

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1977

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS



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II

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Official Report of Debates

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PLP
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEXHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave	Socialist
de BRUYNE Hektor	Volkseunie
DUVIEUSART Etienne	FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
BURCKEL Jean-Claude	RPR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
NESSLER Edmond	RPR
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	RCDS
RADIUS René	RPR
RIVIÈRE Paul	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SCHMITT Robert	RPR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VITTE Pierre	Ind. Rep.

Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
LA COMBE René	RPR

MM. du LUART Ladislav

MÉNARD Jacques
PIGNION Lucien
ROGER Émile
SOUSTELLE Jacques
VADEPIED Raoul
WEBER Pierre

RIAS

Ind. Rep.
 Socialist
 Communist
 Non-party
 UCDP
 Ind. Rep. (App.)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe President of the Assembly	CDU/CSU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
LEMP Hans	SPD
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GÖLTER Georg	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
KOHL Helmut	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDHUBER Peter	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
Freiherr SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM A.	CDU/CSU
MM. UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	DN
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Ind. Rep.
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
REIJNEN Johannes	Pop. Cath.
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Anti-Revolut.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van KLEEF Dik	Radical
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Paul CHANNON	Conservative
William CRAIG	Ulster Unionist
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
John WATKINSON	Labour
Philip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

MM. Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Alan BEITH	Liberal
Robin COOK	Labour
John CORDLE	Conservative
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Eric HEFFER	Labour
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Colin PHIPPS	Labour
Mr. George REID	Scottish Nation.
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
MM. Frank TOMNEY	Labour
Kenneth WARREN	Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 20th June 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Session (Doc. 730).
6. Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 731 and 741*);
Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council; Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 733, 745 and 736*).
7. Nomination of members to Committees.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Grangier, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the Session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of the Representatives and Substitutes given in Notice No. 1.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

One candidate only was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel.

Speakers : MM. Pecchioli and Nessler.

Speakers (points of order) : MM. Amrehn, Dankert, Lewis, Roper and Pignion.

In accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded, by roll-call, to a secret ballot.

The Sitting was suspended at 4 p.m. and resumed at 4.30 p.m.

The Provisional President announced the result of the vote :

Members voting	73
Absolute majority of Representatives	45
Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel	59
Against	5
Abstentions	9

The Provisional President declared Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel elected President.

On the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel took the Chair.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

Speaker : Mr. Nessler.

7. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The President informed the Assembly that five candidates were proposed for the six posts

of Vice-President, namely : MM. Mart, Minnocci, de Niet, Sir John Rodgers and Mr. Tanghe.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation and that the Vice-Presidents should rank according to age, namely: Mr. de Niet, Sir John Rodgers, MM. Tanghe, Minnocci and Mart.

The Vice-Presidency reserved for France remained vacant.

Speaker (point of order) : Lord Peddie.

8. Observers

The President welcomed four parliamentary observers, Mr. Honore and Mr. Damgaard, members of the Danish Folketing, MM. Costa Moreira and Oliveira Baptista, members of the Portuguese Assembly, and Mr. Tembours, Count of Labajos, Minister-Counsellor at the Spanish Embassy in Paris, representing the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session

(Doc. 730)

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

10. Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly

(Presentation by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 731 and 741)

Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 733, 736 and 745 and Amendments)

The Report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher replied to questions put by MM. Radius, Craig, Valleix, Müller, Nessler, Périquier, Lord Peddie and Mr. Reddemann.

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Treu, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. von Hassel.

The Joint Debate was opened.

Speakers : Lord Beaumont of Whitley, MM. Müller and Roper.

Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, replied to the speakers.

The Joint Debate was closed.

The votes on the draft Recommendations were postponed until the next Sitting.

11. Nomination of members to Committees

In accordance with Rules 39 and 42 bis of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six Committees as follows :

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Bonnel Schugens Tanghe	MM. Breyne Dequae Duvieusart
<i>France :</i>	MM. Beauguitte Nessler Boucheny Ménard Rivière	MM. Delorme La Combe Croze Péronnet Schleiter

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Ahrens Handlos Lemmrich Pawelczyk Hermann Schmidt	MM. Büchner Lenzer Klepsch Lemp Vohrer
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Boldrini Fosson Maggioni Pecchioli Roberti	MM. Corallo Maravalle Avellone Calamandrei Urso
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Spautz
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Dankert de Koster Scholten	MM. de Niet Piket Cornelissen
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Critchley Grant Hardy Roper Whitehead	Lord Duncan-Sandys Mr. Banks Lord Peddie MM. Watkinson Craig

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	Mrs. Godinache-Lambert Leynen Van Hoeylandt	MM. de Bruyne de Stexhe Hulpiau
<i>France :</i>	MM. Brugnon Cermolacce Grangier Bizet Péridier	MM. Forni Grussenmeyer Burckel Soustelle Weber
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Gessner Müller Mende Reddemann	MM. Schwencke Hansheinrich Schmidt Evers N... Hermann Schmidt
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Ariosto Gonella Minnocci Sarti Segre	Mrs. Agnelli MM. Pecoraro Calamandrei Treu Rubbi
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Abens	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. de Niet Peijnenburg Portheine	MM. Voogd Reijnen de Koster

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Faulds Sir John Rodgers Mr. Urwin	MM. McNamara Page Heffer Channon Cook

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Adriaensens de Stexhe	MM. Plasman de Bruyne
<i>France :</i>	MM. Boulloche Péronnet Schmitt Valleix	MM. Bizet Cerneau La Combe Vitter
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Lenzer Müller Schwencke Ueberhorst	Mr. Schmidhuber Freiherr Spies von Büllenheim MM. Scheffler Zebisch
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Pinto Treu	MM. Boldrini Urso Minnocci Pecoraro
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Mart	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Cornelissen van Ooijen	MM. Porthoine van Kleef
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Hawkins Lewis Phipps Warren	MM. Craigen Bagier Tomney Jessel

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Dequae de Bruyne	MM. Bonnel Adriaensens
<i>France :</i>	MM. Depietri Kauffmann Schleiter Vadepied	MM. Bourgeois Belin Schmitt Pignion
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Alber Evers Lemp Vohrer	MM. Reddemann Bardens Schwencke Ueberhorst

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Antoni Bonalumi Del Duca Orsini	Mr. Rossi Mrs. Faccio MM. Tremaglia Giust
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. de Koster van Kleef	MM. Peijnenburg Voogd
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Lewis McNamara Page Lord Selsdon	Lord Beaumont of Whitley Lord Peddie Mr. Grieve Sir John Rodgers

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Duvieusart Hulpiou	Mr. Breyne Mrs. Godinache-Lambert
<i>France :</i>	MM. Burckel Cerneau du Luart Pignion	MM. Périquier Nessler Roger Croze
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Marquardt Schmidhuber Schäuble Zebisch	MM. Büchner Handlos Evers Pawelczyk
<i>Italy :</i>	Mr. Borghi Mrs. Faccio MM. Giust Sgherri	MM. Cavaliere Maravalle Del Duca Romano
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Abens
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Scholten Voogd	MM. Cornelissen Piket
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Craigen Grieve Jessel Phipps	Lord Hughes MM. Heffer Cordle Watkinson

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Schugens Tanghe	MM. Bonnel Plasman
<i>France :</i>	MM. Delorme Jeambrun	MM. Radius Rivière

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Enders Reddemann	MM. Bardens Müller
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Arfé De Poi	Mr. Borghi Mrs. Papa de Santis
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	MM. Hengel Spautz	MM. Mart Konen
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Peijnenburg Stoffelen	MM. Schlingemann Voogd
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Farr Roper	Mrs. Knight Mr. Reid

12. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 21st June, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 7 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Lenzer (Lagershausen)	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens	<i>Enders (Lemp)</i>	MM. Dankert
Bonnel	Marquardt	de Niet
Dequae	Mende	Portheine
Leynen	Milz	<i>van Kleef (Reijnen)</i>
Schugens	Müller	<i>Piket (Scholten)</i>
de Stexhe	Reddemann	<i>Stoffelen (Voogd)</i>
Tanghe	<i>Ueberhorst (Hermann Schmidt)</i>	
	Schwencke	
	Vohrer	
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Boucheny	MM. Arfé	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
<i>Pignion (Brugnon)</i>	Bernini	Sir Frederic Bennett
Cerneau	Calamandrei	MM. Channon
Delorme	Corallo	Craig
Grangier	De Poi	Critchley
Kauffmann	Fosson	<i>Cordle (Farr)</i>
Nessler	<i>Cavaliere (Gonella)</i>	Faulds
Péridier	Maggioni	Grieve
Radius	Minnocci	Hardy
Schmitt	Pecchioli	Hawkins
Valleix	Pecoraro	Lewis
	Sarti	Page
Federal Republic of Germany	Segre	Lord Peddie
MM. Ahrens	Treu	Sir John Rodgers
Amrehn		MM. Roper
<i>Büchner (Bardens)</i>	Luxembourg	Urwin
Mrs. von Bothmer	MM. Abens	Watkinson
MM. Evers	Margue	Lord <i>Hughes (Whitehead)</i>
Gessner	<i>Spautz (Mart)</i>	
Handlos		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Rivière	MM. Bonalumi
MM. Boulloche	Schleiter	Orsini
Burckel	Vitter	Roberti
Cermolacce	Italy	Netherlands
Péronnet	Mr. Boldrini	Mr. Cornelissen

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 21st June 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
2. A European armaments policy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 738*).
3. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council; Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council (*Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 733, 745 and Amendments and 736*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The President informed the Assembly that one candidate was proposed for the Vice-Presidency reserved for France, namely, Mr. Valleix.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect Mr. Valleix Vice-President by acclamation.

4. A European armaments policy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 738)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Tanghe, Roberti, Boldrini and Valleix.

Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to, note being taken of one abstention. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 297)¹.

5. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

(Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 733, 745 and Amendments and 736)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 733.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 298)².

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 745 and Amendments.

Speakers : MM. Roper, Valleix and Roper.

The Sitting was suspended at 11.10 a.m. and resumed at 12 noon.

The Assembly resumed consideration of the draft Recommendation in Document 745 and Amendments.

1. See page 22.

2. See page 23.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Critchley :

1. Leave out the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Noting that the more important arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty have never been applied and that those that are have become unnecessary ;”

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“3. Abrogate the arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty when the mutual defence obligations of that treaty are effectively incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy ;”

Speakers : MM. Roper and Delorme.

Part 1 of Amendment No. 1 was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“Continue to indicate in future annual reports the total number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe and consider whether in the light of the security requirement of the governments concerned it can indicate the number of such forces assigned

to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty ;”

2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers : MM. Roper and Delorme.

Part 1 of Amendment No. 2 was agreed to.

Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 was negatived.

Speakers : MM. Roper and Delorme.

Part 2 of Amendment No. 2 was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation in Document 745.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 299)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 736.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 300)².

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.

1. See page 24.

2. See page 25.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	Italy	Netherlands
Mr. Adriaensens	MM. Arfé	MM. Dankert
Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (Bonnèl)	Bernini	de Niet
MM. Dequae	Boldrini	<i>de Koster</i> (Porthéine)
Leynen	Calamandrei	<i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen)
Schugens	Corallo	<i>Piket</i> (Scholten)
<i>Van Hoeylandt</i> (de Stexhe)	De Poi	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
Tanghe	Fosson	
	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	United Kingdom
France	Maggioni	Mr. <i>Beith</i> (Lord Beaumont of Whitley)
MM. <i>Pignion</i> (Bouloche)	Minnocci	Sir Frederic Bennett
Delorme	Pecchioli	MM. Channon
Péridier	Pecoraro	Critchley
Schleiter	Roberti	Farr
Valleix	Sarti	Faulds
	Segre	Grieve
	Treu	Hardy
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	Lewis
MM. <i>Schäuble</i> (Amrehn)	MM. Abens	<i>Grant</i> (Page)
Gessner	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Lord Peddie
Handlos		Sir John Rodgers
Milz		MM. Roper
Müller		Urwin
Reddemann		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
MM. Boucheny	MM. Ahrens	MM. Bonalumi
Brugnon	Bardens	Orsini
Burckel	Mrs. von Bothmer	Luxembourg
Cermolacce	MM. Evers	Mr. Margue
Cerneau	Lagershausen	Netherlands
Grangier	Lemp	Mr. Cornelissen
Kauffmann	Marquardt	United Kingdom
Nessler	Mende	MM. Craig
Péronnet	Schmidt, Hermann	Hawkins
Radius	Schwencke	Watkinson
Rivière	Vohrer	Whitehead
Schmitt		
Vitter		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 297
on a European armaments policy

The Assembly,

- (i) While wishing for a mutual and balanced reduction of armaments in Europe, believing that the increasing cost of future generations of weapons systems makes it urgent and imperative for the European countries of the Alliance to secure the economic and military advantages of standardisation through joint production ;
- (ii) Noting :
 - (a) that the proliferation of equipment types reduces the operational capacity and the cost effectiveness of the defence of Western Europe ;
 - (b) that the growing complexity of modern weapons systems causes a large increase in equipment costs ;
- (iii) Considering the inherent political dangers of any armaments industry which relies on exports to third world countries or areas of conflict ;
- (iv) Welcoming recent indications that the United States will increasingly seek standardisation of equipment in the Alliance ;
- (v) Stressing the need for satisfactory parliamentary control both at European as well as at a national level of the defence procurement process, and resolving itself to play a rôle until the European Parliament is invested by statute with defence functions,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, severally and jointly in all appropriate bodies, to pursue the following objectives :

1. Ensure the maintenance of a viable defence production industry in Europe taking account of the needs of national defence plans and of the Alliance :
 - (a) by giving first priority to the joint production of standardised equipment in Europe while ensuring the interoperability of existing equipment throughout the Alliance ;
 - (b) by pursuing secondly further standardisation in the Alliance as a whole ;
2. Streamline the institutional basis of joint production :
 - (a) by concentrating on the independent European programme group ;
 - (b) by ensuring that military characteristics of equipment are determined within NATO ;
3. Inform the Assembly accurately and fully of the nature and extent of the terms of reference given to the Standing Armaments Committee on 26th April 1977.

RECOMMENDATION 298***on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the positive statements on the present and future prospects of WEU made by several ministers at the Assembly's twenty-second session;

Thanking Mr. von Plehwe for so ably leading the WEU secretariat during a particularly difficult period;

Noting that the Council has appointed a titular Secretary-General in the person of Mr. Longerstaey;

Regretting that the Council is allowing certain procedure essential to its relations with the Assembly to lapse;

Recalling that the Council has frequently undertaken to report to the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, even if it is exercised by bodies other than WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that a joint meeting is held with the General Affairs Committee in the near future allowing a true dialogue to be held on essential matters concerning the future of WEU and the development of international relations, particularly between Eastern and Western Europe;
2. Ensure that, in accordance with customary procedure in national parliaments, governments provide substantial information on the aspects of their foreign policy raised in recommendations of the Assembly;
3. Continue to include in the annual report a detailed account of its work as was its practice until the twenty-second annual report;
4. Report more fully to the Assembly on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty in other bodies;
5. Maintain its activities in accordance with the assurances given to the Assembly.

RECOMMENDATION 299***on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Congratulating the Council on the content of its replies to Assembly recommendations when these emanate from the Council itself or from delegations ;

Thanking the Council for the welcome it gave the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments at the conversations on 31st May 1976 ;

Noting certain shortcomings in the application of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty concerning the control of armaments ;

Gratified that the Council has given the Standing Armaments Committee a mandate whose scope extends well beyond the field of activities hitherto conferred on that body,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that replies to Assembly recommendations furnished by other international organisations are no less precise than those prepared by the Council ;
2. Continue to indicate in future annual reports the total number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe and consider whether in the light of the security requirement of the governments concerned it can indicate the number of such forces assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty ;
3. Ensure a fuller application of the provisions of the treaty concerning the control of armaments, with particular regard to biological and chemical weapons ;
4.
 - (a) Ensure a continuing exchange of information between the independent European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee ;
 - (b) Ensure that the number, status, qualifications and level of the representatives of the member countries on the Standing Armaments Committee are high enough to guarantee the effectiveness of the work undertaken ;
 - (c) Encourage national authorities to provide the Standing Armaments Committee with all the information it requires ;
 - (d) Ensure that the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee is extended to the field of research in order to ensure European co-operation in this sector ;
 - (e) Keep the Assembly regularly informed about the tasks entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee, the time-table and successive stages and the results obtained.

RECOMMENDATION 300***on scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Gratified to note that the Council agrees on the need to seek an overall policy in the field of advanced technology designed to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and to foster fruitful co-operation with the United States on an equal footing and that the Council favours the harmonisation of national aeronautical policies ;

Considering that in the military field the Council recognises the need for a joint approach by member countries in studying and determining their aircraft requirements ;

Regretting the Council's decision not to draw up guidelines for a long-term European policy in sectors of advanced technology,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. Further to their consideration of the construction of civil aircraft, to consider making a combined study of their civil and military requirements and programmes with particular regard to the possibility of developing a transport aircraft, different versions of which could be used for civil or military purposes ;
2. To continue to give a high priority to the operational utilisation and commercialisation of application satellites developed in Western Europe ;
3. In the field of a common European energy policy, which remains of the highest priority, to seek the closest possible co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy ;
4. To advance the interests of fusion research in Europe by taking an early decision on the siting of the Joint European Torus.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 21st June 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. European security and East-West relations (*Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 744 and Amendment*).
2. Motion for a Resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the conclusions of the Report of the Committee, Doc. 740*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Points of Order

Speakers : Lord Peddie and Mr. Lewis.

2. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

3. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

4. European security and East-West relations

(Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 744 and Amendment)

The supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Roberti, Watkinson, Cavaliere, Warren, Corallo and Lewis.

Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the revised draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Roberti :

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "until the Soviet Union is prepared to bridge the gap" and insert "until the gap is bridged".

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers : MM. Roberti, Roper and Calamandrei.

Part 1 of Amendment No. 1 was agreed to.

Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to, note being taken of five abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 301)¹.

5. Motion for a Resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the conclusions of the Report of the Committee, Doc. 740)

The Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Piket, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Grieve and Urwin.

Mr. Piket, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the conclusions of the Report of the Committee.

The conclusions of the Report of the Committee were agreed to unanimously.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 22nd June, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 5.05 p.m.

1. See page 28.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Fosson	MM. <i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen)
MM. Adriaensens	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	<i>Piket</i> (Scholten)
Bonnel	Maggioni	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
Dequae	Minnocci	
Leynen	Pecchioli	United Kingdom
Schugens	Pecoraro	MM. <i>Warren</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett)
Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (de Stexhe)	Roberti	Channon
Mr. Tanghe	Sarti	Craig
	Treu	Farr
		Grieve
France	Luxembourg	Hardy
MM. <i>Pignion</i> (Bouloche)	MM. Abens	Hawkins
Rivière	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Lewis
		<i>Grant</i> (Page)
Italy	Netherlands	Lord Peddie
MM. Bernini	MM. Dankert	Sir John Rodgers
Calamandrei	de Niet	MM. Roper
Corallo	<i>de Koster</i> (Portheine)	Urwin
De Poi		Watkinson
		<i>Craigien</i> (Whitehead)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
MM. Boucheny	MM. Ahrens	MM. Arfé
Brugnon	Amrehn	Boldrini
Burokel	Bardens	Bonalumi
Cermolacce	Mrs. von Bothmer	Orsini
Cerneau	MM. Evers	Segre
Delorme	Gessner	
Grangier	Handlos	Luxembourg
Kauffmann	Lagershausen	Mr. Margue
Nessler	Lemp	
Péridier	Marquardt	Netherlands
Péronnet	Mende	Mr. Cornelissen
Radius	Milz	
Schleiter	Müller	United Kingdom
Schmitt	Reddemann	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Valleix	Schmidt, Hermann	MM. Critchley
Vitter	Schwencke	Faulds
	Vohrer	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 301***on European security and East-West relations***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the military capability of the Soviet Union is continually increasing, as defence expenditure in real terms steadily rises, as considerable improvements in Soviet technology enhance the effectiveness of its unquestioned numerical superiority in manpower and equipment, and as new strategic nuclear missiles are prepared which could threaten Western Europe ;
- (ii) Believing that a policy of détente can be actively and safely pursued only on the basis of close consultation and cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, backed by public support for a fully adequate defence effort ; and welcoming therefore the new resolve of all the Atlantic allies "to strengthen their mutual support efforts and co-operation" ;
- (iii) Welcoming the intention of the new United States Administration to secure significant reductions in the numbers of Soviet and American strategic nuclear weapons, provided always that the essential basis of mutual deterrence and the security of the Alliance is not jeopardised ;
- (iv) Considering that there are both positive and negative features in the application by the Warsaw Pact countries of existing East-West agreements affecting détente, and in the progress of other ongoing negotiations ;
- (v) Calling for all such agreements to be continuously and closely monitored in the Alliance, as well as in WEU, with a view to ensuring their strict observance by both sides, and to assessing the spirit in which the voluntary provisions of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe are being interpreted by the Warsaw Pact countries ;
- (vi) Believing however that, properly conducted, the process of détente can bring advantages to both East and West in increasing stability and security at lower economic cost to both sides,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member governments :

1. To seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Council continues its careful preparation for the meeting of representatives of Ministers to be held in Belgrade in 1977 in pursuance of the CSCE final act :
 - (a) by continuing to compile, on the basis of reports from member States, the record of the implementation by the Warsaw Pact countries of the CSCE final act, with particular attention to all items in the documents on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament", on "co-operation in humanitarian and other fields" as well as to co-operation in other fields ;
 - (b) by agreeing that the policy of all members of the Alliance with respect to the Belgrade meeting shall be :
 - (i) to ensure at the preparatory meeting now being held that the meeting at the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not delayed ;
 - (ii) to exclude from the agenda any proposed new items which seek to undermine Alliance policy ;
 - (iii) to present the full record of the implementation of the final act so far ;
 - (iv) to seek to strengthen and extend the voluntary provisions for confidence-building measures, and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions ;
2. To ensure that the MBFR negotiations are pursued with determination on the present lines until the gap is bridged between Warsaw Pact and NATO positions ;
3. To seek to secure a moratorium on the further development by all countries of cruise missiles and strategic bombers, pending the outcome of the bilateral SALT negotiations ;
4. To propose that Soviet nuclear missiles based outside the MBFR guidelines area, but targeted on Western Europe, and other comparable forward-based nuclear weapons, be discussed in an appropriate East-West arms control forum.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd June 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1977 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 742 and Amendment*).
2. Anti-submarine warfare (*Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 743*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1977

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 742 and Amendment)

The Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Stoffelen, Page, Piket, Lord Peddie and Mr. de Niet.

Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur, and Mr. Dequae, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Opinion.

The draft Opinion was agreed to unanimously. (This Opinion will be published as No. 24)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

1. See page 32.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Piket :

1. Replace the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following text :

"Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the unacceptable delay in applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977,"

2. After Part I of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following :

"II. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff ;"

The present Part II will become Part III.

Speakers : MM. Piket and Dequae.

The Amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 302)¹.

4. Anti-submarine warfare

(Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 743 and Amendments)

The supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

1. See page 33.

Speakers : MM. Reid, Rivière, Banks and Farr.

Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the revised draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Rivière :

1. At the beginning of the revised draft recommendation proper, after "Recommends that the Council" insert "and its Standing Armaments Committee"; leave out "urge member governments".

2. In paragraph 1 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from "with particular reference" to the end of the paragraph and insert "to allow joint production for these forces wherever appropriate ;"

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper and insert :

"2. In liaison with the independent European programme group, evaluate European ASW requirements and capabilities in every field ;"

4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper and insert :

"3. Establish the necessary liaison with the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia, maintaining close links with national centres, and examine the possibilities of starting joint research into anti-submarine warfare."

Speakers : MM. Boldrini and Roper.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Farr :

In paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out "with particular reference to shallow waters".

Speakers : MM. Roper, Lord Peddie and Mr. Farr.

Parts 1, 2 and 3 of Amendment No. 2 were negatived.

Amendment No. 1 was negatived.

Part 4 of Amendment No. 2 was negatived.

The vote on the revised draft Recommendation was postponed until the next Sitting.

5. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Calamandrei	MM. <i>Piket</i> (Scholten)
MM. Adriaensens	Corallo	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
Bonnel	Fosson	
Dequae	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	
Leynen	Maggioni	
Schugens	Pecchioli	United Kingdom
Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (de Stexhe)	Pecoraro	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Mr. Tanghe	Roberti	Lord <i>Selsdon</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett)
	Sarti	MM. Channon
France	Segre	<i>Reid</i> (Craig)
MM. Delorme	Treu	Critchley
Rivière		Farr
Valleix	Luxembourg	Grieve
	MM. Abens	Hardy
Federal Republic of Germany	Margue	<i>Banks</i> (Hawkins)
MM. Müller	Mart	Lewis
Reddemann		Page
	Netherlands	Lord Peddie
Italy	MM. Dankert	Sir John Rodgers
MM. Arfé	de Niet	MM. Roper
Bernini	<i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen)	Urwin
Boldrini		Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
MM. Boucheny	MM. Ahrens	MM. Bonalumi
Bouloche	Amrehn	De Poi
Brugnon	Bardens	Minnocci
Burckel	Mrs. von Bothmer	Orsini
Cermolacce	MM. Evers	
Cerneau	Gessner	Netherlands
Grangier	Handlos	MM. Cornelissen
Kauffmann	Lagershausen	Portheine
Nessler	Lemp	
Péridier	Marquardt	United Kingdom
Péronnet	Mende	MM. Faulds
Radius	Milz	Watkinson
Schleier	Schmidt, Hermann	
Schmitt	Schwencke	
Vitter	Vohrer	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

OPINION 24***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1977***

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

RECOMMENDATION 302
on the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision by the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to introduce a pension scheme ;

Deploring nevertheless that the governments did not take an immediate decision to set up a joint body to manage the pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations ;

Regretting that the pension scheme regulations do not provide for a reversionary pension to be granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the unacceptable delay in applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :
 1. The early establishment of a joint body to manage the pension scheme ;
 2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ;
 3. The creation of a voluntary savings system for granting loans for the purchase of accommodation ;
 4. The establishment as soon as possible of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy ;
- II. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff ;
- III. Invite the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly its study on conditions for seconding national officials.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd June 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Docs. 734 and 746).
2. Anti-submarine warfare (*Vote on the revised draft Recommendation*, Doc. 743).
3. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
4. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Docs. 734 and 746).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee, Docs. 734 and 746)

The Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee were presented by Mr. Urwin, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Temboury, Count of Labajos (Observer from Spain).

The Debate was adjourned.

4. Anti-submarine warfare

(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 743)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the revised draft Recommendation.

The revised draft Recommendation was agreed to, note being taken of four abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 303)¹.

1. See page 36.

5. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Tomlinson replied to questions put by Mr. Rivière and Lord Peddie.

6. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean

(Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Docs. 734 and 746)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Hardy, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Channon, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, MM. Bernini, Müller, Pecoraro, Radius and Valleix.

Mr. Urwin, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

Speakers (point of order) : Mr. Radius, the President and Mr. Radius.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 746.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 304)¹.

Speaker : Mr. Temboury, Count of Labajos (Observer from Spain).

7. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 23rd June, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 5.15 p.m.

1. See page 37.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. <i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen) <i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)
MM. Adriaensens	MM. Arfé	
Dequae	Bernini	
Leynen	Calamandrei	United Kingdom
Schugens	Corallo	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (Tanghe)	Fosson	Sir Frederic Bennett
	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	MM. Channon
France	Maggioni	Craig
MM. Boucheny	Pecchioli	Critchley
Péridier	Pecoraro	<i>McNamara</i> (Faulds)
Radius	Roberti	Hardy
Rivière	Segre	<i>Banks</i> (Hawkins)
Valleix	Treu	Lewis
	Luxembourg	<i>Grant</i> (Page)
	Mr. Margue	Lord Peddie
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	Sir John Rodgers
MM. Müller	MM. Dankert	MM. Roper
Reddemann	de Niet	Urwin
		Whitehead

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
MM. Bonnel	MM. Ahrens	MM. Boldrini
de Stexhe	Amrehn	Bonalumi
	Bardens	De Poi
France	Mrs. von Bothmer	Minnocci
MM. Boulloche	MM. Evers	Orsini
Brugnon	Gessner	Sarti
Burckel	Handlos	Luxembourg
Cermolacce	Lagershausen	MM. Abens
Cerneau	Lemp	Mart
Delorme	Marquardt	Netherlands
Grangier	Mende	MM. Cornelissen
Kauffmann	Milz	Portheine
Nessler	Schmidt, Hermann	Scholten
Péronnet	Schwenecke	United Kingdom
Schleier	Vohrer	MM. Farr
Schmitt		Grieve
Vitter		Watkinson

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 303
on anti-submarine warfare

The Assembly,

Aware that the large numbers of modern attack submarines in service with the Soviet navy pose a serious threat to allied communications, both across the Atlantic and between the different parts of Western Europe ;

Aware that a significant part of the Soviet nuclear threat arises from the Soviet strategic submarines ;

Believing that the European NATO countries must be able to provide an effective ASW capability from their limited resources,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To ensure that their anti-submarine warfare forces are fully interoperable, with particular reference to communications, and in appropriate cases to increase the standardisation of these forces ;
2. To call on the independent European programme group or on Eurogroup to undertake an evaluation of European ASW requirements and capabilities with particular reference to shallow waters and the use of maritime patrol aircraft ;
3. To increase their support for the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia through closer liaison with national centres and improved facilities for national research staff to spend time in the international allied environment of the SACLANT centre.

RECOMMENDATION 304***on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean***

The Assembly,

Having surveyed the present political situation in Spain ;

Gratified that the elections on 15th June 1977 testified to the Spanish people's free choice in favour of a democratic parliamentary régime ;

Recognising the important constitutional and political changes which have occurred in Spain during the last sixteen months ;

Welcoming the moves towards a more liberal system of government which have taken place since 1975, in particular the legalisation of political parties and of free and independent trade unions ;

Recognising the important advances made in the new preliminary constitution of Spain, and expressing the hope that Spain will proceed on its way towards a full system of parliamentary democracy ;

Expressing the wish that Spain will soon be able to take its place in the process of building Europe ;

Noting that Spain is in fact already associated with western defence policy in Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine closely the evolution of the Spanish political régime, the application of universal suffrage and guarantees of public freedom ;
2. Insofar as there are valid guarantees regarding the establishment of democracy, promote the early participation of Spain in Western Europe's economic and political activities ;
3. Study the possibility of close co-operation between Spain and the WEU member countries.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 23rd June 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Application of the final act of the CSCE (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 732 and Amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Pastorino, Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Application of the final act of the CSCE

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 732 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Segre, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Grieve, Müller and Rivière.

The Debate was adjourned.

4. Address by Mr. Pastorino, Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Italy

Mr. Pastorino, Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

5. Application of the final act of the CSCE

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 732 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : Mr. Calamandrei, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Valleix, Urwin, Dankert, Reddemann, Roberti, Channon, Boucheny and Forni.

Mr. Segre, Rapporteur, and Mrs von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

On a proposal by Mr. Segre, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, the Report and the Amendments were referred back to the Committee.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller Reddemann	Netherlands
Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (Bonnell)		MM. Cornelissen Dankert de Niet
MM. Leynen Schugens <i>Breyne</i> (de Stexhe)	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Arfé Bernini Calamandrei Corallo Fosson Maggioni Pecoraro Roberti Sarti Segre Treu	Lord Beaumont of Whitley Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Channon Critchley Farr Grieve Hardy Hawkins Lewis <i>Grant</i> (Page)
France	Luxembourg	Lord Peddie Sir John Rodgers MM. <i>Craig</i> (Roper) Urwin Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Whitehead)
MM. Boucheny <i>Forni</i> (Bouloche) <i>Bizet</i> (Brugnon) Cerneau Delorme Radius Rivière Valleix	MM. Abens Margue <i>Spautz</i> (Mart)	
Federal Republic of Germany		
Mr. <i>Alber</i> (Amrehn) Mrs. von Bothmer		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
MM. Adriaensens Dequae Tanghe	MM. Ahrens Bardens Evers Gessner Handlos Lagershausen Lemp Marquardt Mende Milz Schmidt, Hermann Schweneke Vohrer	MM. Boldrini Bonalumi De Poi Gonella Minnocci Orsini Pecchioli
France		Netherlands
MM. Burckel Cermolacce Grangier Kauffmann Nessler Péridier Péronnet Schleier Schmitt Vitter		MM. Porthoine Reijnen Scholten Voogd
		United Kingdom
		MM. Craig Faulds Watkinson

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 23rd June 1977

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 737*).

2. Review of advanced technology in Israel (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 735*).

3. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 739*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 737)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Treu, Craigen, Lord Hughes, MM. Cornelissen, van Ooijen, Farr and Bernini.

Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 305)¹.

4. Review of advanced technology in Israel

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 735)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Hawkins, van Kleef, Treu and Cornelissen.

Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 306)¹.

5. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 739)

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Cordle, Calamandrei and Hawkins.

Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

6. Adjournment of the Session

The President adjourned the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.

1. See page 42.

1. See page 43.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Corallo	MM. <i>van Kleef</i> (Reijnen)
Mr. Schugens	Fosson	<i>van Ooijen</i> (Voogd)
	Pecoraro	
	Treu	United Kingdom
France	Luxembourg	Lord Beaumont of Whitley
Mr. Delorme	MM. Margue	Sir Frederic Bennett
	<i>Spautz</i> (Mart)	MM. <i>Warren</i> (Channon)
		<i>Jessel</i> (Critchley)
Italy	Netherlands	Farr
MM. Arfé	MM. Cornelissen	Grieve
Bernini	Dankert	Hawkins
Calamandrei	de Niet	<i>Grant</i> (Page)
		<i>Craigen</i> (Roper)
		Lord <i>Hughes</i> (Whitehead)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Orsini
MM. Adriaensens	MM. Ahrens	Pecchioli
Bonnel	Amrehn	Roberti
Dequae	Bardens	Sarti
Leynen	Mrs. von Bothmer	Segre
de Stexhe	MM. Evers	
Tanghe	Gessner	Luxembourg
	Handlos	Mr. Abens
France	Lagershausen	
MM. Boucheny	Lemp	Netherlands
Boulloche	Marquardt	MM. <i>Portheine</i>
Brugnon	Mende	<i>Scholten</i>
Burckel	Milz	
Cermolacce	Müller	United Kingdom
Cerneau	Reddemann	MM. Craig
Grangier	Schmidt, Hermann	Faulds
Kauffmann	Schwencke	Hardy
Nessler	Vohrer	Lewis
Péridier		Lord Peddie
Péronnet	Italy	Sir John Rodgers
Radius	MM. Boldrini	MM. Urwin
Rivière	Bonalumi	Watkinson
Schleiter	De Poi	
Schmitt	Gonella	
Valleix	Maggioni	
Vitter	Minnocci	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 305***on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies —
new maritime sources of energy***

The Assembly,

Concerned that, although Western Europe's energy supplies are far from being adequately guaranteed, only 12% of the European Communities' energy research budget is allocated to new sources of energy and only very small percentages of the member countries' research and development budgets are earmarked for this purpose ;

Deploring the continued absence of consensus on a common energy policy and, therefore, the fact that no concrete measures can be agreed upon in the Community and OECD frameworks ;

Convinced that a common Western European policy should advocate long-term measures to reduce dependence on imported energy and therefore promote research and development on maritime sources of energy, inexhaustible supplies of which are available to the Western European countries ;

Aware of the United Kingdom's research and development in the field of wave power, and of France's tidal power plant and its further research and development on tidal energy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Request member governments to seek political agreement on a European energy policy in the Community framework and on the assignment of a higher percentage of its research and development budget to new sources of energy, in particular to maritime sources of energy ;
2. Promote a joint working group on tidal and wave-power energy of French and British scientists and engineers, together with experts from other interested countries, to study — in the light of experience already acquired in setting up oil rigs in the North Sea and elsewhere — the future possibilities of this kind of energy and problems of corrosion and ocean behaviour ;
3. Foster the harmonisation of policies to achieve practical results through joint action in developing maritime sources of energy in view of their future importance ;
4. Review the possibilities of exploiting the resources of the ocean for energy supplies.

RECOMMENDATION 306***on a review of advanced technology in Israel***

The Assembly,

Considering Israel's wish to establish closer links with Western European countries in the research and development of advanced technology ;

Aware that in various fields such as the desalination of water, Israeli research and development might be of great benefit to several Western European countries ;

Convinced that collaboration between Israel and Western European countries would be mutually advantageous, especially in :

- (a) new sources of energy such as solar energy ;
- (b) oceanography, desalination engineering and pisciculture ;
- (c) aircraft construction and space programmes ;

Considering that Israel, although not geographically part of Europe, is already co-operating with such European organisations as CERN and Euratom ;

Conscious of the need for Europe to play a more important geo-political rôle and to act as a balancing factor for the world superpowers ;

Aware of the necessity to have good relations with all Middle Eastern countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member countries :

1. To intensify co-operation between Western European and Israeli scientific and technological communities ;
2. To promote greater co-operation with Israel in aircraft construction, oceanography and the development of new sources of energy ;
3. To instruct the European Space Agency to seek co-operation with Israel in its work on scientific and application satellites ;
4. To promote a permanent discussion with all Middle Eastern countries in the field of science and technology.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 20th June 1977

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the Session.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of Credentials.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Nessler, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Dankert, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Roper, Mr. Pignion.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Nessler.
7. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
8. Observers.
9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 730).
10. Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 731 and 741*).
Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council ; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 733, 736 and 745 and Amendments*).
Speakers : The President, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).
Reply by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher to questions put by : Mr. Radius, Mr. Craig, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Müller, Mr. Nessler, Mr. Péridier, Lord Peddie, Mr. Reddemann.
Speakers : The President, Mr. Treu (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Lenzer (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Mr. Müller, Mr. Roper, Mr. Delorme, Mr. Lenzer, Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*).
11. Nomination of members to Committees.
12. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Grangier, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation) — The Sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, it is solely due to the fact that I am the oldest Representative among you that I owe the honour of occupying the Chair for a few brief moments at the Assembly of Western

European Union for the third successive year, and also the privilege of declaring open the first part of the twenty-third session of your distinguished Assembly.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would ask you kindly to grant me, as your Provisional President, the few minutes necessary to express to you my opinion on a number of events that point to the sometimes quite unobtrusive yet profound changes which disturb this world of ours, and which have left their imprint on the last year.

As we already had occasion to point out at the same time last year, we are witnessing a continual build-up in the military potential of the Warsaw Pact countries. In the nuclear sphere, the countries of Eastern Europe have reached a position of strategic parity whereas, ten years earlier, the western powers enjoyed a clear superiority. In the conventional sphere, it is evident that the number of divisions, tanks and combat planes which the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe are massing is singularly impressive. If we add to that the development of the Soviet fleet, as well as the quality recently attained by the equipment used by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, we have before us a series of factors that could change the balance

1. See page 18.

The President (continued)

of power which hitherto underlay diplomatic relations between East and West.

If we widen our perspective to encompass the whole planet, the picture which emerges is more likely to inspire disquiet than to afford us a feeling of real security.

The report presented by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the General Affairs Committee listed with exactitude the causes for a certain progressive weakening in the Alliance, and its conclusions are still broadly valid today. May I be allowed to remind you here of some of its findings which were among the most obvious?

Whether it be the emergence of new generations who, unaware of the dangers of yesterday, are perhaps placing undue trust in the process of détente begun at Helsinki, or the negative image acquired by the United States in Vietnam and as a result of its inaction over Angola, or the difficulties we always encounter when we attempt to standardise armaments, or again the inability of some member States to find a lasting solution to their disputes — all these things obviously tend to weaken the Alliance. And this reduction in our potential is not offset by a parallel weakening of the eastern countries. For what do we see there? The deployment of Soviet naval forces in southern waters, a hardening in the attitude of régimes professing the marxist ideology, the advances recorded by these same political forces in many countries of the world — particularly in the Mediterranean countries of Europe — are all plain evidence of the continuing ideological struggle. Let us be on our guard against forgetting that, from the theoretical standpoint of the eastern countries' leaders, détente is perfectly compatible with the ideological struggle.

But this view of the world — although it reveals our determination to preserve peace and to equip ourselves with the means to do so — should nonetheless lead us to temper our pessimism. Political authority has grown stronger in the United States, benefiting from a fresh aura of legitimacy and a popular support which recent events had seriously shaken. The executive authority in the world's most powerful country, which provides the surest guarantee for the defence of the western world, is once again functioning in all its parts. Admittedly, the election campaign suggested that the United States might return to a certain attitude of isolationism — what the pundits call the Wilson syndrome. The statements and actions of the new President have, however, swept away these possibilities and dispelled the clouds. Thus, it can be seen that the defence of Europe is being more unequivocally affirmed in principle and more effectively strengthened in practice.

Moreover, the arrangements for dialogue established in the seventies still exist, and the mere fact of their existence, in the period in which we live, may be considered to be a positive factor. True, the discussions on balanced force reductions in Europe have not made any notable progress, nor has the renegotiation of the SALT agreements ended in a very fruitful fashion; and yet the fallout from the conference on security and co-operation in Europe should not necessarily be looked upon as negligible. Of course, the revised recommendation appearing in the report presented by Sir Frederic Bennett has warned us "that the Soviet Union has up to now interpreted the commitments entered into in the final act of the CSCE in a restrictive manner". Nevertheless, this Helsinki conference seems to have triggered off a mechanism, to have unleashed forces whose results we cannot yet foresee. It is accordingly our duty and our responsibility to probe further into the possible results of the conference and, through the medium of the Council, to analyse methodically the way in which the final act has been applied and to note any failure to observe its provisions. The approach of the Belgrade meetings, due to be held in the near future, renders it more necessary and more desirable that we should give thought to this subject.

Europe finds itself placed in this general context where it serves both as theatre for the negotiations and as stake for the strategists. If we were to liken the process of building Europe to a chemical reaction, we might detect two catalysts that could accelerate that reaction. We have, on the one hand, the process of enlargement, which now seems to have been started, and, on the other, the imminent election by universal suffrage of a European Parliament. These two events seem to us both to hold promise for the future and to be big with consequences that are still difficult to assess. If we now consider these events from the standpoint of defence problems, we perceive that they are liable to have repercussions both on the strengthening of the West's positions on the southern flank of the Alliance and on the composition of a more homogeneous overall defence policy. Moreover, the report presented by Mr. Buck on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments provided us with enlightenment on several of the points which we have just raised. Although the Mediterranean is no longer the *mare nostrum* of the Roman Empire, it would be in our own interests to preserve its specifically European and Euro-African character. Is it not then the logical conclusion of this *petitio principii* that we should strengthen European participation in the joint defence of the Eastern Mediterranean, and associate the Greek and Turkish Governments with the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, indeed with all questions relating to the construction of Europe?

The President (continued)

This brings us to the central place which defence problems assume in the construction of Europe. It is not enough to say, sometimes without conviction, that customs union involves economic union, which in turn leads to political union. We must state the problem in an apparently bolder, but in the last resort far more operative, manner, in terms of the solidarity and independence of Europe. That independence and that solidarity — desirable and desired as they are — will be impossible without the establishment of a really European defence policy. And a really European defence policy presupposes a clear and unequivocal definition of the solidarity and of the relations that exist between Europe and the United States, for European defence policy depends at one and the same time on a shield — the allied forces, and more particularly the American forces, stationed in Germany — and on an umbrella — that is, American nuclear protection.

Now it is obvious that the increased range of the nuclear vehicles belonging to the big powers, their enhanced deterrent value and their improved accuracy are leading to a change in the strategy for using such forces. And in this new strategy, Europe no longer appears in the guise of an essential advanced base. If we add the way in which tactical nuclear weapons are increasingly being perfected — and here the development of “mininukes” appears as an important element — there is a great risk of seeing Europe serve as a testing-ground for the theory of graduated retaliation. It is therefore to be feared that, as happens in some bad fairytale, the umbrella may turn into a sunshade and the shield into a borgnette.

You can see the extent to which we must, without respite or slackening, remain vigilant and always ready to react successfully to any aggression, whether armed or in some other form.

The question of defence therefore stands out as vital to the future of Europe. Progress in this field, however, continues to be impeded both by the need to avoid provoking an intemperate and disproportionate reaction from the Warsaw Pact countries and by the immutability of a specifically French doctrine of defence. Nevertheless, a certain measure of progress has been achieved which it would be unwise and unfair to disregard.

Thus, the results achieved by the independent European programme group on armaments, which some people consider extremely satisfactory, as well as the debate touched off by the programme law on military equipment when it was discussed in the French Parliament in the spring of 1976, constitute so many milestones along the road leading to a change in attitudes

and in patterns of behaviour. Of course, the way in which responsibilities are shared between the Standing Armaments Committee and the independent European programme group is still somewhat vague on certain points. Of course, the final signature placed last month on the “contract of the century” illustrates the difficulty of arriving at a balance of armaments production satisfactory to both sides of the Atlantic. Of course, France’s refusal to see itself allotted a forward position in the defence of the Federal Republic’s frontiers symbolises a divergence in the doctrine governing employment of these forces.

But if so many criticisms are voiced and feelings of acrimony are so persistent, is that not partly the fruit of disappointed hopes that had been cherished too long rather than the result of systematic disparagement? The renewed interest shown by the French Parliament in the deliberations of WEU would seem to justify that assumption. So too would the important speech made before our Assembly by the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a speech in which he felt he should recall France’s attachment to the Brussels Treaty and stress the very close correlation between the establishment of an operational European defence system and the exercise of political power at European level. Further, he stated clearly that there would be no objection to envisaging, here and now, the conditions for setting up such an operational defence system. In that connection, the establishment of the programme group which deals with the standardisation of armaments and to whose proceedings we have already referred, should be able, when it works in conjunction with WEU’s Standing Armaments Committee, to contribute to the birth of a genuinely European armaments industry.

If we are reduced — and these will be my concluding words — to interpreting signs rather than counting achievements, and to dispelling the dark storm clouds rather than contemplating halcyon skies, that does not constitute an admission of weakness, but rather an affirmation of our resolve to serve in a great cause. It seems to us that major progress could be speedily achieved, both in the realm of armaments standardisation and in that of working out a European procurement strategy, which is necessary to enhance the operational character of this European defence.

Allow me one minute more, Ladies and Gentlemen, to tell you that this session is the last in which I shall take part. My age quite frankly impels me not to seek the renewal of my mandate as a Senator of the French Republic next September and, therefore, of my mandate as a French Representative in your hard-working and meritorious Assembly.

The President (continued)

May I be permitted to express to each one of you my wishes for good health and for an auspicious continuation of your work, in which you strive untiringly to ensure that this union of the democratic States of Western Europe emerges from the realm of hopes and enters that of magnificent, living reality; it is such a union that our populations, who so ardently long for peace, call for and desire. (*Applause*)

4. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the examination of credentials.

The list of Representatives and Substitutes attending the twenty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, all credentials have been attested by the statement of ratification communicated by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 25th April 1977.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, no Representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless his candidature has been sponsored by three or more Representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

Furthermore, Rule 7 (2) stipulates that Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. This nomination has been duly sponsored in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that it should elect Mr. von Hassel by acclamation. (*Applause*)

I call Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we believe the election of the President to be of particular importance for the efficiency and proper conduct of our proceedings. Therefore we think it would have been only right

that the proposers should have sought the agreement of all the political groups on the person nominated, to ensure the greatest possible backing for his function in presiding over the Assembly. But due consultation did not take place, which was in our judgment a mistake.

For this precise reason, and with no reflection upon the person nominated, who has our good wishes, the Communist Group will abstain from voting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — If I have understood aright, the Communist Group is abstaining.

I call Mr. Nessler.

Mr. NESSLER (*France*) (Translation). — At this moment when Mr. von Hassel is about to take the Chair as President, I should like to express my very warm congratulations to him. I am convinced that he will strive wholeheartedly to make it his constant endeavour to maintain the prestige, the influence and the authority of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Allow me to point out to you, Mr. Nessler, that Mr. von Hassel has not yet been elected President.

There is an objection, and this obliges us to proceed to an election by secret ballot. Those are the Rules of Procedure, and I can do nothing about it.

In that connection, I would recall the terms of Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure relating to election procedure :

“Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast... If after two ballots no candidate has obtained an absolute majority of the Representatives to the Assembly, the candidate who on the third ballot receives the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected. In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected.”

Envelopes and ballot papers bearing the name of the candidate in the prescribed form will be distributed to you.

I shall first draw lots for the names of the tellers who will be responsible for counting the votes cast.

(*Mr. Watkinson and Mr. Voogd were chosen by lot*)

Each of you will have your name called in alphabetical order to come and place your envelope in the ballot box placed on the speakers' rostrum.

I shall draw by lot the name of the Representative who will be called upon to vote first.

(*Mr. Boucheny was chosen by lot*)

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — How are we to vote, Mr. President? We have not yet grasped how we are to do this. The ballot paper bears the name of Mr. von Hassel, but what do we do if we want to say “yes”, “no” or abstain? We should be given some guidance on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, the ballot paper bears a name. If you are in agreement with this name, you should place your ballot paper as it stands in the envelope; if you disagree with the name of the candidate, you should cross it out.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — And what about abstentions?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — If you abstain, you put nothing into the envelope.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Allow me to say, Mr. President, that the words “yes”, “no” or “abstention” should be entered on the ballot paper. That is the only way in which we can express our voting intentions clearly. I believe there is no other method.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Since there is only one single candidate, and that candidate is Mr. von Hassel, those who agree to vote for him should write “yes” on their ballot paper, those who disagree should write “no” and the others should write “abstention”.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Since the voting has already begun, Mr. President, I do not think that we can change the procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Voting has in fact begun.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — These votes are invalid. Let us begin again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Gentlemen, we have to take the facts into account. The ballot papers which have been distributed show the name of one single candidate. If you are in agreement, you place this ballot paper in an envelope, and if you are not in agreement, you strike out the name. As for those who wish to abstain, they need only refrain from voting or from putting the ballot paper into the envelope.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — Do I understand that the communists have objected to the candidate and are abstaining? Are we now to follow the usual communist practice of having to vote for only one man? That is good communist practice.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — I am very glad that you have explained the way in which we should vote, but one difficulty remains — namely, the fact that some of us have already voted. For that reason, I should like you to consider the possibility of recommencing the voting procedure on the candidature of Mr. von Hassel. Those who have already voted did not hear your explanations about how to vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The ballot has already opened, and it was only after the opening of the ballot that objections were raised. Consequently, I should not have taken them into account. I would repeat that those who wish to vote for the candidate who has put forward his candidature should place their ballot paper in the envelope, those who do not wish to vote for the candidate should strike out his name, and those who wish to abstain should refrain from placing the ballot paper in the envelope. I believe that those of our colleagues who have handed in their ballot papers followed this procedure.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to reassure Mr. Roper. Since I am the only Representative to have voted — and without hearing the explanations given by the President — I can tell him that I assume responsibility for the way in which I voted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall resume the voting and the roll will be called.

(A vote by secret ballot was then held)

Does anyone else wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The sitting will be suspended while the votes are counted.

(The Sitting was suspended at 4 p.m. and resumed at 4.30 p.m.)

Here are the results of the ballot for the election of the President of the Assembly.

Number of votes cast : 73.

Since the number of Representatives is 89, the absolute majority is 45.

Mr. von Hassel has obtained 59 votes in favour, with 5 against and 9 abstentions.

As Mr. von Hassel has obtained the requisite absolute majority, I declare him elected President of the Assembly of Western European Union for the Twenty-Third Session, and I invite him to take his place in the Chair as President. *(Loud applause)*

(Mr. von Hassel then took the Chair)

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, it is an honour for me to have been elected President of the Assembly of Western European Union. I wish to express my thanks for your confidence and shall endeavour to serve in the high office to which you have elected me with the same impartiality, the same calm as my predecessor, Mr. Nessler. (*Applause*)

I shall also seek to emulate his efficiency, which he showed in particular at Bonn when we commemorated the twentieth anniversary of this Assembly. Like him, I shall endeavour to extend the audience and enhance the prestige of an assembly which, it must never be forgotten, is the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence questions. And I should like to thank you, Mr. Grangier, for the work you did at the opening this sitting. I also thank you for the address you delivered here.

Indeed, Ladies and Gentlemen, defence matters have always been one of my main concerns, not only when I was Minister of Defence in the German Government but throughout my whole career.

Despite what is known as *détente*, the safety of Europe cannot be secured once and for all, but only at the price of constant struggle, for Europe, divided since the last world war, weak and hesitant through failure to achieve political unity, is still an uncertain, a fragile reality.

For more than thirty years, a barbed-wire fence has stretched across Europe, rendering Germany asunder and passing through the very heart of its former capital: in the West, peoples may choose their future freely; in the East, it is otherwise. But deep in our hearts we feel that the division of Europe and the division of Germany remain artificial in spite of the years that have passed. On either side of the frontiers between West and East, institutions are different, but not the minds of men. For Europe is drawn to democracy; democracy is the spiritual basis of its unity. So, even if the results of the Helsinki conference are confirmed at the forthcoming Belgrade meeting, we cannot say we are satisfied as long as the peoples of our old continent are unable to recover the ability to express their genius in freedom.

Cruelly cut off from its eastern part, Europe should have found in its misfortune an additional reason for vigorously affirming its identity and its unity, but on the contrary, like Hamlet, it wonders about its existence. There is no lack of institutions which should breathe life into this great body. But without a political will the institutions remain soulless. Europe is but a vague idea which has not yet taken on flesh and blood. Through its failure to make a reality of

its common political concepts and to provide itself with better means of ensuring its own security, even its economic unity is threatened because of the difficulty it experiences in presenting a common front in face of adversity.

How often has Europe given an answer to the monetary, economic, oil, military and political problems which have arisen? Do I hear someone saying that the idea of Europe must be subordinated to the need to preserve Atlantic solidarity? But the Atlantic Alliance itself is being undermined by Europe's weakness. To be a true ally, Europe needs to be more than it is today. Yet while it is failing to define a monetary policy or safeguard its energy supplies through co-ordinated action, the military weight of the Soviet Union and its allies is steadily increasing. The fragile balance of forces may be upset at any time by a technological breakthrough. The slightest relaxation of vigilance and effort on our part may endanger our security.

Even the rampart formed by the armies of the Atlantic Alliance facing a possible invader may be turned by a breakdown in the social balance due to increased malaise in the economic sphere and greater fragility in the political.

The threat we have to face is thus a global one. It is political, military, economic and scientific at one and the same time. It is not to be found in Europe alone, but affects the whole earth and surrounding space. This global threat calls for a global military, economic and moral response, which must be made at three levels: the Atlantic Alliance, Europe and the nation. This response must be inspired by awareness of the superiority of our political system based on freedom, and by the will to turn this superiority to good account.

First, freedom shapes the moral cohesion of the West. While the eastern bloc has no trouble in standardising armaments — a goal which seems to be beyond the reach of the West — it is far from possessing our moral cohesion. On the contrary, it is the Atlantic Alliance which benefits from common ideals. Nothing must be undertaken which might weaken the ideals cementing our alliance. Certain controversies must therefore be laid to rest. The United States must realise that Europe has come of age economically and is entitled to voice its views on political and military matters. This is one condition for the effectiveness of its contribution to the joint defence effort. The other condition, however, is that its contribution must be made in the framework of our alliance with the United States and Canada. For Europe must see clearly that without Atlantic solidarity its security is not assured. The countries of Europe must not therefore merely huddle together under the American nuclear umbrella. Our continent must help to give substance to the North Atlantic Alliance.

The President (continued)

To this end, Europe must strengthen itself. The national pride of its peoples can be a factor in its recovery. Yet Europe must think more of ensuring that it will have a future than of safeguarding its heritage from the past. In this connection, we must welcome the Council's decision to authorise the Standing Armaments Committee to undertake a study whose political aim can only be to safeguard and strengthen Europe's armaments industries. On this continent, whose links with America may prove fragile in time of tension, it is essential to maintain the industrial basis for defending Europe.

Finally, Europe will be strong only if its component States are determined to defend both their economic and strategic interests and also their political philosophy.

It is a political philosophy which has triumphed in Spain. Let us pay tribute to that country's return to the democratic community in Europe. This great people cannot fail to make a contribution of the highest importance to the building and defence of our European homeland.

Before Spain, it was Portugal which, on the heels of Greece, gave proof of political maturity and of the attraction exerted by democratic ideals. These examples should encourage those peoples of our continent who have fallen prey to doubt and discouragement to regain their self-confidence. The future of their freedom is in their hands. In their effort to overcome adversity, they must know that they can rely on a twofold solidarity — European and Atlantic.

It is for our Assembly to express the strength of this solidarity in the presence of Representatives of the Council, in particular of Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, who is its Chairman today, and of the new Secretary-General, Mr. Longestaey, to whom I wish good luck.

The Assembly still takes just as exalted a view of its functions, and wishes to pursue a constructive dialogue with the Council in order to give Europe means consonant with the ambitions we cherish for it. (*Applause*)

I call Mr. Nessler.

Mr. NESSLER (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the haste with which I wanted to convey to you my heartfelt congratulations just now serves to underline their spontaneity and their warmth.

I should first like to thank you for the kind words you had for me. I would next stress the fact that the calmness, objectiveness, great cordiality and even friendship which bind together the members of this Assembly, where some of us have long known and esteemed each other,

seem to me to foreshadow, as it were, the future union of Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, my dear colleague.

7. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that no Representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more Representatives. Representatives who are members of governments are not eligible for nomination for the Bureau.

In addition, Rule 7 (2) states that Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. I have received five nominations in the prescribed form. They are, in alphabetical order: Mr. Mart (Luxembourg), Mr. Minnocci (Italy), Mr. de Niet (Netherlands), Sir John Rodgers (United Kingdom), Mr. Tanghe (Belgium).

The seat reserved for France will be filled later.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that the election of the Vice-Presidents should be by acclamation.

I would point out that should the election be by acclamation, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents would be determined by their age.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, in the following order of precedence: Mr. de Niet, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Minnocci, Mr. Mart.

The seat for the French Vice-President, which has remained vacant, will be filled later.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — May I raise an important point of order? Is there not at least one form of time-wasting that we can control? The Assembly was fifteen minutes late in starting this session. That has become the practice rather than the exception. I sincerely hope, Mr. President, that you will ensure in future that we start our proceedings on time.

The PRESIDENT. — At 10 o'clock tomorrow morning sharp I shall reopen the session.

May I go back to those who have been nominated as Vice-Presidents? I am sure that we shall have extremely good contact with them in the proceedings of the Assembly.

8. Observers

The PRESIDENT. — Several parliamentarians are paying us the honour of taking part in our proceedings as observers. They are : Dr. Honore and Mr. Damgaard, Members of the Folketing of Denmark ; Mr. Costa Moreira and Mr. Oliveira Baptista, Members of the Assembly of the Republic of Portugal. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain has appointed as his representative at our proceedings Mr. Temboury, Count of Labajos, a Minister in the Spanish Embassy in Paris.

On behalf of the Assembly I thank them for their kind acceptance of our invitation. We shall listen to them with the greatest interest should they wish to speak on any subject on the agenda.

9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session

(Doc. 730)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-third ordinary session of the Assembly.

This draft Order of Business is given in Document 730, dated 14th June 1977.

Are there any objections ?...

The Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-third ordinary session is adopted.

10. Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly

(Presentation by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 731 and 741)

Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 733, 736 and 745 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the twenty-second annual report of the Council of Western European Union by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister

of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Documents 731 and 741.

