PRESIDENT. — We shall take the decision by sitting and standing, but I point out that there are ten amendments, and we shall

*The President (continued)*

have to take votes on those amendments. I can do that easily but it will take a certain amount of time. Mr. Grant proposes that we should continue with his report, the final word of the Chairman of the Committee, then discuss the amendments, vote on them and then move on to the debate on China. That could take between one hour and one and a half hours.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Mr. Jessel wishes to vote in favour of Mr. Grant's proposal.

Mr. FOSSON (*Italy*) (Translation). — I think we can reconcile matters, since the voting has resulted in a tie. We could read the report on China without discussing it, and pass on to the debate on Mr. Grant's report.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, at the beginning of the session the Assembly adopted an Order of Business according to which we continue with the report on China at 3 p.m. I do not think that we can proceed to change the Order of Business with the number of members at present in the chamber, given that it was adopted when the chamber was almost full. I would therefore be grateful if Mr. Grant would withdraw his proposal.

The PRESIDENT. — We should consider following the Orders of the Day for this afternoon. We should be happy that a long list of speakers took part. We had a good result this morning.

I ask members to agree to my proposal to start as scheduled this afternoon.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Originally I agreed with you but I have changed my mind since I was reminded about what happened yesterday. At the end of the debate yesterday we amended the proceedings by introducing into the Orders

of the Day the report and reply to the Council. Mr. Reddemann's point of order is irrelevant. It is possible for the Assembly to decide what it will debate at the next sitting at the end of the current sitting.

Although I at first wished that we could reach a consensus, I feel obliged to support Mr. Grant and I wish to vote in support of his proposal.

The PRESIDENT. — It is not easy for the Chair to get along with everyone at the same time. I hope that we can come to an agreement that we should continue with this part of the Orders of the Day at 3 o'clock, providing that all the amendments are not spoken to.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sure that is a very happy compromise, because I think all those who have tabled amendments have already spoken in the general debate. Therefore, I believe it would be perfectly reasonable for you, Mr. President, to ask the movers of amendments to move them formally this afternoon. In the event of their not accepting that procedure, as they are not present, I suggest that you limit debate on each amendment to two minutes for the member moving the amendment with a reply of no more than two minutes. That would restrict the time to four minutes as the maximum on any amendment with, if possible, no debate.

The PRESIDENT. — I think that is a good compromise. Let us finish this Order of the Day at three o'clock and try to restrict everyone to a maximum of two or three minutes, including the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee. We can then take the vote and start with China perhaps three quarters of an hour later.

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)*

# THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 20th June 1978

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Security in the Mediterranean (*Replies to the speakers by the Rapporteur and by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 776 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Grant (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Périquier, Mr. Mende; (point of order): Mr. Valleix, the President; (explanation of vote): Mr. Valleix, Mr. Deschamps; (point of order): Mr. Valleix, Mr. Depietri, Mr. Mende.
4. China and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 770 and Amendments*).

*Speakers*: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Mende, Mr. Cook, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Rubbi; (points of order): Mr. Valleix, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Mende, Mr. Lewis; Mr. Gessner, Mr. Périquier, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Roberti; (point of order): Mr. Druon; Mrs. Knight, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Margue, Mr. Schweneke, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Cruz Roseta (*Observer from Portugal*), Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Faulds, Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*).

5. Change in the membership of a Committee.
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 2.55 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Security in the Mediterranean

*(Replies to the speakers by the Rapporteur and by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 776 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the replies to the speakers by the Rapporteur and by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on security in the Mediterranean and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 776 and Amendments.

This morning we finished with the general debate with the exception of comments by the Rapporteur and the Chairman.

I call the Rapporteur. Mr. Grant, will you please take the floor.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — I am very conscious of the pressure of time for this debate because a most important debate is to take place on China. Therefore, I shall keep my remarks in winding up the debate as brief as I can. If I do not mention every person who has taken part in the debate this is not to be interpreted as meaning that I do not appreciate the contributions that he has made. We have had a most interesting debate and the quality of speeches has been of a very high level. I have greatly appreciated all the contributions and have been very pleased with the wide degree of support for my recommendations and my report from a very wide source. This has gratified me and the Assembly should take note of that.

I must say straight away that I have observed that our friends from France take a different view. I am not entirely surprised at this, because in Committee we had a very full debate when the views expressed by our French colleagues on NATO and on the Greek-Turkish situation were very fully argued in a very civilised manner. But the net result was that the Committee decided nevertheless by fourteen votes to two in favour of the report and the recommendations. I would only say to my friend, Mr. Périquier, who is a very good and skilled lawyer and therefore very capable of arguing one side very effectively, that we understand the points he has made.

1. See page 24.

*Mr. Grant (continued)*

I assure him that if he reads the report and studies my speech when it is recorded, he will find that I visited both Greece and Turkey, that I had discussions with both sides, and that it is my desire to maintain, so far as is possible, a balance between the two sides in his argument.

We note and understand the concern. We have had endless debates on the rôle of NATO, but it is there, in existence, and is the fundamental means of security in the Mediterranean. Although I am always interested to hear debates and arguments about what might be put in its place, this is a practical reality at this time, in 1978, and for the foreseeable future. Again, with our French friends, we have to have a good debate, but at the end of the day we have to agree to disagree.

I also understand the arguments put forward by Mr. Bernini, who speaks for the Communist Party in Italy — and he spoke in very moderate terms. I understand his point of view but it is not one that will command the support of the Assembly as a whole. Nobody wants good relations between East and West more than I do, but those good relations will not be achieved from a position of weakness in the West.

We all appreciated the contributions of our colleagues who came as observers from both Turkey and Greece and we understood very clearly what they said. The last thing I would want to do is to dictate to them or order them in some way what they should do to resolve the questions of Cyprus, the Aegean and airspace. These issues are for them to decide. The only point I make is that there are bigger considerations overriding them. The point I am seeking to get over, in my report and my speech, is that we are all allies on the same side, working together against a common threat, and the sooner we combine and resolve our differences and recognise that we are all one, all united and all friends, the better.

Finally, Mr. Veryvakis, the Greek gentleman who spoke, asked about guarantees that if the arms embargo on Turkey were lifted, the arms would not be used for purposes other than commitments within NATO. There can be no absolute guarantees. There can be no guarantee that Germany will not go to war with Britain or that Britain will not go to war with France.

We have to rely on a common sense of purpose and the fact that we have a common will to defend ourselves when there is a threat today, not against what was a threat yesterday.

Other speeches were excellent though, but I cannot touch upon them all. Mr. Watkinson made an excellent speech on the Middle East. Mr. Müller quite rightly drew attention to ter-

rorism. Mr. Handlos drew attention to the question of armaments. Having thanked them for their excellent contributions I must say that I believe that this is a report that the Assembly can adopt with honour and common sense and, I hope, with as big a majority as possible. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call the Chairman.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I hope to follow the Rapporteur at least in the brevity of my contribution so that we may make progress in our debate. I thank Mr. Grant for having acted as Rapporteur for the Committee and the Assembly on this important subject and for presenting a report which, while it may have one or two nuances with which individuals may have some disagreement, is extremely valuable as a summary and survey of a complicated and difficult subject.

On behalf of the Assembly and the Committee, I should like to thank those he was able to visit, who contributed to the preparation of the report. As will be seen from the third page of Document 776, apart from meetings within the area of WEU, he was helpfully received by ministers and officials in Athens, Ankara and Belgrade, and the quality of his report relied very heavily on the help he was given by authorities in those countries. We are very grateful to the authorities in Athens and Ankara in particular, if they are represented here, for the assistance they gave to him, which largely contributed to his report.

I should also like to say how much as Chairman of the Committee I appreciated the presence this morning of the Council of WEU. I was glad to see how full was the Council bench during this important debate. Listening to yesterday's debate and the report of my colleague Mr. Treu, I thought for a moment that the Assembly was at war with the Council of WEU, but we very much appreciated that on this occasion members of the Council have not only contributed to the preparation of the report but have attended so faithfully when we have discussed the matter today.

My final word of thanks must be to our two maiden speakers who took part in this debate, Mr. Druon and Mr. Ferretti, both from the new French Delegation. Although they were maiden speakers, having heard their speeches, I would have to describe them as maidens not altogether without experience. Their comments show that they will contribute much in both style and knowledge to the future work of our Assembly.

This has been a valuable debate. I hope that we can now complete it quickly in adopting the report of my colleague, Mr. Grant.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

The debate is closed.

Before voting on the draft recommendation itself, we shall deal with the amendments. I think that we need not debate the amendments, because more or less everyone who has tabled an amendment has spoken this morning.

I must just put one question. There are amendments by Mr. Druon on a total of four paragraphs and by Mr. Ferretti on one. Are we able to deal with all Mr. Druon's amendments together, or must we vote separately?

We can take them all together. I therefore call Mr. Druon to support these amendments.

Is he here? He is not here.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Would it be of any help if I said that I accepted paragraph 3 of Mr. Druon's amendment? If you think it right in Mr. Druon's absence, I should be prepared to move it myself.

The PRESIDENT. — Well, he is not able to speak in favour. He spoke this morning. May we go to the vote? Yes, we may.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — On three?

The PRESIDENT. — Then we must go separately, one by one.

I ask you first to take the amendment by Mr. Ferretti, Amendment No. 2:

1. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the principal credible basis" and insert "an essential guarantee"; leave out "full".

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).

3. In sub-paragraph (c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect" and insert "by taking full account of".

Does Mr. Ferretti wish to take the floor?...

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — I request the floor.

The PRESIDENT. — For or against?

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — On my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — I beg your pardon; that is another amendment. I am calling the amendment by Mr. Ferretti, Amendment No. 2. Mr. Ferretti is not here.

Does anyone wish to speak against it?...

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — I assume, Mr. President, that the explanations of vote will come after the amendments have been supported?

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — May I defend Mr. Druon's amendment, Mr. President?

(*The President refused*)

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote separately on parts 1, 2 and 3 of Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Ferretti.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Parts 1, 2 and 3 are negatived.*

We come now to part 1 of Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Druon:

In the draft recommendation proper:

1. In paragraph 1 (d), leave out "and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey".

Is he here?...

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

We shall now vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Part 1 of Amendment No. 1 is negatived.*

We now come to Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Périquier:

In paragraph 1 (d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and by calling on the United States to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey".

Does Mr. Périquier wish to speak?

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — I wanted to take the floor just now to defend Mr. Druon's amendment, and I had a right to do so. Now it is the turn of my own amendment, in which I propose that we should delete the call to raise the embargo for Turkey's benefit. I shall be extremely brief on this point, as I have very little to add to my remarks of this morning.

I ask that WEU should not concern itself with what is a purely American issue, and was decided under the terms of a law. Consequently, I ask the Assembly to endorse the reasons which prompted the United States Congress to refuse to raise the embargo for the benefit of Turkey, for this embargo is the only means which might make it genuinely possible to exert pressure on that country to carry out the United Nations decisions, which all the states represented here have approved.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Périquier has spoken in favour of his amendment.

I now call Mr. Mende and then Mr. Valleix.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to oppose the amendment put forward by Mr. Périquier. We are here not to give expression to our feelings but to decide questions of European security.

We know that the embargo against Turkey endangers European security in that it can have increasingly harmful effects on the NATO member Turkey and consequently on the defence capability of the Atlantic Alliance.

I therefore ask that Mr. Périquier's amendment be negatived.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Valleix, you want to raise a point of order ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I wish simply to call our Assembly to bear witness to the fact that I find it hard to see how, if we adopt working methods of this kind, we can deliberate lucidly and methodically on such important subjects and in such a way as to ensure that our Assembly is taken seriously by other people.

I may be mistaken, but having followed the deliberations until the end of the morning, I understood — but was I wrong ? — that the Orders of the Day for this afternoon provided for this morning's debate to be resumed at about 5 p.m. I can vouch for the fact that this is the reason, and the sole reason, why Mr. Druon, for example, and others among our colleagues who spoke this morning are not now present. Having myself just come out of a committee meeting, I am astonished to learn that our deliberations were resumed in an order different from that which was firmly settled at 12.45 p.m.

I know, Mr. President, how heedful you are of the quality of our proceedings and of the application of methods consonant with that quality. I would draw your attention to what seems to me abnormal in the way in which we are discussing the text presented this morning, and I should like to have the position explained. It is in the interests of all of us that our Assembly should abide by the agreement reached this morning, for otherwise it is manifest that this text will not be properly discussed.

What is more, I cannot accept that the responsibility for this situation rests with the absentees, who are unaware that they are absent not through any fault of their own but as a result of an action taken by us. I must ask that we try to revert to the original Orders of the Day, which will enable us both to stick to the

method adopted this morning and to conduct our deliberations in the most favourable conditions. Otherwise, I would have to consider what I myself, as a member of the French Delegation, should do in a discussion in which the French representatives spoke at length this morning. I am glad that Mr. Périquier is able to be here, but other colleagues, who expressed very emphatic views, are unable to be present. In these circumstances I would find it advisable for us to take no further part in the deliberations on this subject.

The PRESIDENT. — My dear Mr. Valleix, I must inform you that it is the usual procedure that, before a sitting is closed, the Orders of the Day for the next sitting are debated and decided upon. I made the proposal to start with China at 3 o'clock, but I was vetoed. Those who were present in the Assembly know that we had a debate on the Orders of the Day and it was eventually decided to go on with the debate on the Mediterranean at 3 o'clock and to try to finish it as soon as possible.

We have just heard from Mr. Périquier speaking in favour and another speech against. We now come to the vote. I think that this is the best way to proceed in the difficult situation in which we find ourselves, with a lot of speakers on the list.

I hope you will agree that we try to do our best here all together in this Assembly. If you read the minutes, Mr. Valleix, you will see what happened this morning.

We now come to the vote on Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Périquier.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment No. 4 is negatived.*

We now come to part 2 of Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Druon :

2. In paragraph 1 (*e*), leave out "in Turkey in the NATO framework" and insert "with countries bordering on the Mediterranean in a European framework".

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 is negatived.*

I now call Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Grant :

In paragraph 1 (*e*) of the draft recommendation proper, before "Turkey" insert "Greece and".

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — On behalf of the Committee, I beg to move Amendment No. 3.

The PRESIDENT. — The amendment has the support of the Committee.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment No. 3 is agreed to.*

I now call Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Druon.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. We have just voted on Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Druon.

The PRESIDENT. — We are now on the third of Mr. Druon's amendments, dealing with paragraph 2.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — As I understand it, Mr. President, we are on the third part of the amendment tabled by Mr. Druon.

The PRESIDENT. — It is part 3 of Mr. Druon's Amendment No. 1 :

3. In paragraph 2 (*a*), after "remaining" insert "bilateral".

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Part 3 of Amendment No. 1 is agreed to.*

I now call part 4 of Mr. Druon's Amendment No. 1 :

4. Leave out paragraph 2 (*b*) and insert the following :

"Ensure that no outside interference, in particular from neighbouring countries, jeopardises the resumption of the desirable negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus with a view to furthering the Cypriot state's full exercise of its independence and the unitary and harmonious coexistence of its communities."

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Part 4 of Amendment No. 1 is negatived.*

We now come to part 4 of Amendment No. 2 tabled by Mr. Ferretti :

4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "all aspects of" ; leave out "NATO countries" and insert "WEU countries" ; leave out "in the appropriate allied forum".

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Part 4 of Amendment No. 2 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation, Document 776.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

(*Mr. Valleix rose*)

Mr. Valleix, your vote will be recorded.

We now come to the next item on our agenda, China and European security.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I request the floor on a point of order. The vote was taken so quickly that I must tell you that it was announced neither at the sitting nor in the lobbies, and that it was, in fact, the intention of the French representatives here present to vote against. I ask that you be good enough to see that this is recorded in the Minutes of Proceedings.

The PRESIDENT. — It will be recorded in the report.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — I request the floor in explanation of vote.

I should like to state which way we are going to vote, if you will allow me to do so. I hope it is not too late.

The PRESIDENT. — We have concluded the voting on this item and we are now turning to the next item on the agenda.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I am forced to convey to you, Mr. President, my surprise at the procedure and at the way that procedure has been applied, which seems to me unacceptable. It is true that some of my colleagues and I myself left the sitting just now at the moment when the amendments were being discussed, for the simple reason that their authors were put in a position where they were physically unable to present them. We tried to keep a watch on the course of this discussion from the lobbies. Nowhere at any time did I see it announced visually and nowhere at any time did I hear an announcement that the vote on the recommendation as a whole was taking place.

I am astonished, Mr. President, that a vote on an important decision should not be announced in the lobbies, especially when it is known in what circumstances we left the sitting. We left the Chamber because it was physically impossible for us to present the amendments concerned. I beg to point out that I will not be able to accept that this could be interpreted as a refusal to participate in the voting. I confirm that it was our intention to vote against this

<sup>1</sup> See page 25.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

text, and I wish the normal procedure for such cases to be applied.

The PRESIDENT. — We have already finished with the first item on our agenda this afternoon. We have voted on the amendments and on the draft recommendation. We have concluded the item. It has been noted that Mr. Valleix said that the French Delegation were against.

Mr. DEPIETRI (*France*) (Translation). — The question is too important for the vote to be taken with undue haste, so I must ask for a vote by roll-call.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I note that the amendment of the French communist representative, Mr. Depietri, comes after the vote. The vote has already been taken. It is open to the French members to place their arguments on record. I therefore ask that we take note that Mr. Depietri's amendment is invalid.

The PRESIDENT. — We have concluded the first item on the agenda.

*(The President continued in German)*

(Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we have concluded the first item on the agenda for this afternoon. I am not prepared to take the vote again. We have taken note that our French colleagues subsequently submitted a statement. We carried out the procedure correctly. This morning, in a debate on the Orders of the Day, we fixed the agenda for this afternoon. I asked all those present to tell their colleagues that the agenda had been changed following a plenary decision and I must adhere to it.

We shall proceed accordingly and I now take item two on the agenda.

#### **4. China and European security**

##### ***(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 770 and Amendments)***

The PRESIDENT. — We now come to the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on China and European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 770 and Amendments.

We must proceed with this item now, and I ask the Rapporteur, Sir Frederic Bennett, to take the floor.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — On a point of order! I should like to see incidents of this kind avoided in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — You have not been called, Mr. Valleix. Sir Frederic Bennett has the floor.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President and fellow delegates, I am sorry that my introductory remarks begin in a rather feverish situation. I assure all those present that I intend to make my contribution shorter than do most Rapporteurs and in an entirely non-partisan way.

First, I have a rather unpleasant task but it is right for the standing of the Assembly that I should undertake it. I wish formally to draw the attention of the Assembly to a matter of some importance which affects its standing.

On 16th May, the General Affairs Committee adopted the report that I am presenting today by 14 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions. Before that date the report was a confidential document which was not to be distributed outside the membership of the Committee, not even to governments in Western European Union, let alone external governments, friendly or otherwise. Indeed, I have been told that several such governments asked for a copy of the report from our Assistant Secretary-General. He properly refused them that request before 16th May on the basis that before then it was a confidential document that should not go beyond the membership of the Committee. The document became official only on 16th May. Yet, on 12th May, four days earlier, the Russian chargé d'affaires at the embassy in London, with a copy of the report in his hand, went to our Foreign Office and urged the Minister to use his influence to get the report withdrawn and suppressed. I have since learned that similar approaches were made to all WEU governments.

There are, therefore, two matters that I must emphasise, not in the particular context of this report but generally, because the situation is unsatisfactory. First, the report was leaked to a government — and, worse, to an external government — before the authorised date. Secondly, whatever our view about the report, it is surely wrong for any foreign government or, indeed, any member government, to seek to bring pressures on members of the Assembly as to how they should speak or exercise their vote.

I have done my best check the precedents and I can find no other occasion when any other government has indulged in this practice. I hope that it will never happen again.

I recall an occasion when Mr. Segre, an Italian communist, presented a report with which I disagreed. At that time a report appeared in the press that the American Government had taken exception to the report and would not be in favour of its being accepted by this Assembly. At that time every member who spoke, includ-

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

ing myself, deplored any intervention by the American Government on how we should vote. Surely, if we are not to be guilty of double standards, we should make the same protest to them, and more strongly because seven governments were separately approached in an effort to pressurise their representatives to speak, vote and act in a particular way.

Leaving aside that unpleasant incident, I wish to report the origin and purport of my report. I should like to report that I was invited by the General Affairs Committee, of which I have the honour to be a member, as a result of my going to Peking, to present the report. I do not put forward my own point of view but I report faithfully the up-to-date outlook of the Chinese Government on matters of international importance, especially on how they look at the security of the western world generally and Western Europe in particular.

The purpose of the report was not to try to invent or change the attitude of the Chinese Government — which I should not have been able to do — but to report truthfully and faithfully to my Committee and then to the Assembly the outlook of the Chinese Government towards the world problems of security. The report is a result of the researches I made by talking to a wide variety of Chinese who speak with an authoritative voice in Peking.

The fact that the views which were expressed to me and which I conveyed to the Committee are not popular with some members and some governments is not my concern. My task simply was to report how the Chinese saw the world scene today, first to my Committee and then to the Assembly.

If the report appears to have anti-Russian undertones or overtones, the blame does not lie with me, because if I had reported anything other than the impressions that I gained in Peking, I should not be telling the truth today. My conclusions are based precisely on the impressions that I gained during my visit to Peking. If they are unpopular with certain people, it is up to them to seek to persuade the Chinese to change their interpretation of global events. It is not for them to seek to blame me for a truthful account of the situation that I found in Peking.

The report is long. We are later than we anticipated. I shall not therefore go through the usual method of introducing a report at great length. It has received a fair amount of publicity. I should like to summarise in one short paragraph my conclusions.

First, I conclude that China needs to develop its economy, to modernise it and to bring it up

to date. Secondly, China needs a period of peace and stability to achieve this. Thirdly — whether this is acceptable to certain people or not, it is a fact of life — fear of the Soviet Union is the dominant feature of Chinese foreign policy. Fourthly, China wishes to see a strong and united Europe as a counter-balance to Soviet influence. Fifthly, China wishes to develop closer relations with Western Europe, especially in the economic field.

China needs assistance in the modernisation and re-equipment of its defence forces. I know that that is controversial.

In that context I have been glad to learn in the last week that France and Britain are prepared to co-operate on the basis of responding to China's request for such re-equipment and modernisation of its defence forces and that such requests should be judged on their merits.

The Russians, who have been abusive about me personally, this Assembly indirectly, and about the report, have expressed indignation and alleged damage to détente because one or two member states of WEU have responded to China's request.

For the Russians to take this violent attitude about one aspect and one aspect only of the report and its substance and for the same country, as we are standing here today, to be exporting thousands of tons of military hardware throughout the third world in advancement of its own aims is the ultimate in insolence.

I wish to add just one statistic. In the last year, the Russians have exported by way of gift, loan or sale more military hardware throughout the third world than the total defence production of either France or Britain. For them then to come and seek to pressurise this Assembly and western governments with a breach of détente is carrying the Brezhnev doctrine to a ludicrous degree. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying, irrespective of any party affiliations, that we should not allow these endless accusations of breaches of détente to be made by a country which at this moment is indulging in proxy breaching of détente throughout the entire continent of Africa.

I conclude by referring to the procedure to which I intend to adhere regarding this report. I had the privilege, Mrs. von Bothmer, of co-operating with you — and I pay tribute to your patience and forbearance — in trying to achieve a report that was a compromise between a number of varying views. The recommendations and resolutions — because it is not the substance of my report which is my responsibility on which votes will be taken today; it is the recommendations — sum up the maximum degree of agreement that we were able to reach together in the Committee. I do not wish to go back on

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

that undertaking at all. However, I shall tell the Assembly — as Mrs. von Bothmer knows well — that when I agreed not to press the question of arms sales on 16th May I reserved unto myself the right to introduce an amendment at a later stage. In fact, I did that, but then I withdrew it because I realised that it would put me and the Chairman of the Committee in a rather difficult position if I were to move some amendments as a Rapporteur, resist other amendments as a Rapporteur and then leave my seat and put forward other amendments as an individual.

Therefore, on reflection, I have agreed that I shall not move either of the two controversial amendments myself, first, the amendment which does not talk about global security but spells out Africa and Asia in particular, and secondly, I shall neither move nor speak to an amendment regarding arms sales, although of course I reserve unto myself the right to vote as I see fit when any such amendment from another source is put to the vote.

There is one amendment which, if I may address you, Madam Chairman, through the Chair, I shall move as Rapporteur, because I believe it has your sanction. It is that we have noted the wish of China to establish good relations with us. On looking through the precedents, I find that whenever we have talked about any country's wish to foster good relations with us we have always welcomed such a wish, not just noted it, which is a little discourteous. That is the only amendment which, as Rapporteur, I wish to move today.

As regards arms sales, the substance of my report and the discussions in Committee make the matter clear. The British and French Governments have already said in the last few days that they are ready to consider objectively the sale of such arms to modernise China's defence equipment. I shall not move that amendment today. My view remains unchanged, but I shall not pursue the matter further.

I close with one thought only. At this moment let us assume as a western assembly responsible for western defence that we did not have the China of today but instead we had a weak China, a satellite of the Soviet Union such as exists in Eastern Europe today. What would be the consequences of that to our security? We all know that such circumstances would increase enormously the need of the West to strengthen its capacity to defend itself against the growing Russian military threat. On the other hand, what have we to lose in the West by encouraging the existence and the maintenance of a strong, independent, friendly China which can only assist the aim we all have in mind, namely, the

global deterrent to aggression and the security of the West? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you for the report, Mr. Rapporteur.

In the debate, I call first Mr. Mende, who will be followed by Mr. Cook and then Mr. Grieve.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Soviet Government was ill-advised when it approached each of the seven governments of the WEU member states to prevent today's debate and any discussion of the repercussions which the policy of the People's Republic of China may have on European security: for, had there been any need to seek confirmation of the superiority of the freedom which permeates the western democracies when compared with the strait-jacket communist states, then these approaches have supplied it.

We can count ourselves fortunate that we in our parliaments, in our governments, in our radio, press and television, can say what we want, can write what we want, can vote for whom we want when we want, can travel abroad where we want, and can emigrate when and where we want. Even after Helsinki and Belgrade the answer to these matters in the realm of communist power is still a rigid "No".

I therefore look upon it as evidence of his failure to understand our free western society when Mr. Gromyko instructed his ambassadors to make this sorry *démarche* and had them intervene in the capitals of WEU. The fact that all seven governments rejected these moves on the grounds of the sovereignty of parliaments and their members shows, in my opinion, the superiority of our social order and is an expression of the freedom prevailing in our parliamentary union.

I am in the fortunate position, Mr. President, of being able to judge the report of our fellow member, Sir Frederic Bennett, from my own experience, in that four years ago I too, as a member of a German parliamentary delegation, was a guest of the People's Republic of China in Canton, Shanghai, Peking and district. I believe that we can indeed speak of a "Chinese miracle" which took place in this part of the world in the years after 1949.

First, the feeding of this population of many hundreds of millions of Chinese is assured for the first time in its history; second, there are no longer plagues and floods, because all that is humanly possible has been done to avoid them; third, many hundreds of millions of Chinese are bound together by one single will, a symbiosis of Maoism and Chinese patriotism.

Of course the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is worried about its neighbour because it has

*Mr. Mende (continued)*

taken on more than it can cope with. That began in the nineteenth century, when Russia annexed vast areas of the old China by force, threat or blackmail. There are details of this in the report. The same thing has happened again in the twentieth century when, using its military superiority in East, Central and South-East Europe, the USSR brought under its domination a hundred million people living in an area of one million square kilometres in what were formerly non-communist countries: in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and in the other part of Germany.

Now we are seeing evidence of this annexation and the resistance of these countries to Soviet imperialist behaviour: in Poland in 1956, where things passed off relatively harmlessly, in Hungary during the popular rising in 1956, before that in East Berlin and the Soviet-occupied zone with the uprising on 17th June 1953, and afterwards, in 1968, in Prague and the Czechoslovak Republic.

As politicians we know that no empire lasts for ever, neither that of Caesar, the Imperium Romanum, nor that of Charlemagne, nor that of Napoleon — out of respect for Caesar, Charlemagne and Napoleon I refrain from mentioning other names in the twentieth century.

Now Europe owes China some measure of reparation. The report by our colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett, speaks quite frankly of this when it says that some European nations had plundered China — a harsh word of self-criticism which certain European states must apply to themselves. What is more natural than that Europe should today make good to the People's Republic of China the wrongs which individual European states have earlier done to this ancient civilisation and the Chinese people? For reparation, too, is indivisible.

Recently we have suffered a flood of memoirs covering the period of the Nixon administration. Even if I — as we politicians are in the habit of doing — read memoirs with some reserve, no evidence has been forthcoming to refute the statement that the Soviet Union at the end of the sixties planned a preventive strike against the atomic centres of the People's Republic of China.

If that is the case, Mr. President, then Sir Frederic Bennett is right when he says in his report that the best guarantee of world peace is afforded when between the world powers — now including Europe — which confront each other there is the sort of balance which means that it is no longer possible for one of them not to run risks if it threatens, blackmails or exerts other forms of pressure on another power.

And this means that the "sleeping giant" of which Napoleon once spoke is today a sedative which allows us in Europe to sleep peacefully in our beds. We can do so thanks to the balance which the People's Republic of China, to Europe's advantage, provides to the weight of the Soviet Union and to its imperialist conceptions.

I therefore endorse Sir Frederic's report. I am also prepared to vote in favour of delivering arms to China in the same way as the Soviet Union does to the world at large. By what right should we discriminate against the People's Republic of China, a member of the United Nations and a state with which we all have diplomatic relations? Do we want to make fresh mistakes? Far better not! It would be wiser to learn from the previous mistakes which have been made in our dealings with China. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Cook, who will be followed by Mr. Grieve. May I ask those who register for a ten-minute speech to try to come down to eight minutes so that we may be able to fulfil the whole list of speakers this afternoon?

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to begin by congratulating Sir Frederic Bennett on the report he has presented. It is a very comprehensive one and is clearly informed by his own knowledge of the Far East; but I was somewhat startled by some of the opinions I found on reading his report. There are in it one or two references to Russian revisionism. I would not wish to suggest that he had presented this report in a sense reflecting conservative revisionism but certainly there are in the report some fresh perspectives which one does not normally associate with the party he represents.

For instance, I suggest we might consult paragraph 15 in which we find that the Korean war was the result of adventurism on the part of North Korea into which an innocent China was dragged by fear that the United States might exploit the situation to create a permanent base. Or we might consult paragraph 78 in which we see that the origins of the 1962 war between India and China were the result of the provocative actions of the Indians in building roads in Chinese territory; or, again, paragraph 56, in which we find that China was led to support Vietnam by the intervention of the United States on behalf of a right-wing régime which inevitably pushed China into supporting the rebels. I have had some sympathy with that view of the situation for the past twenty years but I am a little curious because I do not recollect Sir Frederic Bennett or any member of his party reflecting that view at the time these events were happening.

*Mr. Cook (continued)*

I understand that what he said in presenting the report was not meant to be entirely his own view and that he was seeking to present the Chinese view of history and foreign policy in the area over that period. I can only say that if that were his intention, it would have been helpful if he had said so explicitly in the report; but nowhere in any of those paragraphs is there any indication that this is the Chinese, as distinct from the Rapporteur's, point of view. In one or two paragraphs Sir Frederic could have been particularly helpful had such a distinction been made. I conclude this part of my address by referring the Assembly in particular to paragraph 61, in which the invasion of Tibet by China in 1956 is described in the following terms: "China implemented its historic authority in Tibet."

I find that a very inadequate description of an armed invasion achieved by greater military strength which brutally replaced the traditional government of Tibet and put an end to the traditional religion of the Tibetan people. That was an invasion which was condemned at the time by the Conservative Party and indeed by every right-wing party in Europe. They were right to condemn it at the time and I hope that they will be prepared to condemn it now and to resist the pressure to be stampeded into accepting China as a further, new ally in the new cold war into which we are entering.

This report would have been better and more balanced if, somewhere in the course of it, the Rapporteur had recognised that small nations, such as Tibet, Cambodia and Bangladesh, have their own rights, their own self-determination and their own foreign policy, to which they have every right, without constantly being regarded as pawns in a superpower game between China, Russia, the United States or anybody else.

Naturally, it follows from Sir Frederic's view that China has been in the last twenty years consistently innocent and peace-loving, that we should sell it arms in order that it may further that policy of being an innocent and peace-loving superpower. It is particularly difficult to take exception to the amendment which he has tabled, although I understand that he does not propose to move it. It is very difficult indeed to object to the suggestion that we consider anything objectively, although I cannot resist pointing out that "objectively" is a favourite word amongst Marxists and plays an important part in their terminology.

I should like to suggest four reasons why we should exercise caution in considering the suggestion that we sell arms to China.

First, if it were true that the sale of arms to China and an increase in the military strength

of the Chinese would result in the diversion of military resources from the Soviet Union's western front, I would find it very tempting indeed to go ahead and sell arms to China. Unfortunately, there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that that is what would happen. If we look over the past ten years, we see that the Soviet Union has very impressively built up its power and its military strength on its Chinese border. It has done so, as everybody in this Assembly knows, without the slightest diminution of its presence on the western border where it faces Western Europe.

If we assist in escalating the confrontation on the Chinese border by selling arms to China, that pattern will inevitably be repeated: the Soviet Union will, in turn, increase its own presence on the Chinese border and it will do so without any cut in its presence in Europe. The net result will be an increase in the military expenditure and military force of the Soviet Union which will, in turn, far from giving this Assembly any comfort, give it cause for alarm.

Secondly, if we are to consider the sale of arms to China, we must consider the effect not simply on the Soviet Union but on some of the other countries in that area which have historically not been unsympathetic to the West, in particular India. India has had a long, traditional relationship, particularly with the United Kingdom, and I should be very surprised indeed if the Indian Government did not have a view on the question of the sale of the 300 Harriers — very sophisticated, very advanced aircraft — to the Chinese, with whom they have been in conflict in the very recent past.

Thirdly, there is no reason to believe that if we sell arms to the Chinese those arms will stay in China. It is quite evident from Sir Frederic's report that the Chinese regard themselves as a great power. Like all great powers, they like to supply arms and military assistance to those states which have come under their sphere of influence. Some of those states are very odd, indeed.

Sir Frederic refers in his report to the Chinese support of the Cambodian Government which, he suggests, is supported by the Chinese because it seems better able to handle the Vietnamese than the previous, neutralist government. Whilst I have no wish to take sides in the dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam, I know that if I were a peasant living in Indo-China at the present time I would rather be a peasant in Vietnam than answerable to the thugs who currently rule Cambodia and who are held in power by the support of Chinese military strength. There is absolutely no reason to believe that if we provide military technology to China it will not, in turn, be made available to the other governments which China supports, such

*Mr. Cook (continued)*

as Cambodia. After all, the particular deal which the Chinese are seeking from Britain is not simply the purchase of aircraft; they are seeking an entire factory in which to manufacture those aircraft. Once that factory is created, we shall have no control over what they choose to do with the weapons which they produce in that factory.

Finally, the sophisticated weapons which we are considering, those which the Chinese seek, are very powerful instruments. It would be prudent not to sell these weapons unless the purchaser was a trusted ally or a state with which we have no fear of conflict. China clearly comes into neither category. If members will turn to the maps at the back of Sir Frederic's report, they will easily see a number of areas where we have been in conflict with China in the past and where we may well be in conflict with it in the future. In these circumstances, it would be neither wise nor prudent for us, at the outset of our new relationship with the Chinese Republic, to base it from the start on the exchange of military technology. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Grieve. He will be followed by Mr. Rubbi and Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I have a great deal of sympathy with many of the observations made to the Assembly by my colleague, Mr. Robin Cook. It is not often that we find ourselves in agreement, but on this occasion there is much in history on which his comments, I suggest, are accurate.

Nevertheless, one does not have to accept the whole of the explanatory memorandum or the possible bias of the view which has been conveyed through the explanatory memorandum, nor does one have to condone all Chinese actions of the last thirty-five years, to be persuaded of the elementary wisdom of the recommendations in Sir Frederic's report. It is to those recommendations that I wish briefly to address myself and they have, as they stand in the report — and I shall say a word in a moment about the proposed amendment — my unreserved support.

I have already spoken today of the dangerous world in which we live. My colleague Mr. Mende referred to it in some detail a few minutes ago. While we are talking about détente, we are faced with Russian expansion throughout the Indian Ocean and across the continent of Africa, with the use of Cuban troops supplied with Russian aid and equipment and with Russian arms in the Horn of Africa and in Zaïre. We are faced with an acute problem in Africa.

In those circumstances, it behoves us to look for friends wherever they may be found in the

world, to look for those who, like us, desire to achieve a lasting peace in the world and with whom we can seek fraternal and friendly relations. It would appear from recent communications and developments that in China there is such a power.

All that Sir Frederic's report at this stage — subject to the amendment, about which I shall say a word in a moment — seeks to do, as I understand it, is set out in the draft recommendation. It is to examine the rôle that China may play in maintaining global security, to encourage bilateral trade with China, to continue through the EEC to develop relations with China and to give favourable consideration to aiding China, a country which has a vast scope for development with increased industrial technology.

We should be failing in our duty to our own peoples and in our efforts to maintain the peace of the world if we did not look for precisely such friendly relations with the greatest power in the Far East. Therefore, the report of Sir Frederic has my unreserved support.

I go further. I have examined with care the amendment which has been put forward in the names of my colleagues, Mr. Handlos and Mr. Page, to "consider objectively, in accordance with already-declared French and British policy, any requests by China to purchase defence equipment". That does not go as far as to anticipate the events which Mr. Cook feared when he spoke just now; it merely calls on us to examine the possibilities. Naturally, we shall examine those possibilities with such concern as history has taught us to use, and recent history at that, the history of the past thirty years.

I am second to none — certainly not second to Mr. Cook — in my concern for the small powers of the Far East. We must approach this whole policy with caution but it contains, it seems to me, an essential rôle for the western world to play in the near future.

This is perhaps not the place in which to do it, but I do not intend to sit down without referring, with commendation, praise and admiration, to the recent action of the Belgian and French Governments and forces in Zaïre, which was instrumental in saving so many innocent European lives. Would such an action have been necessary, should we be seeing such expansion of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Africa, if there were already an advanced understanding between ourselves and this great power of the Far East, China, for the maintenance of the peace of the world? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

I now call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I request the floor on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — I have already called the next speaker, Mr. Rubbi. The point of order raised by Mr. Valleix can be taken afterwards.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we already had occasion in Committee to manifest, together with the representatives of other countries, our opposition to raising this particular subject in the Assembly, because we thought it goes beyond the regional scope of WEU's specific powers.

It has likewise been seen fit to hold the debate in the Assembly, thus creating a precedent. We therefore wish to express our opinion in this precinct too.

We start from the premiss that for European and world security, and a stable grounding of international equilibria founded on friendship and co-operation between nations, the rôle that can and should be played by the Chinese People's Republic is certainly of great importance.

The isolation in which this great country was deliberately kept for many years was the fruit of a short-sighted and blinkered policy inhibited from seeing and contemplating the newly-emerging protagonists of today's phase in world history. And on the other hand China's enforced isolation has, together with the country's own independent internal options, been one of the causes for its adopting on major international issues overt stances that could not always be shared by others and did nothing to facilitate the path to the lofty goals of disarmament, reduced tension and affirmation of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The fact that China is now opening up to the world, and vice versa, is highly significant. It can only be greeted with satisfaction by ourselves who have always hoped for it, and we are pleased to see that it has also been mooted by those who in the past did so much to impede and delay it.

A foundation of international relations based on security among states and co-operation among nations, essential prerequisites for prosecuting beyond the confines of Europe a policy of détente, demands the participation of, and a contribution from, the People's Republic of China.

Therefore we have urged and supported initiatives by our own country in that direction, and expressed a favourable appreciation of the extension of bilateral relations with China and establishment of a relationship between that great country and the EEC. We consider such relations to be a favourable fact which opens up wider vistas of friendship and co-operation. To encourage, as the draft recommendation puts it,

the development of these relations is, we think, both right and proper and therefore to be commended.

But what objectives should such relations serve? Reading Sir Frederic's report, the impression we get is that the aim he set himself and the spirit informing it are very different from our own. What he clearly hopes for is the constitution of a third bloc of forces to meet the hypothetical threat of a no less hypothetical "common foe". But can this serve the cause of international détente and the purpose of stability of equilibria which WEU ought to predicate for Western Europe? Truly, we think not. Secretary of State Stirn said yesterday, on behalf of France: "We do not need an anti-Soviet motivation in order to concern ourselves with China...". And we would add that there is no need of any new blocs. Today, as it is, the rigid policy of blocs, the mutual urge to affirm the supremacy of each, subjects coexistence to serious risks; it engenders a climate of additional tensions and distrust that make more difficult and awkward the path to agreements now more than ever necessary, and opens the way to the use of ever more massive and sophisticated armaments, and to their proliferation.

A Western Europe that truly wanted to fulfil a function of peace and progress for the peoples of this continent and of the world at large should contribute not to a worsening of relations between the existing blocs, or even devising new ones and creating more friction between individual countries, but encourage every means of stabilising relations bearing the stamp of good neighbourliness, friendship and co-operation between states and nations.

This is, as the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Forlani, also said yesterday, when he outlined in this Assembly our country's foreign policy resulting from the convergent efforts of Italy's democratic political parties, the direction we think relations between Western Europe and the People's Republic of China ought to take. With a mind turned towards promoting conditions for establishing peace, progress and independent national development, having that great country play an active part in the development now in process throughout the world, partner us in international treaties, pledge itself to furtherance of a policy of coexistence and disarmament, would be a factor of security for all, and an important contribution to the fate of world peace.

These are our reasons for expressing on this point a very different appreciation from that given in the report submitted in a personal capacity by Sir Frederic Bennett. We could take a favourable stance on the recommendation to be adopted by the Assembly provided our two amendments are accepted. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Valleix on a point of order.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — It was, in fact, on a point of order that I requested the floor, and I should like to see the thoughts we now express lead to progress and not, of course, to accusations of any kind. Indeed, such is in no way my intention.

I should first like to observe, Mr. President, that when I raised my hand just now on a point of order, you indeed did not give me the floor, and I must point out that this is not customary in our parliamentary assemblies. The fact that normal custom was not followed seems in itself to present far greater cause for concern, Ladies and Gentlemen, since these are things on which we have cause to reflect and perhaps — who knows? — grounds for making a change in our procedure.

True, the Rules of Procedure contain no clause making it obligatory to announce a vote publicly. I would nevertheless add that there are notice-boards outside on which to announce a vote and I can testify, since I was with my French colleagues on the other side of this wall, that when you were going to take the vote on the previous item in the Orders of the Day no information concerning the vote, either broadcast or visual, was conveyed to anyone in the lobbies. In my view, that is a bad method and I hope we shall all realise the fact, since it can only lead to incidents. We are involved in such an incident, Mr. President, because just now Mr. Périquier, who is present here, tried, I believe, to speak on behalf of Mr. Druon, who is absent not through any fault of his own but for the reasons of which you are aware. I do not understand why you did not allow him to defend Mr. Druon's amendment, though this is normal practice in our parliaments. I also note that our colleague, Mr. Deschamps, who asked you in good time for a chance to explain his vote, was to be invited to do so after the presentation of amendments. Although I was not present at the time, I do not believe that Mr. Deschamps was invited to present his explanation before the final vote was taken.

I think, Mr. President, that it would also have been very proper if the Committee, noticing perhaps the departure of the French Delegation just now, had pointed out that a number of members were absent and that accordingly what was to be a decision was taken without the consensus of our Assembly as a whole.

All these reasons lead me to make two remarks to you, Mr. President.

Let me say once again that an incident is never desirable in itself, and I who speak to you am the very first to deplore it. I am very

unhappy at wasting the Assembly's time over this matter, and apologise for doing so.

Why, then, should we not try to turn this incident at least to some useful purpose? For that reason, Mr. President, I would make the following suggestion: it may be that the incident we are discussing presents aspects that could be put before our Committee on Rules of Procedure, which is certainly designed to give, when needed, an opinion on difficulties of this kind. I hope, therefore, that you will agree to convene a meeting of the Presidential Committee straight away. That should go ahead with all speed, but in a way which would ensure that greater clarity and an improved method result from the incident which is now over. If you can accede to this request, I would thank you most warmly.

The PRESIDENT. — In order to shorten the proceedings, I agree that ten minutes after we close the sitting this afternoon we should have a meeting of the Presidential Committee. I have no objection to that proposal, because I wish to iron out the problems. If we agree, we can continue the debate.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I will not hide the fact, Mr. President, that I should have preferred an immediate meeting, as I reckon that the discussions should not last long. Nevertheless I have already said that the incident seemed to me to have delayed our proceedings unduly. For that reason, I believe that my colleagues, who share my concern about these matters, will agree to a meeting of the Presidential Committee on the subject this very evening — a meeting which for us is a step in the right direction. In the circumstances, the formula seems to me to be constructive and I accept it.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I too would rise on a point of order. I wish to lodge a vigorous protest about the circumstances — of which you have just been told — in which the vote was taken on the report dealing with security in the Mediterranean. For you were informed, Mr. President, of my intention to explain the reasons which had decided us to vote against this report. Now you have, if you will allow me to use the term, taken advantage of the short time that I was obliged to be absent in order to proceed to a vote which I do not hesitate to describe as hurried through with indecent haste. I consider this absolutely intolerable, and protest emphatically against such methods, which I consider completely anti-democratic.

I would ask you, Mr. President, to give the necessary instructions to ensure that the speech in which I intended to explain our decision is reproduced in the Minutes of Proceedings.

The PRESIDENT. — I shall take no further interventions. I think that we must move on.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, if I heard the interpretation correctly, you have been reproached as having taken advantage of the honourable member's absence in order to take a vote. This seems to me to be accusing our President of failing to conduct the proceedings in an objective manner, an accusation which I reject, basing my rejection on the testimony of everyone who remained present in the chamber after 3 p.m. I would ask you to refer to the Committee on Rules of Procedure or the Presidential Committee the question of whether such an accusation of abuse of office is admissible from a member of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Shall we have a roll-call? The Assembly has unanimously decided that we can continue without a roll-call. This matter has been debated and then we had the intervention by Mr. Deschamps, who wanted to make a personal declaration. The vote was called and he left. Everyone can make a declaration of a vote. The only problem is whether it should be before the vote or after. It should be before the vote, but it was after. This was my fault. He was called before the vote. We have now decided to have a Presidential Committee meeting ten minutes after we finish tonight. By then we might have the Minutes of Proceedings and we can see what happened at about 3.30 p.m.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I do not often come to the aid of the Chair, but I must do so on this occasion. You have taken the blame when it was not yours. I was here and I noticed everything that happened. The first part of Mr. Valleix's statement is 100 % correct. He and some of his colleagues went out. Your procedure was correct. A colleague asked to express his vote before the end and you said that he would be called later. You were wrong, because, although you did not fail to call him, he did not have on his earphones and misunderstood when you gave him the opportunity. During the hubbub you, Mr. President, proceeded with business and he missed the opportunity. If my colleague had had his hearing aid on, he would have understood, but we moved to the next business. You, Mr. President, are taking the blame when it is not yours.

Mr. PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Lewis. Ten minutes after the end of the sitting we shall have a meeting of the Presidential Committee in Room A.

I call Mr. Gessner, who will be followed by Mr. Péridier.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I trust that everybody in this

Assembly would agree that any constructive foreign policy must be directed towards the achievement of good, rational relations with the other countries of the world. Of course — and this too must be equally clear to everybody — the other countries must also want such relations. We trade and deal with other countries for mutual advantage, and hope that this will lead to close mutual relations, and create elements of mutual dependence. Further, it must surely improve the chances of peace in the world. It is against this background that in the last few years my country has, for example, been building up its trade with the East. We, at least, had no doubt that this was an important part of détente policy. In other words, the development of closer relations is intended to defuse or eliminate existing disputes between states. It is not intended to provoke anybody or to play any state off against another.

We know that at one time very critical voices were raised in the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless we set our course towards détente. Any attempt from outside to exert influence on us was doomed to failure from the outset. Of course, what I have said about the Warsaw Pact countries also applies — in reverse — to our relations with the People's Republic of China. We must be open to good, rational, balanced relations between states. And here too we must refuse to accept any interference.

Now in his report Sir Frederic concluded that what is needed is to modernise and strengthen the Chinese economy. I would think that this is a conclusion which can be accepted without reservation. Sir Frederic added that this presupposed a period of peace and stability. Frankly, it seems to me that there is something of a contradiction when he includes, as he evidently does, a policy of modernising the armed forces of the People's Republic of China. I cannot imagine that this would bring about the period of peace and stability of which he was just speaking. He should not therefore be surprised at the reactions expressed in this or that country in West or East.

It should be clear to all of us that there must be no question of undermining the arduous process of détente. I am quite sure that a great many western governments see in the attempt to modernise and build up the armaments of the People's Republic of China a desire to halt the process of détente that has begun.

There really can be no doubt that equipping and modernising China's armed forces will take many years. I do not think the process of détente can be carried forward during that period. Only the opposite would be likely. It seems to me inconceivable that we could achieve here in Central Europe a balanced disarmament such as we are striving to achieve at the MBFR

*Mr. Gessner (continued)*

negotiations in Vienna, while at the same time attempting to promote an arms build-up on the Soviet Union's eastern frontier. The two things are incompatible. I have a feeling that Sir Frederic would like to establish a balance of forces by further armament and not on the basis of disarmament as conceived in our report. This Assembly is after all well aware of the concept of disarmament accepted in the states of the West: a greater degree of conventional disarmament by the Warsaw Pact countries.

I believe that a step such as that proposed to us here would have fatal results. There is no question but that it would lead to a faster and more intensive arms build-up, and this would have dire consequences for us here in Central Europe. I believe that what we have here is in fact an attempt to use the arming of the People's Republic of China, as I have already said, to bring the process of détente to an end.

Many of those who wish to arm the People's Republic of China present themselves as friends of the Russian dissidents — to bring another element into the discussion. I am quite convinced that an increase in tension would have adverse consequences for people like the critics of the régime in the Soviet Union. Support for a communist régime — and the People's Republic of China is a communist régime — would be given at the expense of people who are risking their freedom, their health and even their lives in order to express their opinions.

As a social democrat I would like to state here quite openly that I am against both Russian communism and Chinese communism; and I would ask members whether they think one is better than the other. Does this Assembly realise that a heavily-armed China could one day pursue a policy like that which the Soviet Union is today pursuing in Africa and other parts of the world? Have we forgotten that at the time the United Nations branded China as the aggressor in the Korean conflict?

I must say that the policy we are being asked to follow here is extraordinarily ambiguous. Only détente offers the prospect of a secure future. Our chance lies in balanced disarmament, not in arming one of the world's major powers. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Péridier, who will be followed by Mr. Lewis and then Mr. Valleix.

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, all the incidents which occurred just now have rather upset me, so much so that I was unable to prepare my speech as I should have wished, but I think I can nevertheless state the essentials.

I shall begin by expressing the hope that, with such an important report, there may at least be clarity about the voting. Because — and I want to draw the Assembly's attention to this without the least bitterness — even if they were right from a procedural point of view and even if you, Mr. President, were right from the same point of view, it nonetheless remains true that it is not in WEU's interests to cast its votes as happened just now in a certain climate of confusion.

