IMPLEMENTING MIGRATION POLICY REFORM
AN OUTLINE FOR GERMANY
ORKAN KÖSEMEN

3 Executive Summary
4 Introduction
6 1. The long path from "guest workers" to a welcoming culture
12 2. Migration policy scenarios: What does the future hold?
15 3. The contents of reform: Making concrete progress in migration
18 4. The strategic core group: Actors driving migration reform in the grand coalition
21 5. Agenda setting: The path through the immigration-debate minefield
25 6. Formulation and decision making: Growing the pie, and distributing it fairly
27 7. Implementation: The correct sequence ensures a smooth start for reform
31 8. Ongoing performance monitoring: Keeping the reform on track
33 9. Summary conclusion: A migration policy for Germany’s future
35 Literature
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Migration policy in Germany today is better than its reputation would suggest. It has improved considerably over the last 20 years, though it has suffered setbacks and contradictions in the process. The improvements made have been driven less by a commitment to making migration policy “fit for the future” than by the need to respond to a changing reality. In addition, Germany’s integration into the European Union also positively affected domestic realities of integration, which has sown the terrain for a more effective migration policy concept. Nonetheless, instead of tackling problems directly, the migration policy debate in Germany continues to languish under self-critical navel-gazing. As a result, migration policy in Germany fails to seize present opportunities and – even worse – live up to Germany’s self-proclaimed standards as a modern, pluralistic society at the heart of Europe. A forward-looking migration policy that anticipates challenges rather than a backward-looking, ad hoc approach to policymaking is part and parcel of such standards. Indeed, to date, Germany has failed to embed migration policy within a fully coherent strategic framework.

Implementing a migration architecture of this nature is an ambitious undertaking that must be underpinned by a structurally sound, carefully planned and strategic approach. It demands not only clearly defined objectives, but also clearly defined paths toward these goals. This contribution reviews the course of past migration policy changes in Germany, outlines action areas for comprehensive migration reform and identifies the key elements of implementing such a reform. It was originally published in “ReformKompass Migration” (2014, “Migration ReformCompass – Managing Immigration, Participation and a Culture of Welcome”) and has been updated for the English translation.
INTRODUCTION

On December 17, 2013, the cabinet of Germany’s most recent grand coalition government, which consists of the Christian Democrats (CDU with the Bavarian CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), was sworn in. The coalition enjoys a majority of 504 of 631 seats in the Bundestag. Although they are eight votes shy of a simple majority in the Bundesrat (Federal Council, Germany’s upper house), a deal with the Greens would enable them to achieve a two-thirds majority there (as of January 2015). This is a comfortable position from which to shape policy and set a firm course of action in complex policy areas. This is important because a common policy pursued by the grand coalition in controversial areas could potentially achieve a broader social consensus than could decisions made by a government originating from one specific political camp. This is particularly true for migration policy issues.

In the past 20 years, all major decisions with regard to migration policy were brokered between the ruling government and opposition parties, with both sides presenting competing views of society. For the most part, negotiations took place within the context of standard parliamentary procedures. Occasionally, however, these negotiations were also conducted acrimoniously in the public sphere. No doubt the most striking example of this was the planned reform of the Immigration Act in 2001/2002 by the then SPD-Greens coalition government: The reform failed in the Bundesrat and had to be renegotiated afterward with the opposition CDU/CSU and Free Democratic (FDP) parties before coming into force in 2005. This era also marked the apex of political polarization within Germany on the issue of migration policy. And though political conflicts over the subject of migration are still present today, the general tone has changed. Indeed, migration policy – once a proxy for social battles – has increasingly become the focus of outcome-oriented, albeit slow-paced policymaking.

The case of Germany’s 2005 immigration reform illustrates the difficulty of policymaking, in particular when it has a broad substantive reach and involves the voices of many different actors. It also illustrates the extent to which the process goes beyond policy formulation to include questions of who ultimately has the power to interpret meaning in the public sphere. At the end of the day, policy outcomes often differ from the original intent of reform initiators, which ushers in a new period of readjustments. For example, the 2000 Citizenship Law (Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz) continues to be the focus of political disputes and immigration legislation. In fact, in spite of a completed “reform,” immigration policy is still subject to change today.

Each new government constellation represents the promise of a new beginning, especially if it has a considerable parliamentary majority, as the current German government does. Individual political actors will almost certainly differ in their response to the question as to whether migration reform is necessary. As long as the distribution of institutional and political competencies for migration policy (i.e., immigration, integration, inclusion and citizenship) in Germany remains fragmented, and as long as migration policy is repeatedly modified in response to each new political climate, the mere idea of working on comprehensive reform as part of a coordinated migration policy is a sign of progress.

This contribution seeks to develop this idea further by outlining a possible migration reform in the context of Germany’s current political constellation and from the perspective of the government. Migration reform will be approached from three different vantage points: qualitative policy analysis, professional migration expertise and practical policy advice. All three levels are important in determining the goals, implementation methods and public communication involved in pursuing reform. The template used in planning this reform
is the “ReformCompass – The Strategy Instrument,” a tool for understanding reform processes created by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. The ReformCompass allows policymakers to plan policymaking processes in advance and/or analyze their impact after the fact. The reform process is divided into five fields of action: strategic core group, agenda setting, formulating and decision making, implementation and ongoing impact evaluation. Further information on each facet of this instrument can be found at www.ReformCompass.de.

Reform projects as complicated as migration policy are generally difficult to control. This has in large part to do with the presence of conditions that reform actors cannot influence directly. As mentioned above, the current majorities are a good starting point for significant migration reform. Nevertheless, successfully implementing migration reform is a very difficult task. Every individual reform must be underpinned by a substantive logic that sets goals and maps out the best route to achieving those goals. However, at every stage in the process, individual decision-makers can influence the nature of individual reform steps and their outcomes. This is true regardless of whether we’re dealing with the logic of administrative functions, financing, political parties or federalism. None of this can be determined in advance, nor can it be taken fully into account when planning reform. It should be noted, however, that this dynamic also relieves reform actors from the burden (or idealized notion) of being required to have in advance answers to all reform issues and challenges.

A blackbox of uncertainties such as this does not necessarily mean the idea of planning reform is futile. It simply highlights the need for a roadmap, without which the reform is doomed to fail before it even gets underway. Proposing a possible roadmap for such an undertaking, this outline is intended as a planning aid and, alternatively, as food for thought. It remains the responsibility of policymakers, however, to tread the path toward a modern migration policy and thus overcome existing uncertainties.

THE REFORM OUTLINE IS DIVIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1 (The long path from “guest workers” to a welcoming culture) examines legislative changes in the past 20 years in order to identify patterns and their origins in the ongoing development of German migration policy. This knowledge serves to contextualize the reform outline and its content and processes.

Section 2 (Migration policy scenarios: What does the future hold?) sheds light on the domestic actors and factors influencing migration reform and potential trajectories in migration policy. This section presents the most probable development scenario as well as best and worst case scenarios resulting from the logic of comprehensive migration policy. The best case then serves as the reform objective targeted in this outline.

Section 3 (The contents of reform: Making concrete progress in migration) illustrates the necessary elements involved in formulating a successful reform objective: It must be concrete, verifiable and articulated in terms of individual steps. These elements provide the basis in formulating the reform outline’s ultimate goal, which is to increase the number of skilled workers coming to Germany from third countries in a sustainable manner over the long term. This will be followed by suggestions with regard to the content of a well-thought-through migration reform in which each individual step involves progress toward the reform’s objective.

Sections 4 to 8 move step-by-step through a potential migration reform in keeping with the ReformCompass. Each section examines a different element, including the composition of the reform steering group, the agenda framing the reform, the internal clearance and review of the reform objective, how to communicate and profile the reform project, the practical implementation of individual reform steps and the ongoing monitoring of progress.