After the presentation of this report and after the Chairman of the Council has replied to members' oral questions, we shall hear the three Rapporteurs of the Committees of the Assembly which have prepared replies to the Council's annual report : Mr. Treu will present the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council, Document 733 ; Mr. Delorme will present the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 745 ; Mr. Lenzer will present the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on scientific and technological co-operation in Europe, Document 736.

I welcome you once again, Madam Minister. Will you please come to the tribune to present your report.

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — I would like to start by saying how honoured I am to convey to you, Mr. President, the best wishes of the Council on your election as President of the Assembly. For my part I am sure that your great wide parliamentary experience, your knowledge of the fields involved and the kindly manner which is appreciated on all sides will contribute to making your period in office a complete success for Western European Union.

I would also like, on behalf of the Council, to extend to the retiring President, Mr. Nessler, our gratitude for the splendid way in which he has furthered co-operation between the Assembly and the Council. Our most sincere thanks, Mr. Nessler.

Now Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have the honour to present, on behalf of the Council of Western European Union, the twenty-second annual report which, in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, is required each year. But first I would like to make a brief personal observation.

Looking through the previous reports of debates, I noticed that the Chairmen of the Council who addressed you were experienced and long-standing members of the institutions of WEU. I am afraid that is not so in my case. I took office only at the end of last year. Since then I have tried to familiarise myself from the theoretical side with the difficult subject matter of the Brussels Treaty, its tasks and institutions. However, I have to acquire a personal experience and competence in doing the job. None the less

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

I can assure you that I will do my very best to give you here today the answers you feel you need.

Now let us turn to the matter in hand. The report before you describes in matter-of-fact terms the activities of the Council and of the other organisations responsible for carrying out the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty. As indicated in Chapter II, the Council has in 1976 again paid close attention to the implementation of the treaty and its protocols relating to the strength of the forces of the member States and of their armaments. The procedures laid down for this purpose are working smoothly. As in previous years, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, whose activities are described in Chapter III, was able to carry out satisfactorily the functions in those fields subject to its control.

In the field of armaments co-operation, and under the mandate given to it by the Council in May 1976, the Standing Armaments Committee has worked out a detailed outline programme for a study of the armaments industries in the member countries. The Council has examined the programme, due care being taken in line with the intention of the governments, to avoid duplication of effort and interference in the work of other bodies, in particular that of the European programme group. The Council has now instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to carry on with the study as suggested.

May I now make a few remarks on relations between the Council and the Assembly. In doing so, I shall try to deal with the to some extent critical remarks of your Rapporteur, Mr. Treu. In its report and the replies to the recommendations of the Assembly the Council frequently takes up positions which refer to the viewpoints expressed by member governments in other international bodies. This is in line with the present division of work between the various European and Atlantic organisations. The way in which this sharing of the work has developed and the consequences arising therefrom probably explain the misgivings expressed by the Rapporteur, who said he felt that what the Council actually did did not tally with what the representatives of the governments promise when they speak to the Assembly.

Let me try, therefore, to allay these misgivings and to assure you once again on behalf of the Council that the importance and validity of the treaty and its protocols, and the determination of member States to fulfil the obligations entered into for fifty years, are just as clearly and definitely reaffirmed in the annual report of the Council as they are in statements by

Ministers on the subject before this Assembly. Article V of the Brussels Treaty lays down the obligation of member States to afford each other aid if attacked, and WEU is an important part of the security system of the West.

The WEU Treaty itself emphasises the need for close co-operation between WEU and NATO, and in it the member governments also accept the aim of European unity. The division of labour I have mentioned between WEU, the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance has brought additional tasks for this Assembly, while the field of work covered by the Council has shrunk. You are the only parliamentary assembly which is committed at one and the same time to the two aims of European security and European unity. The WEU Assembly is the only European body dealing with questions of European security and defence. As a result it is working in a complex of political forces which governments see as mainly determined by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Communities. With European political co-operation, the Nine have forged for themselves an instrument of close co-operation in foreign affairs, while European defence co-operation today rests primarily on the independent European programme group.

Your Assembly, Ladies and Gentlemen, has itself repeatedly welcomed these developments in the European Community and the Alliance even though, as a result, the practical work of the WEU Council in these fields has been reduced. In many fields of your parliamentary work the Council can, therefore, render account only indirectly, i.e. referring to the work of WEU members in other organisations.

This situation affects relations between the Council and the Assembly in two ways: firstly, the dialogue with the Assembly assumes special importance for the Council and the governments. Your Rapporteur rightly considers the opinions expressed here last year by representatives of member governments on the rôle of WEU and the Assembly as an encouragement for your own work. Secondly, we ought to adjust the form of the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly to the recent changes in the nature of these two bodies, which I have just described. The real answer seems to me to lie in extending further the system of informal contacts. Formal contacts are subject to the unanimity rule, which occasionally delays communications from the Council, or gives them a rather formal character. And it is a little difficult for the Council to conduct a formal dialogue on matters being dealt with in other organisations.

The Council therefore suggests that, while fully preserving the present formal relationship between Council and Assembly, every possibility

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

for a flexible informal dialogue should be utilised. The Council is thinking, for example, in terms of the meetings the Council has had with the Assembly's Presidential Committee, and the meeting with the General Affairs Committee due to take place in Bonn next November. Members of all WEU governments will be invited to this meeting. I would like to assure you that the German Federal Government, which took over the Chairmanship of the WEU Council at the end of April, will do all it can to strengthen the dialogue with the Assembly.

In concluding the first part of my remarks I would like to thank the Rapporteurs for the work they have done. I was particularly happy at the warmth with which Mr. Treu welcomed the new Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Longestaey. The same is true of the high appreciation he expressed of the successful work done by the deputy Secretary-General, Mr. von Plehwe, during the long interim period.

I would like, Mr. President, following the tradition of this house, to add a few remarks on the policies of the Federal Government. We in Germany remember very well how important WEU was at a critical moment in our history, at a time when a place had to be found for the young and vulnerable Federal Republic of Germany among the democracies of Europe and North America. After the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954, the modified Brussels Treaty acted as a political catalyst and made the Paris agreements possible. At the same time it established the continuing integration of Europe as the political banner under which the Alliance and co-operation amongst the West European partners would develop. This was the period which saw the emergence of the political forces which now determine the pattern of western co-operation, with its two poles of Atlantic Alliance and European unification — a pattern which is and will remain the foundation of our foreign policy.

Since these beginnings the international responsibility of the Federal Republic has grown. Its radius of political action has widened. Through our bilateral *Ostpolitik* we contribute to the multilateral process of détente in Europe. In the world-wide dialogue with the third world we are coming to assume more and more the responsibilities which go with the economic and political weight the German Federal Republic carries. We see our two-year membership of the Security Council as an outward sign of those international responsibilities. But wherever we act, even if we do so simply as Germans, we act in close co-operation and, where possible, together with our partners in the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

From the wide field of current German foreign policy, I will deal briefly with only two problems, both of which are directly concerned with your deliberations. First, East-West relations and, secondly, European unification. The fate of our divided country is closely related to the process of détente in Europe. That is true in two ways. First, the Federal Government had through its *Ostpolitik* to make a substantial contribution in order to start off the process of détente. Persistent confrontation in a divided Germany at the political interface where East meets West would have become a barrier hampering all efforts to achieve détente. Nor, secondly, would confrontation have helped the German people, for it is only in a climate of European détente that we can hope to alleviate at least some of the human problems created by partition. We look at the problem of our national unity, too, in a European context. In the letter on German unity which the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Walter Scheel, handed over on the occasion of the signing of the German-Soviet Treaty of 1970, the Federal Government stated that its political aim was "to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination".

The process of détente, Ladies and Gentlemen, is an opportunity — no more, but certainly no less. It has already resulted in positive changes in Europe. I will give you just two examples: throughout Europe discussions about freedom and human rights are being based on the final act of Helsinki. Since then some 73,000 citizens of German origin from Eastern Europe have been able to resettle in the Federal Republic of Germany. In Belgrade, too, we shall take advantage of any opportunities and, in addition to checking critically what has been done since Helsinki, we shall strive for further progress in the process of détente. Rightly, your Assembly has always stressed the need for a thorough preparation of the Belgrade conference. I believe the West will be very well prepared when it goes to Belgrade. As was the case for the CSCE, the member States of the European Communities have agreed on common positions, and have aligned them in NATO and the Council of Europe with the other western democracies.

But the limits of détente must also be clearly recognised. We are watching with great anxiety the enormous Soviet armaments effort which goes far beyond the needs of defence. It compels us to make a continuing defence effort in order to establish the military balance. If the SALT negotiations of the superpowers succeed — as we hope they will — in stabilising the present situation of approximate parity in strategic weapons, keeping a balance of conventional forces will become even more important for Europe. With our continuing efforts to establish

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

a balance of conventional forces we are also creating the political conditions which must underlie further patient negotiations between East and West. This applies equally to the MBFR talks in Vienna, which are intended to achieve lower combined collective ceilings for the military strength of both sides. An intact western defence is and will remain a precondition for the process of détente.

Mr. President, détente is however not just a European East-West problem. I would like to make three brief points: first, the conflict between political systems extends beyond Europe. I believe we can say soberly but with confidence that the democratic form of State and society is not, as is so often claimed, on the defensive — certainly not in Europe. I would remind you of Greece's return to democracy, the successful struggle of the democrats in Portugal against the enemies on the right and left, and the first free elections in Spain for more than forty years. The statement is equally true for the world at large. I am thinking of India and the many States of the third world where there is increasing doubt as to the disinterestedness of so-called friends who want to export their own political systems and create their own spheres of political influence. Freedom and human rights, independence and self-determination retain their political dynamism whether manifested in the final act of Helsinki, in protest against authoritarian régimes or restraints on national independence, or in the fight against apartheid.

Secondly, we are entering a period of world-wide discussions concerning the responsibility resting on all industrial States — and no longer solely on the economically leading industrialised States of the West — for the economic world order and for development policy. At the beginning of May the heads of government of the West, in the communiqué of the NATO Council and in the statement made at the economic summit, called on the member States of COMECON to make greater efforts in the field of development policy. This idea had repeatedly been put forward by the Germans, who wished to evoke in all States of the world a greater awareness of their common responsibility for a world economy which will work. The intention is also to place East-West relations in a world-wide context. It is not impossible, Ladies and Gentlemen, that one day the common tasks of all the industrialised States may prove more important than the traditional political and military rivalries between East and West.

Thirdly, even the discussions on armaments and disarmament are no longer limited to East-West relations. The link between economic

development and armaments expenditure is becoming a central point in the preparations for the United Nations Special General Assembly on disarmament questions in the spring of 1978. According to figures given by the Peace Research Institute in Stockholm last year some \$334,000 million were spent on armaments and only \$25,000 million on development aid. And, incidentally, only slightly more than 2% of development aid came from the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The Federal Republic of Germany alone contributed 2.5 times as much.

Wherever possible, Mr. President, the Federal Republic of Germany conducts its foreign policy within the framework of the European Community. These last few years have, in European political co-operation and in the external relations of the Community, seen an important move towards a European foreign policy. The outlines of a Community policy in foreign affairs can now be discerned: in the policy of détente, in dealing with the problems of the Middle East, of the Mediterranean and of Africa, in the United Nations, and in the world-wide dialogue on the economic world order of the future. Our American partners see and welcome this development. As President Carter told the NATO Council in London, "The Alliance is even stronger because of the solid progress toward Western European unification and the expanding rôle of the European Community in world affairs". This quotation I would also use to answer your Rapporteur's question as to why, in its twenty-second annual report, the Council no longer dealt fully with European-American relations. It was no longer necessary. Since 1974 it has been the practice for the Nine and the United States to consult on foreign affairs; this practice is in the interests of both sides and reflects their relationship as partners.

These advances reflect the experience gained by the EEC partners that it is only by working together that they can contribute successfully to important international decisions. They are also in line with the expectations which the process of European unification has aroused in the world. And we cannot fail to see that the standing of the Community abroad seems at the moment greater than its ability to inspire confidence at home. The member States are still suffering from the repercussions of the world economic crisis, and these make major moves towards integration more difficult. In some countries a new European political debate has been sparked off by the question of direct elections.

We do not expect political miracles from the decision to introduce direct elections to the European Parliament, which was approved by the Bundestag on Thursday. In the first place we are merely fulfilling an obligation under the

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

Treaties of Rome. But we put our confidence — and it is a point which I would wish to stress before this gathering — in the political vitality of European parliamentarians, whose authority will be considerably strengthened by a direct European mandate. Above all, however, we have confidence in the ability of democracy — and of its processes for the formation of political will — to carry conviction. National parties of the same political shades of opinion have united in European federations in order to prepare for European elections. Political programmes for coping with European problems are being drawn up. The Community is changing from a Europe of governments and institutions to a Europe of citizens. This highlights once again its political objective. The Community is, and always has been, an instrument for the European democracies. It serves their economic and social progress. It helps them to live up to their world-wide political responsibility. But it is also — it is especially — a political instrument for preserving and developing common concepts of democracy in States based on the rule of law.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, today the Community is already a living proof of the will to survive which inspires the democracies of Western Europe. It is no coincidence that Greeks, Portuguese and Spaniards, at the historic moment when they achieve democracy at home, are seeking to draw closer to the European Community. The enlargement of the Community, which is sure to raise many economic problems for both sides, is for us primarily an opportunity to strengthen democracy in Europe. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I should like to thank Mrs. Hamm-Brücher for the presentation of the twenty-second annual report of the Council and for the traditional information she provided about the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. I add my personal thanks for her good wishes to me on assuming the presidency. The Chairman-in-Office is now ready to answer questions.

I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my question falls into two parts and is addressed to the Minister: does the Council think that the events in Angola last year were the result of Soviet intervention? Does she consider that the Soviet position in Africa has been strengthened thereby?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Craig.

Mr. CRAIG (*United Kingdom*). — I begin by congratulating Mrs. Hamm-Brücher on her report. I question whether there is not an ele-

ment of complacency in the attitude to the defence of freedom in Western Europe. I recently had the opportunity to visit Berlin and my country's military government there. I was somewhat perturbed by my findings, but somewhat satisfied with the state of alertness of the garrison.

I had the feeling that we were living in a world of make-believe. I noted the tremendous build-up of the East German forces and I was shattered to discover that more than 100,000 Russian troops, heavily armed with the most deadly weapons available to modern warfare, were located within twenty miles of Berlin.

The PRESIDENT. — Excuse me, Mr. Craig. You may only put questions. You may not make a speech. Will you therefore ask your question?

Mr. CRAIG (*United Kingdom*). — I cannot help but call into question in the light of this knowledge whether we in Europe are being sufficiently realistic in mobilising the strength of Europe in this present situation. I recognise that the North Atlantic relationship has a part to play in this, but Europe has its main responsibility to shoulder.

I question in this day and time, having regard to the treaty, whether it is any longer right to restrict nations in Europe from playing their full part in the defence of western freedom.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — In her excellent speech on the contribution WEU makes to the peace of Europe in the first place and consequently to the peace of the world, the Minister pointed out that amongst its other activities WEU frequently turned to problems which were not only military but scientific. Among other activities of this nature WEU always devoted much of its work, in particular, to European aeronautical questions.

Could the Minister confirm the conclusions of the most recent Franco-German meeting which was held last week? May we, as a result, hope for European co-operation, and in particular for the development of the Airbus? My question is particularly directed to the development of the Airbus family, in some such form as the Airbus 200.

To put my question more accurately, may we now hope that this opening will lead not only to Franco-German co-operation but to large-scale European co-operation?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The next question is by Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In view of the fact that the Soviet Union is today the foremost exporter of armaments to the developing countries, and of the point made by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher that the countries of the eastern bloc contribute hardly anything to development aid, I would like to ask the Minister whether she sees any possibility of giving the so-called socialist countries, at what is known as the North-South dialogue and elsewhere, a more forceful reminder of their world-wide responsibility towards mankind.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The next question is by Mr. Nessler.

Mr. NESSLER (*France*) (Translation). — I will immediately use my regained freedom to speak to put a question to the Minister of State.

In a speech which he made on 2nd May 1977 — in other words recently — to the Association of Refugees in the Federal Republic, the Foreign Minister said that the active participation of the political parties in the European decision-making process would make it more difficult for the Council of Ministers to oppose the European Parliament's demand for integration. When he considered how many eminent politicians had said they were ready to stand as candidates, he could not see how the European Parliament could fail to gain rapidly in importance. For the moment the question of its competence should not be raised publicly.

Does this statement mean that the Federal parliament considers that in fact a European parliament elected by direct vote would not see its powers limited to those given it by the Treaty of Rome?

Does the Minister of State consider that the election of a European parliament by direct vote would authorise it to deal with questions of defence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Nessler.

I call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PÉRIQUIER (*France*) (Translation). — The question which I would like to ask the Minister is as follows: can you tell me what the Council of Ministers proposes to do, or more exactly what has it done, to see that the decision in which the United Nations considered that Turkey was to withdraw its occupation troops from Cyprus is put into effect? Does she think that as long as the situation on the island of Cyprus is what it is, effective security in the Mediterranean can be assured?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Périquier.

The next question is by Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — Can Mrs. Hamm-Brücher give any tangible evidence of the freer movement of peoples between East and West over recent months particularly since the Helsinki agreement?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Lord Peddie.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to ask the Minister who has just given us global figures for expenditure on armaments and for expenditure on development aid, whether she can give us figures on armaments expenditure in what is known as the third and fourth worlds.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, a very widespread range of questions has been asked. Would you please reply to them?

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to thank members for the interesting questions they have put, and will endeavour to answer them; but I must confess that in one case I did not catch the name of the questioner, and in another I am not sure whether I understood the question itself correctly.

The question put by Mr. Radius referred to events in Angola and to Soviet influence in that country. I can only reply that the Council has, by its nature, not discussed the problem of Angola or developments in Africa. I can only give my personal opinion, and that is quite clear: events in Angola have strengthened Soviet influence in Africa. In our future policy on southern Africa care must be taken to see that there are no further developments of this sort; the Federal Republic's policy is calculated to avoid a second Angola.

Mr. Craig pointed to the situation in Berlin and asked whether we in Europe were being sufficiently realistic in our own armaments effort. In my statement I tried to show that in the SALT negotiations, as in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, we have at least to ensure that the balance of armaments is not altered to the detriment of the western democracies. That is the objective in both negotiations. I believe this is an entirely realistic objective, and we ask for this Assembly's help in attaining it.

As to the question on the scientific work or scientific projects of WEU, especially in aeronautical questions, I can only confirm that the

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

agreements reached last weekend and at the latest Franco-German consultations aim at joint co-operation in the further development of the Airbus.

Mr. Müller asked whether we are in a position to influence the Soviet Union in the direction of a greater contribution to the economic growth of the developing countries. Naturally we will seize any such opportunities wherever they exist. This could quite well be at the United Nations, for instance, or it could, given the right circumstances, be at the Helsinki follow-up conference. In my view it will be one of the tasks of the western democracies to call on those socialist States which are industrially developed to make their contribution to development aid, in particular to economic development aid.

I did not quite understand Mr. Nessler's question concerning the competence of a future, directly-elected parliament. Perhaps we can clear this up in a minute. What the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic has repeatedly stated is his conviction that once the parliament is directly-elected the support of the electors and citizens of our European countries will of itself suffice to give it in the course of time a certain authority, and so will increase its potential influence. That this authority will be extended to include defence questions seems to me not improbable.

Mr. Périquier asked what action the Council would take in view of the United Nations decision that Turkish forces should withdraw from the occupied areas in Cyprus. That is a question I cannot answer without having consulted the Council. But I am quite ready to let you have an answer in November, when I have had a chance to raise the question in the Council.

To Lord Peddie's question about the success, the progress made in connection with free movement between East and West as a result of the final act of Helsinki I can give a definite "yes". Since the end of the Helsinki conference the numbers of visitors crossing the borders, especially between the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic, have risen steeply. In this area at least we can see progress. How things stand in other areas, I could not at present tell you exactly.

I regret that I do not have the figures Mr. Reddemann would like on armaments expenditure by the third world. But I will try to get them, so far as they exist, and will gladly pass them on to the Assembly.

I think I have answered all the questions, Mr. President. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, for the comprehensive replies you have given to the questions put to you.

I call Mr. Treu to present his report.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Madam Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report and draft recommendation I have the honour to present on behalf of the General Affairs Committee can be described in various terms. The Minister used the epithet "embarrassed", which is indeed one of their distinguishing characteristics. But allow me to say, Minister, that the report is more than embarrassed, it is, as you yourself have said, fraught with discouragement and disappointment, in contrast to the hopes expressed at the previous session in connection with the twenty-first annual report of the Council — in the numerous utterances dated 1975 and 1976 which I quoted in the introduction to my report — there has not been any of the ensuing exchanges and intercourse that might have been expected.

On the subject-matter of the report I will say that the Minister at the end of her speech permitted a glimpse of blue sky concerning the proposal, not yet materialised, of a joint meeting of the Council of Ministers and the General Affairs Committee. This is not just a matter of time-tables and red tape. If it is true, as we have considered, that the subject matter — concerning not only armaments but also security — may be dealt with in a suitable forum, this could precisely be the General Affairs Committee acting jointly with the Council of Ministers, rather than individual and partial replies to questions asked by the various bodies.

The Minister declared that the meeting we have asked for will be held this autumn, in Bonn. Let us hope that promise will be kept.

About relations between individual national members of parliament and the Council of Ministers, I should like to say that it happens to everybody, including myself, when asked a question about the activity of the Council, i.e. a matter pertaining to WEU, the competent minister takes refuge in a cloud of ambiguity, if not downright refusal to answer, on the pretext that the only replies that can be given in national parliaments are those concerning topics on which unanimity has been reached in Council. Obviously, however, a national member of parliament may be interested in ascertaining his own government's view and not just unanimous decisions emanating from the Council of Ministers.

The third point I wish to mention is a hypothetical one. Maybe the lack of a more concrete relationship between Council and Assembly — or the General Affairs Committee — is attributable to a kind of red tape, to the fact that

Mr. Treu (continued)

instead of the Council of Ministers the proper procedural channel is via the Permanent Council. With all respect to the officials who form that Council, it must not be forgotten that the political vision is supplied by the Ministers who succeed one another — you, Madam, have for example recently joined the Council — and have their own dynamic view on policy whereas the Permanent Council is, for reasons of protocol, more static in character and mentality and more hidebound in precedent. In the procedural context — as several times emphasised by the Minister — Chapter II, fifth paragraph of the report states that in relation to the modified Brussels Treaty, account must be taken of the powers of the various bodies and the Council's answerability to them. But this is the very area in which precise replies are frequently evaded.

Mr. Nessler asked a question I venture to repeat: might we not — not only the General Affairs Committee, but all of us — harbour the fear that the Council might end up by regarding Western European Union and its Assembly as a sort of very closely-related orphan or godson rather than one of its own children. Let me explain: while we place our hopes in an effective political unity notwithstanding all the difficulties encountered in many countries, while the future European Parliament, whether with limited powers, as the French say, or by gradual stages, as our United Kingdom friends maintain, will assume more political functions, can it take on other powers in defence matters? In this way, we shall have only added to our woes: if we are indeed an Assembly intended to be given less autonomy and capability for dealing with defence and armaments questions, we ought to hope that at least we shall not be suddenly exterminated but be given plenty of time to witness the future transfer of powers.

The conclusions, as I was saying, allow a glimmer of hope. Let us hope we do not find ourselves churning out declarations of good will and promises of joint meetings, reciprocal reports, agreements or negotiations in East-West relations. I simply do not believe that limitations on matters of defence, armaments, and the Atlantic Alliance preclude the possibility for the WEU Assembly of being given information on East-West relations and the barely-mentioned relations with the United States. The powers of the WEU Assembly do not merely refer to the need of achieving uniformity of armaments but also of being kept constantly informed of the situation in the various spheres of interest within this little Europe of ours, which is bound up with the Atlantic Alliance.

There is, I said, a glimmer of hope; we have had many expressions of good intentions, but,

as the old proverb has it, the path to hell is paved with good intentions, and we should really prefer not to wind up in hell in the near future along a highway paved with too many good intentions. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Treu, for the report that you have presented.

As Mr. Delorme is not here for the moment, I call Mr. Lenzer to present the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, questions of technological and scientific co-operation occupy no more than a small space in Document 731 of 11th March 1977. I believe I may therefore, without violent objection from this Assembly, confine myself to just one or two comments on the report before us.

The problems that arise in scientific and technological co-operation are illustrated in a quite exemplary way by a small handful of points covered in this document, the report of the Council of Western European Union. These are, first, European aviation, next, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and finally co-operation between the United States and Europe. At the end of section C on the ninth page of Document 731, there is once again a brief reference to contacts with other international organisations.

In the report which I have pleasure in submitting to you today on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, I have therefore likewise confined myself to a few points which at present are in the forefront of public discussion. Here too we begin with the vast subject of co-operation in the field of aviation, followed by the subject of space activities, and finally the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

First, a word of comment on this final subject: I believe that everybody, in this Assembly and far beyond, realises that President Carter's statement of 7th April 1977 has transformed the nuclear world, and that the basis of co-operation between member States of the Assembly has changed as well. This statement by the American President has been deliberately made part of this report, in an appendix, because the Committee felt it would be helpful for every observer to be able to inform himself as quickly as possible on the broad outlines of American nuclear policy under the new President.

Like every report, this one contains a draft recommendation, some of whose points I shall perhaps comment on later.

Co-operation in research and technology is a compelling necessity, for a great variety of

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

reasons. The struggle over the allocation of limited financial resources is getting fiercer all the time. The State, moreover — and this surely applies also to all member States of this Assembly — is having to involve itself more and more in the projects by making public funds available. Since these come from the budget and have to be provided by the tax-payer, we must be particularly careful that, for major technological projects with their especially heavy costs, money is spent correctly and not wasted.

Here I may perhaps be permitted to touch on the question of whether it is necessary at all — or, as someone may ask, why it is necessary — for public money to be thus invested in a field which, surely, should be solely industry's concern, since at the end of the day there will be no new scientific knowledge of any sort, as of course there is with fundamental research but here where we are dealing with applied research, the objective must be a marketable product or a service for which there is a real demand.

Well, the reason why in all countries the State involves itself in these fields is that the projects are long-term ones, that considerable risks attach to them and that they tie up capital for years ahead in projects whose economic success cannot be gauged at the outset. Appraisal of the market is often difficult. The market is often wrong in its assessment of projects of interest to the national economy — projects which subsequently may prove to be of particular importance. So the State must interest itself in such projects — and this too comes out again and again in the report — in order to ensure, particularly for the European area, that European industry, through its co-operative efforts in scientific research and development, is able to play its part as an independent factor in the world market. The technological level maintained in our countries is an important prerequisite for ensuring employment and for avoiding cyclical movements. This is in the last resort an eminently political problem, going far beyond the technical field itself.

It has become apparent — to come back to the subject — that separate and parallel technological research and development work is too costly. One need only consider the high cost of projects in aviation space research, or again in nuclear energy, to cite but the most important areas of co-operation. We cannot escape the need to harmonise these programmes and to spend our money in ways that avoid duplication and will ultimately ensure that our joint efforts result in products that are of importance far beyond our national markets.

Let me say a brief word on the theme of aviation. The discussions between France and

an American firm on the further development of an aircraft type, the new agreements or intended agreements on the future development of the Airbus family just referred to by the Minister, on which an understanding was reached during the Bonn visit of the President of the French Republic, and the debate in the United Kingdom, concerned largely with nationalisation of the aviation industry, all go to show that the whole pattern is changing. They show that the economic basis has shifted. Added to this there is the problem of excess capacity. Nevertheless, in this co-operation the main task must always be kept in sight — that, as Europeans, we must by common endeavour develop aircraft types which can constitute the aircraft generations of the eighties, types which have economic prospects. But they will have economic prospects only if, because of economic, financial and technological conditions, they succeed in penetrating American markets as well. I do not wish to go into the very delicate political problem of possible discrimination against European products in other markets. But that too is something which we must always bear in mind.

Perhaps I may say one more thing on this point. It has been shown that, in terms of technology, the countries of Europe are fully competitive and that when it comes to penetrating the world market and playing a part in it, the difficulties stem rather from the problems of marketing, of financing and of credit.

In the aerospace world we have gained a good foothold by the creation of the European Space Agency. But this cannot be the culmination of a development, merely a first step towards further efforts. Our main objective must be to get beyond the research satellites, beyond the experimental phase, into the operational phase, into the phase in which the States of Europe can also get into the application satellites market, for instance in the fields of telecommunications or earth resources.

Here I should like to mention that this naturally means being able to supply the appropriate launch capacity. This is another reason why we should devote greater attention to the further development of our own European launcher.

As for the big subject of nuclear energy, there would certainly be a lot to say, and it would be tempting to go into it. But in view of the advanced hour I would rather not do so. Besides, this is not intended to be a nuclear energy debate. We have dealt with the problems of nuclear energy in the past, and no doubt they will remain with us for quite a few years yet, so that we shall never be at a loss in examining the subject. We in Europe tend to see the problems of spent fuel reprocessing and the problems of ultimate disposal, somewhat dif-

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

ferently from the American President in his declaration of intent. I also believe, on the basis of experience and discussions with American colleagues from Congress, that one may say that this programme will certainly not yet be definitively accepted by the legislative bodies over there. We are in the midst of a debate ; so it is especially valuable, especially necessary that we as Europeans should learn to concert our views and to speak with one voice before we turn to our partner across the Atlantic.

Let me, in conclusion, touch quite briefly on the draft recommendation which I am inviting you to approve.

In the first paragraph of the recommendation the member governments are invited to draft a harmonised programme in the field of civil and military aviation projects. That is a difficult task. But I believe that we, for our part, should not cease to put this demand to the governments again and again.

The second paragraph makes the point that priority must now be given to application satellites, to satellites with which we might ensure for ourselves a share of the market in application satellites for telecommunications and/or remote earth sensing, which are of special importance for the third world countries.

The third paragraph refers to the need for particularly close co-operation in the field of nuclear energy.

The fourth and last paragraph refers to an alternative form of energy — that of controlled nuclear fusion. On this point, however, we are not going into technical details but asking that a decision must at long last be taken on the JET issue, the Joint European Torus, this joint fusion research project or, if you prefer, demonstration project. This time we must succeed in overcoming national frontiers, and we therefore call on governments to agree on a site as quickly as possible. After all, agreement has already been reached on a certain procedure that is meant to pave the way to this decision. Now, it is our belief — and this is paragraph 4 of the recommendation — that a decision must be taken on the siting ; otherwise there is a danger that in the not too distant future this project may no longer be able to contribute to the advance of nuclear fusion in Europe.

Mr. President, these were just a few comments I had to make on the report. Thank you for your attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Lenzer.

I now call Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-

ments, to present the report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 745.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Madam Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, since I was detained for a few moments at a meeting of the French Delegation, I had to surrender my place to another speaker, and I would ask you to forgive me for getting here late.

In replying to the chapter of the Council's annual report dealing with defence questions — and I shall not dwell too lengthily on my subject — I wanted to avoid presenting you with a routine piece of work, which would consist of serving up every year the same things in what one hopes are new forms. Today, however, careful consideration of the documents which have been transmitted by the Council to the Assembly, and above all the personal contacts which your Rapporteur has been able to establish with the senior officials and the politicians who take part in WEU's proceedings, suggest that there are signs of some changes in approach, of new methods of work. I should like to tell the Chairman of the Council how much we appreciated hearing her say that the Council was trying to establish closer relations with WEU. The Chairman of the Council has anticipated my wishes, for that is what I meant when I wrote that there were undoubtedly grounds for going more deeply into the question of relations between the Council and the Assembly. These relations, as I point out, are satisfactory except on one point — and here is the observation that the Rapporteur has the honour to put forward — which concerns the vague and sometimes incomplete nature of the information given by the Council to the parliamentarians of WEU. I am not using the word reticence ; but none the less the procedure whereby a full account is given of the Council's activities is for us one which we wish to see maintained. As Rapporteur, I made this point when preparing the document I am now submitting to the Assembly.

I shall not dwell further on the first paragraph of the recommendation, where the aim is quite simply to ask the Council to be more demanding in regard to the content of reports that it receives from organisations outside WEU when it is a question of replying to recommendations adopted by the Assembly.

In fact, the main problems which arise in connection with the twenty-second annual report of the Council are three in number. I propose to consider them in the order adopted by the Council — that is, in order of increasing importance.

The first of these problems is that of the level of British forces on the mainland of Europe. We are all aware that, under the terms of Article

Mr. Delorme (continued)

VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain land forces of 55,000 men assigned to joint defence. The figure provided by the United Kingdom in informing the Council about implementation of the Brussels Treaty does not, however, make it possible to judge whether its commitments have been very strictly fulfilled.

When attending a Committee meeting in London, over which our colleague Mr. Critchley presided, I had the honour to hear the British Secretary of State — who is particularly qualified to provide the answer — tell us that it was the United Kingdom's concern to achieve greater flexibility in the strength and conceptions of its Rhine Army. In consequence, we shall not dwell for too long on the discrepancy between the 55,000 and the 60,000 men who might, in fact, be stationed in Germany.

I believe that it was up to the Council to make its observations, and necessary for your Rapporteur to point out that there should have been a clear statement about a *de facto* situation in which — as our British friends have pointed out — a number of units have been transferred elsewhere, in particular to Northern Ireland.

What is, in our view, far more important is the section concerning the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. I consider that it is part of the duty of parliamentarians belonging to an assembly like ours to study closely those reports of the Agency which deal specifically with the control of armaments. One comment has to be made: in the fields open to it, the Agency acts with a regularity and an efficiency which are very satisfactory. The table on the sixth page of the report shows that as many inspections were carried out last year as in previous years. For a very long time past, one difficulty has emerged as regards the nature of the weapons subject to control. It is a delicate matter for a Frenchman to speak here of the control of nuclear weapons, since there have always been some difficulties between France and the Agency, in view of the fact that French strategic armaments would be the only ones subject to effective control, because the units under British command are not stationed on the continent and because, so far as the others are concerned, it would be presumptuous to call for control of American nuclear armaments.

It is a delicate problem, but I note that, in the report on the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, France has made an effort. This is a new and very significant factor which I am pleased to stress. On-site inspections have been carried out by the Agency to check the accuracy of French statements concerning the vehicles designed to carry either conventional

weapons or nuclear weapons. Perhaps this is part of a developing trend in French policy, which might contribute to improved implementation of the treaty. I hope that your Rapporteur may be permitted to emphasise this point very objectively.

Other difficulties have emerged in the control of chemical weapons. There is no necessity, in my view, to dramatise the issue, but I point out in my report that in April 1977 a private firm in the Federal Republic of Germany refused to allow the Agency to inspect its plant for the purpose of checking whether chemical arms were being manufactured there. Being a lawyer myself, however, I have examined this point and can say that, from the purely legal standpoint, the firm concerned was acting within its rights, since the Convention which would give legal force to the obligation on enterprises to allow the Agency to carry out inspections had not yet entered into force. Consequently, refusal was acceptable.

Nevertheless, it has been possible in the past for all inspections to be carried out on the basis of mutual consent. It would be desirable — and the Rapporteur wishes to stress this point — that the practice, which is in fact based on the trust that the member States of WEU place in each other, should be continued with no exceptions. For that reason, I ask the Council in paragraph 3 of the recommendation to ensure a fuller application of the provisions of the treaty which concern the control of armaments, with particular regard to biological and chemical weapons.

Finally, I should like to deal with the third and last part of the report, namely the reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee. Indeed, the main element in the Council's activities in 1976 was the reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee. None the less, despite the importance of this question, the Council has so far been very slow in informing the Assembly about what it is doing — and, I must add, in a pennywise manner that I can only deplore.

These gaps in the information provided keep alive a number of ambiguities which should be cleared up as speedily as possible.

The first of these ambiguities concerns the long-term outlook, in which the highly important mandate entrusted by the Council to the Standing Armaments Committee is one element. The only indications on this subject have been culled from the speeches that have been made before our Assembly by the representatives of certain governments in the course of almost four years. Although the Belgian and French Governments have been fairly explicit in their statements concerning the Standing Armaments Committee, and although we have also heard authoritative statements regarding this field of activity from

Mr. Delorme (continued)

the Federal Republic of Germany and from Luxembourg, our Assembly has not yet had an opportunity of learning the official positions of the Italian, Netherlands and United Kingdom Governments. It is regrettable that a definition of the long-term aims connected with reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee has not been jointly and very clearly expressed.

The renewed vigour being breathed into the Standing Armaments Committee constitutes, in my submission, one of the basic elements of a policy aimed at maintaining and developing the armaments industries. It can only be understood in the context of building up a European union — and here I am perhaps in disagreement with some of my colleagues — which would extend its responsibilities to cover the realms of defence and security.

We are all aware — and the symposium held under the auspices of our Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in Paris during March 1977 strongly stressed this fact — that there is no future for the European armaments industries unless close and solid co-operation is established. Such co-operation should make it possible not only to achieve greater efficiency in the production of equipment, but also to preserve Europe's industrial and technological potential. It should also ensure the safeguarding of sectors vital for maintaining both the level of employment, which represents an agonising problem at the time when we are discussing this question, and also for the re-establishment of the balance of trade in several of our countries. All these aims, moreover, accord with the guidelines laid down by the NATO Ministers on 10th and 11th May last in London. One of the essential aims stated in the press communiqué issued at the end of this meeting concerned the need — and here I quote the actual terms of the text adopted to “promote the strong industrial and technological capability which is essential for the defence of the Alliance and to develop a more balanced relationship between European and North American members...”

There is, therefore, a considerable range of problems — not only military, but still more economic, social, technological and political — with which the Standing Armaments Committee will henceforth have to deal; and it would seem important for them to approach these problems with as clear a knowledge as possible of the goal to which their efforts should lead.

The second ambiguity which it is important to clear up in order to achieve a genuine reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee concerns the relations which that body should maintain with the independent European programme group. None of the documents which

have so far come to our notice gives grounds for thinking that organic co-operation between the SAC and the IEPG has been envisaged. It still seems impossible to claim that we are avoiding all forms of duplication unless machinery is set up to provide information and ensure co-ordination between these bodies. It may very readily be imagined that the governments did not wish to establish an additional organ of information, but it should be possible to resolve this problem by using means that already exist. The present report makes two proposals which have the advantage of being flexible, of complementing each other and of in no way serving to swell still further the ranks of a European bureaucracy which already weighs too heavily on our work. The first proposal would simply be to make the pilot countries which are carrying out different tasks for the IEPG responsible for keeping the SAC informed, while under the second the country which holds the chairmanship would be requested to do likewise. Lastly, some arrangement under which the IEPG — which has no secretariat of its own — could use SAC secretariat services would also facilitate the exchanges of information which are from every point of view essential.

I am now going to conclude my remarks. The fact that, to the best of our knowledge, no additional means have been made available to the SAC to enable it to fulfil its mandate would, if confirmed, mean that its fulfilment will depend to a very large extent on the good will of the participating countries. For it is solely on the basis of information provided by the member countries that the SAC will be able to accomplish its task. Their good will should find expression not only in the volume and value of the information transmitted but also in the standing, the position held and even the number of persons called upon to take part, on behalf of each of the member countries, in the deliberations of the SAC.

These different points lead us to the conclusion that the mandate entrusted to the SAC may assume considerable importance in the future defence of Europe, but that it can be exercised in a meaningful manner only if all concerned are imbued with a genuine will to co-operate in the discussion of armaments.

Of itself, the mandate provides no guarantee, but it opens up a whole range of possibilities — and this means that, in the years ahead, the rôle our Assembly will have to play will place it, and I would emphasise the point, in the forefront of events. It will have to follow carefully the manner in which the mandate entrusted to the SAC is being fulfilled, and will constantly have to ask governments to provide the elements necessary for the mandate to be carried out. In particular, our Assembly will have to obtain sufficient information from governments, the information it will need if it is to fulfil its rôle.

Mr. Delorme (continued)

It was in the light of these considerations, moreover, that paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation was drafted; its main purpose is to obtain from the governments concerned a number of guarantees which are essential to an effective reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee in a genuinely European perspective.

I hope you will allow your Rapporteur to express his personal hope that genuine co-ordination will develop — very close co-ordination with the maximum of good will — so that we may soon achieve, within the framework of this united Europe which we desire to see created, the co-ordination in armaments manufacture which is essential to the effective defence of this Europe of ours. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. von Hassel*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Delorme.

The debate is now open on the three reports of Mr. Treu, Mr. Delorme and Mr. Lenzer, all of which concern the political and other activities of the Council. There are three speakers listed, Lord Beaumont, Mr. Müller and Mr. Roper.

I call Lord Beaumont.

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY (*United Kingdom*). — This is obviously not the moment to embark on a full-scale debate on the issues raised by the three very important reports. Nor, I suspect, does anyone at this hour of night want to spend a great deal of time going over ground which on the whole we have gone over very thoroughly in the past.

However, I do not think that we should let this occasion pass — as it is the first time that we have had the opportunity to consider in plenary session the matters raised by the statement of President Carter on nuclear power policy — without saying a word or two about it.

In his admirable report, Mr. Lenzer has raised in the third section the problem of nuclear energy. In paragraph 42 he has drawn attention to the change in American nuclear policy following President Carter's statement, which is produced in the appendix. Mr. Lenzer said, absolutely rightly, that the member countries will have to react to the common policy. I hope we shall react to President Carter with a common policy and that it will be a very positive one.

I and my fellow British liberals react very positively to what President Carter said. We feel that this is a great step forward and we very much deplore the trouble into which his policy seems to be running in Congress, to which

Mr. Lenzer also referred. We have not come to terms with the full hazards of plutonium technology. There are three, again spelled out in the report, of which I wish to refer to only one, but they are all important.

The first hazard is from accident. I believe that we know from all that has happened and is happening in nuclear technology that nothing is quite safe from hazard or accident at present and that we have probably been running a little far ahead of our knowledge.

The second hazard is the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That in itself is a matter for a separate debate.

The third hazard is the danger from terrorism. This seems to be an immense danger that has been very much underestimated. Obviously, terrorists go for the target — and there are very many of them today well worth going for — that gets the most news and is the most exciting, because part of what they want to achieve is to have their case put immediately before the public. The more awful the threat that they can put before the public, the more attention they will receive. This makes absolutely certain that plutonium technology will be a target for terrorism sooner or later. Let us hope that we manage to take precautions so that such terrorism is not even half-way successful. If it were, we should all be appalled by the problems that would face any government.

We all pay tribute to the bravery and fortitude of governments who have stood up against terrorists, the latest example being the Dutch Government. We felt intensely for them in their dilemma, and we admire them enormously for the way in which they faced it.

What would be the position of a government faced not just with fifty or a hundred hostages in a limited space but with terrorists who had weapons that could at one moment kill up to 50,000 people in the centre of a great city? That is a situation it is almost impossible to contemplate.

There is an alternative, which I shall not say is worse, but it could be nearly as bad for democracy. It is to develop plutonium technology and ensure that no terrorist can ever get hold of it. When I think of the precautions that would have to be taken to make it proof against any form of terrorism — all the infringements of civil liberties, delving into people's lives, wire tapping, the opening of posts, the sterilisation of large areas of countryside where these things might happen — so that no possible danger could ever arise, I am appalled. As has been said in an important United Kingdom report by a distinguished scientist, Sir Brian Flowers, there would almost have to be a suspension of demo-

Lord Beaumont of Whitley (continued)

cracy in certain areas to make certain that there was safety. That challenge has not been faced.

The alternative is to abandon this extremely dangerous technology, at least for the time being. We should be extremely grateful that President Carter has given us a lead. It is up to us, in a united way, as the Rapporteur said, to give him a positive answer. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much.

I now call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, seeing the advanced hour, I want only to make a few brief observations on Mr. Lenzer's report, because I believe that, in dealing with problems of technology, he has touched on a central issue of our European development. I believe that modern technology is today a basic prerequisite both for maintaining the standard of living of the European nations and for preserving their independence and freedom. The countries of Europe are not among those countries of the world which are rich in raw materials — and even if they were, we all know that stocks of raw materials are finite and not infinite.

To maintain our standard of living we must therefore resort to modern technology and find new solutions to old problems. However, modern technology is expensive, and modern technology requires a readiness to utilise all capacities, in particular, intellectual capacities. In Europe, this can be done only by way of co-operation.

I should like to make a few remarks on two points in Mr. Lenzer's report — first on the aviation industry. I believe the European aviation industry has given proof that it can produce outstanding technological achievements and that these outstanding achievements need not necessarily prove to be an economic success. This has been shown by the example of Concorde; it is also being shown by the example of the Airbus. Whereas in the case of Concorde it can perhaps be objected that it is a useless aircraft and one, moreover, which is harmful to the environment — though personally I do not share this opinion — the same certainly cannot be said about the Airbus, which is particularly kind on the environment and, moreover, saves fuel. Everything in fact argues in favour of putting such an aircraft into service. Nevertheless, not even the Europeans themselves seem capable of using this aircraft on the scale needed to ensure a reasonable level of production.

If Europeans themselves fail to set a good example, then one can hardly be surprised if the rest of the world is not exactly enthusiastic

about buying the aircraft. An additional point is that, in my opinion, good technology deserves good marketing; the Europeans — those who manufacture the Airbus — must give serious thought to the matter of making a good product better accepted by making more effective use of marketing technique.

My second comment concerns nuclear policy. Mr. Lenzer has made some important points on this subject in his report, and the last speaker also just referred to President Carter's statement on the use of atomic energy. On this point, I think, one might add a very positive remark on something that has come up only during the past few days. At the consultations between the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany problems connected with co-operation in the field of nuclear energy were among those touched upon and a — to my mind very welcome — agreement was reached on a quite definite policy towards the export of reprocessing plants in the future — to wit, a policy of limitation.

Admittedly the problems now being encountered in the use of nuclear energy — I would cite in particular the problems linked with the use of plutonium — might long since have been nearer solution if a lot more work had been done on the problems of fusion technology. We know that the raw materials for fusion technology are available in virtually unlimited amounts, and that the problems of safety are also quite different from those raised by the way in which nuclear technology has hitherto been applied.

We have here — and I should like if I may to conclude on this point — a very sad example of European co-operation. There is what is known as the JET project — Mr. Lenzer has mentioned it specifically — the Joint European Torus project. We all know that preparations for this project have gone a very long way but that fresh obstacles are always being placed in the path of its execution, important though it is to Europe. I personally very much regret that it was the veto of one of the Nine which recently once again put off indefinitely the execution of this project.

If Europeans realise that technological questions of this sort must be solved very early because their effects will not be seen for ten, fifteen or maybe twenty years, by which time it may well be too late, then we must not just talk interminably about joint projects in Europe but one day we must sum up the courage to surmount national susceptibilities and finally carry through projects which could benefit not only one country but all European countries and, indeed, probably the whole of mankind. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

There is one further speaker, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry to prolong the debate but I shall try to do so rather briefly. May I begin by saying something about Mr. Lenzer's report and commenting on what has been said by Mr. Müller about the JET project? I very much agree with what has been said and greatly regret that one member State of the Community has recently vetoed that decision; and I have said so not merely here but in my own parliament.

I wish, however, to address myself to Mr. Delorme's report. I must begin by apologising for having to leave the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in London three weeks ago before the Committee considered the report, so that I was unable to address my criticisms to the recommendation at that stage.

I am somewhat uncertain as to the exact procedure this evening, as I understand that the Chairman of the Committee has tabled some amendments to the recommendation in Mr. Delorme's report but that these have not yet been circulated to all of us. I am in some doubt, therefore, of what is intended.

I wish to limit my remarks to two parts of Mr. Delorme's recommendation, the first is in operative paragraph 2, dealing with the numbers of the British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe. As Mr. Delorme says, quite rightly, in paragraph 8 of his report:

"This duty to fix the level of the British commitment is undeniably the most important part of the Council's present activities."

That is quite right, but I would qualify it. It is certainly one of the most important tasks facing the Council of WEU, although its other tasks are important. But in his recommendation in paragraph 2 he asks that the British Government should not merely:

"indicate in future annual reports... the total number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe..."

— and that is done in the present report, and is reported in paragraph 2 on the sixth page of Document 731 — but also that future annual reports should give:

"the number of such forces assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty."

As members of this Assembly will know, the British Government provide to the Council of WEU additional information on this point and the Council satisfies itself, from this classified information, that the approved level of forces continues to be maintained; but this information is of a classified nature.

I would not be able to support the second part of Mr. Delorme's recommendation, to ask that this classified information — which comes before the Council of WEU and therefore satisfies all seven member governments of WEU — should be published in a public document. I would ask my colleague Mr. Delorme to consider whether he needs to insist on this information, which is considered by my government — a consideration shared by other members of the Council — to be of a classified nature being revealed in a public document. It is a heavy responsibility for us to ask for this information.

Secondly, I turn to operative paragraph 4 of Mr. Delorme's report. This deals with the question of the relationship between the independent European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee. This is, inevitably, a very thorny and rather difficult problem for us in this Assembly. Indeed, Mr. Delorme himself in paragraph 28 of his report quotes the words used by Mr. Taittinger in November last when he came before us.

But things have moved on since then and the prospective rôles of the IEPG and the Standing Armaments Committee have changed. I am not convinced that the detailed recommendations put forward in Mr. Delorme's report about the relative rôles of the Standing Armaments Committee vis-à-vis the IEPG are right. This is a matter which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is considering in the context of the report prepared by Mr. Dankert at which we shall look later and on which the Committee is doing further work.

I very much hope that, rather than rushing in tonight on what is controversial and difficult ground on this precise relationship between the Standing Armaments Committee and the IEPG in this recommendation, it will be thought better if we agree — and I hope that we shall have a chance to consider an amendment in those terms later — to delete paragraph 4 of the operative paragraphs. But if this is not possible I feel that this subject is of such importance and that there is danger of our getting into a muddle and passing contradictory recommendations in the reports of Mr. Delorme and Mr. Dankert that I shall have to ask at an appropriate stage that this whole recommendation be referred back to the Committee for further study. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

I now ask Madam Chairman of the Council of Ministers whether she wishes to make a contribution to the debate. No.

I now call the first Rapporteur, Mr. Treu. He does not wish to speak. Then I call Mr. Delorme.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to reply briefly to my colleague and friend, Mr. Roper, that as regards his first comment concerning the figures for the forces assigned to SACEUR a form of words might be found indicating that what had been asked of the British Government had been supplied. In this way he too would be satisfied.

As regards paragraph 4, I am sorry I cannot agree with Mr. Roper. I have had a long conversation with our other Rapporteur, Mr. Dankert, and we arrived at the conclusion that the two reports are complementary and that consequently there was no confrontation, no contradiction between them, since one brings out something new and important, the mandate given to SAC, whereas the other relates to the organisation and development of IEPG. Consequently I can reassure Mr. Roper, in view of the fact that we have checked these reports one against the other.

I believe — and it will be the last point I have to make — that if both of us, the assemblies and the governments, intend to participate effectively in co-ordinating the manufacture of European armaments, we shall arrive at the best solution, namely, that there will no longer be either an SAC or an IEPG; instead there will be only one single body.

I believe that the Chairman of the Council would be able to tell us whether this is the spirit in which the Council is working, namely, the search for unification.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to comment quite briefly on the comments colleagues have offered on my report. The first was Lord Beaumont, who spoke about the general nuclear policy on which I had touched in my report and also in my comments. In so doing, he referred to President Carter's declaration of intent. I would say that this declaration is a document which, needless to say, will play a significant part in future discussions. However, I would like in a few words to point out the difference in the position from which the United States starts.

The United States, unlike the countries of this Assembly, is a country rich in raw materials. It is a country with a huge potential for saving energy. Anyone who has ever driven through a big American city after nightfall, or indeed in daytime, and has seen the lights there, knows how much scope there is for economies, not to mention the traffic on the roads. The structure of energy consumption on the other side of the Atlantic is totally different from that in the

countries of Europe where, for instance in the field of combustion engines, enormous efforts have been made to achieve optimal utilisation of fuel.

I believe that agreement in the discussion with the United States and with its new administration can be reached only as between partners. It is my personal experience — and I have been to the United States twice this year and have spoken with the experts concerned — that a measure of uncertainty prevails even among the members of the Ford Foundation who made these proposals for the President. Incidentally, this emerged very clearly at the German-American conference in Princeton in March, where leading United States experts were present and drafted such texts as the recommendation on further sales of the fast-breeder reactor.

Certainly the risk of plutonium must not be minimised. But I believe that one must also clearly realise that thousands of kilogrammes of plutonium for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, for the topping up of nuclear weapon stocks, are already stored in the world. That is a fact we have got to live with. The conclusion to be drawn from it is that we must, in co-operation with all countries, search for new ways of pursuing the idea of non-proliferation of fissile material, further perfecting it and working out better possibilities. I believe that the agreements of the so-called "suppliers' club" are a good first step — provided always that Article 4 of the non-proliferation treaty is observed; this article rests, as far as the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is concerned, on the principle of no discrimination against any State.

Perhaps I may mention in this connection that the United States under President Carter has at present more than sixty-three reactors and that Carter moreover intends to have a further seventy or so light-water reactors built over the next few years. In other words, there can be no question over there of a halt to the efforts to extend the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a suggestion frequently made — though not by you — in the public debate on the subject. Let us also remember, please, that in my personal opinion the safest place for plutonium is still in the fuel element inside a reactor, where it can be burned. To give up reprocessing — as the Americans put it, "to buy time by delay" — is surely no permanent solution; after all, the experts tell us that intermediate storage of used fuel elements is possible only for a maximum of fifteen to twenty years. Then some solution must be found.

Mr. Müller was kind enough to comment favourably on the report and to point to the importance of technological co-operation. He spoke of resorting to technology in order to find

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

new solutions to old problems. I agree with that unreservedly. He mentioned the Airbus. Certainly the fact that it was not possible to clinch an order for the Airbus for Western Airlines cannot be blamed on its technology. I think there is no point in discussing the various problems here and now. A new start has been made. Four machines are now about to go, on a lease basis, to Eastern Airlines in order that they may, as a start, gain experience with them. I think that this may well be a kind of foot in the door of the American market, which still accounts for 90% of the total world market in civil aviation.

As regards fusion, I agree with what Mr. Müller has said. A site for JET must now be found. I believe that the research Ministers have agreed on a procedure. If a clear majority emerges in favour of one site, then the one who is outvoted will, according to my information, no longer exercise a veto, so a decision should presumably be taken in the not too distant future. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. We shall now proceed to replies from the Chairmen of the three Committees.

I give the floor to Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, putting the view of the General Affairs Committee I should like to emphasise once again that, as our Rapporteur has explained, we really are anxious to have a more detailed report from the Council. I think there is a misconception in Mrs. Hamm-Brücher's contention that just because consultations between the United States of America and the European countries have now been intensified and deepened there is no longer a need to refer to the matter in the report. What is said in these consultations is precisely what we want to know. On a whole series of issues listed by the Rapporteur, including, for instance, meetings between Ministers of the WEU countries and East European countries, even less has been reported this year than in the past. Yet these, too, are matters which concern us here. Reports on the relations between the WEU countries and the United States are prepared in our Committee. It is therefore just too ridiculous if the Council of Ministers reports less and less when — as we hope — it is doing more and more.

That is what I wanted to make clear once again, and to say that co-operation, as it is at present does indeed leave something to be desired. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has said that he does not wish to speak. I call the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — First, I should like to congratulate Mr. Lenzer on the excellence of his report. He has epitomised the problems which we in Western Europe face in many areas of prime decision in technology. Including in our appendix the statement of President Carter, we have drawn attention to the views of the other side of the Atlantic. Perhaps it would not come amiss to say with respect to that President, whom we welcome to a post of great leadership, that we in Western Europe have more experience of the peaceful use of atomic energy than has the United States and that we would hope that we can, therefore, join with that country in a dialogue to try to determine how best to use our knowledge of nuclear energy.

Lord Beaumont has rightly drawn our attention to the dangers of nuclear energy, but in return I would say to both him and others that nuclear energy is less dangerous than many other forms of energy available in the western world. There has not been a major accident in the use of nuclear energy. The fast breeder is safer than even the present forms of contribution to electrical supply.

I hope that we shall not be taken away into realms of worry about the future of the people of the world on the ground that energy in any form can be dangerous to its users. If we condemn nuclear energy, we are condemning the poor people of the world — those in India and Pakistan — to cold winters and hot summers, even if we are willing to take cold winters ourselves. We must be very careful before we take from the whole world the only way it has of finding the energy that will be required by its expanding population over the next 100 years.

In these terms, therefore, we in Europe — and I am sure that Mr. Lenzer would agree with me — must find an early solution to the JET problem, based on merit. It is nonsense that a political argument should continue when the world needs fusion energy as a much safer form than the current fission supplies.

Dr. Müller's contribution was most valuable. Nevertheless, I hope that we shall not enter as politicians into the world of the aircraft designer. For too long politicians have made decisions about aircraft that they are not equipped to make. Only the customer should have that right, and he is the passenger, not even the airline operator. For too long we have expected

Mr. Warren (continued)

aircraft designers to talk in political terms. Our language has become confused and I believe that in Mr. Lenzer's report much has been done to help us to talk more sanely.

The PRESIDENT. — The debate is now closed.

The votes on the draft recommendations in Documents 733, 745 and 736 will be deferred until tomorrow morning, probably at about 12 o'clock.

11. Nomination of members to Committees

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the nomination of members to Committees.

The candidatures for the six Committees of the Assembly have been published in an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed. There is a change to be made to that list. In the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Müller, an alternate member of the Committee from the Federal Republic of Germany, becomes a full member of the Committee in the place of Mr. von Hassel. The place for an alternate member remains vacant.

In the French Delegation, Mr. Bizet is replaced by Mr. Nessler as a full member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Mr. Bizet takes Mr. Nessler's place as a full member of the General Affairs Committee.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 39(6) and Rule 42 *bis* (2) of the Rules of Procedure, these candidatures are submitted to the Assembly.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

There are no objections.

The candidatures for Committees are ratified.

The Committees of the Assembly are thus constituted.

12. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 21st June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
2. A European armaments policy (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 738).
3. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council ; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific and Technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council (Votes on the draft Recommendations, Documents 733, 745 and Amendments and 736).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 7 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 21st June 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. A European armaments policy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 738*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Dankert (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Roberti, Mr. Boldrini, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Dankert (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*).
5. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council; Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council (*Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 733, 745 and Amendments and 736*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Roper, Mr. Delorme, Mr. Roper, Mr. Delorme.
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, you remember that yesterday we kept open for the French Delegation one seat for a Vice-President. The Orders of the Day provide for the election of a Vice-President of the Assembly. I have received the nomination of Mr. Valleix presented in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure.

If the Assembly is unanimous, the election may be made by acclamation.

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

Mr. Valleix is duly elected a Vice-President of the Assembly.

4. A European armaments policy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 738)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on a European armaments policy and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 738.

I call Mr. Dankert, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, the very widely differing views that are held about European policy on the armaments industry, expressed at the symposium that this Assembly organised last March, have made it impossible for me to work from the basis of the conclusions of that symposium.

I find it very worrying that here in Western Europe, in our national short-sightedness and without any real conception of a rôle in world politics, we still seem to be doing our best to ensure that America's share in supplying Western Europe with weapons gets bigger rather than smaller; that our tax-payers, in times that are not all that good, are having constantly to dig deeper into their pockets to have weapons that are far too expensive manufactured in production runs that are far too small; that the forces of the Western European countries are, where standardisation, or even interoperability, are concerned, a good deal worse off than they were in the days when we were still living on American charity, despite a superfluity of bodies supposed to bring about co-ordination and harmonisation.

1. See page 21.

Mr. Dankert (continued)

When you look at armaments and the armaments industry in Western Europe, and when you realise despite this that we are still living at peace, the only conclusion you can come to is that our strength lies in our weakness.