It does nothing to enhance WEU's authority, and contributes nothing to a report when votes are cast in such conditions. I hope, therefore, that this time, for the vote on the report concerning China, there will be complete clarity.

Reverting to my subject, I should like to point out that we, together with some of my colleagues on the General Affairs Committee, have taken the view that this report by Sir Frederic Bennett was very valuable from all points of view, even if he at times expresses some rather debatable opinions which I will not hold against him. I am not forgetting, however, that our Committee on Rules of Procedure has decided that a report is a personal document, and that only the recommendation has to represent the Committee's opinion. In consequence, we wanted this report to remain an information report. That is not impossible, Ladies and Gentlemen — and let it not be said that an information report is useless, for that is untrue. Where colleagues are well informed on certain problems outside Europe, I believe that it is in our interests to give them a hearing and there is nothing to prevent us having a discussion if need be. But to adopt a recommendation when it deals with matters outside Europe — and I would stress this point — is, it seems to me, rather to forget what was the purpose of WEU.

Allow me to remind you: WEU was set up to replace the European Defence Community, as you well know, and it was, in point of fact, created to concern itself specifically with Europe. If, then, we are now going to extend the range of problems which may be of concern to us to such problems as that of China and that of the USSR, and if a report is going to be presented that will lead us to take up a position regarding the dispute that may exist between these two distant countries, I believe we are assuming an extremely heavy responsibility, and I think we should give serious thought to the matter.

At the end of my speech I shall show that such a position can do nothing but harm to the détente which we must hope to achieve and which is, in any case, desired by many countries represented in WEU. For that reason, I consider that we must show very great caution.

It should be noted that the recommendation in its present form, which results from the battle

*Mr. Périquier (continued)*

some of us fought in the General Affairs Committee, is one that we can easily accept, since it confines itself to the relations we should have with China in the economic and scientific fields. On this aspect, I think we must all be agreed.

What causes me some disquiet, however, is the fact that Sir Frederic, whose duty it is to report on behalf of the Committee, has decided to reintroduce in the guise of amendments the two paragraphs which we considered dangerous, thus restoring the original text of the recommendation. Allow me to express my astonishment at such a procedure. I wonder whether it is quite in keeping with the rules; and even if it is, I would ask the Assembly to give the matter serious thought.

Really! The Rapporteur is in duty bound to report the Committee's opinion, and that opinion alone; it is not for him to report his own personal views. Well, the recommendation is in line with the Committee's opinion.

Sir Frederic will object that this is what he has done. True, but afterwards, in the guise of amendments which we have not discussed in Committee, he attempts to reintroduce the terms of the initial recommendation. That is a serious matter because — and here I call on the lady who presides over the Committee to bear me out — it was Sir Frederic himself who proposed to us the withdrawal of the last two paragraphs. It therefore seems to me that there is something not quite clear. Here again we have a sort of procedure which we should not accept, since that would afterwards divest the reports and amendments placed before us of all credibility.

To sum up, I believe that we must stick to the recommendation in the form put forward by the General Affairs Committee. Of course, this matter is open to argument because, naturally, when we have a recommendation which, after all is said and done, covers only scientific and economic problems, we should not be competent. We should concern ourselves solely with defence problems. It is not for us to take the place, as it were, of other international organisations — in this case, of the European Parliament, which alone is entitled to deal with economic questions.

What I say is so true that the European Parliament has in fact just approved an economic agreement with China — an event which shows that our recommendation is really pointless and need not have been added to the report. What, then, is the use of this recommendation today? If not none at all, at least not very much.

My last words will be to say that we must think seriously about the consequences that a

recommendation on which we are voting may have on the problems of détente.

We may think what we like about Helsinki and about Belgrade; we have discussed the subject at length. Even though these conferences have not been very helpful from the standpoint of détente, it is still true that we must continue our efforts to maintain and strengthen détente.

Should we then, when considering a problem like that of China and Russia, take up a position favourable to the one camp or the other? Sir Frederic's report unquestionably takes sides — in favour of China — to the point that in the amendment he is going to ask the Assembly to adopt, he even proposes that arms should be sent to that country for the defence of its independence. To defend its independence against whom? Let us be serious! In WEU we must not be thinking only about sending arms and more arms. Recently it was Turkey; now it is China. Do you believe that this is a good way of achieving détente — that détente about which we must think and about which, at all events, many countries represented here, like France, are thinking? Lastly, do you realise the situation in which we are being put? France has treaties of co-operation with the USSR, and now people come and ask us to be ready to take up a position against that country in its dispute with China! Do we know who is the responsible party in this conflict in Europe? On this we know nothing!

Such, then, are the few points I wished to make. I would simply tell you how I am going to vote: if the recommendation stands in its present form, I shall certainly vote in favour. In the unthinkable event that Sir Frederic's amendments should be added, I should, of course, vote against it, since I consider that such a recommendation coupled with these amendments would be a grave mistake if we are to arrive at the détente that we must all be hoping for.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I gave you notice that I would raise on the floor of the chamber the matter of which I had given you private notice concerning your ruling in the Chair; but, having listened to your request that I should not do so, I bow to that request.

I am now approaching my thirty-fourth consecutive year as a British member of parliament. My very first visit to an overseas country from Britain as a member of parliament was to Yugoslavia. There I had the opportunity of meeting President Tito and the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party. When I came back to Britain I was castigated and attacked by my own party, by the Conservative Party, of which

*Mr. Lewis (continued)*

Sir Frederic Bennett is a member, and by the then Labour Government for daring to go to a communist country.

I then said that, having met Marshal Tito, I sincerely believed that, whilst he was then under Russian tutelage and domination, it was my view that Tito was such a great and strong figure that once he had established himself, no one, but no one, would dictate to him. My own Foreign Office and my own government pooh-pooed and laughed that off, but subsequent events proved it to be right.

Then, over thirty years ago, I was the first western member of parliament to go to China. There I had the privilege of meeting the late Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and the then leadership of the Chinese Communist Party when they, too, were under Russian tutelage. Again, when I came back to Britain and told our then Foreign Secretary, the late Ernest Bevin, that China was a great country, that China was going ahead, that China had great leadership and would one day exert itself outside the tutelage of anyone, again I was pooh-pooed.

Again I was told that I was wrong. Again the Foreign Office misled our Foreign Secretary.

When we were in China thirty years ago, we were told that the Chinese wanted to buy £9 million worth of Leyland trucks and lorries. They were turned down because of the Battle Act of the American Administration. By the way, on the aeroplane to Moscow we were with Senator Battle, the author of the Battle Act, and with the late Senator Kefauver, a presidential candidate. We argued with them. When we were in China we argued for understanding and for an integration of our economies so that it would be virtually impossible for one country to go to war with another, because our economies would be so intertwined.

One could not now imagine the British going to war with the Americans, or a war between the Americans and Europe, because we are so intertwined. It was my view at that time that one day China would throw off the yoke of Russian imperialism and would want to assert itself. Incidentally, the first big area of unemployment in our country concerned the Leyland truck people. They could have done very well out of the Chinese order. I wonder what would have happened had they got it. There could have been an interchange of engineers, technicians and so forth, and probably China would have come towards the West at a much earlier date as a result.

Almost everything contained in Sir Frederic Bennett's report was available thirty years ago.

A British Labour Government was the first to recognise communist China, and we have recognised China ever since. In those days, Sir Frederic Bennett and his conservative friends — and, of course, the British Foreign Office — were against having anything to do with communist China. That was then the accepted policy, and it was carried out because the Chinese were under Russian tutelage.

As one of our communist friends, who has left the Assembly, said, it is strange that when a communist country is within the Russian camp it is not welcome. When it comes out, it is welcome. We are now talking of supplying aeroplanes to Romania because the Romanians are not so much under the domination of the Russians as they were originally. I welcome the understanding which has been reached. I do not welcome it so much on the question of armaments — a point made by my colleague, Mr. Robin Cook — but the fact is that in the world today, if we do not supply the armaments, someone else will.

If we could get a system whereby no armaments were supplied to third powers or third countries, or if they had to produce their own armaments, or if it were done through some international agency, I would be all for that. But, much as I should like to see no arms supplied to any country, the facts are that the Chinese claim that they want them for defence. How can we be sure that they will be used for defence? We cannot; nor can we be sure when we supply arms to any other country.

We all have short memories here. We talk about democracy and about allies. The Chinese were our bitterest enemies when they were under Russian tutelage. So were the Yugoslavs and the Romanians. Going back further, what about our German friends? They are now our allies, but we remember that at one time they had a Nazi régime. We also remember that it was the Russian communists who made a deal with Nazi Germany. In a matter of politics they forgot about the antecedents of the Nazis. There is a great deal of politics involved in these issues because of possible strategic advantage or what might suit a particular country. We sometimes forget these things.

For God's sake do not let us think that China will remain a backward country. It will not. Anyone who has had the opportunity and the pleasure of going to China will know that China will not remain backward. Even so, it is amazing to see what the Chinese are able to do without technological equipment. We went on a six weeks' tour from Peking covering the whole length of China. Opposite our hotel in Peking there was an open space. Before we left on that tour we asked for what purpose it had been reserved. We were told that they were laying the founda-

*Mr. Lewis (continued)*

tions for a new building. This was thirty years ago.

When we came back from our tour only six weeks later the building was complete and occupied. It was a hospital. They had to do it in six weeks. We were shown photographs of the construction, with hundreds of little Chinese men going backwards and forwards with their little panniers. We saw the bamboo canes used for scaffolding. The building was almost literally constructed by hand.

At that time, thirty years ago, there were 700 million or 800 million Chinese. Today the population of China has reached about 1,000 million. At least, that was the figure last night. It is probably 1,100 million by now. Once 1,100 million or 1,200 million people are harnessed with modern plant, equipment, technology and the rest, no one will be able to hold them back. There are vast acres of Chinese land which have never been geophysically surveyed. There is no knowing what wealth there may be under Chinese soil.

It is up to us to bring China into the democratic world and into line with the thinking of the western world. It is up to us to try to work together with the Chinese so that we can help them, but not at the expense of India or any other country. We want to help all these countries. When those 1,100 million people have their resources harnessed and have a progressive, outward-looking policy, the situation in the world will quickly improve.

We all realise what a little country, such as Japan, has achieved in a very short time. If we consider what Japan has done in a few years and multiply that achievement by 100, we have some idea of what is possible in China in the future. I want to see us working together with China in every possible way, because I think that that will be to the advantage and benefit of all the people in the world, irrespective of their political situation or their political economy.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Lewis.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Sir Frederic's very carefully-documented and scholarly report brings out a problem that is not only right up to date but also absolutely essential to our international relations as a whole. It clearly analyses China's motives for wishing to establish closer links with Western Europe. As Sir Frederic reminds us, these motives are economic and in many cases political. Above all, they stem from, it has to be said, China's misgivings at the growing power of the USSR

and increased presence in the Indian Ocean, the Indo-Chinese peninsula and Africa.

China, which has since Bandung considered itself bound to the third world and only envisages its own security in the context of close co-operation — the closest possible — with the developing countries of Africa and Asia, is today undoubtedly exceedingly disturbed by Moscow's political and military successes on both continents.

If we add to these considerations the frontier problems, of which Sir Frederic has given us a remarkable historical summary, we can understand that it is a natural tendency for Chinese governments — I mean governments of whatever complexion — to seek the best possible support to ward off what they call the Soviet threat.

In Chinese eyes, Europe occupies a quite essential place among the sources of support it believes it can find. According to the ideology upheld by the Chinese leaders, the countries of Western Europe constitute a second in-between world between the third world and the two superpowers. China sets itself the task of winning over this second world to contact with the third world, in order to put an end to the Soviet hegemony which it blames, often wrongly but sometimes with justification, for the conflicts which are rocking the entire world. There has recently been noted a clear change of emphasis in this analysis of the two superpowers. Today it is, obviously, the USSR which is under attack, and Western Europe is no longer being invited as it was a few years back to break away from the United States but, very much to the contrary, exhorted to join hands with America and face up to the USSR, accused of preparing a nuclear war in the near future in Europe.

Given China's present attitude, we are up against a sizable difficulty in our relations with it. On the one hand, Europe and China both have an interest in developing their political and economic relations, China for the reasons just referred to, and Europe because it cannot afford to ignore a country whose weight and influence in the world, especially in the developing world, are bound to go on growing. On the other hand, however, Europe cannot fully endorse the Chinese analyses of an unavoidable and imminent show-down between the United States and the USSR.

Perhaps one of the defects, if Sir Frederic Bennett will allow me to say so, an essential one in the report he has tabled is precisely that of to some extent glossing over this highly up-to-date difficulty. We can only look with favour on the opening of a regular dialogue between China and Europe. We can only approve continuing and extending the existing economic and commercial relations between the European Community and China.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

But we must in the end come down in favour of stepping up scientific and technological exchanges, and in that respect the report is on excellent lines. France has more than once expressed its wish to see a strong and prosperous China fully occupying its proper *de facto* place in the world. That was the reason why General de Gaulle was among the first to recognise the People's Republic of China. For that reason, too, France has actively supported China's admission to the United Nations and, more generally, its participation in the concert of nations.

On the other hand, Ladies and Gentlemen, it would be extremely dangerous, and in my view fall short of what is needful, to place our relations with China exclusively in the context of the Soviet threat, as Sir Frederic may perhaps have done at certain points and as the Chinese leaders clearly want us to do. There can be no question of taking the USSR from the rear through an offensive military alliance with China. That is certainly not the theme of our discussion. Metternich's saying, quoted by the Rapporteur, is perhaps in this particular case not daring, but hyperbolic; if we came round to that position, it would amount to rejecting détente altogether.

Détente, indeed, presupposes that we should not seek to conclude a new military pact with a state whose quarrels with the USSR take the form of periodical and happily limited armed clashes. From that standpoint, it would, in my view, be difficult to accept Sir Frederic's proposed amendment about purchases of armaments from Europe by China, without jeopardising the still precarious results of the rapprochement now under way with the eastern part of our continent. There is therefore no question of giving priority to matters of security and military capability in the relations between the countries of Western Europe and China, whatever the primary purpose of this Assembly may be. That kind of policy would have the effect of directly involving Europe in the Sino-Soviet conflict, by openly taking sides with one power against the other, in particular by building up China's potential. Europe must not align itself exclusively on the side of China or of the USSR. Its attitude can only be dictated by a clear awareness of its true priority interests, whatever the pressure and reactions to which we may be subjected by any particular highly-placed agency or in some cases embassy. We have to set our course by Europe's own interests.

It is, then, an improvement and parallel development of our relations with the two major communist powers that we must seek after, without injecting into our international relations new and serious disturbing elements arising from Europe's taking sides in Sino-Soviet clashes.

Sir Frederic's report has, thanks to his talents, the immense value of inducing us to take thought, for the first time among ourselves, on this thorny subject; but in my view it ought to have been additionally illuminated by certain priorities only amounting, I repeat, to a wish, but one to be subserved by vigilant determination, to pursue détente to the utmost possible limits.

This has to be done without any illusion, with great realism, into which there should enter the possibility of a constructive dialogue and enhanced trade with China. But it must not go any further than that, and leave itself open to be construed as provocation.

These are the lessons I think we can draw from this report, which will have allowed us to put our heads together in a most useful initial exchange of ideas. Perhaps there will be sequels to it. I believe that the terms of the report as approved by the Committee are appropriate to the situation at this time. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me say quite frankly that a chill went down my spine as I listened to some of the speeches in this debate, especially those at the beginning. For a moment I could not rid myself of the thought: do we really learn so little from history? It was the Hitler-Stalin pact that came to mind.

As regards what has been said about political relations with China, I do not hesitate to join the chorus of those who have expressed very positive reactions.

May I first make a brief point about relations between Germany and China. Germany, too, was once very much involved. In this respect the report is not quite correct. May I remind you of the Boxer uprising at the beginning of the century, the murder of the German Ambassador, the international forces under the command of a German general, Count Waldersee, and the German concession of Tsingtao.

Today the Federal Republic of Germany has removed all tension from its relations with China. Our relations are friendly. This means that in Germany too there is wide appreciation of the value attaching to good relations with China. The German policy of restricting arms exports, to which the Bundestag is fully committed, means that we do not supply weapons to non-NATO countries. The sale of helicopters to China mentioned in the report was for non-military purposes only. On this point the report is not quite correct.

*Mr. Mattick (continued)*

I would like to give a word of warning. Listening to some of the speeches in this debate, one had visions of a policy aimed at encircling the Soviet Union. The term "encirclement" played a disastrous rôle for us in Germany prior to the first and the second world wars; it had lasting and tragic effects on German policy. I must therefore warn against harbouring similar thoughts in connection with the Soviet Union.

We appreciate the fact that the Chinese support the desire for the re-establishment of German national unity. But during the present debate, particularly the speeches at the beginning, I asked myself how it was possible for the Assembly to receive the report from the British Secretary of State so calmly and even to reinforce it through the questions put. His speech clearly showed that the efforts and policy of the Alliance are directed towards achieving a further reduction in tensions and pursuing the disarmament negotiations with as much success as is possible. He also hinted that there were opportunities for further developments at both levels, SALT II and MBFR. We really ought to have asked: where does China come in? The Assembly really ought to have asked how he could paint such a picture when in fact the danger from the Soviet Union is so great that we are now seeking a way of joining China on a road which, I might almost say, leads to encirclement of the Soviet Union — the report says "the enemies of my enemies are my friends".

Let me tell you how I see the Soviet Union. I am a Berliner, have always lived in Berlin and have been through everything to which Germans have been subject at the focal points of tension with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union internally is not as secure as you seem to think. It is extremely concerned that it will not be able to reach soon enough a stage of socio-economic development which would eliminate the unrest or apathy felt at home. In a case such as that hinted at here, the Soviet Union would in my opinion proceed as follows. In order to prepare or, indeed, start a war the people and army must be provided with a picture of the enemy confronting them. I am not prepared, like the rabble rousers who are ready to exploit the situation, to help Europe towards providing the Soviet leadership with this image.

I believe that the development on which we have embarked together with the Soviet Union gives those in the Soviet Union who are not interested in stirring up trouble the chance of pursuing a policy that will doubtless be arduous and certainly subject to repeated setbacks. To disrupt this now by attempting to build up, in concert with China, a system in which we become the common enemy for the Soviet people and the

Soviet army is undoubtedly the stupidest policy one could imagine.

This in no way means that we should not be on friendly terms with China and should not help it. And some countries will assuredly sell weapons to China. We shall not. In any event, the position developed in this debate, mainly in the first three speeches, means a break with the policy of détente and a challenge to the Soviet Union.

I shall now be told that the Soviet Union is challenging us daily in Africa and Asia. Whether that is really justified or not is matter for a long debate. Even if it were really justified, the better policy would still be to draw the Soviet Union into the process of détente rather than to open the way for an arms race that in any case will not in the long run lead to peace.

I would ask you to consider this point and its implications for the recommendation. When I think of the spirit in which some people have supported the recommendation I have difficulty in voting for it myself. In any event I can only support it without reservation if the last two paragraphs are dropped. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Roberti. I should be glad if he could shorten his speech as much as possible.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I will out of respect for the Assembly keep my intervention short, having already had the floor this morning and being wishful in no way of trading upon the Assembly's forbearance.

What I have to say is simply a brief explanation of my voting intention.

I declare myself to be in complete agreement with Sir Frederic Bennett's report and draft recommendation.

However, out of respect too for the political party I represent — the Italian democratic right — I wish to exclude from such agreement any ideological value judgment whatsoever, as well as any historical and political appreciation of the present régime in China.

On the other hand, my agreement is based on a strict consideration of political strategy. Today China fears military and political pressure from Russia.

We Europeans are in the same boat. I think that the Chinese have no intention or possibility of threatening Russia militarily. Just as no country in Europe or the West has certainly any intention of aggressing the countries of the Soviet Union.

Hence a similar defensive urge against the flooding tide of Russian imperialism naturally

*Mr. Roberti (continued)*

brings together the interests of Western Europe and those of communist China.

I think Sir Frederic's report accurately circumscribed this objective situation, making a clear distinction between ideological concepts and judgments, and the genuine needs, of political realism.

Allow me one last comment. The USSR's sharp and exceptional reaction to this initiative proves that the strengthening of China is a valid deterrent against the Russian threat, a deterrent that helps to safeguard peace and Europe's defence.

For this reason too, then, we should be in favour of the conclusions of Sir Frederic's report and draft recommendation. I do not think, as was argued by several previous speakers, that this goes beyond the aims and powers of this Assembly, whose specific task is to watch over Europe's defence, and both report and recommendation are perfectly in place in the framework and interests of Western Europe's defence.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Druon on a point of order.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — I rise on a point of order. At the end of the morning, I was officially informed that my amendments to the report on security in the Mediterranean would come up for discussion at about 5 p.m. That is what I was told. I accordingly organised my day so as to be present at 5 p.m. I want to place on record that I was here even before that time.

The same applies to my colleague Mr. Jager who had agreed to move Mr. Ferretti's amendment for him as he was urgently called away from Paris.

Now the Orders of the Day have apparently either been changed or reshuffled so that it would be impossible for those who had tabled amendments to move them. I thank the members of the French Delegation who were present for having raised the question and voiced a protest.

I personally hope that the Presidential Committee, which has been convened, will rectify the deviation, not to say error, for otherwise we should have to draw the necessary consequences and conclusions. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — This problem has already been discussed here. I have informed the Assembly that at the end of this sitting the Presidential Committee will deal with it. It was tackled here before Mr. Druon arrived. We discussed it for twenty minutes or so.

In the debate, I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). — All of us in my view owe a debt of gratitude to the General Affairs Committee and to Sir Frederic Bennett for a contemporary history lesson of truly scholarly classification, tracing changes in Chinese thinking in recent years and reasons for those changes. In fact, I found the report so compelling that I felt the argument used by my colleague Mr. Lewis fell to the ground, because situations do not stay like a fly in amber for ever. Changes happen and changes must be noted.

I find that the report is a real help to students of global defence trends and intentions. I agree with the report and the amendments except in one particular. In purist terms it is not correct to say that détente is another word for appeasement. Appeasement means giving in to a bully, usually because one thinks that he is making his very last demand, whereas the very act of giving in to a bully ensures continuing demands, so appeasement can never work. Détente, on the other hand, means de-escalation of military potential, which would work if one could trust partners to abide not only by the word but by the letter of the agreement. Of course, we know that such trust has already been broken by Soviet Russia, so the détente of Helsinki is as useless as the appeasement of Munich, but not for the same reasons.

Détente is a dishonoured word, particularly since the trial and imprisonment of Yuri Orlov. Moreover, this dishonour has spread to my own and all other nations which have so signally failed to condemn Russia, save in the mildest terms, for the treatment of Orlov. There has been the squeak of a sick mouse when there ought to have been the roar of a chorus of outraged nations.

Détente means — to misquote Alice in Wonderland — exactly what the Russians choose it to mean. We in the West would count the blatant involvement in Africa as contrary to the spirit of Helsinki. The Russians do not. How can we have a meaningful treaty with a country when the words used mean different things to different signatories?

I would tell my colleague, Mr. Watkinson, that the same goes for MBFR, as the Secretary of State implied in his answer this morning.

I am extremely apprehensive for the future. Sir Frederic Bennett has given an assessment of the armed might of the Soviet Union which is alarming enough, though I am not sure that even this tells the whole story. For instance, what about the build-up of merchant ships by the Soviet Union, ships which I am assured are faster and more powerful than any other merchant ships have yet been? Why is this so? Russia, after all, has only 2% of world trade.

*Mrs. Knight (continued)*

It surely does not need such a merchant fleet. It is then because it is busy undercutting the freight rates of the rest of the world, or may it be, as an admiral of the British fleet said about two weeks ago, that this fleet could be used for mine-laying? Either way, there is reason for us to be concerned.

Putting Sir Frederic's figures in a different way, as I read it, the USSR has one-third of a million more men, armed, trained and ready for action, eight times the number of submarines and seventeen times the number of tanks that Hitler had in 1939 when war was declared, plus weapons like the SS-20 in the so-called grey area to which the report makes no reference but which I feel the Assembly should note, because these, of course, are outside the SALT calculations. Nevertheless, they exist and, although they may be outside SALT because they cannot attack American cities, I care very greatly about the potential of attack of European cities. I therefore suggest that the SS-20 has a place in Sir Frederic's figures.

All history shows that a force like this is not built up as a jolly game. It is built up for defence purposes to preserve a balance of power — and, having read the report several times, I accept what it says; I believe that the Chinese build-up is in that context — or for war, or to force weaker nations to capitulate. There is no other possible meaning of the build-up of such strength save in those three contexts.

That again is as in 1939, when Hitler told the world exactly what he intended. He had said that he intended either war or that the strength he was building up should involve capitulation of weaker nations. But repeatedly Soviet Russia has said exactly the same thing: it has said this again and again and again.

Although I would not wish to draw too much of a parallel between now and 1939, although the situation is different — there would be no breathing space this time — there are similarities which I think we should read and understand. China certainly knows this, to judge by the report, and has calculated bearing in mind that these things are facts. The report makes this clear.

Finally, apart from commenting on the words which I believe sum up the attitude of the report throughout — “the enemies of my enemies are my friends” — I suggest that our efforts in WEU might well be directed towards ensuring that there is forged a much stronger link between the EEC and NATO. In fact, I am not sure that there is a link of any force at all. We have such a link in WEU and we should use all our

influence to make sure that the tie between NATO and the EEC is strong and effective.

Sir Frederic Bennett said this afternoon that China wishes to see a strong and effective Europe. I accept that. I also submit that the development I have outlined is one important way of improving both our strength and our effectiveness, which fall lamentably short at the moment. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Hardy. He will be followed by Mr. Whitehead and then by Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — As the report suggests, China may have slept during the Napoleonic period and merely stirred feebly during the years of abuse which followed but the state of torpor ended when the long march heralded the giant's awakening. Today China displays its alert determination in its present social order. The report recognises that awakening and it may be that this recognition is the principal characteristic of this report, a recognition which includes an understanding that the People's Republic is determined to achieve economic growth.

The preamble to the recommendation and the recommendation itself are very brief. Far be it from me to complain about that, but I hope no one will suggest that this notable brevity will create an appearance of inadequacy justifying a further addition. The addition which we have to decide later today is best not included. Any question of sales of arms to the republic should be based on objective considerations and I suggest we cannot give objective considerations in the rather hasty way which a decision in this debate would involve. I hope, therefore, that there will be no embarrassment caused to any member state by any hasty decision today.

It is clear in this report that the suspicious antagonism and anxiety which mark China's attitude towards the Soviet Union are sometimes seen as providing a significant contribution to the maintenance of international security. That may be true, but it may be also that this military interest is not quite so reassuring as some imagine. Mr. Robin Cook talked of rewriting history but, that apart, armed hostility, deep national anxiety and severe suspicion may not be the best source by which world peace may be engendered. Certainly, this may be so if every well-studied step to reduce East-West tension is deplored by China.

To be fair, however, the response of the Euro-communists seemed to be particularly illogical. This reminds me of a recent speech, perhaps justified, by a very elderly labour peer in the House of Lords who asked why, if Russia is not seriously our potential assailant, we are spend-

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

ing the very large sums of money which we are currently devoting to defence expenditure. In Britain we use the word "blimp" for an aggressive partisan. A blimp is a blimp, even if it is oriental, or, with respect to Mrs. Knight, fashionably and gracefully clad in female attire.

We may think it helpful that the report shows that China's tradition is one of patience. However, we could question whether the patience of a hibernand is certain to be maintained given the new alert concern that China reveals today.

I do not wish to be too critical of the report, because it is substantially interesting. Its consideration of China's past is fascinating and its comment upon its present is acceptable.

If there is inadequacy it may be in regard to its assessment of the future, which may be a little meagre, even bearing in mind the predominantly defence concern involved in the report.

There is a reference to, and there may be reassurance from the assumption, that the improvement of living standards in China may help to build both political relationships and the development of commercial opportunity which may be especially attractive to some individuals as well as to certain member states. Perhaps we could have heard a little more about that. Perhaps we could have had rather more concern for these matters and especially for the social and political effect of China's emergence and growth. China's international participation means markedly more than relevance to East-West security relationships and markedly more than the growth of commercial opportunity. The resources and possibly the traditional wisdom of China are of greater importance than that.

This potential might eventually influence international affairs in a direction and to an extent which the report does not appear to contemplate. There is a possibility of increased influence, which could mean the development of greater economic activity as well as military activity but it may also lead to a more vigorous and meaningful North-South dialogue. Especially if the West does not take its opportunities, China's economic regeneration could be heavily based upon a Sino-Japanese commercial and political relationship, the implications of which could be of immense significance and challenge before many years pass.

Perhaps, though, China's greatest influence may be exercised not from political relationships, military relevance, or commercial opportunity, but from the nature of China's society. I do not expect that western people will ever emulate the same intensive social unity displayed by China; certainly the single-mindedness of conduct and

the monotony of dress which apply there are scarcely likely to be accepted by our electors. But perhaps out of the achievement of a unified order may come in the long term the motive to challenge within our own societies and something of a response to the commercialised triviality of our own civilisation.

I suspect that some of those who hope that China will become open to every business interest in the West are likely to be very disappointed. Chinese concern and involvement may be a trifle more selective than ours. As I have suggested, the report may not have gone as far as it might have done. No doubt future deliberations will take our assessments further, and that would be desirable; but I am pleased that we have had this debate and I hope that we shall soon have another. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Whitehead.

As he is not present, I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the short time allotted to us in this debate does not allow us to develop as we should like our ideas on strengthening friendship and economic co-operation with China.

It has to be said in this Assembly where so many politicians have stood out against recognising the People's Republic of China, it is being borne in upon us that there are a great many ulterior motives behind this debate.

We are disturbed to see the most bellicose and conservative elements of this Assembly advocating the sale of arms to China. These conservatives' policy vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China resolutely turns its back on peace, détente and the peaceful settlement of conflicts between states.

World peace and security cannot be assured by alliances of different kinds. Contributing to peace means rejecting the enlargement and reinforcement of military blocs and refusing to interfere in other states' internal affairs. We are opposed to those aggressive elements in NATO which seek to enlarge its sphere of activity to Asia and Africa. Our anxiety is confirmed by what we read nowadays in the international press. Some newspapers openly admit what they are aiming at: to exacerbate differences between states, until there is a very serious danger overhanging world peace.

We, the French communists are fighting in this Assembly, as everywhere else, for disarmament, security and co-operation. We condemn the policy of the hegemony of blocs and intervention in the internal affairs of states, and we claim the right of peoples to do what they like with

*Mr. Boucheny (continued)*

themselves and their economic wealth. We faithfully support the principle of peaceful coexistence between states and the passionate search for an end to discord between states and peoples, each state, large or small, having the same rights.

We affirm our friendship with the great Chinese people, who, we believe, can make a considerable contribution to peace. We would like to see an expansion of economic and cultural relations with China. We shall support any initiative which will allow the Chinese people to gain access to advanced technologies in order to develop their industries and make China a great modern country capable of providing for its people the riches it needs for its well-being. We shall therefore vote against the document tabled, because it moves in the opposite direction, urges the People's Republic of China to play an interventionist rôle, runs counter to world détente and constitutes an element of political aggression.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Margue. He will be followed by Mr. Schwencke and Mr. Urwin.

Mr. MARGUE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I oppose the draft recommendation submitted to us by the General Affairs Committee, but not for the same reasons as the previous speaker. As a democrat and a christian I am deeply grieved to see that a good many members of this Assembly want us to vote for a document that would have us develop trade with the communist régime at present governing mainland China, to meet its technological requirements and, judging by some draft amendments, even to supply it with arms.

I deplore this because I get the impression that we are incapable of recognising our past mistakes and of learning from history. We are asked in the draft recommendation to take joint action to develop trade between Europe and China, it being well understood that what is meant is mainland China, at present controlled by a communist régime, and to look with favour on requests by the latter in respect of industrial technology.

Have we learned nothing, then, from the mistakes we made in our relations with Soviet Russia? We complied with Soviet Russia's requests, agreed to give it technological assistance and, at the same time as the Russian communists were developing their heavy industry and armaments, we supplied them with factories for consumer goods, for example car factories. What has been the consequence? Whereas Soviet citizens find it just as difficult as before to afford a car, here in Europe we are being

sold Ladas, which are Fiats, but cut-price and therefore competitive Fiats, and the European consumer-goods industry is not allowed any more than it was before to supply its products to the Soviet consumer, who still has no means of buying a pair of nylon stockings!

Now we are scared stiff when we see that Soviet armaments are such that we no longer believe we are able to match them from our own defence resources or those of America, and so we suddenly have a machiavellian inspiration; we will try to push China into war with Soviet Russia, and believe that in this way we shall prevent the Russians from expanding to Western Europe! The Russian communists and the Chinese communists will never afford us the satisfaction of waging war on each other and gobbling each other up for the sake of Western Europe. The Chinese communists will not attack the Russians because they know that they are militarily inferior, nor will the Russians attack the Chinese because they know that in spite of their superiority in armaments they will never succeed in becoming masters of the immense land-mass which constitutes China. They know they will be bogged down in China in spite of all their military successes, just as Hitler was bogged down in Russia, and Napoleon before him.

Marxists and Leninists will continue between themselves as enemy brothers and rivals on the international chessboard; they will continue to cock a snook at one another and make war through third parties, such as Cambodia and Vietnam. The USSR and China will never go to war against each other.

We are being asked to supply arms to the Chinese communist régime. What is it going to do with them? It will not attack Russia. It will not defend itself against Russia because Russia will not attack it. It will use these arms, in the first place, to conquer Taiwan and the remaining part of China which is still under a régime which has so far successfully resisted a communist take-over. Do we in this Assembly want the communists to conquer Taiwan? If we do not, we ought not to supply them with arms. It is not only a question of Taiwan; there are the Philippines, there is Burma, there is Thailand, there is Indonesia, there is even Vietnam. Vietnam is not a good place to live in but life there is probably a bite more bearable than on Cambodian territory. Do we really wish to support the Chinese communist régime by means of armaments supplied by Britain or other European countries, and strengthen its imperialism in East Asia?

The only reason why the Chinese communists have not been able to upset world peace in recent times is because they are economically underdeveloped, and we are being asked to help

*Mr. Margue (continued)*

them out! Have we forgotten the rôle they played in the Korean war? We are being told here that communist China is today an important factor in maintaining world peace and security. I wish it were so, but I simply do not believe it.

The Gospels bid us love our enemies and pray for those that persecute us, but we are not asked to arm the persecutors so that they can persecute our brothers all the better. In communist China all religions are ruthlessly persecuted to a degree unequalled in any other country in the world — with the possible exception of Germany.

Other dictator régimes are outlawed by humanity. We are sent broadsheets against Pinochet in Chile, against the régime in Argentina, and we are told how these régimes trample human rights underfoot, torture their political opponents, and it is unfortunately quite true. But are we forgetting that communist China, a world camp of political assassination, far outstrips any Hitler?

Do we sometimes think about preserving a certain logic in our attitudes? Yesterday a Minister told the Assembly that he scrupulously observed the embargo against South Africa. In South Africa there is racial discrimination against the coloureds, and only whites have any rights. In China there is no discrimination, because as slaves they are all equal. But I think if everybody here were faced with the painful necessity of choosing between the lot of a black in South Africa and that of an inhabitant of mainland China, they would all choose South Africa.

Mr. President, let us be a bit logical with ourselves: the prince of the devils does not cast out devils. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is unquestionably a debate of great moment both in the history of Western European Union and for the parliaments represented here. The passionate speech just made by Mr. Margue, like that of Mr. Mattick from Berlin, makes it clear that the debate is momentous. The speeches made by those who on the contrary unflinchingly support the sale of arms to China show even more clearly just how momentous it is.

Not only Mr. Mattick, but many other members too will have felt as I did. We broke out in a cold sweat because we felt that a set of strategic considerations was being assembled in which the elements did not fit together, indeed that certain

speakers are trying to re-enact a piece of unhappy German and European history without having learnt anything from it. The world cannot be divided into what we define as "good" and as "evil".

I hold this to be a momentous hour because we are discussing in this Assembly a report that is inspired more by an evil spirit of enmity than by a good spirit of friendship. Someone has even brought out the adage that anyone who is my enemies' enemy is my friend. What I would call the evil spirit of the report is out of place here. Because of objections raised in Committee, it is not, it is true, to be seen in this crass form in the draft recommendation.

Given the wide cleavage between the report and the recommendation, I imagine I am not the only member who speaks up wholeheartedly for better relations with China, political as well as economic, but who none the less sees the need for clear limits to what is done in this direction if it upsets the process of political détente, which we all support.

Listening to some contributions to the debate one got the impression that we were actually discussing the admission of an eighth member to WEU. That of all people the conservatives should be treating the People's Republic of China with such respect in the debate seems to me a little curious. Joking apart, the facts are bitter enough. We in this Assembly simply cannot allow the growth of a tendency to regard any means as justified provided they help the enemies of our enemies to fight better against the common enemies. We cannot place them in a situation in which the common enemies react in turn. I do not need to repeat what my colleague, Mr. Gessner, has put so convincingly and so clearly, namely, that we as Western European Union cannot but be interested in the continuation of détente. We must rigorously reject anything that runs contrary to this interest.

Now, although the report is certainly a meritorious and diligent piece of work, written with a great deal of commitment, not everything which it presents as fact is actually correct. I would mention just a few points picked up by Sino-logists in the Federal Republic. For example, the manner in which the Rapporteur presents the connection between foreign trade policy and export policy — I am referring to paragraph 41 — is wrong. Not until 1977 did the growth rate of China's foreign trade — estimated as being at best 12% — come near to the 14% growth rate achieved by industry; but it has not in the end overtaken it. Prior to that the rate had remained constant, and in 1976 the volume of imports actually dropped. Credit policy cannot therefore be said to be the cause of the expansion in foreign trade in recent years. It is only now that there are signs of greater flexibility.

*Mr. Schwencke (continued)*

I would like to make one more point — of greater political importance — concerning paragraphs 6 and 66 of the report. It is not true that Peking is insisting on a large-scale return of territories lost through the “unequal treaties”. Experts who have followed developments in this part of the world, and are better acquainted with Chinese policy than a number of people in this Assembly, sum up the position as follows: the People’s Republic of China insists, as a matter of principle, on recognition of the fact that the historical treaties were “unequal”. On this it bases a claim for renegotiation of frontiers, but no claim for a large-scale return of territories.

Mr. President, when a debate like this is drawing to a close it is surely important to acknowledge the changes that it has brought about in one’s way of thinking. I have learned a great deal. In particular, many relationships have become clearer to me. I would like to say quite bluntly before this Assembly that I, as a democratic socialist, cannot understand why not a few of our conservative colleagues, on whose commitment to democracy I would never wish to cast any doubt, seem to be moving thoughtlessly in a dangerous direction. This can only harm us all. I can do no more than issue an urgent warning. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I take great pleasure in joining in what has been described as a somewhat historic debate for this Assembly. My interest in the debate has considerably quickened because of my membership of the General Affairs Committee. I readily recall the intensive debate which we had in that Committee on the presentation of Sir Frederic Bennett’s first report and his first recommendations. I think it is a tribute to the good sense and the statesmanship of Sir Frederic Bennett that he acquiesced in the quite vociferous request presented to him by members of the Committee to accept considerable amendments to the recommendations and the preamble.

I have listened with a great deal of interest to the debate since the very beginning, when Sir Frederic Bennett presented his statement. I am, to say the least, a bit intrigued by the various attitudes which have been demonstrated towards the report.

One feature of quite considerable importance that has perhaps been overlooked is the fact that China is now under new leadership, although, perhaps regrettably, not under a new political régime. Nevertheless, the determination of the Chinese has been very firmly expressed in regard to becoming a modern industrialised nation. We

have been told in no uncertain terms that it is the intention of the Chinese to become a front-rank power. They are presented with a very formidable task, in that before they can dream of achieving that status they have to undertake a very extensive — and, indeed, intensive — modernisation of their industry, of agriculture, of science, of technology, and, not least important, of national defence.

The Chinese have placed great emphasis on foreign trade in order to achieve the desired level of economic development, including advanced technology. I do not find it at all surprising to learn that the Chinese regard for Western Europe as a source for high technology is apparent in their economic planning.

My belief in the good intentions of the Chinese nation is partly founded on the recent trade agreement between China and the EEC. This is a further indication of its strong developing belief in a strong united Europe.

I also welcome the first ever active participation by a Chinese Foreign Minister in a United Nations disarmament conference. This epitomises a new attitude by the Chinese, because if there is one thing that they need above all else, it is to ensure that eventually, in the not too distant future, they arrive at a firm, defined economic plateau. One prerequisite to that is a long period of peace. That is essential to the economic aspirations of all countries.

In that connection I am sure that the Chinese do not welcome the dispositioning of one million troops along their border. That in itself constitutes a positive threat to their aspirations for an undisturbed peace.

Improved relations with China, for Europe or any individual country in Europe, does not of necessity mean forfeiting friendly relations with other countries. Some contributors to the debate have indicated that developing friendships and trading relationships with China could mean that we are expressing strong opposition to other countries and, more especially, to the Soviet Union. It is true that a closer association between Europe or any constituent member of the family of Europe with China on military affairs contains wider implications and bears closer investigation.

My esteemed colleague and friend, Mr. Robin Cook, gave a constructive historical survey of China’s history. My equally good friend, Mr. Périquier, posed the question whether the sale of arms to any country is the best method of achieving détente. Another colleague made a similar reference to endangering harmony, or throwing a spanner in the works of détente.

I have a firm and strong belief in the principle of détente but I wish that the word had come into

*Mr. Urwin (continued)*

use earlier. I am not speaking on behalf of my government or of the Socialist Group in Western European Union. I speak for myself.

Since 1945 I have had great hopes of the impact that the Soviet Union could have not only on the peace and future security of Europe but on the economic development of Europe and the world. I have been disappointed in the events. There is a long catalogue of disasters so far as Russia and Eastern Europe are concerned.

I am more than surprised at the antagonism that has been mounted by the Soviet Government in the last few days merely because of the knowledge, conveyed to them by whatever source, that this document was to be debated here this week. The Russians must take stock of their own activities if they are to be regarded as having any credibility in the sphere of détente. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Cruz Roseta, an observer from Portugal.

Mr. CRUZ ROSETA (*Observer from Portugal*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, thank you for allowing me to take the floor in this debate although I am only an observer. I shall, in any case, be very brief.

As a member of the Portuguese Parliament I must remind the Assembly that my country was the first of all the European states to establish relations with China. These relations do not date from the eighteenth or nineteenth century but go right back to the Ming dynasty in the first half of the sixteenth century. And for centuries the two countries maintained friendly relations in trade, cultural and religious, and even already certain scientific, exchanges.

Portugal had no part in the subsequent seizing of privileged trading positions by force. I am glad that, in discussing this kind of relations, Sir Frederic Bennett treated Macao as an exceptional case. Macao was a peaceful settlement from the sixteenth century on. On the other hand, I am sorry that his very interesting report failed to mention those Europeans who, well before Napoleon's day, wrote about China and worked with the Chinese people: the Portuguese.

Strangely enough, and despite the very good relations, particularly trade relations, with Macao, which the Portuguese constitution merely considers to be a territory under Portuguese administration, Portugal still has no diplomatic relations with China, notwithstanding also the numerous delegations of all kinds that have already visited that great country, and in which I myself have already had the opportunity to participate.

Of course, the three largest Portuguese parties wish for the establishment of such relations, whether they are in the government or, as my own party, in opposition. I think that it was only the serious events in Portugal in 1975 that have delayed their establishment. I wish to tell you therefore that my party is very much in favour of anything that can bring the European countries and China closer together at a time when the latter is being given its rightful place in the international community, a place more consonant with its dimensions, including the size of its population. The draft recommendation in the report clearly points in this direction.

In conclusion, may I congratulate you all most warmly for not having given in to the Soviet pressure reported in the press, even in Portugal, for the paper to be withdrawn from the agenda of this session. I believe that our peaceful relations with other countries of the world, particularly in trade and technology, are no business of the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Whitehead. He will be followed by Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. De Poi and Mr. Faulds. Then we shall hear the Rapporteur and the Chairman.

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — I apologise for not being here when called earlier. I shall not detain the Assembly for too long.

I believe that a visiting delegation asked a Chinese statesman for an analysis of foreign affairs. He was asked what were the lessons of the French revolution from the Chinese point of view. He replied "It is too early to tell". We should turn that remark back upon the Chinese revolution and, if asked what are the lessons from the Chinese revolution, say "It is too early to tell".

It is too early to anticipate the future development of Chinese society and Sino-Soviet relations to the extent that we can align ourselves firmly on one side or another. That is my main reservation about Sir Frederic Bennett's report, upon which otherwise I congratulate him.

I want to know what is its motivation. It seems to me a report written very much from the Chinese point of view, as Sir Frederic has said. In this Assembly I think we want to have reports which give our analysis, as filtered through the Committees of the Assembly, of the great issues of foreign policy. A report which is so cast in the minds of the present Chinese leadership seems to me to that extent to be a little deficient. When we see the remarks on détente in paragraph 102 of the report which Sir Frederic says are his own views and the

*Mr. Whitehead (continued)*

views of the Chinese, I think we see the limitations of this approach.

Détente as seen from Peking is bound to be an exercise from which the Chinese cannot profit. That does not mean that détente as seen from the West, from Paris or London, and indeed from the East, as seen from Moscow, is an exercise from which we cannot profit. Therefore, I should not like the report to be seen as a simple exercise in anti-Soviet polemic, and I am sure that Sir Frederic did not intend it in that way.

We have to be careful, because to my mind this illustrates two dangers of the report. First, it will arouse expectations, for the degree to which we can follow the principle that your enemy's enemy is your friend can lead into very dangerous paths. I understand the hope of those who live in Eastern Europe, in what Sir Frederic in the report calls the enslaved nations, that the Chinese might somehow be summoned up as a spectre to exorcise the Russian menace.

The Czechs have a sad little joke that if a Czech is visited by the good fairy and asked which three wishes he wants fulfilled, he will say his first wish is to have the Chinese army in full battle order march to the Czech-Russian frontier and march back again; if he has a second wish, it will be the same; and if he has a third wish it will be the same, because this is the only way in which he can see the Chinese fighting their way across Russia six times over. That may be understandable from the point of view of those who live in Eastern Europe and who object to the crushing of their liberties by the Soviet Union.

However, I believe that there are dangers in our treating the report as one which increases the paranoia of the Soviet Union and its fear of encirclement and, as cast in a tone which also "appeases" the Chinese, because it makes no critical comment whatsoever about Chinese foreign policy over the last twenty-five years. If we look at Chinese actions in Tibet which are referred to in the report, at some of the clashes which have gone on elsewhere with India, and at their support more recently of the present régime in Cambodia, as Mr. Cook mentioned, we see things that should be criticised and things that I believe have more of a place in the report than the rather bland and emollient language which has been used here — "restoration of historic legitimacy", or whatever it is that the report says about Tibet. That seems to me very much like the language used by some people about Hitler's Germany in the thirties. "After all, they are going into their own back yard" is what some of our diplomats said at that time.

That does not seem to me a very correct approach, because it reveals the main weakness of standing so far back from Chinese society that one is able to see no more than the towering figures of the leadership and their world view. There is the danger that we ignore the current evolution of Chinese society.

It is perfectly possible to take the view that the Chinese, because of their line in world affairs, are themselves people who should now be courted. This is a view put very strongly in President Nixon's memoirs, which have just been published. He became obsessed with his relations with the Chinese. But it is quite clear, even in those memoirs, what the Chinese were seeking. They were seeking to frustrate any attempt at closer relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It would be dangerous if we took that path, because what we must surely want in the world now is not merely closer relations between ourselves and the enigma that is red China today but also closer relations between all the superpowers in the world, including ourselves and the Soviet Union. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — I always seize the opportunity to speak Dutch in an international gathering. If I do not do so now, but try to say what I have to say in English, it is in order to facilitate discussion with the Rapporteur.

(*The speaker continued in English*)

The report before us is a remarkable one not only because of the subject but because of the way it has been treated. It is very comprehensive, packed with facts, and it reads almost like a good novel, giving a world-wide view. At the same time, it is even reminiscent of a British, not to say a European, Sinological tradition. It is a very interesting report for which the Rapporteur deserves congratulations. It provokes discussion and that, too, can be good.

The time available is too short to go into all the many aspects in depth. I can agree with many of the things that Sir Frederic has said. However, not having had the opportunity to participate in the debate and vote in the Committee, I should like to make some general but critical remarks.

First, I missed something in the report which in my view is not unimportant. Among other things, the report depicts the framework of relations between China and a number of its ASEAN neighbours — Japan, Indo-China, India and Pakistan. But nowhere are the Asian countries of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines mentioned, some of which have important Chinese minorities. Nor is ASEAN as

*Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)*

a whole mentioned. Yet the relations with ASEAN as such could be important for the rôle that China will play in the future and vice versa.

Secondly, as I have already said, I can agree with many things in the report, even with part of the conclusion, but not with one general implication of the conclusions in which I read too much of an identification with the position, views and aims of the Chinese People's Republic. I say this although I am and have always been in favour of a better understanding of China and its peoples and improving relations with that big country — a future world power in its own right. Therefore, our relationship with China in my opinion should not depend exclusively on our relations with the Soviet Union.

That brings me to the draft recommendation. I can agree with the first, third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble, but not with the second, not because I want to be going soft on western defence or even to preach appeasement; on the contrary, I, too, reject Soviet intervention in connection with this report. I cannot agree because I read in that second paragraph too much of a total identification of position, views and aims of Western Europe and China which in my opinion are not identical. Therefore, I should have preferred that preambular paragraph to be deleted.

As to the three operative paragraphs, while I agree with these I would say in connection with the second paragraph that it is very important, as the paragraph says, that our governments concert their approach, especially within the framework of the EEC, with a view to increasing trade between Europe and China. I also believe that we have to bear in mind the experience we have had in our trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding a common trade policy agreed among the nine EEC members, the rivalry among the Nine in concluding treaties of economic and technical co-operation has had a tendency to undermine that vital common trade policy.

Secondly, big credits have led to the debts of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union I have mentioned totalling many billions of dollars.

Thirdly, we have to bear in mind our obligations — financial and commercial as well as technological — to those many millions of poor people in the developing countries, in the rest of Asia, in Africa and in Latin America, thereby realising that our possibilities, our potential, are restricted also. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, there would be a lot of things to say about Sir Frederic Bennett's report, and many of them were said in this afternoon's wide-ranging debate. All I want is to add a small footnote, quite apart from the substance of the report and some shadows cast by it; it had the undoubted merit of confronting public opinion with a big problem in which as politicians and countries of Western Europe we cannot fail to feel concerned.

But I say this without any gloating, or attempt to say that what I may term a Bismarckian strategy of Western Europe could take precedence over the genuine needs of détente in Europe, through which we are given a possibility of increasing the desire for peace, and the appeal to Europe's peoples from other peace-loving nations seeking after freedom and growth. Nor do I underestimate, moreover, the diversity of the systems we wish to compare: the diversity of a system that undoubtedly does not correspond to the concept of freedom or pluralism, to the type of culture that has evolved in Western Europe, in respect of which, while understanding as we ought a different model of development, we are bound to notice that it does form part of a communist world in which we now observe profound contradictions but which is still a major problem.

