

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1978

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly Documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

| | |
|----------------------|-----------|
| MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo | Socialist |
| BONNEL Raoul | PVV |
| HANIN Charles | Soc. Chr. |
| MANGELSCHOTS Jan | Socialist |
| PEETERS Renaat | Soc. Chr. |
| TANGHE Francis | Soc. Chr. |
| VAN WATERSCHOOT John | Soc. Chr. |

Substitutes

| | |
|------------------------|-----------|
| MM. BRASSEUR Guy | FDF |
| DEJARDIN Claude | Socialist |
| LAMBIOTTE Fortuné | Socialist |
| PERIN François | PRLW |
| VAN AAL Henri-François | Soc. Chr. |
| VAN DER ELST Frans | Volksunie |
| VERLEYSEN William | Soc. Chr. |

FRANCE

Representatives

| | |
|-----------------------|------------|
| MM. BIZET Emile | RPR (App.) |
| BOUCHENY Serge | Communist |
| BRUGNON Maurice | Socialist |
| DEPIETRI César | Communist |
| DESCHAMPS Bernard | Communist |
| FERRETTI Henri | UDF |
| GRUSSENMEYER François | RPR |
| JAGER René | UCDP |
| JEAMBRUN Pierre | Dem. Left |
| PÉRIDIER Jean | Socialist |
| PÉRONNET Gabriel | UDF (App.) |
| PETIT Camille | RPR |
| PIGNION Lucien | Socialist |
| SCHLEITER François | Ind. Rep. |
| SEITTLINGER Jean | UDF |
| SÉNÈS Gilbert | Socialist |
| TALON Bernard | RPR |
| VALLEIX Jean | RPR |

Substitutes

| | |
|---------------------|-----------|
| MM. BAUMEL Jacques | RPR |
| BECHTER Jean-Pierre | RPR |
| BELIN Gilbert | Socialist |
| BERRIER Noël | Socialist |
| BOZZI Jean | RPR |
| COUDERO Pierre | UDF |
| DELEHEDDE André | Socialist |
| DRUON Maurice | RPR |
| JUNG Louis | UCDP |
| KOEHL Emile | UDF |

MM. LAGOURGUE Pierre

LEMAIRE Marcel
LEMOINE Georges
MALVY Martin
MÉNARD Jacques
MERCIER Jean
VISSE René
WAGNIES Claude

UDF

ONIP
Socialist
Socialist
Ind. Rep.
Dem. Left
Communist
Communist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

| | |
|----------------------------|---------|
| MM. AHRENS Karl | SPD |
| BARDENS Hans | SPD |
| Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte | SPD |
| MM. ENDERS Wendelin | SPD |
| EVERS Hans | CDU/CSU |
| GESSNER Manfred | SPD |
| HANDLOS Franz | CDU/CSU |
| von HASSEL Kai-Uwe | CDU/CSU |
| President of the Assembly | |
| LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans | CDU/CSU |
| MARQUARDT Werner | SPD |
| MENDE Erich | CDU/CSU |
| MILZ Peter | CDU/CSU |
| MÜLLER Günther | CDU/CSU |
| PFENNIG Gero | CDU/CSU |
| REDDEMANN Gerhard | CDU/CSU |
| SCHMIDT Hermann | SPD |
| SCHWENCKE Olaf | SPD |
| VOHRER Manfred | FDP |

Substitutes

| | |
|----------------------|---------|
| MM. ALBER Siegbert | CDU/CSU |
| AMREHN Franz | CDU/CSU |
| BÖHM Wilfried | CDU/CSU |
| BÜCHNER Peter | SPD |
| HOLTZ Uwe | SPD |
| KLEPSCH Egon | CDU/CSU |
| LEMMRICH Karl Heinz | CDU/CSU |
| LENZER Christian | CDU/CSU |
| MATTICK Kurt | SPD |
| PAWELCZYK Alfons | SPD |
| SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang | CDU/CSU |
| SCHEFFLER Hermann | SPD |
| SCHMIDHUBER Peter | CDU/CSU |
| SCHMIDT Hansheinrich | FDP |
| SCHULTE Manfred | SPD |
| SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM | CDU/CSU |
| Adolf | |
| UEBERHORST Reinhard | SPD |
| ZEBISCH Franz Josef | SPD |

ITALY

Representatives

| | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| MM. ARFÉ Gaetano | Socialist |
| BERNINI Bruno | Communist |
| BOLDRINI Arrigo | Communist |
| BONALUMI Gilberto | Chr. Dem. |
| CALAMANDREI Franco | Communist |
| CORALLO Salvatore | Communist |
| DE POI Alfredo | Chr. Dem. |
| FOSSON Pietro | Val d'Aosta Union |
| GONELLA Guido | Chr. Dem. |
| MAGGIONI Desiderio | Chr. Dem. |
| MINNOCCI Giacinto | Socialist |
| ORSINI Bruno | Chr. Dem. |
| PECCHIOLI Ugo | Communist |
| PECORARO Antonio | Chr. Dem. |
| ROBERTI Giovanni | Chr. Dem. |
| SARTI Adolfo | Chr. Dem. |
| SEGRE Sergio | Communist |
| TREU Renato | Chr. Dem. |

Substitutes

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Mrs.</i> AGNELLI Susanna | <i>Ind. Rep.</i> |
| MM. ANTONI Varese | <i>Communist</i> |
| ARIOSTO Egidio | <i>PSDI</i> |
| AVELLONE Giuseppe | <i>Chr. Dem.</i> |
| BORGHI Luigi | <i>Chr. Dem.</i> |
| CAVALIERE Stefano | <i>Chr. Dem.</i> |
| DEL DUCA Antonio | <i>Chr. Dem.</i> |
| <i>Mrs.</i> FACCIO Adele | <i>Radical</i> |
| MM. GIUST Bruno | <i>Chr. Dem.</i> |
| MARAVALLE Fabio | <i>Socialist</i> |
| <i>Mrs.</i> PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina | <i>Communist</i> |
| MM. PINTO Biagio | <i>Republican</i> |
| ROMANO Angelo | <i>Ind. Left</i> |
| ROSSI Raffaele | <i>Communist</i> |
| RUBBI Antonio | <i>Communist</i> |
| SGHERRI Evaristo | <i>Communist</i> |
| TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko | <i>MSI</i> |
| URSO Salvatore | <i>Chr. Dem.</i> |

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

| | |
|-------------------------|--------------|
| MM. ABENS Victor | Soc. Workers |
| MARGUE Georges | Soc. Chr. |
| MART René | Dem. |

Substitutes

| | |
|------------------------|---------------------|
| MM. HENGEL René | <i>Soc. Workers</i> |
| KONEN René | <i>Dem.</i> |
| SPAUTZ Jean | <i>Soc. Chr.</i> |

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

| | |
|----------------------------|---------|
| MM. CORNELISSEN Pam | CDA |
| van HULST Johan | CDA |
| KOOPMAN Bram | Labour |
| de KOSTER Hans | Liberal |
| SCHOLTEN Jan Nico | CDA |
| STOFFELEN Pieter | Labour |
| VOOGD Johan | Labour |

Substitutes

| | |
|---|----------------|
| <i>Mr.</i> van den BERGH Harry | <i>Labour</i> |
| <i>Mrs.</i> van den HEUVEL-de BLANK Ien | <i>Labour</i> |
| MM. KONINGS Martin | <i>Labour</i> |
| MOMMERSTEEG Joseph | <i>CDA</i> |
| PORTHEINE Frederik | <i>Liberal</i> |
| SCHLINGEMANN Johan | <i>Liberal</i> |
| <i>Mrs.</i> van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria | <i>CDA</i> |

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

| | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| <i>Mr.</i> Alan BEITH | <i>Liberal</i> |
| <i>Sir</i> Frederic BENNETT | <i>Conservative</i> |
| MM. Paul CHANNON | <i>Conservative</i> |
| William CRAIG | <i>Ulster Unionist</i> |
| Julian CRITCHLEY | <i>Conservative</i> |
| Andrew FAULDS | <i>Labour</i> |
| W. Percy GRIEVE | <i>Conservative</i> |
| Peter HARDY | <i>Labour</i> |
| Paul HAWKINS | <i>Conservative</i> |
| <i>Lord</i> HUGHES | <i>Labour</i> |
| MM. Arthur LEWIS | <i>Labour</i> |
| John PAGE | <i>Conservative</i> |
| <i>Sir</i> John RODGERS | <i>Conservative</i> |
| MM. John ROPER | <i>Labour</i> |
| Thomas URWIN | <i>Labour</i> |
| Kenneth WARREN | <i>Conservative</i> |
| John WATKINSON | <i>Labour</i> |
| Phillip WHITEHEAD | <i>Labour</i> |

Substitutes

| | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| MM. Gordon BAGIER | <i>Labour</i> |
| Robert BANKS | <i>Conservative</i> |
| Robin COOK | <i>Labour</i> |
| Jim CRAIGEN | <i>Labour</i> |
| <i>Lord</i> DUNCAN-SANDYS | <i>Conservative</i> |
| MM. Anthony GRANT | <i>Conservative</i> |
| Toby JESSEL | <i>Conservative</i> |
| Anthony KERSHAW | <i>Conservative</i> |
| <i>Mrs.</i> Jill KNIGHT | <i>Conservative</i> |
| <i>Mr.</i> Michael McGUIRE | <i>Labour</i> |
| <i>Lord</i> McNAIR | <i>Liberal</i> |
| <i>Mr.</i> Kevin McNAMARA | <i>Labour</i> |
| <i>Lord</i> MORRIS | <i>Conservative</i> |
| <i>Lord</i> NORTHFIELD | <i>Labour</i> |
| <i>Mr.</i> Cranley ONSLOW | <i>Conservative</i> |
| <i>Dr.</i> Colin PHIPPS | <i>Labour</i> |
| MM. George REID | <i>Scottish Nation.</i> |
| Frank TOMNEY | <i>Labour</i> |

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 20th November 1978

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.2. Examination of Credentials.3. Address by the President of the Assembly.4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 780). | <ol style="list-style-type: none">5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.6. Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU (<i>Presentation of, Debate and Vote on the draft Order of the General Affairs Committee</i>, Doc. 793). |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 11 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The President announced the resumption of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the Sixth Sitting on Thursday, 22nd June 1978, were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of Mr. Jeambrun as a Representative and Mr. Mercier as a Substitute of France.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of :

- Mr. Beith as a Representative of the United Kingdom in place of Lord Beaumont of Whitley ;
- Lord McNair as a Substitute of the United Kingdom in place of Mr. Beith.

4. Observers

The President welcomed to the Second Part of the Session as parliamentary observers :

- Mr. Sørensen and Mr. Melchior, members of the Danish Folketing ;
- Mr. Vyzas and Mr. Katsaros, Deputies from Greece ;
- Mr. Guerra Zunzunegui, First Vice-President of the Spanish Senate, and Mrs. Moll, Deputy from Spain.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 780)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session subject to certain amendments.

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Urwin.

Mr. Périquier proposed that the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 786, be withdrawn from the draft Order of Business.

The proposal was rejected.

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session as amended.

7. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Sarti.

Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Bernard-Reymond replied to questions put by MM. Valleix, Baumel, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Roper, Minnocci, Kershaw and Péronnet.

8. Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU

(Presentation of and Debate on the draft Order of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 793)

The draft Order of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Druon, Mende and Valleix.

The Debate was closed.

The President proposed that the question be referred back to the Committee.

Speaker : Mrs. von Bothmer.

The proposal was agreed to.

9. Change in the membership of a Committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nomination to a Committee proposed by the Delegation of the United Kingdom :

— Lord McNair as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Lord Beaumont of Whitley.

10. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

| | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Belgium | MM. Mende | Netherlands |
| Mr. Bonnel | <i>Amrehn</i> (Milz) | Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> |
| | Müller | (van Hulst) |
| | <i>Schäuble</i> (Pfennig) | MM. <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) |
| France | Hermann Schmidt | <i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster) |
| MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) | Schwencke | Stoffelen |
| Boucheny | Vohrer | Voogd |
| <i>Baumel</i> (Grussenmeyer) | | |
| Péridier | Italy | United Kingdom |
| Péronnet | MM. Bernini | Mr. Beith |
| Schleiter | Corallo | Sir Frederic Bennett |
| Seitlinger | De Poi | MM. <i>Kershaw</i> (Channon) |
| Valleix | <i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella) | Critchley |
| | Maggioni | Grieve |
| Federal Republic of Germany | Minnocci | Hardy |
| MM. Ahrens | <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) | Hawkins |
| <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens) | Pecoraro | Lewis |
| Mrs. von Bothmer | Roberti | Page |
| MM. Enders | Sarti | Sir John Rodgers |
| Gessner | Treu | MM. Roper |
| Handlos | | Urwin |
| <i>Böhm</i> (von Hassel) | Luxembourg | Lord <i>Morris</i> (Warren) |
| <i>Alber</i> (Lagershausen) | Mr. Mart | MM. Watkinson |
| | | <i>Craig</i> (Whitehead) |

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

| | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Belgium | MM. Pignion | MM. Pecchioli |
| MM. Adriaensens | Sénès | Segre |
| Hanin | Talon | |
| Mangelschots | Federal Republic of Germany | Luxembourg |
| Peeters | MM. Evers | MM. Abens |
| Tanghe | Marquardt | Margue |
| Van Waterschoot | Reddemann | |
| France | | Netherlands |
| MM. Brugnon | Italy | MM. Cornelissen |
| Depietri | MM. Arfé | Scholten |
| Deschamps | Boldrini | |
| Ferretti | Bonalumi | United Kingdom |
| Jager | Calamandrei | MM. Craig |
| Jeambrun | Fosson | Faulds |
| Petit | | Lord Hughes |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 20th November 1978

ORDERS OF THE DAY

Europe's external relations (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 790 and Amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Europe's external relations

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 790 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Calamandrei, Grant, Watkinson, Müller, Roper, Beith, Cavaliere and Valleix.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

4. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "and that this objective" to the end of the paragraph.

Speakers : MM. Valleix, Jung, Cavaliere, Valleix, Gessner, Mrs. von Bothmer and Mr. Valleix.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Antoni and others :

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

"Considering that military security in Europe is based on a stable balance of forces between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact ;".

Speakers : MM. Calamandrei, Reddemann, Mrs. von Bothmer and Mr. Gessner.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

5. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "military security" and insert "the security of Europe".

Speakers : MM. Valleix and Gessner.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Antoni and others :

2. Leave out the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

"Concerned that the uninterrupted and uncontrolled arms race between the West and the East may upset the balance of forces and give rise to new dangers ;".

Speakers : MM. Calamandrei and Gessner.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

6. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "uncontrolled".

Speakers : MM. Valleix and Gessner.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

7. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "reduction and control" and insert "universal and controlled reduction".

Speakers : MM. Valleix and Gessner.

A verbal Amendment proposed by Mr. Jung to leave out the words "universal and" was agreed to.

The amended Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

8. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers : MM. Valleix and Gessner.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, at end add :

" , recognising that any effective agreement on arms transfers will require the participation of both supplier and recipient countries ; ".

Speakers : MM. Roper and Gessner.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " integration " and insert "unification ".

Speakers : MM. Valleix, Treu and Gessner.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 322) ¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote) : Mr. Calamandrei.

4. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 21st November, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.

1. See page 18.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| Belgium | MM. Reddemann Hermann Schmidt Vohrer | Netherlands |
| Mr. <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) | | Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> (van Hulst) |
| France | Italy | MM. <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) Stoffelen |
| MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) <i>Jung</i> (Jager) Jeambrun Schleiter Valleix | MM. Bernini Calamandrei Corallo De Poi Fosson <i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella) Minnocci <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) Pecoraro Roberti Sarti Treu | United Kingdom |
| Federal Republic of Germany | | Mr. Beith Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) MM. Craig Critchley <i>McGuire</i> (Faulds) Grieve Hardy Hawkins <i>Tomney</i> (Lord Hughes) Sir John Rodgers MM. Roper Urwin <i>Grant</i> (Warren) Watkinson <i>Craigie</i> (Whitehead) |
| Mr. <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens) Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Gessner Handlos <i>Böhm</i> (Lagershausen) Mende <i>Amrehn</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Schäuble</i> (Pfennig) | Luxembourg MM. <i>Spautz</i> (Margue) Mart | |

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

| | | |
|--|--|---|
| Belgium | MM. Petit Pignion Seitlinger Sénès Talon | MM. Pecchioli Segre |
| MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin Peeters Tanghe Van Waterschoot | | Luxembourg Mr. Abens |
| France | Federal Republic of Germany | Netherlands |
| MM. Boucheny Brugnon Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Péridier Péronnet | MM. Ahrens Evers Marquardt Schwencke | MM. Cornelissen de Koster Scholten Voogd |
| | Italy | United Kingdom |
| | MM. Arfé Boldrini Bonalumi Maggioni | MM. Channon Lewis Page |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 322
on Europe's external relations

The Assembly,

Considering that Europe can prosper only if peace is preserved ;

Considering that the Western European countries share the common objective of promoting democracy and human rights universally and that this objective does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states ;

Considering that Western Europe's foreign policy must demonstrate a readiness to co-operate with all parts of the world in order to assure the security and well-being of their peoples ;

Considering that the security of Europe, which presupposes a stable balance of forces, can best be maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance ;

Concerned at the intensification of the Soviet Union's armament efforts ;

Considering further that an arms race between East and West cannot increase our security, but only precipitate new dangers ;

Convinced that the continuation and extension of détente with the objective of arms control and balanced force reduction agreements serve the interests of peace and military security ;

Considering that East-West co-operation in all fields is an essential element of security and should be continued on a stable basis ;

Considering that the North-South dialogue should be intensified in order to overcome as soon as possible the gap between North and South ;

Convinced that economic and social progress and hence internal security and stability are in the interest of industrial and developing nations alike ;

Aware that Europe's dependence on imports of raw materials constitutes a high degree of vulnerability ;

Considering that the restoration of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain is a great achievement for Europe as a whole which must be consolidated through appropriate assistance measures by Western Europe ;

Convinced that world economic recovery and hence the economic stabilisation of the western democracies require close international co-operation in the political and economic fields ;

Considering that the activities of the WEU Council are based upon a treaty which grants it wide-ranging responsibilities extending into the economic and social area, even though these are effectively exercised through other international organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly, particularly at its ministerial meetings, all the problems raised by the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the opportunities that this article offers have been fully exploited ;
2. Examine regularly the military balance and state of East-West relations in Europe and maintain close co-operation between member countries in order to promote the progress of détente and negotiations on the controlled reduction of armaments ;
3. Study the security aspects of the North-South dialogue ;
4. Investigate the problem of conventional arms transfers especially to third world countries with a view to developing a common policy for the control of weapon exports, recognising that any effective agreement on arms transfers will require the participation of both supplier and recipient countries ;
5. Promote close co-operation in all appropriate international organisations with the democratic nations of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region and support these nations' early entry into the European Community and their share in the process of European integration.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 21st November 1978

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>1. Disarmament ; The limitation of strategic arms ; New weapons and defence strategy (<i>Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789).</p> | <p>2. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.</p> |
|--|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Disarmament

The limitation of strategic arms

New weapons and defence strategy

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament was presented by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The preliminary Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on new weapons and defence strategy was presented by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the limitation of strategic arms was presented by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur.

The Joint Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Cook, Bernini and Roberti.

The Joint Debate was adjourned.

4. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Tomlinson replied to questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Lewis, Valleix, Bozzi, Baumel, Minnocci, Watkinson, Cook, Calamandrei, Lord Morris and Mrs. Knight.

5. Disarmament

The limitation of strategic arms

New weapons and defence strategy

(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789)

The Joint Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Müller, Seitlinger and Deschamps.

Mr. van den Bergh and Mr. Baumel, Rapporteurs, and Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Joint Debate was closed.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

| | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Belgium | MM. Amrehn (Milz) | Netherlands |
| MM. Dejardin (Adriaensens) | Müller | MM. van Hulst |
| Van Waterschoot | Schäuble (Pfennig) | Konings (Koopman) |
| | Böhm (Reddemann) | Scholten |
| | Hermann Schmidt | Stoffelen |
| France | Schwencke | van den Bergh (Voogd) |
| MM. Wargnies (Brugnon) | Vohrer | |
| Depietri | | |
| Deschamps | Italy | United Kingdom |
| Bozzi (Ferretti) | MM. Bernini | Lord McNair (Beith) |
| Baumel (Grussenmeyer) | Calamandrei | Sir Frederic Bennett |
| Jeambrun | Corallo | MM. Channon |
| Péronnet | De Poi | Craig |
| Petit | Fosson | Critchley |
| Pignion | Cavaliere (Gonella) | Grieve |
| Schleiter | Maggioni | Cook (Hardy) |
| Seitlinger | Minnocci | Hawkins |
| Sénès | Del Duca (Orsini) | Tomney (Lord Hughes) |
| Valleix | Pecoraro | Lewis |
| | Roberti | Mrs. Knight (Page) |
| Federal Republic of Germany | Sarti | Sir John Rodgers |
| Mr. Pawelczyk (Bardens) | Antoni (Segre) | MM. Roper |
| Mrs. von Bothmer | Treu | Urwin |
| MM. Enders | | Warren |
| Gessner | Luxembourg | Watkinson |
| Handlos | MM. Margue | Craigien (Whitehead) |
| Scheffler (Marquardt) | Mart | |
| Mende | | |

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

| | | |
|--|---|------------------------------|
| Belgium | Federal Republic of Germany | Luxembourg |
| MM. Bonnel Hanin Mangelschots Peeters Tanghe | MM. Ahrens Evers Lagershausen | Mr. Abens |
| | | Netherlands |
| France | Italy | MM. Cornelissen de Koster |
| MM. Bizet Boucheny Jager Péridier Talon | MM. Arfé Boldrini Bonalumi Pecchioli | United Kingdom |
| | | Mr. Faulds |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 21st November 1978

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 791).

2. Disarmament ; The limitation of strategic arms ; New weapons and defence strategy (*Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order*, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

2. Relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 791)

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

3. Disarmament

The limitation of strategic arms

New weapons and defence strategy

(Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 787.

On a proposal by the President, the Assembly agreed that the vote by roll-call be postponed until later in the Sitting.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Order in Document 789.

The draft Order was agreed to unanimously. (This Order will be published as No. 49) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 788.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

" Considering that to the danger created by the increase in existing military capabilities is now added that of the proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons ;",

Speakers : MM. Boucheny and Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

" Stressing that the intensive arms trade now practised exerts its adverse effects on the economy, is immoral and increases the risk of armed conflicts breaking out ;",

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

3. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

" Considering that any measure intended to slow or stop the quantitative and qualitative

1. See page 27.

arms race must take account of the existing balances and the right of all states to security ;”.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Mr. Bozzi :

15. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “other major arms suppliers” insert “and the main recipient countries”.

In paragraph 1 (e) of the draft recommendation proper, after “major arms-producing countries” insert “and main recipient countries”.

Speakers : MM. Bozzi, Cook and Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Mr. Bozzi :

16. In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “a comprehensive test ban” and insert “a nuclear test ban if this does not jeopardise the security of the state concerned”.

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, delete “(a)”.

Speakers : MM. Bozzi and Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

4. Leave out paragraph 1 (d) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“an effective balanced and controlled reduction, in conditions of equal security for all states concerned, of all forces and all arms, in particular, in a first step, foreign forces and arms stationed in the zone covered by the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of forces and armaments ;”.

Speakers : MM. Boucheny and Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

5. After paragraph 1 (d) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

“the balanced reduction of forces, armaments and military budgets in Europe ;”.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

6. After paragraph 1 (e) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

“the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to strengthen mutual confidence in the military field ;”.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

7. In paragraph 1 (g) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “restrict the development of” and insert “prohibit research, development or production of” ; leave out “conventional”.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

8. After paragraph 1 (g) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

“the reduction at a uniform rate of military budgets of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, as well as those of other countries with large economic resources in the spirit of United Nations resolutions ;”.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

9. After paragraph 1 (g) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

“the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the world ;”.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

10. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“2. To participate actively in the work of the transformed Committee on Disarmament in close liaison with the United Nations General Assembly and its Disarmament Commission in pursuit of the objectives listed in paragraph 1 ;”.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Mr. Bozzi :

17. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows :

"To have an all-European conference on disarmament convened with the participation of all signatory states of the CSCE final act with a view to ensuring the progressive achievement of a programme of confidence-building measures and controlled limitation of forces ;".

Speaker : Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. Roper proposed a verbal Amendment to leave out "To have" and insert "To examine sympathetically the proposals for".

Speakers : MM. Bozzi and Roper.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 18) was tabled by Mr. Bozzi :

18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows :

"To introduce a development assistance fund in the framework of the United Nations formed by a tax on over-armament ;".

Speakers : MM. Bozzi and Roper.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

11. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"To associate all nuclear powers with the United States-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war ;".

Speakers : MM. Boucheny and Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

12. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"To associate all nuclear powers with the strategic arms limitation talks at the time appropriate to the state of the negotiations ;".

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 13) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

13. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"To make the Mediterranean a denuclearised zone, free of foreign military bases, where the United States and Soviet fleets stationed in this zone would be limited, with the aim of their being withdrawn ;".

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 14) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny.

14. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"To prohibit the sale of any weapon or war material to colonialist, racist and fascist governments, and in particular to those of the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Chile and Iran."

Speakers : MM. Boucheny, Baumel and Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 788.

Speakers (explanation of vote) : MM. Bozzi and Boucheny.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 42 votes to 6 with 0 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 323)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 787.

Speaker (explanation of vote) : Mr. De Poi.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 43 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 324)².

4. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 22nd November, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 4.45 p.m.

1. See page 28.

2. See page 30.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| Belgium | MM. <i>Schäuble</i> (Pfennig) Vohrer | Netherlands |
| MM. <i>Dejardin</i> (Adriaensens) Van Waterschoot | | Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> (Cornelissen) |
| France | Italy | MM. <i>van Hulst</i> <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) <i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster) Stoffelen <i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd) |
| MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) Boucheny <i>Wagnies</i> (Depietri) Deschamps <i>Bozzi</i> (Ferretti) <i>Baumel</i> (Grussenmeyer) Jager Petit Talon Valleix | MM. Bernini <i>Giust</i> (Bonalumi) Calamandrei Corallo De Poi Fosson <i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella) Maggioni Minnocci <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) Pecoraro Roberti Sarti <i>Antoni</i> (Segre) Treu | United Kingdom |
| Federal Republic of Germany | | Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) MM. Channon Craig Critchley <i>Cook</i> (Faulds) Hardy <i>Banks</i> (Hawkins) <i>McGuire</i> (Lord Hughes) Lewis Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Page) Sir John Rodgers MM. Roper Urwin Warren |
| Mr. <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens) Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Gessner Marquardt Mende | Luxembourg | |
| | Mr. Margue | |

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| Belgium | Federal Republic of Germany | Luxembourg |
| MM. Bonnel Hanin Mangelschots Peeters Tanghe | MM. Ahrens Evers Handlos Lagershausen Milz Müller Reddemann Hermann Schmidt Schwencke | MM. Abens Mart |
| France | | Netherlands |
| MM. Brugnon Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Pignion Schleiter Seitlinger Sénès | Italy | Mr. Scholten |
| | MM. Arfé Boldrini Pecchioli | United Kingdom |
| | | Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Grieve Watkinson Whitehead |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on disarmament (Doc. 788) ¹:

| | |
|-------------------|----|
| Ayes | 42 |
| Noes | 6 |
| Abstentions | 0 |

Ayes :

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| MM. <i>Dejardin</i> (Adriaensens) | MM. Deschamps | MM. Mende |
| <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens) | Enders | Minnocci |
| Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) | <i>Cook</i> (Faulds) | Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Page) |
| MM. Bernini | Fosson | MM. <i>Schäuble</i> (Pfennig) |
| <i>Giust</i> (Bonalumi) | Gessner | Roberti |
| Mrs. von Bothmer | <i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella) | Roper |
| MM. Boucheny | Hardy | Sarti |
| <i>Calamandrei</i> | <i>Banks</i> (Hawkins) | <i>Antoni</i> (Segre) |
| <i>Channon</i> | <i>McGuire</i> (Lord Hughes) | Stoffelen |
| <i>Corallo</i> | van Hulst | Treu |
| Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> | <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) | Urwin |
| (Cornelissen) | <i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster) | Van Waterschoot |
| MM. <i>Wagnies</i> (Depietri) | Lewis | <i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd) |
| De Poi | Margue | Warren |
| | Marquardt | |

Noes :

| |
|------------------------------|
| MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) |
| <i>Bozzi</i> (Ferretti) |
| <i>Baumel</i> (Grussenmeyer) |
| Jager |
| Petit |
| Talon |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 4 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on the limitation of strategic arms (Doc. 787) ¹ :

| | |
|-------------------|----|
| Ayes | 43 |
| Noes | 2 |
| Abstentions | 3 |

Ayes :

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| MM. <i>Dejardin</i> (Adriaensens) | MM. Hardy | MM. Pecoraro |
| <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens) | <i>Banks</i> (Hawkins) | Petit |
| <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) | <i>McGuire</i> (Lord Hughes) | <i>Schäuble</i> (Pfennig) |
| <i>Giust</i> (Bonalumi) | van Hulst | Roberti |
| Mrs. von Bothmer | Jäger | Roper |
| Mr. Channon | <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) | Sarti |
| Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> | <i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster) | Stoffelen |
| (Cornelissen) | Lewis | Talon |
| MM. Critchley | Maggioni | Treu |
| De Poi | Margue | Urwin |
| Enders | Marquardt | Valleix |
| <i>Bozzi</i> (Ferretti) | Mende | Van Waterschoot |
| Fosson | <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) | Vohrer |
| <i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella) | Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Page) | <i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd) |
| <i>Baumel</i> (Grussenmeyer) | | Warren |

Noes :

Lord *McNair* (Beith)
Mr. Bernini

Abstentions :

MM. *Cook* (Faulds)
Gessner
Minnocci

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 49***on new weapons and defence strategy***

The Assembly,

Aware that the present introduction of new theatre weapons systems, in particular precision-guided munitions, and the proposed introduction of others such as cruise missiles and enhanced-radiation nuclear weapons, have many implications for defence policy, strategy and arms control,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS to continue its study of these questions and to report to the next part-session of the Assembly.

RECOMMENDATION 323***on disarmament***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached \$400 billion per annum and that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to defence ;
- (ii) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament ;
- (iii) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete disarmament under effective international control ;
- (iv) Welcoming the conclusions of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly to the extent that it has focused world opinion on the urgency and importance of arms control measures, and transformed the Committee on Disarmament into a more effective negotiating forum ;
- (v) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability ;
- (vi) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation ;
- (vii) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations: "Armaments Year Book" and "Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition" ;
- (viii) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts ;
- (ix) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control measures to be concluded in the next five years, including :
 - (a) a comprehensive test ban ;
 - (b) a chemical weapons treaty ;
 - (c) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation régime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear countries ;
 - (d) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe ;
 - (e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international transfer of conventional arms which recognise the special responsibility of the major arms-producing countries to exercise restraint in their arms transfer policy ;
 - (f) the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to strengthen mutual confidence in the military field ;
 - (g) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the CSCE final act ;

- (h) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional weapons and incendiaries ;
- (i) the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the world ;

and, concurrently if possible with the first agreement providing for independent verification :

- (j) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible *inter alia* for publishing, on the basis of its own sources of information as well as mandatory reports by all countries, annual reports on the forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries ;

2. To secure the participation of all nuclear weapon powers and previous members in the transformed Committee on Disarmament and the negotiations in that body of agreements on the foregoing items 1 (a), (b), (e), (g) and (h) ;

3. To examine sympathetically the proposals for an all-European conference on disarmament convened with the participation of all signatory states of the CSCE final act with a view to ensuring the progressive achievement of a programme of confidence-building measures and controlled limitation of forces ;

4. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further special disarmament session in 1981 to review progress.

RECOMMENDATION 324
on the limitation of strategic arms

The Assembly,

Believing that the security of Europe must continue to rely both on a credible nuclear deterrent, i.e. a clearly-demonstrated threat of destruction to the adversary far greater than the stake represented by the territories defended, and on sufficiently numerous conventional forces ;

Considering that the United States strategic nuclear forces form the preponderant part of the allied deterrent but that the British and French nuclear forces, through the uncertainties with which they face Soviet planners, make a greater contribution than their size would suggest ;

Stressing that the Atlantic declaration made in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 assigns to the British and French strategic nuclear forces a deterrent rôle of their own ;

Deploring the inadequacy of progress in détente and concerned by the deterioration of East-West relations ;

Welcoming any attempt to curb or stop the quantitative or qualitative strategic arms race ;

Convinced of the essential and urgent nature of genuine European concertation on defence matters, for which the WEU Council is the natural framework,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Work together to reach agreement on a common defence policy based on deterrence and taking account of the results of the strategic arms limitation talks ;
2. Accept no restrictions, imposed or implied, on the forces of allied countries not directly participating in the talks ;
3. Maintain the right of nuclear powers members of the Alliance to provide mutual assistance in respect of nuclear weapons ;
4. Look to a co-ordinated effort to re-establish the true balance of nuclear and conventional forces between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact ;
5. Monitor the pursuit, deepening and extension of the process of détente ;
6. Ensure that the North Atlantic Council effectively examines every aspect of the strategic arms limitation talks and that the WEU member states may through this channel assert their interests in this field.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd November 1978

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>1. A European armaments policy (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 786 and Amendments</i>).</p> | <p>2. Address by Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy.</p> <p>3. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.</p> |
|---|---|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the two previous Sittings were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. A European armaments policy

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Critchley, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Corallo and Grant.

The Debate was adjourned.

4. Address by Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy

Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Mazzola replied to questions put by MM. Grant, Roper, De Poi, Cavaliere, Calamandrei, Péridier and Roberti.

5. A European armaments policy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. van den Bergh and Cook.

The Debate was adjourned.

6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher replied to questions put by Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Vohrer, Lewis, Druon, Schwencke, Reddemann, Gessner, Lord Morris, MM. Brugnon, Valleix, Page and Müller.

7. A European armaments policy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Banks, Hardy and De Poi.

The Debate was adjourned.

8. Change in the Order of Business

On a proposal by the President, the Assembly agreed to bring forward to the afternoon of Wednesday 22nd November the following two items originally scheduled for the afternoon of Thursday 23rd November :

1. Methods of voting (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Order, Document 794*).

2. Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Document 795*).

9. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Belgium | MM. <i>Amrehn</i> (Milz) | Netherlands |
| MM. <i>Dejardin</i> (Adriaensens) | Müller | MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Cornelissen) |
| Van Waterschoot | Reddemann | van Hulst |
| | Schwencke | <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) |
| | Vohrer | Scholten |
| France | | Stoffelen |
| MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) | Italy | <i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd) |
| <i>Wagnies</i> (Boucheny) | MM. <i>Cavaliere</i> (Arfé) | |
| Brugnon | Bernini | |
| Deschamps | <i>Giust</i> (Bonalmi) | |
| <i>Jung</i> (Jager) | Calamandrei | United Kingdom |
| Jeambrun | Corallo | MM. Beith |
| Péridier | De Poi | <i>Banks</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) |
| Péronnet | Fosson | Channon |
| Pignon | Gonella | Craig |
| Seitlinger | Maggioni | Critchley |
| Valleix | <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) | <i>Cook</i> (Faulds) |
| | Pecoraro | Grieve |
| Federal Republic of Germany | Roberti | Hardy |
| MM. Ahrens | Sarti | <i>Kershaw</i> (Hawkins) |
| <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Bardens) | <i>Antoni</i> (Segre) | Lord Hughes |
| Mrs. von Bothmer | | MM. Lewis |
| MM. Enders | Luxembourg | Page |
| <i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Evers) | MM. <i>Hengel</i> (Abens) | Lord <i>Morris</i> (Sir John Rodgers) |
| Gessner | Margue | MM. Roper |
| <i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt) | Mart | Urwin |
| Mende | | <i>Grant</i> (Warren) |

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

| | | |
|----------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Belgium | MM. Grussenmeyer | Italy |
| MM. Bonnel | Petit | MM. Boldrini |
| Hanin | Schleiter | Minnocci |
| Mangelschots | Sénès | Pecchioli |
| Peeters | Talon | Treu |
| Tanghe | | |
| | Federal Republic of Germany | Netherlands |
| | MM. Handlos | Mr. de Koster |
| France | Lagershausen | |
| MM. Depietri | Pfennig | United Kingdom |
| Ferretti | Hermann Schmidt | MM. Watkinson |
| | | Whitehead |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd November 1978

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. A European armaments policy (<i>Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 786 and Amendments</i>).2. Address by Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands.3. Application satellites (Part II) (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific,</i> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><i>Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 784</i>).4. Methods of voting (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 794</i>).5. Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 795</i>). |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Change in the Order of Business

The Assembly agreed, on the proposal of the President and in the absence of a Report from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, to postpone to a future session the item relating to a second reading of texts amended by the Assembly, originally scheduled for the afternoon of Thursday, 23rd November.

4. A European armaments policy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Craig, Urwin, Wagnies, Pecoraro and Mommersteeg.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Debate was adjourned.

5. Address by Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands

Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Peijnenburg replied to questions put by MM. Cornelissen, Konings, Van Waterschoot, Hawkins, Vohrer, Lord McNair, MM. Treu, Lenzer and Valleix.

6. A European armaments policy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers : MM. Valleix, Gessner and Boucheny (point of order).

Mr. Critchley, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, before "the standardisation" insert " , when necessary for the security of Europe,".

Speakers : MM. Valleix and Critchley.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "be concentrated in" insert "the Standing Armaments Committee and".

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen :

4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add "with such assistance as the Standing Armaments Committee can provide".

Speakers : MM. Stoffelen and Critchley.

Amendment 3 was negated.

Speakers : MM. Valleix and Stoffelen.

Amendment 4 was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hermann Schmidt and others :

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers : MM. Hardy and Critchley.

Mr. Valleix proposed that the Report be referred back to the Committee.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

The proposal was negated.

The Amendment was negated.

Speaker (explanation of vote) : Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. Critchley proposed a verbal Amendment to paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, to leave out "Call for" and insert "Give consideration to".

Speakers (point of order) : MM. Grieve and Urwin.

The verbal Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 19 votes to 8 with 20 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 325)¹.

Speakers (point of order) : MM. Roper, Grieve, Roper and Valleix.

7. Application satellites (Part II)

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 784)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur.

1. See page 37.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Treu, Bernini, Cornelissen and Konings.

Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 326)¹.

8. Methods of voting

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 794)

The Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Antoni.

Mr. Grieve, Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Order.

The draft Order was agreed to unanimously. (This Order will be published as No. 50)².

9. Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 795)

The Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Resolution.

The draft Resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This Resolution will be published as No. 61)¹.

10. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 23rd November, at 9.30 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.

1. See page 38.

2. See page 39.

3. See page 40.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| Belgium | MM. Schwencke Vohrer | MM. <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen |
| Mr. Van Waterschoot | | |
| France | Italy | United Kingdom |
| MM. <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) | MM. <i>Cavaliere</i> (Arfé) | Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) |
| Boucheny | Bernini | MM. <i>Grant</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) |
| <i>Wagnies</i> (Depietri) | Calamandrei | Channon |
| Deschamps | Corallo | Craig |
| <i>Bozzi</i> (Ferretti) | Gonella | Critchley |
| Grussenmeyer | Maggioni | <i>Tomney</i> (Faulds) |
| Valleix | <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) | Grieve |
| | Pecoraro | Hardy |
| Federal Republic of Germany | Roberti | Hawkins |
| Mr. Ahrens | Sarti | Lord Hughes |
| Mrs. von Bothmer | <i>Antoni</i> (Segre) | MM. Lewis |
| MM. Enders | Treu | Page |
| <i>Spies von Büllenheim</i> (Evers) | | Sir John Rodgers |
| Gessner | Luxembourg | MM. Roper |
| <i>Lenzer</i> (Lagershausen) | MM. Abens | Urwin |
| <i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt) | Margue | Warren |
| Mende | | <i>Cook</i> (Watkinson) |
| Müller | Netherlands | <i>McGuire</i> (Whitehead) |
| <i>Böhm</i> (Pfennig) | MM. Cornelissen | |
| Reddemann | van Hulst | |

The following Representatives apologised for their absence.

| | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Belgium | MM. Pignion | MM. De Poi |
| MM. Adriaensens | Schleiter | Fosson |
| Bonnel | Seitlinger | Minnocci |
| Hanin | Sénès | Pecchioli |
| Mangelschots | Talon | |
| Peeters | | |
| Tanghe | Federal Republic of Germany | Luxembourg |
| | MM. Bardens | Mr. Mart |
| France | Handlos | |
| MM. Brugnon | Milz | |
| Jager | Hermann Schmidt | |
| Jeambrun | | Netherlands |
| Péridier | Italy | MM. de Koster |
| Péronnet | MM. Boldrini | Voogd |
| Petit | Bonalumi | |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 5 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on a European armaments policy (Doc. 786)¹:

| | |
|-------------------|----|
| Ayes | 19 |
| Noes | 8 |
| Abstentions | 20 |

Ayes :

| | | |
|---|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) | MM. Grieve | MM. <i>Böhm</i> (Pfennig) |
| MM. <i>Grant</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) | <i>Banks</i> (Hawkins) | Roberti |
| Craig | <i>Lenzer</i> (Lagershausen) | Sir John Rodgers |
| Critchley | Maggioni | MM. Sarti |
| <i>Spies von Büllersheim</i> (Evers) | <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) | Treu |
| Gonella | Page | Van Waterschoot |
| | | Warren |

Noes :

| | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| MM. Bernini | <i>Bozzi</i> (Ferretti) |
| <i>Druon</i> (Bizet) | Grussenmeyer |
| Calamandrei | <i>Antoni</i> (Segre) |
| Corallo | Valleix |

Abstentions :

| | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Mr. Abens | Lord Hughes | MM. Schwencke |
| Mrs. von Bothmer | MM. van Hulst | Stoffelen |
| MM. Cornelissen | <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) | Urwin |
| Enders | Lewis | Vohrer |
| <i>Tomney</i> (Faulds) | <i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt) | <i>Cook</i> (Watkinson) |
| Gessner | Pecoraro | <i>McGuire</i> (Whitehead) |
| Hardy | Roper | |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 325
on a European armaments policy

The Assembly,

Aware that the growing cost of modern armaments technology and current economic trends can lead to unilateral disarmament through inflation in the countries of the Alliance ;

Stressing the need for the joint production of armaments in order to provide interoperability and standardisation of military equipment ; to ensure the survival of a viable European armaments industry ; and lastly a two-way street in armaments with the United States ;

Considering that limited but as yet too slow progress in these directions is now being made in the independent European programme group, in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, and Military Agency for Standardisation, in all of which all WEU countries participate ;

Believing that only if the European armaments industry as a whole is restructured on a viable and competitive commercial and industrial basis will adequate progress be made ;

Welcoming the study of the European armaments industry being undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and, when necessary for the security of Europe, the standardisation of defence equipment in the European countries of the Alliance be concentrated in the independent European programme group with such assistance as the Standing Armaments Committee can provide ;
2. Give consideration to the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and research ;
3. Ensure that once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist in the foregoing tasks ;
4. Request the governments concerned to arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual report on its activities to the Assembly.

RECOMMENDATION 326***on application satellites***

The Assembly,

Considering the continuing high level of Soviet space efforts which might result in the Soviet Union occupying a dominating technological position with dangerous consequences in the economic, political and military fields ;

Aware that the United States space efforts are levelling off and that decisions are not being taken for a detailed long-term United States space programme ;

Convinced that the European space policy to be defined in the near future should take into account the danger which might result from this world situation ;

Considering the vast industrial potential which has been developed during the last fifteen years and especially since 1971 when the space applications programme started ;

Taking into account the need to provide mankind with knowledge of and the means to attenuate the consequences of drought, energy shortages, pollution, famine and natural disasters,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member states :

A. To instruct ESA to study the possibility of :

(i) establishing a more sophisticated global communications network in which the data gathered by remote sensing, environmental and meteorological satellites could be combined ;

(ii) building a small prototype solar power satellite providing electrical capacity ;

and to release the financial means necessary for these studies ;

B. To indicate at the next ESA Council meetings which elements of ESA's draft spacelab follow-on development programme are to be carried out ;

C. To prepare a policy defining the medium- and long-term goals of the European Space Agency and their financial implications and to have a draft long-term budget drawn up, *inter alia* to ensure, in the future, the existence of a study group to draw up a coherent programme ;

D. In the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and in its sub-committees, to afford strong support to steps to oblige states launching satellites, in addition to measures governing security and the provision of mutual assistance, to accept specific commitments to provide information about their satellites which have sources of nuclear energy on board.

ORDER 50
on methods of voting

The Assembly,

Considering that its decisions carry greater weight if they reflect clearly-stated and widely-supported political options ;

Considering consequently that it is necessary to retain a strict obligation for a quorum for the adoption of the texts listed in Rule 34, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure ;

Considering however that practical steps must be taken to ensure the presence of the required number of representatives when votes are taken by roll-call and that the Presidential Committee should :

- (a) ask national delegations to ensure that a sufficient number of their members are to be present ;
- (b) improve the organisation of roll-call votes, *inter alia* by audio, and if possible visual, announcement throughout the premises fifteen minutes beforehand ;
- (c) at the opening of each session, fix the dates and times of votes on texts on the agenda of the session ;

Approving the conclusions of the present report,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To ensure that Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure is applied in full.

RESOLUTION 61***to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly***

The Assembly,

DECIDES to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly by the addition of a paragraph 5 drafted as follows :

"5. A Substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote."

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 23rd November 1978

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 (Doc. 782 and Addendum); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 781 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 782 and Addendum and 781 and Addendum*).
2. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1978 (*Presentation of and*
- Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 783*).
3. Weather forecasting (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 785 and Amendments*).
4. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Stoffelen, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979

(Doc. 782 and Addendum)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 781 and Addendum)

(Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 782 and Addendum and 781 and Addendum)

The Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. von Hassel, Antoni, Valleix, Roper, von Hassel and Enders.

Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 in the Addendum to Document 781 was agreed to unanimously.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 in Document 782 and Addendum was agreed to unanimously.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1978

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 783)

The Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation.

The draft Opinion was agreed to unanimously. (This Opinion will be published as No. 25)¹.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 327)².

1. See page 44.

2. See page 45.

5. Weather forecasting

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 785 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins, Rapporteurs.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Treu, Hardy, Del Duca, Konings, Cornelissen and Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins, Rapporteurs, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

Amendments 1 to 5 were tabled by Mr. Hardy :

1. In paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, after "reliable" insert "but cost-effective".

2. In paragraph B of the draft recommendation proper, at end add "providing that this can be carried out inexpensively".

3. In paragraph C of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, leave out "Afford its active support to" and insert "Consider providing modest support for".

4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph D.

5. In paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, leave out "fully".

Speaker : Mr. Hardy.

Amendment 1 was agreed to.

Amendments 2 to 5 were withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Cornelissen.

6. In paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "fully" and insert "their efforts jointly".

Speakers : MM. Cornelissen and Warren.

Mr. Cornelissen proposed a verbal Amendment to insert "their efforts jointly and" before "fully".

The verbal Amendment was agreed to.

Amendment 6, as amended, was agreed to.

Speaker : Mr. Hardy.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 328)¹.

The Sitting was suspended at 12 noon and resumed at 1 p.m.

6. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO

The President announced that Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, had been prevented from addressing the Assembly as originally scheduled.

7. Close of the Session

The President declared the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly closed.

The Sitting was closed at 1.01 p.m.

1. See page 46.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Belgium | MM. <i>Amrehn</i> (Milz) | Netherlands |
| Mr. Van Waterschoot | Müller | MM. Cornelissen |
| | <i>Böhm</i> (Pfennig) | van Hulst |
| | Schwencke | <i>Konings</i> (Koopman) |
| France | | <i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster) |
| MM. Brugnon | Italy | Stoffelen |
| Jager | MM. <i>Cavaliere</i> (Arfé) | |
| Jeambrun | Bernini | United Kingdom |
| Péronnet | <i>Giust</i> (Bonalumi) | Sir Frederic Bennett |
| Pignion | Corallo | MM. Channon |
| Valleix | Fosson | Craig |
| | Maggioni | Critchley |
| Federal Republic of Germany | <i>Del Duca</i> (Orsini) | <i>Cook</i> (Faulds) |
| Mr. Ahrens | Pecoraro | Grieve |
| Mrs. von Bothmer | Roberti | Hardy |
| MM. Enders | Sarti | Hawkins |
| <i>Spies von Büllenheim</i> (Evers) | <i>Antoni</i> (Segre) | Lord Hughes |
| <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos) | Treu | Mrs. <i>Knight</i> (Page) |
| von Hassel | | Sir John Rodgers |
| <i>Alber</i> (Lagershausen) | Luxembourg | MM. Roper |
| <i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt) | Mr. Margue | <i>Bagier</i> (Urwin) |
| Mende | | Warren |

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

| | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Belgium | MM. Schleiter | MM. Minnocci |
| MM. Adriaensens | Seitlinger | Pecchioli |
| Bonnell | Sénès | |
| Hanin | Talon | Luxembourg |
| Mangelschots | | MM. Abens |
| Peeters | Federal Republic of Germany | Mart |
| Tanghe | MM. Bardens | |
| | Gessner | Netherlands |
| France | Reddemann | MM. Scholten |
| MM. Bizet | Hermann Schmidt | Voogd |
| Boucheny | Vohrer | |
| Depietri | | United Kingdom |
| Deschamps | Italy | MM. Beith |
| Ferretti | MM. Boldrini | Lewis |
| Grussenmeyer | Calamandrei | Watkinson |
| Péridier | De Poi | Whitehead |
| Petit | Gonella | |

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

OPINION 25***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1978***

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

RECOMMENDATION 327
on improving the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to set up a joint pensions administration section as a first step towards the creation of a truly independent body to deal with pensions ;

Reiterating its regret that provision has still not been made for a reversionary pension to be granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

Deploring the fact that no reply was given to the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :
 1. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations ;
 2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;
 3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy ;
- II. Give consideration to using a percentage of the pension validation monies received to create a fund from which interest-bearing housing loans could be made to the staff of WEU ;
- III. Invite the Secretary-General to give priority, when vacancies arise, to staff already serving in the organisation in order to ensure maximum career prospects.

RECOMMENDATION 328***on weather forecasting***

The Assembly,

Aware that meteorology for both civil and military purposes is a national responsibility but by definition it is an international co-operative science calling for continuous international collaboration ;

Considering that co-ordination at civil level is conducted in the World Meteorological Organisation, its regional organisations and technical commissions and at military level in the NATO meteorological group of the Military Committee ;

Noting that the availability of adequate data on surface weather and upper air conditions over the North Atlantic and North and Central Africa is of vital importance for weather forecasting in Europe ;

Regretting that the network covering the North Atlantic has been reduced to four stations and that the USSR has replaced the United States as an operator of weather ships ;

Considering ESA's success in pursuing the Meteosat research and development programme and convinced that the time is now ripe to urge the users, i.e. the national European meteorological services, to launch the operational phase of a European Meteosat system ;

Aware that civil and military agencies in the United States have to share the same meteorological satellites, ocean surveillance satellites and also the space shuttle, but that in Europe, since countries such as Sweden and Switzerland take part in the Meteosat programme, this is not possible for political reasons ;

Considering that the need for a defence meteorological satellite programme nevertheless exists in Europe, possibly linked to the NATO communications satellite system,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Draw the attention of member governments to the need to provide more reliable but cost-effective meteorological information covering the North Atlantic and North and Central Africa by increasing the number of observation posts in these areas, and, especially in the North Atlantic, by establishing a network of ocean buoys, organising automated meteorological data collection by specially-equipped aircraft and placing a system of meteorological satellites in polar orbit ;

B. Promote the formation of an organisation by the European meteorological services or institutes to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system "Eurometsat" similar to the "Eutelsat" of the European postal authorities ;

C. Afford its active support to the study of the establishment of a meteorological satellite system for defence purposes, possibly linked to the domestic United States and NATO satellite programmes, together with an appropriate network of mobile ground stations ;

D. Invite member governments to test existing military meteorological co-ordination by means of more frequent exercises to verify the implementation of recommendations made by the meteorological group of the NATO Military Committee ;

E. Encourage member states to engage their efforts jointly and fully in fundamental research so as to understand the mechanism which determines weather conditions and climate, as well as the possible disturbances human activities can bring about.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 20th November 1978

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Examination of Credentials.
4. Observers.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 780).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Urwin (point of order), Mr. Périquier, the President.
7. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Sarti (point of order), Mr. Bernard-Reymond (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*).

Replies by Mr. Bernard-Reymond to questions put by: Mr. Valleix, Mr. Baumel, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Roper, Mr. Minnoci, Mr. Kershaw, Mr. Péronnet.

8. Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU (*Presentation of and Debate on the draft Order of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 793).

Speakers: Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Druon, Mr. Mende, Mr. Valleix, Mrs. von Bothmer.

9. Change in the membership of a Committee.
10. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 11 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

I declare resumed the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 22nd June 1978, at the conclusion of the Sixth Sitting.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the Sixth Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day provide for the examination of credentials of new Representatives and Substitutes to the Assembly.

As shown in Notice No. 7, two new Representatives and two new Substitutes have been appointed. The credentials of Mr. Jeambrun as a Representative and Mr. Mercier as a Substitute of France were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 27th September last. These credentials were attested, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of our Assembly, by a statement of ratification communicated to me by the President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Only the credentials of Mr. Beith who was a United Kingdom Substitute and who has been appointed a Representative in the place of Lord Beaumont of Whitley, and those of Lord McNair appointed a Substitute in the place of Mr. Beith, have not been examined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

In accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 6 of our Rules of Procedure, it falls to our Assembly to ratify their credentials.

Their credentials have not been contested and they have been certified by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

If the Assembly is unanimous, these credentials can be ratified without prior examination by the Credentials Committee.

Is there any opposition to the ratification of the credentials of Mr. Beith as a Representative and Lord McNair as a Substitute of the United Kingdom ?...

1. See page 14.

The President (continued)

Their credentials are agreed to, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Consequently, Mr. Beith, as a Representative, and Lord McNair, as a Substitute of the United Kingdom, are authorised to take their places in the Assembly of Western European Union and I offer them a very warm welcome.

4. Observers

The PRESIDENT. — I also extend a very warm welcome to the parliamentary observers who are doing us the honour of participating in our discussions: Mr. Sørensen and Mr. Melchior, members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Vyzas and Mr. Katsaros, Deputies from Greece; Mr. Guerra Zunzunegui, First Vice-President of the Spanish Senate, and Mrs. Moll, Deputy from Spain.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, Europe is seeking an identity. Europe is more than a geographical concept; Europe is a civilisation. It is more than just a promontory of Asia, for it groups together peoples who have managed to win and preserve their freedom.

This democratic Europe is less extensive than geographical Europe. To the east, all attempts by the peoples to endow themselves with freer institutions have been effectively repressed. To the south, on the contrary, the way things have evolved in Greece, Portugal and Spain bears witness to the triumph of the ideals which we uphold in this forum.

The Europe of free men has thus been enlarged, but, if it is to safeguard its freedom it must also be suitably organised.

The Council of Europe represents the widest form of organisation, because it does not claim to be a political union. As the pioneer of European civilisation, it can thus welcome to its midst peoples who consider neutrality as a guarantee of their independence, an attitude that either may be traced back to a long-standing tradition or is a consequence of the second world war. In fact, the territorial integrity of Switzerland, Sweden and Austria is not assured by their defence efforts alone, however praiseworthy these may often be. It is the military balance, established through the joint efforts of the peoples united within the Atlantic Alliance, which allows the Council of Europe to develop

in an atmosphere of security, its activities on behalf of human rights and social and cultural co-operation.

Europe, however, does not merely reflect a common civilisation safeguarded by the balance of terror. It is a personality in the making. It is the European Community which is now giving this personality a body. To reiterate the words of the final declaration of the summit meeting held in The Hague in 1969, it is the Community which forms the original nucleus of the European edifice. For it is not merely a customs union, but a network of common policies whose ultimate aim is the creation of a European union able to discuss and tackle all problems, even those raised by its own security.

Nonetheless, the personality of community Europe still remains incomplete. The responsibilities conferred upon the Community by the Rome Treaty do not allow it to be the framework for consultations on problems relating to European security. As for the European Parliament, we cannot say today in what way its attributions will evolve consequent upon its election by direct suffrage. Divergent views have been expressed, some opposed to an extension of the parliament's powers and others very much in favour of it. But there can be no doubt that all Europeans hope that its direct election will confer greater moral strength on that assembly, thereby allowing it to give fresh impetus to the building of an economic Europe. Indeed, like Antaeus when his feet touched the ground, our institutions will draw fresh strength from the peoples' participation. May the European Parliament score a full success in encouraging our governments to assert a European personality through common policies and common ventures, particularly through the achievement of a monetary union.

(The President continued in English)

As for defence matters, they are dealt with in an Atlantic framework since, for an area so densely populated as Europe, defence is possible only in the framework of a policy of deterrence, and deterrence implies American nuclear protection. But this does not mean that Europe must take no interest in defence questions.

First, the European countries which are members of the Atlantic Alliance must consider means of increasing their participation in their own defence. This means being able to manufacture modern weapons and therefore keeping Europe in the van of advanced technology, failing which our countries will fall back in the race for progress. A concerted European effort therefore seems necessary in order to ensure the industrial basis of European security. Several European bodies are working to this end. Under its terms of reference, the Standing Armaments

The President (continued)

Committee is examining the juridical, economic and financial aspects of the problem. The independent European programme group is trying to determine which armaments might be produced jointly by European countries. The Community bodies are seeking to strengthen the European industries which make a contribution to defence. But the political impetus which should ensure the success of the operation is lacking. Here the WEU Council has been unable to fulfil its rôle.

Secondly, Europe must not be a battlefield. Our countries must steadfastly ward off any attempt to give up the policy of deterrence, to whatever extent, for without it there can be no European security. They must also be constantly alive to the need to prevent the enemy gaining a foothold which would provide a means of negotiation after a territory has been conquered. This means that Europe must ensure that its interests are defended in the strategic arms limitation talks. To use strategic jargon, Western Europe's territory must be "sanctuarised" to the same extent as that of the United States and the Soviet Union; in other words it must have the advantage, in the same conditions, of the nuclear deterrence which prohibits fighting.

But deterrence today is no longer limited to the possibility of massive retaliation to scorch the earth of the aggressor. It also calls for a successful means of response to an attack which is limited in range or in the means used so that the military powers are not forced up against the impossible choice between capitulation or all-out war, for this prospect would weaken the deterrent nature of their weapons.

Consequently, any East-West agreement must also respect the right of the European countries to possess new weapons such as cruise missiles in the framework of their participation in this policy of deterrence. These weapons might be produced jointly by the major European industrial powers. They may be equipped either with very powerful conventional warheads making them extremely effective because of the accuracy of their guidance systems, or with nuclear warheads of American, French or British origin. That is why Europe must not be forbidden, *a priori*, from controlling this element of a policy of deterrence.

Thirdly and finally, Europe must adopt a position on foreign policy matters relating to its security. Our countries must avert the dangers of destabilisation which, particularly in Africa, would cause disturbances and strife of unforeseeable magnitude and duration and jeopardise their interests on that continent. They must also ensure regular oil supplies at prices compatible with steady economic expansion and concert their

attitude towards China's wish to obtain from the free countries the means of becoming a great power.

(The President continued in German)

(Translation). — The question is to know where these security problems ought to be looked at. Whether one likes it or not, it has to be acknowledged that at the present time the European Community does not have the legal basis needed for tackling all these issues. Ought we to resign ourselves to Europe remaining incomplete? Or ought we to think rather in terms of Europe already, within a suitable forum, discussing the problems that in the long run will have to be dealt with within the framework of the European confederation many of us hope to see?

I believe those who favour a united Europe want a full union. It is generally accepted that even a European concerting of views in the spheres I have just mentioned means neither compromising our alliance with the United States nor relinquishing the national sovereignty of the individual countries.

Western European Union can afford us very special help in coping with these tasks. The comprehensive responsibilities of WEU really do make it seem a forerunner of a full European union. The commitments entered into under the modified Brussels Treaty still apply. Even though the WEU Council of Ministers has suspended the exercise of its functions in fields that are covered by other organisations, it can resume one or other of these activities at any time.

While the problems we have just been listing cannot be put on the agenda for political discussion between the Nine because an answer to them involves questions of security, they can still be talked about in the WEU Council by the European countries which have undertaken obligations of mutual assistance.

As things stand at the moment, the fact that the WEU Council has practically ceased to function seems very disquieting. The Atlantic Alliance is of course the essential framework for collaboration with the North Americans; yet it cannot provide the legal foundation for building what President Kennedy once called the European pillar of the alliance. The ambitions of the independent European programme group are limited to concluding technical agreements on joint production. This means that consultations on the political, industrial, economic and military conditions for ensuring European security must without fail be within a European union embracing all the democratic countries, one that tries through shared efforts to find ways of ensuring their independence and prosperity.

The President (continued)

This union will build on the foundation offered by an economic union backed up by political vision. This is going to take a long time and a great deal of goodwill, as well as calling for the use of every juridical means available.

The modified Brussels Treaty can thus make a major contribution towards creating such a community, since it currently offers the only forum for European consultation on questions of security.

What reason is there, then, for not making use of this instrument? There is no reason; nor is there any rivalry between the European Community and Western European Union. Without the European Community, Europe would not exist; without Western European Union, the European Community forms an incomplete union.

In the WEU Assembly, therefore, we have the only body where the various possible solutions to this problem can be discussed in depth. The Assembly's task is to foster, in our national parliaments, agreement in the way people think about the political goals of European union. By doing this, it can together with the various governments make it easier for solutions to be found to the economic problems that arise when there is a direct clash of interests.

I recently completed my series of visits to the member countries of the modified Brussels Treaty, meeting both leading parliamentary figures and heads of state and government and various ministers concerned. Everyone I spoke to agreed whole-heartedly with me that the Assembly of Western European Union ought to be strengthened, now and for the future. In a word, the WEU Assembly must in its own special fields supplement the moves made by the European Parliament towards European union, and must hasten the political ripening of Europe. To hark back to a phrase I used right at the beginning of this speech, it must help Europe to find its identity. (*Applause*)

6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 780)

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day provide for the adoption of the draft Order of Business for this part of the session.

The draft Order of Business is given in Document 780 dated 17th November 1978, and I will add some recommendations.

In this draft Order of Business, the three debates on the budget of the Assembly for 1979,

on the final accounts for 1977 and on the budget of the ministerial organs for 1978, which were to have been held at the sitting tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, 21st November, have been moved to the beginning of the sitting on Thursday morning, 23rd November, which will begin at 9.30 a.m. instead of 10 a.m.

At the end of the morning sitting on Wednesday, 22nd November, the Order of the Day will provide for addresses by two visiting speakers, and they have been modified as follows :

- at about 10.30 a.m. : Address by Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy ;
- at about 11.30 a.m. : Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

May I add that according to the latest information we also have to change two items in the proposed agenda. The first is that on Wednesday afternoon we must take item 2 on the agenda, application satellites, until the end of the debate because on Thursday there is the following change : immediately after the three items on the budget, which will take only thirty minutes or so, we shall start with weather forecasting, and I hope that we shall finish that report and debate by 12 o'clock, when the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Alliance, Mr. Luns, will address the Assembly.

I hope that the Assembly will agree to this. Are there any comments on the draft Order of Business for the second part of the twenty-fourth session, as I have proposed it ?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, may I take up your point about the change in the agenda for the morning sitting of Tuesday, with specific reference to the ministerial addresses you have announced? In this situation, may I ask what happens to that part of the agenda which refers to an address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom ?

The PRESIDENT. — This is absolutely unchanged. Mr. Tomlinson will address the Assembly at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning and his address will be followed by questions. I have told the Assembly only about what has been changed.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — Forgive me, Mr. President, if my remarks are perhaps untimely, but I am unfamiliar with the proper procedure for requesting withdrawal of a report from our plenary sitting. I want, in fact, to ask for withdrawal of the Critchley

Mr. Périquier (continued)

report, because I consider that report to be out of order. If there is one assembly which should comply with existing treaties, then it is certainly an international assembly like ours — like Western European Union — so I fail to understand how we can discuss a report of this kind, which runs counter both to the Rome Treaty and to the Brussels Treaty.

It runs counter to the Rome Treaty, because it envisages referring defence questions to the European Economic Community; but that is something we cannot agree to.

You are aware, Ladies and Gentlemen, that France would strongly deprecate any enlargement of the European Economic Community's responsibilities; the Rome Treaty set up this Community to concern itself solely with economic questions and not with questions of defence.

We cannot agree to any such extension of the Community's responsibilities. It is wholly unthinkable that our Assembly should decide upon that. Consequently, we see here an infringement of the Rome Treaty — an international instrument for which we must ensure respect — but an infringement of the Brussels Treaty is also involved, since that is the only international treaty which has given us responsibility for dealing with defence questions. It is quite unacceptable that we should see a member of WEU agreeing to relegate our responsibility to another international organisation, namely the European Economic Community.

I believe none of the French Delegation could agree to this and, since an infringement of these treaties is involved, it is my view that we should declare this report out of order and withdraw it from the agenda.

The PRESIDENT. — My dear colleague, it is not a question of whether, for the reasons you have stated, we take this item off the Order of Business. There is no doubt that European armaments policy is the business of our Assembly. We have that subject on the agenda for the sitting on Wednesday morning at 10 o'clock. A second question is whether you agree to the contents of these proposals, and in the debate on European armaments policy you can make proposals and criticise, as you have done; but it is not a question of whether we deal with it or are allowed to do so. The contents may be discussed but we must leave it on the agenda, because this is our own business.

On the question of whether this subject is taken off the agenda, I must now ask whether anyone wishes to speak against Mr. Périquier's comments. There is no one. Then we must decide who is in favour of having this item struck off the agenda, as proposed by Mr. Périquier.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

There is no doubt of the vote, and the item will remain on the agenda. Members will have a right to speak in the debate and we shall see what happens.

The draft Order of Business, with the amendments I have proposed, for the second part of the twenty-fourth ordinary session is agreed to.

7. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I am very glad to welcome in our midst Mr. Pierre Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who has kindly agreed to come here and explain the viewpoint of the French Government on some foreign policy issues which we are going to discuss.

Mr. Bernard-Reymond has said that after his address he would be pleased to answer a few questions.

Before he speaks, I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I apologise to Mr. Bernard-Reymond for holding him up for a few moments, but I think it only right that before such an authoritative representative addresses us on matters so remote from what I want to raise, he should allow me a brief hearing.

I have asked for the floor, not in order to join in the debate about to be opened for our joint edification on the statements by the distinguished representative of the French Government, but because I would not like this sitting to begin without my conveying to you, Mr. President, our sympathy, solidarity and esteem after the unspeakable insult you were given at a recent political meeting in Malta. True, that incredible misadventure befell you not as the President of our Assembly but as chairman of a party international, but this in no way detracts from its gravity. When the most elementary of rights — that of holding a peaceful meeting convened for a normal purpose of liaison and political information — are denied to a widely-based popular gathering of reliable democratic allegiance, and such a serious decision is motivated by a censorship of opinion, which is the ultimate in affronts to democracy, it behoves us to raise our voices in every assembly that is a free expression of the people's will, in the firmest possible protest and forthright denunciation.

Two centuries ago Voltaire's voice rang out in Paris: "I disapprove of what you say" the great man said "but I will defend to the death your right to say it". It is painful to think that

Mr. Sarti (continued)

we should still have to be quoting his words in this Assembly whose task it is to watch over Europe's security and defence. Malta is not represented here, even though its position is not a matter of indifference to us, but I should just like to say, as all of us chairmen of the various groups in the Assembly of the Council of Europe have already said in Strasbourg, that the outrage you suffered in Malta is an offence to us all who believe in democracy and the peaceful co-existence of the nations, and certainly the vast majority of the Maltese people too, whom we have learnt to esteem and regard as still an integral part of the population of Europe. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Sarti, and thank you all, dear colleagues.

I call Mr. Pierre Bernard-Reymond.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in coming here today to speak before your Assembly, as did my predecessor, Mr. Deniau, in November 1977 and my colleague, Mr. Olivier Stirn, last summer, I do not feel that I am simply conforming with a tradition which requires the participation of a representative of the French Government in your Assembly's proceedings.

Indeed, my presence in this forum bears witness to the attention paid by my government to your deliberations. I believe that it also demonstrates a renewed interest in the part played by your organisation — an interest, I might add, which seems to me more keenly felt than ever by public opinion this year, if I can judge by some articles published, in particular, in the Paris press.

In one of these it is said that your Assembly might well be the ancient and solemn temple dedicated to Europe's unspoken thoughts. On this point I shall confine myself to observing that, according to a famous saying, the most enduring treaties in fact result from the harmonisation of unspoken thoughts.

May I also say that I feel a personal interest in your proceedings and your reports, which I have read with close attention. Responsible as I am for following European affairs on the Minister's behalf, it seemed to me at the outset essential not to disregard the oldest-established organisation in this field. Moreover, having had an opportunity of following the proceedings of the first extraordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York devoted to disarmament, I was particularly alive to the quality of your organisation's reports on that subject and to their importance in promoting

wider public knowledge in Europe of the different aspects of this problem, which is absolutely fundamental to our times.

The primary task of Western European Union is to consider security problems. It is the only European institution in which it is possible to discuss these questions, from which our countries can obviously not stand aloof.

As you are aware, 1979 promises to mark an important stage on the road to increased co-operation among European countries. It would therefore appear particularly useful to recall a few actual facts. Accordingly, we can only feel astonishment at certain insinuations which crop up here and there, to the effect that WEU might have outlived its usefulness, that other institutions might be in a better position to take its legacy in hand, and even that its members might not really be competent to discuss the problems, which are in the first instance their concern, without the reassuring and protective presence of non-member but friendly and allied countries. The position of the French Government in this regard is devoid of all ambiguity. We do not wish to see any weakening of WEU; for the latter must remain the forum in which we can hold discussions amongst Europeans on security problems and problems of co-operation in the armaments sphere. And, in this connection, I should like to pay tribute to the useful work performed by the Standing Armaments Committee, without prejudice to the responsibilities incumbent on the independent European programme group.

Lastly, we shall also discuss disarmament questions in this forum, since there can be no doubt that for France, as for the other countries represented here, no conflict can arise between security and disarmament. Indeed, it would be impossible to conceive of any progress along the road to disarmament which failed to take into account the world as it really exists.

As the President of the French Republic stressed on the occasion of his address last May at the rostrum of the United Nations, we must seek means of achieving genuine disarmament, not on the basis of idle utopian dreams but on that of analysing the practical realities of our times.

Now it seems to me that these observations are borne out by the evidence.