Section 9 (Conclusion: A migration policy for Germany’s future) summarizes those findings that are significant for the success of migration reform.
1. THE LONG PATH FROM "GUEST WORKERS" TO A WELCOMING CULTURE

Our perception of political events is always selective – especially in hindsight. Much of what goes on in politics takes place covertly: Sometimes the accompanying rhetoric is more prominent than the actual impact of plans or, in contrast, ostensibly insignificant changes end up having tangible effects on the persons concerned. If asked to identify the major “turning points” in German migration policy, experts, journalists and citizens would most likely name those events they remember best: for example, the asylum compromise of 1992, the new citizenship law of 2000 or the immigration reform of 2005. It’s also possible they might only remember the last major public debate or the most recent legislative change. Indeed, it is hard to keep track of the many changes taking place in migration policy; even if we could, it is doubtful this would play much of a role in the public perception of migration. However, we must look at the big picture in order to identify recurring patterns in the changes made to policies and to trace the route taken to date by German policymakers in their understanding of migration policy.

The overview contained in Table 1 presents a selection of legislative changes in Germany’s migration policy over the past several decades, thus providing an abbreviated representation of the country’s “history of reform.” The table shows that despite the introduction of various reforms since the early 1990s, migration policy has been a long-winded “work in progress,” and not the sum of a few individual milestones. This approach has benefits, as it provides opportunities to effectively monitor the success of each individual reform. Nonetheless, the entire endeavor often leads to the opposite of what it intended to be. It becomes a fundamentally ad hoc process in which actors react and adjust to external events and current policy debates often subject to irrational claims. In contrast, there is also the ideal of a sweeping success able to provide a solution to all challenges and pacify the ideological battles carried out in the policy area. In fact, Germany’s political reality with regard to migration policy lies most often between these two poles. Indeed, the 2005 immigration reform was the last attempt to carry out a large-scale reform in this area (see box).

Based on the information contained in Table 1, the following statements can be made with regard to the development of German migration policy:

- In general, the trend has moved toward facilitating immigration and immigrant access to labor markets, strengthening immigrant rights and improving the situation of refugees. This has not been a linear development; the process has been interrupted by repeated setbacks and reflects more accurately a process of “two steps forward, one step back.”
- Each major legislative change (to foreigners act, citizenship law, immigration law, etc.) reflects both liberalization and restriction elements. This underscores the fundamental ambivalence of German migration policy by modifying individual elements but resisting changes to the status quo or revising in favor of a comprehensive concept. The motto of the Immigration Act, which is “Support and Demand” (“Fördern und Fordern”), is representative of this approach in migration legislation.
- Many of the key decisions facilitating migration can be traced back to EU guidelines, many of which are anchored in the principle of the free movement of individuals. Both the General Equal Treatment Law (AGG) and the EU Blue Card for foreign skilled workers mark migration policy achievements that could never have been implemented in this form – for reasons of domestic politics – had Germany not been a member of the EU. Opposition to the introduction of the AGG and the longest European-wide transitional period for the free movement of Eastern European EU
EXAMPLE

IMMIGRATION REFORM 2000–2005

In 2000, the German government established the Independent Immigration Commission (“Süssmuth Commission”) in an attempt to connect external expertise with effective public communication and to develop proposals for a fundamental reform of the country’s migration policy. The commission’s task was to determine the actual need for immigration, to develop the means by which to manage and limit immigration and to develop an overarching integration concept. In 2001, the commission delivered its final report, which foresaw a general liberalization and, among other things, called for a coherent migration policy with clearly formulated goals. In addition, it called on the legislature to create a permanent “immigration council” (as an advisory council to the government) and to merge the coordination of migration in the hands of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission “Zuwanderung” 2001). Different substantive points were incorporated into the subsequent Immigration Law of 2005, while others – in particular the structural and overall policy proposals – remained sidelined. There are many reasons for this, including the following:

1) For general security reasons and in light of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, the then Minister of the Interior Otto Schily (SPD) tightened Germany’s immigration law (Amann 2001). 2) Structural questions are automatically also questions of power, and it is highly unlikely that a German federal minister would voluntarily relinquish power over migration policy, especially if it involved giving that power up to a subordinate office. 3) Many suggestions fell victim to ideological squabbles with the then parliamentary opposition. The reaction from the CDU/CSU with regard to the Süssmuth Commission’s final report was along the following lines: “The recommendations did not reflect a concept that limited immigration, but rather one that expanded immigration” (“Süssmuth übergibt Zuwanderungsbericht” 2001); they even noted that the report discussed immigration in a positive light “for purely demographic reasons […]” (ibid.). As a result, much was removed in the subsequent mediation committee, including the Expert Council on Migration and Integration (“Das Zuwanderungsgesetz und seine Geschichte” 2009), which had already been set up and had, in its first annual report, recommended an immigration quota of 25,000 people (“Wir brauchen 25.000 qualifizierte Zuwanderer” 2004). In the end, the attempt to achieve comprehensive reform failed due to a combination of external factors (security concerns), the challenge of effectively communicating the idea of promoting immigration in an era of high unemployment rates, and the ideological instrumentalization of the subject by the opposition.
### Table 1: Overview of select legislative changes in migration policy

Liberalization and restriction in immigration, labor market access, naturalization, asylum, religious freedom and equal treatment policies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>The Federal Law on Refugees and Exiles (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) regulates the immigration, naturalization and care of refugees and exiles of German ethnicity (Aussiedler).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955–1968</td>
<td>Labor recruitment agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, South Korea, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Introduction of a recruitment ban on foreign labor migration from the so-called “guest worker” countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1991 | Revised version of the Foreigners Act (Ausländergesetz):
- Introduction of a minimum of 15 years (or six years of school education) for naturalization with simultaneous claim to naturalization “as a rule” (Regelanspruch).
- Elimination of language requirement for the purpose of naturalization.
- Introduction of exceptions to the previous recruitment ban (Anwerbestopausnahmeverordnung).
- Individuals with Jewish heritage permitted to emigrate from CIS states as quota refugees. |
| 1992 | Revised version of the Asylum Procedure Law (Asylum Compromise) and introduction of the principle of safe third countries and countries of origin (refugees cannot apply for asylum when they have entered Germany via a safe third country). |
| 1993 | Reduction of the naturalization fee from 5,000 DM (or 75% of monthly income) to 500 DM.
- Conversion of the claim to naturalization “as a rule” (Regelanspruch) into a legal claim (Rechtsanspruch) with regard to the conditions for naturalization. |
| 1993 | Introduction of the freedom of movement (freedom of establishment and freedom of movement for workers) for EU citizens as part of the basic freedoms of the European Union. |
| 1997 | Tightening of the required language skills for immigrants of German ethnicity (Aussiedler). |
| 2000 | New Citizenship Law:
- Reduction of the minimum duration of stay for naturalization from 15 to 8 years.
- Introduction of the birthplace principle connected to the “option obligation” which requires persons with dual citizenship to choose one citizenship upon reaching the age of 23 (Optionspflicht).
- Expatriation due to secret or subsequent multiple citizenships is now possible. Re-introduction of sufficient language skills as a condition for naturalization. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Introduction of a Greenscard entry program for IT specialists (applied until 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Several Länder (German federal states) enact a ban on headscarves for female teachers at public schools.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2005 | **New immigration law:**  
Simplification of residency permit (merging two permits into one). A new employment regulation brings together all forms of labor migration. Extension of the duration of stay for foreign university graduates looking for employment from 6 to 12 months. Introduction of a Hardship Commission for foreign nationals obliged to leave the country. Introduction of mandatory integration courses (language and orientation course) for certain groups of migrants. The immigration of people with Jewish heritage from CIS states is made more difficult. |
| 2006 | Introduction of the General Equal Treatment Act (AGG or Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) (implementation of an EU guideline). |
| 2007 | Changes to the Immigration Act: Tightening the rules governing the subsequent immigration of family members. Increasing the limit on committed crimes that prevent naturalization. The immigration of people with Jewish heritage from CIS states is governed by a new point system. |
| 2008 | Introduction of a citizenship test. |
| 2010 | The freedom of movement of citizens from Eastern European states that joined the EU in 2004 comes into effect. |
| 2012 | Introduction of the “EU Blue Card” as a simplified form of immigration for skilled foreign workers parallel to the existing law (implementation of an EU guideline). Further extension of the duration of stay permitted to foreign university graduates looking for employment to 18 months. Easing the official recognition of foreign professional qualifications. |
| 2014 | Modification of option obligation (maintaining dual citizenship becomes easier for people born in Germany). Relief for asylum seekers (no mandatory residency area requirement, faster access to labor market, shorter processing times, no so-called “toleration chain”) and classification of several Balkan states as safe third countries. The freedom of movement of citizens from Bulgaria and Rumania comes into effect. |
citizens seeking employment are both expressions of the power of these forces (Preuß 2010; Fraczek 2014). Without the deepening of integration pushed forward by the European Union, Germany’s migration policy record would be far less positive. Indeed, the steady guideline-oriented work of the European Commission brought about a de facto harmonization, even though the EU government and heads of state hadn’t foreseen this effect explicitly in the area of migration (Ghelli 2014).