We in Italy also have relations with the communists. But we certainly have to face the problem of communism. I believe it is not only a matter of having a pragmatic relation, but we must truly face up to the complexity of a strategy towards which even the Italian communists themselves often have difficulties of definition and stance.

Therefore beyond any uncalled for gloating on the subject, we must acknowledge that we are opening a new chapter in the relations of our West European peoples with a country, a sub-continent which has in fact till now shown the utmost understanding for the development of the European Community, for the unity of the peoples of Europe.

We have no wish to repulse proper relations between West European states and East European states, and most certainly none to depreciate the economic significance that relations between the Economic Community and COMECON may have in future.

We simply mean that there ought not to be in respect of Europe any veto, by whatever world power, on relations it wishes to maintain not in any warlike spirit but one of peace, with any existing reality in the world. When a time comes for other countries, the Soviet Union itself, to evince the same objective will as China to strengthen specific bonds and the growth of

*Mr. De Poi (continued)*

Western Europe, we shall certainly not reject the offer. But until today the traditional great powers, and often Soviet Russia in particular, have shown some reluctance and reservations. The spirit of this report, of this new relationship between Europe and China, is specifically that of transcending blocs and creating a new multipluralism. Therefore, precisely in order to strengthen peace and not to make ready for war, we wish to place an interpretation on this relationship, and record a vote in favour of what I think signifies not a fresh tension but an effective search for the *détente* which we, and beyond a doubt all other men of good will throughout the world, seek after. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Faulds.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — As the last speaker in the debate, I have really only two alternatives.

The PRESIDENT. — There is one more speaker.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — In that case I shall not use the first, which is to withdraw my right to speak, as someone is to speak after me, but I shall try to convey my speech in telegraphese, because this report of Sir Frederic Bennett raises so many matters that one would like to make a much longer speech than one is able to make. It is an excellent report particularly in its historical survey of developments between the Soviet Union and China, and is no less valuable in its assessment of how the present Sino-Soviet situation developed. I must make it quite clear to my colleagues, who may not be too pleased about it, that I intend to vote for the recommendation. This is an excellent report, and I agree with the conclusions of Sir Frederic Bennett.

It has long been a mistake of the western nations to see communism largely as a monolithic world religion. If anything has disproved that theory, it is the attitude which China has developed over the last few years. In reality, of course, the national interests of the communist countries dictate national reactions, as happens in the West; it is the normal way in which a country's interests should be asserted.

I believe that China's awareness of its need for a different development stems from a number of very important factors. There is, as the report shows, a long history of Russian aggrandisement at the expense of China. No country with the national pride of China is going to forget that, no matter how many hundreds of years ago such aggrandisement may have taken place.

Secondly, when I was in China three or four years ago, practically every intelligent and certainly every political Chinese I met deeply resented Russia's withdrawal of economic assistance in 1960, when, because China had begun to reassert a degree of independence of attitude, Russia decided that the way to fix China was to withdraw that economic assistance.

I come now to the most important reason for China's different development as a communist country. One has to remember that the Chinese have a particularly strong feeling for their historic superiority — and they do not disguise it — as one of the oldest civilisations in the world.

I agree with Sir Frederic Bennett that China is correct in its assessment of the Soviet danger, not just to Europe but to world peace. One has only to look at the scale of Russian armament. We have rehearsed these arguments often enough in this chamber. We know the scale of its armament and we know about its penetration into the oceans of the world, which can have nothing to do with self-defence. That is the first reason for the Chinese attitude, I believe.

Secondly, we must remember — and we forget too easily in the West — the brutal way in which the Soviet Union has put down fellow communist régimes which have tried to assert their national independence in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We should not forget such matters, because they are typical of Soviet behaviour.

Look at Russian involvement in Africa, a continent which you and I happen to know well, Mr. President, because we were both born in what was then Tanganyika, although I think I beat you by a year or two. One need only examine the Soviet record for the past few years in Africa. Its involvement is not on behalf of liberation movements as we understand them but only on behalf of communist movements within that continent. If Russia really wants to help Africa, why has it the poorest record of any of the developed countries in economic assistance? Is that the way to help developing countries?

As I have said, I believe the Chinese are correct. Marxist imperialism will move first in Europe. This will be because of the weakness of the resolution of European countries either to prepare or to pay for their own defence. We all know, as members of European parliaments, that the most difficult thing is to secure agreement within our governments on the necessary armaments for our own defence; I am not talking of planning for offensive campaigns but of our own defence.

A second reason is the lack of political will on the part of the European nations to assert themselves as a world power. We have the chance within the EEC: we have a minimal chance

*Mr. Faulds (continued)*

within the Council of Europe. Are we really using that opportunity to assert our will? I doubt it.

We also dismiss too easily the danger of the existence of Eurocommunism, which lies like a Trojan horse at the heart of every European country's resolution. Will Europe stand in its own defence? I doubt it. Will the United States stand by it when the crunch comes and invite the retaliation it will undoubtedly face? I doubt it.

The surest guarantee of world peace requires two things. The first is a strong Europe and the second, and just as important, is a strong China, because only the existence of a strong power on either flank of the Soviet Union is going to stop its military adventurism. It follows from that, surely, that Europe must help to arm China whilst rearming itself.

Détente is a delusion. Russia abuses it and we all know it. The only country that benefits from it is Russia. It is time that we in Europe woke up to the reality of the danger which faces not only Europe but China and all the other countries in the world if they exist or try to defend themselves on a purely national basis.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe none of us, not even the Rapporteur, Sir Frederic Bennett, still clings as firmly as he used to, to reservations about China, as a communist country, one which, that is, allows no pluralism and in which dictatorship reigns. So I cannot understand why on earth the report should have raised so many objections and differences, or be represented as a paper to be most firmly rejected. I marvel even more that there should have been objections and unfavourable votes cast against the draft recommendation which, if carefully examined, reveals nothing to offend the susceptibility of a country truly open-minded to détente.

I think that if there have been so many conflicting feelings, and the attitudes I have deplored, we owe this to the offensive interference by Russia which saw fit to try and compel us, through the governments of the countries represented in this Assembly, to reject the report, and even more the draft recommendation. I therefore wish, first and foremost, to add my protest at such an offensive attitude. Besides, it is nothing new for Russia. I recall that it interfered clumsily in Italy, too, to make our government avoid — what I meant to say is, ban — the "biennial" of East European dissent. But perhaps we ought to think that Russia is entitled to interfere in an Assembly like ours

when it seeks to undertake new relations, or tighten existing relations with some countries which it now no longer views as it used to. Or possibly, when one of the Warsaw Pact countries, a communist country, wanted to hold aloof from Russia we ought to interfere by breaking off our relations with all the communist countries including Russia.

Well, just so that there can be no doubt of our intentions, our purpose, we should approve the draft recommendation in order to reaffirm that we reject the interpretations placed on our so doing by some people, especially by Russia; that we also mean by this motion to reaffirm our will to pursue détente, and above all ensure the defence of the Europe in which we believe and go about our work. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

The list of speakers is completed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I believe that I established a record in brevity this afternoon in introducing the report. I hope to establish another record as Rapporteur in winding up.

May I say first how gratified I am that a clear majority of those who have spoken today, irrespective of party affiliation, have realised that what I have tried to do is to offer to this Assembly an objective appraisal of what Chinese thinking is today?

It has been said that the report is biased, but those who say it did not read or listen to my earlier remarks, when I said that the task with which I was entrusted was not to say whether the Chinese views of the world scene were justified, but to report those Chinese views, as they exist, to my Committee and to this Assembly.

So far, not a single speaker has said that I have misinterpreted the Chinese attitude at present towards world affairs, and it was that job that I was given to do, not to analyse whether Chinese fears were justified. That would be a much more onerous and much longer task.

I do not withdraw one sentence or one part of the substance of my report, because it correctly analyses what Chinese thinking is today. Those who seek to say that the Chinese are not seriously worried about the Soviet threat should go to Peking for themselves and talk to the Chinese, and then, if they are allowed to, they should go down below Peking, where they will find the biggest network of anti-nuclear shelters existing in the world today. These shelters can accommodate the whole population of Peking. Anyone who thinks that an anti-nuclear shelter

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

is an offensive weapon designed to threaten South-East Asia should have another look at military strategy.

Mr. Périquier is not here. Not for the first time, my colleague has got it wrong. I have not moved the amendment to which he referred. I kept my word to my Chairman and I am not moving it. I said this in my opening remarks. If my colleague had been here, he would have heard me say it. The amendment will be moved by someone else, and I shall not even speak to it.

I have also been accused of overlooking the new tensions which have arisen between the United States of America and the USSR. When I wrote the report I could not have forecast how the situation would deteriorate during the past few months, but of one thing I am quite certain — that it would have deteriorated a great deal further if it had been the United States which entered into the question of supplying China with arms and re-equipping it rather than Europe, because no country is more aware than the Soviet Union that Europe on its own is in no position to threaten the integrity of China.

I have never advocated a military pact with China and would say straight away that anyone who followed me to Peking would find that the Chinese have no intention of making a military pact with us. Before we try to sell that idea we should consult those with whom such a pact would be made.

When Mr. Margue was speaking I found myself in the unexpected position of thinking that I was listening to my late father in the Carlton Club in London, when he advocated, as a conservative, that in no circumstances should we have any dealings at all with any country which had a communist government, irrespective of its attitude.

As my friend Mr. Faulds made perfectly clear, if we are to be attracted simply by ideologies we find ourselves in some difficulty. We could ask why we allied ourselves with the Soviet Union in the last war to help defeat Hitler.

Finally, I must say this: I remember the fuss that was made when one American telegram was published about an alleged American attempt to interfere with our proceedings here. When I was absent from the chamber for a few minutes I was looking at some of the speeches made at that time, in which particularly those on the extreme left condemned the Americans for trying to interfere with WEU. I have been disappointed today, in listening to the speeches by our communist colleagues here, not to have heard one word of condemnation for the most blatant attempted interference with the proceedings of this Assembly which we have witnessed in its

history. If after this I have even more doubts than I had before about the validity of Eurocommunism, perhaps I shall be forgiven by this Assembly and by you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now call the Chairman.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, when the Committee undertook this report and asked Sir Frederic Bennett to draft it, we naturally realised that it was going to present a difficult problem and that the report would inevitably be read, understood and discussed in a variety of ways. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the Committee was unanimously of the opinion that the establishment of good relations with China was an important step for the future and that such relations were absolutely indispensable in view of China's coming status as a world power.

It was also obvious to the Committee that, if WEU was dealing with this matter, because it was in our own interest to do so, it was of course only right and proper to reflect on questions of defence and security. In doing so it must not, of course, lose sight of the interplay of forces throughout the world, as this is relevant to the problem. Despite all the speeches we have heard in today's debate, some of which have in my opinion attacked the USSR very sharply, we should keep our eye firmly on our goal: we have decided to support and encourage co-operation and security in Europe and in the world. For we have found again and again that if we abandon the drive towards détente, coexistence between East and West, or between the other major blocs confronting one another in the world, is unthinkable.

This is why direct support for Chinese defence is an extremely difficult and controversial problem. If we give serious support to this demand, we must realise that the USSR will look upon it as a provocation. Many of us might not worry about that; but we cannot be quite indifferent to the fact that it would lead to a general increase in armaments, with the result that negotiations like SALT II would be quite pointless and might be dropped. It would then be not only the Russians who set off on an arms race, but other powers in the world would of course join in.

Détente is for us a vital necessity — I really do believe that — whatever each of us may understand by the word and however different our views when we try to bring it about. Détente appears to me as a necessity, and it is a subject we have frequently discussed in the Committee. There would certainly be no lack of repercussions and of cause for concern if our most difficult partner in the détente process, the USSR, were led by what was decided or done in this con-

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

nection in Western Europe to give up talking and solely to arm instead. We all know how little reliance can be put on mere talk, yet talk together we must. This is where Western Europe's opportunity lies in maintaining — or trying to maintain — a balance which will make it possible for the basis of better relations with China to be understood. I think that is what we should be aiming at.

Perhaps these last remarks of mine do not reflect the views of all the members of the Committee, but I think they are worthy of consideration in the framework of this discussion. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Before we turn to the vote on the draft recommendations we must deal with the amendments. We have five amendments and there will be speakers for and against them. This no doubt will take a considerable time since two persons have expressed their wish to explain their vote. I propose that we deal with the amendments and the final voting tomorrow at 12 noon.

#### **5. Change in the membership of a Committee**

The PRESIDENT. — Before closing the sitting I should inform the Assembly that the Netherlands Delegation proposes the nomination of Mr. Mommersteeg to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Cornelissen.

Are there any objections?...

Mr. Mommersteeg is appointed to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

#### **6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow

morning, Wednesday 21st June, at 9 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. International terrorism (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 771 and Amendments).
2. European security and African problems (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 772 and Amendments).
3. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Documents 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment).
4. China and European security (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 770 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.)*

# FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 21st June 1978

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. International terrorism (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 771 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Guerra Zunzunegui (*Observer from Spain*), Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Müller.
4. European security and African problems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 772 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Onslow, Mr. Roberti, Mr. Page, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Whitehead, Mr. Seitlinger, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Critchley,
5. Adoption of the Minutes.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Deschamps; point of order: Mr. Roper.
6. China and European security (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 770 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Roper, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Roper, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Handlos, Mr. Margue, Mr. Roper, Mrs. von Bothmer, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Margue; explanation of vote: Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Calamandrei; point of order: Mr. Faulds.
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper.

*The Sitting was opened at 9 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

I have been informed that there will be comments on the Minutes. This item will therefore be taken at 12 noon.

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. International terrorism

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 771 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on

international terrorism and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 771 and Amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, none of us is ever likely to forget the pictures that went round the world, thanks to television, when the bodies of the Chairman of the Italian Christian Democrat Party, Aldo Moro, and of the chairman of the employers' association of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hanns Martin Schleyer, were found, murdered by terrorists. Nor are we likely to forget the pictures which showed how these terrorists cold-bloodedly shot down their drivers and bodyguards.

Political murder is of course as old as the history of mankind. Caesar's murder by Brutus was not a solitary case. But there is a new dimension to political murder today, seen most clearly in the fact that in many cases the motive for these murders cannot be identified and the choice of victims is often indiscriminate. Innocent workers in a printing works in Hamburg have been just as much the victims of political acts of terrorism, as were the workers and old-age pensioners who as they returned home in the evening were maimed or killed by bombs exploding in left-luggage lockers. Women and little children have been caught up in the hijacking of aircraft, and blowing up a bus carrying tourists has nothing whatever to do with direct political action.

1. See page 28.

Mr. Müller (continued)

Since 1966 and 1967 we have been seeing an escalation of terrorism. If I may use the example of terrorism in my own country, the Federal Republic of Germany, I would like to show the line it has followed.

Starting from a left-wing organisation which in the beginning was set up partly with the help of funds from the German Democratic Republic, the germ cell of a senseless "free-for-all" gradually developed. At the outset there was some confusion of ideas. People justified the use of violence directed against property. There were certain philosophers — I need only mention Herbert Marcuse — who proclaimed a new form of world-wide struggle. Even in the field of education people began to topple all values — we need only think of the "anti-authoritarian" teaching of tiny children. It is certainly no coincidence that one of the leading minds of the Red Army faction, Jan-Carl Raspe, was one of the chief ideologists of the anti-authoritarian educational movement. His article in No. 17 of Enzensberger's revue *Kursbuch* is worth reading even today. There were other writers who drafted "wanted" notices which then incited people to action — the fate of Hanns Martin Schleyer is a case in point. These were all stages in the escalation.

Undoubtedly, too, the circle of sympathisers contributed to this development. Money for weapons was given by people who frequently appeared on television and played a part. Well known people in the world of the arts were ready to collect money for a "legal fighting fund" in order to support international terrorism.

The international links too have become more and more intrusive. We know there are links between, for example, the Red Brigade in Italy and the Red Army faction in the Federal Republic. We know that this terrorism crops up in different guises and that different countries are affected in varying degrees, but that scarcely any European country has been spared, whether we look at the Federal Republic of Germany or at Italy, where we have most glaring examples. But even neutral states like Austria or Switzerland, or small states like Holland, have been affected by this wave of international terrorism. Frontiers no longer mean anything to the terrorists. The progress towards European unity which, thank goodness, has made frontiers more permeable has certainly helped the logistic infrastructure of terrorism.

Even East-West frontiers scarcely seem to matter. We know that Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader, after being liberated in Berlin, went to the Middle East via the East German airport of Schönefeld. We know that at least three of the accused members of the Red Brigade

in Turin, although there was a warrant out for them in Italy, and a "wanted" notice has been put out, were given a chance to carry on in Czechoslovakia. This shows that the permeability of frontiers and the effective possibilities open to terrorists have greatly increased.

The sheer number of acts of terrorism has — to quote Friedrich Engels — introduced a new quality. For me, as a member of parliament in a parliamentary democracy, the most serious consequence is the diminution of certain civil rights and civil liberties made necessary by the fight against terrorism. Even the right to free speech is sometimes threatened by the terrorists or by the consequences of terrorist action. I myself, for example, was attacked by a newspaper of one of the government parties in my Land because I stood up for the right of an artist freely to express his opinion even when he is at the same time in fact a supporter of terrorist association.

The question of whether or not we can tolerate the state or its institutions supporting such extremist sympathisers is another matter. Anyone who directly advocates the use of violence must also be made to feel the full force of the law.

At this point I would like expressly to acknowledge the fact that most, indeed virtually all political parties in the European democratic spectrum have recognised the difficulties of the fight against terrorism, and have been willing to work together in this field as in others. Even the Italian Communist Party, for example, has agreed that a radio station like Radio Alice in Bologna, which openly advocated the use of violence, should no longer be allowed to broadcast.

International terrorism — of this there can be no doubt, Mr. President — calls for an international answer. Western European Union has a special competence based mainly on Article V of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. I do not wish, in presenting my report, to go into detail on this point, as I have expressly dealt with it in the report before you. I would refer you to the relevant passages; the question of competence seems to me to be perfectly clear.

The problem of internal security requires, in my opinion, detailed consultations in the WEU Council, for there is no doubt that internal security is closely tied up with the real purpose of WEU, which is its responsibility for defence. I believe that co-ordination of the work of the rather disparate arrangements for fighting terrorism in the member states of WEU requires detailed consultations as well. I will give you just one example to illustrate this: the establishment or employment of certain special forces in a country other than their own, for instance in a member state of WEU, obviously calls for

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

detailed discussion in advance. We all know that this is a very topical matter today. I need not remind you of the action by a German special force — the GSG 9 of the Federal Frontier Security Force — outside the frontiers of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The member states of WEU are required, under Article V of Protocol No. II, to report on their arrangements for internal defence, and on the strength of their internal defence and police forces. It is of course always very difficult in this sphere to arrive at exact definitions, since the authority involved differs from one country to the next, various ministries are responsible, and there is no uniform method in the member states of dealing with the problem. I have the feeling that the data on this subject included in the annual reports have, over the years, become a matter of routine. The reports have been received, noted and pigeon-holed, in other words, they have gone into the Council's documentation. I doubt, however, whether there has been any detailed discussion of the situation.

The fact that the Assembly of WEU is now going into these problems, that we in the Assembly have taken the initiative and are going thoroughly into the problem of international terrorism, should spur on the Council to concern itself more fully with these questions. I believe the main purpose of the discussion here is to urge the idea — which is of course to be found in the recommendation — that no assistance of any kind to political terrorists, whether through asylum or otherwise, should be forthcoming in the member states of Western European Union; that a group on the lines of Interpol should be set up to co-ordinate anti-terrorist action; and that the co-ordination of joint measures should be ensured.

For me, Mr. President, the greatest threat from terrorism is, I repeat, not the immediate threat to life and limb of the individual citizen in our democracies; no, the greatest threat is the direct challenge to the constitution of these democracies. We want, obviously, to maintain the free basis of society in the member countries of Western European Union: we, as democrats, want to develop it further. But it is precisely the maintenance of this democracy that is endangered by terrorist action, because such acts of terrorism understandably arouse strong feelings in widespread sections of the population, all of whom are affected.

In this the parliamentarians of Western European Union have a special watching brief. We believe that the Council should report to the Assembly on the measures which it has taken to fight terrorism. We consider that in this matter there should be a constant exchange of views.

The Council should initiate a mutual exchange of views with the General Affairs Committee; it should report what is happening, and there should be arrangements for new ideas from the parliamentary side to reach the Council. There should be a sort of continuing dialogue.

It would be a victory for the terrorists who are trying to change our system if the West European states found themselves unable to take decisive and vigorous joint steps to protect our democratic achievements from those who seek to destroy them. It is with this in mind that I present my report. And it is with this in mind that I call on you to accept the report, so that we may find a new starting point for the fight against the danger of international terrorism. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Hardy to open the debate.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I shall be extremely brief. Most of us would agree that this is an interesting and important report, and I hope that we can in broad measure approve it without a great deal of time or a great deal of fuss.

If as civilised politicians we are to respond to the severe threat to democracy and to an orderly society, we certainly need to take adequate international action, and much that is recommended in the report is desirable. Inasmuch as the Assembly is devoted to democracy and justice, it is right for us to consider the insanity of violence which we have seen develop in the world in recent years and therefore I have no objection to the report, nor to the recommendations, with perhaps two exceptions.

Draft recommendations 1, 2 and 3 are obviously very acceptable. The same can be said of recommendations 5, 7 and 8. My anxieties concern recommendations 4 and 6. Recommendation 4 — my Amendment No. 1 seeks to delete it — seems to me to involve quite unnecessary duplication. I think we are all aware that the Nine are working in adequate co-ordination, and with improving co-ordination, to defeat terrorism. For this reason I think that the establishment of a group by this Assembly to do exactly the same job is hardly necessary.

Our energy and our enthusiasm should be devoted to encouraging countries that are not members of the Assembly to ensure that they pursue the same course of action that the nations of the Nine are currently pursuing, in order to avoid duplication. Duplication would be highly undesirable, would achieve nothing and would perhaps engender further senses of despair. I hope, therefore, that the Rapporteur will agree to delete recommendation 4.

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

I have a similar anxiety about recommendation 6, although not to the same extent, since continued consideration of the problem may at least add to our knowledge rather than merely provide a duplicated facility. It is essential, in my view, that we should have action rather than committees, and adequate policies rather than merely the publication of papers. As western nations, we should see that our energies are devoted, above all, to ensuring that the other countries which have not yet ratified any of the conventions are encouraged to do so. Anything that diverted our energies from that end by establishing unnecessarily duplicated bodies would be disadvantageous.

I therefore hope that the Rapporteur will accept my congratulations on the main part of this important report but that he will be prepared to accept the suggested alterations put forward in my own amendment and, I think, in the other two amendments.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our Assembly is — let us face it — behind the times in discussing and exploring ways of countering the new and serious problem of international terrorism. Last November, during the second part of the twenty-third session a draft recommendation on the subject by the General Affairs Committee was, although it figured on the agenda for the Assembly, neither discussed nor voted on.

I really do not think I can in a matter like this be accused of chauvinism if I say that we Italians were very disappointed, because already at the time we were, in view of the mounting intensity of the terrorist onslaught in Italy, possibly more alive than other people in Western Europe to the novelty, significance and acuity of the peril, and to the need to combat it by improved and more effective collaboration between our countries' democratic establishments. Then the tragic ordeal Italian democracy went through during the kidnapping, cruel imprisonment and ferocious murder of Mr. Aldo Moro, brought us — though I believe it made itself felt far beyond the confines of Italy — to a fuller and even clearer perception of the implications and scope of the terrorist phenomenon in two chief respects: first, the aim and purpose of the attacking forces of subversion could be more distinctly and tangibly grasped, and therefore, their inspiration and form.

This was certainly understood in the Italian situation, if we can go by an appreciation given official sanction at the highest level of our country's government, both in respect of the internal

political conjuncture of a broader phasing-in of democracy which terrorism tried to upset at one precise point, or in respect of the political leader the murderers were instructed to wipe out in the person of Aldo Moro, because of the prestigious and determinant rôle he had played in that democratic development.

Thus it has become plainer that whatever name terrorism masquerades under — overtly fascist, like the one which first, at the end of the 1960s, took credit for the violence and slaughter wrought by terrorism, or as in recent years and now, wrapped in a cloud of pseudo-revolutionary gibberish long since denounced by the left — whatever names terrorism may ring the changes on, use simultaneously or interweave, they fundamentally go back to the same root, i.e. the retrograde and subversive interests which also use this means of bringing the democratic régimes to a complete standstill, and trying to confuse, divide and push back the forces that sustain them.

Secondly, and concurrently, Italy's tragic experience as a country of Western Europe located at a point of potential fracture so crucial for security and détente, on the confines of East and West, North and South, has highlighted the fact that terrorism, and the interests it serves, also set out, by shaking the democracies to their foundations, to create vacuums and disturbances in the international balance which in turn, by destabilising the processes of détente and security, rob our democratic institutions of the continental and wider context of stability they require to maintain themselves and develop.

In this twofold respect, as I mentioned earlier, I believe that we who are here today understand better than anyone that terrorism is not a transitory or short-term danger but one that tends to spread and impinge internationally on the plane of the economic and social difficulties our countries are suffering from, and to aggravate such difficulties and by their leverage obstruct any democratic solution of them, paralyse democracy's reforming zeal, undermine in this manner its popular foundations, compel it to erode its own principles, contaminate, push back and denature the democratic system.

The draft recommendation and the report itself on this item of the agenda correspond, I think, as a whole by the words in which they are couched, to the greatest awareness we can all muster in order to safeguard our countries' democratic future against terrorism, using every means of self-defence available to our democracies, including therefore the democratic means with which collaboration, commonalty, alliance and so the powers and forum of WEU can provide us, with due respect for our sovereignty and independence but also in a spirit of real and effective solidarity.

*Mr. Calamandrei (continued)*

The essential, dare I say, prerequisite we should endeavour to establish to this end is a more consistent and effective common political will on the part of our governments and institutions, the democratic organs, functions and media of our society, to prevent what did happen for example to us Italians, our finding ourselves twice, in respect of Italian citizens wanted for complicity in acts of subversion and terrorism, refused by another WEU member country extradition of them on grounds of political asylum following pressures also brought to bear by Italian circles sympathetic to the terrorists, or seeing in that same country the monthly supplement of a highly authoritative democratic periodical characterise, with what I will venture to term arrogant mystification, as "terrorism and Stalinism" the upholding of our democracy against the bloodthirsty hirelings of subversion.

To conclude, Mr. President, the two amendments moved by myself and others to the text of the draft recommendation do not express any disagreement, but the need for greater precision: in the first paragraph of the preamble, in which there is what we think a partial and incomplete exemplification of the names given to terrorism, we propose to insert the more comprehensive phrase "organisations of any denomination", and in the fourth paragraph of the preamble, instead of terrorism constituting "a problem which can be tackled only in an international framework" we propose defining it in a more precise and balanced manner as "a problem which can also be tackled in an international framework". (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Whitehead.

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — I want briefly to add my congratulations to Mr. Müller on his very good report and to support the amendment which has been put before the Assembly by my colleague, Mr. Hardy.

I think we would all agree that political terror and the problem of international terrorism are now almost the major dilemma facing Western European societies. It is a particular irony that we now have in Western Europe more functioning democracies than at any other time in this century, yet simultaneously so many of these democracies are under threat from small terrorist groups which seek, because they have the power of murder at their beck and call, to deny others of liberty and even of life. The threat that is posed to a democratic society by such groups cannot be underestimated.

We have seen how very small ethnic groups as in Holland, small terrorist groups lead by discontented and spoilt children of the bourgeoisie wishing to express their proletarian soli-

arity, as with the Red Brigade in Italy, to some degree the German terrorists and in our case a nationalist movement now pervaded by gangsterism in the IRA can hold a country or whole sections of a country virtually to ransom. These countries include some of the largest, most prosperous and, indeed, the oldest democracies in Europe.

Anything which can be said at least by the seven members of WEU on this subject ought to be of value. However, it is clear that we could go too far in what we say in two respects. First, we could go too far in suggesting that an international co-ordination of anti-terrorist activity ought to lead in some way to a counter-terror organisation itself supranationally controlled.

I do not think that would be desirable, and it is one reason why I support Mr. Hardy's suggestion that we should delete the fourth of these series of recommendations.

Secondly, I think we must stress — and in paragraph 44 of the report Mr. Müller does exactly this — the extent to which it is possible that the deprivation of other liberties, and civil liberties in particular, which a state may think is necessary if it is the more effective to fight terror, begins to play the game of the terrorists. I shall mention this again later.

As to Mr. Hardy's amendment, I think the level of international co-ordination among our own member states in every respect except possibly extradition is already effective. We saw at the time of the latest atrocities of the Baader Meinhof group when the plane was hijacked and taken to Mogadishu that my government in Britain were able to second experts from our Special Air Services Regiment to go with the German anti-terrorist units to Mogadishu airport to take part in the storming of the aeroplane. That kind of collaboration, done on the specific authorisation of member governments and done to counter specific acts of terrorism, so that each time this serious decision must be taken, appears to be more satisfactory than calling for or setting up some kind of supranational anti-terrorist organisation. I am not at all sure that we yet need to go that far.

In supporting Mr. Hardy's second recommendation, nor am I sure that if we follow the full line of the sixth recommendation we can avoid difficulties in the way in which the countries of Western Europe and the democracies in general deal with others who are "terrorists" according to some people's vocabulary and "fighters against terror" according to others' vocabulary. What is the position, for example, of those who hijack planes in Czechoslovakia to escape from a régime which I think we all in this

*Mr. Whitehead (continued)*

Assembly despise and detest. Are these people to be handed back or are they not? What is the position once we start dealing with other countries outside the orbit of Western Europe and of the member states of WEU which themselves may be facing movements, protest movements, even armed or violent movements and which may say that they will enter into these extradition arrangements only if they can be mutual and if people who have lived perhaps for many years in Western Europe are handed over?

I believe that it is now suggested that if the Baader Meinhof terrorists who were arrested in Yugoslavia are to be returned to the Federal Republic, various leaders of the Croat nationalist movement living in West Germany ought to be extradited to Yugoslavia. There are very serious problems here, because it ought to be possible for the Assembly to see a degree of flexibility in how the word terror is used.

In conclusion, I believe that this very useful report should be accepted by the Assembly, with the exception of the two recommendations I have mentioned. I particularly welcome Mr. Müller's having drawn attention to the possible threat to civil liberties if we exaggerate our response.

Of the terrorists who fought against my country many years ago, a Mr. Brennan once said that the only good thing about liberty was fighting for it. I believe we have to disagree with that. That is an essentially fascist-style definition of liberty. The only good thing about liberty is enjoying it and seeing that as many of one's fellow citizens as possible also enjoy it. That is the democratic answer to terrorism and it should remain so.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — Since the Dutch language is one of the official languages, I shall address the Assembly in my own language.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). — First of all, Mr. President, I want to compliment the Rapporteur on his report, which is not only important and interesting, but extraordinarily well-balanced as well. The report is considerably more balanced than the preamble and recommendations.

It is obvious that the subject we are discussing is grimly serious and important. The Rapporteur is right when he says that the Netherlands, too, has in recent years been faced with serious acts of terrorism; so I certainly share the disquiet that has formed his starting point.

As I have said, the report is a balanced one. There is, for example, paragraph 44 where Mr. Müller says that retaliation that involves over-strong, too visible and too unscrupulous means will probably lead to results that are the reverse of those sought and sometimes achieved in the short run; then, terrorism is far from discouraged. On the contrary, Mr. Müller tells us, terrorism is encouraged — and there I heartily agree with him.

The call for discussions to be started in the WEU Council is equally justified. Discussion should not be limited to a straightforward approval of the level, scope or strength of internal defence. It should not be a matter solely of encouraging an increase in the numbers of troops, but also a serious evaluation of the problems and of the ways of overcoming terrorism. Sometimes, too, a call for moderation may be appropriate. Nonetheless it is obvious that terrorism — extremism on right and left — and rising Nazism in many countries must be of great concern to us all.

A second remark concerns the question of whether this subject comes within our scope or not. I agree with the Rapporteur that bearing in mind the treaty, and bearing in mind the seriousness of the problem, there certainly is place, and ought to be place, for a discussion of this kind within this Assembly. He is quite right in saying that — not because the subject is outside our scope, but in order to avoid duplication of effort — we ought to limit our discussions. I think, however, that this limitation ought to apply to the draft recommendation as well. I shall come back to this in a minute; my feeling is that the recommendation, which to some extent is separate from the report, is on a couple of points at variance with this concern to avoid duplication.

It is essential, most of all, that the causes of terrorism should not only be studied but be combated as well, and this involves social and political relationships. But it is obvious that a discussion on this must not be held here, but in other bodies. Wherever possible, counter-measures and co-ordination must be improved.

As I have said, the report is very fair and balanced. This applies, too, to the great majority of the recommendation. So why then have we had amendments put forward? I too think that paragraph 4 ought to go. Why? We should not, in this debate, be showing how indignant we are about terrorism. This must not become a competition in emotional display. The problem is now being tackled in the Council of Europe, in the European Parliament and by Interpol as well: which is why I would offer a serious warning against setting up yet another separate group in this sphere, especially since what is needed is to combat terrorism as effectively as possible.

*Mr. Stoffelen (continued)*

A second amendment has to do with the right of asylum. As a member of the Council of Europe's Legal Committee I and a number of other colleagues have been dealing with this subject. At the moment we were talking about it, there were discussions in many countries about what the right of asylum means. Two other Council of Europe committees were also involved with this. The Legal Committee presented a new report and made fresh recommendations — the report was drafted by Mr. Blank, who because of his country of origin is not a member of this Assembly — in which it is clearly stated that the convention on combating terrorism is not intended to impair the right of asylum as this is applied in line with the principles of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers. With this in mind, I think that the last few words of paragraph 6 are out of place. This is duplication, and it gives rise to fresh confusion. Indeed, it interferes with the work of the Blank committee, and I wonder why it has happened. Let us not be sidetracked from what it is all really about — an effective battle against the causes and consequences of terrorism. What we want is the most effective possible fight against terrorism. This is why I hope the Assembly will vote for the amendments aimed at preventing doubling-up of clauses that spoil the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Guerra Zunzunegui, Observer from Spain, First Vice-President of the Spanish Senate.

Mr. GUERRA ZUNZUNEGUI (*Observer from Spain*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all thank you for allowing me to take the floor although I am only here as a parliamentary observer.

I am deeply moved at being able to address the Assembly of Western European Union as a representative of the democratic parliament elected in Spain on 15th June 1977, scarcely a year ago. I hope our country will soon be a full member of WEU, just as we have been part of the Council of Europe since November 1977.

During the last years of General Franco's dictatorship, Spanish democrats — socialists, christian democrats, liberals, centre party members, etc. — rallied around the spiritual banner of freedom-loving Europe, that is, around a democratic concept of a society that respects the fundamental individual freedoms.

After this introduction, I come to our specific subject, the report on international terrorism submitted by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. Scarcely two weeks ago terrorist intransigence claimed two further vic-

tims in the persons of the wife and brother-in-law of the Turkish Ambassador in Madrid. I offer my condolences to our Turkish colleague, who is also attending this session as an observer.

Of the report under discussion, Document 771, I would stress paragraphs 19 and 20, especially the following sentence: "In recent years, many national liberation movements, or movements merely making regionalist claims, have used terrorist methods, sometimes with a degree of moderation and sometimes with unreasoning violence." This applies in a way more or less to the terrorism from which we have been and are still suffering in the Basque country, bordering on France. This movement, relying on terrorism, for which there might have been some excuse a few years ago in a political situation where fundamental rights were not respected, has had no further justification since 15th June 1977, the date on which our country gave itself democratic institutions in which the freely-elected representatives of the Basque country sit in both Houses of the Spanish Parliament — Congress and Senate. Unfortunately this was not enough, and the said terrorist movement is demonstrating its anarchist nature and its desire to destabilise an area of Spain and, consequently, of Western Europe itself. It seeks by its terrorist attacks not only to make any common democratic activity impossible in that region, but also to destroy power plants, as shown by its attacks on the unfinished installations of the Lemoniz nuclear power station on the pretext of its proximity to Bilbao — whereas it is in fact over fifty kilometres away compared, say, with the distance of less than twenty kilometres between the Barsebäck power station and Copenhagen. Paragraph 37 of the document tabled shows how the terrorist movements take nuclear installations as their targets.

We agree with the report's conclusion that it is necessary to urge and if possible bring about a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly of WEU on questions relating to measures taken or to be taken against international terrorism which would give immediate help to the WEU countries and other Western European countries in their fight against terrorism; my country is a concrete example.

For Spain to be really able to curb terrorist activities in the Basque country, it would be absolutely essential for my French and Belgian parliamentary colleagues to lobby their governments and political refugee organisations so that political refugee status is not granted to persons directly or indirectly active in terrorist movements.

I declare here quite plainly that, following the successive amnesties decreed in Spain in the last two years, there is at this time no Spanish citizen who for having taken part in any political, even

*Mr. Guerra Zunzunegui (continued)*

terrorist, action, cannot come back to our country and enjoy unrestricted civil and political rights. We have overcome the consequences of our tragic civil war and the dictatorship and it is an absolutely genuine fact that has been noted by all the European parliamentarians who have visited our country since 15th June 1977 and been in touch with the various Spanish parties.

The measure for which we are calling would be consonant with recommendation 6 of the draft before you, and could be taken in the near future, indeed well before the initiation of a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, and, if possible, before the President of the French Republic's idea of the establishment of a European law enforcement area becomes a reality. This is the least that can be asked by a Western European country that has made a very great effort to obtain a democratic system.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the young Spanish democracy, which has daily proved its sincere desire to take its place in a free Europe, needs your support to put an end to the terrorist activities that are liable to imperil our new-born democracy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

That concludes the list of speakers. Does the Rapporteur wish to speak? Mr. Müller?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all express my great appreciation of all the contributions to the debate. They have all been constructive. They have helped to elucidate, and to discuss more broadly a whole set of problems with which our draft recommendation is concerned.

I would like to deal, quite briefly, with the proposed amendments, because I feel you need to know quite clearly what my position is as Rapporteur.

First, Amendment No. 1 tabled by Mr. Hardy. There is of course room for disagreement about the usefulness of having such a paragraph in the recommendation. However, no harm will be done by omitting it, so I think we can fully support Mr. Hardy's amendment deleting paragraph 4 from the draft recommendation.

On Amendment No. 3, tabled by Mr. Calamandrei and his colleagues, I think this, too, can be accepted. The recommendation would indeed be less effective if we were to include the proposed list of motives as being those that are dangerous in terms of terrorism. Nobody knows what motives may prompt terrorist acts in a few months' or a year's time. I therefore agree with Mr. Calamandrei on this point and support Amendment No. 3.

The same applies to Amendment No. 4. The fight against terrorism is of course conducted at national as well as international level. This appears to me self-evident. I therefore also agree with the proposal to replace "only" by "also" in the English text.

I am in disagreement, however, on Amendment No. 2, tabled by Mr. Stoffelen. In his speech Mr. Stoffelen tried to explain the reasons for his amendment. In so doing he referred, among other things, to the discussions in the Council of Europe.

We should not forget, Mr. President, that this is the Assembly of Western European Union. Here we have a gathering of representatives from seven countries for a quite specific purpose, whereas the Council of Europe, with its twenty member states, has a much broader membership and different tasks from ours.

I think that the text I have drafted, calling on the Council to study the means by which Western Europe can effectively dissuade any state from granting assistance to terrorists through asylum or otherwise, should be accepted. I would stress this particularly in view of what our Spanish guest said today since he dealt expressly with this point. I would like to thank him particularly for his contribution to the debate. Spain, Mr. President, is precisely a country threatened by terrorist forces as it moves from dictatorship to democracy. It is clearly in our interest that these terrorist forces should have no chance of success in Spain, for otherwise the achievement of democracy would be endangered.

I am therefore explicitly recommending — and I would stress this once again — that Mr. Stoffelen's Amendment No. 2 be negatived, whereas I am in favour of accepting Amendments Nos. 1, 3 and 4, tabled by Mr. Hardy and Mr. Calamandrei.

Permit me to conclude with a brief reference to current developments. As we were talking here, at the moment when the debate was beginning, another act of terrorist violence has taken place. I have just been handed an urgent telex on the subject. It concerns an act of terrorism in Italy. Antonio Esposito, former head of the anti-terrorist squad in Genoa, and present chief of the police in Nervi, was murdered this morning. So international terrorism has claimed yet another victim. We must make it our business to do all we can in the fight against the monstrous plague of terrorism. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Does the Chairman wish to speak?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

debate has confirmed what had already been shown by the discussion in Committee, to wit that this is a problem of unusual difficulty. On the one hand the fight against terrorism is an internal political problem involving the intervention of the police of the various countries concerned; on the other, the Brussels Treaty quite clearly puts the task of international co-operation within our terms of reference. Because terrorism has long since reached out beyond state boundaries it has become necessary for us to concern ourselves with it and to appoint a Rapporteur on this important and difficult subject, one which he has treated most objectively.

A great deal of political tact is certainly required on the part of the Council of Ministers if the governments are to tackle the problem of terrorism in a way that promotes co-operation without involving any interference in internal affairs that could give rise to friction.

On the contrary, it seems to me that the governments, in getting together on this difficult matter, must work to prevent misunderstandings arising when, for example, one or other of the states has to take particular action it considers necessary at a given moment. Hitherto, such action has, quite often, given rise to some misunderstanding on the part of other countries involved — misunderstanding that could be politically explosive.

I hope that our discussion here, and the recommendation addressed to the Council of Ministers, will, not least of all, defuse a potentially explosive situation and improve co-operation. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The debate is closed.

Before we deal with the vote on the draft recommendation we shall deal with the amendments to it. I ask members of the Assembly to follow the documents.

Mr. Calamandrei has spoken to his Amendment No. 3 and the Rapporteur has agreed to it. The amendment reads as follows :

In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "anarchist, nationalist, regionalist or other organisations" and insert "organisations of any denomination".

Is there anyone who wishes to speak against the amendment ?...

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 3 is agreed to.*

Amendment No. 4 from Mr. Calamandrei relates to paragraph 4 in the preamble. I understand that the Rapporteur is ready to accept it. The amendment is :

In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "only" and insert "also".

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 4 is agreed to unanimously.*

We now come to the draft recommendation proper.

Mr. Hardy's Amendment No. 1 is :

In the draft recommendation proper leave out paragraph 4.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 1 is agreed to unanimously.*

We now come to Mr. Stoffelen's Amendment No. 2 :

In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "through asylum or otherwise".

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — Since hearing the statement made by Mr. Müller, the Rapporteur, I think that there must be some misunderstanding. It is not true that the Council of Europe intends to make a report and recommendation. We, Mr. Müller, have already accepted in the Council of Europe a recommendation and we have indicated in which way the Council of Europe should study the problem. Why, then, should we take a decision twice ? The original decision was more far-reaching. We had to avoid overlapping here and to refrain from discussion on the political aspects. Despite this, the Rapporteur does not accept our amendment. After the discussion in the Socialist Group, I tabled the amendment in order to avoid overlapping and in order to honour the excellent report of the Rapporteur. I think that there must be a misunderstanding. I appeal to him to accept my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen.

Do you wish to have the floor again, Mr. Rapporteur ?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I would like to speak once again against this amendment. If Mr. Stoffelen's argument that we have already dealt with this matter elsewhere in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe were correct, then I would ask why we are concerning ourselves with the question of terrorism here at all : we have after all already discussed it in the Council of Europe.

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

We must bear in mind — as I have indeed already stressed — that the membership of the Council of Europe is different from that of Western European Union. Here we have seven countries represented, with quite specific political tasks and aims set out in the Brussels Treaty, whereas the Council of Europe brings together twenty countries for quite different purposes. We are in no way proposing here to decide something that conflicts with a decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. What we have to decide — let me say it once again — is that the governments be asked to study the means by which other states — not just European states, or the member states of the Council of Europe, but all other states — can be dissuaded from granting assistance of any kind to terrorists or terrorist organisations.

Can we, Mr. President, actually ask for more than that the governments should consider the matter, engage in an exchange of views with us — an exchange that we want and that I have expressly called for on behalf of the Assembly — and then report back to us on their conclusions?

I would therefore once again make a determined plea for you to reject Mr. Stoffelen's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Members of the Assembly have heard the pros and cons. May we now vote on the amendment?

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 2 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 771 as amended.

If there is no objection to it and there are no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

#### **4. European security and African problems**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 772 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on

European security and African problems and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 772 and Amendments.

Before I call the Rapporteur I must inform the Assembly that my list already contains twelve speakers. They could take about two hours. I earnestly ask speakers to try to cut their speeches to enable us to complete the debate by 12 o'clock, when we shall vote on yesterday's debate.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, for the second time in a short period we are dealing in this Assembly with the problems of Africa and their repercussions on Western European Union. When we first grappled with this question at the last plenary session it was not possible to foresee political developments in certain parts of Africa. The Rapporteur can note with a certain satisfaction that the views on African problems he expressed in this Assembly a short while ago were not too wide of the mark. He was, it is true, no political prophet, and he could not foresee everything that has taken place there, but his assessment has nevertheless been largely borne out by subsequent political developments. Unfortunately, many of the fears I expressed at the last session have turned out to be justified.

Let us look once again at the picture of Africa. In my office at home there hangs a map of Africa dating from 1806. The map, which is after all not so very old, shows clearly only the coastlines and perhaps the regions along the rivers. Everything else appears as a white expanse. Lake Victoria, for example, which is larger than the Land of Bavaria, in the Federal Republic, was unknown to Europeans until it was discovered by two Englishmen only one hundred and twenty years ago. The extent of our present concern with the continent of Africa, and the degree to which we are having to wrestle with the problems of that continent, are therefore all the more astonishing.

With the phase of discovery, starting around the middle of the last century, there began a phase of European colonisation which, in accordance with the spirit of the nineteenth century, led to certain consequences for better or for worse with which we still have to cope today. The colonial period of the nineteenth century was a period in which all the states of Europe played their part in colonisation. Some were involved in Africa, while others, Tsarist Russia, for example, conquered Asia; and the results of this policy of colonisation are, as we know, still raising a number of problems for us today. May I mention, as a last historical observation, a very interesting international congress

1. See page 30.

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

held in 1907, which dealt with the question of colonialism. I am referring to the Congress of the Socialist International in Stuttgart, at which, after weighing majority and minority opinions, the majority of the delegates concluded that colonial policy was a proper task for the industrialised and, to use a contemporary expression, for the civilised peoples of Europe. The Dutch delegate van Kol in particular, but also a number of German and English social democrats, expressed the view that, while colonial policy should not of course mean exploitation, the European states were duty bound to pass on their cultural values to other nations and so contribute to their development.

Such a discussion would not be possible today, sixty or seventy years on. Today it would revolve round quite different issues. And yet, the period of decolonisation, which began after the second world war, unfortunately preserved much that originated in the nineteenth century. Many conflicts in Africa — we need think only of those in the Horn of Africa which are so much alive today — are the consequences of a colonial development during which frontiers were drawn arbitrarily, corresponding with the spheres of interest of the great powers, but without any regard to tribal or linguistic ties. In later years, that is precisely during the decolonisation period, these tribal and linguistic links were naturally a source of conflict between states that had meanwhile become sovereign.

In many cases, too, decolonisation — it must be said quite frankly — took place rather too hurriedly in certain countries. I think that some of the problems that now exist in Zaïre, the former Belgian Congo, need not necessarily have become quite so acute if the transition from pure colonialism to a sovereign state had taken place over a longer period and more assistance had been forthcoming in the establishment of the new state.

Europe's influence in Africa remains a dominant one. I do not mean political influence, but the influence of European languages, European culture, European customs and of course also the influence of a European economy and industrialisation.

Europe's present problems with raw materials are not nineteenth-century problems. The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century and the technological revolution of the twentieth both helped to arouse the interest of the industrial nations in continents like Africa. In the nineteenth century the iron ore for European smelting works was still mined in Europe. Sometimes European states even went to war over the mines. Today a large part of those raw materials comes from Africa and other countries. Clearly,

technical and industrial development has a considerable influence in this respect as well.

I have already said that the influence of Europe is still to be seen in the African continent. Let us not forget how debates are conducted in African parliaments and how African governments negotiate — in French, English or even Italian. European languages remain a formative influence and often serve as a unifying factor for individual African countries, as for instance when one speaks French and the other English.

When I speak of Europe, I as a democrat naturally see it in terms of the traditional values of freedom, and also, if you wish, in the tradition of the values of the bourgeois revolution of 1789: liberty, equality, fraternity. Although such words have become part of the history of ideas, they have, as we know, not been universally applied where human rights and the rights of the individual are concerned. When I think of this European tradition I am bound to point out that in the most widely differing parts of Africa — but I will not enumerate them, I would far exceed the time allowed me if I were to list all the states in which human rights are violated — human rights are violated or simply do not yet exist. This applies also to the Union of South Africa, to Rhodesia and of course also to Namibia. It does not, however, apply only to these countries, which pursue a policy of apartheid, of racial separation that is contrary to human rights; it applies equally to other states in which sometimes much worse things — the most brutal forms of torture — occur and which just cannot be described as states that know the rule of law in the true meaning of the word.

Of course, European tradition in the positive sense, the tradition of human rights and democracy, means for us as European parliamentarians that we have a special responsibility towards the continent of Africa, namely the responsibility to watch over the preservation of human rights and take action for their preservation.

Now we know that a development is under way — and here I am referring to the southern part of the continent — which raises certain hopes. I for my part sincerely hope that the attempt at an internal settlement in Rhodesia will lead to a situation in which the majority of the people of Rhodesia create, in free self-determination, a free and independent Rhodesia, or whatever they choose to call it, Zimbabwe, perhaps. Africa, thank goodness, also clings to old traditions. As little blood as possible should be spilled until this goal is reached. I think that all those still contributing to bloodshed deserve our contempt, whatever side they are on.

Mr. Müller (*continued*)

I hope too that a solution will very soon be found to the Namibia question. As a German I would say that in this respect it was one of my country's greatest pieces of luck to have lost the first world war and with it the colonies, since we were from then on free of the problem other countries had to face. But, somehow or other, there are still emotional ties with this country called Namibia, ties that place some measure of responsibility on my country. I hope we shall get a little further in the matter of Namibia too. As you know, Security Council Resolution 385 calls for the participation of the whole Namibian people in free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, for the withdrawal of the South African administration and military units, the release of political prisoners and the ending of racial discrimination.

After several rounds of talks and contacts with the front line states and Nigeria, the five western members of the Security Council — including my own country, the Federal Republic of Germany — worked out a draft solution along the lines of Resolution 385, which was distributed on 10th April of this year as an official United Nations document. To many people's surprise, the South African Government accepted this proposal on 25th April. Really, all that is still needed for a solution to be reached is the agreement of SWAPO, one of the organisations striving for Namibian independence. As we know, its agreement is still awaited.