I do not think this is any argument for carrying on in the same way. Even without calling for more, better and cheaper weapons we must surely agree that it is quite mad to have our foreign policy sometimes subordinated to our national need to export weapons, and that it is equally stupid that lack of progress in European co-operation in manufacturing defence equipment — in spite of all the solemn promises made and reverence paid to the European cause — should make it almost 100 % certain that before long countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway are, when they next need a new aircraft, going to look to General Dynamics in Texas for their answer.

I get the impression that a number of the countries which are to blame for the whole harrowing story of European co-operation on defence equipment production have been trying to avoid another failure to get this co-operation going in future. They have tried to do so by setting up what started out as the independent, was then the European, and is now the independent European programme group. I can but say that this development has been to the good, but an IEPG like this is not of course enough. There has to be something more in the way of results, and I am sorry to have to say that what the IEPG has so far more or less produced — the anti-mine warfare vessels — were already on the scene before this club of Rome came into being.

So there is certainly more that has to happen, both inside the independent European programme group and outside it, from the institutional angle and from that of actual content.

We have, in Europe, a jumble of bodies all more or less achieving the same nil result, and keeping each other very busy. We have the IEPG, Eurogroup, the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, FINABEL and, finally, the far from unimportant NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors. I readily admit that these bodies do arrange a lot of talks and contacts; but if you ran an ordinary business along these lines it would have gone bankrupt a long time ago, unless the shareholders had sent the directors packing at an early stage in the proceedings.

So what we need, Mr. President, is a clear allocation of tasks, and a clear statement on which body is going to take the policy decisions — to be the political organ — and what the other existing bodies might be providing.

My report deliberately gives political pride of place to the independent European programme group, not because I see it as being theoretically the best, the ideal way of doing things — that, in my view, would be Eurogroup — but because the practicalities of political relationships in Europe make the IEPG the only instrument that can work in the present circumstances. I believe the IEPG offers the only conceivable formula that can reconcile the interests of the various States with the legitimate interests of our taxpayers and those of the conscripts and volunteers in our armed forces. This may sound like pitching things a bit strongly, Mr. President, but let me illustrate what I mean. The costs of developing advanced weapons systems, rockets for example, are slowly rising to such a level that unless we find a European solution we are going to reach a situation where, having ruined ourselves meeting the development costs, we shall be unable to equip our armies with enough of the rockets that three or four of our countries have developed.

I know there is a strong tendency to find the answer in bilateral or trilateral agreements between, especially, the bigger European countries. But to that I will add at once that if the big countries are not prepared to turn this kind of production into a European production, then they have no right to reprimand smaller countries if these, for purely economic reasons, turn to an American product. It is not for nothing that I have, in this context, mentioned the F-16.

A Europeanisation of co-operation in manufacturing defence equipment is thus needed not only to rationalise production, Mr. President; it is needed to give the smaller countries the feeling that, for instance, their relationship to France is different from what France at the present time sees as its relationship to the United States.

I have tried in my report, basing myself on the IEPG, to outline how this should be done. I will add, and I stress this, that it cannot be done outside NATO. Military production serves military purposes. This means, too, that the products have to measure up to the requirements of the military men. If attempts at achieving a rational European production of defence material are to succeed, they must be matched to the tactical doctrines of NATO. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Dankert.

In the debate I now call Mr. Roberti. He is not present. Will Mr. Tanghe please take the floor.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, more than ever before we in Europe are obliged to work together on new projects in the manufacture and procurement

Mr. Tanghe (continued)

of armaments. It is becoming, for Europe, a question of "to be, or not to be".

Anyone who doubts the truth of this should be convinced after reading Mr. Dankert's report carefully. The report brings together very clearly all the arguments for such a co-operation, arguments of widely varying kinds: they range from the purely financial through wholly military, to economic and even social arguments. There is, for instance, the maintenance of the armaments industry in Europe as one which offers — perhaps we should say unhappily — the advantage of being less vulnerable than other sectors of industry to the vagaries of the economic climate. Not to mention the associated matter of a possible limitation of international trade in armaments, with all the consequences that that could have. Then there is the fact that the inflation and economic crisis with which most European countries are still battling has a sizeable part to play.

I do not intend, Mr. President, to dwell further on the urgent need for co-operation in this sphere; but I do want to look for a moment at what might be done within WEU itself — apart from constantly bemoaning the lack of any progress — in a positive way to bring about European collaboration on arms production. The study mandate that the Council of Ministers gave to the Standing Armaments Committee on 31st May 1976 — the text is given at paragraph 38 of the Dankert report — is certainly a step in the right direction, one that can lead on to further steps outside the study itself being taken towards implementation. These further steps have already been set out in the brief the Committee received from the Council of Ministers when it was first set up back in 1955. The Assembly was informed officially of the content of the recent mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee last year through this being published; but it has been told no more than that. The Assembly has also learned, through the Council's reply to Recommendation 293, that it will be told in due course what the conclusions of this study are. I would have said that it was quite normal that it should be. Taken literally, this also means that the Assembly can expect no official information, until the study is actually complete, about how the Committee is going stage-by-stage to carry out its mandate. It is however obvious that interim progress reports would make it easier for this Assembly to follow, and give its support to, the whole exercise. The bald fact of publication of the mandate to the Standing Armaments Committee leaves this Assembly, besides, in the dark as to the motives that led the Council of Ministers to decide on the mandate.

We do know a little more from two of the governments about their intentions. The Belgian

Minister, Mr. Van Elslande, made it plain, in 1974 and 1975, what Belgium had in mind in putting the proposal forward: and in 1976 Mr. Destremau and Mr. Taittinger explained why France was supporting the idea. There is already a difference of stress in these two ministerial standpoints: the Belgian Minister is obviously concerned that in matters of defence Europe should have an identity of its own, within the framework of the Community and with a joint armaments production and a European defence policy. The principal concern of the French Ministers seemed to lie rather more in the industrial sphere; to safeguard the industrial capacity of France and Europe where this is endangered by developments in technology and the armaments trade. There are indeed differences of stress, but the motivations, when you get down to it, lead to the same thing: as our President said yesterday in his opening address: "it is essential to maintain the industrial basis for defending Europe."

Did all the governments, including those of the other member States, have the same idea in mind in giving the Standing Armaments Committee its mandate, or did some of them try to put limits on the scope of the study?

This is something I cannot answer. At all events it is abundantly clear to all of us that no initiative aimed at achieving European co-operation on the armaments question can succeed unless all the European countries are closely involved, and not just associated with it by words alone; unless all the countries, both big and small, really do look to a European defence policy for their salvation. There is always another choice, the Atlantic alternative; but everyone should realise that that could well pose a threat to European industrial autonomy, or indeed to European autonomy altogether.

The problems that the European aviation industry is facing today have taught us that it is sometimes precisely the countries with the most complete industrial set-up that are the most vulnerable.

(The speaker continued in French)

It seems that all governments are agreed on the need to avoid confusion and duplication of effort between WEU, the independent programme group and Eurogroup. This calls for co-ordination — which our governments do not however wish to be institutionalised — between the several bodies; but our governments should at least indicate more precisely by what means they intend to avoid duplication.

In any case, such duplication as might occur would be no more than marginal in view of the completely different nature of the mandate given to the SAC and the work done by the IEPG.

Mr. Tanghe (continued)

The first has been asked to make a wide-ranging study of the situation in Europe in the industrial field with the aim of organising it in such a way that it would develop a real common policy, as the ECSC has done for coal and steel. The IEPG on the other hand aims at promoting particular projects based on immediate military needs.

The task assigned to the SAC is not primarily military, but touches upon a large number of activities including those of an economic and technical nature, to say nothing of the financial aspects, the question of employment and legal problems. Some people show a distinct tendency to minimise the scope of the SAC mandate. But without wishing to exaggerate its importance, one may nevertheless draw certain conclusions from the mandate. If the Assembly wishes to keep abreast of what is being done by the SAC, it will have to take its duties seriously, and the Defence Committee is not the only one concerned in this matter.

The Assembly should therefore agree with the Council on a new machinery for their relationship. It could increase the number of symposia, show more initiative in national parliaments and revive the joint committee linking the Defence Committee and the SAC, which is scarcely working at all. Representatives from the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions could also be brought in.

On the occasion of the Presidential Committee's dinner at Strasbourg on 22nd April this year, Mr. Taittinger said that from then on the Assembly had the right to be kept informed of how the mandate given to the SAC was being carried out. As part of the information for which the Assembly should ask, we might mention the objectives, the time-limits for carrying them out, the stages envisaged and the way in which the crisis in employment, particularly in the aeronautical industries of Europe, is being tackled.

The SAC mandate might well give us an opportunity to recall the position of the Assembly, which has always held that WEU will one day have to take its place alongside the Economic Community in the future European union. This calls for full implementation of the treaties, including the modified Brussels Treaty, till such time as the treaties and the institutions established by them are merged.

In this connection one might note that paragraph 23 of Mr. Dankert's report on a European armaments policy does not correspond to the facts when he maintains that "there had been no purely European forum for the discussion of the production of equipment in co-operation that was open to all the European members of

the Alliance and in which France participated", and that the SAC "excludes the European flank countries". Now, paragraph 10 of the Council decision of 7th May 1955, setting up the SAC, lays down that agreements or arrangements concluded within the framework of the SAC "would remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation". This paragraph is not quoted in full in paragraph 23 of Mr. Dankert's report, but is cited by the Council in its reply to Recommendation 296 in connection with Greece and Turkey.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

One last comment, Mr. President. Some people may see the mandate as just a straw to grasp at. Let it be, rather, a sturdy liferaft so that this Assembly, having spent its time endlessly bewailing the lack of any move towards standardisation and co-operation in the weapons field, can pass from this to the achievement of genuinely European armaments. For when all is said and done, it is for European defence a matter of "to be, or not to be". *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Tanghe.

I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI *(Italy)* (Translation). — In expressing my agreement with the report tabled, I would like to refer to what you yourself, Mr. President, said in your inaugural address yesterday, namely, that our WEU Assembly is the only European international organisation with the specific task of promoting European defence. I therefore think that all the problems brought to our notice ought to be viewed in the light of the aims corresponding to that task.

I will nevertheless confine myself to two very brief points on the subject we are discussing. First, the one referred to in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the report urging that the armaments — and, let me add, technologies — market be limited to the NATO countries or such non-member countries as represent an interest for Europe founded on an agreed common external policy. This is highly important, as it frequently happens that WEU member countries, including those which are members of NATO, engage in marketing activities in respect of armaments or raw materials or technologies intimately concerned with weapons development even with countries outside the Atlantic Alliance or indeed belonging to the Warsaw Pact. In my view this case, which I have also argued in my own home parliament, needs to be emphasised. Indeed, it seems to me extremely counterproductive to endeavour among ourselves to ensure Europe's defence in every way possible, noting the existing disproportion between the military deployment of the Warsaw Pact compared with NATO, at any rate on the frontiers of Central Europe, on the Central European chessboard, while

Mr. Roberti (continued)

contrariwise the same countries which, at great cost to their tax-payers, strive to enhance their defences, at the same time keep the Warsaw Pact, or uncommitted countries pursuing a different policy, supplied with their own technologies, engineers, raw materials and secrets. This must, in my view, be given the utmost emphasis. Otherwise we should be truly doomed to a labour of Sisyphus, building up our own defences on the one hand and on the other helping to strengthen our opponents', at any rate on the European chessboard.

The other point I wish to make concerns the two-way street for traffic in military supplies between the United States and Europe. I fully agree in this respect with what is said in paragraph 80 of the report. It is not seriously possible to think of a two-way traffic in European and American production without arriving at a unification of European production and not leaving it fragmented in a competitive struggle among the individual European countries, without striving, together with the organs of NATO, after a process of standardisation and not just interoperability, and in the light of such standardisation achieving a unified European supplies pool. Failing such an exchange, we shall never be able to build such a two-way road because of the existing absolute imbalance.

I would like to end by saying that a united Europe could deliver the goods, but only by achieving this unified concept, transcending interoperability. We must eliminate the existing competition between our countries. It would also be as well to introduce parliamentary control, and a European industrial defence group with representatives of armaments manufacturers, precisely in order to avoid the possibility of any such off-route supplies by countries of united Europe to Warsaw Pact countries or third countries liable to be easy tools in their hands. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roberti.

I now call Mr. Boldrini.

Mr. BOLDRINI *(Italy)* (Translation). — Mr. President, I very much appreciated the report on European armaments policy, which has long since become a subject of debate at European level. We cannot ignore the fact that it has been raised in NATO and formed the subject of a great many debates and utterances in this Assembly; nor can we forget that in the national parliaments, including the Italian, questions of standardisation and therefore military expenditures have been the focus of much analysis and evaluation. There are various reasons for this, and the Rapporteur placed his finger on them very accurately. First and fore-

most, for the armaments race, for advanced technology and for military expenditure, the standardisation issue certainly presents a three-fold aspect, political, economic and military. The Rapporteur took care to make evaluations and comments, negative as well as positive, in the light of each country's experience. Then the picture becomes more complex. We hope today's debate in WEU will be continued in the different parliaments, to induce governments too to make more serious, reliable and complex evaluations.

But the question of standardisation is, in my humble opinion, just one important facet inseparable from the general framework of European policy. What rôle should Europe play, what are the economic and social conditions in individual countries? We must not for example overlook that the European Community has repeatedly denounced the fact that in the current situation 50 % of industrial production should be accounted for by the multinational companies, thus opening up a very complex set of relations between these and the national industries. Nor ought we to forget that one of the greatest and thorniest problems concerns relations between Europe and the United States. It has been aptly pointed out by the Rapporteur and other speakers, that we now have to face up to the demands of a two-way policy, for the very reason that the imbalance between Europe and the United States has for many years stood in a ratio of 1 : 10. But a two-way policy needs to be totally overhauled, either because Europe is still incapable of opposing a co-ordinated production front, or because there remain points of difference between its component countries that are still very far apart. May I modestly recall that choices of weapons have on many occasions not been based on binding political partnerships but in many cases on political and military estimations of national general staffs, not always co-ordinated at European level? I should also like to remind myself that a large proportion of industrial research in armaments technology is funded by the individual countries' armed forces on partial estimates by the different State bodies or at the level of tactics and strategy. This is the reason for there being a problem of political and military co-ordination within a more all-embracing overview of rôles inside Europe.

True, the Rapporteur quoted many bodies for which, although Eurogroup, the independent European programme group and the Conference of National Armaments Directors do exist, the question as to whether the standardisation process has done a lot of marking time really seems a hypothetical one only. In my humble opinion this has come about because there is no political will for co-ordination and commitment among the different countries, so that such bodies may have a semblance of importance but

Mr. Boldrini (continued)

not the essential decision-making capability. Moreover, there is one first problem arising here. We already have in the European area five or six consortia, one being that for the MRCA aircraft. But what prospects are there for them? How do they proceed? What steps have they taken during these years? We know the glaring contradictions and the points at issue between ourselves and other countries — the battle over the German and American tank is on the NATO agenda as a case in point for detailed consideration — we know the differences of appreciation about building up the aircraft industry, and so forth. Hence we must possibly not merely assess the armaments industry in and for itself. It would also be erroneous for us to regard it as a sector that is lagging behind, unless we view it in a wider economic and politico-social context in which Europe may truly have its own part to play. Actually, if it were intrinsically falling behind, we should perhaps never arrive at a unitary standardisation policy: domestic internal interests and competition on the world market will rule the roost.

Furthermore, I believe various countries now have on their agenda a demand for general, binding overall economic planning into which military planning would be dovetailed. In Italy the issue is currently being debated. We have passed three acts for the updating of the army, navy and air force but realise that unless these are geared to overall economic planning they will not solve the problem of refurbishment of the armed forces, still less the more general one of standardisation with the other European countries. That is, what we need is a wider form of co-operation and maybe to concentrate our efforts at standardisation on certain particular sectors without getting lost in the more complex field of armaments production in general. I will, in conclusion, go farther: if these efforts at standardisation in technological and scientific research are not simultaneously linked to civilian production requirements, there will be a difficult hurdle to clear. Perhaps, then, the time has come for standardisation policy to become more unifying both in respect of the complex reasons adduced by the Rapporteur and in respect of current thinking. But in that case we must take a closer look at the general political framework as a whole. We therefore maintain that standardisation may certainly be a phase towards unity, but also towards unity combined with research in a process of détente.

I think the Rapporteur has made a splendid effort. The fact that his draft recommendation has received nineteen votes in favour and one abstention points to a new process of reconsideration and unity.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Boldrini.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Dankert, in his excellent report, clearly states the fundamental economic, military and political reasons which make European co-operation in armaments urgent and necessary. He rightly stresses that the armaments industries represent a considerable economic potential which must be preserved and developed. He therefore recommends that the outlets open to armaments production be extended in order to achieve lower unit costs.

From the military point of view the Rapporteur reminds us of the advantages of interoperability and joint production. Finally, from the political point of view, he notes in paragraph 13 that co-operation in the military field is the only real way for Europe "to avoid... becoming wholly reliant on the United States of America for its defence".

Unfortunately it seems to me that Mr. Dankert does not draw all the conclusions from his findings, even though he started out extremely well. He recommends that the European arms industry remain viable but, at the same time, he seeks standardisation throughout the Alliance, which would be tantamount to creating a common Atlantic market of military production without any safeguards or guarantees.

How can one fail to see, in view of the considerable superiority of American competition, that abolition of the safeguards which the European industries enjoy in one form or another would inevitably lead to the dismantling of these industries or their reduction to the rôle of subcontractors? By adopting this line one would without doubt be acting in a manner contrary to the basic economic aims of European co-operation in the armaments field. Far from establishing a two-way street in the flow of goods, such a development in standardisation on a NATO scale could only result in a serious imbalance to the detriment of the countries of WEU. Up to now the United States has imported from Europe only products of a lower technological level. When it has wanted to introduce more sophisticated European weapons, it has been content to purchase the manufacturing licences, as a result of which it has in certain cases been able to modify and to improve the European products and then to compete with them. The ambitious attempts made to implement certain projects on a basis of equality have so far been failures. For proof of this I need do no more than cite the difficulties experienced by the Federal Republic of Germany in carrying out the project for its heavy tank Leopard XM-1 in conjunction with the United States.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

From the military point of view the Rapporteur quite rightly says in paragraph 104 that interoperability is the first essential as far as existing weapons systems are concerned. The ability to operate together using the same basic weapons is of prime importance for the Atlantic deterrent. The present multiplicity in the types of aircraft and tanks, the impossibility of inter-communication between the different ground or shipborne interception control systems, all these things can adversely affect the credibility of the Alliance.

Your Rapporteur, however, instead of confining himself to the logical consequences of this diagnosis, and advocating the immediate application of a policy of interoperability, asks governments to give priority to the joint production of standardised equipment, coupled with a plea for further standardisation in the Alliance as a whole. To do this is to aim at a standardisation which is remote, difficult and ambiguous, in place of the imperative need for interoperability, which is obvious, rational and urgent. If standardisation is carried out in an Atlantic framework, it can in fact be criticised from the military point of view. It would compel Europe to produce military equipment the specification of which would be determined according to the military needs of the United States. Standardisation, therefore, does not always fit in with Europe's own defence needs. Moreover, standardisation would lead to situations where there would be industrial and technological monopolies which would benefit only a few firms and a few countries.

In the final analysis and, in view of present relative strengths, standardisation would result in production by the United States of the most advanced equipment, with its attendant risk of a decline in Europe's technology.

I can therefore only recommend that the Assembly stick to the aim of interoperability and be more guarded in respect of the ambiguous and dangerous notion of Atlantic standardisation.

Finally, as far as the political advantages of European co-operation in armaments are concerned, it would appear that here too the Rapporteur's findings are correct but that his conclusions contradict his premises. He emphasises the absolute necessity of striking a new balance in Atlantic relations. And again, in paragraph 111, he sees no economic or industrial reason why Western Europe should not provide for the greater part of its defence equipment within its own resources, provided the political willpower exists. Yet the proposals put forward by this prominent member of the house, far from encouraging Europe to obtain greater autonomy

in the field of defence, tend to tie it even more firmly into a system where it is unable to voice its particular needs.

The proposal that military needs be determined exclusively within the framework of NATO means that, broadly speaking, there has been a failure to recognise the needs of our own countries. Moreover, the failure of the report to bring out the fresh possibilities afforded by the new impetus given to the SAC seems to be another instance — and here we are more or less back to the debate we had yesterday afternoon — of seriously underestimating the possibilities of independent co-operation which are open to Europe.

Finally, if the independent programme group represents an advance in the search for an armaments policy which strikes a better balance between Europe and the other countries of NATO, a shift which must be in favour of Europe, it certainly cannot do this unless the European rôle of Eurogroup is strengthened. It seems to me perfectly normal, seen from this point of view, that the group should contribute to the renewal, or rather reactivation, of the SAC, firstly, because the Committee is an institution of WEU, and we are speaking here within the framework of WEU, and secondly, because the Standing Armaments Committee is, in point of fact, an instrument that is indispensable for Europe within the framework of a better balanced western defence.

I am sorry if the basic information selected by our Rapporteur, which in my opinion was quite correct, does not lead him to conclusions which are objectively consonant with Europe's possibilities and its true interests as regards defence. The will to strengthen the union of our countries in defence which imbues the report is an inspiration for us and is very much in line with what we are striving to do. It seems to me that where standardisation is concerned the line adopted in this report ends up rather wide of the mark, and that is why — whilst expressing my regret that I am not able to support our Rapporteur — I oppose the recommendation, although as far as the rest of the report is concerned I am on the whole quite satisfied with it.

I should like the Assembly to bear witness to the fact that, if possible, the will to introduce interoperability should be even more clearly brought out, but without introducing a hasty standardisation which would in the end be too dependent on the Atlantic Alliance and so undermine from the outset the good intentions which, in other respects, are the basis of the report.

That is why I, personally, must conclude by opposing the motion and regret that the general trend of the report does not result, when it comes

Mr. Valleix (continued)

to the recommendation, in conclusions in line with what could have been hoped for from the report itself.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix. The list of speakers is completed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to take the floor again?

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*). — I should like briefly to reply to Mr. Valleix, who illustrated our problems in getting a unified view on co-operation in defence matters in Western Europe. The well-known debate between standardisation and interoperability as put forward by Mr. Valleix is at the heart of the matter. In line with what General de Maizière said during the symposium in Paris, in my report I posed the necessity for standardisation.

It is clear that if we continue to produce armaments in the way we do and do not achieve sufficient standardisation, we shall not be able to replace existing equipment by new equipment simply because of the cost problem.

Interoperability cannot always be avoided. It is even necessary in so far as existing equipment has to be interoperable with other equipment, but I am a little afraid that if we stress interoperability too much, as is done by Mr. Valleix and his government, we shall be unable to solve the problem of the industrial armaments structure as it exists at the moment in Western Europe and we shall be unable to cope with the problem of exports, because interoperability is a camouflaged way of trying to maintain national sovereignty in the production of arms, and that is contrary to the purpose of achieving a more organised and better structure of European co-operation. I am glad, therefore, that Mr. Boldrini stressed so strongly the necessity for standardisation.

I am grateful to Mr. Tanghe for his remarks. He pointed out that we as a parliamentary assembly and as national parliamentarians always have great difficulty in exercising parliamentary control over defence matters. Our influence is at best marginal and at worst non-existent. Where such opportunities arise — the Council of Ministers of WEU created an opportunity by commissioning the Standing Armaments Committee to engage in this study — it is also in the interests of governments to commit parliamentarians to the work that is going on.

For that reason it is essential for this Assembly to be informed from time to time of the progress of the study now being undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee, because governments commit a very great error if they

think that defence without parliamentary control will be acceptable by the people for long. We have to communicate and to control so as to ensure that our peoples are ready to contribute to our national defence.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have to reply on behalf of the Committee although I was not present when this report was adopted. I should like to congratulate Mr. Dankert on the excellent interim report which he submitted to this Assembly this morning. This is a very important part of the total work of this Assembly.

You will know, Mr. President, of the symposium that we held in Paris on 3rd and 4th March. That was an extremely important initiative taken by my predecessor, Mr. Critchley, as Chairman of the Defence Committee, with the support of the Presidential Committee. On behalf of our Committee I should like to thank Mr. Critchley for all his work in the three years during which he served as Chairman of the Defence Committee, and to thank him in particular for having organised this symposium which was of considerable importance in bringing these important problems to our attention.

As your distinguished predecessor, Mr. Nessler, said, Mr. President, at the opening of the symposium here in Paris:

“The WEU Assembly ... is the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence matters and ... felt it should take the initiative of organising this symposium. It is intended to allow a free dialogue between the various European authorities concerned with armaments co-operation in order to explore the obstacles which have so far stood in the way of such co-operation and to consider means of overcoming them.”

The symposium, over which in part your predecessor presided, Sir, was an important start, but in the months and years ahead this will be a continuing problem of very great importance for our Assembly.

I believe that from the debate this morning we see three areas that will be of continuing concern for the Assembly and for my Committee as we go forward with our work programme. First, there is the problem of the relations among the various European and international organisations in this field and in particular the relations between the Standing Armaments Committee of our own WEU and the independent European programme group. I am sure that our Committee and the Assembly as a whole, together no doubt with the WEU Council and

Mr. Roper (continued)

our governments wearing their other hats, will want to pay particular attention to this problem to make sure that we do not have duplication and that there is the best possible use of the resources of the two organisations. I am sure the Assembly will wish to return to that problem.

Secondly, there is the whole question of parliamentary intervention in these matters. I was particularly interested in the contribution made in the symposium in Paris by your fellow member of the Bundestag, Chairman of the Defence Committee, Mr. Manfred Wörner, who suggested that the parliamentarians of the various WEU countries, and in particular the members of committees responsible for defence questions and armaments, could consider together how the parliaments concerned might adopt a resolution in which they would undertake to approve the procurement of new weapons systems only insofar as such systems included a sufficient proportion of standardised parts or were suitable for interoperability. The opposition and the majority in the Bundestag agreed on recognising the need for such a decision. It was to be hoped that all the WEU parliaments, or most of them, would share that view. Mr. Wörner suggested in Paris that our Assembly could perhaps play a greater rôle in co-ordinating the work of defence committees in our countries.

I hope that you, Sir, with him and others, will affirm that as a possible way of taking forward what we have discussed here today although I remember that on the same occasion the Chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly Military Committee, Mr. Thyness, who I am delighted to see in the gallery today, commented that perhaps it was not so sensible to pass formal resolutions on such matters and that this was not realistic. He said that a government could not be overthrown like that. It would be more effective to bring pressure to bear on it behind the scenes.

Whether we go forward by bringing pressure to bear on governments behind the scenes or, as Mr. Wörner suggested, work out common resolutions, this Assembly has a particularly important rôle in linking together the defence committees of our countries so that we do not merely discuss these matters in international assemblies but ensure that the ideas included in this report become living reality in our national parliaments also.

Finally, I hope that we shall also be able in the months and years ahead not merely to talk of these matters in this Assembly but, as parliamentarians, to ensure that we take action on the proposals put forward in the symposium in Paris and put forward so admirably this morning by Mr. Dankert in his report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr Roper.

The debate is closed.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 738.

If there are no objections to it, and no abstentions and the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a roll-call vote.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I shall abstain.

The PRESIDENT. — There is one abstention only. We take note of Mr. Valleix's abstention.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I agree to this solution.

The PRESIDENT. — *The draft recommendation is adopted, with one abstention*¹.

5. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

Scientific and technological co-operation in Europe — Reply to the Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Council

(*Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 733, 745 and Amendments and 736*)

The PRESIDENT. — At the close of the debate on the three major reports last night it was agreed that the Assembly should vote this morning at 12 o'clock. I suggest that we now go on to vote. Are there any objections? If there are, I shall interrupt the sitting until 12 noon.

It is agreed that the Assembly will vote now.

The Assembly will vote on the draft recommendation in Document 733, the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council. No amendments have been tabled to this recommendation.

If there are no objections and no abstentions and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a roll-call vote.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

1. See page 22.

The President (continued)

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

In accordance with the Orders of the Day, I now call for the vote on the draft recommendation in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 745.

Amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation. I call Mr. Critchley to support his Amendment No. 1.

Is Mr. Critchley here?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — He is being looked for.

The PRESIDENT. — Let us just wait a moment until he comes into the chamber.

As he is still not here, perhaps we may start with Amendment No. 2. I call Mr Roper to support his amendment.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am in some difficulty because Mr. Delorme, the Rapporteur, is not present in the chamber today and I am reluctant to move an amendment to his report in his absence. I do not know whether the French Delegation can tell us whether he is likely to be here at 12 o'clock. It may well be that, following the announcement yesterday, he has not planned to return until that time. However, if you wish me to move my amendment, I shall, of course, do so. Perhaps you, Sir, could help the Assembly on this matter.

The PRESIDENT. — Is any member of the French Delegation able to tell us whether Mr. Delorme will be here by 12 o'clock?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — That is what I understood yesterday to be Mr. Delorme's intentions, and I think he will be here towards the end of the morning.

I would like nevertheless — and I hope Mr. Roper will excuse me — to suggest the possibility of an agreement with the Rapporteur. It was my understanding that the author of the amendment and the Rapporteur had spoken about the problem.

Since an agreement seems likely, I think that — Mr. Roper's good faith being obvious — we could accept the formula which he is putting forward.

The PRESIDENT. — Could you tell us, Mr. Roper, whether there is an agreement between you and Mr. Delorme?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — There is an agreement, as it were, to the first part of my amendment, that is, the redrafting of paragraph 2. That was a formula acceptable to Mr. Delorme.

However, the second paragraph of my amendment, which is the more radical, deleting paragraph 4, is one to which he took exception in yesterday's debate. I am, therefore, somewhat reluctant to move it without his having a right of reply.

The PRESIDENT. — I think we can decide on these amendments only if we listen to Mr. Roper and to Mr. Delorme. We ought to postpone this decision until 12 o'clock, when Mr. Delorme will probably be here.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I suppose so.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Assembly? Very well, if this meets with agreement, it will be better to interrupt the proceedings until 12 o'clock. However, we can start with the Amendment No. 1 of Mr. Critchley if he is here. He is not here? We shall interrupt the proceedings until 12 o'clock.

(The Sitting was suspended at 11.10 a.m. and resumed at 12 noon)

We shall now deal with the draft recommendation in Document 745. We have two amendments, the first being tabled by Mr. Critchley. I call on him to support his amendment.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — The object of these amendments, which were circulated yesterday, is to draw attention to the inadequacy and unfairness of the arms control measures of Western European Union. That they are inadequate is easily demonstrated, although, in truth, I do not very much mind if they are. There is no control, for instance, over the United Kingdom armed forces stationed within the United Kingdom. There is no control whatsoever over nuclear weapons. Indeed, the French have instructed that some of their forces be known as "strategic forces", and, therefore, their inspection and that of a certain number of airfields is not allowed. There is no biological weapons inspection at all, nor, in reality, is there any control over chemical weapons production.

If the controls are inadequate, the question we should consider is whether they are unfair. In 1954, one of the main objectives of the modified Brussels Treaty was to control, restrict and limit the rearmament of Germany, while, at the same time, wedding that country to the Alliance.

The Germans themselves renounced the production of what are known as "ABC weapons" — atomic weapons and so on — but they are still subject to certain restrictions. They are

1. See page 23.

Mr. Critchley (continued)

forbidden to produce or manufacture any surface-to-surface missiles, such as Lance — indeed, no surface-to-surface missiles at all unless they are anti-armour or naval, in which case the missile itself is restricted to the range of 70 kms. They are permitted no strategic aircraft. The restrictions are more vigorous when it comes to naval forces. They are permitted only eight destroyers of 6,000 tons and they are forbidden any nuclear warship of any kind whatever.

It is nearly thirty years since the signing of the treaty which established Western European Union. The Federal Republic provides the majority of NATO's land forces. It is the strongest and most valued ally, whose democracy and whose prosperity are one of the seven wonders of the modern world. Are not then these restrictions unnecessary, even ridiculous?

Western European Union cannot live for ever. Sooner or later — and I hope sooner — it will be merged into a new organisation, the European union. When that happens, we shall keep Article V, which is of tremendous importance, namely, that one country should come to the aid of another in case of attack; but the arms control provisions must be allowed to lapse.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Critchley.

Does anyone wish to speak against this amendment? What is the opinion of the Committee?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The Committee has not had the opportunity to consider this amendment but I feel that the Rapporteur should have a chance to speak to it.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Delorme.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am indeed going to make a few comments. First of all, I am astonished that this amendment should have been tabled after the Committee meeting at which we discussed the question at length. I was also surprised that it should be the former Chairman of our Committee who tabled it. However that may be, the amendment has been tabled, and we have to discuss it.

Then, I am also surprised because my report only notes certain shortcomings. I was, moreover, very cautious in my comments on the application of the treaty's provisions. And now, Mr. President, we are being asked purely and simply to do away with the treaty — or that part of the treaty which deals with the control of armaments — by means of an amendment. This amendment runs counter to an essential principle of international law, namely, that treaties must be observed. It is not by an amendment that we are going to modify the treaty. We are

not today entitled to make profound changes in a treaty which exists and which I consider to be a necessity. Although not perfect, its application has none the less given satisfaction over a period of nearly thirty years, as was mentioned just now.

Very objectively, Mr. Roper has just pointed out that the Committee has not considered this amendment. As your Rapporteur, I object to the amendment tabled by Mr. Critchley, which proposes to the Assembly that the third paragraph of the preamble should be replaced by the words:

“Noting that the more important arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty have never been applied, and that those that are have become unnecessary;”

and that paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation should be replaced by the words:

“3. Abrogate the arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty when the mutual defence obligations of that treaty are effectively incorporated in a treaty on a European union controlling all its external defence and foreign policy;”

These, Mr. President, are the conclusions reached by the Rapporteur, who is accordingly opposed to voting for this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — You have heard the Rapporteur speak against the amendment.

I must now ask for a vote on part 1 of Amendment No. 1.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 1 of Amendment No. 1 is negatived.

That deals only with the first proposal in Amendment No. 1. I must now turn to part 1 of Amendment No. 2 tabled by Mr. Roper and then I shall come to part 2 of Mr. Critchley's Amendment No. 1.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I must make clear at the outset that although I am sitting on the Committee bench, the Committee has not had the chance to consider this amendment either. I have the agreement of the Rapporteur to the amendment to paragraph 2 of the recommendation.

I therefore beg to move to leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Continue to indicate in future annual reports the total number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe and consider whether in the light of the security requirement of the governments concerned it can indicate the number of such forces assigned to SACEUR in accordance with the

Mr. Roper (continued)

commitment contained in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty ;”

I have spoken to this amendment and I need now only point out that a range for these figures is published each year in the British defence white paper. It is therefore a matter which could be usefully considered in more detail by the Council of WEU.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — The Rapporteur is agreeable to accepting the amendment concerning paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

The PRESIDENT. — Is there anyone to speak against the amendment ?...

Since there is not, we shall now vote on part 1 of Mr. Roper's amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 1 of Amendment No. 2 is agreed to.

We now come back to Mr. Critchley's amendment. Does anyone wish to speak ?...

Since no one wishes to speak, we must decide on part 2 of Mr. Critchley's amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Part 2 of Amendment No. 1 is negatived.

We now come to part 2 of Mr. Roper's amendment.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Unfortunately, this part of my amendment is not acceptable to Mr. Delorme and therefore I am obliged to speak in support of it, although again I must make clear that I am speaking in a personal capacity only and that this matter has not been considered by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

This part of the amendment is to leave out paragraph 4 of Mr. Delorme's recommendation. I move the amendment with some reluctance, particularly since Mr. Delorme said yesterday that there is nothing necessarily inconsistent between it and Mr. Dankert's proposal. However, it is a considerable extension and elaboration of what has been put forward by Mr. Dankert in Committee. My personal view is that it would be better for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to explore further the relations between the independent European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee before adopting this recommendation. Therefore, I hope that we may now delete paragraph 4, although it is a matter to which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments must return.

The PRESIDENT. — Will the Rapporteur please take the floor ?

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — I regret that I find myself in conflict with the Chairman of the Committee and the author of this amendment. Indeed, I do not see in what respect the recommendation to “ensure a continuing exchange of information between the independent European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee ; ensure that the number, status, qualifications and level of the representatives of the member countries on the Standing Armaments Committee are high enough to guarantee the effectiveness of the work undertaken, encourage national authorities to provide the Standing Armaments Committee with all the information it requires ; ensure that the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee is extended to the field of research in order to ensure European co-operation in this sector ; and keep the Assembly regularly informed about the tasks entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee, the timetable and successive stages and the results obtained” can be in conflict with what was agreed. Contact having been made, I repeat, with the Rapporteur, Mr. Dankert, we were in complete agreement in noting that our two reports complemented each other and that, as a consequence, in voting for this recommendation, the Assembly was not going to give the Standing Armaments Committee powers which the recommendation did not confer upon it. The Assembly could, in reality, make only one observation : one by which it would endorse what the Council of Ministers did on 31st May 1976, in other words, instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to submit a detailed outline programme for a study of the armaments industries in the member countries. The recommendation does no more than echo the decision taken by the Council of Ministers ; and in these circumstances, I greatly regret that I must maintain the terms of the recommendation which I have the honour to present to your Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — We now come to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

There are 10 in favour, 21 against and 5 or 6 abstentions.

Part 2 of Amendment No. 2 is therefore negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 745, as amended.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a roll-call vote.

The President (continued)

Are there any objections ?...

There are no abstentions.

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted unanimously*¹.

We now come to the vote on the draft recommendation on scientific and technological co-operation in Europe presented by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 736.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft recommendation.

If the Assembly agrees, there is, therefore, no need for a roll-call vote.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*².

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. European security and East-West relations (Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Document 744 and Amendment).
2. Motion for a Resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the conclusions of the Report of the Committee, Document 740).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.)

1. See page 24.

2. See page 25.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 21st June 1977

SUMMARY

1. Points of Order.
2. Adoption of the Minutes.
3. Attendance Register.
4. European security and East-West relations (*Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 744 and Amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Koster (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roberti, Mr. Watkinson, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Warren, Mr. Corallo, Mr. Lewis, Mr. de Koster (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Roberti, Mr. Roper, Mr. Calamandrei.
5. Motion for a Resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the conclusions of the Report of the Committee, Doc. 740*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Piket (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Grieve, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Piket (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Points of Order

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — May I raise a point of order, Mr. President? I wish to draw attention to the fact that some members, at least, deplore the fact that the President has been unable to maintain his initiative in starting these proceedings at the published time.

The PRESIDENT. — I certainly agree, but the President and the Clerk have been a few minutes late coming from a Committee meeting.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order, Mr. President. We have rules and procedures and we have agreements. I also attended a Committee trying to help but I was told that the rules did not permit me to be present. I accepted that, but are we to have rules of procedure implemented at some times and not at others? I agree with my colleague. In addition to the President, we have Vice-Presidents. In addition to the Clerk, we have other Clerks. If it is agreed that we should start at a particular time, while I accept that the President and the Clerk may well be engaged, what is the point of appointing deputy Vice-Presidents, deputy Clerks and deputy deputy Clerks if they cannot be here to take over when they are wanted?

I have said that I was at the other meeting. Although I should not have been there, I went to help to get a quorum to assist the Committee to proceed. I was told, quite rightly, "You are not a member. You should not be here. Therefore you have to leave." I agree that if we are to have a 3 o'clock start, we should start at that time, or it can be at 3.15, as long as we know.

The PRESIDENT. — I have already said that we lost fifteen minutes in that way. I do not

propose to lose another fifteen minutes discussing that point.

2. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

3. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

4. European security and East-West relations

(Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 744 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the supplementary report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and East-West relations and vote on the revised draft recommendation, Document 744 and Amendment.

1. See page 27.

The President (continued)

I remind you that the previous report, Document 726, was referred back to the Committee at the end of the debate on 2nd December 1976, at the request of the Chairman of the Committee.

I call Mr. de Koster, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. de KOSTER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — You have very rightly reminded us, Mr. President, that the report was discussed fully in December last year. Unfortunately, it was then at a point on the agenda where the meeting was almost over, and as I had commitments in the Netherlands I was unable to be here for the whole of the debate. All I have done, therefore, is to incorporate in this report events that have taken place since December last year, so as to bring it up to date. There has also been one small change made to the draft recommendation, to allow for developments in the time that has elapsed since December 1976.

(The speaker continued in English)

Détente is a French word which has been translated into both Russian and English but with quite different results. For the Soviet Union, it is first and foremost coexistence, guaranteed frontiers for the Warsaw Pact countries and excellent inter-State relations. On top of that — but not as a consequence of détente, I think — it means a military superiority in conventional arms and equilibrium in strategic nuclear arms.

We are faced with what has been called by the West since 1967 the Brezhnev doctrine — non-interference for others and exclusive interference for the Soviet Union in the internal policies of other Warsaw Pact countries. Our interference is dangerous to the communist system.

We democracies are faced with a problem because we have very little knowledge, if any, of how decision-making in Moscow takes place or indeed how, in general, it takes place in totalitarian States.

Apparently Mr. Brezhnev did not want to share decision-making with his aging partner, Mr. Podgorny, so he has chosen a new partner, much younger at the age of 70, and his name is also Brezhnev.

Today's revised draft recommendation is the only one tabled by the Defence Committee, not the former one which is in the new document just for reference. I haven't taken into account some of the remarks made at the December session and also the contents of some of the amendments tabled by several colleagues during that session. I must point out, however, that not all the amendments have been taken over.

I regret that I have to confirm that since the last WEU meeting there has been no substantial progress in the MBFR discussions or, as they would eventually be, negotiations. Let us hope that there will be an early conclusion to SALT II.

The Soviet view of détente remains in principle unchanged. Soviet involvement in Angola, however, indicated that its notion of détente is limited to Europe and North America. It does not include Africa or perhaps Asia. Here we find a precedent of open Soviet interference with the help of Cuban troops in Southern Africa. The then President Podgorny's visit to Africa and the arrangements with Zambia are also indications of the Soviet Union's interest in that continent, and they will be followed by other visits, for example, to Tanzania.

The West, on the other hand, has confirmed that détente is global. It recognises no limitations and it is not confined to Europe. It may be that the Angolan affair, which is now clear to western political observers, will lead to a dangerous situation if a repetition of it takes place in, for instance, another African country.

In assessing détente in 1977 we must accept that we have seen the end of its most active era, inaugurated by Chancellor Brandt with his *Ostpolitik* and marked by President Nixon's first visit to Moscow, by the CSCE negotiations, by the ratification of the final act of Helsinki and also by the first SALT agreement. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the indications are that inter-State relations are the cornerstone of détente and that the individual interest is subordinated to the interest of the State — what is good for the State is good for the individual.

So far, my introduction has sounded a rather pessimistic note but in principle I am optimistic. I have given some facts but, while the background may be a mystery, it may also indicate that the Soviet leadership wishes to wait until it has fully evaluated, for instance, the new Carter administration and the pressures that will arise from the Belgrade conference, pressures that will be very strong and that they will hope to see level off, and that, apart from the application procedure of the final act, there will also be positive developments.

The Soviet Union has been strongly attacked but not to such an extent that improvements in its relations with the West are completely excluded.

There is also fierce criticism on the part of the Soviet Union of Eurocommunism. I speak exclusively about the Soviet attitude and not about the Eurocommunist attitude vis-à-vis Moscow.

Another reason why I do not wish to be considered a pessimist is that the process of détente,

Mr. de Koster (continued)

not of coexistence but of détente, is both structural and long term. It is not a process in which one success story is likely to be followed by another. Helsinki was a decisive step on that long, difficult, narrow path. I hope that Belgrade will be a mixture of facts and realities with the other side not hiding facts about abuses, facts which should be discussed positively.

I hope that human rights will be a very important issue, but I hope that there will be some understanding of the fact that dictatorial systems tend to hesitate when they believe that to be necessary for their survival. They consider that criticism of their countries, whether or not it is true, is dangerous, especially when it comes from within those countries. Groups to promote observance of the final act were set up in several Warsaw Pact countries, and this led to an organised plan of action by the Soviet authorities against such dissidents as Sakharov and Bukovsky, and against President Carter and Mr. Ginsburg, discrediting the existing human rights movement in Warsaw Pact countries and trying to intimidate potential newcomers to the movement. All the same, for the sake of détente Belgrade should not be limited to factual criticism. The facts alone are sufficient and I believe that we should look to the future on the basis of those facts.

The Soviet Union has not intimidated President Carter or, I hope, this Assembly. Real détente can only happen when we have successful negotiations on MBFR. They will decrease tension in Central Europe.

Without a military détente there can be no real political détente. The threat must be removed on both sides on the basis of balanced force reductions.

Whilst I was optimistic about the Vienna negotiations on MBFR, I must repeat what I said in Strasbourg — that perhaps the centralised decision-making in Moscow prevents the Russians from negotiating both SALT II with the United States and MBFR with Western Europe, Canada and the United States. If SALT II is concluded in November, real results may be achieved for MBFR in Vienna. If that does not happen, there is a great risk that even I shall become a real pessimist about the future of democracy in Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the debate, I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like first of all to express my agreement with the Rapporteur, Mr. de Koster, both for his report and particularly for his explanatory speech just now, which in my view very lucidly highlighted the problem of

East-West relations, especially from the standpoint of the differing interpretation placed on détente, either side of the iron curtain.

This being so, and Mr. de Koster's exposition having spared me any further expatiation on the theme of the differing interpretation and attitude of the two opposing sides in the ongoing process of détente, I will confine myself to a few concrete observations.

We have, since the report last November and a visit by our Committee to the United States in the spring, had the opportunity to observe the considerable disparity of forces on the military chessboard of Central Europe. I therefore think there is one conclusion to be drawn from what we have seen: the impossibility of accepting equal percentage reductions by either side, in view of the superiority now corroborated, especially in conventional weapons, of the Warsaw Pact powers compared with the Atlantic Alliance.

I therefore fully endorse what is said in paragraphs 35 and 36 of Mr. de Koster's original report. We must equally support the idea that for reasons of geographical disparity any reductions having the effect of excluding and withdrawing military forces not belonging to the sector are quite unacceptable. In fact, whereas on the one hand the forces of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR would remain at the ready in proximity to the frontier, those of the United States would have to retreat beyond the Atlantic, six thousand kilometres away. This is another point on which to stand fast in any approach to possible MBFR negotiations, if we are not to find ourselves in an awkward fix. The matter is dealt with in paragraph 29 of the report.

I agree that it will be advisable to establish that joint ceiling of 700,000 men which the Atlantic Alliance powers are asking for; but I would reject any attempt to apply a unilateral reduction in NATO's missile deployment too. In this respect I would refer to an amendment proposed by myself to the draft recommendation in its final version, in the sub-paragraph where it calls for a moratorium on cruise missiles. In the course of our recent mission to the United States we had occasion to note that the cruise missile was the sole deterrent against the Warsaw Pact's weapons array, and that only this deterrent and this type of weapon will enable us in some measure to make up for the existing imbalance of forces in the Atlantic Alliance's disfavour compared with the Warsaw Pact. But this can be discussed in the debate on the amendment after I have sounded out the views of the Rapporteur and the Committee Chairman. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Watkinson.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — It is appropriate that we should yet again be discussing the de Koster report on European security and East-West relations. As Mr. de Koster has pointed out in the report, 1977 is a crucial year, given that the SALT negotiations are at a critical stage and that the Helsinki agreement is under review at Belgrade.

But in addition to that there are factors which, as Mr. de Koster points out in the first part of his report, we need to consider at this stage, and I refer to the expansionist nature of Soviet expenditure on defence. The report says that defence expenditure in the USSR is increasing in real terms at a rate of 4 % per annum. This now accounts for between 11 and 13 % of the gross national product of the USSR.

Before we get too hysterical about these figures it is worth remembering that the GNP of the USSR is approximately half that of the United States. Even so, this commitment to expansion is and must be a source of concern to NATO, at both conventional and nuclear levels.

We all well know that negotiations at the nuclear level are directly the concern of the United States and the USSR. I doubt whether any of us were particularly surprised by the abortive beginnings of the SALT negotiations earlier this year, given the freshness of the American proposals and the brave stand that the United States has adopted on human rights. It is in the interests, however, of both the United States and the USSR that agreement be achieved in the SALT negotiations.

I am certainly not optimistic about the ultimate outcome, therefore. If there is no agreement, it will mean inescapably, as the report spells out, higher balances of nuclear weapons at greater economic cost to the West and the East.

The report makes the very important point that we are now moving into a stage of nuclear weapons that will make it extremely difficult to verify exactly what is going on, particularly with the development of the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber. For this reason I endorse the recommendation that there should be a moratorium on the development of cruise missiles and strategic bombers.

On the conventional front matters are different and possibly more serious. There is little doubt that the balance in Central Europe has been materially changed. We know that there has been a massive modernisation of Soviet forces and an imbalance in numbers. However, there has also been a quantum jump in the quality and nature of the Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. In the past nine years, British estimates show that there has been an

increase of 140,000 Soviet troops in East Europe, a 31 % increase in tanks, a 25 % increase in artillery, a 78 % increase in armoured personnel and a 25 % increase in tactical aircraft. The important point is that much of this equipment is equal, if not superior, to the equipment now existing within the Alliance. Linked with that is the nature of some of this Soviet equipment which has changed from that of a defensive to an offensive nature.

It is possible to speculate at length about the reasons for this Soviet build-up. It is also possible to react paranoically to this perceived threat. It is worth noting that even as of now NATO has more men in its forces and spends more on armaments and defence generally than does the Warsaw Pact. What is important is that we should be sure that our existing policies in NATO are viable in this new context.

I see no cause to anticipate a Warsaw Pact invasion of the West. The issue is whether now our strategy of flexible response is capable of responding adequately. If one reads the highly pessimistic and hawkish Nunn-Bartlett report, the response is that we are not.

For this reason I understand why Mr. de Koster points to the fact that defence expenditure in the West has been increased and will be increased. He gives it a welcome. I do not welcome this increase in defence expenditure, but I understand why it is taking place. I, and I suspect most members of the Assembly, as Mr. de Koster mentioned, want to see some progress made in a fundamental cutback in arms expenditure. Indeed, in my view it is right and appropriate that we should all express our dismay at the appallingly slow progress in the MBFR talks in Vienna.

So slow has been the progress of these talks that doubts have been expressed about the *bona fides* of both sides in the negotiations. For too long the talks were stymied by the meaning of "parity". I welcome the initiative that the West made in December 1975. The ball is clearly in the court of the Soviet Union in this matter.

I note the recommendation in Mr. de Koster's report that the MBFR talks be held in Belgrade. It has also been suggested that these talks fall outside the ambit of discussion of the conference at Belgrade. I would welcome, as does the report, the instigation of these talks, because I believe that progress has been painfully slow. However, if the progress in MBFR remains stymied, it seems appropriate that we should switch our attention to the confidence-building measures as set out in the CSCE final act. If Central Europe is crucial — and I hope that I have demonstrated that it is — we might specifically seek to limit the number of troops who could come into Central Europe at any one time and, indeed, possibly attempt to limit the military operations

Mr. Watkinson (continued)

on both sides that could take place within this area.

I believe that both the report and the supplementary report are important documents, and I gladly endorse the recommendations that have been put forward. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, already at the sitting of 2nd December I stated the Italian Christian Democrat Delegation's view on the subject under discussion, and concluded that, notwithstanding some criticisms, Mr. de Koster's recommendation and the whole of his report could be approved, and that we were at all events willing. I now confirm that appreciation, especially in the light of the new elements he has introduced into his report today, and of certain events that have overtaken us in the meantime.

Are there any reasons why Europe should strive with all its might to ensure its own security? There are plenty, and cogent ones, I dare say more cogent even than ever. As the topic of our survey has some points in common with that dealt with by Mr. Segre in Document 732, I venture to make certain references to those suggested by him in connection with measures for Europe's defence, and of course departing from the basic ideas of Mr. de Koster's report and proposals.

I said the reasons were possibly even more substantive: indeed, despite Helsinki, and the talk of a certain renewal of relations between East and West, despite certain developments inside the communist parties of some of our countries, we may note the irritation of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries in general at a stand taken not only by the United States President but by all sincerely democratically-minded persons and at any rate the western nations, towards systems which are the opposite of democracy, i.e. the attitude of the eastern countries towards what they call dissidents. This attitude is all the more disquieting in that the stand of the western countries is taxed with being unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of others. This attitude seems to me to be omnipresent in Mr. Segre's report. But this is not true, quite the contrary, for no self-respecting countries, least of all those of WEU, can stand by unconcerned in the teeth of certain demonstrations, certain misunderstandings — let us not mince any words — a certain tyranny encountered in the eastern bloc. How else are we to define the behaviour meted out to the signatories of Charter 77,

except as genuine persecution, intolerable discrimination, attachment to a system of organisation of State and society that stands in stark opposition to the systems we believe in?

All this has its importance for security and defence requirements. I think, in fact, that we can all agree that threats to peace and outbreaks of warfare have always occurred in countries having no democracy and groaning under dictatorships. Now, where we do not have the guarantee afforded by respect for the democratic system that allows pluralism and controls, we obviously have to be on our guard, so we still have reasons for seeking to safeguard that security which we must chiefly look to ourselves to preserve.

This is why I fail to understand certain resistances in some of our Western European countries to the construction of a political Europe in the strict sense of the term, for a politically-united Europe can really be regarded as a guarantee of security in itself.

At this juncture I think we should expound another concept. There is no question of belauding the theory of the two blocs. They do not please anybody, least of all myself. But I think that if today, in countries where there is a dictatorship, we observe what happened first in Greece, then in Portugal and now in Spain, we shall have taken a really important, perhaps decisive step towards abolishing the two blocs. As long as this has not happened — we hope it will be soon, in communist countries too: so far I have seen fascist types of dictatorship topple, but not a single communist one — we shall have to look to our own security and not only keep a watchful eye on the existence of the two blocs, but also guard against a suggestion put about in various quarters to the effect that we should steer a middle course between the Soviet Union and the United States. No, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is quite impossible, and it is only in order not to trespass upon your time that I shall not linger over listing the reasons why.

Nevertheless, I would add one last observation. Even when — as we may hope, soon — we have created European political union, and so established a body truly capable of looking after its own security, so long as that same system persists in the eastern countries, we shall not be able to pursue such a policy of a middle course between Russia and America, because the friendship, collaboration and alliance of the United States will still be necessary to Europe's defence, which every sincere democrat, and all of us Europeans, must aim to secure. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — At a time when President Brezhnev is in this city

Mr. Warren (continued)

it is good that we have this opportunity, through the excellent report of Mr. de Koster, to explore the reality of détente, not just in terms of armaments but in terms of the rights of people. Signatories to the Helsinki agreement from the West believed that the defence of the West included the duty to make sure that people would have the right to speak in freedom without persecution. I believe that we have a duty to speak not only for people in the West but for those on the other side of the iron curtain who do not have the opportunity to speak in freedom, even if they are told by their governments that they have that right.

Over too much of the world freedom has become that which the rulers of a country allow it to be. The decolonisation of Africa since the second world war and the retreat of the Belgians, the French and the British from that continent have been accompanied by slogans such as "One man, one vote". The reality of that in Uganda, as one typical associated country — and not one practising oppression more than others — has become that there is one man, General Amin, who has one vote.

Mr. de Koster has spoken this afternoon of the interpretation of this word détente, on which I had an opportunity to speak at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, saying that we must determine what we mean when we use such words as détente. Both Russia and Western Europe must demonstrate that they practise human rights in terms that both understand as meaningful.

When we speak of people like Pastor Georgi Vinns or Anatole Sharansky in Russia, we speak because they cannot speak. In the same way, I would not mind if the Russians spoke if they found somebody in the West being oppressed. But the parties to the Helsinki agreement have a right and a duty to speak for all those whose governments were signatories to that agreement. There is nothing wrong in that and therefore when we speak out for particular people, Russian people, we speak because they have no chance to speak for themselves.

To me one of the mysteries is why the Russian Government act as they do. It is easy to say that obviously they are aggressors and that we should look at their vast armaments. My colleague, Mr. Watkinson, who sits for the Labour Party in Westminster, in an excellent contribution vividly drew attention to the tremendous Soviet expenditure on armaments. The question is why do they do this, not only to the world but to their own people.

Karl Marx believed in the freedom of the individual and said so, and Engels encouraged him to put these words into writing. Yet in the

case of Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin are not only deviating from the teachings of Marx but going against Mao Tse-tung's teaching when he said, "Let the flowers of all the seasons bloom together. Let diverse schools of thought contend". But communism in Russia is totally different from that postulated by Marx, Engels and Mao.

Whereas Marx believed in freedom of the individual, Brezhnev, like Stalin, believes that freedom of the State is more important, freedom of the State to do what it wishes with the individual. Many of those who speak out in Russia, as Marx and Engels postulated they could, are confined as madmen in psychiatric clinics. If ever Russia used its mighty armed weight to preserve the kind of communism that it practises, the expectations of freedom of its own people and the freedom of the West would disappear from the face of the earth. Let us remember that when that happens, all of us here, whether we are christian democrats, liberals, socialists or communists will also go in that holocaust.

None of the Soviet States of Eastern Europe has allowed its old-time communist party leaders to survive. Those States have put in their own tools of communism. Democracy has the duty to defend not only those who are free but those who are not free.

Above all, democracy has the duty to give hope to those who are not free, for whom we have a duty to speak. I would hope that President Brezhnev could hear our voice in Paris after sixty years of enforced silence by his own people in the Soviet Union. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Warren.

I call Mr. Corallo.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the draft recommendation on European security and East-West relations presented by Mr. de Koster has, as you know, had to weather some storms before reaching us.

I reckon the latest version to be definitely better than the first, even though some defects have survived the labour of revision and updating it has undergone. I should like to remind you that just a few weeks ago I had occasion to express in another place, the Assembly of the Council of Europe, my heartfelt appreciation of another document bearing the signature of Mr. de Koster: one that, not being concerned with military matters, had more successfully managed to strike a different tone, indicative of serenity and objectivity, which caught our interest and won our esteem. To be sure, it is easier to be Olympian and fair-minded on a non-military subject. But since Mr. Cavaliere has drawn a contrast between Mr. de Koster's and Mr. Segre's reports, I must say that Mr. de Koster, in touching on the themes of human rights

Mr. Corallo (continued)

and the follow-up of the Helsinki agreements, did not seem to me to differ so very much from what Mr. Segre had to say. Any way, it suffices to reflect that no one ever dreamed of establishing a close connection between the two categories of problem. Certainly, anyone who truly has at heart the hope of seeing the principles of freedom and democracy also take root in the eastern countries, has not the slightest interest in such a tie-up with military matters. We who do want to see this happen are therefore against such a tie-up, and welcome the remarks on the subject by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Forlani, who, albeit a fellow-member of Mr. Cavaliere's own party, gave the problem quite a different slant.

Turning now to the document tabled, I have mentioned a few points to which we feel unable to agree. We cannot, for example, go along with Mr. de Koster's hope that the gaps can be bridged by an effort by one side only, however convinced we may be that it is in the general interest to seek ways of agreement, and everybody's duty to help to resolve conflicts. Nor does the construction placed by Mr. de Koster on certain facts strike us as being at all fair-minded. Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the fact that, over and above the points that are unacceptable to me, the draft recommendation does contain many interesting considerations that carry our full assent. This is the case as regards paragraph (iii) of the preamble on the new United States Government's intention to secure reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, and the case for ensuring strict observance by both sides of the existing agreement affecting détente, and paragraph (vi) of the preamble referring to the advantages that détente can bring.