Although the migration debate of the past two decades has focused more on people from North Africa, Turkey and the Balkans, as well as on refugees more generally, immigration to Germany since the beginning of the 2000s was in fact a direct result of the freedom of movement of individuals within Europe. In this sense, since 2005, an average of two-thirds of net migration by individuals without German citizenship originates from EU nations (see Table 2). The absolute numbers have increased as a result of the current financial crisis. However, the large percentage of EU migration within the context of overall migration to Germany remains roughly the same (Federal Office of Statistics, 2013, 2014). The largest share of EU immigrants to Germany over the past decade originate from Southern and Eastern Europe.

Despite the overall increase in immigration, which some parts of the public perceive as a threat, the absolute numbers continue to pose no problem for Germany – a country with more than 80 million inhabitants – in terms of absorbing these new immigrants. Indeed, it is the very essence of European openness that this immigration (i.e., inner-European mobility) cannot be controlled and is subject to strong fluctuations. For this reason, it is very important – especially for Germany – to apply a uniform nationwide migration policy that contains comprehensive settlement services for all immigrant groups. Doing so will allow Germany to better handle immigration surges that occur at certain times and/or in certain regions.

The effects of European integration as well as international political events have been instrumental in shaping German migration policy. Whereas the 1973 oil crisis brought an end to Germany’s recruitment of “guest workers” policy, the civil war in former Yugoslavia prompted a change in its asylum policy. Later, in the 1990s, the collapse of the eastern bloc led to an influx of ethnic Germans and Jewish refugees. And like many other governments, the German government has responded to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 by mixing migration policy with security policy. In fact, the current debate over internal migration within the EU is driven in large part by Europe’s financial crisis.

In politics, effective countermeasures are usually introduced only once an acute need has been established. In migration policy, this has resulted in several initially sensible decisions being made that do not reflect long-term planning and often contradict other measures. Expanding settlement services for one immigrant group while resources for another are cut is just one example. This kind of ad hoc policymaking can also result in measures that are counter-productive in the medium term. Deterrence policies targeting first-generation immigrants, for example, can ultimately render integration more difficult for dependents and later generations.

And though we’ve touched upon a variety of factors influencing Germany’s migration policy in the last 30 years, we’ve not yet mentioned party politics, electoral strategies and political ideology. On balance, the accomplishments of the German Bundestag on migration policy are positive. But what about public debates on migration? Developments here run similar to those seen with legislation: Both support for diversity and opposition to migration have generated mixed results. Overall, however, we’ve seen among Germans (i.e., the receiving society) a growing acceptance of diversity and sense of responsibility for the success of integration.

The question as to whether laws are created in response to public debates or public debates influence legislative plans is the subject of ongoing debate among political scientists. The interplay between public debate and policymaking is intense, and much depends on the skills (and intentions) of individual politicians. In Germany, despite several years of skepticism regarding immigration, the fact that the idea of a welcoming culture has permeated public discourse more thoroughly than that of a leading national culture (Leitkultur) can be explained by a simple social reality: We live in ethnic and religious diversity; a truly solution-oriented policy must therefore accommodate this diversity.
Table 2: Net migration to Germany of non-German nationals from elsewhere in the EU 2004–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net migration (from other EU states)</th>
<th>Total net migration (from anywhere)</th>
<th>EU migrants as a percentage of net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014 (first half)</td>
<td>170,816</td>
<td>283,250</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>303,893</td>
<td>459,160</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>275,476</td>
<td>387,149</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>215,725</td>
<td>302,858</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>99,010</td>
<td>153,925</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>18,156</td>
<td>27,506</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>11,695</td>
<td>10,685</td>
<td>109.4%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>73,261</td>
<td>99,003</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>61,644</td>
<td>74,693</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>60,944</td>
<td>95,717</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>13,494</td>
<td>55,217</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net migration refers here to the difference between immigration (i.e., people moving to Germany) and emigration (i.e., people leaving Germany); 2004–2006: EU25, 2007–2012: EU27
* The net migration balance of non-EU nationals for 2008 was negative

2. MIGRATION POLICY SCENARIOS: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

Predictions in politics are always difficult as the course of past developments is not always destined to continue into the future, particularly given the incalculable nature of external factors and day-to-day politics. It is nonetheless useful to develop scenarios as this can help anticipate the effects of potential developments and thus define reform needs in migration policy. Scenarios help those engaged in policymaking answer the following questions: Which development is likely to take place? What impact will this have on my interests? And where should I take action in order to mitigate the negative effects of likely developments?

In addition to the two aforementioned external factors (international events and the deepening of EU integration) there are three groups of relevant actors with corresponding interests that represent driving factors in German domestic politics and shape the country’s migration policy:

- Employers and trade associations which, given current and projected skilled labor needs, have an interest in expanding and simplifying immigration, whether this applies to skilled workers with a university degree or vocational training (e.g., industry or nursing) or unskilled workers (e.g., agriculture, service sector, construction). Employers and trade associations have particular relevance for the issue of migration regulation. Normally, labor unions also play a role here, and their consensus is sought through the social partnership framework.

- Municipalities and cities in need of pragmatic solutions tailored to their local needs, and which therefore act accordingly. This is true in particular with regard to the complex issue of settlement services (language courses, orientation support, job placement, social services, access to education, sensitivity training for handling migrant customers of municipal services, recognition of foreign certificates, etc.). In the last ten years, increasingly more municipalities have recognized the need to develop locally a comprehensive and participatory approach to integration policy in order to meet the cross-cutting demands brought forth by migration and integration. These proven solutions eventually find their way to the regional or Länder-level of policymaking. Eventually, some approaches (or aspects thereof) find their way into the national framework legislation – independent of the political constellation and regional actors’ political clout. Often these issues are related to financing.

- Parties at the Länder and national levels seek attention, votes and Deutungshoheit (which is what you have when your interpretation or framing of events is broadly accepted as fact) by stating their position on migration (this is true irrespective of whether they are for or against it; for a detailed analysis, see Kösemen 2014). But normative aspects such as equal treatment, lifestyles or social cohesion also play a role here and are manifest in the issues of citizenship and anti-discrimination. Though more diffuse as a factor, party politics have more influence than the first two factors because party politics play (in directly) an immense role in formulating and implementing legislation as party members generally sit at the top of government administrative offices and agencies. Party politics also play a key role in determining public agendas, although NGOs and other civil society actors work together with opinion makers to influence discussions within parties.

Now-common references to a welcoming culture refer not to an explicit structural or legislative feature of migration policy but, rather, to the idea that the implementation of migration policy should be driven by good will and not obstructed by reluctance. Simply stated, it’s a matter of providing customer services for the target
group of migrants with specific needs. The concept of a welcoming culture can therefore find its way into each, some or none of the aforementioned factors, irrespective of the individual actor and his or her concept of migration policy.

Table 3 presents three potential scenarios regarding key elements of migration policy (settlement services, migration regulation, citizenship and anti-discrimination). The first and most probable scenario draws on migration policy developments observed in Germany over the last 20 years (as outlined in Table 1). It represents a slow trend toward liberalization that nonetheless features thematic gaps and exceptions to the rule in policy contents. Titled “fragmented ad hoc policymaking” it could also be referred to as “muddling through.” The second “ideal solution” scenario involves a comprehensive overhaul of migration policy in which all actors are targeting the same objective in a consistent manner (best case). The third “setback” scenario assumes that as a result of certain events or political constellations the migration debate takes a turn for the worse, which has a negative impact on migration policy (worst case).