We also know that blood is still being shed in Namibia. An example of terrorism in this country was the treacherous assassination of the chief of the largest tribe, the Hereros. We know that in the course of the conflicts going on in that area repressive measures are being taken which do not comply with our ideas of human rights.

Nevertheless, I as a politician continue to hope that a solution will be found to the Namibia question that is satisfactory for us all — possibly, one may hope, on the lines of the decision taken by the five western members of the Security Council.

And now, Mr. President, I would move on to another group of problems that has made today's debate a matter of such immediate interest and the subject of a certain amount of public attention. I am referring to the events in Zaïre — not only to the recent events, but to everything that has happened as a result. I do not agree with President Leopold Senghor of Senegal, one of the great men of modern African history and creator of the concept of negritude, that the third world war has begun in Africa, in Angola. I hope he is wrong about this, and we should all hope so.

We have all been disturbed to see that Africa has suddenly become a battlefield for spheres of influence. At the same time as we are talking about détente — and détente, or at least some slowing-down of developments, has been achieved in Europe — a conflict has now arisen outside Europe, in Africa, in an arena which is, one might say, foreign to Europe; a conflict that must necessarily cause concern to us all, particularly those who are interested in détente. For such a policy in Africa can bury all hope of détente, in Europe too. I want to say this here, quite clearly and unequivocally.

What has happened? Cuba, a country that is allied to the Soviet Union and has a Marxist-Leninist government and constitution, has manifestly become a kind of continental forward post for the Soviet Union in Africa. There is no doubt that over 40,000 Cuban soldiers are operating on African soil. I have here a very interesting map taken from the *Welt der Arbeit*, the headquarters publication of the German Trades Union Congress, which shows very clearly the areas in which large numbers of Cuban and Soviet military advisers and troops are active. This compilation shows that 23,000 Cubans are operating in Angola alone, and another 13,000 in Ethiopia, which has naturally resulted in a considerable shift in the balance of power in Africa.

We ourselves know how weak the combat forces of African states are. I do not regret this — it would be a good thing if combat forces were weak throughout Africa, because these developing countries surely need their national product primarily to build up their countries, not to buy weapons. I fear, however, that partly as a result of Cuban intervention a process has been set in motion in which an ever greater proportion of the GNP of the African countries will be spent on weapons and armaments, something that will certainly not contribute to their development.

The conflicts vary widely in their nature, and it is interesting to see that there have often been shifts of support in this respect. We know that the Soviet Union began by supporting Somalia and now supports Ethiopia. Think, too, of the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia! First Fidel Castro supported Eritrea; now he supports Ethiopia. Castro justifies this on the grounds that in Eritrea the class enemy is fighting against the progressive Ethiopian revolution. I count it, for example, to the credit of Mr. Calamandrei, an Italian communist, that the Italian Communist Party has taken the somewhat different position of saying: "in Eritrea there is not only the class enemy; our friends are there too". As you can see, something is certainly happening here that can give us a measure of hope for the future.

The most serious conflict, however, took place a few weeks ago once again, one has to say, in

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

Zaire. The province of Katanga — today called Shaba — is of course a particularly desirable prize because of its many very valuable raw materials. In this province of Zaire there has been a second invasion from across the Angolan border within one year. Opinions differ as to the amount of support from Soviet, Cuban and above all East German military advisers. But the document put before the American Congress, for example, makes it evident that the information available is incontestable.

The investigations carried out by the relevant United States agencies show that intensive training and briefing of the troops who subsequently attacked Shaba was carried out from the summer of 1976 by Soviet, Cuban and East German military advisers. No less than six training camps were identified in Angolan towns: Cazombo, Nova, Chaves, Chicapa, Saurimo and Camisombo. It is interesting to know, too, that there is a letter in which the leader of the Katangese rebels, General M'Bumbo, informed the Zambian Government that there was to be an invasion of Shaba. Here I am referring to the announcement of the second invasion. The first invasion, a year ago, was repelled with the help of Moroccan units. The second invasion this year was rather different. In order to ensure the safety of the Europeans living in the area and working in the industrial installations, foreign, European troops from Belgium and France had to be sent in. These troops have meanwhile been withdrawn and are to be replaced by units from African states.

My time is running out. I have just one or two brief comments to make and then I will finish.

In my opinion this intervention was necessary, and it was welcomed fully by many African statesmen, from Nemery to Senghor. Let me put it like this: the deployment of troops which was necessary and was carried out with American logistic support along with the flying in of African troops, shows that there is no European intervention. For once calm was restored, once the lives and freedom of the people there had been safeguarded, the troops were withdrawn. I am sure we would all be willing to provide the Cuban troops with American aircraft to take them back to Cuba so that they do not have to carry on interfering in Africa. We would be glad to have them taken back to Cuba so that peace could be maintained or re-established in Africa.

May I say the following in conclusion. In an amendment tabled to my report I welcome the efforts of the five western powers, but also those undertaken in the framework of the European Community. I think that co-ordination of a com-

mon African policy is necessary. We should support everything that helps the Africans to stabilise the situation themselves by deploying their own defence forces.

May I finish by stating a principle, as time is running out. If we are concerned to achieve peace and détente in Europe, we must not allow the development of a new source of unrest and military conflict in Africa. We must stamp out the bush fire — as the old African saying goes — as soon as it breaks out. Afterwards it is too late and the bush fire becomes a general conflagration. We in Europe and in Western European Union must not in any circumstances pursue a policy based on the Indian image you will know, of the three monkeys: see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. Keeping quiet for quietness' sake is no good if we want to maintain peace in Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Onslow to open the debate.

Mr. ONSLOW (*United Kingdom*). — Since it falls to me to be the first to do so, I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his report and on the manner in which he has presented it to us this morning. He made an extremely interesting and competent speech. We can look forward to a stimulating debate.

I shall, of course, Sir, respond to your plea that we be brief, and therefore express the hope that the Rapporteur will not take it amiss if I concentrate on one or two criticisms in the time available to me. I hope that he will accept that they are of a constructive kind.

I believe that the report could usefully have gone a little further in its definition of the extent of western interests in Africa. It is important that we be reminded, as we have been in the table, of the contribution that southern African mineral exports make to the European economy. What I would have welcomed, however, to complement that picture is a representation of the extent to which all Europe relies on the African continent for its mineral and oil imports. That would have broadened the picture. It would also have helped to underline the second criticism which I believe we need to make of the report. It would have shown us that Russia has virtually no economic interest in Africa in the sense that there are no imports which Russia needs from the African continent and which are essential to its economy; and that would have prompted us to ask ourselves what Russia's motives are in intervening in the African scene to the extent we know it does.

There are some people — and I can understand the temptation — who take the view that Russia's motives are simply to make mischief wherever

*Mr. Onslow (continued)*

the opportunity occurs. I well remember a report, going back as far as 1948 when the cold war was beginning, which defined Russia's motives as "all mischief short of war" and which was careful to show how Russia would always try to act through proxies and to establish buffers between itself and the area in which it was making trouble. You can cast the Cubans in Africa in that rôle with no difficulty whatsoever.

I believe that an analysis of Russian motives would have shown that chief amongst them must be a systematic attempt to deprive Europe of goods — raw materials in particular — which are essential to the European economy and thus to undermine that economy as part of a grand world strategy. This does not need much working out, but I should have liked to see it spelled out in the report, because we sometimes fall into the trap of becoming preoccupied with South Africa in the same way that the bull becomes preoccupied with the red rag which the matador waves in its face. Of course, we have as much hatred of apartheid and all that goes with it as the bull has of the red rag, but the real danger is elsewhere, in the other weapons which the matador takes such pains to conceal.

I suspect again that this might have been brought out in the report if it had a little more to say about the importance, for instance, of Zambian cobalt, and if there had been some more specific reference to the significance to Europe of Nigeria, which is one of the most important countries in Africa but which is scarcely mentioned in the body of the report at all.

I hope that the Rapporteur will accept that I am making these points as constructive criticisms. I recognise that he may have wished to put some things in the report but, for the sake of agreement or brevity, was unable to find a place for them. However, I should still have liked to see them there, together with some reference to the American attitude towards Africa. Even if that attitude is confused, as we see reported again in today's papers, it is nevertheless significant to Europe that America is regaining the international confidence which was so badly damaged in the tragedy of Vietnam. That must be to our advantage.

It must also be relevant to our consideration of our policy that we take note of the importance in American politics of what is known as the ethnic vote. Anyone who has heard Andrew Young on this subject must understand how conscious American administrations in general and this one in particular are of the need to carry the ethnic vote in support of their policies.

Since that is so, and since the Rapporteur is quite right in reminding us that there is less evidence of détente in Africa than anywhere else

in the world, my final criticism must be that we need to be told a little more about what our response should be. Whilst I endorse what was said about the need to restrict arms sales to African countries, and whilst I agree that this must become a more important theme of western policy, we must recognise that other responses are also required. If we are to restrict arms sales, we must replace arms with something else as an agency of peace, which is the essential precondition of economic progress.

Perhaps we should consider in the report the need to concentrate on promoting economic development in areas where it is most vital to our interests and most likely to be achieved. We should examine in another context the possibility of linking some kind of territorial integrity treaties with the Lomé Convention. That is not to say that I dismiss the importance of the need for the type of humanitarian ventures of rescuing Europeans who are in acute danger, which we saw recently in Kolwezi. Europe owes a particular debt of gratitude to the French and the Belgian forces who undertook that venture.

It is not enough to suppose that we can keep the bush fire out by setting up fire brigades. It is essential to understand that if Russian policy is moving in a certain direction, we must focus on that policy. If the dangers are economic, so must be the response. If the Russians are waging economic war in Africa, we must respond in the same way.

It does not make sense for us to continue to subsidise the Russian cold war effort whether it is by cheap credit, cheap grain or gifts of technology. We are faced with an economic offensive which requires a response in kind. I hope that the Assembly will turn its attention to that when we have passed this excellent report, as I hope we shall.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as all the political commentators have noticed, African affairs have in the last few years come to assume overriding importance for the maintenance of peace and security. Up till now the peril had always been underestimated by the West, but the grievous events in Shaba just lately have drawn this serious problem to the attention of public opinion. Without wanting to be indulgent towards the catastrophic prophecy of an African head of state, President Senghor of Senegal — who nevertheless, as one directly concerned, must be considered well-informed — to the effect that the third world war has begun in Angola, we cannot fail to acknowledge — we wish with all our might we could avert that prophecy — that Africa has become, all over from Angola to Ethiopia, from Zaïre to Chad

*Mr. Roberti (continued)*

and from Namibia to Mauretania, a huge patch-work battlefield.

Nor can it be gainsaid, despite Russian and Cuban denials, that the wave of Soviet imperialism, arrested till now at the frontiers of Western Europe by the Atlantic Alliance and in Asia by SEATO and CENTO, has swung back with amazing unscrupulousness, one may almost say arrogance, upon Africa. There is hardly any need to remind you of the impressive documentation given in a recent report by the United States secret services, submitted to Congress and alluded to just now by the Rapporteur, Mr. Müller, on the part played by the Cuban Republic in Angola in 1975 and not long ago in Zaïre; this documentation enabled President Carter, in his Annapolis address of 7th June, openly and weighing his words, to lay responsibilities for the Zaïre incidents squarely on Soviet Russia and Cuba.

Nevertheless, the parlous state of Africa would not warrant our calling upon the Assembly to deal with the problem, did it not directly involve the security of Europe whose defence is the primary object of our institution. As a fact, Africa covers Europe's southern flank and has throughout history always been the traditional jumping-off place for invasions of our continent from the south; the most elementary rules of strategy teach that for a territory to guard itself against aggression it needs to have the security of its opposite seashore.

Soviet Russia, well-known to be a continental power remote from Africa, which therefore makes no demands of a defensive order upon it, is nonetheless, directly and in collusion with its associated countries, especially the Cuban Republic, engaged upon a systematic penetration which is not just peaceful and economic but frankly political and military, which being, as I have said, unwarranted by any defensive consideration, is clearly imperialist in character and so a threat to Europe.

These are the considerations which in our view justify our concern, and therefore the recommendation, moved by Mr. Müller and admirably supported by his report, to which we have added an amendment. I will say straight away that the proposals themselves are not in the least intended to exclude the peaceful contribution of moral, economic and cultural support by any country, including of course Russia, the Warsaw Pact countries and third world, to the development and progress of African countries, old and new, but we do want to guarantee their political and military independence, Europe's security and those countries' right to a free choice, under no external duress or interference, of the ideological, political and economic régime of their preference.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate Mr. Müller on his exceptionally interesting report and on the way in which he presented his case to us. I welcome hearing a fellow parliamentarian speaking with such commitment and dedication. His report avoided the double standards that we so often see in connection with African problems, and that is also welcome.

I hope and believe that the Soviet policy of colonialism by proxy in Africa is now so obvious that the world is waking up to this new imperialism. Castro, who is striding across Africa like a twentieth-century Caesar moving his armies, is alerting African influence and the rest of the world to the depth of his intentions.

I want to refer particularly to recommendation 2, which deals with Namibia, which I was lucky enough to visit last August. Namibia does not often receive as much publicity as Rhodesia, although it is the cummerbund of Africa, with Botswana and Rhodesia.

We in the British Conservative Party believe that in Rhodesia greater encouragement should be given to those who are trying to work out the internal settlement. The lukewarm attitude which has been adopted by some spokesmen, including Mr. Andrew Young, might lead to its dying of malnutrition.

South Africa has agreed to leave Namibia by the end of this year and to give it total independence. But I believe that Namibia is now under threat. The South African Government have also agreed, as our Rapporteur said this morning, to the recommendations of the five western members of the Security Council for the holding of elections on a one-man, one-vote basis under United Nations supervision. However, this is not going ahead because of the power of SWAPO, which is exercising a kind of veto in the United Nations.

I believe that they are trying to postpone these elections for two reasons. First, they are afraid that if elections were held they might lose if SWAPO votes with the multi-racial, multi-tribal Turnhalle Democratic Alliance. The second reason is that during the period of delay new activities could take place over the border into Namibia from Angola.

I should like to give several quotations from the front page of the *Sunday Times* of last Sunday, 18th June. I point out that this is a reputable newspaper which does not always, I regret to say, support the Conservative Party in everything. It is an objective newspaper. The report, which is written from Paris, says:

“According to reliable sources here, the Russians have moved eleven senior generals into

Mr. Page (continued)

Angola. They are taking over key posts from Cubans inside the Angolan force and the Defence Ministry in Luanda."

The report goes on to state :

"At a conference in Luanda three weeks ago... it was announced that six Soviet cargo vessels would start to bring in large quantities of supplies, including tanks and artillery, for impending military operations. The first shipment has already arrived at the Angolan port of Santo Antonio do Zaire."

The report adds :

"the next phase of Soviet activity, according to my sources, will be to back invasion of Namibia as a 'war of liberation' by pro-Soviet elements of SWAPO, the guerrilla organisation which has been fighting South African troops for the last decade."

The last quotation that I wish to make from this report reads :

"The Soviet and SWAPO idea, apparently, is to try to win 'liberation' before the country, made up of mixed tribes and 10 % whites, can go to the polls."

This is another operation that is pending in Africa. Although perhaps a year ago one could say "It will never happen", after the Zaire tragedy we have to admit that it can happen now. Namibia is a huge country, twice the size of France, with a population of only 600,000. It is rich in uranium, germanium, diamonds and many other minerals which the Soviets wish to deny to the West.

I hope most sincerely that the excellent report and recommendations will receive unanimous approval by the Assembly here today. I hope that in passing it we shall remember the position of Namibia, promote its independence, support peaceful internal political development, and remain alert to the dangers of a Soviet take-over, which is now a real threat.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Page.

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the initiative which this Assembly is taking in dealing with African problems could be an excellent one. There are indeed serious problems arising in Africa at the present time : those of the independence of peoples, those of foreign military intervention, and above all — and these are the ones I would like to deal with in a little more detail because in our view they account for the existing situation — those primarily concerned with access to economic independence, the right of the

Africans to benefit from their countries' immense natural wealth which is at present being pillaged by the monopolistic companies.

Secondly, the struggle against the racist régime in Pretoria which holds over Africa a serious threat for the countries which have been liberated and been, quite recently, targets of military attacks by the apartheid countries.

In the report submitted we would have liked these problems to have been dealt with objectively and those peculiar to that continent dealt with at greater length. In point of fact we think the report is exceedingly thin, and fails to get to grips with the African realities of today. We think the Rapporteur's concern and proposals are not aimed at improving the situation in Africa but on the contrary at making it worse, for it does not deal objectively with the real problems.

Actually, this is anti-apartheid year, chosen by a unanimous vote in the United Nations. However, we look in vain in the report for any references to the struggle decided on by the United Nations and for any strong condemnation of the murders in South Africa and, in particular, since 16th June was the second anniversary of the Soweto massacres we seek in vain for any demonstration firmly denouncing these murders.

We look in vain too, and I think this is the most important, for any real analysis of what apartheid is. Apartheid is profoundly immoral, and in the report there are some faint echoes of that. We also find in the report echoes of the South African theory about superior races, but what we do not find is that other aspect of apartheid which is an integral part of it, i.e. the fact that apartheid is also an economic system. It is an economic system which relies on the exploitation of millions of human beings in order to provide maximum profits for the big capitalist companies. And there I should like to indicate what is lacking in the report, and perhaps recall a few facts to our Rapporteur's memory.

I would like to take only the example of South Africa because it is there that the nub of African problems lies. I would like to recall the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office who stated not long ago, on Thursday, 15th June 1978, that Great Britain could very rapidly mount a military operation in Rhodesia — moreover he said "Rhodesia" whereas the real name is "Zimbabwe" — comparable to that by the French and Belgian troops in Zaire in the province of Shaba.

This confirms the news published by the English newspaper, the *Daily Mail*, about a permanent force of 650 parachute commandos and squadrons of C-130 transport aircraft.

Britain is the latest investor in South Africa and it continues to recruit mercenaries and to

*Mr. Boucheny (continued)*

send military equipment to those countries from which it gets its supplies of uranium, although this is contrary to United Nations decisions.

And in order not to speak only about Britain, I should like to point out that our Rapporteur certainly knows that some of the biggest concerns in his own country, the Federal Republic: Daimler, Krupp, Siemens, AEG, Hoechst, Volkswagen, are those which exploit and use South African labour. But while on the subject of the Federal Republic, I would like to quote the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, on the firm of OTRAG, and ask the following question: is there not also some connection between the intervention of the Foreign Legion in Zaïre and the fact that a German firm can act contrary to international treaties forbidding that country to produce strategic armaments, and use a subsidiary firm OTRAG-France as an intermediary? I quote *Le Monde*: "The private company OTRAG is thus developing, for the first time anywhere in the world, a new technology for constructing rockets and space vehicle launchers using exclusively commercially-available components and materials and thus proving that a highly specialised aerospace industry is not indispensable for constructing, assembling and launching such vehicles." Thus, in Zaïre in the immense area of territory which this German company has taken over, ballistic missiles are being constructed.

I could not leave this question without quoting my own country, since three hundred big French firms, including nationalised industries, are also taking part in the pillaging of South Africa's natural wealth.

The President tells me that I have overrun my time. I shall therefore conclude, whilst regretting that we have so little time to deal with these questions.

It is a pity that the report is so lacking in objectivity and evades the real problems, including the extension of NATO to Africa, gravely endangering the world, and is silent on the vital question, that of South Africa. For it has to be said that we are opposed to intervention by foreign troops in Africa just like anywhere else in the world. But it has to be said that South Africa's intervention in Angola has been a cog in the machine; that is the aspect that must be dealt with if we want Africa to become an area of peace and the necessary conditions created for a new economic order and world peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Boucheny.

I call Mr. Whitehead.

Mr. WHITEHEAD (*United Kingdom*). — I also broadly welcome the report. The Rapporteur will understand that in the short time available for the debate we wish to draw attention to differences of emphasis, to omissions and to shadings of meaning which perhaps exaggerate the degree to which we dissent from the broad movement of the recommendation.

It is a pity that in the last two speeches, from my British conservative colleagues and from the representative of the French Communist Party, we have had assertions of a particular point of view eliminating the other side of the argument. It is a great pity that someone speaking from the position of Mr. Boucheny cannot acknowledge the really serious concern that I think all people in Western Europe ought to feel about the expansionism shown by the current policy of the Soviet Union in Africa. It is a policy which has gone so far in one area, in the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, as first to arm one side in the dispute, then to arm the other, and then to stand back and let its armed forces crush the group with which the Soviet Union was temporarily in disagreement.

It would be far better if in looking at the report we asked ourselves which are the areas where even now we might strengthen it and which are the areas to which we have to draw attention, irrespective of the partisan speeches which are inevitably made in this kind of Assembly. Only today I see from one of my own national newspapers — those "objective" newspapers that we have in Britain — that Mr. Cyrus Vance, the American Secretary of State, has made a speech in which he has specifically said that we ought to take an even-handed approach in solving the question of countries such as Zaïre, and that we should not simply say that we will rush to the support of President Mobutu and ignore the nature of Mobutu's régime and what has gone on in that country for very many years. This is to repeat and to exaggerate the error which I think other powers have fallen into in Africa in their indiscriminate support of a particular régime which has helped their own expansionist policies.

I regret that the report has one or two serious mistakes in its description of the Rhodesian problem as it stands at the moment. We should have it on record that the Anglo-American proposals, which were put forward by Mr. Vance and the British Foreign Secretary, never envisaged a fund, as the report says, to guarantee the property of the white population so as to freeze it for all time at the pre-independence level. We do not envisage that. We envisage substantial help for those who wish to leave an independent Zimbabwe after the transition of power.

Equally, we envisage that that transition of power must take place after free elections, which

*Mr. Whitehead (continued)*

will determine the nature of the régime in Zimbabwe. That is a point on which one can see now some areas of disagreement with people such as Mr. Mugabe who have announced that they want to set up a one-party state in Zimbabwe. One needs to have elections in order to see what kind of state it is to be, and those elections must take place in the transitional period which was suggested by the Anglo-American proposals as being under a resident commissioner, Lord Carver.

Even more so, it differs from the so-called internal settlement of Mr. Ian Smith and some of the African nationalist leaders within the country, which has not been internationally recognised, which is not viable and which is now so clearly in disarray that Mr. Smith, in his weekend speech, was obviously intending to swing support in my country and elsewhere in Europe behind him at the last possible moment, since he says that the guerrilla war is going on, that a great many people have been killed, and that there is no possibility that he can sell this settlement to the broad mass of the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. The report should have been fairer to the Anglo-American proposals and I am not at all pessimistic as it tends to be in its treatment of the Rhodesian problem.

Secondly, perhaps the report should have said a little more about what is going on in Ethiopia. The war that is at present being waged against the people of Eritrea is in a rather different category from some other disputes over borders which have arisen in Africa. Eritrea is an identifiable country which was annexed by the Ethiopian Empire after the last war. It is quite clear that the people of Eritrea have no wish whatsoever to be ruled by Addis Ababa and, however many Cuban soldiers or whatever are sent into that country to help the Ethiopians, it is highly unlikely that the people of Eritrea will accept forcible incorporation under the régime of the Derg, a régime which has one of the worst records on human rights of any country in Africa.

My final point on exclusions from the report is that, while I quite see that this covers broad foreign policy considerations, we ought to have had a little more about the nature of the régimes with which we are dealing. It is absolutely right that there should be some kind of Monroe doctrine spelt out by the Organisation of African Unity whereby African problems are solved by African countries in their own way, which is what they wish to do; but we have the right, also, to say that some of the régimes which survive under that kind of stabilisation are fairly disgusting affairs.

Some of them are supported by either side. France supports the régime of the ridiculous

Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire. We in the past supported the régime in Uganda, and the Soviet Union still does so, just as it supports the régime in Ethiopia whose violations of human rights have recently been on a grand scale. I do not believe we can do so and see the problems of Africa clearly, unless we accept that in many of these countries the allies of today appear to be becoming the opponents of tomorrow with, too often, very little real analysis in Europe and the United States of the nature of people.

How many people looking at the problems that have recently arisen in Shaba province and Zaïre, on which the report cannot be absolutely up to date, have accepted that this is Katanga and the people involved are the Katanga gendarmerie, many of them former supporters of Moshe Tshombe, once the hero of the right in Europe, who have caused enormous loss of life in that former province?

To see how these factions have changed sides and to understand the kind of power struggle that is continuing there is as important as deciding on whose side are the Cubans, the Americans, or the French. The fact remains that if the Soviet Union, mentioned in Mr. Müller's introductory speech, and its Cuban allies persist in an imperialist policy in Africa, they will suffer the fate of imperialist countries everywhere: they will become more deeply involved and more of their own people will be killed; and whatever short-term benefits may be reaped, in the long-term the experience will be as bloody and powerful as the experience of the Americans when they became involved in South-East Asia.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Seitlinger.

Mr. SEITLINGER (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Müller's report rightly stresses how precarious is the balance on the African continent. Africa, endowed with frontiers inherited from the colonial era and possessing mineral wealth and raw materials essential to the industrialised countries, has today become an economic and military prize for the powers who seek to gain a footing there. Because it provides outlets on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, on the Indian Ocean and on the Atlantic, this continent is of major strategic importance. It has already become a vital operational base for nuclear submarines.

Such major assets could scarcely fail to arouse feelings of covetousness. That is of course what is behind the offensive carried on by the Soviet-Cuban coalition and aimed at destabilising the continent, which we have been witnessing for several years past first in Angola and then, on two occasions, in Zaïre. In Angola, the intervention of some 20,000 Cuban troops supplied

*Mr. Seitlinger (continued)*

with Soviet equipment enabled the MPLA — the Angolan liberation movement — to wrest control of most of the communication links between the south of Zaïre and the Atlantic. The entrenching of a pro-communist régime in Angola lies at the root of the two attempts to destroy the state of Zaïre and of subversive activities in the Shaba province.

Faced with a situation like this, Europe cannot remain a mere onlooker. Because of its traditional ties with Africa, and the many agreements on co-operation built up by the French, the British and the Belgians, Europe must not allow powers from outside Africa to exploit conflicts within the continent in order to foist their economic, political and military presence on the Africans.

We cannot accept the strategy of Europe's encirclement by Africa which Lenin envisaged, just as we cannot accept the Soviet attitude to implementation of the Helsinki agreements, particularly in the sphere of human rights.

How can one fail to be amazed at such a discrepancy between the official pronouncements and the actions of this superpower, which on the one hand preaches disarmament and on the other is incessantly reinforcing the strength of the Warsaw Pact armies? We must, therefore, take a firmer attitude towards the Soviet Union, as we have been urged to do by President Leopold Senghor, who recently exhorted Europeans to abandon their fond illusions in the face of the grave threats that hang over Africa.

Obviously, we must respect the sovereignty and independence of the African countries. France's attitude has consistently — and in particular during the recent Shaba conflicts — provided an illustration of this. The French intervention in Zaïre, made at the express request of that state, had a purely humanitarian purpose and was of limited duration. Actions of this type can only be carried out with respect for certain principles which should guide the concerted efforts of the member states of Western European Union in their dealings with Africa.

The first of these principles, one that has always been upheld by the Organisation of African Unity, is respect for the frontiers inherited from colonial days. France respected that principle during the recent events, since it intervened only at the request of African countries whose existence and integrity were being threatened by separatist movements operating with outside assistance.

The second principle is the indivisible nature of détente, which cannot be confined solely to technology and trade. Détente must also apply to the ideological struggle, and hence take its place in a wider political framework.

The final principle concerns the overriding need for solidarity between the industrialised European countries and the developing countries of Africa. Such solidarity should embrace both economic and military questions, so as to meet the security needs of the African states. On the basis of these principles Europe should engage in collective action, to meet the collective threat from the Soviet Union and the allies it has found on the African continent.

This collective action should be directed against any new subversive activity, and must involve Africans, Europeans and other westerners. The Europeans should, in particular, envisage co-ordinated action covering forces as well as transport and logistics. Co-operation in defence must accordingly go beyond mere co-operation in the production of standardised or interoperable weapons, the kind of co-operation with which our Assembly is by its nature usually concerned.

The second facet of Euro-African co-operation, likewise typified by its collective character, concerns development aid in its various forms: public or private assistance, stabilisation of export income, transfers of technology and financing on privileged terms. This aid should be provided through both bilateral and multi-lateral channels.

On the strictly bilateral plane France, as you will be aware, attaches great importance to this. It devotes a far from negligible proportion of its resources — more than 0.6 % of its gross national product — to public development aid. For a long time past, France has striven to encourage organisation of the primary commodity markets, aimed at stabilising the prices of these products, and has contributed to the full development of the North-South dialogue by organising the conference on international economic co-operation. The recent Franco-African summit, which brought together nearly twenty heads of state and government in Paris, showed the importance of the bonds of friendship and co-operation uniting France and Africa.

France attaches no political strings to its aid. Its exemplary action is carried out for the benefit of Europe as a whole. Action to promote development is not, however, exclusively bilateral. The countries of the European Community have worked out a particularly advantageous system of relations with the less-developed countries.

The Lomé Convention, which they signed with these countries, specifically provides a system for the stabilisation of export income, known as "Stabex", which enables these countries to provide against price fluctuations in certain commodities of vital importance to their economies. The Lomé Convention also provides for the duty-free entry into the European Community of all industrial products, and 96 % of agricultural

*Mr. Seitzinger (continued)*

products, from the signatory third world countries.

Euro-African economic co-operation thus has extremely valuable means at its disposal. It must nevertheless be broadened in scope, for the needs of these countries are many. Only comprehensive and concerted action can measure up to the magnitude of the problem. The proposal by President Giscard d'Estaing to set up a special fund for Africa — a real Marshall plan, in which the United States would participate — deserves positive support.

In conclusion, I would say that Europe owes it to itself to ensure both that its policy of co-operation with the developing African countries is enlarged in scope, and that a joint defence policy, the only one capable of countering outside interference, is worked out.

These are the two aspects of the growing solidarity between our two continents which we shall have to develop in order to make a shared contribution to the maintenance of peace and the advent of greater justice in international economic relations. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Antoni. He will be followed by Mr. Critchley, Mr. Cruz Roseta and Mr. Pawelczyk.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the question of Europe's security and of African problems, which we were unable to deal with completely last November, comes up again for debate in our Assembly today. More than one of us at the time forcefully argued the pre-eminence to be given to the principle of sovereignty in our relations with African countries. We were among them, taking the view that independence is a precondition for social and economic development, and that it postulates a firm international basis of security, coexistence and co-operation, and therefore disarmament and détente. It was maintained at the time that the recommendation needed to be more explicit in its support of these principles. Therefore, while expressing our bewilderment at some of the points made in it, we declared our willingness to adopt a favourable stance towards approval of the amendments proposed to that effect.

The Assembly then took a favourable decision on many of these. In the meantime very serious events have followed thick and fast in the African continent. Tension, outright fighting and external military interference. Thus the threats to détente and world peace have become more menacing. We therefore consider that the updating of the previous draft recommendation

ought to have been spurred by these facts to a more clearcut stand on the principles of sovereignty, coexistence and co-operation. That is, any suggestion of positions objectively biased towards new forms of "cold war", friction and sharper clashes between opposing blocs, was to be repudiated.

As was rightly said, we must labour to "strengthen peace, not prepare for war"; someone else added that Europe should not lend itself to imagining enemies in order to construct a policy of challenge and rupture that has been represented as one of provocation and would put an end to détente.

Western Europe can therefore pursue effective action towards peace and progress by moving closer to Africa with due respect for its independence for finding a balanced solution of existing disputes, and for friendship and co-operation.

The draft recommendation before us today does not in our opinion, viewed as a whole, consistently move in that direction. Indeed even as it stands, amended and openly self-contradictory, fresh elements have been introduced which add up to a picture that fails to observe this requirement. The reality of the situation is not appraised in its entirety, but rather one-sidedly, even going so far as to represent as victims of aggression those who are possibly most responsible for the current serious state of affairs, I mean the South African and Rhodesian aggressors who by general consent are the original cause of the existing matters in dispute in Africa, and the reason for the presence of troops foreign to their solution.

By the racist nature of their régimes they are still today an element of conflict and danger for independence and self-determination in that part of the world. Hence our biggest reservations and dissent from the previous paper too.

One of our tasks is therefore to clarify our views. The goals to be aimed at, in our opinion of course, are: first, full support for the total freedom and therefore independence of all African countries; second, respect of their sovereignty against any recurrent attempts at neo-colonialist domination or outside interference from whatever quarter and for whatever reasons; third, bending every effort to encourage the autonomous development of the African states, making full use of local resources and taking account of these realities.

The fundamental instrument for doing all this remains multiple international co-operation on a basis of equity and mutual benefit, as provided for by the Lomé Convention. The general aim is Africa for the Africans.

In our view this is the historical rôle that Western Europe is autonomously able to play.

*Mr. Antoni (continued)*

We pursue those purposes which, as we have heard the Italian Foreign Minister say here, loom so large in Italy's foreign policy. We are convinced that aside from these, there is only the politics of opposing blocs, a real risk of their hardening, to the certain detriment of all.

It would in consequence mean the partition of Africa and an end to the process of decolonisation, co-operation and international détente.

It follows that external military interventions do not serve the furtherance of the process of independence and autonomous development.

So, we are agreed on the need for direct negotiations between African countries, towards internationally recognised peaceful solutions. It also seems fair to us to express concern at the lack of a joint European policy because of divergences between the countries of Europe. We believe, then, that we must work for Europe to have a unified vision and stance, and in each of its countries refrain from any other sort of interference; accordingly, any attempt to introduce reasons for tension, conflict, aggravation of the situation in Africa must be firmly rejected. We too wish to drive home our conviction that there is no alternative to détente and peaceful coexistence.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, holding such opinions, we cannot accept the recommendation in all its parts. In particular we do not share all that is expressed in paragraph 10 about South Africa and Rhodesia: we also think the next paragraph 11 ought to express general disapproval of military interventions and call for the withdrawal of foreign military forces.

We have submitted an amendment to this effect. If adopted, we believe the draft proposed could be converted into one that we could accept. We confirm at this time the balanced and responsible stand we have as Italian communists taken on numerous occasions here, and to which the Rapporteur also alluded this morning. We reaffirm our support for the part of the recommendation which reiterates the wishes of the Assembly last November, appealing to the principles of non-interference in African internal affairs and calling for control and strict limitation of sales of arms, and an embargo on the South African Republic and, let me add, Rhodesia. As we have said, we share the trend towards a European policy of co-operation and a negotiated solution of conflicts in the cause of African peace. Certainly Western Europe is greatly interested in such aims, for its own security and economic development. Therefore a more stringent commitment in that direction is now in order.

To sum up, we shall adjust our attitude according to the way in which the debate goes, and the fate of our own amendment. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — "To be uncertain is to be uncomfortable but to be certain is to be ridiculous." I offer that piece of advice to everyone, especially in connection with the problems of Africa. Unfortunately, that point of view seems to have been adopted by the United States Administration as the basis of its foreign policy.

On 7th June at Annapolis President Carter gave a pledge to help other African states "as we have done recently in Zaïre". United States aid in that instance amounted to an air lift of equipment and of Moroccan forces.

Mr. Whitehead seemed to suggest that we should discriminate between the types of country in which we might intervene. His discrimination was based on the measurement of human rights. But if we were to restrict ourselves to helping those governments of whose régimes we approve, we should probably limit ourselves to intervening on behalf of the Swiss.

Amongst all the uncertainties of Africa three main headings emerge. First, as European economic strength increases, so there is a need for Europe to extend its military — not just economic — assistance to its allies within that continent.

There can be no such thing as a European force. Clearly, it must be left to the individual nations of Europe to intervene. Clearly, within the Common Market there should always be a high degree of discussion and agreement.

The second heading in the uncertainties of Africa is that African problems cannot be exclusively the province of Africans. It is far too bland to argue that in the long term — however long that might be — the problems of Africa are insoluble. In the long term we are all dead. The problem is to try to restrain and protect the western influence in Africa when it is under challenge.

The third heading in the uncertainties of Africa is that we must be careful not to exaggerate the rôle of the Cubans. We object to the fact that they were involved in Angola. We deplore all that they have done in Ethiopia. But there has been no attack across the frontiers of Somalia. Somalia's independence should be guaranteed not by the states of Europe but by the Saudi Arabians and the Persians.

The western nightmare is that the Cubans might in future help the forces of the Patriotic Front in a full-scale war against the Salisbury

*Mr. Critchley (continued)*

régime — of whatever kind — thus obliging the West to intervene on what would look like the wrong side. There are signs that the Cubans are over-extended. They will find themselves in great difficulty over Eritrea, as Mr. Whitehead suggested, because it makes nonsense of their plea always to be fighting wars of national liberation when they are engaged on the side of the Ethiopians in holding down the national aspirations of the Eritrean people.

If the Cubans are over-extended in Angola, Ethiopia and, to some extent, in Zambia — and I believe that they are — it is unlikely that they will be prepared to intervene in civil war in Rhodesia if that means that they will have a head-on clash with the forces of South Africa.

The most important fact is that the Russians are most unlikely to intervene with soldiers in Africa, because the Soviet Union sees Africa as being ideally suited to low-cost mischief at second hand and will be prepared to fight to the last Cuban. Africa is very much part of the western sphere of influence. If we are to keep it so, the nations of Europe must, on occasion, intervene. They must do so with United States logistic, and therefore moral, support.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Cruz Roseta.

Mr. CRUZ ROSETA (*Observer from Portugal*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for allowing me to take the floor in this debate. I shall be very brief.

There is not very much I can add to a report that seems to me to be very full and to show great awareness of the importance of the African continent for democratic Europe. The draft recommendation, too, seems to me to be almost exhaustive in its coverage. I think it is very important for Europeans to condemn apartheid, which the Portuguese have consistently rejected throughout their history. It is indispensable, too, that they should help especially those countries in which human rights are respected. I do not think it matters much whether the régimes in question call themselves right or left wing, progressive or otherwise; our touchstone must be the extent to which freedoms are respected.

I hope that the consultations envisaged in the draft recommendation will in fact go beyond the framework of WEU, and that certain European countries that are not yet members of the organisation will be able to make a useful contribution to this chapter in the relations between Europe and Africa. This includes, of course, Portugal.

My country has been closely linked with Africa for centuries, and has had many exchanges, good

and bad, with the African continent. It should not be forgotten that Portuguese is the language of five African countries. Despite the scars left by decolonisation, Portugal maintains good relations with the Portuguese-speaking African states, except for Angola. It also already has very good relations with other African countries.

The three largest Portuguese political parties — the democratic parties — are in favour of a policy of aid and co-operation with African countries along the lines of, for example, the Lomé Convention.

If account really is to be taken of history and of special cases, and of the special relations of each European country — if, therefore, it is impossible to define, completely from scratch, a policy that European countries should pursue in Africa — then regular information on the interests and goals of all parties concerned is indeed, as the Rapporteur rightly observes, indispensable.

I think the consultations in question should cover not only trade and economic and technical aid, but everything connected with politics and military matters as well. And, as the Rapporteur says, the development of such consultations is what we should be demanding from our governments at a time when African problems seem to be acquiring a new, indeed world-wide importance.

Before I conclude may I express our deep concern at the situation in Angola. My party vigorously condemns the neo-colonial intervention by Cuban forces in that country. The Angolans, unlike other peoples, have not had a chance to choose their own political and social system; the system has been imposed on them from outside. The guerrilla war now raging in the country, especially in the centre and the south, is proof that, for the greater part at least, the Angolan people do not want their new masters.

In conclusion, may I say that a firm policy of friendship and co-operation between the countries of Europe and Africa is the best way to safeguard the mutual interests of both continents. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Pawelczyk. He will be followed by Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PAWELCZYK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I make a preliminary remark on the criticism voiced by Mr. Boucheny. He has accused the Federal Republic of taking part in the construction of rockets — I assume that he was also meaning nuclear developments in general — outside its own territory. I regret that this accusation is being levelled again. The Federal Republic has on several occasions made its position quite clear. The Federal Republic

*Mr. Pawelczyk (continued)*

stands out, I think, as a state which has an absolutely tiny share in the export of arms ; a state which, since 1954, has explicitly renounced the possession of nuclear weapons on its own territory and, of course, elsewhere.

I would think that anybody who has followed our policy up to now knows that we are convinced protagonists of the policy of non-proliferation, and have everywhere been urging those states which have not yet signed the treaty to do so. I think it would be helpful if these repeated statements by the Federal Government were listened to and accepted.

And now to today's debate. I believe that we can rightly claim that yesterday and today we have been having a highly important foreign affairs debate and that all the various subjects we have been dealing with are inextricably linked and must accordingly be discussed within this same context.

It is quite correct that African problems are also European problems. I belong to those who are not surprised that affairs in Africa have taken the turn they have. I think nobody who knows African history can be surprised at this. This is why I would warn against our taking snap reactions as a basis for our appreciation of foreign affairs. We must apply at least medium-term parameters. In every case where we have done this — in the Middle East and in Africa — we have already gained further experience. We have found that states which we expected or feared would prove dangerous were unable to maintain their initial successes.

Yesterday too we made it quite clear at certain points in the debate that this is so, and that there is a limit to what any of the great powers, including that in the East, can achieve. I fail to see those successes of the Soviet Union of which so much was repeatedly made in yesterday's and again in today's debates. It is for that reason that on several points I cannot come to the same conclusions.

Let us look for example at the international conferences in which the countries of the third world take part ; they have, with time, come round to a very discriminating attitude to communist policies. This used not to be so, and it is a result of western policy. We should stick to this policy of helping them by non-military means. I would draw your attention to a speech by Mr. Vance two days ago in which he said, rightly, I think, that we are competing with the states of the eastern bloc when we offer to help a state to help itself. I believe that is the right way, and we have had some success with this policy.

Nor is there any sign of the communist ideological unity which many speakers conjured up yesterday, as a threat on the horizon. This was especially obvious in the debate on China. I also believe, in common with a fellow member who was of the same opinion, that in questions of foreign and defence policy we must treat China with some reserve for on one absolutely decisive point we cannot see eye to eye with them.

Our aim is, by a policy of security and détente, to get Soviet military potential out of Central Europe. From the Chinese point of view the right policy is to pin down the Soviet military potential there. I keep wondering how we can reconcile these two basically opposing aims. It cannot be done. And this means that we Europeans must lay down our own priorities.

But here too we need not take a pessimistic view of developments. In other words, the right course is not to rely on snap judgments but to work out a concept for the medium-term. I regret that a certain pessimism has crept into the discussion when we try to assess our capabilities, a pessimism for which I find no justification.

At the end of the sixties we all arrived at an agreement to enhance our security by bringing about greater stability in East-West relations. I think we are also all agreed that the basic condition for this stability lies in parity between the two leading powers of this world. And since the sixties the United States has been prepared to accept parity.

If that be the case, there are certain possible moves open to the state which has not yet found its place in this situation of international parity. I do not think it is logical to adopt *a priori* a negative view of the steps which such a state is taking. I am of the opinion that we must discuss whether it is right to take this basic decision. But the basic decision itself has already been taken, and that has certain consequences. I welcome this basic decision, because without stability between the two superpowers there can be no stability in Europe and in the rest of the world. We must keep our attention firmly fixed on whether the Soviet Union is seeking to move from parity to superiority. That is what we must be constantly watching. However, I have not as yet seen any signs of either the strength, the capability or the support of the states of this world for such a Soviet commitment — in fact there are less and less signs of this.

What we need is a state of equilibrium in the options available. What we need is that it shall be impossible for one state to rob another of its foreign policy options as a result of having an impressive military superiority. Neither side has this superiority. Nor ought we to make the mistake of judging security solely in terms of the numbers of soldiers and tanks or aircraft.

*Mr. Pawelczyk (continued)*

Security and parity do not depend solely on the military situation, they also depend on the social and economic climate and on the internal situation of the states.

I believe that in our foreign affairs debates we should aim at having a broader definition and that security should be understood in these wider terms.

The possibilities for giving support to Africa depend in part on resources available. How do we stand in this respect? We are in a peculiar situation. Compared to the Warsaw Pact states the West spends only a fraction of its GNP on defence. We possess greater material possibilities for strengthening our security than the Warsaw Pact.

I would like to make one final point. I think it would be wrong, from a foreign policy point of view, to change the concept underlying our policy of détente, which works only as long as we deal with areas of conflict one by one and solve each problem in turn. I am, for example, against creating a link between SALT policy and African policy. Each of these problems must be dealt with and solved in its own context. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Pignion, who will be followed by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. De Poi.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I say how interesting I find Mr. Müller's report as an analysis of the subject and how weak the draft recommendation appears in comparison. Although, as a French parliamentarian, I feel the weight of the reproaches so well expressed in paragraph 6 of the explanatory memorandum, I would remind the Assembly — and this, I think, is one of the weaknesses of the report — that it was a president of the French Republic who once declared in Dakar that the one highly essential condition for the solution of African problems was to hand over Africa to the Africans and make sure that it stayed that way.

If we could be sure of our agreement in principle, a number of our problems would seem to be partially solved or, at any rate clearly perceived. How can we keep out of Chad, Mauritania and Zaïre and avoid foreign military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia, whilst devastating raids are being made into Mozambique and Angola from inside South Africa and Rhodesia? How can we avert the destabilisation of Africa and the undermining of our security?

Mr. Müller's report gave a sound analysis emphasising in particular that Europe cannot do without Africa. I would say that one of the

reasons for our difficulties is that the contrary is not absolutely true. Africa is not necessarily dependent on Europe, but it also wishes to be less and less submissive, and that is why some parts of the recommendation miss the point.

Co-operation between Europe and Africa is necessary — indeed it has now become absolutely indispensable because of Africa's coveted wealth, but the report seems to me to underestimate the African's own anxieties and give too much weight to arguments forged for the Europeans and dangerously enrolled under the banner of security.

The policy pursued by Europeans in Africa since decolonisation is now coming up against a rival project, that of the countries within the orbit of the Soviet Union. China plays only a marginal rôle here. I think the sequels of colonisation should enable us to turn the page and let them be forgotten, without allowing ourselves to be locked into a process of ideological and military escalation with the Soviet Union, which seems to be what the recommendation is suggesting and emphasising.

According to the report, one of the dangers threatening Africa, and one of the obstacles in the way of a reliable analysis of Afro-European relations derives from a number of factors, including the often artificial boundaries of the African countries. It is in my view a rather superficial analysis, and the essential point is that we Europeans should in fact create a new economic order in Africa. This new economic order would remove the temptation for Africans to turn to an external ally for the occasion who will turn out to be as much of a nuisance as yesterday's coloniser. The stable, "European" Africa was the Africa of the Berlin Congress of 1885. We all understand that such an Africa is no longer possible. How long will it take us to understand that a balkanised Africa, open to every outside influence is, in the world of today, no longer viable? On the principle I postulated of Africa for the Africans, we must listen more attentively to the voice of the Africans themselves who, as long ago as the Cairo meeting in 1964, themselves considered that the frontiers taken over from the old colonial system were politically acceptable for the time being.

It is therefore impossible to protest against the African consensus on frontiers without approving everything that is being done apart from this, in particular under the government of Mr. Vorster in pursuit of the policy of bantustanisation.

Socialists condemn any form of intervention in Africa. In our view, firm support for the OAU and its charter, respect for the former colonial frontiers and action to ensure that they are respected within the relevant international organisations, is the way to safeguard Africa's

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

stability and independence and, thereby, our own security in Europe. We must pay heed to the voice of the Africans.

In this context I would remind the Assembly of what Mr. Kaunda, the President of Zambia, has said in declaring his readiness to call in outside forces, who could only be in his mind the Cubans, if the Rhodesian problem is not rapidly solved. We have played a major rôle in Africa. Are we going to understand that European selfishness must now be hidden under a bushel, and a solution looked for in the quest for, I repeat, a new African economic equilibrium? We are partly committed in that respect by the Lomé agreements, which require us to give preference to African states.

Europe's trump card is an economically strong Africa. That is why, as far as the recommendations are concerned — and I say this to Mr. Müller in all friendliness — we are missing the real point. This has to be emphasised. The rest — the problem of frontiers to which I referred and the problem of arms sales — evokes, I think, comments lacking in force and substance. Recommending that the Council "study means of achieving a strict limitation of such sales, including enforcement of the embargo of arms supplies to the South African Republic" is a timid formulation of no great scope. We have heard better in the United Nations on the embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. Even some of the European Parliament's recommendations contain more interesting proposals, for example the idea of tackling the problem first at the economic level calling on the heads of European multinationals in South Africa not to comply with Pretoria's racial discrimination measures inside their own enterprises.

As to using respect for human rights as a criterion for European aid to African states, I say it is unrealistic and, though praiseworthy from the legal point of view, quite impracticable.

What criteria are we to use in deciding whether or not human rights are respected, and how many African states would find their already insubstantial aid suspended if this approach were followed?

Consequently, it is rather indecent to try to attach strings to economic aid to African states, whereas the report makes no proposals for exerting on South Africa, the country of apartheid, the economic pressure called for in the resolutions of the United Nations Assembly.

In conclusion, I would say that European security will depend essentially on our governments' willingness to promote the new international economic order the African states call for, which could provide the conditions for real

economic independence and thereby alleviate, and perhaps subsequently eliminate, the real or latent conflicts fed by its present instability.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I have asked for only three minutes and I doubt that I shall even use those, because I have no wish to stand between this Assembly and the important votes that are to follow, but, as a member of the Committee which has worked with Mr. Müller, I must make one or two observations.

I have not heard this morning the very real difference — one which we must appreciate — drawn between the presence of foreign troops who go to a country in pursuit of the aims of an external power and that of troops who are asked by the country threatened to defend its frontiers. This is precisely the arrangement that exists with us in NATO. There are, for instance, in my own country at the moment substantial numbers of American forces, and there are in Belgium and Germany large numbers of other forces also. We really must draw a distinction, if we are to be honest, between forces which are asked to defend frontiers and forces which come in in order to engage in conflict, either within or outside the borders of a sovereign state.

I heard our communist colleague say that he was putting the blame for the presence of foreign troops on the shoulders where it ought to lie, that is to say, those of Rhodesia and South Africa, because otherwise there would not be any Cubans in Africa. I think that our colleague ought to have a look at the map. How he can justify the presence of Cuban troops, first in Somalia and then in Ethiopia, in the context of Rhodesia rather baffles my comprehension. The two issues are entirely disconnected.

Finally, in the context of yesterday's debate, when there was so much international fuss about the prospect of a couple of western countries supplying modest arms at the request of another country in the third world, China, there has been strangely lacking from the speeches of some of those who were so angry yesterday about the prospect of any sales to a friendly China any condemnation of the enormous supplies of men, equipment and ammunition which have been sent to Africa by the Soviet Union. If there were to be fuss, I should have expected to have heard today at least some of the same sort of condemnation that I heard yesterday concerning the prospect of even limited arms supplies to China. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our Western European countries have for many years thought that their own defence and the essential points of external policy world-wide were other people's business, a matter not to be directly handled by themselves. Yet the concern voiced throughout the debate by the whole Assembly not only on this but on other topics proves that the Europeans and the Western European countries do finally want to get defence and foreign policy, the essential factors affecting their security, back into their own hands. At a time when the outlook for a conflict affecting sources of energy and supplies closely bound up with our continent's future possibilities is ominous, it is finally being realised how much the future of our countries depends on that of the African countries in which a new imperialism is taking shape with a total reversal of the previous rôle and attitudes in respect of the liberation of peoples, of the rôle and attitudes of the liberation movements themselves.