Last, I wish to register my full agreement to the call for a moratorium by all countries on any further development of cruise missiles and strategic bombers, for we are also convinced that this is necessary if any progress is to be made in the SALT negotiations.

In the light of these appreciations, which go a long way towards mitigating our reservations on other points that fail to carry our conviction or that we find unacceptable, I myself and my other communist colleagues in this Assembly will abstain from voting on the paper presented by Mr. de Koster. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President, I put my name on the list and was told that I should be called. May I have some explanation why I was not called?

The PRESIDENT. — I did not see your name on the list, Mr. Lewis, but if you wish to take the floor, you may do so now.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you. I am very pleased to follow the communist representative. First, I want to pay a tribute to my colleagues, John Watkinson and Ken Warren, for their contributions. I do not know whether they have had any help from the British Foreign Office or British Government with their speeches. I certainly have not and I do not think that they have. What I am saying, therefore, owes nothing to the British Government.

I ask our communist colleagues in particular to bear in mind that some of us do not always find fault with the communists. There are some of us who, like me, believe that there are always two sides to every question. Sometimes it is a good thing to look at the other person's point of view.

I do so on this subject. For years I have heard debates on defence. I must say frankly that one of the reasons why we shall not achieve what is euphemistically called détente and a reduction in defence expenditure is that it is the biggest vested interest in both East and West. Both sides have a strong interest in keeping the arguments going. No one in the Soviet Union and the iron curtain countries is better off than the generals and the field marshals. They are given privileges, good wages and good conditions of service. This is equally true of the West. The western general is very well looked after. He gets his cars and his "perks". There would be an international strike tomorrow if we were to announce that we proposed to abolish them. We should see the Red Flag being carried by western generals and the Union Jack by the Russians: the generals would be united.

In Britain we have the operation of Parkinson's Law. It is usually applied to a bureaucracy. The civil servants see to it that they get secretaries, who appoint their own secretaries, *ad infinitum*. Empires are built in this way. The same happens with defence. It is a well paid job for these generals.

In addition, the big multinational armament businesses make fat profits. My communist friends here must not believe that Russia is communist. It is, of course, the biggest State capitalist organisation in existence. Its State capitalism is doing very well and does not mind doing business with the multinationals in armaments or in anything else.

We must tackle the problem of who profits from keeping forces going. Who is doing very well out of it? It is not the ordinary worker or the ordinary tax-payer. In my country expenditure is currently being reduced on education, hospitals and other social services in order to

Mr. Lewis (continued)

make savings, and all the generals cheer when they hear this, but if we were to start cutting expenditure on generals or on their cars and "perks" there would be a terrific scream.

When we are given these documents, therefore, we ought to be given some facts and figures to show what would happen if we were to achieve some understanding on how such expenditure could be reduced. Let us go either to Mr. Brezhnev in Paris or to Belgrade and suggest that every top-ranking military expert in both East and West takes a 20 % reduction in salary.

I am a cynic. I believe that we must attack vested interests not only in our own countries but in the Soviet Union. Let us try to understand that there are always two sides to every question and that, when one points the finger at another, four fingers point to oneself. Once we start to see the other person's point of view, we might make progress.

I am not against the report. It is another good one from the Committee that has been going on now for the past five years. I wish the report well, but I do not think that it will begin to touch the problem. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are no more speakers on the list.

I call Mr. de Koster.

Mr. de KOSTER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I thank the various speakers who have bestowed so much attention on my report. I think that we in the Defence Committee shall feel invigorated by the general approval that this report has met with. Part of the debate is perhaps important because a comparison has been drawn — not in the same way by everyone — between the report by Mr. Segre, which we shall be debating on Thursday, and my own report. I shall come back to this in a moment.

Mr. Roberti mentioned the geographical disparity that there is with regard to the balance of power. He is quite right. I believe that it is playing a large part in the talks on this issue going on in Vienna, and this is immensely important for us.

Mr. Roberti has also presented a two-part amendment. The first part concerns the second paragraph of the substantive part of the recommendation, where he feels the text would be better if it read "until the gap is bridged". I do not think this differs greatly from my text, unless it be that mine works from the assumption that there is at the moment superiority on the side of the Warsaw Pact countries, and that a balance can be achieved only if the Soviet Union cuts back more than we do. I find Mr. Roberti's

suggestion entirely acceptable, and for many people it will be an improvement. I accept the first part of Mr. Roberti's amendment.

The second part I find rather more difficult to agree to. I have explained that a moratorium is difficult for both sides, yet I do believe that this forms an essential component, one that one might hope for from the WEU Assembly's positive approach to the question. It is precisely in respect of the weapons that can represent a great stumbling-block in the attempts to achieve an agreement that we want to make positive proposals along the lines of such a moratorium, a moratorium which is of interest to both sides and will put neither the Soviet Union nor the West at a disadvantage and will surely help towards disarmament. I would not therefore wish to adopt this part of the amendment.

Mr. Watkinson spoke about the Soviet Union's defence spending in relation to gross national product. He went on, however, to say that it was hard for the West to gauge properly the reasons behind this big build-up of Soviet forces. He said, too, that he did not at the moment expect any invasion by Russian troops.

Last New Year's Eve, a comedian on Dutch television asked the question: "Are the Russians coming?" He went on to give the answer himself: "Of course the Russians are coming; but they are coming one at a time." I think he is right. I can see no reason for a Soviet invasion so long as the risks the Soviet Union would run are plain to it. But if the West were to begin to weaken its relative position, without there being a reduction on the Warsaw Pact side, then we would be increasing the risks — not so much in the way of an invasion as of political pressure. Past history shows that if the balance of force is too far out, political pressure can be enough to make the weaker side give way.

Mr. Cavaliere touched on an interesting point. After being, broadly, in agreement with my report, he mentioned the one by Mr. Segre. I believe that while the Segre report does contain a number of very valuable comments, anyone reading the two reports carefully will see that there are real differences of principle between them. I would refer in particular to paragraph 17 of the Segre report. *Détente* is indeed a very complex business, but I do not agree with Mr. Segre that anything that might upset *détente* must be avoided. Taken on its own, one might agree with this, but it is reasonable to ask whether this means one must cease speaking the truth about human rights. I think that would be wrong. I have already said that the truth must not be hidden and that people must say clearly what is going on; that human rights are not being respected in a number of countries that signed the Helsinki agreements. What matters

Mr. de Koster (continued)

is how it is done. People must not limit themselves to listing the facts; nor must they see the facts primarily as a criticism — they must go on to talk them over together. This means that once the truth has been told, proposals need to be made on how to improve matters.

Here it might be useful to look at paragraph 49 of Mr. Segre's report, which refers to the statistics quoted for the MBFR. The West has shown great openness in providing data, and I do not think the Soviet Union has any problem with these figures, because it already has information on a host of items, given in our debates in public on defence, which examine the broad outlines and often the details as well. Then there are the reports by international bodies in London which yearly give a very clear picture of the make-up of our forces. I do not believe there are any secrets on our side; we have no secrets, and we have put our cards very plainly on the table. I sense a veiled criticism in paragraph 49 of Mr. Segre's report, leading to a number of recommendations based on it. I agree with Mr. Segre that détente is a very complex affair and needs to be dealt with with great care, but I must say that excessive caution can present dangers.

Mr. Warren spoke about détente as the other side sees it, and has very properly brought up the question of what we mean by détente. He said, among other things, that it is defending those who are not free. In saying so he took a defensive stance; he was not saying that we must interfere with other people's business, and must see to it that the number of free countries in the world is doubled or trebled. That would in any case involve only a handful of countries who could win this freedom. I would add to this that freedom and democracy are concepts that go together — there is no freedom without democracy, and no democracy without freedom.

I want to thank Mr. Corallo for his kind words. I do not have to tell him that my report to the Council of Europe's Political Committee, which numbers many more countries than there are in WEU and which adopted my report, is quite different in kind to that of a defence committee made up of a number of countries all of which are in NATO. It is a question of the purpose being served, and of my report having a different content. Still, I am glad that he agrees with a number of points in my report. I have accommodated him by accepting the first part of Mr. Roberti's amendment; and he also agrees about the moratorium — like me, he rejects the second part of the amendment.

Mr. Lewis commented that our speeches are not written for us by the British Foreign Minister, David Owen. I do not think his speech was

written by David Owen, either. I met Dr. Owen in Paris not long ago, and the ideas I heard from him were quite different from those expressed by Mr. Lewis. Mr. Lewis did make me quite envious when he talked about the numerous secretaries some civil servants have as a result of Parkinson's Law. This is something where in Europe we are still a backward region; this sort of thing hardly goes on in the Netherlands, at all events. Mr. Lewis asked what it is we are defending when we build up a defence structure. His own answer was that we are defending our military-cum-industrial, capitalist and multinational complex. I do not agree. One can certainly take it that — and this we do hear from those who criticise what I regard as justifiable and necessary defence efforts — we are defending a certain system, the system existing in a given country. As democracies, we are free to decide what system we want, be it capitalist, socialist, communist or christian-democratic. We are defending the right to make up our own minds what system we want. Mr. Lewis has said he is against a capitalist system. I believe the British Government has managed to place a lot of limitations on the capitalist system, something we can surely see happening in all our countries. We too, as liberals, believe there has within the framework of liberty to be a certain amount of restraint when freedom puts limits on the freedom of others. Democracy does not defend any militarist, or multinational, system.

What it is all about is having to defend free democracy for as long as this is necessary. I agree with Mr. Lewis that the money spent on defence, which is far too much, could be employed much better for other purposes. He mentioned education, culture and social services. I would include the third world. I believe that if we managed to reduce defence expenditure all over the world by a quarter, this could make a sizable contribution towards getting rid of the disparities that still exist in the world today. In that respect, I am wholly with Mr. Lewis. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. de Koster.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I apologise to the Assembly for having missed the first part of the debate.

On behalf of the Committee, I thank Mr. de Koster for the hard work he has put into the report. We hope that the recommendation will be accepted.

We also hope that, whatever may happen in Mr. de Koster's move from one chamber of the Netherlands Parliament to the other, we shall

Mr. Roper (continued)

still see him on our benches for many years to come.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

In Document 744, the Committee is proposing a revised draft recommendation.

Mr. Roberti has tabled Amendment No. 1, which reads as follows :

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "until the Soviet Union is prepared to bridge the gap" and insert "until the gap is bridged".

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would first like to thank Mr. de Koster for lending a courteous ear to my amendments. I shall not go back over the first one, but merely recommend it to the Assembly's approval, now that it has been accepted by the Rapporteur, who has even been kind enough to say it might be considered an improvement. I did not claim as much, nor should I be so presumptuous. I think it was only his natural politeness that made him say it, for which I am duly grateful.

As for the second amendment, which the Rapporteur felt unable to accept, I shall not insist on a vote. I would merely like to explain my reasons for making it. First of all, there was a psychological one. I believe that when we in this Assembly recommend a moratorium on a certain increase in armaments, the exhortation is not only addressed to the western powers. I have no illusion about a moratorium recommended by this Assembly being able to win a hearing beyond the iron curtain, and therefore in the Soviet Union. So I did not want it to look like a delaying tactic on the part of what is today the weaker segment of the Central European chessboard, in respect of armaments.

I was also concerned by the fact that cruise missiles are precisely those which represent the greatest deterrent. But thanks to the explanations given by Mr. de Koster on the intentions which lie behind the recommendation at paragraph 3, I believe we can accept it. So I shall not insist on a vote on the second amendment, but I trust the first one will be approved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — We accept the first paragraph of the amendment and are glad that Mr. Roberti is not pressing the second paragraph.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Since Mr. Roberti has withdrawn the second part of his amendment, I will put the first part to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Part 1 of the amendment is agreed to.

The vote on the amended draft recommendation as a whole would be by roll-call if the Assembly were not unanimous.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — There are some abstentions, Mr. President, but we are not asking for a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — *The amended draft recommendation is agreed to, note being taken of five abstentions*¹.

5. Motion for a Resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the conclusions of the Report of the Committee, Doc. 740)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the motion for a resolution on the designation of Greek and Turkish parliamentary observers to the WEU Assembly and vote on the conclusions of the report of the Committee, Document 740.

I call Mr. Piket, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am glad to present to you this report, which we have already discussed very briefly and on several occasions in the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. At the last session, Mr. Burekel and other members presented a request that WEU invite the Governments of Greece and Turkey to arrange to be represented at each of the Assembly's sessions ; and we decided that it was not an urgent matter. That is why it was raised in the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Obviously it is not a political matter. We simply discussed whether it was necessary to invite Greek and Turkish parliamentarians to all our sessions.

¹. See page 28.

Mr. Piket (continued)

The Committee considered there was no need to do so: it is, in fact, customary for the Bureau — the President, Vice-Presidents and Committee Chairmen — to examine on each occasion whether there is any necessity to invite parliamentarians from other Western European countries to attend the session. I consider that this is a practical way of doing things, and that it should be adhered to. After discussing the matter in Committee, we noted that, if we were to follow another of the rules, we should be obliged, under Rule 25 of the Council of Europe's Rules of Procedure, to invite five members of the Greek Parliament and ten members of the Turkish Parliament to each of our sessions. In our view, that would slow down the work of the Assembly and of the Committees.

If we keep to the existing rules, we simply have to consider whether or not, in the light of the agendas of the June and December sessions, there are grounds for extending such invitations. What is more, if we were to invite Greek and Turkish parliamentarians to attend each of our sessions, other difficulties would arise in the sense that we should similarly be obliged to invite parliamentarians from other countries of Western Europe as well. Whenever there is no subject on the agenda of our Assembly of particular concern to the parliamentarians from these countries and they already have a heavy workload, there is no point in their putting in a formal appearance here, except perhaps to enjoy the pleasures of good French cooking.

I believe, however, Mr. President, that our habit of inviting parliamentarians interested in particular agenda items is a practice that should be continued.

A few moments ago, I had the honour to have two Portuguese parliamentarians sitting behind me, who had been invited to attend this session because the agenda was of some interest to them. I believe in always co-operating and working very realistically in this life; one has to do the decent thing and not make work for parliamentarians when there is no call for it.

I conclude my report by expressing my heartfelt gratitude to my Committee colleagues, who have supported and helped me in preparing it. I would also thank my Committee colleagues and everybody else who have stayed on to the last moment to attend the discussions on this item of the agenda. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are two speakers on the list.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I shall not detain the Assembly for very long. I have been presiding as acting Chairman and Vice-

Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure which, at a meeting in Rome on 9th May, came unanimously to the conclusion that Mr. Piket's report was well-founded and that we should support it.

May I preface my few observations with these words? I am second to none in my admiration and affection for our Greek and Turkish friends. I am second to none in my appreciation of the immense importance to western defence — that is to say, to the defence of the whole free world — of both Greece and Turkey. The reasons that motivated the Committee on Rules of Procedure to come to the conclusion it reached are enshrined in the report of my friend and colleague, Mr. Piket, as Rapporteur.

The motivation was entirely a procedural one, and a desire that we should not fetter the absolute discretion that we at present enjoy in inviting friendly countries, those with which we are associated in alliance but which are not parties to the Brussels Treaty, to come here as observers. Were we to invite two such countries, great friends of the signatories of the treaty though they be, we should be institutionalising a system that has prevailed with great success ever since Western European Union came into existence and we should be institutionalising it in favour of two countries only.

Where, therefore, would our other allies be and what would they say to us? I believe that they would say, "If you ask Greece and Turkey to have permanent observer status with the numbers of observers that such status imports, we, your other friends, ought to have similar status", and the rows behind us would be full of our friends on every occasion, whether or not they were interested directly in the proceedings before the Assembly.

In my submission to my colleagues and to you, Mr. President, it is vital for this Assembly that we should guard and keep our absolute discretion in this respect. It is a discretion that we have exercised very carefully and very fully in every year since 1968.

I hope that I shall not detain the Assembly more than a few minutes if I deal with those countries, our friends, that have come here as observers in the years since 1968, because the figures and the names of the countries are compelling support for the arguments that appealed to the Committee on Rules of Procedure when it met in Rome.

In the first part of the fourteenth session in October 1968, Denmark and Norway each sent an observer. Let us not forget that, important as is the rôle of Greece and Turkey in the defence of the southern flank of Western Europe, Norway and Denmark have a rôle as important to play in the defence of its northern

Mr. Grieve (continued)

flank. In the second part, in February 1969, Malta and Turkey each sent an observer. In the fifteenth session, in December 1969, Canada and the United States each sent an observer. In the sixteenth session, in November 1970, Denmark and Norway each sent two observers. In the seventeenth session, in June 1971, Denmark and Norway each sent two observers, and likewise in December of that year.

In the eighteenth session, Denmark, Norway and Turkey all sent observers in June and Denmark sent an observer in December. In the nineteenth session Denmark sent two observers and in June 1974 Canada, Denmark and the United States all sent observers. In December 1974, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Turkey were all represented by their representatives with observer status. In May 1975, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Turkey and the United States sent observers and in December Canada, Denmark, Greece, Norway and the United States sent observers. In June last year, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Norway and Portugal sent observers and in December Canada, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Turkey.

In my submission, that record shows that the Assembly and you, Mr. President, and your predecessors and their colleagues have exercised very wide and very wise discretion in asking to our Assembly, with observer status, representatives of friendly and allied countries having an interest in proceedings before the Assembly at any particular session. At this session also we are happy to see observers attending from Portugal, Turkey and Spain. We are very happy to welcome for the first time a Spanish observer.

It is important that this discretion should be kept and that the system should not be institutionalised. We are not just a debating chamber. We are concerned with the operation of the modified Brussels Treaty. To that treaty there are seven signatories and those seven signatories are those who should be represented here institutionally in this Assembly. We hope to continue to invite our friends but it would be a grave error of judgment to ask any of them as a matter of our legal and procedural requirement, because to do so might offend others and would cause difficulties in the future.

I hope that I have put the case as succinctly and shortly as I can. That is the case that prevailed at meetings of the Committee on Rules of Procedure which met in Rome and which unanimously supported the excellent report of my friend and colleague, Mr. Piket, whom I wish to congratulate not only on his report but on being elected today Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

I now call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — It is not my intention to detain the Assembly for more than a few minutes if only because the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges has presented us with what I consider to be an excellent report on this question. Mr. Piket enlightens us about the reasons for which the Committee has rejected all requests made for the bestowal of permanent observer status on Greece and Turkey. In its report the Committee has said that it has approached this question not from the point of view of politics but rather from the standpoint of the rights and wrongs of the application.

I say immediately that if I thought for one moment that the grant of observer status to Turkey and Greece would assist in quickly resolving the unfortunate outstanding problem between those two countries I, like the rest of my colleagues in this Assembly, I am sure, would welcome that suggestion most warmly. But, unfortunately, it cannot be so. If we were to accept the application, we should immediately create a further anomaly in that those proposing the recommendation have insisted in their wording that the representation of Greece and Turkey should be based, in relation to numerical status, on that which they enjoy in the Council of Europe. That would clearly mean that the numbers of the Greek Delegation to the Assembly of Western European Union would be exactly half those allocated to the Turkish Delegation.

As Mr. Grieve has said, this would undoubtedly create a precedent which is hardly worthy of creation if only because the system which we have operated for so long has worked quite admirably. The statistical information produced by Mr. Grieve on the countries that have responded to invitations to send observers and indeed participants — a position which Greece and Turkey enjoyed only a short while ago — is of itself sufficient justification for not establishing a precedent.

In these circumstances, the application tabled by our colleagues for urgent procedure must be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Urwin.

I call Mr. Piket, the Rapporteur.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — It is a European question, but the debate has shown that it has become an Anglo-Dutch issue, argued over by speakers who think and speak with western ideas. That is highly important in this distinguished WEU Assembly.

Mr. Piket (continued)

I have nothing to add to the speeches made by my British colleagues and friends, who urged the necessity referred to in my report ; I thank them most warmly for their support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to add anything to the statement made by the Rapporteur ?

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — As Chairman of the Committee, I have nothing to add to what the Rapporteur has said. (*Laughter*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

In its conclusions, the Committee proposes that the Assembly should not adopt the resolution moved by Mr. Burekel and others.

I accordingly put to the vote, by sitting and standing, the conclusions of the report of the Committee which recommend the rejection of the motion for a resolution.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The conclusions of the report of the Committee are agreed to unanimously.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 22nd June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1977 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Document 742 and Amendment).
2. Anti-submarine warfare (Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Document 743).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 5.05 p.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd June 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1977 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 742 and Amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Lord Selsdon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Page, Mr. Piket, Lord Peddie, Mr. de Niet, Lord Selsdon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Dequae (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. Anti-submarine warfare (*Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 743 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Roper (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Reid, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Banks, Mr. Farr, Mr. Roper, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Boldrini, Mr. Roper, Mr. Farr, Mr. Roper, Lord Peddie, Mr. Farr, Mr. Rivière.
5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1977

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 742 and Amendment*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1977 and votes on the draft opinion and draft recommendation, Document 742 and Amendment.

1. See page 31.

I call Lord Selsdon, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Lord SELSDON (*United Kingdom*). — I must admit to my colleagues that I am becoming extremely bored by all this business of staff remuneration, pensions and everything else. At present, for one reason or another, governments or parliaments seem unable to come to terms with their responsibilities in relation to employees of co-ordinated organisations.

Whilst I am at heart a private sector man, I can hardly believe the problems of bureaucracy that have arisen in the area that this report covers — the time-wasting, the enormous expense and, perhaps most important of all, the sense of frustration and disillusionment that goes through any employee who does not know where he stands or what his future is.

It would almost seem as though some outer power were trying to infiltrate to destroy the European civil service, because in no way during my time as Rapporteur over the past years have I found anything but a willingness to co-operate on behalf of the bureaucracy, and a willingness to seek to achieve that which we seek to achieve. Yet nobody will take responsibility for any action.

This is a preamble of my own. I was always brought up to believe that bureaucracy was the servant of the people or parliament and not the other way around. It seems that everybody has lost his master. Perhaps the masters are not even in Western Europe. I shall again reiterate the points made in this report and try if I can to be a little practical.

As members will know, there are some 8,400 employees of co-ordinated organisations together with their dependants, families, friends and others, of all nationalities embodying up to

Lord Selsdon (continued)

eighteen countries. The smallest organisation is Western European Union with 149 employees. Perhaps it is appropriate in this forum, where so many countries are represented and where those that are represented are perhaps the original European countries, certainly strongest in material fields within Western Europe, that one should seek to encourage slightly greater initiative.

I start with the pension scheme. It will be known to my colleagues here that, after many years of trials and tribulations, it was agreed that from 1st July 1974 a pension scheme would be introduced for WEU. Since then there have been more and more moves to have a properly co-ordinated and effective scheme for all co-ordinated organisations to save money, time and effort. The problem that faces us at present is not so much to know what is or is not logical or easy to implement, but lack of the decision-making process by governments. It seems strange that governments should hold back, or that the decision-makers within governments should do so, because the importance of a pension scheme to an employee is not so much one of the money now, but the element of security for the employee when he leaves or retires. That is, therefore, a psychological value that far outweighs any financial one.

So that I may remind the Assembly of the true position in relation to co-ordinated organisations, I would ask my colleagues to bear in mind the current procedures. Historically, under most schemes, employees contributed to a provident fund about 7% of their basic salary and the employer or government contributed 14%. So 21% of the basic salary of the employee was put into a provident fund. Over the years, these provident funds multiplied, although some declined in inflation terms. But at present in excess of £1,000 million, or 1 billion French francs, is in provident funds around Europe.

The provident fund system stopped from 1st July 1974 and all that has been taking place since then is the deduction of 7% from employees' salaries. The money in those funds would be returned to governments provided that the employees concerned opted for the pension, and it seems likely that older employees almost to a man might feel more inclined to do so.

Naturally their contribution to a provident fund would be greater. So implementation of a common pension scheme through the co-ordinated organisations would instantly return to governments substantial sums of money.

Furthermore, under this system governments would not be likely to have to make any further contribution to pensions for a period of up to thirty years, so those who may have attempted to

argue that financially this kind of arrangement was not justified should think hard again. In the meantime we have uncertainty about provident funds, with people thinking in the short term and losing opportunities of maximising growth and keeping pace with inflation.

All this leads one to the suggestions made in this report with the approval and support of others, because governments originally appointed a committee of experts who met but could not agree and so ran up an incredible amount in expenditure. Although their hearts were in the right place, they did not seem to have power or authority to achieve what they set out to achieve.

We are now suggesting here, therefore, that for a period two separate operations should take place — a central pension unit located within OECD with a minimum amount of staff and facilities, and a joint management scheme for the fund or the residue of the provident funds. This is how things are done in the outside world with pension funds, which generally have been extremely successful in managing their affairs. But as soon as a large element of bureaucracy is involved in money connected with people, there are tremendous problems. I would ask my colleagues, therefore, to support the course that we urge for the establishment of some form of joint body to manage the pension scheme.

The second recommendation is one that, in a way, is controversial, but put in with my tongue slightly in my cheek. It is to grant a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff on the same conditions as for widows of male staff. In other words, if a woman dies and her husband is really dependent, the reversionary rights to her pension should apply.

It will be argued that this would be a dangerous precedent, because it might extend throughout Europe in due course and increase costs considerably. In the case of WEU that would not be so, because the numbers involved are relatively small and I gather that across the board it would not represent a particularly large sum. I have forgotten the exact figure but it is likely to be a relatively small percentage and not for a long period. This recommendation has been inserted so as to take account of an anomaly that should perhaps be put right.

The third recommendation again relates to pension schemes and to the conditions of employees of the co-ordinated organisations. Until now, because many of them are classified as international and therefore not necessarily resident in the country in which they work, they are sometimes denied the benefits of housing or mortgage schemes that would be available to nationals. It has been the practice within the organisations that if people make a substantial contribution to their provident fund and if the

Lord Selsdon (continued)

fund itself is sizable, they may borrow from it in order to finance the purchase of a house.

As we all know, house purchase is almost the most valuable way of saving in Europe today. The introduction of a pension scheme would, therefore, again cause an anomaly in that people might be penalised in terms of housing loans. The creation of some form of mortgage arrangement or loan scheme for the purchase of accommodation from savings drawn from within the organisations would be infinitely desirable.

There is no doubt in my mind — and I think many of you share this view — that no real thought or planning has been given to the conditions of employment or terms of service of people within the co-ordinated organisations for the simple reason that there is no boss. It might, therefore, be advisable to establish quite quickly a committee of experts who would plan and promote some form of personnel policy. This is not without precedent in that as long ago as 1957, a similar operation took place.

In view of the feeling of uncertainty amongst the employees of most co-ordinated organisations, the feeling of disillusionment with broken promises and the tremendous despair at the knowledge that nobody seems to be taking the right action, it seems desirable to bring in some form of outside committee to make recommendations that might take the heat out of existing negotiations and produce a rational and acceptable proposal.

One must bear in mind that to many people outside the international bureaucracy the terms and conditions of employment have compared very favourably with the best available in the private sector and in other governmental organisations, particularly in net terms because of the taxation position. We are thus faced with two points of view: the feeling that the bureaucracy is overpaid for what it does and enjoys much better conditions of employment, and that of the bureaucracy, which suffers from this uncertainty. Surely the solution is for outside people to investigate and make recommendations on pay structures and conditions of employment, taking into account all relevant factors.

I should like to push this extremely hard and I think that it would receive support from governments. The problem we are up against is that of delay. I know of no organisation in the private sector that would still have any of its employees if it had promised a pension scheme three years ago and had done nothing since to implement it and if its already retired employees had no source of income from a pension scheme and were living on a day-to-day basis, wondering whether people were going to

keep their promises. We live in an era when broken promises seem to be much more acceptable than was once the case.

An issue that has been raised before is the seconding of national officials. Again and again we are urged, particularly with reference to WEU, which has a relatively narrow career structure in view of its limited number of employees, that conditions for the secondment of national officials to other organisations should be made clear. I do not feel that the replies so far given by the Council have been sufficient. The whole question of secondment, however, must be looked at within the total context of a career structure.

I am sorry if I appear to have hammered away incessantly on the subject of pensions. When I became Rapporteur, I did not realise that a report would take four years to produce. It becomes very difficult to say the same thing twice, despite the fluency of the English language as opposed to others. However, if something is not done before long, there will be disruption. I for one feel rather like trying to create it just to see what happens at the end. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Lord Selsdon.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — I read Lord Selsdon's report with great interest, Mr. President, and I have listened to his introduction of it with even greater admiration. I am sure that if this were a parliament like that operating in each of our member States, and if a representative of the government had been present, that representative would have to have been both blind and deaf not to have been spurred into immediate action on hearing this extremely clear exposé. There are one or two not entirely friendly words I want to add, along the same lines.

I was particularly interested to read Chapter III of Lord Selsdon's report. It has struck me that this — unlike his introduction of a moment ago — does not mention the problem of the high costs incurred by the shortcomings of the co-operation procedure, which Lord Selsdon refers to in paragraph 25. What does in fact happen? The twenty-four countries involved in the consultations meet in the Co-ordinating Committee of budget experts, every fortnight or so. Then there are the meetings of administrative committees of the co-ordinated organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the European Space Agency, NATO with its twenty-seven sub-organisations, OECD and Western European Union. On top of that there are the meetings of the staff associations of all these bodies, and finally the meetings of the Secretaries-General, sometimes resulting in meetings of the various ministerial councils or councils at ambassadorial level.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

Try explaining to your constituents how all this interlocks. Nor is this the end of my survey. There are also scores of meetings of so-called joint committees, meetings between the budget experts and representatives of the personnel departments of the organisations I have just listed, meetings between these experts and representatives of the staff associations, meetings between representatives of the Secretaries-General and representatives of the staff associations, and there are many other kinds of joint committee meeting you can think of. It would not surprise me if over two-thirds of the time of the heads of administration of the various bodies were spent in meetings. Many of these are attended by forty to sixty persons, who travel the length and breadth of Europe to attend meetings held now here, now there. It stops them giving their time to their ordinary work, they get paid travel and subsistence expenses, and they are often overworked because of all these bureaucratic goings-on.

When you look at what the result of it all comes to, saddening is not the word for it. The staff pension rules were practically complete on 1st April 1974; yet there have been almost continuous meetings about them for a further two years and eleven months, with the result that on 1st March 1977 a text was produced that was 97 % identical with the text that already existed on 1st April 1974. What a superb result! The minute changes that have been made to the rules have cost a massive amount of money. For what purpose, one wonders. Moreover, the instructions for implementing the rules now have to be drawn up. As Lord Selsdon rightly comments, the rules relating to taxation are so complicated that it is still very doubtful whether all the organisations will be able to apply them in the same manner. New staff members have been, or will be, taken on in all the organisations to deal with this.

What I have been saying about pensions applies just as much to salaries, salary reviews, calculation of the inflation factor and any increases in salaries. In view of the economic situation over the last few years, there has been practically no question of the last-named point, but the others have applied. The inflation factor is of course extremely important, especially for those working in Britain and France where in recent years inflation has been running at 17 % and 12 % respectively. Here again we find that though quite satisfactory rules already existed back in 1961, all the committees I have mentioned — of budget experts, administrative experts, and so on and so forth — have been busy since 1974 working out new and so-called "objective" rules. For three years they have not succeeded in doing so, and time after time the Councils of the organisations, or the Committee

of Secretaries-General, have had to reject the proposals of the expert committee. I shall not go into further details, since paragraphs 31 and 32 of Lord Selsdon's report have dealt with this very thoroughly.

Lord Selsdon says that the situation, seen as a whole, must be judged severely, and he puts forward fresh proposals for making an improvement. He writes that even the Secretaries-General are spending more and more — and in some cases all — of their time coping with administrative matters of all kinds, so that they are prevented from doing their real job. And scores of other officials are also constantly engaged on this subject. And still the result is distressingly meagre. Although the 140th and 141st reports from the Committee of budget experts was eventually accepted last May, about eighteen months late, the rules are still not being put into effect because the representative of one country has again changed his original viewpoint. This, of course, again affects the calculation of the salaries that have been paid assuming implementation of the two reports in practice. Now the salaries for 7,000 or 8,000 staff members have to be computed again, meaning a substantial amount of extra work that may well be pronounced unnecessary if and when the 140th and 141st reports are put into effect.

Finally, I would stress Lord Selsdon's proposal that new rules should be drawn up as speedily as possible which, once adopted, should then be applied. It is in general a sorry state of affairs when matters that could be sorted out quite simply become extraordinarily complicated, difficult and long-drawn out; but when this sort of thing is being done with the legal position of employees, it is scandalous and unacceptable. The management of an ordinary business would never be allowed to act like this. If they did, the trade unions would make a very noisy protest, and it seems as if this could happen here!

For all these reasons I am glad to lend my support to the draft recommendation, and even more so to the very lucid survey of the subject by Lord Selsdon. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — We are all familiar with that moment of blinding experience when we feel that we have been here before. That is called *déjà vu* — anyway, it is called *déjà vu* in English. When we hear Lord Selsdon and Mr. Dequae repeating almost word for word the sentiments they have expressed on three or four previous occasions, I think that we are today *très déjà vu*.

Even though the suggestions are repetitive and the criticisms have been used before, that does not detract from their importance. Since the same complaints have to be made again and

Mr. Page (continued)

again, that emphasises the delays and the lack of decision by the co-ordinated organisations, and, as Lord Selsdon said, the frustration of the staff grows in proportion to the delay.

Any organisation is only as strong as its staff, and I think that an international organisation probably depends on its staff more than any other. If the general assembly is the boss, the boss does not meet very often. The general assemblies of the WEU and the other co-ordinated organisations are the only parents to whom the staff can turn. They therefore have a particular responsibility to guard the interests of the staff.

I fully support the report that Lord Selsdon has presented, except in one small respect, and I shall return to that. I wish to draw attention to three points in Lord Selsdon's report. The first is in paragraph 9, which says that the continuity of the pension fund must be ensured and unharmed by political upheavals. As Lord Selsdon explained, it is more of a scheme than a fund. However, newcomers to the staff may be looking forty or more years ahead to their pensions and it is obvious that during that period there will be political upheavals, difficulties and changes in the organisations concerned. As well as the scheme, there should perhaps be some kind of reserve fund to provide a cushion to ensure that the finance is available immediately in the event of difficulties with member States.

My second point concerns paragraph 21, in which Lord Selsdon suggests that the joint management of the fund in the co-ordinated organisations — a principle I fully support — should be governed by a board comprising one or two senior officials from each of the organisations. I put forward here for consideration by the Secretaries-General and governments only the suggestion that it might be as well to have two or three outside specialists — bankers, insurance specialists or others — who could give their objective views when the governing body meets, since the governing body might become a little too introspective.

My third point deals with paragraphs 31 and 32. There Lord Selsdon sets out, in absolute and clear reality, some of the difficulties that have bogged down the negotiations. In paragraph 32 he suggests that perhaps outside opinion might be obtained. I believe that this is a good idea, provided that the outside opinion does not produce yet another layer on the gateau and, as Mr. Stoffelen said, yet another committee that is meeting to discuss the same subjects all over again.

It therefore gives me the greatest pleasure to support the draft recommendation.

I query only the part of the recommendation that discusses the granting of reversionary pen-

sions to widowers of female staff. I expect that this will develop in European countries over the next twenty, thirty or forty years, but I would find it difficult to persuade my own constituents that now is an appropriate moment in the financial condition of European countries and the developed world generally to demand this new method of granting pensions.

If the recommendation "that the Council promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations" means carrying on a discussion, I am happy to leave it at that. I should not like any criticism I make of that slightly way-out recommendation to detract in any way from my confirmed belief that the other recommendations are important, vital, necessary and urgent. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Piket.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I first want to congratulate Lord Selsdon on his excellent report. We are really astonished to learn that, in the matter of pensions, the organisation has for so long behaved in the manner described in this report towards the officials working here for Western European Union. At first I thought that we were dealing with chattels and not with human beings.

For that reason, I am very glad that all these negotiations which have been going on for so many years, have made it possible to achieve results as regards pensions. Nevertheless I read that at the end of three years we are at the same point as before. In other words, from now onwards the Council will have to show greater care in its dealings with the staff working for Western European Union.

As has been said, it would be impossible to act in this way towards the staff of any private firm in the member countries of WEU. Accordingly, the Secretary-General and the Council will have to proceed very carefully if they are not to experience further difficulties with the staff who give us such good backing in our work.

As other speakers have already stressed, I too was surprised by paragraph 30 of the present report, which tells us that the negotiations for salary increases sometimes last for more than a year. I read the following :

"... without going into the actual level of salaries applicable in the co-ordinated organisations, there is no escaping the fact that during the period of reference for assessing the change in the cost of living the purchasing power of staff progressively diminishes, and in addition several months elapse after the end of this reference period before compensation is granted, with the result that staff are always at least nine months behind in a vain attempt to adjust salaries to prices."

Mr. Piket (continued)

I believe that in all countries of Western Europe civil servants receive their salary increases after a delay of only a few months. Here, they have to wait nine months — in other words, the time required to conceive a child. Nine months of negotiations for a normal salary increase is far too long. For that reason, I invite the Rapporteur to study closely the suggestions that I make in my amendment.

This amendment is to replace the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following text :

“Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the unacceptable delay in applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977,”

The report stresses that a satisfactory outcome has been reached as regards pensions, but it also emphasises that the delay in waiting for salary increases is unduly long. Consequently, I hope that the Rapporteur will be good enough to accept this amendment.

Furthermore, I propose the insertion of the following new paragraph after Part I of the draft recommendation proper :

“II. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff ;”

This is what happens in all the countries of Western Europe. It should also happen in the same way in an organisation to which we are proud to belong ; and that is very important for the preservation of freedom in Europe. Our officials must find satisfaction in their work. They must not be allowed to experience difficulties or to feel anxiety — in greater or lesser degree — about their salaries. When prices increase, it is quite normal that their salaries should also be increased. I hope, therefore, that my colleague and friend, the Rapporteur, will accept my amendment — all the more so, since he wrote in paragraph 30 that far too long a period of time elapsed before salaries attained their normal level after a devaluation.

I would add that, if my amendment were accepted, the present Part II would become Part III.

I read the report which we are debating with great interest, and hope that in the future we shall no longer have to discuss a problem of this kind. We must act with humanity towards those men and women who work for us, and not consider them as mere chattels with which we can do as we like. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Piket.

I now call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate Lord Selsdon on his report and thank him and the Chairman, Mr. Dequae, for their diligence, patience and persistence in preparing and presenting the report.

I have but one objection, reference to which has already been made by Mr. Page. It is to the suggestion of a reversionary pension to widowers. I have on previous occasions protested against this suggestion, probably with exaggerated emphasis. I look upon it as an obeisance to sex equality, and I am to some extent fortified by the fact that I doubt whether member governments will be prepared to accept the suggestion.

In his supporting remarks Lord Selsdon indicated that that suggestion would cost WEU little, but if it were accepted, it would be at least an unfortunate precedent, because its effect upon other pension funds, particularly those of which a high proportion of females were members, could be catastrophic.

I feel compelled to mention this today because of my consistent and persistent opposition to the suggestion, although the single criticism I have voiced does not detract from my overall acceptance, with a measure of enthusiasm, of Lord Selsdon's recommendations. I repeat my congratulations but reinforce my arguments against the suggestion of reversionary pensions to widowers. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Lord Peddie.

I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — I have listened to the interventions that have been made in the debate on Lord Selsdon's splendid report. Unexpectedly, I am confronted with a phenomenon that is part of a much bigger phenomenon.

We have an interesting set of rules and decisions about the conditions of civil servants who serve this organisation. Even then it is apparently almost impossible to take final decisions and, when they are taken, to bring them into operation. The phenomenon in practically all sectors of national bureaucracies, and it is even more apparent in international bureaucracies and bodies, is that for the effective and efficient tackling of problems we need high-quality and well-equipped civil servants, and that necessity makes it much more difficult to reach final solutions.

That is a phenomenon that I have noticed in many years' experience of the small international body, Benelux. A civil servant, who has been punished for so doing, told us that there were about 1,500 civil servants in Benelux, not in the organisation as such, but at home, dealing with the colour of vermicelli, the method of packing milk, and more serious matters. Those 1,500

Mr. de Niet (continued)

civil servants had regular meetings, perhaps not every fortnight, but certainly every three weeks or every month to try to find solutions to the problems.

Among those civil servants, we were told, there were several who would ask to be passed by when they were up for promotion because they were much more independent than they would be if they were promoted. That was so because they were the representatives of their country. The more a person works on the details of any scheme, the more perfectionist he becomes. There is, therefore, a vested interest in this enormous post-war complex in not coming to final solutions. That is almost demonic because it is almost always an unconscious rather than a conscious motivation. It happens possibly because those organisations never become bankrupt.

I give this analogy because I have been struck this morning by the much bigger phenomenon to which Lord Selston has not and I have not the final solution. It is important to be conscious of this, because those who are politically responsible have no time for such matters. They cannot know everything. They perhaps see only the report in which a solution is not found. The solution is very difficult to find.

I hope that the younger generation of politicians and civil servants will be very conscious of this phenomenon. Otherwise, if we go on as for the past twenty-five years, the result may be the bankruptcy of international co-operation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. de Niet.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Lord SELSDON (*United Kingdom*). — I thank my colleagues for their support, at the same time pointing out the considerable time and expense we have incurred today in speaking about the same subject. I have no objection to Mr. Picket's amendment and urge its adoption. It is slightly more forceful than what I had in mind.

European bureaucracy is perhaps not like the human being but more like the elephant that has a two-and-a-half-year pregnancy. The mind boggles at the idea of an impoverished parliamentarian seeking to marry a rich elephantine European bureaucrat.

On the particular reservations expressed on the pension scheme and reversionary rights for widowers, it might be appropriate if I put forward figures for the record. At present within the co-ordinated organisations 65 % of all employees are men and 35 % women. Of the women

approximately just over one half are classified as heads of family, and of those 17 % are married.

I understand that actuarially the cost of such a proposal, provided women continue to outlive men, as they seem successfully to have done for generations, would be approximately an extra 2.5 % maximum on the cost of the annual contribution by governments, but only after twenty-five years. It may well be within that period the slow steady advance by women over men may have ceased and they may be even retiring. It is such a long way off that I would ask that that comment should be left in the report simply to make the point.

I am grateful to my colleagues for the support they have given, and to the bureaucrats themselves, because this is very much in their own self-interest.

I close on a point of principle which may be thought a personal point of view. I still believe bureaucrats are there to serve, not to spend time arguing their own affairs. I believe, too, that their level of remuneration should be lower than in the outside world, because the benefits and security of tenure should be higher. They cannot fairly expect to be amongst the most highly paid in Europe and at the same time to have the highest benefits and best possible conditions of work.

Here one would draw an analogy between the salaries of those parliamentarians who seek to serve their countries and whose security of tenure, particularly for example, among the opposition in my own country, may be very brief. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I think this is one of the best budget reports we have ever had. It does not dodge the problems — indeed, quite the opposite.

I would thank the various speakers, who by making their contributions have ensured that the debate did have some meaning, at least more meaning than in the past.

I have asked to speak, however, because I shall be leaving this Assembly in October, and I do not like leaving a house untidy. I would not like to have gone away leaving behind me a staff that is dissatisfied. So I am especially pleased to see that the only obstacle that stood in the way of this solution has now been removed. I can go away with my mind at rest. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I think I may say that the Assembly owes a great deal to Mr. Dequae for his work as Chairman of the Committee.

The President (continued)

On behalf of the Assembly, Mr. Dequae, I would like to thank you very much indeed. *(Applause)*

(The President continued in French)

The debate is closed.

In Document 742, the Committee presents a draft opinion and a draft recommendation.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU.

I put it to the vote.

Are there any objections to the draft opinion ?..

Are there any abstentions ?..

The draft opinion is agreed to unanimously¹.

Mr. Piket has tabled an amendment to the draft recommendation on the status of WEU staff as follows :

1. Replace the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following text :

"Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the unacceptable delay in applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977,"

2. After Part I of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following :

"II. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff ;"

The present Part II will become Part III.

Does Mr. Piket wish to speak in defence of his amendment ?

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I think that I have sufficiently explained the motives behind this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the Committee's opinion on this amendment ?

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — The Committee accepts it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Mr. Piket's amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is agreed to unanimously.

1. See page 32.

The vote on the amended draft recommendation as a whole would be by roll-call if the Assembly were not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the amended draft recommendation ?..

Are there any abstentions ?..

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The amended draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously¹.

4. *Anti-submarine warfare*

(Presentation of and Debate on the supplementary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 743 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the supplementary report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on anti-submarine warfare and vote on the revised draft recommendation, Document 743 and Amendments.

I would remind you that at the end of the last session, owing to lack of time, the previous report, Document 725, was referred back to the Committee on 2nd December 1976, at the request of the Chairman of the Committee.

I call Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As you have already explained to the Assembly, Mr. President, this report was intended to be taken in December last and the text of Document 725 and the recommendation which it contains were therefore on our agenda for that day. Since then, as you have said, the Committee has looked further at this matter and produced the supplementary report in Document 743 and this morning we shall be considering the revised draft recommendation on the single sheet of paper.

I was a little upset in December that we were unable to consider this report, but I am now rather grateful to have had the additional period to think again about some of the things in my report and to make minor amendments to the draft.

I have also been able to take into account some of the continuing contributions to the debate on anti-submarine warfare that have been published and become available since our December meeting. These include the important speech made by my colleague, Mr. Duffy, at the last session of our Assembly when he spoke in his

1. See page 33.

Mr. Roper (continued)

capacity as Under-Secretary for the Navy in the British Ministry of Defence; various important articles in the United States literature, including articles in the journal *Sea Technology*; and, in particular, the most interesting article in the June issue of the French journal *Défense nationale*, in which Commandant Brenot does me the great honour of analysing my report in some detail. I shall want to comment later on his critique, but I am particularly glad that, as a staff officer of the French Navy, he is able to conclude his article with the words:

"La lutte anti-sous-marine pourrait être une des premières tâches à assigner en commun aux forces maritimes des nations européennes."

That, of course, is the burden of my report. It is one of the first areas in which we should work for co-operation between our European neighbours.

In introducing the report, I should like to make one or two points which are inherent in it and which have perhaps been misunderstood. In considering the problem of anti-submarine warfare there is clearly an important difference between strategic submarines capable of firing ballistic missiles over distances of 2,000 to 4,000 miles or more, and the anti-ship submarines that threaten merchant shipping and NATO military reinforcements across the Atlantic, the English Channel and the North Sea.

It is worth remembering that some sixty of the Soviet submarines currently in service already have a cruise missile capacity with ranges between 30 and 400 miles. It is perfectly true that these submarine-launched cruise missiles do not necessarily have the sophistication of the cruise missile which the United States is now developing, but the fact that there are cruise missiles already deployed in the Soviet fleet has important implications for arms limitation discussions on cruise missiles. We are not dealing with something which does not yet exist in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. They already have a significant number of cruise missiles in their fleet.

Having made this distinction between strategic submarines and anti-ship submarines, we can then go on to discuss whether it is possible or desirable to have an effective form of anti-submarine warfare against the strategic ballistic missile-firing submarine. The argument in favour of desirability turns on the possible destabilising rôle of anti-ballistic measures in general. Certainly at the moment the United States considers that its submarine-launched ballistic missiles are the most secure part of its triad of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bombers and land-based missiles that makes up the United States strategic deterrent. Although the Americans,

through their SOSUS system, described in my report, and their Seaguard system of computers and satellites for analysis and processing on what is virtually a world-wide basis, described in Commandant Brenot's article and in *Sea Technology*, are developing at enormous cost a system of information on Soviet submarine activity, it is not clear that, even taken together with the development of the Captor anti-submarine mines, they provide an effective capability vis-à-vis Soviet strategic submarines and, indeed, as Commandant Brenot points out in his article, they may become increasingly ineffective in the next decade as submarines become quieter and in view of the development of possible counter-measures which would confuse the surveillance system.

In any case, the burden of my report is that this sort of operation, attempting to track submarines on a world-wide basis, is almost certainly outside the scope of the European members of NATO, individually or together, and that we should concentrate our efforts on defending the use of the seas by friendly surface vessels. Here again there are two approaches which can be distinguished. The first is shallow water anti-submarine warfare in the confined waters of the Mediterranean, the North Sea, the Channel and the approaches to the Atlantic ports; the second is deep water anti-submarine warfare, primarily in the Atlantic, both north and south. It is worth stressing that not all European countries are involved in this.

As far as deep water anti-submarine warfare is concerned, there are only a limited number of European countries involved. Clearly, the French Navy and the Royal Navy, together with the United States and Canada, are, but inevitably many of the other European members of the Alliance have concentrated their resources upon anti-submarine warfare in the areas immediately surrounding their own countries. Deep water anti-submarine warfare can itself be further divided into two categories: "point defence" around a convoy or a major naval vessel and "area defence", which ensures that a particular shipping route or area is kept clear of enemy submarines.

My report perhaps over-simplifies the situation in suggesting that there is a choice between these two. I want to make it clear that they are complementary, although, in terms of European co-operation, I would argue, as I have in the report, that more attention should be given to point defence rather than area defence. The recommendations in my report, therefore, concentrate on closer co-operation among the European members of NATO in shallow water anti-submarine warfare.

I believe that this must include urgent action to ensure effective ship-to-ship communications

Mr. Roper (continued)

between respective navies. It is highly depressing that after so many years of the Alliance NATO ships exercising together still do not possess secure methods of intercommunication. We also need, as is mentioned in the report, to develop interoperability in our sonar systems. Future sonar buoy processors must be capable of reading the signals of other countries' sonar buoys.

We also need interchangeability in our ASW weapons systems in order to ensure economic and flexible logistics support. If we have a mixed European fleet involved in a frigate screen around a convoy, we need if possible to have all of the ships in that screen using the same sorts of weapons so that the logistics can be rationalised.

Reference is made in my report and in the recommendation to the SACLANT research centre at La Spezia. I should like to say how important I believe such co-ordinated research institutes are. I believe that we should give more attention to the idea of doing research and development on a European-wide basis. But clearly, as research becomes more expensive, many countries will no longer find it possible to finance research and development, and here centres such as the SACLANT centre could play an important part.

I am pleased that all the members of WEU — with the exception of Luxembourg, which does not have a navy — together with six other members of NATO are contributing staff to that centre. I hope that we shall find ways of expanding its work and of considering whether this technique of common research and development institutions could not also be expanded.

Unless General Close is right and Soviet forces would be on the Rhine in two days, our planning for hostilities in Europe must depend on continuing liaison and supplies across the Atlantic. In a speech which I quote in my report and which was made by the outgoing Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Vice-Admiral Jungius, he pointed out that on any day some 7,000 merchant ships could be found in the North Atlantic or in the ports of neighbouring countries, and that even in a period of austerity and rationing he estimated that half the goods and raw materials would still have to be transported, this amounting to some 70 million tons each month. This would also need to be shipped across the Atlantic.

In addition, reinforcements for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in the event of hostilities would amount to more than one million men in the first month and equipment weighing one million tons. Ammunition would add a further 4.5 million tons and initial supplies also 4.5 million tons.

Fuel supplies to the forces would amount to about 600,000 barrels a day. Although most of the men and their light equipment could be transported by air, there would still remain 1,000 cargoes of initial supplies of ammunition and fuel and, later, 500 cargoes a month of supplies to sustain the forces.

That demonstrates the importance for us in Europe of secure sea lanes across the Atlantic. One must add to that not merely the need to get reinforcements and supplies across the Atlantic, but the need to get reinforcements across the English Channel and the North Sea from the United Kingdom to Central and Northern France. There might be submarines operating in those waters as well.

In this situation we need to give urgent attention to making the most effective use of our resources in the field, and the Committee makes the recommendation, which was adopted by fifteen votes to zero, with one abstention, to put forward certain measures that we could take to secure that end. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

I now call Mr. Reid.

Mr. REID (*United Kingdom*). — As a Scot, I want to thank Mr. Roper for his lucidly presented and excellently researched piece of work. Those of us who live north of the English border are well aware of the vital importance of anti-submarine warfare. The reasons for that are clear. Our furthest point north is 1,800 kilometres nearer the Kola Inlet than is Paris. We have no illusions about the Soviet northern fleet. We are well aware that our waters are the forward deployment area for that fleet, and we have no desire to see Scotland go neutral or be taken out and so provide the opportunity for the NATO northern flank to be rolled back by several hundred miles.

Scottish waters command the northern approaches both to the Soviet Union and the United States and if the former's strategic and attack submarines are to gain access to the North Atlantic, the Shetland/Faroes and Shetland/Norway gaps become of prime military importance. The present British and NATO defence establishment in Scotland recognises this and is almost exclusively devoted to surveillance and interception.

I speak this morning as a Scottish Nationalist — someone who is dedicated to the return of a parliament to my country. This has two complications for ASW, given our enormous strategic importance. In Scotland we are fully aware that we cannot contract out of the military debate. We have a common commitment to Western European civilisation and western democracy. We are well aware of the importance of our fishing and of our vast reserves of oil

Mr. Reid (continued)

to the European communities. In my party we have to look at this area of ASW in a two-tier way: first, ASW as presently adopted, and, secondly, the impact on ASW of certain political developments in Scotland in the future.

I hope that I shall not be accused of special pleading in this matter since I consider that most distinguished delegates who are brought together in this Assembly, in common with their governments, will take position on constitutional developments in Scotland only when these become a reality. It is important to note, however, that there is a movement in Scotland which has doubled its vote at every election since the war and that a small swing could produce a constitutional change of great magnitude north of the border. Nevertheless such a change would produce no new *démarche*, because the same strategic determinants would control the defence capability in Scotland whether as part of the United Kingdom or as an independent State and Mr. Roper has delineated that quite neatly in his report.

If at any given time there are five strategic Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic and four or five attack submarines, clearly, given any rise in tension, they will require access to the North Atlantic for an additional fifty, sixty or seventy submarines. Access to the sea lanes of the North Atlantic would enable the Soviet Union to carry military hardware there in the event of military hostilities.

In that situation, Scotland points a broad finger to the Greenland-Faroes gap. We have a radar defence network backed by aircraft from Lossiemouth that patrol "over the horizon" into northern waters. At Kinloss and Leuchars are our main bases providing aircraft to cover and hunt WTO submarines and to intercept WTO aircraft.

There are several NATO bases in my country, some of them nuclear. There are the American bases at Holy Loch and Edzell. The major British base is at Faslane and the major repair and maintenance base is at Rosyth in the River Forth. In Scotland, too, we have substantial experience of underwater surveillance and of operating sonar systems of the SOSUS and mobile SURTASS types.

I take issue with John Roper on only two points. He reports in paragraph 49 that the primary NATO concern in regard to ASW should be on a localised basis in shallow waters. He says in paragraph 49:

"The Committee believes that considerations of cost alone must lead most NATO nations to concentrate their ASW effort on coastal and point defence."

That seems rather at variance with some of the other arguments advanced by Mr. Roper in terms of transatlantic trade and the bottling up of the Soviet fleet from Murmansk.

Area and point defence are not alternatives but complementary. I suggest that to abandon one at the expense of the other would simply encourage Soviet activity in the abandoned area.

Secondly I wish to touch on the underwater research establishment at La Spezia, to which Mr. Roper referred. He says in paragraph 31 of the report:

"Your Rapporteur believes that there could be a case for moving the centre to a country with a strong national ASW research centre with which the SACLANT centre could collaborate more closely."

I find that an attractive argument, although I do not wish to diminish the work already completed at La Spezia.

Again I draw the attention of the Assembly to the work carried out in Scotland in this sphere. Given our enormous oil development, we are deep into undersea technology in Scotland, we have the research capability and there may, indeed, be an opportunity for further work to be carried out in Scottish waters and under actual ASW conditions.

I wish to comment on Mr. Roper's remarks on interoperability. ASW involves the integration of more than one weapon and command/control system. Air surveillance, surface and submarine sea patrols, radar and communications and high-speed response and interception are all important elements of ASW. Scotland at present contributes in all these spheres to NATO and would continue to do so under an SNP government.

These systems involve advanced technology, consequent high capital cost and the use of highly-trained manpower. Scotland is, of course, capable of providing the necessary manpower for operating such systems, and the defence budget would have to allow resources for the provision of such personnel. But beyond this Scotland will need access to and participation in the development of the advanced systems associated with ASW.

The SNP accept that such access and participation must take place within the context of the Alliance. We clearly accept that a budgetary contribution to multinational and Alliance joint development projects, wherever sited, allowing for the crucial and priority rôle for ASW in Scotland, would be called for, and this would have to be an element in our defence budget. It goes without saying almost that Scotland would adopt ASW systems approved by the Alliance that were interoperable. In view of the present multi-member involvement in maritime

Mr. Reid (continued)

operations in the North Atlantic, interoperability is absolutely essential.

Lastly, I wish to say a few words on the Scottish independence option. Today the word "independence" is used too widely. We should be talking about interdependence, because no State in the world is independent these days, with the exception of the Soviet Union, America and possibly China.

We welcome attention to the crucial rôle of anti-submarine warfare within the defence plans of the Western Alliance. Our defence policy commits the Scots to providing the necessary resources for the maritime rôle and envisages that this would constitute Scotland's main contribution to NATO.

Our strategic geographical position at the southern end of the Faroes gap makes it one of the most important maritime bases in the Western Alliance. Through the northern waters the large and growing Russian northern fleet must pass to gain access to the Atlantic.

Already Russian long-range maritime surveillance aircraft engage in flight operations through and beyond this area. The main sea lanes from North America which must be protected can be reached from sea and air bases in Scotland. This makes Scotland a front-line military contributor to the Western Alliance.

In recognising this strategic situation, which is bound to grow in importance as Russian naval strength grows and extends its reach into the mid-Atlantic, the SNP has adopted the commitment to the maritime rôle in consideration of the mutual benefits and obligations to a small country like Scotland within the Alliance of free countries, that Alliance being NATO. In exchange for this Alliance commitment, Scotland would expect that the Alliance under Article 5 would relieve Scotland of the necessity for maintaining armed forces beyond its resource capability, particularly of the conventional or standard composition.

Our present rôle within the United Kingdom is almost exclusively maritime in respect of home-stationed forces. While we shall require removal within a reasonable period of the strategic nuclear submarine bases on the Clyde, we shall continue the maritime cover provided from Scots bases, particularly in the ASW rôle. For example, the long-range maritime surveillance carried out from Kinloss by Nimrod aircraft in the North Atlantic, North Sea and Norwegian Sea would be continued. These patrols can be supplemented, as at present, by operations contributed by other NATO members, and facilities would be made available to do so. ASW training using Scots facilities and air and sea

space could be used by NATO members which would be useful for developing interoperability and also familiarising crews with the operational environment for ASW against the Russian northern fleet.

We require a combination of area and point defence. NATO's "bottling in" operation across the Faroes gap and to Norway is aimed at keeping as many Russian vessels out of the mid-Atlantic as possible. Scotland would wish to contribute to that ASW rôle. This involves the area defence concept. For escorting convoys and protecting home ports, ASW and mines counter-measures forces using point defence would be required. For Scotland at least both concepts are essential and have to be provided for.

In sum, an independent Scotland would continue its maritime rôle within the Alliance and seek to develop it by concentrating its military resources on and round the Faroes gap and in chosen coastal areas. Scotland would favour interoperability and compatibility within NATO and would make an appropriate budgetary contribution to joint research and development in ASW wherever sited within the Alliance. In return, it would expect assistance in other military areas and the normal coverage given by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Reid.

I call Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report presented by Mr. Roper contains many extremely relevant analyses and much valuable information, the importance of which has been recently pointed out by French specialist publications.

The Rapporteur shows to what extent Western Europe depends on maritime trade in times of peace and even more in times of war. He therefore rightly emphasises the seriousness of the threat to our lines of communication posed by the expansion of the Soviet submarine fleet, in particular its nuclear attack submarines.