On the one hand, disarmament cannot be founded on approaches and cannot use procedures conceived only in the light of preoccupations felt by the two biggest powers. Since, on their own admission, they possess an over-capacity for mutual destruction, it is primarily up to them, by pursuing the bilateral dialogue on which they have embarked, to seek conditions in which their redundant arsenals can be reduced.

Mr. Bernard-Raymond (continued)

On the other hand, any initiative in the disarmament field can make progress only to the extent that it succeeds in consolidating the security to which every nation legitimately aspires.

It is at the regional level, where the threat is most frequently felt but where the prospects for co-operation also emerge clearly as being the most promising, that the right to security must first of all be fortified. That does not mean that progress cannot be accomplished in some fields through consultation and co-operation among all the states concerned. On this point, France has put forward proposals and will continue to work along these lines in New York and soon, as you know, in Geneva where the new Disarmament Committee is to begin its work next January.

It is also, however, at the regional level — that is, where our countries are most directly concerned, at the level of Europe as a whole — that my country is calling for realistic efforts to be made in the realm of disarmament. These cannot and must not be allowed to conflict with the strategic facts governing the balance on our continent.

Europe has known peace for the past thirty years. It has witnessed the birth and development of détente. At Helsinki, thirty-five countries agreed on the principles for co-operation and increased exchanges among all the peoples of Europe. But this involves, as we all know, an armed peace which is guaranteed by nuclear realities and the balance of deterrence.

Indeed, we are well aware to what extent deterrence is contributing and will continue to contribute in the future to maintaining peace in Europe. That should not prevent us from noting at the same time that arsenals of conventional weapons are growing in numbers and in power on our continent in an unbalanced fashion; that these weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated; and that such types of equipment are increasingly mobile. In other words, the terrain for their potential deployment is less and less confined to the areas where the military blocs are in contact and where the largest numbers of such weapons are located.

For that reason, my country, which wishes to consolidate détente in Europe, is calling for the priority efforts of our nations to be focused on this factor, which is potentially the greatest source of imbalance in the realm of European security. France is proposing that a new balance based on rational confidence and voluntary moderation, as President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing reminded us last week, should replace the balance of forces, which the conventional arms race is threatening.

With that in mind, a few months ago it notified all the countries concerned with European security — that is, in practice, all the countries which signed the Helsinki final act — of a projected conference on disarmament in Europe. It suggests tackling the problem cautiously and by stages, and makes the concrete proposal that we should first of all agree on measures calculated to build up trust.

Within the framework of the CSCE, the participating countries have already recognised the political attractions of measures of this kind. As is well known, however, the final act does not constitute a treaty. Although they have considerable political and moral significance, the commitments which it entails are not comparable with the signature of a pact. Now, in the realm of disarmament, the rights and obligations of the parties can scarcely leave room for individual appraisals. Quite on the contrary, we do not believe that the provisions in the final act concerning confidence-building measures can find themselves in any way weakened thereby, on the sole grounds that we were seeking an agreement of wider scope in a separate forum.

We must accordingly go further and embark upon a new dialogue on this subject. But, it may be objected, is there not at present another exercise under way in Vienna, whose aim is strictly limited to dealing with the one single area of confrontation of the two blocs in Central Europe, but which has the advantage of actually taking place?

What, in fact, do we see? For the past ten years, this exercise has kept the experts busy; and we have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of negotiations being opened. The view is unanimously held that these have shown scarcely any progress. France is not participating therein and — this is no secret to anyone — has no intention of taking part. Its reasons are known. It is, therefore, not for us to ask the participating countries what conclusions they mean to draw from this stalemate. On the contrary, it is our duty to stress once again what a dangerous burden the creation of a zone having a special status in the heart of Europe would represent for our continent's future, and to put those concerned on their guard against the risks involved in conferring political endorsement on a situation of imbalance, whatever technical artifices may be resorted to in order to disguise it. For this could not fail to have consequences for western security. An increasingly clear awareness of some of the perils inherent in the approach accepted at Vienna almost inevitably makes people sceptical about the chances of a positive outcome.

For that reason, we believe that the French proposal for a disarmament conference in Europe will constitute the best means of lending fresh

Mr. Bernard-Reymond (continued)

impetus to the essential political dialogue on security problems and on confidence among the European countries.

What, in fact, are we proposing? First of all, that the interest of all the European countries, and not merely a minority among them, in seeking a greater measure of security, should be stimulated. Then, so far as the substance is concerned, we should proceed by stages, advancing from the simple to the more difficult — that is, in the endeavour, in the initial stage, to help develop a climate of confidence among the European countries by means of measures like those already applied in the case of the CSCE; and then, as a second step, to negotiate limitations on and reductions in the most destabilising types of conventional weaponry, taking into account at each stage the right of all nations to preserve their security.

Moreover, although only a difference in thinking and methods exists between our proposal for a new forum and the MBFR, there are certain special aspects which entitle us to believe that concurrent pursuit of the two approaches need not, *a priori*, be ruled out. Naturally, however, it is for those countries at present participating in the Vienna talks to consider and evaluate to what extent these possibilities might stand up to the test.

I would say, in conclusion, that in proposing that we substantially readapt the procedure and aims of a debate on security in Europe among all the states concerned therein, my country is conscious of moving forward towards an objective as important as it is ambitious. In the coming years, these problems cannot be circumvented. Parliamentarians as keenly alive as yourselves to the issues of security in Europe, to which your reports bear witness, are quite obviously fully aware of this; and that is an additional reason for the French Government to take a particular interest in your deliberations, as I said at the outset. The discussions which we shall continue, in the spirit of the Helsinki and Belgrade conferences, with the aim of re-establishing confidence in Europe, will bear fruit only if an atmosphere of security prevails in all the countries concerned. The policy of the French Government, based on dialogue, firmness and vigilance, should make it possible to attain this goal. I am sure that on that score it will meet with the understanding of our Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you very much, Mr. Minister of State.

You agree to answer the questions of those who wish to speak? (*Assent*)

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, just now, the President, Mr. von Hassel also spoke of the twofold task of our Assembly and of WEU, namely that of keeping a positive watch over security through maintaining our armaments capacity at such a level and through pursuing a clearly-defined policy of such a kind as would enable us to face all the dangers and all the threats hanging over Europe. But the other aspect, it is true, is that of disarmament; and although it is important, too, that Europe should be in a position to defend itself by active means, it is, of course, equally important that our continent should make its contribution to world disarmament, that is to say to the security not only of Europe itself, but also of the majority of nations. These two themes have been raised by myself, Mr. Minister, and also earlier on by the President. I should simply like to ask you the following question: the French Government has given as its view that any deliberations by the assembly of the European Communities on issues lying outside the latter's area of competence are null and void. You yourself, moreover, were good enough to recall in positive terms just now the specific function of WEU and hence its proper vocation as an irreplaceable entity.

Could the fact that the reports on armaments production prepared by that assembly were officially referred to the independent European programme group mean that the French Government would agree to the assembly of the Communities intervening — and even to a less limited extent — in armaments questions? Does it not consider that it would thus run the risk of establishing some form of links between the IEPG and the Community?

If I venture to ask you for confirmation on this point, Mr. Minister, it is because, I would repeat, WEU has a very clear-cut task to perform and if we are to carry it out effectively, we must, as you yourself have said, avoid anything that smacks of ambiguity.

In this connection and on this specific point, I should be grateful if you would confirm, or in any case clarify, the position of the French Government.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Do you wish to answer all the questions at the same time or separately, Mr. Minister?

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — As you wish, Mr. President — it would perhaps be simpler to give a brief answer after each question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I give the floor to the Minister of State.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I should like to give you confirmation of the French Government's position which is very clear-cut on this subject, as I did in my speech just now. The government considers that all security and disarmament questions involving Europe should be discussed in this forum, and that it runs completely counter to the Rome Treaty for the European Economic Community to take up questions of this kind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Minister, the question I wish to put is of unquestionable importance so far as the armaments problem is concerned.

Some member countries of WEU — and in particular France — have concluded or are ready to conclude bilateral treaties with the United States on certain armaments exchanges. I should like to know the position of the French Government on such a bilateral approach to these problems.

Does it not think that a bilateral approach runs the risk of jeopardising the cohesion of Europe in transatlantic exchanges? Would not European consultations prior to the conclusion of any agreement with the United States and Canada be preferable? Is it possible in this way to avoid competition or disagreement between the European countries in their relations with the United States and Canada? Lastly, do you consider that WEU might possibly provide the natural framework for such consultations?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I give the floor to the Minister of State.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I believe that the existence of an assembly such as this and the deliberations which you here pursue in no way rule out the possibility of a policy necessarily leading to bilateral agreements being developed concurrently. And consequently, the French Government approves of the fact that bilateral agreements like those which you have just mentioned can in fact be concluded. But, of course, that in no way runs counter to your Assembly's task with regard to consultations and to the holding of discussions here on agreements of this type.

I would say, therefore, that we believe the thinking in which you engage here and the bilateral agreements to which you have referred are far more complementary than competitive. And it is in this spirit that the French Government is pursuing its own policy.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to refer the Minister to a recent report, endorsed by this Assembly, about future relationships between Europe and China. It was Recommendation 315. Although in the text of the report there was reference to arms supplies, there was no actual mention of them in the recommendation.

Thereafter, I put down a written question for answer by the Ministers, and as this came into my hands only an hour ago and, therefore, many members and perhaps even the Minister have not seen it, I shall read the answer. It is very brief:

"As the Council stated in their reply to Recommendation 315 on China and European security, member governments consider that the existence of a stable and confident China seems to them likely to be a propitious factor for the maintenance of stability in the world.

The Council are convinced that governments of member states will take full account of this principle.

On the issue referred to in the question..."

that is, on arms supplies,

"the policy of the governments concerned is, or would be, based upon their assessment of the overall progress of their relations with the People's Republic of China, and taking into account their own armaments export policies."

About a couple of weeks ago, Mr. de Guiringaud, the Foreign Minister of France, made a statement, which was widely publicised overseas. I shall refer to just one sentence. On arms sales to China, Mr. de Guiringaud, on behalf of France, stated that his country was ready to supply defensive weapons to China.

May I take it that when Mr. de Guiringaud was reported as having said that, what he said correctly interprets the present French position?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I give the floor to the Minister of State.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I think, Mr. President, that I can indeed fully confirm the statements made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. We consider that this is a field essentially involving bilateral action.

In this matter, France in fact takes the attitude of which you have just reminded us and which was officially adopted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of the French Government.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I should like to ask the Minister a question about the important proposals that he has put before us today.

Will the Minister accept that the Assembly was interested to hear a renewal of the proposals for a conference on security and disarmament in Europe, linked particularly to proposals for confidence-building measures, a proposal which was put by the French Delegation to the recent special session of the United Nations Assembly?

Will the Minister also accept that we were interested to hear, I think for the first time, that he did not suggest that this need necessarily replace the MBFR negotiations in Vienna? However, will the Minister tell the Assembly what reactions the French Government have received to their proposals on this matter and, in particular, whether Mr. Gromyko, on his recent visit to Paris, was able to say anything about the attitude of the Soviet Government to such a proposal?

On a related matter, in view of the report from Mr. Baumel which this Assembly is considering, on the question of SALT, will the Minister clarify the remark that Mr. Gromyko made after his visit to Paris, that he felt that other nuclear powers, apart from the Soviet Union and the United States, should take part in future SALT discussions?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — On your first question, Sir, namely whether your Assembly is entitled to take up the issues which would be discussed as part of the French proposal, I consider that all matters connected with confidence and security — and hence all matters connected with disarmament — may appropriately be raised here in your Assembly. In my view, therefore, it would be absolutely natural for such questions to be discussed in this forum. Of course, that does not mean that it is among your functions to participate, as an institution, in the negotiations and discussions to which I have alluded.

Secondly, you referred to the proposals which I have just made at this rostrum, including our belief that the MBFR negotiations and the French proposals for a conference on security in Europe could go forward simultaneously. As I said just now, we, the French, are not participating in MBFR and we consider that the results hitherto achieved have very markedly failed to live up to the hopes placed in these

negotiations by their promoters. We have no intention of changing our attitude on this subject. We take the view, however, that if other European countries have different ideas, we are not going to make winding up the MBFR talks a prior condition for organising that other type of meeting by which we lay so much store.

As regards your third question, which refers to the reactions we have obtained from those concerned, I would inform you that they are on the whole encouraging and positive. It is still too early to give you more precise information on the subject. Some countries are still discussing the exact content of the answer they will give us. But the initial contacts and the initial reactions which have reached us are very encouraging for the French proposals.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Minnocci.

Mr. MINNOCCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, not long ago President Carter of the United States practically gave the go-ahead for preliminary work on development of the neutron bomb; a few days ago, Mr. Brezhnev received some United States congressmen and told them the Soviet Union was also able to produce such a weapon. I think these two news items are undoubtedly a threat to the policy of détente and disarmament in which we Europeans are so vitally concerned.

Since the French Minister of State was telling us just now of his justifiable concern at the exceedingly numerous stockpiles of armaments in Europe, may I ask what he thinks about the potential manufacture of the neutron bomb?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — It is correct, Sir, that during the past few days we have witnessed a renewal of tension between the two superpowers. I trust that we shall speedily return to an atmosphere and climate more propitious for détente.

As to your specific question, I can only remind you — on behalf of the French Government, of course — of the declaration made by the Minister of Defence, in which it was clearly stated that France would not build a neutron bomb.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Kershaw.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — My question is very nearly the same as Mr. Roper's, so I shall shorten it. What countries does the Minister of State propose should participate in the conference on European disarmament to which he has referred? While I agree that MBFR has made no progress, what new facts or policies would such a conference as he pro-

Mr. Kershaw (continued)

poses be likely to discover to ensure any greater success?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — As I said in my speech just now, we are proposing that this conference should bring together all the countries which took part in the Helsinki conference. There were thirty-five of them. The mere fact of putting forward this proposal shows you clearly the difference which would exist between the nature of this conference and the MBFR talks, even if only as regards the number of participants.

Secondly, you ask what difficulties have become apparent? It is very difficult for me — and I would even say it would be offensive to the countries participating in MBFR — and for a representative of the French Government, which is not taking part in these negotiations, to pronounce any judgment going beyond the results visible from the outside, as regards the progress of the negotiations and the difficulties encountered.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Péronnet.

Mr. PERONNET (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, one of your predecessors in the French Government, when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed the hope that WEU might serve as a framework for effective consultations among Europeans on defence questions. Is that, Mr. Minister, still the policy of the French Government?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). — I think the Deputy is alluding to a statement made here in this Assembly by Mr. Michel Jobert. It was completely in line with what should, in my view, constitute the activities of WEU. And as I reminded you just now, when speaking at the rostrum of the support which the French Government gave, was continuing to give and would give in the future to WEU, not only is there no conflict, but there is on the contrary perfect harmony between what Mr. Michel Jobert stated then and what I have said this morning. My answer to your question is therefore yes.

The PRESIDENT. — If there are no more questions, that concludes this part of the agenda.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for the explanations you have provided about the policy of the French Government and for the answers you have given to the questions asked.

8. Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU

(Presentation of and Debate on the draft Order of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 793)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the draft order of the General Affairs Committee on the consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU and vote on the draft order, Document 793.

I call Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have to inform you of the adoption of a procedure which is not entirely without precedent in this Assembly. The General Affairs Committee considers it preferable that Mr. Druon's report should be withdrawn for the time being. In other words, the Committee has decided not to present the report during this session.

There are a number of reasons, none of them in any way the fault of Mr. Druon. The subject did not seem to us suitable for discussion in all its wider aspects, and a wide-ranging discussion would have been inevitable. First, there was some disagreement about the extent to which defence questions might at present be taken over by another European organisation. We ourselves realised during the discussion that we were both unable and unwilling to make any pronouncement on the matter at this stage.

The other difficulty was Mr. Druon's proposal that countries wishing to join the European Community should be invited to apply for membership of WEU irrespective of whether they had already submitted applications to join the former. This again is doubtless open to discussion.

However, the majority of the Committee thought it — how shall I say — not entirely diplomatic to raise the issue in this form at the present time. Although Mr. Druon himself tabled an amendment removing the names of the various countries concerned and maintaining only in general terms the invitation for membership applications from such countries, the majority of the Committee considered that the whole subject should be withdrawn for the time being.

Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)

I would stress that the Committee held an excellent and very fruitful discussion on Mr. Druon's report and has expressed its gratitude to Mr. Druon for the work he has done.

I am bound to add, however, that I was subsequently rather surprised and also somewhat disturbed by the fact that a section of the press, including some of the German press, had totally misrepresented the situation. I am very disturbed about this as there has clearly been a deliberate attempt to create difficulties specifically between Paris and Bonn. I cannot understand it, since anyone who attended the sitting will remember that it was not in fact the German Delegation at all which, for whatever reasons, wished to reject Mr. Druon's report. This simply was not the case.

I would urgently request people from this Assembly passing on information to the press to stick to the truth in future, and I make no apologies for expressing myself so strongly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Druon.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I find myself obliged to speak on the subject of a draft order, the background of which has just been explained to you by Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, to whom I would express my salutations and thanks for the very kind words she has spoken about me. The draft order relates to the report with whose preparation I had been entrusted by your General Affairs Committee and about which you are now being asked to say that it is not expedient to discuss it here today.

You will thus have to take a stand by voting on this point. It is only proper, however, that I should first remind you of a number of factors wholly germane to this question of expediency.

To begin with, I was not yet a member of the Committee when the somewhat complicated title of the report entrusted to me was chosen. Nor did I propose myself as Rapporteur. It was at the insistent request of the Committee that I agreed to take on this responsibility last June. Indeed, it would have seemed to me discourteous not to fall in with a request which I could only judge to be meant in a friendly way.

On 16th October, I presented a preliminary draft report to the Committee. As is customary, its members made a number of comments to me. The only point which really seemed to contribute a potential source of disagreement in the eyes of some members was the fact that I did not mention

the case of Turkey when referring to possible candidates for entry into the EEC.

Furthermore, amendments to the draft recommendation were tabled. They were not designed to alter its substance, but either to broaden or make more specific the terms used on several points, leaving its spirit unchanged.

I therefore deemed it perfectly possible to meet these criticisms. In order to do so, and with an eye to the meeting on 2nd November in Rome, I inserted, firstly, a passage dealing with Turkey in the revised report, so that it should reflect the opinion of some of our colleagues, without my necessarily assuming any personal responsibility for it. That seemed to me necessary. Secondly, at this same meeting on 2nd November, I presented the beginning of the recommendation in a revised drafting, which followed the lines of the wishes that had been expressed.

Accordingly, there was nothing to give me grounds for belief that a text which the Committee seemed ready to adopt on 10th October, subject to the only two reservations formally expressed, and which I had revised in order to meet the Committee's wishes, would have become "inexpedient" by 2nd November. Nonetheless, that is what happened.

Is the report itself at issue? Is it the actual subject of the report? Why has a subject which relates to Europe and its security, and which it seemed necessary to deal with urgently in June, become premature or undesirable in November? Could it not be that, when the subject was mooted, its full implications were imperfectly perceived? Or else could it be that other considerations have arisen in the meantime which would explain this strange inconsistency?

The majority of the Committee members were kind enough to concede — when offering their congratulations, for which I would thank them here — that I had gone to the root of the matter without skirting round any of its difficulties. That seemed to me a matter of course. It was clear to me that, having accepted responsibility for considering the consequences of a possible enlargement of Western Europe, I was operating well within the framework of WEU's areas of competence. For one thing, all the members of this organisation are also members of the European Economic Community; and for another, the security of Western Europe undoubtedly constitutes the justification for this institution's existence under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty. We are not taking a partisan stance when we say that WEU is very specifically the only European organisation competent in the defence field: our seven governments have proclaimed the fact with a single voice on many occasions; it has just been reaffirmed in your

Mr. Druon (continued)

opening address, Mr. President, and confirmed so far as France is concerned by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs a few moments ago. Accordingly, from that point of view I saw no limitations or obstacles to the task entrusted to me.

It was, moreover, clear that a new situation was taking shape in Europe. One reason lay in the applications first of Greece and then of Spain and Portugal to join the Common Market, another in the elections by direct universal suffrage to the assembly of the European Communities, due to be held in June 1979. It therefore seemed natural to me to deal as specifically as possible in my study with the issues effectively raised by this situation.

You are aware that the probable accession in the near future of three countries from Southern Europe to the European Community, and particularly that of Spain, cannot fail to involve very serious problems of an economic order for France. Some of our partners, especially Italy, will also be gravely affected by it.

Although I was keenly alive to the objections and very well aware of the obstacles, I nevertheless wrote in this report, for which I was assuming personal responsibility, that the overriding advantages which Europe as a whole might enjoy as a result of this enlargement were well worth the acceptance of efforts in all fields to overcome the difficulties within a reasonable period, it being agreed that the timetable in the case of Greece had already been established.

The second observation which I was led to make and which was, in fact, only a reminder of the obvious, was that the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities, like the Communities themselves, had no competence in the defence field. This circumstance, which stems from the actual commitments entered into by our seven countries, led me to say that, until further notice and until the states concerned had decided otherwise, WEU was and remained the only European body in which the member countries — and such others as might come to participate in its work — could consult together on a valid basis in order to co-ordinate their efforts to safeguard their security.

It is an unchallengeable fact that the modified Brussels Treaty makes WEU an organisation open to all European countries with democratic régimes. I accordingly expressed the wish that the candidate countries might be invited, if they so desired, to accede to this treaty, before or after their accession to the Rome Treaty, and irrespective of whether they did or did not belong to the Atlantic Alliance.

There was no question whatever — for that would have been contrary to the most elementary good sense — of appearing to try to represent as incompatible WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, which we all likewise support. It was merely a question of suggesting the easiest way to allow Spain, as it is today and as it aspires to be tomorrow, to associate itself, if it should so desire, with our joint security efforts.

In the case of all the candidate countries, it was generally speaking the simplest, most natural and most reasonable way of inviting them to take their places in a Europe which would not be merely a “common market”, but which would also reflect the resolve to count for something in the political sphere and to take its destiny more firmly in its own hands. That seemed all the simpler, since accession to the modified Brussels Treaty does not involve automatic participation in all WEU’s current activities, any more, indeed, than participation in some of them requires accession to the treaty.

Lastly, it seemed to me essential to mention the seriousness of the economic situation, with which we have been familiar over the past five years and which represents a threat to our security — all the more so, since it seems destined to drag on and probably even grow still worse between now and the end of the twentieth century, until such time as new forms of technology enable mankind to take control of what is in store for it in the twenty-first.

This argument may appear somewhat abstract, remote and theoretical. In my view, it is an essential one. As the years go by Europe finds itself in a position which calls for serious and urgent decisions. It cannot afford to behave as though the crisis did not exist. It cannot be everlastingly enquiring whether or not it is expedient to provide solutions to the problems it faces. If Europe does not resolve these problems today, it will not do so tomorrow and still less the day after tomorrow, because it will no longer have the means to do so. It is today that Europe must decide in what direction it is going, if it wishes to remain in existence tomorrow.

Europe is necessary to each of its component countries, since their size, their resources, their activities and their populations alike allow them no chance of subsisting in isolation for more than a few years. In order to meet this common need, however, Europe can only be based on a reality: that of European society as it is, as it recognises itself to be and as it finds its embodiment in nations aware of their own identities. None of these countries are prepared to give up their separate existence, although some may claim to be in favour of an entity which, for all its supranational pretensions, would be devoid of reality, devoid of will and wholly powerless.

Mr. Druon (continued)

There, in a few words, is the substance of the report, which the General Affairs Committee deemed it would be inexpedient for you to discuss at the present session.

Has a study conducted according to the very logic of the subject suddenly revealed new factors, which dictated that your General Affairs Committee should defer its consideration *sine die*?

Is it the idea of an enlargement of the European Community which suddenly appears untimely? The idea was contained in the title, and since the consequences are discussed in the report, that clearly means that the fact was considered an inherent reality.

Enlargement by whom? By the three countries which are at present candidates. On the specific point of relations between the Community and Turkey, and the possibilities of a Turkish candidature, I told you just now how I had intended to take the opinions expressed into account. Their proponents expressly acknowledged that I had done so, even finding that I had perhaps gone too far in interpreting their wishes and that it was unnecessary to maintain all of them.

Did it seem unduly daring to mention by name in the recommendations those countries which might possibly accede to the modified Brussels Treaty? When speaking of enlargement, on the one hand, and of WEU on the other, what else can we propose, unless we make no proposals at all? In order to deal gently with any undue susceptibilities, present or future, I came round to adopting a comprehensive form of words, as I said earlier in my speech, which named no names and yet at the same time named everybody, since I am not unaware of the advantages of a certain diplomatic vagueness.

Let us brush the details to one side. The real grounds for disagreement on the actual subject of the report are of a political order. They demonstrate that there are deep divergences about the allotted task — and even the justification for its existence — of the institution which unites us: Western European Union.

The objections to this institution, moreover, do not just date back to yesterday. I recall perfectly clearly — for I was at that time a member of the French Government — a number of proposals which my then colleague, Mr. Michel Jobert, presented to this Assembly on 21st November 1973.

In effect, these proposals were designed to impart to WEU the rôle assigned to it by the treaties — a rôle which, however, it has never fulfilled except very imperfectly and which it hardly fulfils at all any more — that is, of con-

stituting the forum in which the European countries could examine among themselves the requirements of their joint security, both in the political sphere and in that of defence and armaments. Almost complete silence followed the remarks made by Mr. Jobert, although I would except the courageous proposals made the following year with regard to armaments by Mr. Van Elkslande, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium. His proposals, incidentally, did not meet with any more favourable reaction amongst our other partners. It was not, however, possible at that moment to tell the French Government or the Belgian Foreign Minister too clearly that their remarks were untimely. It is clearly less difficult to proclaim this today.

We are well aware that WEU was always the temple of unspoken thoughts. But on this occasion such unspoken thoughts are in the forecourt.

Why then does the activation or reactivation of a vital treaty today appear so inexpedient? It emerges from certain comments made that, in the eyes of many people, any organisation of Europe in the realm of its security and defence automatically means adopting an anti-American attitude. We are — or so it seems to me — insulting our American allies, who are also our lifelong friends, if we let it be thought that Europe can only be built up against their interests.

Was I not careful in my report to stress the proposal made in earlier days by President Kennedy — which, to the best of my knowledge, has never been abandoned by United States governments — to build up the western alliance on twin pillars, one American and the other European?

It is obvious that the day-to-day policy conducted by the United States has not always encouraged the realisation of this project, but nothing entitles us to say that, if Europe were to demonstrate the will for a separate existence in the fields of foreign and defence policy — the United States would necessarily consider that this represented a process inimical to their interests.

Nevertheless, there may exist some grounds for the fears felt in certain quarters that we may see America severing its ties with Europe or countenancing some reduction in the safeguard afforded to our joint security by the vital element of deterrence at its disposal, whose benefits it enables the whole Atlantic Alliance to enjoy.

But then, if we were to approach every one of the problems involved in the organisation of Europe with the ever-present fear of seeing an ally who had become a protector not even objecting to what we are attempting to do, but simply showing some hypothetical signs of dissatisfaction or hesitation, what sort of Europe would we be building up in those circumstances? Why should

Mr. Druon (continued)

we relinquish any part whatever of the sovereignty enjoyed by our states to institutions whose only aim would be to turn themselves into the instruments of a foreign power?

I must turn here to a second consideration, which has certainly played its part in determining the reactions of the General Affairs Committee. Convinced as I am that in international affairs there is nothing solidly based except what is founded on treaties which have been freely agreed to, signed and ratified by the powers that they bind, I expressed reservations regarding a number of encroachments already committed by the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities in spheres where the Rome Treaty gives it no competence, and in particular in that of defence. Need I say that I feel still greater anxiety about recent statements, which serve most pertinently to confirm my reservations — statements in which some of the government or political leaders from one of Europe's biggest countries express the view that the future assembly should quite naturally and *proprio motu* extend its competence and its powers? Competence in what field, if not foreign policy? Powers over what, if not defence?

What a strange attitude for an assembly to adopt, which is acting in breach of the treaties that set it up! Changes in these treaties cannot be carried out by spontaneous generation. It can serve no good purpose for the assembly of the Communities to initiate, conduct, and wind up by a vote, discussions concerning issues about which the governments are bound neither to give answers nor to take the slightest action to follow up its wishes. Any such debates can only constitute an apple of discord.

Advocates of deferring consideration of a question like the one now under discussion until after the election, by direct universal suffrage, of the assembly of the Communities are not, I feel, making a very wise calculation, since they would thus be condemning us to a state of immobility from which the security of Europe can have nothing to gain.

In signing the treaty and its appended protocols, our countries undertook to maintain certain elements upon which the balance of Europe then depended until the year 2004. We are at the half-way house. It is quite obvious that positions have changed since 1954, that relative strengths are no longer identical, and that the respective rôles of the different member countries in our joint defence are no longer the same as they then were. Nevertheless, what has permitted this development is the specific assurance that, over a period of fifty years, there would be compliance with the clauses of the modified Brussels Treaty. Now, we may well

wonder whether those who today want to muzzle political co-ordination within the framework of WEU, and those who would like to have us forget the treaty and the commitments which it involves, are not really aiming simply to go back on those commitments entered into in 1954, after they have enjoyed all the advantages they could gain from them.

Let us be clear about this. Is it because some clause in the modified Brussels Treaty or its appended protocols are today looked on askance by some of the countries which signed them earlier on, that it has become sacrilege to try and adapt WEU to the new situation that will be created by the enlargement of the European Communities? The fact that there is no explanatory memorandum to buttress the order which you are being asked to vote upon makes it legitimate to adopt any assumption, including that of the least openly avowed motives.

These are some of the questions that assail me in face of the reactions shown by a very large majority of the General Affairs Committee.

I personally am no longer involved. I have handed in my resignation as Rapporteur, and I have no intention of going back on that action. I would, however, ask you to weigh carefully the consequences of a decision which would lead to the abandonment of what our Assembly has always claimed to be and always claimed to desire. In that case, if we are to be completely logical, should not the title of a forthcoming report be "Ought WEU to be abolished?"

I believe that I have affirmed with sufficient conviction the extent to which not only the confirmed existence but also the renewed vitality of this institution appears to me necessary, if we wish to advance a few steps in the direction of genuine European unity. It is for that very reason that I shall not vote in favour of the order presented by the General Affairs Committee. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Before we go on with this short debate, I should like to thank the Chairman of the Committee and the Rapporteur appointed by the Committee for the report and for their speeches here.

I now call Mr. Mende. He will be followed by Mr. Valleix. Is it possible to have short speeches so that we can finish on time?

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the advancement of his arguments by the Rapporteur, our respected colleague, Mr. Druon, has resulted in precisely the opposite of what was decided unanimously by the Committee in Rome and put forward here by the Chairman, Mrs. von Bothmer — namely, that we should not enter into a debate on the main

Mr. Mende (continued)

issue. However, as a result of the lengthy observations made and the President's magnanimity in handling the agenda, we now find ourselves in the midst of a substantive debate. If the personal opinion expressed by Mr. Druon were to go unchallenged, it would give a wholly false picture of the Committee's motives for not dealing with the report here today. This by way of comment on the procedure.

I would moreover agree with Mr. Druon when he says that in Paris, for example, my concern at the isolation of Turkey was seized upon. I still think it unfortunate that Greece, Portugal and Spain should be invited to join WEU, and Turkey, in view of the tension between it and Greece, be left out in the cold.

I am still critical of the way the report underplays the security we owe to the Atlantic community. I too would have wished NATO to be shown more forcefully as the decisive factor in both European and Atlantic security.

Like Mrs. von Bothmer, I wish to express my regret at the misunderstandings that have arisen, and I would be unhappy if they indeed resulted in *malentendus franco-allemands*. What happened in Rome was not a conspiracy; unanimous decisions of a parliamentary committee remain unanimous decisions wherever taken, in Rome or in Paris.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you Mr. Mende.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I shall be brief, particularly as Mr. Druon has explained at length and extremely clearly how this matter came to be discussed — albeit for different reasons — a first and then a second time in the relevant Committee. As I shall be voting against the order, I would simply like, as Mr. Mende advocates, to attempt to clarify the thinking behind today's debate and decision.

It is true, Mr. President, as you yourself noted in your speech just now, that enlargement raises two problems that give our consideration of this matter its urgency.

There is, for example, the fact that the Council of our organisation has not itself been in a position to carry out its task properly, and we are therefore urgently faced with the twofold awareness that, while WEU might indeed be led to enlarge itself, it is apparently not managing to find all the resources necessary for it to carry out its task in full. And the fact that these two phenomena are occurring at the same time entitles us seriously to pose the question of how we can fully acquit ourselves of the responsibility that falls to each of us.

Therefore, without wishing to be over-dramatic, I would like this morning's debate and the subsequent vote not to leave any ambiguity about our jointly-felt commitment to the full assumption of the task that falls to us, each at his own level, and of our part in the defence of Europe, by pursuing an arms policy based on a definition of what arms are necessary and by making a real contribution to disarmament, which, as an aspect of our activities, could not be more pacific.

Now, Mr. President, you yourself also spoke of political impetus, which you regretted was somewhat lacking in regard to WEU's possibilities for action. Coming from you, Sir, these were no light words!

Here I join forces with our distinguished Rapporteur, who has unfortunately resigned, in urging that we should profit from this circumstance to rearm, if I may so put it, our political will to equip WEU with all the means of action it requires.

The problem of enlargement will therefore have to be discussed again. But the problem of our ability to carry out our task to the full — being, as we are, already faced with certain facts — must be constantly borne in mind.

That brings me, Mr. President, to my conclusion, which is quite simple. It is that there are two ways in which we could fail in our appointed task, both in regard to defence and in regard to the European countries we represent.

The first would be to let others grasp the responsibilities that are ours. How would they then acquit themselves of those responsibilities? In any event, our own abdication would effectively make us guilty of abandoning the task assigned to us.

The other way of failing would be not fully to assume our responsibilities and, consequently, to leave a gap in regard to the task assigned to us, namely the defence of Europe, which, though it must of course be conducted in collaboration with our American friends, must naturally be a European defence involving all our countries while respecting the sovereignty of the individual states.

That is why, Mr. President, my vote against the draft order will be a way of expressing a regret that the very interesting developments which were apparently under way, and the thoughts expressed before the relevant Committee, have failed to give rise today to an affirmation of our will to defend ourselves and of the will of the members of WEU fully to assume that task for the sake of Europe and its security.

That is my conclusion, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I was present in Rome. As far as I could learn there, at the meeting and

The President (continued)

at the press conference later on, it was only a question of whether there had been enough time for it to mature or whether we should postpone the discussion and decision.

Perhaps I may make a suggestion, Mr. Valleix. We have to vote on the draft order which has been prepared. My suggestion is to add an additional sentence, saying "but that we invite the Committee to table its report during the next session" — be it in six months' time, or in twelve months' time. It will be left with the Committee.

That would mean that we adopt the draft order of the Committee with this sentence, "but invite the Committee to table its report during the next session". Could this be a compromise? We go on in the Committee with the discussion and we leave it to the Committee to table it whenever it seems to be mature, because the only problem seems to be that it is not yet mature. Could this be a compromise, Madam Chairman?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — That is a possible compromise, but the Committee must of course discuss whether they are in agreement with it.

The PRESIDENT. — Do you agree that we send the whole back to the Committee and that the Committee discuss it and then we shall be informed about the view of the Committee at the next session, and we leave it with the Committee to tell us what it is going to do? Do you agree?

If you agree, please rise.

Who is against it — that is to say, not to take it up again in the Committee?...

Are there any abstentions?...

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I abstain.

The PRESIDENT. — The proposal is carried. Thank you.

9. Change in the membership of a Committee

The PRESIDENT. — Before closing the sitting, may I inform you that the British Delegation proposes the nomination of Lord McNair as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Lord Beaumont of Whitley.

Are there any objections?...

Lord McNair is appointed as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

10. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

Europe's external relations (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 790 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.*)

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 20th November 1978

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Europe's external relations (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 790 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Gessner (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Grant, Mr. Watkinson, Mr. Müller, Mr. Roper, Mr. Beith, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Valleix, Mr.

Gessner (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Valleix, Mr. Jung, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Gessner, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Reddemann, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Jung, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Roper, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Treu, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Calamandrei (explanation of vote).

4. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Europe's external relations

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 790 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on Europe's external relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 790 and Amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have the honour of presenting the

report on Europe's external relations, a report which has been the subject of repeated discussion in the General Affairs Committee.

When the report came to be drafted the difficulty of deciding what exactly should be understood by "Europe" was immediately apparent. "Europe's external relations" is, after all, an extremely broad frame of reference. It is obvious that Eastern Europe, for example, is part of Europe. Nevertheless, I thought it should not be included in the report. I could have said that we should restrict ourselves to the Europe of Western European Union, but that, on the other hand, seemed too narrow a framework. When we looked at the problem of what should be understood by Europe, we became more and more inclined to take the term as denoting those states whose policies are based on a form of society which I might call democratic and pluralistic.

This leaves us, finally, in the position of dealing with the states which are members of the Council of Europe, and that is what is meant by Europe in this context. I therefore beg your indulgence for having omitted from my report everything else that properly speaking is part of Europe. Having adopted a flexible definition, I have placed security policy at the centre of our discussion in accordance with the terms of reference of Western European Union. The next thing, if one is considering whether any common external policy actually exists, is to say something about the relevant internal conditions.

First and foremost one should note the absence of any shared European machinery capable or competent to forge a common external policy on behalf of the pluralistic states of Western Europe. Then, too, the states in question have a whole series of very different interests to defend and belong to very different organisations — for example, the Council of Europe, Western European Union, NATO, the Nordic Council and the

1. See page 17.

Mr. Gessner (continued)

European Community. External relations are thus discussed and conducted by the most diverse organisations. In the circumstances, this alone, I believe, shows clearly that it is impossible to speak of a common external policy.

Nevertheless, certain groups of states have in the past on a number of occasions adopted a common position on certain questions, or at least partially expressed a common attitude. Thus, at the great conference on security and co-operation, groups of European states attempted to go along certain stretches of the way together. The Middle East declarations of the nine foreign ministers of the European Community also come to mind. One should not underestimate the significance of this, nor indeed of the European Community's attempts to speak with a single voice at the United Nations. I mention this to illustrate the fact that, time and again, common positions do get expressed in certain situations. Admittedly, so far that scarcely warrants talk of a common external policy, but the beginnings that have been made should not be underestimated.

The Council of Europe also plays a part in this connection. As I see it, the Council's bridging function is also important in the field of external relations, for example as a link between the member states of the European Community, those of the free trade area, and those which have taken a neutral stance. The Council has carried out a whole series of very useful analyses and initiatives, with joint resolutions from the Parliamentary Assembly on matters of external policy. The Assembly has called on the governments to adopt a joint position on certain foreign policy issues, for example in regard to the third world, the Middle East conflict, Africa, and the conference on security and co-operation. We should, therefore, note the existence of numerous connections, which admittedly partly overlap and are also often the expression of specific interests.

The third point of significance here is Europe's position in the world. I have based myself on the view that Europe's position today is no longer comparable with that of past decades or centuries. The second world war left deep traces. Beyond any doubt, the European identity needs to be defined differently today from what it was in the last century or before.

May I quote a statement by the nine foreign ministers of the European Community :

"Although in the past the European countries were individually able to play a major rôle on the international scene, present international problems are difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and res-

ponsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with a single voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper rôle in the world."

I would add that I absolutely agree with this statement.

Yet it would be quite wrong to assume that Europe no longer has any influence at all in the world. As a factor in world politics Europe still needs to be taken very seriously. There is, for example, the size of its gross national product, its population, monetary reserves and share of world trade. Nevertheless, I think it would be a mistake to believe that Europe might develop into a kind of super-state or perhaps one day even a superpower. Western Europe lacks both the internal and external prerequisites for this. I have already said that there are no supranational institutions that can take responsibility for a common external policy. A further major consideration is Western Europe's high degree of military and economic vulnerability.

On Europe's vulnerability and dependence, I would quote from a statement by the former Belgian Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans :

"That which struck me in all my conversations was above all the widespread feeling of our impotence and vulnerability. This is a new experience for our peoples in recent history."

Mr. Tindemans had more to say about this problem, but I shall leave it at that to save time. I do think, however, that his assessment of the situation is absolutely correct.

It is my firm conviction that Western Europe is above all a civil and not a military power centre. From this I conclude that its rôle in the world should above all be one of providing a balance. Although its military options may be limited, Western Europe's opportunities for action are still great, for example in the fields of trade, social policy, culture, and politics as such.

Europe must play its part in helping to break down East-West confrontation to the greatest possible extent. I do not believe it is in Europe's interest that the cold war should be stepped up.

Another opportunity I see for Western Europe is co-operation with the great industrial nation of Japan. Some time ago we had a world economic summit in which Japan participated. It became clear on that occasion that closer co-operation with the great Japanese industrial power is extremely important for the economic well-being of Europe.

Another possibility that should not be ruled out is increased co-operation with the People's Republic of China. It goes without saying — and

Mr. Gessner (continued)

it is in the very nature of a policy of *détente* — that we should trade with any country showing bona fide willingness to trade with us, and that includes the part of the world I have just mentioned. In my opinion, however, it would be most ominous if the motive for this co-operation were a military one. I am deeply convinced that this would block the process we have managed to get under way, with such great effort, by pursuing a policy of *détente*.

Another possibility for Western Europe is that of playing an active rôle in the North-South dialogue. The Lomé Convention, concluded with fifty-three states, is a good example. The important thing here is that our relations with the third world should be based on fair partnership.

Finally, a further possibility for action in the field of external policy would be for the Western European states to attempt to make a specific European contribution towards the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

Having dealt with the question of opportunities, I would like to turn now to the aims of Western Europe's external policy. The prime aim must be to achieve a stable and lasting peace. I think five objectives follow from this: maintenance of security; continuation and extension of the policy of *détente*; security of raw material supplies and economic co-operation; continuation of the North-South dialogue with a view to achieving a just world economic order; the stability of Southern Europe. These follow necessarily from what I have said so far about the need to achieve a stable and lasting peace.

On the subject of security, I would point out that I have broadened this concept to include more than just military security. Besides military security I have covered economic, social and internal security. This wider-ranging interpretation of the concept of security is considered in the report as an important precondition for the preservation of a stable peace.

One objective that to me is quite clear — and I assume that there is agreement on this in Western European Union — is the maintenance of the military balance. I am quite aware that a peace based on this is relatively unstable; so long as the two blocs confront one another bristling with weapons, peace is not as secure as it should be in everyone's interest. If we want to serve the cause of peace — and this is an active function of Western Europe's external policy — we must work towards equal and balanced disarmament. Naturally, the concept of balance must be understood dynamically. When one is trying to follow a policy of balanced disarmament, it is not simply a question of numbers — how many units one side has and how many the other has

— but of taking account of all relevant factors, for example proximity or distance in space. This demands a willingness to compromise on all sides. Without this willingness I do not believe any really meaningful disarmament discussions would be possible.

It is equally important for us to understand that such a policy can be pursued only from behind the protective cover of the North Atlantic Alliance. There is no alternative to this alliance at the present time.

To include economic security among our objectives is, I think, obvious. I can scarcely imagine that the defence capacity of the western group of states could be at an optimum if our countries are being shaken by economic crises. Our economic relations must therefore be organised in such a way as effectively to guarantee our security *vis-à-vis* the outside world.

Europe is also extremely vulnerable in respect of another vital need, namely imports of raw materials. I do not believe that we will ever find ourselves in a situation in which this vulnerability no longer exists. I take it as something Europe has to live with, whether it likes it or not. Of course, this dependence is not all one-way. Fortunately, I would say, dependence often cuts all sorts of ways. Those on whom we are dependent for raw materials are also dependent on Europe. We must therefore try to show a spirit of co-operation. The dependence I have spoken of can be, if not eliminated then at least attenuated, only through co-operation with the states which are our partners. And each of us must realise that violence as a means of eliminating it is out of the question.

I also see the possibility of a European contribution towards the efforts to achieve a more just world economic order.

I have already mentioned social peace and security. The defence capacity of the Western European states is compromised by social unrest at home. If we are fully to satisfy our security requirements we must create social conditions such that we do not, through internal unrest get ourselves into a situation that would make it difficult for us to look after our security interests. And finally, on the subject of security, I would say that terrorism is also a major consideration, for it could after all lead to western society being threatened from within. I conclude that we should recognise the need to overcome that threat by means of a common policy and joint action.

Europe's interests and aims, of which I have just spoken, also include the continuation and further development of the policy of *détente*. In my report I give a number of examples of efforts which I believe serve the cause of *détente* — a number of treaties that have been concluded, for

Mr. Gessner (continued)

example the Berlin agreement. You will forgive me for not dealing with them in detail now.

However much our ideas may differ as to the current policy that should be pursued in order to achieve détente, there should be no disagreement among us about the aim itself. We all feel jointly committed to basic acceptance of the principle of détente. The detailed arrangements, the methods to be adopted, are something that will need continually to be worked out in the course of discussion. But once again, we have first to be clear about the aim. Here in Western European Union I believe we are all agreed on the need to seek détente, and that is extremely encouraging.

At this point I would like to say clearly that détente does not mean ideological coexistence. It is always important to spell this out, for each of us remains what he is. We are trying to achieve normal relations in areas where we and the other side have a common denominator. Nevertheless, both of us remain what we are. Détente will not do away with ideological confrontation.

In this connection I would ask the Assembly to consider whether we, as Western European Union, ought not to make a contribution when the time comes to prepare the follow-up conference to the CSCE due to take place in Madrid in 1980. It is worth discussing in good time what we could put forward at such a conference and on what problems we ought to concentrate. We need to discuss well in advance how we see things developing in the future.

I think Europe has to make very considerable efforts to look after its own interests. In this connection I should like to say something about the SALT II agreement now under discussion. I assume that the agreement will actually come off and that, once it has been concluded, the way will be open for a SALT III agreement. SALT II will have to be followed by SALT III if we are to defend our European interests.

I say this for the following reason. We are all aware that the Soviet Union is producing a whole series of weapons that are principally of a tactical nature. They are primarily directed not at the United States of America but at Western Europe. This is something we simply cannot ignore. I would mention only the SS-20 missiles, as they are referred to in NATO, which are targeted on Western and Central Europe. Once SALT II is concluded we must direct our European interest towards achieving an agreement that keeps this threat to a minimum. The grey zone that has been created by the Soviet Union's production of tactical middle-range missiles must be removed. Putting it more clearly: if it cannot be entirely

eliminated, it is in our interest to keep the danger to a minimum. That is why I think that we must as Europeans consider how to proceed in the negotiations I have just been talking about.

In my report I also mention my concern at the proliferation of the international arms trade. I must say quite frankly that I have no time whatsoever for third world states that have a low economic and social standard of living and stand in need of further economic development, and yet seek to purchase arms in a whole series of world capitals. Now, it is obviously not our place to tell sovereign states what to do. But we should consider whether the time has not come to reflect on ways of keeping this flow of weapons under control.

I believe this is an enormously complicated proposition, and I do not believe the problem can be solved from one day to the next. But I believe it is necessary to do something in this direction as soon as possible. I consider it most regrettable therefore that the Soviet Union seems to regard development aid principally as arms supplies. It is good that the United States and the Soviet Union should discuss the arms trade. I am no prophet, and I do not know whether the two countries will achieve any results, but I am encouraged by the very fact that the problem is being discussed. I think the European states should themselves consider what contribution they might make to this dialogue.

The aims and interests of Western Europe also include trying to bring about, in one particular part of Europe, the conditions needed for successful pursuance of our external relations. I mean that we should increase our efforts to re-stabilise external policy in Southern Europe. I would remind the Assembly of the Cyprus conflict, and of the very serious tension between Greece and Turkey. I have no doubt that this conflict has adversely affected the ability of the North Atlantic Alliance to pursue its external policy. Nor do I have any doubt that, because of this conflict, our military security is rendered less effective. It is therefore a good thing that the foreign ministers of the Nine should act as mediators in order to help in their own way to remove this source of conflict as soon as possible.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I have listed a whole series of points on which I think discussion is important. Let me sum up as follows: at the present time it is certainly not possible to speak of a unified, unanimous European external policy. Democratic Europe lacks above all a number of internal conditions for this. Nevertheless, in the opinion of your Rapporteur, the democratic states of Europe have developed a network of external relations that shows a unified pattern and, despite the great variety of interests involved, a series of common features.

Mr. Gessner (continued)

At the centre of these stands Europe's high degree of dependence and vulnerability, due to its economic and military situation. Europe can guarantee its own security only within the Atlantic Alliance. This results in a common interest in keeping Europe as a factor for peace, balance and détente, and in pursuing an external policy marked by a readiness to co-operate with all parts of the world. Europe should develop its influence in the world primarily as a civil rather than a military power.

Europe's main vital interests are the maintenance of security and peace, the continuation and consolidation of détente, guaranteed raw material supplies and economic and social security, the continuation of the North-South dialogue with the aim of a more just world economic order, and stability in Southern Europe. While one should not seek to overestimate Europe's position in the world, this is a set of tasks that will require from the democratic states of Europe a great deal of energy and imagination.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this brings me to the end of my remarks, and I beg to remind you that the General Affairs Committee approved the report and recommendation unanimously. I strongly urge you to support them also and I thank you for your patience. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Gessner, for that clear, concise and invigorating presentation of your excellent paper on Europe's external relations. I, too, would remind the Assembly that it was unanimously adopted by the General Affairs Committee.

I now call Mr. Calamandrei, who has asked for ten minutes. He will be followed by Mr. Grant, who has asked for five minutes.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the reports on the agenda for our session and the draft recommendations concerning them are, I think, in their variety and the very contradictory views and proposals put forward in them, a sign of the view taken, inside WEU, of the current international phase; in other words the way in which they reflect the existing complexity, uncertainties and fluidity of relations between the two superpowers and the eastern and western blocs, between the industrialised and the developing countries, between the countries of Western Europe, as well as the fact that coming institutional events like the European parliamentary elections bring us nearer to a situation of deep-seated economic, monetary and social difficulties, not to mention the wider international context that is so critical.

Any of the risks inherent in WEU too of confusion, bewilderment and pushing blindly ahead are exemplified in some of the reports tabled, such as the tendency I discern in Mr. Critchley's report to devolve WEU's possible functions upon an EEC charged with armaments questions, or the tendency I detect in Mr. Baumel's report to make it WEU's chief purpose, on the contrary, to conduct the concerted management of the French and British strategic nuclear forces.

But of course, we shall be discussing these reports when their turn comes round. What I have to do is briefly convey the Italian communists' view on the report and draft recommendation of Mr. Gessner.

Let me say straight away that Mr. Gessner's endeavour to avert the risks I was referring to just now by seeking a general organic solution to the problems of Western Europe and the function of WEU within its framework, is one with whose remarkably balanced results we are in substantial agreement. Time is too short for me to do more than additionally underline a few main points of convergence in the closely-reasoned, intelligent and highly-stimulating Gessner report.

First, the objective of finding points of stability, founded in a balance of forces relying on the alliances, treaties and existing communities, which Western Europe has every interest in promoting between the two opposing blocs — a stability and equilibrium to which, I beg to remind you, I declared last June it was WEU's primary task to contribute; they are to be understood as forming a dynamic whole, linking security and greater co-operation with détente and thereby initiating a gradual mutual and balanced rundown of the armies and weaponry on which the equilibrium and stability are founded.

Second, the notion aptly defined by Mr. Gessner as the "civil power" which Western Europe should especially aspire to become, remaining aloof from any desire to form a kind of third force or military superpower: a "civil power" capable of being distinguished by pluralism, the observance of human rights and freedom, the social development of democracy and, based on growing and non-discriminatory participation of all citizens in the functioning of democracy while at the same time combating terrorism with the utmost democratic firmness, promoting internal stability in every country of Western Europe as one of the conditions for international stability.

Third — for, as Mr. Gessner very truly remarks, Europe's economic and social problems can only be solved in agreement with the raw material producer countries — Western Europe's interest and need to maintain the North-South

Mr. Calamandrei (continued)

dialogue and prospects of a new international economic order.

Fourth, and last, as a means of realising an effort by Western Europe to achieve in these manifold directions a plurality of regional institutions which our countries may use as a lever for a joint effort by the Atlantic Alliance in the EEC, the Council of Europe, WEU and other bodies such as OECD: a plurality and interlocking mechanism which ought, at any rate at the present juncture, to be fully employed to the ends of stability in their full potentiality of mutual co-ordination of Western Europe's internal functions and constructive projection of these beyond its own frontiers, and ought not, as some people have proposed, to be ironed out, emptied of content and thrown off balance by any premature absorption or identification between one body's functions and those of another.

For these four kinds of consideration, I think that WEU could and should not only maintain but expand its functions within the framework of the Western European institutions. It is a matter of retaining WEU's own basic function of contributing to Western Europe's defence, but also extending it to the plane of interoperability and standardisation of armaments tightly geared to the Atlantic Alliance. It is also a matter of seeking, in and by WEU's existing dimension — one, I repeat, not to be tampered with, for the sake of stability — to confer upon it also a function of participation in, and contribution to, the negotiation for a mutual, balanced and controlled reduction of armaments, as well as, most certainly, a function of contributing to preparation of the new time scale for the CSCE due to be held in 1980 at Madrid. It is, finally, a matter of giving some elbow-room, so far lacking, for the function provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty of concertation for the purposes of economic stability in, for example, the reduction of armaments costs by means of standardisation, investment and employment in member countries' armaments industries, and more generally in respect of the crucial and problematic interrelations of defence efforts and economic, technological and social progress.

All I have said is, I think, more or less explicitly stated in Mr. Gessner's report or at any rate chimes with its appreciations and conclusions which I consider, on the whole, are adequately summed up in the draft recommendation, its operative clauses and many of those in the preamble. Nevertheless, one of the latter could or should, in the view of the Italian party of which I am a member, be brought into line with the overall spirit of the report and the recommendation, and we have to this end tabled

a few amendments to which we shall speak when it comes to the vote. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Calamandrei. You spoke for exactly ten minutes and I congratulate you.

Mr. Grant will speak for five minutes, followed by Mr. Watkinson, who will speak for eight minutes.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, this report covers a very broad canvas and the Rapporteur, Mr. Gessner, in presenting his report used a very broad brush. I, equally broadly, support it.

I want to draw attention to only one aspect of the report. I was particularly pleased to see that he drew attention to the importance of encouraging co-operation among the democratic nations of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region, and of supporting their early entry into the European Community and their share in the process of European integration.

I was glad that Mr. Gessner drew attention to that, because I believe that it is of immense importance that in an alliance such as ours we should be looking closely at the potential danger spots. I happen to believe that Southern Europe and the Mediterranean area present the most dangerous areas of our alliance.

The Assembly will recall that at its last meeting I presented a report on security in the Mediterranean which was overwhelmingly, but not quite unanimously, accepted by the Assembly and in which I drew attention to some of these problems. The main factors which I emphasised in my report were the need for Greece to return fully into NATO and for the United States arms embargo on Turkey to be lifted. Since our meeting in the summer, the United States has decided to lift the arms embargo but, alas — I regret this — our friends in Greece are still not fully negotiated into the NATO organisation. Therefore, NATO, which I believe to be our principal defence in this respect, is still in an unsatisfactory state.

I certainly support recommendation 5. I want Portugal, Spain and Greece to join the EEC, and I should like to see them in the EEC as full members at the earliest possible moment. I would go further — here I tiptoe very delicately into the future, because I understand the situation — and say that I should like to see Spain as a member of NATO also, but I accept Spain's difficulties and I understand that this must take place in the future.

In a much shorter time I want to see Greece — that important country, the home of freedom and democracy — fully back into our organisation. If we recommend this and if, as I hope, these countries will form an enlarged Community

Mr. Grant (continued)

in the not too distant future, we should not ignore the consequences of the effect upon another of our equally important allies, Turkey. It is very important that Turkey should not be, to use an English expression, "left out in the cold". It is a country that is right up against the forces of the Warsaw Pact. It has immense economic problems, with which we sympathise. These economic problems, despite the lifting of the United States arms embargo, could very well impinge upon its defence capacity, and this is something that we cannot just ignore, as the Turks are our allies.

Again, if we are talking of the eastern Mediterranean, we cannot ignore the fact that we need allies wherever they may be.

I remind the Assembly of the importance of Yugoslavia, as I did in my report. It is arguable and debatable whether Yugoslavia is a democratic country in the way that we are. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia has shown a remarkable and sturdy resistance to the imperialist ambitions of the Soviet forces. We all agree — and the Assembly agreed — that we should support its independence and territorial integrity to the utmost. Again, because of its economic difficulties, Yugoslavia would like to have the closest possible association with the EEC on economic matters, and we should take this into consideration.

Unfortunately in this area there are two — I must not use the word "parochial" — narrow and confined issues which are in danger of damaging the solidity of the West as a whole. It is tragic that we should be divided over the Cyprus issue. It is tragic that two of our great allies should be divided over the Aegean problem. These two issues, localised and narrow, are tragedies not only for the Greek-Cypriot community and the Turkish-Cypriot community, not only for Greece and Turkey, but for all the allies and friends that they have in the West. They present a danger to the freedom and democracy that we all have in common and, indeed, the divisions that exist can only give comfort and pleasure to the enemies of us all. Therefore, the sooner these problems are resolved, the better it will be for everyone who believes in freedom and democracy.

Although it is primarily a matter for these countries to resolve these problems nevertheless we should consider ourselves available in WEU and the EEC, and in the West generally, to offer as much help as we possibly can. Here in WEU I know that we have differences of view about Greece and Turkey. Mr Druon — who spoke this morning — and his colleagues are great grecophiles, they support Greece very strongly; and other people have views about Turkey; but it is important to recognise for

the purpose of this debate that we are all on the same side against a common foe — that is what is vital.

In wartime days Winston Churchill referred to the Mediterranean area as being the soft underbelly of Europe and vulnerable in that respect. I believe, as I said in my speech to the last Assembly, that that is true and that this soft underbelly of the Mediterranean and Europe is suffering from running sores which, if they are not corrected, on our southern flank can endanger the health and the survival of the West and of free society as a whole. I hope in that respect that the message from this report is that we should direct attention to this aspect and give full and total support to it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Grant.

I now call on Mr. Watkinson to speak for three minutes. He will be followed by Mr. Müller who will speak for eight minutes.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to congratulate Mr. Gessner on his report. So great is the potential subject matter of the report that of necessity he had to limit his observations in this vast field of study. I wish to limit myself to the consideration of the Soviet position in the world scene during the course of last year.

It is a paradox that we in the West tend to play down Soviet failures in foreign policy and play up apparent successes. Not so long ago the media of the West were obsessed by the so-called advance of Soviet imperialism, and, indeed, the slightest puff of Soviet success brought cold-war warriors out of their winter quarters with demands for massive retaliation. I believe that the Soviets pose a threat to the West and that we should meet Soviet policies of aggrandisement with purpose and resolve. At the same time, it does not help if the West blinds itself to the present inherent weaknesses in the Soviet position around the world.

Looking at Europe we see that the NATO Alliance has responded firmly to the ruthless expansion of Soviet forces on the central front with their concerted increase in expenditure. Perhaps that increase in expenditure and enlargement of the determination to resist what would appear to be Soviet aggrandisement in this area had something to do with the willingness of the Soviets to come again to the negotiating table in Vienna for mutual, balanced force reduction talks. I would hope that those talks, which have been stymied for so long, could be given new emphasis. I would hope, too, that the suggestion of the British Foreign Secretary that Foreign Ministers might participate directly in those negotiations might give an added spur to those talks.

Mr. Watkinson (continued)

Looking at the Soviet position in other parts of the world we see weaknesses there, too; and even in Africa, which, according to all the press analysts, was to have been the area of the world in which the Soviets were to make the swiftest advance, it is apparent that that advance has not been as much as the Soviets would have hoped. It is clear that, aided and abetted by Cuban troops and East European advisers on the African continent, the Russians have made significant headway; but it is important that we in this Assembly should acknowledge that it is not only the West which has a divine right to be involved in African politics. Having said that, I would argue that the presence of Cuban troops in Africa at present and in the immediate past has done little to promote stability in that inherently unstable continent.

One should emphasise that the record of the Soviets in Africa is not one of unmitigated success. Let us consider the Horn, an area supposed to have been neglected by the West and handed over, as it were, to the Soviets. If we consider the position of the Soviets there we see that it is not as strong as might appear at present. There the Soviets switched their alliance from the Somalis to the Ethiopians, leaving the Somalis with a sense of betrayal. They now find themselves tied to a régime which is engaged in a difficult and bloody civil war within its own country.

The Russians would be unwise to underestimate and underplay the importance of African nationalism. The African nations having thrown off one colonial yoke, it is unlikely that they are about to undertake another imperial yoke. Looking at the conference of the Organisation of African States earlier in the year we see that a blunt warning was given to the Soviets that they should not overstay their welcome in Africa.

Consider the position of Angola, supposedly one of the greatest prizes of Soviet adventurism in Africa: there, too, we see a willingness on the part of the present régime to come to terms with African events and to trade with the West. One of the most significant developments has been the emergence on the world stage of China. The vigorous opposition of China to the Soviet Union has been an event of marked influence. Recently, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic went on a world tour during which he underlined over and over again the dangers of Russian imperialism in Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

If we look to the Far East we see that there, too, Russia has sustained yet another crushing diplomatic blow through the signing of a treaty between China and Japan. It is clear that the

Soviets are deeply disturbed by that treaty. I believe that must account for the massive build-up of Soviet forces on that border. It is true to say that wherever one looks in the world we see that the Chinese are undermining the Russian position.

Look, finally, at one other crucial area in the world, the Middle East. In this area, which is of such strategic importance to the world, and to the West in particular, we see that the position of the Soviets is weak indeed and that it is the United States of America which has emerged as the key major superpower in this area.

I conclude, therefore, that the Cassandras who see nothing but the advance of Soviet imperialism blind themselves to the facts. I do not think it does us any good to underestimate the threat which comes from the Russians but, equally, I do not believe it serves our purposes, or those of the West, to fail to recognise the failures and weaknesses of Soviet foreign policy. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Watkinson.

I call on Mr. Müller, who will be followed by Mr. Roper, who has requested ten minutes.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, our Rapporteur, Mr. Gessner, has presented a very balanced report on Europe's external relations. Its balanced nature is corroborated by the fact that the General Affairs Committee has unanimously approved it.

However, a debate such as this is also an opportunity for the odd observation, addition or point of emphasis. I should like to do so by making three observations: on the issue of concern for the southern part of Europe, our relations with China and the issue of terrorism.

First, Southern Europe.

I think we are all agreed that Southern Europe is giving us some cause for anxiety, chiefly because of economic development problems, which are of very considerable importance in that area.

We know that the question of the admission of new members to the European Community plays a major part here. We know that the standard of living in Southern Europe is substantially lower than in the north. We know the high unemployment figures. I believe that on this point the more highly-developed industrialised nations of the north have a certain duty to involve themselves more deeply in Southern Europe. This would have to be done by way of mutual complementarity, by forms of co-operation which would be profitable to the northern nations as well as bringing real help and improvement to the south. I should like to give just

Mr. Müller (continued)

one illustration of an area where this seems to me to be possible.

You all know that there is great concern about the pollution of the Mediterranean. Now, the Mediterranean area is, one might almost say, the recreation centre on the doorstep for tourists from Northern Europe, and it is no secret that the riparian states are frequently unable to raise the necessary capital for installations which would at least halt this process of pollution.

Here we would have a genuine opportunity for co-operation, for investing capital from the northern parts of Europe in Southern Italy or Greece or other Mediterranean regions, in order to set up filtration plant and sewerage systems — installations that would provide a lot of jobs. This would thus also be a contribution to reducing unemployment and, indirectly, the nations of the north and their citizens would, in turn, benefit if the pollution process of the Mediterranean were halted, and perhaps even reversed.

That much on the first point.

Now for the second point — China. I share the opinion of the Rapporteur when he says that, in his view, a security alliance with China is not an object of discussion. But I would nevertheless go so far as to say that, at least for European politics, the factor of China must be included in calculations even in matters of security policy. Admittedly, there is that dictum of Mao's that a distant fire cannot be put out with nearby water, and the other way round. But one must at least include that country's existence and its attitude in deliberations on security.

Of course the West European nations cannot support China's struggle against a nineteenth-century colonial power — incidentally, the last existing colonial power to have occupied foreign territory. That certainly is no task for European nations. But the rôle played by China in world politics should be watched with great attention.

A few weeks ago I had a very interesting personal experience. On a visit to a third world country, which is worrying a great deal about the imperialist tendencies — say, of the Soviet Union — I spoke to a leading man in the defence set-up of that country, which today is absolutely pro-western and, if you like, anti-Soviet in its attitude. This was a man who had been trained in China as a guerrilla and who has meanwhile taken up a totally different stance. Today's China, which has performed a right-about-face in its relations with the country in question, has here made a contribution to a world-wide policy of security that cannot be assessed too highly in Europe. After all, a few things which hap-

pened over the past few years in terms of adjustment and détente between East and West have resulted, *inter alia*, from the fact that the weak position of the West has not become weaker but has perhaps slightly improved just because the Chinese card has begun to play some part in policy considerations.

My third observation concerns the passage which our Rapporteur, Mr. Gessner, has devoted to terrorism. I fully share his view that all nations must have a shared interest in fighting terrorism jointly and decisively. When I read this statement, and when I then realise that there are nations today which act in overt complicity with the terrorists; when I reflect that Yugoslavia, which certainly plays a rôle in relations with Western Europe, not only, as ought to have been made known, releases terrorists who have been detained but actually, in a flagrant spirit of complicity and quite unbeknown to those who are internationally searching for them, goes so far as to take them to a place of safety, then I must declare that there are still nations which patently place themselves beyond the pale of civilised society.

That is why a country such as Bulgaria, a country with a communist government and a member of the Warsaw Pact, presents a contrast because, as we know, that country co-operates well in matters of seeking out terrorists. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, manifestly acts entirely as an outsider in the civilised world.

I believe that if one really wants to fight terrorism in the world — we debated the subject at our last session, as you know, and it is a matter of concern to all nations, whatever form of government they have — then those who are not prepared to help in doing so should be pilloried. This should be made emphatically clear. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Müller.

Mr. Roper has just come in here, and so I call him. He will be followed by Mr. Beith, who has asked for five minutes.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I apologise, Mr. President. I was called to the telephone and was away from the Assembly for a few moments.

It is not my intention to follow all the remarks of the last speaker, although I found his remarks about Bulgaria somewhat odd in view of the Bulgarian secret service activities in London and Paris recently.

But I should like to say something about the report that we have received from Mr. Gessner today. It is a model of the sort of report that we ought to have in Western European Union. It is a full analysis of the problems of our external security, and it enables this Assembly to have a wide-ranging debate on the general

Mr. Roper (continued)

problems of foreign policy facing us at the present time. If I had not known of Mr. Gessner's academic origins I would say that this was a magisterial report providing an analytical basis for discussion by the Assembly of the problems of foreign policy.

This afternoon I want not to cover the wide range of subjects which are bound up in Mr. Gessner's report but to concentrate on one or two paragraphs of his recommendation and one of the paragraphs in his explanatory memorandum which is particularly important for the work that we have been doing in my Committee recently on defence questions and on armaments.

First of all, in his recommendation Mr. Gessner refers to a number of problems which are problems of defence. In the fourth of the introductory paragraphs he points out that military security, which requires a stable balance of forces, can best be maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance. That is the view of my Committee, as well as, I believe, of the Assembly as a whole. But then he goes on to say that an uncontrolled arms race between East and West cannot increase our security but only precipitate new dangers. There is no doubt that not merely in the United Kingdom but throughout Western Europe the rate of Soviet expenditure in the defence area and, in particular, the improvements in the quality of weapons available to the Warsaw Pact forces, are matters which give rise to considerable anxiety throughout the whole of our national parliaments.

But I think it is important that, as Mr. Gessner says in his recommendation, in spite of and perhaps because of our concern at the growth of the Warsaw Pact forces we should none the less persevere where it is possible to try to seek détente with the objective of arms control and balanced force reductions. That is also why we shall be considering later this week a report which I have prepared on the question of disarmament and why, at the next meeting of the Assembly, we shall be considering a report by our colleague Alfons Pawelczyk of the Federal Republic on the balance of the forces in Western Europe with particular reference to discussions at Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions.

Therefore, this section of the report from Mr. Gessner is absolutely in line with the thinking that has gone on in the Defence Committee and will, I think, receive a very wide measure of support within the Assembly as a whole.

We then go on to the recommendation. I should like to comment on two parts of the recommendation. First, there is this call to the

Council regularly to examine the military balance state of East and West relations in Europe and to maintain close co-operation among the member countries in order to promote the progress of détente and negotiation on the control and reduction of armaments. I am sure that is right. I am sure that the Council of WEU has a vital function to play in co-ordinating the rôle of our governments in this area.

Mr. Gessner goes on, in his fourth paragraph, to an area which I have treated also in my report on disarmament matters which will come before the Assembly later on. This is the very difficult, very controversial, area of arms transfers. He points out that within the Council of WEU our governments ought to work towards the development of a common policy for the control of weapon exports. This is obviously a vital and critical current problem. Mr. Müller, who has now left us, was discussing arms to China, a difficult problem facing our countries at the present time, a difficult problem which is made more complex because, in some cases, these arms are produced not by one country but jointly by more than one country member of WEU.

Therefore, if one is talking about a missile developed as a result of Franco-German collaboration, or an aircraft developed from British-French collaboration, that is no longer something which one country can decide totally on its own. It has to be decided on the basis of a common policy within the Alliance.

But in this paragraph, Manfred Gessner is not referring only, or even explicitly, to the difficult problem of arms sales to China. He is talking about the problem of sales to the third world and analysing in detail the pressures in our economies which encourage them. I appreciate what he says, but, as is said in an amendment which I have tabled and will be able to move, it is impossible to find agreement only among the suppliers. If an agreement on controlling arms transfers is to be effective, it will require the agreement of the customers, too. Therefore, when we consider the recommendation in detail, I hope that Mr. Gessner will be able to accept my amendment to this effect.

My Committee has recently been considering the problems of European armaments policy, which we shall debate on Mr. Critchley's report on Wednesday. This brings me to Mr. Gessner's important and interesting paragraph 9. As he says :

"A number of observers have perceived possibilities of co-operation in defence and security issues within the European Community."

That of course is the burden of the report adopted by seven votes to six in my Committee.

Mr. Roper (continued)

I am not sure of the view of the General Affairs Committee as a whole, but it is significant that Mr. Gessner goes on :

"The Rapporteur regards such proposals with scepticism."

We must be careful, however much we want European co-operation developed, lest we put burdens on the EEC in defence and defence procurement which it cannot carry. As we are not debating my Committee's report, I can speak more freely than I shall be able to when we do. As an Assembly, we must be cautious before piling on to the European Communities, which are finding it difficult to deal even with their present problems, complicated and controversial issues such as defence procurement.