Unfortunately, liberation movements and their credibility are at the present time in Africa handicapped by an aid that is certainly not disinterested, not to say by unwarranted interference in African affairs, and the same is true of world peace inasmuch as we, like the African countries are called upon to defend the stability and equilibrium of the African continent.

We are bound to notice that in the Horn of Africa there is disquiet at the massive Sovieto-Cuban type presence that constitutes a permanent threat to stability and peace in Africa. We are bound to try and encourage détente in the Horn of Africa, Shaba and ex-Spanish Western Sahara; we are bound to tell the people of Ethiopia to understand and accept the autonomous development of the Eritrean nation within the framework of United Nations decisions and peaceful cohabitation in an entire region. We are bound to point to the fact that the dispute in the Western Sahara should be steered towards a negotiated settlement safeguarding that people's legitimate rights. We are bound to remember the very grave danger in which thousands of European workers, of Italian fellow-nationals, also stood during the recent fighting in Shaba.

Such are the reasons why we ought to remind Europe that it has a direct stake in keeping the peace, and certainly we need no such reminder from the President of Senegal. He assuredly proves himself at this time to be more sensitive to problems of Europe's future than the Europeans themselves, and we are also disturbed at attitudes, noted elsewhere, of wishing somehow to exclude Europeans from direct collaboration in the security of the African states; this was made clear by certain recent manifestations occurring at the instigation of the United States itself.

At a time when an initiative by President Giscard d'Estaing had again proposed a genuine European interest in and collaboration with the countries of Africa, the same old view was taken that world security and peace should solely reside in the decisions and availabilities of the two biggest powers, with the risk that this would not diminish but aggravate the dangers of tension and aggression, and doubts about what effective will the superpowers really have towards world peace and détente.

Hence, just when the second Lomé Convention is in process of renegotiation, I believe we have to include in it a political chapter on the human rights often violated in Africa, and on political solidarity.

We are bound also to encourage any serious initiatives by Europe within the community framework and inside WEU itself to clarify, and add force to, the policy of support for the peaceful future of the African peoples.

I think, therefore, that while accepting in general Mr. Müller's recommendation and congratulating him on the excellence of his report, there are a few things that ought to be added, as Mr. Müller himself proposed in an amendment, by way of clarification as far as concerns the contradictions and smudging of outlines of a policy that in some of its aspects attempts to uphold the logic of boundaries recognised by the Organisation of African Unity. This logic was accepted by the amendment proposed by Mr. Kershaw, Mr. Page and Sir Frederic Bennett, just as the amendment tabled by Mr. Cavaliere clarifies sufficiently, I think, certain underhand motives and attitudes that escape no one.

I think these three amendments can convey more precisely, but without distortion, the meaning of a concern, an indication that is surely obvious in the draft amendment as proposed. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The list of speakers is completed. I now ask the Rapporteur whether he wants to add a word. I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the lateness of the hour does not permit me to deal in detail with everything that has been said in the debate. I would however like to express my thanks for the many and varied contributions we have been privileged to hear during the last two hours. May I quote at this point a fellow member whose political opinions I certainly do not share. Our fellow member, Mr. Antoni, an Italian communist, said that in this Assembly we should say openly where we have differing views. In my opinion that is a useful contribution to the exchange of

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

political views which we conduct in this Assembly. It is always a good thing to say quite openly what one's position is.

Rather than deal in detail with the speeches made by our different colleagues, I shall make some short remarks about one or two of them.

First of all, I would like to thank our guest from Portugal for his remarks. Portugal has, I think, had a great deal of experience in Africa, and can be of great assistance in maintaining good relations between the African states and Europe. It is precisely because of the great experience Portugal has that I would especially like to thank Mr. Cruz Roseta for mentioning the state of affairs in Angola, and emphasising that the people there want a change of government and that intervention was forced on the country from abroad.

It would be very intriguing to start a large-scale debate on foreign affairs with Mr. Pawelczyk. He tried to discuss the policy of détente beyond the frontiers of Africa. He will not hold it against me if I say that I do not share his views. I am not convinced that the Soviet Union is a power which still has to strive for parity. I have my doubts whether the western side is in a position of full parity with the eastern bloc and with the Soviet side.

On one point, however, I do share his views. I do not belong to the pessimists. I believe that the free world, if it knows what its task is — but only if it knows what its task is — has every reason to look to the future with optimism and not pessimism.

Of course we could have expanded the report. We could have published an additional volume. We shall continue to concern ourselves in the General Affairs Committee with African questions, for things are constantly changing on a continent which once upon a time was known as the "dark continent", not because of its political colour or of racial prejudice, but simply because people were not clear as to what was happening there. I might almost add that for us in WEU, too, Africa has long been a somewhat dark continent because we rather neglected it, down there in the southern part of the globe. Now we are being forced by events to concern ourselves more closely with it.

I must comment on what our fellow member, Mr. Boucheny, said. His contribution was the only one which was somewhat out of place — and not because he attacked the Federal Republic because of a private firm which is testing in Zaïre rockets that could one day be used to put communication satellites into orbit cheaply. No, what really surprises me is that on 22nd

February 1978 Mr. Boucheny put a written question to the Council of Ministers to which he received an answer of which he evidently has taken no note, either because he was not able to, or because he did not want to. I would like, Mr. President, to assure Mr. Boucheny that it would be fascinating to discuss monopolies in Africa, but the lateness of the hour does not allow this. And, in any case, to do so would be to attach too much importance to his intervention.

There is one remark, however, that I should like to make. Mr. Boucheny said that I had neglected South African problems. I had, for example, not mentioned the anniversary of the Soweto massacre. I might tell Mr. Boucheny that I did not mention any massacre, since if I were to make a list of all those which have taken place in equatorial Guinea or in Uganda or elsewhere, then I would have had to attach a lengthy supplement to this report. I did not mention any particular state, but merely said in general that human rights had not only been violated in South Africa but also elsewhere. I would like to leave it at that.

If Mr. Boucheny would look at the report, he would see that of the columns that deal with Africa in detail eleven deal with the South Africa-Rhodesia-Namibia group of countries, and five the rest of Africa. I almost blame myself for the report being somewhat lacking in balance, in that perhaps I put the South African problem too much in the foreground. I only wanted to put this matter right in order that the minutes shall not continue to present a one-sided picture.

One further remark on monopolies. Mr. Boucheny has an excellent opportunity of taking part in the fight against the monopolies of South Africa, a matter which he mentioned. He knows that the marxist republic of Mozambique sends hundreds of thousands of foreign workers to South Africa to work there. The only difference between the pay they receive and the pay of the others who work in South Africa is that a large part of the money which these workers from Mozambique earn is not paid out to them personally but is paid direct to the Government of Mozambique. Mr. Boucheny should use his influence in order that his proletarian friends from Mozambique get the same pay as the others who work in the factories of South Africa. He would introduce a helpful gesture of class solidarity — to use his own terminology — into the debate if he prevailed upon Mozambique to see to it that the workers there receive the same pay as the other black workers in South Africa.

Once again, Mr. President, I offer my thanks, and I hope that we have all recognised how important the African problem is for us. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now call the Chairman of the Committee, Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the debate on Africa has, Heaven knows, certainly shown that we in Europe have all really begun a serious debate on Africa much too late. Each of our countries up to now has pursued its own special interests but without having an African policy as such, although I would not say the one country has done more or the other country less. There is no point in trying to throw reproaches at each other. What is much more important is that we should try at long last to get down to joint consideration of what should be done.

That was why I put a question to the Council asking whether consultations with the other WEU countries took place on the occasion of the recent intervention by France and Belgium in Zaïre. It was not so much that I wanted to criticise the event itself, but it seems to me extraordinarily important that there really should be discussions before action of this kind is taken. Otherwise what is the use of the Council of Ministers, whose job it is to take joint decisions on matters of European security and defence?

We should remember that joint measures of support in Africa are in any case a very tricky matter. Really, such measures can reasonably be considered only in quite close consultation with the Africans, in this case with OAU, however little the OAU may on the whole be able to do at the present time. We are continually emphasising that there must be respect for the sovereignty of African states and their decisions. We ought to be quite strict in applying this principle.

The report is of course far — and it was obvious from the outset that it is bound to be — from covering all the problems and all the burning issues in Africa today. But the most important things have been mentioned. With the permission of the Presidential Committee we will take the opportunity of discussing Africa again at the next session.

I would like to add only one remark on southern Africa. The problem of apartheid is becoming more and more threatening and a smouldering source of danger. There is one aspect in particular we should consider. In recent years the South African Government has enforced apartheid more and more ruthlessly, with the result that the generation of black Africans now growing up no longer has any personal contact with whites. They are not allowed to. As a result white people exist for them only as the oppressors above any other. I consider this a very

dangerous element in the situation in South Africa, and it should give us pause for reflection.

As for Namibia I agree with Mr. Page that what the *Sunday Times* wrote is certainly quite true. But it is equally true that the sudden incursion of South African troops into Angola has caused extreme instability, which in turn has jeopardised the initiative of the five states, which we all welcome. Let us hope that the initiative of our five member states nonetheless results in an early solution in Namibia.

Western European Union should seize this opportunity of becoming, so far as possible, a partner of Africa, without however forgetting that Africa consists of independent states and that it is not for us to tell the Africans what they should do. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The debate is closed.

Later I shall inform the Assembly about the arrangements for voting on the amendments and the draft recommendation.

Yesterday we decided that we should have the vote on the amendments to the draft recommendation, Document 770, at about noon.

### 5. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — We decided in the Presidential Committee that two members should be called in accordance with the Minutes.

First I call Mr. Valleix and then I shall call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Presidential Committee, which convened yesterday at the request of the French Delegation, decided that the latter would be given leave to present explanations of their vote on the report on security in the Mediterranean. These explanations will be shown in the Minutes of Proceedings of the discussions of 20th June on this report.

The French Delegation is unanimously of the opinion that it was unable either to defend most of the amendments tabled by its members or to give any explanations of its vote. It deplores the confusion and misunderstandings that arose during that sitting. In particular, it stresses that those of its members who were to speak in the debate were officially informed at the end of the morning that the Orders of the Day would be changed, but right at the very end of yesterday morning's sitting it was decided not to. This was the reason which prevented several of our colleagues from being present to defend the amendments they had tabled, although due note was taken that they were present at the

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

appointed time, in accordance with the information given.

The delegation also deplores the manner in which the vote was taken, just when its members had withdrawn for a few minutes to take counsel among themselves about the discussions. So much haste at this stage of the sitting made it impossible for any French representative to request, as he is entitled to do, a vote by roll-call which, as you are aware, requires a quorum.

For that reason, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the French Delegation does not consider itself bound by the vote that was taken. It cannot endorse any decision arrived at in such conditions, and it would remind you of the positions adopted by its members on the substance of the report, in opposition to the draft recommendation on security in the Mediterranean. As leader of the French Delegation, I believe I am expressing the view of my country's representatives in confirming their disagreement, whatever the reasons on which their attitude is based.

At the request of all my colleagues, I formally move on their behalf that the present statement be entered, as agreed, in the Official Report and especially in the Minutes of Proceedings of the debate on security in the Mediterranean.

I also demand that the explanations of vote tabled with the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly yesterday afternoon, 20th June, should be added to the Minutes of Proceedings, having been submitted in writing.

Lastly, Ladies and Gentlemen, there is also perhaps a practical lesson to be drawn from the difficulties into which we ran at yesterday's sitting. Therefore, as it has become the established practice not to apply the provisions of Rule 34 (3) which makes it compulsory to take a vote by roll-call on all draft recommendations and opinions, my delegation requests that at the very least voting should be announced in advance, for example, by an audible signal.

The French Delegation requests the President of the Assembly to communicate the present statement for information to the Council of Ministers of WEU, since the recommendation itself is addressed to them. If our Assembly will accept the terms of this communication, I believe we shall all be rendering a useful service. I beg you to be so friendly as to agree that in yesterday's incident there was also an element of good will on the part of several new and often distinguished colleagues, who were attending their very first session in our Assembly — but is there anything wrong with that? In that way, the progress of our deliberations and the conditions in which they were conducted ended up by

causing a certain amount of confusion. Therefore, if we succeed in drafting this agreement, I hope you will take due note of the French Delegation's wish to associate itself as actively as possible in the work. And so we should be very grateful if you would ensure that the French position on the substance of the report is recognised for what it is worth. Our future proceedings can only stand to gain from it.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix. We shall take your intervention into the Minutes and proceed according to your proposal.

I now call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, at yesterday's sitting of 20th June, when a point of order was raised, I asked that the explanations of vote I intended to give on behalf of the French communist representatives and had been prevented from doing so should be recorded in the Minutes of Proceedings. It was our understanding, Mr. President, that you were in agreement, but I find no trace of my submission in the Minutes of Proceedings.

Yet we consider it necessary that the reasons why we opposed the report on security in the Mediterranean should be clearly set out. In our view the report is no contribution to peace and disarmament. On the contrary, the measures which it advocates, by strengthening the policy of blocs with a joint policy for sales of arms, could only exacerbate existing tensions and conflicts in this part of the world. We condemn, *inter alia*, the proposals for building up Turkey's military potential, the reintegration of Greece into NATO and the admission of Spain.

Furthermore, the report does not support the United Nations resolutions for bringing peace to the Middle East by taking into account the reality of the state of Israel and the rights of the Palestinian people.

In a general way, we think that to pave the way for peace we must banish any thought of detracting from the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations and the nations' right to self-determination.

Lastly, as already stated in the French Parliament, we consider that the Mediterranean must be made a nuclear-free zone, without any foreign bases, in which the fleets of the United States and the Soviet Union on station there would be limited, and eventually withdrawn.

That, Mr. President, was what we intended to say yesterday. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you both for those explanations, which will be taken into the Minutes of yesterday as an amendment.

Thus I think the Minutes can be agreed to.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — You have a point of order?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want to prolong the discussion, but the incorporation into the Minutes of Proceedings, as distinct from the official record, of statements is a very remarkable precedent which you are creating, Mr. President. Without in any way wishing to disturb it at this time, I believe that the incorporation of speeches into the Minutes is something which may well be abused in future, and I hope that you will consider very carefully before allowing this to become a precedent.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper. Before a final vote anyone is entitled to give an explanation of vote to make clear his intentions. I rank this as an explanation of vote since the member was unable yesterday to give an explanation because of what happened. If I am wrong, we must discuss this in the Presidential Committee, which meets tonight.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry, Mr. President, to intervene again, but it is very important that we be accurate in these procedural matters. An explanation of vote or alternatively a comment on the Minutes is, of course, completely correctly recorded in the Official Report of the Proceedings, and this is what would normally occur. What you appear to have agreed to today — and this is what I wished to challenge — is an incorporation into the Minutes of Proceedings which, as you will see from our Rules of Procedure, are intended only to have incorporated the names of members present and the decisions that were taken.

It is most unusual to incorporate the text of speeches in the Minutes of Proceedings as distinct from the Official Report of our proceedings, and I wanted to make sure there was no error of language in what you or Mr. Valleix had said.

The PRESIDENT. — If there is any discussion about it, I propose that we give this intervention of Mr. Deschamps to the Committee on Rules of Procedure, which can deal with it this afternoon. Is that agreed?

*(The President continued in French)*

(Translation). — This afternoon the Committee on Rules of Procedure will be discussing the problem, Mr. Deschamps.

## 6. China and European security

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 770 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — We come now to the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 770 and Amendments.

Before we vote on the draft recommendation itself, we will deal with the amendments.

I should like to point out that, before the final draft recommendation is voted on, I have two members who wish to speak to their vote, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Calamandrei.

The first amendment is Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Rubbi. The first part reads as follows:

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "determination" add "shared by all the peoples of the world."

Does Mr. Rubbi want to speak?...

Does anyone wish to speak against?...

What is the opinion of the Rapporteur?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I have consulted the Chairman on these matters and my opinion is that these amendments should not be accepted. We arranged matters in the Committee and voted in a certain way in accordance with what I might describe as a "package deal" within the Committee. The effect of these amendments would be to destroy the whole meaning of the report, which is a report on what China feels about international relations and which is not meant to be a global review. If we delete the second paragraph of the preamble, we are apparently not even prepared to accept that "resistance to external aggression... is a fundamental element in Chinese political thinking". There is nothing ideological or offensive in that. After the visit to China on which this paper is based, it was obvious from the statements of every Chinese minister every day of the week that resistance to external aggression was a fundamental element in Chinese thinking. We should recognise this fact.

In regard to the first paragraph of the recommendation, it is suggested that we should stop at "security". In this Assembly we are now apparently to be told that we cannot even study the views expressed by China. It is not a question of accepting them; we are told by our communist friends that we are not even allowed to study them.

I suggest that we proceed rapidly and without further explanation from me to reject these amendments en bloc.

The PRESIDENT. — You have heard the opinion of the Rapporteur.

I shall now put part 1 of the amendment by Mr. Rubbi to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 1 of Amendment No. 4 is negatived.*

Part 2 of Mr. Rubbi's Amendment No. 4 reads:

*The President (continued)*

2. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble.

We have already heard from the Rapporteur in regard to this. Does he wish to add anything ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I thought that in my remarks I had covered all three parts. I said that if we adopted the amendment, it would destroy even the good sense of the document. I think that my colleagues would like to know the opinion of the Chairman of the Committee. I believe that her opinion on this coincides with mine.

*(Mrs. von Bothmer indicated assent)*

The PRESIDENT. — The Chairman of the Committee agrees with the opinion of the Rapporteur.

We now have to vote on part 2 of Mr. Rubbi's Amendment No. 4, which I have already read out to the Assembly.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 2 of Amendment No. 4 is negatived.*

I understand that Sir Frederic Bennett does not intend to move his Amendment No. 1.

I now call upon him to move his Amendment No. 2, which reads :

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the third paragraph and insert :

“Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government's continuing efforts to develop good relations with Europe ;”

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — The whole purpose of the amendment — to which I do not think anyone can object, because it is not a point of substance — is one of courtesy. I have looked up the precedents, and it appears that when a country expresses wishes to have good relations with us, we welcome this rather than simply noting it. This is purely a matter of courtesy. I have discussed it with the Chairman of the Committee and we are happy that this change should be made. As I have already indicated, it is not a matter of substance. I think that Madam Chairman has agreed to it.

*(Mrs. von Bothmer indicated assent)*

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — My colleague Sir Frederic Bennett has said that the amendment follows precedent. May I ask whether the precedent includes the use of the words “and reciprocating” ? Is not that an addition ?

The PRESIDENT. — Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I spent a great deal of time in looking at past reports of the Council of Europe and of Western European Union. I do not have them with me but I am sure that I found one instance in which we reciprocated. If I have misled my colleague Mr. Roper, I still would not feel it necessary to apologise, because I presume that if we welcome something, we also wish to see reciprocation. Every speech from every side yesterday reciprocated the wishes to have friendly relations with China. If I have gone beyond the precedents, I apologise, but I spent about an hour yesterday in looking at them. I think I am right in my recollection about there being one precedent for the use of the word “reciprocation”, but if I am wrong I still suggest that we should leave the wording of the amendment as it stands.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*). — Mr. Chairman, may I ask you to clarify once again the wording of the paragraph ?

The PRESIDENT. — The wording of paragraph 3 is replaced by the following :

“Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government's continuing efforts to develop good relations with Europe ;”

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On the order paper the words are “Delete paragraphs 3 and 4”. What does Sir Frederic Bennett now intend ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I thought I had made clear yesterday — and I said it twice during my speech — that because of my position as Rapporteur I would not be moving the other amendments that were originally printed in my name, because, unless I could move an amendment which I had cleared with the Chairman of the Committee, I felt it not right to do so. I withdrew the amendments yesterday and the amendment which I have just moved appears on the order paper only in my name.

The PRESIDENT. — The question is whether this is instead of paragraph 3 or is a new paragraph 4.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The question is whether it is, as it appears on the order paper, in place of paragraphs 3 and 4, or as you have just read out, Mr. President, only in place of paragraph 3.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I apologise to Mr. Roper a second time. The wording on the order paper is wrongly printed. I have only just noticed it and it is not my error. This amendment refers only to the third paragraph, otherwise it would involve a matter of substance.

The PRESIDENT. — As far as I can see, there is no doubt that instead of paragraph 3 there is a new paragraph 3 reading "Welcoming and reciprocating" and so on.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — That is correct, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — We must know what we are voting on. Instead of the paragraph 3 as printed in the order paper, we have the new paragraph 3 which reads "Welcoming and reciprocating..." which Sir Frederic Bennett is proposing and to which the Chairman of the Committee agrees. Is that correct?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — That is correct, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall therefore vote on this amendment by Sir Frederic Bennett.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.*

We now come to the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Rubbi to move paragraph 3 of his Amendment No. 4, which reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, delete from "and study carefully" to the end of the paragraph.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I dealt with this in my earlier remarks because I thought, Mr. President, that you were taking them all together.

The question of "studying carefully" is the result of a very considerable compromise during the Committee stages. I have the agreement of the Chairman of the Committee that this amendment should be rejected. It really is verging on the ridiculous to say that if we are going to have friendly relations with a country, we are not even prepared carefully to study its views. It does not say "accept their views"; it merely says "and study carefully" their views.

The PRESIDENT. — Is the Chairman of the Committee in agreement?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall therefore vote on part 3 of Amendment No. 4.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Part 3 of Amendment No. 4 is negatived.*

I understand that Sir Frederic Bennett does not intend to move paragraph 2 of his Amendment No. 1.

I call Mr. Handlos to move his Amendment No. 3, which reads:

In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows:

"4. Consider objectively, in accord with already-declared British and French policy, any requests by China to purchase defence equipment."

Mr. HANDLOS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to move the amendment by Mr. Page and myself, Document 770, Amendment No. 3. The document on China and European security has obviously attracted the close attention of the Soviet Union. Although this document — and I would remind members of this, just as Sir Frederic Bennett himself pointed out — was confidential, the USSR got hold of a copy before some of the western governments. It is absolutely unprecedented that the Soviet Union has attempted, as we know it has done through Great Britain at least, to put pressure on Western European Union to prevent this document being submitted.

At the same time, I would remind members that both the British and the French Governments — the Secretary of State concerned spoke to the Assembly the day before yesterday — have stated that they are ready to co-operate militarily with China. I repeat: both governments have stated this.

What does our amendment in fact say? All it says is more or less that we should consider objectively whether defence equipment — not offensive weapons — should be supplied to China. I do not see, for example, why the supply of anti-tank weapons — a point raised yesterday — should endanger countries such as Taiwan or the USSR. I recall the excellent speech we heard yesterday from Mr. Faulds of Great Britain, a Labour Party member, in which he made all these things crystal clear: that the Soviet Union had as yet shown no signs of drawing closer to us on international disarmament or in other fields. Yesterday, moreover, there was no discussion of the fact that we will shortly be subject to pressure from the Soviet Union in another connection. I would remind members of the neutron bomb debate and of the great pressure the Soviet Union exerted on this Assembly as it tried to prevent western parliaments and western governments from taking a decision. We all know how the whole thing ended. The Soviet Union has not yet accepted the neutron bomb as a matter for negotiation.

I hope therefore that this Assembly will not back down a second time to pressure from the Soviet Union. I hope you share my opinion that it is quite right and proper for the Assembly to study objectively the supply of defence equipment to China.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Margue.

Mr. MARGUE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — I think what has just been said is a good example of "confusionism". There is no question here of our submitting to a *diktat* by the Soviet authorities who have apparently been flat-footed enough to make representations to one government or another, as if doing so could prevent us parliamentarians from altering our stance in this Assembly. But that is not what it is all about. What we are doing is approving a document in which we ask that any request by China for military equipment be examined objectively, which means favourably.

This document is not about defensive military equipment but military equipment period. Moreover the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons is sometimes very artificial. Most of them can be used both ways. I would therefore ask the Assembly not to add a further amendment to a document that is in any case highly debatable.

The PRESIDENT. — You have heard the pros and cons. We now come to vote on the amendment.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I was hoping to hear the opinion of the Chairman of the Committee on this amendment. I understand that the Committee has already rejected this form of words.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Madam Chairman of the Committee.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the overwhelming majority of the Committee considered that we should not discuss arms supplies and that we would not vote in favour of such an amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — There is one minor correction. In fact, I withdrew the amendment. We did not have a vote in the Committee on it. Therefore, Madam Chairman is slightly wrong in that we do not know what the majority opinion of the Committee was. I said again yesterday that because the Committee were not united on this — and I go no further than that — I did not wish to move this amendment myself, nor speak in support of it. Madam Chairman takes a different view from me over this and I am quite content with that situation.

The PRESIDENT. — I think we accept the situation of the Rapporteur having officially withdrawn the amendment. He did not speak in favour of it or against it. As we have heard, Madam Chairman, we can vote on it.

Mr. MARGUE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — I note that the French text does not correspond with the English. The English says "defence equipment", whereas the French, on which I based the remarks I have just made, says "military equipment", without specifying whether it was defensive. Which are we voting on, the English or the French ?

The PRESIDENT. — As I am always going along with the British language, I have the British text which says "defence equipment". If the French text is different, I cannot go into all the details as it is not my duty to compare the texts. I go along with the English version, which is "to purchase defence equipment".

Mr. MARGUE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — Has the French text been changed ?

The PRESIDENT. — I must ask those who tabled the amendment whether the original text had the words "defence equipment" or "équipement militaire". What was the original text ? I think we must be clear that the French text is in the meanwhile rectified. The French text reads now as follows, and we shall make the French text and the English text concur, because this is vital for the vote.

*(The President continued in French)*

(Translation). — The text reads: "Consider objectively, in accord with already-declared British and French policy, any requests by China to purchase defence equipment."

*(The President continued in English)*

Is that correct now ?

We shall now vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 3 is negatived.*

Before we come to the vote on the draft recommendation, I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — Mr. President, on behalf of the Socialist Group, I wish to give an explanation of vote. I shall do so in the Dutch language.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). — The great majority of my group will not be withholding support from this recommendation, but we do want to make it quite plain that we have strong objections to the language used by the Rapporteur in his report, as well as to the spirit of the report. There is, for instance, the way the Rapporteur talks about disarmament. As a great many socialist members have made clear during the debate, it is an abomination to think that selling

*Mr. Stoffelen (continued)*

weapons and continuously building up weaponry will lead to disarmament.

We have serious objections, too, to the way the Rapporteur talks about the policy of détente. To quote from paragraph 102 :

“Moreover ‘détente’ as it is deemed the Russians interpret it, is as harshly criticised in Peking as being just another way of spelling appeasement as it is in the most conservative circles in the West. The fact that your Rapporteur shares this evaluation does not detract from the accuracy of this analysis of Chinese thinking, as any visitor to Peking would speedily find out within twenty-four hours of his arrival.”

I can also mention as an example the alacrity and enthusiasm with which the Rapporteur quotes the famous text: “The enemies of my enemies are my friends.”

I have already mentioned the spirit of the report, one against which we want to protest. Nevertheless, the great majority of the Socialist Group, too, feels that political and commercial relations with China must be strengthened and for this reason will, for by far the greater part, not be withholding its support from this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Rubbi in his speech during the general debate yesterday indicated the context and spirit in which we representatives of the Italian communists were prepared, in a sense of responsible goodwill, to give a favourable vote on this recommendation. The spirit in which not long since we voted in favour of the amendment moved by Sir Frederic Bennett, the same spirit, voiced yesterday, may I say, with great clear-sightedness and efficacy, at the end of the debate by Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee. Unfortunately, the Rapporteur rejected our amendments, confirming in the terms of his reply yesterday evening, unyielding and truculently, the one-sided and axe-grinding character of his explanatory memorandum, and furthermore, the same Rapporteur seems to me to have taken a very ambiguous stance towards Mr. Watkinson’s amendment.

It is therefore the Rapporteur who is responsible for preventing us from expressing by a vote of the Assembly the hope for a development of friendship between our countries and the People’s Republic of China in the framework of peaceful coexistence, co-operation, collaboration, non-interference and non-intervention in every direction.

By voting against the recommendation, we representatives of the Italian communists also consider we are consistent with the foreign policy orientations of the present Italian Government which looks to the development of relations with that great country, the People’s Republic of China, with specific reference to the context of peaceful collaboration of all peoples and states, with no exclusions, prejudices or opposition.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We shall now proceed to vote by roll-call on the draft recommendation, as amended.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Schwencke.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows <sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast . . . .	54
Ayes . . . . .	44
Noes . . . . .	8
Abstentions . . . . .	2

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted <sup>2</sup>.*

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Faulds.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — I raise this point of order now, as we have been discussing the Bennett report, Mr. President, and because I think it is a very serious matter that we should consider. We now know that Sir Frederic Bennett’s report was leaked to a foreign government outside WEU and that this led to the extraordinary incident of the insolent Russian representations about the report to various European governments.

I am making no accusations. We do not know whether the report was leaked by a delegate or by a member of the staff. We do not know whether it was leaked by someone else working here. I wonder whether it would not be advisable for there to be set up within WEU an investiga-

1. See page 29.

2. See page 31.

*Mr. Faulds (continued)*

tion into how the leak took place. Unless we stop it, or try to find out why it happened this time, it may happen on future occasions with other important reports, and may lead to repetitions of this sort of intervention from outside governments, which have absolutely no right to make representations about such matters.

May I, therefore, Mr. President, suggest that this issue be examined and, if necessary, discussed within the Presidential Committee?

The PRESIDENT. — We shall put this intervention before the Presidential Committee, which will meet tonight, and we shall see what we can do in this respect. I fully see the situation as Mr. Faulds has described it.

### **7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 773).
2. Application satellites (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 766).
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 775).
4. European security and African problems (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 772 and Amendments).
5. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (Resumed Joint Debate on

the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Question and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Documents 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment).

Does the Assembly agree that we start at 3 o'clock this afternoon?

Is there any objection?...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As you will remember, Mr. President, from the remarks of Mr. Treu in the debate at the beginning of the Assembly, our principal statutory responsibility as an Assembly is to receive the report from the Council and to debate the reply of this Assembly to it. For the fifth successive time that particular item has been placed as the last order of the day for a succeeding sitting. On four occasions we have seen what has happened — that item has not been reached. Are we to finish this sitting without fulfilling our sole statutory duty, that is, to discuss the report from the Council of Ministers and the reply of our Assembly to it?

The PRESIDENT. — I beg your pardon, Mr. Roper. I said that at 4 o'clock we might break, as we have done today, first for the vote on European security and African problems and, secondly, for the twenty-third annual report of the Council. We have still four speakers on the list who will have a chance to take the floor, and then we shall vote. Meanwhile, we must postpone the other items on the agenda which have not been covered by 4 o'clock.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry, Mr. President. I misunderstood you and thought that the break would apply only to European security and African problems.

The PRESIDENT. — As I have said, we shall break for the vote and, preceding the vote on the twenty-third annual report, there are four other representatives in the chamber to take the floor.

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.)*

# FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 21st June 1978

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology; Application satellites (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 773 and 766*).

*Speakers*: The President; point of order: Mr. Warren; Mr. Konings (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Treu (*Rapporteur*), Dr. Phipps (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Jessel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ueberhorst (*for the Rapporteur*), Mr. Craigen, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Onslow, Mr. McGuire, Mr. Konings (*Rapporteur*), Dr. Phipps (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Jessel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*).

4. European security and African problems (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 772 and Amendments*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Müller, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Müller, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Müller, Mr. Roberti, Mr. Müller, Mr. Roper, Mr. Müller, Mr. Boucheny.

5. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, technological and

aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Konings, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Treu (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Tanghe (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Treu, Mr. Roper, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Roper, Mr. Treu, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Adriaenssens.

6. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 775*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Reid (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Craigen, Mr. Kershaw, Mr. Beith.

7. Adoption of the Minutes.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*Speakers*: The President; correction of vote: Mr. Calamandrei; points of order: Mr. Roper, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Kershaw, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Roper, Mr. Calamandrei.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — I should have been able to announce that the Minutes of the Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed and to ask whether there are any comments on them. But, because of the unprecedentedly late hour at which we rose, the Minutes are not ready and I cannot, therefore, ask the Assembly to agree to them as is the normal practice.

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 36.

### 3. United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology

#### Application satellites

*(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations Docs. 773 and 766)*

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology, and vote on the draft recommendation in Document 773.

I shall call the four Rapporteurs — Mr. Konings, Mr. Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel.

I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President, in order to save the time of the Assembly, I suggest that we take the reports jointly so that the Rapporteurs are therefore able to present the two reports as one item.

The PRESIDENT. — Certainly. That is a good suggestion.

I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I hope the report before us demonstrates, and I want to emphasise this, the need for such visits to the United States and elsewhere, for it is extremely important, because of our responsibility as members of parliament, that we should know about developments in the world that have a direct bearing upon us. I say this from four viewpoints.

First, we can in this way find out about very important technological developments taking place in the world.

Secondly, our visit to the United States was important from the viewpoint of collaboration between the United States and Europe in the technological sphere. We were able to learn a great deal there that has to do with this collaboration, and this is most important.

A further argument is that as parliamentarians we have responsibility for spending the funds made available for co-operation with others and for technical development. In this respect, too, we learnt a number of things. The European Space Agency's budget for 1977 comes to my mind here; in the annual report we received this week we read that this budget came to 483.5 million units of account. This is a not unimportant sum, for which we as members of parliament are entirely responsible.

A fourth argument is also concerned with our parliamentary responsibility, and has to do with the political consequences of the technological developments that are taking place. If one is to be able to anticipate these political consequences, then one has to know what is going on at the present time in this field.

I must say, however, that co-operation in the general sense of the word is inadequate. You can break this down under two aspects. In the first place there is industry, where you could say that co-operation is inadequate by definition because in our western society industrial firms are in a situation of competing with each other. In each industry, enormous sums are spent on research, and obviously firms are not prepared to share the results of their research with others. This is a shame, and you might say that this means, in our western industries, that we keep on re-inventing the wheel.

The second aspect concerns the various governments. I think that governments, too, do not work together to the best advantage here, because national interests are frequently put first. You see this time and again. Real or imagined national interests hamper exchanges of knowledge and

co-operation between the various governments in the area of technical development.

I believe that in both these cases — industrial firms and governments — there is an unnecessary and excessive use of resources and a wastage of inventive brainpower. There are people in different places busy doing the same things whereas if you could add their efforts together the results could be vastly better.

In Western Europe space activities are grouped together in the European Space Agency, ESA. But what happens in practice? More and more countries — and this is a point for serious criticism — which have signed the ESA convention have despite this been entering into bilateral agreements with other countries or firms. In this way agreements that have been made within the ESA frameworks are being undermined.

I think this is a sad state of affairs. Not long ago I read, in the British journal *Nature* of 18th May 1978, an article by a British university professor from Leicester who was making a frank plea for pulling the United Kingdom out of ESA and entering into direct collaboration with the United States. This, too, is a deplorable state of affairs. If Western Europe wants to hold on to a place in the market, and to continue to share in the technological developments that are going on, we must pool our efforts and guard against falling out with each other. We have agreed within Europe that ESA shall operate in its own right in dealing with the rest of the world: a logical consequence of this is very close co-operation between ESA and NASA. This is the forum where talks must take place. This is where co-operation must take place. It is disappointing to have to note that the very opposite looks like happening — to see that co-operation between these two bodies threatens to decrease because there is a tendency, on both the North American and the European side, to enter into more and more individual agreements with various countries. This is deplorable. This is why, in our recommendation, we come to the conclusion that there ought to be a high-level joint North American/European committee to co-ordinate things in this sphere. I think this is extremely important. A committee like this, with reasonably far-reaching powers, could bring about a pooling of the inventive capacity of the western world.

Then, Mr. President, I want to make one or two comments on particular activities in this field. First of all, there is the launching of all other space vehicles: in particular, the launching of space vehicles that may or may not be under the supervision of governments, such as that to be undertaken soon by a German concern in Zaïre. I think we need to talk about this in good time, because we need to voice objections to this kind of development.

*Mr. Konings (continued)*

A second aspect is that of privately-owned communications satellites. Here I would sound a serious word of warning, because I can see real problems arising in the near future. Most of all there are the dangers of direct television reception, by which I mean reception directly from satellites without the intermediary of a ground station. Experiments are going on in Japan at the present time, and we are now at a stage where something of the kind is feasible. The phenomenon already exists for radio. There are transmitters beaming across frontiers, used for commercial radio broadcasts. Television, however, is a very insidious medium, and if the danger I have just mentioned took on world-wide dimensions, this could represent a threat to the systems of the western world. There, generally, we have broadcasting systems on a non-commercial basis. An even greater threat can come about when ideologically-oriented broadcasting is involved. In such a situation, certain countries might well be able to propagate their ideologies on a world scale. I think we need to keep a close eye on this, and it needs to be regulated in some way or another.

To sum up, Mr. President, I would say that the explosive development of technology over recent years is in general to be welcomed. I think that on the whole mankind benefits from these developments. Yet I urge that the whole matter be discussed more, and that there should be international legislation to cover it. Too little attention is being paid to it at present. Legislation of this kind would need to be directed mainly towards the application of these technical developments. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Konings.

I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I could begin by latching on to Mr. Konings' last words. Our visit to numerous United States establishments in this advanced sector of defence, civil aviation, and space applications has pointed up two essential facts: the broad development of research, fundamental and applied, and a certain difficulty of reaching an understanding between opposite shores of the Atlantic.

The recurrent leitmotiv is that certain substantial expenditures for impoverished little Europe could be put to better use if there were greater understandings between the biggest American firms we visited and the other collateral ones operating in Europe.

I will venture to dwell briefly on the underlying reasons for such technological collabora-

tion. First, trade relations and service contracts. We were welcomed by the director of the civil aviation sector of the State Department, and talked about liberalisation, air transport agreements to avoid overloading on certain lines and cutbacks on others, and, so to say, technological and commercial discipline in consequence. It is a matter of striking a least common denominator for civil airlines in Europe, e.g. Pan-Am, not to have surplus capacity in respect of national regulations.

I think I am voicing the thoughts of my fellow Committee members in saying that we were greatly impressed by the enormous waste of energy in civil aviation, which is not always all that distinct from military aviation. As regards the latter, some major innovations in the United States are recorded in this report. One of the most interesting is the anti-aircraft weapons system in which Boeing, the biggest aircraft manufacturer in the world, is closely interested, with the surface-to-air missile Roland. This mobile operational system can be attached to a track-laying vehicle and speedily moved on the ground. In this connection let me stress the news that Boeing is building these machines and has reached an agreement with Europe for the supply of interchangeable parts for the American NATO forces in Europe. Even if this is not direct participation in the production of the Roland missile system, it is a type of defence equipment that affords a means of integration with European groups.

Another interesting item concerns AWACS, an airborne warning and control system. The most advanced aircraft technology is now based on the transport of aircraft and defence weapon systems by airborne missiles.

An interesting discovery or improvement of recent date in the military aircraft sector concerns F-16, a multi-rôle fighter which replaces the F-14s and F-15s operating in the Middle East theatre.

The YC-14 is an advanced medium short take-off and landing transport aircraft, and has high tactical mobility. Boeing is operating in this sector and has new plans for replacing the 747 by the 757, 767 and 777 aircraft capable of carrying two hundred to two hundred and fifty passengers instead of Jumbo's five hundred.

Collaboration with Europe. If there is one sector in which we are scoring rapid successes it is space exploration, the co-operative programme for which goes under the name of spacelab, an essential component of the space transportation system. For this programme to be completed, all European forces must see that there are no more of the notorious disputes with other European establishments and other national programmes seeking to operate on a narrow-minded

*Mr. Treu (continued)*

parochial scale. I do not mean we should abandon the Ariane programme. It should also be noted that as regards the scientific programmes, space research establishments and space applications, we were able to see how the United States in the advanced technology sector is turning towards research into the use of solar energy, not only by arrays of panels but by systems of reflectors with somewhat high rates of concentration of solar energy on the ground. We were impressed by a kind of tower of imposing dimensions capable of convergent concentration at the ground of sizeable amounts of solar energy collected outside the limits of the atmosphere, with all the advantages this implies of collecting it the most rapidly, although the problem remains of converting technical energy to energy transmissible to the ground.

In the general orientations of United States space policy, explorations of the highest scientific interest, such as missions to Mars and beyond the solar system, have been discarded or postponed. Telecommunications and everything concerned with space dimensions, cover an enormous range, but in my view, rather than going too far into, say, researches about the mysteries of galactic origins, we should concretely translate into terrestrial terms such studies as well as advanced technologies, especially the Jupiter space-probes and artificial satellites.

In conclusion, as regards this sector of space activity, I should like to return to the leitmotiv that all applications which demand sacrifices in funds, men and talents need to be co-ordinated, and not form separate sectors. There should be a least common denominator: not to waste energy as has happened all too often before, because 1985 is not very far ahead now. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — I call Dr. Phipps.

Dr. PHIPPS (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to make two personal observations before setting out the main gist of the energy report. The first is to record on behalf certainly of myself and my colleagues our thanks to our American colleagues for their enormous help and assistance throughout our visit. The second is to say that if my remarks appear somewhat critical of United States policy, it is because I recognise the importance of the interdependence of Europe and the United States and that I also recognise that that which happens in the United States has a very considerable effect upon us.

My second observation is that it is rather disappointing that in this very important debate we should have a relatively empty chamber. It is perhaps illustrative of our proceedings that when we are discussing political matters such

as whether we shall sell arms to China, which tends to be a decision which does not rest in the hands of most of us, we get a relatively full chamber, but when we discuss matters such as the future of energy policy in the world, which may well make the kind of decisions we make about China and Russia totally redundant within ten or fifteen years, we have very few present to listen.

I appreciate that perhaps this is related to the nature of our parliaments, in which there are very few scientists and technicians, but in which parliamentarians, in Britain for example, seem to know more about Scottish divorce law than irrigation. I am not sure that that is a valuable contribution to the future of mankind.

With those remarks I should like to pass on to just two aspects of our visit to the United States. We covered an enormous range of energy subjects and it will not be possible to cover everything we discussed, but it seemed to me that there were two outstanding problems in almost all our meetings. They concerned the current American usage of hydrocarbons, that is, natural gas and petroleum, and the future energy resources that we might be able to tap and that are renewable.

It is often said that we are living in some kind of revolution. We have talked of living in the industrial revolution and the technological revolution and others. Currently, we are supposed to be living in a computer revolution, or a micro-electronic revolution. One of the overriding facts of all these supposed revolutions is that we have been living in an energy revolution. It started somewhere around 1730 in the United Kingdom, but it has continued ever since.

Perhaps one of the most important facts to be appreciated is that in one year, 1977, the world used as much energy as it had used altogether up to the year 1700. We have been fortunate in a way in that in this energy revolution of ours each year, although we have used more and more energy, more and more of it has become available. It has been a happy coincidence and we have been allowed to go on in a very profligate and extravagant way using particularly fossil forms of energy, always expecting that these would be renewed in even greater abundance year by year.

In the last five years there has been a sudden appreciation that this is not the case, that non-renewable sources of energy, particularly fossil forms and especially petroleum and natural gas, are limited and are finite resources. This has been appreciated in the continental United States since the late 1950s when studies were done by Dr. Marion King-Hubbard, an Englishman who worked for Shell in the United States. He was able to predict in the year 1957 that by 1963-64 the United States would be using each year more

*Dr. Phipps (continued)*

oil than it discovered. This prediction turned out to be absolutely correct and in this sense the United States is a microcosm, a model for the rest of the world, because it is a very large country with very considerable hydrocarbon fossil reserves, with a much longer history of petroleum and gas exploration than anywhere else in the world and, of course, a much greater usage.

Similar statistical studies applied to the rest of the world have demonstrated for some time that by the early 1990s the world will be using more petroleum and more hydrocarbons each year than are being discovered.

This is the realisation that jolted the whole of the developed world, particularly in 1973, when we began to realise that we were using up finite resources. The first point that I wish to stress and that came out of this visit is to do with the way in which we are still using these resources and particularly with the influence of the United States upon them. Everyone appreciates that since 1973 the world price of petroleum, especially crude oil, has risen to new heights, generally of the order of \$14 per barrel. This is not the case in the United States, where there are actually five different prices for crude oil. The lowest price — what is known as the lower-tier price — for crude oil which was discovered many years ago is on average only \$5.68 per barrel. There is an upper-tier price for crude discovered since 1973-74 of \$12.16 per barrel. There is a price for Alaskan crude of \$13.18 per barrel; for stripper crude — that is, from any well producing less than ten barrels a day — of \$14.39 per barrel; naval reserve crude of \$12.52 per barrel; and imported crude of \$14.68 per barrel.

No less than 40 % of American crude is at \$5.68 per barrel. The net effect is that the average price of crude oil to the American consumer is substantially below that of international prices, about 20 to 25 %. The result is that the United States uses more crude oil and imports more than it probably should. If the price of crude oil in the United States averaged the same as internationally — namely, the imported price of \$14.68 — purely because of the price mechanism one would expect the United States to be using some two to three million barrels of oil less per day. That is two to three million barrels of oil which would be saved for the rest of the world and for the future.

The idea that it is the Saudi Arabians who command the current world price of crude oil is mistaken; it is still very much the United States, the world's greatest importer and user of crude, which determines the international price of crude oil and is also the world's most profligate user

of crude oil. This seems to me to be something which must be said and which it is very important for us to say because the crude oil which the United States is importing and using is crude oil which will not be available to European nations and particularly to third world nations in the future. Once used, it does not exist; one cannot reproduce it, it is a finite source and it is being used in a very wasteful manner in the United States.

This is appreciated by President Carter and he has produced a number of suggestions, particularly a tax upon the cheap crude produced in the States which might bring its price up to an international level. This suggestion has been thrown out by Congress and I can see that, especially in an election year, it is not a very popular thing for American politicians to be going round telling their constituents that they must pay more for gasoline. However, as far as the rest of us are concerned, it is vital that we get across to the United States the fact that we and the third world need a world price for oil in the United States in order that its overwhelming excess consumption can be reduced.

My own view is that the United States should have a world price for all its oil which, if nothing else, would encourage much greater exploration in that country and would also impel their huge technology towards looking for better ways of producing more oil from existing sources. That, again, would benefit the whole of the world.

The second aspect of our visit which came home to us very strongly indeed was that the United States has recognised, probably better than anybody else, that fossil fuels are running out and that renewable sources, such as solar energy, must be harnessed for the next century. Perhaps the most impressive statistic that we saw was that the United States is spending about four billion dollars a year on renewable, alternative sources of energy. This is over ten times the amount that the whole of Europe is spending. The approach of the American Department of Energy to the spending of these research funds is that it is trying to cut the price of producing these alternative sources to a figure which is twice the amount of the equivalent conventional source. At that stage, the research is handed over to private American industry in order that it can develop that new form of energy into a commercial proposition.

The net effect of this is going to be that in the next century American technology and American private and multinational companies will be absolutely dominant in new energy resource supply and that we in Europe will become totally dependent upon American technology, in much the same way as other areas of the world are currently dependent on the multinational oil companies. This has economic, social

*Dr. Phipps (continued)*

and political effects which we must consider and consider now. If we allow it to happen without Europe's playing any part whatsoever in the development of these new sources of energy, in the energy revolution, we shall be left way behind.

At the moment we are not spending any sum even comparable with the amount being spent in the United States on developing these new sources of energy. If we do not do so, I think it is probable that Europe will become no more than a satellite to or an appendage of the United States. This is healthy for neither Europe nor the United States. It is, therefore, vital that European countries do two things.

One is that, as a European entity, preferably through the EEC but on a wider scale, we begin to develop research programmes to invest in and develop alternative sources of energy. Secondly, we must at this stage co-operate with the United States Government agencies and private enterprise in developing these new sources so that Europe in the future will have not only the energy resources that it needs but the political independence which I am sure all of us believe and hope will always be ours. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to begin by supporting both my colleagues, Mr. Treu and Dr. Phipps, in what they said on the importance of new and renewable sources of energy especially solar energy, about which we learnt a very great deal on our visit to the United States. If one mentions solar energy in Europe, most people think that one is talking about a gadget on the roof of a house which provides hot water for the inhabitants; but we found that in the United States solar energy meant much more and was much more applied to the notion of energy obtained on a large scale from the sun, either by mechanisms of the sort described by Mr. Treu, mirrors reflecting heat and duplicated many times over on to a steam engine on a turret, or solar satellites.

Here I would mention the tremendous impression I received at Boeing from their description of the device on which they are working, to be put into orbit in perhaps twenty or thirty years' time and which Dr. Phipps referred to in his report. The mind boggles at the tremendous notion of a device which is five kilometres wide and twenty-one kilometres long, constructed in outer space because it is easier to construct it in outer space than to launch it from the earth, receiving heat from the sun and beaming it on to the earth where it can be converted into electricity. This is a marvellous notion and I agree with Dr. Phipps that we should do all we

possibly can to co-operate with the United States, so that we can also, on a basis commercial to both, make use of their inventiveness and their initiative in Europe.

In turning to oceanographic subjects, I should like to quote from paragraph 167 of the report, where I wrote in connection with the Law of the Sea Conference that the Director of the Scripps Institution said that "the scientific community was very worried about the different zones which were now being created and which would be detrimental to the freedom of research on currents, climate or weather of the seas and oceans. Especially, the fact that the 200-mile economic zone now being adopted by nearly all coastal states would automatically mean a serious reduction in the possibilities of conducting research in ocean resources."

The point here is that a 200-mile zone alongside the coast of many states inhibits ocean research, and such research could be beneficial to mankind in relation not only to currents, the climate and the weather, but the discovery of minerals, and fishing.

It should be possible for ships carrying out research at sea to carry scientists representing the coastal states, which would be fully informed of the research taking place. It seems to me that the governments of the Western European Union member countries should initiate urgent consideration by the United Nations of the means by which fundamental and applied ocean research can continue without restraint, while also providing for the protection of mineral and other rights of each country bordering the sea. If we do not do this, it is the poorer countries, such as coastal African and coastal South American countries, which will suffer most, because it is they which will be prevented from taking advantage of scientific aid to exploit their mineral and other maritime resources.

I now turn to some matters that we learned at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, which it was a great privilege and interest to visit. We learned that the stock of fish in the sea is not just an agricultural or gastronomic matter. It is of strategic importance, because it has to do with the food supplies of the western world. Governments tend to look at single species of fish taken alone, and this is not appropriate to the creatures of the sea, because they eat one another.

I can illustrate this with some practical examples. Agriculture ministers in our respective countries look at single species of mammals — pigs, cattle or sheep — in isolation. However, the balance of nature is disturbed if the stock of one species of fish is suddenly augmented or diminished. In the report I give the example of porpoises, which we were told about by the

*Mr. Jessel (continued)*

Scripps Institution. In the United States there is a lobby for the protection of porpoises, because these are beautiful and interesting animals. But if porpoises are protected so that their numbers increase to any extent, that has an effect upon tuna fish. It has to be remembered that porpoises eat tuna, so an increase in the number of porpoises results in the diminution of the stock of tuna. This is very detrimental to countries such as Portugal, where people eat a lot of tuna.