However, it seems to us that there are two serious gaps in the recommendations made by Mr. Roper. In the first place they envisage anti-submarine warfare only in the context of the Atlantic Alliance: but this only covers the Atlantic, or more accurately that part of the Atlantic situated to the north of the Tropic of Cancer.

The Rapporteur himself points out, in paragraph 20 of his explanatory memorandum, that beyond this area there are other regions which are just as important to Europe and that the USSR's nuclear-propelled submarine fleet gives that country the means of attacking and sinking ships, not only in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, but also in more distant areas.

Mr. Rivière (continued)

In the areas beyond the North Atlantic and the Tropic of Cancer it is the major part of our oil supplies which is threatened. The route round the Cape of Good Hope is vital for Western Europe, but not for the United States. Consequently, the submarine threat is assessed very differently by the European and North American partners in the Alliance. It is therefore up to Europe to find while there is still time its own means of protecting its lines of communication. To do that our States must press on with their anti-submarine warfare research in order to cope with the rapidly-increasing performance of the modern submarine.

On this point Mr. Roper does not put forward any precise proposals, since he is opposed to Europe committing itself to an effective wide-ranging independent anti-submarine warfare programme. In his view, Europe must concentrate its anti-submarine warfare efforts on coastal defence and point defence, in other words drop the greater part of its research and its production and rely solely on American protection.

Of course it would be difficult for Europe, with its limited budgetary resources, to undertake a programme comparable with the programme which the United States has christened Seaguard, and which is to enable the Americans to patrol certain crucial ocean areas.

However, even on a European scale, new solutions could be found to enable our countries too to tackle anti-submarine warfare on an oceanic scale. It is quite possible to develop in Europe new weapons which will have a greater maximum effective range, will reach the target faster and have a better chance of making a direct hit.

It is also desirable to brush up our tactical concepts in anti-submarine warfare. Naval air forces on the other hand may have better chances of success if they use methods aimed at making the submarine's task of assessing the situation more complicated by presenting it with a tactical situation which is as fluid as possible and which compels it to limit its use of acoustic, electromagnetic or visual instruments.

Similarly the techniques for protecting convoys may be improved and adapted to the new conditions of anti-submarine warfare.

It is, then, possible for Europe to bring its methods and techniques up to date. Action on this matter is urgent and vital, as the sources of our supplies must be protected and our lines of communication secured.

This protection is not fully secured by the Atlantic Alliance. The way it is organised within the framework of NATO does not tally with our

needs. It is in an autonomous structure, in other words in WEU that the States of Europe should take up the challenge posed by the development of the submarine fleets of the other side. The Standing Armaments Committee should therefore give this problem a high priority amongst its new commitments. As Commander Didier Brenot recently wrote in the review *Défense nationale*, "Anti-submarine warfare could be one of the first tasks to be assigned jointly to the naval forces of the European nations".

It is with this in mind that I have tabled an amendment which proposes more active intervention by WEU in the field of joint production of equipment and in the field of research. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rivière.

I call Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — I welcome our discussion of this report today, first because I regard the Russian submarine threat which it poses to the West as being one of the most serious subjects we could possibly discuss and, secondly, because this is my first speech to Western European Union, and I am particularly grateful for this opportunity to speak on a subject on which I feel strongly and which is of such importance.

The report is seen against the background of the growth of the Russian submarine force. It is salutary to consider that in the past ten years the Russian submarine force has increased threefold and that the Russian submarine building programme is running at one submarine per month. It is appropriate that we should be discussing this subject on this very day because Mr. Brezhnev is here in France. The question I would pose to him is "Why are you building all these submarines?"

It should be remembered that the submarine is an aggressive weapon. It is not built purely for defensive reasons. It is a lethal, dangerous and aggressive piece of machinery. Both conventional and nuclear submarines pose a political as well as a serious military threat by their presence in the seas of the world. They are secretive; they can appear at odd corners. When we consider the expansion of the Russian fleet into the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean, we realise that we are dealing with a very serious situation.

The report shows that fifteen years ago the NATO Alliance had within it 1,300 warships. Now there are half that number, yet the Russian submarine force has increased threefold since those days.

The first recommendation is to ensure that the anti-submarine warfare forces of member governments are fully interoperable. I take issue with that recommendation, because I believe that it is too wide. One of the difficulties is that it sets

Mr. Banks (continued)

such a wide compass within which to attain interoperability that it will become ineffective.

Of course we wish to make all our anti-submarine forces interoperable, but is that recommendation a practical statement of what can be achieved? I believe that it is not and that we need to ensure that the recommendations are more specific. A narrower definition should be given in the recommendation of the interoperability towards which we can work.

I am pleased that the following words of that recommendation read "with particular reference to communications", because I believe that this is the core of what needs to be improved. It is essential that positive steps be urgently taken to improve communications, the equipment and spares that are available, the training of the operators and particularly the standardisation of computer analysis of the information that is communicated. Within our Alliance we shall depend on the early detection of submarine movements and the threats that they may or may not pose, and the action that can be taken by our navies and land forces to preserve the *status quo* will depend on the communications between us of the movement of those submarines. I believe, therefore, that the research which is referred to later in the recommendation should concentrate solely on improving interoperability of communications as a first step.

These matters are of great import and it will not be possible for us as allies to secure a peaceful and secure free West unless we ensure that the Russian submarine fleet is aware that it may be detected by helicopter, surveillance aircraft, people with sonar or hydrophones with sonar, and that one detection will lead to the widest implementation of the forces arrayed against that submarine by communications. It is the communications that will be the key to ensuring that in any crisis, whether brought about by the movement of ships or by concentration of ships at those points, communication of information on those activities will create a reaction amongst the forces at our disposal that will ensure that no further action can be taken without moving one step further towards the outbreak of an aggressive situation. It is in that way that we shall be able to ensure that peace is secured and that the status quo is maintained. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much for that maiden speech, Mr. Banks.

I now call Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to congratulate Mr. Roper on an absolutely excellent report. As we saw when it was produced earlier, it has been very well researched. Mr. Roper has done a considerable amount of work on it and has succeeded in presenting his

figures and facts so effectively that nobody could possibly read this report and discard it. It will be almost the only report of all our discussions here this week that I shall take back with me to the United Kingdom, because I am so concerned about its contents.

We have in the House of Commons a custom that I should like to follow by congratulating my friend Robert Banks on a really good maiden speech. Those lucky enough to have heard him will hope that he will give us the same kind of message again. It was a first-class speech.

What worries me about Mr. Roper's report is that it is a document that cannot be pigeon-holed. Rather it is a document that we should keep for ready reference, for, as Mr. Roper has made absolutely clear, the equation — the balance of forces — is continually altering and it is not good enough to equate Mr. Roper's report with the present-day balance. The document and its information must be more than just kept on one's desk: it must be continually updated.

That was admirably illustrated by Mr. Banks when he pointed out that ten years ago the Russian submarine force was one third of today's level and that ten years ago the NATO vessels engaged in anti-submarine work were double the present number. That is an indication of how the balance has tilted against the western navies and western anti-submarine vessels in the past ten years.

Paragraph 6 of the explanatory memorandum which Mr. Roper has tabled, together with the recommendation, gives the situation today, but it is constantly changing, as I have said, and possibly I can best illustrate what I have tried to point out by referring to what Mr. Banks has just said is inadequate — as reflected in the text at the head of page 16 of today's issue of *The Times*. In his document and explanatory memorandum Mr. Roper deals with the current situation and refers to the fact that missile-carrying submarines may be some 2,500 nautical miles away from a target and indicates to this Assembly what a large area of ocean is to be covered by defensive vessels.

In *The Times* today, however, we have reports of the dilemma that western countries, and in particular the United States and Britain, find themselves over the cruise missile, which has a range of that number of miles but, on the other hand, can be produced very much more quickly and can be launched from a platform at sea and to a target on land 2,500 miles away, from a torpedo tube, and achieve accuracy of target of thirty yards. If we are to get this kind of advancement in the mechanics and capabilities of delivery vessels everywhere, it is a certainty that the target range of missile-carrying submarines will rapidly increase. Bearing in mind

Mr. Farr (continued)

that in a time of conflict, as mentioned in the explanatory memorandum, there will still be some 70 million tons of goods destined for Europe on the Atlantic each month, it is a false optimism that would persuade us in Western Europe to design our protective and combative measures to shallow water or coastal areas alone.

I entirely agree with the analysis in paragraph 42. We have the two alternatives clearly pinpointed by Mr. Roper: first, area defence and, secondly, local or point defence. But, unfortunately, in its conclusion the Committee in paragraph 49 says that NATO nations should concentrate their anti-submarine warfare effort on coastal and point defence. I do not believe that that is an acceptable solution for us in this Assembly, or a subject on which we should take a decision today. The fact that we are seeking to ignore our responsibilities over deep water sea traffic means presumably that we are hoping the Americans or some other nation will assume that responsibility for many millions of tons of sea traffic in deep water on its way to Europe on any one day.

I believe, as I have tried to point out, that coastal defence will become strategically more and more irrelevant as missile ranges increase. In any event, we have the maintenance of and improvement in the virtually unlimited range of nuclear submarines. Of the two alternatives in paragraph 42, I believe the first is the right solution for us here today.

Once again I would offer my most sincere congratulations to Mr. Roper on an absolutely first-class and excellent report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Farr.

There are no more speakers on the list. I ask the Committee Chairman and Rapporteur if he wishes to reply to the speeches.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am extremely grateful to all who have intervened in this debate for having contributed so much to it. We were all particularly interested to hear such an authoritative outline of the defence policy of the Scottish National Party from Mr. Reid, with particular reference to anti-submarine warfare, in view of the strategic importance of Scotland. It is not for me here to debate with him the relevance or appropriateness of that policy or of the cost that it might have for the Scottish people. None the less, it was a matter of very considerable interest and no doubt the Council of WEU will be working out how it can enlarge its bench so that it can be of eight seats instead of seven in the unlikely event of Scotland becoming independent, because no doubt Scotland would wish to continue her commitments to WEU as well as to NATO.

In what Mr. Reid has said — and this was touched on by Mr. Farr in his closing remark — there is some misunderstanding among a number of my colleagues about paragraph 49. I had hoped in what I said in presenting the report to have made clear what I was and was not talking about.

Paragraph 49 says: "considerations of cost alone must lead most NATO nations to concentrate their ASW effort...". It says "most", not "all". I thought I had said — and I shall have a chance to check the text tomorrow morning — in introducing the report that I was perfectly well aware that certainly the French Navy and the Royal Navy have, and will continue to have, important deep-water obligations in partnership with the United States and Canada. However, most of the European members of NATO have neither the experience nor the resources to develop deep-water capabilities.

The whole burden of the report is that we need to pool our techniques in Europe as far as shallow water work, for which we already have responsibilities, is concerned. In addition, and this is intrinsic to the report, certainly France and the United Kingdom and possibly other European countries will wish to continue the work which they have done in deep water. This would not be excluded. The two are not alternatives. I am merely trying to say that, within the European members of NATO, we have a common interest in shallow water anti-submarine warfare which is so important for the Mediterranean and for moving equipment across the North Sea and the English Channel and in the approaches to the Atlantic ports.

I hope that neither Mr. Reid nor Mr. Farr will misunderstand me. We are not ruling out deep-water work. Indeed, even in paragraph 49 there is a reference to point defence. I shall return to this when I comment on the important remarks of Mr. Rivière about point versus area defence, to which Mr. Farr referred. Point defence is, of course, deep-water ASW, so that, even in this sentence of the paragraph, there is a very clear commitment to some continuing deep-water work.

I was trying to argue, as was demonstrated with such skill by Commandant Brenot in his article, that when it comes to the costs of developing something like the SOSUS and Seaguard systems of the Americans — which involve enormous amounts of computer analysis and data processing in order to achieve worldwide surveillance and potential area defence — this is going beyond the sort of expenditure which is likely to be available to most European nations. I say in paragraph 49:

"Such specialisation would not of course stop joint operations with Canadian and United States ASW forces — 'point defence' includes

Mr. Roper (continued)

the capability of protecting convoys and naval forces."

This is one of the areas in which we need to specialise within the Alliance. The United States is currently investing enormous resources in area defence and to try to duplicate that sort of system for European countries does not seem to me sensible.

I repeat that I am not in any way ruling out deep-water activities by European NATO members. Indeed, as Mr. Reid said, it is very important to maintain the concept of complementarity between area and point defence because, if we were to concentrate on the one, that would constitute an invitation to our opponents to concentrate on the other.

I should now like to turn to the very interesting remarks of Mr. Rivière. I am not sure whether he was in the hemicycle when I myself quoted from the excellent article by Commandant Didier Brenot the final phrase: "*La lutte anti-sous-marine pourrait être une des premières tâches à assigner en commun aux forces maritimes des nations européennes.*"

I agree absolutely that if one reads the article as a whole one sees that it also says, commenting on my paragraph 49, "*Cette complémentarité des efforts souhaitée par les Etats-Unis est logique.*" It is, of course, logical. Area defence and development of Seaguard and SOSUS are something the United States will continue.

However, I do take exception to one point made by Mr. Rivière and by Commandant Brenot because the latter, quoted by Mr. Rivière, suggests that there is no American interest in traffic around the Cape of Good Hope. Here one must look at the figures. Something like 40 % of American oil imports come round the Cape of Good Hope and this percentage is continually rising. It is inaccurate to suggest that this route is of no importance to the United States. It is also, of course, an important responsibility for the Alliance as a whole. I am afraid, therefore, that I do not share the view of Mr. Rivière that we ought to be responsible for this on our own.

Nor do I believe, as I think Mr. Rivière was suggesting, that this would really be a sensible area in which we in Europe could work on an autonomous basis. The enormous cost of such a course of action would rule it out. Surveillance of convoys across the Atlantic — and Commandant Brenot in his article has some interesting comments on the development of new convoy techniques — is something that must also be considered as a shared responsibility with Canada and the United States.

I should like to add to what has been said already by you, Mr. President, and by Mr. Farr

about the maiden speech of Robert Banks. In the House of Commons we have a habit of saying that we look forward to hearing a member many times between now and the next general election — which I hope is a long way away — and I say this to Mr. Banks now. I appreciated particularly the reference to the need for us to examine standardisation and interoperability by stages. In my introductory remarks I took up this point by saying that communications must be of first priority. I also believe in an ability to read each other's sonar buoys and to process the information therefrom, and in a move towards common systems for ASW weapons.

I am extremely glad to know that in my country and elsewhere there is a start objective for a next-generation lightweight torpedo which, it is hoped, will lead to a NATO-wide level of standardisation. Similar consideration is to be given later to heavyweight submarine torpedoes which afford a great deal of scope for practical standardisation. Mr. Banks makes a fair criticism of the recommendation when he says that the Assembly should go into more detail and be more specific about areas into which standardisation or interoperability could be extended.

One must not confuse the rather unsophisticated cruise missile in the existing Soviet submarines with the sort now being developed in the United States — it may well be in the process of development in the Soviet Union. They are not the same sort of thing. None the less, my report makes reference to a ballistic missile with a range of 2,500 miles and some of the Soviet submarines are now armed with a missile that has a range of 4,200 miles, the SSN-8. Quite clearly, there is a very serious threat a long way from our shores.

I hope that I have been able to deal with the points raised and that I have removed the possible ambiguity in the report about the relationship between shallow water ASW, wherein there is a large scope for European member countries, and the continuing rôle of some of our nations in deep water ASW as well. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

The debate is closed.

In Document 743 the Committee presents a revised draft recommendation.

We have two amendments before us: Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Farr and Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Rivière.

I will read out to you Amendment No. 1:

In paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out "with particular reference to shallow waters".

Mr. Rivière's amendment reads as follows:

The President (continued)

1. At the beginning of the revised draft recommendation proper, after "Recommends that the Council" insert "and its Standing Armaments Committee"; leave out "urge member governments".

2. In paragraph 1 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from "with particular reference" to the end of the paragraph and insert "to allow joint production for these forces wherever appropriate ;".

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper and insert :

"2. In liaison with the independent European programme group, evaluate European ASW requirements and capabilities in every field ;"

4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper and insert :

"3. Establish the necessary liaison with the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia, maintaining close links with national centres, and examine the possibilities of starting joint research into anti-submarine warfare."

Since Mr. Rivière's proposal contains the greater number of changes, I will call on him first to defend it.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my Amendment No. 2 consists of four paragraphs :

The first is aimed at adding after the words "Recommends that the Council", the words, "and its Standing Armaments Committee", since that is indeed the intention of our Assembly.

In my second paragraph I propose that in paragraph 1 of the recommendation, after the word "interoperable", the rest of the paragraph be replaced by the words "to allow joint production for these forces wherever appropriate ;". You know what is involved. The word "standardisation" means of course that it will once again be America which will be giving us the maximum quantity of armaments, whereas it would be far better for Europe to realise what it is capable of doing for joint production for these forces.

The third paragraph proposes drafting paragraph 2 as follows: "In liaison with the independent European programme group, evaluate European ASW requirements and capabilities in every field ;" And that in such a way as to cover absolutely everything. I ask yet again — and perhaps this is rather excessive, although it is a call I make every year — that Eurogroup, of which France is not a member, be terminated.

The fourth paragraph suggests that paragraph 3 should read as follows: "Establish the neces-

sary liaison with the SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre at La Spezia, maintaining close links with national centres, and examine the possibilities of starting joint research into anti-submarine warfare". The main purpose of this amendment is to ask the Council of Ministers of Western European Union to play its rôle in full and not beat about the bush, in other words, to initiate a real European policy of armaments co-operation in those fields where it is urgent and necessary. Anti-submarine warfare is a vital necessity for Europe, inasmuch as it provides protection for our lines of communication and for supply lines which are at present not fully covered by the Atlantic Alliance. It is therefore up to Europe to ensure its own anti-submarine protection in those fields where this protection is not effectively guaranteed by the integrated military organisation of NATO. It is clear that this is not a question of rivalry, but of taking complementary action. That is what I spell out in my amendment when I ask in particular for the best possible co-ordination to be established between the SACLANT submarine research centre at La Spezia and the European bodies concerned.

I hope, Ladies and Gentlemen, that you will appreciate the urgency of the purpose underlying my amendment and will vote for it.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment ?

Mr. BOLDRINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, without going into the merits of the discussion on the amendments — as we are going to abstain, and also in view of the many appreciations that might be made in support of, or against, those of the Rapporteur, we venture to oppose paragraph 4 of Mr. Rivière's amendment. We think the La Spezia centre did fulfil a primordial rôle from 1959 to the present, internationally as well as nationally ; we therefore think experience dictates that paragraph 3 be left as it stands in the Rapporteur's draft. For the rest, as I say, we shall abstain, given the different motivations we should be able to adduce.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The Chairman has seen the amendments only this morning and, therefore, the Committee has not been able formally to reach a view. In my capacity as Rapporteur, however, I ask the Assembly to oppose all four of the amendments.

Mr. Rivière does not in any way hide his objectives. He believes that we should work towards the development of an autonomous European anti-submarine force. When it considered this matter, the Committee was aware of Mr. Rivière's views and understood them, but a

Mr. Roper (continued)

majority disagree with him, and believe that it is a matter for which we should continue to be responsible within the Alliance.

There is some doubt whether we, as an Assembly, can make recommendations to the Standing Armaments Committee. I believe that under our own rules of procedure we can make recommendations only to the Council. However, that is a technical matter.

As far as the second amendment is concerned, I should really be very sorry if we were to leave out explicit reference to having interoperability, particularly with regard to communications. If Mr. Rivière wishes to move an amendment, I cannot understand why he does not do so after the reference to communications, because interoperability is essential for effective ASW.

However, I believe that it is better to say, as we do, "and in appropriate cases to increase the standardisation of these forces". I would be prepared to add "giving consideration to the possibilities of joint production" because that would go some way to meet Mr. Rivière's point. This might encourage Mr. Rivière not to press that amendment.

I cannot accept, for the reasons I put forward earlier, the suggestion that it would be possible for the European programme group to evaluate all European ASW requirements and capabilities. It would be a great mistake. As Mr. Banks said, we must lay down explicit points on which we want to work stage by stage. We should drown the EPG in its infancy if we were to ask it to consider requirements in every field, and that is why I have tried to specialise in one field at this stage.

Finally, I very much support what was said by Mr. Boldrini about the La Spezia centre. It is extremely discourteous to that centre to use at the end of the amendment the words "examine the possibilities of starting joint research". Starting, indeed! This research has been going on for years. I am delighted that, although France is no longer a member of the integrated Alliance, French officers play a distinguished part in the work of the centre and have done so since the war. From time to time France suggests projects for the centre and is therefore participating actively.

Mr. Rivière suggested that the objective of our Assembly was to provide work for the Standing Armaments Committee. That is a misunderstanding. Clearly we have a considerable interest in the effect of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, but I do not believe that we obtain the best results from the Committee or the mechanism of European defence procurement if we pile its tray too high with a mass of tasks.

Therefore, I must ask the Assembly to reject Mr. Rivière's amendments.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Farr to move his amendment.

Mr. FARR (*United Kingdom*). — I beg to move my Amendment No. 1, which I do on the assumption that Mr. Rivière's amendment is not accepted.

I have three reasons for suggesting that my amendment will be an improvement to the recommendations to the Council. The first is the increasing range of ballistic missiles carried in submarines. The second is the almost limitless range of hostile submarines, which can police deep waters thousands of miles from their targets. The third is the fact that this month 75 million tons of sea cargo are on their way to Europe across the Atlantic. This involves a 3,000-mile journey, 2,700 miles of which are beyond the 50-fathom limit in deep water. It is essential that our anti-submarine defences in Western Europe forget what I would call the North Sea or English Channel approach and concentrate on the deep-water dangers.

I remind the Assembly of more recent developments in Europe which I do not think have been mentioned so far in this debate but which must surely be relevant. I am referring to the declaration by the EEC of a 200-mile exclusive zone. Three-quarters of that zone on the western side is in deep water, and I maintain that it is no use declaring a deep-water conservation zone unless it is policed and patrolled, with the movements of other vessels monitored, and I believe that WEU should co-ordinate that.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to oppose the amendment for the reasons I tried to advance earlier. We appreciate very much the initial and consequent deep-water problems. Nothing in the report seeks to suggest that there is no deep-water problem.

We are suggesting, however, that the independent EPG, bringing together the navies of Western Europe, brings together the majority of the navies which inevitably operate, because of resources, in shallow waters.

From the discussions I have had in visiting commands, it is recognised that there will be certain navies that will, and should, continue to have a deep-water rôle within Western Europe as a matter of priority. We are not ruling this out. We are merely asking that the :

"European programme group or... Eurogroup ... undertake an evaluation of European ASW requirements and capabilities with particular reference to shallow waters and the use of maritime patrol aircraft."

Mr. Roper (continued)

I would be happy to try to meet Mr. Farr — and make quite clear that there is no ambiguity here — by adding before the words “to shallow waters” the words “with particular reference in the first instance” — to shallow waters. That would make clear that there was no exclusive consideration about shallow waters.

However, if we are to get the European programme going, we need to start with matters that interest the majority of the navies of Western Europe and not merely one or two, although I understand that in my country there is considerable interest in deep-water work. It is better for us to concentrate on the matters that concern the majority of the other countries and the majority of those represented in the programme group.

Having said that, I hope that Mr. Farr will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone else wish to speak? If not, I shall put the amendments to the vote.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — May we have Mr. Farr's reaction to Mr. Roper's suggestions?

The PRESIDENT. — I asked whether anyone wished to speak about that, and nobody asked to do so.

Mr. FARR (*United Kingdom*). — I am grateful to Mr. Roper for his suggestion. It is very good of him to be so elastic. However, it is not quite good enough because I still believe that the emphasis at present placed on shallow water defence is unhappy and inappropriate.

Therefore, although Mr. Roper's suggestion goes a little way towards meeting my objection, I do not think it goes quite far enough.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote paragraph by paragraph on Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Rivière.

I put to the vote paragraph 1 of this amendment.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Paragraph 1 of Amendment No. 2 is negatived.

I put to the vote paragraph 2 of the amendment.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Paragraph 2 of Amendment No. 2 is negatived.

I put to the vote paragraph 3 of the amendment.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Paragraph 3 of Amendment No. 2 is negatived.

I put to the vote Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Farr.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment No. 1 is negatived.

I put to the vote paragraph 4 of Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Rivière.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Paragraph 4 of Amendment No. 2 is negatived.

I shall put to the vote the draft recommendation as a whole.

If the Assembly is not unanimous the vote will be taken by roll-call.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — I shall vote against the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall, then, have to vote by roll-call.

The vote will take place this afternoon at 3.30 p.m.

5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean (Presentation of and Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee, Documents 734 and 746).
2. Anti-submarine warfare (Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Document 743).
3. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
4. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean (Resumed Debate and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Documents 734 and 746).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.*)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd June 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee, Docs. 734 and 746*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Urwin (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Temboury (*Observer from Spain*).
4. Anti-submarine warfare (*Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 743*).
Speaker: The President.
5. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
6. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Docs. 734 and 746*).
Speakers: The President, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Hardy, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Channon, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Müller, Mr. Pecoraro, Mr. Radius, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Urwin (*Rapporteur*).
On a point of order: Mr. Radius, the President, Mr. Radius.
Speaker: Mr. Temboury (*Observer from Spain*).
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee, Docs. 734 and 746)

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day provide for the presentation of and debate on the report and supplementary report of the General Affairs Committee on Western Europe's

policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean, Documents 734 and 746 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 746.

I call Mr. Urwin, the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I deem it a very great honour and privilege to have been invited by the General Affairs Committee to present the report contained in Document 734 and the associated Document 746 containing the draft recommendations of the Committee.

However, my pleasure in occupying the rostrum at this moment is tinged with a little sadness and some regret because of the circumstances which have prevented my good friend and colleague, John Mendelson, a former delegate to the Assembly, from seeing the completion of his work as Rapporteur on this question of Western European policy towards Mediterranean problems, especially those of the Western Mediterranean. I must convey to the Assembly the information that through no fault of his own Mr. Mendelson is no longer a delegate, because of the rules which have to be observed in the composition of the British Delegation to the Western European Union Assembly.

I must go on to pay a well-deserved tribute to John Mendelson for the report that he has prepared and for the customary diligent performance of his duties and responsibilities as Rapporteur in relation to this question. He was able to make a visit to Spain some weeks ago, some time before the recent general election.

1. See page 35.

Mr. Urwin (continued)

During the course of that visit he conducted discussions with leading politicians, trade unionists and many others of influence and importance in Spain. This visit also provided for him valuable practical aid in the preparation of the report now before the Assembly.

Valuable as the work is, however, it has been to some extent overtaken by events. The increasingly rapid tempo of the march towards democratisation in Spain has happened a little too quickly for the report to have recorded the most recent interesting, exciting and rather dramatic events in Spain. The whole democratic world is extremely gratified to see the first real election to be conducted in Spain for more than forty years. Over the past two years the developments in Southern Europe have been very exciting, first Portugal and then Spain emerging from dictatorships to real democracy.

The report itself contains a good deal of historical fact. The Rapporteur necessarily and almost compulsorily has been speculative in some areas of his report. But he has none the less succeeded in focusing our attention on the quite formidable problems facing the new government in Spain, not least of which is the economic situation. It is abundantly clear that to achieve full economic recovery somewhat repressive measures may need to be introduced by the new government. Unpopular decisions will have to be taken, decisions that will not always meet with the approbation of those who so joyfully went to the polls a week or so ago. A nation faced with rampant inflation running at the rate of 25 % per annum, with intolerably high levels of unemployment and with an increasing balance-of-payments deficit is indeed faced with very considerable problems with which other countries in the western world are all too familiar.

The Rapporteur draws attention to the problem created by the over-proliferation of political parties in Spain. Were we to reflect on this for a moment, I believe that we should arrive at a consensus that it is a mark of relief, of release from the grip of dictatorship, that so many new political parties have come into being over the past two years. In one field the Rapporteur has been left well behind. It was impossible for him to record all the events, for certainly he could not do it in advance. But in the trade union movement considerable progress has been made even since the report was written. Rapid steps have been taken towards the democratisation of the trade unions in Spain, a marked improvement over the situation, which had obtained, of a single trade union on a national basis.

I am sure that it will occur to many of us that the stabilisation of Spain would be greatly assisted by the establishment of a parent body — and for want of a better comparison I would suggest something of the nature of the Trades Union Congress in the United Kingdom — acting as a confederation representing all members of individual trade unions. I am sure that the trade unions in Spain will be sufficiently responsible to accept the premise that theirs is a very important rôle in ensuring that the new democracy fully emerges, a more important rôle, perhaps, than that already played by trade unions in the democratic nations in Western Europe.

They have got off to a good start and I am perfectly certain that the Assembly will join me in hoping that that progress will be maintained.

The Rapporteur quite rightly draws attention to the very serious regional problems that have long been apparent in Spain and that will continue to be a bone of contention, especially in the Basque, Catalan and Galician regions.

In paragraph 42 Mr. Mendelson refers to amnesty for all political prisoners, and these demands have already been substantially met. The question of regional autonomy, however, will inevitably remain for some time a major issue for Mr. Suarez and his new government, an issue that has a direct bearing on the future unity of the State. There is also the problem with which we in the United Kingdom and in other western democracies are all too familiar — regional economic discrepancies, which are particularly represented by the regions I have already named.

In paragraphs 49 and 50, as a result of his discussions with prominent people in Spain preparatory to compiling this report, Mr. Mendelson has said that he sees no fundamental shift in existing foreign policy. But it is a well-known fact that many responsible people in Spain regard membership of European institutions as one of their most immediate objectives. Whilst it is not within our province to discuss the outcome of any application by Spain for membership of the European Economic Community or of the Council of Europe, I am sure that many of us will look forward with some eagerness to her application for membership of both those bodies. I mention in passing that Spain is now the only European country remaining outside the membership of the Council of Europe. There is a basis for us to build on, since Spain is already associated with western defence policy.

However, the subject of our discussion is the policy of Western European Union towards Spain, and the General Affairs Committee in Document 746 has fairly set out the position in the explanatory memorandum :

Mr. Urwin (continued)

"The importance of defence and of the promotion of parliamentary democracy has frequently been reflected in the emphasis laid on these subjects during contacts between the representatives of the member countries and those of other members of the international community. In this context, the member countries of WEU have been specially attentive to their relations with the new parliamentary democracies which have recently come into being in Southern Europe. There is a growing likelihood that these democracies will take an increasing part in the process of European integration."

These principles are very well reflected and embodied in the recommendations of the General Affairs Committee, which invites the Assembly to :

"Examine closely the evolution of the Spanish political régime, the application of universal suffrage and guarantees of public freedom ; in so far as there are valid guarantees regarding the establishment of democracy, promote the early participation of Spain in Western Europe's economic and political activities ; study the possibility of close co-operation between Spain and the WEU member countries."

In offering the congratulations of the Rapporteur, which I am sure will be endorsed by the Assembly, to the Spanish people on their emergence as a new democracy, and in wishing them the best of success in the difficult times ahead, I commend to the Assembly the recommendations of the General Affairs Committee in the knowledge that they will be endorsed by the end of this debate. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you for your report, Mr. Urwin.

The debate is open.

I now have pleasure in inviting Mr. Temboury, Count of Labajos, representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, to address the Assembly. Before he speaks, on behalf of the whole Assembly, I congratulate him and his people on the marvellous new beginning of democracy in his country. Mr. Temboury, we assure you of our very kindest regards and offer you our felicitations on this demonstration of a return to democratic life in your country. (*Applause*)

Mr. TEMBOURY (*Observer from Spain*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have the honour to express to you — to yourself and to the members of this Assembly — the gratitude of the Spanish Government for your invitation to send an observer to this twenty-third ordinary session of the WEU Assembly and for allowing

me to take the floor. Spain follows the work of this organisation with great interest and is gratified to see the importance of the Brussels Treaty in collaboration for the defence of Western Europe and in the study of a whole range of questions affecting the chief subjects of topical interest in international politics.

Allow me, Mr. President, also to express to you, in my capacity of observer, my congratulations on your election to the presidency of this Assembly, as well as my congratulations to the other members of the Bureau.

The agenda of the Assembly includes a report by Mr. Mendelson, a member of the United Kingdom Parliament, presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems and, in particular, those of the Western Mediterranean. In view of the nature of Spanish participation in this Assembly, I will confine my remarks to Document 734, of 9th May 1977, conveying Mr. Mendelson's impressions of a visit to Spain between 9th and 14th January 1977.

The Mendelson report contains many assertions and judgments on Spanish foreign policy and Spain's relations with the Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance which demonstrate the author's interest in these questions and, apart from a few shades of emphasis and details, generally deserve our sincere praise.

As the report says, there cannot be any radical changes in the present course of Spanish foreign policy. Spain has always practised and will continue to practise, in its foreign relations, the principle of absolute respect for other States' sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs. It has diplomatic or commercial relations with all the countries of the world and, while preserving its special links with the countries of Latin America, wishes to maintain and strengthen them.

Spain has participated through special agreements in the system of western defence and my government is resolved to initiate a nation-wide debate with a view to its joining other alliances of a defensive military character so that the Spanish people may democratically take the appropriate decisions.

At the start of its study of Spanish domestic policy, the Mendelson report, whilst emphasising that "the trend so far is towards liberalisation" — Section II, paragraph 5 — postpones a final judgment until the elections, which at the time when the report was drafted were still pending, had actually been held. I am sure, however, that if Mr. Mendelson went back to Spain now, his report would be appreciably modified, as it would reflect the political reforms which were only in the offing at that time.

Mr. Temboursy (continued)

In that sense, the amnesty, the legalisation of political parties, the complete freedom they were allowed for conducting their electoral campaigns, the way in which the elections of 15th June 1977 were held, in which there was nothing for even the most exigent of critics to find fault with, the availability to all the political parties, on the same terms, of official information media, including radio and television, and the general atmosphere of the elections, which were followed by many foreign observers of all persuasions, demonstrate the extent to which the democratic system is already functioning in Spain. The recently-elected Cortes, that is, our parliament, is going to tackle the drafting of bills for amending and adapting our constitution to the new political situation.

Nevertheless, there is one important point to which I should like to draw your attention: the reference in Section II, paragraph 4. As regards this statement, I should like to point out that the massive support of the Spanish people, freely and indisputably expressed at the referendum of last December, firmly places the King on the throne of Spain by an absolutely democratic consensus, strengthened in respect of legitimacy by the recent renunciation by HRH the Count of Barcelona of his dynastic rights in favour of his son. I would add that this consensus is so clearly established that the issue was not even raised during the two election campaigns by any major political party.

The new Cortes will probably meet at the beginning of July. The Spanish people has delegated wide powers to it, and expressed great hopes that it will initiate the process of change the circumstances demand. Spain, the tenth industrial country in the world, currently finds itself having to contend with problems similar to those which all the other countries of Western Europe have to face. It will set about them with just as much political energy as all the rest of our part of the world, in the thrust and parry of all sectors of public opinion and differing concepts of the State.

I should like to conclude by a reference to some later developments which have not yet reached the daily press. His Majesty the King has just confirmed the Prime Minister, Mr. Adolfo Suarez, leader of the coalition of the Union of the Democratic Centre, which won the elections, in the task of appointing a new Cabinet. Although these are very early days, we go so far as to say that it is Mr. Suarez's intention to form a team representing the political groups which have been given a popular mandate and the confidence of the electorate. The new government will therefore undoubtedly reflect the composition and characteristics of the other European governments.

The paragraphs which the report devotes to the trade union system have been overtaken by the action taken at home and abroad in subscribing to the conventions of the International Labour Organisation. The report which I have been commenting on also contains some imputations of motive my delegation cannot accept.

In conclusion, Spain, whose civilisation and culture make it one of the countries in which the European concept first originated, now wants to tighten its links with the countries of Western Europe, in the hopes of a favourable reaction to its application for membership and that, once the political obstacles have been overcome, there will be no other impediments, economic or whatever, to stand in the way of its aspirations.

Lastly, Mr. President, I should like to express to you once again my delegation's gratitude for the invitation to this Assembly, and to Mr. Mendelson for all the hard work he has done, together with my good wishes for success in the task that has been assigned to you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — The applause shows, Mr. Temboursy, that we are very glad to have you here to make your speech. We thank you and we wish good luck to your country.

The debate is adjourned.

4. Anti-submarine warfare

(Vote on the revised draft Recommendation, Doc. 743)

The PRESIDENT. — This morning we agreed to vote at this time on the revised draft recommendation on anti-submarine warfare. We are about to hear a contribution by the United Kingdom Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tomlinson. I propose that first we deal with the vote.

If the Assembly is unanimous we could save the time required for a roll-call vote.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that there are four abstentions.

The revised draft recommendation is therefore adopted, note being taken of four abstentions¹.

5. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT. — I now welcome Mr. Tomlinson to the Assembly. I am glad that he is taking the opportunity to address us and I ask him to come to the rostrum. (*Applause*)

1. See page 36.

Mr. TOMLINSON (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). — I first thank the Assembly for its willingness to interrupt its business in order that I may address the Assembly this afternoon.

You will not, I am sure, be surprised to hear that I have chosen as the subject of my speech today the question of CSCE follow-up. As you know, representatives of the thirty-five countries that signed the final act are at this moment gathered in Belgrade in order to prepare the way for the first meeting of the participating States to take place since Helsinki. It is therefore quite natural for part of this current session of the WEU Assembly to be set aside for discussion of the results that have so far flowed from the final act.

You are, of course, due to debate tomorrow a report and draft recommendation on this subject. I hope I shall be forgiven if I steal a march on you by covering much the same ground now, not in any spirit of competition, but rather in the conviction that the main points that need to be made are important enough to bear repetition, and in the knowledge that the subject is large enough for there to be no chance of my coming anywhere near exhausting its possibilities within the compass of a single short speech.

How far, then, can the final act be said so far to have been a success? It was clear from the start that its potential value was enormous, but that it would actually be of value only to the extent that its provisions were implemented. Equally, it was clear that, in giving full effect to the final act's provisions, some participants would have much more ground to cover than would others and that it would be unrealistic to expect the radical changes necessary in some cases to be made overnight. As we see it, the full implementation of the final act should be viewed as a fairly long-term process, with the Belgrade meeting as the first check point, its purpose being not to pass a definitive judgment on the value of the CSCE, but to do what it can to open up opportunities for the future.

We shall be looking at Belgrade for willingness on the part of all countries, but particularly those with the most ground to make up, to take the necessary steps to bring their practice up to the standards of the final act. So far, it must be said that progress in certain areas has been disappointing, and in others non-existent. There has been some indication of movement and change, but a great deal needs to be done before a number of the final act's provisions, especially those covering human rights, freer movement and the freer and wider dissemination of information, can be said to have been satisfactorily implemented.

You will note that I have singled out human rights and certain issues from basket III — that part of the final act that covers co-operation in humanitarian, information, cultural and other fields. This is simply because it is inevitable that the areas in which there has been the least progress should demand the most attention and the most discussion. It should not be taken in any way to suggest that to the British Government these are the only issues of importance in the final act. On the contrary, we see the final act as a balanced document all parts of which are of equal importance, and we shall take care at Belgrade to approach it in that way. The three baskets will have to be treated in an evenhanded manner if the authority of the final act is to be maintained.

With this in mind, we do not accept the attempts that have been made by the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe to elevate the declaration on principles contained in basket I of the final act to a status above that of the rest of the document. The ten principles are, of course, of very great importance, but no more so than the rest of basket I or than baskets II and III. The various parts of the final act are carefully interrelated and it must be seen as a unified whole.

Nor do we accept any attempt to single out for special attention one or another of the ten principles, such as that concerning non-intervention in internal affairs. The final act states clearly that the principles are all "of primary significance" and that they must be "equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others".

The Soviet Union and its allies have tended to place great weight on the non-intervention principle, arguing that it renders impermissible western criticism of the way they handle their internal affairs. Some western commentators, following this line, have suggested that there may be a contradiction between, in particular, principles VI and VII, which respectively cover non-intervention and human rights. The British Government, together with the other members of the Nine, are emphatically of the view that there is no contradiction between these two principles. The non-intervention principle prohibits interventions, particularly those involving force or coercion in matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State. In no way, however, does it lessen the extent to which those States are committed to putting into effect all the other provisions of the final act. Matters that come within the scope of the final act cannot be said to lie solely within the domestic jurisdiction of those States that signed it. On the contrary, they can quite properly be made the subject of political discussion between them.

Mr. Tomlinson (continued)

This is no less true of human rights matters than of all the other questions covered by the final act, and we shall certainly not shy away at Belgrade from making reference to them. As a democratic government, when considering what line to take on this subject, as on others, the British Government must, of course, take into account the feelings of public opinion, which in the United Kingdom is extremely concerned about a number of aspects of human rights which can legitimately be raised in the context of the final act. All participants in the CSCE process must recognise that concern for human rights is not in any sense a diversionary tactic, but rather an integral part of foreign policy in countries such as my own.

Moreover, without a greater measure of respect for human rights, we cannot in my view hope for peace and stability in the longer term. In this field especially it is idle to retort that comment on the internal affairs of one country by another cannot be permitted. The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the final act itself all demonstrate quite clearly that abuses of human rights, wherever they may occur, are a legitimate subject of international concern and discussion.

The British Government are also anxious to see progress in that part of basket I that covers confidence-building measures. We intend at Belgrade both to take part in the exchange of views on the steps that have been taken to apply these measures and actively to consider, with the other participating States, the possibility of developing them further. So far the position is only partially satisfactory. While all the participating States have honoured the final act's mandatory provisions on confidence-building measures, the discretionary provisions have been less universally implemented than we should have liked. We shall press at Belgrade for the wider application of all those provisions, since this can only benefit the growth of confidence between the countries of Europe that we are seeking to achieve.

I turn to basket II which covers the no less important field of economic co-operation. Again, some progress has been made, but we should like to have seen more. We are particularly keen to see a reality made of the final act's provisions covering facilities for foreign businessmen, and the availability and exchange of economic and commercial information. We continue to regard the Economic Commission for Europe as the appropriate forum for multilateral follow-up on the matters covered by basket II of the final act. We have ourselves played, and will continue to play, an active part in its work.

Basket III, as I have already suggested, in the view of my government, is the area of the final act where least progress has been made, particularly with regard to the chapters on human contacts and information. It is quite naturally on the questions covered in basket III that parliamentary and public opinion in the West has tended to concentrate since the signature of the final act. At Helsinki the participating States promised *inter alia* to deal "in a positive and humanitarian spirit" with applications for family reunification, to simplify and administer flexibly their procedures for exit and entry, to allow members of religious faiths to have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information, to facilitate the improvement of the dissemination on their territory of newspapers from the other participating States, and to improve working conditions for journalists. These commitments are of great importance and have naturally engaged the emotions and close interest of very many individuals in the West.

In the field of human contacts the British Government have been especially concerned to press for the implementation of the final act's provisions on family reunification and marriage cases. We have made a considerable number of approaches to the Soviet and East European Governments. In some cases we have met with some success, and we have been encouraged by this. But in general there has not been nearly as much progress as we should wish. We shall continue to make clear to the governments concerned, both bilaterally and at Belgrade, the strength of feeling that rightly exists in the United Kingdom about cases of this kind. We shall stress our view that, as our then Prime Minister, Sir Harold Wilson, put it during his speech to the Helsinki conference: "détente means little if it is not reflected in the daily lives of our peoples." It will certainly not be credible or complete while families remain divided, or people are prevented from marrying the partner of their choice simply by political or national frontiers.

Nor have the final act's provisions on the freer and wider dissemination of information been implemented in the way we believe to be necessary. The number and choice of western newspapers on sale to members of the public in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries remains deplorably limited. In the Soviet Union, for instance, only three British newspapers are available for public sale, and then not regularly. One of them is the British Communist Party newspaper. Of the other two, fewer than 200 copies go on sale, most of which are available only in Intourist hotels or at airports. The position is similar in other countries of Eastern Europe. We believe firmly that the choice of what is to be read by individuals in the CSCE signatory States should be made by

Mr. Tomlinson (continued)

individuals and not by their governments and we shall continue to press for this aim to be reflected in the practice of the countries concerned.

Looked at overall, the progress achieved so far in honouring the commitments contained in basket III of the final act can only be described as very modest, and one of our aims at Belgrade will be to do what we can to ensure that it is carried forward at a more satisfactory pace in the future. We shall not hesitate to speak our minds frankly at Belgrade in identifying areas where performance on implementation has been inadequate, and in urging those who are lagging behind to take the necessary steps to put matters right. But we shall have to remember the need to make our criticism constructive — that is to say, to avoid criticism for its own sake — and to avoid fruitless polemical venting of moral indignation. If we are to achieve results from the Belgrade meeting, we must seek above all to stimulate others to move in the direction we want them to move in, and not simply to flood them with resentful accusations of bad faith and sharp practice. This would endanger the dialogue which was so promisingly begun when the final act was signed.

As I have said, my government believe firmly that the Belgrade meeting should look to the future as well as to the past. The final act obliges the participating States to consider possible new ways of improving security and developing co-operation, and also the possibility of further Belgrade-type meetings, and perhaps of a second conference. Belgrade must be used to inject new life and momentum into the CSCE process. The final act must be maintained as the centre and focus of the follow-up to the CSCE. It will be our firm aim to ensure that any new proposals that are made do not divert attention from it, distort its balance, or seek in any way to undermine it. But we shall welcome proposals which appear likely to lead to more effective implementation of what was agreed at Helsinki.

As for the question of further meetings, we very much hope that the CSCE States will be sufficiently encouraged by their experience at Belgrade to agree to the holding of a second follow-up meeting, as envisaged in the follow-up section of the final act, after a further interval of two years or so, perhaps at Foreign Minister level.

First, however, we must devote our energies towards making the Belgrade meeting a success. We see as the key to this the establishment during the preparatory meeting now in progress of a consensus on the procedural issues with the solution of which the current preliminary meeting is charged. The task of this meeting in our view,

is not in any sense to construct a political framework for the main meeting by entering into firm understandings on the type of political comment that will be permissible during the main meeting, a suggestion that I have heard from a number of communist governments. It is rather to reach agreement on the strictly organisational questions that it must solve if the follow-up meeting is to run smoothly. We see no need whatever for the elaboration, in advance, of any political concept relating to the main meeting. The necessary political instructions are already spelt out clearly in the final act's section on follow-up.

Whatever difficulties may arise in the course of the preparatory meeting, or later in the main meeting itself — and I hope they will be few — we can be confident that the political co-operation machinery of the Nine and of NATO will prove equal to the demands placed upon it. Indeed, the successful development of this machinery has been one of the most heartening features from the West's point of view of the whole CSCE process so far. Another has been the opportunity it has provided for full and fruitful discussion with countries that, while not members of the European Community or of NATO, are nevertheless not members of the Warsaw Pact. Far from weakening and dividing the non-communist nations, as some would argue its original supporters intended it to do, the CSCE has had a quite contrary effect by giving the non-communist countries of Europe a heightened appreciation of the values they have in common. There is every sign that, as time passes, this tendency is growing stronger rather than weaker.

We can also point with satisfaction to the fact that the final act has established as legitimate and proper items on the international agenda a whole range of questions that were previously excluded from it by some governments. Many important issues affecting the daily lives of ordinary people, and forming in our view an integral part of any proper conception of détente, have now been put on a par with the more traditional elements of inter-State relations, and that can only be regarded as being to the final act's credit.

We must not, however, forget the inherent limitations of the CSCE process. The final act, if fully implemented, would do a great deal for the development of co-operation among the signatory States but relatively little, it must be admitted, for their security. The confidence-building measures enshrined in basket I constitute a step in the right direction, but only a very small and very symbolic one. They are on any objective analysis quite insignificant when compared with the crucial issues involved in the SALT talks and the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. Anything that is achieved in the CSCE context will be of strictly limited value

Mr. Tomlinson (continued)

unless real progress can be made towards turning Europe into a safer continent for its inhabitants. We can only regard as deeply disquieting the tendency of certain of our CSCE interlocutors, and in particular of the Soviet Union, to combine professions of eagerness to talk about peace and disarmament with a major improvement in the quality and quantity of the armaments at their disposal.

We must, therefore, be careful not to invest the CSCE process with any false glamour. It must be looked at realistically and in its proper perspective. The final act must still be regarded as having a greater potential than actual value. But its potential value remains as great as ever and is now much more generally appreciated than it was at the time of Helsinki. The concrete results it has had may not be very impressive, but its impact on the European scene has been far from negligible. The publication in the countries of Eastern Europe of the commitments into which their governments entered at Helsinki has been a very evident inspiration to the peoples of those countries and has given them fresh hope for the future. There is increasing evidence that the final act is serving as a source of real encouragement to those who want to make their societies more open, and that also is greatly to its credit.

The British Government therefore continue to take a positive view of the CSCE process and to believe that it offers valuable opportunities for the development of détente in our continent, to the advantage of each and every one of the States that signed the final act. The Belgrade meeting, for which preparations are now being made, presents us with a chance to give further impetus to the process set in motion at Helsinki. This is an opportunity of which we intend to take full advantage. My government's approach to Belgrade will be balanced and we shall keep the meeting in perspective. We shall keep in mind in particular the need for progress to be made also on those questions to do with international security that are not covered by the CSCE. But we shall be determined to do all we can to give the CSCE process fresh vitality and increased momentum. The member countries of WEU have a common interest in seeing that this is done, and we look forward to taking part in a corporate western effort in pursuit of that aim. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — The House has received that very important statement from the Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom. I beg to thank him. He has kindly agreed to reply to questions that members of the Assembly would like to put to him.

I now call on those who wish to ask questions and start with Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, last Monday Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, stated in reply to Mr. Nessler that the assembly of the European Communities, once it had been elected by universal suffrage, would acquire enhanced authority and influence and be able to concern itself with defence matters.

Do you share this opinion, Mr. Minister, and do you, in particular, think that the assembly of the European Communities, however it was elected, would be able, in contempt of international law and treaties, to arrogate to itself any powers whatsoever in a field expressly forbidden to it?

The PRESIDENT. — The second question to Mr. Tomlinson is from Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate Mr. Tomlinson on a very clear and concise statement. He has indicated that the Helsinki agreement has greater potential than actual value. We recognise its potential. We recognise it as a milestone along the road to international co-operation, but certainly not the end of the road.

I wish to ask a question on the subject of basic human rights on which Mr. Tomlinson had quite a lot to say. So far it is exceedingly difficult to secure a complete definition of what is meant by "basic human rights". I am sure that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards basic human rights is fundamentally different from that of the West. Indeed, if the Soviet Union were to accept in its entirety the definition accepted by a majority of people in the West, the Soviet Union would not be likely to last very long, because there would be completely free expression within the Soviet Union itself.

Mr. Tomlinson stated that the right of personal determination of what one read was fundamental. I can hardly imagine the Soviet Union accepting that at this stage. I would ask, therefore, whether there would not be virtue in limiting the approach to the Soviet Union to this attitude towards basic human rights. There is one aspect of basic human rights that is, or should be, clearly understood by both sides. It is the free movement of people. If we could concentrate upon that I am certain that we should be taking a substantial step forward in securing what I believe to be basic human rights. But if we fight dispersed on a wide front, ultimately we shall arrive at the kind of attitude by which very little progress is made.

I repeat my question: would there not be virtue in narrowing the approach, rather than seeking to approach on the very wide front indicated in Mr. Tomlinson's speech?

The PRESIDENT. — Are there further questions? If not will Mr. Tomlinson please reply?

Mr. TOMLINSON (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). — I found Mr. Rivière's question interesting but it is not one to which we can give any kind of meaningful answer now. First, we do not yet have a directly-elected European Parliament. The nine member States are going through their own domestic problems in relation to direct elections, and I can see nothing in the process of direct elections that in any way changes the powers of the European Parliament. To speculate on a hypothesis of what might happen at some future date is an exercise in which I do not want to engage at this stage. I can see no reason at the present time in any way to accept that what Mr. Rivière suggests might happen will happen. Certainly, there are no proposals for it to happen. There is no increase in the power of the parliament to allow it to take that area of discussion as part of its forum of activities merely by a change in the process of election and I do not want to speculate about what might happen.

I was very interested in Lord Peddie's remarks, but it would be a mistake now to start thinking about limiting the application of the CSCE process, because we are discussing at Belgrade not a range of new ideas but a range of ideas to which all the signatory States committed themselves in the final act at Helsinki. What we are really looking for now is to match the achievements of the promise with its potential. Helsinki's potential has scarcely begun to be realised.

I cannot believe that we should in any way narrow our approach. We must be vigilant in pursuit of the interests of all people everywhere who are denied fundamental human rights, and we must never lose sight of the fact that the denial of human rights is the legitimate concern of peoples and parliaments of all countries. I therefore do not wish to see any narrowing of the base of our activity as we consider the follow-up to the final act.

Lord Peddie referred to the Soviet Union. We should remind ourselves that the Soviet Government ratified the United Nations Covenant on Human Rights in October 1975 and that, in so doing, they undertook solemn treaty obligations. Neither the British Government nor any of the others represented here would want to see any dilution of the discussion to avoid focusing attention on the abrogation of solemn treaty obligations entered into by a signatory to the final act. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Tomlinson, for your replies.

6. *Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems — the Western Mediterranean*

(*Resumed Debate on the Report and supplementary Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Docs. 734 and 746*)

The PRESIDENT. — We return now to the debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on Mediterranean problems.

I call Sir John Rodgers.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — I shall begin by making it crystal clear that, although I am sitting on this particular bench as senior Vice-Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, I am speaking in a purely individual capacity at the moment.

The report before us is now out-of-date since, for the most part, events have overtaken what is written. I am glad that our Spanish friend referred to one particular paragraph, paragraph 4 under "Basic facts":

"The present régime in Spain is thus still the one instituted after the civil war and the system established by the Franco dictatorship will remain in force until another takes its place."

He went on to point out that the Count of Barcelona had already renounced any claim whatever to the throne and that a referendum had entirely endorsed the legitimacy of King Juan Carlos. This particular paragraph, therefore, should really be deleted altogether.

As an almost life-long admirer of the Spanish people, it is a happy day for me to see a friend from Spain talking to us in this Assembly. The Spaniards are a great race and will be able to contribute enormously to the progress of the West culturally, economically, in defence and in other ways.

I can understand the deep antagonism that many people have felt towards the totalitarian nature of the Spanish Government during the past forty years, but it is now time to forget the past altogether and to hold out the hand of friendship to the Spanish people. All of us have reason to be happy at the way in which the recent elections were held, with hardly any of the disturbances that had been feared, and happy also at the results of the election.

Before the election took place we saw the legalisation of all political parties, the granting of universal suffrage, and the guarantee of public and personal freedoms in Spain. Whatever our political loyalties, I am sure that all of us here are in some way or other delighted at the outcome. The Socialist Party has emerged as the strongest single party and Prime Minister

Sir John Rodgers (continued)

Suarez heads a coalition that is stronger than the socialist group and will, therefore, form the government.

At one time it looked as though the socialists and the Centre Democratic Party might form a coalition; perhaps it is healthy, from a democratic point of view, that this will not be the case and that the socialists will now form the official opposition. Whilst it is too early to comment on the exact results of the election, because Mr. Suarez has not yet completed the composition of his government, it would appear that the ministers will be appointed in the main from the twelve parties that compose the centre.

Many problems face him, not least that which is very familiar to us in Britain, devolution. There are a great many problems in areas such as the Catalan and Basque regions, and we have the same problems in Scotland and Wales and, to an even greater extent, in Northern Ireland.

Whilst we have great sympathy with the desires of the people in the various regions, whatever the solution that the Spanish Government itself must find and whatever degree of autonomy is granted, it seems that Mr. Suarez has an overriding commitment to preserve the unity of the Spanish nation.

We have owed a lot in the past to Spanish governments for their co-operation with the West in our defence policies, for example, in granting bases to the United States. If Spain desires to be more clearly associated with NATO, I hope that the NATO authorities will consider this sympathetically, because she could strengthen our defences.

Mr. Urwin has mentioned the many economic problems facing Spain. I hope that we shall hold out a helping hand economically and financially. We recently granted generous help to the Portuguese. I hope that we shall be equally generous and understanding towards the Spanish people.

Although it is not really for this Assembly to comment on relationships with the EEC, Spain already has some association and I am sure that the Community will consider carefully any overtures to a closer association, even though the enlargement of the Community presents problems that have already been demonstrated by the applications of Greece, Portugal and possibly Turkey, and may take more time than was originally supposed to solve them.

It was a great joy to me to hear a Spaniard speaking as an equal today and I hope very much that the Spanish Government will now take an early opportunity to apply not just for observer status but for full membership of the

Council of Europe as the first step to joining the European organisations. I am sure that if problems on defence arise, we in this organisation will be very willing to help.

As one who loves the Spanish nation and the Spanish people I say that the bitterness that has clouded our view of what has happened there in the past ten or twenty years should now pass and we should recognise that this has become a great industrial nation with forward-looking ideas in almost every sphere. I hope that we shall do all we can to help Spain quickly to come into as many of the European organisations as possible so that we shall not fail to be able to help Spain and Spain will be able to help us. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — Sir John Rodgers suggested that the report was out-of-date. Possibly it is, but few reports to any international organisation are considered in a way that could keep pace with such rapid developments as we have seen this year in Spain. The developments in Spain are certainly welcomed, particularly by the Rapporteur, who is, unfortunately, not with us today. However, I am sure that we all found Mr. Urwin's introduction most appropriate.

As parliamentary constituency neighbour to John Mendelson and as the person who has possibly known him for longer than anyone else here today I am grateful for Mr. Urwin's comments about this perceptive and generally excellent report. As Mr. Urwin said the developments have been rapid. Spain has seen the first democratic election in the lifetimes of most of the Spanish people. We have now to hope that neither mischief nor accident will destroy our desire for this progress to be maintained. Certainly we do not wish to see any reversion to that which has passed so recently and which in passing brought about the end of the last fascist and totalitarian régime in Western Europe.

I made the obvious point that most people in Spain have never had the opportunity to cast a meaningful national vote. That is an important guideline to a significant source of attitudes. All the countries represented in this Assembly have memories of economic difficulties in the period before 1939. They remember harsh unemployment and dreadful inflation. Those factors made lasting impressions upon the public minds in our countries. But more deeply engraved in the Spanish memory may be recollection of the horrors of civil war. One hopes that those memories will strengthen the demand for the transition to be peaceful, for there to be greater certainty in the prevention of any reversion to the politically primitive, and for the past to be allowed to be forgotten.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

However, democracy does not mean that the problems will cease. The position in Spain is far from easy. We recognise that living standards were rising before 1973, but they have certainly not since maintained that improvement. We recognise that investment has fallen, perhaps more severely in Spain than has been normal in Europe for the past two or three years. Energy prices have severely affected the Spanish economy, not least by depressing the important and previously booming tourist trade.

We see that inflation is running at a savage level and that economic problems are severe. It is perhaps because these problems are so severe that the political progress we have seen has been possible. If those economic problems had not existed, perhaps the political progress would have been more halting and certainly more tentative.

The responsibility for the administration of Spain over the next few years therefore involves great difficulties, not merely economic but political. I shall not refer to those since they have already been discussed at length. However, we can be confident that Europe's newest democracy will prove a very lusty and rapidly-growing infant. The interests of Europe as well as of Spain make that desirable.

Future progress will be made more certain if present Spanish foreign policy is maintained. This should see the end of the partial isolation from which Spain wishes to move. As Mr. Temboury said, and as the world should desire, it is Spain's intention to enter full international participation. This will and must depend upon the maintenance of stability within a sure democracy and, that achieved, Spain's full membership of the international organisations and European institutions must be welcome.