We heard today the view of the French Government and we know that other governments believe that there are other mechanisms, such as the independent European programme group, which are most effective. The Assembly should listen carefully not only in this debate but in debates later this week to the wise advice of Manfred Gessner in this respect. It should view with scepticism proposals to transfer to the EEC matters of defence procurement. Since the General Affairs Committee and its wise Rapporteur have made such a recommendation, this should be brought to the attention of the Assembly, because it has a significant bearing on questions that we shall be considering later.

This report, covering such a wide spectrum of foreign policy for our countries, both individually and collectively, should be studied with care. It is the sort of report that we should not merely adopt and forget. We can all take it back to our own parliaments and use it effectively in foreign policy and defence debates in the months ahead. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

I now call Mr. Beith, who has asked for five minutes. He will be followed by Mr. Cavaliere, who has asked for eight minutes.

Mr. BEITH (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Gessner has provided a report which is not only thorough but has given rise to little disagreement. I attribute that not just to his evident drafting skill but to the fact that there is increasing recognition that co-operation in foreign policy among European nations is essential. Not only does this have positive advantages, but in a number of areas, failure by the European powers to act in concert could be disastrous.

Some examples are the maintenance of our relationship with the United States and our very different attitude to the Soviet Union, a difficult combination of realism about Soviet pretensions

and aims, the constructive desire to reduce our combined efforts in armaments production and duplication, our attitudes to southern Africa and to the North-South dialogue, where, if we struck different postures and sought different results, there could be disastrous consequences.

Some other similar matters do not figure largely in the report. One is the fight for human rights, which is becoming much more an issue of foreign policy. With some justice, we regard ourselves as first guardians of those rights, since we have sought hardest to incorporate them in our national affairs. Also, in the search for peace in the Middle East, there are great dangers if we are at odds with one another.

As recommendation 5 implies, we have a common interest in widening the number of countries prepared to co-operate in foreign policy through European media and organisations. Spain, Portugal and Greece are candidates for major co-operation. This has not only the direct effect which their rôle as democracies on the southern flank of Europe brings but the indirect benefits of the knowledge and actions of those countries in South America, the Arab world and elsewhere.

There is a more fundamental point about European co-operation and what it is for. It has been a motive for European co-operation since the war, and of the co-operation of all the institutions that we have mentioned — whether this one, the Council of Europe or the European Community itself — to secure a basis for co-operation that will give internal stability to Europe and prevent any further internal conflict and that will enable Europe to make a united contribution to a more peaceful order of world affairs.

That overriding objective is in some ways more important for defence and security even than our attempts, important though they are, at co-operation on weapons procurement and standardisation of weapons, or even on the issue, mentioned by John Roper, of how far the EEC should become involved in such issues.

I can speak only for my own country, but there is no doubt that in Britain we have allowed our people to lose sight of some of the fundamental purposes of European co-operation. Debates, in Britain at least, tend to be preoccupied, as the EEC institutions themselves tend to be, with arguments about food surpluses and the European budget, about fishing disputes, about harmonisation, and about whether we have centigrade or fahrenheit, and grammes or ounces. They are all perfectly legitimate matters of argument, because there are reasonable issues to be argued and outstanding difficulties to be resolved.

However, the dominance of that kind of discussion, important though it is, tends to conceal

Mr. Beith (continued)

the purposes of co-operation. Over the last few years it has successfully concealed from a large part of the British public the reason why we have embarked on any of these ventures at all and why British political leaders have combined with those of other European countries to try to build European co-operation.

This Assembly has no direct concern with most of the contentious matters — domestic matters — which I have just mentioned, such as food surpluses, fishing disputes, harmonisation and the rest of it. Our concern is with the security of Europe. But that concern gives us both an opportunity and a duty to call attention to the dependence of that security and co-operation in fields such as foreign policy. We in this Assembly and when we return from it should be the first to draw attention to the fundamental purposes of European co-operation and to what that implies. We have a responsibility to speak out in our own domestic debates and to point out what Europe is about.

Whatever disputes we may have about other European issues, it is vital that we spell out to our own people that security requires co-operation and that co-operation requires a great deal of common cause in the kind of foreign policy issues to which Mr. Gessner has drawn our attention today. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Beith.

I now call Mr. Cavaliere, who would like to speak for eight minutes. He will be followed by Mr. Valleix, who has six amendments down, so I hope that he can confine his intervention to about five minutes.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I too wish to express my favourable appreciation of the Rapporteur's work. I endorse the guiding theme of his report to the effect that Europe and the individual countries need to bend every effort towards ensuring peace, which alone can bring us abiding economic and social progress. The Rapporteur indicated some of the difficulties in the way of Europe's pursuing its own foreign policy, and I agree that these do exist. But let us not forget that we stand on the eve of direct elections to the European Parliament, a solemn occasion that should have a tremendous effect on the powers and functions to be assigned in future to Europe. This is the background to the view taken by us of the foreign policy Europe could and should pursue.

I agree with the Rapporteur that Europe should not be a superpower, but I ask him, as I ask myself, whether there can be any "civil power" if Europe is not, or will not be, able to supply itself, directly above all, with the arms needed for its defence in case of need.

I wish to remind you that in answer to my written question 188 the Council said that the Netherlands and most of the WEU member states have concluded with the United States protocols of agreement for arms procurement. Now, I wonder whether the Western European countries are, like other European countries, hastening to conclude arms procurement agreements with America and other countries, in order that once we have an integrated Europe — that is, what may well be called a superpower — it may or should not itself dream of manufacturing its own independent weaponry, and so of conducting an autonomous armaments policy of its own.

I think it would be a desirable development. One point in the report which gives me pause, and to which I draw Mr. Gessner's attention, is paragraph 51 on human rights. I get the impression that there is some wish to evade the problem and sacrifice this extremely vital point for Europe and WEU in relation to the need for détente. The second paragraph of the preamble states very properly — or rather, let me say, reminds us — that the Western European countries share the common objective of promoting democracy and human rights universally, and that this objective does not run counter to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Let me ask the Rapporteur for an explanation, and an assurance. What does it mean, after noting that at Belgrade the problem of human rights ended in a complete fiasco in view of the hardening of the attitude of the USSR, to assert with an eye to the 1980 conference in Madrid, that a new report should be compiled to establish WEU's views on the matters to be dealt with there, and then go on to say: "However, one should avoid overburdening the process of co-operation in the framework of the CSCE with new demands" in respect of human rights? Does it mean perhaps we ought to abandon the fight? If it does, then I am sorry to say I really cannot approve the report, because that would be to forget all that the Council of Europe, and Western Europe, have said and written on the subject; we should also have to strike out in the second paragraph of the preamble the reference to the Western European countries and the principle of the defence of human rights.

My preoccupation is increased by an amendment by Mr. Valleix proposing to leave out in the second paragraph of the preamble the words from "universally" to the end, i.e. the notion that it does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states. I think we should disqualify ourselves if we were to confirm the principles hinted at in paragraph 51 of the report and practically confirmed by Mr. Valleix's amendment. So then, have we fought in vain? Does it not mean a thing that, since Belgrade, in the USSR and other eastern countries, acts

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

of repression of every demonstration in favour of upholding the defence of human rights have increased in number and grown in intensity of persecution? Should we tell these citizens they have nothing more to hope for from the countries of Western Europe, that we feel no solidarity with them? I wonder at this juncture what we meant this morning by our expression of affection and esteem to our President because of what happened to him in Malta, amounting, apart from other considerations, to a demonstration of disrespect for human rights. I therefore ask for explanations, and trust the Assembly will confirm our will to uphold the principle of human rights. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to say first of all how much the concerns expressed by the Rapporteur, Mr. Gessner, in his excellent report on Europe's external relations are shared by most of us, indeed doubtless by all of us here.

To strengthen the process of détente and really extend it in regard to the security of the states involved, to relaunch the North-South dialogue, to help the less-industrialised countries of Southern Europe in their efforts to modernise and stabilise their economies, such are the inevitable aims of any common policy of the European states in the light of their international responsibilities.

In no way, therefore, are my present remarks aimed at questioning the excellent premises on which the Rapporteur's conclusions are based, but rather at adding a few explanations and nuances which might help towards a realistic implementation of the general policy proposed.

First of all — and here I can perhaps mollify the colleague who has just spoken — Mr. Gessner rightly stresses that the only possible basis for a European external policy is the preservation and deepening of our common heritage of human rights and basic freedoms. I am sure we are fully agreed on that.

Faced with the many different situations throughout the world which conflict with the ideal shared by all our states, nations and peoples, Europe owes it to itself to act resolutely with all the means at its disposal. But we must also be wary of using the defence of human rights as a pretext for policies that actually lead in other directions. This is important above all in regard to East-West relations. It will obviously always be possible — I almost said necessary — to criticise the eastern countries for their refusal

to grant their citizens the fundamental rights and freedoms.

We know well, however, that we cannot refrain from co-operation with these countries because of this. A certain moderation is thus called for when making an ideological assessment of the partners' attitude and behaviour — moderation on the part of East and West alike.

That is why I propose, in the amendment I have tabled, that the Western European countries' unswerving attachment to human rights should be dissociated from the different problem of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states — a very different problem, but one which, in certain respects, might involve a kind of transcendence of the respect for individual freedom. This must not take the form of renunciation, and I shall refer to it again when speaking to the amendment.

Let us never forget that what was done after Helsinki made it possible to unblock a given situation, although I understand the honourable member's comment and recognise its importance. Nevertheless, the blockage which arose at Belgrade was not a positive element either, and I therefore suggest that we should be morally unshakable in our attachment to the principle involved, but that we should proceed with caution when invoking it. My position is therefore based essentially on the need for caution, and not only on attachment to fundamentals. I think we can consider the latter aspect too, and I shall touch on two details shortly.

Second, Mr. Gessner quite rightly reminds us that European security depends to a large extent on preservation of the Atlantic Alliance. This is obvious. Rather surprisingly, he explains that he is referring only to military security, whereas in fact it seems necessary to stress that Atlantic western solidarity is a wider question than simply the joint solution of military problems. Our states are not unanimous about the military implementation of their security policy, but they are all certainly unanimous in their attachment to western solidarity.

Third, Mr. Gessner is happy about the present state of negotiations between East and West, which are basically concerned with arms control rather than disarmament. It therefore seems essential for Europe that the considerable arms stocks maintained by both sides on its territory, and the very high level of forces which it supports, should be effectively cut down under conditions of equal security for all. It is not negotiations between blocs aimed at channelling the arms race that need to be encouraged, but rather a concerted effort to achieve universal disarmament under effective control.

Finally, Mr. Gessner raises the important and difficult problem of arms exports. Here, however,

Mr. Valleix (continued)

we must bear in mind that we Europeans have not yet been able to define either a production or a marketing policy among ourselves. Our consideration of the matter is therefore a little premature, in view of the existing difficulties. If there are arms suppliers it is because there are customers. Must Europe stand completely aside from a situation brought about not only by its own actions but also by foreign demand, a demand which would then be met by other suppliers?

You will have understood, Mr. President, that my remarks do not affect the main issue but are aimed simply at improving a very interesting and important report. We would wish our Assembly's position on this document to be as unanimous as possible.

Finally, we must remember that for the last few years Europe has found itself in an unstable and dangerous world situation and that it has frequently been hampered in its ability to take initiatives and in its political influence.

I believe, Ladies and Gentlemen, that this report will help us regain the initiative — which we should not be prepared to give up — in the arena of world politics to which Europe has attached so much importance throughout its history, just as we should not renounce the political influence of a Europe which, as I recalled a little while ago, is so attached to the defence of human rights.

(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. We are at the end of the list of speakers in the general debate.

I ask the Rapporteur to take the floor.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — To begin with, Mr. President, I am delighted to see the great measure of agreement this report has received. In fact, I find the agreement a little on the plentiful side and I have asked myself whether I did not perhaps go wrong somewhere. Be that as it may, a whole string of supplements have been put forward which I can only acknowledge with approval. I see no reason to comment on them any further. Instead I should like to deal with a few points which are perhaps still in need of further elucidation.

Attention has been drawn to the importance which stabilisation of conditions in Southern Europe has for Europe's external relations. I should like to emphasise here that of course we welcome the application for admission of Portugal, Spain and other countries to the European

Community, not least against the background — and this leads us again straight to our subject of Europe's external relations — that Portugal and Spain, in view of their centuries-old policy pursued well beyond the boundaries of Europe, possess a great wealth of experience which they will bring with them into the European Community. Even though these relations no longer exist in a formal way as they did in the past, there exist nevertheless relationships with Africa or Latin America, relationships which, used correctly, can certainly be of importance to the European Community. I believe that this is a point of view — I dealt with it briefly in my report — that once more needs oral restatement.

I agree with my colleague Mr. Watkinson when he says we should also realise that the other side has had failures. I too feel that our discussions sometimes are a little one-sided. This is important because much of what we are doing for our security costs a lot of money. I believe that we do the greatest service to our security by using our financial resources to the best advantage. This, however, can be done only if we are quite clear about the real nature of the ratio of forces. If this is presented incorrectly then sums of money will flow into certain channels, money it might have been much more important to employ elsewhere. I believe that this consideration should play a greater part in our discussions than it has in the past.

What has been said about the People's Republic of China has, so far, been exceedingly cautious. I think that is very sound. Secondly: no one has disputed that it is necessary to do business with that great country. Should there be anyone in the world who thinks he might stop us from doing so, then he must be told right from the start, and very clearly: we do not let anyone else make the rules for us!

At the same time I would ask you always to bear in mind that our external policy should be so designed that it does not become dependent on the conflict between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. After all, one must remember that situations could well arise — maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow — in which this conflict became less important, perhaps because there were new men in charge in the two countries and the conflict was then no longer as pronounced as it is today. If we allowed our external policy to become dependent on that conflict continuing, we might one day find ourselves in a difficult situation. This should always be borne in mind.

We have quite enough difficulties as a result of the existence of one heavily-armed communist great power in this world. I do not know whether the position of the western democracies would in the long run become easier if a second communist great power, also armed, were added to

Mr. Gessner (continued)

the first. And as I have said, always to rely on these two being in conflict with one another would, to my mind, be exceedingly risky. We would find ourselves in a dangerous state of dependence. I felt I needed to say this yet again, to make my own position quite clear.

I agree with my colleague Mr. Müller: we do indeed have many opportunities for doing something sensible with regard to Southern Europe. I too have been exceedingly worried to read and hear of the alarming way in which the Mediterranean is being increasingly polluted. This is no longer a matter for the riparian countries alone; the problem concerns us all, and it would be truly splendid if, as I proposed in my report, we could agree on a joint aid programme. We must realise that this is not a unilateral but a common interest. It applies just as much to the northern states of Europe and the states in Central Europe as it does to those located further south.

To my mind, too — I do agree here — there are states which are not only suspect of complicity with terrorists but actually practise it. However, I do not believe one can impose any solution by force. A long, long process of persuasion, including political persuasion, will be needed, and I am not certain that it will succeed in every instance. I venture to doubt it when I run my eye down the list of states concerned. However, the goal is rewarding enough for us to aim at it.

I agree with Mr. Roper. Of course the issue of arms supplies also concerns the buyers and not only those who are trying to sell. But I would add that if the sellers agreed — which they do not — to limit and restrict exports an enormous step forward would have been taken. What is needed on the part of the sellers is, I would say, really more of a restrictive nature whereas, where the buyers are concerned, what matters most is persuasion. It is a case of convincing them that ultimately it will do them no good to arm themselves to the teeth. Political, maybe even ideological persuasion will be needed here. But I admit that of course one must bear both sides in mind. Except that I think it is perhaps a little more natural to tackle first those states which are themselves producers and suppliers, simply because this applies to quite a number of states in our own camp. Nor do I deny the need also to discuss the whole issue with the Soviet Union and other states. And I repeat what I said in my statement earlier: I regard it as most encouraging that, in this respect, the Americans and the Russians have already entered into a dialogue.

I do not think it very probable that Europe could become a super-state — at least not in respect of its military potential. I certainly do

not underrate this potential; it is very considerable. But matters are as we have seen: this Europe is very largely in a state of dependence; once the oil stopped flowing the tanks would not be able to go on rolling very long, and once we ceased to receive other raw materials Europe's military potential would be considerably narrowed down and restricted — in contrast to the great powers which are far more autonomous in this respect than we are.

I do not believe that on the issue of human rights — which incidentally is being very fiercely debated in the Federal Republic too — it is necessary to stage a demonstration every day. Nor do I believe that it is necessary every morning to pass a resolution expressing support for the preservation of human rights. This I do not believe. I do believe that if one wants to make human rights a fact, if one wants to promote the process that is now in motion, then one must in fact — and this touches on what our colleague Mr. Valleix said — practise a certain measure of circumspection. We in the Federal Republic, at any rate, have learned from experience — that excessive demonstrating leads nowhere. It merely becomes a matter of prestige on the other side, and the result is that attitudes harden. But with hardened attitudes one cannot easily achieve results. This implies using the right means depending on the situation. Admittedly, this may mean that in the United Nations, for instance, one champions a particular kind of solution for a particular case, and that one does this quite openly and forcefully. But I believe, as a general principle, that if one really wishes to help the people affected one should keep out of the discussion anything that might needlessly burden that process. This does not rule out — and here I agree with you — continuing to demand that human rights be respected.

That is why it was quite simply a matter of course for me to return to it in my recommendation and to say that it should be universally promoted. For it is important to point out that it is not just in one part of the world that human rights are being trampled underfoot. If we look around we shall find that there are very many states where human rights are not being respected. If I review in my mind the more than 150 states which are members of the United Nations, and then count how many of these 150 are democracies, I find there are barely 30; the majority of the states in the United Nations are not democracies. If we talk about human rights and if we are serious about respecting them then we must not look in only one direction. We must look at every country where human rights are being trampled underfoot.

I do not believe that concern with this problem constitutes interference with the internal affairs of certain countries. I would have to quote now from a speech which I made on this

Mr. Gessner (continued)

very topic in the Council of Europe some time ago — on why discussion of this issue is not interference with the internal affairs of a state. For one thing, because human rights are an acknowledged principle of our international law and for another — I am now thinking particularly of the eastern bloc countries — because anything that happens there in domestic politics is justified on ideological grounds. This is a fact: it can be read in all the speeches available to us and — let me be very careful — published over there in the eastern bloc countries. And since the ideological debate between us and the communists is continuing it necessarily includes also what we subsume under the concept of human rights. I do not propose to elaborate this in greater detail. But I wanted to suggest, at least, the trend of my arguments in this area.

Mr. Valleix touched on a few points which I have dealt with briefly elsewhere. He said we should proceed with caution, we should impose a certain moderation upon ourselves. All that is correct and I believe that I, too, tried to imply this in my report. I do not think that document suggests that I was, as it were, trying to use the issue of human rights to serve another end. Quite certainly that was not my intention, nor does my report suggest anything of the kind. When I talk about human rights I mean human rights, and it is not a case of using human rights as a cudgel to get back to the cold war. This is an attitude one finds; but it is not mine.

It has been said quite rightly that here in Western Europe and in the world generally, in the East and in the West, there are great stockpiles of arms and armies which should be reduced. That is correct, and I said what I thought about it in my report; what I would like to add is that it is not just a matter of reducing them but of preventing further unrestrained rearmament. Both these points must become the focal point of our considerations. Disarmament must be as balanced as possible. Of course if one side tried to dupe the other the dialogue would very soon be at an end. Secondly, as I have said, we must see to it that the armaments race does not gain ever more momentum with the result that it becomes increasingly difficult to halt it.

I am not quite sure, Ladies and Gentlemen, whether I have covered all the points which have been made. I agree with Mr. Valleix that we must get down to new initiatives. He is quite right. I would add, however, that we have taken in the past, and are taking today, a whole string of initiatives which ought to be supported.

May I thank you very cordially for the attention you have given me. I am pleased to have met with so much agreement and I also hope that

we may be able to adopt the draft recommendation with a solid majority. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Madam Chairman, do you wish to take the floor?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. President. Just a few words. The Committee as a whole was very pleased that this very extensive report was accepted by everybody. I would describe it as a great success. But one of the reasons why the points put forward by the Rapporteur were universally accepted lies in the nature of the subject. As for the amendments which are being proposed, none of them is so major that agreement cannot be reached on them. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Chairman.

We shall now consider the amendments. Nine amendments to the draft recommendation have been tabled. We shall take them in the order in which they relate to the paragraphs of the preamble and the draft recommendation proper. Thus, we start with Amendment 4 on the second paragraph of the preamble; then Amendments 1 and 5 on the fourth paragraph; then Amendments 2 and 6 on the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble. Then we deal with the amendments to the recommendation proper, that is to say, Amendment 7 on paragraph 2, Amendments 8 and 3 on paragraph 4 and Amendment 9 on paragraph 5.

I now call Mr. Valleix. Do you wish to move your amendment, Mr. Valleix? That is Amendment 4:

4. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "and that this objective" to the end of the paragraph.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — After hearing the words of our Rapporteur, I think that there should be no divergences amongst us regarding the absolutely paramount priority we accord to human rights and fundamental freedoms.

It goes without saying that this priority finds affirmation in a principle which we fully recognise, namely non-interference in the affairs of other countries. But I would reaffirm here the pre-eminence of human rights and the imperative demand for fundamental freedoms. The only problem, I would repeat, Mr. Rapporteur, is whether it is desirable that the following clause should appear in this text: "and that this objective does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states", since I am afraid that this affirmation might conceivably serve the purposes of others simply to draw the

Mr. Valleix (continued)

opposite conclusions in the name of another ideology. I mean specifically that this might be deemed to constitute interference and also that it would be possible to interpret the clause as indicating our intention to defend human rights and the fundamental freedoms of mankind without any limitations if I may say so, as regards the respect due to states.

It was with that in mind that I advocated caution just now, but since, I repeat, there cannot in any case be room for doubt about the pre-eminence of human rights and fundamental freedoms over any other requirement, I should like to have such reassurances as the Rapporteur can give me in order to draw what would in my eyes be the right conclusion as regards maintaining or not maintaining the amendment; for in my view there can be no basic divergences between us. My remarks are of a tactical nature only, and I do not believe they have caused any confusion in our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to ask the Chairman of the French Delegation, our colleague Mr. Valleix, to withdraw his amendment. Of course, I agree with him about what he has just said, but since the Rapporteur and the Committee were careful how they formulated this part-clause before they added it, surely it is inconceivable that the members of WEU should now withdraw it, for they would then be running the risk of undermining our position on the defence of human rights. So far as interference is concerned, it would be an aberration on our part if we were to put on kid gloves at this point, when some people make no bones about proclaiming a world revolution, concerning themselves with all the internal problems that arise in our own countries, and employing agents who are ready to challenge democracy. And doubtless none of that constitutes interference with the internal affairs of our democracies.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — I endorse the request that this amendment should be withdrawn and I would remind the Assembly that last year, during the previous session, an amendment was tabled in the context of the Segre report which precisely affirmed that invoking the defence of human rights did not signify interference in the internal affairs of other countries. I would not want the presentation of this amendment to lay us open to the opposite interpretation: that we have gone back on our former position and acknowledge that

Brezhnev was right when he protested in September against states that spoke of the trampling underfoot of human rights in Russia and accused them of interference in the country's internal affairs.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding I would strongly urge Mr. Valleix to withdraw his amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I should have liked to hear the Rapporteur's opinion again. Does he wish to confirm it now or is he deferring his explanations until later?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Rapporteur, will you take the floor? You have been asked.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President this is a problem we discussed in the General Affairs Committee. I should like to abide by the line which we agreed on there. We were all agreed that the text should stand as proposed in the draft.

What I am going to say may sound a little caustic, but I shall say it all the same because it may help to dispel somewhat the reservations of our good friend Mr. Valleix. It is interesting, is it not, to read in documents from the Soviet Union that they, too, are in favour of human rights? The only problem is that by human rights they understand something different from us. This is why no one can really take umbrage at our referring to human rights here. Everybody is in favour of human rights, even the Soviet Union, except that what is meant by the term there is not identical with what we understand by it. This means that one has to discuss content. The concept exists in Soviet civil law just as it does in ours, with, as I have just pointed out, a totally different interpretation.

I do not therefore, as I have said, see any great problem about agreeing the passage as it stands in the draft.

We must, besides, be clear about one thing. If we were to conclude that discussing human rights was interfering with the sovereignty of other states then, strictly speaking, we could not go on conducting the ideological debate with communism at all. That objection would bring everything to a halt. But since we are agreed that normalised relations between states does not mean ideological coexistence it is no more than logical to accept the recommendation as drafted.

I therefore ask you to follow the line of the Committee. We should leave the text as it stands.

The PRESIDENT. — Madam Chairman, do you wish to take the floor?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I think we might abide by the Committee's judgment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — It is obvious that we are not going to reopen discussions on a point on which we all hold similar views and which constitutes the law that unites us all: human rights. You will have seen that I was approaching these thoughts solely from a tactical standpoint: the difference that specifically exists between the things that unite us — namely, human rights and fundamental freedoms — and the thesis advanced in other countries, namely human rights and fundamental freedoms considered as ideologies.

Since we are all agreed on essentials, I would simply express the hope, echoing the words of the Rapporteur, that the West may be able to ensure that its common faith prevails and is propagated — with caution wherever necessary. I agree with you that, after Helsinki, a certain trend has asserted itself. Twenty thousand Jews were able to leave the USSR during October. It is true that, in the meantime, Belgrade proved on the whole to be disappointing. That is some measure of the difficulties we face. Let us reaffirm our values, and tactical issues will not divide us. I withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Amendment 4 is withdrawn.

I now call Amendment 1:

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Considering that military security in Europe is based on a stable balance of forces between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact";

The amendment is in the name of Mr. Antoni and others.

I call Mr. Calamandrei to move it.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — As I said in my speech, this is the other amendment of which I am one of the movers. Its purpose is to bring the relevant paragraph of the preamble into line with the overall spirit of the recommendation, which is essentially marked by the desire for global and dynamic promotion of international stability between East and West on the irrevocable basis of the balance of forces.

In the fourth paragraph of the preamble it seems to me that this very desire of ours could be obscured. The point is not to reaffirm the value of any particular Atlantic alliance — which is how the paragraph is phrased at present

— but to reaffirm the value of an Atlantic alliance endowed with the ability and will to maintain a balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact. That is the purpose of our amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. Who wishes to speak next?

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this amendment has already been tabled at the meeting of the General Affairs Committee in Rome, and was rejected by a very big majority. The Committee took the view, which I wish to restate here, that it is not possible to reduce two such different alliances to a common denominator, viz. the alliance of free states within the North Atlantic defence community and the enforced pact which the Soviet Union has brought into being with the Warsaw Pact.

We moreover took the view that it must be made perfectly clear that the Soviet Union is arming in a way that does not match its defence needs alone. Hence the anxiety within the West European states that these efforts are not merely defensive.

In order to make this clear the Committee agreed unanimously the draft which Mr. Gessner has submitted to us. I would ask, therefore, that we abide by this draft and that the two amendments which have just been supported by Mr. Calamandrei be negatived.

The PRESIDENT. — Do you wish to speak, Madam Chairman?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Let us abide by the Committee's wording.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Rapporteur.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I endorse what has just been said and would like to say the following on the subject myself.

To me it is obvious that the alliances in the East and in the West cannot, by their very nature, be equated with one another. This seems to me to be the decisive point.

I pointed out in Rome that after the second world war there were many years when the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance were alone in having nuclear weapons at their disposal and in being able to transport them. On the other side there was nothing. It was not till years later that the Soviet Union caught up. If the western world really had an aggressive character and had wished to attack then it would have had an opportunity during those years to fight without the risk of its own total destruc-

Mr. Gessner (continued)

tion. But it did not do so. And why not? Because its attitude is defensive.

If we place the Warsaw Pact and NATO on the same footing then I do not know that we shall do justice to the defensive character of the alliance. I have certain doubts on that score.

Because this is so I believe that the formulation should stand as envisaged in the draft. To spell out my meaning clearly: even if only NATO existed and there were no Warsaw Pact I believe that peace in Europe would not in consequence be threatened. I do not know whether the same could be said if things were the other way round.

This is what makes me plead that the draft recommendation, as it is before you, be adopted.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I shall now put the amendment tabled by Mr. Antoni and Mr. Calamandrei to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

I now call Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Valleix:

5. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "military security" and insert "the security of Europe".

Will Mr. Valleix please take the floor in order to speak to this amendment?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I shall be brief, because I in fact referred to this amendment in my speech just now.

In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, we read "that military security, which presupposes a stable balance of forces, can best be maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance". I should like the word "military" to be deleted and replaced, if possible, by "the security of Europe", for this seems to me to give wider scope to our thinking and aspirations, and also reflects the trust we place in the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?..

What is the opinion of the Committee?

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I recommend that the amendment be agreed.

The PRESIDENT. — The Committee agrees with this amendment. I must adopt the same procedure of voting by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

I now call Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Antoni and Mr. Calamandrei. It reads as follows:

2. Leave out the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Concerned that the uninterrupted and uncontrolled arms race between the West and the East may upset the balance of forces and give rise to new dangers;"

Will you please move your amendment, Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Here again, in the case of Amendment 2, the purpose is to correct a wording which seems to me inconsistent with the general spirit of the recommendation and the explanatory memorandum, particularly paragraphs 37 and 53 of the latter.

The point here cannot be to express concern in the present terms of the fifth paragraph of the preamble, but rather to express concern at the possibility that the Soviet military effort might change the overall balance of forces to the detriment of the West. However, this possibility is in our opinion already accounted for in the sixth paragraph. That is why Amendment 2, as you can see, combines the present fifth and sixth paragraphs in one new paragraph.

The PRESIDENT. — Who wishes to speak against the amendment? What is the view of the Committee? Mr. Rapporteur.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am genuinely concerned at the increase in Soviet armament efforts and I think that this should be expressed in the recommendation. We discussed the same proposed amendment in Rome. I recommend that we abide by the Committee's line and reject the amendments moved.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now put Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Antoni and Mr. Calamandrei to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

I now call Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Valleix, which reads as follows:

6. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "uncontrolled".

The President (continued)

Will you please move your amendment, Mr. Valleix?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — My thinking here is somewhat different from that which led me to table the previous amendment, since this amendment is designed to stress that what is dangerous is the arms race itself and that, in consequence, it is not so much a matter of controlling the arms race as, if possible, of preventing it. It is accordingly with this in mind that I am asking for deletion of the qualifying adjective in the phrase “an uncontrolled arms race”, so that our main effort can focus on exerting real influence on the arms race and the competition which it involves, and not merely monitoring its progress.

I should be glad if we could agree on this point, since it seems to me that this aim accords far more closely with our aspirations and with the interests of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Will you give the view of the Committee, Mr. Rapporteur?

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I recommend that the amendment be adopted.

The PRESIDENT. — We now have to vote on Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Valleix.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

I now come to Amendment 7 tabled by Mr. Valleix, which reads as follows:

7. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “reduction and control” and insert “universal and controlled reduction”.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — The subject here is perhaps more difficult, but it is also more important since we are now dealing with the operative text of the recommendation.

It goes without saying that, when we speak of “negotiations on the reduction and control of armaments”, we are stressing two different ideas, whose application would not necessarily be simultaneous and not necessarily cumulative. To what does control apply? To what does the reduction of armaments apply?

It seems to me that the negotiations should cover a reduction in arms as a whole, and that it is this reduction which should be controlled.

We could thus monitor the reduction, covering the whole range of armaments, in a lucid and responsible manner.

That is the justification for my Amendment 7, in which I propose that the words “the reduction and control of armaments” be replaced by the words “universal...” — that is, covering all weapons — “...and controlled reduction of armaments”.

I believe, Mr. Rapporteur, that our respective ways of thinking cannot be very far apart, but it seems to me that the form of words which I am proposing is more condensed and represents the Committee's preoccupations more comprehensively. I should therefore like to hear your views on the subject.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the Committee?

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, on the one hand I have a great deal of sympathy for the remarks made by Mr. Valleix. On the other, however, I should like to say that in the report we concentrated on European conditions. It seemed to me right and logical to draw the appropriate conclusions from this. One should, after all, realise that the broader the basis one gives to the problem the more difficult it will be to solve. It is already quite difficult enough to come to definite arrangements in Europe. If the whole problem is now raised to a universal level then I am sure it will become even more difficult to achieve results. That is why I would like us to concentrate here in Europe. Bear in mind also the MBFR negotiations. They are one of the reasons behind the present formulation. Conditions are quite difficult enough — we should not introduce extra complications. I therefore urge that we proceed on the lines of the original draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — Am I right in thinking that you are sticking to the report and the draft recommendation you have tabled?

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*). — Yes.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). — With your leave, Mr. President, I am going to make a proposal.

I believe that it is the adjective “universal” which, for the time being, presents a stumbling-block for the Rapporteur. In these circumstances, could we not say: “...the controlled reduction of armaments”?

This wording would doubtless follow the lines desired by Mr. Valleix. Moreover, if I have

Mr. Jung (continued)

understood aright, the Rapporteur wants us to confine ourselves to the European scene.

Presented in this form, the amendment would become almost a drafting amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the view of the Committee?

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I would agree with that, but would point out that the scope for interpretation of our text has of course increased enormously as a result. But I accept the proposal.

The PRESIDENT. — I must confess that I did not quite catch the proposal. Mr. Jung amended the amendment. What will be the text of the amendment now, Mr. Jung? Will you please read it again?

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). — Here is the text: "... in order to promote the progress of détente and negotiations on the controlled reduction of armaments".

The PRESIDENT. — I understand. I repeat, instead of "reduction and control of armaments" we have "controlled reduction" — is that correct?

Mr. JUNG (*France*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Valleix has indicated his agreement to the amendment on which we shall now vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7, as amended, is agreed to.

I now come to Amendment 8 tabled by Mr. Valleix, which reads as follows:

8. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Mr. Valleix, will you please move your amendment?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I feel incidentally some embarrassment, Mr. President, at having handed in these amendments belatedly, but this position is sometimes unavoidable for people who, like myself, do not take part in the Committee's deliberations. Having just now in my speech demonstrated the essential expediency of this amendment — that is, the deletion of paragraph 4 of the recommendation — I shall not revert to the substance, namely, that in the armaments field there are not only sellers but also buyers.

In this regard, the Rapporteur was good enough to combine the two lines of argument — that adopted by Mr. Roper, which partially follows the same lines as mine, and my own

argument. It is obvious that, if this amendment were to be rejected, I should rally to the support of Mr. Roper's.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Does Mr. Roper wish to do so?...

What is the opinion of the Committee?

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I consider that deleting paragraph 4 would not do justice to the problem of the purchasers, which is touched upon here. I would therefore enter a plea for paragraph 4 to be kept.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on Amendment 8.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is negatived.

I now call Mr. Roper to move Amendment 3:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, at end add:

" , recognising that any effective agreement on arms transfers will require the participation of both supplier and recipient countries ;"

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — We seem to be following House of Lords procedure rather than House of Commons procedure in that we are attempting to discuss the substance of whether we should have the clause before trying to improve it.

I should like to add the suggested words because I believe this text would link up rather better with the recommendation which we shall be considering later this week from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, in which we call, in paragraph 1 (e) of our recommendation, for agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international transfer of conventional arms. The recommendation as it stands overlooks the importance of involving customer states in any control of arms sales. I believe the Rapporteur accepts this point. It is fair to say that many developing countries are suspicious of attempts to restrain arms sales and consider that the effect would be discriminatory and would interfere with their sovereign right to defence, set out in the United Nations charter. Therefore, it is important to avoid any suggestion that we are trying to set up a suppliers' group to impose control on customer countries without consultation.

I hope that the form of words that I have suggested should be added at the end of Mr. Gessner's recommendation:

Mr. Roper (continued)

“, recognising that any effective agreement on arms transfers will require the participation of both supplier and recipient countries”

will be acceptable to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against this amendment ?...

I would point out that there is no comparison here with the House of Lords. Rule 29 (4) states that where two or more amendments are contradictory in the same paragraph, the amendment which differs most from the text of the Committee's report shall have priority. No doubt the amendment by Mr. Valleix, who wanted to throw this into the wastepaper basket, is as far-reaching as Mr. Roper's.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Normally, an amendment seeking to delete something is taken after an amendment attempting to improve it. One attempts to improve a paragraph and, having done so, considers whether it shall be included. I do not think an amendment of this kind is within the terms of Rule 29(2). None the less, Sir, it is within your competence and I bow to your ruling.

The PRESIDENT. — We do not want a dispute over this. What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I recommend that the amendment be agreed.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Roper.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We now come to the final amendment tabled by Mr. Valleix, Amendment 9 :

9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “integration” and insert “unification”.

Will Mr. Valleix please move his amendment ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I do not think, Mr. President, that there is any call to mix up once again what is essential and what is less so. In this paragraph 5, the word “unification” might, because of the way in which the paragraph is drafted and because of the subject referred to with the word “integration”, have repercussions in the shape of arguments, if I may say so, both in the military sphere and possibly at what we might describe as the European level.

It has occurred to me that, in order to avoid risks or misapprehensions of this kind, and so as to ensure that we are able to preserve all the excellence and, I hope, effects of this text, we could replace the word “integration” by the word “unification”. It is in order to give the text its best chance of success and of gaining a hearing, if I may so express myself, that I am proposing this slight change which would, in my view, add still further to the high quality of the recommendation as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — But, Mr. President, we are smugly playing at splitting hairs and complicated quibbles.

I cannot distinguish — or rather, I do distinguish quite well, Mr. Valleix — between the semantic implications of “unification” and “integration”. But if we are going to debate each word, we shall end up with a whole Larousse ! Personally, I prefer the word “integration”, because it coalesces several elements without any loss of meaning, which would give us a full ensemble and not just one that was all bass drum !

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I must confess that basically both terms are acceptable to me. In German they come to the same thing anyway. It is a little difficult for me to decide which I am in favour of. But pressed for a decision I would recommend that we leave the clause as it was worded in the Committee's draft. This seems to me to be more precise.

The PRESIDENT. — The Assembly will now vote on Amendment 9.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 9 is negatived.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 790, as amended.

If the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to*¹.

I call Mr. Calamandrei.

1. See page 18.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — In explanation of my vote I would like to emphasise that, although the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the preamble, to which I together with other colleagues had tabled amendments, have remained as they were in the original text and their sense and wording are still in our opinion so foreign to the overall spirit of the recommendation and the explanatory memorandum, with which we agree, we have not hesitated to vote in favour of the entire substantive recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

4. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow

morning, Tuesday 21st November, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Disarmament ; The limitation of strategic arms ; New weapons and defence strategy (Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Documents 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789).
2. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.*)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 21st November 1978

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Disarmament ; The limitation of strategic arms ; New weapons and defence strategy (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789).

Speakers : The President, Mr. Roper (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. van den Bergh (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Baumel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cook, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Roberti.

4. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Speakers : The President, Mr. Tomlinson (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*).

Replies by Mr. Tomlinson to questions put by : Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Minnocci, Mr. Watkinson, Mr. Cook, Mr. Calamandrei, Lord Morris, Mrs. Knight.

5. Disarmament ; The limitation of strategic arms ; New weapons and defence strategy (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789).

Speakers : The President, Mr. Müller, Mr. Seitlinger, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. van den Bergh (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Baumel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Disarmament

The limitation of strategic arms New weapons and defence strategy

(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and joint debate on

the three reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament, the limitation of strategic arms and new weapons and defence strategy, Documents 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789.

I call Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, to present the report on disarmament, Document 788.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I perhaps speak too often in this Assembly, and some would say too long, so you, Mr. President, and my colleagues will have a pleasant surprise this morning, because my intervention will be brief.

I spoke on the subject of this report at our sixth sitting on 22nd June. In order to save the time of the Assembly, I shall refer my colleagues to pages 206 to 210 of the Official Report of Debates of the last session, in which I made what I thought at the time was a reasonably good speech. I do not need to repeat it.

However, since that debate, the Committee has considered the subject again and has made some small amendments to the original report and the recommendation in order to take note of the conclusions which were adopted by consensus at the special session of the United Nations which ended on 1st July. We have therefore made certain alterations in the report and the recommendation. Paragraph (iv) of the draft recommendation has been added, welcoming the conclusions of the special session on disarmament, and we have also made an alteration to paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, which commends

1. See page 20.

Mr. Roper (continued)

the important decision of the General Assembly in setting up new machinery for the consideration of disarmament.

It is of great satisfaction to all of us to know, particularly after the speech of the French Minister yesterday, that there will be active French participation in the new Committee on Disarmament which will begin its work in Geneva after 1st January.

The remainder of the report and the recommendation are the same as I presented in June. I might need to speak at the end of the debate to reply — Mr. Boucheny has tabled some amendments — but there is no need at this time to add to what I said in June.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur, to present the report on the limitation of strategic arms.

Mr. Baumel has not yet arrived.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — In the circumstances, perhaps Mr. van den Bergh's report could be taken before Mr. Baumel's report.

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Mr. Roper's request, I shall therefore call Mr. van den Bergh to present his report.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Like Mr. Roper I shall need only a couple of minutes to present my preliminary report. I hope that Mr. Baumel will arrive in the meantime.

The report I am presenting on behalf of the Committee does not, of course, take any particular stance as to the subjects we want to study, for the very simple reason that it is still far too early to do so. Fortunately points of view on the defence strategy that has to be adopted in conjunction with the Alliance are discussed within Western European Union, NATO, our national parliaments, and so on. I would remind you that it is general knowledge that with the passing years — especially in the 1960s — there have been substantial changes made in NATO strategy as a result of technological developments.

The reason why the Defence Committee is suggesting to you that further study should be made of what is wanted in the defence strategy of the western alliance is not that we believe there need to be essential changes in it, but that we think there are a number of technological developments that can have a not inconsiderable influence on certain elements of defence strategy and on the various options that exist.

I would emphasise that it is not our intention to concentrate the study we are undertaking solely on matters of the enhanced radiation weapon, though everyone here will know what emotionally-charged discussions this new weapon has given rise to over past months. We shall, definitely, be paying attention to this new weapon; but I stress that we shall not, in our deliberations, be limiting ourselves exclusively to this weapon. We shall also be looking at a number of important questions involving technology.

Let me briefly list a number of the points to be covered: they include the developments in the field of precision-guided weapons, the cruise missiles and questions of the level of the nuclear threshold. They raise problems of strategy, seen in relation to the level of conventional armaments.

The members of the Committee, and I myself in particular, ask the Assembly for nothing more than to be allowed — without taking up any particular standpoint at the moment — to carry on with our study. We already say in this preliminary report that we have had very thorough meetings to take evidence from leading experts, both in Paris and in London. I should like to ask the Assembly, in addition to approving the continuance of the study, to offer suggestions as to other aspects we could include in it.

I am glad that I have been able to make it possible for Mr. Baumel now to address the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now call Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur, to present the report on the limitation of strategic arms.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report I am presenting concerns the current SALT negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, and their consequences for European security.

I shall naturally refrain from reading out all the documents and shall refer only to the basic problems in the report.

One might of course take the view that these famous SALT negotiations, about which there is so much talk, have to do only with the interests and responsibilities of the United States and the USSR.

It should, however, be pointed out that they concern Europe above all, on the one hand because of the preponderance of Soviet and American nuclear arms in the two alliances, and on the other because Europe is directly or indirectly affected by the negotiations themselves.

Mr. Baumel (continued)

Any change in the balance of forces between the two great powers immediately results in a deterioration of the climate in which Europe has to safeguard its own security, and therefore forces the Atlantic Alliance to undertake a critical examination of the strategic concepts on which its defence policy is based.

At this point I cannot resist quoting from a recent article by the well-known commentator Raymond Aron :

"Because of their destructive power and the terror they inspire, nuclear arms appear to differ in kind from other arms, and in fact do so in reality. Hence the tendency to deal with them separately in negotiations.

Moreover, the tendency is to choose a script for two, a choice which is all the more natural because only the superpowers possess all the means necessary for a full panoply of weapons.

The bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, i.e. the SALT negotiations, reflect this state of mind.

But are negotiations restricted to so-called strategic arms not a false way of thinking, since they conflict with the need for overall strategic considerations to take account of all arms, both nuclear and conventional, in relation to every political objective, while neglecting none of the psychological, economic and logistic aspects of the rivalry between the two adversaries ? "

This is a principle which, according to Raymond Aron, makes good sense and is none the less a condemnation of the United States' present diplomacy.

"For — he continues — the development of strategy must be based on an overall examination of the multilateral strategic relations between East and West. Although the SALT negotiating framework is bilateral, any limitation decided by the two superpowers will affect third parties not included in the procedure. "

That is why we must look with particular care at the possible consequences of the initial agreements concluded under SALT I, and above all at those of the future agreements now being negotiated under SALT II.

As you know, the negotiations on the SALT II agreement are, according to certain authorities, particularly and most recently Mr. Brezhnev, all but concluded, and it is possible that they will be finally approved and signed in the very near future.

What do these SALT II agreements consist of? I shall not of course attempt to describe them very extensively.

I would simply remind members of the Assembly that they contain three elements : first, a treaty to expire in 1985 and 1986 which would establish a certain number of ceilings and subceilings for strategic arms. I shall not deal here with the extremely technical details about the limitation of the various nuclear weapons, whether intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched missiles or strategic bombers armed with nuclear bombs or cruise missiles.

The second element in the SALT agreements will be a three-year protocol imposing a ban on the deployment of mobile ICBMs and a ban on test flights and deployment of certain types of cruise missile.

The third element will consist of a statement on a subsequent stage in the negotiations. According to the information now available — obviously in the midst of a great deal of confusion and difficulties in obtaining precise data — there are still a number of differences preventing final conclusion of the agreements for the moment. There are apparently four stumbling-blocks, and I shall list them very briefly so as not to exhaust your patience.

The first concerns the deployment and range of the American cruise missiles. The second concerns the modernisation of the existing strategic systems and the development of new ones. The third concerns the time-table for dismantling the Soviet missiles that exceed the overall ceiling of 2,400 strategic arms systems. Finally, the fourth difference concerns restrictions on the deployment of Soviet bombers.

In this respect a distinguished strategic expert has stated, in regard to the problem of the Backfire bomber, that the discussion was rather academic since, on the question of whether the Backfire bomber is a strategic weapon or not, one might wonder whether it would not constitute a greater threat to the United States when deployed against shipping rather than as a vector for nuclear warheads. In fact, any Russian-American agreement necessarily affects the security of the United States' allies and cannot be assessed solely in terms of nuclear exchanges between the two superpowers. Supposing that the SALT II agreement results in a cut in the Soviet Union's expenditure on strategic arms, which, it should be pointed out, has not been the case so far, will the Russians not be tempted to spend the money saved on strategic arms on different, i.e. conventional weapons, which would perhaps be more threatening to the European and western allies than intercontinental vectors ?

After this overall reflection on the SALT negotiations, I would now like to turn quickly to our assessment of the situation from the point of view of Europe's interests.

Let us leave the Americans to assess their own interests in regard to these negotiations ; let us

Mr. Baumel (continued)

leave the battle of the hawks and doves to take its course in the United States Senate and Congress and look at the possible consequences of the signing of the SALT II agreements for us as Europeans.

First of all let us attempt to identify the positive aspects of the agreements. Obviously, seeing that the two superpowers have accumulated a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying our planet several times over, it is a victory for common sense that an attempt should be made to limit this fantastic nuclear super-arms race. Moreover, what it is possible to find out about the SALT II agreements certainly seems more broadly satisfactory than the SALT I agreements. They do, after all, provide for effective limitation of the strategic potential of the two superpowers and indeed, if one can believe it, a reduction of around 8 % in the number of weapons systems maintained by the USSR. One wonders, however, whether this reduction will be real or simply verbal. The agreements place considerable restraint on an arms race that is increasingly tending to become qualitative rather than quantitative.

Despite these positive agreements, some critical remarks are called for. First of all, the proposed SALT II agreements directly or indirectly underwrite a situation of strategic equilibrium ; but beneath the overall balance thus to be consecrated, the dynamics of the situation are disturbing.

In this modest contribution I have no need to list the extraordinary quantitative and above all qualitative progress in Soviet arms. Indeed, it seems that since the signing of SALT I and contrary to certain hopes or illusions, the USSR has not ceased to perfect its military arms while the United States, having been perhaps drawn towards a rather optimistic view of the situation, has allowed the Soviet Union, not to overtake it, but to catch up to a certain extent.

A shift in the strategic balance to the detriment of the United States is to be feared during the period covered by the coming treaties. For, in attempting to examine the reasons behind the Soviet attitude, it is difficult to avoid the thought — which is moreover quite logical — that the Soviet leaders are basically aiming at three objectives : first, to increase the vulnerability of their American partner ; second, to strengthen the invulnerability of the Soviet power ; last, through all manner of agreements and negotiations, gradually to detach Europe from America and in any event cast doubt on the credibility of American support for the European countries.

Those are the three basic principles which, while they are not the guiding principles of

Soviet strategy, are, more importantly, those which dominate political thought in the Soviet Union. It is obviously possible, by means of negotiations between military technicians and by seeking to separate the SALT agreements from the overall problems of world strategy, to obtain certain specific technical agreements, but one forgets the basic point that certain issues are essentially a matter for the national policy of the superpowers and the European countries. That is why, without insisting too much, I think the SALT agreements should be looked at with a certain amount of good will but with no great illusions from the point of view of European security.

We are therefore bound to take the view that the European states must follow the SALT negotiations with particular attention and bear in mind, firstly among themselves, and then with respect to their essential partner the United States, the need to avoid endangering the security of Europe and, as it were, "lowering one's guard".

In order not to take up too much of your time — since we could of course go straight on to examine the whole set of problems raised by the limitation of nuclear arms, a discussion which would necessarily take several hours — I would simply like to recall, in conclusion, the reasons why we must look closely at the SALT II negotiations, in a positive frame of mind but nevertheless with special vigilance, particularly in so far as they may prepare the ground for future SALT III negotiations which would make the problems of Europe even more central to the discussions.

Already in the SALT II negotiations, as I have previously pointed out, the interests of Europe are directly affected. But let us not fall into the trap of attempting to bring European nuclear forces into any future SALT III negotiations. In any event, as regards France — a power with which I am well acquainted — that is obviously out of the question. It is inconceivable that, in negotiations which would call into question European nuclear armaments, France should be led to abandon the greater part of its nuclear credibility and independence. That is worth stating in this debate.

As regards the general comments that can be made about SALT, I would say first of all that SALT II is likely to confirm a certain shift in the strategic balance in favour of the USSR ; but I mentioned that a short while ago and shall not labour the point. I imagine that almost everyone who has had an opportunity of looking into the question, on the European side at least, is convinced of this.

Moreover, I would say that SALT II does not safeguard the Atlantic Alliance against the possible vulnerability of the American Minuteman

Mr. Baumel (continued)

missiles, and this is one of the sticking points in the negotiations at the present time.

The SALT agreements will also include a non-circumvention clause — a special technical term — which may apparently be a major factor as regards the European countries and the United States.

Finally, there will certainly be a temptation on the Soviet side to push the argument for the limitation of American capacity in Western Europe. Some people fear that the United States might be inclined to trade off an arms system directly concerning Europe — the cruise missiles — for Soviet concessions in the field of inter-continental missiles directly threatening American territory. But I would remind the Assembly that American territory is not the only problem; the problem is also the vulnerability of European territory, that is to say the states we represent here. And that leads us to take a very serious view of the mutual safeguarding of their territories by the two superpowers, which they are trying to protect from each other even to the detriment of their respective allies, among whom are of course the European allies on both sides of the Elbe.

As we are those Europeans, we may well not take too kindly to this and should attempt to protect Europe better, rather than simply trying to protect the territory of the American continent. That is why, in the face of a situation that is extremely important for peace in the future and for the future development of the free world, we must try and reflect on the adoption of a position that would not be the position of one or the other European country but the position of Europe as a whole. For it is certain that if Europe does not manage to speak with one voice, both vis-à-vis its American partner and in the major international debates, the voice of a divided Europe will be weaker and less credible.

It is therefore necessary to intensify the Atlantic dialogue, particularly as regards SALT, and to ensure that the voice of the European countries is heard by our American partners before any decision or final commitment. For the contrary would obviously seriously compromise the credibility of our free-world alliance. Some people might be tempted to think that, because of a selfish concern for its own security, America prefers to share certain of its military secrets with its partner and fundamental rival rather than with its own allies. A strange situation within an alliance that proclaims the equality of all its members!

In addition, there is the problem of Soviet arms in the so-called grey area of the SALT negotiations, like the SS-20 that directly threaten

Europe. There again, this particular aspect of strategic relations between the two superpowers needs to be discussed at length, but it is not possible for me to include it in this debate.

I think that Europe should make its voice heard in the Atlantic Council and its constituent bodies, particularly the Assembly of WEU before which we are speaking today, especially in order to permit a better definition of the conditions for its security in the context of strategic arms limitations.

A more active and more unified presence on the part of Europe would also bring out the recognised individual deterrent value of British and French nuclear weapons. SALT raises new problems for Europe, and Europe must solve them by itself. It has the means to do so, particularly in the strategic nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom.

It is therefore possible, indeed desirable, that an agreement be reached and joint arrangements established, within WEU especially, concerning the deployment of European strategic nuclear forces, with particular regard to their deterrent capacity as far as Europe is concerned. From this point of view nuclear co-operation between France and Britain appears most opportune. Of course, there have been considerable obstacles to such co-operation in the past, and those obstacles remain. They are firstly of a legal nature, since the British are linked to the Americans by a bilateral agreement signed in 1958 and by the Nassau agreements. There are also political obstacles, inasmuch as the British nuclear force is integrated in NATO's military structure and, in particular, in its targeting arrangements.

Nevertheless, there is a possibility. If it were to materialise — and your Rapporteur is in favour of it along with, I believe, very many members of our Assembly — it would have to be in the next few years, before the very major replacement of the hulls of the British submarines and the Polaris launchers.

Thus, and on this note I conclude, the SALT negotiations not only concern the security of the United States but directly involve the fate and future of Europe.

Your Rapporteur expresses the wish that our governments should realise this and not allow our states to find themselves — as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of 8th October put it — in the grey area of the talks where their essential interests will be ignored or jeopardised.

If strategic arms limitation is really to be beneficial and conducive to peace and security, the interests of our individual countries will have to be taken fully into account.

This is the primary aim of WEU, and it is to reflect this wish that a draft recommendation

Mr. Baumel (continued)

has been presented to you on the limitation of strategic arms, after being adopted unanimously by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.
(*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. We have agreed to have a joint debate on the three reports we have just heard.

I call first Mr. Cook. He will be followed by Mr. Bernini and then by Mr. Roberti.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Baumel has done a service to the Assembly in that he has presented us with a very workmanlike and very serviceable document. Those who have attempted to follow the SALT negotiations will be extremely grateful to him for having presented a very comprehensive report on the procedure of these negotiations in a very lucid and clear style and within an amazingly brief space. His paper will be very valuable to those of us who want to follow the result of these negotiations and to assess the final conclusion when it is announced within the next two or three months.

I must say that I found the rather gloomy conclusions to which Mr. Baumel was impelled concerning the implications for Europe of the SALT talks unnecessarily depressing. He is, I understand, impelled to his rather profound conclusions of the consequences for Europe because of his own profound suspicion of the motivation of the two superpowers in undertaking these talks, which are aimed at strategic arms limitation. This comes at its sharpest in paragraph 95. In the preceding paragraph Mr. Baumel refers to the danger that Europe might become used as a nuclear battlefield between the two superpowers after they themselves have achieved sanctuary for their heartlands through joint negotiations. He goes on to say in paragraph 95 :

"It is significant that various agreements on the prevention of nuclear war have been concluded in the framework of SALT."

I find nothing particularly sinister or insidious in the fact that various agreements to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war have been concluded within SALT. That seems to me an entirely healthy and positive development. It does not seem to me to be something which we should produce as a basis for concern within Europe. It is perhaps because of, as I understand it, Mr. Baumel's suspicion of the motivation of the two superpowers that he produces a conclusion which I find disappointing.

I find myself agreeing with Mr. Baumel very closely in his opening paragraphs where he

argues that the proposals within SALT do not really represent disarmament, they do not represent any attempt to disarm the nuclear arsenal of either superpower ; but merely represent an attempt to place a ceiling on those arsenals, an attempt not to stop the arms race but to create rules within which we can have a more competitive and more orderly arms race.

I found Mr. Baumel's comments on that highly perceptive, but I would have thought that, that analysis having been produced, which he did with vigour and clarity, the logical conclusion of that analysis would be to offer various proposals on ways in which we could tighten up proposals within SALT.

I think that we should strengthen the proposed disarmament contained within the future agreements so that the arms race does not simply run within more orderly rules but is brought to a halt and reduced. Unfortunately, in the conclusions to the report we do not find any proposals for strengthening suggestions in SALT, nor any way to move faster towards disarmament. I think that there is a paradox in that Mr. Baumel's main conclusion is that the possibility of the three superpowers reaching agreement on strategic arms limitations makes it all the more desirable that Britain and France should get together to expand their own strategic arms. I find that conclusion rather perverse.

As I understand it, Mr. Baumel reaches this conclusion because he is concerned that the SALT agreement may, as he puts it, sanction a shift in the strategic balance towards the Soviet Union. Here, again, we face a further paradox within the report. Mr. Baumel, rightly, shows great scepticism and suspicion of the two superpowers but when he comes to the assessment of the strategic balance between them he shows an uncharacteristic reliance on some of the American official estimates of the way in which that strategic balance has shifted during the last five years. I would urge him to show the same caution in using those American estimates of how the strategic balance has shifted that he displays when considering the motivation of the superpowers.

It has to be said that if one looks at some of the unofficial American sources one sees that many of them come to the conclusion that it is very difficult to see any marked shift in the strategic balance towards the Soviet Union. For instance, over the past seven years since 1970, when the SALT talks began, America has not only maintained its relative position of having two warheads to every single Russian warhead but in the same period in absolute terms it has added more warheads to its arsenal than has the Soviet Union. Moreover, they are more accurate, and it is accuracy rather than yield that increases the

Mr. Cook (continued)

capacity to destroy hard targets such as missile silos.

But we should ask ourselves whether there is very much sense in carrying out assessments of that kind of the relative strategic balance on either side. It is of a very dubious value once one achieves arsenals of the size of those of the Soviet Union and the United States. In crude terms the United States now has 35 warheads for every Russian city of over 100,000 population. By comparison the Soviet Union has only 28 warheads for every American city of over 100,000 population. On a crude balance that indicates a lead for the United States. It has 35 missiles as opposed to 28 Soviet Union missiles against the major targets of population. But there is no real lead there for the Americans, there is no gap, because once the Americans have destroyed every city once, they cannot do it 34 times again. We are back with the exasperated cry of Henry Kissinger, who once observed "What is the point of overkill? What can you do with overkill?" The fact that one side has substantially more overkill than another does not really give it any advantage. My concern is that if we allow ourselves to get sucked into debating which side is winning a race in which there can eventually be no winners we obscure the very real truth that both sides are improving and increasing their nuclear arsenals, which are already far too large for any sane or rational purpose.

How do we go forward? I would have thought that one of the proposals that we would wish to insist upon, which would be more successful in drawing the arms race to a conclusion, would be a comprehensive test ban, because without nuclear tests it is impossible to carry through the qualitative improvement in warheads which has marked the arms race for the past twenty years. I understand why France was unable to come into the partial test ban. Agreement was possible only because the superpowers had the ability to carry out tests underground, and they have carried out more tests under the ground since the agreement than they did in the air before it.

Nevertheless, we are now involved in negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban, and they have been going on for the past two years. I would have thought that nothing would be more clearly in the interests of the industrial countries if we want to halt the arms race than to make sure that they succeed in preventing further qualitative improvement in the nuclear arsenals on either side.

There is before the Assembly, not simply this week but in this debate, another report by Mr. Roper in which he recommends that we should

endorse movement towards a comprehensive test ban.

In concluding, I would say that if we look at Mr. Roper's excellent report and his recommendations, in which he has now generously included my amendment, we find that, if it is not in flat contradiction with Mr. Baumel's report, there are certainly very important differences of emphasis. I suspect that we shall not be invited to choose between the reports when we vote. We shall probably endorse both at the same time. But if I had the opportunity to choose I would rather choose the path outlined by Mr. Roper in his report and recommendations than the conclusion reached by Mr. Baumel.

I know that it will be difficult to proceed to the disarmament which Mr. Roper has put forward, but if we were to put into that effort half the vigour and ingenuity put into the arms race and if we put into our negotiations a fraction of the resources that we put into our armaments procurement, we might get somewhere. A phased disarmament along the lines of Mr. Roper's recommendation would offer far greater security to Europe than continuing to permit an arms race and panting along behind the superpowers in that arms race, an arms race which threatens the security not simply of Europe but of the whole industrial world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, during the first part of this session of the Assembly we had occasion to express our lively appreciation of Mr. Roper's admirable report. I will therefore dwell more particularly on his explanatory memorandum and recommendations for the limitation of strategic weapons, which raise questions of indubitably vital importance for Europe's security and future.

In these he emphasises, in my view quite correctly, the necessity of an involvement of WEU and its member countries, through the intermediary of NATO, in the SALT negotiations, in order, he says, to uphold European interests and security motivations. On the other hand, we regard as disputable and loaded with unknown factors and risks, the proposal for establishing a possible European nuclear strike force.

Europe's security, in our view, lies rather in maintaining, and ensuring, a favourable evolution of the existing strategic equilibrium by balanced and controlled measures for the reduction of armaments both of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In this context the SALT agreement does not halt the nuclear armaments race, and is quite incapable of doing so; but it seeks to curb and restrain it to preserve the balance of forces and so foster a climate of greater trust and détente in

Mr. Bernini (continued)

international relations, which is a precondition for making possible a system of mutual checks and effectively arriving at agreements for the reduction of armaments.

While, therefore, as Mr. Baumel points out, Europe certainly cannot remain indifferent to any outcome of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union which may in any way add to its own insecurity, we shall still have to suspend judgment and not jump, as he does, to conclusions as unfavourable as they are gratuitous.

In the existing state of affairs I believe, at all events, that we should first of all concern ourselves with the stagnation of the negotiations, the difficulties in the way of reaching agreement, at the same time seeking to identify their causes and the fresh problems ahead.

As you know, one of the causes, perhaps the determining factor, is, aside from the deterioration of relations between the two big powers, the steady advances in military technology which keep upsetting the balance and making control more difficult.

These difficulties are being further aggravated today, we believe, by the fact that the advances affect tactical as well as strategic nuclear weapons, whereas the former are outside the SALT agreements and of course the negotiations at Vienna between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance for the reduction of conventional armaments.

Thus it has come about that considerable room is left for research and the refinement of nuclear tactical weapons, while the gap between these and strategic weapons is being gradually narrowed, and the importance of what we called "ambiguous weapons" is being confirmed. Hence the increasing inadequacy of current forms of control, the weakening of guarantees of mutual equilibrium, and so the greater uncertainties, of and obstructions to, a favourable outcome of the negotiations; and what we consider the grave decisions of the United States to produce components of the neutron bomb obey that perilous logic, of pushing ahead with continuous technological and military improvements and constantly new rearmament measures, which it is Europe's interest to split up because, whereas, by lowering the atomic threshold, it renders ever more difficult any agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons, it helps to aggravate the dangers of nuclear conflict and place Europe's security and future increasingly at risk.

This is why the proposal, which has our support, for participation in the SALT negotiations, ought in our view to be tied to that for

an extension of the talks to include tactical nuclear and Eurostrategic weapons, to be achieved in all likelihood at the SALT III talks, and to a link-up with the negotiations on conventional armaments, so that we may, as Europe, help to dissipate those areas of greyness and the difficulties which underlie the worsening of the international situation, and to define forms of control of the various weapons that will enable agreement to be reached for effective armaments reduction and disarmament agreements fully consonant with the irreducible requirements of Europe's security.

Also and above all, this will be necessary for setting free and making available immense resources for setting in train a solution of the dramatic problems of underdevelopment and the building of a new international economic order in which Europe has a stake, for overcoming its own difficulties and fashioning its future in the world anew.

In complete contrast to these vital requirements stand those sections of the explanatory memorandum and recommendations which pronounce themselves in favour of concerting efforts in WEU in regard to the French and British nuclear strike forces as a means of furthering the construction of an independent European nuclear strike force; providing for a recasting of the existing agreements between Britain and the United States and NATO, and placing what we regard as a very arbitrary interpretation on the Atlantic declaration of Ottawa in June 1974 on the specific strategic rôle of the British and French nuclear strike forces.

Well now, by modifying the current strategic military configuration of the West and being unable to shirk the technological updating and continuing expansion of defence and deterrence capabilities, what other consequences could the formation of such a force have than to lend justification to the uncontrolled proliferation of other nuclear poles and an incentive to further development of strategic and all other kinds of weapons? All the difficulties in the way of control, and therefore agreement, would be multiplied while the risks of Europe's destabilisation and uncertainty would, far from dwindling, be worsened.

The dreaded danger — albeit not yet, in the absence of a conclusion of the SALT talks, concretely substantiated — of a possible disengagement or transformation of Europe into a kind of special nuclear status zone will not be averted by seeking European independence in strategic nuclear weapons or turning Europe into another nuclear pole, but by claiming and enhancing participation, strengthening our own independent initiative, the presence and commitment of WEU and our governments to furthering within NATO, and beyond its bounds in both West and East,

Mr. Bernini (continued)

the efforts to reach agreements for effectively holding back the armaments race and achieving disarmament as the best safeguard for the security of Europe and the world.

This is why, Mr. President, the questions tabled and the differences that emerge are too important to be left to a majority vote, even before the ongoing talks are concluded. I think we all, including Mr. Baumel, are interested in enlarging the discussion to find a solution genuinely corresponding to security and the cause of détente and peace, in Europe and the world.

So, in the spirit, to which we pay tribute, proposed by Mr. van den Bergh, of a further review of the problems of producing the neutron bomb, with reference to paragraph 4 of his explanatory memorandum, we hope Mr. Baumel will foresee a similar requirement in respect of the problems of limitation of strategic armaments. Otherwise, in the current state of the views expressed here, we can only vote against the motion.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe the decision to take the three reports together was a wise one, because far from contrasting with one another as a previous speaker seemed to be saying, they are, I think, complementary and interlinked.

Undoubtedly the objective we all seek is complete and controlled disarmament, staying off, we cannot say for ever but for a long time, the anguish of a conflagration affecting the whole of mankind, for in this respect the world is no longer divisible. To achieve this goal, Mr. Roper has put forward suggestions and reached conclusions we fully endorse, as we had occasion to say in the early part of the debate on his report. We also think it would be advisable to have a technico-political discussion in greater depth on some aspects of certain nuclear weapons, as advised by Mr. van den Bergh in his report prior to a fuller examination. But this does not conflict, we believe, with the conclusion Mr. Baumel tried to infer: we and every other citizen of Europe should all be grateful to him for drawing attention to a serious peril liable to loom ahead for Europe in consequence of the SALT agreements we are discussing today. What does in fact strike a jarring note is not the various reports but the differing concepts of what ought to be the function, nature and interests of Europe in this political phase and in armaments policy. In short, must we view Europe

as a passive element, an inert subject of political contention between the superpowers, and so arrive at a kind of total neutralisation of it, with all the risks entailed, to the extent that it would become part of the spoils of other people's policy, or vice versa, must it be seen as an active element essential to the interplay of world policy and, while firmly adhering to our Atlantic Alliance relations for defence of the West, ensure that Western Europe is able to bring its own contribution of strength, wise counsels and energy to the general deployment of the dialectic of opposing forces?

I seemed to detect in some speeches, such as that by Mr. Bernini and one or two of those on the Gessner report yesterday, a kind of throwing in the sponge for Europe, considering it as a political object vitally caught up in the ups and downs of international policy. In this respect, however, we think we must give Mr. Baumel credit for arguing for an active stance by Europe and making us face up to some of the potential dangers of the SALT agreement. The perils he pointed to boil down to two: one more quintessentially military, the other strategic and political. The military one concerns the possibility that Russia might, by means of its SS-17, 18 and 19 missiles, and tomorrow 20 as well, accomplish immediate neutralisation of the Minuteman in United States silos, thus neutralising Europe's strategic umbrella. This is a strictly military danger, whose solution lies with the strategic and technical development of the nuclear weapons in the western armoury.

But the greater peril is the one mentioned by Mr. Baumel in his report in paragraph 6 of the explanatory memorandum where he says we might be up against a direct understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union, likely to have negative consequences of two kinds for Europe: on the one hand the territories of the two great powers are mutually recognised as nuclear sanctuaries, although the possibility of a confrontation in other theatres, particularly Europe, is not precluded. On the other hand, the United States may be tempted to give its policy of co-operation with its allies second place to the search for a compromise with its Soviet partner.

Now no one is going to accuse the United States of harbouring such an intention, but it may be tempted to try and ensure a kind of security by which we ourselves should be hamstrung, the European situation being considered of minor importance. Hence the need for Europe to be a protagonist, in its own interests, and to defend them; hence, too, Mr. Baumel's emphasis on the existence of a strategic strike force — primarily in France, but also in Britain — and the need for it to act as an incentive, a control, a constant standby, and on the value of this other

Mr. Roberti (continued)

strategic component which to this extent leaves the Warsaw set-up in uncertainty as to the ways in which it may be used, are, we believe, extremely cogent arguments.

The other consequence inherent in the SALT II situation is precisely the need for Europe as a whole, through the intermediary of its own organisation of WEU, to find some way of intervening in the negotiations, making its voice heard, demonstrating its active presence in upholding its own interests and averting the temptation of an agreement being reached behind its back, over its head, and, God forbid! at its expense, Europe being reduced to a simple grey area, with all the perils this would entail.

Such is Mr. Baumel's final conclusion, and one to which I fully subscribe.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We shall now adjourn the debate on the three reports in order to hear the address by Mr. Tomlinson.

4. Address by Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT. — I have the privilege of welcoming Mr. John Tomlinson, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, and ask him to come to the speaker's rostrum and address the Assembly.

Mr. TOMLINSON (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, members of the WEU Assembly, I am grateful for the opportunity that you have given me to come and address you again. It is less than eighteen months since I last spoke to you on the hopes that we had for the CSCE conference in Belgrade. These hopes were not realised, but the expectations that were aroused by Helsinki are too important to be neglected. It is therefore necessary to find ways of keeping the CSCE dialogue going, restoring momentum to the CSCE process, if you like, to the benefit of both arms of the CSCE — to the security arm, because that, obviously, is important to the prospects of peace and stability in Europe, and to the co-operation arm, because that includes contacts between people, and it is only through this process and on this front that the deeper aspirations which underlie the Helsinki negotiations will eventually be realised. My own ministerial responsibilities cover both foreign affairs and overseas development, so I have a particular interest in this relationship between

foreign policy and aid policy, and in the rôle that aid has to play in the process of détente.