What are the consequences of these scenarios with respect to reform needs in Germany? None of these three scenarios would spell the end of migration policy, but they do involve different results. In migration policy there are so-called hard (i.e., quantifiable) determinants such as immigration figures, naturalization figures, retention quotas among foreign-born university graduates, the duration of stay of immigrants, quotas for the subsequent immigration of family members, the percentage of positions in so-called bottleneck occupations that are filled by foreign skilled workers, and equality of opportunity in accessing education and jobs. There are also so-called soft (i.e., qualitative) determinants such as a sense of belonging, participation in public life, demonstrating commitment to civil society, a sense of identification with Germany and perceptions of inclusion or exclusion. We can assume that in the first scenario, several of these determinants change little or improve somewhat; in the second scenario, they improve palpably; and in the third scenario, they worsen appreciably.

The remainder of this reform outline draws upon the second scenario (best case with regard to a comprehensive migration policy) as a desired reform outcome because it promises to deliver stronger improvements for more determinants in migration policy than would the other two scenarios. This is consistent with our belief that approaches marked by ad hoc and situationally dependent decision making cannot generate significant changes with broad reach because the migration policy area itself is heavily fragmented with regard to decision making and its contents and implementation. Furthermore, comprehensive reform is the only means of ensuring sustainable positive effects for the long term in a policy field. It also delivers what we would expect of a progressive migration reform: ensuring the attractiveness and openness of a country of immigration, managing immigration fairly for migrants and the recipient culture and providing all citizens – regardless of their background – equality of opportunity as well as opportunities for personal development and societal participation.
Table 3: Possible scenarios for Germany’s migration policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Most probable scenario</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>“Fragmented ad hoc policymaking”</strong>: Changes made to the status quo will be obstructed by veto players and control mechanisms or exceptions to the rule that speak to specific interests will be introduced into migration policy. The principle of a transparent and straightforward migration regulation will be dropped and its necessity contested. Nobody wants to bear the costs of establishing a comprehensive system of settlement services. Fragmented regional solutions are developed that differ considerably in reach and impact. In response to urgent labor market demands, the EU Blue Card is taken up as a fast-track solution and expanded in parallel with existing legislation. It is accompanied by limited settlement services (and only for specific immigrant groups) in selected regions. Changes to citizenship and anti-discrimination legislation and practices are minor.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Best case with regard to a comprehensive migration policy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Ideal solution”</strong>: Migration regulation is subject to a complete overhaul in order to take full advantage of and improve Germany’s economic situation. Veto players are incorporated within the process and compensated. The legal framework is redefined and long-term settlement is articulated as an objective of future immigration. Dual citizenship without any exceptions is introduced. Actors at the regional and Länder level reach agreement on establishing consistent settlement services that are properly financed. Participating parties communicate the positive social and economic effects of a modern immigration policy and expanded anti-discrimination measures.</td>
<td></td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
<th>Worst case with regard to a comprehensive migration policy</th>
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<td><strong>“Setback”</strong>: Political activity with regard to migration regulation remains primarily symbolic in nature and fails to move beyond emotional appeals. The term “welcoming culture” becomes an empty phrase and loses meaning the more actors refer to it without taking substantive action. Following the propagation of an initially loose interpretation of migration regulation, the pendulum swings back in response to external shock factors or the instrumentalization of supposed poverty-driven immigration or the fear of foreign cultural domination for specific political goals. This results in a considerable setback, taking migration regulation back to a state behind that of the current status quo. Settlement services remain an exception; inner-EU migration, thanks to EU legislation, remains possible but becomes more difficult as a result of additional regulations; attempts to gain citizenship are handled with less good will; and little more than lip service is paid to equality policies.</td>
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3. THE CONTENTS OF REFORM: MAKING CONCRETE PROGRESS IN MIGRATION

A broadly conceived and comprehensive migration reform comes closest to reaching the goal of improving the determinants identified at the end of Section 2. The point here is not only to bring general improvements to all those areas related to migration (e.g., labor market, demographics, education, political participation) but also to overcome the problem of protracted and recurrent legislative tinkering. The constant readjustments made to migration policy in recent years have rightfully warranted references to a “permanent construction site” or political “rearguard battles” being waged.

A reform’s rationale and its formulated objectives are inextricably linked to each other. They are conceived, planned and formulated together, often in alternation with each other. The difference between broad political declarations and the communication of a reform vision should lie in the clarity of targeted objectives. Strengthening a culture of welcome is not a reform objective. It is, at best, a consequence of successful reform. The same is true of “improving the integration of migrants” or “creating participation opportunities for migrants.” These statements are purposefully vague. And this vagueness allows them to resonate among both critics and supporters of an active migration policy. It also makes them less susceptible to calls for verification.

Calls to increase “the percentage of college-bound migrants,” “retention rates among foreign-born secondary school graduates” or “the number of immigrant skilled workers” are, by contrast, more appropriate because they can be tracked and verified, and therefore promote accountability with regard to reform goals. Poorly defined objectives lead to ineffectual outcomes.

A key reform objective should therefore be concrete, verifiable and potentially broken down into individual steps (for the purpose of taking corrective measures but also for achieving medium-term goals). Participants should know what it is they are working toward, targeted groups should understand the changes they face and what opportunities the reform will provide. All of these factors play a role in the various phases of reform implementation.

In this reform outline, we’ve identified increasing skilled worker immigration as a main goal. The reasons for this include:

- Demographic change and Germany’s growing need for skilled workers have been matters of public debate for a while now.
- Skilled worker immigration represents primarily an economic benefit and is therefore associated with a positive development; the advantages this has for wealth creation (or for preventing the loss of wealth) is in principle of benefit to society more generally.
- Employers’ associations comprise a well-organised interest group that has already begun advocating such reform and is very influential among conservative political groups critical of migration.
- Current migration regulation standards established by the EU Blue Card have had no noteworthy impact because although they have lowered legal hurdles to immigration, they have failed to improve administrative and societal conditions (“Die Blue Card ist ein Flop” 2014).
- The current influx of inner-EU migration from southern Europe is driven by the current economic crisis and therefore temporary. Given similar demographic issues in southern Europe, this solution is not tenable beyond the medium term.
- It is a goal that all actors in Germany’s federal government can agree upon.

Finally, this reform objective is also tactical. The argument for skilled worker immigration is clearly based in large part on economic necessity. However, the set of regulations and structures that would be established in
**Main goal**

Increasing skilled worker immigration (from third countries) sustainably

**Intermediate goals**

- **Transparency and comprehensible immigration rules**
  - Merge currently parallel EU Blue Card and German employment regulations into one set of rules and regulations.
  - Introduce elements of a point system to manage immigration.
  - Ensure the clear communication of immigration rules and regulations abroad. Provide a public point calculator for all types of immigration (highly skilled immigration, bottleneck occupations, education, temporary stays).

- **Structurally anchor a culture of welcome and recognition**
  - Establish settlement services across the country (language and integration courses, orientation support, bureaucracy guides, recognition of qualifications) that target the needs of immigrants.
  - Place settlement and other immigration-related services under one "welcome" or "citizens'" center roof. Open settlement services to all immigrants (refugees, students, family members).
  - Establish consistent standards for settlement services throughout the country (quality and reach of offerings) which are properly financed and held accountable for the services they provide.

- **Establish legal frameworks for long-term societal participation**
  - Make it easier for families to reunite and ease restrictions on visitation visas for family members.
  - Strengthen and expand anti-discrimination measures and provide the resources needed to ensure these measures are implemented.
  - Expedite and make easier the process of naturalization and promote a general acceptance of dual citizenship.

**Figure 1: Goal pyramid for migration reform**
order to achieve intermediate and action goals would create benefits for all migrants in Germany – that is, not only future skilled workers, but also those migrants already living in Germany with or without qualifications and irrespective of whether they arrived through familial relations, internal EU migration or as refugees. More can be achieved by focusing on the utility argument than can appeals to humanitarian or sociopolitical concerns which generally generate greater resistance among migration skeptics.