Surely we are all sane enough to hope that the prime conditions of civil and political liberty are soon fulfilled and that the rest of the States of Europe will give the necessary encouragement to ensure that that fulfilment is soon achieved. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I had almost decided to withdraw my name from the list of speakers, because I felt that the contribution from our distinguished Spanish visitor and the words uttered by Sir John Rodgers adequately summed up the proper reaction of the Assembly to the report. Therefore, instead of claiming the ten minutes for which I had applied, I intend to speak for only a fraction of the time and to make only one point that needs to be stressed.

Within the Council of Europe and here we must be extremely careful not to allow political prejudices or, for that matter, national economic fears to interfere in any way with the right and ability of a potential member of our assemblies to join if within that country the political conditions exist that qualify it so to do. We gave a very warm welcome to Portugal and we began negotiations right away in a situation that in some respects has not attained the level of democracy and the sort of constitution that the Spanish seem about to embrace. Within its national sovereignty Portugal has put upon the army privileges, responsibilities and powers that in no way accord with what happens in all the other Western European countries. That is Portugal's business and I make no criticism of it. In the case of Spain we must be extremely careful at least to do no less than extend the same sort of warm welcome as was applied to Portugal and, earlier, to Greece after its period of suspension during which it underwent a time of authoritarian military rule.

When we are discussing the possibilities of Western European countries joining our assemblies the only thought that should be in our minds is whether those countries are qualified to join under the house rules that apply to the rest of us. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, there can be no excuse or reason for delay, and we should not be prevented from proceeding with the maximum expedition to welcome Spain to all the bodies that it is qualified to join. Only in that way shall we encourage the forces of democracy in that country, but those forces will themselves be damaged if they feel that, they having played their part, we are failing to play ours in extending the same welcome as has been extended elsewhere.

I said that I would content myself with that one point. I have felt it right to make it partly, with our Spanish friends here, because of the feelings I have that all countries that have recently left authoritarian rule still have slightly fragile edifices. The best way to make those fragile edifices secure is to welcome and encourage them and not to set impossibly high standards for one reason or another to suit the individual prejudices of countries or individual members of parliament. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Channon.

Mr. CHANNON (*United Kingdom*). — In view of the remarks made by so many previous speakers, it seems almost unnecessary for me to intervene in the debate since clearly the Assembly is of one mind on this topic. I wish to make two points only.

Mr. Channon (continued)

First, the achievement of the Spanish people in moving from a dictatorship to a democracy, as they have, should be recognised as an historic step by every member of the Assembly, regardless of individual political opinions, and the Spanish people should be congratulated.

If Spain can achieve full parliamentary democracy in the sense that we understand it in this Assembly and in the Council of Europe, that will be a good day not only for Spain but for Europe. As Mr. Hardy pointed out, it will remove the last fascist government from Europe. However, it will not, as I think he said, remove the last totalitarian government. I fear that we have some way to go before that happens. Nevertheless, we can all live in hope that we shall live to see that day.

As I see the situation after the elections in Spain, we now look forward with great eagerness to the drawing up of a new constitution by the Spanish Government and the Spanish Cortes. We hope that it will be a fully democratic constitution, as we have every reason to assume it will be, that there will then be a further period of elections, that subsequently the Spanish Government will wish to join our European democratic assemblies and that we shall give them every assistance before and after those elections to enable them to do so.

Sir Frederic Bennett made the very important point that when a country is on the road to democracy it is our duty, representing democratic countries elsewhere in Europe, to do everything in our power to encourage the forces tending toward democracy and to make no excuse for those who take the different view involving extreme steps that we would all regret later. The Spanish Government is embarked on a very dangerous road. It has proved remarkably successful with the constitution. There are many other appallingly difficult problems confronting it in its economy and its regions. One cannot yet be sure that all is won in Spain. All one can be sure of is that an amazing stride has been taken, and we all look forward to the day when Spain will be a full member of our Assembly.

The message from this debate, which I think is supported by all political points of view in WEU, should be one of encouragement, hope and good will to the Spanish people for what has been an historic and remarkable achievement. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Lord Beaumont.

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY (*United Kingdom*). — It must be with some embarrass-

ment that yet another Briton speaks in the debate seemingly without interruption. However, like the previous speaker, I hope to be brief and make merely two points.

However, before I come to those points I must, as we all must, and as we have all shown, express deep pleasure at the success of the Spanish elections. The victories won for democracy in Europe over the past few years are heartening and something for which we should not necessarily have looked several years ago.

As a liberal, I have great pleasure in seeing representation of the liberals in the present ruling coalition in Spain and in Catalonia. I look forward to meeting my fellow liberals in the various political groups of the European assemblies when that time comes.

I wish first to make a point about the move towards regionalism in Spain. This move is, more or less, taking place in a great many European countries today. It is a very healthy move. Just as we face these problems in the United Kingdom with the devolution of Scotland and Wales, so the same problems arise for Spain.

On the whole, it is not a matter for this Assembly. At least, it would not be so if it were not that it had another important corollary, because at the same time as we devolve more and more power, it is important that our defence and solidarity as democracies are the more firmly established. If it were not so, the fissiparous — the devolutionary — tendencies would be worrying. Because this is happening, we must the more urge that Spain, if she is willing, be more and more closely involved with us in defence, be welcomed as a full member of NATO, if possible, and be welcomed to a much closer association with this body.

The second point — and I know that I am treading on fairly delicate ground here — is to see that we are dealing in Western Europe's policy towards problems in the Western Mediterranean with the question of Gibraltar, which has not been touched on so far in the debate. The situation regarding Gibraltar and Spain's attitude towards it is in a rather different position now that there is a democracy than it was before. First, we can look together on the possibility of friendly and democratic conversations about our mutual problems. To continue, we can expect from Spain a respect for self-determination on behalf of the people of Gibraltar, which they have already shown they now hold in respect of themselves by having their own elections.

Far be it from me to suggest what the final solution might be. It may well be in terms of some kind of condominium. Such things have happened before. This is a moment when two

Lord Beaumont of Whitley (continued)

friendly democratic nations should start talking again about a problem that has caused great grief in the past.

I conclude by repeating my welcome to Spain as a new member of the democratic countries of the West. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in appraising the recommendations tabled, I too should like to welcome, together with the other members of my group, the significant results of the voting at the recent general elections in Spain. What was at stake for the Spanish nation was — as we are all aware, and as Mr. Mendelson's report emphasised too — the possibility or otherwise of culminating a long and laborious period of growth towards maturity by a clearly democratic choice. The polls demonstrate in no uncertain manner that the conditions for such a choice have now been achieved. The relics of the Franco régime that had managed to continue to rely on the support of whole sectors of the State machinery failed in fact to "snatch" any result liable in any way to reserve or even halt the drive for renewal that forcefully emerges from the electoral results. Certainly the way ahead may still bristle with difficulties, but it does lie open. The orderly conduct of the elections, the high proportion of the electorate voting and above all the results recorded indicate beyond all shadow of a doubt the emergence of a Spain imbued with profound aspirations towards democratic reform, able to bring its own contribution to enlargement of the area of assertion of civic rights and looking ahead to a Europe capable of renewing itself, and becoming a factor for freedom, progress, co-operation and peace in the world.

Hence our congratulations and good wishes to the new Spain, our parliament's message of good will and our agreement with the spirit of the recommendations designed to foster and increase Spain's economic, social and political collaboration with Western Europe. By the same token, we have welcomed, and do welcome, the amendments to the original draft recommendation in respect of the military aspects referred to by various speakers, not only because, as others have said, it is for the Spanish people to decide on the future direction of their country's military policy, but also because we cannot forget the special situation Spain now occupies, on the military plane, in the West as a whole. This situation is one of the elements in the current European and international equilibria, in whose favourable trend we are vir-

tually all interested. The co-operation which the countries of WEU ought in our view to seek with Spain is viewed in the context of these equilibria in order to enable a further joint effort, and a favourable trend also in East-West military relations towards the gradual supersession of the military blocs by disarmament and the consolidation of détente and security.

We think the democratic Spain that emerged from the elections is interested in this cause, and deserves to be associated, in the interests of democracy and peace in Europe and the world. It is in this spirit that we shall give our supporting vote to the recommendation tabled. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Bernini.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. I think we are all very happy to see in Spain the start of developments which are carrying the Spanish people — who for more than forty years were far removed from democracy — once again towards a genuine parliamentary democracy of the kind that is familiar to us as members of parliament in the WEU member countries, the kind which we know from our own nations and States. We probably all realise that this is not an easy road for the Spanish people, and we should really all be very happy that this difficult road, embarked upon during the past few months, has — to my own surprise, I must admit — been beset by so few serious difficulties.

I believe one of the reasons has been the fact that the forces in Spain which emerged as the strongest from the elections have chosen a road of common sense, and that those forces on the radical right and on the radical left, which clearly were not and cannot be interested in a democratic process, and which at the time of the elections resorted increasingly to violence and bombing attacks, were given an unequivocal rebuff by the citizens of Spain.

I also believe that those who prepared the elections were well advised to insert in the electoral law, among other things, a certain limiting clause, with the result that tiny splinter groups are not represented in the new parliament on the scale that would otherwise have been the case.

We may therefore view the future in Spain with confidence and can unreservedly support the line of the draft recommendation. We all hope that Spain will attain full democratic freedom of action and become a member of those European organisations within which our coun-

Mr. Müller (continued)

tries have now been working for years. Even in a period of détente, Europe will be able to preserve its freedom only if the democracies in that Europe co-operate.

A few points could be made here on the military aspects, in particular in connection with what Mr. Bernini has said. But I will not do so, because I believe that our principal interest at this moment must be in seeing Spain advance without difficulties along the road to complete and lasting democracy after forty years of dictatorship, and in ensuring that the problems which undoubtedly exist in the military field as elsewhere, in Spain's co-operation with other countries, or in connection with the question of the balance of forces in Europe, are not for the present placed in the forefront, but that we first await the consolidation of democracy in Spain.

Personally, I have great hopes — and I believe the past few months confirm this — that the Spanish people is ready for democracy, even though some political writers thought that after forty years of dictatorship it would not be possible to get used to democracy so quickly. I think that the events of the past few months in particular have shown that we may now welcome the Spanish people as, if I may put it that way, a new link in the chain of western democracies. In the economic field, too — and I want to stress this particularly — we should all feel in duty bound to support the Spanish people as friends and helpers as they move forward. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I call Mr. Pecoraro.

Mr. PECORARO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I too wish to associate myself with the great gratification which this Assembly has seen fit to express at the results of the recent Spanish elections. The Spanish nation has given an outstanding and exemplary proof of cultural and political maturity. Actually, a country deprived of democratic institutions for practically forty years might have been expected to have difficulty in adapting itself to a régime of freedom, and to be inclined to toy with temptations from the extreme left or right which, as we know, often chase one another in a spiral of mutual exasperation.

Unfortunately, what has happened now in Spain has not happened elsewhere, and we have had to note that in various countries of Europe the biggest loser in the transition from régimes of the extreme right to other kinds of régime,

has always been democracy. But in the last two years we have had the satisfaction of seeing that two Mediterranean countries which for many years groaned under fascism — I refer to Greece and Spain — have, upon the occasion of their return to democracy and parliamentary elections, given exemplary proof of wisdom and balanced judgment, which augurs well for a democratic future in the Mediterranean, Europe and the world.

With these thoughts and sentiments, I renew my welcome to the Spanish observers, hoping that soon Spain may be admitted as a full member of the different international assemblies presiding over Europe's fate, and that we may, together with that great nation, be granted a democratic future for Europe, the Mediterranean and the whole world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Pecoraro.

I now call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Spanish elections have fully demonstrated the nation's political maturity and attachment to democracy. By its massive participation in the polls, it has clearly demonstrated approval of the course taken over the past few months by King Juan Carlos and his Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez. Since last summer, reforms and proposals for democratic changes in Spanish society have followed apace. An amnesty in the summer of 1976, affecting eight hundred persons, succeeded a popular referendum approving the establishment of a parliamentary system; and then, step by step, the government took several measures for ensuring a return to normal in political activities: legalisation of the Communist Party, allowing the exiles to come home; trade union legalisation; and restoration of the right to strike, enabling fair representation of both sides of industry, so necessary for the development of normal working relations.

The re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Eastern European countries put an end to a systematic isolation that was becoming anachronistic and out of date.

Reforms of this kind, which culminated in the election of a parliamentary assembly by universal suffrage, could only be carried through, as the Spanish Government clearly understood, gradually. Only an attitude of moderation, taking account of the complexities of Spain's political life, could ensure the triumph of such a policy of change without social unrest.

We must not forget the traumatic experience Spain underwent during the civil war of 1936 to 1939. Families deeply divided, the drama of partition and memories of savage fighting are

Mr. Radius (continued)

still vividly present in the minds of many Spaniards, who desire above all to avoid any return to such a tragic situation.

The most striking phenomenon of the Spanish elections is the respect for democratic procedures shown by a people, most of whom had not taken part in any direct election for over forty years. The elections were held in an atmosphere of calm, and every party was able to conduct its electoral campaign with all desirable safeguards. Such respect for pluralism and diversity of opinions and formal recognition of the existence of more than one way of thinking, are healthy signs in Spain's youthful democracy.

A striking proof of the new régime's political maturity is provided by the respect for popular suffrage shown by the Prime Minister, who presented his resignation to the King before he was again summoned to form a government. Such maturity is especially necessary at a time when Spain is experiencing particularly severe economic problems, and has to find a satisfactory answer to autonomist and regionalist claims.

A high rate of inflation, liable to exceed 30 % in 1977, is in fact undermining Spain's economy. The new government will have to grapple with inflation by restoring a balance of payments in deficit by about 20,000 million francs. Corrective and economic support measures will have to be vigorous enough to solve the unemployment problem, which at present affects nearly one million Spaniards.

The new government will also have to solve the question of regional autonomy. The success of the supporters of autonomy in Catalonia and the electoral performance of the Basque nationalist party demand the establishment of organs of dialogue and negotiation, which will have repercussions on the ways in which the matters to be settled are handled.

For all these reasons, our Assembly has a duty to encourage the young Spanish democratic régime. That is why we must take a position on the accession of Spain to such European assemblies as the Council of Europe and Western European Union, which are democratic parliamentary assemblies. In this way, we can continue to contribute with maximum effect to enabling democracy to take firm root in Spain. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Radius.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — The report presented by Mr. Mendelson is an objective and accurate survey of the political

situation in Spain and as such is an excellent source of information for our Assembly. There is one slight criticism which could be made; he is more interested by the present political situation, it seems to me, than by the long-term trends in the way Spanish society is developing, long-term trends against which it seems to me it would be useful to view the significant event which has just taken place in the political evolution of Spain.

This is doubtless what explains why the difficulties besetting Spain today, difficulties which are referred to both in Mr. Mendelson's report and in the draft recommendation presented by Mr. Urwin, are underrated. These texts show some hesitation in giving, as we should, a whole-hearted welcome to recent political developments in Spain, a country which, moreover, I know well since I am more or less a neighbour.

Thus Mr. Urwin in paragraph 1 of his draft recommendation would have us drop the idea that public freedom and universal suffrage in themselves constitute a great step forward which has already been taken in Spain. Of course there are certain characteristics in the way events have been going in Spain which may appear surprising to those of us who have long been accustomed to democracy. It is none the less true that Spain has seen a real democratic debate held in conditions of complete liberty. Criticism has been sparse and often ill-founded, so the Spanish régime may now be described as a democracy, one which is still in its infancy, it is true, but which has seen the light of day.

The blemishes which are still evident in certain areas of Spanish public life cannot be taken as grounds for condemning the country once again. On the contrary, they must be appreciated in the light of the serious difficulties which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech and which have long — I might say always — been a feature of life in Spain.

The first of these difficulties is political. It arises as a result of the existence in Spain of very closely knit regional communities which are conscious of their individuality. Madrid has always had to struggle to maintain its supremacy over Barcelona and Bilbao. This has constantly resulted in disturbances and a lack of balance in the Spanish community as a whole.

The second difficulty is economic. Spain may be counted amongst the ten most powerful industrial countries of the world, but its economic development is uneven, still depending on what happens outside Spain. May I recall in this connection that in the sixties Spain was, with Japan, at the head of the list of developing countries as regards the rate of its expansion? Behind this, however, there is a serious

Mr. Valleix (continued)

discrepancy between the agricultural and industrial sectors.

The third difficulty results from the absence of democratic traditions, and for a very good reason. Spain has known only two republics, both troubled and unstable. Apart from these two brief periods in the past, it has lived, in one form or another, under authoritarian régimes.

This doubtless explains why the present transition to institutions similar to our own can be only gradual and must follow a course of its own. The main thing is that on the qualitative plane a fundamental step has been taken, for this is the step from an authoritarian régime to democracy. Moreover, we must beware, when judging institutions, of seeking abstract perfectionism: each of our countries has its own constitutional features which, from the point of view of pure democracy, might appear to be open to criticism.

The Federal Republic of Germany has a rule that eliminates parties with less than 5% of the vote. Great Britain has a uninominal system with only one round, and this does not always reflect exactly the wishes of the electorate. It would no doubt be possible to level similar criticism at the French system.

We must therefore judge Spanish institutions in the light of the characteristic features of that country. We must facilitate any future progress that occurs in the country, being careful at the same time not to reject it or isolate it. Seen from this point of view, French policy has — one cannot but note the fact — been the wisest. This policy has been, wherever possible, to bring Spain and Europe closer together, while clearly pointing out that it could never be integrated into Europe without fully accepting democratic principles. Now that Spain is moving irreversibly towards democracy, we should continue along this path and ensure that in the near future it is admitted to the Council of Europe, after which we should examine the procedures and various stages by which it could join the Common Market.

In the field of defence, too, we must ensure the help of Spain, and so bring about its full participation in the only European organisation competent in this field: WEU.

It is along these lines that I hope our discussions will develop, and it is on a note of confidence that I conclude my remarks by saying how delighted we are at the democratic events which have just made their mark on the history of Spain, and by expressing the hope that this country, which is a neighbour of all the peoples of Europe, by its traditions, by its culture and

— this too is true today — by its economy, may as a result of these developments take its proper place as a fully-valid partner in a dialogue with WEU, a dialogue which will become more and more intensive and certainly fruitful. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

We have reached the end of the list of speakers. Does anyone else wish to take the floor? Does the Rapporteur want to reply?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to join with all those who have spoken in expressing gratitude not just for the presence of Mr. Temboury as an observer but for what he said to us.

Not surprisingly in view of this extremely important event in European politics, the first free and untrammelled election in Spain for more than forty years, the contributors to the debate have been almost unanimous on the importance of that decision by the Spanish people and all have wished the new régime well. I agree entirely with Sir John Rodgers and others who have said that as European politicians we must do all we possibly can to assist Spain as it emerges as a new democracy towards the achievement of its expressed ambition to participate in the accepted European institutions.

I detected what appeared to be a little confusion in the contribution of my colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett, in his use of the pronoun "we". He said that "we" had welcomed Portugal and ought also to welcome Spain with equal warmth into what surely should have been the "Council of Europe".

We have not welcomed either Portugal or Spain into Western European Union; nor can we. With that correction, I fully endorse what Sir Frederic Bennett said.

My colleague, Peter Hardy, quite properly reminded us that the establishment of a new democratic régime does not mean that all the problems will disappear immediately. He was supported in that point of view by Mr. Bernini. It is absolutely true that the Spanish Government will need all the co-operation of the Spanish people in order to make progress as a new democracy. I am sure that with the determination and willingness of the government and the support of the people, Spain will very quickly justify its new status as a western democracy.

Sir John Rodgers welcomed Spain and looked forward to the extreme value of the contributions that Spanish representatives would be able to make to the Euro-dialogue. Mr. Bernini expressed similar sentiments when he referred

Mr. Urwin (continued)

to Spain's interest in peace and détente. I hope that all European countries, whether new democracies or old, will continue to appreciate the full value of discussion on the vital matters that confront not only Europe but the whole world.

Mr. Müller and Mr. Radius referred to the bloody battles that had been fought in Spain. Unfortunately, those battles have indeed taken place. Mr. Müller quite properly reminded us that the forces of violence had been emphatically rejected by the electorate. I join him in hoping that the forces of violence will be rejected everywhere by understanding people, people who are interested in ensuring the safety of the areas in which they live.

Lord Beaumont welcomed the move towards regional autonomy and then went on to equate the situation, to some extent, with that in the United Kingdom. If I may indulge in a little byplay with Lord Beaumont, I would suggest to him that it is not possible to equate the Spanish situation with the British, if only because in Spain there is a far better chance of conceding the wishes of the Catalans, the Galicians and the Basques, since the first major task confronting the new Spanish Government is the drafting and presentation of a new constitution. I could wish sometimes that we in the United Kingdom had the same opportunity. Perhaps we should be able to resolve that problem much more easily.

I cannot, of course, comment on Lord Beaumont's question about Gibraltar or his observations, but they were potent and cogent remarks and I am sure that due notice will be taken of them.

I conclude by drawing on an old political axiom that on winning an election the major task is to proceed to plan to win the next. In congratulating the Spanish people on the wisdom and sense of their decision in these first steps towards becoming a democracy, I observe that the next Spanish general election might far outweigh the importance of that held last week, even though that was one of the most historic ever conducted.

I see that I have not replied to the comments by Mr. Valleix. I say to him in the friendliest possible way that there are no examples of reticence in the text of the recommendations. He referred specifically to the first recommendation, saying that we were not sufficiently forthcoming in our bestowal of praise upon the Spanish people. In the preamble to the recommendations we have said the kind of things that Mr. Valleix would want us to say. I am sure that my uninhibited acceptance of the decision of the Spanish people and acknowledgment of

their bitter and successful struggle towards the achievement of a new democracy echoes precisely the sentiments of my colleagues. I remind Mr. Valleix that a good deal depends on the new constitution that Mr. Suarez is to present to the Cortes. This has a vital bearing on the first paragraph of that text.

I hope that the wind blows fair for the Spanish people and I trust, too, that all of my colleagues in this Assembly, whatever their political leanings, will extend to the Spanish people our best wishes not just for a democracy, but for an enduring democracy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Urwin.

Does anyone wish to speak on behalf of the Committee?...

No one wishes to speak and therefore the debate is closed.

Before we move on to the vote, I understand that Mr. Radius wishes to take the floor on a question about the rules of procedure.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have asked as Chairman of the French Delegation, to speak on a point of order, a point which concerns Rule 39. This rule provides for the setting up of Committees which reflect both the national and the political composition of the Assembly. This is made clear in particular by paragraphs 2 and 6.

The problem, then, is how paragraph 7, which governs the election of the Chairmen of these Committees, should be interpreted in the light of the preceding paragraphs. I deduce from them that the Chairmen of the main Committees of the Assembly — General Affairs, Defence and Technology — must represent a proper balance between the different national delegations.

However, it appears that the present tendency is to eliminate France from all chairmanships except that which I have the honour to hold in the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

This situation does not seem to me to be in keeping with the support which my country has always given WEU, particularly in speeches by Ministers. Everybody here will remember the statements made by Mr. Jobert, Mr. Destremau and Mr. Taittinger. It may therefore be wondered what are the real motives behind this systematic exclusion of members of the French Delegation, of whatever political group, from the chairmanship of the main Committees of this Assembly.

Is it a deliberate attempt to deny France, with the views on policy which it has steadfastly upheld, all influence in the only European assembly competent in matters of defence?

Mr. Radius (continued)

I am not the only one to suspect this, or to wonder if the real instigator behind the decisions taken in the Committees is not the author of a certain telegram which had a wide circulation in a number of delegations.

But that is not, Mr. President, what I really wish to ask you. What I would like to know is your interpretation of paragraph 7 of Rule 39. Does this paragraph make it obligatory that there shall be equitable representation of the national groups when the Bureau of the Assembly is set up, and especially the bureaux of the Committees? Finally, can France really be expected to allow itself to be kept out of all the important functions of the Assembly?

The PRESIDENT. — I understand your situation, Mr. Radius, but I have heard of no tendency to exclude France from being properly represented. You ask me for my views on Rule 39, paragraph 7, and I shall give them.

The Committees are independent as regards the composition of their bureaux. Candidates for the posts of Chairman and Vice-Chairman are nominated by members of the Committee concerned and are elected by secret ballot, or by acclamation in the event of unanimity. However, there is no doubt that it is customary for national delegations and political groups, on the initiative of one or other of them, to concert their views in order to achieve a suitable balance between nationalities and political leanings in the allocation of posts in the bureaux of the Assembly and Committees. Members of bureaux already appointed for the session which has just begun remain in office until the opening of the spring 1978 session.

The bureau of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions still has to be appointed and this Committee is to meet tomorrow, Thursday, at 9.30 a.m. It is for national delegations and political groups to discuss the matter, if they so wish, in accordance with the abovementioned practice.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Do not worry, Mr. President, I am not going to hold up proceedings any longer. I shall take your statement to be an indirect appeal for the different delegations to get together and I shall take it that that means: let us try to do better in future. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — We must all try our best. This is indeed a question that must be dealt with and we must find solutions, if not tomorrow, in the near future.

We are at the end of the debate and no amendment has been tabled to the draft recommendation in Document 746.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a roll-call vote.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The draft recommendation is therefore agreed to unanimously¹.

I call Mr. Temboury.

Mr. TEMBOURY (*Observer from Spain*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I only wish to thank the Assembly for having adopted this recommendation which is a great encouragement for my country and my government.

Many thanks to you, Mr. President, for the kind words you have addressed to me. I would also like to express my thanks especially to all those who spoke in the debate: Mr. Urwin, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Hardy, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Channon, Lord Beaumont, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Müller, Mr. Pecoraro, Mr. Radius and Mr. Valleix. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr Temboury.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday 23rd June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Application of the final act of the CSCE (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 732 and Amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Pastorino, Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 5.15 p.m.)

¹ See page 37.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 23rd June 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Application of the final act of the CSCE (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 732 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Segre (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Grieve, Mr. Müller, Mr. Rivière.

4. Address by Mr. Pastorino, Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Pastorino.

5. Application of the final act of the CSCE (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 732 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Calamandrei, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Dankert, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Roberti, Mr. Channon, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Forni, Mr. Segre (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*).

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Application of the final act of the CSCE

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 732 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the application of the final act of the CSCE and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 732 and Amendments.

I think I ought to explain the situation. I have been informed that after 1 o'clock a great many members have to leave. We have therefore only three hours. As I announced yesterday, we shall have to break off the debate at 11 o'clock to listen

to the statement by the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Defence and the questions which may be put to him.

The list of those wishing to speak in the debate already contains twelve names besides that of the Rapporteur and we have quite a number of amendments, which will entail seventeen separate votes. I would ask all those who wish to speak to be as brief as possible, otherwise we shall not be in a position to close the proceedings at 1 o'clock.

I call Mr. Segre, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SEGRE (*Italy*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report I have the honour to present, in accordance with the terms of reference given me by the General Affairs Committee — a mark of confidence I am fully alive to, and for which I would like once again to renew my thanks to all my fellow-members — is intended to be only a short oral presentation of the draft report adopted by the Committee itself — with seventeen votes for, one against and one abstention — at its meeting in Rome on 9th May. A short explanation, and a few necessary touches to bring it up to date.

During the past few weeks there has in fact been, as was only to be expected a flurry of diplomatic activity in preparation for the Belgrade follow-up conference, whose initial technical phase began on 15th June. What appraisal have we to make of this activity and of the prospective outcome of the encounter ? The other day and specifically following a meeting with President Tito in Belgrade, Chancellor Schmidt said : "The prospects for the success of the Belgrade conference have improved in recent weeks". This is a measured and realistic appraisal which I think gives a precise snapshot of the potentialities of the conference. Similar pronouncements were made at this time by res-

1. See page 39.

Mr. Segre (continued)

possible statesmen of most of the States concerned.

May I remind you in this connection not only of yesterday's Franco-Soviet press communiqué but also of the confirmations given a few days ago by the official visit to Rome of the Hungarian leader Kadar and his interview with Pope Paul VI, or the visit to Belgrade of the Italian Foreign Minister Mr. Forlani, because of the importance attaching to it upon final ratification of the Rome-Belgrade agreement concerning the adjustment of their common frontier? At the end of his visit Minister Forlani spoke in terms I am happy to record :

"If the word alliance were not at this historical juncture linked to the notion of integrated relations at institutional, military and economic levels, we should be able to declare that Italy and Yugoslavia were allies."

In the wake of Helsinki, and in the spirit by which it was guided, Italy and Yugoslavia have successfully healed an ancient quarrel and opened up a new chapter in their mutual relations which I believe to be not only in the interests of both nations but more generally in those of all the peoples of our continent and of peace, security and co-operation.

I will not go back over all the vicissitudes of the preparatory work during the past few months for the Belgrade conference. This has been so intensive that the attempt would be impracticable. But allow me to emphasise that this work has been done by our countries not only behind closed doors in the chancelleries but in a free-for-all debate among the different political groupings and a wide spectrum of public opinion. Quite naturally, of course, it has had its polemical highlights and passionate clashes of opinion. But it has been an essential, useful and therefore positive debate, in which, generally speaking, everyone had an opportunity to hear the other man's side of the matter, and no one set out from preconceived ideas or on the presumption that he alone was the repository of absolute truth. It was indeed the scope of this confrontation, conducted at different levels, national and supranational, which underlined the importance of the final act of Helsinki as the basic charter for relations among the thirty-five signatory countries, and the demand for the rigorous implementation of all its postulates by all contracting parties. Never before, in all likelihood, had a diplomatic enactment roused so many echoes in public opinion. We can but rejoice that this should be the case, and interpret this impact as a reminder of the necessity for prudent governance of the capital of goodwill created by the Helsinki conference, whose fruits are not likely to be the yield of one particularly

abundant crop due to exceptional seasonal conditions, but the result of serious, stern efforts which will go on for years and years.

At the heart of the system built at Helsinki lie détente, mutual security and co-operation, as the cardinal points for a more just, better-balanced international order, more capable of solving the major problems of the contemporary world: ranging from those of balanced and controlled reduction of military rivalry and the armaments race, to the economic ones of the need to set about the construction of a new international economic order, from human, civic and social rights to the framing of a philosophy of co-operation.

The dialogue which has been gaining in strength on all these topics is not only the result of Belgrade and the deadline accepted, and still accepted, by the thirty-three European States and the United States and Canada. It encompasses the whole world, one in which the new datum is the emerging awareness of a twofold fact: the interdependence of its major problems and the mature conviction that a true solution can only be found for them in peace and détente. These are weighty and serious problems, as we all know. Only think of the shoals which the North-South dialogue has run into, and the misgivings roused by the situation in the Middle East. All the more necessity therefore for enabling this twofold awareness to grow and be ratified. Post-Helsinki Europe can do a good deal in this respect, both in its own interest and in those of the world in general.

This is the backdrop to the review of the implementation of Helsinki, and the preferred approach to the rendezvous at Belgrade: with no soulful illusions, but equally no useless repining or repudiations. The debate will, I repeat, not have been wasted if it has, as it originally at any rate seems to have done, initiated a process transcending blinkered unilateralism, and a concrete effort by the various countries to gain a better grasp of the intricate ramifications of the final act.

When at the meeting of the Atlantic Council in London on 10th May President Carter said in his speech, referring to Belgrade, "the United States shares with you a desire to make this a useful and constructive meeting. We support a careful review of progress by all countries in implementing all parts of the final act. We approach these meetings in a spirit of co-operation, not of confrontation", he indicated an approach that has found its own justification in the very fact that it had been independently arrived at, through the debate I was referring to above, by the vast majority of those who, inside or outside Europe, had come to grips with these problems — and, let me emphasise, by our governments. Underlying this approach there

Mr. Segre (continued)

was and still is the conviction — it was Willy Brandt who first, in a happy phrase, subsequently widely reported, warned against such a hypothesis — that Belgrade could not and cannot be regarded as a court of law in which some appear as prosecutors, others as judges, and others still as defendants or as counsel for the defence. There was and is, too, the conviction that in such a forum diplomatic negotiation may not be synonymous with concealment but rather allow a most unbiased hearing. Lastly, the conviction that what is wanted is to look ahead towards realistic and at the same time ambitious goals in the construction of the Europe foreshadowed in the final act.

There was and is, in short, no question of seeking a victory, sportsmanlike or vindictive, of one side over the other, but a victory for all: victory for humanity, for the nations, for rational politics and therefore the gradualness and concreteness of a process in which the interconnection of détente, co-operation, civil, social and human rights is ever more tightly consolidated.

The debate, over these months and weeks, has, viewed in this context — if I may be allowed to say so — been an important stage in a general growth of democracy. This has been possibly the first time diplomacies, together with the politicians and a by no means negligible fraction of public opinion, have ever, so fully and so passionately, got to grips in broad daylight with a set of problems in so many ways fresh and innovative, if it be true — as it is true — that the Helsinki final act has in fact, in full respect of the sovereign powers of States, established an interdependence in the domestic behaviour of governments, the state of their external relations and so of the process of détente and co-operation. Admittedly, Helsinki is no international agreement in the legal sense of the term but broadly a declaration of intent. Already *per se* this fact goes to show that it is in effect a process that cannot be exhausted and completed in the short- and possibly even the medium-term prospect. It is this quality of being a process which does and will necessitate the vigilant alertness of public opinion and the political and social forces, to remind *all* the contracting parties, at *every* stage in the process, of *all* the obligations entered into. Thus will be ensured a new, active and fruitful presence of public opinion on the international scene, which is and will be a democratic fact of whose significance we should be fully mindful.

Are we mindful of it? The debate that has gone on over the last few months should precisely give us cause to shun unjustified pessimism without veering to the opposite extreme of equally unwarranted optimism. If we look at our country's affairs, in all their pluralistic reality, the

wealth of opposing opinions, the forces fielded for this encounter, I think we can safely say that there is such an awareness of their importance. The various political forces have, in the exercise of their independence of views and jealous assertion of their own personalities, all brought their own contribution to establishing such a loftier and more complex vision of the interdependences of the modern world. Perhaps every one of them has studied, and sought to understand, more effectively than they have ever done in the past, what truth there is in other peoples' attitudes, in an attempt at a synthesis which too is the sign of a positive understanding of these interdependences.

When, at the beginning of May, the first political manifesto of the World Union of Christian Democrats proclaimed that "there are promising signs that we stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of mankind", and "something has changed in human consciousness, by the discovery of a new sense of freedom and responsibility towards one's self and others, of the necessity of a world-wide solidarity and of sensitivity to a living and whole-hearted democracy", it was no mere chance that the manifesto should contain a reference to the "interdependence of the problems of the world's peoples... characteristic of the new era", that ought to be marked by détente, "step-wise, controlled and balanced disarmament", and the building of a new international economic order.

When in recent weeks the socialist and social democrat parties renewed the demand for human rights to be regarded in their entirety and universality, they too made no fortuitous reference to such interdependence and the need to consolidate and advance the process of détente.

Other political groupings, including our own, took the same line.

The Helsinki final act certainly helped these ideas to come to fruition. The President of the French Republic, Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing recently remarked, quite rightly, that the scope of the Helsinki agreement was underestimated at the time it was signed. While this was true, this underestimation can now be said to be a thing of the past, at all events in the place where it was recorded. We should not else have been, in the last few months, at our Assembly and in its Committees, at the Council of Europe and in our own national parliaments and in the press, both actors and bystanders in such passionate debates, with all their quite natural shades of opinion. At this point I am impelled to allude to the stand taken by Sir Frederic Bennett in the Committee's proceedings and conveyed to the members of this Assembly in an appendix to my report. This dispenses me from any attempt at a summary of it, with all the risks of one-sidedness that would entail. I will therefore confine myself to the

Mr. Segre (continued)

expression of a personal view of Sir Frederic's opinion. I think his paper places a construction on the Helsinki final act which, if it were accurate, would render it impossible to explain how and why it was arrived at by an effort and tenacious negotiation lasting for years. It would have been a sheer waste of time for western diplomacy. If Sir Frederic's argument is true, the world of today would be immediately split asunder by strife, with no possibility of understandings being reached. But in that case, what future would there be for mankind? To what fate should we all be doomed? But this dramatically pessimistic vision has been and will go on being opposed by a contrasting picture, one of ever closer interdependence in a pluralistic world of differing socio-political systems in which there is no rational alternative to peace, détente amid security, and co-operation.

As I have used the word pessimism, Mr. President, allow me to quote a saying attributed to Romain Rolland and repeated by a great Italian, the fortieth anniversary of whose death at the hands of the fascist régime has just been celebrated by my country's culture and democracy. I refer to Antonio Gramsci and his urging that we always let ourselves be guided, in politics and our daily living, by intellectual pessimism and optimistic will.

With no other purpose, and in broad agreement, the governments of the countries of which we are members of parliament and have the honour to be the representatives in this Assembly have kept the appointment in Belgrade, as we were reminded yesterday morning by the United Kingdom Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. John Tomlinson. As was said on Vatican Radio some days ago: "There now seems to prevail among those attending the meeting the will to avoid its being turned into a purely polemical occasion for mutual recriminations and complaints about failures to apply or breaches of the final act, more especially in the human rights area." At the same time the papal speaker voiced the hope that "without pigeon-holing all serious discussion or honest assessment of progress, note will be taken of the goals, however limited, that have been achieved, to forge ahead with a process that slowly but surely leads to the concrete execution of what has not yet been done but needs to be done for the final act not to remain a mere declaration of good intentions".

It is my hope, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the same realistic and constructive goal will also find encouragement in our own debate, contribution and voting. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

To open the debate I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to begin by congratulating our Rapporteur under three heads. I do so, first, on the moderation, fluency and intellectual quality of his presentation of the report this morning to the Assembly. Secondly, I congratulate him on having produced in an area that is fraught with difficulty a report that nearly succeeds in being all things to all men. Thirdly, I wish to congratulate him on the fact that much of the sentiment that informs the report is completely irrefragable.

That is one of the difficulties one has to face in considering the whole problem of détente, all the agreements that have been arrived at at Helsinki and the matters now under discussion in Belgrade.

It is the natural human desire to want peace. It is the natural human desire that the countries of the world should settle down in agreement as far as possible in every particular with one another. It is the urgent desire of every government — certainly in the free world — to cut down on expenditure on armaments and to say to its people that it is safe to transfer government expenditure, that should perhaps go to defence, to social security and other much-needed services in society. Therefore, those who seek to support what has happened as a result of Helsinki have on their side the overwhelming desire of mankind for peace and to have as little expenditure as possible on armaments and as much expenditure as possible upon measures that will make our societies better for the citizens and for the underprivileged.

Those who will support Mr. Segre's report have on their side an overwhelming sentiment, but, as Mr. Segre said in his clear presentation of the report, we must approach this matter realistically, and I wish to do that under two heads.

Approaching the problem realistically, I cannot share the optimism of Mr. Segre's report or his presentation of it. I go along with a large part of the recommendation and — subject to the acceptance, for reasons I shall come to in a moment, of amendments put down by many of my friends, including Mr. Leynen, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. de Koster and others — I shall be happy to support the recommendation and much of the preamble, but we must look at the report realistically, and the two heads under which I desire to deal with it are, first, that of human rights and, secondly, the general build-up of forces in the world, which we cannot ignore and would ignore at our peril.

The Rapporteur deals with human rights under Chapter X, paragraph 57, of his report and he does so, I am sure not deliberately, in a

Mr. Grieve (continued)

way that is cursory and unfair to the western partners to the Helsinki agreements. It is a travesty to compare breaches of human rights, which we all acknowledge have taken place and do take place in all our countries from time to time, because no society is perfect, with those breaches that are the very foundation of power on the other side of the iron curtain — if I may still use that expression.

With my friend Mr. Craig — who referred to the matter in the question he asked on Monday of Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, the German Minister — I recently visited Berlin and had the privilege of surveying the whole city from a helicopter and seeing for myself the effect of the Berlin wall. How is it possible to say that there has been any substantial progress in the sphere of human rights when that wall winds its way across the whole agglomeration of Berlin, when it is surmounted by a special top designed to prevent people from getting a grip upon it, and when people of all ages, from children upwards, who seek to get across it are shot down in the act? How is it possible to equate with any respect for human rights the refusal of Soviet Russia and the countries which are parties to the Warsaw Pact to allow virtually any emigration by people who wish to leave those countries? It is surely by the token of human rights that we must consider the bona fides of the other parties of the Helsinki agreement.

Basket III is not just an accessory to Helsinki: it is an integral part of it. It is by the conduct of the Eastern European countries in the sphere of human rights that we are able to judge the real desire for détente and for progress in peace in the world. When we do that, have we not reason to be pessimistic, even though our Rapporteur chides Sir Frederic Bennett for the pessimism of his final note to the report, the somewhat dissenting note?

At present I find myself in the company of those who approach this matter with some degree of pessimism. I must tell the Rapporteur that I do so in full regard for the achievements of Helsinki, which are set out in Chapter VIII. Of course, there have been many most desirable fruits of the Helsinki agreements, as between States — Yugoslavia and Italy — and we ought to be glad of that and to thank the powers for it; but this does not by any means go to the root of the matter. I am all for seeking agreement and progress, but we must do so with our eyes open to the reality of the situation.

Another aspect of the reality of the situation of which I was able to learn, again in Berlin, is the massive build-up of forces on the other side of the Berlin wall and of forces in East Germany, Poland and Russia, and the not so gradual

build-up of Russian power on the seaways of the world. We must have regard to those realities. Having regard to them, let us by all means seek détente, but let us do so realistically without falling into the error of thinking that Helsinki and whatever may happen in Belgrade are manifestations of a complete change of view in Soviet Russia and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, because in my submission to the Assembly they are nothing of the kind.

We must seek agreement wherever we can. I support Mr. Segre's report, subject to the amendments which have been put down. I commend my own sentiments in it, but we must approach this matter with realism, and with realism we must be sure that our own defences are in order so long as there remain the dangers that the features to which I have briefly referred clearly indicate. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

I call the next speaker, Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. I want first of all to thank Mr. Segre for his report. Maybe, in view of what I shall be saying in a minute, this will surprise him. But it is the strength of our pluralist system to acknowledge the achievement of someone who holds different views.

My rejection of this report is connected not with the draft recommendation as such but with what Mr. Segre has added by way of explanation. I quite understand his subjective difficulties. After all he could in the circumstances — that is, being a member of the central committee of the Italian Communist Party — hardly have said anything but what is in this report.

If we discuss the results of the CSCE and endorse the principle of détente in the proper meaning of this word, then — and I am using Willy Brandt's words quoted in Mr. Segre's report — "illusory ideas must be opposed". To put it differently: we must not beat about the bush. What disturbs me most in the report — Mr. Grieve has already referred to it — is its equation of trends in the East and West which are quite simply not comparable. Thus, for instance, it is stated in paragraph 15 that there is a growing demand for democracy in East and West; it is said that violations of human rights occur equally in East and West, and reference is made in paragraph 57 to instances of a ban on the exercise of one's calling, for instance in my own country, the Federal Republic. But can one really compare the case of an employer who — to take the most recent ban on the exercise of one's calling in the news — in our country, in the Federal Republic, has been barred for five years from the exercise of his calling because he had stopped paying the social security contributions

Mr. Müller (continued)

for his workers — can one compare this with the fact that in Czechoslovakia, for instance, a writer who signed Charter 77 is not allowed to publish even a book that is purely literary, a book that does not deal with political questions? Or take another example of a ban on the exercise of one's calling in my country. There was a university lecturer who wanted to become an established civil servant. He was not taken on because he subscribed to the aims of the German Communist Party which — unlike the Rapporteur's party — continues to support the dictatorship of the proletariat in the full meaning of the term. The man concerned — because you see, this is possible in our country, in a pluralist system — thereupon took the matter to court. The court decided that he really could not be exposed to the conflict of conscience involved in working for the preservation of our libertarian democratic system as a civil servant from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and striving for the dictatorship of the proletariat from 5 p.m. to 8 a.m. This is why, of course, the court did not find in his favour.

The good Mr. Segre is, if I may say so, comparing apples with pears — or, to put it even more pointedly : grapefruit with sea-urchins. Thus, if we apply his method to a topical event, we might say : a citizen in the Federal Republic owns only one motor car, whereas a citizen in the Soviet Union owns seven sports cars since, under the constitution of the Soviet Union, all citizens are equal and, as we know, Mr. Brezhnev owns seven sports cars. If we make such comparisons we know perfectly well that we are not getting anywhere but are simply talking around the real subject.

The fact that Mr. Segre refers to the ratification of United Nations declarations in the socialist countries cannot stop us from seeing things as they are. Even the Stalin constitution, as far as its wording went, was a real model of democracy, superior to many democratic constitutions of western countries. Great Britain, Mr. President, does not even have a written constitution. Nevertheless, I venture to think that pluralism and democracy are safeguarded in Britain to a degree entirely different from that found in the Soviet Union where, to quote one example, in the days of the Stalin constitution MM. Bukharin and Zinoviev, and Neumann and Radek from my own country — who certainly were not class enemies, but communists — disappeared without trace. Until the communist parties dissociate themselves from Lenin's democratic centralism and endorse the separation of powers, they are to me anti-revolutionary and autocratic. It is the democratic parties of Western Europe — though this seems almost a contradiction in terms — which at present hold high the principles of the great revolution of 1789, Montesquieu's separa-

tion of powers and the tradition of enlightenment, against the real reactionaries. This holds good, too — and I want to say this especially to our friend Mr. Segre — for what goes nowadays under the name of Eurocommunism. His party secretary, Mr. Berlinguer, in the yearbook of the Communist Party of Italy in 1972, came out clearly in support of Leninist principles, including the principles of democratic centralism. In 1973 his party secretary, Mr. Berlinguer, told Mr. Honecker, the general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany : "Our ideals, the ideals of the Italian Communist Party, are the same as yours". Automatic death traps, barbed wire, the wall — are these really the same ideals? I can hardly imagine so.

Only a few days ago I learnt what these ideals are really like : I discovered it from a member of the executive body of the student organisation of the German Communist Party — that is, of the official party because we have several communist parties in a libertarian country like the Federal Republic and that is one of the differences from the communist countries, where of course there is invariably only one communist party. In *Rote Blätter*, the periodical of the Spartakus student organisation, she writes : "We want no freedom of the press, no freedom of coalition, no free elections." Have we no ears to hear, and no eyes to read what is being spelled out here? In *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, a periodical close to the German Communist Party, one Axel Peter, in an article on the revolution in Portugal, refers to the seventh Comintern congress and states :

"Revolution via the Communist Party was possible because ever since 1935, since the seventh Comintern congress, the Communist Party had systematically been pursuing a Trojan horse policy."

This was said by a communist, not by a critic of communism. I believe he is right.

I must tell Mr. Boucheny that I can see no change when, for instance, the French Communist Party by the unanimous vote of 1,700 delegates, deletes the formula about the dictatorship of the proletariat — the very same delegates who a few years earlier, with the very same unanimity, expelled Roger Garaudy from the party because he wanted this formula deleted. Surely there is something that does not add up here.

Mr. Segre quoted Gramsci, the fortieth anniversary of whose death came round a short time ago. He was father to the concept of the struggle for hegemony, which has now been re-christened as the *compromesso storico*. He describes how the Communist Party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, is to achieve victory. And this, appropriately enough, was written in an article entitled

Mr. Müller (continued)

"Note on Machiavelli". The points of contact with Machiavelli, who died 450 years ago yesterday, are not far to seek.

I believe — and I will finish on this point — that what we have here is a truly grand-scale manoeuvre, that there has been no change from the concepts of Lenin who, in his pamphlet "Left-Wing Radicalism — a Childhood Complaint of Communism" wrote the following :

"It is necessary to combine the utmost devotion to the ideals of communism with the ability to accept whatever practical compromises are necessary, to change tack, to make pacts, to advance by zigzags, to beat a retreat and so on."

This quotation from Lenin is no different from the quotation which I am now going to give you from the official party manual of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a signatory to the Helsinki final act. Professor Afanasyev, a member of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the man responsible for this basic course in scientific communism, writes :

"Tactics moreover require the ability to make use of the strength of one's allies and temporary fellow-travellers, as well as of contradictions and vacillations in the enemy camp, to advance the interests of socialism. To gain allies for the proletariat, communists must know how to change tack and how to enter into compromises and agreements useful to the revolution. In so doing, the communists do not surrender one inch of their ideological revolutionary principles and preserve unshakable loyalty to the revolutionary ideal. By means of such flexible tactics the opponent is deprived of his broad social basis, the working masses and the proletarian vanguard are combined and strength is gained for the revolutionary assault on capitalism."

I believe that any discussion that is not conducted clearly serves just these communist intentions. That is why I have preferred to bring out the contradiction there is here, in plain simple language. Either there are still communists in Italy, and in France, in which case they are still the same people who endorse Lenin's principles : or else they no longer endorse Lenin's principles, in which case they are left-wing socialists, and we have reached a different negotiating position.

For the reasons I have already mentioned, Mr. President, I therefore reject Mr. Segre's report, and call for a roll-call vote. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Müller.
I call Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to thank Mr. Segre for his report, whose fair-mindedness has been acknowledged by all.

It is somewhat astonishing that a foreign government, a non-member of our organisation and a non-European should presume to try and influence certain WEU member governments.

That the United States should pursue its own policy in the integrated organs of NATO, it is its right to do so. That the member States of NATO should follow its lead in adopting an Atlantic policy, turning their backs on all considerations of national interest, it is also their right to do so, even if they lose their own souls and identity in the process. But that the United States should take the liberty, through the intermediary of its State Department, of expressing the wish that the Segre report should be rejected, is inadmissible and self-contradictory.

Such conduct is inadmissible for Western European Union is an independent international organisation, composed of sovereign States having chosen to discuss together in full freedom and away from any pressures problems of their defence and security. WEU, which is the only European defence organisation, is in duty bound to preserve its freedom of action and cannot yield to any pressure, however discreetly applied.

Such conduct is not only unacceptable, it is also self-contradictory. The United States is one of the signatories of the final act at Helsinki which, in its first section, enumerates the principles that should govern mutual relations among the participating States. Among those principles is one ordering that participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect,... in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

The attitude of the United States in this Segre affair smacks strongly of that kind of intervention. Does it not remind us disagreeably of statements by Mr. Kissinger limiting European sovereignty ?

The United States attitude is politically hamfisted and dangerous. What is the use of attributing excessive importance to this report, compiled in a spirit of moderation by one of our colleagues, on instructions from the General Affairs Committee ? What is the use of making it out to be a document that smells of the brimstone of Eurocommunism ? It is hamfisted to attach importance to Eurocommunism, a fragile and more than a little ambiguous alliance of three European communist parties. Let us not delude ourselves about the sincerity of parties naturally disinclined to play the democratic game. But no good purpose would be served by an unduly negative stance which would be dangerous.

Mr. Rivière (continued)

It is better by far to advocate further détente. The Segre report has the essential merit of stressing the need for co-operation among States with different social systems on a basis of equality, independence and mutual preferences.

This was already the purpose of General de Gaulle in going to Moscow and pronouncing his prophetic speech that paved the way for the policy of détente. In many aspects, the Helsinki conference has been the recognition in tangible form of that "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" of which he dreamt. For the first time, the States of Eastern and Western Europe were meeting to sign a major document on the development of co-operation in the economic, technological, cultural and monetary areas, and above all the conditions they undertook to observe for assuring the security of our continent and fostering trust between two camps that had for thirty years been too sharply opposed.

Now that the Belgrade Conference is opening, it is for us to recall some essential principles. There is at present no alternative to détente. Any other policy would take us back to the time of the cold war, and accentuate the division of Europe into two hostile blocs, engaged in an armaments race and seeking an all-round superiority that is bound to be illusory. We do not want détente between blocs, but among States. It must, as President Tito rightly says, facilitate the establishment of relations conducted on the basis of independence and sovereign equality.

Lastly, détente should not only be a matter for governments but also for human beings. It should not rest solely on economic exchanges or the quest for a military *modus vivendi*. It should also enable human relations to be established between citizens of countries with different social systems, on a basis of the requisite respect of human rights.

Therefore, we should speak out plainly for further détente in compliance with the Helsinki agreements. An independent attitude, clearly showing that we yield to no pressure, from whatever quarter it may come, can only redound to the honour of our Assembly. (Applause)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rivière.

4. Address by Mr. Pastorino, Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Italy

The PRESIDENT. — As agreed, we are now to interrupt the debate in order to hear the statement by Mr. Pastorino, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Italy. We are highly honoured that you have come to our Assembly,

Mr. Pastorino, and I therefore ask you to come to the rostrum to make your statement.

Mr. PASTORINO (*Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, thank you for the cordial style in which you have heralded my speech. It adds to my pleasure in attending this twenty-third session of the Assembly of WEU.

May I also convey my appreciation of the high honour that this august gathering has done me by allowing me to make a modest, albeit carefully pondered and earnest contribution to the topics debated at the current session, which by their diversity and range touch on the most vital aspects of our peoples' peaceful coexistence.

The very wealth of subject-matter that has constantly been a feature of the debates it has roused, in which ample room has been given us for expressing our opinions as free men, divergent at times but always democratically attended to, in a painstaking search for some meeting-place of minds, is in my view the clearest and direct proof of the vitality which has animated this Assembly, along the often rough but ever fruitful road embarked upon years ago and marked by our tenacity of purpose and awareness that only joint action would have enabled the barriers that still divided our peoples, only a few short decades back, to be surmounted.

Our efforts, to be sure, often come up against obstacles, have suffered setbacks, and further delays in our action are only too likely to occur. But what I want to dwell upon today is the progress that has been made, the impetus imparted by the union and its organs, especially this worthy Assembly, towards achieving the goals we had set ourselves, of security and defence.

In this connection and with reference to the effort accomplished in the twin sectors of defence and security, I would recall the big contribution made by the Council of Ministers in their decision of 31st May 1976 instructing the Standing Armaments Committee to carry out a study intended to facilitate co-operation between member States' armaments industries.

There is no need to stress the profound ethical as well as pragmatical implications this study has for our countries' continuing effort, in other places, towards European political co-operation.

In this connection I am bound to mention the success of the independent programme group in which eleven European countries come together in a combined effort to identify aspects of common interest in the military equipment production sector. The economic crisis which has compelled our countries to review their military expenditure with the object of more rational use

Mr. Pastorino (continued)

of the limited resources available for defence, renders the requirement of collaboration in this sector even more topical. The results achieved by the programme group confirm the importance of the agreements and understandings that led to its creation, and the Italian contribution to the organisation of its activities has been abundantly recognised, so much so that Italy has been requested to chair the group for another year.

I referred a little earlier to the diversity of the topics on the agenda for this twenty-third session, among which there seem to me to be two of particular interest to the Italian Government. I allude to the debate on Western Europe's policy towards Mediterranean problems, which has now been held, and to one now proceeding on application of the final act of the CSCE.

The Mediterranean region, which I would extend beyond that commonly defined as the southern flank of the Alliance, to take in the North African littoral as well as the sorely-trying countries of the Middle East, is an area which Italy cannot, in the economic straits in which it finds itself, afford to disregard in the search for new and bigger markets on which its traditions of highly specialised technology and superabundance of skilled manpower may find a possible desirable outlet.

I think it particularly necessary to underline in this sector the need for whole-hearted and binding collaboration between the countries of our union in grappling with the problem of what contribution to make to development of the Mediterranean peoples. Such collaboration, to be progressively geared to the various requirements and necessities, cannot disregard, on the one hand, a proper balance between the countries supplying the required technologies and, on the other, considerations of effective contribution to the progress of customer countries and the effort to overcome the conflicts that darken this area.

In this context I deem it pertinent as well as realistic to say that Italy hopes for political co-ordination in market freedom, so that an industry not regarded by us as backward but as complementary in finding a solution to the grave problems of our national economy, balance of payments and employment — I refer to ship-building, and aircraft and helicopter production — may smoothly, without any simple-minded moralising, be slotted into an overall framework in which competitors of no mean dimensions of every territorial and political origin, operate. Italy hopes, and is sure, that this kind of political co-ordination should primarily allow for morally self-imposed limitations respecting the problems

of freedom and democracy of the countries concerned.

It is impossible nowadays to mention the Mediterranean without a reference to Spain.

Authoritative comments have been passed in this forum on the results of the recent free elections in Spain. The Italian Government cannot fail, in this highly appropriate assembly, to raise its voice in heartfelt satisfaction at the return to democracy of a country of such importance to the Mediterranean basin. Our trust is that the stabilising factor for democratic institutions that can be supplied by such a decisive contribution as Spain's, will not only prove durable, as everything leads to suppose, but have a multiplier effect on the whole Mediterranean area, which is undoubtedly, for various considerations, a sensitive point for European and possibly world equilibrium.

Lastly, the subject, now being debated in this august Assembly, of the application of the final act of Helsinki has bearings which I have no hesitation in qualifying as vitally important to our countries' futures within the broader perspective of regulating relations with the Eastern European countries, and to our peoples in their direct inter-relations and the affirmation of their rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the agreements of the United Nations, enactments whose observance is mandatory by virtue of the assumption of a precise international obligation.

The inherent difficulties in the way of a satisfactory and acceptable application of the final act were clearly perceived by our governments on the morrow of signature of the convention. We realise it will take a long time for the CSCE, which is a long-term process, to yield any results. Therefore, the Belgrade conference must be regarded as a first stage in the process. Nevertheless, the States taking part in it should give substantial pledges of the sincerity of their intentions in fulfilling the commitments entered into at Helsinki and promoting co-operation among the European States. Indeed, just like the Helsinki conference, the one at Belgrade should not be squeezed into the framework of a confrontation between two opposing blocs. On the contrary, the greatest possible room should be allowed for the participation of neutral and non-aligned countries, so that these may be enabled to stand at the sides of the Eastern European countries in development of their own freedom of action.

I should like to emphasise that observance of the provisions agreed at Helsinki is fundamental to relations not only between East and West but also among all the member States. In this respect it is relevant that the western countries had already, by the time the agreement was signed,

Mr. Pastorino (continued)

implemented a great many of its provisions. Other countries, setting out from a lower level of implementation, have made some progress in given sectors. It is stressed, however, that in others, especially respect of civil rights and freedoms of the individual, such progress is but limited. These countries will therefore have to show greater dynamism in applying the relevant provisions.

Of equally great importance is the possibility of freer disclosure of information and promotion of greater freedom of movement and contacts between individuals, and removal of the remaining obstacles that stand in the way. Consequently the States attending the Belgrade conference ought to develop their relations in the spirit of the declaration of principles, and bear in mind the concept of the indivisibility of détente, which cannot be in any way confined to our own continent but should be extended to the entire world.

At this point let me state that we are fully aware of the importance of the subject matter and vote which are on the Assembly's orders of the day.

The Italian Government's thinking, which I have had the honour of expounding, is not of course aimed at influencing the decisions of this Assembly, from whose debate, moreover, I trust may emerge a common guideline which genuinely interprets the spirit of the policy of détente pursued by our governments and the Belgrade conference, as well as of those we hope may follow upon it in the context of application of the Helsinki final act.

I should like to conclude, Mr. President, by a reference to a matter on which feelings run stronger, I know, in certain countries, including my own, than in others, but none the less important for all that. I allude to the phenomenon of the subversion, or rather attempted subversion, of our institutions by terrorism.

My government voices on this subject the hope that by this Assembly's authoritative contribution, the governments of all countries will join in a collaborative effort, transcending all ideologies, for action by way of mutual intervention with a view to extirpating this noxious weed, but in the name of the ideals of humanity, democracy and freedom. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank you, Mr. Minister. Your statement was extremely important and we listened to it with special interest.

Mr. Pastorino has kindly agreed to answer questions from any members who wish to ask them. If any members wish to put questions, I request them to make those questions very short.