The West, by and large, includes the wealthy countries of the world. We may think that we have economic difficulties — and, indeed, to some extent that is true — but ours is the region of the world where starvation is unknown, where the poverty line is drawn well above meagre subsistence. There is then the developing world, which encompasses two thirds of the world's population, where to have the wherewithal for bare subsistence is relative wealth, where the large mass of the people are on familiar terms with hunger and even starvation. The World Bank's first world development report, which was published some months ago, puts the number of people — in its own words — at the very margin of existence at 800 million people, and growing.

You yourselves have shown in the resolutions that you have been passing in recent years and in the questions that you have been putting to the WEU Council, that you recognise the strategic implications of this disparity in the sharing of the world's wealth. In fact, only yesterday, in your discussions on Mr. Gessner's report, Europe's external relations, you highlighted some of these very problems.

Frustration in the developing world could seriously undermine international security, and this is a risk that we ignore at our peril. I believe that thinking persons in all countries now accept the reality of interdependence between what we tend to call the North and the South. Whereas in the 1960s we were inclined to regard the problems of the developing world as peripheral to the world economy, now, in the 1970s, it is common ground among us all that the North-South dimension is now integral to the problem of managing the world economy. They have the raw materials and, increasingly, the markets for our goods. We have the capital and the technology. Access to these and to our markets is what the North-South dialogue is all about, and it is a dialogue which is essential to the protection of peace and security. The aid programmes of the developed countries are not merely moral obligations; they are an essential component in our joint effort to bring greater security and the assurance of peace to the world.

There are a number of relatively rich countries which at present are standing aside from the efforts of their fellows to help the developing countries. In particular, the Soviet Union and its partners claim that assistance to the developing world, mostly countries which have achieved their freedom from a past colonial rule, is the sole responsibility of the former colonial powers. The Soviet Union and its partners are therefore reluctant to give aid for the purpose of improving a country's economic lot.

Mr. Tomlinson (continued)

When it comes to transferring resources, the contribution of the Soviet Union and its satellites at the present time is pitifully low. The Soviet aid budget, including aid to the communist developing countries, represents less than 0.1 % of the Soviet GNP, compared with the United Nations target of 0.7 % and the average OECD performance of 0.31 %. More striking still is the proportion of non-military aid to the developing countries that comes from the Soviet Union — at present 0.01 % of its GNP. There has been a decline in the value of Soviet aid to the developing countries since 1973-74, and debt service payments to the Soviet Union now exceed the disbursements that the Soviets are making in new aid to the least developed countries. While a few communist countries, such as Cuba, Vietnam and Mongolia, are benefiting from Soviet aid, the net effect of their aid policy is of resource transfer from the non-communist developing world to the Soviet Union.

When I talk of aid in this context I mean development aid and not military assistance. The Soviets provide large amounts of the latter and the figures tell their own story. While the United States budget in military assistance is only about 24 % of its total aid budget, the equivalent of the Soviet aid budget is of the order of 60 % to 70 %.

I am not seeking to deny that military assistance is in some circumstances helpful to a developing country. It can meet a genuine security need, and it certainly can release resources for other development purposes, but a study of the direction of Soviet military assistance shows quite clearly that it is based not on developmental grounds but solely on strategic grounds. This is demonstrated by the speed with which it is cut off in countries such as Egypt and Somalia when the recipient becomes disaffected with the donor.

It is, however, significant to see that newly independent countries are beginning to recognise the dangers inherent in acceptance of this sort of aid — an attempt not to help to solve the recipients' economic problems, nor to help them to a stable and secure place in the world community, but to secure political power for the donor country itself.

There are one or two countries where these policies of the eastern bloc have had some success, but more and more this so-called aid is being recognised for what it truly is. This is particularly so on the continent of Africa, where the newly independent countries for the most part clearly realise the dangers of accepting military assistance that is so obviously given with the object of obtaining political authority in return. These countries are showing that they

are not prepared to exchange one form of political domination for another.

The divide between the rich and the poor countries is everybody's responsibility. It is a responsibility that our countries are basically shouldering, some better than others. We in the United Kingdom are hoping to do better. We are increasing our aid budget by 6 % in real terms in each of the next three years, making this the fastest growing area of public expenditure. We have been amongst the leaders in giving aid to the very poorest countries in grant programmes instead of as soft loans and, more recently, in cancelling the debts of some countries which were incurred when they were given as loans.

Of particular interest to this Assembly is the Lomé Convention, which replaced the Yaoundé Agreement, after the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community. This established new trade aid and co-operation links between the Community and the developing countries, twenty-two of which are members of the Commonwealth. The agreement makes special provision for countries which have had particular difficulties because they are landlocked, or islands, or are economically dependent on one crop or one commodity. The last are particularly liable to suffer great economic hardships at times when their particular commodity commands, for reasons beyond their control, a very low price on the world market. Lomé is not a perfect arrangement; we are currently trying to improve it; but it is an earnest of the common desire of the members of the Community to have a helpful relationship with the developing countries concerned.

We in the United Kingdom therefore consider that our aid programme, both in its bilateral and multilateral aspects, has a vital rôle in our overall foreign policy, especially in our relations with the many developing countries in the third world. Increasingly in the past decade, the third world nations have become more unified, more vociferous in their appeals for a more just distribution of the world's economic resources and of the world's trade, yet the wealth gap between the rich and the poor, between the North and the South, has continued to widen.

In the talks that have been going on inside the so-called North-South dialogue in the regular UNCTAD meetings, the developing countries have been seeking to close this gap by demanding from the rich a series of economic packages, covering trade through the proposed common fund for commodity price stabilisation, and covering debt by proposing a general debt servicing agreement, and by the increasing transfer of technology and resources. It is no secret that we do not see eye to eye with them on all these proposals, but in the end it is

Mr. Tomlinson (continued)

essential that satisfactory agreement on these issues is reached, for otherwise the frustration which is evident in the third world will burst forth with dire consequences for us all.

The importance of the North-South dialogue is clear. Why is it, then, that the North-South dimension seems so distant, even dangerous, to so many people in Europe? Recession is perhaps one reason. Another is the language of the dialogue being so complex. It is perhaps not surprising that there is such a regrettably low degree of understanding of the issues if they are talked about in erudite concepts that many of our people do not understand. This is one of the dangers of what I see in bureaucratisation in the North-South relationship. Armies of officials from both North and South spend hours haggling over texts in international gatherings, where often the location of a comma can take an hour of argument.

Not all the fault is ours. The developing countries weaken their own case by their tendency to rest on sweeping prescriptions for the overturning of the international economic system in set piece exchanges of rhetoric in United Nations fora. Their desire to restructure the world's economy logically leads them to pursue some aims which are unrealistic, some of them contradictory and frequently, if pursued, self-defeating. For example, indexation of the price of developing country exports could hurt those developing countries which are not blessed with a staple commodity as much as it would affect us in the developed world.

Another such issue is debt. The middle income countries, which are increasingly turning to commercial markets for their investment finance, are acutely aware that the pressure for generalised debt relief could scare the banks right off and deprive them of the money that they so badly need. Sensible propositions like retrospective terms of adjustment are a different matter. After all, it is entirely logical that we should bring the terms of our old aid loans to the poorest countries into line with the present terms which are more generally grants; but rhetoric leads to divergence, not convergence. Behind it there are the necessary and desirable changes in the management of the world economy which we must all wish to see.

Could any of us not favour the smooth supply of raw materials to our own industries at stable prices? Could any of us not support sustained investment in food, energy and raw materials so as to provide real increases in the least developed countries' purchasing power, and thus increases in our own exports? Could any of us not welcome access for our consumers to the cheapest goods available on world markets so as

to raise both real standards of living and combat inflation simultaneously?

Yet to the developing countries it seems that the industrialised countries are more interested in raising protectionist barriers against their exports, in limiting the amount of official aid given to them and in resisting their claims for a greater say in the management of the world economy.

As I see it, our approach to development should rest on four pillars, four interlocking imperatives. The first of these is clearly a moral imperative. As a politician, and particularly as a socialist politician, I believe that we should not be coy about the moral imperative. We are relatively rich. Most of the developing countries are absolutely poor. This plain fact will be a powerful motive force behind the decisions that we shall have to take. The second is an economic imperative. The newly industrialising countries of the world represent the fastest-growing overseas market now available for many European manufacturers and that market will exist only as long as those countries themselves are able to export the products of their new factories so as to pay for their investment in new imported plant and hence pay off the debts that they have incurred in their creation. The more they can export, the faster their economies will grow and the more business they will generate for manufacturers in the industrialised countries.

The third major pillar is a strategic imperative, because political instability is always only one step away from economic instability. It is not long ago that China and the Soviet Union were relatively backward, mainly agricultural economies. Now they are nuclear powers. One third world country has already exploded a nuclear device. Others may be in the queue to do the same. Failure on the part of the industrialised countries to respond convincingly to the needs and aspirations of the developing countries could, in an age of potential proliferation, lead to political upheavals which might result in the brandishing of military capability by the third world.

The fourth is a structural imperative. This is what I see as the acid test. It has two basic elements. First, painful as it may be to those sectors of our industry which are facing competition from cheaper imports — steel, textiles, footwear and shipbuilding — we must resist the temptation to put up the shutters and try to seek our salvation behind indiscriminate trade barriers. I do not deny the seriousness of the social problems involved, but seeking to protect uncompetitive sectors of European industry in anything but the most temporary sense by keeping imports out is not the best way of safeguarding jobs in Western Europe in the long run. It would increase prices. It would decrease

Mr. Tomlinson (continued)

choices. It would divert government funds from productive to non-productive uses. It would lead to restrictions on our exports overseas and it would thus inhibit those sectors of our own industry which are competitive.

I just do not believe that we are so bankrupt of inventiveness that we have to resist new achievements instead of welcoming them as offering the hope of a higher standard of living for all of us, and spreading economic activity across the globe. Of course we cannot cynically abandon certain sections of our own domestic industries, their employees and their dependent community, for that would be as mad as it would be a dereliction of our responsibility towards them. The backlash would be immense. We have to mobilise our relevant skills into producing effective adjustment plans. The tragedy is that in very few parts of the industrialised world is this seriously being done.

I said that there were two elements. The second is the need to face the reality that our genuine commitment to democratic values that we like to claim is seriously being questioned by those in other parts of the world. The leaders of the developing world are seeking a fairer share in economic and social policy-making in the world. That challenge will not go away and we have to come to terms with it. So some kind of spreading of the world's wealth is essential. In the meanwhile, on our more limited national aid programmes, there is a vital factor in maintaining a reasonable political and economic stability, a kind of global insurance policy that is an essential element for world peace. That is a theme I should like to commend for much further consideration inside the WEU Assembly.

In a single speech there is no time to consider in detail the numerous individual issues which concern us at present. Members of the Assembly will know as well as I do what they are. We are much engrossed in the problems of southern Africa, especially Rhodesia and Namibia. We are less directly involved in the Middle East, and rather more so with Cyprus, where we still have responsibilities, not to mention troops and two sovereign base areas. We have an important stake in stability in Iran and we have time-consuming and difficult problems connected with some of our remaining dependent territories, including the Falkland Islands and Belize. Our relationships with our fellow members of the Commonwealth remain a significant and integral part of the pattern of our world relationships. I should welcome questions, if that were necessary or useful, on any of these detailed areas.

I should not like to conclude my remarks without referring, with your permission, Mr. Pre-

sident, to the visit you made to London as the guest of Her Majesty's Government. In the talks you had with us during your visit you expressed to British Ministers your concern that direct elections to the European Parliament might have the result of weakening the effectiveness of the Assembly, and of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, to which all members of this Assembly belong. With your permission, Mr. President, I should like to repeat the reply that you received from our Secretary of State and from other British Ministers, including myself.

Once direct elections to the European Assembly have come into effect, they will have brought to an end the obligatory dual mandate and then the WEU and the Council of Europe Assemblies will be the only assemblies where members of Europe's national parliaments will meet to discuss their common problems. As such, we in the United Kingdom believe that these assemblies will gain an enhanced reputation, an enhanced quality and that their discussions and value will in no way be diminished.

I thank you and members of this Assembly for the hearing you have given to me today. I have greatly enjoyed this honour once again to share a few thoughts with your Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your kindness in addressing the Assembly. You were kind enough to say that you would reply to questions which might be put by members of the Assembly. The first question will come from Sir Frederic Bennett. Do you intend to answer each question, or will you answer them all at the end?

Mr. TOMLINSON (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). — I shall wind up at the end.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — The Minister will not be surprised at the question that I am about to ask him. Only yesterday I received a reply here to a written question addressed to the Council of Ministers. It asked about the attitude of WEU to the supply of offensive arms by Britain and France to the People's Republic of China. I shall not quote the answer in full but give the relevant part. The answer was generally favourable to my question. The relevant part is part of a sentence:

"the policy of the governments concerned — that is, of WEU — is, or would be, based upon their assessment of the overall progress of their relations with the People's Republic of China, and taking into account their own armaments export policies".

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

Yesterday we had a speech by the French Minister from the Foreign Office, and I put to him the question that I am now going to put to my Minister. I referred him to a statement by Mr. de Guiringaud, which was widely published abroad, in which he stated without equivocation that his country was now ready to supply offensive weapons to China. Mr. Bernard-Reymond confirmed that what the Minister for Foreign Affairs had said was true. There was no equivocation at all in his reply and no attempt to cloud the issue. I therefore ask my own Minister to be at least as forthright as his French colleagues yesterday and tell the Assembly what is now the British Government's policy with regard to the sale of offensive equipment to China.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — First, I congratulate the Minister on the magnificence of his world tour in such a short space of time. He covered everything that one could possibly expect. I was interested in his truthful reference to the growth of bureaucracy in the world's councils spending the taxpayers' money — I emphasise that — in arguing whether there should be a comma. They are all well paid bureaucrats. I am glad to hear him say that he looks askance at that. To what extent has his government at home and in the world's councils made complaint of and attempts to try to reduce this, control it and stop it, because so many of the taxpayers of every country in Europe are getting a little fed up with seeing their money being wasted and the spending of hard-earned marks, francs and pounds on whether a comma is or is not necessary? It would be a great help if he could say that he has made or is trying to make some progress in saving money in these fields.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Valleix. He will be followed by Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — We, like Mr. Lewis, have found this exchange of views extremely interesting, and I was most impressed in particular by the study carried out on behalf of the developing countries, not only because of our responsibilities towards them but also in the interests of our own security, because of the trade which it is both our duty and, admittedly, our self-interest to maintain with them.

The Minister has broadly stated the underlying problem, which is also an industrial one, of our security. The two matters are closely linked. Obviously, you cannot talk about armament problems without mentioning those of the armaments industries; but it is also possible to treat

the latter only in the context of industrial problems in general. Thus, the European Communities, approaching the matter from the other way round, have, in dealing with industrial problems, touched on certain arms industries and intend, as you know, to deal with defence matters in this manner.

This then is my question to the Minister. What is his assessment, from this standpoint, of the expediency and content of the report adopted by the assembly of the European Communities on a European arms policy? I refer in particular to the Klepsch report, with which he is familiar.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — I would like to ask the British Under-Secretary of State two questions.

Since, in all likelihood, the United States will halt production of the Polaris missiles towards the mid-1980s, does he think his government will soon have to take decisions for renewing the equipment of the British strategic submarine force in Polaris missiles?

Secondly, does he see any possibility of Franco-British nuclear co-operation — in armaments, of course?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Baumel. He will be followed by Mr. Minnocci and then Mr. Watkinson.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — After the resounding declarations by eminent Europeans — particularly one from Germany and, very recently, one from Luxembourg too — on extending the powers of the future European assembly, I would like to know what the British Government's position is on the matter, and whether it takes the view that the provisions of the Treaty of Rome should be faithfully adhered to.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Minnocci.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have greatly deteriorated recently, as shown by the difficulty of bringing the SALT talks to a favourable conclusion. Negotiations between Israel and Egypt on peace in the Middle East have also run into difficulties. There is no lack of trouble areas in the Far East, the Horn of Africa and other parts of that continent.

In this situation the European countries ought to intensify their own efforts towards integration: does the British Under-Secretary of State agree with me in expressing that hope? If he does, how does his government intend to make its contribution towards intensifying the policy of European integration? Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — I have another four questions, Mr. Minister, Do you want to take them now and wind up afterwards?

Mr. TOMLINSON (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Watkinson. He will be followed by Mr. Cook, Mr. Calamandrei and Lord Morris.

Mr. WATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — I thank the Minister for his wide-ranging speech. He dealt at some length with the price of commodities, particularly as they affect the underdeveloped world. Could he enlarge on the impact of the increase in oil prices on the underdeveloped world? Is he satisfied with the aid flowing from those Arab countries which have benefited from the increase? What is his view of the impact of yet a further increase on the underdeveloped world?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I join in thanking the Minister for a thoughtful and thought-provoking speech. I was struck particularly by his reference to moral imperatives.

Sir Frederic Bennett knows that I do not entirely see eye to eye with him about China. Does the Minister regard the Harrier aircraft as a defensive system and is he confident that the dozen neighbours of China, including such old friends of the West as India and Taiwan, would agree with the assessment of the Harrier as a defensive system?

On the wider question of the arms trade, and in view of the Minister's obvious concern for the third world and his reference to moral imperatives, is he not uneasy when he reflects that the United Kingdom and other members of OECD receive in income from arms sales almost as much from the third world as they donate in aid to the same countries?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, if I understood you properly, you spoke of your government's deep concern in maintaining stability in Iran. What conditions would, in your view, have to be fulfilled for this to be possible?

Do you not think that the repression inflicted by the existing Iranian régime on the widespread and vigorous protest movements in that country is in fact liable to increase the risks of instability in Iran and other areas?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Lord Morris.

Lord MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). — What does the Minister see as the strategic effect of

Her Majesty's Government's military assistance to Zambia?

The PRESIDENT. — Finally, I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). — What proportion of aid is paid in straight money grants and how much goes in educative and other efforts to help industry in underdeveloped countries? Secondly, what steps are taken to ensure that countries receiving straight monetary aid do not spend the money on developing nuclear bombs and other weapons, as happened recently?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister, we are at the end of our questions. Would you please reply to them?

Mr. TOMLINSON (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). — I hope that I have taken a note of all the questions and have not omitted anyone.

I would say to Sir Frederic — this partly answers Robin Cook as well — that it remains the policy of the United Kingdom Government, as the Prime Minister said in parliament last week, to consider requests for equipment by China on a case-by-case basis, subject to our own international obligations. We do not wish to be solely a supplier of defence equipment to China. It is our policy that any defence sales should become part of a general trade agreement dependent on our general relations with China. That clearly does not rule out the possibility of defence sales, but we shall not become just a defence supplier.

Arthur Lewis expanded his views on bureaucracy and asked me what we have done in the United Kingdom. I should not like to answer that specifically in terms of the United Kingdom. I can assure Mr. Lewis that in the Foreign Office there is a persistent process of staff reduction. If Mr. Lewis, who is one of the most pertinent parliamentary questioners in the United Kingdom, looks at some of the staffing figures revealed in answers to questions in the United Kingdom, he will see that there has been a net reduction of staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Wearing my other hat as Minister responsible for overseas development, I take a fairly simple view. I am against the proliferation of more international bodies discussing aid. If we could get as much international activity at the sharp end in the developing countries as we do in the international fora discussing the problem, our collective effort might be more substantial. When anyone makes a proposal to me for another international gathering, I want to know what existing body it will replace. There seems to

Mr. Tomlinson (continued)

be almost a self-perpetuating expansion of international bodies, which does not necessarily help us to deal with the problems.

Mr. Valleix asked me about European defence equipment co-operation. I do not want to be unkind about reports which are due to be considered by the Assembly, but I can see little advantage in pursuing the course recommended by the Committee.

There are several solid objections to any closer EEC involvement in this respect. We have already been at great pains to establish acceptable machinery in the shape of the European programme group, which involves all European members of NATO. We must concentrate on making that machinery work. I should not be happy about going in the direction indicated in the report, since that would be inconsistent with that primary objective.

I was asked next about Franco-British armaments co-operation and about what might happen in the 1980s. I do not want to appear reluctant to answer the question, but I am reluctant to hypothesise. I do not have a reliable crystal ball, so I cannot answer what is basically a hypothetical question.

Mr. Baumel spoke about enlargement, but he was speaking in terms of the enlargement of the Community's powers, whereas I am not prepared at the moment to talk about that at all. The current debate is about enlarging the number of countries in the Community. I am a firm believer in a European Community of twelve nations. The accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece is a political imperative, and I see it as a major contribution to buttressing European democracy by having the re-emergent or fledgling democracies of Southern Europe inside the Community. But enlarging the number of countries does not lead automatically to enlarging the powers of the Community or, particularly, of the European assembly. Those matters must still reside primarily with the Council of Ministers.

I was then asked about the apparent difficulties in the Middle East following Camp David.

This led the same member of the Assembly to ask me about the need for greater European integration. I do not entirely follow his scenario. Because there are difficulties in one area and in relations between countries — such as in the Middle East — and because there is difficulty in securing the agreement in SALT, to which we all look forward, between the United States and the Soviet Union, I do not follow the progression to the suggestion that that proves

the need for closer European integration, without defining what that involves. That is a *non sequitur* and not an area into which I should like to follow the member.

Mr. Watkinson asked about the effect of oil price increases on the developing world. I am sure that the Assembly does not need me to underline what the effect was. It was catastrophic. If we feel that we had a bad time in the developed world as a consequence of oil price increases, we should at least remember that we are coming out of their effects now, but large parts of the developing world are still very seriously affected by that crisis. Any further increase in oil prices of that type of magnitude would be disastrous for the global economy.

Mr. Watkinson then asked me about aid flows from the Arab world. I have to tell the Assembly that if we examine our aid flows and development assistance and compare them with that from the rich oil states, we find that we are very much behind them. A number of rich oil-producing states have aid flows varying between 2 % and 5 % of their gross national product. One of the great problems is that although they have the money, they are themselves developing countries in need of technical assistance.

One of the features that certainly need to be further developed in our aid relations is a continuation of technical co-operation between the developed industrialised countries and the oil-rich states. That can be on a basis of paid technical co-operation, as they have the capacity to pay for it, and, at the same time, working in triangular co-operation with those oil-rich states so that they can provide the cash and resources. The developing countries can add to that cash and those resources and use their technical expertise in joint activity in some of the least developed countries. That is an area which has tremendous potential, particularly when one considers bodies such as the Gulf Organisation for Development in Egypt, and the interest of other bilateral donors. A useful triangular co-operation, with their cash and technical co-operation resources being added, can vastly improve the utility to which that aid can be put.

I tried to answer one part of the question asked by Mr. Cook about how I would evaluate the Harrier system. I confess to him that I do not have the technical competence to evaluate it. I have to take what I am told about it. I am told — Mr. Cook is sceptical about this — that the Harrier system is a defensive system. I have heard Mr. Cook's scepticism. Obviously, I respect the sincerity with which he speaks about these matters. I am in no position to talk about it. However, the Prime Minister has announced that our Secretary of State for Industry will be

Mr. Tomlinson (continued)

visiting China to talk, among other things, about the Harrier.

Mr. Cook mentioned the sale of arms to the third world. Here I think that he was slightly muddling his constituencies about the third world when he said that we give to the third world only marginally more cash than we receive from it in arms sales. But it is not the same constituency of the third world. When we look at our official development assistance, we find that the vast majority of it goes to the poorest countries, those which, according to the World Bank, have a per capita gross national product of something under \$280. They are not the major purchasers of our arms. Although the major purchasers of our arms are developing countries, they do not tend to be the major recipients of British aid.

I take the point, none the less, having split a hair with Mr. Cook, that there is a moral dilemma about any country which is seeking, on the one hand, to pursue peaceful purposes with development assistance and, on the other hand, is involved in the sale of armaments. It is obviously a problem. I do not necessarily draw the same conclusions as Mr. Cook. Perhaps my conscience is slightly more easily reassured than his is.

I come to the other three questions. Lord Morris asked about the strategic effect of military assistance to Zambia. I think that we have now reached a position at which most people in the United Kingdom will accept that the minimal assistance — it is minimal — that has been given by the United Kingdom to Zambia was absolutely necessary for a country to respond to a demand from a fellow Commonwealth country which felt that its own security was seriously at risk. I do not consider that it in any way seriously alters the strategic balance in Central Africa. It is a minimal supply of defensive equipment for a country which felt, in the circumstances that prevail — the rapidly changing circumstances — in southern Africa and Central Africa that its own security was at risk.

Mrs. Knight asked about grants for development assistance. It is only in very exceptional circumstances that British development assistance is given in the form of cash, or that any development assistance is given in the form of cash. Most of our development assistance from the United Kingdom is in the form of tied loans or tied grants, the vast majority of it now being in the form of tied grants. But what will happen is that in our bilateral trade relations with, say, India, Pakistan, or whatever particular developing country it happens to be, aid within

their perception of their development needs will identify projects with which they want assistance over financing.

Then, with capital aid tied to procurement inside the United Kingdom, which is a matter which causes great mistrust and concern to many people in the dialogue, with that form of tying and having identified a project that the particular recipient country wants, we shall finance it with procurement taking place through the Crown Agents.

The kind of fear that Mrs. Knight expresses and which is very commonly expressed by people who have not had the opportunity of seeing how our aid programme is managed is a totally unfounded fear. There will be very exceptional circumstances in which the United Kingdom Government will give balance-of-payments support to a country which has serious economic difficulties — such as Zambia, for example, at present. But that balance-of-payments support that we give is always done as part of an international effort, usually under the kind of stringencies with which we have learned to live ourselves, as are imposed by the International Monetary Fund, because usually the international assistance will be through the IMF's presence and our assistance to balance-of-payments support will usually be as part of an international effort.

I now come to the question in relation to Iran and the conditions necessary to maintain stability. We all deplore and are concerned about the present instability and insecurity of Iran. If I had a ready-made prescription for the restoration of stability to Iran, I do not think that I would be here as a junior Minister from the British Foreign Office. If I had that kind of perception and that kind of ability to get solutions to most intractable international problems, my rôle would probably be somewhere else.

However, I do not believe there is any solution to the problem of Iran other than continuing the path of modernisation and of liberalisation and a return to elections in that country. That is a minimum demand which everyone, irrespective of the views that he takes about fundamental questions in Iran, can share.

I think that I have answered all the questions. I am sorry that I have taken so long in doing so. I hope that everyone is at least satisfied that he has received an answer, although perhaps not necessarily satisfied with it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minister. We are very grateful to you for addressing the Assembly and for replying to the twelve questions put to you. We are glad that you were able to be with us.

5. Disarmament
The limitation of strategic arms
New weapons and defence strategy

(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the
 Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,
 Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789)

The PRESIDENT. — We now resume the debate, and I call Mr. Müller, who will be followed by Mr. Seitlinger and by Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to make resumption of the debate on disarmament problems the occasion, first of all, for picking up something Mr. Bernini said a little while ago. He said that a climate of trust was necessary if we were to clarify disarmament problems and make any progress in solving them. There I entirely agree with him. I would also like to take up another point he made, namely that it is important that disarmament should release resources which might be used for the North-South dialogue. That would indeed be an important result — except that our experience over the past few years unfortunately shows that the trade in armaments has become very big business and that many of the countries in the southern hemisphere are to a large extent using their limited foreign currency to buy weapons.

Unfortunately — I have to say this — the Soviet Union has now moved into a clear lead in these international arms deals. It heads the list of arms exporters to what are known as developing countries. And the Soviet Union not only outstrips the United States in arms exports but confines its aid to the developing countries almost exclusively to arms deals. Its aid covers practically none of the civilian measures that occupy a large part of aid from the United States.

While we are talking about an atmosphere of trust, I should like to refer also to two points which are not specifically mentioned in the reports but which seem to me important in the debate on disarmament.

The first is that psychology also plays some part, that domestic conditions within the different countries can make their contribution, either to disposing them in favour of disarmament or, on the contrary, to fanning the hysterical urge towards armaments and war.

What makes me raise this point is that, to quote one example, the German Democratic Republic at the beginning of this scholastic year introduced a separate subject at school — war studies. In other words, children over there are being taught war-gaming at school — which surely does not help improve the climate of trust. Admittedly, this is basically nothing new, for such instruction has existed in the Soviet

Union for a great number of years. There it is called "patriotic instruction" and is a contribution to pre-military training. But the introduction of such instruction in a country like the GDR shows that, while disarmament discussions may take place at international conferences, the psychological climate in any individual state is not necessarily conducive to them.

Secondly, the problem of what are known as paramilitary organisations and associations should also be included in the debate on disarmament. Here again I refer to the example of the German Democratic Republic, where there are so-called factory defence groups; these are not just a kind of superior factory security guard with pistols and rifles, but are equipped with heavy weapons. As a general of the National People's Army stated at a roll-call of these groups, they provide a massive combat capability for the national defence of the GDR. Such combat groups exist not only in the GDR but also — contrary to the four-power statute — in the eastern sector of Berlin. Only quite recently in East Berlin there was an infringement of the city's four-power status, namely the swearing-in of recruits to the *Bereitschaftspolizei* — special patrol group.

One more observation in this connection, one that comes under my first point, psychology. The fact that the treatment meted out to conscientious objectors in the Warsaw Pact countries differs from that accorded in the countries of Western Europe also gives cause for concern. I should like to mention specifically the case of Nico Hübner, an East Berliner, who cited the four-power status of the city when he refused to do military service in the GDR. For this he was awarded quite a heavy sentence.

I therefore believe — and I will conclude with this point — that in all discussions about disarmament one should not just count guns and rockets, tanks and armoured troop carriers, and not only weigh up relative numbers of forces, but bring in the psychological factors as well. What we must create is a climate of trust which, to coin a phrase, would help to make peace doubly sure.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Seitlinger.

Mr. SEITLINGER (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report presented by Mr. Roper will doubtless mark an important stage in the thinking of our Assembly. The preparation of a report on disarmament in fact constitutes an innovation for Western European Union. We have engaged more often in speculations about the military means necessary for our defence than about procedures designed to safeguard our security at a lower level of armaments.

Mr. Seitlinger (continued)

There is doubtless nothing incompatible between our states' aspirations to security and the quest for disarmament. The point is important; it has been repeatedly stressed by the President of the French Republic and, it seems to me, provides us with an excellent starting-point for any analysis of disarmament problems.

The present-day world — and more particularly Europe — is characterised by its excessive armaments. Military budgets never stop growing, both in volume and as a percentage of gross national product. Research and development costs for new types of weapons are becoming inordinately swollen. There has never before been such an intensive world-wide armament effort in a situation where no major conflict threatens.

In order to combat this phenomenon, however, moral condemnations or the mere proclamation of principles which will remain a dead letter are not enough; what is important is to attack the very root of the evil — in other words, the mutual distrust which causes the atmosphere in international relations to deteriorate — and the absence of collective security guarantees for each individual country.

It seems to me that Mr. Roper's report to a large extent takes this vital consideration into account. Two points, however, deserve closer consideration.

The universal disarmament programme advocated by Mr. Roper would be developed almost exclusively in the United Nations framework. An essentially world-wide approach is involved. Now, although the United Nations constitutes the natural framework for discussions by the international community on general disarmament problems — and I myself as a member of the French Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly shall be taking my seat there next week — it will nevertheless be possible to settle these problems only with the help of all countries. In our view, moves at the regional level form the necessary complement to any effective undertaking in the realm of re-establishing confidence and reducing armed forces. In this field, we bear a special responsibility since Europe, in the geographical sense of the term, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, constitutes a region of nuclear armament of exceptional importance for the peace of the world.

Nowhere else does there exist a comparable accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons. Nowhere else is it more necessary to tackle the problems of disarmament in a bold and imaginative fashion. It seems that in Europe the factors of instability are not to be sought in

the existence of nuclear weapons taken in isolation — which henceforward represent one of the essential elements in the strategic balance — but also in the arms race, both quantitative and qualitative, in conventional or nuclear weapons, and in the obvious disparity in traditional armaments.

It is therefore obviously necessary to convene a conference which would bring together all the countries directly concerned in preserving an equilibrium on the European continent. Unlike the Vienna conference on the reduction of forces, pan-European negotiations of this kind would be conducted between nations and not between blocs. The aim would be, as a matter of priority, to strengthen mutual confidence on this basis, and to work out a progressive programme for the controlled reduction of forces.

Initiating action along these lines would not basically run counter to the efforts being undertaken in Vienna, but would seem better adapted to establishing the security of our continent on more solid foundations.

The second and last problem with which I shall deal, and which is raised by Mr. Roper with, it seems to me, an insufficient admixture of realism, is the proposal for a total ban on nuclear tests. On this occasion, Mr. Roper appears to be making himself the spokesman of the British Government, since the latter is a party to the negotiations being conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union, which are designed to lead to a ban of this kind.

In that connection, I can only express the anxieties felt by the French Delegation, which transcend any political divisions. France possesses an independent nuclear weapon, whose contribution to the security of the Atlantic Alliance was recognised by the Ottawa declaration of June 1974. This force is far from representing a potential to match that of the two superpowers. A country which possesses a few score nuclear missiles cannot be compared with powers that hold thousands of them. It is therefore vital for the security of France, which is essentially based on deterrence, that the national strategic weapon should be refined and perfected, so that its credibility remains assured in face of the nuclear potential of the possible adversary. A ban on nuclear tests would constitute a measure whose repercussions for France would be quite different from its effects on the United States or the Soviet Union. It would jeopardise the actual effectiveness of a weapon which, need I stress, serves the interests both of France and of Europe.

Going beyond the two reservations which I have just expressed about Mr. Roper's report, one must none the less emphasise its many positive aspects. On a large number of problems,

Mr. Seitzinger (continued)

Mr. Roper provides an answer to very lively feelings of concern about the present state of security in Europe and the world at large. The Rapporteur thus affirms very clearly his opposition to any nuclear proliferation, and he advocates strict reinforcement of the controls applied to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, without taking as a yardstick the questionable framework of the non-proliferation treaty.

Besides this, Mr. Roper very properly proposes the setting up of an international disarmament agency, attached to the United Nations and endowed with means of control and its own monitoring facilities. In this way, it might be possible to overcome the obstacle represented by control, which prevents the conclusion of many agreements. Furthermore, a measure of this kind would remove from the United States and the Soviet Union the monopoly of monitoring facilities constituted by the observation satellites which the two big powers are at present alone in possessing.

I would accordingly express the wish that the Rapporteur should, as far as is practicable, take into account the legitimate feelings of concern of many members of the French Delegation, and that he should qualify his proposals so as to render them acceptable to all the member countries of our union. Only thus will the many positive points in his draft recommendation be assured of receiving close consideration by the governments concerned and realism in their formulation be added to the generous sentiments inspiring them. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the special United Nations session last spring showed how strongly the peoples of the world aspire to put an end to the arms race and move along the road to disarmament.

For indeed, although today the danger of a new world war breaking out has diminished, the fact remains that conflicts exist and drag on, threatening the fragile balance of peace.

When one remembers the frightful means of extermination employed by the Nazis during the second world war, as well as the immense tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the consequences it continues to have for thousands of human beings, or indeed when one thinks of the ravages and destruction caused by the biological and chemical weapons used against the people of Vietnam, one can only be seized with horror and fright at the escalation of the arms race. The fantastic accumulation of weapons, particularly

nuclear weapons, and the appearance of arms that are more and more sophisticated and murderous, like the neutron bomb, as well as the miniaturisation of weapons, which makes efficient control increasingly difficult and multiplies the risks of proliferation — all this makes progress towards disarmament urgent and imperative.

At a time when life could be so beautiful and fraternity flourish, it is more and more unnatural to live under this constant threat of wholesale destruction, mutilation and suffering.

Furthermore, the arms race is incompatible with the efforts towards the establishment of a new economic order. Every day children, women and men are dying of hunger, while fabulous sums are spent on manufacturing and maintaining weapons of mass destruction. From the end of the second world war to the year 1975 inclusive, total military expenditure throughout the world reached the sum of around \$4,500,000 million. In 1976 world arms expenditure amounted to \$334,000 million, i.e. about 1,670,000 million French francs. In constant money terms, world military expenditure today is three thousand times greater than in 1900. It is equivalent to the gross national product of sixty-five Latin American and African states.

This is, without doubt, the most fantastic waste of money of our era. More than a twentieth of the world's resources of labour and raw materials is devoted to arms; more than a quarter of the world's research goes towards the development of new arms or the improvement of existing ones. One of the Rapporteurs noted with interest that world military expenditure for 1976 was equal to the amount spent on public health and greater than that spent on education. It was thirteen times greater than all the aid programmes for underdeveloped countries put together. Every minute, the arms race costs half a million dollars, i.e. 20-22,000 million French centimes. Arms mean anguish and greater misery for the peoples of the world, and that is why the French communists act everywhere and always to slow down the arms race, to halt it and then to start disarmament.

The debate in the United Nations shows that this is now a realistic demand, and that mankind stands at a historic crossroad where it must change direction. It is in this framework that our Assembly must develop its thoughts on the matter.

The French Communist Party, for its part, wishes passionately to help turn world developments in this direction. The year 1978 was the year of the special United Nations session. No effort must be spared to make 1979 the year of a world disarmament conference and the year in which the United Nations resolution is put into operation.

Mr. Deschamps (continued)

Moreover, we propose specifically the conclusion of a treaty banning research, development and production of any new weapon of mass extermination, particularly the neutron bomb; second, the achievement of a balanced reduction of forces, arms and military budgets, together with the establishment of non-nuclear zones or zones free from foreign military bases in specific regions of the world; third, in the Mediterranean, progress towards the reduction of American and Soviet naval forces and the conversion of the area into a non-nuclear zone; fourth, a ban on the sale of arms to racists, fascist and colonialist governments; fifth, scrupulous application of the measures laid down in the final act of the Helsinki conference; and sixth, the adoption of a series of measures going in the direction of military détente, which implies the rejection of any project for the strengthening of a joint European policy on the study, manufacture and use of arms.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the grand design we are proposing for progress towards disarmament and the strengthening of the trend towards peace throughout the world.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Since he is not here, I call the Rapporteurs, first Mr. van den Bergh and then Mr. Baumel.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Once again I can be very brief, Mr. President, because I am basically in agreement with the one or two comments that have been made. I promise the Assembly that we shall incorporate these points in our report.

First of all, there was the remark by Mr. Roberti that the three reports complement one another. I think this is very true, and that we must try to develop further the elements that are dealt with in the two reports I hope you will be accepting today, and set out in more detail in the report I have put before you.

I agree entirely with the comment that in our report on technological developments we must also discuss the technical and political aspects. I agree with this because as everyone in this Chamber will know it is never possible, when there are technological developments in the military sphere, to evaluate them properly without looking at them from the political angle as well. A weapon cannot have anything other than a political objective. It has to be a means of pursuing political aims. It is essential, therefore, for us also to study and chart the political consequences of any technological development.

I would almost say that one of the main tasks of the report we are going to prepare must be to provide an accurate definition of the problem.

Let me give an example. A great deal is being said all over Europe about the significance of the neutron bomb. But I do not think there has been much discussion about exactly what the technical features of this new weapon are, because they are in general well-known. Discussion inside and outside Europe has been primarily about the technico-political consequences — with the accent on political — of introducing such a weapon. But I stress that our report will most certainly not be limited to any one important issue such as whether or not to introduce the neutron bomb.

Finally, I have two remarks to make. It has been said that attention should be paid to various psychological aspects of East-West relations. This, too, would seem to me to be a perfectly sound viewpoint, though I wonder — and I shall talk this over with my colleagues — whether this is a topic that ought to be dealt with in the report for which in the first instance I shall carry responsibility. Naturally, one part of the technical and political assessment we make of weapons is always expressly bound up with the question of what political and military intentions we ascribe to our potential opponents. This seems to me to be very much something that is linked to the psychological relations between the various countries, and between East and West in general.

One of our colleagues here has said that the great question of our times is how we can make the nuclear threat recede, especially in Europe. The task I shall set myself is to investigate how far this vital question — a question of life or death for all of us — can be satisfactorily answered, though I am well aware that, bearing in mind the manifold aspects of the problem and the many studies that have been made of it in the past and will no doubt be made in the future, we shall have to approach the task with some modesty.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call now Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, at this stage in the debate I shall not go over the main points of my speech just now. I would like to thank the various speakers and try to reply to some of their objections.

The first and most important point is that my presentation of the SALT negotiations, which I tried to make as objective as possible, was not intended to convey the over-pessimistic impression that I feel some of my listeners got from it.

I felt that I should, for the sake of objectivity and clarity in our discussions, note the indisput-

Mr. Baumel (continued)

able positive aspects but at the same time mark the limits and dangers of certain areas in the negotiations that still remained murky.

The first such area stems from the fact that the negotiations are not really genuine efforts towards disarmament but are more or less inspired by the American policy of arms control, a device for limiting part of international armaments, i.e. nuclear weapons only. I would remind you that a real global strategy cannot differentiate, at its very base, between an agreement on what is certainly the most dangerous element, the nuclear element, and the other aspect, which is the growing disproportion in conventional arms between the forces of the East and West. To limit nuclear arms while maintaining this disproportion, thereby allowing the USSR to take advantage of the nuclear arms limitation to use its funds and credit to strengthen its conventional weaponry, is to turn one's back on détente and on peace itself.

Second, I believe that the problem of the SALT agreements — whether I, II or perhaps tomorrow III — is ultimately, like all the great problems of the world today, one of good faith and trust between partners; because, whatever the technological status of the controls that can be applied to nuclear arms, it is certain that without good faith and real trust between partners the application of even the SALT II agreements will allow one or both partners to slip through, among their defensive armouries, new and more sophisticated weapons, less vulnerable and less subject to control, and so we shall have turned our backs on the real meaning of a genuine effort towards arms control.

Third, and in conclusion, for time really is running short, I will simply say that what bothers us is that, in fact, the problem is not to assess the benefits of the SALT II agreements for the Americans and Russians — and I am surprised at the scepticism of a number of members of this Assembly, which is not American but European — it is to look after European interests. And it is certain that while paying tribute to the effort to limit strategic arms, we should take steps to ensure that such limitation does not involve a reduction in Europe's security and a greater vulnerability of the countries we represent.

To sum up, I believe that the SALT agreements are like the curate's egg: good in parts — they contain both positive and negative elements. Since we are here as representatives of the Europeans, let us concern ourselves with the defence of European interests. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

To wind up, I call the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — We have had a useful debate this morning. It is helpful that we have discussed these three interrelated reports within the framework of a common debate. Some, including Mr. Cook and others, weighed the relative merits of defence and disarmament. As parliamentarians, we have responsibilities in our own countries to ensure that — either individually or, in the modern world, collectively — we defend our own security and the security of our people. That must be a major priority for all of us.

But in a world where weapons exist which could totally destroy our countries, as well as ensuring that we have effective defence, we must do our best, difficult though it may be, to find methods of achieving disarmament agreements. Therefore, the balance today, discussing new weapons, strategic arms limitations and broader measures of disarmament has been the right balance. They must all be seen together as part of the same programme for which we work to secure in the long run the security of our people.

The debate on the introductory report by Mr. van den Bergh might be described as the "trailer" for the debate that we shall have next June. Before today's debate, the Committee had a day in London and one in Paris holding parliamentary hearings with outside authorities. The function of this Assembly in educating its members cannot be over-stressed. Those were two very valuable days for all of us and will ensure that when the Committee considers Mr. van den Bergh's report it will do so against a background of common knowledge and understanding of the complexities of these problems.

We were fortunate in London to hear from Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, a former Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; from Dr. Shreffler from the United States who at one time was Deputy Director for Weapons Development of the Los Alamos Laboratories and subsequently responsible for nuclear planning in NATO; and from Professor Boskma from the Netherlands, who put a different point of view.

At our hearings in Paris, we heard from the Ambassadeur de France, François de Rose, who, with his usual Gallic logic and clarity, presented some of the highly-complex strategic and tactical dilemmas which face us with the development of new weapons. We were also fortunate, Mr. President, to have from your own country Mr. Uwe Nerlich from the Eberhausen Research Institute, who went through some of the newest ideas being discussed in this area.

Those two days were a valuable experience for us and showed the method of working which we

Mr. Roper (continued)

in our Committee and in other Committees should use more widely, perhaps even considering opening our meetings to the press and public, thus ensuring that more attention is given to the work of our Assembly.

I merely mention that in passing. I am looking forward, as I am sure we all are, to the report which Mr. van den Bergh will be able to prepare after he has been able to complete his studies and travels in different parts of the world and present to us in the Assembly in June.

I now turn to the excellent report which has been presented by one of our newer members of the Assembly, but none the less a very old and distinguished parliamentarian, Mr. Baumel of France, who has played such an important rôle within his own country and is now coming to assist us in our work in the Assembly. His report, like any report dealing with this subject, was not altogether without controversy. Today we have had various members of the Assembly — I refer to the very stimulating and thoughtful contribution of Mr. Bernini of Italy and to some of the remarks of my colleague, Mr. Cook of the United Kingdom — who have questioned some parts of the analysis that Mr. Baumel developed. Mr. Baumel, as an old parliamentarian, knows very well that if one is going to say something important, it is likely that there will be controversy about it. He has not been surprised today.

Quite clearly, within the Committee there are differences of opinion and emphasis about the extent to which the United States has kept its European allies informed of the progress of the SALT negotiations. Certainly even since we considered the report in the Committee we have heard of the further round of consultations in Paris, Bonn and London, carried out by the President's representative, the head of the National Security Council, Dr. Brzezinski. There are differences of view whether enough has been done. But, clearly, what the report wanted to emphasise and what the Committee feels strongly is that these matters concern Europeans and therefore there is a continuing need to ensure effective communications between the United States and its partners in the alliance on these broad issues.

On the other questions which are raised and touched on in the report, and referred to today, about the rôle, both at present and in the future, of the French and the British nuclear deterrents, clearly these are matters of much greater controversy, matters perhaps to which the Assembly may wish to return on some future occasion. They are problems of considerable difficulty both in the countries in which they exist and elsewhere.

Finally, I should like to make a few comments in reply to the remarks made upon my own report. As will be seen, I have been flattered by the fact that a large number of amendments have been tabled to my report, to which we shall no doubt come this afternoon. It is obviously a high compliment to me that so many amendments have been tabled, and I take it as such.

However, I will comment on the remarks of Mr. Seitlinger which I found most interesting in terms of my report. In particular, I would remind him that although he is kind to say that my report was one of the first on disarmament in the Assembly, there have been earlier reports by our Assembly on matters dealing with disarmament.

I should like to deal with the two specific points that Mr. Seitlinger raised — the proposals outlined initially by President Giscard d'Estaing in the United Nations special session on disarmament, and which I outline in my memorandum at paragraphs 47 to 50 when I quote fairly widely from the memorandum submitted by the French Government to the twenty-three countries which had participated in the CSCE, proposing a conference on disarmament in Europe.

In my report, at paragraphs 47 to 50, these proposals are discussed in, I think, rather greater detail than anywhere else in the public print. Certainly this proposal of France, which was repeated by the Minister this morning, is not ignored in the report. It is true that at present it does not find a place within the recommendations. It is in the report, but not in the recommendations.

I have seen that there is a draft amendment in the name of Mr. Seitlinger's colleague, Mr. Bozzi, which we shall be considering this afternoon. I do not think that that amendment is necessarily unacceptable to the Committee. I think that we shall be able to find, perhaps with a minor alteration, a way of accepting the amendment tabled by Mr. Bozzi about the proposal for a conference. There might have to be certain changes, but in principle I think that we could find a way of accepting that amendment.

I come now to Mr. Seitlinger's second point, on which I am afraid I shall be unable to be quite as hopeful as I have just been. That is the question of the comprehensive test-ban agreement.

It is a very difficult subject. It is a subject which, quite rightly he said, raises many questions for France, and not merely from members of any one party but from members of all parties. He suggested, in an obviously light-hearted way, that I was being the spokesman on this subject for Her Majesty's Government. I assure him that Her Majesty's Government have never asked me to be their spokesman on anything. I do not think that I would be a very good one even if I were so asked.

Mr. Roper (continued)

Certainly within the United Kingdom there are different points of view on this matter. There was very recently, in hearings in the United States on the comprehensive test ban, in August this year, evidence given by some United States scientists saying that when they had visited the United Kingdom various research scientists working in this field had told them of their concern about the comprehensive test-ban proposals.

But when I am speaking here, if I can speak for anyone I am speaking on behalf of five of the governments of WEU. If one looks at my report, at paragraphs 12 to 21, and particularly paragraph 16, one will see outlined the memorandum on disarmament which was submitted by the Belgian, the German, the Italian, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom Governments, together with some other governments, to the United Nations special session. As will be seen in paragraph 16 of my report, I point out that that proposal put forward by five of the seven governments of WEU called for a comprehensive test ban. I think that we must realise that on this matter there is one view which is held by five of the governments of WEU — and, indeed, I think, probably by Luxembourg as well, although I have no evidence either way on that — and another position which is held by France. There is an honest disagreement about that. We shall return to it and discuss it this afternoon when we come to the appropriate amendment.

However, I am very glad that Mr. Seitlinger raised this matter, because it is important, and I am glad that we have been able to have this short exchange on the subject this morning.

Mr. President, I believe that we have had a useful debate. Once again, I should like to thank

all those who have taken part and made it such a good report. I thank in particular Mr. van den Bergh and Mr. Baumel, who have contributed, through their reports, so much to this morning's debate. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The joint debate is closed.

Perhaps I may suggest that the Assembly take all the votes later in the afternoon, when a majority of members is likely to be present.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 791).
2. Disarmament ; The limitation of strategic arms ; New weapons and defence strategy (Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Documents 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.*)

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 21st November 1978

SUMMARY

1. Attendance Register.

2. Relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 791).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Schlingemann (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper, Mr. Schlingemann (*Rapporteur*).

3. Disarmament; The limitation of strategic arms; New weapons and defence strategy (*Votes on the draft*

Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Roper, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Cook, Mr. Roper, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Roper, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Roper, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Roper, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Roper, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Roper; (explanation of vote): Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. De Poi.

4. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

2. Relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 791)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries, Document 791.

I call Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur.

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, though it is very tempting to present this report in Dutch — a language spoken by more than twenty million people in Western Europe — I shall speak in French in order to make a direct record possible.

(*The speaker continued in French*)

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report which I have the honour of presenting today is simply a brief account of the activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

since the last session, held from 19th to 22nd June 1978.

The Committee has attempted to provide you with new working methods and new means of action to ensure that the activities and, more importantly, the ideas of WEU are adequately understood in our various parliaments. Secondly, the Committee has started a study of the possible use of various computers that store military and defence data.

If you will permit me to deal with the second part first, I have to inform you that initial contacts have been established and that your Rapporteur hopes to establish other contacts with the computer centres, which could be extremely useful for our Assembly, from the beginning of 1979. A report on these discussions and their outcome will be included in the report presented to you in June 1979.

I am already in a position to make some remarks on the Paris centre. On 11th September 1978 I visited the Armaments Documentation Centre — CEDOCAR — where I was received by the Director, Mr. Yerle, and a number of his colleagues. The task of the CEDOCAR is to research and meet the requirements of the General Delegation for Armaments of the General Staff, as well as those of the various administrative and other bodies approved by the Minister for the Armed Forces, with regard to scientific, technical, industrial, economic and financial information of all kinds concerning armaments.

This task is defined in general and specific terms by the Advisory Committee on Armaments Documentation and the Higher Council for Armaments Documentation.

Action is co-ordinated in the General Delegation for Armaments with the help of central

1. See page 24.

Mr. Schlingemann (continued)

officials appointed at the level of the major technical directorates and local officials appointed at departmental level.

It publishes, *inter alia*, three different monthly summaries: first, documents in French, second, documents of foreign origin, and third biomedical documents of French and foreign origin. Once a fortnight the publication *Nouveautés scientifiques et techniques par thèmes sélectionnés* provides a list of documentary references, together with indexed summaries, for a specific subject such as air safety and aircraft accidents, military aviation, remote-controlled aircraft and aerial targets, the OPEC countries, new sources of energy, political defence studies, missiles, arms costs, telecommunications satellites, to name just a few of the three hundred subjects dealt with in this manner.

Selective distribution of information (SDI) makes it possible to keep abreast of and update its information in a specific area. The references of documents are provided simultaneously with their selection by CEDOCAR and other sources.

Apart from other "secondary" publications, CEDOCAR has a multiple-media information storage system which contains — on paper, microfiches or new media — most of the primary documents, a reference storage system combining thesaurus, indexes, catalogues, directories, etc., a library, a copying service, etc., as well as a telephone assistance department providing information on specific points.

All these services are available, on subscription, to the Assembly or even to WEU as a whole, subject to the consent of the Minister of Defence, Mr. Yvon Bourges. It would then be possible to set up a documentation exchange service between the WEU Assembly and the Armaments Documentation Centre. The Assembly already provides the centre with the documents and public proceedings of its sessions, and with its bulletins, brochures and dossiers.

As regards the preparation of documents for the Committees on Defence Questions and Armaments, General Affairs, and Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the centre, which is equipped with a computer, could, in the opinion of your Rapporteur, provide an entirely new form of assistance for us; in the preparation of questions to be put to the national governments or to the Council, the telephone assistance service could be of considerable help to members of the Assembly.

As regards ways and means of transmitting WEU ideas to our national parliaments, the Committee held a wide-ranging discussion in Rome on 3rd November last. I understood that

those who took part in the discussion wished to introduce their own ideas and put forward their own proposals here in the Assembly. The discussion in Committee will continue at the next two meetings, and the results will be included in the report to be submitted to the Assembly in June 1979.

Some of the decisions taken in Rome will be implemented before that date:

First, the Committee will ask the parliaments to post the agendas of the WEU Committees on their own notice-boards or to include them in their bulletins, etc.

Second, the Committee will prepare and publish short reports on the sessions and other public sittings of the Assembly for all the parliaments.

Third, the Committee will endeavour to inform, in addition to the parliaments of the member states, all those who might be interested in a specific subject dealt with in the Assembly.

Fourth, the Committee will strengthen its contacts with the national delegations and political groups. Joint meetings with the delegations are planned; the political groups will be made aware of the terms of reference and activities of WEU in view of the forthcoming European elections.

Fifth, the Chairman of the Committee will get in touch with the President of the Assembly during the preparation of the next budget in order to look at ways of making WEU better known in the parliaments.

Sixth and last, the Chairman of the Committee will ask the press advisers to study the possibility of establishing more and more contacts between the WEU Assembly and the press at the level of the national parliaments.

May I conclude by appealing to all WEU Assembly members and substitutes to spread awareness of the activities and importance of WEU and thereby help keep alive the aims and ideals of the Brussels Treaty. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper to open the debate.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — I should like to follow Mr. Schlingemann's example by speaking in French, but I think, Mr. President, that my teachers at the Lycée Lakanal, who were also yours, would be so ashamed of the way in which I maltreat your beautiful language that I shall do better, after these introductory remarks, to continue in English.

(*The speaker continued in English*)

Mr. Roper (continued)

I should begin by saying that I believe that in verity the Committee whose reports we are studying this afternoon has one of the most vital functions of any of the Committees of our Assembly, because there is no point in our having an Assembly of WEU unless we can make sure that the work that we do here, and the work we do in committees and colloquies, has an impact upon our national parliaments. It is not for me at this stage to debate whether our work has any impact on the Council of Ministers of WEU, although I know how much time and effort they put into preparing replies to our recommendations. But I believe that our essential rôle is not to change them but to change ourselves, to learn from the experience of working together in different national organisations about the approach that other countries and other parties have towards the common problems that we study and then to find ways of taking back to our national parliaments the work that we have done here and introducing those ideas into policy formation in each of our national parliaments, because I believe that we in this Assembly can play a rôle in integrating Europe in matters of defence if we are able to take the ideas that we develop here and introduce them into our national parliaments.

There is no point in exaggerating the rôle of this Assembly. On the other hand, one must not underestimate it. I would say again that our most important rôle, as I have said on previous occasions, although the words were not originally mine, is essentially a rôle of adult education for parliamentarians, stretching us and opening us to new ideas, ideas on problems as they are seen by those in other countries and other political parties in our continent of Western Europe.

We shall be more effective in our work if we can find ways of relating it to the work that goes on in our national parliaments and ways of ensuring that what we do here is not just a pleasant week in Paris but can have some relation to the things we do within our own parliaments back home.

When we come to the the important report submitted to us by Mr. Schlingemann this morning, Document 791, augmented as it was by his interesting oral presentation, we see what is being done at present ; but we have a problem : we have an English proverb, which may or not be translatable, that one can lead a horse to water but one cannot make it drink. From this building we can send out, as I read we do, 3,000 copies of the brief account of the session of this Assembly. I would not want to make too detailed inquiries about how many of those 3,000 copies are read. Certainly, in my own parliament at Westminster — and I speak only for the House

of Commons, no doubt things are different and possibly better in the House of Lords — the information about Western European Union is available but I doubt whether very many members of the House of Commons seek it out.

The question we need to ask ourselves, therefore, is whether we correctly direct our parliamentary relations, which is one aspect, and an important one, of our public relations in general. How much do we know about the target audiences we are trying to interest ? How much do we know about whether the booklets we send out are the right kind of booklets to interest members of parliament ? We have done it for a long time. Have we thought whether this is the right way to spend this amount of money ? More important in a way than how one sells something and how we promote our organisation and make sure that what we do is known is what it is about which we are trying to tell people. In this sense we are somewhat unusual as an Assembly in that, unlike the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament or the North Atlantic Assembly, where there is a large administrative structure in the Commission, NATO or the Council of Europe which are doing things, for reasons which we quite well understand, this is an Assembly where the rest of the organisation — I should not say is moribund — but is not over-energetically active, for reasons which we well understand. Therefore, we have to ask what we can do as an Assembly. How can we create a reality of this Assembly which can contribute something to debates in our national parliaments ?

I am biased and I make no secret about this. As Chairman of the Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I must see this as something which is unique to this Assembly. To use the jargon of marketing, it is our "unique selling proposition". It is the one thing we do here which is not done in other assemblies in Western Europe. Therefore, if we are to make our work more effective we need to look at how the oriented part of our work can be better integrated with studies and work on defence in our national parliaments, because that is where we have an interaction of what is happening in the national parliaments.

Therefore, I think that we need to examine this.

I am glad to say that my own Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has had a series of successful joint meetings with the defence committees of a number of national parliaments — with the defence committee of the Netherlands Parliament, with some members of the defence committee of the Bundestag, recently in Rome with the defence committee of the Italian Assembly and the Senate, and next month we shall have meetings with the defence

Mr. Roper (continued)

committees of the French National Assembly and the French Senate. That is useful. It means that we are able to put our ideas across to those in national parliaments who are concerned about these matters.

We need also to examine — this is throwing out an idea which will obviously need much more mature thought but I throw it out so that we may see what the reactions are — the structure of our committees in WEU. Should we not look at our committees and have perhaps two or three dealing with different aspects of defence and one dealing with general policy? If defence is the one thing that we can do that no one else can do, are we using the organisation as effectively as we should to focus the attention of members of parliament on the work of WEU? Should we look at it to avoid a possible overlap with the Council of Europe?

In that area I come back to a suggestion that I have made before and that has been welcomed by some but not by others, and that is whether we should pursue rather more energetically the suggestion I have made previously — that we need to look carefully at the present arrangements whereby both full members and alternates of the Council of Europe should automatically be the full members and alternates of WEU.

According to the treaty the full members have to be the same, but I see no reason why the alternate members should be the same. It would be perfectly in keeping with the treaties of the Council of Europe and WEU if we had different alternates. We should examine this idea with a view to bringing here from our national parliaments those who are particularly concerned with defence so that we can ensure that this Assembly will be more effective in this area of its specialisation, defence. In that way we should be able to be much more effective in promoting our ideas.

I was interested by the remarks this morning of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of my own government. He said in response to a question put by you, Mr. President, about the European Parliament that the British Government believed very clearly that after the direct elections this Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe would grow in importance because they would be the only bodies in which the representatives of the parliaments of seven of the Nine would meet to discuss matters in common. We sometimes face direct elections with a curious nervous fear. I do not believe we need to do so. I believe that this Assembly will for some years to come have an effective rôle but that rôle will be successful only if we as an Assembly are prepared to face the challenges,

look at our working methods and be prepared to make changes to ensure that our work integrates with the work in our national parliaments so that what is done here is not the activity of a pleasant week in Paris but an essential part of the debate on defence, security and foreign policy which goes on throughout the whole of our parliaments. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have no more speakers on the list.

Without wishing to depart from my rôle as President, I would like to compliment Mr. Roper on the amount he learned at the Lycée Lakanal, and also compliment the Rapporteur, who did not attend the same school, on his powers of expression.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to the debate.

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I shall answer in my own language, Mr. President. It is easy to do so since I can be brief.

In the first place I would like for my part to thank Mr. Roper for the suggestions he has put forward. Many of these are however, I feel, suggestions that ought rather to go to the Presidential Committee — those on working methods, composition, substitutes and the like — and are not so much matters for our Committee. Aside from that, they are very interesting suggestions. I take it they will indeed be discussed in the proper place.

So far as our Committee is concerned, I can only repeat that in the forthcoming meeting we shall be occupied in looking for the best way of going about making the ideas of this Assembly, of Western European Union and the Brussels Treaty better known, especially in our national parliaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Schlingemann.

The Committee is not submitting any text for the Assembly to vote on. The Assembly would no doubt wish formally to take note of the information report presented by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Are there any objections?

Note is taken of the Committee's report and we thank it and the Rapporteur for their work.

3. Disarmament

The limitation of strategic arms

New weapons and defence strategy

(*Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Docs. 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft texts

The President (continued)

presented by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Documents 788 and Amendments, 787 and 789.

If the Assembly were unanimous and there were no objections to the draft recommendation in Document 787, and no abstentions, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Since Mr. Bernini has expressed his opposition, the right course will be to take a vote by roll-call in accordance with the procedure with which our Assembly is familiar. The vote will be taken later.

In Document 789, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is submitting to the Assembly a draft order on new weapons and defence strategy.

No amendments have been tabled.

I put the draft order to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is agreed to unanimously¹.

In Document 788, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is presenting a draft recommendation.

I have before me eighteen amendments tabled by Mr. Boucheny and Mr. Bozzi, which I shall call for discussion in the order of the paragraphs in the preamble and the text of the recommendation proper to which they relate.

Mr. Boucheny has tabled Amendment 1 which reads :

1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Considering that to the danger created by the increase in existing military capabilities is now added that of the proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons ;”.

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — If you agree, Mr. President, I think that it would serve no useful purpose for me to speak to each of the fourteen amendments I have tabled. I should simply like to give a brief explanation of my reasons for tabling them. Essentially what we want is to specify the conditions for disarmament. We wished, as far as possible, to improve the draft text along the lines of a paper which the French Communist Party has pre-

sented to the President of the French Republic, clarifying the party's positions on disarmament problems. So I think that the wording of the amendments is self-explanatory.

I point out that we wish to withdraw Amendment 3. I therefore propose that we should discuss the amendments whose texts are sufficiently explicit.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Mr. Boucheny has stated, Mr. President, that he will speak only once, to all the amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Yes.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — As Mr. Boucheny's amendments interfere with Mr. Bozzi's, it is rather difficult for me to answer all of them at once. I would therefore prefer to speak to each amendment as it is called.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I recognise of course the correctness of your observations and that you are entitled to speak to each amendment.

Do you wish to express your views on Amendment 1, Mr. Rapporteur ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not feel that Amendment 1 adds a great deal to our report. I do not feel strongly opposed to it, so I shall abstain, but I cannot recommend the Assembly to adopt it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 1 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

I will read out Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Stressing that the intensive arms trade now practised exerts its adverse effects on the economy, is immoral and increases the risk of armed conflicts breaking out ;”.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not feel that Amendment 2 is necessary. It seems to be covered by paragraph (ix) of the preliminary section of the draft recommendation. If one had wanted to refer to arms sales, it would have been more appropriate to do so there, rather than after paragraph (i). I therefore cannot recommend the adoption of the amendment.

1. See page 27.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 2 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Amendment 3 is withdrawn.

We will pass on to Amendment 15, tabled by Mr. Bozzi :

15. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "other major arms suppliers" insert "and the main recipient countries".

In paragraph 1 (e) of the draft recommendation proper, after "major arms-producing countries" insert "and main recipient countries".

I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — As this amendment is self-explanatory, Mr. President, there is no need for me to enlarge upon it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to make a few comments on this matter, since the text in the ninth paragraph, which we are now discussing, results from an amendment which I myself proposed to the Assembly at our June sitting. It was subsequently adopted in the Committee on consensus, without opposition in the Committee, I think, and put forward by the Committee unanimously as part of their recommendation.

I have to say that if Mr. Bozzi and the other supporters of his amendment object to the amendment which has now been put forward within the text submitted by the Defence Committee, I would rather that they had moved for its deletion than that they had made what I can only describe as a mockery of the sense of my amendment by putting in the addition which they propose.

Essentially, what the text does at present is to recognise a special responsibility of the arms exporting countries. If we accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Bozzi, we then say that it is a special responsibility shared by both the exporting countries and the recipient countries.

As a practising politician, Mr. President, you will be aware that once one describes everyone as having a special responsibility, no one is left with the special responsibility.

I believe that it was quite correct of the Defence Committee to accept the amendment, to recognise that there is a special responsibility on the part of the exporting nations to exercise restraint. I entirely accept that it would be very

nice if the importing countries were prepared to practise restraint, but I think that we have to ask ourselves whether it is realistic to expect them to do so, and we also have to ask ourselves whether we, the exporting countries, assist them in achieving that kind of restraint.

Even as we meet in this Assembly now, there is a fleet auxiliary ship of Her Majesty's Navy touring the coasts of South America and Africa carrying with it the many weapons which we are prepared to export under agreement to countries in those continents, and carrying with it as well servicemen who are specially trained in demonstrating those weapons, to tempt the recipient countries to buy them.

That does not seem to me to be exercising any kind of restraint on our part, and it seems to underline the particular responsibility that we as exporting nations bear, because we tempt those countries to buy weapons. In order to sell them, we play on the fear that they have of their neighbours having purchased them. That creates a very special responsibility which we have to face and accept.

Therefore, I very much hope that the Assembly will not accept this amendment, because it would have the effect that we would all, both importers and exporters, have a special responsibility, and the consequence of that is that our own special responsibility for restraint in our exporting policy would be thereby obscured.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The original text was Mr. Cook's. It was accepted by the Committee. I feel that the additions now proposed by Mr. Bozzi somewhat confuse the matter. We already refer, in sub-section 1 (e) — which I know we have not yet reached — to the responsibilities of both supplier and recipient countries. However, I do not think that this further amendment would clarify the matter, so I am afraid that I cannot recommend to the Assembly that it should adopt this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anybody else wish to speak ?...

I put Amendment 15 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 15 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 16, tabled by Mr. Bozzi :

16. In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "a comprehensive test ban" and insert "a nuclear test ban if this does not jeopardise the security of the state concerned".

The President (continued)

In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, delete "(a)".

I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this amendment seems to me to be of particular importance and to deserve some explanations which I shall try to give to the Assembly as briefly as possible.

I would remind you that the debate on the nuclear test ban was embarked upon, in the course of the previous sitting, by our colleague Mr. Seitlinger. He highlighted the fundamental reasons why the majority of the French Delegation were unable to accept the proposals made at that time by Mr. Roper.

Mr. Roper, for his part, had pointed out that five member states of Western European Union had adopted a stand in favour of a total nuclear test ban. He had stated that France alone was opposed to such a ban — which, of course, is indisputable.

Two observations are called for on this issue.

The first is that a security policy, in order to be common to all, requires the agreement of all. Europe can only define its appropriate positions in matters of security and defence if it arrives at unanimous agreement. Each of the states which make up Europe is sovereign and its fundamental options should therefore be respected if the very viability of the European edifice is not to be compromised.

The question of nuclear tests is fundamental to France. Without a minimum of testing its nuclear force, such as it is today, would have no guarantee of remaining fully credible. France, in fact, has a certain technological lag to make up and it is therefore no service to the cause of European security to forbid it all progress in the nuclear field. On the contrary, one would be damaging the security of the alliance — to which the French force of deterrence contributes — endangering the security of Europe, and, in the final analysis, establishing a Soviet-American monopoly in nuclear matters.

My second remark is this. It is not the nuclear tests of medium powers such as France or China that endanger existing balances but rather the unbridled armaments race in which the two great powers are engaged. Because of the accumulation of their nuclear resources it is the United States and the Soviet Union that have the prime responsibility for making progress with disarmament through a significant reduction. Only if the powers which today are over-armed agree on a realistic reduction can a country which possesses only the indispensable

minimum for a policy of deterrence participate, as it would wish, in nuclear disarmament efforts.

It is necessary therefore that the Assembly should adopt an attitude that is both equitable and realistic. Equitable in the sense that it must acknowledge where the real responsibility for nuclear over-armament lies. Realistic to the extent that it must take into account national sovereignty and the independence of the military choices made by each of our states. It is on this control of the nuclear weapon by a European country that the security of the whole of Western Europe largely depends.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This is probably the most difficult amendment we shall have to consider this afternoon. We know that because, Mr. President, you moved an amendment in similar terms when we considered this report on the previous occasion. I begin by saying how much I respect the fair way in which Mr. Bozzi has outlined the problem we have to face. As I explained before lunch — and Mr. Bozzi had the kindness to quote what I said then — there is obviously a difference of opinion between our countries within WEU.

As you have made clear on a previous occasion, Mr. President, and as Mr. Bozzi and Mr. Seitlinger have made clear today, the French Government and the majority of French parliamentarians maintain, as is their right, that such an amendment would not at present be in the interests of France. They would go further and say that it was not in the interests of Europe or, in the long run, of world security. It is a matter on which we disagree honestly and openly.

We believe that a comprehensive test ban is a very important step in preventing vertical proliferation, in putting a halt to the development of further generations of nuclear weapons. The majority of the Committee has adopted this proposal and the majority of the Assembly, on the last occasion when it considered it, rejected a similar amendment. The Assembly is in full possession of the facts of this matter. It is with some regret, because I understand the position of Mr. Bozzi and many of the French Delegation, that I have to recommend to the Assembly that it reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 16 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 16 is negatived.

I now call for discussion of Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Boucheny, which reads :

4. Leave out paragraph 1(d) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

The President (continued)

"an effective balanced and controlled reduction, in conditions of equal security for all states concerned, of all forces and all arms, in particular, in a first step, foreign forces and arms stationed in the zone covered by the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of forces and armaments ;".

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have just said that I had no intention of speaking to the recommendation as a whole. But it seemed to us that this amendment was of some importance, the more so as problems of our Assembly's future are raised in it. That is why we wish to uphold this amendment and to highlight the contribution which it makes towards détente in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The amendment proposes to replace the reference in the text as it stands — "a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe".

Mr. Boucheny's amendment refers to a reduction of "in a first step, foreign forces and arms stationed in the zone covered by the Vienna negotiations". As I understand it, the only negotiations deal not only with the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union forces based in the area but with the forces of all the countries in the zone covered by the MBFR negotiations.