The goal pyramid (Figure 1) lays out the details of a skilled worker immigration reform objective, including intermediate goals (i.e., the general requirements in various areas of migration policy) and the necessary action goals (i.e., measures explicitly needed in order to achieve the intermediate goals).

Clearly, the action goals for a reform of this nature require fine-tuning and must be filled with concrete actions to be taken by individual administrative bodies and agencies at each level of government. Information at this level of detail lies beyond the scope of this contribution. Furthermore, these activities are a product of negotiation processes among the agents of reform and should not be determined in advance. The goal pyramid serves to illustrate the wealth of aspects to consider in migration reform and their capacity to bring about genuine broad-based change.
4. THE STRATEGIC CORE GROUP:
ACTORS DRIVING MIGRATION REFORM IN THE GRAND COALITION

The strategic core group – or strategy group – is comprised primarily of those individuals standing at the core of a reform. They hold all the strings and are the motor driving reform forward. They should agree on the basic objectives of the reform and act as a voice and convincing advocate of reform both internally (within their party or parliamentary group) and externally (vis-à-vis interest organizations, the public). Internal and external expertise is bundled within the strategy group, which determines the pace of reform, its communication and how to engage supporters and critics in the process. The constellation of personnel with regard to content and information, influence, maintaining a partisan balance and public credibility is important as these individuals must build support for the reform and be able to ensure follow-through on decisions made. Every reform runs the risk of being undermined by obstructors, that is, individuals in the strategy group who have been sent by influential veto players unable to prevent reform plans from getting underway and who aim to torpedo the reform in the medium term. It is therefore advisable to keep the group’s numbers small and to integrate and thereby mitigate the impact of those who might otherwise obstruct reform.

The current makeup of the German government is conducive to establishing a balanced strategy group. Led by two modern major parties, the government features a balance of ministers presiding over migration-related areas. The fact that the CSU no longer heads the Ministry of the Interior – a key ministry for migration policy – is an advantage in terms of formulating and communicating a cohesive reform. Generally critical of immigration measures, the CSU as a party cannot credibly act as a driver of reform. Table 4 shows the distribution of legislative and operational tasks and competences in migration policy at the federal level. The number of federal ministries demonstrates the extent to which migration policy is a cross-cutting issue. There are, however, two key ministries: the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI or Bundesministerium des Innern) and the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS or Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales), each with their subordinate agencies, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF or Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) and the Federal Employment Agency (BA or Bundesagentur für Arbeit). The ministers heading these two key ministries should therefore make up the core of the strategy group. The two subordinate agencies should provide internal expertise regarding the reform. The strategy group should also include representatives from the chancellor’s office and the office of the commissioner for migration, refugees and integration (Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration). Maintaining close relations with the chancellor is important not only to secure her political support during difficult moments but also as proof that she stands fully behind the reform. A strategy group based on this kind of quadrivirate would, under the current political circumstances, feature ministerial and partisan parity between the CDU and SPD.

In addition to the strategy group and working committees from the BAMF and BA who prepare information, another forum is required to bring together other non-central actors, such as the remaining ministers. This could take the form of a state secretary’s committee that meets on a regular basis and includes, in addition to representatives from the Ministries of the Interior and Labour and Social Affairs, those from other ministries listed in Table 4. A committee of this sort is relatively common. A temporary committee of this kind has already been established, for example, with regard to the issue of EU internal migration (BMAS 2014). Together, these three areas (reform headquarters/strategy group, internal expertise/BAMF-BA and ministerial
### Table 4: The distribution of migration policy competences within the German federal government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant migration area</th>
<th>Ministry and/or subordinate agency tasked with the issue</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry and immigration regulation</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and asylum-seekers</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job placement and vocational training</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, Federal Employment Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled labor immigration</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement services</td>
<td>Federal Office for Migration and Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-discrimination</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for Families, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, Federal Anti-discrimination Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban development and neighborhood management</td>
<td>Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of foreign qualifications</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Education and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German-language courses abroad (for family reunification)</td>
<td>Federal Foreign Office, Goethe-Institut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa issuance</td>
<td>Federal Foreign Office, diplomatic missions/consular posts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
interaction/state secretaries’ committee) comprise the structural core of reform planning.

In addition to determining the contents of reform and how to manage the reform process, the strategy group must also incorporate the input of supporters as well as critics. It is therefore important for members of the strategy group to pay close attention to their own party and parliamentary group (for the CDU this means the CDU/CSU parliamentary group) and stay informed of any resistance to the reform that might arise from within their party ranks. An early warning system of this sort should be considered by the party leadership and heads of each parliamentary group.

In a pluralist federalist democracy such as Germany that features a cooperative political regime, it is important to involve many other actors in such a reform process. Temporary forums such as commissions, working groups, workshops or other forms of exchange and information dissemination come to mind here. These kinds of forums serve multiple purposes: NGOs, migrant associations, universities and other institutes can contribute their expertise to the process; municipal umbrella organizations (e.g., the Association of German Cities), providers of social services and employees’ or employers’ associations can demonstrate a plurality of interests by voicing their expectations and needs. And finally, politically influential actors in the executive and legislative branches of government such as the Bundesrat or Länder-level governments must take the interests of their own party and parliamentary groups (including the CSU in the case of the CDU) as well as those of existing ministerial conferences (e.g., the Conference of Integration and Interior Ministers) into consideration. The great challenge and task facing every strategy group is to accumulate as much support as possible without eroding the reform’s core content.
5. AGENDA SETTING: THE PATH THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION-DEBATE MINEFIELD

Formulating a clear reform objective (an increase in skilled labor immigration from third countries) and establishing a well-functioning strategy group are only the first challenges in a reform process. It is a far greater task to additionally win public support for or even develop appreciable momentum behind the goal. For large reforms, the public mood is naturally rather vague. There will be both support and opposition on the basis of individual interests, along with a certain overall reluctance in the face of too-substantial changes. No one wants to be among the losers of a reform process. And for individual groups, societal changes always pose the risk that public goods might be redistributed to their disadvantage. The topic of migration is in this regard particularly susceptible to blanket judgments, generalizations and the articulation of fears over the loss of social status or affluence.

In public debates, it is common for negative individual cases (e.g., unemployment-benefit abuses or politicians’ perks) to be represented as the rule, and for fundamental changes to be demanded on this basis. However, the topic of migration is particularly prone to broad-brush arguments of this kind, as – in addition to the above-noted factors – issues of cultural, religious and ethnic affiliation also play a role. Thus, fears that advantages for a foreign group (in this case, migrants, foreigners, Muslims, Roma or refugees, for example) could come at the expense of the majority, and are therefore unjust or to be viewed primarily with suspicion, are a part of the landscape of debate. Therefore, the agenda-setting process – initiating public debate on the content of the reform with the aim of influencing opinion – is a much greater challenge for migration reform than would be the case in other reform projects.

In addition, the political messaging that promotes and accompanies the reform should not supersede or take the place of the actual contents in the course of the reform process, as the outcome would in that case be purely symbolic politics. This risk is certainly present in the area of migration, as the reform issue not only affects an exceptional number of other political areas, but can also trigger emotions that descend quickly into rancorous debate, conducted on the basis of solutions that are no more than platitudes. In the end, the outcome of reform must be something more substantial than mere slogans. Answering the following questions is crucial for the agenda-setting aspect of migration reform:

HOW SHOULD THE REFORM BE FRAMED FROM BOTH A COMMUNICATIVE AND THEMATIC PERSPECTIVE (FRAMING)?

The three scenarios in Table 3 show the range of possible developments in the field of migration policy. The goal of a reform should be to get as close as possible to the best-case scenario. The best case is not automatic, as political reality provides ample justification for all three scenarios, even and especially when the reform actors fail to achieve their own goals and must subsequently communicate the outcome of the reforms. A risk to every reform is that obstruction by one or more actors may lead to suboptimal results and yet, in the end, all participants praise the outcome in order to avoid having to admit failure.