Does anyone wish to ask the Minister a question ?...

I see that no member wishes to do so.

Mr. Minister, I think that means that you have said everything which is of importance and we have nothing to add. Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

5. Application of the final act of the CSCE (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 732 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — In the resumed debate I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe none of us fails, or none of us ought to fail, to perceive the responsibility that is ours — even more so, in that by a coincidence today's debate is being held at the same time as the Belgrade conference is having difficulty in getting off the ground ; to wrest some contribution out of the Assembly of WEU that will make Belgrade, in Europe's interest, a proving stage of continuity and development in the process set in train in Helsinki : a contribution no smaller than the one made two months ago in Strasbourg by the other Assembly to which we all have the honour of belonging, that of the Council of Europe, in unanimously approving that so balanced, stimulating and positive resolution on application of the final act, following a debate in which authoritative spokesmen of the United States and Canada also agreed to examine in depth the western countries' common interest in the preparation and constructive conduct of the Belgrade conference.

We should therefore be thankful to our General Affairs Committee for drawing up — over and above, and separately from the Rapporteur's no less outstanding effort — a draft recommendation aimed at enabling this Assembly too to make its contribution to the success of the Belgrade conference with what amounts to full consensus, as shown by the Committee's vote in Rome : a consensus confirmed by the fact of an amendment like Mr. Leynen's.

So I regard as an absurd anachronism — for I should else have to consider it, as Mr. Rivière has done, offensive to the independence of WEU — the identification some newspapers claim to have been made between one particular political side and the direction taken by the General Affairs Committee of our Assembly, precisely on the basis of a convergent common Western European interest, and more broadly of the West as a whole, in the extension of détente, and to this end application of all the clauses of the final act of Helsinki. Any unilateral identification of this convergence of interests with whatever political side is particularly baffling to us Italians.

Mr. Calamandrei (continued)

The stand adopted by Italy at the Belgrade conference — of which the presence here today of Under-Secretary Pastorino has enabled us to have a first-hand summary — in fact reflects a correspondence of views, on this as on the Osimo agreements with Yugoslavia, elections for the European Parliament and other important international issues, arrived at in Italy by the government and all the constitutional forces of parliament. There is in our country today a vast ground-wave of national opinion for which the government speaks, in the sense that the whole range of provisions determined at Helsinki are to be reviewed at Belgrade and carried farther as an organic whole, maintaining, indivisible and simultaneous with one another, the consolidation of security, expansion of co-operation, the affirmation of human rights in respect of which so far as security is concerned we in Italy are profoundly mindful of the requirement that impulses may be sent out from Belgrade for appropriate measures to enhance trust and mutual respect of sovereignty, the negotiation for a mutual, balanced reduction of forces and the quest for a relationship of security in the Mediterranean too.

We Italians equally have a lively sense of the need to develop East-West co-operation as a precondition for coping with the crucial problem of North-South co-operation.

As for human rights, we nourish a growing conviction that, to safeguard these — all-round, and in the historical diversity of systems adopted — we have to have a more effective machinery of international agreements, starting with more effective implementation of the United Nations pacts on civil and political rights, to which Mr. Pastorino also referred; pacts on civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights which the Italian Parliament has deliberately ratified in the specific context of Belgrade by a unanimous consensus of the constitutional forces for which, if I may say so, your humble servant was the spokesman in the Senate, and one of his christian democrat colleagues in the lower House.

Admittedly the draft recommendation as tabled may seem a bit half-hearted compared with all these lively national sensibilities of ours, but I regard it all the same as a significant step in the right direction, one to be given our full approval and backing so that our Assembly may play a constructive rôle in the task to which our countries are addressing themselves in Belgrade. The main thing is that a clear and consistent political will shall emerge from this debate, in support of the efforts that will ensure a positive result at the Belgrade conference. The main thing is that, over and beyond today's debate, we still maintain our constant

endeavour, responsible attention to and balanced support of the process which, throughout the Belgrade proceedings and thereafter, we are all bound in the interests of Europe to continue and advance. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Calamandrei.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Those of you who are aware that mine was the single vote cast against the report in Rome — which I do not regret — and that I am the author of the minority opinion at the end of the report, will not be surprised if today I reaffirm my opposition to the report and make a few points of substance about the report and the attitude I shall feel bound to adopt.

It would be only courteous of me to respond to the courteous question asked of me by Mr. Segre, and I shall do so briefly. He asked me why and how it is that Helsinki came into being if the interpretations and the opinions I expressed were valid. He deserves an answer. That answer is contained in the minority opinion.

The Soviet Union wanted the final act to come into being primarily in respect of basket I with special reference to the legitimisation of the political structure and the frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe, and for that it was prepared to pay a substantial price. On the other hand, the western powers wanted desperately to be able to get some advancement on the path towards a greater observance of human rights and to open a window between East and West, and for that they were prepared to pay a price, which was to concur in the legitimisation of the frontiers of Eastern and Central Europe, although, in fact, this is limited only to the exclusion of change by the use of force.

That is the answer to the Rapporteur as to why such widely differing interpretations nevertheless led to a signature. Each side was prepared to pay a certain price to achieve the objectives that above all it wanted.

The Rapporteur also politely suggested that my interpretation was pessimistic. In my political life I have always found that, whenever I am realistic, my political opponents call me pessimistic. I do not blame Mr. Segre for doing precisely that. I should doubtless do it to him if our positions were reversed. So I prefer to deny the charge of pessimism, to say that I am being realistic, and to let the facts stand for themselves.

In addition to what I have written in my minority opinion it is only considerate to the Rapporteur to mention those parts of the report that I find particularly and fundamentally unacceptable. The first and certainly the over-

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

riding one is that which has been mentioned by my colleague, Mr. Percy Grieve — the attempt, for reasons which I realise, to equate conditions in human and civil rights on either side of what we still refer to as the iron curtain. Whatever the reasons that led the Rapporteur to attempt the equation, the result amounts to an insult to the intelligence. To suggest that at the moment there is any parallel between the observance of what we in Western Europe and North America refer to as human rights on the one hand and what the Soviet bloc refers to on the other is a fundamental travesty of the situation.

Let me give a few short examples. Where in the western half is the parallel for the Berlin wall? Where in the western half are the Gulags, written about not by a conservative in Britain but by Mr. Solzhenitsyn and other Soviet victims? Where in the West is the parallel of the abuse of drugs and so-called medical treatment to effect what is called a cure of political dissidents such as exist behind the iron curtain, of which testimony has been given not by any conservative but by Russians subordinated to that treatment? Where in the western world is the parallel of the imposition of capital punishment even for such lesser offences as currency smuggling? Where in the western world is the parallel of forced labour camps? Finally, in only a short interim list, where in the western world is the parallel of the refusal of the Soviet Union to allow its citizens to move freely outside its borders and even within its borders?

It is for these and many other reasons that any attempt at an equation is really a travesty. Almost the only example the Rapporteur has chosen, in regard presumably to my country, is a reference to the right of people to work and unemployment, which at present exists in Britain and other western countries. That is regrettable but as a conservative I say straight away to my labour colleagues that unemployment in Britain is not a deliberate act of policy such as Soviet Union breaches of human rights, but a condition that my government is doing their best to cure. Therefore, to try to achieve a parallel in this field is totally illogical.

Now I should like to say a word on basket II and trade, on which my colleague, Mr. Critchley, wrote very effectively in a national newspaper recently. At a time when the Soviet Union is spending a larger and larger proportion of its gross national product on armaments, we have been lending that country money on terms that we deny to our own farmers and citizens, both as regards length of tenure and repayment, so that the Russians can use more of their own resources to build tanks while we supply them with tractors. That is the sum total of the improvement in trade as opposed to fantasy.

I refer to human rights. A tendency has shown itself today when we talk of human rights to get circumscribed into thinking that we are talking only of human individual rights. But there is another very basic human right not mentioned anywhere in the report — the right of nations freely to decide their own political destinies. At the end of the last war it was decided that all colonial empires except one should be dismantled, and I pay tribute to France, my own country and Belgium. We have freely given the right to citizens of scores of countries throughout the world to choose their own political destiny and to decide whether they want to be with us, against us, neutral, or otherwise.

I suggest that we now bear in mind when talking about advances towards human rights that we should also talk of including an opportunity not just for civil rights at home for individuals but for national States within the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe also to choose their own destiny as to which bloc, if any, they wish to belong, and which political and other structures they wish to adopt. In some ways freedom to decide the destiny of one's country is one basic human right that the western world has freely accepted since the end of the last war.

Under the circumstances of what I have outlined I have had to think seriously of what should be my reaction to this report as a whole, because I am aware that on technical grounds we shall be voting here today for the preamble and the recommendation. But as a conservative I am also a traditionalist and I took the trouble to read some speeches, notably that by Mr. de Niet, when I was in a similar position over a controversial report with recommendations and resolutions that had been approved without votes through this Assembly. Yet I was told at the end that, nevertheless, the whole theme of my report was such that it was necessary to vote against it in that context as a whole.

I am always ready to learn. A substantial number of those who agreed, amendment by amendment, with me, nevertheless felt it right to vote "No" to the report as a whole because the structure of the report and the theme behind it was such that, quite reasonably from their point of view, they did not wish to accept it.

Today my attitude is precisely the same as that which was adopted a comparatively short time ago in connection with that other controversial report. Therefore, although I shall press my amendments and support others, my present inclination is strongly to the effect that, particularly because the outside world will not be reading just these resolutions and recommendations but the report as a whole, I can with integrity only continue to adopt the attitude I adopted in fairness in Rome and vote against the report at the conclusion of today's debate. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank you, Sir Frederic.

I now call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Segre's report raises confused and controversial issues, which in fact involve two separate questions. The first concerns what it has been agreed, doubtless wrongly, to call Eurocommunism. The second concerns the policy of détente, its development and Europe's need for it.

So far as Eurocommunism is concerned, I should like to confine myself here to expressing a certain scepticism. Indeed, I do not believe that this represents anything new. It is not the first time that the communists have preached the policy of extending the hand of friendship and have affirmed their resolve to play the democratic game. They already did so in France at the time of the popular front and in the period after liberation. They acted in the same way in Italy until the cold war led to their leaving the government. Let us remember, however, that the liberal and apparently democratic periods in the history of the French and Italian Communist Parties were on each occasion followed by a violent and brutal return to intolerance and to the rejection of pluralism.

We have no guarantee that the current spate of fair words from the communist leaders of Western Europe will not be followed in a few years' time by a fresh hardening in their attitudes — desired and encouraged by Moscow. It is not, however, because the Rapporteur belongs to the Italian Communist Party that we must, for that reason alone, reject a proposed recommendation which has many positive aspects.

Admittedly, the communists cannot be considered as democrats in the full sense of the word. I am thinking of political freedom as we know it in the West. But is that a reason for spurning any dialogue, all constructive discussion with them, when they set in train something which can contribute to détente and to peace? Is it not thus, by engaging in a dialogue, that we are attempting to advance along the road to co-operation with the countries in which communist parties are in power?

Do we believe that the systematic rejection of any proposal coming from the communists will dissuade electors from voting for them? The truth is quite the reverse, for by giving credence to the idea that Europe's responsible political leaders are seemingly hostile to an open democratic discussion with the whole spectrum of representative political forces, we should in fact be serving the cause of communist propaganda, which accuses us of scorning and rejecting one-fifth of the French electorate and one-third of the electorate in Italy.

Nor — and this is certain — will any pressure from abroad, however clumsy and offensive it may be, succeed in influencing the European peoples when they are called upon to determine the political line which their countries should follow. This sort of interference, which is after all both ridiculous and insulting to Europe, instead of producing the desired effect, might even prove counter-productive, leading the citizens of France and Italy to believe that acceptance of a government with communist participation would be a sign of independence. Let us then allow the peoples of our States to decide for themselves, let us trust in their wisdom and let us concern ourselves rather with the substance of the debate — the policy of détente.

It seems to me that Mr. Segre's proposals, subject to some amendments, might constitute a reasonable and constructive contribution to improving East-West relations. The proposals, in fact, have the merit of bringing out the dynamic character of the détente process, which should be pursued untiringly both on a bilateral basis and, in certain cases, in the context of multilateral negotiations. Mr. Segre also rightly stresses the rôle which WEU might play in co-ordinating the various détente policies, while taking into account the security requirements of the member States. Lastly, the Rapporteur very rightly emphasises that the relaxation of tension between East and West gives the European countries, to whichever alliance they may belong, a chance of translating their deep-rooted affinities into direct and fruitful co-operation.

Nevertheless, Mr. Segre's draft recommendation, in the form presented to us, is obviously somewhat unbalanced. It seems to me that, for it to be acceptable, some safeguards must be provided. Now we find these safeguards, in the main, incorporated in Amendment No. 8 tabled by Mr. Rivière and Amendment No. 7 tabled by Mr. Leynen, the Rapporteur himself, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Mr. Dankert and Mr. Urwin.

I disagree in only one single particular — albeit a slight one — with Mr. Leynen's amendment. It concerns paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. I am not in favour of deleting this paragraph, inasmuch as it underlines the need for signatory States to respect one of the six principles of international good conduct defined at Helsinki: non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, which is a fundamental point. And in this respect I would associate myself with the anxieties voiced just now by Sir Frederic Bennett. As at present drafted, however, paragraph 3 is incomplete. In fact, it is the whole set of ten principles which the signatory States should observe strictly, and in particular those of refraining from the use or the threat of force, and of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It accordingly

Mr. Valleix (continued)

seems to me necessary to amend paragraph 3 so as to introduce a reference therein to the sum total of the Helsinki principles. In this connection, it might be added that it would hardly be wise for our Assembly, after the pressures to which it has been subjected, to come out against the principle of non-intervention.

In other respects, Mr. Leynen's amendment is satisfactory. It states clearly that Helsinki is not a conclusion but a point of departure, that the final act does not absolve the eastern countries from fulfilling the obligations into which they have entered elsewhere, that détente is not just a European — I am thinking of Africa as well — but a world-wide concept, and lastly that it is important to apply the detailed clauses of the final act and not merely vague abstract principles of international law. At the conclusion of his talks with President Brezhnev, the President of the French Republic himself affirmed yesterday that there could be no détente without respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

For WEU the vote we are going to take on the text presented by the General Affairs Committee is one of indisputable importance. It must, in my view, clearly reflect the firm and determined commitment assumed by the States belonging to our union to pursue the difficult but vital task of easing the tensions between East and West and co-operating among countries with different social systems.

Europe must have the courage to determine for itself, with originality and boldness, what its détente policy should be. The adoption of the text presented by the General Affairs Committee, as modified by Amendments Nos. 7 and 8, would constitute a first step in that direction. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

I call Mr. Urwin and, after him, Mr. Dankert and Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I want to begin by paying tribute to the Rapporteur for the extreme patience he has shown throughout the preparation and final presentation of his report. As can be imagined, discussions in the General Affairs Committee were not dissimilar from what we have heard in the debate so far. Mr. Segre has co-operated with the Committee and, indeed, with members of the Assembly, in accepting amendments. It may well be that the proliferation of amendments this morning is due largely to the somewhat over-optimistic nature of parts of his report.

The British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tomlinson, yesterday spoke

of the attitude and the policy of the British Government towards the final act and the forthcoming Belgrade conference. It is therefore unnecessary for me to recapitulate the policies of Her Majesty's Government in this regard. I would, however, take advantage of the opportunity to comment on what Sir Frederic Bennett has said.

He has made it perfectly clear that he speaks solely for himself, not for the British Government, nor, indeed, for the Conservative Party insofar as his minority report is concerned. However, I thank him for the statesmanlike manner in which he expresses himself, even though he was quite hostile to the report. Indeed, he met with very little support in the General Affairs Committee when he presented his minority report there.

What he has succeeded in doing is to describe very accurately the wide gulf between the signatory States in their attitude towards the final act of Helsinki as a starting point for the implementation of various parts of the agreement.

At the time of its signing, millions of people all over the world pinned great hopes on and put great faith in the work that the politicians were then to undertake to reach agreement on those matters of tremendous concern, especially to those who are deprived of access to even the most basic human rights, freedom of movement and of speech and the ability to conduct free elections. Such people looked to politicians to act sensibly yet quickly.

It is an unfortunate fact of political life, however, especially when such serious topics are being discussed, that a great deal more time is needed than people are prepared to accept. It is in the interests of millions of people in different parts of the world that the utmost effort should be applied by all concerned to securing full implementation of the final act in order to remove them from the shadow of the bomb, the gun and the more dreadful highly sophisticated weapons of destruction designed solely to kill.

Progress on Helsinki has been painfully slow and we are entitled to be critical and anxious that not enough appears to be done quickly enough. It would, however, be wrong to imply that there has been some perceptible movement from deeply entrenched positions since the final act. I note that the press this week suggests that the communists are being a little awkward about the preliminary conference, which is under way and which is clearing the arena for the political struggle that will ensue later in the year in Belgrade.

I hope that all concerned in that preliminary conference will work quickly towards unanimity,

Mr. Urwin (continued)

if that is possible, in the matters with which they are concerned. I sincerely hope also that those concerned will take a statesmanlike attitude to any indictment of certain of the signatory States to the final act. This is a matter of such world-wide importance that politicians must adopt a statesmanlike attitude if they are to reach acceptable decisions reasonably speedily.

In that sense it would be wholly wrong for the representatives of any of the countries involved at Belgrade to use the opportunity to exercise judgments in order to try to turn the conference into a tribunal. The conference should be wholly concerned with checking progress so far made and deciding how quickly further progress can be achieved.

The conference will be concerned not with MBFR or SALT, but with baskets I, II and III. The one lesson that emerges clearly is that democratic Western Europe must reach out to Eastern Europe as often as possible to bring political enlightenment to our counterparts in that part of the world. To that extent I was one of those who gave a warm welcome to the initiative of President Czernetz of the Council of Europe earlier this year. He almost succeeded in getting a conference organised between parliamentarians from Western Europe and from behind the iron curtain with the intention of exchanging ideas, of bringing more equality into our thinking, and in the hope of persuading our counterparts from Eastern Europe that there is a better way of life for their people if only they will harness and accept the principles of democracy that so many of us are fortunate to enjoy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*). — Yesterday morning the French newspaper *Le Figaro* described Mr. Segre's report as neutral. I was rather stunned by that description, since I thought that Mr. Aron's quality was such that even after his departure from that newspaper the stamp of his clear mind still remained. That seems not to be the case. I was also stunned because I honestly felt that the use of the word "neutral" was an insult to the work that Mr. Segre has been doing.

The report is intelligently written. It is a clever piece of work for which warm compliments should be given. That does not mean that I do not run into difficulties with it. These problems cover three main areas. The report tries to give the impression that it is avoiding taking sides. It is trying basically to avoid defining what we mean by the impossible word *détente* and it is not always careful enough in the quotations it gives from leading statesmen and from the final act.

That could create major problems. I am thinking particularly of the sixth principle on non-intervention. In view of the full text of that principle in the final act, I must conclude that non-intervention as defined there does not accord with the principle as stated in Mr. Segre's report.

It is clear from the final act that the States agreed that they would not use coercion to interfere in the affairs of other States, but that they would be free to interfere on the basis of the agreed principle. That is a sound principle, but it is not the principle formulated in paragraph 13 and still less is it the view of the overwhelming but probably sleepy majority of the General Affairs Committee as formulated in paragraph 3 of the recommendation.

The principle of non-intervention as defined in Helsinki leaves a lot of room for interference in the affairs of others on the basis of the many other principles formulated there. It is therefore understandable that in paragraph 3 the Committee gave such prominence to a principle that does not exist in such terms and that must be seen in relation to the other principles formulated in Helsinki.

The report skips the basic issue of defining *détente* and of stating the relevance of Helsinki and Belgrade to it. In a short speech such as this I would not endeavour to describe in detail the meaning of the word *détente*. The word is too French for us to get a grip on it. Reading the report, one cannot avoid asking oneself what the Rapporteur means when he uses the word *détente* and sometimes adds to it the word co-operation. However, even that does not make matters clear.

The emphasis in the report on the principles and the lack of emphasis on the provisions of Helsinki make my difficulty in accepting the report somewhat greater. In my view, principles as defined in Helsinki are very much the rules of the game of *détente* while the provisions are the concrete results that can be achieved by applying those rules. These two elements should be combined.

I do not believe that some rule in Helsinki — and here I base what I say on some ideas uttered in France in the last few days — means that the ideological struggle between East and West should be brought to a halt or watered down. On the contrary, Helsinki, on the basis of the agreed principles, opened up the way for the West to pursue peacefully the fight for human rights in those countries where they are endangered. Even before Helsinki, it was clear that the Soviet Union had the fullest right under the principle of peaceful coexistence to try to export its system to our countries. One has to balance those two basic ideas and define the rules of the game.

Mr. Dankert (continued)

In that sense I should be far less deceived by Helsinki than some members who have spoken before me. Helsinki is an agreement to promote basic values which so far are adhered to more in the West than in the East. I believe that there are basic human rights problems concerning this principle on the one side and there are certainly problems, although relatively minor, on our side. Under Helsinki we are allowed to fight each other by peaceful means, but at the same time each of us is forced to keep his counterpart on the other side alive. That is the direction in which we should move.

In such a battle there are no neutrals. That is the basic problem for a communist working in Western Europe, and that basic problem is also the real issue of Eurocommunism. In the explanatory memorandum Mr. Segre has tried to avoid that problem, but I do not think that is because he is neutral.

I wish to comment on the title of the report — application of the final act of the CSCE. I did not find much judgment on that subject expressed in the report. The report deals mainly with atmospherics, the word *détente* and principles. I feel that those atmospherics and principles have a meaning only if they help bring about concrete results in East-West relations. Progress is slow and far more remains to be done. Therefore, contact between East and West remains a great necessity.

For that same reason, Belgrade should not inspire us to cold-war attitudes. That is the main conclusion I share with the Rapporteur. I hope that the Committee will, therefore, look with favour on Amendment No. 7.

I understand that the United States Government have been rather worried about this debate on the report and, through their permanent representatives at NATO, have informed governments to apprise us of that worry and try to put matters right.

I began by saying that I was stunned by *Le Figaro*. I conclude by saying that I am stunned by the lack of confidence the American Government seem to have in the working of democracy in WEU.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Dankert.

I call Mr. Reddemann, who will be followed by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the documents of Western European Union undoubtedly deserve to be treated with great attention; even greater attention must be given to a report submitted by a man of

Mr. Segre's reputation. I must confess that, for this reason, I studied it with quite exceptional attention. But I must also confess that, unfortunately, this attention does not incline me to such laudatory observations as have been made here by some of our colleagues.

Certainly some passages in Mr. Segre's report are without any doubt of extraordinary interest to all of us. He does not indulge in the customary assertions of most speakers from communist parties that violations of human rights do not occur in the East, in States with communist governments. He does not claim — as party-line communist propaganda normally does — that nothing but great progress, the happiness of mankind and the fulfilment of humanity's millennial dreams are to be found in the countries of the so-called socialist camp. For that reason it may be assumed that a large part of Mr. Segre's observations will never be published in the columns of *Pravda* or other, similar communist papers.

Nevertheless, I am sorry to say his stresses are wrong. Let me quote one sentence to explain what I mean. Mr. Segre writes: "Your Rapporteur [in other words, himself] thinks it obvious that violations of such rights [meaning human rights] are committed in both East and West." This may seem a neutral statement. But in fact — as has already been pointed out this morning — it is a distortion to the detriment of the West. Indeed, I maintain that it is a spurious equation of conditions in the western democracies and in the totalitarian States ruled by communist parties.

Mr. Segre has already been asked some questions, Mr. President, questions about the system of concentration camps in the Soviet Union, questions about psychiatric hospitals where attempts are made to destroy opponents of the régime physically and psychologically. I would like to ask him in what democratic State in the West there is, for instance, a secret police which, without a warrant, can arrest people and detain them indefinitely, a secret police capable, by means of its own police tribunals, of imposing sentences of up to twenty-five years' hard labour after secret trials, or a secret police responsible for the murder of millions of people and the deportation of still more millions? In what democratic State — and it is regrettable that I have to ask our Rapporteur this question too — may no one but the ruling party and the organisations controlled by it appear in the press, on the radio or on television? I know of no such democratic State in the West, and I am sure that no one in this Assembly knows of such a State because, quite simply there is none.

But even Mr. Segre has to admit that all these crimes against humanity, which were quoted here this morning and which I have briefly

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

recapitulated, are very much part of the daily round in the Soviet Union and in the other communist countries which signed the Helsinki final act; and, what is more, not just as from today but from the very beginning of the régimes in those countries, sometimes to a greater and sometimes to a lesser extent.

No doubt we democrats have cause to be self-critical of the faults in our libertarian system, even in a report like this, even in a discussion like this. But anyone who puts the systematic violation of human rights in the East on the same moral footing as occasional condemnable infringements of the law in the West is arguing that leprosy and measles are equally dangerous just because both are diseases.

Let me deal more particularly with one point which — and here I ask for your indulgence — is especially close to my heart. Mr. Segre quoted only a few points which, to his mind, are particularly serious infringements of human rights, and he then referred to the alleged ban on the pursuit of one's calling and telephone-tapping in the Federal Republic of Germany and to Cyprus and Northern Ireland. I would not blame any member of this Assembly for not going along with our ideas of keeping the opponents of a State with a libertarian constitution away from public service. Each country tries in its own way to cope with the problem of extremism. We Germans, once bitten twice shy, have our own ways. Our fathers have been accused of not having stood up in time to the rise of national socialism. We today are more vigilant; hence our ideas, which Mr. Segre tries to denigrate as a ban on the pursuit of one's calling. We simply want to prevent members of totalitarian groups from infiltrating the machinery of the State and establishing a dictatorship against the majority of the people. Far from restricting basic rights, we are protecting them.

However, since Mr. Segre expressly condemns this practice in his report, I must ask you why he failed to mention, for instance, that children of fourteen in the so-called German Democratic Republic are not admitted to secondary education if, on grounds of conscience, they refuse to participate in an atheist youth dedication ceremony so that in practice at the age of fourteen they are branded as unskilled workers for the rest of their lives, since they are not allowed to acquire further qualifications. Furthermore, as Mr. Segre has picked on human rights in Germany as a weighty point in his report, I must ask him another question that has already been asked this morning: why not a word about the Berlin wall, why not a word about the fact that the communist people's police along the frontier keeps packs of dogs to be let loose on refugees who are doing no more than exercise their human

rights of wanting to change their place of abode? And why, furthermore, not a word about the automatic killer devices which automatically fire a hail of lead and steel at refugees whenever they try to get out of the communist part of Germany into the other part? And why, again, not a word about the penitentiaries or about the brutal methods of oppression practised by the Ministry for State Security in East Berlin?

I have the impression — and I hope, Mr. President, you will allow me to say this, as one who has experienced communism at first hand — that important things have quite deliberately not been mentioned here, in order to prevent a discussion developing on the human rights issue, a discussion which might possibly stop Mr. Segre's whole report from becoming a document of this Assembly.

I have witnessed the various attempts to modify Mr. Segre's report by a number of proposals on individual points, proposals that we are meant to adopt in order that we might in this way still reach an agreement on the broadest possible terms. Unfortunately, I have fairly accurate knowledge of communist practices, so I am afraid of the following: if we agree today on a recommendation which embodies the view of the majority of this Assembly, this is what we shall very soon find — in communist propaganda, Mr. Segre's own memorandum, even though it met with opposition here, and our recommendation will be lumped together as one document issued by WEU, and then in a few weeks' time we shall find Mr. Segre's highly-subjective report alone presented as the WEU document in propaganda on these matters, but no longer any trace of the detailed points we have voted on here.

That is why, Mr. President, I must, much as I regret it, give notice of my unequivocal "no" both to the report and to the draft recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Reddemann.

The Chairman has a right to take the floor at the end of the debate. We must close the debate at 1 o'clock and there are still four members who wish to speak. I therefore ask the remaining speakers to be as brief as possible.

I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I bow to your wishes, and will try to be brief. I give Mr. Segre full credit for having had to tackle a difficult task, a difficult one for anybody and especially for him, seeing what party he belongs to. It would be ungenerous of us not to take due account of the fact. As several speakers have said, there are statements in his report that have to be challenged, but contrariwise there are others from which it is a duty to dissent.

Mr. Roberti (continued)

I will say for a start that I particularly agree with Mr. Segre when he says there is no rational alternative to détente. But I would modify this slightly, to the effect that there is no rational alternative to the aspiration towards détente, meaning a bilateral and not a compulsory détente, for otherwise it would entail being condemned to détente, if it had to involve renouncing fundamental principles of the defence of one's own and one's country's freedom.

The Rapporteur also recommended us to guard against the Manichaeian tendency of viewing every problem in a cold-war context, or passing judgment on the basis of ideological prejudice or sheerly propagandist stances. I shall take good care not to fall into this error. What I bow to are real situations and historical facts that have nothing to do with Manichaeism, still less with any prepossession.

We are faced by a deployment of forces like the Soviet Union's, a country which proved itself opposed to any such attempt at détente when some countries tried to change their own régimes, as we saw for ourselves less than ten years ago in Czechoslovakia, when certain external armed forces intervened to prevent the citizens of those countries from expressing their dissent. Can that be called Manichaeism? Or propaganda? These are historical facts! Faced by such historical facts — without going back to what happened in Hungary twenty years ago — we may legitimately doubt what value is attached to the word détente by the war machine of the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union.

Mr. de Koster attempted the day before yesterday to define the different meaning attached to détente in the West and the East. Let me sum it up by a single metaphor. For the West, for us, détente is the end to be attained, but I have the impression that for the Soviet Union it is a means, one of many, for improving its own position of imperialist expansion.

Here too, I will stick to historical fact. Undeniably the Soviet Union pursues imperialist expansion. It was brought to a halt on the frontier of Central Europe by the NATO military set-up, but the Soviet Union has sought by every means, by building up its own military forces, to overcome even such resistance by NATO, creating an imbalance of forces which we discussed at length two days ago in connection with other reports. We have recently seen that the Soviet Union's imperialist expansion, halted in Europe, has spilled over into Africa, as shown by the Angola and other episodes, so that I believe it would be advisable for this Assembly to convey to the President's office a proposal for setting up for Africa some such body as NATO for Europe and SEATO for Asia, since

Soviet expansion was getting ready to spill over into that continent too. I think that Africa, as a continent complementary to Europe, ought to be defended against such expansionism. The tendency to build up armaments is symptomatic of the continuing pressure, not to mention the expansionism that takes the form of ideological penetration, the organisation in western countries of political, and not only political, formations tightly linked to the Soviet Union.

So, since this tendency of the Soviet Union towards imperialist expansion still — as other speakers, including Sir Frederic Bennett, have emphasised — persists, there follows the question whether for this reason or suspicion, we must give up our efforts and attempts at effective détente, and put to the real test the will for détente. Should we follow a principle of methodical doubt? I do not think so. Rather, I would say we must continue the efforts started. If we should have to say yea or nay to Belgrade, we should say yea, but above all, before making any other concessions, ask for and demand proof and concrete facts from those who have so far shown themselves defaulters in respect of the final act provisions. This endeavour must be continued at Belgrade, and every avenue explored for giving public opinion a reminder of the rational and inescapable necessity of achieving détente, and by such a stance inducing the side which has so far been dragging its feet and showing itself unco-operative, to make some demonstrations of co-operation, give some proofs that it is truly willing to fulfil its obligations; only once we are assured of this can further concessions be granted and justified. In the contrary case, we shall be faced by an absurd situation of being ourselves compelled to worsen the existing imbalance. In all systems of law there is a clause to the effect that no one is required to bear witness against himself!

Such are the reasons why we have moved certain amendments. Now we shall see whether they can be accepted, and in what way, and then decide our attitude on the final vote. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roberti.

I now call Mr. Channon.

Mr. CHANNON (*United Kingdom*). — The debate this morning has shown that this report is not exactly uncontroversial, but none of us has any personal criticism to make of the Rapporteur, who has produced an extremely valuable report from his point of view and in some senses has leaned over backwards to put other points of view. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult for many of us to accept the report as it stands unless the recommendations are heavily amended.

In view of our understandable wish to conclude the debate, Mr. President, I shall be very

Mr. Channon (continued)

brief. Surely we can all agree that there is no one, whatever view one takes of the report, who does not prefer détente to living in a situation where there is likely to be either a hot war or an extremely cold war that may possibly lead to a hot war. Of course it is better to have some form of détente, but détente does not mean closing one's eyes to reality. If everything is so peaceful and if détente is improving relations between East and West, if Helsinki is having an effect and the situation in the world is improving, why is it necessary, as we have heard in other debates during this week, for the Russians to increase their armaments all the time? What need is there for a great Russian fleet, the largest in the history of the world? Why are the Russians constantly increasing their expenditure on defence? Why are such large conventional armies in Europe needed by Russia and its allies?

Helsinki will not solve these problems. They will be solved, if they are solved at all, elsewhere. We may well come to a situation where there will be mutually satisfactory joint disarmament measures. If we are to achieve them, those will be long, tiring and intellectually difficult but essential negotiations.

But can we create more confidence in other fields such as was tried at the Helsinki conference and I hope will be tried later this year in Belgrade? Certainly the attempt is worth making. It has been tried constantly since the war on a number of occasions, but surely this Assembly must agree that the real progress has been disappointing. There is no point in pretending that it has not. I am not surprised by that, nor, I believe, is anyone else. I do not think any of us realistically had very high hopes of results from the Helsinki agreement.

Mr. Roberti has mentioned the situation in Africa. Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the various struggles now going on there, can it be seriously denied that the Russians and their allies are attempting, in many instances successfully, to intervene throughout the whole continent of Africa, with very great repercussions on all of us who live here in Europe?

Can it be seriously denied that in human rights it is a scandal that in Europe we should see appalling restrictions on freedom and liberty existing in so many countries behind the iron curtain? We have seen the brave stirrings of dissent and the brave men and women behind Charter 77. All these developments make it impossible for me, at least, to accept the third recommendation outlined in the report.

I understand the report itself to be the work of the Rapporteur and it is only the recommendations that concern this Assembly, but they need

to be heavily amended. Is it not right, as Sir Frederic Bennett has said, that the most important thing for all of us is not only our concern for human rights and the rights of individuals but the right of other countries to self-determination? Can anyone seriously deny that there are in Europe countries that do not have a genuine right to choose their future? We have complained in the past about Portugal, Spain, Greece and other countries, yet we must surely not burke the issue that countries of Eastern Europe have no genuine choice for their freedom.

There is no point in going to the Belgrade conference to have a row for the sake of having a row, or to indulge in polemics for their own sake. But there is no point, either, in mincing our words when the conference takes place. A delicate task exists for the negotiators of the West in putting their points firmly and sensibly. Perhaps the issue of human rights in Europe is more the concern of the Council of Europe than WEU, although it is a scandal that anywhere on our continent people should be treated as they are treated in East Berlin, being unable to leave the country, and to have the existence of the wall, of which Mr. Percy Grieve has spoken.

But I do not think that we in WEU, which has special defence interests and special responsibilities in this Assembly, can accept a report and recommendation which says that the maintenance of alliances is essential to the preservation of balance and peace in Europe. If we accept something like that we are saying in effect that we accept that the Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Eastern Europe are essential to peace in Europe. Does anyone believe that to be true? I certainly do not. Perhaps there may well continue for many generations to be *de facto* existence of Warsaw Pact troops in Eastern Europe, probably as a fact of life. But we cannot put our names to a report that accepts their permanent existence. If we were to do so, what is the point of this organisation at all?

Much as I respect the sincerity of the Rapporteur and the report, which he has very genuinely produced, I cannot accept it unless it is heavily amended and unless the recommendations are very drastically changed before the end of our debate today or on another occasion.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Channon.

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, today's debate is an important one. We reject the extreme views which we have heard here and which belong to another age. There is a French saying that enough is enough.

Mr. Boucheny (continued)

What is serious, on the other hand, is the excuse which anti-communism affords for refusing to make any effort towards détente and peace. What is on the order paper today is vital: we have to go further with détente. In this nuclear age it is the only alternative to another war.

Mr. Segre's report, which was approved by the Committee, is an important contribution to the drive to reduce tension in Europe. I would like to draw your attention to the Rapporteur's concern for realism, which even the only speaker opposing the motion, Sir Frederic Bennett, recognised when he referred — and I quote — to "the gallant and sincere efforts of the Rapporteur".

At this very time the first phase of the Belgrade talks is taking place, evidence of the world-wide importance of the final act of Helsinki. When we speak of détente we mean détente in all its aspects: security, disarmament, economic co-operation and human rights; they form a whole in which none of the parts can be separated from the others. There are those in this house who would describe the situation as follows: when we speak, we speak of human rights; you attach more importance to security. Such an assertion bears no relation to the position of the French communists. We do not wish to attach particular importance to any one aspect. What we want is that everyone should apply all the provisions of the final act of Helsinki.

To speak of human rights, of freedom, is not the prerogative of any one person. We do not claim that we are the guardians of that most precious possession of the peoples: freedom. There are those politicians in Europe who practise political discrimination, putting millions of workers out of work, banishing from society ethnic minorities, followers of the Catholic religion, men and women, whose skin is not white. We refuse to engage in polemics in this field. I appeal to the humility of those who criticise, and would point out that what is important, what matters, is that progress be made towards détente, which cannot but establish the right conditions for securing democracy in the world at large.

That is what we mean by a positive, constructive attitude. Today the Assembly can make its contribution to the building of a peaceful world. But the forces ranged against détente are powerful and active, particularly in this house. As proof I need look no further than the attitude of certain circles in America, mentioned by our colleague Mr. Rivière, who state — and I quote an AFP news item — "According to well-informed sources close to WEU, the American

State Department has drawn the attention of the Secretary-General of NATO to the ambiguity of the wording used in Mr. Segre's report" — and the Americans express the hope that the report will be rejected.

The same thing applies to the participation of the communists elected to the Defence Committee.

We say "no" to the paternalist attitude of the Americans. The elected representatives of the peoples of Europe, heirs to long-standing humanist traditions, have no need to kowtow to orders from elsewhere. We must consider our dignity as elected representatives and also, even more important, stand up for the independence of our people and, for it comes to that, for peace. Europe cannot be a docile element serving the interests of others. There can be no democracy in Europe if the communists, representatives of the working classes, do not occupy the place, all the place, which is their due.

It is not possible today to reject every move that could consolidate political détente and open the road to military détente. We would have to be blind, or have inadmissible mental reservations, to neglect the final act of the Helsinki conference. As far as we are concerned, we shall fight for a lessening of tension. We shall support all moves in that direction. We shall fight for a world of fraternity and peace.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Boucheny.

I call Mr. Forni.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, everything immoderate is unworthy, and what is excessive can have no place in our parliamentary language. Anyway, there is one point on which we shall all be able to agree: that is, the exceptional quality of the report which Mr. Segre has presented here, and the subtlety of the way in which he analyses the prospects opened up at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

It might be tempting to carry out an analytical examination of this agreement which, by breaking it down into its several elements, would lead us to apply the fine toothcomb of captious criticism to the results achieved in each sphere. A procedure of this kind might however lead those who indulged in it to miss the point which seems to me essential, namely that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe constitutes a whole, in which each element has meaning only by virtue of the place that it occupies in the whole. The CSCE itself, moreover, represents only a stage, that is, an element in a wider whole, namely the process we may describe as détente, despite all the reservations to which this term gives rise.

Mr. Forni (continued)

Before turning to matters more specifically connected with the Belgrade conference, however, I believe that it would be not unprofitable to state rapidly the aims which seem to me to dominate the policies — transcending all national or ideological interests — not only of the western powers, but also of all the countries participating in the negotiations which began at Helsinki and are continuing today at Belgrade.

The first of these aims — and on this I believe that we shall all be able to agree — is to ward off the dangers of war. That quite obviously involves a certain stabilisation of frontiers, doubtless also a number of disarmament measures, and finally, the re-establishment of a greater measure of confidence in the countries of Eastern and Western Europe regarding their intentions towards each other.

It seems to me that the second aim of the CSCE is to ensure the maximum amount of freedom for our peoples. Of course, this freedom consists in ensuring a certain measure of autonomy to the weakest States, when they face the strongest ones, but it also consists in the right of each people to choose the system which suits it and, should the occasion arise, to change that system. The history of Western Europe since the second world constrains us to ask ourselves how far our own countries have been — or still are — truly free to choose as they think fit the men and the parties — in other words economic and social principles — that will guide public affairs in their countries.

Naturally, this freedom for our peoples must not endanger international peace. It will be possible to safeguard peace only if those who today form the two camps have sufficient confidence in each other to accept what even today might still be viewed as an intolerable change in the balance of power.

Finally, the third of the major aims of détente, as conceived at Helsinki, is to ensure that individuals enjoy a number of safeguards, both in the economic sphere and in that of their freedoms. This means that it is essential to aim at opening frontiers more widely to exchanges of every kind and to enjoy greater personal liberty ; but these aims must not be allowed to jeopardise the independence of national States — and still less peace itself, for without peace there can be neither prosperity nor freedom.

To these three aims, which more specifically concern the situation within Europe, we might add a fourth, which is indispensable to the enduring character of the three others, namely, shaping the world economy in such a way as to allow the countries of the third world to gain access as quickly as possible to the economic

activities and prosperity in which they are today still unable to join.

It was necessary to define these aims before asking ourselves how far the final act at Helsinki and the Belgrade meeting are likely to ensure genuine progress along the road to détente.

In Sir Frederic Bennett's eyes, if we are to believe the minority opinion annexed to Mr. Segre's report, no détente is possible without a radical change taking place in our eastern partners. So long as communist countries continue to exist — and perhaps he would even say socialist régimes — no genuine détente will be possible, and above all a process should not be allowed to develop, which could only be a semblance of détente and an eminently temporary truce since, according to Sir Frederic, in the struggle which opposes international capitalism and socialism there can be neither peace nor a genuine truce.

A few moments ago Sir Frederic Bennett spoke about equating conditions. Do not venture any further on this terrain, because I believe that we should make no mention at all in this forum of parallels between the Berlin wall and what is happening at Soweto, between freedoms on the other side of the iron curtain and the freedoms that exist in Chile. Sir Frederic has embarked upon a crusade, but we are no longer in the age of knights.

In contrast to this pessimism, Mr. Segre puts forward a view that is distinctly more optimistic, and also more realistic, when he shows that all the governments of Western Europe and also of Eastern Europe are, basically, determined to ensure that détente should progress. One thing in any case is certain, namely that in the West as in the East international tension leads to processes which not only endanger peace, but also weigh heavily on the prosperity and freedom of the individual. Firstly, it has an adverse effect on prosperity to the extent that an armaments policy diverts a large proportion of our States' budgets to unproductive expenditure. But, secondly, it also has an adverse effect on freedoms, because any concession to the principles of tolerance is very quickly seen as a weakening of the cohesion necessary to any society confronted with a threat from outside.

Accordingly, a meeting like that held at Helsinki was of considerable importance, doubtless not so much because of the content of the final act but because of the long process that began with the initial proposals made by the Soviet Union and led on to the discussions among the western countries, to the negotiations which culminated in the opening of the Helsinki conference, to the conduct of its three stages, to the problems involved in drafting the final act, and so to the series of meetings of which the present Belgrade conference is meant to be the first.

Mr. Forni (continued)

A number of indisputable facts emerge from this whole process, the first of them being that, in the final analysis, all European countries, however great the distrust inspired in them by the régimes of countries in the other camp, recognise that a certain measure of détente is possible. At the same time — and the “decalogue” contained in the Helsinki final act affords proof of this — all of them accept that détente does not merely constitute an agreement among States on specific points, but that it forms a whole, based on an essential balance between each of its parts which is no longer the balance of terror.

That is probably one of the points on which I should differ somewhat from Mr. Segre's report. For he stresses the need to respect the independence of States in a way which seems to me rather excessive. In that connection, he bases his remarks on a quotation from President Carter; but it may be feared that this does not express the sum total of his views, as they may be inferred from his later statements. Of course, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries is in the front rank of the Helsinki principles, but it would be excessive to make the other elements in the “decalogue” subordinate to this principle.

Lastly, all the Helsinki signatories were agreed in considering that détente involved concrete measures, and this was reflected in a genuine determination to apply the principles formulated there. At the same time, however, they all conceded that a long and difficult process was involved; and nobody ever thought that it would be possible to turn the whole series of Helsinki declarations into a legal system that would be applicable by all concerned immediately and in all its parts. But this process has certainly been speeded up by the statement of the principles upon which it is founded, and by the fact that the Helsinki final act showed clearly that détente cannot be based either on victory or on the hope of victory by one camp over the other. I feel that recognition of this fact constitutes a result that is extremely encouraging in itself and, whatever Sir Frederic Bennett may say, it seems to be obvious that the Helsinki final act marked considerable progress along the road to détente, without either of the camps renouncing its right to be itself.

If we now turn to the realm of concrete results, we should stress — perhaps more than Mr. Segre has done — how real they are. First, although for some countries the recognition of frontiers meant making serious sacrifices, at least, so far as principles were concerned, this was a vital step in any advance towards the re-establishment of confidence. Secondly, this recognition was undoubtedly more real than the

measures of a military character decided upon at Helsinki, which may appear somewhat derisory in face of the real problem of military confrontation by the two blocs.

It is undeniable that, since Helsinki, progress has been achieved in the economic sphere so far as increased trade and the changed attitude of the eastern countries towards commercial representatives from the West are concerned. Agreements on economic co-operation have multiplied, and the activities of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe have been given fresh impetus.

Finally, with regard to the whole series of issues which affect individuals, whether in the field of human rights or of the facilities for exchanges of persons and ideas, it is perfectly obvious that Helsinki has not brought about a revolution. In all fields, however, Helsinki has improved the conditions in which such rights are applied. This improvement has above all been tangible so far as families or ethnic minorities are concerned, as, for instance, in the case of the Germans living in Poland. Improvements are less obvious in the realm of human rights within States. Yet the Helsinki final act has at least become an instrument for those who have been demanding respect for such rights in some of the countries of Eastern Europe.

Here we see results which are not to be despised, especially if we consider that the period during which the Helsinki final act has been applicable is relatively short. And if, today, the Belgrade conference were to be only a check-up conference, there would be every reason to fear that, far from improving the Helsinki results, it might lead the two sides to indulge in mutual recriminations about inadequate and incomplete implementation of the final act, and that a feeling of failure might emerge from such a cross-examination. It would be regrettable if, at Belgrade, the emphasis were placed on “checking-up”, whereas the real problem is that of consolidating and extending the Helsinki results. Belgrade must not be transformed into a court of law. Others have said this before me.

Inasmuch as the initiation of a process is far more important than the wording of principles, it would seem especially vital that the process upon which we have embarked should be extended to cover fresh areas in which tensions persist between East and West and in which distrust prevails. We should concern ourselves with points of friction in the world, and especially in Africa. We should envisage the establishment of procedures designed to avoid a situation in which incidents that may occur on other continents lead to a resurgence of the distrust and the tensions which the CSCE partners have been endeavouring to dispel.

Mr. Forni (continued)

The statement made by Sir Frederic Bennett constitutes one proof of this, since he uses the Angola affair to support his thesis that the conference on European security may be only a snare. Accordingly, would it not be important for the countries of Eastern and Western Europe to agree in the next few years on a code of good conduct, which would in particular be designed to restrict or prohibit deliveries of armaments to regions in which there is a risk of tensions developing? The accusations which are at present being levelled at the countries that sell arms are certainly well founded, but we can scarcely hope that these countries will refrain from selling arms unless there is an agreement covering that field. It would be possible to look for the basis for an agreement along those lines in the context of CSCE, since all the principal countries that sell arms are participants in that conference.

Similarly, the problems raised by the permanence, the growth and the modernisation of armaments constitute a factor which gives rise to considerable distrust. Here, too, it seems that localised measures will remain ineffective and that, in consequence, it would be essential for CSCE to set in train a process leading to disarmament agreements of far wider scope than those which are being sought today, particularly in the framework of MBFR.

I will conclude my remarks by saying that I am in full agreement with Mr. Segre in thinking that we must approach the Belgrade meetings in an optimistic and positive frame of mind. For that reason, I shall unflinchingly support the report presented by Mr. Segre.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Forni.

The list of speakers is now completed. Does the Rapporteur wish to take the floor? Thank you, Mr. Segre.

Mr. SEGRE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I only want to thank the members who have spoken on all these various matters, many of whom I agree with, while disagreeing with others.

I think, nevertheless, we have been given food for further thought on a subject that is not yet closed and is likely to engross us and our countries for a long time to come. Just consider the fact that the Belgrade conference has, on the technical and procedural level, only just begun.

Hence, in my view, as we also have no time to take the amendments that have been, in various tones, proposed, a logical solution would be, pursuant to Rule 29 of the rules, to refer the matter back to the Committee so as to allow time for thought and so wind up the debate by reaching a favourable conclusion.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Segre.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — We have heard a lot of views expressed, Mr. President. I will be quite brief, and merely draw attention to the fact that both sides have claimed realism for their views: the pessimists say they are being realistic and the optimists say they are being realistic; and that is quite true, they both are. If this were not so, then the talks in Helsinki and the continuing talks in Belgrade would not be necessary at all.

And do not believe that a German politician may not also have a dash of pessimism. Basically, I am an optimist. I consider the talks important, and I remember here what we have jointly decided in Strasbourg. The report presented there likewise did not include any of the details which make German-German relations in particular such a tragedy. I do not therefore believe, to make this point briefly, that the Rapporteur omitted these matters deliberately.

On the other hand, I am glad that Mr. Grieve, for one, focused attention on that tragic situation this morning. Of course I am pessimistic, as a German politician, when I think of the wall, because I do not see how this can be changed in the near future, or at all. I can only hope that it can be changed.

Naturally, interpretation of the principles will continue to differ. I believe that one of the main fields of work in Belgrade will be concerned with getting closer to each other in interpreting them. And this is a justification for reports and views which may be assessed here as either pessimistic or optimistic.

In the Council of Europe, you will remember, we agreed that no one now wishes to break off the negotiations and that, in spite of all the admitted, fundamental differences between East and West, more has been set in motion in a positive direction than any of us could have envisaged only two or three years ago. We were unanimous that this world-wide awakening of concern with human rights and the practical examples of rapprochement and reliefs in various fields were of such value that we must make every effort to pursue them further.

The question naturally arises of why this report has now been so harshly criticised. Of course some things in the report should be criticised. But in doing so we should not forget that the report itself reflects Mr. Segre's views. That is quite natural. We have had other reports which reflected the views of other politicians. The draft recommendation is what we have to agree on. There is no other answer but to accept the proposal to take the report back to the Committee and to look at it again, together with the pro-

Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)

posed amendments, and then to have the report submitted here again in November.

The second reason why criticism has been so harsh is of course simply that Mr. Segre is a communist. It is in this context too, that one must understand the misgivings expressed by the State Department. That is all very well and good ; but it is not in our power to decide, or to wish, that there should be no communist colleagues in this Assembly. In fact, I think it is quite important that they should be here at a discussion about the CSCE. Surely, it is just the voices of the European communists that we should be anxious to hear in this context. The fact that I am in favour of this does not in any way mean that I am prepared to shut my eyes or ears. On the contrary, we ought to seize this opportunity.

What worries me, and probably other colleagues here, is that we do not as yet quite know how our European communist colleagues — perhaps I am saying this as something of a lay person — really see their kind of communism. We cannot make this out clearly, and that is what worries us.

On the other hand, I think it important that they should have a voice here. I am very pleased that it was Mr. Segre who made this report, and he has done it excellently, as various speakers have already pointed out. If we want to be realistic, we must be able and willing to include this voice in the concert of voices heard here.

We live in a world in which human rights are not absolutely everywhere viewed in the way that we as individuals would wish. I am well aware that in the East European countries they play an even smaller rôle in life. This is the starting situation we are faced with. We must be patient because we have only just begun to negotiate about them. But we really must not be hypocritical and act as if human rights were being magnificently observed in all other countries of the world. I believe that none of our countries will be any the worse for submitting the rights which the individual enjoys in his country to very close scrutiny. This could also benefit the Belgrade talks. One should take a critical look, as Mr. Carter has said — and we should not be too proud to take up this phrase — at the extent to which human rights can be enjoyed elsewhere, but in one's own country as well.

I believe that this endeavour, on which we have set out here with the Segre report, is entirely correct and that it must be pursued. It is also our duty to follow the talks which have just started in Belgrade with a great deal of patience and wisdom. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mrs. von Bothmer.

I close the debate and in winding up I state that the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee proposed to send the whole report back to the Committee. Rule 29 (5) of the Rules of Procedure provides as follows :

“Reference back to Committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee.”

Both Rapporteur and Chairman requested reference back, so we need not take a vote. The report will be sent back to the Committee.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). — Now that Mr. Segre's report has been sent back to the Committee, will it be possible to debate it again at the November session of the Assembly ?

The PRESIDENT. — There is no doubt that the report will be debated at our next session.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 737).
2. Review of advanced technology in Israel (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 735).
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 739).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.*)

SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 23rd June 1977

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes

2. Attendance Register.

3. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 737*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Jessel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Treu, Mr. Craigen, Lord Hughes, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. van Ooijen, Mr. Farr, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Jessel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*).

4. Review of advanced technology in Israel (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 735*).

tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 735).

Speakers: The President, Mr. van Ooijen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hawkins, Mr. van Kleef, Mr. Treu, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. van Ooijen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*).

5. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 739*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cordle, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*).

6. Adjournment of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. de Niet, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 737)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 737.

Members of the Assembly will know that the Chairman of the Committee is Mr. Warren. The Rapporteur is Mr. Jessel. I now call on him to present his report.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — This report is the second of two before the Assembly dealing with new sources of energy. The first was the excellent report of my Dutch colleague, Mr. Cornelissen, in the last part-session in November when he dealt primarily with the derivation of energy from the sun and the wind.

This report deals with new sources of energy from the maritime field. I begin by suggesting that these new sources of energy taken all together are vital to Europe and in the long run to the world. But from the European point of view there are two main reasons for this. First, economically the supply of energy from sun, wind, waves, tide and geothermal currents is eternal and will never run out, unlike oil, coal, gas and certain rare metals from which certain types of nuclear energy can be derived.

The second reason is strategic. In the preamble to Mr. Cornelissen's report last November it was stated in Recommendation 295 that there is a close link between Europe's security and safeguarding its energy supplies. Europe is a net importer of energy and apart from your own country, the Netherlands, Mr. President, each individual member country of Western European Union is a net importer of energy.

Appendix II to my report gives the statistics, which are that the United Kingdom imports 43 %, Germany 55 %, France 74 %, Italy 79 %, Belgium 86 % and Luxembourg almost 100 % of energy requirements. Thus the security of Europe and of European nations must depend

1. See page 41.

Mr. Jessel (continued)

partly on their degree of self-sufficiency in energy, and the achievement of that self-sufficiency in energy must be obtained from a variety of sources so that no one supplier, whether at home or abroad, can subject us to threats or blackmail over our energy supplies.

Looking to the next century, I quote the first paragraph of my report: "The prospect of inexhaustible supplies of energy from tides and waves grips the imagination." We must not, however, allow our imagination to run away with us. We must maintain some sense of proportion and perspective. New sources of energy cannot fully satisfy all our energy problems. Nevertheless, they can make a highly significant contribution.

I deal first with wave energy. The prospects are best near the coasts of large oceans such as the Atlantic and Pacific. Prospects are not so good by smaller seas such as the North Sea, the Baltic and the Mediterranean. So in Europe, within WEU, the two countries that stand to gain most from wave energy are France and the United Kingdom with their length of Atlantic coasts and within Europe, outside WEU, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, Norway and possibly Iceland can derive considerable benefit. I quote paragraph 12 of the report in relation to the United Kingdom:

"For Britain, with its long coastline and extremely rough seas, wave energy is a particularly enticing prospect, not only because waves are plentiful but also because they are at their most powerful when energy demand is at its highest, i.e. during the winter."

The United Kingdom potential time-scale coincides with the possible running out of North Sea oil in from twenty-five to forty years' time, because that is the approximate optimum time for the development of the retrieval of energy from the waves of the sea.

As for the scale of production, the United Kingdom Department of Energy has estimated that the equivalent of 50% of current electrical consumption in the United Kingdom, equivalent to about fifteen nuclear power stations of 1,000 megawatts, can be achieved. Currently, there is a research programme, funded at £1 million, which was increased in April last to £2 million, for the development of this type of energy. In my report I deal with different types of device into which research is being carried out.

There are many difficult problems. Foremost is the question of anchorage of devices in rough weather, because there are extremely rough seas in the North Atlantic. Then there is the problem of corrosion and the protection of shipping, but

there is no reason to think that these problems cannot ultimately be overcome.

In the production of electrical energy derived from the tides, France leads both Europe and the world. I was fortunate enough to have the opportunity, together with Mr. Huigens, the Clerk to the Scientific Committee, to whom I should like to pay tribute for the excellent work he carried out on my behalf, to visit the Rance in Brittany early this year and to see the barrier between Dinard and St. Malo across the mouth of the Rance river. As well as a road along the barrier between the two cities there are below the surface of the sea twenty-four turbo-mechanisms now producing about 1% of the French electricity supply. If the economics are justified in future, France has in mind the possibility of a much bigger scheme across the whole of the bay of Mont St. Michel, which would produce energy on approximately twenty times that scale.

In Britain the most suitable site is the Severn estuary. In the whole world, however, there are only about twenty sites that would be suitable for this method on an economic scale, even if the economic conditions changed so as to render it more profitable than currently. Europe itself contains less than half that total number. On first examination the potential for tidal energy appears to be less than that for wave energy, not least because of the enormous capital cost of constructing a big tidal barrage. The probable time scale is twenty-five to forty years. No doubt the devices could be produced more quickly, especially for wave energy, but that would entail the risk of making some mistakes in pilot schemes — perhaps expensive mistakes — and I am advised by experts that the optimum time is nearer twenty to forty years.

The cost of electrical energy derived from either waves or tides will undoubtedly be larger than that derived from nuclear power stations. Here I should like to quote from the preamble to Mr. Cornelissen's report on solar and wind energy, accepted by the last part session of the Assembly:

"Considering that no nuclear programme on a large scale is acceptable without a solution being found for the hazards posed by nuclear power, stringent safety measures being established to eliminate these hazards and special attention being paid to the problems of the disposal of radioactive waste ;"

That sums up the misgivings felt not only by a sometimes emotional public but by committees of distinguished scientists and other experts who have so far failed to give nuclear energy the clean bill of health that some of its advocates would like to see.

Mr. Jessel (continued)

Apart from these misgivings and apprehensions felt by experts and non-experts on nuclear energy, there is the question of cost. We have seen in the past few years how dramatically and drastically the relative costs of different energy sources can change in an unforeseen manner. We cannot predict what the relative costs of the different types of energy production will be in ten years' time, let alone in twenty, thirty or forty years. In the circumstances, it must be wise to proceed with research such as is being carried out into different sources of energy, except that the potential is so large and the implications for European security so great that I believe that we should be prepared to be quite generous in the funds that we allot to research into these sources.

In my conclusions I say that we must have more research. Only 12 % of the European Community's research budget is devoted to new sources of energy, and I believe that the proportion should be higher. I should like to see greater co-operation among the member countries of Western European Union and the European Community. In this way we could look forward to the development of new sources of energy, which will be so important to the future security of Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Jessel.

The debate is now open and there are seven speakers on the list.