The amendment would change the basis of the MBFR negotiations and, whilst I appreciate the way in which representatives of France, in spite of the attitude of the French Government towards the MBFR negotiations, can table an amendment dealing with MBFR, those of us who have to deal with MBFR believe that the present arrangement is correct. This would be an unfortunate amendment. It would follow the course that has been argued from time to time by the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 4 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We now turn to Amendment 5 which reads :

5. After paragraph 1(d) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

"the balanced reduction of forces, armaments and military budgets in Europe ;".

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — When we introduce the term "military budget", the difficulty always is that within the United Nations, in spite of studies done by experts and the offer of member governments to take part in a pilot study of military accounting in different countries, we have been unable to get a clear basis for comparing military budgets. To introduce the topic of military budgets into these discussions causes a great deal of complication. I do not want to go into boring arguments about how much is spent by the Soviet Union or by other Eastern European countries on armaments, because that poses considerable technical difficulties. Therefore, with some diffidence, I recommend that the Assembly reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 5 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

Mr. Boucheny has tabled an Amendment 6 which reads :

6. After paragraph 1(e) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

"the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to strengthen mutual confidence in the military field ;".

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Amendment 6 is accepted by the Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 6 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

We come to Amendment 7, tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

7. In paragraph 1(g) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "restrict the development of" and insert "prohibit research, development or production of" ; leave out "conventional".

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The original text was put in this way because there

Mr. Roper (continued)

have been earlier conferences on what are called inhumane conventional weapons. I believe Mr. Cook moved an amendment in these terms on the last occasion. I understand Mr. Boucheny's wish to extend it to include, for example, the enhanced-radiation weapon, but I would prefer the Assembly to accept the original text, which refers to specific negotiating procedure which is continuing. We shall have another opportunity to return to the other problem touched on by Mr. Boucheny and to consider it in more detail when Mr. van den Bergh presents his report in June next year. Although I understand the motives behind the amendment, I recommend to the Assembly that it would be much more satisfactory for us to retain the original text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Mr. Boucheny's Amendment 7 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is negatived.

We now come to Amendments 8 and 9, tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

8. After paragraph 1(g) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"the reduction at a uniform rate of military budgets of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, as well as those of other countries with large economic resources in the spirit of United Nations resolutions ;".

9. After paragraph 1(g) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the world ;".

I call the Rapporteur to speak on Amendment 8.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have to repeat the speech I made earlier on the subject of military budgets. We do not at this time have effective ways of measuring the military budgets of certain countries. Until we have effective data, to call for this sort of reduction is unrealistic, and, therefore, I have to recommend against it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 8 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is negatived.

I call the Rapporteur to speak on Amendment 9.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This amendment is quite acceptable to the Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 9, accepted by the Committee, to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 9 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 10, tabled by Mr. Boucheny, which reads :

10. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"2. To participate actively in the work of the transformed Committee on Disarmament in close liaison with the United Nations General Assembly and its Disarmament Commission in pursuit of the objectives listed in paragraph 1 ;".

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This is a little difficult and I wonder whether Mr. Boucheny is aware of the implications of the amendment. We have to go back to the beginning of the recommendation. We are recommending that the Council and member governments :

"Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following object in view :"

In the original text we proposed the words :

"To secure the participation of all nuclear weapon powers... in the transformed Committee on Disarmament..."

Mr. Boucheny's amendment would really only be calling on members of WEU to participate actively in the work of the transformed Committee on Disarmament. I am very anxious that we should use our influence to encourage China to participate in the transformed Committee on Disarmament. I do not believe that we can have effective disarmament negotiations without China taking part. I do not know whether it will do so. Opinions differ on this, but things change so rapidly in China that nobody would dare to make too many predictions about that country ; but Mr. Boucheny's amendment would restrict the participation request merely to countries which are members of WEU. We are anxious to involve all the nuclear weapon states and therefore I hope that Mr. Boucheny will accept that his amendment is rather restrictive and limited and therefore that it is preferable to leave the text as it was.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 10 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 10 is negatived.

We now come to Amendments 17 and 18 tabled by Mr. Bozzi :

17. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows :

"To have an all-European conference on disarmament convened with the participation of all signatory states of the CSCE final act with a view to ensuring the progressive achievement of a programme of confidence-building measures and controlled limitation of forces ;".

18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows :

"To introduce a development assistance fund in the framework of the United Nations formed by a tax on over-armament ;".

Mr. Bozzi, perhaps you would care to speak to both amendments at once ?

Mr. BOZZI (France) (Translation). — I would prefer to move them in turn, Mr. President.

I undertake to be brief and not hold up the proceedings.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Bozzi has the floor.

Mr. BOZZI (France) (Translation). — The purpose of Amendment 17 is to stress that there can be no progress towards disarmament in Europe unless fresh initiatives are taken.

As you know, Ladies and Gentlemen, there are two ongoing sets of negotiations of concern to Europe militarily : first, the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms ; second, the talks on the reduction of forces in Central Europe. However, neither can satisfy — in full, I mean — the needs of the European states.

Indeed, the agreements on strategic arms limitations are conceived solely in terms of the interests of the two great powers, and it would be dangerous if they should one day contain provisions making Europe an area of special status. This is the possibility that Mr. Baumel referred to this morning in his excellent report. It would, in effect, achieve what I would go as

far as to call the "uncoupling" of the American strategic forces and the European forces. Europe would then no longer be automatically assured of an American strategic retaliation in the event of a successful mass offensive by the Warsaw Pact forces.

As for the Vienna negotiations, they are, as you know, talks between blocs, and that too carries the risk that Europe might one day find itself with the special status of a military zone under the *de facto* joint control of the two superpowers.

I therefore think that a new forum for negotiations should be set up that meets Europe's own specific disarmament requirements. Such a forum, composed of all signatory states of the Helsinki final act, would respect the independence of each. It would not be *de facto*, under an American-Soviet condominium, and its main task would be to establish a solid basis of mutual trust between all the states of our continent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur for his views on Amendment 17.

Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). — I spoke on this amendment this morning in response to a speech by Mr. Seitlinger. As I then said, the proposals of the French Government referred to by the French Minister in his speech yesterday are perhaps described in more detail in my report than in any other place in public, in paragraphs 47 and 50 of my report, which outlines the way in which such a conference could take place. Therefore, although these are already covered in the report, as Mr. Bozzi and Mr. Seitlinger pointed out, they are not covered in the recommendation. We discussed this in June to some extent but perhaps on that occasion I was rather harsh with you, Mr. President, when you were not in the chair. I should very much like to be able to accept the amendment. I have discussed with Mr. Bozzi and Mr. Seitlinger a minor alteration to the text which is acceptable to them so that the text in French would now read :

"Examiner avec bienveillance la proposition de convoquer une conférence..."

and the English text would read :

"To examine sympathetically the proposals for an all-European conference on disarmament..."

I understand that this small drafting amendment is acceptable to the authors of the original amendment and therefore, with the permission of the Assembly, if the authors will accept it in that form, it would be acceptable to the Committee and myself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — What counts is that the intention should be accepted.

As the rewording of the amendment you are proposing, Mr. Roper, shows that you have made a considerable move towards the underlying motives for my amendment — supported by many of my colleagues in the French Delegation although not signed by them — I accept your proposal and thank you for your co-operation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — For the sake of clarity, would the Rapporteur please read out the text as it will now stand?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Mr. President. The French text of Amendment 17, which begins at the moment :

“Obtenir la convocation d’une conférence pan-européenne...”

would now read :

“Examiner avec bienveillance la proposition de convoquer une conférence paneuropéenne...”

and in the English text — if I may act as a translator, and, obviously, if there is a mistake in my translation, I would bow to the technicians — the wording would be something like :

“To examine sympathetically the proposals for an all-European conference on disarmament...”

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur/translator. (*Laughter*)

The Assembly is now in a position to pronounce on the amendment in question, including the sub-amendment tabled by the Rapporteur with Mr. Bozzi's consent.

Does anyone wish to speak ? ...

I put the amendment, as amended, to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 17, as amended, is agreed to.

We now move on to Amendment 18, tabled by Mr. Bozzi, which I have already read out.

I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment is to establish a principle which, I quite appreciate, would have to be put into practice in ways not easy to define. If disarmament is achieved with the aid and under the control of all states, we also think it should, as it were, as far as humanly possible, be of benefit to all. It is by enabling the whole community of nations to benefit from the savings achieved that disarmament will take on its full significance and, let

there be no doubt about it, its efficiency be enhanced. That is why we feel it necessary to set up a special development assistance fund formed by a tax on over-armament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Bozzi.

Does anyone else wish to speak ? ...

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am very sorry to have to say to Mr. Bozzi that I have a little difficulty with this amendment. I think all of us are sympathetic to the idea of associating disarmament with making funds available for overseas development, a matter that was touched upon to some extent by Mr. Tomlinson this morning. What is difficult to realise is what I was saying about military budgets and measuring over-armament. It is a technical problem which, if one looks at it, presents a lot of difficulties.

I would be very glad for the proposal to be studied in the Committee in the proper way. Until we have made rather more of a study of the practicalities and realities of it, I would be reluctant to see it added to our text at the moment. I wonder whether Mr. Bozzi would consider withdrawing it on this occasion and enabling it to be studied in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — I note two things from what the Rapporteur has said : first, that there is a real problem, the ultimate aim of my amendment which seems worthy of consideration ; second, the very serious, very considerable and very varied, difficulties raised by over-armament, as I concluded in my introductory statement. I am therefore happy to withdraw my amendment, provided, if I may so put it, it can be very attentively considered by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Bozzi.

As the amendment has been withdrawn, we can now move on to Amendments 11, 12, 13 and 14, tabled by Mr. Boucheny, to insert four new paragraphs after paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation.

I shall now read out Amendment 11 :

11. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

“To associate all nuclear powers with the United States-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war ;”

Mr. Boucheny, do you wish to speak ?

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — I do not know what you think about Amendment 11, Mr. President, but I believe it fully answers the objections that had been raised in respect of Amendment 10. I believe the Chairman of the Committee is agreeable, and that this corresponds exactly with what the Committee wanted just now with regard to Amendment 10.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you.

Does anyone wish to speak to the amendment? ...

What is the Committee's view, Mr. Rapporteur?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This goes further than my original report. It is not covered in my report, but, as Mr. Boucheny has said, I find it very difficult to take exception to the amendment and will certainly not oppose it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put the amendment to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 11 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 12, tabled by Mr. Boucheny, which I shall read out:

12. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"To associate all nuclear powers with the strategic arms limitation talks at the time appropriate to the state of the negotiations;"

Do you wish to speak, Mr. Boucheny? ...

Does anyone else wish to speak? ...

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This again is an important and rather difficult amendment. I think, with great respect to Mr. Boucheny, that it would have been better tabled as an amendment to the report by Mr. Baumel on the strategic arms limitation talks rather than in the context of my report. Mr. Baumel dealt with the strategic arms limitation talks, and it seems to go rather better into that discussion than into my report. It might be that Mr. Baumel would like to express a view of this proposal about associating other nuclear powers within the strategic arms limitation talks. This raises certain problems, and although I asked for the view of the French Government about the matter yesterday morning, it is a matter about which there may be many divergent views. I do not think I can recommend its acceptance on behalf of the Committee, and I think that the Assembly should make up its own mind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — You have heard the Rapporteur's opinion.

I put the amendment to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 12 is negatived.

I now call Amendment 13, tabled by Mr. Boucheny:

13. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"To make the Mediterranean a denuclearised zone, free of foreign military bases, where the United States and Soviet fleets stationed in this zone would be limited, with the aim of their being withdrawn;"

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This is a proposal which has been discussed on a number of occasions and which came up when we were considering a report from Mr. Grant about the Mediterranean last year.

The Assembly must realise what is being said here. A denuclearised zone in the Mediterranean world have important implications for certain NATO countries which have nuclear weapons based in the Mediterranean at the moment. There are serious strategic implications in this proposal, and I think we should be very careful before adopting this amendment without a great deal more study. It requires study. It would be a mistake for the Assembly to adopt the amendment without having given the subject rather more study than we have been able to give it. Therefore, I have to recommend that we reject Amendment 13.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 13 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 13 is negatived.

We now pass on to Amendment 14, tabled by Mr. Boucheny:

14. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"To prohibit the sale of any weapon or war material to colonialist, racist and fascist governments, and in particular to those of the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Chile and Iran."

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — In defending this Amendment 14, and having come to the end of the list of amendments, I

Mr. Boucheny (continued)

should first like to thank the Chairman of the Committee for having expressed a positive opinion on three of them, which proves that there are a number of possibilities open to us for improving an important text that accords with the principles of détente.

As I said just now, these amendments were inspired by the essential idea that our Assembly can play a rôle, surely a positive rôle, in the parliamentary control of crises and in the efforts of parliamentarians to make Europe a haven of peace.

I should nevertheless like to join issue for a moment with our Chairman, in particular as regards the previous amendment — the one we just discussed, which concerns the Mediterranean — since it is easy to say in Committee: we shall discuss this afterwards, especially as we have not been able to deal fully with the questions raised.

More specifically, so far as Amendment 14 is concerned, I believe it to be of great importance, since it raises in forceful terms the problem of arms exports and that of arms sales to a number of countries which, both intrinsically and because of the policies they pursue, constitute a grave threat to peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, with regard to the amendment condemning arms sales, I should like to add one comment. There can be no question merely of condemning arms sales by certain countries to régimes which are described as racist and colonialist, if elsewhere there are other countries which do not sell arms but give away quantities of them to other countries or to other regions.

I believe that Mr. Boucheny has grasped my meaning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to thank Mr. Boucheny and Mr. Bozzi for tabling their amendments. I think that their participation in the debate and the amendments presented by two factions in the French Delegation this afternoon have lent a great deal of animation to our discussions and have been of very great importance to our Assembly. I would express my thanks to both of them, and apologise for having been unable to agree to more of their amendments.

(The speaker continued in English)

There are obviously some difficulties about accepting the amendment. First, prohibitions are in effect in regard to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. One would want the countries of WEU and of the rest of the world to apply those bans to the export of arms. As for Iran, however much I disapprove of some of the behaviour of the Iranian Government, I cannot say that it is colonialist, racist or fascist. I am never quite sure of the definition of fascist, but I am not sure that the Iranian Government is fascist. However much I share the views of Mr. Boucheny about the Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, I cannot recommend the acceptance of the amendment as drafted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 14 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 14 is negatived.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the amended draft recommendation? ...

I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — I asked for the floor in order to explain my vote. We shall save time if I say right at the outset that the members of the French Delegation belonging to the majority, which supports the actions and more specifically the defence policy of the President of the Republic, cannot to their regret vote for the whole draft report presented by Mr. Roper.

They regret this because they have much esteem for the considerable work that has been performed by the Rapporteur and the Committee.

They regret it, moreover, because the report contains some excellent things in important particulars, but for us the discussion which took place just now on continuation or prohibition of all experiments in the nuclear field constitutes an obstacle which we are unable to surmount. That is why the security of France — and over and above the security of France, the security of Europe, as I demonstrated just now, so that I do not need to repeat myself — appear to us to depend on the continuation of a number of experiments where we have afforded proof of good will; we have renounced experiments of a certain type, because we were recommended to do so, and now carry out only underground tests. It is legitimate to express the hope, without betraying state secrets, that by the end of a few short years these tests will be completed,

Mr. Bozzi (continued)

that our deterrent force will — in the technological field and, what is more, in regard to credibility, authenticity and protective value — have matched the level attained by the deterrent forces of the two big powers, the two super-powers. But until such time as we have reached that stage, national interests require that we should continue with these tests. So long as the Assembly tries to prohibit our doing so, we shall vote against the report. It was necessary that that should be said in the clearest possible way, and I believe that this has been done.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for your remarks and for the clarity of the conclusions you draw.

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — I take the floor in explanation of my vote. The French communists will vote in favour of the text presented by the Committee. We do so with the feeling of performing a constructive act, which reflects the conception we should like to hold of this Assembly. We are in an alliance which is called the Atlantic Alliance. There is much that we could say about this alliance, but we believe that the parliamentarians, whoever they may be who play a part in this alliance, have a duty to perform and a rôle to play in supervising the activities of the military authorities, on the one hand, and, on the other, in striving to promote anything which might be considered as a factor for détente. Hence, our position is obviously the opposite of that adopted by our colleague, Mr. Bozzi. In fact, we do not believe that it is in the national interests to continue with nuclear tests rather than to work for progress towards disarmament, and that is the meaning behind our positive vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anybody else wish to speak? ...

In the light of the statement by Mr. Bozzi, we shall of course proceed to a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Péronnet.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote? ...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

| | |
|----------------------------|----|
| Number of votes cast | 48 |
| Ayes | 42 |
| Noes | 6 |
| Abstentions | 0 |

The amended draft recommendation is adopted².

Ladies and Gentlemen, in Document 787, which contains Mr. Baumel's report, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is presenting a draft recommendation on the limitation of strategic arms.

No amendments have been tabled.

A vote by roll-call was requested just now. We shall accordingly proceed to vote.

I call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, on behalf of the Christian Democrat Group I beg to announce that we shall be voting in favour of the Baumel report. Our vote has a very precise intention bearing in mind more particularly what was expressed by the vote on the Roper report, namely an unambiguous will to achieve a balanced reduction in world nuclear armaments, carrying an unmistakable significance for what Europe represents today. The efforts expended by some European countries to strike a balance of forces can neither be ignored nor obscured. They certainly contribute not to world tension, but to deterrence, to that strategic and defence understanding which we in this Assembly defend, and a forthright vision of the political rôle Europe ought in the future to play, in and by our integrated military strength.

I therefore believe that the convergence of views now possible on the vote concerning the Roper report gives clear notice of the European's determination to conduct also a foreign policy providing for specific instruments of defence that cannot be overruled and without which that same foreign policy would only remain a bundle of good intentions. For the present, I claim that the very fact of simultaneously voting for the Roper and the Baumel reports makes crystal clear our intention of serving peace, precisely because we have set our faces against any forms of pacifism that are incapable of doing so, but are capable of furthering the interests of the great powers, or any single one of them. For this reason we attach particular importance to taking the vote on both reports concurrently, and great significance, too, to the favourable or unfavourable votes cast on

1. See page 25.

1. See page 28.

Mr. de Poi (continued)

both, already and at this moment, by the various political formations.

(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 787.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Péronnet.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ? ...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹ :

| | |
|----------------------------|----|
| Number of votes cast | 48 |
| Ayes | 43 |
| Noes | 2 |
| Abstentions | 3 |

The draft recommendation is agreed to².

4. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 22nd November, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. A European armaments policy (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 786 and Amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy.
3. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Are there any objections ? ...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ? ...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 4.45 p.m.)

1. See page 26.

2. See page 30.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd November 1978

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. A European armaments policy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 786 and Amendments).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Critchley (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Corallo, Mr. Grant.

4. Address by Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Mazzola (*Minister of State for Defence of Italy*).

Replies by Mr. Mazzola to questions put by: Mr. Grant, Mr. Roper, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Calamandrei, Mr. Périquier, Mr. Roberti.

5. A European armaments policy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 786 and Amendments).

Speakers: The President, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Cook.

6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Speakers: The President, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*).

Replies by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher to questions put by: Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Vohrer, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Druon, Mr. Schwenneke, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Gessner, Lord Morris, Mr. Brugnon, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Page, Mr. Müller.

7. A European armaments policy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 786 and Amendments).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Banks, Mr. Hardy, Mr. De Poi.

8. Change in the Order of Business.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the two previous Sitzings have been distributed.

Are there any comments?

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. A European armaments policy

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the

report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on a European armaments policy, Document 786 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Critchley, Rapporteur, to present the report.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — There are two vital objectives for the North Atlantic Alliance. The first of these two objectives is the achievement of the standardisation and interoperability of arms equipment. The second vital objective for the alliance is the establishment of a two-way street in arms equipment between Europe and America. The first of those two objectives we shall strive to achieve through the existing fora of NATO, Western European Union and — most important of all — the IEPG.

The second of the two objectives — and I ask members to keep them separate, because they are separate — a viable European arms industry into the 1980s, 1990s and beyond, can be achieved only if the EEC restructures the European arms industries themselves so as to bring about a common procurement policy for arms. Why is it that we wish to achieve the interoperability and, more important, the standardisation of arms? We wish to do so because if we do not Europe will be disarmed by inflation at a time when the perception of the Soviet threat is growing. Then why achieve a two-way street in arms sales and production between America and Europe? The

1. See page 32.

Mr. Critchley (continued)

answer to that is because of the threat inherent in the large American aircraft and arms manufactures to the viability and, indeed, the future existence of a European aircraft and arms industry.

Who in this Assembly opposes this great leap forward, and why? I sense that there is an unholy alliance formed between the communists, the socialists and the Gaullists. The communists are naturally hostile to any supranational process that would, were it to succeed, amount to a policy of European rearmament at no additional cost. The socialists now seem more attached to the concept of the nation state than they are to the unity of Europe. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the ranks of the British Labour Party, because the social democrats within the British Labour Party were once in the vanguard of the movement towards European unity, but they now suffer from a hardening of the arteries.

What of the Gaullists, who are obsessed with national sovereignty and see the manufacture of arms as going to the heart of their idea of the nation state? The Gaullists confuse sovereignty with virginity. "Once you have lost your virginity, it does not much matter" is my message to the Gaullist party. I would remind them that France would still enjoy the lion's share of arms made and exported to Europe, but were there to be no restructuring on the part of the EEC and no common procurement policy, as I advocate, French industry would inevitably become a sub-contractor of the American industry giant. A European armaments agency would not eliminate the sale of arms to the third world but it would reduce the volume of sales. We should sell less to the third world but more to ourselves and very much more to the United States.

Leaving aside the moral objection to the arms trade — and many socialists object to the arms trade in principle — there are three disadvantages to the existing arms trade. They are that the armaments industries of Europe are dependent upon the procurement attitudes of other countries, that the sale of arms runs the risk of accelerating arms races abroad which may lead to the involvement of Europe, to its disadvantage. Thirdly, it subordinates NATO standardisation to the competitive interests of the third world.

Have we the will to restart our journey towards the unity of Europe? There are three routes to unity. The first is unity through conquest, which has been tried and successfully resisted — Hitler, the Kaiser, Napoleon and Louis XIV. In each case England threw its weight in the scales against the aggressor, the principal power. This historical reflex may do

something to explain the enmity to the EEC shown by the present British Government.

The second route towards unity is unity through economic integration, which appears at least to have run into the sands.

The third route, which is the one that I am advocating, is unity through fear of a common enemy. Soviet rearmament has increased the perception of the threat in Europe but are we sufficiently afraid to begin the process of dismantling the bastions of national sovereignty? Today we must start to talk again about the defence of Europe within the context of Europe. A Community-wide armaments procurement and manufacture agency is in the long term — I stress "long term" — the only way in which Europe can hold on to its ability to make arms and by so doing preserve its security and independence. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

We now begin the debate.

We start with Mr. Corallo, and he will be followed by Mr. Grant and then Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. CORALLO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I may as well tell you quite bluntly that we are firmly opposed to the draft recommendation and report on a European armaments policy. The reasons I shall be giving you have nothing to do with any presumable imaginary agreements with other political formations, still less any hardening of our arteries, seeing that at any rate our cerebral arteries are much more resilient than our Rapporteur's!

You all know that we have on other occasions shown ourselves willing to spare no effort to encourage joint armaments production and interoperability and standardisation of military equipment, within both Europe and, if possible, the alliance as a whole. We are indeed absolutely convinced that by consistently following this path, substantial results would be within our grasp both economically and for the efficiency of our countries' armed forces, through the elimination of senseless squandering and of operational difficulties.

Certainly, if no great progress has been made in this direction so far, it is because some countries have a more advanced armaments industry, especially in the aircraft sector, than others, and wish to keep their lead.

In short, what we fail to realise is that the safeguard of certain advantages carries with it for Europe and the individual European countries most highly developed in this sector an enormous capital expenditure threatening in the

Mr. Corallo (continued)

near future to outrun every possibility of survival for the European armaments industry save at such a high cost to our countries as to make heavy inroads on their financial resources. Nor are the alternatives less fraught with peril: either total subordination to the American industry, with serious consequences on employment and the state of the economy, or a unilateral rundown of armaments that is a very different thing from a world policy of armaments reduction and control.

In this respect I would like to say we should have liked the draft recommendation to have contained a cry of alarm at the mad rush for more and more numerous sophisticated and costly armaments, world-wide, with, if you allow me, Mr. Critchley, every country, not just the Warsaw Pact, joining in.

We are caught up in a pernicious spiral that snatches away enormous financial responsibilities just when even the most advanced countries are grappling with the economic crisis and there still survive throughout the world frightful pockets of backwardness, underdevelopment, poverty and hunger. The world seems deranged by a whiff of madness and the danger looms ever nearer that the piling up of armaments will end by determining relations between states and the military blocs, regardless of whatever will for peace the governments may proclaim.

Yet the difficulties springing up in the SALT negotiations, the announcement of new, and more and more sophisticated lethal weaponry, ought to make us all think and pledge ourselves to making wise counsels prevail among the governments bearing the greatest responsibilities in this respect.

In the Soviet Union the psychosis of encirclement is spreading, not, it has to be said, without some reason. There is concern in the United States at the military capability of the Warsaw Pact, and the neutron bomb is being given the go-ahead: the world looks on in stupefaction at this rush to destruction.

Of all this Mr. Critchley seems to be unaware or at all events to feel he need not bother about it.

But we must not let Mr. Critchley's deafness prevent us from demonstrating our opposite opinion, for we realise quite well that until such time as bilateral disarmament agreements are reached and even after such an auspicious development, the problems listed by our Rapporteur will retain their cogency.

Joint armaments production by the European countries, interoperability and standardisation of military equipment are still valid objectives if

we wish to reduce our imbalance with the United States, to avert the risk of our economies being bled white by senseless squandering of our resources on research, production and operations.

But when it comes to proposals for assigning to the European Economic Community functions in this area which would wrench its true nature awry in breach of the treaties on which it is founded, then we are no longer agreeable.

Mr. Critchley laments the failure of the project for a European Defence Community in 1954, and regards it as a damaging setback to the European idea. We respect, if we cannot share, his opinion; but we cannot condone any attempt today to surreptitiously convert the Economic Community to one of defence. Above all, we stand on the eve of the first European elections, and already so many difficulties, so much mistrust, have been encountered and had to be overcome to reach this important milestone. Even today resistances are being encountered, and oppositions that seemed to have become quiescent are being revived. It would be irresponsible, in this delicate phase of the Community's existence, to inject a disturbing element that would let loose fresh polemics and provide opportunities for those seeking to create a diversion. Armaments problems are the alliance's concern; there is no lack of bodies which can and should take the matter up, starting from the forum in which we are met here today: WEU. There is the independent European programme group, the organs of NATO, the national governments. The case abundantly mentioned by the Rapporteur of the multi-rôle combat aircraft Tornado teaches us that substantial results can be achieved where the political will exists, and especially where there is awareness of the need for collaboration.

We have to fight against the short-sightedness of the man who considers himself privileged yet fails to notice that by confining himself to the defence of his existing privilege he is liable to lose, not just his privilege, but all. However, this can be accomplished by pledging ourselves one and all to bring the requisite political pressures to bear on our respective parliaments, marshalling arguments in order to break down resistances.

Once all European governments and armaments industries are convinced of the necessity of co-operation, the battle will be won; but let us not delude ourselves that we shall be able to solve the problem by shrugging off the responsibility of doing so on to some other body of different character and functions, which while it may seem today broadly co-extensive with the alliance countries ought not, unless forced to do so, to place any concrete limit on its possibilities of growth, of acquiring new member countries, which are not, potentially, limited to Greece, Spain and Portugal alone.

Mr. Corallo (continued)

Precisely because, taking the long view, we hope for a development in due course of this peaceful instrument of collaboration and unity among the European countries, because we see in the European Economic Community a bridge towards other countries of Europe and the third world, we intend to participate in the construction of little Europe by keeping alive the ideal goal of a greater one, united in firm opposition to whatever may stand in the way of that exalted aim. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr Grant.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — This is an excellent report but also highly controversial because of recommendation 2. No one can say that procurement and manufacture of armaments in the West are ideal. Nor are the standardisation and interoperability of our weapons systems. All too often, our present arrangements lead to fragmented individual projects. Ever since I have been a member of this body, I have been alarmed at the disorganisation of the West in these areas, contrasted with the tight cohesion in the Warsaw pact countries, cohesion which dictatorships can more easily achieve and impose. Therefore, we cannot rest on the present position.

In this report Mr. Crichtley has made a positive and realistic proposal to make matters better. All sorts of arguments are raised against it. There is always a reason for doing nothing and for taking the easier course. It is argued, particularly by our French friends, that this proposal infringes Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome. But that article says that any member nation

"may take whatever measures it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security and which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material..."

If that does not mean, in the words of recommendation 2 that there can be a restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community, I do not know what it does mean. Some argue sincerely that if this is done, we shall suffer because there is a lack of political or parliamentary control. But I thought that the intention of the present move towards direct elections was to give more parliamentary control over the Community.

It is also argued that Portugal, Greece and Turkey are members of IEPG but not of the EEC. This argument is spurious, because when these proposals come into effect, those countries will be members of an enlarged EEC and able to play their full part.

It is argued also that these proposals will damage Western European Union. This is misleading. The two are not similar: they are complementary. After all, WEU does not manufacture arms: it has an entirely different rôle. But unless we do something about this, the long-term prospect is of European countries becoming increasingly subcontractors of multinational United States companies. It cannot be in the interests of anyone, least of all our French friends, that there should be over-dependence on the United States.

Therefore, the arguments for doing nothing can be easily demolished. The report points the way to the long-term future, which must lie with the Community. We are not changing the policy overnight or even next week. This is a long-term approach. All too often this Assembly produces platitudinous reports which add up to nothing and are a reason for doing nothing.

If we pass the report, the argument will be continued in the Council of Ministers. This must be right. But if we water it down in some vague woolly recommendations, I do not think that there will be anything for the Council of Ministers to do.

It is in the interests of the unity of Europe — and as Mr. Crichtley pointed out, that unity comes from threat and fear of a common foe — that we should pass these recommendations and approve this report. In particular, I hope that we shall support recommendation 2. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Grant.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I think we may now adjourn the debate on a European armaments policy in order to hear the address by Mr. Francesco Vittorio Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy.

4. Address by Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy

The PRESIDENT. — I welcome you, Mr. Minister. We are extremely glad to have you here this morning, so that we may listen to your speech. I hope that you will agree to answer questions later. Would you please come to the speakers' rostrum and address the Assembly?

Mr. MAZZOLA (*Minister of State for Defence of Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I first of all thank you for your cordial welcome. It is a great honour for me to represent my country in this Assembly, the only European parliamentary institution empowered to deal with defence matters.

May I also express on behalf of Ministers Forlani and Ruffini their warm appreciation of the kind invitation to address this meeting,

Mr. Mazzola (continued)

which unfortunately they have been unable to accept because of prior engagements.

Finally, may I, in the name of the President of the Italian Republic and Government, thank you for the visit you paid to Italy last week to review the major current problems of concern to WEU.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the abundance and depth of the questions that have been raised so far are attested by the highly-interesting debates they have given rise to and the forthright utterances of every speaker. They afford the clearest and most direct proof of the vitality that continues to animate this Assembly.

I can only at this point express the Council's appreciation of the Assembly's rôle in regularly monitoring the developing problems of European security and union from the particular standpoint of WEU, and direct the Council's own attention to the problems of major concern to the union. The Council too, I can assure you, has not failed to keep a close watch on application of the Brussels Treaty and annexed protocols, given the continuing importance attached by the member governments to the treaty itself and their manifest will to fulfil the obligations assumed by them.

Moreover, as I am sure you will all agree, the Council has not failed, during the first months of Italian chairmanship — which has brought home to us even more clearly the commitment you all give without stint to the common task — to fulfil the assurances given you by Minister Forlani in his presentation of the twenty-third annual report that we should go on constantly developing our mutual relations.

In this connection it is, as you know, only a little more than a fortnight since an informal joint meeting of the General Affairs Committee and the Council was held in Rome. May I say I thought it usefully complemented other specifically "official" contacts which, being subject to the rule of unanimity and obliged to observe stated conditions, do not permit such a free, rapid and direct dialogue.

Allow me now to give, for the benefit of those who were not present in Rome, a short summary of what was discussed. The main emphasis was on the following three topics: the incidence on Europe's security of certain external crises of the greatest relevance, however, to its peacefulness and security, and more especially, the crises in the Middle East and mainland Africa; the impact on WEU of progress in the European integration movement, such as enlargement of the European Economic Community and the coming elections by direct universal suffrage to

the European Parliament; and Europe's external relations.

The Council stated, on the first point, that it was following with the closest attention the persisting crises in the nearer Middle Eastern area, especially the protraction of a serious state of instability in the Lebanon, because of its potential consequences on the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the preoccupying spread of smouldering warfare on the African continent, already wracked by the problems decolonisation left in its wake.

In this respect, and I should like for a moment to digress from what transpired at the joint meeting, it is highly indicative of Italy's continuing interest in events in the Middle East, that Prime Minister Andreotti should have recently visited four Arab capitals. We believe we should do our utmost to ensure that the Camp David agreements and ensuing negotiations prove able to trigger off a global process of pacification, by which we mean a negotiation involving all interested parties and covering every aspect of the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is likely, or rather may be taken for granted, that such a negotiation would proceed by stages, by the gradual method. Nevertheless reference must be continually made at all times to the overall settlement which alone can bring to that area a just and durable peace, durable precisely because it is felt to be just. This is, moreover, I think, the political task of the Camp David agreements, the first text of which is in fact entitled "Framework agreement for peace in the Middle East", taking note of the contracting parties' determination to "reach a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict, through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts."

To come back to the Rome meeting, the second topic concerning progress towards European integration is so intricate and important, I believe we may all agree that it still demands a little more time for reflection. For my part I believe that in any case the enlargement of the European Economic Community and the coming elections to the European Parliament may be regarded as important milestones towards realising the full worth of having a democratic, jointly responsible and progressive democratic union of the nations of Western Europe. Indeed it is the aim of all European institutions to assist in developing and completing European union by gradually enabling its peoples to speak with one voice.

It was also stated that the Council did bear in mind Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty on the accession of new member states, but that it felt it should not interfere with the political decisions of any countries wishing to join the organisation.

Mr. Mazzola (continued)

Lastly, concerning Europe's external relations within the abovementioned perspective of European integration, and having regard to the constantly-changing world situation, it was pointed out that there seemed to be no grounds for departing from the line followed so far, hinged on the guarantees of equilibrium and security afforded by the Atlantic Alliance, a policy of détente in East-West relations to be given tangible form in Europe by whole-hearted implementation of the Helsinki final act, and a steady growth in economic, technical and financial co-operation with third world countries, as, for example, within the framework of the Lomé Convention, which is now being extended.

Other questions were touched on at the meeting, such as the major SALT II negotiations between Russia and the United States, and such a sensitive topical issue as the sale of arms to third countries. On SALT II, the Council reiterated the interest with which it was following these talks by reason of their possible impact on the progress of East-West relations in general as well as on European security in particular, and took a favourable view of the current phase in the negotiations now no longer confined to fixing ceilings for the number of strategic missiles but also envisaging their being effectively lowered.

On armaments sales, Mr. Radi stated the Italian position, which we consider particularly apt and reasonable and which would seem to be supported by the other members of the Council and various other countries: it may be expressed in a nutshell as refusal to authorise shipments of arms to states in what are called "hot spots" of conflict or crisis. This was one case, for example, in the fighting in the Horn of Africa, where Italy left nothing untried — a line of conduct we shall continue to follow — in support of measures to arrive at peaceful settlement of the problems in this area, by negotiations among the African countries themselves with due respect for the principles of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations and in accordance with the aspirations of the populations concerned.

I should like now in my capacity of Italian representative to the Council to review briefly a few considerations on two themes particularly dear to the hearts of members of this Assembly: the negotiations for reduction of forces in Central Europe and the work of the independent European programme group.

Italy whose territories are for geographical reasons outside the area of the forces reduction exercise, solely confined to Central Europe under the terms of the agreements on which the negotiations are based, and which is therefore given the special status of flank country for the purposes

of MBFR, is none the less interested in a favourable outcome of the negotiations in Vienna.

Accordingly, the Italian Government has endeavoured, and will continue to endeavour, to ensure smooth progress of the negotiations, supporting any steps likely to advance them and bring about an effective limitation of the opposing forces in this area while at the same time safeguarding the interests of all the states concerned and ensuring for them undiminished security and greater stability throughout the area, also viewed against the future prospect of European union.

Following proposals put forward on 19th April last by the western countries, which go some way towards meeting the requests of the Warsaw Pact countries who in their turn have updated their stance of last June, a small step forward seems to have been taken. However, numerous differences subsist on fundamental issues between the positions of East and West, especially on the essential matters of collective common ceilings and data about the armed forces.

On the Italian side we trust that, above all in the interests of the European countries, further efforts will be exerted to arrive at a reasonable equality at a lower level of armaments between the two alliances confronting one another in this area.

As for the IEPG, presided over by Italy for the fourth consecutive year, we all know that its activities in practice have much in common with WEU's, or rather they are in a few ways complementary to one another. It is therefore natural that closer contacts should have been established, and are still being established, at various levels between the two bodies, for mutual exchanges of ideas, and a review of their guidelines to avoid needless duplication and the consequent waste of precious energy.

One of the most significant features of these contacts has been the speech which the Chairman of the IEPG at national armaments directors level, Admiral Paolo Mainini delivered at the WEU symposium in March 1977. I shall in what I have to say be picking up the thread of the ideas expressed at the time by Admiral Mainini, in order by a review of the most salient points to give you an updated situation report at the close of the meeting of IEPG under-secretaries of state in Rome on 6th and 7th November last. At all events, I deem it also essential to indicate briefly first of all, by a suitable and convenient reference to what I shall be saying later, the aims and structure of the IEPG.

It was first set up in Rome on 2nd February 1976 to promote European co-operation in equipment, strengthen the internal cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and maintain an adequate level of the member countries' conventional forces.

Mr. Mazzola (continued)

This was to be achieved from the standpoint of greater standardisation and interoperability of equipment and better use of available resources, bearing in mind the necessity of strengthening the European pole of the alliance and in consequence having at Europe's disposal a technologically adequate industrial capability in the defence sector.

As you certainly know, the IEPG has no true institutional structure of its own. It deploys its activities through three working panels which are given their instructions and are co-ordinated by the national armaments directors convening twice yearly. It gets its political impetus from the plenary session at under-secretary of state level, held once a year. Panel I has the task of harmonising future requirements of defence equipment; Panel II co-ordinates ongoing studies on specific projects considered to lend themselves best to co-operation; Panel III deals with the chief aspects of international collaboration, such as industrial co-operation, competition, off-set arrangements, project management procedures, exports. These general activities are being gradually developed and refined, proceeding at a rather deliberate pace, justified by the complexity of the problems involved, such that a positive appraisal of the results achieved appears legitimate.

I consider it interesting to recall at this juncture that the schedules of future requirements on which Panel I bases its forecasts give such a fuller picture of production so far that they have been adopted by other organisations for their planning. There are currently thirteen specific projects being carried out under the auspices of Panel II, some having reached a very advanced stage. The results achieved by Panel III are opening up new and attractive prospects of international collaboration.

I believe I can say that existing relations, informal as they are, between the IEPG and other international bodies dealing with co-operation in the defence sector may be unhesitatingly described as excellent and mutually beneficial.

Another aspect touched on by the IEPG in recent times is relations with North America, better known as the transatlantic dialogue. This was also widely debated at the last plenary session I referred to just now.

This brings me to the main theme of my address, the development of such a relationship with our North American friends, recognised by the IEPG from its very inception to be essential to restore the balance of trade flows across the Atlantic in the wider framework of standardisation of equipment throughout the alliance. The

dialogue has been conducted with all due caution, so as to ensure that this activity should proceed *pari passu* with the IEPG's other activities. Above all, it has been accepted as a legitimate task, and one consonant with the wishes of our North American partners, to merge any divergent attitudes of the member states into one IEPG stance, and a high-level group has been set up for the purpose directly answerable to the national armaments directors.

The meeting at armaments directors level, at which all countries of the alliance are represented, has been chosen as the appropriate forum for conducting the dialogue. Initially it dealt with matters of immediate relevance to restoration of the trade balance, including identification of obstacles impeding access to the North American market and a greater two-way exchange of information across the Atlantic. The most significant benefit of the dialogue has been in every case its focusing on a clearly-defined issue.

I allude to the recent American proposal on priority equipment requirements for the Atlantic Alliance, as provided in the long-term defence programme already approved by the ministers of defence. These are, briefly, certain equipments classifiable in weapon system families or linked with a particular mission area, around which transatlantic collaboration can be developed by mutual exchanges of experience and technologies.

It is of course too soon to pass final judgment on the feasibility of the recent United States proposal because of its numerous and sensitive ramifications.

At all events, the IEPG at its latest plenary session considered it an interesting proposal and placed actions for its detailed examination. Should it reach a favourable decision, having due regard to the shared needs of our transatlantic allies, to make a move towards tangible projects, I think it would be realistic first of all to select as a test-bed some relatively simple but complete piece of equipment — simple, to overcome the difficulties of a materially complex running-in phase but complete, i.e. adequately segmented to allow most IEPG countries — according to the stage of development of their industry but also taking due account of the economic and technological interests of the smaller countries — to collaborate in the scheme, thus achieving one of the fundamental aims of the IEPG.

I consider therefore that the efforts the IEPG is making constitute a highly-favourable contribution to the Western European countries as well as drawing tighter the bonds between member states. At the same time parity of status of both Atlantic allies — placed by the IEPG among its most immediate aims — puts the IEPG in a position, limited, to be sure, to the particular sector, of tangible pre-eminence on

Mr. Mazzola (continued)

the international scene. It should, in my view, continue as such to be given strong support in the various capitals.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I in conclusion offer you, on the Council's and my own behalf, my good wishes for your further proceedings and my grateful thanks for lending me your ears. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank you, Mr. Minister, for the address we have just heard. You were kind enough to say you would reply to questions which might be put to you.

I call Mr. Grant to put the first question. He will be followed by Mr. Roper.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — The Minister, whose speech we enjoyed very much, may be aware of the Assembly's concern over Malta, particularly in view of the gross insult which you, Mr. President, sustained at the hands of Mr. Mintoff recently. I should like to ask the Minister whether he would be kind enough to tell us what is the defence policy of Italy towards Malta, in view of the proposed final withdrawal of the British base there in March of next year.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Will the Minister accept that we very much welcomed what he had to say about the independent European programme group? Will he note that the report from my Committee, which the Assembly is discussing at this moment, in the first of its recommendations urges the countries of Europe to concentrate their efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment in the European countries of the alliance in that independent European programme group — a most important recommendation? Would he use his good offices both in the Council of Western European Union and in the independent European programme group to respond to recommendation 4 in the report from my Committee, which asks the independent European programme group to submit an annual report of its activities to the Assembly? I realise that there may be problems about the formal mechanism to be adopted, but will the Minister use his good offices as the Italian member of the Council to see whether we can find an informal mechanism by which such an annual report can be made?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. De Poi, who will be followed by Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like first of all to thank the right honourable gentleman for his wide-

ranging address, with whose political line I am familiar, but over and above what is the political will of the Council as conveyed by Mr. Mazzola there have come to light these past few days certain preoccupations which contradict in some ways what Mr. Bernard-Reymond and Mr. Tomlinson have assured us of about the future of our Assembly and the backing it is being given; I refer in particular to certain news about the Council of Ministers' attitude towards the Assembly's budget.

We are afraid that unwarranted cuts may be made in it, which would in various ways conflict with the indications we have been given. Actually it is a matter of a few trifling sums which the Assembly cannot do without for the pursuit of its activity, which everybody acknowledges to be useful and which the Council of Ministers pretends it wants to encourage.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — We are all rather perturbed at the time the WEU Council takes to answer questions and enquiries by individual members of parliament. Can you, Sir, account for it? Should you be unable to give a precise answer, can you at any rate assure us that you will convey to the Council our disquiet — not far short of a protest — at the tardiness complained of?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Calamandrei.

Mr. CALAMANDREI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I should like to ask the right honourable gentleman two questions, with thanks for the exhaustive exposition he has given the Assembly of the positions of the Italian Government and the majority coalition which supports it, as well as for the interesting way in which in this connection he emphasised the importance Italy attaches to the targets of interoperability and standardisation of armaments in Western Europe and more broadly the Atlantic Alliance, with specific reference to the bodies, like IEPG, which labour to this end.

My first question concerns President Andreotti's very recent tour of Arab capitals. The right honourable gentleman, recalling that the itinerary was carefully planned, and for that very reason intended as a contribution to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, asserted that Italian foreign policy was addressed to every aspect of that conflict. May I ask whether, in this Assembly too, express reference may be made to the aspect of the necessary and essential solution to be found to the national problem of the Palestinian people?

My other question relates to a statement made by Minister Forlani in many gatherings, the latest in a speech to the General Affairs Committee of WEU meeting in Rome, to the effect

Mr. Calamandrei (continued)

that development of the construction of Europe and European union should be based on the multiplicity of institutions available to Western Europe and to which it may look for its own security and progress — the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance: such multiplicity needed to be retained and put to good use in the variety of institutional powers specific to each organisation. Can the right honourable gentleman confirm this orientation of method and principle in Italy's Europeanist policy?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — My first question precisely concerns the independent European programme group. Could the Minister tell us whether the results achieved so far justify, in his view, the expectations entertained by the Italian Government when it took the initiative of convening in Rome those responsible for the armaments of twelve European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance?

If so, would he tell us whether he thinks it necessary to refer this programme to another international organisation, another European organisation?

If not, would he then tell us whether he thinks the group should be maintained?

The second question I feel called upon to put to a representative of the Italian Government, is the following: Would he tell us what he thinks of General Haig's statement to the effect that NATO's decisions and action might have to be modified if the communists came into power in Europe?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roberti.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — In his reply of a technical and military character but carrying many political overtones, the Minister of State said, among other things, that the Council of Ministers had confirmed its own resolve not to allow shipments of arms to troubled areas where there are, or are likely to be, conflicts: he specifically mentioned certain parts of Africa. I think this is true of the Council of Ministers.

But, we all know that certain foreign powers do, on the contrary, supply large quantities of arms to some of the conflicting parties; may we know what political action the Council thinks it should take not to leave the countries not supplied with arms thereafter at the complete mercy

of their opponents to whom other foreign powers fair-mindedly supply aid in the form of weapons, armies, generals and strategists? Otherwise the Council's attitude might seem to some piratical compared with the actual situations created.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

There are no more questions as far as I can see. I now invite the Minister to reply to the questions.

Mr. MAZZOLA (*Minister of State for Defence of Italy*) (Translation). — To the honourable member who asked the question about Malta, my answer is that Italy has particular interest in, and affection for that island. Quite apart, of course, from the fact that its position in the middle of the Mediterranean basin certainly makes us particularly watchful of it. As you are aware, talks are proceeding between the governments of Valetta, Rome and Paris about the future status of Malta having regard to the guarantees of its neutrality and the needs of its economy. On the basis of these, our attitude will be crystallised during the next few months, always in line with the testimony of my statements of late.

On the other question which links up with Mr. Périquier's, Italy has, as you know, the twofold function of presiding over the Council and IEPG, and will be particularly interested in what Mr. Roper has had to say. The Assembly's recommendation will be given the most careful consideration, but I must remind you that any decision is the sole concern of the Council.

I will simply say to Mr. De Poi that the budget problem is certainly of particular importance, and the Council is now subjecting it to scrutiny; you must know that it has directly undertaken to examine the matter, and has already done so on two occasions. However, let me point out that any increase in the 1979 budget will cause difficulties in some member countries. Therefore I cannot anticipate at this moment what the Council's decision, which has to be unanimous, is likely to be. My impression is that the difficulty I am asked about would be an obstacle not easily surmounted for 1979. In view of its importance and specific interest, Mr. President, the Council has, as I say, taken it up directly, with all the responsible attention it deserves, before letting it take its normal course at the technical level of government experts.

Mr. Cavaliere may rest assured that I shall pass on his demand, but he will appreciate that it always takes a little time to harmonise attitudes and canvass opinions before answering a question. I shall, I repeat, personally pass it on, in order that the matter may be considered with the utmost possible dispatch.

Mr. Mazzola (continued)

Let me tell Mr. Calamandrei that I feel there is nothing to add to what I have already said about Mr. Andreotti's tour of Arab capitals. The problem of the Palestinian people should certainly be comprehensively examined in the context of Arab-Israeli relations. I believe I indicated in my report that the institutional tasks of the different European bodies need to be maintained. For example, our Assembly is the only one with an institutional remit to discuss defence policy — other bodies have other powers. To be sure, if I may for one moment take off my hat of President of the Council — in which capacity I can only give the answer I have just given — and adopt a position that also partly reflects the opinion of the Italian Government, I will say that we do consider it legitimate to discuss the institutional powers of the European bodies, but an evolutionary policy, albeit moving, with all necessary gradualness, towards a unified Europe, must in the long run induce a consolidation of functions, especially following elections by direct universal suffrage to the European Parliament.

Then Mr. Périquier also raised a problem I do not think to be within the Assembly's competence: I refer to what view should be taken of an incautious remark by a certain general. This can more properly be dealt with elsewhere. For me personally, at any rate in the current phase of the development of our alliance, the topic of any changes in action by the alliance in the event of accession by the communist parties to the government sphere in the member states does not arise immediately.

It remains to be seen whether shifts of emphasis in the internal majorities of members of the alliance do or do not automatically involve realignments of their foreign policies. If that does not come about — as it has not done yet — I do not think any immediate consequence needs to be drawn from what the general said: that could only happen if an internal change in the governments of the member states were to be accompanied by a shift in the external relations of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, with a possible escalation of armaments policy in the eastern bloc and a switch from détente to a phase of aggression. The same would apply to the external policy of the Warsaw Pact countries, irrespective of whether particular groups may have gained admission to the majority in western member states, as has to some extent happened in my own.

Earlier on I spoke as Italian Government representative and I now resume the hat of President of the Council, to say that the problem is being carefully attended to, and if certain states failed to observe the policy we have freely chosen on armaments and defence policy, the

Council would immediately draw the consequences, with all that the case might demand.

Mr. Roberti, I said in my report that our line is to discourage sales of arms to countries in trouble areas. But it is dangerous to strike attitudes more extreme than his own conclusions. We should in that case be setting off a real escalation that might exacerbate the problem more than by not selling arms in the "hot spots". At all events, the Council is particularly alive to this problem. If certain states do not, as has been proved, follow the same policy as we do, I do not think we should supply arms with the consequences I have indicated.

Let us so far as possible remain faithful to the policy of not influencing, by the sale of arms to troubled areas, the already difficult situation in such countries; let us be on our guard to ensure that countries pursuing other policies do not upset existing equilibria to the detriment of the parties concerned; in such case we shall see what attitude should be adopted in such a sensitive matter. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you for your address, Mr. Mazzola, and for replying to the questions.

5. A European armaments policy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now continue with the debate on a European armaments policy. I shall call Mr. van den Bergh and he will be followed by Mr. Cook. Then we shall have the address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — First of all, Mr. President, we would like to thank Mr. Critchley for making it possible for the Assembly to debate here such a politically sensitive and controversial subject.

I myself am among the minority in the Defence Committee who feel obliged to reject the draft recommendation, at least in its present form. I think that today the Assembly will have to discuss a recommendation by carefully and conscientiously weighing up factors that are very important for European integration in general and for European defence policy in particular. To make my position quite clear, I will say that in my view there is not enough of this search for balance in Mr. Critchley's report. I hope, therefore, that the Assembly will not agree to his recommendations.

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

I feel that Mr. Critchley's report gives a totally false picture of the way European integration can proceed. Though it is indeed regrettable that European integration — however one sees it — has in recent years been stagnating badly. I feel very strongly that it is putting the cart before the horse to see defence policy as the motive force behind European integration. That is what I believe is at the heart of the proposal in Mr. Critchley's report. Undoubtedly this comes about through the understandable frustration there is at the way matters stand in regard to European integration. Yet there is quite a difference between seeing that no progress has been made in major areas of policy on European integration and Mr. Critchley fostering the illusion that progress in European integration will indeed be possible as soon as we integrate the defence industry. I think it very wrong that in the report the image of the Soviet enemy — a phrase that Mr. Critchley used again in his introduction — is being conjured up so as to bring about European integration via European defence policy.

I am convinced that it cannot and will not work like this in Europe. I believe, moreover, that the notion is diametrically opposed to the policy of détente that has been pursued between East and West in recent years, and has had the active support of all European member states. If it is held against us that as a result of the proposals formulated in the report Europe must become a totally independent factor — and I stress the words "totally independent" — in the whole process of détente, and precisely because of this can become an obstacle to further détente, then I think there is every reason to see this as fair criticism. The countries of Europe ought, using the existing international channels that have been set up for the purpose, to continue with the policy of détente as it has been arrived at through the consultations in Belgrade and Vienna and in other ways.

Trying to achieve a defence industry of its own, free from the links that exist at present, awakens the fear that Europe will attach so much importance to building up a profitable defence industry — I think, incidentally, that Mr. Critchley is right on this point — that the whole idea of moderation in acquiring defence equipment will be jettisoned. For the countries outside Europe this prompts the obvious conclusion that building up a defence industry of Europe's own can become more important than continuing with a policy of détente, and of moderation in one's defence efforts.

This means, as I see things, that the European countries ought not to strive for greater rationalisation of the existing industries. One factor is indeed to reduce in future the excessive rise

in defence expenditure. I note however that this realisation is gradually dawning and that modest attempts are being made in the framework of the independent European programme group to implement this new policy without new bodies having to be set up for the purpose. Bringing things under the wing of the European Communities inevitably leads to new institutions, the effective functioning of which must I believe be very much open to doubt.

There are however other major and fundamental objections to what is being proposed. I will pass over the fact that, it having been found that the European Community is not even able to adopt an up-to-date policy in important areas such as shipbuilding, steelmaking and electronics, it is highly unlikely that it can do so with the defence industry. We all know that national interests have a great rôle to play in this. One point of principle is that the defence industry ought to be subordinate to foreign policy and to be a major component in the formulation of foreign policy. These two aspects are inextricably bound up with each other and I fear lest Mr. Critchley's proposals should lead to defence policy prevailing over our foreign policy; that is something I do not believe anyone in politics could be happy with.

I will not disguise the fact that in my country there are serious objections to the export policy of various European countries in respect of weapons. It is obvious that in order to achieve a profitable industry one will try to export. This is why it is absolutely essential that there should first be agreement on formulating common foreign policy objectives. But this is not happening at the present time. It means that in any integration of a European defence industry member countries of the European Community will in practice be forced to support an export policy they do not agree with. I feel, therefore, that the objections there are in my country to this are wholly justified.

I come now to another fundamental objection. Everyone in this Assembly will agree that one of the jobs of members of parliament is to exercise control over all facets of official policy. But if there is any single field where parliamentarians need to exercise the greatest possible care — even suspicion, perhaps — it is the field of defence policy, and in particular arms exports. I can see that in the various national situations there is perhaps already not enough control over what the defence equipment firms are doing, certainly where weapons exports are concerned. How can one, in heaven's name, imagine an effective parliamentary control on the defence industry at European level, when the European Parliament has hardly any powers and when one cannot, alas, look forward to it in any near future acquiring such powers in the field of foreign policy, let alone defence policy? The con-

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

clusion is that if one were to change over to having defence industries grouped together within the European Community, it would inevitably lead to an absence of parliamentary control in this field.

There are a few more remarks I would have liked to make on the importance of the existence of the European programme group. I would point out that the European countries must, under the two-way street agreements that have now been reached with the United States, press that country to follow a less protectionist policy.

What this leads me to is that I cannot agree with the conclusions of Mr. Critchley's report, because it sets out no clear conditions on this point. This is why I have, together with my colleagues Mr. Hardy, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Schmidt, felt obliged to move an amendment to paragraph 2 of Mr. Critchley's draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I am glad to join earlier speakers in congratulating Mr. Critchley on having presented a very comprehensive report. He has given us a valuable guide to the institutions which have been set up by NATO to foster the harmonisation of the European armaments industries. Those of us who have sometimes felt that we are getting lost in a maze of initials of different sub-groups of NATO will now have the Critchley report to guide us to the exit of that maze. I do not think Mr. Critchley will be surprised, and I hope he will not be too deeply disappointed, if I say that upon reaching the exit he has chosen I have difficulty in assenting to the conclusions he arrives at.

On looking at his conclusions, I have difficulty in seeing how they arise from the body of the report. In the body of the report, until we reach the chapter headed "Conclusions", Mr. Critchley gives a useful summary of the considerable work that has already gone into harmonising European arms industries. Insofar as he has comments on those developments, he seems to be cautiously approving of them. For example, he observes that the EUROLONGTERM projects which NATO has instituted have great potential. He makes no comment on the independent European programme group, but, as he notes, the group has been in existence for only two years, and it would take a much more rash man than Mr. Critchley to reach a judgment of it on the basis of two and a half years' work.

Finally, he discusses some of the collaborative programmes that are at present going on between

the NATO countries. For example, he quotes Tornado. Although he does not comment on the success of Tornado, he quotes, presumably approvingly and endorsingly, the remarks by the Chairman of Panavia, saying what a wonderful project it is and how important it is that this collaborative project should be followed by others.

When we reach paragraph 49 and start on the conclusions, we see that there is a complete revolution within the report. All that has gone before is ignored. When we look through the conclusions, we do not find a conclusion from what has gone before about any of these different trends towards harmonisation; nor do we find any suggestion how they might be strengthened and rolled forward. Instead, we are faced with the proposal that all this work should be transferred to the EEC Commission. This, too, does not appear to follow from the report.

Just as the independent European programme group is not mentioned in the conclusions, so too the EEC is not mentioned until we reach the conclusions. This creates some difficulty in the Assembly, because we are faced with the suggestion of a major departure in the organisation of our armaments industry without being given any information or data on whether the EEC Commission has the skill, expertise, or staff to handle this enormous task.

Certainly, I could see considerable advantage for the defence of the West if the skill of the EEC in achieving surpluses of skimmed milk and beef were to be translated into skill in securing surpluses of tanks and PGMs. Even the most supportive supporter of the EEC ideal could not count on that. If it were to happen, there would be very smart financial consequences.

Mr. Critchley suggests that there should be a common fund to facilitate the harmonisation of the European arms industry. On a rough calculation, I suspect that the EEC nations spend three or four times the total budget of the Commission on procurement of armaments. If only a fraction of that were channelled into a common fund to harmonise that procurement and the industries which provide for that procurement, we are still talking of a substantial increase in the EEC budget.

As Mr. Critchley must be well aware, there is some heart-searching at present as to whether the way in which that budget is funded, the way in which it raises its revenue, is entirely equitable, in that it derives most of its income from the poorer members of the EEC. That is a doubtful proposal in terms of natural justice, and it is even doubtful whether it makes much common sense. In fairness, it should be said that when Mr. Critchley addressed us this morning he did not pretend that he was making this

Mr. Cook (continued)

proposal in the interests of a better armaments industry or as necessarily being the best option for the European armaments industry.

He was making this proposal because it would tend towards European unity. That was the basic motivation and we can see from paragraph 14 that that is the main reason why he puts it forward in the conclusions of his report.

I should have thought that there could be no more thorny way towards European unity than attempting to reach it through military integration and armaments harmonisation. Yesterday, Mr. Bozzi addressed us with great eloquence on how important the defence industries and the defence strategy are to the national security of the separate nations of the EEC and NATO. Indeed, the nation which surrenders the right to choose how to arm itself is a nation which has chosen to cease to be a nation state.

I was slightly puzzled by Mr. Critchley's analogy in the matter of sovereignty and virginity. I am not sure of the appropriateness of that simile. As I understood, Mr. Critchley was not suggesting that the loss of either sovereignty or virginity was a matter of no moment. It is a matter of considerable importance in either regard, and I see no evidence that either our governments or our electorates are ready to forgo their sovereignty as a light matter.

I give one illustration. Mr. Critchley and I have both come from the Committee on Defence Questions. One matter we discussed in that Committee was whether Britain should be replacing its Polaris missile deterrent. He and I take different views on that matter. If it were decided that Britain should go ahead and replace the Polaris nuclear deterrent, that would be our biggest single procurement decision. It would have profound repercussions on industry, because it would mean the construction of a new missile industry within Britain. It does not matter who is in charge of the government of Britain. It does not matter who is the Defence Secretary who will take that decision, whether it is an extreme left-winger, such as Mr. Roper, or an extreme right-winger, such as the young Winston Churchill. Whoever he is, does Mr. Critchley imagine for one moment that he would be prepared to let an EEC Commissioner stick his nose into the procurement decision of how we replaced Polaris? To ask the question is to answer it. There is no possibility of it within the foreseeable future.

I thought that Mr. Grant hit the nail on the head. He pointed out that the Warsaw Pact nations had achieved a high degree of unity. They have indeed. They have a high degree of

standardisation of equipment. They have no duplication of armaments production. They have a common doctrine of military force and military tactics. But that unity is bought at a price. It is bought at the price of the surrender of national independence. It is the very price that the nations of the West are not prepared to pay, and it is the price that brought them together in the Atlantic Alliance in the first place.

As Mr. Critchley notes, as an alliance of free states, that Atlantic Alliance has been highly successful. So long as it remains an alliance of free states taking their own decisions in unison, it will continue to succeed and develop.

If we attempt instead to make it a vehicle for some vague European ideal, we risk the danger that the Atlantic Alliance will, like the EEC, become bogged down in the interminable problems of reconciling national self-interest with supranational decision-making. If that were to happen we should not have strengthened the Atlantic Alliance. We should have very much weakened it. (*Applause*)

**6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany**

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now hear an address by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher. I believe that members will agree that we interrupt our debate on a European armaments policy to listen to her speech and, if agreed, to ask her questions.

Madam Minister, will you please take the rostrum?

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great honour and pleasure to be allowed today to address you for the third time, and to be once again given the opportunity of assuring this Assembly of the constant interest with which my government and I personally follow the work of the WEU Assembly.

On behalf of the Federal Government, Mr. President, I can endorse unreservedly the statement of my French colleague, Minister of State Bernard-Reymond. As has been repeatedly stated in this Assembly, the Federal Government does not wish to see any weakening of WEU as created by the modified Brussels Treaty.

Mr. President, the Assembly deals with a wide range of subjects. I should like to confine myself to talking about some of the issues raised and to telling you in particular about a number of

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

meetings between German politicians and politicians of other countries. The main burden of my remarks will be on East-West relations, though I would also like to touch upon German policy with regard to Africa and briefly with regard to Asia.

First of all, Mr. President, let me make a few observations on East-West relations.

The spectacular phase of our *Ostpolitik*, marked by the conclusion of treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the basic treaty with the GDR, has now given way to a steady development of our relations with our eastern neighbours. The task in this new phase is to give detailed life and substance to the outline drawn in the past. It is an arduous task, as the example of the negotiations on traffic between the Federal Government and the GDR, which have just been concluded, has again demonstrated.

From the outset the Federal Government has seen the policy of détente as a realistic policy in line with our own interests and the demands of our time. Though during the initial phase of the policy of détente vis-à-vis the East public opinion in the West had been characterised by an optimistic mood of things being on the move, the persecution of dissidents in Eastern Europe and the intervention of some Warsaw Pact states in Africa have since reminded us emphatically of the fundamental disagreement there is between East and West, and of the Soviet Union's continuing intention of extending its power and influence wherever possible.

Nevertheless, Mr. President, *Ostpolitik* and the policy of détente continue to represent for the Federal Government — based on its membership of the western alliance and European Community, together with its participation in the North-South dialogue — one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy.

The Federal Republic of Germany's special interest in the policy of détente stems directly from our geographical position at the interface between the two blocs, and from the partition of our country. Now as in the past there is no reasonable alternative to a well-considered policy of balance, and this we intend patiently to pursue. In doing so we must not allow ourselves to be diverted from our course, not even by occasional obstacles to this process. At the same time it must be clearly realised that, in our understanding, peace and respect for human rights are linked with the policy of détente and that the policy of détente loses its credibility if it is accompanied by the exploitation, by certain states, of instabilities outside Europe.

Important meetings have taken place this year between German and leading eastern politicians. I refer only to the state visits by Gustav Husák and Leonid Brezhnev to the Federal Republic of Germany in April and May this year, and to the journeys made by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to Poland in November 1977 and to Romania in January. There was also the visit by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Madenov to Bonn in July this year. In addition there have been numerous high-level consultations and repeated meetings at sessions of the United Nations.

The question of how the policy of détente can be further pursued in Europe was also an important subject during the visit made by Federal Foreign Minister Genscher to Poland from 2nd to 4th November 1978. The Federal Government attaches special importance to German-Polish relations, to getting rid of the burdens of the past and to the development of good and normal relations between our country and Poland. At the same time it views the shaping of German-Polish relations as an important factor in the European political climate and in all-European détente.

There was agreement between Federal Minister Genscher and his Polish partners in the talks that, in spite of continuing difficulties on certain questions, German-Polish relations have become steadily more intensive over the past few years. This is true not only of the political dialogue but also of economic, cultural and scientific exchanges, as well as of travel. In this connection we must also mention progress in the solution of humanitarian problems which are of substantial importance in relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland.

In addition to questions of German-Polish relations, international issues also occupied a major place in the talks on the occasion of Federal Minister Genscher's visit to Poland. They will continue to be a focal area for our contacts in the future. They include principally the CSCE, problems of armaments control and the relations between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

The exchange of views also revealed Polish interest in an early successful conclusion of the talks between the European Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, as well as in the success of the current negotiations for the conclusion of a textiles and fishery agreement between the Community and Poland. The Poles are evidently concerned lest a concentration on development within the European Community should lead to a neglect of relations with the East European States. On this point the German Foreign Minister pointed to the desire of the European Community and the Federal Republic of Germany to see a favourable development of relations with all East European States.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

The quality of German-Polish relations finds a visible expression also in what is now the second meeting of the German-Polish Forum at Allenstein from 16th to 20th October, a meeting modelled on the round-table talks with our western neighbours. These meetings in particular, between leading politicians of all parties in both countries, of scientists, representatives of industry and of the trades unions, of journalists and young people, are all part of the all-European process of détente. Twinning arrangements of towns and universities are now gradually tracing a trend, in relations with Poland, which is already much more advanced in the links with our West European neighbours.

Apart from its numerous bilateral aspects the multilateral aspects of the policy of détente are of considerable importance.

Here, alongside the current disarmament talks, the progress made with following up CSCE is well to the fore. We had expected the Belgrade CSCE follow-up conference to produce substantial results that would lead further. Nevertheless, we consider it a positive point that the importance for the process of détente of the final act and its implementation was emphasised in Belgrade. We hope that the determination, voiced in Belgrade by all participant states, to advance the multilateral process of détente initiated by the CSCE will be followed by further steps towards turning this determination into solid reality.

Finally the outcome of Belgrade might also have a positive effect in the sense that it taught all participants — in varying degrees — certain lessons with regard to the next meeting, scheduled for Madrid. A repetition of Belgrade in Madrid would do nothing for any of the participant states, nor indeed for the process of détente itself, and must therefore be avoided. The participant states should show more flexibility in Madrid, and not make proposals that have no prospect of finding a consensus or serve solely propaganda purposes.

No subject area should be ruled out. This applies especially to co-operation in the humanitarian area of basket three, and to discussion of the fundamental values of human coexistence in Europe, which of course includes the problem of human rights. Such a discussion, which should be conducted on the basis of each side's fundamental philosophical approach and with respect for the other's ideological standpoint, is a precondition for creating political trust in Europe, and hence also for achieving security. Such a discussion should not end in barren, stubborn bloc-to-bloc confrontation.

The Federal Government would like, therefore, to focus the Madrid meeting not only on the past

but above all on the future. It advocates that that meeting be held, at least partially, on a political plane in order that the CSCE process as a whole may receive a fresh stimulus.

Between Belgrade and Madrid the CSCE is also being followed up by a series of meetings of experts. The Federal Republic of Germany had the honour and pleasure, this summer, to host the first of these meetings, for the purpose of preparing the forthcoming scientific forum. The Federal Government is pleased that, in spite of the stresses of the East-West relationship at the time, this meeting went off successfully. The scientific forum, to be held in Hamburg in the spring of 1980, ought to lead to a fruitful exchange of views among scientists from all over Europe and North America.

The other two meetings of experts — one in Montreux, concerned with the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and one in Valetta, to be devoted to problems of the Mediterranean area — ought also to proceed in a constructive manner. These meetings are to a great extent East-West conferences. Each of them has a politically delicate task. In the case of Montreux, the subject is additionally complicated by questions of international law.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are still a long way from implementation of the Helsinki final act. We all know that. The steps taken in that direction continue to be, for the Federal Government, a thermometer of the degree of détente. We believe therefore that all participant states should intensify their efforts towards implementing the act in order to serve peace and the people of Europe.

Our gaze, however, is not confined to Europe. Europe has a great responsibility in other parts of the world as well for making felt its influence for peace. In Africa, in particular, great tasks confront us Europeans in this respect, as recent work in WEU has shown.

German policy in Africa continues to reflect the prime importance attaching to our efforts towards peaceful solutions of the increasingly menacing conflicts in the south of that continent. In order to make a substantial contribution to their peaceful settlement, the Federal Government is actively co-operating in the Namibia initiative of the five western members of the Security Council, an initiative designed to avert civil war in Namibia and to make possible an early transition to Namibian independence.

The Federal Government, like the other governments taking part in this initiative, is firmly convinced that a peaceful and lasting solution to the Namibian problem will be possible only if one can be certain in advance that it will be recognised by the overwhelming majority of the community of nations.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

The internal elections in Namibia, envisaged by the Republic of South Africa for December this year, cannot, in the view of the Federal Government, meet this precondition. On the contrary, these elections, which the Federal Republic and its four western partners in the United Nations Security Council regard as null and void, constitute a major obstacle to future broad international recognition of an independent Namibia. The Federal Government hopes it may soon be possible to overcome this obstacle too.

We regret the growing escalation of conflicts also noted in Rhodesia, but are hopeful at the same time that despite all difficulties it may still prove possible to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict with the participation of all parties concerned. It is our firm view that the Anglo-American conference and negotiation proposals continue to provide a good starting point and a realistic opportunity for achieving a peaceful and, at the same time, internationally-acceptable solution.

Both in Namibia and in Rhodesia the obstacles in the path of western endeavours towards peaceful solutions increase daily. There is a growing danger that the conflict may engulf the entire region. If that happened, intervention by powers outside Africa interested primarily in exploiting these conflicts for their own ends would then be almost inevitable.

The Federal Government emphatically opposes the grievous racial discrimination in the Republic of South Africa. It regards the policy of apartheid as a particularly gross violation of basic human rights. We are anxious to persuade the South African Government to allow all groups of the population to take part in the country's political decisions and economic prosperity. The changes needed for this are far-reaching and must be started soon; otherwise the accumulating substance of conflict threatens to detonate in clashes which no one would be able to control any more.