A second example has to do with whales — not the principality, part of the United Kingdom, but the mammal that we find in the sea! The stock of whales has been depleted because the Japanese and the Russians have allowed whaling to go on in Antarctic waters. There is a small crustacean called krill on which certain types of whales feed. Because there are fewer whales, there is now a glut of krill, and if we exploit it this could be extremely useful for the feeding of people in underdeveloped countries. The gastronomic quality of krill is not high, and probably it would not be consumed in large quantities in Paris, but it would be perfectly adequate to augment the food stocks of developing countries.

My next point concerns the disposal of organic waste in the water. This again is something that we were told at the Scripps Institution. A mountain of public ignorance has to be overcome here. The public do not like the idea of organic waste — that is to say, sewage, mainly — being put into the sea, but sewage is extremely good for the stock of fish. People who would not think twice about putting compost or organic manure on their vegetable garden to improve the growth of their vegetables are horrified by the idea of putting sewage in the sea.

Of course sewage must not be put in places which are popular for swimming: that would be intolerable. Apart from the health aspect, there is the amenity aspect. But if the sewage is disposed of far enough out in the sea, it is diluted and broken down sufficiently for there to be no risk either to health or to amenity.

I hope that the Assembly will accept the point put to us by American scientists at the Scripps Institution — that scientific knowledge is not taken sufficiently into account when policy decisions are taken by the politicians. We have to act as links in the chain between the scientific knowledge that is available and persuading the public. Indeed, it is the persuasion of the public that is a major factor of political life today. Thirty or fifty years ago, in a democratic society, parliament would take decisions and governments would defend them at the ensuing elections. If the public did not like a government, they kicked it out. Nowadays democracy has changed, and in

order to govern at all, governments have to carry public opinion with them all the time as an ongoing process.

This is a feature that was brought home to us very forcefully in connection with the United States' energy policy, which the Federal Government had great difficulty in getting the American democratic institutions and the American public to accept, because insufficient time was given by the government to this necessary process of persuading the public to accept what is necessary in the public interest.

We gained political and scientific knowledge from our visit to the United States and it was of value to us all. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — We agreed at the beginning of the session to debate together the two reports on United States-European co-operation and competition and application satellites.

I call Mr. Ueberhorst to speak to the second paper.

Mr. UEBERHORST (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, according to the Orders of the Day we have now to deal with the report on application satellites. I must, to start with, present a report of which I am unfortunately not the author. Mr. Scheffler is at the moment in Latin America for the German Bundestag, and has asked me to present the report in his place. On his behalf I must also thank the secretariat for its work on this report, as well as the previous Rapporteurs who did the preparatory work on the subject.

The report on application satellites reviews the tasks undertaken by Europeans in the field of application satellites, and the successes they have had. It takes as its starting point the welcome community of view between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Western European Union, which agree that Europe should develop and apply overall aeronautical, space and energy policies and that European industry's capacity and technical level should be maintained.

It lies in the nature of things that, if matters continue to develop as described in the report, certain of the developments called for have already occurred. For example, the report recommends that the Council of Ministers decide on the production of a first series of five Ariane launchers. This was written in February. Today we are glad to note that the Council of Ministers has already taken account of the proposed recommendation at its meeting on 1st March and, happily, decided in favour of the production of the Ariane launchers. The intended starting date for operational launchers, 1980-81, can therefore be maintained.

*Mr. Ueberhorst (continued)*

Perhaps this reference to the recommendation on Ariane launchers is typical of the arrangement of the report. As already pointed out, the report takes as its starting point common objectives of the Assembly and the Council : it is an attempt to overcome the forces that retard progress and so to make a genuine parliamentary contribution. It illustrates the usefulness of application satellites in many fields. It points to the European successes we have had. But it also talks about dangers in this field and stresses the need for action.

Permit me, Mr. President, to develop this idea in a little more depth. Successes and the need for the further extension of communications satellites are illustrated by the successful launching of the second OTS on 11th May 1978 after the unsuccessful first launch. This was a decisive step towards a European communications satellite programme. We must realise that, according to the estimates of experts, European telecommunications traffic is growing by around 20 % a year, while an Intelsat computer forecast shows that in the communications sector the demand for transmission capacity is rising by some 10 % per annum. This opens new prospects for a European communications satellite system, prospects that should be used to advantage.

In this connection paragraph II (a) of the recommendation, that we adopt a three-year ceiling for ESA's compulsory expenditure, is understandable ; it will enable financial provision for longer-term projects to be established more clearly in advance and remove a certain insecurity. In paragraph II (e) it is recommended that the pursuit and development of European activities in earth observation, including meteorology and remote sensing by satellites, be ensured. Here too we can point to the first beginnings of European successes. Our first meteorological satellite, put into orbit in 1977, used an American launcher. The second is intended to be put into orbit in May 1980 by means of an Ariane launcher. The report stresses, in this connection, the present need to develop a long-term European meteorological programme.

Similarly, we must use these opportunities to develop an earth resources programme, where we have also made a good start with Earthnet. We want to see the development of a coherent earth resources programme of European origin for oil and gas exploration, as well as for assistance to shipping and fishing.

I have already said that the report goes into dangers that are associated with the use of satellites. Mention must be made of the occurrence, in the last few months, of what was — in the words of the report — one of the most spectacular accidents of the space age, the fall from orbit

of the Soviet Cosmos satellite on 24th January of this year, which conjured up the danger of contamination of the earth with radioactive material. The report finds that not only governments but also parliaments must concern themselves with these problems, and points out that the United Nations Committee on the peaceful use of outer space has now set up a sub-committee to deal with these matters. In the Rapporteur's opinion it should also consider whether the dangers revealed by the incident involving the Soviet Cosmos satellite can still be accepted. Here we have, therefore, a matter which calls for international regulation ; we must meet this call, and we will want to concern ourselves with it in our parliaments and here in the Assembly.

At the last meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Mr. Scheffler was asked to submit a second report on this subject. The submission of this second report will give us a further opportunity to discuss these problems here.

Today I would ask you on behalf of Mr. Scheffler to adopt the recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Four delegates have indicated that they wish to speak. Two of them have said that they will speak briefly and require only five minutes. I hope that they will stick to that. The other two delegates have asked for an extension of time to ten minutes. The first speaker is Mr. Craigen. I hope that he will be brief.

Mr. CRAIGEN (*United Kingdom*). — The Committee has produced an interesting report on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology. It is obvious from the statements that have been made that the Committee found the visit well worth while.

But the impression that I received was that there is less scope for co-operation between Europe and the United States and the United States has little to fear from any competition. The main message of the report involves the danger of United States monopoly in the whole technological arena.

I wish to ask three broad questions. Two of them are of Dr. Phipps and one of Mr. Jessel. From Dr. Phipps' report it is obvious that, although everyone is in favour of developing a national energy plan in the United States, there will be not a little difficulty in persuading the American electorate to meet the higher prices and taxes necessary to implement a plan for the greater conservation of energy.

To what extent has American government and technology been looking at areas of making more use of oil in terms of improving the mileage per

*Mr. Craigen (continued)*

gallon for car travel and even for aircraft and reducing consumption by factories, schools and homes with a reduction in the inbuilt obsolescence of many of our modern everyday facilities?

Secondly, regarding alternative sources of power, it seems quite clear that one of the main reasons the United States is having to develop these alternative sources is its sheer greed in absorbing and consuming world energy resources at present. Does Dr. Phipps see a danger in the United States almost monopolising technological developments in, say, solar energy? He stressed in his statement that in the United States the main initiatives have been as a result of private enterprise. Does this mean that he foresees that in the European context the main initiative will have to lie with states, with public enterprise, as distinct from private enterprise?

Lastly, Mr. Jessel's report emphasises the discussions that have been taking place at the Law of the Sea Conference and in particular on seabed mining. Over a year ago I produced a report for the Assembly on European oceanographic activities, Document 722, in which I made the point that one difficulty for member countries of WEU was defining their own maritime policies. This in turn created special problems in combating oil pollution. Since that report was prepared, we have had the Ekofisk disaster and the unhappy incident of the Amoco Cadiz.

Does Mr. Jessel feel that there is any current American experience that would provide a useful guide to European countries in trying to combat the problems of oil pollution, particularly because of the importance to Western Europe of North Sea oil? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we all take a great interest in this collaborative report by several hands, and in the work in Committee and on mission, some of which I was able to follow. I would like therefore to pick out certain particular aspects which are familiar ground.

Whereas the United States is already engaged on vast research programmes in advanced technology, Europe, a whole generation later, seems sometimes to be discovering with wonder and amazement the possibilities afforded by remote tracking equipment or the large-scale use of solar energy.

Now, it is vitally important for Europe to participate in the ongoing research and have its own scientists associated with it, to prevent the new technologies from becoming the sole

preserve of the Americans, which would have the most serious economic and political consequences.

However, co-operative arrangements are not always easy as the experience of several European states in the field of aeronautics and the construction of satellites has shown: competition and the desire to achieve a market-dominant position are never to be ruled out when the stakes are so high. Considerations of defence, national independence, autonomous decision-making, are too involved in any decision concerning matters of high technology for there not to be created a climate often little conducive to frank collaboration with no mental reservations.

Participation in joint ventures in advanced technology is undoubtedly worthwhile but Europe should take care not to lose its true vocation in the aeronautics and space areas.

There are numerous examples of how fruitful Euro-American co-operation in advanced technology can be. Co-operation between NASA and the European Space Agency in transatlantic telephony will provide a capacity of five thousand telephone circuits in 1980 and twenty thousand in 1990 by means of the Intelsat V satellite. Similarly, the retransmission of television broadcasts will be made easier by the construction of large ground stations in each of the states wishing to receive them.

In the scientific and application satellites area Europeans and Americans have already achieved several joint successes. For example, maritime communications satellites, the first of which will be launched from Cape Canaveral in August 1978, will ensure operational maritime services throughout the world. Their usefulness is particularly obvious from the fact that at the present time it takes on average six hours to transmit a message to a ship and another six hours to receive a reply.

Three projects are of particular interest in respect of rescue services and scientific work in space: a satellite search and rescue project jointly carried out by the United States, Canada, France and possibly the Soviet Union, will make it easier for distress buoys from ships and aircraft to be detected and tracked.

The solar power satellites now being studied by Boeing and with which European researchers could be associated, will be designed to transmit to earth large amounts of solar energy converted to electricity and carried by microwaves; these studies received the full attention of our "missionaries", if I may so call them, during their recent visit to the United States.

The space telescope which is to be placed in orbit by the space shuttle will be able, unhindered by the earth's atmosphere, to observe the stars with a resolution approximately seven times better than that of the largest telescopes on earth.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

However, in spite of all these projects, present and future, co-operation between Europe and the United States is still at a low level and subject to many setbacks.

Thus the Aerosat project, which was to have enabled the European Space Agency, the United States and Canada to develop jointly an aeronautical communications satellite came to grief because of disagreements between the American space agencies and other United States government departments.

Again, the American Delta launcher has failed several times to put into orbit European satellites, as for example the scientific satellite GEOS or prototypes of the OTS satellite which were to be used for trial transmissions of telephonic communications and television broadcasts between several European countries.

We must therefore enquire into the reasons for such slow progress in co-operation in aerospace. Is such co-operation actually possible if so many financial, military and political interests are at stake ?

The question deserves to be asked all the more when we look at some very recent examples, one of which is possibly worth retailing to the Assembly. It is taken from the economic field, but very soon assumes aspects involving financial and political dimensions ; I refer to the dumping, for I think that is what it has to be called, by our great American allies, of styrene, a by-product of cracking, which has resulted in a situation of such insecurity for European production as to run the risk of its being dropped altogether and not being able to stand up to the invasion of the American product.

Economically and financially, control of new technologies can enable monopolies already established many years ago to be safeguarded, which is of course the hidden political interest behind such economic activities.

The United States, which now has a market-dominant position in aeronautics, has little desire to lose such an extremely advantageous position. The insidious anti-Concorde campaign and attempts to oppose Airbus share the same motivations. Boeing's current fight against European co-operation in the field of medium-range aircraft for the next twenty years is further evidence of continuing practices unfortunately detrimental to the balance of sound co-operation between Europe and America.

As regards military equipment, in order to co-operate at the present time, it is difficult to obtain information which is very often top secret. Co-operation in the satellite area does not only have civil aspects. Mastery of the

engineering techniques for satellite construction, launching or placing in orbit, or data reception and collection, can quite obviously have military implications because of the great importance of accurate data enabling one to assess the military, industrial and economic strength of a potential adversary. Observation satellites can likewise detect troop concentrations and movements of ships.

Finally, on the political plane, and I am still drawing your attention to the difficulties encountered, having one's own independent observation satellites is not compatible with being a neutral. The reception given by the United States and the Soviet Union to France's recent disarmament proposals are the most striking proof of this. Neither of the two superpowers is currently ready to share the data collected by its observation satellites in the defence area. Hence, the plan for an international agency of surveillance satellites proposed by Mr. Giscard d'Estaing at the United Nations can only be effectively implemented once other powers possess such satellites.

In conclusion, Mr. President, Europe cannot afford to abandon to the United States the mastery of technologies so important for the future of this continent. The repeated failures of American launchers have shown that only the will to continue the Ariane launcher programme would enable Europe to carry out an ambitious programme of observation and detection satellites. The success of Airbus has similarly demonstrated that European manufacturers of various nationalities were able to design and produce co-operatively a highly successful aircraft whose commercial possibilities are not in doubt. Europe, Ladies and Gentlemen, has to believe in its own capabilities so as not to figure as a second-class partner in co-operation with the United States. Only real equality in our technological contributions and also, I emphasise, political will, usher in a fruitful co-operation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Onslow and I would ask him to keep his speech within five minutes.

Mr. ONSLOW (*United Kingdom*). — I shall try to do so, Mr. President.

I want to start on a critical note by saying that I regret that the Rapporteur was not able in this most important recommendation to use more positive phrasing than recommending the establishment of a high level committee. I would have hoped that it would be possible to tell that committee one or two fairly firm things.

The first and most firm should be that it is not enough for Europe to resign itself to being an American customer. Starting from that proposition we can then perhaps try to build a

*Mr. Onslow (continued)*

policy. Some of the ingredients of that policy I shall seek to outline. One of the objectives must be interdependence, but it must be selective. It is no use seeking to compete from a European base with everything the Americans can do.

The man I most admire in technology, Sir George Edwards, talking of the difficulties of producing Concorde in competition with the Americans, once said with a beautiful smile that it had always been a comfort to him to realise that one could not hatch an egg faster by setting more chickens upon it. Nevertheless, it is true, and we should recognise it, that the more hens we can afford, the more different eggs we can hope to hatch; which seems to define the relationship between ourselves and the Americans which we should be idiots to overlook.

We must tell the Americans, "It will be no good for you if we are reduced to the ranks of customers" because Mr. Valleix, Mr. Craigen and I, like others, have no desire to shop in the American market only. We want to see our goods sold there. I might be as anxious to see Harriers sold in America as Mr. Valleix may be to see Airbuses sold there.

We need not be in conflict, but in some areas we shall have to resign ourselves to letting the Americans have design leadership, though not in all areas. Design leadership is of immense importance and we must strive to retain it where we have already developed that capability. In other areas we may have to content ourselves with some kind of subcontracting, but it must be powerfully in America's interests to keep the European technological capability alive. It is a mutual matter and interdependence should be the objective.

Another minor criticism is that I do not quite know how the report came to be produced, especially in relation to aerospace, without some mention of aero engines. I realise that there are considerable difficulties in saying anything about European-American relations in aero engines but that does not seem to justify saying nothing. Mr. Warren may be able to explain to me why the report stands in that form.

Finally, I entirely agree with the Rapporteurs that this is a subject of the utmost importance to the future of Europe, and one where government must accept responsibility, because the speed of progress of technology in the twentieth century has uniquely been the product of governments' willingness to spend money, whether in war or peace. The development of aircraft and automobiles in the first world war and the development of space satellites since the second world war are examples of the power of government here. It is essential that the governments

of Europe should combine and should let it be known to the Government of the United States that Europe has to be something more than a customer if technology is to mean anything at all. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. McGuire.

Mr. McGUIRE (*United Kingdom*). — I shall try to be brief, Mr. President.

I have read this fascinating combined report by our four Rapporteurs and I should like to spend a minute or two discussing one aspect which interests me most, energy. In our country there is a famous and oft-quoted statement attributed to Dr. Johnson — that when a man knows he is to be hanged in the morning it concentrates his mind wonderfully.

Following the rapid increase in oil prices in 1973, our minds were concentrated wonderfully on that subject. It was a theme on which my colleague, Dr. Phipps, made a contribution in a colloquy on energy some months ago. He said that up to the year 1973 energy policy, certainly in the western world, had been based on the premise that there was a free, abundant and cheap supply of oil.

In 1973, when our minds were wonderfully concentrated, when that position that we had fondly imagined existed no longer existed, we started to fall back on old friends. As an ex-miner representing a mining constituency I have read the report with very great interest, but I do not think that sufficient emphasis has been placed on the need for greater co-operation within the western world and with the Americans in the further development of technology. Recommendation A(d) stresses that we should:

"work together in research and development of alternative technologies such as gasification and liquefaction of coal, solar energy and other new sources of energy..."

and I would generally agree.

I would take up two points made by my colleague, the first made also by Mr. Onslow, about being only a customer of America rather than participating in innovating things. Generally, I welcome that theme. I hope that we shall not become this supplicant customer. We have enough initiative and enough common sense to avoid it, provided that we can resolve the problem which has always bedevilled Europe — our conflicting interests. We must get our interests to work together to our common good rather than have seven or eight different ones.

I very much envied the opportunity of my colleagues who went on this trip to America. They saw things which seem to me to be in the realm of fantasy, certainly as regards energy production. I hope that we can bring these mechanisms out of the realm of science fiction

*Mr. McGuire (continued)*

and into reality, because if we can use solar energy on the scale which the Americans seem to envisage in their programme, the greatest beneficiaries will be the poor countries which happen to have rather a lot of sunlight descending on them, rather than the countries in the West where we get it intermittently and not always as we want it.

Whilst I welcome the report, I have one reservation, that the committee may duplicate other committees which probably already exist. Nevertheless, if we can see to it that Europe achieves a common purpose, certainly as far as energy and aerospace are concerned, we shall become not the supplicant customer but an active participant with those who now seem to have the lead in new energy technology, aerospace, satellites and that kind of thing. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

I do not know whether anyone else wishes to take part in the debate. I hope not, because our programme is greatly overcrowded. Whilst it is my duty to invite the four Rapporteurs to reply, I hope that some of them may not wish to. If they do, I hope that they can confine their contributions to a minute or two at most, because we are very much behind with the business yet to be done.

I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I must come back on the comments made by Mr. Valleix, so as to prevent misunderstandings. In my first speech I referred to the possibility of direct television links between satellites and television receivers on the ground. Mr. Valleix, however, talked about ground stations — but that is the situation as it exists today. What I was talking about is a situation where there is a direct link between satellites and television sets in the home. The time when this will happen is not far off, and it can mean commercial and ideological broadcasting stations achieving world-wide coverage through the insidious medium of television. We must be wary of this, because it is an important political factor. It needs to be discussed internationally, to see what ought to be done about it.

The same is true for telephone traffic. In sparsely populated areas, where there are problems about laying cables, telephone communications will be via satellites, without passing through ground stations. This means that the privacy of telephone conversations — something that is guaranteed in many of our countries — becomes threatened. This is a political problem that could arise in the not-far-distant future, and which we need to keep an eye on.

My colleague over there said that we must not be at North America's beck and call. I agree entirely with him, and I have never said that we should. On the contrary, I said that we should greatly strengthen ESA and should stop making bilateral agreements as individual countries. The countries of Western Europe must band together in ESA, which as a body in its own right can then provide, in both size and quality, an equal partner for the United States.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Does Mr. Treu wish to speak ?...

Dr. Phipps ?

Dr. PHIPPS (*United Kingdom*). — As three questions were directed at my part of the report, I should just like to deal with them.

Mr. Craigen asked whether the United States was doing anything to improve the efficiency of its oil usage and hydrocarbon usage in general. Certainly in his national energy plan President Carter is trying to do something. There is the famous "gas guzzler" legislation which has been brought in against the very large cars that Americans use.

However, I must reiterate what I said in my presentation — that these very good ideas being put forward by him are not being passed by the American Congress. This is something that we can do in Europe: we can bring some degree of pressure to bear on the United States to mend its ways. At the colloquy on energy of the Council of Europe held in Strasbourg last September/October, a very distinguished Irish senator said to me, after I had put forward a rather similar argument, that proud nations should not be told by small nations what they should do. In my own view, when those small nations are being crushed underfoot — perhaps unknowingly — by the proud nations, it does not do any harm at least to squeal. If we were to make it plain from Europe that the current American hydrocarbons policy is extremely damaging, both now and in the future, that might help President Carter in his aims.

Mr. Craigen also asked about the monopoly which is being developed on new energy resources in the States. He wondered whether the European approach to this should be public or private. It is, in fact, public in the United States at the moment, in the sense that it is the Department of Energy which is expending most of the funds. The very nature of this kind of research is such that it has to be funded publicly, and will have to be funded publicly by European nations, although there is certainly a rôle for private companies to play once these energy systems have been developed.

The outstanding fact that we brought back from the States is that there is a willingness on

*Dr. Phipps (continued)*

the part of both the American Administration and private American industry to co-operate with Europe and that they do, in fact, recognise the interdependence which my colleague, Mr. Onslow, mentioned. We should take advantage of this. At the moment, it is perhaps we in Europe who are dragging our feet.

Mr. McGuire mentioned coal. I appreciate his special interest and I apologise for not putting more about coal in the report, but the problems that we face, I fear, are not soluble by coal alone. It is a particular form of energy which is extremely useful for certain kinds of electricity generation; it is not terribly useful for forms of energy which require a degree of mobility. We are also still a long way from cracking the problems of pollution and environmental defacement which large-scale coal production creates. With him, I believe that coal has a future, and I think that he knows that I believe this. Coal alone, however, will not solve the energy problems of the western world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Dr. Phipps.

Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Craigen asked me whether when we were in the United States we discussed with the authorities oil pollution of the sea, such as resulted from the Amoco Cadiz disaster. We did not discuss this matter with the American authorities. However, I should like to mention an invention from my own constituency, developed by the National Physical Laboratory of the United Kingdom at Teddington, Middlesex. It is called the rotating cylinder rudder and, if it is put on all oil tankers, it will enable them to turn in about one-quarter of the distance it takes them to turn at the present time. I feel that this is the most likely solution to oil pollution of the sea. I did, in fact, draw this invention to the attention of Mr. Cranley Onslow when he was the British Minister responsible for shipping and aerospace some five years ago, but before he was able to do anything there was a change of government in the United Kingdom. I hope I shall now have the support of the whole of the Assembly in pressing upon the international community the benefits of this invention from my constituency. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Ueberhorst, do you want to say anything?

Mr. Warren, do you want to say anything?

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — It is my pleasure to pay a particular tribute, which I am sure the Assembly will endorse, to the Rapporteurs for the efficiency and speed with which they prepared the report, and to Mr. Huigens

and Miss Turner for the way in which they produced it. It was extremely difficult to prepare in a short time, but they met the deadline.

We are particularly grateful to the United States State Department and the various agencies which we met in America for their courtesy in organising our visit. We were delighted to go out on a British Airways Concorde. The only complaint was from one member of parliament who said that the flight did not go on long enough. We were received well everywhere in the United States, and the report indicates the many places that we visited in a very short time.

It will be recognised from our report that we tried to carry out the task of our Committee, which is to look ten to twenty years ahead into the new worlds of science and technology, up to the end of the century. As Mr. McGuire pointed out, there are many realms of fantasy in comparison with the reality of today, but these will become the realities of tomorrow.

Without doubt, as Dr. Phipps mentioned, there is the problem that we as politicians spend much of our time expressing opinions as if they are facts and ignoring the facts which ought to give us our opinions. It is a disappointment to see, on both sides of the Atlantic, an absolute failure by government after government to come to any considered policy on energy after the millions of words talked and written about it. The same applies to transportation.

The scale of the work in science and technology which has been carried out in the United States is apparent in the report, but I should like to repeat one quantitative phrase to you and to ask all of you to go away with it in your minds, because it will give you an idea of the scale on which we have to practise if we are prepared to compete with the United States. The United States certainly will not co-operate with us unless we are competitively capable of co-operation. They are spending as much on research and development on solar energy alone as we in Western Europe are spending on every type of research into new forms of energy. It is not possible to think that we can expect them to co-operate with us unless we are capable of offering at least something different in return.

The Rapporteurs have commented on the small number of members present. I am delighted to see that more members have now come in. It is a pity that more members are not able to be present today when we are trying to look so far into the future.

There have been some interesting questions put in the various contributions. If I may be provocative and bold here, I believe that they were all, with respect, starting from the wrong point of departure in trying to understand what it is that the United States will allow us to do, as

*Mr. Warren (continued)*

opposed to what we want to do. People in the United States start from the position where they believe that the way forward is through competition and that collaboration can come about only as part of the competitive process. It is no good our hoping that the good guys in Boeing will come over and give us a nice piece of contract which will keep our workers employed, because that would put their own people out of work.

We have to look at these problems not, as we persist in doing as members of parliament, as political issues. They are not political issues: they are market issues. The United States is interested in collaboration only if it enables it to gain enlarged markets.

My colleague Mr. Onslow asked about aero-engines. His criticism was very fair. We did not visit an aero-engine company in the short time that we were in the United States and he is right to say that we should look at this aspect further.

In terms of his comments as to Western Europe, we have illustrated the difference in attitude that we have to achieve before we can consider ourselves on a par with America in many areas where we have the science and technology in our minds and laboratories which are quite capable of giving us a chance to work on an equal basis.

Mr. McGuire said that we were looking almost at fantasies. What Mr. Jessel was describing as a solar collector, twenty-one kilometres long and five kilometres wide, orbiting the earth, is of such a size that it would be seen in the brightest midday sun as an extra moon in the sky. But it would not be the only one there. There would be dozens of them. In Western Europe we need to make sure that some of them are ours, and if we are to do this we must use our brains as well as our minds. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Warren.

We have now debated Document 773 and Document 766. No amendments have been tabled to either of the draft recommendations before the Assembly.

May I put to the vote the draft recommendation in Document 773 ?

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 38.

I now put to the vote the draft recommendation in Document 766.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

The President is about to resume the Chair, and we shall then move on to the votes which he said would be taken at about 4 o'clock.

(*Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

#### **4. European security and African problems**

**(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 772 and Amendments)**

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation on European security and African problems, Document 772 and Amendments.

Before voting on the draft recommendation, we shall deal with the amendments, starting with part 1 of Amendment No. 3 in the name of Mr. Müller which reads as follows :

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following new paragraphs :

“Welcoming the effort made by several African states to form a force with a view to maintaining peace on the African continent and defending it against any interference from outside ;

Encouraging the member countries to pursue the efforts made in Paris on 5th June 1978 by five western powers and in Copenhagen on 12th June by the members of the European Community to concert their African policies,”

Do you wish to speak, Mr. Müller ?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I can be brief. In my introductory speech I already explained that the amendment I have tabled is in fact only a sort of postscript that takes account of subsequent developments. The amendment is necessary because the report was adopted in Committee before those developments took place.

I would therefore ask the Assembly to adopt the proposed additions.

1. See page 40.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall therefore vote on the first part of the amendment.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 1 of Amendment No. 3 is agreed to.*

We now turn to the draft recommendation proper. There is an amendment which was originally tabled by Mr. Stoffelen, which has been taken over by Mr. Roper. It is Amendment No. 4 which reads :

In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 7 and insert :

“7. Relate the economic assistance extended by European countries to the African states to the development of human rights in those countries.”

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I shall be brief. This amendment is intended to convey the same spirit as that in the original draft but to express it in words which are closer to those that have been adopted by the nine countries in the European Community as they have prepared the mandate for the development of the Lomé III agreement. Instead of saying that we should look at the present state of human rights in African countries, the amendment suggests that we should try to relate our aid policies to the development of human rights in African countries.

We have tried in the amendment to introduce words that represent more closely the policies of the Nine than were used in the original text. We are not trying to move away from the spirit of the original draft.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee ? I see that no one wishes to speak. We must decide on Amendment No. 4.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 4 is agreed to.*

We now turn to paragraph 10.

I call Mr. Antoni to move part 1 of his Amendment No. 6 :

1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 10.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I confirm what I said in explanation of our position. We consider that deletion of the paragraph is more consonant with a unified vision of action by Western Europe. On the content, we also stand by what has already been said.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The Rapporteur considers that

the original text should be retained, and this amendment negatived.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak ?

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to support the Rapporteur and call on the Assembly to reject the amendment proposed by our Italian communist colleague. I think everybody knows the rôle of the Cuban invasion army in Africa and understands the attempt to implement a neo-colonialism that we had thought long overcome. It would be bad for this Assembly to change the report in such a way that aggression was no longer called by its name. For this reason I support the original text.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 1 of Amendment No. 6 is negatived.*

I call upon Mr. Kershaw to move his Amendment No. 1 :

In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, after “of” insert “Zaire”.

Does Mr. Kershaw wish to speak ?

What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I think we should support this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — The Committee agrees to that amendment.

We now come to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 1 is agreed to.*

I call Mr. Antoni to move part 2 of his Amendment No. 6:

2. In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “aggressive”; leave out “particularly the present Cuban operations”; at the end of the paragraph add “and obtain the withdrawal of all foreign military presence in Africa”.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — The amendment is clear.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The same applies here as to part one. I think the amendment should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. — The Committee rejects the amendment.

We must now vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 2 of Amendment No. 6 is negatived.*

We come to Amendment No. 5 which was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen:

In paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "particularly" and insert "for example".

He is not here.

What is the view of the Assembly?

There appears not to be a view so we shall not deal with it.

*The amendment is withdrawn.*

I call Mr. Cavaliere to move his Amendment No. 7:

At the end of paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper, add "encouraged by the support of the Soviet Union".

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my amendment is very clear. After all that has happened recently, with the invasion by Cuban troops with the full connivance of the USSR, I request that the Assembly take official cognisance of the fact and that my amendment may serve to clarify the meaning of paragraph 11.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the view of the Committee?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I support Mr. Cavaliere's amendment, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — The Committee supports the amendment.

We shall vote on it.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 7 is agreed to.*

I call Mr. Roberti to move his Amendment No. 2:

At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph :

"Ensure that there are not created on the African continent, through the acts of the Soviet Union or its allies, in particular Cuba, military or strategic zones of influence because of the danger of encirclement that such situations would present for Europe and the Mediterranean."

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I have already explained the amendment in my speech. I bow to the Committee's opinion.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I have no objection to this being added.

The PRESIDENT. — There is no objection from the Committee.

We shall therefore vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.*

The final amendment is tabled by Mr. Müller, part 2 of Amendment No. 3, which reads:

2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph :

"Encourage and afford effective support for the steps taken by several African states to combine their efforts with a view to maintaining peace in Africa and defending the African continent against any interference from outside."

Does anyone wish to speak?...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want to oppose the amendment but to ask Mr. Müller whether he will look very carefully at the text. I ask him in particular whether he would accept a small drafting change in the amendment as he has drafted it. I wish to ask him to replace the third word of the amendment, "afford", with the words "provide where requested".

This would make it quite clear that European countries would be providing aid for this African force only when they were asked to do so by the African countries and would, I believe, make the relationship between the African countries and the European countries clearer than what appears in the present text. This is in no way an unfriendly amendment but is intended merely to clarify and assist what I think is a useful amendment from Mr. Müller. I hope that he can accept it in the spirit in which it is offered.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I agree with what Mr. Roper has said. Obviously such aid can be accorded to sovereign states only when it is called for. His amendment makes this clear.

I accept this clarification.

The PRESIDENT. — We can then proceed to vote on part 2 of Mr. Müller's amendment as now amended by agreement.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 2 of Amendment No. 3, thus amended, is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 772, as amended.

*The President (continued)*

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — We have asked for a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. — I see that Mr. Boucheny has asked for a vote by roll-call.

Under Rules 34 and 35 the vote on a draft recommendation considered as a whole shall be taken by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President, has the bell been rung?

The PRESIDENT. — Yes, before I came here I rang all the bells we had.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Whitehead.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup>:

Number of votes cast .....	48
Ayes .....	44
Noes .....	4
Abstentions .....	0

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted<sup>2</sup>.

### **5. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council — and the future of the WEU Assembly**

#### **Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

#### **Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Council**

(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 768 and Amendments, 777 and Amendments and 774 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the resumed joint debate on the reports of Committees in reply to the twenty-third annual

report of the Council, Documents 768, 777 and 774.

In the resumed debate I shall call first Mr. Bernini, who will be followed by Mr. Konings, Mr. Roper and Mr. Valleix.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I beg to welcome the replies in the report to the twenty-third annual report of the Council and briefly state our opinions on the papers tabled, first of all indicating our agreement on the recommendations concerning the political activities of the Council, technological, scientific and aerospace questions and the order for the appointment of members of the WEU Assembly.

Mr. Treu's comments on the activities of the Council and its relations with the Assembly, his remarks on the composition of member countries' delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and Europe's problems for its security and development in the field of energy, aircraft manufacture and aerospace, as expounded by Mr. Adriaensens, appear to me commendable and generally expressed in the draft recommendations and order tabled.

However, we have some reservations on Mr. Tanghe's report, and in particular differ from him on the section of the recommendations concerning the proposed deletion of naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments that may not be produced on German territory under the amended Brussels Treaty and annexes. We do not wish to be misunderstood in this matter. We realise the reasons for making it and are even, given the subject, agreeable to it. Far be it from us to claim intangibility of the treaty, especially its annexes, in any case amended in other circumstances; all the more in any appraisal other than that of friendship and appreciation in our dealings with the Federal Republic of Germany. But we wonder — and it is a question we also put to our German friends — whether at a time like the present, one of hardship for world equilibrium and détente, when it appears more necessary than ever to overcome every obstacle, not create any new ones, and add to mutual trust, we should take the responsibility for a decision which, over and beyond its motivations — but precisely because it amends a military treaty — may in some ways be construed as a demonstration of orientations and trends aimed at altering existing equilibria and so arousing negative reactions to any change in these equilibria, whose maintenance should be regarded as a precondition for creating fresh opportunities of favourable developments for détente and world security.

We therefore ask for further thought on the measure proposed, to possibly get the paragraph deleted from the recommendation and, perhaps, reference back, until a more propitious moment

1. See page 37.

2. See page 41.

*Mr. Bernini (continued)*

for such a decision. Otherwise, we are sorry to say we cannot vote for the recommendation.

These are the observations I wish to touch upon briefly, as well as to explain my vote and that of the Italian communist representatives on the various recommendations and the order tabled for examination and vote by this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, our colleague Mr. Adriaensens is alas right when he says in his report that there is very little in the way of progress to be noted in co-operation between the various aircraft firms to bring about a European aircraft industry. By a European aircraft industry I mean one able to compete on equal terms with the American giants. Yet at the moment the opportunities for such collaboration seem greater than they have ever been. There is, for instance, the Airbus programme. I find it quite incomprehensible that the governments of Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are not doing all in their power to encourage such a collaboration between firms.

The European Commission has once again, in a report it brought out recently, pointed to the importance of doing so, and has recommended the governments to help the creation of a European family of civil aircraft by providing financial aid. With certain provisos, I am in favour of this. I believe that intensive co-operation like this should relate to all aspects of the aircraft industry. In the first place, there is the shared developing of new ideas; second, there is joint production, shared reasonably among those taking part; third, there is a joint sales organisation; and fourth, there is control over the funds made available by or through the European Commission or by national governments. Without all of these there can never, I believe, be a European aircraft industry — nor, in the long run, any aircraft industry at all in Europe.

Where the Netherlands is concerned, this means involving VFW-Fokker — which in 1977 had a turnover of 1.2 million guilders, no small sum — in the talks now under way about a merger with Messerschmidt-Bölkow-Blohm. I think such a merger would be a good thing, but I believe that VFW-Fokker should be able to retain its own capacity to initiate; this is an area in which Fokker has an immense amount of know-how. My firm conviction is, however, that an increased participation by VFW-Fokker in the Airbus development in the near future is essential — at the present time its share is 6%. An increase in VFW-Fokker's share in the Airbus project calls for a government guarantee, in the Netherlands, of 100 million guilders. I think the Dutch Government will have to take a deci-

sion on this before long. The purpose of such a collaboration is to survey the market. I believe there must be clear agreements about the A-300 Airbus and the F-28. There should also be clear understandings on the distribution of the work, that is to say about sharing in the development costs and satisfactory agreements about the sharing out of the production. I think, too, that this is an essential condition for Fokker's survival; but that is true not only for Fokker.

I am heartily in favour of the second part of the recommendation. Fast action is called for; an enormous number of jobs in Western Europe are involved, and a possible increase in employment and the keeping in being of a high-technology industry.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — In view of the remarks of Mr. Adriaensens and those of the last speaker on the Airbus I thought I should tell the Assembly that on a recent visit to the United States I was reading an advertisement in a periodical for the Airbus by Airbus Industrie. The advertisement said that the great thing about the Airbus was that more of its components were made in the United States than anywhere else, that 33% of its components were American-made, which meant that Americans made more of the Airbus than any other country. I am sure that there is a moral in that for Europeans.

The subject to which I wish to devote the majority of my remarks this afternoon is, of course, the very important subject touched on in the excellent report of Mr. Treu — the future of our Assembly. I can think of no more important subject. It might not affect us, of course, but it may well affect those who follow us.

Less than a year from now, as you said, Sir, in your opening remarks, we shall be faced with direct elections to the European Parliament. Some say that that will put this Assembly and perhaps the Council of Europe into the shadows. I do not believe that that is necessarily the case, particularly as in many countries there will be problems about the dual mandate of being in both one's national parliament and the European Parliament.

Therefore, our Assembly, which will be the only body bringing together the parliamentarians of seven out of the nine countries of the European Community from the national parliaments of the Community, could have an increased rôle after direct elections if — and I emphasise the "if" — we learn to work effectively and usefully to achieve our important objectives.

In order to do that we need to make leaps of imagination. We need to be far more imaginative

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

in how we organise our work. My particular passion — I make no secret of it — is to interest the chairmen of national defence committees in the work of our Assembly. I should like to see ways within the framework of WEU of bringing together the defence committees of the seven member countries of our organisation. I was particularly pleased that earlier this week we had Mr. Accame, the distinguished Chairman of the Defence Committee in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, sitting with us for part of our meeting. I should like to see more of this.

I turn now to the important draft order submitted to us by Mr. Treu. If I were a sensitive soul, I or my Committee might take a certain amount of offence at Mr. Treu's remarks. We might have thought that the suggestion that there should be "an appropriate number of parliamentarians interested in defence matters" meant that in some ways our Committee was inadequate in those matters at the moment and that the General Affairs Committee thought it could make a judgment whether the Defence Committee was competent in matters of defence.

I am sure that that was not in the mind of Mr. Treu. I am sure that he did not intend to cast a slight on that Committee.

I now turn to what he suggests in paragraphs 50 to 59. There is, of course, in our Assembly a consensus that we should not try to amend the modified Brussels Treaty. This is what one might call the "conventional wisdom" in these circles. It is assumed that if one tries to amend the treaty it will be rather like opening Pandora's box and all sorts of dreadful things will happen.

I am never quite sure that I believe in conventional wisdom. I do not actually believe that WEU is such a fragile structure that it will fall apart if you open the box. None the less, this is the conventional wisdom and I shall not argue against it for the moment.

I then come to the important matters which Mr. Treu discusses in paragraphs 50 to 59 and which my learned colleague, Mr. Grieve, discussed in his contribution to the debate. It must be said that legal interpretations of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty vary very considerably. The most qualified sources in the United Kingdom for the interpretation of international treaties have assured me that it would be perfectly possible to interpret the modified Brussels Treaty in such a way that the alternate members to this Assembly could be other than those who are appointed as alternate members to the Council of Europe.

I know that different lawyers have different opinions. All I can say is that those who are best equipped to interpret international treaties in

the United Kingdom hold the view that that interpretation could be made of the treaty.

Without wanting today to make a judgment one way or the other, in favour of the interpretation put upon it by Mr. Treu, that put upon it by Mr. Grieve or indeed my own interpretation, I hope that when we come to consider the amendments which I have tabled to Mr. Treu's draft order he will enable us to accept that, in order that we can go forward from the consensus reached at the meeting of the Presidential Committee in Bonn, further inquiries should be made of the legal authorities in each of our member countries to discover whether such an interpretation can be put on the treaty.

Unfortunately, the wording of Mr. Treu's order would really not permit an interpretation of the sort that I should like to place upon it. I do not insist that it is the correct interpretation. I should like, however, to have a chance to move my amendment in order that he can leave open this matter for further examination. It might be found possible at least to consider whether it would be desirable to make use of such an opportunity to widen the range of parliamentarians who could attend our Assembly, make it more effective and enable us to do the job for which we are here, to extend and develop parliamentary debate and decisions on defence and foreign policy within the countries of Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Valleix.

I would point out that his is the last name on the list of speakers.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, our Assembly has before it two replies to the report of the Council of Ministers, whose philosophy, fundamental approach and implications are, as we can see, clearly very different. It would, indeed, be surprising if we were to adopt two reports written from such conflicting standpoints.

The report presented by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee betrays a certain ill humour felt by this Committee in view of the hesitations of the WEU Council about the full implementation of Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty, which makes it obligatory to examine any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or a danger to economic stability.

Admittedly, the other Rapporteur, Mr. Tanghe, stresses with some justification the slightly larger fund of information which the Council gives us this year on its activities, and the replies dealing with the texts voted by the Assembly are indeed somewhat more precise; but one essential point remains, as Mr. Tanghe reminds us: concerted action by governments in the fields of security and defence, which are the object of the Brussels Treaty, is still completely unsatisfactory.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

How can we fail to see that NATO is not a European organisation — that is not its rôle — and that the EEC has no competence in the field of defence? WEU alone, therefore, makes it possible to lay the foundations of a European security policy *de facto* and *de jure*. It is essential that the Brussels Treaty and, in particular, its Article VIII should be scrupulously applied.

I can therefore only approve Mr. Treu's words, when he asks that the Council should examine regularly the questions within its area of competence, even when these are being tackled by other organisations that are frequently neither suitably composed nor possessed of the required competence to deal with them effectively. I would, on the other hand, voice the strongest possible reservations concerning the views expressed by Mr. Tanghe in the report he presents on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Whereas Mr. Treu deplores the low level of activity of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Tanghe congratulates that body on the substance of its replies to the Assembly's recommendations. We see, in fact, that the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is proposing nothing less than the total voluntary eclipse of our organisation. And I should like to give chapter and verse for my observation, since in presenting his report he has tried to reassure us, if I understood his remarks aright.

In the first place, Mr. Tanghe considers that the control of armaments exercised within the framework of WEU is incomplete and useless, and he accordingly takes a stand in favour of abolishing this control. I consider that this position is extremely serious. The Brussels Treaty is a legal reality which is a positive gain both through its clause on automatic assistance among its member states, which enshrines a form of European solidarity more binding than Atlantic solidarity, and also through its Protocols Nos. II, III and IV, which lay the foundations for a European military set-up compatible with détente. To call in question the machinery that guarantees implementation of the Brussels Treaty seems to me to be sowing doubts about the resolve of countries so far as their ability to abide by their contractual commitments is concerned. Mr. Tanghe's proposals are clearly negative in my eyes, and I believe that our Assembly should not adopt them.

Secondly, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments does not hold out any prospects for fuller co-operation among the WEU member states in the sphere of armaments. Mr. Tanghe does not raise the problem of the follow-up action to be taken on the study carried out by the SAC. Quite the

reverse, in fact, since he considers that the best way of using the expert knowledge of the Standing Armaments Committee's secretariat would be to incorporate it in the European centre for defence studies. The character of the SAC would thereby be radically transformed. Thus WEU would be robbed of the concrete basis for its activity: the organisation of and co-operation in the European armaments industry.

Lastly, the third and final point: Mr. Tanghe refrains from voicing any criticism regarding the present efforts to concert action within the framework of WEU. These efforts are very poor: the ministers of the member states meet in the WEU Council only once a year. Can we rest content with this frequency — or rather infrequency — of meetings which constitutes a form of inertia that in turn prevents WEU from seeing its Assembly's proposals followed up sufficiently closely and sufficiently quickly?

In short, a comparison of the two reports presented by Mr. Treu and Mr. Tanghe sheds a particularly clear light on the various problems which Europe is facing in the security field.

The first assumption would imply renouncing the autonomous affirmation of a personality and of clearly-expressed interests, in order to seek some sort of protection under the shelter of a nation inclined to hegemony. The second assumption would imply taking note of the demands and reality of the states that make up Europe, organising their co-operation and fitting this into an ambitious design.

To sum up, it would be regrettable if our Assembly, faced by these alternatives, should decline — as it all too frequently does — to make a choice. Only the courageous definition of clear policies will be able to restore to the faltering effort to build Europe the impetus which it lacks.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

We closed the list of speakers and the list has been completed. Do the Rapporteurs wish to speak?

Mr. Treu, do you wish to speak?

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Before you said that the list of speakers was closed, I handed in my name to speak for two or three minutes on the report.

The PRESIDENT. — I think that it is not worth fighting about it. When we opened the debate we had four names on the list of speakers and I informed the meeting that the list of speakers was closed. You put in your name later on. But, as you have asked for only four minutes, please take the floor.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I am very sorry that I did not hear you say earlier the second part of what you have just told me. I apologise for not having heard you, but there was a great deal of noise in the chamber.

I support Mr. Treu and I agree very much with what Mr. Valleix has said. My object in speaking is really to draw attention to the fact that the Council of Ministers appears to take little notice of our proceedings. The media also take little notice of our proceedings. For instance, the Secretary of State for Defence came here yesterday from the United Kingdom. The *Daily Telegraph*, which gives a lot of prominence to defence matters, merely mentioned that the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Mulley, was here in Paris, but did not state that he was at the meeting of WEU. WEU was not even mentioned.

We are not being encouraged in our work, either by acknowledgment from the Ministers who form the Council of Ministers, or by the media. I believe that this is partly because we as members of this Assembly have not raised our voices sufficiently in our own parliaments.

I am in a little difficulty, Mr. President, in that I am being permitted to speak because of your indulgence, but I have to be somewhat critical. We came to this meeting thinking that the sittings would last four full days. Having made our plane reservations and booked our hotels accordingly, we were told when we arrived that the meeting was to finish at midday on the Thursday. Indeed, your predecessor in the chair, Sir John Rodgers, was encouraging us all to hurry up and rather hoping that no one else would wish to speak.

If we carry on in this way, Mr. President, I do not think that a great deal of notice will be taken of us. I support everything that Mr. Valleix, Mr. Treu and Mr. Roper have said, but I feel that we must ourselves take steps to ensure that encouragement is given to our work. We must all make sure that our own people in our own countries know what we are doing. Then they may take some notice of us. Thank you for allowing me to speak, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call the Rapporteur, Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, all but a faithful few have left the meeting: our report, and the presentation of it I had the honour to make on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, have travelled a long and weary way. After many references back, they have only reached a conclusion this evening.

I shall not linger over the comments of those who have seen fit to speak in support of some of

the substantive points made in the report. Mr. Valleix has used an inaccurate term in speaking of our discontent. Our opinion is that things are slightly better compared with the situation last year. We acknowledge a rather better collaboration between the ministerial Council and the Assembly. More importantly, in paragraphs 37 and 38, I have said that with regard to the sometimes very warmly resolute series of promises — although I wonder more than ever what promises by the Council of Ministers and Secretary-General are worth — the bureaucrats, the Permanent Representatives — the ones who meet thirty-seven times a year and not just twice, Mr. Valleix — are possibly those who give us the greatest trouble. I would pay tribute to the attitude shown by the ministers — we have heard what Minister Forlani and the United Kingdom Minister have had to say — who show themselves more co-operative than the bureaucrats, ambassadors sitting as permanent delegates.

This is why there is still a notable difference between the conclusions of my report and Mr. Tanghe's.

Now let me go into what Mr. Roper had to say, based on his usual sagacious and shrewd reading of the text. He picked out the meat of my modest report, which is more preoccupied with the future of WEU than relations between eminent colleagues, ministers or under-secretaries of state. I also remember Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, the United Kingdom Minister Mr. Tomlinson, another one who had never come to any of our joint meetings although he knew more about the subject for debate than the permanent delegates.

We are concerned at all this, yes indeed, but even more about tomorrow. Why did we see fit to indicate in the operative part of the order, the need for better working arrangements between representatives on the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments? Not out of ill-will towards the Committee members but precisely because we have been concerned about what Mr. Roper has said.

When the elections to the European Parliament are held, if there is any compatibility between the representatives to the various parliaments and other institutions like WEU — which will, we trust, remain in being for a goodly number of years — the workload, especially for representatives of the smaller countries, may hamper the work of the Committee on Defence Questions, especially if it be true, as it is true, that the amended Brussels Treaty in Articles IX and VIII makes WEU solely and indivisibly competent for defence matters.

I do not feel I can answer the comment on the appropriateness of nominating different representatives to the Council of Europe compared

*Mr. Treu (continued)*

with WEU. All I know is that in our country representatives to the Council of Europe are elected, and that these include those to WEU. Our draft order seeks to show governments the way to find a solution whereby titular representatives and alternates are quite familiar with their subject matter and properly in attendance.

I say straight away that the amendment seems unclear to me, in that it is capable of being construed in two ways. I can accept it, but I wonder who the possessive "its" refers to, the Council of Europe or WEU. Obviously it refers to WEU, but if the ambiguity is any use to anyone, good luck !

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I note first of all that one Italian member has found reason for not supporting the report in the fact that the recommendation proposes allowing West Germany to build auxiliary craft of a certain tonnage on its own territory. It amazes me that so long after the last world war proposals like this can still arouse such strong psychological reactions. I do not therefore intend to drop this part of the recommendation, because in this case what we have is a certain discrimination against one particular member state.

Mr. Valleix, and Mr. Treu too, felt that they could see a certain contradiction between the terminology used in my report and that in Mr. Treu's.

When, in the first paragraph of the preamble, we say "Congratulating the Council" this is rather more than simply a diplomatic formula of politeness to the Council of Ministers. We have here two Rapporteurs who on behalf of two different Committees have studied the annual report from the Council of Ministers. Everyone has his own way of putting things. Our Committees have had a great many meetings to prepare a reply to the Council's annual report. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments looked mainly at how the Council of Ministers had reacted to this Assembly's recommendations coming from that Committee. It looked particularly carefully at the replies to written questions and written questions, and on the fact that because of this we felt it was right to offer the Council a word or two of congratulation on the way they had responded to these recommendations and written questions, and on the fact that each year the Council is again willing to have an informal meeting with the Committee. This year we shall be having another meeting with the Permanent Council, in October.

If Mr. Valleix would like to read more than just the preamble and the recommendation, he might find in this report rather less optimism and rather more realism about the way our institutions are working: he will find it comes far closer to the tone Mr. Treu is trying to put into the report with his amendment.