Framing is important in two respects: It serves as a guiding theme in convincing others and winning support, and it offers an opportunity during the reform process to make calibrations between individual decisions and their effects on the intended goal of reform. The framing should moreover address a future-relevant issue, thus laying the groundwork for reform. In the context of migration policy, demographic change is a natural theme in this regard – thus, the constructive
shaping of migration as an essential measure to achieve positive effects for prosperity and society that otherwise threaten to dwindle as a consequence of the population’s aging.

The focus on the utility argument is controversial among some migration policy actors, as it pushes the sociopolitical and humanitarian elements of migration policy into the background. But the fact is that fears of loss of social status and affluence are more pronounced than usual with the topic of migration, and thus the recourse to self-interested arguments promises greater success in terms of achieving a reform that ultimately should (and must) also encompass humanitarian, social and sociopolitical elements. However, these elements must not be allowed to be lost or negotiated away during the reform process. This interpretation paradigm (“securing future prosperity and domestic peace”) will better protect the reform against culturally pessimistic, xenophobic and anti-modern arguments than if the reform is directly touted as a more progressive migration policy under the banner of “integration.”

WHICH ASPECTS OF REFORMS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED FIRST?

The issue of demographic change has been in the public eye for some time; for this reason, it does not need to be newly reintroduced. In addition, it has the distinct advantage that it affects the lives of all population groups in one way or another: The issue encompasses the areas of work, social affairs, health care and long-term care, housing, education, infrastructure and public services – all of which also play a substantial role in migration reform. Conversely, that means that avoiding the negative effects of demographic change will benefit all. The chain of argument establishing these connections runs as follows: 1) Demographic change threatens our prosperity, 2) thus we need migration, and 3) this must, however, be actively fostered through regulations, structures and the social climate. Use of such an argument should diminish the politics of envy (who are the winners, and who the losers of reform) as well as anti-migration reflexes (“they’re taking something away from us”), as a successful reform will benefit not only migrants, but the entire population.

During the course of the reform, actors must successfully pursue a balancing act, on the one hand promoting the reform goal of “more skilled foreign workers” and the various associated intermediate goals (see Figure 1), and on the other continuously communicating the expected benefits of the reform to the public. Thus, the intermediate goal of “transparent and comprehensible immigration rules” serves the subject heading of bureaucracy downsizing and better migration management, while the intermediate goal of “structurally anchoring a culture of welcome and recognition” by contrast serves to achieve a better customer orientation within public agencies, as well as better integration of all migrants living in Germany. Ideologically charged portions of the reform should be somewhat minimized from a communicative perspective, particularly with regard to the third intermediate goal of “legal frameworks for long-term societal participation,” and thus questions of dual citizenship and anti-discrimination policies. Both are issues that can produce disproportionate amounts of opposition, but are nevertheless essential in order to bind skilled foreign workers to Germany over the long term and send all migrants a signal that they belong.

WHAT IS THE RIGHT TIME TO ADVANCE THE ISSUE OF REFORM?

For reform projects, it is easier if the population already perceives the need for action and a sense of urgency behind the reform exists, or alternately if there is a window of opportunity for a change in political course (for example, the one provided by the Fukushima catastrophe). Neither is currently the case for migration reform. The window of opportunity in this area is rather of a negative nature, which can be exaggerated and used for political purposes by right-populists and critics of migration (for example, attacks by youth in the subways, higher numbers of refugees, alleged abuse of social services, conflicts in socially deprived urban neighborhoods). Pressure for action certainly exists, but is not sufficiently perceived as such by the public.

This has a variety of causes. With the introduction of the EU Blue Card for immigrants from third countries at the same time as an increase in internal migration from EU countries, the previous federal government conveyed the impression that immigration rules were now sufficiently reformed and that current immigration levels were adequate. The EU Blue Card program’s low levels of success (2,500 Neuzuwanderer im ersten Jahr der Einführung; Expert Council 2014: 50) is also due to the fact that this diminishing of hurdles to immigration represents only the first step toward unified migration management. The management of immigration continues to lack clarity, and the remaining elements neces-
sary to facilitate immigration – see the intermediate and action goals in Figure 1 – have largely not been pursued. The largely crisis-induced internal EU migration is only “loan” migration, which despite being viewed by the public as sufficient, will in fact do little to alter the long-term situation. Only immigration from third countries can serve this latter purpose – however, third-country immigration as a share of total migration continues to fall short of expectations (see Table 2).

Thus, it is necessary for reform actors to steadily build awareness of the issue, while always situating it within the context of demographic change, for example by discussing it in conjunction with the federal government’s annual reports on long-term care or pension insurance. There are enough examples that the somewhat abstract topic of “the aging of society” can be translated into voters’ everyday life experiences: nursing shortages and costs, school closures, the disappearance of clubs and associations and the loss of crucial volunteers (such as firefighters), regional depopulation, and higher pension contributions in return for smaller pension increases. These messages can be packaged together with the formula: “These are the consequences, if we don’t bring demographic change under control.”

If reform actors are themselves to set the pace of public discussion and ensure that thematically relevant highlights are addressed, communication of the reform must be continuous and free of contradictions. The coalition’s discipline is likely to be put to the test, particularly if the CSU responds to right-populists’ attempts to mobilize against the reform, as they themselves are proponents of positions critical of migration. Here, reform actors must think at an early stage about compromised that avoid undermining the reform project. The expedient of themselves acting in a manner critical of migration is not a solution. This is effectively letting the genie out of the bottle, so to speak – the spiral of outrage can be turned back only with difficulty, and in cases of uncertainty, protest voters critical of migration always vote for the “original,” which can always behave more shrilly and demand more than can the governing party.

WHO IS THE TARGET AUDIENCE FOR COMMUNICATION OF THE REFORM?

There is a minority in Germany – which should not be underestimated – of about 20 to 25 percent of the population that is hostile to migration, diversity and multicultural aspects of society, and which accordingly supports the positions of the extreme right, the new right and the populist right, even if only a small proportion actually votes for these parties (Decker, Kiess and Brähler 2014: 44). This share of the population will not be convinced of any migration reform that will fundamentally lead to more immigration. By contrast, there is a roughly equal share of the population that rejects xenophobic attitudes (Decker, Kiess and Brähler 2012: 29 f.). These people presumably no longer need to be convinced of Germany’s future as a progressive country of immigration. The reform communication must therefore focus primarily on the remainder of the population – that is, those people who represent the broad spectrum of opinion on migration issues, from critical to favorable in its various gradations. It is the task of reform to win over this broad and ultimately not clearly defined middle.

On closer examination, there are certain groups in which reform communication should explicitly take place: For instance, surveys regularly show that somewhat older people and people from rural or underdeveloped areas are more critical of migration. Similarly, medium-sized businesses find it difficult to embrace ethnic and religious diversity (Köppel and Krislin 2008). Paradoxically, these are the three groups that will be strongly affected by the consequences of demographic change. Reform communication must be pursued here. The foreseeable negative consequences of demographic change for these groups must be addressed with reference to explicit real-life examples (see above), and linked with migration reform as a solution. In sum, this means identifying affected population groups and using storytelling elements to present the migration reform as a possible solution for impending future problems. The presentation should be neither abstract nor based wholly on figures, but should rather be relevant to everyday life.

WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL RETURN FOR THE ACTORS INVOLVED?

Without doubt, the sociopolitical aspects of a progressive migration reform pose greater challenges for the conservative portion of the coalition – the CDU and the CSU – than for the Social Democrats. More migrant rights and more ethnic and religious diversity are not an obvious part of the Conservatives’ fundamental political convictions, and are indeed rejected by portions of their political base. A certain conflict of political values exists here, as employer and business associations, which are traditionally closer to the Conservatives, are
key drivers of the reform (see Figure 2). This is also true of municipalities with conservative governments that nevertheless demand solutions for the consequences of demographic change. It is therefore important in the context of migration reform to grant the conservative actors involved political successes, offering incentives for their support so they can go along with the project despite emotional distance from the reform goals – as long as the core of the reform is not put into question. This means that even progressive migration rules must sometimes be conservatively reinterpreted (instead of, as previously, conversely presenting restrictive migration rules as a positive innovation, such as casting limitations on foreign-spouse reunification as a protection against forced marriages). Among the reform actors, the CSU could even take a role as a devil’s advocate or watchdog that respects the sensitivities of conservative circles. However, this will only work if the CSU is conscious of this role, and also supports the core of the reform.