However, the Federal Government's attempts to persuade the South African Government to make these changes have not, unfortunately, produced any perceptible results to date.

It is especially with regard to South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia that German foreign policy reflects the belief that all important steps should be harmonised with our partners in the context of European political co-operation as well as in the Security Council, and indeed taken jointly with them. Only a clear, consistent attitude holds out any prospect of success for the policy of the West. That is why we see co-operation with our western partners as a decisive element of our African policy generally.

I would like, Mr. President, also to make a few remarks, prompted by current events, on German policy towards Asia. A number of events in this area have given a qualitative impetus to our bilateral relations and also — mainly with regard to the South-East Asian region — placed the position of the Community upon a new basis.

I am thinking primarily of Federal Chancellor Schmidt's most recent visits to Japan and Singapore, of the visits to Bonn by the Foreign Ministers of the five ASEAN states from 15th to 17th November, and of the EEC-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Brussels on 20th and 21st November which was chaired by Foreign Minister Genscher and which, as we now know, was exceedingly successful.

Ever since 1975 the Federal Government has expressed its heightened interest in that young association of states, ASEAN. In April 1977 Foreign Minister Genscher visited Indonesia and Singapore. I myself, on his behalf, visited the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand in November of the same year. By making these trips we wanted not only to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation in the region but also to emphasise that, as a matter of principle, we support the goal of the ASEAN states of promoting the stability of the individual states and of the region through co-operation in the economic, social, technico-scientific and cultural fields. The Federal Government is moreover guided by the desire to conduct a regionally-balanced third-world policy. It is just such inter-regional co-operation as ASEAN that, in our view, serves stability and peace in the world. From this viewpoint, we see yesterday's political declarations by the Brussels Foreign Ministers' conference as an endorsement of our own South-East Asia policy. In Brussels the EEC and ASEAN member states mutually recognised the importance, for regional stability and world peace, of the bonds between them and expressed their intention of further developing and extending the relations between the two associations.

The Nine for their part promised to support the endeavours of the ASEAN countries to continue along the road to economic, social and cultural development and expressed their approval of an ASEAN foreign policy directed towards good-neighbourly relations with all states of the region, especially Indo-China. We see here a valuable and mutually-beneficial relationship with a region with which the European countries maintain close relations.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me say something about China. China has recently been providing the international press with headlines. China's travelling diplomacy, the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty, the ambitious modernisation programme and the announcement that

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

tens of thousands of Chinese students are to be sent, in stages, to be trained abroad — all these indicate that China is preparing to play a bigger part on the international stage in future. We are watching this Chinese policy with interest, and we welcome China's greater involvement in international responsibility.

We intend to let our bilateral, untroubled relations with China develop fully in the economic, technico-scientific and cultural fields and to make use of opportunities for exchanges and co-operation. The development of such co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and China is not directed against others. In this area of our political relations, as elsewhere, our supreme principle is that the policy of détente should make progress in all parts of the world.

Mr. President, that completes my survey. In conclusion I should like to offer you and the members of the WEU Assembly, my very best wishes in the further discharge of your tasks. I thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, for your address and for your kind agreement to answer questions.

I call Mrs. von Bothmer to ask the first question.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to ask the Minister two questions. First in connection with a draft report dealing, among other things, with the possibility of enlarging the membership of WEU — a document this Assembly decided not to discuss — reports have appeared in the French press voicing the fear that the Federal Republic of Germany is no longer interested in the WEU treaty because it obliges it to forgo nuclear weapons, and that it was also very doubtful whether the Federal Government would observe the non-proliferation treaty. I know that these questions, if put in Bonn, would sound downright ridiculous. In the circumstances, however, Mr. President, I should be glad to hear the Minister state the Federal Government's attitude here.

I should also quite like to know in that connection whether the Federal Government might be touching on this subject in its next consultations with the French Government.

There is, moreover, talk about German politicians championing a reinforcement of the competences of the European Parliament, a transfer of certain of WEU's terms of reference to the European Communities. On this point too I should like to hear the German Government's views.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Vohrer.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I think Minister of State Hamm-Brücher's manifest support for WEU has made it plain that in the view of the Federal Government there is no rivalry between WEU and other European institutions such as the European Community and European political co-operation. I imagine that a definite statement to that effect might dispel fears that are quite often expressed in this very chamber.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — I have had the pleasure of hearing the Minister on the three occasions that she has spoken. There has been remarkable progress in détente in regard to East and West Germany and the East generally. There is a good, active socialist group from the Federal Republic in this Assembly, who have circulated, certainly to the socialist members and I think generally, an excellent pamphlet which apparently the Minister herself has not seen. It gives chapter and verse of all that she has reported.

We all know of the magnificent progress particularly between East and West Germany. The pamphlet I mentioned even refers to the "GDR" — dirty letters to us a few years ago. Can the Minister be sure that this process will continue? Rather than have the Berlin problem flare up again, could her government try to create an international forum in Berlin, perhaps originally a discussion centre on all matters of détente, and then possibly an international city? This is a serious problem, which might flare up in the future, and I hope that that can be avoided.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Druon.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Nobody is more convinced that I of the fundamental importance for the future of Europe of a close entente between France and Germany, such as Chancellor Adenauer and General de Gaulle inaugurated almost twenty years ago.

I was therefore particularly happy to hear the Minister, in the introductory remarks to her very distinguished address, confirm her identity of views with the French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on the points concerning WEU.

It is in order to dispel any misunderstandings that may have arisen about the interpretation of various statements made in her country or in this Assembly that I wish to ask the Minister a question which is not, I think, capable of being misinterpreted. Does the Government of the Federal Republic still consider that the modified Brussels Treaty should be applied in all its terms, in all its applications and for its full duration?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

We continue with a question by Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to put two brief questions to the Minister.

The Minister rightly, in my view, attached considerable political importance to German-Polish relations and referred to the need to develop these relations further. Could she perhaps tell us, beyond that hint of hers, how they might also be further developed with the European Community? How definite are these ideas, and what might they involve?

My second question concerns the subject matter touched upon by Mr. Druon just now: does the Federal Government think the French idea of a conference on détente among the thirty-five states which were at the CSCE holds any interest and has real prospects?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should be most grateful to the Minister if she would tell this Assembly that not only the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany but all parliamentary parties in the German Bundestag stand firmly by the WEU treaty, and that there is no interest of any kind in the Federal Republic in setting up nuclear armed forces in any form whatever. I should be most grateful if the Minister could endorse what I have just said, on behalf of the Federal Government.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — There are two points on which I wish to question the Minister.

My first question concerns the policy of détente against the background of the talks in Vienna. You are aware that, up to a few months ago, the Soviet Government has always maintained that security in Europe and peace generally could be guaranteed only by superiority for the Warsaw Pact. There has now been a reversal of opinion, in that the Soviet Government has stated that the precondition for security is, basically, balance between East and West. I would be very glad if the Minister would tell us what political significance she attaches to this change of heart.

My second question is about arms sales to foreign countries, where the Federal Republic's attitude has to date been exceedingly restrictive.

I should like to hear from the Minister whether the Federal Government intends to depart from this attitude in any way.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Lord Morris. He will be followed by Mr. Brugnon.

Lord MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, may I first thank the Minister most warmly for addressing us?

Madam Minister, if I may say so, it was not solely your eloquence and erudition that I found so very captivating.

Bearing in mind what Mr. Bernard-Reymond said in the chamber on Monday when he stressed the importance of the strategic balance in Europe, and bearing in mind also the truism that economics is nothing other than the accountancy of politics, may I ask the Minister whether she has any views on the likely effect of the proposed European monetary system — in contrast to a global monetary system? Does the Minister fear that the proposed European monetary system, unless properly structured, might, by possibly creating positions of economic imbalance, threaten the present delicate balance of interdependence in Europe?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Brugnon.

Mr. BRUGNON (*France*) (Translation). — Does the Minister think, having regard to what she said in her address, that the Franco-German entente, which, I am pleased to say, has already proved its value, has a positive contribution to make to the construction of Europe? Further, what are the prospects in this respect in the light of the last Franco-German summit?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Having already on a previous occasion had an opportunity of taking part in a dialogue with the Minister in Bonn, I am greatly honoured this morning to be able to put a question to her in a very open debate following her presentation of Europe's external policy, in which she invites us to participate and in which Germany has a considerable part to play. This has made the present exchange of views of the highest interest to us.

The Minister made very frequent allusions to co-operation by the Nine, which is obviously quite fundamental, including action on behalf of Europe throughout the world. But we are here in WEU, an organisation which only includes seven of the nine member states of the Communities. In her address — and this will no

Mr. Valleix (continued)

doubt be confirmed by her replies to our questions — the Minister stated her attachment to the Brussels Treaty. However, her address did not reveal a very clear position on defence problems, and hence on WEU in particular, either.

My question is as follows. Does the Minister accept that such co-operation among the Nine, which has its justifications and fundamental importance in the world, should be pursued in parallel with recognition of our own powers in WEU and for European defence; and does she accept that co-operation among the Seven should not only passively comply with the treaties, but be active too, i.e. that WEU should vis-à-vis other international organisations play a full and active rôle in defence matters in the name of a European Europe?

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Page. He will be followed by Mr. Müller.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — At the end of her most interesting speech, the Minister touched upon the situation in southern Africa. Would she care to comment on the presence of increasing numbers of Cuban and East German troops on the border between Angola and Namibia, and possibly as well, on the border between Angola and Zaïre?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Mr. Müller please.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — After many questions on high-level politics, Mr. President, now a question of, maybe, low-level politics. The Minister has given our Assembly her good wishes. Could she tell us whether she can see that these are followed by good deeds? A modest increase in this Assembly's modest budget would enable it to convert her good wishes into deeds more effectively.

The PRESIDENT. — That is the end of the questions. Are you ready to answer the questions, Madam Minister?

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I shall be pleased to answer representatives' questions so far as time permits and as I have correctly understood them. I should like, first of all, to reply to the general questions and then, in conclusion, to deal jointly with those asked by Mrs. von Bothmer and Mr. Druon.

May I begin with Mr. Lewis, who expressed pleasure at the progress made in East-West relations and asked what developments are possible that might once more impede that progress. Mr. Lewis, we very much hope that the four-power

agreement on Berlin, which is time and again confirmed by the signatory states and which is being strictly observed and fully applied by the Federal Government, will help to ensure that no serious tensions over Berlin problems ever arise again. We are making great efforts on those lines. At the same time the inclusion of Berlin in the process of détente is, to the Federal Government, the touchstone of the good will shown by the other side.

As for Mr. Schwencke's question on German-Polish relations, I would once more refer back to my own speech. Efforts are being made in Brussels to reach an agreement between the European Community and Poland in the textile and fishery areas and, as I said, negotiations are going on between the COMECON members and the Community. These negotiations — as such negotiations invariably do — are becoming protracted. But we hope that they will lead to a positive result.

Mr. Gessner asks me if I can interpret the Soviet Union's change of view about the evolution of the arms race. I see this change in view as one result of the very intensive talks and discussions on the problem of securing peace in Europe, for example during the MBFR negotiations. During Mr. Brezhnev's recent visit the principle underlying disarmament negotiations was once more clearly defined — the principle based on possible parity but also on collectivity. We are hoping that, on this basis, the Vienna talks may also be encouraged to take a further step forward.

The Federal Government quite certainly does not intend to change its restrictive policy on arms sales in any way. The armaments industry in our country is employed virtually exclusively — you will know the figures — on meeting our own obligations in the alliance and towards our partners in the alliance. We have taken an extremely restrictive attitude towards other arms exports, and we shall not change this attitude in the future.

Unfortunately I did not quite understand the substance of the question by Lord Morris on the European monetary system. May I, however, stress here once more that from the viewpoint of further development of the European Community the Federal Government attaches enormous importance to an agreement on monetary union among the EEC member states. We very much hope that this agreement can be finally concluded at the forthcoming session of the Council of Ministers early in December — for the sake of stabilising the currencies in our partner countries. We very much hope that this arrangement — after all, this is not a treaty or a law, but an arrangement between note-issuing banks — will be shared by as many member states as possible.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

Mr. Druon asked a general question about the prospects in Franco-German relations. This leads me at the same time to the questions by my German colleagues. If there is one thing that can be assessed optimistically, Mr. President, it is Franco-German relations; since the talks between Adenauer and de Gaulle these have come a long way but they have now, as a result of the far-reaching harmony between the efforts of President Giscard d'Estaing and our own Federal Chancellor, undergone a most welcome further development. Nor do I believe that misunderstandings, misinterpretations or slips of the tongue could, as has been suggested in the papers, strain these good relations, these relations of trust, in any way. I am certain that it will require only a minute or two at the next Franco-German meeting, if indeed that much is needed, to clear things up.

I should now however like to answer Mrs. von Bothmer's question in rather more detail. Mrs. von Bothmer asked — in connection with a draft report before your Assembly — whether the possibility of widening the membership of WEU might not have been shelved because the Federal Republic of Germany was no longer interested in continuing the WEU treaty under which it took on the obligation of forgoing nuclear weapons. Mr. President, all these suppositions are totally unfounded. The Federal Government has no knowledge so far of any other government wanting to join WEU. The Federal Government feels firmly bound by the modified Brussels Treaty and by the conditions linked with our membership. We abide by the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no question of us calling this undertaking in doubt in any way whatsoever. I want to say this with all possible emphasis and thus put a stop to any further speculations.

I do not believe either that there is any cause for anxiety that the discussion on the future competences of the European Parliament is in any way linked with an intended or even conceivable weakening of WEU and its Assembly. The purpose of the discussions in our member states is simply to explain to the citizens the meaning of these first direct elections to a European parliament. And of course we have to tell our citizens something about the kind of powers that that parliament may one day possibly have. Otherwise we might find ourselves faced with a considerable lack of interest among our European voters. I believe that in this respect the discussion will be fruitful. In France there are certain conditions about changes in the powers of the European Parliament which still have to be ratified by the French National Assembly and endorsed by a referendum. But surely discussion of this problem cannot be

suppressed from the start; instead it should help to promote the process of European unification. I believe we can all agree on that.

I think this also answers the question put by Mr. Vohrer.

This leaves Mr. Müller's question about deeds to supplement our good wishes. Mr. President, as I did in my address, I should again like to emphasise that your Assembly's financial requests are known to the Federal Government and that, in the impending discussions on the WEU budget at the beginning of December, we shall urge proper consideration of the Assembly's requests. Whether it will be possible to allocate to your Assembly a bulk sum which you will then be able to use on your own responsibility and in line with your own priorities, I cannot today say definitely because I do not as yet have any information on this point. But you may rest assured, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the Federal Republic will make every effort to ensure that your ability to carry out your important tasks is safeguarded — financially as in other ways.

Finally, Mr. Page asked about the number of Cubans and GDR advisers in Angola, on the Zaïre frontier, and also in the Horn of Africa; he wondered whether any figures were known. I would ask for Mr. Page's understanding; even if I could present reasonably accurate figures, it would not serve any useful purpose to broadcast them here publicly. But I am sure that, on a suitable occasion, this question too can be answered.

Mr. President, my apologies, I have slipped up. I failed to respond to the question put by Mr. Reddemann, although I mentioned his name at the beginning. While I can of course speak here only on behalf of the Federal Government, on one point I am quite clear — I can confirm unreservedly that all parliamentary parties in the German Bundestag stand firmly and unswervingly by the WEU treaty, and that all of them join us in supporting and fully observing the obligations stemming from the non-proliferation treaty. I just wanted to reaffirm that on this point there are no differences whatever in the Federal Republic of Germany between the national political parties and their parliamentary groups. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank you, Madam Minister, for your speech and for your replies to the questions which have been put to you.

7. A European armaments policy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — We now continue with the debate on a European armaments policy.

The President (continued)

I call first Mr. Banks, who will be followed by Mr. Hardy and Mr. De Poi.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — I would like first to congratulate Mr. Critchley on presenting this report. I regard it as an excellent document, which will be most valuable for future reference. One of the important things that it does is to recognise what is in the back of the minds of many people who have a belief and a commitment to the EEC; that is, that we should aim for a strong and united European Community. To achieve that, it must be logical that defence becomes a part of that unity within the EEC. The setting up of the IEPG has been a first step, and that organisation is, to many people's minds, still in its infancy. This report reaffirms the position of the IEPG and that should not be forgotten.

The report goes one step beyond that, and I commend the second recommendation contained in it, which calls for the restructuring of industry under the aegis of the European Community. I believe that that raises our eyes to a new horizon for Europe, and that Europe's safety will be enhanced only through the restructuring of the arms manufacturing base. It will avoid duplication and will considerably help towards a reduction of costs. Above all, it will act as a catalyst for greater unity within the EEC.

The facts of disunity have been staring at us for far too long. The imperative need for greater rationalisation of defence equipment, for standardisation, for pooling research efforts, for interoperability and for cost-saving measures have been written on the wall in clear terms for us all to see. These are words frequently called for, but action has seldom been effective in rectifying what is so obvious to so many people. The growing Soviet strength lends emphasis and urgency for Europe to put the European house in order. If Europe can shoulder the responsibility for defence, as I believe it should and will do in due time, the advantage for Europe will be great and it will be an advantage also to the United States. I believe it is recognised by the United States as being an advantage to the grand alliance of NATO as a whole.

I do not see these recommendations as in any way seeking to isolate or shut out the United States from the European armaments market. I see it as a rationalisation that will benefit all the parties in the grand alliance. It will bring respect and confidence in the progress and ability of Europe to find solutions to its problems and counterbalance the armaments machine of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The minority report at the back of this paper refers to the suggested recommendations as being too great a burden for the Community but I see that

as a poor reason for not accepting the challenge that is there for the Community to grapple with. Let us remember, though, that these proposals could not be achieved overnight. The restructuring of the European armaments industry will take years to achieve. This report points us in that direction, but it is only a start to what could occur in the years to come. The coming direct elections will, I hope, bring a new form of direction and control over the working of the EEC. To bring that control and that involvement to defence must be also an important factor. It must be an advantage when applied to the production of defence equipment and the cohesion of a western defence policy.

I should like briefly to say a word about Greece, Portugal and Turkey, who are in the IEPG but outside the EEC. Let us look to the future. These reports should not be seen as in any way excluding them. No one would wish that, but if we look to the horizon I believe we can see these countries enclosed with us in membership of the EEC. In many ways this report may bring that membership nearer. In any event, their participation in a European defence production programme will, under these recommendations, continue in a positive way, namely, through the IEPG. It would be foolish for Europe not to recognise the Soviet challenge to the whole of Europe and the western world. While we delay in meeting that challenge the balance of advantage will inevitably shift against us. Let us, therefore, give approval to this small start towards solving some of the problems which are written on the wall. It is out of date to think only in national terms. Let us strive for greater unity. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I am sure all of us found Mr. Critchley's report interesting and stimulating. I certainly did, although I must say I found that his almost ritual, rather spinsterish stoop to look under the bed for the left-winger rather jarred with his grand, if not grandiloquent, sweep of historic concern, which I think is an accurate description of his speech introducing the report. The difficulty was that in the speech we did not really have much attention to detail. I believe that if one considers the detail of the speech and of the report, one is bound to come to the conclusion that the second recommendation is not acceptable or practicable. That is why I have signed the amendment which we shall be considering later.

I do not disagree with Mr. Critchley's view — I think it is correct — that interoperability is essential and that a great deal more progress should be made to achieve an adequate level of that and standardisation, but I do not believe it will be if we are to pass responsibility to the Economic Community. I shall say briefly why in a moment.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

But I want to make it clear that I agree with the view that interoperability must be developed. I do not disagree with Mr. Critchley's assessment of the need for a two-way street. I believe that rapid development and progress along that road are essential. I believe, of course — I do not think that he has adequately stressed it — that in the last five years there has been a greater political awareness and an awareness of the need for that development and that something has at last begun to be achieved.

I believe that we should seek to further the achievement through existing institutions rather than tread a path which may enhance European unity but could lead to division and separation within the western alliance.

I believe that we should not take risks with our basic defence needs. There are risks to that need not merely by widening the gap between Western Europe and North America but by weakening NATO within Europe itself. Neither Norway nor Turkey is a member of the Economic Community. Mr. Grant suggested that the other members of NATO might be brought into the embrace of the EEC, but there is insufficient progress in that direction for us to rely upon it. Neither Norway nor Turkey is a member of the Community. Both are vital members of the western alliance. Neither should be faced with the risk of feeling any degree of exclusion. This would happen, I believe, if the EEC became responsible for defence policy.

We have to bear in mind not merely the wider horizons for Europe to which Mr. Banks referred but the geographical position of the western defence arrangements. If we consider that both Scandinavia and the Caucasus routes to Asia Minor are important, we cannot disregard those factors in the way in which I believe Mr. Critchley's recommendations have suggested.

Certainly there are those of us who are somewhat anxious about adding to the responsibilities of the Economic Community at this time. But let me make it very clear — because it would not be clear from certain remarks which have been made this morning — that the British Labour Party accepts membership of the Economic Community. That does not mean that we believe that the Community is infallible. That does not mean that we should automatically ascribe to the Community every possible responsibility that politicians can dream up at the present time: certainly not.

I do not believe that we should divert attention from certain imperative needs in the Community which currently exist. For example, I do not want to see it concerned with defence policy at this stage when there is imperative need for the reform of the common agricultural policy, which has gone on for far too long. I certainly do not want to divert the attention of the Community

from the imbalance in current levels in contribution. At the present time we find that the United Kingdom will be paying billions of francs more per year than any other member state. It would be very gratifying if British politicians were to consider that need at the present time.

But certainly an involvement of the EEC in defence equipment would not stop there. It has already become clear in the debate this morning that British members of parliament are willing to see the horizons extended, perhaps not immediately but in the near future, to make the European Community a defence organisation. I know that Mr. Critchley and his colleagues very honourably serve that cause and would like to see that goal, but until Norway and Turkey, on the flanks of NATO, are involved in the Community — there is no sign of that at the present time — such a development would be entirely hazardous. Therefore, I believe that we need to be extremely cautious and not tread a path which may not be particularly economic in any case.

I am not convinced that we could not make a greater advance by instilling more vigour in the international organisations. A little has been achieved, more can be achieved, and I am not sure that satisfying the ambitions for expansion within the Commission will be an automatic guarantee of that advance.

I do not want to strike a harsh and jarring note of domestic politics, but I commend Mr. Critchley for the information that he has provided about collaborative projects. It is interesting that the United Kingdom is a participant in eighteen such projects — more than any other member of the western alliance. One would not imagine that was so from the British media, which seem to be serving the current fashion of suggesting that our defence arrangements are in some way negligent or incompetent. That is not the case.

It is time that the British media and British politicians who claim to be responsible ceased to peddle stories about the Royal Air Force having only seventy-four aircraft. They know that that is grossly incorrect. We should express our gratitude to Mr. Critchley for listing the formidable nature of United Kingdom defence developments and arrangements. I am grateful for that, and if the British media pay any attention to this debate, I hope that they will note that information from the report.

We are not necessarily questioning or complaining about our membership of the western alliance in criticising this report, or that part of it which recommends that the Community become a defence organisation.

It is because such a development could imperil or create hazards for the western alliance that I view it with reservations.

I hope that when we consider recommendation 2 we shall think about the broad strategy

Mr. De Poi (continued)

and the facts of geography rather than pursuing the broad horizons mentioned by some members. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it seems to me that Mr. Critchley's report conveys substantially two preoccupations. The first is that, just at a time when a series of strains are being reactivated world-wide and the spectre of the cold war is again darkening the earth by an increase in armaments instead of a reduction in them that would answer our prayers, Europe's place is perilously empty. The second is the fact that there exists in effect today neither an institutional policy in concrete terms for standardisation and interoperability of armaments nor, in consequence, any practical possibility of maintaining in constant readiness an organisation at the same time strategic and genuinely operational for defence purposes.

I certainly do not want, because it would take too long, to go back over all that was said from the christian democrat standpoint in the Tindemans report on this matter, nor what was said in the Klepsch report, which some political spokesmen criticised in this forum but voted for in the European Parliament. I note that one fact is to be stressed above all, that the European Community can certainly not disinterest itself in the technological, research and more typically industrial, aspects of armaments since, as Mr. Grant also reminded us, all this is covered by the letter of the treaties. But there is, I think, one very ticklish matter touched on in the Critchley report: at the very moment the European Community projects an increasingly substantial political image in the world at large, we are running the risk of letting our own institution get more and more asphyxiated. In short, by the very fact of WEU's failure to evolve, we are encouraging take-over bids by the EEC for some of its functions, not so much — and this is, I think, typical — in respect of certain economic and technological spheres as in the more specific one of defence.

I go back to the Druon report, which possibly went too far, but did make some valid points. By disregarding the necessity of a certain parallelism in the geographical coverage of the EEC and WEU, we compel the latter to remain in a limbo as a mere academic forum where declarations of solidarity by the Council of Ministers are listened to politely but in practice everything has been put on ice. By the law of opposites, maintaining a kind of extremism and frozen attitudes may promote the opposite tendency, of amalgamating WEU and the EEC. I believe

a development, authorised, moreover, by the treaty on which the Assembly is founded, should allow a clearer division of rôles rather than a blurring of them.

I take the view that these subjects of concern ought indeed to be favourably interpreted in the context of the Critchley report, which we, who in the past supported the Defence Community and have always believed in a defence policy, regard as a fruitful prospect for future years.

To be sure, this is, alas, a time for the shopkeepers rather than the great poets of politics, and I think the latter have often been right, because as a diplomatic Frenchman once put it, the heart has its own reasons, on occasion. I think we should not measure ourselves so much by fallacious distinctions and fail to demonstrate our true will, as by the genuine will that gives us a quiet conscience and makes us feel on the right side with history and foursquare with the true interests of the European nations.

Accordingly I think a two-level appraisal is called for of effective powers relevant, even in the EEC, in some specific aspects, to the armaments industry but which would, by an extension of its geographical scope to include Ireland and Denmark, retain for WEU the possibility of having an authentic strategy and authentic control of armaments. It seems to me that these preoccupations — even if there may be some trouble with the wording of paragraph 2 — are implicit in the Critchley report, and in this sense I declare myself in favour of it, especially if this debate puts a more correct construction on it both as regards the powers of the parliament of the European Communities and those of WEU and its Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

The debate is adjourned.

8. Change in the Order of Business

The PRESIDENT. — May I now suggest a change in the Order of Business for this afternoon, which I hope will be for the convenience of the Assembly? I propose that we take the report on methods of voting, tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Document 794, as the last but one item this afternoon, since Mr. Bozzi, the Rapporteur, is unable to be with us tomorrow. I also propose that we add, after the report by Mr. Bozzi, the report on the right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly, tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Document 795, which I understand will take only a few minutes.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. A European armaments policy (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 786 and Amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands.
3. Application satellites (Part II) (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 784).

4. Methods of voting (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Order, Document 794).

5. Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Document 795).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd November 1978

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Change in the Order of Business.
4. A European armaments policy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 786 and Amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Craig, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Wargnies, Mr. Pecoraro, Mr. Mommersteeg.
5. Address by Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Peijnenburg (*Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands*).
Replies by Mr. Peijnenburg to questions put by: Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Konings, Mr. Van Waterschoot, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Vohrer, Lord McNair, Mr. Treu, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Valleix.
6. A European armaments policy (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 786 and Amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Gessner; point of order: Mr. Boucheny; Mr. Critchley (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Valleix, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper; explanation of vote: Mr. Stoffelen; points of order: Mr. Grieve, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Roper, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix.
7. Application satellites (Part II) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 784).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Scheffler (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Treu, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Konings, Mr. Scheffler (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*).
8. Methods of voting (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Order*, Doc. 794).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bozzi, (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Grieve (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Bozzi (*Rapporteur*).
9. Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution*, Doc. 795).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Grieve (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
10. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 35.

3. Change in the Order of Business

The PRESIDENT. — A point relating to Rules of Procedure, which appears on the draft Order of Business, must be decided. In the absence of a report by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on a second reading of texts amended by the Assembly, this subject should, I suggest, now be postponed to another session.

Are there any objections to that?...

It is so decided.

4. A European armaments policy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on a European armaments policy and vote on

The President (continued)

the draft recommendation, Document 786 and Amendments.

I now call Mr. Craig, who is a little lower than normal in the batting order. The other gentlemen do not seem to be here, so I hope that he does not mind going in first.

Mr. CRAIG (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I find myself caught slightly unawares. However, I am sure that I shall be able to make my point and, I hope, do so in a coherent fashion.

I regard this debate as one of our most important debates. I am very grateful to the Rapporteur for the way in which he has helped us to focus on a very critical decision for the defence of Western Europe. I am a little puzzled as to why so many see it as a matter of controversy. I do not think that there is any doubt in our minds that if Europe were required to defend itself tomorrow relying on its own capacity it would be a bit of a shambles.

Those of us who are concerned about the well-being of democracy and the freedom of the people of Europe, cannot live easily with that situation. It is all the more worrying when we realise that those who threaten the democratic concept appear to be growing stronger. I hope that the Assembly will be able to give a lead that will result in positive action in improving the defensive capacity of Europe and enabling it to use all the resources that are available.

The Rapporteur is right to emphasise that we have to concern ourselves with a procurement policy that rationalises and co-ordinates the resources of Europe. He is right, too, to emphasise the need for the two-way street in the armaments industry.

Recommendation 2 is obviously the one that causes some difference of opinion. I fail to understand the argument. For instance, I cannot see that it is illegal in terms of the Treaty of Rome. I believe that it is well within the scope of the Economic Community to discharge this service for Europe. It is essentially a matter of seeing that the economic resources of the Community are deployed to assist those who are charged with the defence of Europe.

It is unhappy for all of us that, as the different arms industries of our member countries are organised today, we cannot adequately discharge our duty in providing an effective supply of European arms. Nor can I see any real improvement being made in terms of rationalising and co-ordinating, let alone improving, the interoperability of our weapons systems unless some authoritative body rationalises the industry. It is strange that, as we embark upon this great economic experiment of the EEC, there has

always been a blind spot when it comes to facing the realities of defence. We should not be doing our duty by helping that blind spot to continue a day longer.

In the early days of the Economic Community much was said about fair competition and the need to harmonise many economic activities if there were to be fair competition. Strangely, no mention was ever made of the weapons of defence, yet I cannot see the concept of fair competition within the Economic Community having any meaning unless there is a sharing of the cost of defence — but that is by the way. What is important now is to see that it does, in positive terms, in defence matters.

I do not see how any economy can be managed unless the requirements of defence are taken into consideration. The Economic Community has a duty to do that, and it has a duty to see, just as we have, that we get value for money. The Rapporteur has clearly demonstrated that Europe is not getting value for money in terms of its present defence expenditure. He has also clearly shown that, unless we do something about it, Europe will effectively be entering into a policy of disarmament through inflation.

Those who accept this argument have not shown how we can make progress without enlisting the aid of the Economic Community in reorganising our armaments industry. It is all very well to criticise the involvement of the Economic Community in defence matters, but if the Economic Community does not do this, who else will do it? The Assembly has shown considerable skill in giving leadership over the years in analysing the requirements for defence, but the Assembly cannot undertake the responsibility of ensuring that the economic means and wherewithal are there to make the policies effective.

I hope that, on reflection, members will see how important it is for the Economic Community to ensure that the economic conditions are right for a realistic defence programme and that the arms industries of Europe are rationalised and organised to deliver to the forces of Europe the means to defend Europe. That is the crux of the debate. If we do not ensure that, we are wasting our time.

Yesterday, I was told about a strange airline. It has no aircraft, it has no airfields, it operates no air services and its only tangible asset appears to be a tie. That tie adequately symbolises the airline, because its centrepiece is a duck pierced by an arrow — presumably, a dead duck. I should not like European defence policies to drift into a position in which they could be symbolised by a duck of any sort. I am not suggesting that they can ever be put in a position of being described as a dead duck, but we should not be

Mr. Craig (continued)

stretching reality if we described our defence at the moment as that of a lame duck.

I pay tribute to the Rapporteur for his courteous effort to get us to face that reality and to do something about it. I intend to support his report in every detail. I have singled out recommendation 2 simply because others seemed to find it a difficult matter. The intention to enlist the economic resources of Europe might have been expressed in a way that avoided any misunderstanding, but, as I see it, having listened to the Rapporteur, I believe that we are in no way seeking to extend the rôle or function of the Economic Community; we are merely asking it and its member countries to help the Assembly and those responsible for the defence of Europe to have the necessary teeth to defend Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you Mr. Craig.

I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — If I may claim your indulgence for a moment before beginning to deal with the main substance of the debate, Mr. Chairman, I should like to pay tribute to American Congressman Leo Ryan, who is very well known to some of us in the Assembly and, indeed, in the Council of Europe. He was, unfortunately, killed in Guyana earlier this week in pursuance of his duties as an American congressman.

I first met him in Strasbourg in 1975 when he attended an OECD conference, and latterly in 1976 and 1977 when he participated in discussions on the subject with which we are now involved during the course of visits by the General Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee of the Assembly. It is tragic that one so young, so able and virile should have lost his life in this unfortunate way.

I also pay what I consider to be an extremely well-deserved tribute to my colleague John Tomlinson, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom Government, for his excellent address yesterday and the superb way in which he dealt with the questions which were put to him. I extend that tribute to all the Ministers who have spoken to us, including those who spoke this morning. They acquitted themselves well in addressing the Assembly.

For me it is a matter of great sadness that at this time we should be debating a European arms policy at all. Following the excellent papers which we had yesterday and the equally good debate on disarmament, it is clearly in the best interests of world peace and security for this Assembly, and all who are associated with these

matters, to press assiduously, perhaps more assiduously than ever before, for complete multilateral disarmament, to ensure the ultimate goal for which so many millions of people have hoped throughout their lives.

However remote the achievement of this objective may be, it constitutes a monstrous waste of massive resources and assumes a somewhat obscene rôle when one thinks of the extent of the poverty in the world today. However, a realistic approach to the question dictates, especially in the present madness of the arms race, an absolute necessity for an unmistakably clear policy for procurement and interoperability of defence systems.

There is no doubt in my mind that the report presented to us by Mr. Critchley is perhaps one of the most serious and most important to come before this Assembly for some time. It deserves the very careful scrutiny and consideration which it has so far been given during the course of this debate, very well exemplified especially in the speeches of my socialist colleagues, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Cook and Mr. Hardy this morning. In each of those we had a quite masterful analysis of the nature of the acute problems presented by Mr. Critchley in his report and his attempt to assess the future of the European armaments policy.

I must confess, however, that the puzzlement expressed by my colleague, Mr. Robin Cook, is shared equally by me, because I find it extremely difficult to equate the body of the Critchley report with the actual recommendations that he puts before us. Mr. Critchley in his verbal presentation this morning, in attempting a résumé of the attitude of political parties towards the stated objectives in his report, based it solely on the rejection of the principles of European union. I must say it is a strange analysis to make so far in the presentation of a report of this nature; and of course I completely disagree with what he had to say about the attitude of democratic socialists in the United Kingdom, who, he claimed, had always been in the forefront of the United Kingdom national debate in favour of European unity.

Throughout the course of that debate — and I need not remind you, Mr. President, or my other British colleagues of it — whether we were pro- or anti-European Economic Community, the main theme of that very wide-ranging debate was the loss of national sovereignty. The debate on that particular point will go on for quite a long time yet, unabated, and certainly without apology. My colleague, Mr. Peter Hardy described Mr. Critchley's approach this morning as being spinsterish and went on to explain that his rôle was that of a spinster who is always suspicious, always looking under beds to see what might lie in wait for her. I would regard Mr.

Mr. Urwin (continued)

Critchley's approach to the question this morning as more avuncular than spinsterish. In his place, I would take strong exception to the use of the term "spinsterish", because it could imply that he had not yet lost his virginity.

To my knowledge there is insufficient evidence to justify the claim that many social democrats in the United Kingdom have abandoned the idea of complete European unity. I hear that far too frequently. It is not a posture that I myself have ever adopted. Having said that, I believe that it is essential that we adopt a pragmatic approach to questions of procurement, interoperability and standardisation of defensive systems. I would suggest to Mr. Critchley that the facts of the case which he has marshalled to present to us are not at all helped by calling in aid the Tindemans report.

However, like some of my colleagues, I am deeply grateful to him for providing the opportunity for us to discuss the two-way-street principle. During the course of our participation with our American colleagues in discussions in Washington in 1976 and 1977, this subject figured very prominently. Our delegation without exception laid great stress and emphasis on the absolute necessity to open up this two-way street, as it is called, so as to extend participation, particularly in the manufacture of weaponry, to the European countries.

Here, of course, there are very serious economic connotations, and very important employment considerations in those countries throughout Western Europe facing acute unemployment problems. It is essential that the campaign in this field be intensified as much as possible, because it is clear to me, and it has always been, that the two-way street remains really a one-way street, with the red traffic light constantly burning and no sign of the green light coming into effect. There are those of my colleagues in the British Parliament who are frequently claiming that the government should reduce their defence expenditure but who nevertheless faithfully get out the prayer-mat when there is the threat of the closure of a factory in order to secure some order for defence equipment. That attitude is scarcely equatable with complete opposition to defence expenditure.

Turning to Mr. Critchley's recommendations, I have said that I regard it as one of the most important and serious reports we have ever discussed and on his remarks on recommendation 1 I find myself in almost complete unanimity with him regarding the IEPG. However, I take exception to some of his critical remarks about the slowness of progress in this organisation, especially bearing in mind that it is relatively still in its infancy, having been born only two

and a half years ago. This morning the Italian Defence Minister was at great pains to support the whole principle and idea behind the IEPG and I myself certainly give it full-hearted support.

Undoubtedly, the most controversial elements in the Critchley recommendations are consistent with the strong lobby which has developed over the past few years for participation within the European Economic Community on defence matters. This is where I personally completely depart from Mr. Critchley's analysis and, indeed, his recommendations.

It is very doubtful whether EEC involvement could effect any improvement at all in present policies and implementation of policies. Is it not a fact that the differing membership of the EEC states and the IEPG is of itself a quite formidable factor in the way of the full implementation of recommendation 2 as proposed by Mr. Critchley? Mr. Hardy made a very appropriate reference to the problem with which we should be confronted in relation to the northern and southern fronts of the NATO alliance as represented by Norway and Turkey. We surely would be in a very difficult situation if we were to accept the advice tendered by Mr. Critchley.

In the final analysis it is perfectly true that each NATO state and every EEC country is directly responsible for its own national defence policy, and procurement is equally a vital constituent within those policies.

The only other reservation that I have about the recommendations is on recommendation 4, where the request is made for an annual report to this Assembly from IEPG. While accountability is a very important aspect of this situation, and I am pleased that Mr. Roper this morning asked this question of the Italian Minister, it is a question which has to be kept in the forefront of the thinking of the members of the IEPG in relation to reporting back.

The Assembly is undoubtedly very seriously divided on this issue and paper. I sincerely hope that there is support for the amendment, having regard to the inordinate difficulties which would ensue if the whole report were adopted without amendment. I urge members to support the amendment, which calls for the deletion in particular of recommendation 2. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Urwin.

I call Mr. Wagnies, who has asked to speak for ten minutes, to which I hope he will keep.

Mr. WAGNIES (*France*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in this Assembly it is a tradition for reports to be presented which advocate the stepping up of armaments production in Western Europe, the abandonment of all national defence efforts, and

Mr. Wagnies (continued)

complete integration of forces and equipment into the military and industrial structure of NATO. Mr. Critchley's report, however, goes still further : it proposes that the European Community should arrogate to itself powers to intervene in the sphere of arms development, production and marketing. The EEC would, thereupon become a West European armaments community.

Although I shall not take up all the questions raised by Mr. Critchley's report, I should like to voice a few comments to account for our total opposition to any European armaments policy. Others besides ourselves have abstained or have already expressed their opposition to this report in Committee. And such opposition is likely to grow in the Assembly.

It is, however, important to know the motivations of both sides, and that is what I should like to do now on behalf of the representatives of the French Communist Party.

We communists want peace and disarmament. We have always fought against war and the arms race ; our party was born that way. It has consistently ever since fought for the objectives of peace and disarmament. However, this does not shut our eyes to the present-day world or make us disregard the international environment in which we find ourselves.

But contrary to the approach and conclusions of Mr. Critchley's report, our analysis of the situation lends strength to the idea of a national defence, but not that of a joint European armaments policy.

Organising armaments production within the framework of the EEC would be tantamount to considering the latter as having competence in the military sphere, throwing back into the melting pot the treaties on European security and rejecting any further limitation being imposed on rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany. It would implicitly deny any absolute and binding force to the prohibitions affecting that country, and, first and foremost, the ban on the manufacturing of nuclear weapons.

We cannot close our eyes to the disquieting nature of Mr. Critchley's proposals which deliberately ignore the possibilities and chances afforded by the development of talks and contacts between East and West. Instead of taking into account the proposals made by the socialist countries to banish the spectre of nuclear war once and for all, or to ban the development and production of weapons of mass destruction, Mr. Critchley prefers to tread the road to unending and unlimited over-armament, even going so far as to try and make credible the

possibility of West Germany having its own nuclear weapons.

We, for our part, refuse to countenance a large part of our economic potential being alienated or our country's political freedom of action being mortgaged.

That is why we decline to see France being set on the path to Atlantic dependence, to which Mr. Critchley's report would inevitably lead. We consider it unacceptable to see our country exposed to the pressures, the dangers and even acts of intervention by a foreign country acting as a spearhead in Europe to further its own aims of domination, just as we consider it unacceptable that France should become a stepping-stone, within the framework of greater European integration, for the military forces of a Federal Germany, whose economic and military power is already considerable.

By the same token, we reject just as emphatically the idea of France being turned into a province, of it becoming a European protectorate tacked on to the American empire. What is more, such a European armaments policy would lead to industrial concentration, to a concentration of the armaments industries for the benefit of the economic and military forces of Federal Germany and the United States, which would at one fell swoop enhance their political rôle in Europe.

We want none of this. Therefore, we reject this West European co-operation in armaments manufacture — a form of co-operation which, as I said just now, would not only result in the German military authorities bringing their full weight to bear, but would also lead to a European military community that would give Germany access to nuclear weapons, and this — I am weighing my words carefully — is unacceptable.

Yes, we rule out any form of joint European defence that would only wedge our country still more firmly into an Atlantic strategy, opening up access to atomic weapons for the military forces of Germany.

In total contrast to such integration, which would place us under the protection of a foreign shield and endanger our national independence, we are, on the contrary, attached to the idea of an effective national defence, safeguarding our country's security, integrity and independence.

We advocate both military means and political means for doing so.

Our opposition to a European armaments policy also takes into account the fact that the concentration of armaments industries which would result from it would further exacerbate the under-utilisation of production capacity in our arsenals and state manufacturing plants, to the detriment of employment, which is already

Mr. Wagnies (continued)

precarious, for French wage-earners in this branch of industry.

We are opposed to the type of co-operation advocated by Mr. Critchley, under the aegis of the independent European programme group — a group tied up with the NATO and United States military authorities through the intermediary of the conference of national armaments directors. We find the same pattern of co-operation repeated in the Atlantic committee responsible for assuring the interoperability of armaments, as a prelude to their standardisation: it is in fact nothing but a screen for the pure and simple subcontracting imposed on the various European countries by the United States.

In conclusion, the approach adopted in Mr. Critchley's report does, in fact, lead to setting up a European defence system and establishing a military bloc dominated by the forces of West Germany under American tutelage, all of which would have heavy consequences for the balance of peace and disarmament.

We, on the contrary, are in favour of rising above the idea of blocs, and of doing away with them. That is an additional reason, if one were needed, for us resolutely to oppose Mr. Critchley's report and the draft recommendation attached to it.

Yesterday, our Assembly took a stand in favour of disarmament by adopting a text which had many positive aspects, even if it still fell distinctly short of the United Nations resolutions.

It would amount to going back on our previous decisions, if we were to vote today in favour of a text which encourages over-armament, threatens détente and is designed to abolish with the stroke of a pen the treaties concluded following the second world war, after our planet had experienced the innumerable sufferings caused by Nazi militarism. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Pecoraro, who wants to speak for ten minutes, and after him, I hope, Mr. Mommersteeg, who wants to speak for five minutes.

Mr. PECORARO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have to say that Mr. Critchley's report is to my way of thinking highly interesting and important, for two sorts of reason: the first is that he makes a historical *excursus* on the problem of Western Europe's armaments since the second world war which is truly valuable and, I believe, sufficiently complete, at all events as regards this Assembly's need to know; the second, his forthright proposal to press ahead along the effective and valid course of operational military integration.

I think I may stress in particular, and lend my full support to, a set of proposals whose implementation really establishes the basis of such co-ordination and efficient organisation. I refer in particular to the institutions and machinery now available which it is suggested to make use of to ensure standardisation and interoperability of armaments; I mean a more conscious understanding of scientific and technical research bodies with the object either of sustaining a high, updated and competitive level of European defence arrangements, or of obviating duplication and waste in testing and applying results; and I also mean, finally, relations with the United States both in respect of a substantial independence of the European continent — on which point we had a lengthy discussion yesterday — and of the so-called two-way street, or the need for managerial and financial complementarity between Europe and America that would ensure even distribution of costs and commitments, or at any rate equal presence of both partners.

The Rapporteur must not, however, take it amiss if I express some reservations on two points in his paper. One concerns more especially the draft recommendation, and the other related to what we read in the latter part of the report. I think that following the elections to the European Parliament the centripetal spiral of European unification will be given a far from merely national boost. To express my meaning more clearly, I wish to say that paragraph 2 of the recommendation we are discussing may be regarded as a long-term aim that will have to be preceded by a whole series of time-scales, happenings and achievements without which any specific determination and thorough-going commitment whatsoever, appears, to say the least, to be ill-timed. Of course in these circumstances it is not possible to subscribe to what paragraph 2 of the recommendation says, without, as I say, prejudice to the underlying theme of European integration also to be extended some day to take in armaments in relation to defence and security.

My other observation concerns, as I say, the report, where Mr. Critchley argues that European unity cannot be founded on conquest, or on economic integration, but might be more easily and explicitly determined by fear. I reject this postulate which, aside from the ensuing comments, is in my view both dishonourable and unworthy of our civilisation and way of living. On the other hand, I think I may assert that European unity will be generated by a clear-sighted encounter between common interests and objectives and making sure of the possibility of achieving it in concert.

These objectives are economic but also certainly social, cultural and moral; they stem from our history, traditions and spiritual and civil

Mr. Pecoraro (continued)

heritage. The Community has today the opportunity of debating common problems of international policy, and it may well be that, at some remote future, particular European organisations and institutions will be able to transfer to one supranational forum in whole or in part, other competencies, together with their attributes and responsibilities.

But, as I say, the path to unification will be long and gradual. Let us therefore guard against letting our reach exceed our grasp, avoid stepping on the accelerator too hard, allow the ripening process to take place without endangering the fragility of the body engendering and controlling it, and strive to bring into its ambit not only institutions and governments but, much more important, all the peoples of Europe. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, I have to apologise to the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for the fact that other commitments have prevented me from taking part in the Committee's discussions over several months. I have however followed the work and the thinking of Mr. Critchley, insofar as this has been made public. I have read his report very closely, and I find his analysis impressive. I think however that it is not so much the analysis that matters now as — since we are a political assembly — the political conclusions that are drawn from it.

I see from paragraph 114, where Mr. Critchley maps out three ways to European unity, that he speaks, without adducing any supporting evidence, of "unity through economic integration, which has run into the sands". There are of course a great many difficulties surrounding European unification, but has nothing at all happened? Has nothing been gained and shared? I think there has. As a clinching argument for the way he sees the defence of Europe he puts forward "fear of a common enemy". I do not think this is right, even though I share this apprehension. It ought not, however, to be the basis, the starting point, nor yet the final goal, of European unification.

When Mr. Critchley pictures the actual implementation of his idea of an "arms procurement and manufacture agency", he sees defence ministers sitting in the European Community's Council of Ministers. Security policy, Mr. President, is just one aspect, one part of foreign policy. We have European political co-operation, and it makes slow and painful

progress. The foreign ministers work together in this EPC system, and they try to arrive at a common foreign policy, to speak with a single voice, which is what Mr. Critchley wants to see in the defence field as well. We can see how difficult this is. It is not happening within the European Community context, as the Council of the Communities, but rather at intergovernmental level. An attempt is being made between the governments, to find a common denominator; and most times it is a fairly low common denominator.

I say this, Mr. President, because this seems to me an unrealistic proposal; but there is something else. If one really wishes the European Community well, with the unity that people are working towards, then one has to take account — as Mr. Critchley too has done — of what has been achieved so far towards the goal set out at the 1972 summit conference of the Nine, that of European union by 1980. A whole clutch of objectives was also set in the field of industrial collaboration, which is partly what we are talking about now, though these too have not been realised.

In the European Community we are involved not only with the problems of failing to reach targets but also with major decisions about a European monetary system. We are coming up to decisions on expansion, which will call for sacrifices by certain countries. These are very momentous decisions, and now we are supposed to suggest — and we have to take this seriously in this Assembly — that European defence, which is what Mr. Critchley is talking about, should also be brought into the European Community. This is an issue that is sowing an enormous amount of dissension at the present time, and we are supposed to add it to all the problems we already have in the European Community. I think that adopting a paragraph like this — for this is what, in essence, is what is in paragraph 2 of the recommendation — would be politically most unwise.

I myself in 1973, in a report I prepared as Rapporteur for the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, of which I was then a member, and which resulted in a resolution, have already written — and Mr. Critchley knows this, for he has quoted from it — that European political co-operation could in the final analysis not ignore the aspect of European security policy. This needs discussing, but so far it has not been discussed.

I also said then that there will have to be standardisation and collaboration in the field of weapons manufacture, but this will have to be part of an industrial policy which has up to now scarcely been developed within the framework of the European Community, and not as the motive force behind European co-operation.

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

I will mention once again an idea I floated in 1973, that it might be useful if the parliamentarians of the Nine, who have to have discussions within the context of their purview of foreign policy, of the external policy of the Nine — and perhaps soon of the Twelve — were at the same time to talk about the security aspects. Let the parliamentarians do so! I suggested then, and I will stress it again, that it might be useful if there were each year a colloquium — like that between the European Parliament and the Council of Europe — between the European Parliament and the parliamentary body with the greatest expertise in defence matters, that is to say this Assembly. What I have in mind is an annual get-together to thrash out further our ideas in this field.

This, Mr. President, is of course something quite different from a straightforward inclusion of the armaments industry under the wing of the European Community at the present stage.

(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. — Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that you will agree that we should pause here in the debate and listen to the speech by Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands, and then continue with the debate later in the afternoon.

5. Address by Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands

The PRESIDENT. — I welcome you, Mr. Minister. You have been a member of the Assembly, as you told me, for more than six years. We are extremely glad to have you here as a former member and now as a Minister for your country. Will you please come to the rostrum and take the floor.

Mr. PEIJNENBURG (*Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am specially appreciative of the invitation to address your Assembly on developments in science and technology in our western society. I appreciate it because on the one hand it gives me the opportunity to renew old contacts that I had in Western European Union as a Dutch parliamentarian, and of which I have fond memories, and on the other it gives me an opportunity to put forward my point of view on international collaboration in science and technology.

In my comments, I shall give a brief account of how science policy has developed in the Netherlands, and then show where the Dutch Government is placing the stress. This will bring

me naturally to the aspect of international co-operation. On this I shall first make a number of comments of a general kind, and then finally I shall go into a number of individual topics that demand attention in the international context: these include research and development on new sources of energy and the way these relate to energy policy, and scientific and technical co-operation in space research.

I shall start, Mr. President, with a short historical survey of the development of science policy as a new area of official concern. For this we have to go back to the early sixties; it was around 1963 that the need for a better matching of scientific training to the social, cultural and economic developments in western society became more generally evident. In that year the OECD organised its first conference of science ministers, and in 1965 there was a first meeting, held under the aegis of the Council of Europe, between parliamentarians and scientists in order to discuss science policy.

It need surprise no one, therefore, that the beginnings of formulating science policy on a national scale date in the main from the mid-1960s. In the Netherlands a Consultative Council for Science Policy was set up by legislation in 1966, to advise the government on this subject, and since that year the submission of the national budget to parliament has included a science budget. There has for a number of years now been a science minister in the Dutch Government. In 1971 he was still minister for scientific education and scientific research; but since the government changes of 1973 and 1977 — that is to say for the second time, now — there has been a separate minister in charge of science policy who not only oversees university education but also has a co-ordinating function in respect of non-university governmental research and industrial research.

The initial period of our science policy can be termed a development phase, during which a start was made on setting up new structures for organising scientific research and for achieving a better match between this research and society's priorities. I think that here there is a parallel state of affairs in other countries that are concerning themselves with science policy. And although this phase is still not complete, one can see now that similar developments are again under way. Science policy is now going to be concerned with the socio-economic problems that our society is facing. I would draw attention especially to the rôle that this technological reawakening can play in solving these problems.

In various countries it has now been realised that a stimulus needs to be provided by the authorities if an adequate degree of technological innovation is to be achieved, thus bringing about

Mr. Peijnenburg (continued)

both economic growth and new job opportunities. This is all the more important since it is a matter, in the long term, of major changes in the way work is shared between the third world and the industrialised countries. One may surely expect that the industrialisation the third world needs will, for industrialised countries, mean positive opportunities as well as a threat. Against an increase in the market for industrial goods there will be the threat of the increasing competitive capacity of the developing countries with their lower labour costs. Such a development can be countered only by having a long-term policy to which our science policy must make a contribution.

This presents a major task for the business and industrial world as well as for the authorities. Scientific research and development, aimed at the manufacturing of products or the supplying of services wherever there is a sizable demand in the world and others cannot provide these, or provide the right quality, has become an economic essential for highly-developed countries. This makes it understandable that technological innovation has, in those countries that have in recent years been developing a science policy, become a major subject of interest. It forms part and parcel of industrial policy and of development co-operation policy.

I come now to international co-operation in the field of science and technology. It is self-evident that the industrialised countries must concentrate on innovation in those areas where traditionally and internationally they have always held a leading position. It is obvious that the scientific and technical knowledge needed for this must be as wide as possible. In this, international co-operation is essential, not only from the viewpoint of exchanging information but certainly also from that of acquiring knowledge, especially in areas where capital-intensive investment is called for. I realise that because of the cost the need for international co-operation is greatest for the small countries in particular. It probably makes them more prepared to sacrifice some of their own interests. It will then be up to the big countries — from the common European interest — to implement a close international scientific co-operation. This will have to show itself as a greater readiness to take decisions in the various spheres of international co-operation.

I want to deal in detail now, Mr. President, with two areas of research which have at international level led to a far-reaching measure of co-operation — energy and space. I have been asked to talk about these fields in rather more detail, and I am glad to do so.

Where research and development on new sources of energy is concerned there is a close link

with energy policy. In OECD, at the ministerial meeting on 14th and 15th June 1978, the ministers listed what was needed in this context of energy policy. Briefly, this was: to give special attention to energy price levels in those countries where these were below the world level; to achieve a greater saving of energy; to encourage the replacement of oil with other forms of energy; to encourage an increased extraction of oil and gas, and development of this technology; to carry out intensive research and development into new energy technologies.

One important need they saw was to resolve as speedily as possible any conflicts that exist between energy needs and important environmental, regional and safety issues. This calls for collaboration between all countries, something for which the ministers again expressed themselves prepared.

Keeping now to the narrower confines of the European Communities, one sees that again during the last meeting of the Council of Ministers on 31st October of this year it proved impossible to arrive at agreement on a common energy policy. It was noted during this Council meeting that where oil is concerned the situation in the European refining industry is still one of under-used capacity in most member countries; that in the coal sector the importing of cheap coal is on the increase; and that it is enormously important to develop fresh sources of energy, in particular energy recycling and new technologies for utilising the Community's energy reserves.

The potential of the new energy sources is however limited. According to the Commission, they will be able to make only a 2 % to 5 % contribution by the year 2000. On the energy saving front, the Council saw further great possibilities for making a rational and more economic use of energy. As to nuclear energy, I would remind you that in Bremen the European Council stressed that the contribution made by nuclear energy was vitally important, and is a matter of urgency for the European Community.

On research and development in the energy field, I will limit myself to discussing that of the European Community. The principal objectives of the Community's energy policy are to ensure energy supplies for the future and to create the widest possible range of options; they govern the Community's strategy with regard to energy policy research and development. As you will know, the Council approved a four-year energy research and development programme in 1975, with five strategic sectors: energy saving, solar energy, geothermal energy, hydrogen production and utilisation, and systems analysis by evolving energy models. This programme, with a budget of 59 million European units of account, continues until 30th June 1979. The Commission

Mr. Peijnenburg (continued)

has now presented the Council of Ministers with a second four-year programme, funded with 125 million European units of account, covering the same subject areas as the first programme. Here again we have what is termed an indirect programme, under which contracts are concluded with industrial firms, research institutes and universities in the member countries and are partly paid for by the Commission.

I may say that I can support the broad lines of the scientific and technical content of this programme. The total expenditure must be seen in association with the Commission's spending on pilot projects, with which the present programme is closely linked. An attempt is for instance being made to see that research and development activities in the field of energy saving, coupled with pilot projects, fiscal and other measures of encouragement, are able to contribute to an immediate cutback in energy consumption by 1-2 % a year on the initial estimates. On 31st October last, for example, the Council of Ministers approved a proposal for allocating something over 100 million EUAs to forty-seven development projects in the hydrocarbon — oil and natural gas — sector. Furthermore, there have to date been more than 300 proposals submitted for pilot projects on energy saving; these are still being studied, and so far the European Commission has not earmarked any monies for them. The Council in fact decided last May to open up the possibility of subsidies for development projects involving energy saving and alternative forms of energy. Replacement energy projects take in geothermal energy, gasification of coal and solar and wind power.

Where research priorities are concerned, I may say that in my country we attach a great deal of importance to research and development into energy saving.

The systems analysis studies, too — that is to say the elaboration of models stemming from the initial programme — are now entering the stage of practical application.

Bearing in mind the rapid developments there have been in this field of research, it is important to make an interim assessment of the programme — say, before the end of 1980 — and to look at the desirability of having a limited opportunity to transfer funds between one project and another.

One programme the impact of which on energy supplies can become significant only in the long term is the Community's fusion energy programme. In 1978, the United States will have invested \$455 million in fusion energy research; this is more than twice the amount spent by the European Community. The Russian fusion programme is likewise very substantial, employ-

ing some 2,000 scientists and some ten nuclear accelerators in the Kurchatov Institute. The growth of the Japanese fusion programme, estimated to be similar in extent to the European Community programme, is also impressive. The European Community fusion programme, too, is what we know as an indirect programme, based on the programmes of laboratories in the member states associated with Euratom.

The Commission's contribution to the present programme, which runs from 1976 to 1980, amounts to 120 million EUAs, with an additional amount of 102.4 million EUAs for JET. The total Community programme comes to 588 million EUAs. The new programme — partly overlapping with the first — for the period 1979-83 is funded with 217 million EUAs, with a total programme budget of 736 million EUAs. The programme proposed concentrates especially on the development of magnetic confinement, and only to a limited extent on inertial confinement, mainly laser fusion. This stems, as you will know, particularly from the fact that this latter type of research also has military applications, and so much of this research in both the United States and Europe is confidential. New activities proposed in the programme include research in associated laboratories into tritium technology and materials research.

The very rapid development in this area of research — one can instance the breakthrough recently achieved at Princeton, where a temperature in plasma of 60 million degrees was reached — make it necessary to study the desirability and feasibility of incorporating these new scientific developments — in part because of the sizable financial implications — into the JET project that is now starting up. There seems to be a possibility that the JET project will be ready for operational use earlier than planned — in late 1982 instead of mid-1983. These developments are however not only a drain on the Community budget, which meets 80 % of the JET costs, but also on the budgets of the associated laboratories forming part of the joint undertaking that runs the JET project.

One must also bring into these calculations the fact of national expenditure on research and development being held steady, with a consequent greater need for setting out research priorities. The previous Dutch Government had already decided, in 1976, to freeze expenditure on nuclear fusion research at its current level, which inevitably means that upping the scale of the JET project is at the cost of curtailing fusion research in the Netherlands.

One can therefore note with approval that there are now talks under way between experts from the European Community, the United States and the Soviet Union and Japan — in the framework of the International Atomic

Mr. Peijnenburg (continued)

Energy Agency — on studying the technical objectives and nature of the larger fusion device of the Tokamak type, following on JET and identical installations elsewhere, that might be produced by international co-operation.

Where national research work in the Netherlands is concerned, it can be noted that before long an energy research council is to be set up; this will further encourage co-ordination between research establishments, universities and industry. A considerable rôle has been earmarked in this for central institutes such as the Dutch Energy Research Centre and the TNO research institute.

The main research priorities, linked to the objectives of energy policy, include wind power, solar energy and to a lesser extent geothermal energy, diversification of energy supplies by using coal, energy-saving measures, and energy storage; nuclear energy, in particular research into the safety and environmental aspects, electricity generating network coupling systems, systems analysis and the like. The total outlay on energy research in 1978 has been estimated as 145.2 million guilders. If one adds in research associated with energy problems, including nuclear fusion, costing 86.5 million guilders together with the Dutch share in Community research and development programmes and supplementary Euratom programmes, then the grand total of money allocated in 1978 comes to about 300 million guilders.

A further aspect of scientific and technical co-operation in Europe to which I would like to devote special attention here, Mr. President, is that of space. I do so because the Netherlands has, from the very beginning, felt closely involved in this European activity. Dutch astronomers have from the outset seized the new opportunities that space research offered for their discipline. Dutch astronomers were involved very early on, and their astronomical experiments were so interesting that they were able to join the ranks of the first European pioneers who were given a lift on European and American launch facilities.

This enthusiasm on the part of Dutch astronomers inspired the Dutch Government to take part whole-heartedly in setting up the European Space Research Organisation — ESRO. The Dutch Government was delighted by ESRO's decision to site its main establishment, ESTEC, the technology centre, in Holland at Noordwijk.

It is valuable for a country to have such a concrete example of an experiment in European collaboration within its borders, not only from the space research viewpoint but also most definitely from that of European unification. An

institute like ESTEC, with so many nationalities working together, has beyond all argument a stimulating effect in spreading the idea of Europe. That the Netherlands was an enthusiastic member of ESRO does not get away from the fact in our country, as in other member states, we were aware of the industrial importance of space research. The technological challenge of space engineering triggers off a great deal of interest on the part of European firms, and very early on our country too had to look to its interests — that is to say, it had to try to strengthen its competitive position. These industrial considerations, together with the undiminished enthusiasm of Dutch astronomers, led us to initiate our own national projects. The first Dutch astronomical satellite, ANS, was launched in 1974. The amazing scientific results this satellite yielded encouraged us to repeat the experiment. While the first Dutch satellite was designed for observations in the ultraviolet and X-ray part of the spectrum, the second satellite IRAS will chart the infra-red part of the heavens. Work on developing and building this satellite is now going on apace, in collaboration with the American NASA organisation and the British Science Research Council. The launch of this second national satellite is scheduled for 1981.

Our enthusiasm for making national efforts of our own in scientific research in space does not prevent the Netherlands from remaining a staunch supporter of space research in a European context. Our space scientists participate in many projects, as well as taking an active part in forging scientific policy in the European Space Agency.

So while we may feel some uncertainty about the ESA programmes, this certainly does not apply to ESA scientific programmes — our concern is rather that the scientific interests on which the old ESRO organisation was founded should not be pushed into the background by a major part of ESA activities being concentrated on the applications of space engineering.

One of the important differences in the objectives of ESRO and ESA is the express task that ESA has set itself in its convention. This concerns an improvement in the competitive position of the European space industry in a world-wide setting. This is no mean objective, one that is of decisive importance for the future success of ESA and places a great demand on international co-operation. It calls for a European organisation capable of taking commercial initiative, able to react rapidly, and hampered as little as possible by bureaucratic delays and by the numerous obstacles that are an inherent part of international consultation between member states.

An industrial-cum-commercial goal like this does however demand a clear long-term policy. At the first ESA Council meeting at ministerial

Mr. Peijnenburg (continued)

level in February 1977, my predecessor pointed out the need for a long-term policy for the agency. I am sorry to have to say that ESA still does not have this long-term policy. One reason why it is still lacking is the great deal of attention that has to be given to day-to-day work, that has to be devoted to developing and preparing the programmes that have already been approved. In the draft report on applications satellites before this Assembly, I read the following advice :

"The Council should meet at ministerial level and try to establish a comprehensive European space policy and formulate specific goals for the coming decades."

This seems to me to be a very welcome recommendation. One way or the other the present uncertainty about ESA's long-term plans must be sorted out. A long-term policy can, I feel, come about only through sound collaboration between the ESA Council and the ESA executive. To achieve fruitful joint work by these two bodies I think there should be an attempt to formulate directives at ministerial level.

One may wonder whether the time is ripe for this. There is a lot that is still uncertain, especially since the future plans of ESA are closely tied up with those of NASA, because in particular of transatlantic collaboration in the development and operation of spacelab. In the United States, President Carter announced a new space policy on 11th October 1978. His statement gives the impression that in the United States there is a move to make a more efficient use of the funds devoted to space activities, and disinclination for the time being to embark on new, major projects comparable with Apollo. I think it is also important for the future planning of European space research that the Americans have made it known, as their intended policy, that it is still too early to start developing satellite stations for collecting solar energy. This is due to the uncertainties of the technology involved, the uncertainties of the economic cost-and-return, and uncertainties of the environmental considerations. If these intentions are in fact adhered to, this cannot fail to affect ESA's long-term plans — especially on the activities supplemental to the spacelab programme, in particular the spacelab follow-on programme.

This brings me to the end of my comments, Mr. President. I hope that what I have said will have demonstrated sufficiently clearly that international co-operation in science and technology can be a major tool of science policy. The specific research fields of energy and space that I have mentioned give ample evidence of this. There are however still quite a number of other areas where there is still not as much international

co-operation as one would wish. I might mention the areas of health care and protection, the environment, agriculture and the provision of information.

According to an analysis carried out by my office, less than 10 % of the total expenditure on these areas of research is spent in an international context. My staff is now studying ways of encouraging co-operation across national frontiers. It is already clear that such co-operation need not come about exclusively through the big international organisations, and that there are many other opportunities that are not being properly exploited at the present time.

I have not gone into social science research here. I want to mention it, because I attach great importance to this area of research ; there, too, I believe that international co-operation is very important.

I think, Mr. President, that what I have said should provide enough on which to base a fruitful discussion, and I shall be very happy to take part in it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you for your address, Mr. Peijnenburg.

The Minister has been kind enough to agree to answer questions. I understand that he wishes to reply to them all together.

First I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — I listened to the address by our old colleague Mr. Peijnenburg with great interest, Mr. President. I would like to offer him my compliments.

Bearing in mind the stress that he put on the great importance of European co-operation in science and technology, I would like to ask Mr. Peijnenburg to tell us what part this plays in the matter of a successor to the Neptune aircraft in the Netherlands.

Can he confirm that the French and Dutch Governments are prepared to work to have the Neptune followed by the French Bréguet Atlantic aircraft, as part of a co-operation arrangement under which Fokker is involved in building the Bréguet Atlantic and Aérospatiale is to collaborate in production of the F-29 ? Are both governments ready to take a definite step along the road of European co-operation ?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, I too would like to thank the Minister for his very clear account of two areas of co-operation. He talked about energy, emphasising that in the European context nuclear energy represents a very major factor.

Mr. Konings (continued)

Throughout Europe there is growing resistance to nuclear energy, because of the problems that have still not been solved.

The Dutch Government has, in the meanwhile, decided not to take any further decisions in this area, but first to foster public discussion of the whole issue. Would the Minister not think it sensible for this to happen throughout Europe? Does the Dutch Government have any plans for bringing something of the kind about?

The Minister mentioned the European Space Agency, and had some very positive things to say about it. He spoke about the need to pool European efforts. Aside from efforts within ESA there are a number of programmes for international co-operation among member states. The Netherlands, too, is in a number of trilateral and bilateral agreements outside the ESA context or with non-member states. Does the Minister think this is a happy development, and why does the Netherlands enter into agreements of this kind?

The Minister talked about other fields of European co-operation, mentioning in particular health care and data processing. I would like to make a further comment on the European aircraft industry, a field that because of the Airbus project is of very topical interest. If we are in favour of a European aircraft industry of this kind — and I gathered that the Dutch Government is — would it not make sense, when it comes to buying new aircraft in the countries of Europe, to turn first to the European aircraft industry?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Van Waterschoot.

Mr. VAN WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I too, Mr. President, do not want to let slip the opportunity of putting one or two questions in my own language, a chance that seldom offers itself. The Ministers spoke about systems analysis and the use of models in developing replacement energy sources and in energy saving. Computer models are of course important tools of scientific research; but one can however say about them, like the English, "The best of servants, the worst of masters". I would like to ask the Minister to tell us something more about the concrete results he sketched out for the future in this field.

In April this year this Assembly's Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions visited Washington, and, *inter alia*, NASA. Some of us were very impressed by the firm plans there are in the Department of Energy in Washington to make the changeover, at pre-scheduled dates, from government-sub-

sidised research to commercial operation. Does the Minister know whether there is a similar concern at European level? Is this economic aspect being looked at in our systems analysis, or is it limited solely to the technical side of things?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The next speaker is Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — We are pleased to see the Minister back here as a Minister after having been a member of this Assembly. First, how long does he expect the internal natural gas supplies to last in Holland? Secondly, there has been a wave of anti-nuclear power protest throughout Europe, most of it caused because we do not know how to dispose of the waste from atomic power stations. What progress has been made towards the disposal of waste? Does the Minister hope to have, within the next ten, fifteen or twenty years, a safe method of disposal?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Vohrer. He will be followed by Lord McNair.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Minister, my question concerns a marginal area of research policy. The Netherlands has for many years been deeply committed in the area of development policy and certainly is a model and fine example to many industrialised countries. It is also, thereby, making a sizable contribution to the lessening of tension in North-South relations. Here I would make the point that for development policy, in particular, the transfer of technologies is playing an increasingly prominent part. It is not just a question of making the technologies of the industrialised countries available to the developing countries, but also of working out special technologies for the latter's needs. We call these adapted technologies. As part of the competitive race for scarce energy resources it will, for example, be very important to offer the developing countries such new technologies for recyclable energy carriers. I should be interested to know, Minister, to what extent you see opportunities here for greater international co-operation, and to what extent you formulate political priorities in your own department.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Lord McNair. He will be followed by Mr. Treu.

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I hope that I am not out of order if I first comment on the exceptionally high standard of the translation into English. It was a pleasure to listen to it.