From various speeches and from reactions I have heard in the corridors, I think I can detect among some of our members a certain amount of resistance to the setting up of a European centre for defence studies. Some people question the need for such a centre. It has been asked whether it would not mean duplication of effort, bearing in mind the existence of the institutes for strategic studies which we have in a number of European capitals. I would comment, however, that these are not international study centres; they are generally national bodies, having at all events a very clear national character without a truly European stamp such as the centre proposed in the recommendation would have. Inter-governmental bodies would be able to call on a study centre of this kind. We believe it could enhance the long-standing and respected institution that Western European Union now is. Moreover, there is a potential clientele for a European study centre like this. This Assembly would not have to call on foreign experts, as it does at present. The Rome group, I would point out, does not even have an international secretariat of its own; it could, with the European study centre, have its study requirements catered for. The study centre could provide qualified experts when there are serious and supervised disarmament initiatives. The four member states of this European defence association could, from the facilities of the study centre we are proposing, draw support in their study of a uniform logistics system.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

There are, furthermore, some colleagues who offer resistance, saying that they fear lest the establishment of this European centre for defence studies hamper the execution of the important task entrusted to the Agency for the Control of Armaments and even put an end to the existence of this body which is indeed so essential to WEU and to implementation of the treaty and its protocols.

Here I would repeat once again, Mr. President, that no member of the Committee would in any way wish to do anything that might threaten the existence or impair the prerogatives of the agency, or prevent it from fulfilling its functions, which are so important and useful within the framework of WEU. Far from it! The show must go on. That is clear. And if we were to call on its high qualifications and experience — which is precisely what we find just in this agency, but less readily elsewhere — to carry out

*Mr. Tanghe (continued)*

specific and precise studies of limited duration, this would not prevent the agency from carrying out its own duties as laid down in the treaty — duties which have, alas, already been cut back owing to the attitude of certain member states.

All this applies even more to the Standing Armaments Committee, a committee which was set up only to carry out studies. It has now undertaken one such study, but that is of limited duration; and once it is finished I hope the distinguished members and staff of the SAC will be enabled to continue carrying out studies relevant to the joint defence of Europe.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

For all these reasons we are maintaining this draft recommendation. We would ask the Assembly to give it its approval, and then leave it to the wisdom of the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. Do the Chairmen in charge of the three items want to take the floor?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I wish only to thank Mr. Tanghe, the Rapporteur of my Committee, and, in the absence of Mrs. von Bothmer, the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, for their contribution to the debate which, as it is the one statutory debate of our Assembly, is one which has the greatest importance.

The only thing I would say on behalf of my Committee in closing the debate is that I believe that all three of our Committees concerned and the Presidential Committee between now and the end of this year should give attention to how this debate in reply to the report of the Council on the work of WEU can become a more central and more important debate as part of the work of our Assembly.

I believe in connection with the Council that we could make this a really central debate on the current problems both of defence and foreign policy of Western Europe and give a whole centre to the proceedings of the three or four days we have here in Paris, and I hope in that way respond to some of the views which were so eloquently expressed by my colleague, Mr. Hawkins.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The debate is closed.

We are at the end of a long debate and we turn now to votes on amendments.

First, in Document 768, a draft recommendation and a draft order are submitted to the Assembly. We shall proceed as follows: first we must vote on the draft recommendation and we

shall then vote on the amendments which do not touch the recommendation but only the draft order.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

*The draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

We now take Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 to the draft order. The first amendment is tabled by Mr. Voogd and reads:

Leave out the operative text of the draft order and insert:

“To ask the authorities concerned to promote the appointment of an appropriate number of parliamentarians interested in defence matters to the delegations of WEU member countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.”

This is an alteration to the draft order as written by the Committee.

Does anyone wish to speak in favour or against?...

Does anyone object?...

What is the view of the Committee?

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the conclusions of Amendment No. 1 conflict with those of Amendment No. 2. As Rapporteur I accept them both, but we should agree which one to vote on first.

The PRESIDENT. — I believe that there is no contradiction here. We must vote first on Mr. Voogd's amendment and then go on to the second amendment, which deletes only two or three words.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 1 is agreed to.*

We take now Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Roper and others which reads:

In the draft order proper, leave out “the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe” and insert “its Assembly”.

This is the only addition to the wording.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I make it clear that although I speak from this front bench I am speaking as a back bencher? I am most grateful to Mr. Treu for having pointed out the ambiguity in the drafting of my amend-

1. See page 43.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

ment. It could certainly be drafted rather more clearly and it would be better if it read: "to the delegations of member countries to the WEU Assembly". That would remove the ambiguity and would leave it perfectly clear for the future examination agreed by the Presidential Committee in each member state whether it was obligatory or otherwise and enable us to carry forward the policy decided in Bonn by the Presidential Committee. If Mr. Treu would accept that amended form it would remove the uncertainty which he rightly pointed out and would help us to get a clear vote. I hope that he will accept it in those terms.

The PRESIDENT. — Will Mr. Treu take the floor?

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, it still remains true that the voting procedure will be a legal argument. I accept that interpretation, that is, that the members of the WEU Committee on Defence Questions should be identified. Then if they are the same people, elected anyway, *provident consules*.

In this sense I accept Mr. Roper's comments.

The PRESIDENT. — I must ask Mr. Roper, who drafted the compromise, to read the correct text upon which we are to vote.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — It would mean that the final words of the operative paragraph, as amended by Mr. Voogd, would be "to the delegations of member countries to the WEU Assembly".

The PRESIDENT. — "to the delegations of member countries to the WEU Assembly". And then "of the Council of Europe" is deleted?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — I do not think there is any problem.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 2, as amended, is agreed to unanimously.*

I now put the draft order, as amended, to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft order, as amended, is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

That concludes Document 768.

We now turn to the draft recommendation in Document 777.

We begin with Amendment No. 2, tabled in the name of Mr. Treu. I think I had better read it item by item. That will be the best way.

The first part of the amendment by Mr. Treu reads as follows:

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out the beginning of the first paragraph up to "recommendations and".

If you look at Document 777, you will find that it no longer congratulates the Council on the contents of its reply to the Assembly's recommendations.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Valleix has pointed out a difference of tone between the conclusions of the report by the General Affairs Committee and that of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The latter's report applauds, while the former indicates reservations. This is why we cannot accept the word "gratified", to which we would prefer the alternative "noting".

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The Committee is opposed to this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — I see, the Committee is opposed.

I now put the first part of Mr. Treu's amendment to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 1 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.*

I come now to the second part of the amendment, which reads as follows:

2. In the third paragraph of the preamble, leave out "and that the usefulness of those that are applied is contested".

Does anyone wish to speak on this part of the amendment?

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 2 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.*

We turn now to Amendment No. 1 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others, which reads as follows:

In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of the second paragraph insert "making use of the resources of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and its Standing Armaments Committee".

Does anyone wish to speak on this? Mr. Tanghe?

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — We accept this amendment, Mr. President. It makes more explicit what we say at great length in the explanatory memorandum.

1. See page 44.

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Committee agree to it?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Sir.

The PRESIDENT. — I shall put Mr. Stoffelen's amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment No. 1 is agreed to.*

We come now to part 3 of the amendment by Mr. Treu, Amendment No. 2. It reads as follows :

3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

"2. Encourage the Standing Armaments Committee to pursue and develop the study it has undertaken to improve co-operation between European armaments industries and provide the Agency for the Control of Armaments with the means it needs to enable the modified Brussels Treaty to be applied in full ;".

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The Committee is totally opposed to this amendment which is contrary to what was considered in detail in the Committee and agreed unanimously. This was never proposed in the Committee at all. I hope that it will be rejected unanimously by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — You are all sitting there in peace but it does not seem to be very peaceful !

Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (*Translation*). — I did state the reason for the proposal to delete paragraph 2, albeit cursorily. A superstructure that hampers the Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee still seems a dangerous build-up. I will not venture to pronounce on its functional merits, but certainly the General Affairs Committee saw it as a superstructure.

So although I am sure of my colleagues' motive for opposing it, I stand by my interpretation, and I am unwilling to withdraw it.

The PRESIDENT. — You have heard Mr. Treu speaking to his amendment. You have also heard that the Committee is opposed to it. That is the situation in brief.

We shall now take a vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 3 of Amendment No. 2 is negatived.*

Now we have to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 777, as amended.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, I wish, if you please, to go down as abstaining in the vote on Mr. Tanghe's report, and some of my colleagues would like to do the same.

I shall not further complicate the procedure, if it is the Assembly's wish.

The PRESIDENT. — It has been recorded that you and one or two of your colleagues, Mr. Valleix, wish to abstain.

It appears that Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Bernini and another of their colleagues are saying "No". Will you take the microphone ?

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*). — Three of us say "No".

The PRESIDENT. — You do not ask for a roll-call ? You are just saying "No" ? This will be recorded.

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 774.

An amendment has been tabled in the name of Mr. Jager, Amendment No. 1. It is:

At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph III as follows :

"III. Invite the governments of the member countries to discuss the communication of 31st May last from the Commission of the European Communities on concerted action on aircraft programmes so that they may take a decision on this matter at the next meeting of the European Council."

Does anyone wish to speak ?

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, the Committee and myself are in favour of this amendment. I would merely ask that a few words be added by way of further clarification.

Where Mr. Jager speaks of "communication of 31st May last from the Commission of the European Communities", I propose that we add "to the Council of Ministers of the EEC".

The PRESIDENT. — We can now take the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

1. See page 45.

*The President (continued)*

*The amended amendment is agreed to unanimously.*

We must now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 774, as amended.

I think that, as before, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously*<sup>1</sup>.

## 6. Relations with Parliaments

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 775)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the information report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 775.

I call Mr. Reid, Rapporteur.

Mr. REID (*United Kingdom*). — This has been a long day, Mr. President, and I shall be as brief as possible. This report is no more than a brief update of the much lengthier document which I presented at the last session of the Assembly. Since the current paper was drafted, some of our parliamentary assemblies have reached a firm conclusion on bills for direct elections to the European Parliament. The report must therefore be seen as an interim document which to some extent has been outstripped by events.

The document falls into three parts. It covers the work of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, it makes a few suggestions as to the future work of the Committee, and it gives a brief outline of direct elections legislation in our seven countries.

With regard to the work of the Committee, the report lists the five recommendations which have been selected for transmission to our national parliaments. It notes the work of the committee on local government in France in colloquy with the Director-General of the French new town of Cergy-Pontoise, and Mr. Cabana, the Secretary-General of the municipal authority in Paris.

It also records, with a fair degree of satisfaction, the significant rise in the number of inter-

ventions by members of this Assembly in their own national parliaments, from fifteen in the last half of 1977 to thirty-eight so far this year. This is particularly gratifying as the period coincides with the French national elections and with the political crisis in Italy.

Secondly, the report deals with the future work of the Committee. Lying on the file of the Assembly there is a remarkably detailed report by Mr. Péronnet on the devolution of decision-making and regional assemblies in Europe throughout our seven member states. That report is now badly in need of review and rewriting. Since the report was composed by Mr. Péronnet, the Scotland Bill and the Wales Bill have made significant progress through the House of Commons. There have been important developments in regional government in Italy, and, if one is to believe the British press, Belgium would appear to be heading for a fully federal state by the early 1980s.

Reading the official reports of our national parliaments I am struck by how often this subject comes up. As power grows at the centre, should there be a corresponding growth of power at the periphery? How is the identity of the homogenous regions to be retained? What are the rights of national minorities?

This problem was pointed up recently during the visit of the French President to Corsica and by the activities of the Simeoni brothers. In Brittany, regrettably, the bombs still go off. The Spanish Observer this morning referred to Euzkadi, and to the search of the Basque nation for a political identity. In Italy the Government of Val d'Aosta has tabled a bill for separate representation in the European Parliament. Even in Cornwall there are protests about the heavy hand of London government. The Committee should turn its attention to this general European problem in the near future.

The report also deals with direct elections to the European Parliament. I must record an immediate difficulty.

The lead time involved in preparing a document of this kind — in obtaining documentation and information from national parliaments and having these translated and typed — inevitably means that such a report can be somewhat dated by subsequent events.

I am grateful to the Clerk of the Committee, Mr. Bernard Van't Land, for his patience and forbearance in this respect.

Direct elections are a complex and difficult matter. I shall therefore headline only four specific items. First, it is worth recording that the United Kingdom is out of step with other member states. Proposals for proportional representation in direct elections to the European Parliament

1. See page 46.

*Mr. Reid (continued)*

were backed by the British Government but were thrown out by the House of Commons by a large majority. Members of the Commons took the view that regional lists were something of "an alien importation" and that there should be in the United Kingdom a continuing link between geographical areas and individual representatives. Whatever the merits of these arguments they will have serious consequences on British representation at Strasbourg. It is not impossible that the Liberal Party could gain 15% to 20% of the votes but no European representatives whatsoever. It is possible that the regionally-based parties in the United Kingdom — the Ulster Unionists in Northern Ireland and the Scottish National Party in Scotland — could gain up to three seats each, with 3% of the vote.

It is certainly likely that in the United Kingdom a broad line will be drawn through the Mersey and the Humber. North of that line the Labour Party is likely to gain the plurality of seats and south of that line there is likely to be a large conservative majority. The first-past-the-post system — the winner-takes-all system — is clearly not satisfactory, and it will not achieve a fair representation of views.

I turn now to the question of the dual mandate. Our national parliaments have been open-minded in their approach to this subject. There is no compulsion towards dual membership, nor is there any requirement that members should sit in only one parliament. Our view, as expressed in the report, is that the pressure of travel, time and parliamentary work will in due course make the dual mandate wither away.

In recent weeks in the United Kingdom, however, there has been pressure, certainly inside the two major parties, to make members of parliament decide one way or the other. The fact that many British seats are identifiable as "winnable" should hasten that process. The salaries and allowances at Strasbourg should help to clarify the minds of British members of parliament wonderfully.

But in all our countries there is still the problem of how European members of parliament will dovetail with their national legislatures. How is information to be fed from one body to another? Will there be a joint committee of European and "national" members of parliament? Will European members have speaking but not voting rights in their home parliament? Should European members automatically find a seat in the upper house? All those ideas have been canvassed, and it is likely that only the passage of time will produce answers.

I now deal with what I call "the disenfranchised Europeans". As I indicate in paragraph 34

of the report, there are probably about two and a half million Europeans who are citizens of one EEC state but live in another. They have a direct vested interest in what happens in "their" parliament, but they are unlikely to have direct representation. Their very mobility is in the broad interests of European integration. Certainly, it is the view of the Committee that all the one hundred and eighty-one million electors — from the Shetland Islands in the far north to Sicily in the south, from Brittany to Berlin — should have a vote on 7th June. The report states that the easiest way of achieving this is by giving those expatriates a vote at home — possibly by turning up at the nearest consulate, but preferably through the granting of a postal or proxy vote.

Lastly, I want to touch on the subject of "regionalism" and direct elections, and the question whether, or how, the regions, the provinces and the submerged nations of Europe should have a voice in Strasbourg. This subject has been raised in most of our countries. The United Kingdom has adopted an openly regional approach to direct elections. Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland have had specific numbers of European members allocated to them. The same is true of the francophone and Flemish communities in Belgium. There has been considerable debate in Germany on whether the Länder and regions can have a voice in Strasbourg.

The report does not advocate *l'Europe aux cent drapeaux* or a Carolingian Europe. Clearly, that is not a practical proposition at this time, although it might be a desirable ideal to hold out for our grandchildren.

I wish simply to note what I have gathered from conversations throughout the regions of Europe, the feeling of representatives from these regions that direct elections might enable them in some cases to leap-frog their existing parliaments. Edinburgh may well want to speak direct to Brussels. The Sardinians might find it a convenient way of avoiding Rome. Perhaps the Flemings might find it a way of bypassing Brussels. That process could well be speeded up by a grumbling discontent over inequalities of representation between communities of similar size. For example, Scotland has a bigger population than Denmark, but Denmark has sixteen seats to Scotland's eight. With no disrespect to Luxembourg, may I point out that that state has a smaller population than that of our capital city, Edinburgh. Yet Luxembourg will have six members of the European Parliament to Scotland's eight.

The debate will continue in many regions of Europe as to whether the communities are better served as a component part of one of the big boys, or whether they should seek a European identity of their own.

*Mr. Reid (continued)*

I have dealt with some of the main themes of the report. It is the tail-end Charlie of this Assembly's business today, as we say in Scotland. But if the report has encouraged colleagues to spare a few minutes of thought for what is happening outwith their own parliaments, it will have made its own small contribution to the European ideal. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Craigen.

Mr. CRAIGEN (*United Kingdom*). — The report is an information report. As we said earlier, the document provides a useful cross-reference to developments in the move towards direct elections to the European Assembly. A number of politically objective points were made by Mr. Reid both in his report and statement.

I should like to question the report's relevance to the work of WEU. But before doing so I have two observations to make on the content of the report, which is a useful information document.

The first concerns how the European representatives will be elected. As Mr. Reid said, there will be an inevitable move towards the adoption of some uniform electoral procedure for the consultative Assembly. I believe that this kind of electoral harmonisation will lead in time to a system of proportional representation.

As one who voted for the proportional representation list system in the United Kingdom Parliament, I have no doubt that the main contention when the move is towards proportional representation the European Assembly will adopt. In the context of a consultative European Assembly the real need will be for members who can bring to bear specialist and professional knowledge on a variety of subjects rather than the Assembly being simply another tier of parliamentary government above national parliaments, regional assemblies and local authorities.

I noted Mr. Reid's remarks about the imminence of assemblies in Scotland and Wales. But those proposals nearly came to nought last week when his party in the United Kingdom Parliament was prepared to bring down the government and therefore to dish the possibility of assemblies coming into being in Cardiff and Edinburgh.

My second main observation concerns representation at the European level. Mr. Reid has mentioned the problem of inequalities between different parts of the European Community. He instanced the particular issue of Scotland's representation compared with, for example, representation from Ireland and Denmark.

I rather think that with the enlargement of the European Community we are going to be talking of something over 500 Euro-members of parliament. I believe that the size of electorates and therefore of populations should dictate representation in the European Assembly, and not the question of existing member states. I have no doubt that the time may well come when we shall have a system whereby the size of the electorate is the determining factor in the representation in the European Assembly.

I would point out, however, that on the basis of 410 members, if it were worked out on an electoral basis, the United Kingdom would probably have 88 or 89 seats instead of 81. This would not, however, mean that Scotland would have more than the present 8 but rather that England would have 74 instead of 66; while Wales would continue to have 4 and Northern Ireland 2 or possibly 3 seats. The real gainers in such a situation would be the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy, with consequential reductions in the representation from other member countries.

Lastly, on the question of the relevance of the Committee's report to WEU, we have this week discussed the allocation of committee chairmanships and debates are going on behind the scenes about the question of dual membership of WEU and the Council of Europe. With direct elections in the near future, what do we see as the rôle of WEU as an organisation, as the western flank of NATO — because with the exception of Ireland and Denmark all the member countries of the present European Community are member countries of WEU? I believe that with direct elections the European members of parliament are before long going to be taking far greater interest in defence matters. Certainly, with the prospect of the enlargement of the European Community there are great implications for the work of WEU, because we are not simply talking of the inclusion of Spain and Portugal. We have also the vexed issue of Greece and Turkey. I would suggest that perhaps these strategic issues have more bearing on the rôle of the work of WEU, and a bearing which the Committee for Relations with Parliaments cannot afford to ignore at this stage.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Kershaw.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — I pay tribute to the remarks just made by my colleague Mr. Craigen and very much concur in what he said. Like him, I regret the system which has been chosen by the United Kingdom for the election of members of the European Parliament, the first-past-the-post system which is noted in the very factual way in this report by our Rapporteur, which quite rightly does not come to

*Mr. Kershaw (continued)*

any conclusions on the subject. Nevertheless, the system is extremely distorting to public opinion as represented in the European Parliament.

At the moment as far as one can judge — because it lies in the future — it seems likely that of the 81 seats which are allocated to the United Kingdom as many as 60 will return conservative members, with only 15 socialists and no liberals whatever. They will be representing an electorate which, on the assumptions I have been making, will be about 30 million conservative voters, 12 million socialist voters and 2 million to 4 million liberal voters. Clearly, it is grossly unfair and not really to be defended by any good democrat that such a result should happen.

In Scotland, on which Mr. Reid was rather modest in not putting it right in the front of his speech, there are four parties of substantial numbers. When there are four parties, the first-past-the-post system is bound to be extremely chancy and to produce a result which, even in Ascot week, would be very difficult to forecast. Basically, therefore, it is unfair and will be found to be unsatisfactory.

Furthermore, the European Parliament will be elected by this system in the United Kingdom in 1979 and we shall also have a general election in the national parliament. It can be expected that in accordance with the usual swing of opinion half way through the next parliament public opinion will be quite substantially against the government of the day. We shall then find ourselves facing another European election. The result which I have shown to be so distorted will be equally distorted next time but the other way, so that the government of the day will be faced, as now, with a large majority in the European Parliament of its members who are hostile to the national government. I cannot believe that this is a sensible way of ordering the running of our proceedings.

Again, after the next election we are committed — all of us — to an election on the same basis. How are we to harmonise? Of course, there will be a lot of party political manoeuvring about this and it is difficult to see how at any rate the first-past-the-post system will survive, as I believe almost all of our partners are against it. It will not be too soon if this Committee and our Rapporteur now turn their minds to a further report as to how we should harmonise our systems for the next elections after 1979 so as to try to mould public opinion to the difficulties which we have brought upon ourselves by the way in which, at any rate in the United Kingdom, we have approached this matter.

I very much hope, therefore, that this will be done. This has been a most valuable report. It has opened this matter in a most interesting way and has given us information which perhaps was not available to all of us. I very much hope that it will be followed up in another report in which we shall be able to make proposals towards the harmonisation of our voting systems in the future.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Beith.

Mr. BEITH (*United Kingdom*). — After the remarks made by my colleagues from three different parties in the United Kingdom, may I speak from a fourth party to express a unanimous view of disapproval of what our parliament has done in the matter to which Mr. Reid has referred in his report? It is an extremely useful document in many respects, not least because it highlights this issue. One aspect of our failure to choose a fairer system for elections to the Assembly of the European Community which concerns our colleagues from other countries and other parties has not yet been effectively brought out.

It is this. If our country sends to any assembly, whether it were to be this Assembly or the Assembly of the European Community, a delegation which is not representative of opinion in our own country, one of the consequences is that the balance of opinion of the major party groups within that assembly is itself distorted. It is not simply that the representation of British public opinion is distorted; it is that the balance between conservatives, christian democrats, socialists, liberals and communists, viewed on the European scale, is itself distorted.

The friends and colleagues alongside whom we have worked here will find to their surprise that the strength of their group has been quite significantly reduced or expanded by the curious lottery by which we propose to send direct representatives to the European Parliament. I cannot think that that would meet with the approval of those of us who have worked successfully together in various assemblies over the years. I hope that colleagues in many countries will not be afraid to draw attention to what is their legitimate concern in the matter. It is, no doubt, first and foremost the concern of the British Government to organise affairs in Britain, but it is the right and proper concern of members of any Europe-wide body to be sure that the balance of parties in that body is representative of opinion throughout Europe.

With that, I underline the point which, with the modesty which becomes an objective Rapporteur, Mr. Reid touched on only fleetingly in his report and his remarks.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

That completes the list of speakers.

*The President (continued)*

As Rapporteur, Mr. Reid, do you want to take the floor ?

Mr. REID (*United Kingdom*). — I should just like to thank my three British colleagues. I have noted their remarks and will bear them back to my Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — The Chairman of the Committee is not here.

The debate is therefore closed.

Thank you, Mr. Reid, for tabling this informative report.

**7. Adoption of the Minutes**

The PRESIDENT. — We are now at the end of this afternoon's session. According to the Rules of Procedure, at the beginning of a sitting we usually take the Minutes of Proceedings of the last sitting. Whilst they could not be distributed at the beginning, they have been distributed in the meanwhile.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

**8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 22nd June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

Disarmament (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 778 and Amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Mr. Calamandrei wishes to speak to a point of order.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have asked for the floor on a point of order concerning the conclusion given first to the voting on Document 777, i.e. the second recommendation on the Committee's replies to the annual report of the Council of Ministers.

As will certainly be remembered, besides an announcement by Mr. Valleix that he would abstain, I asked to speak on my own and two other Italian colleagues' behalf to announce that

we should be voting against. It was understood that, on the basis of Rule 34 (3) of our rules, the chair would, following my announcement, take a vote by roll-call. We have waited till now, till the end of the debate, for the chair to wind up proceedings by applying the rule. It has not been done yet, so I venture to draw your attention to the fact that we have not yet taken a vote on one of the three recommendations. It is of course too important a document, relating to such a fundamental report as our annual report, for us to be able to waive the rules.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I agree with Mr. Calamandrei that the point he has raised is of considerable importance. However, I should like to bring to your attention — and I am sure that there will be no difficulty in bringing it back to your memory — that what happened was as follows.

When we had come to the end of the debate on Document 777, you said, as you always do on these occasions, that if there were no objections, no one wished that there should be a vote by roll-call and that you would proceed to this vote. Then Mr. Valleix, following what I have described elsewhere as the Nessler compromise, rose and said that he did not wish a roll-call but wanted to have his name recorded in the minutes as abstaining. Following that, Mr. Calamandrei and two of his colleagues also asked whether their names could be recorded as being against.

My recollection is that you explicitly asked at that time whether a roll-call was being requested by the Italian members, and they said that they wished their names to be recorded against.

Now it may be, Mr. President, that you will feel, in rereading the Rules of Procedure, that while it is possible to record an abstention and fail to have a roll-call vote, it is not possible, within our Rules of Procedure, to record a vote against and continue without a roll-call. If that is the case, however, I feel that the roll-call should have been taken at that particular moment and this point of order raised at that particular moment rather than waiting for the best part of forty minutes when the majority of the delegates who would have made up the quorum had left the Assembly. As is well known, if we were to proceed now to a vote it is almost certain that a quorum would not be achieved.

The PRESIDENT. — You spoke to the point of order and I can usually call for one in favour and one against.

Mr. Calamandrei, do you want to speak again ?

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*). — What I should like is to make clear some facts. This may

*Mr. Calamandrei (continued)*

enable our Assembly and our colleague, Mr. Roper, to reach a conclusion as to how to behave on this point. Perhaps I could explain what, in my opinion, happened. This may be helpful.

*(The speaker continued in Italian)*

(Translation). — Mr. President, I deplore the reference in the latter part of Mr. Roper's speech to the time we have, as it were, deliberately allowed to slip by until the last moment, just before the close of the sitting, before standing up to raise what we regard as an untoward conclusion of the voting on Document 777. I think, although I am a much more junior member of the Assembly than Mr. Roper, there have to be sufficient grounds for mutual esteem not to allow this kind of suspicion to be expressed.

To come to the fact, I should remind you, as can readily be ascertained from the Minutes, that I rose to say that to facilitate application of the rules I was announcing my own and my other two colleagues' negative vote; but I made it quite clear that I was leaving it to the chair, implicitly on the basis of the rules, to decide on what should be done in this event. Following which, the President's conclusions did not in our view follow any procedural compliance with the rules for taking a vote on Document 777 until the moment before we ourselves called for the close of the work. This is why I felt the need — on such a document, already important in itself and belonging to an even more important and basic context such as the annual report — the need, I say, and the duty to raise the point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — Before I call other speakers, I must tell you, Mr. Calamandrei, that when we came to the vote on Document 777 — this was the third document in the combined debate, starting on Monday and finishing today — I asked whether there were any objections. Then Mr. Valleix said that he wanted to make clear that he and one or two of his colleagues abstained. Then you, Mr. Calamandrei, said something which could not be understood up here, and I repeatedly asked you to take the microphone and tell us whether you wanted a roll-call. As I understood you, you said that you only wanted to make clear that you and two of your colleagues were against, and you said "No". You did not ask for a roll-call. I am not ready, therefore, to go into this matter again. I think that you will find from the Minutes that you have been recorded as saying that you were against, but you did not ask for a roll-call.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I wish to speak on a point of order or to make a personal statement, since Mr. Roper was pleased to refer to my intervention a short while

ago and you yourself, Mr. President, have just referred to it.

As far as I am concerned, what I did was to make known my abstention and that of Mr. Ferretti. I certainly do not want to put any spokes in wheels, although my interventions, perhaps somewhat too numerous in the last few days, have been interpreted as splitting hairs or unhelpful. I simply added to the announcement of my abstention — I think I can remember rightly, the Minutes will verify it — the following comment: "not wishing to complicate the procedure any further". That is about what I think I said, and anyway that is what I meant. I say it again, I do not withdraw a word of it.

On the other hand, it is obvious that as soon as other members take a position hostile to the report, the problem itself takes on another dimension and actually changes its nature. My abstention and that of Mr. Ferretti were based on the fact that a certain amendment, along the lines we wished, had been approved, while another had not. We were therefore unable to give our full support and wished to express a reservation. Opposition is something else.

So, Mr. President, I think there are only two alternatives. Once, even just a single member, and therefore all the more so if there are several, have expressed clear opposition, it seems to me that the Rules of Procedure — I am afraid I am trespassing on the rôle of the President and the Presidential Committee, but I am just giving my interpretation — applies fully. And this means, in this specific case, that we cannot have recourse to the compromise accepted by our Assembly on a proposal by our former colleague and President, Mr. Nessler, two years ago. Consequently the Rules of Procedure have to be strictly applied. Should the Assembly ignore this first point, which seems to me incontrovertible, I should feel some misgivings.

A bottle is either half full or half empty, as they say. Our recommendations and directives would in future run the risk of being considered, at the whim of their interpreters — and here I am not referring to language interpreters — sometimes as decisions taken by certain people and at other times as decisions rejected by others. I should therefore fear this would completely undermine the absolute authority of our Assembly.

That is my first interpretation.

The second follows from the first. In these circumstances, particularly in the case of votes against, if the Rules of Procedure were applied strictly — and we are referring, I think, to Rule 34 (3) — and if a discussion arises, the only solution would be to refer the matter to the Presidential Committee or the Committee on Rules of Procedure, or both, so that the Rules

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

of Procedure could be revised. I do not see any other way out.

The PRESIDENT. — I point out that I can call speakers for only five minutes on the Orders of the Day.

I call Mr. Kershaw.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — It seems, Mr. President, that the head of the French Delegation, having abstained, is now seeking to bring about a "No" vote. Your recollection of the events which took place earlier, Mr. President, accords exactly with mine and that of Mr. Roper. I was sitting here. I heard what Mr. Valleix said about abstaining, and then the Italian Delegates in front of me shouted "No". They caught your attention. You turned to them and you said in English, "Do you want to be recorded as saying 'No'?" They nodded and appeared to be quite content. There was no request for a roll-call. That is my recollection of what happened.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Kershaw.

I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, I am surprised and happy that everything that has been said by your humble servant and other Italian colleagues in this Assembly, has been so vividly and accurately fixed in the memory of more than one of us. It is a commendable sign of attention and diligent listening to our proceedings. As for my own memory, if it does not fail me, I very clearly remember having said in answer to the chair — this was the way I understood this question, in the cut-and-thrust of questions and answers in English: the hurry and confusion were no fault of mine — having understood he was asking whether, in announcing we should vote against the motion, we intended to vote against the call for a vote by roll-call. This is the question I agreed to, meaning we should not vote against a proposal for a vote by roll-call, but wished to announce we should be opposing the final vote on Document 777.

It may be there was some ambiguity in this exchange, in what is for me a foreign language; but this was my very clear intent, and what sticks in my mind as what I wanted to say.

Beyond all this, I think in any case that the kernel of the question was grasped and emphasised by Mr. Valleix when he pointed out that the Rules of Procedure are our master, which luckily happens to be a fundamental principle of representative democracy. So long as the rules are

unchanged they are everlasting, and exist to ordain what we ought to do — and this is still true, Mr. Roper, even forty minutes after the vote has been taken. Even if it was forty days later, the rule would still stand that, as the voting was irregular, Document 777 had not been properly approved, was non-existent. So I think that what Mr. Valleix said was fundamental and definitive, and that is where I stand, too.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I begin, Mr. President, by making it quite clear that in referring to the delay between the time of the original incident and the present time I was not casting any aspersion on Mr. Calamandrei in his bringing forward the matter now. I was merely saying that it is unfortunate that many of those who were present at the time are no longer present. It was not a criticism of Mr. Calamandrei. I do not intend, either, to refer to any private conversations which took place before the vote.

I believe that this evening we have touched on an ambiguity in our Rules of Procedure. As Mr. Valleix has said, Mr. Nessler introduced a certain compromise some time ago to permit the Rules of Procedure to be interpreted in such a way that those who were not content with a vote need not demand a roll-call vote but could have their abstention — extended by you today, Mr. President, to their opposition — recorded in the minutes. That was a development of the practice of the Assembly about which I had some reservations at the time.

If Mr. Calamandrei cares to read the record, he will see that I objected to that procedure and to its being developed, but it was developed and it has taken place in our Assembly ever since. From what happened today, it appears that the practice would be extended to those opposing being recorded in the minutes, if there were no demand for a roll-call by any of those present at the time.

I feel, therefore, Mr. President, that it would be very unfortunate if your decision in the chair should in any way be challenged at this time. A decision has been taken. There was no challenge and no call for a roll-call at the time. Therefore I believe that the vote should stand.

However, in view of what has been said, quite rightly, by Mr. Calamandrei and, quite rightly, by Mr. Valleix, as to the possible difficulty of interpretation — and the possible question whether the development of practice in the Assembly as it has occurred over a number of years as to the interpretation of the article stretches the original intention of the article — I feel that it would be useful if the whole of the article could be referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure for examination.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

It could then be seen whether the procedure which began, Mr. President, under your predecessor, Mr. Nessler, and which has been extended today, is in keeping with our rules or whether the Rules of Procedure should be extended.

I hope, therefore, Mr. President, that you will consider that we accept the vote which has taken place today but that, nonetheless, the procedures of today and the remarks of our colleagues, Mr. Calamandrei and Mr. Valleix, have pointed to a possible ambiguity between our rules as interpreted by some members and the practice as interpreted by the chair, and that there is a need for a study by the Committee on Rules of Procedure, and some report to the Assembly on what our future practice should be.

The PRESIDENT. — I fully agree with Mr. Roper. I repeat that I asked expressly whether the Assembly required a roll-call. There was no demand for a roll-call. Therefore the vote is valid, I agree that we must discuss our Rules of Procedure in the Presidential Committee because the rules and procedures in this respect are unsatisfactory. I agree with Mr. Roper.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, believe me, nothing is farther from me than to wish to prolong a sort of wrangle between an individual member of the Assembly like myself, and the chair. I think the proposal you have moved, for referring the matter back to the Committee on Rules of Procedure for an authoritative opinion which can be debated at the next plenary session, acceptable. What I would like you to add by way of qualification is a recognition of the good faith which prompted my interventions in this latter part of our debates, for what I cannot accept, as I think is still to some extent suggested by some of the words you have just used, is that the chair should impugn my sincerity. I can accept a ruling from the chair that there was a misunderstanding in the way the incident arose.

The PRESIDENT. — There is no doubt that the vote is valid, but there is also no doubt we shall have to discuss our Rules of Procedure ; and in due course the Presidential Committee will table proposals in its Committee on Rules of Procedure. I hope that by the winter session we shall have a report on what we can and should change in our rules.

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 7 p.m.)*

## SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 22nd June 1978

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Disarmament (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 778 and Amendments*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Cook, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Kershaw, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Roper (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Cook, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Cook, Mr. Tomney, Mr. Cook, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Tomney, Mr. Roper; points of order: Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper.

4. Adjournment of the Session.

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Disarmament

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 778 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 778 and Amendments.

I call the Chairman and Rapporteur, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I should perhaps begin by explaining the somewhat strange circumstances in which on this occasion, Mr. President, you have the Chairman of the

Committee acting as Rapporteur for the Committee. The Committee decided, somewhat late in the day, that it felt it would be useful to present to this sitting of our Assembly a report on the special session on disarmament of the United Nations which is now taking place in New York. As I was to be in New York in any case earlier this month, it was agreed by the Committee that I should prepare this report and submit it to you. I am most grateful to have had that opportunity.

I should like to preface my remarks by saying how grateful I was to the members of the Council of Western European Union for arranging for me, in a number of cases, through their ambassadors in the United Nations, to have discussions during my visit to New York which proved most helpful.

If I were being facetious, Mr. President, I might suggest that one of the unfortunate results of my report having come out only in the past few days is that there has therefore not been time for it to be leaked to the People's Republic of San Seriffe or for it in turn to make representations to our governments about it. It has therefore not received as much attention in the press as some other matters that we have discussed earlier in the week. It is not, however, as a result of that, any less important than the documents that we considered earlier.

Disarmament does not make headlines very often, even on those rare occasions when success is recorded. It tends, I am afraid, to be written off as a pious hope, both by the press and many so-called realistic politicians, with a ritual genuflection in a speech but no hope of success. Certainly in the light of experience the grounds for hope are limited.

It would be in some sense easier to turn our backs on the prospects of reduction in arms expenditure or even holding expenditure at the

1. See page 49.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

present levels, but if we look at the figures we find that they are alarming. In the eight years of the present decade, spending on armaments throughout the world has doubled. Even after allowing for price increases in the period since 1960, world expenditure on armaments has increased by more than 60 %.

Putting it in another way, since 1960 the number of those serving in the armed forces of the world has risen by almost a third, from 18 million men to 23 million men. This has been at a time in which the world, in general, has been at peace. But what is tragic is that a very large proportion of that increase has not been in the countries of NATO — or, for that matter, in the countries of the Warsaw Pact — but in the developing countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

Ignoring for a moment the risks of war — indeed, of a nuclear holocaust — it can be argued that defence is an expenditure to which the developed countries, the rich countries, the industrialised countries, could, and in certain circumstances should, allocate resources. What I think is particularly alarming as one studies the statistics is that the developing countries, the poor countries, are this year spending substantially more on defence than all the European members of NATO. The statistics are not clear but probably by this year the poor countries will in total be spending almost as much on defence as is spent by the United States. It is an alarming picture that these countries, which have such limited resources, should be allocating so much of the little they have to such an expenditure. But, of course, it is not only to poor countries that armaments present a threat, as my own Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, made clear at the special session on disarmament earlier this month. Even for developed countries :

“Armaments of themselves do not breed security. Ultimately, by proliferation and competition they breed insecurity. We therefore prefer balanced disarmament under international inspection, where each government reduces its armaments as it perceives its adversary reducing his. This will not only make for national security but will also increase security in a wider sense, by releasing skilled human and material resources for redeployment on economic and social projects — for the real well-being of our own people, and of the people of the developing world.”

But there may well still be some, not necessarily here but elsewhere, who will be saying “Yes, it is true that this is all very necessary, but why spend the time of this Assembly in talk of disarmament which may be used” — as, of course, it has been used not infrequently in the

past — “by our enemies to lull us into a false sense of complacency? — Why on earth should a Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments be presenting a report on disarmament?” Someone suggested that it was also almost as eccentric as the Salvation Army opening a brothel. I should like to try to explain why I think that point of view is wrong.

I believe that we shall make progress in this field, we shall begin to scale down the fearful expenditure on defence and on armaments — and eliminate the fearful threat of overkill represented by the stockpile of nuclear warheads of the superpowers, which since 1970 alone have increased from 8,000 warheads to 14,000 warheads — only if we go into negotiation in a very hard-headed and realistic way. We should not expect to succeed in large measures overnight, but we should attempt to create machinery and to set tangible objectives which could provide the beginning of a process, step by step, which in the context of political détente could begin to halt the growth in arms expenditure and then reverse it.

I thought that this was put extremely well at the recent special session in speeches by two of the heads of government and state of two of our countries. The first was by Chancellor Schmidt, in a particularly interesting speech, in which he said towards the end :

“It has been the general experience that all-embracing concepts for global disarmament hold out no prospect of success. What we need instead are many individual advances, progress step by step. And all of them taken with the determination to harmonise conflicting interests.”

In another important contribution by President Giscard d'Estaing, the French President said :

“Progress cannot be made towards disarmament unless further progress is also made towards improving international relations. It is not only when we discuss disarmament that we make progress but also each time we mitigate any international tension. The policy of détente between East and West, the improvement of the security of African states, the implementation of an overall and just settlement in the Middle East, the consideration of the situation of China”

— these are the subjects that we have been considering this week —

“all these things are necessary if progress is to be made on disarmament. The second point is that if our ultimate goal is to be real, general and controlled disarmament, we have to seek the means for this not in mirages of Utopia but in an analysis of the concrete conditions of our times.”

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

These important contributions from the leaders of our countries set out the motivations of that special session on disarmament which I described in some detail in the report. I do not intend to repeat this at length this morning.

This was a special session which began nearly a month ago and which will close, one hopes successfully, in less than a week. In such a special session oratory is not enough: there must be negotiation; there must be give and take. It was the head of government of another of our WEU members, Mr. Thorn, who made that point clearly and effectively. He said:

"Let us be aware that the statements made from this rostrum, regardless of the importance or the political influence of the speaker, will serve no end if they are not followed up by concrete action and flexible instructions, making it possible to reach compromises and take decisions which will in the end lead to disarmament."

Mr. Thorn is a skilled negotiator and he looked at the reality of what is going on in New York as the nations not merely make speeches but try to find agreement, a draft declaration and programme of action and to work out proposals for the machinery for disarmament following the special session.

In my report I have tried to summarise the positions taken up by member countries of Western European Union and a number of the other participants. I refer to a particularly interesting facet of the special session. A number of delegations had appointed parliamentarians to their delegations as political advisers.

In the case of one or two countries, including one if not two WEU countries, those parliamentary members were attending for virtually the whole of the special session in order to advise the delegations. That was beneficial to the delegations, which I am sure already had a great deal of wisdom, but the parliamentarians were experienced in the process of negotiation and the challenges of disarmament. This is a method of working which should be examined in more of our countries.

The debate and the negotiations have and are continuing to focus around the three elements. The first is the declaration on disarmament, the second a programme of action for the next few years, with various concrete steps, and the third is proposals about the machinery for the ongoing work.

I am sad to have to report that on the first two items progress has not been particularly quick in the negotiating meetings in New York. But in the third there have been some significant

signs of progress. I hope that we shall see progress in the next few weeks.

I turn to the draft recommendation of my Committee and I shall refer to a number of particular items in detail. Among the preambular paragraphs I wish at this stage to comment only on paragraph V, which refers to Western European Union's Agency for the Control of Armaments. Already this week speakers have referred to Chancellor Schmidt's reference to the controls which Germany has experienced since the war and the implicit reference which he made to the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments. Two weeks ago, on 6th June, the German Mission to the United Nations circulated an invitation in New York which read:

"Invitation to attend an international chemical weapons verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany."

The eight paragraphs of the invitation made no specific reference to WEU or the Agency for the Control of Armaments, but surely the Council of WEU — and this is a rhetorical question — should now be considering ways of making available at that workshop or elsewhere the experience which has been built up by the inspectors of our Agency for the Control of Armaments?

As the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research said in its study of chemical and biological warfare in 1971, our Agency for the Control of Armaments:

"... has certainly gained valuable insight into the detailed problems of verification. It is to be hoped that its experience will be shared with people outside its own closed circle. For example, by a declassification of some of its reports and studies... the technical expertise of the Agency's inspectors and their long familiarity with the techniques they have been applying and studying would be of great value to international chemical and biological verification."

In our organisation we have something which can make a contribution to the negotiations which are going on in Geneva on the verification problems of a chemical warfare treaty. I hope that the Council will look carefully at the possibility of making use of the expertise which we hold in the process of finding satisfactory systems of verification.

I turn to the recommendation proper. I refer to paragraph (a) — the comprehensive test ban. This has been under negotiation, particularly among the three nuclear powers — the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom — for some time. We are close to agreement, although recent controversy in Washington has suggested that there might be one or two problems still to be surmounted.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

I turn to paragraph (c), which refers to a strengthened non-proliferation régime. We are all aware of the increasing risks of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in more countries and of the need to ensure the most satisfactory controls of such proliferation. But we should also be aware of the resentment of some of the non-nuclear countries of attempts by the suppliers to discriminate against them, not necessarily because they do not share with us the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but because they see it in some ways as a form of neo-economic imperialism.

When I was in New York I heard references to the "dirty London club" — that is, the group of suppliers of nuclear engineering equipment which meets in London from time to time. That is why it was important that Mr. Callaghan and, more recently, Mr. Vance assured the non-nuclear powers that there would be no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers or those not allied to them.

These negative security assurances are particularly important. I hope that they can be incorporated in some statutory form.

Perhaps the most important development in the last ten days has been in the area referred to by Mr. Mulley earlier in the week. It is the proposals which the Soviet Union tabled in Vienna just over a week ago at the discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions. I know that not all WEU countries take part in these negotiations but they are important. We should give some consideration to them today.

According to reports in the press, for the first time the Soviet Union has agreed that reductions should tend to equal levels of the troops that would remain after the reductions, both in the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries, within the controlled area. The limits which the Soviet Union apparently accepted were 700,000 on each side for ground troops and 900,000 on each side for ground troops together with air forces. The Soviet Union accepted the principle suggested by the West that in the first phase a cut of about 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons by the United States should be matched by a reduction in tanks on the Soviet side, but not the 1,700 originally requested in the western proposals. In fact, the Soviet Union seems to have suggested 1,000.

None the less, the fact that the Soviets, apparently, in a document for the first time put forward this proposal is again an important development that has not received the attention in the western press that it deserves. Finally, they accepted, again for the first time, that the first rounds of reductions need not in themselves

be balanced. The reduction of 15,000 in the United States forces would be matched by a reduction of 32,000, twice as many, in the Soviet forces. On a number of points, although it is quite clear there are still details, the Soviet Union appears to have made significant moves in the direction of the proposals of the western powers in the discussions in Vienna ten days ago.

As Mr. Mulley said when he addressed us, this marks :

"the most significant move that it [the eastern side] has made since the negotiations began nearly five years ago. The eastern proposals are complex and require detailed study."

But surely this is a moment when we should try to ensure that progress is made, and perhaps the proposal which Dr. Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, made, that there should be a meeting at foreign secretary level at the appropriate stage, should be considered once again.

I turn now to sub-paragraph (e), the question of conventional arms transfers, on which I note that an amendment has been tabled by my colleague, Mr. Cook. Here the Committee wishes to stress the importance, if it is at all possible, of reaching agreement on regional disarmament measures involving the participation of recipients as well as of suppliers. We of course accept, as is incorporated in Mr. Cook's amendment, the responsibility of the supplying power. Indeed, it was Mr. Callaghan in the address from which I have already quoted in New York who said :

"Britain recognises that special responsibility rests on those countries which have the capability to supply arms to others."

In the same speech Mr. Callaghan went on to say :

"Our preferred option is an agreement involving both the suppliers and the recipients. If that fails, we have to go back to find what other methods can control the transfer of conventional arms."

I come briefly to sub-paragraph (f), the idea of extending the supports of confidence-building measures which were developed in the CSCE negotiations in Helsinki into other parts of the world, the idea of having rules for the notification of manoeuvres in other parts of the world, the possible development of hot lines between countries which may from time to time be in a situation of political or military tension, something which I think is a practical and useful suggestion to create an environment in which it is more likely we should achieve disarmament.

As to sub-paragraph (h), the concept of an international disarmament agency, this of course

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

draws very largely on papers put forward by three different members of WEU, the Netherlands, which itself pioneered work in this area and made very clear proposals, the proposals in the French document submitted earlier this year and in the speech of President Giscard d'Estaing, and certainly one should refer to the Italian proposals, particularly in the domain of the sort of information which should be provided by such an agency. This is something on which a number of WEU member countries have co-operated in trying to find a satisfactory machinery for progress.

Finally, I come to perhaps the most important aspect of the negotiations in Geneva. I refer to the development of the machinery, the institutional national arrangements, negotiating machinery, on which disarmament discussions will take place in the future. As you all know, in recent years we have had the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva. One should not underestimate some of the achievements which it has been able to develop itself and the fact that what one might describe as the disarmament community in Geneva has provided a framework in which other talks have taken place.

However, there are very serious drawbacks to the arrangements of the CCD. The whole chairmanship by the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, is resented in very many parts of the world, including of course significantly within the membership of WEU. It is seen as a sign of superpower hegemony. It is not seen to be properly linked to the United Nations and at present, as is well known, France is not participating in the work of that committee and China is not a member.

What I hope one could see coming out of the discussions is an acceptance that the First Committee of the General Assembly will become a disarmament committee which will give priority in its agenda to discussions on disarmament each year involving all the 149 members of the United Nations. But, because such a large body is not an appropriate body for negotiation, we should find our way to producing a compact body which would be more widely acceptable than the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

I am delighted to hear that proposals have been put forward in New York in the last few days by a member state of WEU, which I understand is supported by a large number of the other members of WEU, which would, I believe, provide such a framework. I refer to the paper tabled by the British Government last Friday which would abolish the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and create a new

disarmament negotiating committee which would end the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States and replace it by a rotating membership. This would end the situation whereby the management of the operation of the CCD is controlled by the two co-chairmen and instead ask the Secretary-General to provide an executive secretary who would be able to create a proper link with the United Nations machine and, indeed, be the personal representative of the Secretary-General in those discussions.

It would at the same time ensure that there was a realistically defined body with a limited membership of perhaps not more than forty that would again operate, as the CCD has, on the basis of consensus. I believe that these are important proposals that go a long way to meet the objections, which I can perfectly well understand, that were made to the old machinery of the CCD. I very much hope that this will provide a basis for agreement within the next few days on a structure whereby adequate institutional arrangements for disarmament can continue in existence.

I conclude by saying that it is very important that we get adequate machinery out of the present session. It is very important that we get a satisfactory declaration and a satisfactory programme of action. That is why I believe it important that we should have devoted some of our time at this Assembly, as parliamentarians of seven member countries of the United Nations who have grouped themselves together in WEU, to consider what is happening, to give our good wishes to the proposals that have been put forward by our government to try to resolve the difficult problems and to ensure that there is the final political will that will bring us to success — I trust in the next few days.

Finally, I should like to quote from the speech of the fifth of the prime ministers or heads of government of WEU countries who attended and spoke at the special session on disarmament, the Prime Minister of Italy, Mr. Andreotti, who said in his remarks to the General Assembly:

“This special session reflects a growing awareness of the fact that mankind is now at the crossroads: one path may lead to a nuclear catastrophe, the other to a world of peace and well-being.”

Mr. Andreotti made clear in his speech his wish — which surely we should share — that mankind chooses the right path next week. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank the Chairman and Rapporteur.

In the debate, I now call Mr. Antoni. He will be followed by Mr. Cook and then, as far as I can see, by Mr. Valleix.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, not only are we agreed on the choice of topic, but we also underline the advisability and necessity of giving it ample attention and place in the proceedings, and not only of the Assembly, as we shall now argue. We also greatly appreciate the close analysis by the Rapporteur of the news and information on disarmament matters and developments over the last few years, up to the start of the current meeting of the United Nations Assembly. Third, we also appreciate the multiplicity and scope of the action proposals contained in the draft recommendation. Unfortunately we have such a vast and complex area in respect of both documentation and proposals to contend with at the close of the session, and therefore a material time-scale that we consider much too tight for such a decidedly central subject matter. Moreover, the Rapporteur's analysis and elements of information were, at the same time, necessarily bound to stop short at the start of such an important and decisive debate for disarmament options as the ongoing one in the United Nations Assembly. But this morning our Rapporteur did very aptly supply us with some useful additional material on that debate. However, in our view there still remains the requirement that the proposals and actions in the draft recommendation, broad, important and clear cut as they are — one might even say, over-ambitious — cannot ignore the United Nations Assembly which is sitting now and rises at the end of the month. The more so in that during the United Nations proceedings, besides certain matters the Rapporteur reported to us and reminded us of this morning, there emerged — allow us to make this clear — what we consider a highly-important guideline that deserves to be examined and appraised with all due care, and would merit more space and attention in the recommendation. We refer to the task that may devolve upon the alliances in greater measure, namely playing an active rôle in research and negotiations on the reduction of armaments and disarmament, in addition of course to the primary one of presiding over defence and security.