The CDU, which has engaged in a timid, more symbolic than programmatic relaxation on migration issues, must as a major national party behave in a more statesmanlike manner than its Bavarian sister party. With migration reform that mutes the effects of demographic change, it has a single option: to be able to reconcile its core supporters (older people, rural populations, the medium-sized-business sector) with the issue of immigration. The political base’s emotional distance from the topic can also be reduced insofar as the conservative reform actors emphasize that migration reform is ultimately the best path at all levels (see Figure 1) to make migrants into active citizens committed to Germany, and to further reduce the integration problems of the past. However, this “political pathos” should remain non-partisan, and should not include cultural or ethnic elements.

Individual reform actors should avoid taking on an ideologically charged profile. Examples from the United Kingdom and France have made the dangers of this clear: Prime Minister Gordon Brown publicly called in 2007 for the development of a national motto that would express British national values, and the French government under President Nicholas Sarkozy launched numerous citizen forums in 2009 tasked with discussing national identity. Both experiments got out of control and had to be suspended, and ultimately helped push public opinion on immigration – particularly in France – further to the right. Ultimately, only the right-populists benefited from these campaigns (Wüpper 2010; Lyall 2008).

Naturally, the Social Democrats can more easily score political points through a grand-coalition migration reform; however, they too must take their labor wing into close consideration. Possible resistance from within the party may in this regard come more on labor-market policy grounds than from sociopolitical concerns. However, the introduction of a national minimum wage should mitigate this conflict to a substantial degree. With regard to migration reform, the SPD is nonetheless reliant on the one hand on winning the support of the unions, who want to know how to protect their labor-market interests; while on the other, the reform must be conceptualized and communicated so that migrants who are already in Germany (as well as municipalities with large numbers of migrants) will benefit. The reform should not produce a distinction between new and old migrants in the public eye. That would contradict the basic idea of an overall reform of immigration policy, as well as the political left’s understanding of social policy.
6. FORMULATION AND DECISION MAKING: GROWING THE PIE, AND DISTRIBUTING IT FAIRLY

The term “growing the pie” is used in negotiation theory, and refers to the idea of an integrative approach to negotiation. In this regard, one does not focus primarily on the position of the individual parties, but seeks rather to uncover the interests that lie behind these positions. Solutions are subsequently sought that meet these interests as far as possible. Thus, one does not negotiate in order to attain one’s own position in full, but rather to collectively consider all interests – thus growing the negotiation pie. This has the advantage that the climate of cooperation is strengthened, long-term cooperation becomes possible, and neither side begrudges the other’s successes. This contrasts with the classic approach to negotiation, in which various positions clash and the parties ultimately meet in the middle after both sides have made concessions. This comes down to finely argued details, and results in a compromise that leaves both parties unsatisfied (Spangler 2003).

The compromise in the grand-coalition negotiations to abolish the Optionspflicht (the requirement that children of immigrants born in Germany ultimately choose a single citizenship) is a good example of such an outcome. The abolishment itself was first negotiated, settled and announced, only to have both sides fight Afterwards about the meaning of the word “raised” in the negotiated text (“For children of foreign parents born and raised in Germany, the requirement to choose a nationality will in the future no longer be required [...]” “Shaping Germany’s Future” Coalition Agreement 2013: 105) The draft law since enacted likely pleases neither side, and also has the problem of administrative expenses, while failing to solve the problem of provisional naturalization. This was primarily a matter of minimizing the political successes of the other side through the details, and not of solving an outstanding problem or establishing a common understanding of the problem and the underlying interests.

A broad-based migration reform would not survive this kind of negotiation. Thus, following the agreement in principle to work toward an increase in the number of skilled foreign workers as a reform objective (in order to mitigate the consequences of demographic change), it is necessary to be very clear internally with regard to the interests of individual reform actors and their associated interest groups. Reform actors should go through the individual intermediate and action goals (see Figure 1) and ask the following questions: Are the participating interests and the objectives targeted compatible? Can they be made compatible for the purposes of communication? Where can interest-driven changes be made without changing the core of the reform? What red lines exist, and how can other participants be compensated if the ability to reach intermediate goals is limited by these red lines? Examples of interests that play a role in shaping the reform may include the following: The CSU does not want to give right-populists an opportunity to raise their profile or political support; the CDU fears alienating its conservative base, and that new migrant voters may disproportionately support the SPD; the SPD is concerned that unions not be neglected in favor of employers’ interests, and that the long-term unemployed do not become the losers of the reform.

All this taken together means that reform actors must build a relationship of trust with one another before the reform process begins. As a part of this, they must come to know and respect each other’s interests. And finally, all parties must be ready to participate actively and productively in the implementation of the reform. Gaining political profile through the reform should be a common goal, not gaining profile at the expense of the reform or of other reform actors. It is above all the task of the strategy group to keep these points in mind (see Section 4). The ability of the group’s collective composition to meet these requirements will also be tested. It is an advan-
tage that the other primary drivers of reform – municipalities and business associations (see Section 2) – have a foot in both government camps, and thus represent a unifying rather than divisive element.

Despite the helpful framework conditions – the grand coalition has a majority government, the public is aware of demographic change as a future challenge, the reform drivers are not deepening the gap between the two political camps, and European directives favor a progressive migration policy – the CDU/CSU must overcome more emotional hurdles and political risks than the SPD if the reform is to do more than simply modify what has come before. In the end, a reform of this magnitude can be societally grounded and can win broad public acceptance only through consistent, conservative participation. The alternative is a political trench warfare that goes on for decades and discourages actors from tackling the challenges posed by migration. For the Conservatives, constructive participation in a migration reform project offers the opportunity to be perceived as an authentic modern major party (Volkspartei), and to lay the foundation for winning the political support of future migrant voters.
7. IMPLEMENTATION: THE CORRECT SEQUENCE ENSURES A SMOOTH START FOR REFORM

After reform actors have agreed on reform goals, the agenda and opportunities for political return, implementation begins. A reform of this magnitude cannot be accomplished in a single step. An approach employing multiple, in part parallel phases of different lengths (corresponding to the three intermediate goals: transparent immigration rules, structural anchoring of a culture of welcome, and a legal framework for societal participation) has a number of advantages: The actors involved can determine the sequence of intermediate goals, and thus provide for a smooth start for the reform process, so that initially the abstract, then the tangible and resource-intensive, and finally the most controversial intermediate goals are implemented. In addition, the various institutional reform drivers and allies can be used to help achieve the different intermediate goals according to their specific influence and interests. Finally, those elements of the reform that continue to be the source of disagreement between the reform actors can in this way be postponed. The longer the actors successfully pursue the reform process together, thus building trust and creating a common public image, the easier it will be at the end to resolve the remaining differences of opinion.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES, AND IN WHAT ORDER SHOULD THE REFORM GOALS BE ADDRESSED?

The three intermediate goals generate different financial and political costs, and the individual reform elements should be timed accordingly. The establishment of transparent immigration regulations produces the least amount of costs, and their implementation requires the least effort of all three intermediary goals. This largely entails a unification and simplification of existing laws, which are moreover limited to the federal level. This intermediary target will appear rather abstract in the public eye. Of course, internal (and as appropriate, external) expertise must initially be called upon here, and the public administration must be compelled to reformulate the regulations to correspond with the overall tenor of the reform. The primary task will be to shape the early reform communication so as to send a positive signal to the public (as well as abroad); lacking this, opposition among potential reform opponents can rapidly form. In this stage, it is to the benefit of the reform that the business associations, as key institutional drivers, have a strong interest in this intermediate goal, and can be involved in this phase of the reform as effective public advocates.

If the first intermediate goal is for the most part a legislative and communicative challenge, the second – nationwide, unitary settlement services – is a complex mix of fine-tuning of substantive administrative functions (the type and extent of settlement services, along with their coordination) and negotiation processes at multiple levels, as the Länder, the level at which these services are provided, will be involved to a significant degree (responsibility for settlement services, agreement on uniform standards, approval in the Bundesrat). In addition, an increased level of financial resources will be needed for the implementation of this intermediate goal. Thus, negotiations between the reform actors and the representatives of the federal states on cost-sharing and the legal framework for uniform service standards should begin as soon as possible, ideally in parallel with implementation of the first intermediate goal.