Lord McNair (continued)

I should like to ask the Minister a short question concerning alternative sources of energy. We all know the many victories which the Dutch people have won over the sea in their history. I believe that in France there is an installation already operating in the Rance estuary, and we are studying the possibilities of one in the estuary of the River Severn in Britain. Have the Dutch Government any projects under active consideration for harnessing the power of the tides?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Treu. He will be followed by Mr. Lenzer, and by Mr. Valleix as the last speaker.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Your ample comments, Mr. Minister, have ranged over a great many sectors of research and technology: I will venture to ask one or two very quick questions on the assumption that energy is the underlying theme of any economic and social growth whatsoever.

You said that a new body is being set up in your country to study energy-economising systems in the immediate, and rationalising uses of energy: who is going to manage it? We visited one Community country in which such a body already exists, and it looked to us almost like a kind of technological superpower, over the government's head. Where would the new body stand in respect of parliament?

Next, what about the JET project that was to be set up at Ispra to generate plasm? I do not know whether the new installation in Britain has become operational yet; plasm provides a basis for reaching high temperatures, but it is still all at sea!

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I note with satisfaction that in his speech the Minister attached particular importance to improving energy supplies. Referring to the Bremen meeting of the European Council he mentioned nuclear energy as an indispensable source. There are two projects on which the Dutch Government is engaged jointly with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the governments of other countries, and I would ask him to comment, from his government's point of view, on how he assesses the importance of these projects. There is, first of all, the construction of the SNR-300, the prototype of a fast-breeder reactor, at Kalkar; then there are the joint endeavours to develop a new energy-saving uranium enrichment process on the gas ultra-centrifuge principle within the framework of

URENCO; this is a joint agreement which envisages construction at Almelo and Capenhurst and may perhaps look inside the Federal Republic of Germany for a site for a uranium enrichment plant of this kind. How does his government rate the significance of these projects for European energy supplies?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I have two questions for the Minister. He has just quite rightly described the work of the European Space Agency at some length, and we have listened to him with considerable interest.

What programmes does he think the European Space Agency should embark on in 1981, after the end of the current Ariane and Spacelab programmes which cost about \$600 million per year, and what should be the size of the agency's budget, given that Mr. Matthöfer recently mentioned a figure of \$350 million a year?

Now my second question. What is his government's opinion of a study, admittedly still going on — to be dealt with presently in Mr. Scheffler's report — concerning a project for construction of a prototype solar satellite, relevant therefore to the concern he voiced about energy supplies, which would be able to supply a certain amount of electric power, and, of course, involve corresponding costs? Can he give us an opinion, either his own or that of his government?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Those were the questions, Mr. Minister. Will you please reply to them?

Mr. PEIJNENBURG (*Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, there have been a number of questions on space research and energy supplies, but before that Mr. Cornelissen asked me about the situation with regard to the aircraft industry and linked this to talks now under way between France and the Netherlands — the matter of replacing the Neptune aircraft by a new submarine-hunter aircraft.

The subject I am talking to you about, and the reason why I am here, is the applications of science. The question from Mr. Cornelissen is partly concerned with industrial policy, and it also — and this is what makes it interesting — has to do with scientific research, and with research and development. What are the facts of the case? I think that we can, in the case of the European aircraft industry, say there is a great deal of international co-operation, albeit often on an ad hoc basis. What matters in developing a European aircraft industry is to know to what extent we are going to be able to build the advanced-technology aircraft that will be needed in the years ahead. I think this is a question

Mr. Peijnenburg (continued)

of European solidarity, but also one of European self-preservation in the world as a whole, when you look at how far everyone is dependent on everyone else.

In my speech on scientific co-operation I also mentioned the relationship between small and large countries. I think this is important, but talks that are going on this week or the outcome of which will be announced this week will make it clear how far this co-operation is really going to come about. Our goal must be to try to build up the creative capabilities we have in Europe in, for example, manufacturing aircraft, and our technical skills and design potential, by continually working in with and complementing each other. At all events I think it would be something of major significance — though I do not want to anticipate the outcome of the talks that will finish this week — if it were possible to achieve co-operation more or less along the lines Mr. Cornelissen has sketched out.

Mr. Konings talked about energy problems, and said that nuclear power is an important part of the total field of energy research. He went on to describe the discussion that has been going on in the Netherlands about whether, in the Netherlands and Europe, nuclear power stations ought to go on being built at the rate planned a few years ago. Ought not the Netherlands to take the initiative of encouraging similar discussions in other countries on this issue, he asked.

If I look around attentively, Mr. President, I can see that this debate is in fact already going on in every European country. So I do not think there is any need for the Netherlands to do anything special to promote it. If the drift of Mr. Konings' question is, besides, whether we are allocating research funds properly, and whether we are not giving too much to nuclear power and too little to research into replacement energy sources, then I would point out to him that not only in our country but in the United Kingdom as well there has been a major shift in this respect; establishments that in the past have been concerned solely with nuclear energy research are in fact now also looking at alternative forms of energy.

Other questions were asked that have to do with making a more frugal use of energy; this brings me, implicitly, to the question from Mr. Van Waterschoot, who wanted to know what our systems analysis work was about. The purpose was to get a better idea of the relationship between energy consumption, efficiency and so on, so as to make the most effective possible use of the available energy, taking into account

the various forms of this energy and the ways of using it.

Mr. Van Waterschoot would like to know whether real progress has been made with this systems analysis; I can tell him that there have already been major studies made of alternative methods of using energy, of applying technological discoveries that have already been made, and energy-saving methods that could lead to substantial reductions in consumption. Coupled with this, however, goes the need for substantial investment to achieve these alternative uses of energy.

In the European context, especially in the European Community, great importance is attached to systems analysis, and I am glad it is. As Mr. Van Waterschoot will know, spectacular results have also been achieved with systems analysis in other fields, by the international institute for systems analysis, in Austria.

Mr. Hawkins asked — and I realise he asked the question because the answer could probably prove instructive to other countries — how long the Netherlands expected to continue to be able to derive a profit from its reserves of natural gas. There are certain estimates that are updated year by year, because on the one hand it has been found that the gas reserves are larger than cautious calculations had previously shown, and on the other the exhaustion of these reserves is being delayed by consumption turning out to be a little less than was originally predicted. It is certain however that we in the Netherlands — and I think this is a lesson for other countries too — are already having to allow, in working out its socio-economic policies, for the natural gas revenues dropping off as early as the 1980s; this faces us with a pressing need for technological innovation, for finding other sources of exports than the natural gas which has over past years financed part of the rise in our social expenditure. For this reason, too, the need has become very clear in the Netherlands to put science to work on technological development, as one of our main priorities.

Mr. Hawkins went on to ask about the problem of nuclear waste, and to ask whether enough was being done about this. I believe that thought and effort is indeed being given to this problem in various places. I am wholly with the questioner in putting this question, for he himself still cannot see what solutions we shall have to use. I think that the wide public debate that Mr. Konings calls for will depend very largely on whether we manage to find the answer to this problem of nuclear waste. I think we shall have to admit too, that this is something for which every country carries a responsibility. One consequence of the sense of responsibility borne by the Netherlands is that though we have put a brake on the programme for building nuclear

Mr. Peijnenburg (continued)

power stations, we are still busy, for instance, investigating salt domes as a possible storage medium. This topic is arousing as much public discussion as the question of nuclear energy itself.

Mr. Vohrer mentioned that in our country a good deal of research is being done in the area of development co-operation. He said it was very important that we should, in the framework of development co-operation, be not so much ready or able to translate our western technologies to the countries of the third world as thoroughly aware of the fact that we are doing these countries a service only if we help them to look for and find the technologies that suit them. I am very happy that this matter is receiving attention in my country as well, where there is collaboration between, for instance, agricultural research institutes and the authorities dealing with development co-operation. They have set up joint research projects. The fact that I am proud about this does not mean that the whole problem has been solved; we all have to make an effort to overcome it. We must ensure that the international discussion that is going on on this subject, and which will have an impact on the conference on science and technology as part of development co-operation that is due to be held in UNESCO next year, does not centre on whether or not we are prepared to pass on our knowledge, with or without payment. It would be far more sensible to look at how we can make a contribution to technical developments that will serve the ends of progress in the third world countries.

Mr. Treu asked particularly about energy saving. I have dealt with this in my replies to other speakers. He then asked about the developments in connection with JET, the joint European programme aimed at developing the potential of nuclear fusion. Cases like this involve research that calls for vast investment, making it necessary for the preparatory research work to be spread out around the various countries while the actual project is concentrated in one place. I have already mentioned in my introduction that we are very pleased that the Netherlands has, in an establishment like ESTEC, for example, one part of international co-operation going on on Dutch soil. Britain can draw just as much satisfaction from this other project.

I think it is to the advantage of European co-operation to look carefully at whether the various countries are all involved in developing joint projects of this kind.

Mr. Lenzer asked for my opinion about collaboration of the kind going on in the joint project at Kalkar, and in the uranium enrich-

ment project. I think it is essential that this kind of research should be undertaken not by countries acting on their own, but within a context of international co-operation. Basically, I am very much in favour of this kind of international co-operation.

How the decisions are arrived at at any given moment is of course something that we, the politicians, do not always have under our control. All of us regularly run up against difficulties in this respect in our own countries, but as a general principle I would certainly agree with the speaker — if this is indeed the drift of his question — that projects like the one we are talking about now stand to gain from a multinational approach.

Lord McNair mentioned in particular the importance of research into harnessing tidal energy. Where the Netherlands are concerned, I must say that the potential for making use of the tides to generate power is very limited. The main reason for this is that Britain stands in the way of the main tidal flow. The question is thus less relevant to the Netherlands, though we are watching developments with keen interest.

Mr. Valleix, finally, spoke about the developments going on in ESA, and asked which projects I had in mind and what the budget total would be. I did say in my introduction that ESA does not have a long-term programme, so that there is no long-term budget. I explained, too, why this proves difficult. ESA itself is extremely busy with current work, which probably prevents it from working out long-term plans itself. I mentioned that in the United States, for instance, there are developments under way for exploiting solar energy via satellites, which have taken on a different look following the recent statements by the American President. It may be that the various member states of ESA are hesitating themselves to open up a discussion on long-term objectives because this would by its nature bring up the basic question of the financial contribution to be made by each of the member countries.

Though I have mentioned that my predecessor specifically raised the matter of long-term policy in the ESA Council, I must with some humility count myself among those of my colleagues who have not yet managed to help in finding an answer to the problem of what this long-term programme ought to look like.

I hope, Mr. President, that I have been able to give adequate answers to the questions put to me by your Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you again, Mr. Minister, for being here with us and also for replying to the many questions which have been put to you.

6. A European armaments policy

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 786 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — We now resume the debate on a European armaments policy.

I call first on Mr. Valleix. He will be followed by Mr. Gessner.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report before us has already given rise to numerous reactions in our Assembly, and there are perhaps more to come. It does, in fact, awaken fears and entertain speculations that are entirely prejudicial to the future of European arms co-operation and, consequently, to the very future of our work. The report seems to rouse a certain mistrust among Europeans.

To ask, as does our Rapporteur, that the European Community should arrogate to itself powers not conferred upon it by treaty is further to aggravate the divergences from which Europe suffers so greatly and which it has so much trouble in surmounting on the road to unification.

The armaments industries, Ladies and Gentlemen, are not like any other kinds of industry. They are in Europe, and not only in Europe, state-controlled, either directly in the case of nationalised concerns or indirectly, by way of government policy for placing contracts.

Decisions to produce or purchase this or that type of weapon are in no way comparable to civil economic decisions. They are dictated by considerations of national defence that are the exclusive responsibility of the sovereign powers of each state. It is therefore not possible to claim, as does the Rapporteur, that European armaments co-operation could be simply one aspect of Community industrial policy.

The only frameworks politically practicable and legally suited to the rapprochement and harmonisation of European arms policies are necessarily located outside the European Economic Community. They are the independent European programme group, for the specifically military aspects of such co-operation, and WEU for the political and economic aspects.

The Rapporteur does not conceal the underlying aims of his proposals. He accuses the RPR, the party to which I belong in the French National Assembly — for you must know that in France, what he referred to this morning as Gaullist is almost totally identified with the RPR — of being obsessed with national

sovereignty. I think he must be trying to be funny. In this Assembly everyone understands a joke, but everyone also understands the difference between humour and being offensive. But this accusation enables him to clamour openly for the definition of research, development and production priorities in the case of new types of arms to be taken out of the hands of the national authorities.

In calling for respect of national sovereignty, France is not furthering its own selfish or anti-European ends. The defence of Western Europe can only be firmly guaranteed if each of our peoples is determined, within the national framework it has freely adopted and without any abdication or renunciation, to ensure the means of its own security.

Of course, co-operation is indispensable. The Rapporteur has indicated the reasons for this in his report. The European arms market is currently split into a multitude of national markets too narrow to guarantee cost reductions by means of longer production runs. Moreover, national resources will be all the better used if they are pooled for the purposes of specific research, development or even production projects.

It is true, as the Rapporteur emphasises, that without European co-operation our countries' industries may well find themselves reduced to the status of subcontractors to the American arms giants. But we find the means proposed by the Rapporteur to stave off this threat somewhat astonishing. For he purports to believe that systematic integration of the production of all equipments in NATO programmes, according to priorities set by NATO and on directives from the NATO general staffs, could fully safeguard Europe's military capability and, in particular, its armaments industries.

Who could fail to see that the predominance of the United States within the integrated structure of NATO is such that an industrial policy pursued in that framework can only be heavily biased in favour of American industry and distort competition, which Mr. Critchley precisely says he wants to increase, that is, make it less one-sided.

The Rapporteur's approach has, admittedly, the merit of consistency, and I emphasise the word. He is proposing a system for organising arms production and procurement in which NATO and the European Community would finally share out all the tasks between themselves.

He advocates the establishment of an organ of the European Economic Community, attached to the Commission in Brussels — although we have heard ministers express the wish that such projects should not be implemented — which

Mr. Valleix (continued)

would be charged with co-ordinating European arms programmes. This organ would carry out instructions from a Council of European defence ministers, incidentally, one with no legal basis. We are almost in the realm of politics-fiction. These instructions should, according to the Rapporteur, correspond to the commitments undertaken by NATO's Defence Planning Committee.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is impossible to separate, in the report before us, the passages concerning the powers of the European Economic Community in regard to arms from those which deal with the standardisation of equipment in the framework of NATO. The two aspects of the report are inseparable from one another. Abdication of national decision-making powers, whether in favour of national bodies that are nominally Community organs, or in favour of Atlantic organs, will always in fact boil down to sacrificing Europe's own industrial potential.

The latest attempts at arms standardisation have been, to put it briefly, an organised competition between American and German combat tanks. The conclusions were in favour of the American. I will not go over again the competition between the F-16 and the French Mirage. We therefore have to find some means of developing our own independent arms research and production in Europe. Only European organisations that respect national sovereignty and act in accordance with the treaties can successfully do this: it is what they are there for. It is therefore up to us to promote the work of WEU and its Standing Armaments Committee, and give more support to the work of the Rome group.

We are not willing to embark on the road towards abdication of national sovereignty and abandonment of our defence responsibilities. Nor are we willing to flout the treaties and overturn the legal bases of European security.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the majority of the French Delegation had not originally intended to table or support any amendments. We thought at first it was preferable to retain the text as a whole. However, an amendment has been tabled that is not without its importance. We have therefore decided to respond to this attempt at clarification by another such attempt in the form of the amendment which has been distributed.

The amendment, though tabled as Amendments 2 and 3, is really only one. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my belief that we must not commit ourselves, by the recommendations that are being proposed, to a text which would finally result either in undermining that will to defend Europe which is WEU's responsibility, or in

its function being split up between the European Communities on the one hand and NATO on the other. What about the defence of Europe? Where is our defence? How does Europe stand in all this?

I conclude by imploring you not to forget that our decision this evening — and this is, I believe, an important moment of truth — should steer clear of dramatisation and ambiguity. Let us not forget that WEU should remain the framework for our co-operation in defence matters, not only because it is the place in which we meet as Europeans in mutual respect for all our countries, but also because it rests on voluntarily-accepted disciplinary constraints. Nor should these constraints be called into question, any more than the institution that is charged with defence, with acknowledging and maintaining discipline. A proposal like the one before us would in my view to some extent have the effect of threatening to disturb the existing balances of forces on European soil. I hope, in the interests of Europe, its defence and respect for the rules of play that we have voluntarily adopted, that the Assembly's vote will bring greater clarity, and not lead us into the paths of ambiguity towards which we are being enticed. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I ask for your indulgence if first of all I react to the contribution of the communist speaker who mentioned the Federal Republic of Germany, before I comment on Mr. Critchley's report.

This speaker acted, in his speech, as though peace in Europe were being threatened by the Federal Republic of Germany. I do not know how he arrives at that mistaken view. Surely the fact is that people in democratically-constituted Europe are afraid not of the Federal Republic of Germany but of the armaments policy of those dictatorships with which the French Communist Party continues to consider itself ideologically and politically linked. This is a fact that quite simply has to be faced. Thank you very much for that most significant applause. If the French Communist Party really wants to do something for peace then it should first of all try within its own camp to work, for instance, towards getting the Soviet Union to reduce the gigantic army of tanks it keeps in Central Europe, an army far larger than is needed for defence.

I believe we find ourselves in a rather odd situation in that the Federal Republic has declared a hundred times that it neither wants nor needs nuclear weapons. However, I am quite certain that even when we have said it two

Mr. Gessner (continued)

hundred times, and emphasised it by the policy we follow, there will invariably be people who repeat assertions of the type just mentioned. I cannot imagine that such people are saying these things from real conviction. They are doing so simply because they believe they can, in this way, stir up things a little against the Federal Republic. Anyone acting that way need not be surprised if he is ruled out as someone one can discuss matters with seriously.

There is something else I should like to draw your attention to. I found it revealing that the French communist speaker referred to the military strength of the Federal Republic. He knows very well that we in the Federal Republic are merely endeavouring to fulfil our treaty obligations, and that the programmes set up are agreed jointly by the alliance in which the Federal Republic is only one partner among fifteen.

I can only conclude therefore that in reality he is concerned not with the — to use a highly-coloured word — might of the Federal Republic but with weakening the North Atlantic Alliance. I think we must be very clear about that.

But now to the Critchley report itself. Mr. Critchley in his draft recommendation asks among other things that the European armaments industry should be restructured under the aegis of the European Community. I certainly appreciate the endeavour to standardise since, after all, our defensive strength ultimately depends on this, and it is always important to ensure the most cost-effective spending of our defence resources. So I understand very well why this point was made, and I am very grateful for it.

But we must remember one thing: an armaments policy can be pursued only if there is a simultaneous concern with the strategic and tactical situation in the world, for instance with the state of relations between East and West. Now if the European Community were to venture into that area, it would be undertaking tasks which properly belong to the alliance. My reaction is that such a road, if one were to embark on it, would be highly dangerous.

I think that by doing so we would, for instance, block the path for those neutral states which perhaps might wish to find their way into the European Community in a far-off future. Surely, the moment we orient ourselves more strongly towards a defence community, towards an armaments policy, the moment we as the European Community take a part in defence matters more than we have in the past, it will no longer be possible for the neutral countries to become members of the European Community later on. And I would greatly regret that.

Another point is also important. It should be clearly realised that we would be creating tensions. After all, Ireland does not belong to the alliance. If we were now to involve ourselves more deeply in armaments policy we should be confronting that state with difficult decisions. I have to ask here whether that is what we want, and whether we regard it as sensible. I can only say no, it would not be sensible.

Finally I ask you to consider the following point of view. Over the years the Soviet Union has always tried to discredit the European Community by saying that it is only a sort of economic adjunct to the North Atlantic Alliance. We have always repudiated this. We have said that this was not so. But if we now take the road which Mr. Critchley has proposed then we should, in a manner of speaking, be running on to the Soviet Union's unsheathed knife. We would be retrospectively confirming what throughout many years, and rightly, we have denied.

I believe we would do better to concentrate on the institutions that are dealing with the problem of standardisation. This means Eurogroup within the alliance. I do not believe that we should be doing ourselves any good by discussing this subject in a wide range of institutions. We should only be frittering away our strength, and our right hand would not know what the left was doing. That would not be in our interest (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur to reply.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — I request the floor on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry, but we have closed the list of speakers.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — We have just heard a speech which made us the subject of direct and personal accusations. I request the right to reply in one or two minutes.

The Rules of Procedure provide for this.

The PRESIDENT. — Very well, I will allow you two minutes to make a personal statement, Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — I deplore Mr. Gessner's statement and I wish to clarify our position. I deplore the fact that he should have diversionary methods to distort our remarks, by trying to delude our Assembly into believing that the French communists might, as it were, be the mouthpiece of the Soviet Union or of any other country.

I insist that the statements made by the communists are actuated solely by our country's

Mr. Boucheny (continued)

national interests and that we are careful to be only a mouthpiece of the French people who elected us.

Although I regret Mr. Gessner's remarks, I would, on the other hand, register with satisfaction the determination with which he declared that Federal Germany did not wish to possess atomic weapons.

But I regret, too, that he did not place on record some statements with which we are all too familiar — those made, for example, by Mr. Strauss, the Secretary-General of the CSU — according to which, and I am quoting from memory, an army which does not have atomic weapons at its disposal is like a warrior without a shield.

A number of statements made in the Federal Republic of Germany...

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to know why I am being interrupted by the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry, Mr. Boucheny, but the two minutes are over and this is not a personal statement. You are going into the detail of the debate. I can give you the floor at the end of the debate only for a personal statement. I did so to clear up the matter, but now your two minutes are up.

The Rapporteur has the floor.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — The debate was almost hijacked in an easterly direction.

It is always a pleasure to hear the wit and wisdom of visiting ministers, but it makes it rather difficult to hold a coherent and consistent debate. It is rather like going to a nightclub and finding that, as soon as the dancing girls appear, the lights go on and yet another comedian comes on to perform.

This has been a difficult debate for me as Rapporteur. Mr. Hardy began by saying that I was spinsterish. I did not know, Mr. President, that it showed. But the situation was then saved a little by Mr. Urwin, who stepped in to say that I was avuncular. If I have to choose between those two adjectives, naturally I prefer "avuncular".

Mr. Hardy rather suggested that what I was trying to do in this report was to unite all the defence policies of all the different European countries. Clearly, I am not prepared to do any such thing. All that I wish to do is to improve the instrument whereby the countries of Europe may be able to purchase their defence more effectively and more cheaply.

In another intervention, Mr. Cook, who is one of the brighter members of our great Labour Party, suggested that were this document to be carried — his voice at this stage trembled with emotion — the British would be unable to extend their Polaris programme and move into a new era of strategic nuclear weapons. Leaving aside the well-known fact that Mr. Cook is not in favour of even our existing strategic nuclear weapons, he avoids the main point of the argument. As I have said, any country within NATO or Europe is free to embark on its own defence policies in its own way. But were we to structure the industries of Europe to make them more efficient, clearly, were the British to go into a replacement programme for the Polaris programme, we should be able to purchase and build the submarines more effectively or, indeed, the missile systems that would be necessary.

Later in the debate, Mr. Mommersteeg, who is a most distinguished expert on defence matters, I think suggested — this may be a fault in translation — that I felt fear should be an objective of European union. Quite clearly, this must have been a mistake in translation. I used the word "fear" in the document only in the hope that this would not be an objective for Europe but a cement in order to bring about a greater degree of European unity. I agreed with his suggestion that there should be an annual meeting between the members of this Assembly and the members of the European Parliament, and that that should take place probably once a year, which would be very valuable for both our organisations.

In conclusion, I am asking the Assembly to take a leap forward. I suspect that many of the members who have spoken have not read the document at all and have been making speeches that are firmly based on all the views that they have held for many long years. For goodness' sake, have a look at the small print and see what it is that we are trying to do. NATO does not manufacture arms, nor would I wish it to do so. WEU, thank God, does not manufacture arms, and the IEPG does not manufacture arms, and nor would I wish them to do so. We wish to use their expertise and brains, though, in order to link that to a new, rationalised and more efficient armaments industry in Europe which would be able to give us the arms that we need more reasonably, more efficiently, less expensively and more quickly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I begin, Mr. President, by congratulating Mr. Critchley, our Rapporteur, on his brilliant if idiosyncratic report, which he presented this

Mr. Roper (continued)

morning with his characteristic verve and his typically combative style?

It has been a very good debate. I would at least disagree with Mr. Critchley on one point. I think that he was being a little unkind to suggest that the speeches today have been ill informed. I believe that they have been very well informed. The quality of the debate has shown the attention which has been given by our colleagues to this important subject.

As Chairman of the Committee today, whatever my personal opinions may be, I am tied to the decision of the Committee, however narrowly the report was carried in Committee or even, as in this case, by a minority of those present. I should also point out, perhaps, that one of Mr. Critchley's most effective arguments was that we ought to have a debate such as this in the Assembly. We have had this debate, and the Assembly should now make up its mind.

What I should like to do, however, before coming to the matters which divide the Assembly is to say that it is very important to stress the issues on which we are united, because somehow, listening to the debate, one would think that this Assembly was divided on the main objectives of having a more coherent policy in Europe on arms procurement. To that extent, we have got the subject out of balance in today's debate. First, we are, I think — in the Committee anyhow — very largely agreed upon the important future rôle of the independent European programme group. There was no criticism of that in the Committee, although there may be an amendment later today. We are not satisfied, of course, with all that the IEPG has done so far, but we believe that it should be allowed to try and work.

Then, we make it quite clear in our third recommendation that we see the very considerable importance of our Standing Armaments Committee. In this respect, as no one has referred to it yet, I should like to say how much the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments appreciated its recent opportunity to have a meeting with the members of the Standing Armaments Committee in the Liaison Sub-Committee. I was particularly grateful, as were my colleagues, that the Chairman-in-Office of the Standing Armaments Committee, Ingénieur-Général Cauchie, and Mr. Plantey, the Head of the International Secretariat of that Committee, were so helpful to us on this occasion.

As a Committee, we believe — and I believe that the Assembly does — that we should make the fullest possible use of the Standing Armaments Committee in the plans for European integrated defence procurement. I referred this

morning to the fourth part of the recommendation — the request to the Council to try and find a way whereby the Assembly could have, formally or informally, information each year on the working of the IEPG. I realise that this represents to the Council certain legal and formal difficulties. I should like it to use its ingenuity — I know that its members have a great deal — to see whether, if we cannot find a formal mechanism for doing this, we can find an informal mechanism.

I stress these points because I believe that these are matters on which there is great unity in the Assembly. It would be wrong for people who have listened to this debate, or who read about it, to think that we were divided on many essential matters. Of course there are issues that divide us: I shall come to them shortly. I would not want to get involved, following Mr. Critchley and Mr. Cook, in the arguments as to the appropriateness of the analogy of the loss of virginity and the loss of national sovereignty. However, I feel that it might be considered, in the context of the EEC, that the Luxembourg compromise has been almost as successful in reversing a situation of one sort as some Japanese surgeons are supposed to be in the other.

I now turn to the matters which have caused some division in the Assembly. These arise on the second recommendation. Here I think that the arguments have been at three different levels, all of which need to be looked at.

There has been the argument at the level of legality and the interpretation of the treaties. Concerning that, all I can say is that different international lawyers have taken different views. I think that the matter will be resolved as a matter not of law but of politics. None the less, there is clearly a legal level of argument.

Secondly, there has been the argument of what I might describe — I am glad to say that it has not been adduced to any great extent today — as the argument of institutional pride. If it were the case — this is not yet proven — that it would help us to achieve the objectives that are set out in the Brussels Treaty for us to transfer our responsibilities to other bodies, we should not be too proud to do it. But it must be proved that that is the case, and the Assembly must be clear that that is what it wants to do before it votes on that matter.

Thirdly — these have been the bulk of the arguments — there have been what I must describe as the pragmatic arguments — can we or can we not achieve our twin objectives of defence, co-operation and closer co-operation and integration in Europe by the particular institutional arrangements which are suggested in the report?

Mr. Roper (continued)

The Committee has made its decision by a narrow margin. It is now up to the Assembly to make its decision. As Chairman of the Committee, I can only present the facts to you.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before we vote on the draft recommendation, we must deal with the four amendments which have been tabled.

First, Amendment 2 :

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, before "the standardisation" insert, "when necessary for the security of Europe,".

Do you want to explain your amendment, Mr. Valleix, or is it clear ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — This amendment is really a joint effort, since it has been approved by the members of the French Delegation that represent the majority in France.

I would like Amendments 2 and 3 to be discussed together. They were tabled separately between 12 noon and 2 p.m. by the Assembly's secretariat although I had requested the tabling of a single amendment. I think we can therefore go ahead with a joint discussion.

The purpose of this amendment is to dispel numerous misunderstandings, not to say ambiguities. During the session the representatives of our governments — and a large number of them have addressed the Assembly — have not ceased to reaffirm their attachment to WEU, and yet one is forced to admit that the practice of European arms co-operation appears to belie that attachment.

It seems to me today especially necessary for our Assembly to take a clear position in favour of full and whole-hearted application of the Brussels Treaty in regard to what is after all one of its fundamental aspects, that of armaments.

We therefore cannot adopt a text that only mentions the activity of the independent European programme group and ignores the rôle of WEU. When you re-read the recommendation you see that WEU is not mentioned — and it is in WEU's name that we are speaking and acting — despite the fact that the powers of WEU and its Standing Armaments Committee are indisputably wider, are established by treaty, and give it a head start towards achieving real harmonisation of European arms policies.

The two amendments we are tabling constitute a minimum threshold this side of which I see no possibility of coming to an agreement except by some form of compromise.

I explained earlier that, because of the tabling of Mr. Hardy's Amendment 1 — and contrary to an initial proposal that we reject the text as a whole — we came to the view that the original text could be improved, in particular by our two amendments.

If they are not adopted we shall be unable to content ourselves with Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Hardy and others because, whether at Atlantic or Community level, integration of arms policies in a supranational framework can in our opinion only end up by depriving Europe of the means of ensuring its own security.

The Rapporteur — to take him up on what he said — stated just now that WEU did not have the possibility of manufacturing arms directly — that is true, no more than NATO can manufacture them directly. It is our governments that place the orders and — whether the firms are nationalised in the one case, or via government contracts in the case of non-nationalised firms — it is they who decide on a co-ordinated defence policy, if possible, within WEU.

That is why, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe that these two amendments — which in effect constitute one whole — can enable us to reach a consensus in this Assembly on a subject which is after all of capital importance.

But if these amendments are not adopted, we feel it would be wrong to decide on a general policy statement of such importance in the way proposed. That is why we attach fundamental importance to our amendments.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?

What is the opinion of the Rapporteur ?

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — My opinion is that we would accept Amendment 2 of Mr. Valleix, that is, to insert "when necessary for the security of Europe".

We would not accept Amendment 3 to insert "the Standing Armaments Committee and". This amendment is moved not on behalf of the French Government but on behalf of the Gaullist Party only, and it represents not French Government policy but the policy of the Gaullist Party. It would put more weight upon the SAC than it would bear, and it would give it more priority than IEPG.

We accept Amendment 2 and reject Amendment 3.

The PRESIDENT. — We have first to decide on Amendment 2, and you, Mr. Critchley, agreed to 2 but did not agree to 3.

We must now vote on Amendment 2 by Mr. Valleix, which reads :

The President (continued)

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, before "the standardisation" insert " , when necessary for the security of Europe ,".

*(A vote was taken by sitting and standing
Amendment 2 is agreed to.)*

I now call Mr. Stoffelen to support his Amendment 4, which reads :

4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add "with such assistance as the Standing Armaments Committee can provide".

Mr. Stoffelen, will you please take the floor ?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — After reading the amendment of Mr. Valleix I came to the conclusion that it is true, as our good colleague said, that paragraph 1 of the recommendation proper does not mention the rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee. Therefore, there could be a reason to mention this rôle, which is not without importance, but in a balanced and cautious way. Therefore, I have tabled an amendment, which I now move. It means not more and not less assistance than is necessary in a moderate, balanced attempt to make the position of the Standing Armaments Committee clearer than it is in the draft recommendation proper.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Rapporteur ?

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — We accept Mr. Stoffelen's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — The situation is that Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen is accepted by the Committee.

I must deal first with Amendment 3 by Mr. Valleix, and then Amendment 4. Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Valleix reads :

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "be concentrated in" insert "the Standing Armaments Committee and".

This amendment has been vetoed by the Rapporteur. Is that clear ?

Does anyone want to speak to this amendment ?...

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

We come now to Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen.

The Committee was in favour of this amendment.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have asked to speak again in order to explain why I and my colleagues will be voting against this amendment.

We had a large exchange of views about Amendment 1. You therefore doubtless understand the negotiations, as it were, that went on in this regard.

In order to clarify the discussion, I should say that I actually proposed to a number of honourable members a wording different from that of the amendment which has just been rejected. I therefore ask Mr. Stoffelen whether he cannot accept the following wording for paragraph 1 of the recommendation : "should be concentrated in the independent European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee". In other words, I am proposing that a reference to the Standing Armaments Committee, which emanates from WEU — and we are here to speak on behalf of WEU — should be associated with the reference to the independent European programme group. I would hope that Mr. Stoffelen can in turn make an effort in the direction of my proposal.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — I really appreciate the attempt of our colleague to reach agreement, but, as I declared earlier, I cannot accept wording which is more or less the same as the text of Amendment 3. As I have already explained, I tried to table wording which was more moderate — I would emphasise that — and a balanced attempt to make the position of the Standing Armaments Committee clear. I cannot possibly accept the suggestion of Mr. Valleix.

The PRESIDENT. — The Assembly will now vote on Mr. Stoffelen's Amendment 4.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

I now call on Mr. Hardy to move Amendment 1 standing in the names of Mr. Hermann Schmidt and others. Mr. Cook has added his name to this amendment, which reads :

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I shall not need to take a great deal of time, because the debate has already largely concerned itself with the wisdom or otherwise of recommendation 2. We have not so far considered whether the timing of the proposition is appropriate and

Mr. Hardy (continued)

perhaps that is where a passing thought for delicacy of timing should not be alien to political consideration; but there are other reasons for objection.

I do not believe that the recommendation would strengthen the western alliance. Certainly, we need to improve interoperability. Certainly, we need to see real progress along the two-way street and possibly the development of the Community as a defence organisation — and this would be a consequence of the proposition within the report. It may be that that development would assist in achieving interoperability but it would introduce division and separation within the alliance. It could generate a sense of exclusion among those members of NATO which are not within the Community. I believe that that is dangerous from the point of view of the northern and southern flanks of the alliance. I do not believe that we can afford vulnerability in those areas.

It would be unwise to construct division within the alliance and there are more effective ways of improving defence industrial activity, and better and more equitable arrangements for defence competition with the United States may be desirable and ought to be achieved. But this proposal takes us rather a long way from that. It inclines inevitably to division and erosion of relationships within the alliance.

There is another significant point which has not yet been made: the Republic of Ireland is a neutral state. British politicians ignored Ireland for rather a long time earlier in this century and in this debate we may be doing so again. Perhaps it might be regarded as useful to have Ireland involved in western defence matters but that is for the Irish to say. Otherwise, we indulge in disdain for the democracy and sovereignty that we are purporting to defend.

It is because of our concern for the maintenance of democracy and our anxiety about the overwhelming expansion of Warsaw Pact military power that we do not feel that we should take risks with the Alliance's relationships. For that reason I believe that recommendation 2 is unwise. Let this Assembly call for improvements in interoperability. Let it call for real movement along the two-way street, but let it do so within the existing organisations rather than embrace that hazardous division that this gamble — and I believe that it is a gamble — could very well involve. I move Amendment 1.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against this amendment?

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I shall not hold the Assembly up by making the same speech a third time, for that would be

insufferable. This is the most important element in the whole paper. A number of my friends have persuaded me to add three words before paragraph 2 which may help some members in making this big leap forward. The words which I will add to it are: "Give consideration to" so that it will read: "Give consideration to the restructuring of the European armaments industry..." I believe that this will soften the blow for some members, but naturally I also hope that it will still be of sufficient importance and interest for a majority of members to vote for what is, in fact, the central point of this very important paper.

The PRESIDENT. — We have an amendment to cut the whole paragraph and we have a kind of amendment by the Rapporteur to add in paragraph 2 the words "Give consideration to".

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I do not want to prolong the discussion and I admit that I fear we shall not end up with a text that is as clear as I would like. As I have already said to the Assembly, the subject is too important for our decision to be shrouded in in ambiguity.

Moreover, I am not a member of the Committee in question and I admit, as a relative layman in comparison with others in regard to a matter of such capital importance, and in view of what has happened in the sitting, that I am tempted to suggest that there is perhaps a very good case for asking for the matter to be referred back to Committee. If reference back is ever justified, it seems to me that it is precisely in a case like this, because I believe there is indeed a worrying split as to the position which the Assembly should take on a subject of such importance, a position which will surely come under scrutiny from outside. Finally, in addition to this split which is in itself a bad thing, and to the need to affirm our political responsibility vis-à-vis the outside world, there is the risk of confusion in the minds of some members in taking a decision which, whatever it proves to be, is likely to have caught people rather on the hop.

Mr. President, I beg to suggest — and both the Chairman of the Committee and Rapporteur may have something to say about this — that our Assembly would perhaps be well advised to ask its Committee to look into the substance of the problem, together with the authors of amendments who have just spoken.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper, the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As I understand it, Mr. Valleix, under Rule 29(5), is asking that this amendment be referred back to the Committee. I understand that his argument

Mr. Roper (continued)

is that this is new matter which is coming forward and that it needs more consideration.

We have discussed the report. As is well known by most of those present, I was not one of the most enthusiastic for the way it came out, but it was very fully discussed at a meeting at the Assembly on 30th and 31st October. The report has been available for two weeks before today, and in the report, in paragraph 145, there are clearly set out the narrowness of the vote and the opinion of the minority. I may not like the report and I may hope that Mr. Hardy's amendment is carried, but I think that it would be a mistake for the Assembly at this time to run away from making a decision and, therefore, I oppose the proposal by Mr. Valleix.

The PRESIDENT. — I must read the relevant paragraph in our Rules of Procedure. It is there stated that reference back to Committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee. They did not request it. Therefore, there is no doubt about sending it back to the Committee.

We now come to a vote on Amendment 1 by Mr. Hardy. It has been debated.

Will those who are in favour of Amendment 1 please show? We are now voting, Mr. Valleix. *(Interruption)* The situation is as follows. I read the paragraph from our Rules of Procedure saying that it is obligatory to refer a matter back if the Rapporteur or the Chairman of the Committee demands it. If neither the Chairman nor the Rapporteur demands it, the Assembly itself can decide whether to send it back. Mr. Valleix asked that the Assembly should decide. It is not obligatory. The Assembly can say that it will send it back. It is the Assembly which must say that we shall send it back. It is the decision of the Assembly. Am I correct? I hope so.

Therefore, I must ask for an indication of those who are in favour of sending the report back to the Committee as demanded by Mr. Valleix. Will they please rise?

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

There is no doubt that the Assembly, by a fair majority, is not in favour of sending it back.

Therefore, we now come to the vote on Amendment 1.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Mr. Stoffelen wishes to make an explanation of vote.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — As Chairman of the Socialist Group and on behalf of the Socialist Group I want to give the following explanation of vote.

As members of my group explained during the debate, it is our strong conviction that paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation, referring to the rôle of the European Community in the future of the armaments industry, is a profound mistake, an unacceptable proposition and harmful to European integration. For these reasons we tabled an amendment to delete paragraph 2. Since our amendment has been rejected we have to reconsider our position. We have strong objections but none the less we want to avoid the misunderstanding that we are against European integration in armaments policy and industry, and it is for these reasons that, though we as socialists tend more or less to reject the recommendation, we shall not vote against, but shall abstain.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Before coming to the final vote on the draft recommendation I must ask for a vote on the proposal of the Rapporteur to insert "Give consideration to" in paragraph 2.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. With respect, I think that the Rapporteur desires, does he not, to substitute for the words "Call for" the words "Give consideration to".

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — That is what he said.

The PRESIDENT. — Yes, I think it is understood. The text will read: "Give consideration to the restructuring..." Is that correct? Yes.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The verbal amendment is agreed to.

We now come to the final vote on the draft recommendation in Document 786, as amended. For this we must vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Pecoraro.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

1. See page 36.

The President (continued)

| | |
|----------------------------|----|
| Number of votes cast | 47 |
| Ayes | 19 |
| Noes | 8 |
| Abstentions | 20 |

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to*¹.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order. Before we close this matter, Mr. President, I should like you to give your interpretation of Rule 35(b), which says: "for any other decision, an absolute majority of the votes cast" is required. On this occasion, 19 votes were cast in favour out of a total of 47. I should like to know your ruling.

The PRESIDENT. — There is no doubt that the decision is in favour, because 19 is more than 8. I do not see a rule which says that we must have a 50 % majority.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The phrase is "absolute majority". I am asking you to rule on the meaning of the word "absolute". It seems that that must be an absolute majority of those taking part in the vote.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Grieve, you are the Chairman of the Committee which has to deal with this problem.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I have been trying to attract your attention, Mr. President, via a silent microphone for a second or two. Without any doubt, in my submission, Rule 35(b) means exactly what it says — an absolute majority of the votes cast. As you have said, 19 is more than 8. Abstentions are not votes cast. Had the vote been 19 to 18, the vote would still have carried.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — We are in a marvellous situation. Paragraph 4 of Rule 34 states that the roll shall be called in alphabetical order beginning with a certain name and the votes shall be "yes", "no", or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative votes count in calculating the number of votes cast. Therefore, there is no doubt about it — 19 is more than 8. I think there is some contradiction in the rules.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am grateful for your ruling, Mr. President. I was searching for that ruling from you. As this is such an important matter, there should be no doubt about it. You have now totally clarified the matter and I am most grateful for your ruling.

1. See page 37.

The PRESIDENT. — Could you not have told me beforehand that you were looking for this direction?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Without wishing to prolong this extremely interesting procedural debate — it is never too late to learn — could we not have the opinion of the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, or an authoritative opinion from you, Mr. President?

As the abstentions are not taken into account in the vote, I would like to know whether or not there was a quorum and whether or not abstentions count in determining the quorum.

Such a rule is not the case in all our assemblies, and I must confess to some doubt on the matter. How are abstentions considered — as forming part of the quorum or not?

The PRESIDENT. — There is no doubt that abstentions are counted for the quorum. As regards the majority, it is just as we decided it was. There is no doubt about it.

We shall continue now with the Orders of the Day.

7. Application satellites (Part II)

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 784)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on application satellites (Part II) and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 784.

I call Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur.

Mr. SCHEFFLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have the thankless task of making a report which would have had to be more extensive were I not in the fortunate position that a minister, a former member of this Assembly, already dealt very extensively in his observations with the subject which you and I have to discuss this evening.

Following the presentation to the WEU Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of a first report on application satellites on 2nd March 1978, I am now able to present to you the second part of that report. I should like to express my thanks to all those who gave me such generous help with the drafting of both parts.

As detailed in the explanatory memorandum, a number of important decisions were taken

Mr. Scheffler (continued)

within the framework of the European Space Agency in the course of 1978. I realise, moreover, that the report presented here today can be no more than a snapshot and will probably have to be enlarged by the addition of important data next year.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a quarter-century of space travel now lies behind us, and science and technology have been steadily developing the field of application satellites. Since the spectacular event of the first moon-landing public interest quickly returned to everyday affairs so that, if anything, we have to complain of a lack rather than a spate of public interest. The entry of space research into its second quarter-century is characterised by sobriety and reflections on the rôle it should play in mastering the difficult questions associated with world-wide structural changes in many industrial fields.

Priority in this report is inevitably given to an account of space activities in the application field, i.e. the area where satellites can perform direct services for us in a variety of ways.

At the same time there is no doubt at all that scientific research must continue to be promoted unless our knowledge is to fall behind. I am thinking here of the areas of astronomy and astrophysics, atmosphere research, physics, geophysics and biomedicine. Such research will have to be conducted by means of satellites, space probes and space stations, not because science is an aim in itself but because the results and the knowledge gained should help further to improve life upon this earth.

Europe has undoubtedly made extraordinary progress in satellite technology during the past few years. However, it would be unrealistic to deny that advanced space technologies are determined nowadays by the United States and the Soviet Union. The gigantic efforts of the superpowers in the development of application satellites have, alongside the scientific-technological reasons, had primarily military reasons. I am aware that the chapter on military application satellites in this report can be no more than an outline and a very vague picture of what is at present happening in that field.

The European Space Agency, founded on 31st May 1975, pulled together all European space activities existing prior to that date. The eleven member states of ESA — Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom — expressly declared in the foundation agreement that it was their task to ensure and develop co-operation among European states for exclusively peaceful purposes in the field of space research and space technology,

with a view to their use for science and for operational space application systems.

That was a step which led from the fragmentation of numerous national projects to a purposeful co-ordination of those activities. There can be no doubt that only by working together in ESA were the European member states in a position to realise certain projects at all, projects which because of their excessive size could not have been realised by one state alone. In spite of many difficulties, which I shall mention later, ESA is entitled to be satisfied with its achievement and feel its continued existence to be justified. It must, of course, be concluded that difficulties which have now been identified can also be removed and must be removed. The past year in particular proved that many questions were solved through the good will of all those concerned.

Mr. President, the application satellites of the European Space Agency and their missions may be briefly outlined as follows. The first OTS communications satellite was unfortunately destroyed when its Delta 3914 carrier blew up. On 23rd November 1977, however, the Delta 2914 launched the Meteosat-1 satellite whose mission lies within the meteorological area.

This first European weather satellite is already supplying pictures of the earth and its cloud cover every thirty minutes. These pictures are to make it easier for users — meteorologists, oceanographers and hydrographers — substantially to improve their weather forecasting. It is obvious that this system is not yet fully perfected and requires additional elements. That is why a second version of the Meteosat is planned for 1980; this will strengthen quite substantially the European contribution to the World Weather Watch and to the global atmospheric research programme.

OTS-2 is a communications satellite. It was launched by a Delta carrier on 11th May 1978. As its name implies, this orbital test satellite is a satellite that is principally concerned with the needs of European postal and telecommunications administrations as well as the needs of broadcasting institutions. In this pre-operational phase its capacity embraces 6,000 telephone channels or 4,500 telephone and two television channels. The OTS is intended to demonstrate the faultless functioning of all the equipment.

In the second generation ESA intends to develop a European regional system equipped with 20,000 telephone channels.

The technological trend in the area of communications is already perceptible in outline. Much of what today still seems Utopian will have been realised by the year 2000.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to slip in a personal observation. It is not the

Mr. Scheffler (continued)

task of this report to examine how the human individual is coping — intellectually, spiritually and socially — with the tempestuous changes in the field of technical communication and the increasing supply of information. But it is not enough, in my opinion, to assess solely the development of technology while disregarding the social components in peoples' lives. Reduced to a simple formula, this means: engineering and modern technology must serve man but must not dominate him. So much for my personal remark.

In the field of data-processing the legislator has already been compelled to intervene to ensure the protection of the individual's personal privacy. Besides, it is questionable whether it is necessarily the greatest happiness on earth for a person to be able to receive twenty different television programmes from all over the world at the same time whenever he wants to. That is a question which will certainly have to be answered in the future.

In the series of application satellites the next to follow were Marots-A for maritime communications, ECS-1 for communications — already as an operational system — then Marots-B, likewise for maritime communications, H-Sat (heavy satellite) for communications (direct broadcasting), as well as ECS-2, also for communications. This then outlines the list of projects. The last six satellites mentioned are to be put in orbit by the Ariane carrier system during the years 1980-82.

That brings me to the system which represents a major part of the activities of ESA. The first of four planned trial launches will take place as early as next year from the Ariane launching complex at the Kourou space centre. The ESA member states have decided to go in for the mass production of this carrier and to begin with a promotional series consisting of five units. The question of how that carrier is to be used in the future remains to be answered. Over the next fourteen years some 200 geostationary satellites will have to be lifted into space. The association of European industries, Eurospace, estimates that of these no less than sixteen and no more than sixty-two satellites can be put into orbit by Ariane carrier rockets. This reflects the economic importance of that system.

The Minister has already mentioned the spacelab programme today. I must emphasise once more that, with this programme, Europeans will take their first step into space, and that this is not just a project aimed solely at industrial objectives but a project which can help Europe to draw level with the rival powers.

In 1980 the first spacelab will be launched with the shuttle transporter. Totally new opportunities will open for scientific research.

For the first spacelab mission a total of seventy-six scientific and technological experiments will be carried out — sixty of them European, fifteen American and one Japanese — and it is to be hoped that the efforts of ESA for further applications will lead to success.

In all this ESA is not jealously concerned about keeping all projects within its own sphere. But it would not be pleased to discover that similar projects were being worked on in a variety of different countries on a national plane. That would be uneconomical and incompatible with the economy principle.

The overall ESA budget will surpass its culmination point of over 600 million accounting units in 1978-79 and will subsequently, during the succeeding years until 1983, decline to a figure of less than 300 million accounting units. This is connected with the tapering off of the Ariane and spacelab projects with the high investment costs attaching to them.

It follows that the members participating in these projects are starting to consider how national excess capacities already might be prevented, since these would not be subsequently taken up on the basis of the trend outlined above. It is to be hoped therefore that a sufficient number of users will facilitate our entry into the industrial phase and thereby bring about a continuity which the aerospace sector has so far lacked. This concerns not only industrial enterprises or investments but also a large number of highly-qualified scientists and engineers who have devoted their entire strength and their whole skill to the advancement of these projects.

In conclusion I should like to make a remark on the military part of the present report.

The accident that befell the nuclear-powered Soviet reconnaissance satellite Cosmos-954 has again reminded the public of the dangers associated with crashes of space objects.

Admittedly the so-called space treaty of 10th October 1967 defined the liability of states which launch space objects or cause them to be launched. That liability has been further regulated in detail by an agreement of 29th March 1972 on liability, under international law, for damage caused through space objects. No unambiguous legal basis, however, for a specific duty of notification in the event of the crash of a space object emerges from treaties under international law to date. There are, of course, endeavours, within the framework of the United Nations, to lay down specific norms for such obligatory notification.

It is obvious that particular dangers attach to nuclear-powered satellites. President Carter on 31st January 1978 submitted to the public a proposal that the operation of nuclear-equipped

Mr. Scheffler (continued)

satellites in relatively near orbits, and hence carrying a particularly high risk of destabilisation, should be banned by a treaty with the Soviet Union.

It is doubtful, however, whether specific decisions will be taken on the subject of nuclear satellites in the immediate future. That is why all member states should be asked — and this is what we have done in Section D of our recommendation — to support, to the best of their ability, in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its sub-committees, the proposal stipulating specific mandatory notification by states launching nuclear-powered satellites, in addition to measures governing security and the provision of mutual assistance.

A remark by Mr. Valleix in the course of today's discussion with the Minister leads me to observe that our recommendation does not aim, at this stage, at giving institutional form to the possibilities of establishing a global network but that we are concerned with studies of how to finance such possibilities. The same applies to the study of the construction of a prototype for deriving power supplies from space. We certainly realise the difficulties and the potential risks in the gigahertz range which has by no means been fully explored yet.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this brings me to the end. I thank you and ask you to accept the recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

I call first Mr. Treu. He will be followed by Mr. Bernini and Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. Scheffler's report, submitted to all these empty seats, would have deserved longer and wider discussion, both in itself and for the trouble taken by the Committee.

We Latins have a regular habit of qualifying every argument. Before the European Space Agency was founded, as you will remember, in May 1975, studies of this weighty matter were being pushed ahead, and there already existed ELDO and ESRO: this double instrument for studying outer space was merged into one, and so the agency was born. Now the question arises of distinguishing between applications and scientific satellites: this is becoming an impossibility. As we have seen many times during the last few years, Mr. President, when a scientific satellite is launched there has never

been a single case in which it was not set in an applications context.

The launch of Ariane, which required lengthy studies, was conducted among other things so as not to be always tributary to American industry. Let me add that some thousands of applications satellites are planned, weighing over 2,300 kg each. How many of them are literally for scientific purposes, how many for applications, exploration, etc., how many for military and how many for peaceful uses? We need say no more, to grasp how complicated a matter this is. It is difficult to confine oneself to only mentioning the OTS orbital satellites, telecommunications satellites and earth resource development satellites.

I prepared a speech to last a quarter of an hour, but will hasten to conclude briefly, at the President's request. Our Rapporteur argues the criterion ought to be co-operation and commitment, but the agency founded in 1975 has only welcomed to its bosom a restricted circle of participants. This is a subject batted to and fro between the Council of Europe and the European union, and we often find ourselves convening in due and proper assembly. Therefore WEU might be the best forum for collaboration in defence policy. There is a very wide scope for the extensive body of documentation on this subject.

Concerning the latest application, that of remote-sensing satellites, we have seen in Europe too what results can be achieved by the Earthnet programmes which have scarcely begun at Fucino and Kiruna. The earth-sensing satellites will not only look for water and mineral resources but are also capable of monitoring the surface of the earth for tracking jet-propelled aircraft: here you see a cross between civilian and military uses. Let me remind you of a very serious incident that occurred between the Soviet Union and the United States: a BC-2 surveying over the Urals detected movements of Russian land and naval forces. All this leads me to conclude that future programmes will see a gradual build-up of technico-operational applications satellites, with cross-fertilisation by the sciences: just think of spacelab. It will be a laboratory for studying not only the possibilities of work, communications and research in space but also the development of new channels and men's living conditions in relation to the environment.

I think the big contest for developing the Ariane launcher is now over. We are told that the space shuttle ought to be already operational. Is there still any need to produce this vehicle that can go to and fro between satellites? In other words, is it worth-while going on producing expendable rockets when in a few years' time we shall have a reusable vehicle — produced in the United States, to be sure — on which we can collaborate anyway? Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to Mr. Scheffler's report, with its wealth of stimulating references and information. But I do not think sufficient light is thrown on the problems which applications of space engineering pose for governments especially in Western Europe. The draft recommendation aptly stresses the importance, over and beyond military purposes, of using satellites for economic and social development purposes, and the rational use of resources, including defence of the environment, and the potential decisive contribution that may stem from all this for overcoming the difficult and complex development problems of the third world.

So we are agreed on the need to activate the European Space Agency and call on the member governments to put up adequate funding so that Western Europe's presence and commitment may be increased in the space area. The indications in the recommendations are particularly important in this respect, being designed to identify the objectives of a medium and long-term space policy for Western Europe. But we feel that the directives given on two points, which we think the member governments should be taking up in the near future, fall short of what is required.

First, Western Europe's rôle in the development of international space co-operation: we consider that the status or advancement of the United States' and Soviet Russia's ongoing space activities are not as essential as they purport to be in the recommendations. If anything, what is important is the status of their bilateral relations and agreements in respect of space stations.

The risk to be guarded against is not only that of being shut out from such agreements, but also of remaining subject to all the standards and criteria that may be laid down by the two big powers. Admittedly, the agreements are open to other parties, but Europe also has its own qualifications for participating in the fruits of its own progress in the space area. What is needed, however, is a commitment by our governments to encourage by bilateral or multilateral arrangements such presence by Europe in space, such participation by Western Europe and the European Space Agency in implementing and developing the existing international agreements in the various United Nations space bodies.

Secondly, developments in remote-sensing technology and space laboratories and stations call into question the coexistence of two principles: the territorial sovereignty of states and the free use of outer space, together with the cognate

problems of nuclear-powered satellites and the danger of warlike uses of space.

Hence the urgent need, also mentioned by Mr. Scheffler, not to be shirked by WEU, of making international regulations legally adequate, of contriving in the United Nations suitable legal instruments for making the independence of states compatible with the uses of outer space, with the object of banning, or at least controlling, nuclear satellites and safeguarding the peaceful use of space.

Western Europe's task is to apply itself to this aim, to be able to cope with the new problems posed by space developments, for the latter to be used to serve the cause of progress, détente, security and world peace.

Subject to these observations, and a greater commitment by WEU in the matter, we shall vote in favour of the draft recommendation that is before the Assembly today.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I want to congratulate Mr. Scheffler on his report, though I must express my sympathy to him and his right-hand man that because of the late hour there are so few members able to take part in the debate.

In its reply to Recommendation 317 on applications satellites, the Council stated on 6th November 1978 that it recognised the need for giving European industry a "fair share of orders in connection with military applications satellites". This sounds a marvellous reply, but I think it is highly unsatisfactory. It is one of those answers we have been getting from the WEU Council for years and which are — to be perfectly frank — neither fish nor fowl. The question that immediately arises is why the orders have not been forthcoming. European industry has already repeatedly shown that it is capable — sometimes even more so than American industry — of building satellites. There is, especially on the military side, a sizable demand, while in the industry there is certainly an over-capacity that would enable it to meet this military demand.

Why is it not possible to pursue a space policy in which the military and civil sectors are complementary? If this policy is not brought about, satellites for both sectors will undoubtedly become too expensive, with the logical outcome that American industry will get the orders because over there they have a policy of matching up civil and military requirements.

It is understandable that the Rapporteur should be worried about ESA's programme for the future. The budget for 1978 comes to 600 million units of account.

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

The greatest part of this goes on developing spacelab and Ariane. The Ariane rocket is to have four practice launches next year. In 1981 it may become operational, and will have to carry satellites to and in space. The question is whether there will be a market for the launcher.

The prospects are perhaps not all that bad, since development of the shuttle is lagging nine months behind and it is also going to cost more than was expected. Ariane ought to be able to win itself a place on the world market after 1981, provided it is an operationally reliable launcher. I would stress very strongly that we must avoid ESA getting into the same position as the Euratom research centre at Ispra, which has been suffering without any proper programme, for years on end. Overall, ESA has a staff totalling no less than 1,500. This substantial potential must be put to use. Europe stands, I believe, at a crossroads. It cannot drop out now if it does not want to fall economically, industrially and politically behind the Russians and Americans. For this reason I support Mr. Scheffler's recommendation. I think it gives clear guidance on the direction ESA must take. Let us hope this recommendation will be translated into action by the political authorities in our member countries.

Thank you for your attention at this late hour, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I too shall begin by complimenting Mr. Scheffler on his report, which gives a good picture of European co-operation in the field of space research during the last fourteen years. This is also illustrated in Appendix I to the report.

I would like to make a few more comments on one point in the report that has not received sufficient attention. Some members of ESA are still going outside the organisation and concluding individual agreements with non-member countries. We think this is wrong; all such activities should be concentrated in ESA. There are also national programmes, as one can see from the sixth page of the report. We realise that in the industrial research sphere one cannot simply exchange information, because of the effect on the competitive position of the firms involved: with the structure of our society, this is not on.

We believe, however, that everything that is done in the field of space research should be under the auspices of ESA. ESA could then take the initiative vis-à-vis industry by awarding contracts to, if necessary, different firms. They

could be quite specific contracts. I think this is necessary if Europe is to keep up in the technical field. It requires the concentration of all the western world's forces and intellectual resources.

I would also refer to Europe's energy problem, one of the most difficult problems for the future. On the one hand there is growing dependence on third parties, and on the other one sees a growing resistance to nuclear power.

I think therefore — and the Rapporteur too mentioned this — that ESA must give much greater priority to the development and harnessing of solar energy than it does at present. I think that the developments we saw in America — the plans for launching space stations which would gather solar energy and beam it to earth — should be looked at very closely here in Europe. This is possibly an area in which we should push ahead and give a lead to the whole world, though that would require money for the necessary research. I would also mention the dangers of space vehicles in close earth orbit carrying radioactive material. For the sake of brevity, I would simply endorse what the Rapporteur has said on this point.

Continuity of work in ESA is a particularly difficult point. Continuity of work means continuity of funding, and that is what ESA lacks. It is dependent on what the governments grant it. This makes it difficult to pursue a long-term research policy. I think ESA should put forward a long-term development programme, covering a period of five or ten years. Once such a programme had been established and accepted by the member countries, funds would have to be allocated for the same period in order for the programme to be implemented. This is the only way Europe can keep up with technological developments throughout the world, and that is why I consider such long-term planning indispensable.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply? Please speak for a minute only.

Mr. SCHEFFLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, to answer four contributions to the debate in one minute is almost as much of an adventure as launching a satellite into space. Let me nevertheless make the attempt.

Our colleague Mr. Treu basically further endorsed the arguments I put forward as the Committee's Rapporteur. I am most grateful to him.

Mr. Bernini pointed to the dangers arising from the fact that we still have no international standards recognised by everyone. I believe that

Mr. Scheffler (continued)

this is one of the needs we have to keep very firmly in mind. It is just as Mr. Treu said: the number of satellites — I make no distinction between application satellites and scientific satellites — is growing. It lies between five and ten thousand. We do not know which way development is going. Purely statistically, there is today a risk of someone being killed by a satellite once every 275 years. But this could change very rapidly.

Mr. Cornelissen said a lot about industrial policy, and thus touched on what Mr. Konings mentioned in his speech. However, I must point out that it cannot be ESA's job to share out orders if industry itself does not realise the need for having in its hands an instrument that can be used to economic ends. What is needed is for national industries to realise the enormous opportunities the opening-up of space is offering them in the various areas I have mentioned.

I believe that, as I have already mentioned, we are entitled to say, after twenty-five years, that we have taken a first step into space and we shall take many more, and that too on a peaceful basis, because we know that space can offer us substitutes for items we lack today. Here I must underline what Mr. Konings said — that in seeking a solution to the energy problem we should not call a halt at the threshold of space: it offers us vast possibilities.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Does the Chairman wish to speak?

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Sir. Mr. Scheffler has done a fine job in his report and I hope that the Assembly will approve it.

The European Space Agency comprises the work of eleven governments in Western Europe and not all those governments either support the ESA in the way in which they are committed to do in the association that they have made, or come up promptly with the financial payments which are due for the programmes which have already been agreed. We have questioned this in a number of parliaments of Western European Union. It is clear that the ESA is not being backed as it should be by the member governments. I hope that WEU will not hesitate to back this agency properly. It is working with only a sixth of the funds that the Americans devote to space. As the Americans and Russians move further and faster away from what Europe is accomplishing, so the penalties for the economic future of Western Europe and the employment of people in Western Europe become more severe.

In the United States, as our Committee saw earlier this year, the space industry has provided

hundreds of thousands of new jobs. We in Europe should look at the opportunities of space not just as a means of satisfying our future aspirations but as a means of solving our present employment problems. We are neglecting to do this because Europe does not yet understand the value of space, at the public as well as the government level. We have received an invitation from the ESA to see some of its work at its launching site at Kourou in America. We have had several opportunities to see what the United States is doing in space. It is high time that WEU came out boldly and said, "We support this agency and want it to succeed." This report is a sound basis for making the claim that WEU can help the European Space Agency.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that I express the view of the whole Assembly if I say that in view of the importance of this matter it might be dealt with at a more appropriate time the next time it is discussed. What we do with our future, after all, is important.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 784. I hope that we can proceed as follows: if there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?

The draft recommendation is agreed to¹.

8. Methods of voting

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 794)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on methods of voting and vote on the draft order, Document 794.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the problem examined by your Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, at the request of the Presidential Committee, is very specifically how to remedy drawbacks associated with the difficulty of obtaining a quorum at plenary sittings of our Assembly. It is not a new problem, as the studies and proposals made not long ago by Mr. van Hall and Mr. Prélôt in 1971 and, more recently, by the Rapporteur of your Committee, Mr. Piket, in 1975, bear witness.

1. See page 38.

Mr. Bozzi (continued)

In order to resolve it, Mr. van Hall and Mr. Prélôt advocated making the Rules of Procedure less strict. Mr. Piket, for his part, proposed — both more modestly and more realistically, it seems to me — not to modify the Rules of Procedure, but to specify a number of practical measures and ensure compliance with them — for there lies the difficulty.

The report which I prepared on behalf of your Committee at the end of discussions in which, amongst others, Mr. Grieve, its Chairman, Mr. Périquier, Mr. Voogd, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Antoni and Mr. Jessel took part, repeats in the main the proposals formerly made by Mr. Piket, which were adopted by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and by the Presidential Committee.

Now, for various reasons which, it must be confessed — and Mr. Périquier stressed the point this morning — are mainly attributable to the manifold, simultaneous and sometimes inescapable obligations to which we are all subject, these recommendations were not followed by effective action. Still worse, we observed an aggravation of what I might describe as the drift in our practice when compared with the request in the President's letter. But let us look at this more closely.

The problem of a quorum — please forgive me for recalling these obvious facts — arises in various ways according to the voting methods employed.

In the case of anonymous votes cast by sitting and standing — and these are, as you know, the most frequent — no reference is made, unless a member of the Assembly makes use of this right, to the fact that provision is made in the Rules of Procedure for the President to be asked whether or not there is a quorum, before the voting begins. On the other hand, a quorum is evident, in principle, where a vote by roll-call has been requested in the prescribed form.

I said advisedly: "in principle". In practice, when the President is entitled in all honesty to consider that there is apparently a general consensus — that is, in the absence of stated objections or abstentions — the Assembly may, on grounds of efficiency — in fact, to speed up the tempo of its discussions — refrain from taking a vote by roll-call. The vote is then deemed to have been unanimous; and that holds good even in cases of ballots in which a quorum would be necessary under the Rules of Procedure.

This practice, which has been gradually extended, has often given rise, as you will remember, to difficulties.

When the matter was duly referred to it by the Presidential Committee, your Committee considered that the moment had come to return to stricter application of the Rules of Procedure — in other words, in concrete terms, to take a vote by roll-call whenever the slightest doubt existed about unanimity and, of course, whenever a quorum was expressly required.

Indeed, it seems to the Committee that the value of a recommendation voted on by our Assembly lies mainly in the force of the political conviction which it expresses, in the degree and still more in the genuineness of the support which the recommendation has received. Respect for the political diversity of our Assembly and, to be more specific, assessment of the importance of minority opinions expressed, likewise depend on the satisfactory application of Rule 34.

It was these essentially political considerations, as you can see, far more than mere concern for the legalistic aspect, which would, after all, have been quite respectable in the circumstances on the part of your Committee on Rules of Procedure, that led it to present a number of recommendations, which its members are unanimously requesting you kindly to adopt.

If you will be good enough to approve these recommendations in a few moments' time by voting for them, it will be for our President and the Presidential Committee to: (a) ask national delegations to ensure, by the methods suggested in the written report, that a sufficient number of their members are present; (b) improve the organisation of roll-call votes, *inter alia* by audio, and if possible visual, announcement throughout the premises fifteen minutes beforehand — this figure of fifteen minutes was reached as a result of an amendment presented by Mr. Antoni; (c) at the opening of each session, fix the dates and times of votes on texts on the agenda of the session. Lastly, to ensure in a general way that Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure is applied in full.

I thought, Mr. President, Gentlemen, that that was enough to tell you at this late hour in order to draw your attention to the importance of the problem which has to be resolved, and to express the hope that it may be settled by a unanimous vote. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

I now call Mr. Antoni. I ask you Mr. Antoni, not to speak for ten minutes but for only five minutes.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*). — Only one or two minutes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — All right.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I shall mainly make it my duty, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to pay tribute to the work of the Rapporteur and spokesman for the Committee and convey to him our agreement to the draft order just presented.

The method proposed, for adapting action to suit the requirements as they arise, is both pragmatic and fair. Our ruling about voting methods this evening demands an authoritative interpreter among such a highly authoritative assembly. As regards Rule 34 (3), reference to a decision by the President instead of administrative discipline, which is different to a political issue, is very fair: it will give more trouble to the chair, but that is what it is there for. Ensuring attendance is not an administrative, but a political, matter. Attendance and participation depend on the political mood of individuals and groups.

It is right to avoid snap votes, which is the reason for the fifteen minute rule, precisely to avoid minority votes in the Assembly and ensure that besides the statutory quorum a bigger attendance, and as a rule a genuinely majority view, can be relied on.

In confirming our support for the proposition, I recommend — in the meaning of subparagraph (c) of the draft order — that the President invoke the further invitation, considered by the Committee to be inherent in it, of concentrating voting on the item on the agenda, by sitting, or block of sittings — e.g. the one preceding the closure — at predetermined times, communicated to members beforehand. The fact of knowing that a vote may be taken at a fixed time on individual issues might enable a more representative expression of our political will.

I have made these short remarks to beg the Assembly to approve the Rapporteur's recommendation of reference to the President in order to respect Rule 34 (3). I wish to ask the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges whether it does not, in the light of previous experience, deem it suitable to devote other meetings to a more detailed examination of the rules as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the view of the Chairman?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, it remains only for me to congratulate our Rapporteur on useful and constructive proposals for helping in a respect in which we have a great problem in our Assembly and to commend the report to what I hope will be the unanimous approval of those who are here.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. Am I right that you agree to the proposal? Is there anything else you want to propose?

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to reply to Mr. Antoni, whose analysis and final recommendation I approve. In this instance the problem involved is more one of everyday practice than of legal technique. And, although I am a relative newcomer to this Assembly, you will allow me, without indulging in undue presumption, to express the Committee's view that you yourself, Mr. President, and the Presidential Committee are perfectly entitled to take into account the spirit of our report, even going beyond its mere letter, and to take the necessary practical steps to ensure that voting takes place at a moment when the largest number of members are able to be present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you very much; we shall do so.

The debate is closed.

(*The President continued in English*)

We are now able to vote on the draft order in Document 794.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The draft order is agreed to¹.

9. Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 795*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly. Document 795 is relevant and we have a debate and a vote on the draft resolution.

I call Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur, to present the report.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — The matter of the report is, I trust, beyond controversy. The proposal is designed to fill in a lacuna in our rules. It emerged in 1977 that there was no provision in our rules such as exists in the rules of the Council of Europe for a substitute

1. See page 39.

Mr. Grieve (continued)

who is fulfilling the rôle either of Chairman of a Committee or of Rapporteur to speak in the debate. Such a rule exists in the Council of Europe and it is clearly essential that we should have a similar rule.

Normally, a substitute will in such an event sit in the place of someone who designates him to take his place, but this does not always happen — as it did not happen in 1977 — and in such an event it is desirable that a substitute should be able to take part in the very debate for which he is designated as Rapporteur or in which he speaks *ex officio* as Chairman of the Committee. Therefore, it is proposed to add subparagraph 5 to Rule 7 in these terms:

"A substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote."

That proviso is the same as that which applies within the Council of Europe.

I commend this improvement in our rules, which I hope will receive the unanimous consent of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I open the debate.

No one wishes to speak ?...

I close the debate.

We shall vote on the draft resolution in Document 795.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

The draft resolution is agreed to¹.

10. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow

morning, Thursday 23rd November, at 9.30 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 (Document 782 and Addendum) ; Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Document 781 and Addendum) (Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Documents 782 and Addendum and 781 and Addendum).
2. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1978 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Document 783).
3. Weather forecasting (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 785 and Amendments).
4. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Before I close the sitting I must tell you that we have broken the rules. The rules say that we are not allowed to close the afternoon sitting after 6.30 p.m. and it is now 7.20 p.m. I apologise to all those who are working for the Assembly for not sticking to the rules.

We start early tomorrow morning. I apologise for asking you to start at 9.30 a.m.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.)

1. See page 40.

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 23rd November 1978

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 (Doc. 782 and Addendum); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 781 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 782 and Addendum and 781 and Addendum*).