I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our fellow-member Mr. Jessel's presentation of his report affords me the pretext for a by no means critical preliminary remark. The report is entitled "Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy". I do not think it is correct to call tidal power or wave power and geothermal energy "new sources". Especially as these forms of energy represent a come-back on the world scene of ideas dating from a few centuries back, when oil and the hydrocarbons were unknown, and when Leonardo da Vinci — to name but one scientific scholar — spoke of the lowering of the sea level by the conjunction of sun and moon as the cause of the tides. Hence the talk of new sources is really a return to the ancient programme for exploiting the natural resources which the earth offers to its inhabitants.

I am not, I repeat, criticising. I merely beg leave to say that, while at the level of research for the development of human society energy becomes an essential very long-term theme, medium-term energy resources can only be

nuclear fusion and fission; in the meantime, whereas inside human limits they make the means for seeking alternatives to oil energy more reliable, these can only be temporary and immediate substitutes which we can and should endeavour to harness.

To say just one more word in general about the energy resources still available, let me mention solar and geothermal energy, which may fill a fairly sizable time gap, always pending the consolidated resource of nuclear and sub-nuclear energy.

Coming now to my friend Mr. Jessel's report, I venture to say that the maritime energy sources may be located and clearly defined, not only in Europe but world-wide. It is of course impossible to think about maritime resources where seas are stable, tides limited and thermodynamic variations small. At all events, these forms of energy have one advantage — which is why I feel I support the joint effort that ought to be made on a world scale, not merely a European one: they are not contaminating forms of energy. Let us bear in mind that when an attempt is made — it is not always easy — to render the use of maritime energy, tidal power or wave power economically rewarding, these different energy sources do not cause environmental pollution as the traditional fuels of coal and oil do. Unfortunately we shall have to rely on nuclear energy sources too for some time to come.

If an endeavour towards national and ultra-national policy for research into the use of these seemingly modest sources of energy is acceptable, another reason for its being so is that it involves the use of sources of pure, non-contaminating energy.

Paragraph 32 of the report says with reference to the project for using tidal energy, there are only some twenty sites in the world suitable for extracting tidal energy, as the tide level needs to be at least seven metres high. I realise that, while they are limited in time and space, these operational sites constitute an eminently usable substitute: let us not forget their importance, even if today such a system works out more costly than would be desirable, allowing likewise for the difficulties of transporting the energy.

During a visit to Israel we noticed a notable development of the use of solar power not only for house heating but also for conversion of solar thermal energy to electric power by the solar battery system. We realised that even as an alternative sources of energy this involves some difficulties. In the Mediterranean islands and countries where districts now having no supplies of solar energy could still be filled with solar accumulators, there would still be

Mr. Treu (continued)

the serious difficulty of transport. Conversion of thermal energy to electricity involves using solar batteries or a Carnot steam cycle. Here we find cropping up again the technical difficulties that may be encountered, though they are certainly not insoluble. Other sources, however, are capable of being directly used.

I do not want to make any other comments on Mr. Jessel's valuable report. I will merely say that this kind of use may to the superficial observer smack of science fiction, and we may seem to be harking back to mediaeval times. Nevertheless, the system is not to be disregarded, even if it is too costly at present. Anyhow, oil prices and the risks of depletion of fossil fuel resources justify such research, which ought to be carried out on a world scale. It is not enough to reach agreement between England, Cornwall and the Hebrides: plans for the exploration and exploitation of wave-power and tidal power as temporary but essential makeshifts must be drawn up on a world scale. Maybe in twenty years' time or so the process will be quite obsolete, but in the meantime it will serve to ensure the alternative sources, which are, I repeat, nuclear fission and, better still, fusion by the so-called hydrogen cycle. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now give the floor to Mr. Craigen. The speakers this afternoon may choose the place from which they wish to speak. They may speak from their own place or they may come to the rostrum. It depends whether they prefer to see the whole auditorium, which is not crowded, or to concentrate on the President.

Mr. CRAIGEN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Jessel's report is to be welcomed, as Mr. Cornelissen's report was welcomed at our last session. That is because energy is becoming a much more political issue in the member countries of WEU and the EEC.

Any report dealing with energy supplies has considerable significance for Western European defence, quite apart from the implications for the domestic economies of member countries. All of our member governments are concerned to reduce oil imports and are only too conscious of the vulnerability of their economies to external pressures at times of political complications and of the demands that increased oil prices make on domestic economies and standards of living.

Recently the Secretary of State for Energy of the United Kingdom suggested that Britain, which will be increasingly well-endowed with North Sea oil, should be devoting some of this new-found wealth to the study of alternative energy supplies. One obvious area is the contribution that wave power and tidal power could

make. However, there is a growing anti-nuclear lobby in all member countries, and it would be easy to see new maritime sources of energy as alternatives to any nuclear expansion. No matter how attractive a proposition that might seem, new maritime sources of energy will complement rather than alternate with additional nuclear sources.

Our Rapporteur points out that even by the year 2000 the United Kingdom, for example, will still be obtaining a smaller proportion of its energy requirements from maritime sources than from existing nuclear power stations in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Jessel's report does not deal to any great extent with the impact of tidal and wave power on the flora and fauna around the United Kingdom, or with the impact that these new sources of power might have on fishing interests.

There is also the question, which I recognise he cannot easily answer at this stage, of capital and running costs involved in new maritime sources. We here at WEU can become very theoretical at our meetings, but we have consumers at home who are already grumbling about the cost of energy in the home and in industry. How much consumers can pay towards new forms of energy will be a very important political fact in any national economy.

Individual governments will have to continue to try to adopt methods to reduce consumption whether by punitive forms of taxation or perhaps more effective methods, such as encouraging people, whether in factories or households, to insulate or to introduce economy-saving measures. As an example, it is intriguing that in a hemicycle filled with daylight all the lights are on.

The report is worth while. I am not being cynical when I ask the Rapporteur whether he sincerely believes that Western European nations currently have common energy requirements. He has readily acknowledged that member countries do not have common energy resources by pointing out how well placed the Netherlands are. We know that the United Kingdom and France are better placed in terms of maritime resources than are Germany and the Benelux countries. As a Scotsman I readily recognise that wave power could have considerable advantages for the industrial prospects of Scotland, not least because we are surrounded by sea and divided from England by a river and hills.

One common factor only at present affects the Western European nations. It is our vulnerability to oil imports and their cost.

As to the second recommendation, I welcome the suggestion that there should be additional

Mr. Craigen (continued)

research and development co-operation. However, I suspect that for some time it will remain somewhat limited. We cannot overlook that our member countries, while joined for certain common purposes, are at the same time industrial competitors. Unless and until we have some form of monetary economic union, I cannot see limitless co-operation among member governments when this problem affects their industrial performance so vitally.

I am certain that the report will rank as a very useful pointer to the direction in which our member governments should work. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). — I thank the Rapporteur for his excellently-researched report with its emphasis on the use of water power and for the lucid and brief way in which he presented it.

Coming from Scotland, as does Mr. Craigen, I find the report of special interest as at present the main provision in the United Kingdom of electricity from water is in Scotland. Much of the electrical energy used in the north of Scotland comes from the hydrostations there. Now, of course, Scotland is concerned even more with water, namely, the waters of the North Sea from which are now extracted the oil and gas which by the end of next year will make a very large contribution to meeting the energy needs of the United Kingdom.

My Scottish nationalist colleagues talk not of "North Sea oil" but of "Scottish oil". The progress this party has made in recent years cannot all be attributed to an appeal to Scottish patriotism. It owes at least something to a more materialistic appeal. It is also expressed as an appeal to greed. The riches of North Sea oil, divided among 5.5 million people in Scotland as opposed to 55 million people in the United Kingdom, are not without attraction.

This sort of thing leads some people to describing us in Scotland as "blue-eyed Arabs". However, it occurs to me that if there is advantage in present circumstances in small nations having control of these riches from the sea, there is the at least potential danger that in twenty to thirty years there will be an energy starved world. If greed might transfer control in the 1980s, envy joined with strength might take it away in later decades. Therefore, the energy producers among us have just as great a need as the consumers to co-operate in finding new sources of energy.

The Rapporteur has researched an area in which the United Kingdom could play an important part. The technology developed in the recovery of oil from the difficult waters of the

North Sea will have a relevance to maritime energy, particularly in thermal sea power. Just as Scotland has played a pioneer part in the successful distillation of potable water from sea water, Scottish universities are currently very much involved in successful experiments in the use of wave power.

In the north of England and in Scotland for many years there has been interest in using the waters of the Solway Firth in this way. The Rapporteur refers to this in the report, although it must, of course — and correctly — take a secondary place to the possibilities of the Severn. Just as the much increased cost of oil has brought coal back into the picture as an economic source of energy, the same factor gives a new importance to projects like the Severn and Solway in the United Kingdom and, I assume, in other parts also, projects that in the past have also been turned down because the experts advised us that they were not economic.

We must remember when listening to the experts on the economics of fuel that it was they who advised us that coal would never again be economic. At least one-third of our usable coal reserves were abandoned in the past decade, and we wish now that we had never listened to the experts.

The Rapporteur pointed out that maritime power was one of those sources that would never run down. This distinguished them from fossil fuels. The fact that it is not likely to provide a major replacement is no reason for ignoring this power. As Mr. Treu pointed out, it might be merely a temporary solution. Nevertheless, he agreed with the Rapporteur, as I do, that it is one well worth following up.

Like the Rapporteur, I hope that recognition of the need for co-operation among all our countries soon becomes a reality and that this will not be yet another area in which too little is done too late. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am very glad to take advantage of your invitation to speak from this rostrum, confident that I have the support of your attentive guidance of our debates. I know that this is the last meeting at which we shall be able to benefit from your chairmanship and your comradeship, and would like to take this opportunity — for myself and I am sure for my colleagues as well — of offering you our heartiest thanks. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Please return to the Order of the Day.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I read the report from Mr. Jessel on

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

safeguarding Europe's energy supplies — new maritime sources of energy with a great deal of interest. It follows on from the report I presented to this Assembly last December, and I would like to thank Mr. Jessel for the kind things he had to say about my report in his introduction.

It is clear, Mr. President, and it is now generally accepted, that Europe must give priority to the safeguarding of its energy supplies. And this includes, par excellence, the extraction of energy locally, e.g. from the sea, as suggested in Mr. Jessel's report.

Research into energy sources is going on in all the WEU countries. Some research programmes are being looked at again, to see whether it is possible to shift away from nuclear to non-nuclear projects. In the Netherlands the government is making an extra 115 million guilders available for energy research, to be used for a study of the further development and efficient utilisation of non-conventional sources of power.

More and more — and very properly too, I might add — attention is being centred on ways of using energy more economically. I believe that the welcome breakthrough in thinking on this is still reflected far too little in the policies actually being followed by the governments of the various countries in this organisation. A really promising energy policy cannot be pursued only by the Ministers responsible for energy or economic affairs, but must be given a high priority in overall government policy in the various countries. This makes a European approach to the problem a *sine qua non* for success.

The recommendation included in my report in December 1976 called for the acceptance of joint planning for the improved use of energy resources and for an increase in investments, especially for encouraging the use of coal and the gasification of coal. The Council of Ministers has replied that further attempts are being made within the EEC to arrive at a joint plan on making better use of sources of power. The Council also said, in its reply of May 1977, that the Council of Ministers of the Communities intends to look into the possibilities of fostering the use of coal in electricity power stations. This is, in itself, cause for some satisfaction, though it is obvious that a final judgment must depend on the results achieved in various fields.

Mr. Jessel has, in his report, given us a number of interesting facts about tidal and wave energy, facts which deserve to be brought into the discussion about the size of the contribution that the sun, wind, tides and waves can be expected to make to energy production. When

Mr. Jessel tells us, in paragraph 13, that wave power could provide 50 % of Britain's electricity needs — equivalent to the output of fifteen 1,000 megawatt nuclear power stations — this is a very substantial amount. Speaking about tidal power in France, the Rapporteur says that a tidal power station in the Bay of Mont St. Michel could replace ten nuclear power stations of 1,000 megawatts each. This, again, is a far from negligible figure. So it seems to me that more research in this field would be a very good thing, bearing in mind the small amounts that have been spent on it so far.

Here I would like to call attention once again to what is going on outside Europe in the field of new energy sources. Dr. Robert Frosch, the new Director of NASA, has said in the United States that there are very many new developments about to get under way, including the construction of satellites for collecting solar energy and beaming it to earth. It is enormously important that we here in Europe should also make use of these new forms of energy; but to do this, the money needed will have to be made available for research and development in the various countries. I agree entirely with the Rapporteur that there must be a European energy policy, and that a sizable budget will have to be voted for research and development work in the various countries on new sources of power. I hope, too, that what has fortunately already been done in the different European countries in this area can be co-ordinated, so as to avoid overlapping as much as possible. I think it would be only logical for the WEU member States, who are levying such high taxes on petrol and oil, to earmark some percentage of this money for the research work that is so urgently needed in this field. It need not be all that big a percentage. Together, the European countries can achieve a lot in this area, on top of which there is the chance of a major export market opening up for equipment for extracting power from these sources.

I also believe, Mr. President, that this area of developing new sources of power is ideally suited to incorporation in a policy aimed at an essential increase in development co-operation with third world countries. Some projects lend themselves extremely well to being located in the third world, bearing in mind the climatic conditions of those countries and the present-day low level of energy consumption there, though it must be assumed that this will rise substantially in the years to come.

I am glad to support the draft recommendation, Mr. President, although I would have liked to see paragraph 2 worded rather differently. As it stands, the text calls for the setting up of a working party of French and British scientists and engineers, together with experts from other interested countries. I

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

appreciate that it is especially in France and Britain that something has already been done in this area of research, but I would not wish to belittle the work done in other countries; I have, for example, myself had extensive correspondence with the hydraulic engineering laboratory in Delft, in the Netherlands. This was back in 1974, when the view taken of this kind of thing was rather different; I found from the exchange of correspondence that the Dutch laboratory had already been carrying out hydraulic research all over the world for a number of years. It can undoubtedly make an important contribution to studies in this field, and would be happy to do so. The wording chosen — and Mr. Jessel did not of course intend this — might be interpreted as less friendly towards, or even as discriminating against, the experts of other member States, than appears here. Perhaps the Rapporteur, in his reply, will remove any misunderstanding on this point.

To close, Mr. President, I must congratulate Mr. Jessel on an extremely interesting report. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Cornelissen.

I now call Mr. van Ooijen.

Mr. van OOIJEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — We should be grateful to Mr. Jessel for his initiative in producing a report on maritime sources of energy. This is a field to which too little attention is being paid today. As the report shows, this is something that would be worth doing. I have repeatedly, on other occasions, criticised the fact that we in Europe are, from the viewpoint of economising on oil, devoting our scientific effort and our research funds almost exclusively to a single alternative — that of nuclear energy.

You yourself, Mr. President, have often made the same criticism, albeit in another capacity. Too little notice is taken of other possible forms of energy, which is why it is important that this Assembly not long ago discussed a report from Mr. Cornelissen on new sources of energy, and is today debating the report by Mr. Jessel. Mr. Jessel has gone to a great deal of trouble to produce this report; he visited a number of places in Britain and France where experiments are being carried on with ways of extracting power from the waves and tides, and he went to Brussels to find out what plans are being made there for the future. For completeness, he even reports on plans in Israel for generating energy by digging a canal between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea. This is gone into in greater detail in the report I shall presently be submitting to the Assembly.

There is a lot of inventive ability in our countries, Mr. President; many solutions are being sought and found for the problems that arise in our society or are created by it. A scarcity of energy is one of these. Looking for and finding the answers is not, however, enough — there has to be political support for them. The report and recommendation from Mr. Jessel represent an attempt to find new paths towards a solution to our energy problem. A recommendation like this deserves our support, and I would urge my colleagues to accept the report and recommendation. I can, incidentally, endorse what Mr. Cornelissen had to say about the wording of the second paragraph — participation by other than French and British experts in scientific research must not be excluded. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. van Ooijen.

(The President continued in English)

I now call Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR (*United Kingdom*). — I, too, should like to join with those of my colleagues who have spoken so far in congratulating Mr. Jessel on an absolutely excellent report on a very specialised subject which I am sure has greatly increased the knowledge of all in this Assembly who have studied it.

I wish to comment particularly on two items included in the report. In section III Mr. Jessel refers to thermal sea power. In sections I and II he refers to wave power and tidal energy, and it appears to me that in this context, perhaps in section II, there should be some reference to tidal currents, which do not have the same application as the rise and fall of tides. They are persistent, permanent and of known direction at certain times of the day or night in certain European waters. I would have thought there might be a case for examining the possibility of harnessing, for example, the regular flow in a clockwise and then in an anti-clockwise direction around the British Isles of tidal currents moving at quite a rapid pace.

I should like particularly to congratulate my honourable friend on his excellent sections relating to wave power, tidal energy and thermal sea power, but I wonder whether in section IV under "Other energy sources from the seas and oceans" he has dealt quite as exhaustively with these alternatives as he has with those in other sections. It is a recognised fact, for instance, that the use of the ocean as a surface to position a raft or a platform to collect energy from either solar or wind sources is practicable, and it has been utilised to a great extent in some parts of the world.

I understand that the advantage of the collection of solar energy from a unit constructed

Mr. Farr (continued)

on a platform at sea is that the solar rays are less subject to pollution than when land sites are used. There are also advantages in the collection of wind energy from a solar platform in the ocean in that such a platform can collect and utilise the energy of the wind after many hundreds of miles of uninterrupted passage. It arrives at the platform unimpaired and undiluted.

The British Department of Energy yesterday published a report containing the results of a pilot survey in the United Kingdom. It has been found that a total of 10,000 small machines to harness wind energy could save the equivalent of approximately 8 million tons of coal annually. Such machines could cost up to £182,000 and produce electricity at a cost of between 1.4p and 3.2p per unit compared with diesel-produced electricity at 3.6p, oil-produced electricity at 3.09p, coal-produced electricity at 0.97p and nuclear electricity at 0.67p.

In producing his magnificent report, Mr. Jessel in some respects has gone almost beyond the frontiers of recognised knowledge. He has also put in a lot of individual and enterprising ground work in preparing it for us.

None of us can be satisfied, certainly not those of us who live in the United Kingdom, when we remember that the British Government currently plan that by the year 2000 we shall still be relying on traditional sources for 95 % of our energy supplies, oil, gas, coal and nuclear power. That is too high for Britain. If it is anything like as high as that in other WEU countries, it is too high for them, too. For that reason alone Mr. Jessel is to be congratulated on what he has done.

The PRESIDENT. — I call the last speaker on the list, Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I too congratulate Mr. Jessel on his report, which to my mind represents a notable contribution to defining a common goal for Europe in the area of new sources of energy. However, I also feel, like other speakers who have preceded me, that certain comments are called for. The reports and recommendations single out for special stress two undoubtedly important points: first, the possibility of co-operation among the countries of the European Communities in framing a common policy for the exploration and exploitation of new energy sources. I believe what is happening in nuclear fusion confirms both the importance and the urgency of such co-operation and this appeals to governments. The various bans — the latest in date being the United Kingdom's — on choosing a location for building the JET are liable to cause delays in an area which appears to be ever more decisive to any solution of the

problem of sources of energy, with adverse repercussions whose consequences, especially for Europe, are not all predictable. Hence our full approval of the Italian Government's stand in calling for and declaring its own willingness to support other choices than Ispra, which would be the most suitable site for the JET, simply in order to avoid any more waste of time and for an immediate start to be made on implementation of the project.

The other necessity stressed by Mr. Jessel's recommendations is that of devoting more funds to scientific research, of proposing the creation of a common study centre for such research, more especially into maritime sources of energy. In my view such a task of research and development is certainly a prerequisite for the transition from the trial stage to effective utilisation of new energy sources, exceedingly costly today but capable of being made competitive with conventional sources by technological advance. Hence the shrewd criticism of insufficient funding of research at present. We therefore support the appeal to governments to allocate greater funds to this sector.

We share these views, which I deem essential, put forward in the report and its recommendations. But we think that to achieve effective independence and security of energy supplies, which is after all the central theme of the report, these remarks should be viewed in a less narrow, a broader and more flexible framework, particularly in two respects. The first should be the utilisation — also called for by other speakers — of existing domestic alternative sources of energy in each country. Tidal power and sea currents cannot, owing to the natural conditions required, be harnessed in every country; the same goes for other sources, such as geothermal, energy of solar origin, and so on. But the possibility exists in nearly every country of using new sources of energy and it is these that should command growing attention to technological and scientific research with a view to creating favourable competitive conditions in the applications area, thus ensuring a real growth in Europe's economic potential and so the possibility of its self-sufficiency. In Italy, for example, given the low level of use of nuclear energy, the problem is to develop this source but, as recently pointed out by parliament, treating it as part of an effort towards full utilisation of other domestic resources — solar energy, etc. — as alternatives, encouraging technological advance and to this end drawing up an estimate of time-scale and costs for research and development and industrial applications.

The second object should, I think, be a commitment to promotion and encouragement by every means of collaboration not only among the Community countries — I think this point was precisely made by Mr. Treu — but among all

Mr. Bernini (continued)

the countries of Europe and the world because of the contribution this would make to solving essential problems for tangible achievements in this sector. First of all, exchanges of information by the various countries in research and development — a precondition for making alternative sources competitive — and secondly, for the contribution it would make to diversification of energy supplies and therefore the guarantee of achieving effective autonomy and security to satisfy energy requirements; finally, for solving ecological problems of damage to the environment, which also touch on the issues of international law raised by the use of new sources of energy.

We believe all these problems are capable of finding an adequate and looked-for solution within European and international co-operation with no distinction of countries, regardless of their economic and social régime. I think Western Europe could and should pull its full weight by way of commitment to and initiative in such co-operation.

This is the comment I wanted to make, conveying to Mr. Jessel our favourable appreciation of his interesting report and the recommendations tabled. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call the Rapporteur, Mr. Jessel, to take the floor.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — I am grateful for the opportunity to sum up the debate and I shall try to do so briefly since we have been debating this subject for one and a quarter hours. I was grateful for the many thoughtful contributions — seven in all — from different parts of the Assembly. It has made me feel that the work that I and Mr. Huigens did on the report was worthwhile, because its object was to draw attention to the important possibilities here for the future of energy supplies.

Two members from Italy, Mr. Treu and Mr. Bernini, have suggested that collaboration and research should be world-wide rather than confined to Europe, and that I accept.

I mention at the beginning of the section of the report on wave power in paragraph 11 that in addition to the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and the United States have shown an interest in wave power. I hope that there can be not only international but intercontinental collaboration on this matter. Mr. Treu remarked that his distinguished compatriot, Leonardo da Vinci, had referred to tidal energy long before this report was commissioned by the Scientific and Technological Committee. Of course, the Senator referred to one of the greatest scientists in the history of the world. However, in para-

graph 26 I have stated that discussion of tide energy dates back to the ancient Greeks, although I am quite prepared to accept that Leonardo da Vinci had more to say on the subject of a scientific nature than had the ancient Greeks.

Mr. Treu also made the important point that these new sources of marine energy would not pollute, and this relates to the observation by Mr. Craigen, who said that I had not dealt with the impact of such schemes on flora and fauna and fishing interests. I believe that the fact that these new sources of energy will not pollute implies that there would not be a problem with the flora and fauna or with fishing in respect of wave devices, except in terms of navigation. Tidal devices, however, could have much more considerable implications for flora and fauna, and I agree with Mr. Craigen that this factor deserves further study.

Mr. Cornelissen and Mr. van Ooijen from the Netherlands were kind enough to say that I had not referred specifically in the recommendations to the Dutch expertise on this subject. Through you, Mr. President, I should like to request that the Secretary-General of WEU draws the attention of member governments to this expertise on the part of the Dutch when the report is recirculated after this debate, because I fully accept the importance of that expertise.

Mr. Farr said that I had not dealt sufficiently with other sources of energy, but I made clear in my report, as I think I made clear in my speech, that the subject of oil from beneath the sea is so enormous that it must have a special report of its own.

I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for your courtesy and the other members of the Assembly for the way in which they have received my report. I look forward to studying in detail the points that they have made. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I first pay tribute to Mr. Jessel for the energy that he did not conserve in his production of this report. Throughout his work the analytical strength that he has brought to the study shines out. I should like to congratulate him on the report and also particularly to express our thanks to the French electricity authorities and to the United Kingdom Department of Energy for the assistance they gave us. It is clear from the debate that energy is a subject that, though it has commanded the attention of no more than a small number of the members of the Assembly, has drawn into the debate some strong and valuable views. We have in Mr. Jessel's report a building block in providing information about energy.

Mr. Warren (continued)

It is strange that there is no shortage of energy in the world. The problem is knowing how to convert the available energy into useful sources of power. It is difficult to talk about any source of energy without talking about waste and conservation of energy. Therefore, Mr. Jessel's report is a step along the road that our Committee is planning to take towards a colloquy that we hope will take place in 1978, when we shall be able to consider a whole range of energy matters covering production, conservation and use.

May I say, Mr. President, how much we have enjoyed your Chairmanship and how sorry we are that this is our last chance to address you in the Chair.

We look forward in the next debate to another Dutch member coming forward, but again it will be with sorrow because it will be Mr. van Ooijen's last chance to speak to us as a member of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — The debate is closed.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 737.

If the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted unanimously*¹.

4. Review of advanced technology in Israel

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 735)

The PRESIDENT. — We proceed to the second Order of the Day, Document 735, review of advanced technology in Israel, without doubt an important subject.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. van Ooijen, to present the report.

Mr. van OOIJEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Before introducing my report, Mr. President, I would like publicly to thank the Israeli ambassador and his staff in Paris, as well as the

Israeli authorities in Jerusalem. Making the preparations for a trip like that of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions demands a great deal of time and a lot of organising ability. One of the appendices to my report shows the programme for our visit; when you read this it will be obvious that the Committee had to work very hard. I am grateful to you, Mr. President, and to the Presidential Committee for giving approval for this trip, which I believe has proved extremely useful both for our own work as parliamentarians and for the Assembly. I would like, too, to thank our Committee Secretary Mr. Huigens, not only for his share in the organisational work but for his contribution to the report.

Now to the contents of my report, which is in three parts. After an introduction, the first part deals with Israeli policy on scientific research and the development of science and technology in general. Then come a number of chapters covering special fields such as oceanography, computer science, agricultural research, desalination of seawater, nuclear energy, aircraft manufacture and military industry. Finally, I felt a chapter ought to be devoted to political-cum-military questions, and this is a distillation from talks the Committee had at the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries.

Though purely political affairs were not the subject of study during our trip, it was nevertheless extremely useful to have talked to these authorities. We got the background information one has to have to understand the Israeli Government's policy on the development of modern technology. The need for maintaining close contacts with Europe in this sphere comes through very clearly in the report. I think these contacts are useful for our countries, and a necessity for Israel; a necessity because Israel's borders with its neighbours are completely sealed, and it quite rightly cannot depend solely on contacts with the United States. Contact on scientific matters is useful for Western Europe because in areas such as solar energy and oceanography and in a general way in its organisation of scientific research, Israel has a lot to teach us. We as Europeans should be able to play a middle-man rôle in bringing Israeli knowledge and skills in things like the desalination of seawater, fish-farming and solar energy to the underdeveloped countries, many of which face just the same kind of problems as those the Israelis have been able to find answers to, thanks to the great ability of their scientists and engineers. At the same time there are areas in which Israel, as a small country, obviously cannot operate on its own — in space research, for example. I think that Europe could offer Israel a form of co-operation here, and since Europe has organised its affairs quite well in the European Space Agency it is able to speak

1. See page 42.

Mr. van Ooijen (continued)

with a single voice, and to help to see that Israel does not have to depend entirely on the Americans.

Mr. Warren, as Chairman of the Committee, made serious efforts for us to hear an Israeli Minister during this debate, and it is unfortunate that political circumstances in Israel, with the general elections and the forming of a new government, made this impossible.

I hope, Mr. President, that another opportunity may be found to discuss the desires set out in the draft recommendation in the presence of a member of the Israeli Government. This recommendation, adopted by the Committee, calls on member countries to intensify scientific and technological co-operation between Israel and Western Europe, to work together with Israel in aircraft construction, oceanography and the development of new sources of energy, to make possible the association of Israel in the European Space Agency's work, and finally to promote a permanent discussion on science and technology between Israel and its neighbours, once peace has been achieved in the Middle East. When it comes down to it, it is this peace we want to see come about: it is essential for the development of that part of the world, and for the true prosperity of those who live there. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. van Ooijen.

I call Mr. Hawkins to open the debate.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate the Rapporteur on an excellent and compact report. The expedition to Israel was a major one and, because our party was split into two, not everyone saw the results of all the visits. The report was, therefore, of great interest to everyone on the Committee.

I welcome the recommendation because it speaks of greater co-operation with Israel. In this context I fear that the British Government are less than enthusiastic. The reason is undoubted fear of Arab hostility.

Secondly, I welcome the recommendation because it talks of promoting permanent discussion with all Middle East States. This is surely what all European governments should be doing. As the Rapporteur said, we could be acting as middlemen to try to bring together on a practical basis the great wealth of the Arab States and the know-how and energy of the Israelis. Great gains could be made both by Israel and the Arab countries from permanent discussions whereby each side could see the great advantages of working together in a Middle East community. The gains are obvious. Israel's energy resources are desperately small and the Arab countries

have an abundance of oil. The Israelis have the know-how, the skills and, above all, the experience, gained over many years, of how to overcome natural difficulties and make deserts blossom. That knowledge and experience could only bring great advantage to all the Arab countries.

Because the visit was split into two parts and I had to leave a day early, I did not see everything. Although no doubt Israel welcomed the fact that we had rain on almost every day that I was there, and the rain hampered us in our first few days and prevented our seeing everything we were meant to see, I found the visit fascinating and I certainly want to return to that country.

Our first trip — a horrifying trip it was — was to the memorial to the holocaust. That visit enabled me to understand the feelings of the Israeli people and their absolute determination to hold on to their homeland, having been driven from so many places that they had previously called their homeland.

There are many spheres of activity in which European governments as well as Israel could gain great advance from co-operation. I shall speak of only one subject, of which I know a little, and that is agriculture. My visit to the Volcani Agricultural Research Centre was an enthralling experience. The director, Professor Va'adia, was an informal but intensely interesting and dynamic young man. He was a born leader with great drive, and he was supported, I was glad to see, by a second-in-command from England.

I was struck by the basis for production. In Europe we talk either of the output per hectare in tonnes or, in old-fashioned terms, of output per acre. The Israelis' objective was the greatest return in dollars, and their basis for production was output per cubic metre of water spent. They are desperately short of foreign currency and of water and by up-to-date market research they are able to switch crops rapidly to take advantage of world shortages.

A few years ago, Israel went into the production of sugar on a large scale. That was when the price of sugar was high and when sugar was badly wanted. Now sugar production has been dropped down, probably to the amount needed for consumption within Israel, and high-quality cotton has become the second largest dollar export from Israel.

It is well known that citrus fruits and vegetables have for many years topped the export list and paid for the necessary imports of cereals and fodder. Some people might ask, why fodder. I saw only some hardy sheep grazing the hill-sides near Bethlehem, but I gather that Israel has a large and highly-productive dairy herd that supplies all the dairy products needed by

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

that country. But all the agricultural production — particularly fruit and vegetables, and the avocados that have become a large export recently — needs a lot of water.

The only source of water is in the extreme north, a source that could be under attack, from the River Jordan through the Sea of Galilee, and it is piped through a grid throughout the whole of Israel. That is a system of which we should have been very glad in Great Britain last year. Now we have too much water. From the south coast the only major source of energy is oil through the Gulf of Aqaba, and that has been under constant military pressure from other Middle East countries.

No further agricultural land can be developed without more water. Hence there is intense research into desalination. We could learn a great deal from Israel about methods of water saving and distribution throughout the country.

I am convinced that European countries must have constant contacts with Israel and, at the same time, with the Arab countries. European countries must not be intimidated by anyone from having contacts with anyone else. In my home county of Norfolk many years ago a manager of the Norwich Union Insurance Company forced a director off its board because he was of Jewish blood — it was feared that the company would otherwise lose business in Arab countries.

We in WEU and in all our European parliaments must use whatever influence we can to bring together all countries in the Middle East, particularly over practical matters. That co-operation will be of the greatest possible benefit not only to Israel but to the Arab countries and all the world. I have great pleasure in supporting my colleague's report and I hope that the Assembly will accept it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hawkins.

For the rest of the afternoon I call on all participants in debates to make their speeches as short as possible in the hope that by that means no more members will have to leave before the close of the session.

I call Mr. van Kleef.

Mr. van KLEEF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I endorse most heartily the Rapporteur's thanks to the Israeli authorities for the way they made the preparations for our trip there from 6th to 13th February, and for the welcome they gave us. It made an extraordinarily deep impression to visit Yad Vashem, the memorial to six million victims of the Nazi

pogroms. This visit made it plainer to us than ever before that the people and Government of Israel will never again accept being a people without a homeland. It was impressive witness of a political reality, of a kind one very seldom gets. General Peled explained to the Committee how the Kingdom of Israel went under in 70 AD because it had neither the means nor the morale to withstand the Roman legions; a situation, he said, that must never occur again and which the people of Israel and their armed forces would use every means in their power to prevent.

It is against this background that one must see the general policy towards research and development followed by the Israeli Government since 1948. Civil and military research and development takes up 2.2 % of the national product, a considerably higher percentage than in most of our countries. Western Europe, too, ought to realise that unless enough money is invested in research and development it could become an easy prey to its enemies. In these present days of crisis all too many Western European countries are tending to cut back on their research and development budgets, mortgaging the future in a way that to my mind can be highly dangerous. It became clear to us, from the trip to Israel, how it is possible for a small country with about three million inhabitants to achieve such a magnificent performance in areas of modern technology. Particularly worthy of mention is their oceanography, and the breeding of fish in specially-equipped fish-farms. This is of enormous importance for feeding a population, and could mean a revolutionary advance for underdeveloped countries as well if the trials now under way continue to prove successful. The heads of the oceanographic institute believe that fish-farming could begin to produce yields on a commercial scale in three or four years from now. Very important, too, is the agricultural research going on in Israel, using desalinated sea water for irrigation. This again could be a revolutionary development for many of the world's countries and bring the beginning of a new standard of living.

The Committee gathered a great deal of information about nuclear power in Israel where, as in many other countries, it is a hotly-debated issue, though it is regarded by the Israeli Government as essential for future economic development. Naturally the Committee was not told anything about the military aspects of the nuclear programme. Personally I believe that nuclear weapons could for Israel mean a situation which the Israeli Government wants to avoid at all costs — the complete end of Israel as a State. It is obvious that for a small country — not just Israel but, for example, the Netherlands as well — an atom bomb, and certainly an H-bomb, would mean the end of their existence as such.

Mr. van Kleef (continued)

It is evident, therefore, that Israel is paying a great deal of attention to conventional armaments, especially aircraft, helicopters and tanks. The Committee was most impressed that the Israeli aircraft industry has been able to build aircraft of its own, the Kfir, which is a fighter-cum-reconnaissance aircraft, and a transport plane carrying some twenty troops. Israel's generals are clearly expecting that if a new war does break out it will be fought as a three-dimensional battle, with the advantage going to whoever can best achieve tactical integration of his tanks, aircraft and helicopters. Long- and short-range missiles will undoubtedly play a major rôle.

The conclusions that we have to come to from this visit are incorporated in the draft recommendation, adopted by the Committee on 9th May in Rome. I do believe that we in Western Europe can learn from what Israel has achieved in the nearly thirty years of its existence. As a result of the political situation and the trials withstood over the years, this country has garnered an enormous amount of knowledge and skill from which we in Western Europe could derive great benefit. There is no single country that has as much experience in the research and development of modern technology as Israel.

After the Committee had been to Canada it recommended close collaboration between the European Space Agency and the Canadian space organisation. This has now come about, and it is even on the cards that Canada, which is now an observer with ESA, may one day become a member. I think the Rapporteur's suggestion of a similar sort of development for Israel is a sound idea. A number of contacts have already been made, via the Weizmann Institute, between the West European and Israeli scientific and technological communities; these must be extended, and the governments should do what is necessary to promote this.

Israel is well on the way to becoming a country that makes large-scale use of solar energy. Europe, too, is short of oil, and could learn a lot from Israel on this score. I think it is a great pity, Mr. President, that in Europe there is still too little shared research in this area. Everyone has become convinced that new paths need to be explored on the energy front; but the necessary political stimulus is missing.

Before I sit down I would just like to say, Mr. President, that this is probably the last time Mr. van Ooijen will be with us here as Rapporteur. He has been appointed Chairman of our Second Chamber's Education Committee, a post which is not in fact compatible with membership of a delegation to an international parliament. I can appreciate Mr. van Ooijen's accepting this

post, but I am sad that he will be lost to our Committee and to the Assembly. His reports on Canada and Israel will, however, remain with us. I wish him every success in his new job.

I gather too, Mr. President, that this is the last time you will be chairing this Assembly's debates. I am sure I speak for all members of the Assembly and of its staff in thanking you for the work you have done for WEU and for the Council of Europe. May all go well with you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I understand you are not an exception. All speeches about such people, as between you and me, are exaggerated and I think too much has been said about that. People go and people come and we are not important, neither you nor me. Off we go.

There are two more speakers. First, I call Mr. Treu.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, whenever any one of us brings the Assembly the fruits of his observations and experience in an extra-European mission, I believe it to be his duty to talk about the chief impressions it has made on him. After the visit to the United States and Canada, we ought to say something now about the Committee's recent visit to Israel. To Mr. van Ooijen I offer my cordial acknowledgement and appreciation of his diligent work in co-operation with the secretariat, as well as my appreciation of his excellent timing and organisation.

The mission to Israel was a unique experience. Unlike the United States and Canada, this country maintains a siege economy, on a constant war footing, hence the collaboration it seeks, and commitment, for finding the most efficient ways, military, economic or social, of defending the country, have found a forcing-ground very different from anything that can be seen across the Atlantic. The impression I got was one of obvious international solidarity in all sectors. It is a "macro-cosmic" entity having its root, its focus of self-expression, in the tiny area of the Middle East which now circumscribes its independent statehood. Well, if I venture to voice my opinion in connection with Mr. van Ooijen's long and circumstantial report, it is to assert that we should pay less heed to the military aspects of the country's organisation, precisely because of its being on a permanent war footing. When I find particular emphasis laid — I am not saying it is untrue — on the fact that they manage to build fighter-bombers with a speed of more than Mach 2.3, surface-to-surface and air-to-air missiles, I think that this pales in interest compared with the progress they have made in, how shall I say, peaceful technology. Let me explain.

Mr. Treu (continued)

Having already visited ten years ago the districts of Negev and Eilat, I remain impressed by a twofold sphere of practical engineering and technology in that country: dissemination of agricultural irrigation know-how, enabling the growing of grain crops capable of flourishing with a minimum of water, even just the nightly dewfall, and in particular the Dead Sea and Red Sea for the already advanced technology in desalination of sea water. This is where, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to latch my personal experience on to Mr. van Ooijen's fascinating report. There has to be close co-ordination of both economic programmes: industrialised farming with real funding, and the desalination of sea water. For many European countries, and non-European too, the problem of water resources is critical. Mr. van Ooijen knows, from his visit to the centre near Tel Aviv, that plants for converting sea water to drinking water have in fact become commercially operational, and that despite being at war with the Arab States, Israel sells desalination plants to its belligerent neighbours. These are the technical and civil conquests I feel I should recall from the visit to Israel.

Coming now to the subject of nuclear energy, I will say that the State of Israel spends 40% of its national income on defence. I come back to what I was saying: it is no paragon, no pattern of reference for our Western European countries or at any rate those which can tranquilly remain on the defensive. Of the three sectors in which collaboration with Europe could be useful, the one offering up-to-date experience is that of solar energy. In the vast region of the Negev large towns are independent of any source of energy whatsoever that is not solar. Desalination has in fact become an economic proposition.

Let us speak now of information science. Anyone who has visited the Elbit computer plant — a factory producing data-processing units and computer terminals which are the last word in up-to-date technology — realises that a co-ordinated organisation using modern techniques, a pace-maker industry — computer science, as it happens, which enables the astounding achievements of modern electronics — may not only be an industry of high technology but also an independent capability for industrial progress without supplies from overseas. We heard that this, I do not say "poor", but certainly small country of a few million inhabitants, successfully supplies the United States with data-processing systems and terminals. Well, this just goes to show once more that where determination, tenacity, civil and technical solidarity can overcome the constraints of an ideology and a political stance, this life-style and progressive mentality are an example to all.

In his conclusions, Mr. van Ooijen says that these, let us not mince words but call them friends of ours, are concerned about co-operation with our institutional set-up. But I would add that, irrespective of political differences, we need this nation not only for technical but also for geographical and moral reasons to be on Europe's side, making its own contribution to economic development and human progress. Such collaboration will not only enable easier technological positions to be improved upon and won, but help to relax the strain placed on us all by the serious situation in the Middle East where Israel is engaged to the hilt. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Treu.

The last speaker in the debate is Mr. Cornelissen. He has told us that he needs three minutes at most.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — I was very pleased, and very much in agreement with, the report from Mr. van Ooijen. After all that has been said about it, I will make only two comments.

The first concerns the draft recommendation. I think there is an intrinsic jarring note in the draft recommendation, where the first paragraph of the preamble expresses Israel's wish to establish closer links with Western European countries in technological research and development; account is taken of this wish in paragraph 1 of the substantive part of the recommendation. Then the last paragraph of the preamble stresses the need for good relations with all countries in the Middle East. This I would gladly agree with. But what I consider even more important is the promoting of good relations between the Middle East countries themselves. What made me uneasy during our visit to Israel was that during otherwise very interesting discussions I had the impression that more stress was being placed on good relations between Israel and Western Europe than on improvements in the relations between Israel and its neighbours, though such an improvement is essential for a real solution of the tragic conflict in the Middle East. I shall be glad to hear from the Rapporteur how far closer collaboration between Israel and Western Europe might contribute to better relations between Israel and its neighbours.

My second comment relates to our trip to Israel. I have many pleasant memories of our visit; and I am not thinking only of Mr. Jessel's yeoman contribution to fuel saving when the route our bus was taking in an isolated part of the countryside did not match its destination! I would join with others in sending sincere thanks to our hosts.

It has occurred to me to wonder whether, after getting all this valuable information in Israel

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

about the difficulties overcome and opportunities put to good use by this little country, it might not be right, having these facts at our disposal, to visit other Middle East countries where a lot of attention is being paid to promoting technological development and improving relations between them and the West European countries. By making such a trip our Committee might also be able to make a modest contribution towards the mediating rôle that Europe can play in the Middle East.

In closing, I am very happy to join in congratulating my friend David van Ooijen on his report. I am sorry that this is the last time this will be possible in a meeting of the WEU Assembly, and I would like to thank him for his friendship over many years. My very best wishes to him for the future. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — It is possible that it is not the last time, only the last time for the time being. That is the difference between Mr. van Ooijen and myself.

Mr. van Ooijen has the floor.

Mr. van OOIJEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — My thanks are due, Mr. President, to all the speakers for their support and for their flattering reception of my report. Mr. Hawkins has added facts about his view of Israel as one who knows about agriculture. I note what he had to say, and thank him.

Mr. van Kleef stressed the importance that Israel attaches to scientific research, and mentioned that 2.2 % of its GNP is devoted to it.

Mr. Treu commented that Israel was in a state of war. While this is in itself quite true, I feel I should make the point that in the United States and Canada as well there is a very close relationship between scientific research and defence. The link may be rather stronger in Israel, but it is by no means absent elsewhere.

I did not indeed say anything about technical developments in the Negev. Mr. Treu no doubt knows that our Committee was unable to visit that area, and I envy Mr. Treu the fact that he has been able to do so, even if it was ten years ago.

Mr. Cornelissen said that there is a kind of inbuilt jarring note in the draft recommendation. Both Israel and the Arab countries have been mentioned as countries with which we should maintain contact. I recognise that the discordant note is there, but must make the point that it has not been caused by my recommendation — one is simply recognising it, and it exists as a fact. I think that Europe could play a mediating rôle — I said this in my introduction — by having contacts with both Israel and the Arab

countries, including contacts in the scientific sphere. Israel has knowledge from which we can learn. The Arab countries have the money for this research, and need this research. I think a combination of the two, backed up by the knowledge and probably the support of Western Europe, could be important for the whole Middle East.

To pause for a moment, finally, at something Mr. Hawkins said. There were a number of things we could not manage to see in Israel because of the rain. It would be a far more serious matter if we in Europe were unable — not because of the rain, but because of lack of interest — to see the benefit Israel has to offer us.

Lastly, Mr. President, I want to thank you and my colleagues here for all the kind comments on my report and on myself. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — We all wish Mr. van Ooijen success in his new task as Chairman of the Education Committee of the Dutch Parliament. He has proved in our Committee and in this chamber that he is a worthy man who is capable not only of presenting a report but of presenting it well. Thanks go to the staff of WEU, particularly to Mr. Huigens, who accompanied us on the trip and who made so many arrangements for us. But, above all, our thanks go to the Israelis, to their Embassy in Paris and to the Israeli people. We experienced their courage, their kindness and their courtesy, and we shall never forget that.

Israel has built one of the first science-based societies in the world. We found much of interest to observe in their work. Mr. Hawkins referred to the whole of the Middle East, and I believe that we all see Israel in that context. We see the Israeli technology and we see the oil that surrounds Israel in the Arab countries. If only the two could be brought together, they would provide as a by-product the peace that the men and women of the Middle East have not had in their hearts and minds for long enough. They deserve better, and we hope that the bridge we are helping to build across to Israel will be recognised by the whole of the Middle East. We wish that these people will no longer face death. We hope it will not be long before that peace is theirs.

The PRESIDENT. — The debate is closed.

We must now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 735.

If the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

The President (continued)

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is therefore agreed to unanimously*¹.

5. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 739)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 739.

I call Mr. Delorme to present the report.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the fact that this report is being presented at a late hour simplifies my task for me. At all events it allows me to ask you, Mr. President, and the Assembly as a whole to look into the possibility of arranging more reasonable time-tables for the presentation of reports.

Our Committee's report is intended to enhance the reputation of this Assembly, extol its labours and demonstrate its efficiency and usefulness. I feel that when one has to address so many empty benches and certain delegations are no longer represented at all, the usefulness of a report like ours is uncommonly diminished.

I simply want to say, at the end of this part of our session, that those of our colleagues who are still here have certainly studied the report to some purpose since three or four speakers will be discussing its terms and demonstrating, by their comments alone, that the report has been read.

As the fifteenth report of your Committee indicated, the present report is divided into three sections of very unequal length and importance. The first part is entitled "Members of parliament and defence"; the second describes the action taken in the different parliaments of member countries on texts adopted by our Assembly; the third part is entitled: "Activities of the Committee".

I shall not go into each of these three parts in detail. We have concentrated on the first part because we thought it was very important that a comparative study be made of what weight

the ordinary member of parliament can carry in such an important area as defence.

That is why we took the liberty of sending a questionnaire to the parliaments. I must add straight away that the parliaments replied to this questionnaire, and the replies given demonstrate the interest they showed in it.

The questionnaire was divided into four main sections: general responsibilities of parliaments in defence matters; defence and parliaments' legislative rôle; defence and parliaments' supervisory rôle; and defence and parliaments' information rôle.

As already said, I shall not go into the details of the report, which incorporates almost all the replies and sets out chapter by chapter the existing state of affairs in each of our parliaments.

I know that one of our colleagues in the Italian Delegation will propose rectifying paragraph 38 of Document 739. In the report we said — and nobody contradicted us in Committee — that "in the preamble to the Italian and French Constitutions... war is repudiated as a means of political action". Actually that is an error. It only applies to the French Constitution. As soon as the speaker has dealt with this point, I shall do exactly what is asked for, and accept the correction.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — It makes a difference.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Exactly. I agree to the corrections you are going to give me.

That brings me directly to the second aspect of our report which concerns the work done by the parliamentarians since the last session, the questions which have been asked and the action taken on the texts adopted here.

I think I ought to make a small digression about action in the texts adopted. The Assembly we represent is in the last analysis the only European assembly entitled to deal with national defence, armaments and military matters. I repeat what I have been saying for years — having been entrusted by colleagues in the Committee with the compilation of this report — namely, that the WEU Assembly's rôle and importance are not well enough known, even in our own parliaments, and I can only speak of my own. And yet, we have persuaded our Assembly to have an information report circulated to all parliamentarians. We would like to go further. We would like representatives of our Assembly to be allowed to speak in our defence and foreign affairs committees in order to show all the importance of an Assembly like ours, born of the desire to see in Europe that

1. See page 43.

Mr. Delorme (continued)

spirit instilled whereby our Assembly will soon be celebrating its thirtieth anniversary, and has rendered those services to which tribute was paid in the preceding sessions.

Consequently we should persevere in the same direction and endeavour to demonstrate — I was about to use the English expression our Committee's "public relations" — the usefulness and effectiveness of this Assembly.

You will find at the end of my report the most attractive part of it, a list of the visits made by the Committee. In this connection I would like to pay tribute to our Italian colleagues who were our latest hosts, to my fellow-members on the Committee and its Chairman, Mr. Radius, for whose absence I apologise, as he has been detained in Brussels this afternoon, and to say how much the information appended to the report, concerning application of Italy's regional laws, has been extremely useful and productive for the members of the Committee. This is the tribute of gratitude I wanted to pay to the Italian Delegation.

This is, very briefly summarised, the report which I have the honour to present at the end of this part of the session. I shall listen with great pleasure to the members who have put down their names to speak on the report and its conclusions. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Delorme.

I call Mr. Cordle.

Mr. CORDLE (*United Kingdom*). — I thank Mr. Delorme for his report and his presentation of it.

I wish to raise briefly two aspects of this interesting information report. The first is the part dealing with members of parliament and defence and the second is the action taken in the parliaments of member countries on texts adopted by the Assembly.

On the first, parliament and defence, the replies given to the questionnaire point out a number of noteworthy features. On general responsibilities, it is seen that parliaments derive their responsibilities and powers in defence matters basically from formal constitutional provisions. On their legislative rôle, parliaments' powers in respect of defence budgets are shown to differ where debates and votes are concerned.

On parliaments' supervisory rôle, general and specific means are discussed whereby the executive can be given political endorsement, including the rôle of committees. On parliaments' information rôle, the task of parliaments is to inform both population and government of the con-

sequences of defence policy at national and European level.

On that last feature, it is a matter of grave concern that the news media do not appear to attach sufficient importance to the coverage of defence debates, particularly when they take place in a multinational framework. For example, this Assembly holds some high-quality and topical debates, such as the one we had today on the CSCE. We sincerely hope that newspaper coverage will be given on this occasion so that the public may know that this and similar matters are discussed by the one European parliamentary body empowered to examine them.

Secondly, as to Assembly texts, I am particularly struck by the reference in the report to the fact that the texts of the Assembly are made available to national parliaments in varying conditions, leaving much to be desired in the way that parliaments are able to question governments about their implementation. We send our recommendations to the Council for reply, and that sometimes seems to work reasonably well, although, often, more information can be obtained by using the traditional members' questions to a minister in a national parliament. I am not satisfied that we have a good enough system for enabling all the parliamentarians in each member country to be informed of our activities.

The Rapporteur rightly points out that our recommendations are not examined systematically by parliaments, nor are they discussed by governments. It would be good to know that some uniform system was being instituted so that identical conditions prevailed in each national parliament for continuing the consultations across national frontiers.

I should like to conclude with two general remarks, both of which are very much the business of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. The first concerns the urgent need to promote a greater degree of awareness of the important tasks undertaken by our organisation, especially in the framework of foreign policy and defence. On this I think we are all agreed.

Secondly, our parliaments can assist in ensuring that the Council carries out its duties and that each part of the organisation plays its full part at this crucial stage in European development. Future generations will not thank us if, as we move towards direct European elections in a wider framework, we neglect to maintain our traditional links between multinational assemblies such as this and national parliaments and governments.

Why do we do what we do here? It is because we think that this organisation has an important rôle to play in European affairs, as much now as in the future. Of course, the question of the

Mr. Cordle (continued)

enlargement of the Nine must be borne in mind. Because the Assembly is an essential part of this organisation, it must speak up. It must be heard. It must be informed and it must be understood. We have a direct line to governments through the Council and we can, therefore, influence the many policies and decisions arrived at. We are here — at minimal cost and the quality and consistency of our work are uncontested — because we are all in the same boat and we might as well row together in that same boat. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cordle.

I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, while paying tribute to the harvest of information compiled by Mr. Delorme in his report, the organic collation of material and very careful and specific attention given to Italy in Appendix III — which is the best return we could have had for the modest hospitality we recently extended to our fellow-members of WEU — I am nevertheless bound to say that, in the chapter on defence and parliament's legislative rôle, there appears to be a serious misinterpretation of a principle, so approximate and partial as to constitute a misrepresentation, of the Italian Constitution. I refer to paragraph 38 of Document 739 which says: "In the preamble to the Italian and French Constitutions... war is repudiated as a means of political action. Nevertheless, articles relating to the declaration of war make no mention of the offensive or defensive nature of such a declaration. Parliaments might therefore be asked to authorise a war of aggression".

Now it is quite right that the preamble to the Italian Constitution — I cannot of course answer for the French, which I know nothing about — ordains in Article 11 that Italy repudiates war as a means of solving international disputes, but the complete sentence runs: "Italy repudiates war as an instrument of offence against the liberties of other nations and as a means of solving international disputes". We have therefore a specific repudiation of warfare, inasmuch as it is a war of aggression. Consequently it is wrong to state that on the basis of the Italian Constitution parliament might be asked to authorise a war of that nature.

In the same context reference must also be made to Article 52 of the Italian Constitution, which says: "The defence of the motherland is the sacred duty of the citizen", which implies *a contrario* that the citizen's duty does not apply in the event of war declared contrary to Article 11 of the preamble and infringing the liberties of other nations.

I should therefore be grateful if the Rapporteur would make this correction to the final version of his report. May I add, Ladies and Gentlemen, that on the basis of principles fully safeguarded by the constitution, the hypothesis of an Italian parliament ever authorising a war of aggression is excluded, as it is by the whole spirit of our democracy, by the orientations imparted within the defensive framework territorially defined by the Atlantic Alliance, which have been more and more actively guiding the foreign policy of the Italian Republic. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Now I ask Mr. Hawkins to speak.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I am not a member of this Committee, but I wish to make two brief comments neither of which is in any way a criticism of Mr. Delorme's excellent report. However, a colleague of mine who is on the Committee has asked me to draw the attention of Mr. Delorme and the Committee to the fact that the 1976 and 1977 meetings ended before the notice said they would start, and the only agenda that my colleague received was changed so that no notice was given of the election of the Chairman. I understand that this should have taken place on the Thursday and in fact took place on the Monday but my colleague was given no notice of this before he left London. Perhaps this is a minor matter but it is rather important if people want to take an interest in committees.

This Committee could and should be the most important of the Assembly, having Mr. Delorme, an experienced parliamentarian, as its Rapporteur. I have been here only a short time but I have come to realise how experienced and energetic he is. More should be known to the average member of parliament of the work of WEU, certainly in our country, let alone the average citizen or elector in Great Britain. Though I cannot speak for any other country, I fear that in my country very few know of the work of WEU. When we make a speech in parliament, we all say, "Of course it was a very good speech, but the press took no notice of it" and of course the press has a job in trying to report everything. Nevertheless, if this Committee were as powerful and dynamic as I believe it should be, the work of WEU would be better known.

From what I understood of his speech, Mr. Delorme feels much the same. We in WEU are at fault. I notice that no visit has been made to Great Britain for eleven years. Nor is London the be-all and end-all of my country. I notice that there have been meetings in more than one German city, which I imagine means that some publicity is given to the work of WEU through the work of this Committee.

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

WEU and this Committee in particular should be determined to make a major impact on public opinion. While this must be done by members in their own parliaments, certainly in the British parliament opportunities to speak on defence are few and far between.

Everyone ought to know that the initials WEU stand for the defence of Europe. I passionately believe in this. I spent five years of my life in a prisoner of war camp and I do not wish to see that happen to my children and grandchildren.

If our work were brought to his attention, the man in the street would be interested in it. Public relations campaigns generally have a bad name, because it is assumed that high-powered people are employed to sell something that is false. We have something good to sell and it ought to sell itself, but we must try to persuade the press and our defence committees to take an interest in what we do in the Assembly. WEU must not be a self-satisfied and inward-looking body. We must justify ourselves to those who pay for us to come here, or one day, perhaps before long, they will tell us that it is time that we packed up.

I ask the Rapporteur, the Committee and the whole direction of WEU to investigate ways of making known the work of this organisation. I hope that the Vice-President will tell the President of the Assembly what has been said here. I believe that before he accepted this office he had great influence with European governments. It is essential to use every possible means to publicise the work of this body. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. No doubt what you and others have said this afternoon will be brought to the attention of the Assembly's President.

Has the Rapporteur any comment ?

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — May I thank the three speakers and reply at once to Mr. Cordle and Mr. Hawkins who, in their remarks, mentioned the importance of making known the work of our Assembly and the rôle it ought to play in the eyes of the public. I entirely agree with their comments.

If there has been some mention of forcefulness as a criticism of the Committee's Rapporteur, I have to admit that he sometimes gets carried away in the heat of debate. We have tried to inject some sense of urgency, first of all into the Assembly — we were agreed on this — its Bureau and its President, both the last one and the new one but I do not think that our Committee's rôle is sufficiently known to the public at large outside and above all in our own

parliaments where we should have our spokesmen on the various defence or foreign affairs budgets and proclaim what the initials WEU stand for.

I proposed in a motion to the Assembly in Strasbourg that all our radio and television stations should allocate at least one hour a month — perhaps even a week — to expounding European topics, and holding a monthly debate on European defence and what the initials WEU stand for. We have not been given any satisfaction so far.

This fight is what we are here for. We should take it up, shouldering all the responsibilities that go with it, and we should in our national parliaments specifically request all the mass media, with all the audiovisual aids which are at the disposal of every government and every parliament, to explain what the parliamentary assembly of the Atlantic Pact means: hold quizzes about how many nations are represented in it, how many nations are there in the Assembly of Western European Union, how many in the Common Market in Brussels, and how many in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. I think the results of such an enquiry would be very disappointing. It is just this work of educating and informing others which our Committee is calling for, and I think that the comments you have made ought to be disseminated, and quite objectively passed on by the President to the Presidential Committee. I thank Mr. Cordle and Mr. Hawkins on this point.

I will say to our Italian friend that I fully understand the remarks that he made on paragraph 38 of my report. I must say that it was a case of reasoning *a contrario*. Obviously, even as representative of France, I cannot say that my parliament would often be ready to declare an offensive war. It would be insulting to my fellow members of parliament, the Senate and the National Assembly.

I just meant that in fact both the Italian and French Constitutions repudiate war as a means of policy but that the articles on declaration of war remain silent on whether it is a defensive or offensive war. I am sure our great Latin sister nation will understand this, and the Rapporteur, who is here to give you satisfaction, will insert in the definitive text what you have said. I take official note of the fact, and the corrections you have asked for; they will appear in the final report. Your remarks on both Articles 11 and 52 of the constitution will be taken note of.

It only remains for me to conclude by also thanking you, Mr. President, for having followed so attentively the proceedings of our Assembly, for having presided over it for the last time at this sitting, and for having given me the honour of being the last Rapporteur to speak during your term of office. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — There is no draft resolution. All we must do is take note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Is that agreed ?...

That is agreed.

6. Adjournment of the Session

The PRESIDENT. — The Assembly has now come to the end of its business for the first part of the twenty-third ordinary session. I am very grateful to those who have been kind enough

to be present for part or all of this afternoon. I am especially grateful that members have not presented me with any problems of law and order.

To Mr. Hawkins I would say that neither WEU nor its Assembly is packing up, but I am.

I declare the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.)

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