Among other things, this item is given great prominence in the address to the United Nations Assembly by the Italian Prime Minister, precisely to account for the choice of the alternative path, to which the Rapporteur referred, the one leading to peace. This of course is a matter for NATO, and we think it should also concern WEU, which would then, besides a defence function for the member countries, be able to assign to its own organs, such as the Standing Armaments Committee, tasks also of research and comparison with other disarmament agencies.

In conclusion, we think that today's business may only amount to — what is still not negligible

— taking note of the matters submitted to us, an opportunity for a first quick exchange of opinions and nevertheless above all for a first step towards arousing that particular attention which our Assembly and its Committees, including the Scientific Committee, should henceforward regularly and periodically devote to disarmament matters as such an important dimension of our interests and capabilities for initiating proposals independently and in liaison with other external bodies, from NATO to the major forum of the United Nations. In this connection I feel that Mr. Cook's amendment is both apt and proper, and therefore commands our approval.

Such a follow-up of our proceedings can but be based on the future findings of the United Nations Assembly with which we should compare our own, as well as comparing and updating the recommendations and explanations tabled.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we therefore regard the recommendation as a set of possible guidelines for a much wider study to be effected over time and given a more definitive grounding, and many-faceted and exact configuration. This is why we are able this morning — with the interpretation we think our Chairman and Rapporteur allowed us to take, especially in the latter part of his speech — to lift the relevant reservations which we placed on our final vote in Committee. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to begin by congratulating the Rapporteur and Chairman on his report, which provides a comprehensive survey of disarmament negotiations over the past two decades. I would congratulate him in particular on having drafted a recommendation which I believe is both constructive and at the same time a realistic programme of action which can be achieved in the next five years. One cannot read the report without being struck by the extent to which our success in achieving additional disarmament agreements has followed behind our success in achieving additional further breakthroughs in our technological capacity to achieve new generations of even more powerful weapons systems.

In his report the Rapporteur makes the point that the only treaty that has resulted in actual weapons disarmament is the biological weapons treaty, and even there it is important that we should recall that at the time it was being negotiated it was envisaged that it would be linked to a chemical weapons disarmament treaty. Ten years later, we have still to achieve agreement on those negotiations towards chemical disarmament.

The truth, which we can now clearly see, is that we achieved agreement to disarm biological

*Mr. Cook (continued)*

weapons only because the military on both sides had no serious interest in such weapons because of the time-lag between the delivery of a biological weapon and its effect on the country on which it is dropped. For that reason, they raised no objection, and we were successful in getting an agreement. In the case of other weapons, however, chemical weapons, in which both sides have a serious interest, we have been unable to achieve an agreement to disarm.

As a result of this experience, there are now cynics who say that we shall never be able to achieve any disarmament agreement in any area where the military on either side has a serious interest in the biological weapons systems. It would be very unfortunate if we were to let ourselves fall into that cynicism or share that special attitude towards disarmament negotiations. Nevertheless, it is clear that if we are to attract the attention, concern and support of the public for disarmament negotiations, it must be shown that there is some way in which such negotiations can make progress and succeed.

For that reason, the special session on disarmament called by the United Nations is especially valuable, because it does at least give the countries of the world the opportunity to declare their support and their intent to move towards disarmament agreements.

The Rapporteur was quite right to draw special attention to the very exciting and constructive declaration made by the President of France in the course of the special session on disarmament. However, I believe that we are entitled in a spirit of friendship to tell our French colleagues that that declaration will be much more meaningful if France follows it by taking her rightful place at the current negotiations on disarmament, in particular with reference to Europe, and if she could take her place at the discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna. Whatever the problems that impede progress towards agreement in Vienna, it will be much more difficult to agree to a reduction of forces in Europe without the participation of France, a major military power with a NATO interest in the balance of forces in Central Europe.

It would also be helpful if France could follow up a declaration of intent on disarmament by taking part in discussions towards a comprehensive test ban, because one of the difficulties in achieving agreement on a comprehensive test ban is the Russian fear that it will be signed by neither France nor China. Our French colleagues are themselves in a direct position to remove that particular obstacle to agreement.

If I have a reservation about the special session it is that it has so far perhaps placed too much emphasis on discussion of nuclear weapons at the expense of discussions on conventional weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons have brought a new dimension to the arsenals of the world. They represent a distinct and different threat to mankind. It is, therefore, right and natural that they should prompt concern and discussion. The fact of the matter is, however, that every war in the last thirty years has been fought not with nuclear but with conventional weapons and the increase in expenditure on military procurement by the third world, to which the Rapporteur referred in his opening remarks, has been wholly on conventional weapons. It is perhaps time that we focused our attention rather more on discussions on conventional disarmament instead of being obsessed simply with discussions aimed at nuclear disarmament.

There are two particular issues here which should concern us and both are dealt with in the recommendation before the Assembly. First, in paragraph (g) of the recommendation there is a reference to the discussions on inhumane conventional weapons. I am aware, Sir, that the concept of an inhumane weapon is a difficult one to grasp. After all, it is not immediately obvious what a humane weapon would be. However the concept of an inhumane weapon, one which causes unnecessary suffering, suffering superfluous to the military objective sought, is a very old one. It goes back to the nineteenth century when The Hague Convention outlawed the dum-dum bullet. Unfortunately in the seventy or eighty years since then it has been impossible for the international community to agree on any further weapons system for this category, which at present is occupied solely by the dum-dum bullet.

Yet, as members of this Assembly will be all too well aware, those years have seen the development of many weapons systems which cause far greater suffering. I am thinking particularly of incendiary weapons, such as napalm, which are inhumane not just because of the horrendous wounds which they inflict but because, by the nature of incendiaries, they are frequently dropped on civilians rather than just on military personnel.

Not only should we feel concern about the present generation of incendiaries; we should also be particularly concerned about future generations currently being developed, which promise to be even more effective for the military and even more callous in their impact on the people on whom they are dropped. If such weapons systems are developed and put into use with the armed services, it will be far more difficult ever to achieve agreement to disarm and

*Mr. Cook (continued)*

to withdraw them from use. It is, therefore, quite right of the Committee in putting forward this recommendation to say in paragraph (g) that a first step in the next five years should be to restrict the development of new generations in order that we can then move to attempt disarmament of the present generation.

I welcome the reference in paragraph (e) to the transfer of conventional arms from industrial nations to the third world. This occurs on a scale which it is difficult for the imagination to grasp. Sir Frederic Bennett, when addressing the Assembly two days ago, referred to the scale of the transfer, of the export, of arms from the Soviet bloc. It is indeed carried out on an extremely large scale.

It was right for the Assembly to express in its applause of his remarks members' disgust at, and rejection of, that scale. Nevertheless, I am bound to tell the Assembly that the most recent figures available from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency show that 29 % of the world export of arms is at present carried out by the Soviet bloc and 64 % by NATO. If it is right for us to be concerned, if it is right for us to condemn the export of arms by the Soviet Union, how much more should we ourselves be concerned about the much greater export of arms by NATO and the western bloc?

I have a difficulty with the particular formulation of the recommendation from the Committee in that it emphasises the need for agreement between both exporting and importing countries, between supplier and recipient. I must tell the Rapporteur that I believe it to be pious to expect recipient countries to come to such an agreement. First, many of the countries that are buying these weapons on a large scale are doing so not to fight their neighbours but to keep their own populations in place. They are governments of repression which require those weapons in order to keep themselves in power. They are, therefore, never going to come to any agreement to restrict their right of access to those weapons. Secondly, we ourselves, in selling weapons to the areas of tension in the world, stimulate the demand for further purchases of arms.

Perhaps I may give one brief illustration of that by referring to two British sales of 1974. In that year, we sold to the Israelis a number of submarine-launched missiles which are intended to fire at helicopters which are seeking submarines. They are known as the Short Blowpipe system. We did so because earlier in that same year we had sold to the Egyptians Sea King helicopters, which are designed to go out to sea, look for submarines and drop depth charges on them. It is a beautifully symmetrical example: first sell weapons with which to look

for and destroy submarines and then sell to the other side the system with which they can defend the submarines. This is described by the Foreign Office as "maintaining a military balance in the area". Of course, it is nothing of the kind; it is a self-serving way of exploiting the fears and tensions of that area for our own economic gain. I believe that the time has come when we must denounce that particular form of economic gain.

For those reasons, I have tabled two alternative amendments which emphasise the special responsibility of the arms-exporting countries. Two of the member states of WEU — France and Britain — are conspicuous amongst those major exporting nations. I am sure that members of the Assembly will not wish to dump their special responsibility in this matter, and I very much hope that when we come to consider the recommendation at the end of this debate it will be possible for the Assembly to agree on at least one of the two amendments I have tabled. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cook.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — For the first time since the beginning of the sixties, Ladies and Gentlemen, the question of disarmament has ceased to be solely the concern of the two great powers, the United States and the USSR, in their effort to regulate and organise their fierce competition in the military field.

It is the whole comity of nations, in particular the countries of the third world, that is beginning to realise the crushing burden of armaments and the intolerable restrictions it imposes on countries whose prime objective today is economic and social development.

It is fortunate that the WEU Assembly, although it has unfortunately adopted a position on these matters rather late in the day, is supporting and encouraging the present move towards disarmament. From this point of view Mr. Roper's report is a memorable event in the history of our Assembly which, over the last few sessions, has been concerned more often with the development of military production, in a framework often transcending Europe alone, than with the need to maintain armaments at a level consistent with the real security of Europe.

How can one, indeed, avoid the connection between Mr. Roper's report and that by Mr. Grant, which, as we know, procedural difficulties have prevented us from rejecting? Mr. Grant's report makes no mention at all of the dangers to peace in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, he is in favour of intensifying the production of arms in Turkey, Greece and Portugal within the framework of the integrated

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

NATO structures. One can only welcome the fact that Mr. Roper's report has an appreciably, not to say fundamentally, different approach.

It seems however that the report before us does not take full account of the evolution currently occurring in ideas about disarmament. Basically the Rapporteur puts his reliance on the negotiations taking place in the framework of the Geneva conference. He considers therefore that the states of Europe should, in order to negotiate disarmament, put their trust in a forum where the debates are prepared, organised, and oriented exclusively as a result of conversations held elsewhere between the United States and the USSR.

Similarly, as far as Europe is concerned, the Rapporteur sees no point in embarking on negotiations other than those currently under way between the two blocs, under the direction of the two major powers, in the Austrian capital.

The report is therefore far too modest, since it fails to call current procedures into question and is resigned to the excessive weight of the two superpowers in all discussions on disarmament. It can also be accused of a certain lack of realism in its proposal of voluntary arms restrictions, indeed arms prohibition, without attacking the roots of the problem, that is to say the lack of trust between states and their inability to agree on reasonable guarantees for their security.

Any consideration of disarmament in Europe must start with an effort towards a mutual understanding on the security needs of each side. Only when all the states maintaining a military presence in Europe have agreed on the ways and means of establishing a stable military balance that takes account of everybody's security requirements will we be able to embark on the implementation of specific measures backed up — and this is important — by effective means of supervision.

The task is then to work towards the convening, as quickly as possible, of a European disarmament conference bringing together all the states of our continent that are interested in disarmament. Would the WEU Council of Ministers not be a particularly competent body to take such initiative?

These few remarks on Mr. Roper's report do not deny the very positive spirit with which it is imbued. But they do conflict with a number of practical recommendations put forward, and they are in addition designed to strengthen the rôle of WEU in the new international dialogue on disarmament, something we cannot but support.

In order to solve the extremely difficult problem of disarmament we need to find more imaginative solutions that transcend the old and obsolete procedures which, up to now, have unfortunately proved their total ineffectiveness.

I would like to see WEU take this opportunity of assuming its rôle to the full and, above all, of making a contribution to disarmament. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

I call Mr. Kershaw.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — It is certainly suitable that our Assembly should concern itself with the subject of disarmament, and I should like to add my tribute to those already paid to the Chairman and Rapporteur, not only for the report, which is excellent and full of knowledge, but for the way in which he presented it this morning. It is suitable that we should discuss these matters because of the grave and, I fear, increasing danger of war — war deliberately planned and provided for, but which nevertheless, if it comes, will probably do so because of some mistake or, more likely, because of miscalculation of the reactions of other people.

I am to some extent reminded of the years shortly before the war of 1939. Then, as now, we have a very strong power rearming at a great rate, to a scale which clearly has gone far beyond any need for self-defence. Then, as now, we have difficulty in guessing what are the ultimate motives of that power and in probing the personalities who rule that power. Then, as now, we have among us a number who deride our fears and believe in appeasement. Then, as now, there are doubts about which allies would, in the end, stand together. Then, as now, we have a vigorous disarmament lobby, spurred on by all our hopes and fears, but which is, in spite of what has been said this morning, in fact achieving less and less in an ever more dangerous world.

The situation is the more dangerous because it is apparent that Russia is losing the economic and ideological contest. Nothing showed the Russian ignorance of economics more than Khrushchev's silly boast that Russia would soon overtake the United States economically. On the contrary, Russia falls further and further behind and will continue to do so.

Ideologically, too, the appeal of communism is on the wane. Disillusioned by Russian imperialism, the world is starting to see that communism can never supply either the spiritual or economic needs of the people. There rests for Russia, therefore, the military approach, and it must be admitted that, uninhibited as Russia is by considerations of public opinion at home or moral scruples abroad, it has been remarkably successful. Its diplomacy may not be adroit but

*Mr. Kershaw (continued)*

everywhere the world stands in fear of Russian strength and in doubt of its intentions.

That is why I think that disarmament at the present time stands little chance of being accepted by the eastern bloc. It would strike down its trump card, the open use or the threat of force. That is why none of the existing negotiations, let alone new ones, is making progress. Russia will only agree to an arms freeze if it consolidates its position of strength, and I hope that the West will not agree to that.

Reverting to my comparison of these days with those of 1937 and 1938, we in Britain know now that in the Hitler camp of those days not all was so monolithic as we supposed. There were divided counsels. The generals were more pacific than the politicians. There were doubts and fears. We know now that if the allied powers had presented a more solid front — if, indeed, we had only fulfilled our treaty obligations, at least — probably Hitler would not have attacked. Probably he would have been overthrown, and all that misery and bloodshed would have been avoided.

And so it is today. If we keep up our guard, if we keep our promises to each other, all may be well. At least we have no reason to suppose that we are dealing, as we were in 1939, with a maniac. We are dealing, I think, with shrewd calculators who know how to measure risks.

The paper is quite right to assess the chances of disarmament, to discuss the modalities and to propose reorganisation. The leaders of our countries are contributing to this debate, and we should back them.

But let us not be beguiled into thinking that our dreams are already realities. Let us not by our actions deceive our enemies into thinking that they can take risks which could plunge us all into disaster. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to congratulate John Roper and his Committee on reminding us of the need for disarmament. We must always be reminded of that need, because if we give up hope and do not go on trying, matters will become worse and worse.

We owe it to our electorates not only to protect them with sufficient forces but to press for the likelihood of war to be reduced. That is a difficult dual mandate for any statesman, any member of parliament and any country to carry out.

Not only is there a great increase in armaments throughout the world, as Mr. Roper said,

but there is a horrifying increase in types of weapons. In my brief war my worst moment was being attacked by my own allies' aircraft and shot up, with my best friend killed in front of me, within three weeks of getting out of a prisoner-of-war camp and going home.

I also remember the horror, during the early days before I was taken prisoner, of seeing fleeing civilians — little children and women — bundled on the tops of cars going, as we knew, to bridges which had already been blown. The worst that they had seen then were attacks by Stukas and tanks. Now it is clear that another war would bring, if not the end of the world, the end of civilisation for decades to come.

It must not be one-sided disarmament. I remember in this chamber — at least I am sure that it was this chamber — my late colleague, Mr. John Mendelson, with whom on most matters I disagreed most profoundly, saying something upon which I thought we all agreed. He said that whenever he met someone from the Soviet Union he said: "Why do you need so many aircraft, so many tanks, so many men? You cannot need them to defend the Soviet Union." To me this seemed to be a bitter cry from the heart from someone who had always tried to further disarmament and who had in the past put forward a defence of the Soviet Union.

In this Assembly, in our own parliaments and wherever we go we must go on asking John Mendelson's question. At the same time we must seek to prove to the Soviet Union, which, like so many big bullies, is frightened at heart — and it has a right to be, because of its experience during the war — that we really do wish mutual disarmament. We must stress mutual disarmament.

I refer again to the dual duties to our own countries and electorates. They are extremely difficult duties to combine but we must do it. I refer to the need to lift the burden of armaments off the backs of our taxpayers and to lift the clouds surrounding the fear of war. At the same time we must have sufficient forces to defend our own countries and electorates. The interests of our electorates must be predominant. Those must be the interests of any government when they come to office.

I welcome the document. I am glad that we have, after so many motions on other matters, come to the theme of disarmament. This matter must be central to all our thoughts. But at the same time we must never drop our guard. We must never give up hope of coming to a satisfactory conclusion over disarmament at some time. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to reply to some of the points that have been made in what has been a useful and important debate. I agree with the remarks of Mr. Antoni that this is an area to which more attention should be given by the Assembly and the Committee. Some matters came up this morning which we shall want to pursue in the Assembly. One of those referred to the possibilities of the Council in the area of chemical warfare and the experience that it has acquired through the Agency for the Control of Armaments. Reference has been made to that being made available to those negotiating the verification machinery of the chemical warfare treaty.

My colleague, Mr. Cook, made a number of remarks with which I agree. He referred to the problems of coming to an agreement on any disarmament treaty, but at the end of the day there will be risks. There will be risks if one agrees, because the other side might not honour its pledge or might cheat in some way. But one has to balance the risks. There are risks in agreeing, but there are other risks involved in not agreeing, because of the increase in the power of arms and the risks of war sooner or later.

Mr. Cook has tabled amendments on the question of arms transfers. Even though he has the support of the Vice-Chairman and Chairman of the General Affairs Committee I hope that he will not pursue his first amendment. Our governments are putting forward proposals in New York to try to find a basis of agreement between the suppliers and recipients. It would not be sensible at this moment to say that we do not believe that there is a chance of success of an agreement between suppliers and recipients. If we do not succeed let us come back to the question of an agreement among the suppliers alone. Mr. Cook's second amendment takes up the point which has been made by Mr. Callaghan and others at the recent special session.

I turn to the important and valuable contribution by Mr. Valleix. I am sure that he will excuse me if I make one preparatory remark. For the second time when I have been a Rapporteur in the Assembly I have been at a slight disadvantage in dealing with a speech by one of my French colleagues. The last occasion was when Mr. Rivière was speaking in a debate on anti-submarine warfare. He attacked me without having heard my speech. He was attacking me for something that I had not said.

I know that Mr. Valleix was unable to hear my remarks at the beginning of the debate. His remarks were misdirected because he had not heard what I said. I am therefore in a difficulty but I hope that the Assembly will forgive me.

There were two aspects of what Mr. Valleix said to which I wish to draw the attention of the Assembly. In paragraph (*d*) I referred, but not

explicitly, to the discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna because not all members of WEU take part in them. I referred to the need to have a substantial reduction in armaments in Europe without making any reference to a specific forum for these discussions, whether they be the disarmament discussions in Vienna or proposals which President Giscard d'Estaing presented to the General Assembly last week, about which I asked Mr. Stirn earlier in the week.

I have made it quite clear that I do not want to distinguish between one forum and another. I hope that Mr. Valleix will accept the good faith of that which was discussed in detail in the Committee. We are not trying to choose between these two fora. We are saying that whatever forum is eventually achieved, we want to see a reduction of forces and armaments in Europe.

On the second and major point, the question of the negotiating forum, paragraph 2, Mr. Valleix would have heard if he had been here that I made it quite clear that I want to see — and, indeed, the proposal is now being discussed in New York — the end of the superpower hegemony of the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, I want to see the end of the co-chairmanship régime and I want to see a negotiating forum in which the chairmanship will rotate among all members. Those are the proposals which we are supporting and that is what is intended by paragraph 2. What I was speaking about earlier was not what Mr. Valleix accuses me of having put forward. We do not want to get into any misunderstandings because members are not present when a report is introduced.

There is a significant difference between what has happened up until now and what is now being discussed. What I tried to suggest this morning is that the new proposals to move away from superpower hegemony, the proposal to create a new disarmament negotiating committee on which all members would sit on a basis of equality, provides us with a basis from which to go forward.

None the less, I think that it will be generally agreed that if we are to have a negotiating forum as distinct from the First Committee of the General Assembly, which should be the forum for discussion, we must have a more restricted body of perhaps some forty members which can operate by consensus rather than by majorities. In the light of what I have just said and of what Mr. Valleix may have been told about what I put forward — and, indeed, the suggestions which I outlined and which are being discussed in New York — I hope that he will very seriously reconsider his amendment on that point.

Finally, I turn to the remarks of my two conservative colleagues. I hoped, in quoting from

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

the moving words of President Giscard d'Estaing, that I had made it quite clear that we wanted in disarmament to distinguish between dreams and realities. He used the words "Utopia" and "practical measures for disarmament" which I quoted in my presentation. I hope that Mr. Kershaw will agree that appeasement is by no means the same as negotiated disarmament. It is not inconsistent to want to see negotiated disarmament, as Mr. Hawkins pointed out, but, none the less, failing this, to support the achievement of effective defence in all our countries.

Mr. Kershaw spoke with great force on the reduction of the power of Soviet ideology and on the fact that the Soviet Union was holding on by its military strength in many places. This in itself is surely an argument for continuing to press for disarmament measures. If the Soviets fail to respond to the approaches, we are calling their bluff, showing just how shallow their propositions are and preventing them from winning the propaganda war which they might otherwise wage.

Therefore, I thought the whole debate was summed up remarkably clearly by the particularly moving remarks of my colleague, Mr. Hawkins, coming out of his experience — "the eloquence of experience cannot be equalled". (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is closed.

Before turning to the draft recommendation itself, we must deal with the amendments.

First I call Mr. Cook to move Amendment No. 2. I think he has already spoken to it, but does he wish to move it?

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — My own preference would certainly be for Amendment No. 1, which is also tabled by me.

The PRESIDENT. — I shall call Amendment No. 2 later.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I understand that we are in agreement with the Chairman and Rapporteur about Amendment No. 2. If Mr. Roper is willing to accept Amendment No. 2, I would then, if you will allow me, refer to Amendment No. 1 but not move it because, looking round the Assembly, I can see good procedural reasons why we should seek to avoid a division at our sitting this morning.

I am bound to say that I regret that it has not been possible to reach agreement on Amendment No. 1, which is a very modest one. Indeed, it has been signed by my colleague, Sir John Rodgers, who is not normally *ad idem* with me on disarma-

ment matters — and I am sure Mr. Roper will be a little worried by being outflanked to his left by Sir John Rodgers.

If there is agreement on Amendment No. 2 and no agreement on Amendment No. 1, I propose to move Amendment No. 2 and not Amendment No. 1.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I must inform you, Mr. Cook, that Sir John Rodgers has informed me that he wishes to remove his name from Amendment No. 1.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order, I should like to explain for Mr. Cook's benefit why I have removed my name.

When I read Amendment No. 1 very carefully — "...exercise restraint in their sales policy" — it suddenly occurred to me that this excludes the Soviet Union, which, of course, gives arms away and calls this "aid". This is, therefore, very damaging to the West. That is why I removed my name and why I shall support Mr. Cook on Amendment No. 2.

Mr. TOMNEY (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to speak on Amendment No. 1.

The PRESIDENT. — I am calling Amendment No. 2. You will be called to speak on Amendment No. 1.

On Document 778 we have first to deal with Amendment No. 2 tabled by Mr. Cook which reads :

At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a paragraph (*viii*) :

"(*viii*) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments,"

We have heard the view of the Committee.

Does anyone wish to speak against this amendment?

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.*

We now switch over to Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Valleix.

Does Mr. Valleix wish to speak to the whole of the amendment?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (*Translation*). — Thank you for your proposal that I should now speak to an oral amendment, Mr. President. I would accordingly ask the Assembly to forgive me for presenting it in this way.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

In fact, besides these amendments which are, incidentally, being presented somewhat late — I would express my regrets for this, but it is due to the intensive nature of our deliberations, as you know just as well as I do — I should like to draw the Assembly's attention quite solemnly to the subject of paragraph 1 in the recommendation proper, that is paragraph 1 (a), as regards the expression used: "a comprehensive test ban", so that you can clearly understand the position of the person addressing you. You must be well aware of the difficulty that faces a representative in accepting such an affirmation, since the proposed ban is described as "comprehensive". It is fully agreed that the approach reflected in paragraph 1 (a) of the recommendation is completely in line with the views of all of us, but it is also true that the vicissitudes of our era have led to recognition that a deterrent is needed. It is also true that we find ourselves in a period of full development in the negotiations in this sphere. I do not believe that I am far wrong — after consultation, moreover, only this morning with specialists who are actually here in this Assembly — if I say that the United States, the USSR and probably the United Kingdom are moving towards an agreement in the near future. It cannot be ruled out; and I hope that such an agreement will remain an open-ended agreement, with which France can associate itself in due course. I cannot, however, as a French representative, prejudge the attitude of my government and commit it — however great the freedom given a parliamentarian vis-à-vis his government may be — I cannot, I repeat, speak in the name of my country and bind it by this today.

For that reason, I would ask you whether, having considered the consequences of our decision on this point, we can delete the word "comprehensive". I would repeat once again that my explanation is in no way intended to run counter to the sense of the Rapporteur's recommendation. If we are unable to delete the word "comprehensive", I think that at the worst I should perhaps be led to abstain from voting on the text. That is the worst that can happen, but I shall not vote against it. If the word "comprehensive" were to be retained, Mr. President — forgive me for prolonging the debate for a while — I think it my duty to tell the Assembly in advance that, while regretting this oral procedure for presenting an amendment, I shall find that I have to vote against it. If this word is deleted, I will be able to abstain only on the recommendation as a whole. It was, I believe, my duty to present a clear explanation so that my attitude may not subsequently be the cause of additional difficulties as regards our discussions.

Thank you very much indeed, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the view of the Committee?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am somewhat taken aback by this new proposal from Mr. Valleix and the strength with which he delivers it but I should like to try to put his remarks into the context of the recommendation and the resolution as a whole, because, again, we are not here referring to comprehensive test-ban negotiations in capital letters. We are not referring to any particular set of negotiations which are or may or may not be taking place at this moment. We are not saying that every country of WEU whose parliamentarians vote for this resolution today are signing up for some particular set of negotiations taking place at this moment in Geneva.

We are saying — and it is very important to note this and we must go back to the very beginning of the recommendation — that we are recommending that the Council and member governments take concerted action in all appropriate bodies, and it may be that test ban negotiations in which not all Western European countries are represented are an appropriate vehicle for them to take some concerted action, having in view a comprehensive ban on all testing.

With great respect to Mr. Valleix, I took care to avoid embarrassing any of our colleagues by not tying this to any particular treaty action which would place the French Government in particular difficulties but put it in a much wider context. I am sorry that Mr. Valleix, as a non-member of the Committee, was not able to see the detailed way in which we prepared this work particularly to avoid tying or embarrassing him or anyone else.

I believe that this enables him as a French deputy to say that this is a good objective for the long term but that France cannot be tied to any particular negotiation in which it is not participating. It seems to me that the recommendation as drafted gives him that freedom and I hope, therefore, that he will again consider an amendment which otherwise would go to the heart of this recommendation and which, on behalf of the Committee, I should have to resist.

The PRESIDENT. — We have first to deal with the oral amendment to paragraph 1 (a), where Mr. Valleix proposes to delete the word "comprehensive".

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The amendment is negatived.*

We come now to Amendment No. 3 tabled by Mr. Valleix. First, part 1 which starts:

1. In the draft recommendation proper, paragraph 1 (d), leave out "restore" and insert "safeguard".

*The President (continued)*

Does anyone wish to speak against or in favour?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Could Mr. Valleix please explain his amendment?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the importance of this amendment is in no way comparable with the last one, which was unfortunately negatived. In this connection, I wish simply to make clear that my amendment is intended simply to note the fact that there is at present a *de facto* balance, which stems from the existence both of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. It is quite obvious that, if we take only conventional weapons, there is a glaring imbalance. If we also take into account deterrent weapons, then there is a certain equilibrium.

For that reason, I should not like the draft recommendation, which does not apparently take these facts into account at the outset, to suffer a change in its general tenor, nor should I like it if, under the pretext of restoring balance, we allowed an imbalance to develop in favour of conventional weapons to the advantage of one party or another, as this would make it necessary, in order to maintain the balance, to restore non-conventional weapons. For that reason, I should like to leave out "restore" and insert "safeguard".

In any case, I do not think that there is necessarily any fundamental difference on this point. I thought that it would be valuable to contribute this observation to the discussion. I shall listen to our Rapporteur with interest.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have heard Mr. Valleix's views and I am only sorry that we did not have a chance to hear them earlier. It is an interesting point of view. I am somewhat tied by the form of words, not a particularly happy form in the English text, which was reached in Committee after considerable argument in which a large number of people took part. To reopen it here after the Committee has said this form of words is acceptable would cause a great deal of difficulty for me and therefore I feel I must oppose it.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — On this point, taking into account the explanations provided by the Rapporteur and the discussions which took place in Committee, I think that our positions are not so very different and I withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — We turn to Amendment No. 1, tabled by Mr. Cook and others.

Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — As we have agreed to the other amendment, in the interests of avoiding a division this morning, I do not propose to move Amendment No. 1.

Mr. TOMNEY (*United Kingdom*). — I want to say this by way of explanation of the amendment. As usual, let there be no dubiety in any words I shall say.

I am a parliamentarian of short tenure of office, both here and in the United Kingdom. I have been a delegate here on two previous occasions. The more things change, the more things remain the same. One looks carefully at any amendments tabled by certain colleagues of mine and at the language in which they are framed. I have been an unremitting and unyielding opponent of Soviet foreign policy, from Casablanca to Potsdam and beyond, and I shall remain that kind of opponent of Soviet foreign policy. Wherever I meet ignorance in an amendment or a resolution from European nations — and from my colleagues in particular — which favours Soviet policy, I will oppose it.

I remember all the pious hopes and promises embodied in the Potsdam Treaty. I remember over the years the obduracy of Molotov. I remember how the Soviet policy of grab was sanctified and how at Helsinki the West was left with precisely nothing. The process has never stopped.

As a politician I cannot be confused by argument because I know the facts. Sir John Rodgers took his name off the amendment this morning after a discussion with me in the course of which I told him what it was really all about. The amendment is about favouring Soviet policy against the rest of the western world. The operative word here is "sales". The Soviet Union does not sell arms: it gives them away under the pretence of aid. In doing so it is responsible for part of the tragedy in Ethiopia and in Eritrea. Soviet arms have been given freely to either side.

I find that these political do-gooders have a way of disguising their language. This, too, has never stopped. The process has gone on continually. Wherever it goes on, I shall oppose it. I am a substitute delegate and I picked up this paper an hour ago. I am not perhaps as diligent as I have been in the past, but what really matters is our understanding of the facts. In a speech this morning Mr. Cook referred to the weight of arms expenditure and to the weight of taxation. He referred to the possibility of reducing that weight, but he did not mention the weight of Soviet arms in Hungary, or in Czechoslovakia, or the weight of Soviet arms which will be apparent in Poland if it becomes necessary. Do not confuse me with words, because I know the facts. If the amendment is not to be put, well and good, but, had it been put, I for one would have been voting solidly against it.

The PRESIDENT. — As far as I have learned from Mr. Cook, he does not wish to move his Amendment No. 1.

Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I had not proposed to move the amendment, but since you have allowed a speech on it, I think that the Assembly might allow me to respond.

Mr. TOMNEY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Mr. Cook has not moved the amendment and he cannot now speak to it.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — A quite unfounded and totally scurrilous suggestion was made that the amendment was tabled at Soviet instigation. There is not the slightest basis to this suggestion. If Mr. Tomney ever has the guts to repeat that allegation outside the privilege of a debating chamber, I shall sue him. I want that to be made perfectly plain.

As to the suggestion that the words "sales policy" were chosen because those words favour the Soviet Union, let me make it quite clear that that was not, of course, in my mind. But, had Mr. Tomney or Sir John Rodgers said that they objected to the word "sales", I would have changed it to "exports", "transfer", or any other word which met their objection. Their objection is founded on a misconception of the present nature of Soviet arms transfer. The Soviet Union sells arms as much as any other nation, and it takes money for its transactions, just like the others.

The PRESIDENT. — As far as I learned from Mr. Cook, he has not moved Amendment No. 1, so we do not have to vote on it.

We now turn to the end of part 1 of Amendment No. 3, tabled by Mr. Valleix :

Between paragraphs 1 (g) and 1 (h) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "if possible".

Do you wish to speak to it, Mr. Valleix ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — In fact, I have not had an opportunity of speaking to this amendment. It is very simple : it is clear to me that the words "if possible" run completely counter to the spirit of the recommendation.

The phrase "and, if possible concurrently with the first agreement providing for independent verification : (h)", introduces the proposal for an international disarmament agency. It is a good proposal, but the words "if possible" divest it of any practical value. A proposal is not made simply "if possible" ; either it is possible or it is not. In this case I believe the suggestion to be

a good one, and I propose deletion of the words "if possible".

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I go a long way with Mr. Valleix but there is an unfortunate ambiguity in the way in which this particular section has been drafted. The words "if possible" were not qualifying the proposal. They were qualifying the word "concurrently".

I think that it would be much clearer and would meet the point that Mr. Valleix is worried about if we could reverse in the English text — I do not know how it would be in the French text — the word "concurrently" and the words "if possible". What we are talking about is the timing of the introduction of this international disarmament agency. We should like it to take place at the same time as the first treaty is agreed — perhaps the chemical weapons treaty, which provides for independent verification, so that it can carry out that verification. If that is not possible, we would not want it to block the agreement on the chemical warfare treaty. The words "if possible" were not intended to qualify the whole of proposition (h) but only the timing of its introduction. I hope that Mr. Valleix will accept that explanation, but I would be very happy to make a verbal amendment to reverse the order of the words "concurrently" and "if possible" so that it would be "and concurrently if possible with the first agreement". This would, I think, remove the ambiguity.

The PRESIDENT. — Do you agree to the proposal of the Rapporteur ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I merely wish that an effort in translation be made to ensure that this comes out clearly in French, since I recognise that the language used in the two texts does not quite tally.

I hope the Assembly will agree to this and, in the circumstances, I withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — You withdraw your amendment but Mr. Roper proposed to turn the words round so that it reads "and concurrently if possible". Is that correct ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. Is that agreed upon ? There are no objections to it.

We now come to the second part of Amendment No. 3 which reads :

2. In paragraph 2, leave out "without reducing its effectiveness" and insert "and of all states on an equal footing".

Mr. Valleix, do you wish to speak to this part of the amendment or is it sufficient just to have it read out like that ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — In this relatively important matter, Mr. President, the purpose is, to some extent, to go a little further than the Rapporteur. But I realise that it may also involve a certain change in the spirit of the proposal.

I believe that the expression “without reducing its effectiveness” does not add very much, and for that reason I propose to replace it with the words: “and of all states on an equal footing”.

It is, in fact, important that the spirit of blocs and superpowers should be condemned, and that concerted action among the different partners should be open but also egalitarian.

I believe, moreover, that this is what happens in the United Nations technical committee.

It seems to me that, thanks to my amendment, paragraph 2 would be better balanced and, in the last analysis, more in conformity with the spirit of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As I tried to explain to Mr. Valleix, I did in my remarks — which he will be able to read in the official report — very much accept the spirit of what he said in that the proposals which I want to see adopted are the abolition of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with the superpower hegemony of the present co-chairmanship and its replacement by a negotiating disarmament committee on which all the members would be on a basis of equality, with the chairmanship rotating.

I must make two points. First, I should like to maintain, without reducing its effectiveness, the concept of consensus, whereby the negotiating forum has met so far. One would not like to see it moving away from that to a system of majority voting as occurs in some United Nations institutions. My understanding is that that is not far from the official position of the French Government.

Secondly, I would not want the negotiating forum to be open to all of the one hundred and forty nine members of the United Nations on the basis of equality. To be an effective negotiating forum, it must be a restricted body, although I would make it clear that the proposals being put forward in New York would make arrangements for interested states, not members of the committee, to submit to it written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament which are the subject of negotiations in the committee, and to participate in the plenary sessions of the committee as well as in the proceedings of the appropriate decision-making bodies when the subject matter of such proposals or working documents was examined. That is explained in the body of my report.

I hope that in the light of that explanation Mr. Valleix will see that we are not so far apart as he may have thought and thus will be able to withdraw this amendment as well.

The PRESIDENT. — As far as I can see, the Rapporteur is asking Mr. Valleix to withdraw the amendment. If it is not withdrawn, I can see that you would be against it.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I am going to make a counter-proposal.

Would Mr. Roper accept that the end of paragraph 2 be drafted as follows: “... which would allow the participation, directly or by delegation, of all the powers possessing nuclear weapons and all states on a completely equal footing”?

We should thus avoid — and Mr. Roper is right — this forum becoming a bear garden.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am extremely sorry. I want to be helpful to Mr. Valleix but, whereas one can accept an oral amendment which removes just one word, for example, suddenly to have a new text thrust at us, one which I have not got in front of me and which is of such a length and on such a sensitive matter, is a little difficult at this stage. I am not trying to make difficulties but I cannot accept an oral amendment of such complexity without notice.

The PRESIDENT. — Then we must vote on that part of Mr. Valleix's amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 2 of Amendment No. 3 is negatived.

We turn now to part 3 of Mr. Valleix's Amendment No. 3. It reads:

3. Add a new paragraph 4 as follows:

“4. To have a European conference convened grouping all the powers interested in disarmament on the continent, *inter alia* through appropriate consultations between the member states of WEU in the Council of this organisation;”.

Will you please move your amendment, Mr. Valleix?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — It is stated in the French text that: *toutes les puissances intéressées au désarmement*, etc. I have not got the English text, but as the word *puissances* in French means “countries”, I am quite prepared to accept the word “countries” if that is the term preferred by others.

The grounds on which the amendment is made are self-evident, since it recalls the task of WEU and gives our Assembly an opportunity of participating without further ado in this move that we hope to make in support of disarmament and,

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

instead of merely discussing the matter, I believe that it is more important to put forward concrete proposals, which is what is happening here.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I wish to propose, Mr. President, two sub-amendments to the one tabled, with whose substance I am fully in agreement. Nevertheless, I think two corrections are needed to eliminate certain limitations that may seem too restrictive in the existing draft. The first has been made orally by the mover of the amendment in his interpretation, and by Mr. Valleix who said that the French word *puissances* should be taken to mean *pays*. I move, nevertheless, that instead of "powers" the word should be "countries".

In the next paragraph of the amendment I also move that instead of "*inter alia* through appropriate consultations" we should insert "also through appropriate consultations".

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Valleix ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I completely agree with the two proposals made by Mr. Calamandrei, for which I thank him.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This, of course, is a proposal which Mr. Valleix made in his speech. I made some reference to it in my reply, to the effect that in our document we have not made proposals either for or against the institution of Vienna or for or against the proposal of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing in New York. In fact, I made reference to these proposals in the body of the report.

I feel, and I think that the Committee feels, that, without further study, it would be premature for us to support in such concrete terms this proposal. Unfortunately, there have not yet been published, even though I asked Mr. Stirn a question on this on Monday, the details of the memorandum, which the French Government at this stage has circulated only to the countries which took part in the CSCE negotiations. The Committee, therefore, is not clear about the details of this proposal. At this stage, it is probably a mistake to call a conference about which we are not clear and to set up more meetings until we know exactly what we are going to do.

Although I say so reluctantly, I feel that it would be wrong, without having more information and without any study of it by the Committee, for the Assembly to accept this addition at the last moment. I should very much like this

matter to be referred back to the Committee for it to examine. Perhaps a recommendation could be put forward next time.

If Mr. Valleix is not prepared to accept that procedure, however, I would unfortunately be obliged to recommend that the Assembly reject this, owing to lack of preparation.

The PRESIDENT. — We are in some difficulty now. We have an amendment proposed by Mr. Calamandrei to the amendment of Mr. Valleix. We cannot vote on it before I have the text. As we have just heard from the Rapporteur, it is difficult to go ahead on such a complicated matter. He proposes to refer these amendments back.

Perhaps I could ease the situation. We had a problem yesterday over a roll-call vote. We shall not have a quorum today if someone says he wishes to vote against, and if there is no quorum I shall have to refer the whole matter back to the second part of the session, in November. Perhaps instead we could send these two amendments back to the Committee.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I must plead with the Assembly. We are meeting at the crossroads of history. The General Assembly is making up its mind next week on these matters. For us not to vote on the principle of the report would be a tragedy for this Assembly. We should be failing in our duties if we did not vote. The idea of a reference back cannot be acceptable. I was trying to get an agreement that this specific proposal should be referred back.

The PRESIDENT. — Are you ready, Mr. Valleix, to put this proposal back to the Committee ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I thought I had made myself quite clear. I have said what my position was as regards the first point, that is, sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 of the recommendation. Consequently you know what my attitude will be when the vote is taken. I think therefore that this discussion is rather academic. I abide by my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Calamandrei, what is your proposal as regards this amendment ? I shall call for a vote on the amendment tabled by Mr. Calamandrei and then on the amendment tabled by Mr. Valleix.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — In the second line of the new paragraph proposed by Mr. Valleix, I suggest replacing the word "powers" by "countries" and in the third line of the same paragraph replacing the words "*inter alia*" by "also".

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on the two amendments :

*The President (continued)*

Leave out "powers" and insert "countries"; leave out "*inter alia*" and insert "also".

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amendments are negatived.*

We now come to the original amendment tabled by Mr. Valleix.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 3 of Amendment No. 3 is negatived.*

I call Amendment No. 3, part 4, tabled by Mr. Valleix :

4. Add a new paragraph 5 as follows :

"5. To institute in the framework of the United Nations an international development fund financed by contributions levied according to the level of armaments of the member states of the organisation."

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, to begin with may I make the following remark : this is the first time that I have ever seen an amendment to an amendment, accepted by the author of the amendment to which it applies, being put to the vote. We could have saved ourselves some time.

As for the amendment which we are now discussing, the new paragraph 5 is self-explanatory. I think that all our members have read the newspaper recently and followed the international discussions on disarmament. Consequently, since the grounds on which this amendment is made are self-evident, there is no need for me to say anything further in support.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the view of the Committee ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am a little surprised.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Tomney.

Mr. TOMNEY (*United Kingdom*). — If this amendment were accepted, it would fall outside the province of United Nations regulations. There are only four nations in the United Nations who are in membership according to their contributions. This amendment would not be admissible. One of the debtors is the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the view of the Committee ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am aware that this proposal was originally included in the French proposals. My understanding is that the French Government, having considered its implications, have not circulated a memorandum covering the proposal in New York. There

are obvious snags in the proposal. The proposal is for an arms super tax and means that the more a country spends on arms, the more it must pay to the fund. It is not clear that the Soviet Union will want to spend more in contributions to the fund by admitting that it is spending more on arms.

Although the idea of linking the savings on armaments to developments might be sensible, the idea of creating an armaments surtax when countries have to pay more into a development fund is not very sensible. It does not have much chance of being adopted in the United Nations. The proposal, which I know is well meant and which is no longer officially supported by the French, is a foolish proposal. We should not adopt it.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on the amendment tabled by Mr. Valleix.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 4 of Amendment No. 3, is negatived.*

We now come to the vote on the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Roper on a point of order.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Have the bells been rung recently?

The PRESIDENT. — We have been ringing the bells because we have been voting for a long time.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The point that Mr. Valleix made the other day was that the bells should be rung firmly and clearly just before the final vote. I must defend my colleague on that matter.

Mr. President, so far you have called me to speak as Rapporteur. Before we come to vote, may I say a few words as Chairman of the Committee ?

The PRESIDENT. — Of course you may.

I call the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — We face at present what I believe is a difficult situation for the Committee and, indeed, for the Assembly, because we have a report which in my view in large measure is very widely agreed and supported in the Assembly. Everyone I think accepts the importance of coming to a decision today rather than failing to do so and postponing the matter until after the special session on disarmament is completed.

Yet — and I want to make this quite clear for the record — there is a difficulty which Mr. Valleix has outlined about the commitment which

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

he feels we should be undertaking if certain events occurred regarding the reference to the comprehensive test ban. I hope that once again I can make it clear for him and for the record that the form of the draft recommendation is perfectly clear in that it does not refer to a comprehensive test ban in capital letters or *majuscules*. It is not referring to a specific set of negotiations therefore committing any specific government in any way by the votes of its members of parliament here, if in any case we did commit ourselves by a vote, which is not so.

Thus I hope that Mr. Valleix will look again at what I understand to be very deeply-felt views on this matter and see that this is an objective only over the long term which one hopes would be achieved and that he can see his way perhaps to not abstaining on this matter, thereby ensuring that, under the practices which your predecessor introduced, Mr. President, perhaps with an explanation or a personal statement after the vote explaining his position, or perhaps an explanation of vote before we proceed to the vote, which is of course possible, we should then be able to avoid the difficulties which might otherwise arise.

I know that Mr. Valleix wants to be helpful to the Assembly. I know that he does not want to block a decision on this matter. I know that we want to find a formula whereby his honour can be satisfied and yet whereby the Assembly will be able to proceed with this matter.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I think I have the right of reply. Thank you. Unfortunately it seems to me that all this is not so simple. I can understand the difficulties of the Assembly in tackling a highly topical debate and I am the last person to blame it. On the contrary, that is what we are here for, and I stress the point in support of the work done by the Rapporteur.

I can therefore understand the difficulties of going far enough and even going as far as possible, without going too far. In my opinion, as you have no doubt well understood, we have sometimes not gone far enough, and WEU could have committed itself further. On other occasions we have gone too far.

May I come back to the text we are discussing. It is not for Mr. Roper to criticise me for not having submitted my amendments earlier. I am not a member of the Committee and this text, dated 20th June, I must point out, was in practice made available to members of the Assembly yesterday.

Once again : it is the topicality of the matter which puts us in this difficult position. I cannot accept the proposal of the Rapporteur where he says in paragraph 1 of the recommendation, and I quote :

“1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control measures to be concluded...”

I am sorry, but the words “programme of immediate disarmament” are quite clear to me, or else it is badly worded. And I am sorry that we cannot get out of this dilemma now that amendments are no longer called for. Consequently I can only repeat what I already said a moment ago at the beginning of my remarks. My position has been clear all along, I drew the Assembly’s attention to it and so I am taking nobody by surprise.

Like Mr. Roper, I believe that it would serve little purpose to refer the recommendation back to the Committee. The importance of our discussions this morning will not be diminished by what happens to the report itself, and I am convinced that the liveliness of the debate will be followed by our governments in the Official Report.

Even without adoption, the high level of our debate will ensure that our governments are provided with the information we wanted to give them.

I cannot do more, Mr. President, than confirm my intention of voting against this document.

The PRESIDENT. — In the light of yesterday’s debate, we have been informed that there will be a vote against it. If there were an abstention, we could go on. If there is a vote against, I must take a roll-call. That will mean that there is no quorum, with the result that we must refer it back to the next sitting.

I agree fully with the Chairman of the Committee that we must try everything to decide it today, because we must show our opinion to the United Nations. If we cannot do this because we have no quorum, we shall not make a very good impression on world opinion.

Could you not abstain, Mr. Valleix ? You have made perfectly clear what your view is, but if you abstain in order to allow us to approve the recommendation, we should be doing something of great advantage to world opinion.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — My position has been very clear. No agreement has been reached in favour of the opinions which I have put forward and which moreover are not mine alone. I take it that we are perfectly free vis-à-vis our respective governments.

Since France has taken the lead in this matter, I do not think I have the right, or still less the duty, to overlook this.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

I regret the position taken by the Rapporteur in the matter. It has been as courteous as it was firm and lacking in comprehension. Comprehension of words is one thing ; comprehension when we come to texts is of much greater import. I have done my best since arriving here to note as carefully as possible what the Rapporteur had to say. Such oral statements however are one thing ; the written texts are another. Given the text before us, I greatly regret that I cannot approve it.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not think that there is much to be gained by prolonging things, but there are two points which I should like to make for the record. First, I believe Mr. Valleix has slightly misunderstood the preamble :

“To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and armed control measures to be concluded in the next five years ...”.

This is a phrase which has been taken from the United Nations document and in this context means within the next five years rather than those things which have a long-term objective. That terminology does not refer to present negotiations. I hope that I have clarified that point.

Secondly, I must make clear to the Assembly and to Mr. Valleix that this document was distributed in French, in first draft, to members of the Committee at the meeting that we had in Paris at the end of May and I asked for reaction from all my colleagues at that time. The document was again distributed to the Committee and discussed in detail, clause by clause, here in Paris this week, in the presence of a distinguished French Delegation. It was also circulated somewhat earlier than Mr. Valleix said.

No written amendment was submitted at any time by any French Delegation, and I think it is somewhat unfair to the Assembly, on a matter which is apparently of such great principle, that Mr. Valleix is to handicap our work in this way, that a Committee or its Rapporteur or Chairman should not be given any notice of an objection of this profundity until the last moment. I know that Mr. Valleix can abuse our procedure in the way he proposes, but I consider that the submission of something of this kind at the last moment is a discourtesy to our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Under Rules 34 and 35 a vote on a draft recommendation, taken as a

whole, shall be taken by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Channon.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

There is no quorum. The draft recommendation will have to be again on the Orders of the Day for the second part of the twenty-fourth ordinary session later in the year.

#### **4. Adjournment of the Session**

The PRESIDENT. — Before I close the session let me make a few remarks in order to give the Assembly my thoughts about our work. I feel that the session has been a good one both because of the presence of ministers and because of the high standard of interest in the reports which have been debated.

Moreover, this has been well understood by the press which has covered matters discussed in the Assembly, by the many representatives of every political shade and from all national delegations who have spoken in the debates.

Members of the Assembly have been remarkably assiduous, despite the length of the debates. This morning the sitting appears less satisfactory, but we well know that many members have urgent political commitments in their own countries.

I hope that the Council of Ministers will consider the Assembly's recommendations without too much delay, thus demonstrating that there is a true dialogue between the executive and the Assembly of Western European Union.

This has been a very active session, and tiring both for our colleagues and the staff, whom I wish to thank for their devotion and great efficiency. But I think that consideration might perhaps be given to the Assembly sitting one day longer in order to avoid such stress being imposed on the staff.

I declare the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.)*



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