Speakers: Mr. Alber (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. von Hassel, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. von Hassel, Mr. Enders, Mr. Alber (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).

4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1978 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and*

Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 783).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Kershaw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen.

5. Weather forecasting (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 785 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Cavaliere (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hawkins (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Treu, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Del Duca, Mr. Konings, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Cavaliere (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hawkins (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Warren, Mr. Hardy.

6. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.

Speaker: The President.

7. Close of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Stoffelen, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979

(Doc. 782 and Addendum)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 —

1. See page 43.

The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 781 and Addendum)

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 782 and Addendum and 781 and Addendum*)

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1979, Document 782 and Addendum, and the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 — the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, Document 781 and Addendum.

I call Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. ALBER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, normally budget debates in parliament are highlights of political life — for one thing because an account is rendered about general policy and for another because the amounts involved are tidy sums. Neither is the case in the budget debate in this Assembly. As for general policy, the decisions are made elsewhere, especially through reports of Committees. And the amounts in question, it seems to me, are so modest that they are hardly worth talking about any way. I say this with some sarcasm. The sums which we have at the moment

Mr. Alber (continued)

— or rather which we have always had, alas — are of the kind that, as the German saying goes, are not enough to live on and too much to die on. It is unfortunately a fact that one can just about keep the firm afloat; but grandiose political schemes are not possible.

The answer given this week by Minister Hamm-Brücher to Mr. Müller was also significant — that an attempt would be made in early December to take appropriate account of the Assembly's wishes. I think this shows up clearly the position we are in. We are suppliants. And I say quite frankly: where else does this kind of thing still go on — members of a parliament having to ask for money in this way, whereas in all countries it is precisely the members of parliament who have sovereign power to vote the budget? We come forward cap in hand like an illegitimate, unloved child that is being fobbed off with some small alimony.

This, unfortunately, is so because many governments still believe that these international organisations are classic organisations set up under international law and because they cannot come to terms with the idea — and this applies to some extent even to the Council of Europe — that we also have a parliamentary assembly. Certainly this aspect is not part of international law. But one cannot, just because of that, treat us as if we did not exist. As an organisation we have a dual function, one side being a parliamentary assembly, and that has to be allowed for whether people like it or not.

We are also prepared to make savings. To save is a noble virtue. But, of course, if you have so little money that, when you have to give some of it up, nothing is left, then saving becomes pointless. Since we are an organisation that concerns itself with military questions I would like to give you a parallel from the disarmament field. If one man has two pistols and another has one, what is the use of saying: we will each disarm by one? Because then the second person is left without anything. That is the situation we are in. If we are now expected to save there will not be anything left.

I should like to pick out just a few points from the budget and ask members to approve the requests of the President, who has here put forward some praiseworthy proposals, and to approve the decisions of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, thus making them a recommendation of the Assembly.

Our main concern is the political work. That is why we have applied for an increase by what is certainly a substantial amount under that head. But surely it is obvious: if I start out with nothing — and we have all of 19,000 francs

— then of course any effective increase will come out as a considerable percentage. If I first have one franc and then two francs, that is an increase of 100 % even though the increase in effect yields nothing. One has to remember the smallness of the amounts when one looks at percentage increases. I believe that this, an appropriate endowment of the political groups, is the most important issue because only by such means can political work be done.

I myself belong to the European Parliament. Surely it is significant that before each plenary week in the European Parliament there are two days of political-group meetings, whereas we here are totally unable to meet outside the weeks of the sittings in order to have preliminary consultations about the political decisions. That is why we must demand a suitable increase in the appropriation for the political groups.

Next to political work I would see the second area of emphasis in the sphere of information. It is alarming how little the European public knows about Western European Union. Whenever I speak in connection with the preparations for direct elections I invariably explain the different institutions. For the fun of it I regularly permit myself to ask my audience if they know what Western European Union is. I must say that my personal experience shows that of every hundred persons ninety-six have never heard of Western European Union at all, and that the majority of the 4 % who have heard of it confuse it with some other institution. Half of them believed that Western European Union was the same thing as the European Movement, that is the supraparty organisation for the promotion of the European idea, and the other half thought WEU was the final stage of the European Communities, i.e. they confused WEU with the European political union. At best some teacher or other might know what Western European Union was. All this is very humiliating. We are the only European body that concerns itself with questions of security policy and defence. What use is our entire economic system, all our freedom, if we cannot pay due attention to the important area of security and defence and if we are not even able to explain this to our constituents? The importance of the subject alone makes it necessary to ensure better information.

That is why I would ask you earnestly to agree these two points — first an increase under Head V, Sub-Head 17, on information, and secondly the allocation of a sum under Head II, Sub-Head 3, Section 6, which would enable groups of visitors, students, and so on occasionally to attend our meetings.

For all other items — expenditure for staff, expenditure on premises and equipment — the normal inflation-linked increases are envisaged. No one can say that we are asking for more than

Mr. Alber (continued)

that. On the contrary, we are being modest and are contenting ourselves virtually with the *status quo*. But I should like to say again that those two essential areas, the work of the political groups and information, are indispensable to the work of Western European Union.

I should like to touch on two other points where an increase is involved. First, under Head III an additional sum of 122,000 francs is envisaged for the renovation of the building — this is unavoidable as the conference rooms have to be refurbished.

A final point concerns Head II, Sub-Head 3, Section 4. The request was voiced that additional television monitors be set up across the way in the delegation offices so that one may follow at any time what is happening in the plenary session, or who the next speaker is. I believe this is customary in all parliaments and we should see to it that members who happen to be in their offices know what is going on.

All in all we shall have an increase of roughly 14% to something over 8.9 million francs. This may alarm some people. But, as I have just said, the increase is due to the fact that the items I spoke of were more or less zero before.

I would therefore ask you — and this is the first part of my closing remark — that you accept the draft budget as it stands and that you make the wishes of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration your own.

Secondly, I would ask you to approve the final accounts for 1977 and discharge the President of his responsibility.

Finally, in my own name and on behalf of the Committee and the Assembly, I offer most sincere thanks to all the WEU staff. They are doing a very important job which is not a matter of course. I believe that the budget debate is the right opportunity for thanking them very cordially, and that the whole Assembly will join me in doing so.

Once again, Mr. President, I should be most obliged to you if you could endorse these modest requests. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Alber, for your very interesting and clear statement.

I give the floor to the most well-known and honoured member of the Assembly. I call Mr. von Hassel.

Mr. von HASSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all thank the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary

Affairs and Administration most warmly for the work he has done on the preparation of the budget now before us. I would like to thank him not only for his work but also, and above all, for his tenacious efforts to make ideas which are common property in the Assembly more accessible to those who have finally to approve the budget, as well as for the diplomatic skill with which he has presented the matter.

I am conscious, Mr. President — as, I believe, are the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Budget Committee — of the need for caution in passing judgment on this expenditure, because the money, after all, comes from the taxpayers of our seven countries; and each of us, as a parliamentarian, is aware of his responsibility to the taxpayer.

It seems to me, however, for a number of reasons that I myself as President have been in a position to consider, that a number of remarks are called for. You are aware that, in my capacity as President, I have visited all seven governments and parliaments — both Houses in those countries which have two. I have had the opportunity of speaking to the presidents of the parliaments, heads of state, heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs and defence. In every case, without exception, all the people I spoke to — from heads of state or government to presidents of parliaments — emphasised the importance of Western European Union. Nobody even hinted at the possibility of dispensing with Western European Union and its parliamentary Assembly or at other ways of dealing with matters of defence, security, armaments, disarmament and arms control — whether through the European Parliament, the North Atlantic Assembly, or any other body. Every single person stressed that the importance of Western European Union and its parliamentary Assembly would remain undiminished in the future.

I say this, Mr. President, against a background in which some people are expressing doubts on the matter. If anybody can speak fresh from talks with the responsible authorities in all seven states, I can.

A second point. This week we have heard statements from four ministers, state secretaries or ministers of state. All four have assured us of the great importance and irreplaceable rôle of Western European Union. They have literally confirmed the vitality of this Assembly. They have also expressed high regard for the Council, which has left nothing undone in performing the work required of it by the treaty. They have expressly stated that, time and again, WEU can be seen to be — in their own words — fulfilling its obligations. According to statements made in this Assembly, all parties, including therefore Western European Union, have their part to play in European union, but this Assembly alone is

Mr. von Hassel (continued)

competent to deal with matters of defence, and other assemblies have other tasks.

Thirdly, Ladies and Gentlemen, it has been stated repeatedly during the debates of this part-session — which has without doubt had a whole series of political high points — that one assembly has one task and another assembly another and that, for example, the European Parliament should not be allowed to interfere in matters which are for us, the parliament of Western European Union, to deal with, and *vice versa*.

If, then, the Brussels Treaty continues to be seen by all seven states as the yardstick for our Assembly, if through the mouthpiece of the ministers present in this chamber they have once again stressed the whole importance of Western European Union — not only with kind words but also, as we believe, by setting their seal upon it, so to speak — and if we ourselves are agreed that we are to take our task seriously, then it seems to me that our colleague Mr. Alber, the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs, is quite right to demand that we be granted the modest means for which we have asked. We have said this repeatedly, and I have so far failed to find anybody in this Assembly who disagrees with Mr. Alber on the matter.

We have heard, however, that for a number of reasons there may nevertheless be some reluctance to meet our demands. Some may think that one should proceed with caution in strengthening Western European Union's political tasks — it has other functions, reserve functions. Others think that our demands cannot be conceded because the national budgets of the individual states have already been fixed and can no longer be added to — the appropriations can no longer be increased. Yet others say: what is all this anyway? One of these gentlemen said to me that we are talking, after all, about an increase of 1,000%. Ladies and Gentlemen, if I give my four-year-old son 1p pocket money and then raise it to 10p, that is also an "irresponsible 1,000% increase." That is a matter of fact. We too are beginning with nothing, for up to now we have had nothing at all. I believe, however, that we simply must fulfil our task.

I ask those who, as officials of the executive, have to decide upon the budget of the parliamentarians, to consider that it is a strange situation for a parliamentarian to belong to a parliament that he feels is only just about being kept alive. If that reflects the opinion of those who have to decide our fate, then I do not believe that in the long term they will find capable and responsible parliamentarians who are ready to struggle with questions of European security, the security of our seven states, and thus with the tasks assigned to the seven states under the Brussels Treaty.

We expect our petition to be taken seriously and the demands endorsed by this Assembly to be met at long last — naturally against the background of the economies we have imposed on ourselves and others. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. von Hassel.

I now call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Rapporteur's presentation and President von Hassel's impassioned speech demand some answer on our part, to clarify our position and, if we wish, our specific individual stances on questions previously raised in the Assembly, at this or preceding sessions — at any rate, so far as we are concerned, since we have been taking part.

I shall therefore be making one or two statements about, and general appreciations of, the budget, and some more political comments about the function of this Assembly.

The first comment I wish to make is as follows: if we hark back to the last available budget, the one for 1977, the Assembly's expenditure is up by about 30 %, from just over seven to just over nine million francs. Compared with the estimate for 1978, for a total expenditure of about 7,800,000 francs, the corresponding increase is less than 20 %. Hence one first observation: if we consider the automaticity of much of the increased personnel expenditure, and devaluation, I think we may surely endorse the opinion that the budget tabled today represents no very great quantitative change, at any rate over the recent past. It is also a fact that it includes some proposed increases in expenditure that have been specifically finalised; they are analysed in the report, and quoted afresh by the Rapporteur, and some have been referred to by the President. They concern technical improvements for bettering the functioning of the Assembly, increasing appropriations for the political groups, adding to efficiency and making the Assembly better known, especially to younger people.

Our feeling is, therefore, that we may in general acknowledge the continuity of the budget, and compared with the expenditures authorised in other European assemblies, the outstanding feature of ours is the containment of costs. I think therefore that we may support the current budget, because it presently corresponds to a real requirement.

There remains the broader question of WEU's rôle, and, in so far as we are in this debate more directly concerned with it, that of the Assembly, its guidelines and functions. This is the more political aspect of what I am about to say.

Mr. Antoni (continued)

In the course of this session, a great many of us from different countries and of different political allegiance have been able to express our ideas on agenda items, establish comparisons and convey views on matters also, and more specifically concerning the rôle of WEU and of the Assembly in particular. I refer to speeches on disarmament and European armaments policy, and the statements various ministers have made in these precincts. We have listened attentively to them all, and consider ourselves able to confirm those which voice common recognition of the fact that WEU, and especially the Assembly, are potentially capable in the near future of performing a function in the quest for stability, security, increased co-operation and détente, for a mutual and balanced reduction of armaments, i.e., we believe, for seeking a way towards another, more rewarding use of resources throughout the world, satisfying more adequately man's primary needs and advancement — and this is the road towards peace.

Turning Europe into a great civil power — I too am pleased to accept Mr. Gessner's phrase — in our view also means controlling defence expenditure, military expenditure, and not merely in Europe. We all know the scale it has reached world-wide, and therefore recognise that this is a realistic way of addressing ourselves to such tasks, conditions and goals.

We therefore esteem it our duty, in the context of the budget, to emphasise the contradictions of some of the decisions reached by the Assembly during this session without our agreement and, in our view, not calculated to enhance the Assembly's powers. We see our views better reflected in Mr. Gessner's report, which we call in evidence. We in fact think that we should, at this time, ensure an enhancement of the Assembly's functions, acknowledge its greater centrality and the need for a real confrontation of political forces and countries, serving to identify fresh guidelines and goals.

The elections to the European Parliament do not necessarily close the door to WEU or reduce its effectiveness. Rather, as several speeches have urged, they point the way to co-ordination among the various regional institutions.

Therefore, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we feel we can support the view that the Council should, in the exercise of its right under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the Assembly to approve the latter's budget, desirably take notice of the comments, observations and contents of this morning's report and debate. The information given by the Italian Minister of State Mr. Mazzola on behalf of the Council gives us no comfort. We note in this respect that to discuss keeping expenditure within the 1978 limits is

unrealistic because of the automatic machinery for increasing personnel expenditure, meaning in this instance solely staff costs, which is fair enough but too narrow to suit the manifold requirements of the Assembly.

So it is, I repeat, desirable that the Committee bear this in mind, possibly without exceeding the gradualness proposed by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs.

We consider that this largely — I mean above all — depends on the Assembly being able to find room and activities for tasks and functions more and more compatible with the guidelines now prevailing in Europe, more and more consonant with the expectations of our peoples. The budget ought to afford the Assembly an opportunity of doing so, and we Italian communists therefore assure you of our approval, our attendance and our contribution on this and every other single issue, our intention to collaborate in achieving a wider unity of peoples on these guidelines. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in supporting the proposals of the Chairman of the Committee — whom we thank for having put forward proposals that appear so close to the real needs of our Assembly — I would like to pay a tribute.

After the particularly striking appeal by our President, Mr. von Hassel, confirming his written note, and after Mr. Antoni's statement on behalf of the Italian communist group, it seems to me worth while — and you will excuse me if my comments include some repetition — for the Chairman of the French Delegation also to express his support for these proposals, for I know I can speak on behalf of my French colleagues, just as, I imagine, the chairman of each delegation could speak on behalf of his own delegation.

What is at issue here ?

The draft budget has two aspects. One, the traditional aspect, concerns the operating expenditure of our Assembly, and the credits sought for this purpose only follow, unfortunately, the rise in the cost of living. But the draft also comprises three essential elements : a large increase in the funds allocated to the press, an appreciable rise in the sums allocated to the political groups and — something that is quite new and remarkable — the creation of a new budget head under which the Assembly will be able to receive students and eminent persons, particularly students, and above all young people, but not necessarily only students.

This is not simply a technical demand. We know how hard our President has worked,

Mr. Valleix (continued)

particularly during all his trips — and we owe him a debt of gratitude — to make our respective governments aware of the need for their membership of our organisation to be accompanied by a financial effort.

But, you know, Ladies and Gentlemen, we must never forget the realities of the situation. It is not enough for our Assembly to vote a budget — especially one that contains a sizable increase — for that budget to be actually adopted. It is for the Council to adopt the budget, and you know how cumbersome and bureaucratic the procedure is in practice.

Mr. President, with all due respect to those concerned, I must say that I regret that we are discussing this subject this morning in the absence — as I believe I note — of the governments' representatives.

I therefore feel that we are duty bound to support the Chairman of our Committee in his own functions and support his proposals, as well as to support our President in the difficult actions that lie ahead.

Of course, I too note with satisfaction what the various representatives of our governments have said during the last three days, and I welcome the consistency in their statements.

The fact remains, however, that we are engaged in a debate in which reality and honesty require us to find some correspondence between words and deeds. What counts in budgetary matters, after all, is deeds. It is unnecessary to stress the fact that the proposed increases correspond to real needs.

As far as the press is concerned, I could say without exaggeration that the funds granted up to now have been derisory. All the more so since no funds at all are allocated to the Council for this purpose, consequently the only funds available to the press services of our organisation are those that come under the Assembly's budget. Once again, in a democracy — and we flatter ourselves that we are in one, for democracy also means struggle — what ultimately counts is that things should be done as well as possible, but it is also necessary for the things that are done to be understood and shared by the public, so that public opinion is always involved. The least comparison with the Council of Europe — and even more so with the national parliaments — reveals the derisory nature of our funds, and even the increase proposed by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration is extremely modest. That does not mean that up to now our proceedings have remained hidden or secret. We have been able to make ourselves known to the outside world through colloquies,

and the efforts of those responsible for press affairs in our Assembly have, thank God, had some results all the same.

However, if we wish our activities really and democratically to be made known to and supported by our peoples, an effort in this area is indispensable. The forthcoming election of the Assembly of the European Communities by universal suffrage puts us under a special obligation, this year in particular. Again, as far as the political groups are concerned, the funds available to the WEU Assembly are obviously inadequate. You are aware of the funds, however modest, granted to its political groups by the Council of Europe, and also of the much larger sums granted by the Assembly of the European Communities.

Let us remember that, unlike the Assembly of the European Communities, we in the Assembly of Western European Union are required to maintain organic links with the parliaments of our own countries, and this confers a special importance on the parliamentary groups of which we are members in addition to our membership of our national delegations.

We have already stressed, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the statements made by the government representatives are highly encouraging. The WEU Assembly is the only European assembly competent to deal with defence questions. Some members have expressed or repeated the wish to see the Council snap out of its lethargy. I have noted the appeal by our President, and his hope that the political impetus thus imparted would actually enable the Council to carry out its task more effectively. It is an appeal to which we cannot remain deaf unless our proceedings are to be no longer consultative but — excuse the expression — simply platonic.

We must therefore insist that our governments suit their deeds to their words. We cannot accept a situation in which the actions of our governments constantly fall short of their statements in our respective countries and in this Assembly. The words used in these different places are, fortunately, always the same, but the deeds lag far behind.

A negative reaction from the Council would mean that in spite of all the public statements of support, and the private assurances given to our President during his visits, the Council intends to drag the Assembly with it into a torpor that would be a veritable abdication of our responsibilities.

I would also remind you that this morning the Presidential Committee was still discussing proposals that could entail the organisation of a major symposium, fully consistent with the purpose of our Assembly, in a year's time. Such a symposium naturally involves expenditure, and I

Mr. Valleix (continued)

would ask the Chairman of the Committee concerned to work out as soon as possible what funds will be required, because it is no good putting in a lot of work if the money is not forthcoming. I say this not in order to put our governments on the spot, but as a contribution to our budgetary debate intended to ensure that the symposium receives proper consideration by our governments and the funds that are at least one of the conditions for its success.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I repeat that the purpose of my address is to support the President of our Assembly in the fulfilment of the responsibilities to which he committed himself before us today, when he stressed the responsibilities that are ours and invited us to share them with him.

May I say, as Chairman of my delegation, that after addressing this Assembly and casting our votes, we must all, in a spirit of solidarity, ensure that we act in our own countries as the national partners of our governments and remind them of the need for consistency between word and deed in regard to national and European security. Let us then, as we reach the end of this session, affirm our determination that our sessions shall not simply be platonic exercises, but shall really serve the cause of European security (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

I now call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to associate myself with almost everything that has been said this morning, particularly with much of what has just been said by Mr. Valleix. I found his logic rather easier to follow today than I did yesterday. However, I would ask the Rapporteur when he replies to the debate to clarify one point made by Mr. Valleix about the symposium that is to be held next year. It is my understanding that that is to be borne on the normal budget of the Assembly and, therefore, Mr. Valleix's request for special funds is probably not necessary.

I echo what Mr. Valleix said about the regrettable absence of members of the Council from the bulk of this debate. When Mr. Alber rose to make his introductory remarks, no representative of the Council was present. I am glad to see that the Council is now represented. I know the heavy duties that our diplomats have. None the less, as members of the Council will know when they come to read these remarks, there is a difference of opinion between the Council and the Assembly and it would have been helpful if members of the Council or their representatives could have been present this morning to hear the views of the Assembly on these important and critical matters which from time to time divide

us. They will have an opportunity to read what has been said. I hope that they will not merely read it but mark, inwardly digest, and then act upon what has been said in our discussion this morning.

I should also like to say how much we as an Assembly have appreciated all that has been done by Mr. Alber as Chairman of this Committee and Rapporteur for many years on the question of the budget. We are always told that this is the last year when we shall see Mr. Alber. Fortunately, it never is, and he always comes back for another year. Again we have been told that this may well be the last year when we shall see Mr. Alber, and if, regrettably, that happens this time, it would be unfortunate if we did not say how much we have appreciated the hard work he has done in this Assembly on budgetary matters.

As he said, he is very well assisted in his work by the staff of the Assembly, particularly by Miss Cohen. We shall be discussing a report on weather forecasting later this morning. If Miss Cohen's budget forecasts were anything like the weather forecasts we sometimes get, we would really have problems. Fortunately, her forecasts are always precise, so the troubles we have are relatively restricted.

I turn now to the two or three important subjects which have already been mentioned. As has been said, in the Europe of today the rôle of political groups within an Assembly of this sort is of major importance. One problem is that, although funds have been available, they have not perhaps always been spent as fully as they might have been. That is because the funds are not of a critical size. They are insufficient to enable us to begin the regular employment of staff, who have a vital rôle in making the Assembly coherent.

Members of the Assembly have many other responsibilities in their parliaments. To achieve continuity and coherence we rely upon groups of people and upon the staff of the Assembly and secretaries of our national delegations. But we also need to have continuity provided through the proper staffing of our political groups to improve the efficiency of the work of the Assembly.

Only if we make a move along the lines proposed in the budget shall we have the resources to make those political groups effective.

To give one example, I hope without breaking confidences, I can say that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments has written to the chairmen of political groups asking them to take the initiative in connection with the forthcoming direct elections to the European Parliament so that the political groups themselves can contact people of their own political family to ensure that the rôle of WEU is stressed. That will need

Mr. Roper (continued)

resources and the political groups do not necessarily have those resources to do this work at present.

Then I come to information. It is very important not only that people are informed but that they are informed accurately. I have looked today at two distinguished French newspapers. I shall not comment on an article in *Le Monde* written by a distinguished French politician discussing the debate here on the Druon report — or non-report — but, none the less, it reflected a certain lack of information on the attitudes of this Assembly. What is much more surprising is a comment in another French newspaper of today's date which I have just received, a newspaper with a large circulation. It starts :

"Revival of plan for an armaments community. The extremists of Atlantic Europe revived yesterday in the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU), meeting in Paris, plans for an armaments and defence community."

One might disagree with that ; but at least it is accurate. However, it goes on — and this is the point which should come to our attention, and particularly the attention of some of my conservative colleagues :

"The British Labour MP Critchley presented a report advocating the direct intervention of the EEC."

That suggests that there is something wrong with our Assembly if at the end of a whole day of debate somebody still thinks Mr. Critchley is a member of my party. It seems to me a very strange suggestion, and that suggests that there may be some gaps in our information services. I merely draw it to the Assembly's attention as perhaps another example of the inadequacies of the services we have at present and the need for greater resources to be made available for information.

Once again I find myself on this matter in agreement with Mr. Valleix. The responsibility is, of course, in part that of gentlemen who are not present, but it is also our responsibility as members of this Assembly, because our Ministers are responsible to us in our national parliaments and we should make sure in our national parliaments, if we believe in what we are agreeing today, that we follow up this report and ensure that Ministers have to answer to what parliamentarians here consider to be necessary. We have a control over them in that way. If we believe what we are saying today, let us make sure that we exercise the control that we have. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

I am told that Mr. von Hassel wants to take the floor for the second time, for a short statement.

Mr. von HASSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I shall only speak for a minute, Mr. President.

When I addressed the Assembly earlier the ministerial benches were empty. I was just as annoyed about it as Mr. Valleix and Mr. Roper, but when I subsequently inquired where the Permanent Representatives were I was informed by the Secretary-General that they had already left for London where they have a commitment this afternoon in their capacity as Ambassadors.

I mention this because I think it fair to let the Assembly know what I have learned. I shall therefore inform the Ambassadors in writing of what we have to say in this debate. Their absence here, however, is excused, although we ought to have known about it in advance.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. von Hassel.

I give the floor to Mr. Enders, who, as far as I know, is the last speaker in the debate.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the budget debate leads me to touch on a problem which you might say concerns us personally. I mean the working conditions in this chamber, the welfare of our members, staff and guests.

We have all of us come to know a great many parliamentary assembly halls and learned to put up with various inadequacies. But the equipment here is the most uncomfortable that I have ever come across. Hence my anxiety, Mr. President, to be allowed to have my say.

No doubt, Mr. President, you will have noticed that honourable members, when sitting in this Assembly, lean backwards with both hands, that they have been seen to massage their back muscles with painful expressions on their faces or that they have sat slumped forward over their knees. This, in my opinion, is due to three faults in our seats.

To start with, the seats are too narrow. If you sit here, listening to long debates, your legs go to sleep. Why ? Because our seats run counter to all principles of furniture manufacture and provide no support. For another thing the benches are curved. You cannot lean back and there is nothing to support your body. Next, the seats have no arm rests so that one cannot relax. Some members even try to hook their arms over the seat backs in order to find some relief. Thirdly, I criticise the desks which are too low. If you want to make a note, you have to lean forward so that your spine and your discs become distorted.

Mr. Enders (continued)

I should like, therefore, to enlist the support of the President of this Assembly in requesting that this state of affairs be remedied and refurbishing considered. We talk such a lot about humanising the working environment, about humane working conditions, but we do not, to my mind, have them here. That is why something should be done. Maybe this would also help to keep members a little longer in the Assembly instead of walking out after a brief appearance.

There is yet another thing I would like to mention — the dangerous stairs. From where I sit I have repeatedly watched colleagues stumbling and falling. It is a real miracle that nothing serious has happened so far, and that we have not yet had an accident.

Then I should like to list a third shortcoming — this concerns the surface area of our desks. If you look around here, you see a horrible clutter of microphones, switchboxes, headphones, cables, but you find hardly any space where you could put pen to paper.

In my opinion the conditions may be summed up like this : we have dangerous, health-impairing and excessively cramped working conditions. Our furniture could easily be placed in a museum ; but I would not object if nasty-minded people said it should be thrown on the junk heap and that we need not shed any tears over parting with it.

To remedy this state of affairs would not be a luxury but is a dire necessity for the sake of our health and our output of work.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, these things had to be said at long last — and perhaps by me because I have over many sessions spent hours on the benches of this torture-chamber. To remain silent any longer would have been false modesty, and would have brought upon future representatives the same torments that we have suffered here. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you for your interesting statement.

Does anyone else wish to speak ? If not, I give the floor to the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. ALBER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, just a few very brief words, as time is so short.

You are certainly right, our accommodation is not exactly ideal. The furniture manufacturers presumably thought that a politician should be ductile and malleable, flexible as well as mouldable. As for the stairs, you can tell a good politician by the fact that he does not stumble or fall. But maybe this is truer in the political sense.

I do not wish to repeat myself, Ladies and Gentlemen, but merely to thank all those who have spoken. I can only agree with what Mr. Antoni, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, and more particularly our President too, have said.

One very short remark. Mr. Roper mentioned the symposium. We are in principle in favour of it and shall try to make it possible.

He also said that budget forecasts were easier than weather forecasts. That is certainly true. In our case the former are very easy because we are always in a depression. So we can make very accurate forecasts. For us the weather is always gloomy and frosty, and alas, never sunny. It is just because there are no possible alternatives, that it is all so sad.

I should like at this point to express my specially warm thanks to the President of the Assembly, Mr. von Hassel. He has really fought doughtily for our common cause, and I do hope we shall win the day.

As for this building, Mr. Enders, we are only sub-tenants here. It is not our building, and not our furnishings. This is just another illustration of the unfortunate lot of the sub-tenant. But that is more a problem of rent law in general than one of this Assembly.

Once more, many thanks to all our colleagues for the points they have made. You have all supported the work of our Committee. I should be very pleased if our many years' efforts to obtain greater funds were at last to be crowned with success. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The debate is closed.

The Assembly now has to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 in the Addendum to Document 781.

No amendment has been tabled.

Are there any objections to this motion ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The motion is adopted unanimously.

We shall now vote on the draft budget for 1979 in Document 782.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The President (continued)

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 is adopted unanimously.

(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1978

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 783)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1978 and votes on the draft opinion and the draft recommendation, Document 783.

Before we start I would tell members that we must try to deal with all the business today before noon, before we listen to the speech by Mr. Luns, the Secretary-General of NATO, because I have been informed that the majority of those who are still present here will leave immediately after lunch. Therefore, I would be extremely glad if all the Rapporteurs and those taking part in the debate would concentrate their remarks into some few minutes only.

I call Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur, to present the report.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — Document 783, to which I speak, deals with the pensions and personnel within Western European Union. There have been several reports in the past on this theme. The Assembly will know that pensions for the staff of WEU are not considered in isolation but in conjunction with the co-ordinated organisations, a list of which can be found in Appendix VII of this report.

One important question has now been agreed, in May of this year : that a pensions unit be set up. It was intended that it should be operational by 1st January next, but as the head of the unit and its members after eight months have not yet been appointed, it is clear that some time at least must elapse before this unit can operate. I know that our Secretary-General in pressing his colleagues of the other organisations to take action which has already been agreed will have the backing of this Assembly.

Members may agree with me that international organisations have a special need to give their personnel a sense of security in matters of pensions because of the possibility of the winding-up of an organisation or the withdrawal of a

member. The best way to do this is to establish an independent body for the administration of the pensions in the co-ordinated organisations and in time, no doubt, such an organisation could also administer the provident funds held by the various co-ordinated organisations.

Members of the Assembly will see at Appendix IV that I asked the Secretary-General to obtain replies to a questionnaire relating to pensions. Unfortunately, I have not yet received all the replies and, therefore, I have not been able to include them in my report, but I will see that they are provided as soon as available.

As far as the whole of WEU is concerned, the total number of staff employed at 1st July last was 144. There are thirty former members of staff receiving a pension and six receiving a survivor's or orphan's pension.

As far as the reversion of pension rights to the widowers of female staff is concerned, the WEU Council has approved the recommendation to reopen the option for the female staff concerned if and when it were decided to modify the pension rules in this connection, and that the possibility of reopening the option should be strictly limited to the female staff concerned and to this particular case only, and that it should in no way be invoked as constituting a precedent for other changes which might be made in the pension rules.

In conclusion on this part, it can be said that the Assembly can take credit for having focused the minds of governments on the problem of co-ordination of pensions.

From the personnel point of view in this Assembly, the most urgent problem is the current lack of career possibilities for staff members. The office of the Clerk of the Assembly has twenty-six graded officials. Of these, eleven are already at the top of their respective grades and three will reach their last step next year. This means that under the present system most of those concerned will remain in the same grade and at the same step until retirement.

This is the second time in my parliamentary career that I have had the honour of serving as a member of WEU and also of the Council of Europe. I first came here in 1960 and stayed until 1967. I had, therefore, ample time to get to know and to value the high quality of our permanent staff, and it was, therefore, with a sense of great anticipation that I looked forward to renewing active contact with my friends both of WEU and of the Council of Europe.

At the Council of Europe I was gratified to note the deserved promotions and extra responsibilities which my friends had achieved. But here, at WEU, I found that, eleven years later, they are all, or about all, doing the same job,

Mr. Kershaw (continued)

in the same grades as when I left them. One can understand in these circumstances a certain sense of frustration on their part.

Most of the staff in the Office of the Clerk were recruited in their twenties or thirties. It is to the credit of the Assembly that it has been served loyally by its officials for many years. But, because of its small establishment, the highest grade of any official in the Office of the Clerk is A-5, whereas in the larger co-ordinated organisations it is A-7. It is therefore of paramount importance that attention be given to staff career problems. In particular, attention should be given to the grades already existing in the various co-ordinated organisations, the number of steps in each grade, the possibility of dual grading and more flexibility in transfers between staff in the organisations.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General of WEU should ensure that no post be the prerogative of a specific government and that all vacancies, however senior, be advertised within WEU. In fact, no A grade post should be filled until it is abundantly clear that no official within the organisation can fill the vacancy in question.

As for housing loans, some provision should be made, particularly for staff taking up an appointment and those nearing retirement who wish to resettle in their country of origin. Before the setting up of the pension scheme, Article 20(d) of the staff rules of WEU stipulated :

"The Clerk may authorise long-term loans from the provident fund to assist the financing of the purchase of, or improvements to, accommodation to be occupied by the borrower."

It went on to lay down the terms of the loan, which are not exceptional.

The only practical solution is for member governments to allow WEU to use, say, 20 % of the total WEU validation moneys, which amount to approximately twenty million francs, for this purpose. The money is available, and clearly governments would not be losing out, since staff would be required to pay interest on the loan received.

I realise that members of the Assembly will be happy, particularly in view of the economic difficulties in all our countries, to see moneys returning to our national treasuries, but I have considered what the cost is likely to be. For example, the United Kingdom would be likely to contribute about £80,000 to such a housing loan fund. I hope that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in my country could spare this sum from the national purse for that purpose.

These are my three points — pensions and their administration ; promotion possibilities within

the organisations ; and housing loans. I ask the Assembly to approve Document 783.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — Every year, unfortunately, we have yet again, in debating the budget, to talk about staff policy and financial problems connected with the staff's economic circumstances, so that these can be safeguarded and maintained. This is necessary because for Western European Union, as for the other co-ordinated organisations, there is still no satisfactory procedure laid down for making changes so as to match salaries to living costs and living standards. This year, for the third or fourth time, rules have been set out for achieving a better system ; but unhappily these rules have in the past all too often not been observed by members of the co-ordinated and budget committees themselves when they felt that these rules did not square with the interests of the national civil services and, sometimes, of the governments. I find myself wondering whether this time the new rules will stand the test and be applied. To give one example, the authorities concerned have still not said how much the compensation to the staff is going to be to offset the inflation factor in the period from July 1977 to July 1978. Discussion about what percentage will be used is still going on in these committees, in the joint committees on which the staff is represented in the Secretary-General's committee, and finally in the Councils — like the WEU Council of Ministers in London. It is still not certain, therefore, whether it will be possible to pay compensation for the inflation factor by 1st January 1979. This is a fault in procedure which, because of the interminable series of weekly and monthly meetings of all the committees involved, is costing the member countries far more than it need. A number of times already the Chairmen and Rapporteurs of the budget committees have pointed this out, as our Rapporteur, Mr. Kershaw, has just done. All their speeches have alas been in vain, since the European travelling circus of financial and personnel administrators misses out not one single pleasant European city to have a meeting in, though without achieving any impressive results.

I am addressing myself therefore especially to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Ministers in the Council, to put an end to all this, to have fixed rules worked out and, once adopted, to have them put into effect.

A number of times already my colleagues and I have commented on how complicated the procedure has been for working out a pension scheme for the staff of the co-ordinated organisations,

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

in particular those of WEU. The negotiations on this, happily now completed, have taken from 1971 to the middle of 1978.

It seems to me that the consequences of this new pension scheme have not been properly thought through. When one is setting up a staff pension scheme this also means — normally speaking — providing a planned career structure. This is entirely lacking, certainly in WEU. I welcome, therefore, the fact that the Rapporteur and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration have now proposed asking the Secretary-General to give priority, when there are vacancies, to staff already serving in the organisation so as to give as many prospects as possible of making a career. This applies especially to administrative and non-technical staff. If it appears impossible to provide a career plan for every member of the administrative staff, then I wonder why consideration cannot be given to giving them the opportunity of moving into another — higher — grade after they have clocked up a maximum number of years — say, ten or eleven — in their present grade.

I want to ask the Secretary-General, too, to see within the co-ordinated organisations set-up whether it might not be possible to arrange a joint career plan. In Appendix VII of Mr. Kershaw's report it says that a total of 8,467 people work in the co-ordinated organisations. It should surely be possible for the Secretaries-General of these organisations to work out a system of joint career planning.

In this connection I will mention the European centre for medium-term weather forecasts, about which I put questions to the Council on 10th October. I asked why this organisation could not be included among the co-ordinated organisations. Though four weeks have gone by, I have still not had a reply to this question, and on behalf of the staff involved I do ask the Council to answer as soon as possible.

Would the Council also, please, include the European Patents Office in their reply? This has a small, 200-strong staff, with offices in Munich and The Hague, and is not yet a member of the co-ordinated organisations although it has asked to become one.

I am glad to give my support to the recommendation attached to Mr. Kershaw's report.

Finally, I want to thank the Rapporteur Mr. Kershaw, and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration under the outstanding chairmanship of Mr. Alber, for their work. Theirs is a valuable but often, I fear, thankless task; they have, with meagre means, to do battle with a powerful technocracy of twenty-four coun-

tries in the interests of Western European Union, the WEU staff and that of the other co-ordinated organisations. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen. I thank you for using only five of the ten minutes for which you asked.

I agree with Mr. Stoffelen that this is an important question, since it relates not only to our own matters but to the affairs of those who assist us and work for us.

The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Very well. It is not necessary.

We shall now vote on the draft opinion in Document 783.

If there are no objections to it, and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The draft opinion is agreed to¹.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 783.

If there are no objections to it, and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?....

The draft recommendation is agreed to².

5. Weather forecasting

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 785 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on weather forecasting and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 785 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Cavaliere, joint Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report. We should be extremely grateful for brevity.

1. See page 44.

2. See page 45.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will cut my speech short because Mr. Hawkins and myself have in our report given you all the elements we managed to obtain from the various authorities and bodies we contacted. We thank each and all of them, who were really and truly open-handed with information and advice for us in our comparative studies.

The subject of weather forecasting is a vast and exceedingly important one, so much so that all countries co-operate in compiling more and more accurate data. We may say that this is the only area in which there are no divisions or clashes of opinion. Both the industrialised and the developing countries are concerned to obtain accurate meteorological information giving us an idea of the evolution of the weather not only in the short term but also, and above all, in the medium and long term. The United Nations which have realised the nations' need in this matter and have noted that knowledge of changing weather conditions has a direct and most important effect on all human activities of a military, economic and social order, have sponsored a world-wide organisation, in the shape of the World Meteorological Organisation, located in Geneva, whose remit is to organise, promote and co-ordinate all research activities in this area, and which has created a single world-wide co-ordinated meteorological service called the World Weather Watch whose objects are to establish a global observing system, to establish and operate a global data-processing system and establish and operate a global telecommunication system.

We have in this field made enormous progress which, even if still not fully satisfactory, is a source of great gratification, thanks to technological advances and the introduction of satellites capable of monitoring all layers of interest to the world as a whole.

The World Meteorological Organisation has moreover decided to implement a global atmospheric research programme whose aims are to extend the range, scope and accuracy of weather forecasts and gain an understanding of the physical basis of climate and climatic fluctuations. The programme was launched in 1969 and the first global atmospheric research experiment is to be started on 1st December 1978 using two polar orbiting satellites and five geostationary satellites spaced around the globe over the equator to monitor for a whole year atmospheric conditions of the entire globe.

The Director of the WMO said when interviewed by us that they were aiming to satisfy requirements in every field, i.e. that the data — which now have a good reliability and are therefore operationally useful on a time scale of one week — and the work carried out following this global atmospheric research programme could

have a time scale of two weeks. It will be appreciated how useful and necessary it is in the military, agriculture and fisheries areas, and in all economic and social activities in general. It is not only necessary to know the evolving weather conditions but also, in order to take action, besides the military action which interests us more directly, especially in the economic and social areas, it is necessary to know the factors likely to influence climate, as well as in order to have data and take action to modify climate where possible and adapt it to suit the environmental conditions and economic requirements.

To this end, the WMO has started a world climate programme whose aims are set out in paragraph 31 of the report.

I should like before concluding to mention the fact that to date, as the direction of all services have reported to us, the short term data, up to forty-eight hours, are sufficiently reliable, whereas medium- and long-term data are less so. Therefore we must multiply research efforts and data processing in this sector.

In conclusion, from the defence angle, we have a service that constitutes an independent European organisation called the European centre for medium-range weather forecasts in the United Kingdom.

I invite the Assembly to approve our draft recommendation because, in view of the importance and influence of these factors, we must multiply all efforts so that the countries collaborating under the aegis of the institutions and bodies can effect satisfactory work with data that will confer reliability on not only short-term but also, above all, medium- and long-term, forecasts. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now call the joint Rapporteur, Mr. Hawkins. May I ask you to try to be brief in presenting your report?

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible, Mr. President. As you know, I also want to be back in London this evening. Nevertheless, this is a fairly wide subject and I have a fair number of areas to cover. It was a great pleasure to be associated with Mr. Cavaliere in preparing this report, the first in which I have ever helped for WEU.

Unfortunately, I could not go to the United States of America; nor was it possible for my colleague to meet the heads of the three United States military meteorological services. The United States undoubtedly has the largest service. It is split into three, the military service, the governmental service and several independent private services. But size is not everything

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

and our British service is compact, cost-effective and co-ordinated.

I should like to add my grateful thanks to all those I met in the countries we visited. We had great co-operation and everyone was extremely kind to an amateur trying to understand this complex science. In particular, I should like to mention my fellow countryman who, I am proud to say, comes from my own county, Norfolk, Dr. Mason, a Fellow of the Royal Society, who is the Director-General of our Meteorological Service at Bracknell.

If there are any omissions or errors in his part of the report, it is my fault. My excuse is that, like many other people in Great Britain and, indeed, in the world, I was fooled by our Prime Minister into thinking that there would be a general election in the autumn. Therefore, over a certain time I concentrated more on trying to retain my seat than I did on the report. No fault can be attributed to Mr. Huigens, who, unfortunately, had to go back to Holland because of the death of his father. No fault can be attributed either to Miss Turner, both of whom took in their stride, even with a smile, all the alterations I made in the draft report.

Before going into detail on my part of the report, may I make a few corrections and additions? In paragraph 71, we should add, for clarification, "Dutch" before "institute". In paragraph 117, line 5, at the request of the British Government, I have to take out "over forty years old" and replace those words by "nearly forty years old". These all-weather ships were made in the early 1940s and not before 1940. It seems rather to be splitting hairs. In the penultimate line of paragraph 136 we should take out all the words after "sure" and replace them by "that the time-table can be adhered to". That is to make sure that everyone understands that the medium-range forecasting unit being set up near Reading will do a good job, but we may not be able to get it done within the time limit.

The purpose of the report was to examine what services existed in WEU countries, what gaps there were in our knowledge and what weaknesses could arise in an emergency. There has never been a similar study by WEU or by any other body. A lot of ground still remains unexplored, but I hope the report will add to members' knowledge — it certainly has to mine — and will stimulate us to question our governments and find out more.

The importance of the subject is well known. Militarily, we all probably think of the invasion of Europe as being greatly affected by the weather. Earlier there was the destruction of the Spanish Armada by a very bad storm after it

had been defeated. Politically, the great African drought was one of the major reasons why the Emperor of Ethiopia and his government fell and Marxism and Cuba advanced into that part of Africa. Economically, we all realise what a difference the weather makes to our crops and thus to the lives of millions. Only yesterday I was glad to see in *The Times* that one good thing that has come out of the long autumn of dry, mild weather is a great improvement in the prospects for burgundy. Perhaps that is not the most important result, but as someone who likes burgundy, I am very pleased to see it.

May I turn to some of the details of the report? I ask you to turn to part II, the general remarks. This is the most important part of the report. You will see that it is necessary to combine the information coming from the satellites in the upper atmosphere with the information that comes from weather ships and so on. The United States thought that they could do away with weather ships, as they did, and replace them entirely by satellites. Now, the information coming through, although greatly extended in part, is lacking in other respects because the weather ships are no longer there. Weather ships are still highly important and gaps in our total information appear as a result of their withdrawal. Finally, it will be realised that information-gathering facilities could be reduced, indeed, severely damaged, if a conflict arose.

I should like now to touch on a few of the countries which we visited. In Belgium I was impressed by the continuing close co-operation with the Royal Air Force as a result of co-operation during the second world war. Belgium also has a great knowledge of conditions in parts of Africa and is doing considerable work of great importance politically and economically in trying to solve the problems of the spreading desert areas south from the Sahara. That is a very worth-while project.

Holland has very close links with the Royal Air Force. It has especially concentrated on the problems of inland and coastal flooding. Because of its position, Holland is liable to flood damage, as is Eastern England, and coastal flood protection is extremely important. Holland has immense works. I was pleased to be invited to Holland in the late 1960s and to see what a marvellous job Holland has done with its coastal defences.

I am proud to say that Great Britain provides much of the leadership in world meteorology and at NATO. As I said, Dr. Mason is an outstanding man. He and his deputy, Mr. Potthecary, have done a fine job, and both have been extremely helpful to me.

I should like you, Mr. President, and everyone else present to read the paragraphs under the NATO heading, particularly paragraphs 121 and

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

122. In the past, economies have been effected by withdrawing facilities such as weather ships because the airlines do not need them any more. But this was done — and this is the important point — without realising until too late that this information-gathering facility was also vital for defence, and so we have to replace it.

Paragraph 125 points out the urgent need to reassess data-gathering requirements for the Atlantic, which is where the majority of Europe's weather comes from — across the Atlantic. So we want more facilities in the Atlantic to gather information as early as possible.

On Chapter V, paragraphs 127 onwards, Mr. Valleix was kind enough to try to help me. I am sorry I cannot see him present. Very disappointingly, despite many dates being suggested, a meeting could never be arranged between the heads of the French service and myself. However, Mr. Huigens was able to get the information which is published here. Undoubtedly our French friends have a great deal of information, with wide experience overseas, and still have fifty-nine stations overseas. Personally, I should have liked to discuss in detail what they referred to as their second most important customer, agriculture, because this appears to loom very large in the French budget.

Chapter VI describes the new European centre of which Mr. Cavaliere has spoken. This was one of the survivors of the schemes thought up by a former British Prime Minister as part of what he called the "white hot technological revolution", but it is one of the better survivors and is a good scheme.

It is interesting and pleasing to note that Yugoslavia, as I understand it, has joined us. This is the first European organisation that Yugoslavia has joined.

Finally, our conclusions, particularly those in paragraphs 141 to 149, lead to our recommendations. Before touching on those I must refer to paragraph 150, which states clearly that twenty-four-hour and under forecasts have shown little improvement. This is very disappointing, but I was glad to learn that the United Kingdom at Bracknell has started a major research programme into this. Obviously, from the point of view of economic arrangements, for farming, and from the point of view of our air forces — defence and offence — twenty-four-hour forecasting and less is very important and it has not made the progress that it should have made, but I am glad to see we are having quite a lot now.

The appendix concerns the request of the European Commission to the Council of Ministers to allow it to conduct a study on climate and

weather. This request was made in September 1978, just as our report was completed. Secondly, I must mention that weather does not stop at the EEC boundaries. Personally, I would have thought that if a wide study for Europe were required, the Council of Europe would be a better body to make it. Nevertheless, I feel sure that if WEU agrees, we could provide copies of our final report and all information to the EEC.

Finally, to touch on the recommendations, the British Government have stated :

"The problems addressed are complex, and the solutions advanced are not necessarily the most desirable or cost-effective."

My reply is that I am very glad that we have addressed our minds to complex problems. I am quite prepared to believe that we have not got the final solutions. The British Government go on to say :

"The report would require detailed study and comment by appropriate specialists before any decision could be reached on the basis of its recommendations."

I entirely agree and I hope the Assembly may do so ; but I say "Three cheers" : this is what this Assembly is here for, to draw attention to complex problems and to make governments think, and I hope to stimulate them into taking action. If this should happen and governments come up with better, cheaper solutions to these problems, this report and our Assembly will have done their job. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

I now call Mr. Treu who will be followed by Mr. Hardy.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report presented by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins is, in my opinion, most informative and interesting, abounding in searching questions, and still more, hypotheses, out of which I shall only dwell on two matters.

If there ever was a sector of science and technology in which national resources and capabilities of research and action cannot be kept within the range of even a single continent but are bound to cover the entire globe, study and research in meteorology and the space environment are just that. Hence the necessity of a close linkage between in-flight observers and ground data-collecting centres. Satellite hardware and research into capabilities of meteorological action cannot be military or civil. They are services for environmental studies.

Mr. Treu (continued)

When the authors ask, in paragraphs 142 to 147 of their report, whether a military meteorological satellite network ought to be established, I wonder whether it would be worth the trouble to make use of tools that cannot be military but depend in the nature of things upon who the user is. If, as often happens, there is a naval weather service, it will only be concerned with storms at sea, but if the observatory, satellite-borne or otherwise, is, as it ought to be, interested in passing on the state of the weather, the service becomes a civil rather than a military facility.

Speakers have noted that we are entering upon an entirely new era for services of this kind. As Mr. Scheffler was saying yesterday, satellites have a useful life of twenty-five years. Informatics — the new discipline of computerisation and data-collection for immediate processing — is a very recent innovation. Telecommunications and remote display facilities are also children of the second half of the twentieth century. I think such services, such capabilities, be it only of partial intervention in the meteorological environment, have an immense future and demand to be co-ordinated.

I am impelled to embark upon a long and highly-interesting survey of the national situations as recorded by Mr. Hawkins, but for the sake of brevity will merely touch upon the conclusion in the last paragraph of the draft recommendation E: "Encourage member states to engage fully in fundamental research". If meteorological observations are to be of medium- or short-term use in predicting the path of a cyclone or the whereabouts of interesting climatic variations, the question could be of relative interest. But the report, and especially the appendix, proclaim the need of trying to get back to the remote causes and origins of the phenomena we are concerned with today, to their extraterrestrial origins. I do not think it is true that nuclear tests above or below ground can disturb the climate. But the influence of sunspots and planetary conjunctions on the tides were already studied by Leonardo da Vinci and other Renaissance scholars. In short, the origin of such studies lies very far back in time.

The possibility must be studied of interfering in, and reinforcing, the causes and origins of climatic variations. Franklin invented the lightning-conductor, while nowadays we are exploring the use of carbon dioxide to avoid thunderbolts and hailstorms. Such are the studies and actions of interest for both civil and military purposes.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Hardy, and he will be followed by Mr. Del Duca.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I shall endeavour to be brief. I am very grateful to the Rapporteurs for their interesting report. It deserves detailed consideration. Mr. Hawkins and his colleagues deserve our commendation. Mr. Hawkins will not mind my saying that I was not surprised at his interest in the weather because, as the representative of an important farming area and a man with a great deal of experience of agricultural matters, he perhaps more than many other members of the Assembly who are more urban in their interests will recognise the direct importance of weather for agricultural activities, its direct and vital concern and importance to human life, and will recognise it in a way which people who live in an urban setting do not always appreciate.

I believe that we already have very reasonable meteorological services. They are particularly useful in those parts of the world which are affected by tornado and typhoon. They seem today to be able to foresee the dramatic developments in hard weather quite effectively. I believe that we are pretty well served in Western Europe, though our services may be rather less accurate than the application of an ancient wisdom, which, again in an urban area, we tend to overlook.

I am reminded that my observation of the night sky in my locality tends to be slightly more accurate than that afforded through the broad-casting of weather forecasts. I am reminded of an old English saying "Red sky at night, shepherd's delight. Red sky in the morning, sailors' warning." The evening sky seems to me to be a very reliable indicator. I understand that the French have a similar saying "*Rouge le soir, espoir; rouge le matin fait tourner la roue du moulin*".

It seems to me that we tend to overlook the fact that there are natural indicators which are remarkably inexpensive. The area of Mr. Hawkins is largely devoted to arable farming. In my constituency I have a lot of livestock, and it seems to me that the behaviour of cattle in the fields is often a very reliable forecast of imminent weather conditions. It may be that the Yorkshire cow is rather more perspicacious than cattle in other parts of Europe. But certainly we tend to disregard the natural and inexpensive methods of foretelling the weather. I am not in any way suggesting that we should not seek to push the bounds of human knowledge a little further — I think that this is an obligation on mankind in every academic discipline — but I want to strike a note of caution, and this is why I have tabled five amendments for the Assembly to consider. I am not in any way opposed to extensions of research, and I am not opposed to greater international co-operation, but I think that we must strike a note of prudence. It seems to me that the recommendations in the report involve very large sums of public money, and I

Mr. Hardy (continued)

believe that public expenditure has to be considered from the point of view of application of priorities. We need to determine whether the spending of millions of pounds in one direction is justified at the present time. I am not absolutely sure that the recommendations in the report are likely to be as profitable for us as expenditure of the same sum in other directions.

It may be, but I believe that the cause of cost-effectiveness should receive a little more consideration than seems to have been the case in this report.

Hence my amendments. I do not intend to make speeches about my amendments, but I hope that they can be considered and that the Rapporteurs can insert one or two of them to ensure that the note of prudence and caution is properly considered. We should be careful to ensure that expenditure does not increase to a level greater than the benefit which may be conferred by the expenditure. The open-ended nature of the expenditure envisaged in the report requires cautious consideration. That is why I am speaking this morning and that is why I have tabled amendments. I trust that the Rapporteurs will be able to give one or two of the amendments careful consideration and, I hope, favourable consideration, because they, like me, represent people who do not always like paying taxation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I call Mr. Del Duca, and he will be followed by Mr. Konings.

Mr. DEL DUCA (*Italy*) (Translation). — I rise, Mr. President, to convey my appreciation to the whole of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions which has, I believe, for the first time surveyed a matter of such great importance in the modern world as weather forecasting.

In point of fact advance knowledge of weather conditions has clearly become more than necessary, quite indispensable for a great many purposes, not only — though also — military, but civilian and economic too. With this report, therefore, the Committee is making a remarkable contribution to scientific research in the sectors I have mentioned.

The Rapporteurs, Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins have done a splendid job, and they too deserve our warmest thanks. I personally think, and would argue, that incentives must be offered for any research — here I part ways with the previous speaker — and every possible effort be made to try and improve forecasts, especially medium- and long-term, in an attempt to identify the factors operative in stabilisation of the climate, and any changes in it that might

be — this is a hobby-horse of my own — man-made.

We are, as we were also told in the report, now able to manage short-term weather forecasting for the next forty-eight hours and a good use can be made of medium-term forecasts of three to ten days. With the meteorological satellite network we ought to be able to intensify researches and studies with a view to upgrading results. There has to be the closest collaboration of all countries in this area, and I think this is the direction in which we should move, in order that knowledge of changes in weather and climate even between the remotest countries can be validly used for enhancing the accuracy of the data for processing.

We are discussing a strictly technical subject that does not lend itself to fine speeches and flights of oratory, but get right down to concrete facts; it is possibly for the same reason that I, who am also a surgeon by profession, am more at ease in a practical discourse.

If I may do so, I should like to say that on the basis of my own personal experience in both medicine and surgery, in, for example, the use of local anaesthetics, meteorological conditions are of some importance in the effects the medicines should have which are influenced by the state of the weather. But let us close this digression. My hope is that the recommendation we are to vote on today will be treated by all member states with the seriousness it deserves, in an attempt rather to extend their mutual agreements to other states as well, embracing economic and civil as well as military aims. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — We too, Mr. President, are grateful to the Rapporteurs for the sound, clear report we have before us. Specially clear is the listing of the systems in use in the various countries for charting and forecasting the weather.

I want to look briefly at three items which I believe are major issues. In the first place, the report shows the great importance for mankind of a world-wide organisation dealing with meteorological observations. This has two aspects. First, there are the short-term forecasts, making it possible in particular to predict disasters like hurricanes and tidal waves and that sort of thing. Not long ago I saw on television a Japanese documentary which showed how many hundreds of lives could be saved every year by having effective warning systems. The second aspect is that of long-term forecasting, which is well under way. I am incidentally quite certain that it is going to take a lot more trouble and effort to achieve long-term weather forecasts, and thus

Mr. Konings (continued)

to avoid the effects of adverse developments like drought.

The second thing I want to mention is the excellent survey the report gives of the way meteorological services are organised in the various countries. The report shows — and this is something I shall refer to when I come to the military aspects — that the organisation of these services differs widely. A country like France, for instance, has only a civilian organisation. Other countries have both military and civilian organisations, but these operate separately from each other. It strikes one, however — and it could hardly be otherwise — that the data both are dealing with, and the results that both provide, are the same. Military observations add nothing to the civilian observations, and vice versa.

One gets the impression that there is a lot of duplicated effort going on; I cannot see the need for it. I think it is costing an unnecessarily large amount of money, to the various countries as well, and one assumes that all the civilian organisations in the different countries would in time of war turn into military organisations. I can hardly imagine a country like France, in those circumstances, not having a military organisation.

As to the third point, the military aspects, we are rather less happy with the idea of bringing a further, separate NATO weather satellite system into being alongside the many duplicated organisations I have just been mentioning. If we agree to a study being made of this, following adoption of the amendment from Mr. Hardy, which has my full support and is intended to alter paragraph C of the draft recommendation, this certainly does not mean that we approve of the possible setting up of such a system. I want to make that clear from the start. From that viewpoint, too, I find one inconsistency in the report, and perhaps the Rapporteurs can explain it. On the one hand there is a call for a NATO satellite system, possibly tied in with the American defence system; on the other I read from the minutes of the Committee meeting at which the text of this report was approved that Mr. Hawkins spoke against the idea of satellites. He thinks satellites and computers are marvellous things, but says they are complicated and service personnel would not be able to use them. I beg leave to doubt this, for at this very moment, in the Netherlands at least, there are military personnel, too, under training at the meteorology establishment at Den Bilt. I read in the report that in France, too, service personnel are being trained by the civilian organisations. In itself this is no problem, and I am sure that if it were necessary military personnel would be able to use the full range of modern aids.

Nor can I understand why Eurosat data should not be used by NATO. I gather that the argument is that Sweden and Switzerland, as neutral countries, take part in the Eurosat project; but I believe that every Eurosat member can make unrestricted use of the data received via this satellite. This is in fact what has happened so far. NATO has access to the weather data, which it gets from the various member countries. I cannot see why the data obtained via Eurosat should not be passed on to NATO by Eurosat member states that also happen to be members of NATO. I think this is perfectly possible, and I should like to hear more about it.

There is perhaps no need for me to say this, but up to now NATO has always operated without a weather forecasting system of its own. NATO has got the information from the various countries. This has obviously worked very well from its inception. I have never heard cogent arguments from those quarters for NATO having a meteorology report system of its own.

There is a further argument — that a system of NATO's own would add nothing to the available information. It would merely double up on it. A NATO satellite can observe no more, and probably no less either, than other weather satellites that exist at the present time. So we feel it would be a totally pointless expense to decide to have one. We might look at quite different priorities, and this brings me back to my first point, that of research into long-term weather forecasts. If funds are to be made available, it might be better for the sake of the population of the whole world, and especially of the third world, to devote the money to this. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, I was very interested to read this report, on which I would congratulate our Rapporteurs. Though one may be satisfied with the civilian side of things — apart from one point to which I shall come back — there is cause for concern over the military aspects brought out in the report. I mean here the way meteorological and other observations on the world's oceans is becoming more and more a Russian affair. It looks as if before long there will be, apart from the Russians, only French, Dutch and Scandinavian weather ships in northern waters.

I think this needs discussing in the European and NATO context, so as to stop the Soviet Union gaining an over-dominant rôle — though of course the work of the Soviet Union in this field is to be welcomed.

The second military aspect is the lack of preparation for collecting essential meteorological

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

data in time of war or threat of war, should the civilian meteorological services suddenly collapse. I do not get the impression from this report that enough provisions are being made within NATO to ensure that in abnormal circumstances the safety of our air forces in particular will be assured by having good, reliable weather forecasts. It does seem rather strange to find that meteorology for military purposes remains a national responsibility, even in crisis conditions, and that as I gather there is tacit acceptance of this on the part of NATO.

On the civilian side of the meteorological services, I would comment that according to a recent reply from the Dutch Minister of Transport, weather forecasts over an eighteen to thirty-hour period have scarcely been improved over the past thirty years, especially as regards cloud cover and precipitation. He said that in other temperate latitude countries, too, experience was much the same. Research is now under way in the Netherlands, as in various other countries, to find a system that will fit classical forecasting methods into computer forecasting, and thus improve matters. This appears to be a very difficult job. Paragraph 150 of the report says that a programme of this kind is under way in the United Kingdom, as well. It seems to me, Mr. President, that there ought to be co-operation on this at European level. I would ask, therefore, that in paragraph E of the recommendation we should call for a joint approach, and I have put forward an amendment to this effect. Having discussed things with the Rapporteur, I would like to alter this amendment a little, so that in the draft text of paragraph E the words "their efforts jointly and" are inserted before "fully".

In order not to make the forecast of the duration of this debate unnecessarily unreliable, Mr. President, I will close now, with thanks to the Rapporteurs for their work and to you and my colleagues here for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Spies von Büllenheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLENSHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like, first of all, warmly to congratulate the two Rapporteurs on their report. To my knowledge their report is the first summing-up of all efforts in this field by European and, as far as one can judge, by extra-European states. It gives us a picture of what co-operation is like and what it has achieved to date. The Rapporteurs have spoken of progress, they have shown up shortcomings and suggested how things could be, and should be, done better. Naturally they have at several points expressed their disappointment

that the weather is not yet as predictable as one would like and that its governing causes are not yet known.

Personally speaking I share their disappointment but, on the other hand, I am happy that things are as they are — I mean that, in matters of the weather and weather conditions, nature once more faces us as it is, nature which can still be influenced by man only to a very limited extent. As I have said, we do not yet know all aspects of the causes of weather. Reading this report, I felt above all a certain sense of happiness that we are, thank God, still a very long way from being able deliberately to influence the weather. Just imagine that this possibility existed and could, for instance, be used for military or national ends! It would be terrifying. Man would then have got his claws even on this area of nature.

But should we not — and this is the real burden of my remarks — ask ourselves whether we, the industrialised nations, are not already unwittingly influencing the weather to a far greater extent than we really wish, even helping to produce climatic changes? And is it not perhaps a fact that, as part of our many endeavours to provide ever-greater prosperity for mankind, we are here too beginning to run the risk of destroying the natural equilibrium? The Rapporteurs have referred to these problems, especially in paragraphs 4 and 10 of their general introduction and elsewhere in the report as well. I am trying to go deeper here into the whole question — and not only in its effects on energy production. It is not just that we are using up more and more fossil fuels or that we are about to use very much more nuclear energy. The whole field of applied chemistry also holds dangers for weather and climate. All these aspects are listed in the report. I want to restate and amplify them.

What, for instance, are the long-term effects of the increase in the earth's temperature? What are the effects of the declining ozone content caused by the use of aerosol sprays? We read about these things in the press, time and again, and we do not know how this is developing. And what of the increase in the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere due to the growing combustion of fossil fuels, and likewise the increase in radioactivity which, thank God, is not yet alarming? But all these dangers exist.

We are talking today about weather satellites, about weather monitoring. I believe — and the Rapporteurs also made this point — that quite apart from the short-term objectives it is an essential task of the organisations and research programmes involved to watch how the dangers I have mentioned develop. It is the industrialised nations which have the necessary facilities, and it is they who want to concern themselves

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

actively with the weather. At the same time it is they who threaten the world with the dangers I have referred to. That is why, to my mind, the industrial nations have a special obligation, under all these programmes, to work towards lessening the dangers of long-term climatic changes. We have the necessary infrastructure, we have the financial means and we ought, through our commitment as part of international co-operation, to intensify our efforts to keep the dangers I have outlined in check.

Modern man thoughtlessly, or at any rate relatively thoughtlessly, exercises an influence on nature; he wants to improve his living conditions. But man should also employ the means at his disposal to identify in good time the risks that improvement involves, so that they may be remedied wherever they arise.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The debate is closed.

Does either of the Rapporteurs wish to speak?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I first of all sincerely thank all who have spoken in the debate for their appreciations and suggestions. I venture to express the hope that all the bodies interested in meteorological and climatic research will intensify their own efforts. We do not call for greater expenditure but rely on their own evaluations for conducting with ever-greater efficiency the service we are called upon to provide.

In addition, I think it matters that in all the countries we visited there was close co-operation among military services, and as regards their efficiency it is significant that e.g. in Italy the national meteorological service is in practice provided by the air force, and that it speaks for Italy in the World Meteorological Organisation.

I note therefore that, aside from some petty changes — I anticipate that Mr. Cornelissen's Amendment 6 will be agreed to — the draft recommendation can be unanimously adopted without any need for special votes.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Mr. Hawkins, please.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — Of course a lot remains to be done. I said in the Committee that I believed that in two or three years' time we should have to do a second report. This is no reflection on you, Mr. President, but it is difficult to deal in twenty minutes in this Assembly with the compressed research which has been undertaken in many countries.

In reply to one or two questions which were asked, I should like to say to Mr. Konings that if he reads the report he will see — and I thought I had said — that great care has been taken within each country not to overlap military and civilian aspects. In Great Britain everything is under civilian control.

I am certainly not against satellites. I only noted that satellites do not give all the information that is required when they are used on their own and we do not have weather ships to back them up.

Mr. Cornelissen talked about weather ships and said that only Russian weather ships seemed to be left. One weather ship has been replaced. Co-ordination is done by the Military Committee of NATO, although militarily the matter is in individual hands.

To reply to my friend Mr. Peter Hardy: we are prepared to accept Amendment 1 and, in effect, Amendment 5 which has been altered by Mr. Cornelissen. I am afraid that we shall be unable to accept Amendments 2, 3 and 4. I said that we should be unable to accept Amendment 5, but it is incorporated in Amendment 6 and I think Mr. Hardy understands that.

As to recommendation D, I should explain that the military wanted what are called in one country "white shadow exercises" and what we call "TEWTS" — tactical exercises without troops. That works on the system of trying to knock out one piece of information and seeing what happens, and then knocking out another piece of information and seeing what happens.

I hope that answers a few of the questions. In a few years' time, either I or someone else will perhaps be able to do a further and fuller report based upon the interesting contributions we have had from our colleagues so that we may take this matter a stage further.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Mr. Chairman, do you wish to speak?

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I think the whole Assembly will welcome this study. It is the first made on a European scale by a European political assembly on a subject which not only affects all of us in our personal lives but is of tremendous importance in terms of the efficiency of our western defence systems, let alone the effect it has on industry and agriculture.

In the Committee we greatly regretted the inability of the French Government to collaborate in our project. I hope that the French parliamentarians present will try to get some note from the French Government on this subject, as we try to speak with a united voice, having examined

Mr. Warren (continued)

the material available from each constituent member country of the Assembly.

If I may make a personal view known to the Assembly, on reading the report carefully I sense a certain amount of complacency on the part of various European governments towards the problem of weather forecasting and the need to improve. The statistic which reigned during the second world war that the accuracy of forecasting of the United States Air Force was 49 % of the predictions does not seem to have changed very much over the thirty years since that time. The comment made by Mr. Hawkins about our own government's attitude seems rather in line with this. I hope that our government will reconsider their views after they have read the debate and studied the report with its amendments, because they need to set a paced lead in Europe. So much of what goes on in Europe is dependent on the World Meteorological Organisation, which has been set up in Switzerland.

In conclusion, I hope that we shall recognise the great importance of this report. We want to see it endorsed by the Assembly and we want members of parliament to call upon their governments to improve standards which for too long have not had the benefit of attention from member governments in Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before we come to vote on the draft recommendation, we must deal with the six amendments which have been tabled. We shall take them in the following order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 5. They read as follows:

1. In paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, after "reliable" insert "but cost-effective".
2. In paragraph B of the draft recommendation proper, at end add "providing that this can be carried out inexpensively".
3. In paragraph C of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, leave out "Afford its active support to" and insert "Consider providing modest support for".
4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph D.
5. In paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, leave out "fully".
6. In paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "fully" and insert "their efforts jointly".

Mr. Hardy has already supported his amendment and we hear that the Committee agrees with it. Do you wish to add anything, Mr. Hardy?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — In the interests of brevity, we would take together the five amendments I have tabled. I am most grateful to the Rapporteurs for being prepared to accept Amendment 1. I regard that as the key amendment. In view of their willingness to accept it, I see no need for me to press Amendments 2, 3 and 4. I am particularly grateful for the explanation Mr. Hawkins gave of Amendment 4. He realised that were the exercises not to be of the kind he described, the undertaking would be very expensive. I am happy that staff officers will be given something to do. Amendment 6 disposes of any need for Amendment 5 to be considered. I am happy with that situation.

The PRESIDENT. — There is no doubt that Amendment 1 is backed by the Committee.

Does anyone wish to speak against it?...

The opinion of the Committee is known, so we can put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

I understand that Mr. Hardy is not moving Amendments 2, 3 and 4, so the Assembly will not vote on these.

We now take Amendment 6 by Mr. Cornelissen.

I believe the Chairman of the Committee is in favour of this amendment. Am I right? That is so.

If no one is speaking against the amendment, the Assembly can vote by sitting and standing.

I call first Mr. Cornelissen and then the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — I repeat, Mr. President, to avoid any misunderstanding that I have in the meantime altered my amendment. The words "their efforts jointly and" are to be inserted before "fully".

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — The amendment, as amended, is acceptable to the Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — The proposal is that in paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, before the word "fully" we should insert the words "their efforts jointly and". Is that correct?

We shall therefore vote on Amendment 6 as amended.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6, as amended, is agreed to.

This means that Amendment 5 is obsolete.

Mr. Hardy will not move that amendment?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I shall not press it because of the time factor. I believe that the amendment which has just been moved will have the effect of qualifying the word “fully” but I do not like open-ended commitments. The word “fully” is still there, but I shall not press the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — The amendment is not moved so the Assembly will not vote on it.

The Assembly agrees to Amendments 1 and 6. The other amendments have not been moved.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 785, as amended.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to*¹.

The sitting will now be suspended for a few minutes until the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Luns, arrives.

(The Sitting was suspended at 12 noon and resumed at 1 p.m.)

6. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is resumed.

I am sorry to announce that the Secretary-General of NATO has not turned up. Please do not ask me questions. I do not know anything other than that the Secretary-General left Brussels at 8.30 a.m. this morning by car. He is on the road to Paris. I do not know the reason why he has not arrived — whether the weather forecast this morning here was incorrect, or whether there has been an accident or whether there is a traffic problem. What it is I cannot tell you.

Anyhow, I think we now have to close the session.

7. Close of the Session

The PRESIDENT. — I declare closed the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1.01 p.m.)

1. See page 46.

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