Rapid progress is important, as the first tangible results should follow the public formulation of the new immigration regulations in order to prevent the reform process’s implementation and external communication from stalling. For example, opening the first welcome
centers for migrants in a number of large cities would represent a forward step for the reform process that was both visible on a personal level and easily communicated to the media. Moreover, the sooner this phase of the reform begins, the sooner the reform actors can expect useful results while they are working on the third intermediate goal (see Figure 2). It is to be assumed that an agreement will be achieved only after a somewhat protracted period of time. Here, the municipal associations should be used as reform drivers in order to win the support of relevant stakeholders at the federal-state level for the reforms. Regardless of their success, the federal government will have to make financial concessions – ultimately, the Länders’ acquiescence with the reforms will also be a question of funding.

The third intermediate goal – long-term societal participation – is no more difficult with regard to administrative implementation than the development of transparent immigration regulations, but for the participating reform actors it involves the highest political costs of any of the intermediate goals. Underlying this goal are measures such as the expansion of anti-discrimination policy, an easing of family reunification rules, more rapid naturalization and the acceptance of dual citizenship – all elements that meet with significant reservations among portions of the public as well as in the conservative government camp. There is no general sense that these are necessary steps in a migration reform in order to secure the reform objective in a long-term and sustainable way. Yet without them, Germany will bind only a small share of the new immigrants to itself over the long term, and will be unable to facilitate coexistence within an increasingly diverse population without producing unnecessary tension.

An additional problem is the difficulty in measuring the effects engendered by this intermediary goal. The first intermediary goal increases the number of immigrants, the second eases practical burdens for local authorities, but the positive societal effects of the third intermediate goal, such as the development of a sense of belonging or self-perception as a full-fledged citizen, are largely intangible, and come into being only after a relatively long interval. Although the majority of migration researchers consider the above-noted elements to be necessary for a modern society of immigration, some political actors regard them as dispensable, or even fight actively against their implementation. Higher naturalization or family reunification figures are good signs that immigrants feel at home in Germany. However, these relatively easily collected indicators are of only limited use in convincing the public of the positive effects of migration reform, as they relate to controversial areas within the current migration debate. Moreover, there are no external stakeholders able to serve as strong institutional drivers for this intermediate goal. Foundations and socially oriented NGOs working in this area do not have the same degree of political influence.

Figure 2: Sequence and start of implementation of the individual intermediate goals

**Intermediate goal 1:** Transparent immigration regulations

**Intermediate goal 2:** Structural anchoring of a culture of welcome

**Intermediate goal 3:** Legal framework for societal participation
as industry associations, unions or municipal umbrella associations.

If the reform is to succeed, reform actors need to have the political will to overcome resistance even within their own ranks and their own voter base. One possibility is a detour to the EU level. In Section 1, it was made clear that the European Union has developed into a major determining factor in migration policy, regardless of whether governments have fulfilled directives only reluctantly, or – as in other policy areas (internal security, for example) – have injected themselves into European decision making processes in order to bypass national resistance.

The examples of the General Equal Treatment Act (AGG) and the EU Blue Card show that important milestones in German migration policy have been implemented without prior political debate, and out of the public eye. This was done on purely pragmatic grounds, as the actors were required to implement the legal changes on the basis of EU directives, and to the extent possible wanted to avoid being too aggressively associated with a policy that did not in fact fit with their political agenda. This approach could also benefit reform actors with regard to the still-contentious aspects of the reform, as they could initially advocate for the idea in general terms, but without communicating details, in order to avoid provoking opposition within their own ranks. This would enable some of the reform actors to save face, and provide them with the opportunity to promote the changes after their implementation and reinterpret them according to their own convictions.

In this regard, the European Union is not only a key determinant of migration policy, but also offers an opportunity for action at a moment at which the reform project may have been stalled by national actors. Reform skeptics can in this way be integrated into the process, insofar as they can be offered a European solution that soothes their fears of adverse consequences from the reform, or which better serves their interests. It may therefore be useful to allow certain elements of the reform to enter German policy in the context of EU directives, taking advantage of the EU as a stepping stone. Regardless of this approach’s advantages, however, any effort to depart at the national level from the realities of the migration-policy framework (free movement of persons and the equal treatment of all EU citizens) specified by the EU will meet with no success. European-level processes and decision-making structures are too complex and too lengthy to yield any such outcome.

**WHAT ELEMENTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ONGOING REFORM COMMUNICATION?**

Public communication around the reform begins by associating the reform with the overarching issue of demographic change (see Section 5). The second step is regular communication of the various successes in the context of the intermediate goals (for example, an increase in the number of skilled immigrant workers, the utilization of welcome centers, or an increase in the naturalization rate), accompanied by narrative elements that make the issue more tangible for members of the public (for example, profiles of new immigrants, descriptions of everyday experiences in a welcome center, naturalization ceremonies), and information on positive impacts for the rest of the population (for example, the medium-sized-business sector increases its production levels and creates more jobs in a region; schools in sparsely populated regions no longer have to close; people’s own older relatives receive better care; vacant rural physician positions can be once again filled more easily). The third step – the creation of a general positive public sentiment that welcomes immigration beyond its economic necessities – is the most difficult.

At first glance, this seems to contradict the economic argument for reform centered on demography and the demand for skilled workers. However, it is fundamental for the implementation of the third intermediary goal, and also to prevent a distinction being made in the public debate on migration between supposedly economically “useful” and “less useful” migrants. This distinction would neither be conducive to societal acceptance of ethnic diversity, nor help close the emotional distance between current migrants and the remainder of the population. Both are prerequisites for a successful society of immigration, however. Here, the reform communication must perform the tricky balancing act of highlighting the utility of immigration for Germany without making it appear that migrants are simply instruments for combating economic shortages, rather than fellow citizens who will help shape the country’s future.

Right-populist and right-conservative opponents of the reform will attempt to steer the public debate with cultural arguments – thus, not directly opposing immigration management, but instead demanding that only migrants that are in their view culturally compatible with Germany be allowed to immigrate. Attempts to quell discussion of this kind do not work (and taking up these putative concerns, thus strengthening the anti-reform argument further, is certainly of no use). The reform actors should argue that Germany has experienced...
and is experiencing continuous social change, and that cultural selection criteria can thus never be adequate to the social reality, and are moreover not generally applicable to whole ethnic groups.

In addition, the discussion should not hinge on what allegedly defines Germany currently or in the past, but rather on what kind of society we want to be in the future; thus, not about whether and which migrants supposedly suit Germany, but how we as a modern society of immigration can make all migrants active and self-identified citizens. Arguments about cultural differences will no longer play a significant role when a societal consensus on equality of opportunity and participation exists without regard to ethnic origin.

**HOW SHOULD THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN REFORM ACTORS AND CITIZENS BE SHAPED?**

The subject of migration can develop a destructive momentum among the public if changes are not made carefully and with clear consideration for the interests of the citizens affected (or those who feel they are affected). The 2013 protests against the planned refugee-applicant housing in Berlin-Hellersdorf are just one example in which right-wing extremists were able to use the local population’s frustration in order to poison the public debate (Roth 2013). A public dialogue is altogether important, and even essential for a reform project of this magnitude in order to convince the undecided; however, a few points must be considered in this regard. Reform actors should seek to avoid triggering a general discussion of migration, foreigners or identity – this simply invites actors critical of migration to hijack the agenda, and the entire discussion will ultimately be dominated by prejudices that make reform seem impossible. The example of France cited in Section 5 shows the inability to control such debates.

Where the reform issue is abstract, it should also be argued on an abstract and technical level, as in the case of immigration management, annual immigration figures or the expected economic benefits. Where the population is directly affected, the real expected changes should be discussed with reference to the local level, for instance in neighborhoods with high proportions of new migrants, in areas where settlement services are established, or with locals seeking work in regions with a shortage of skilled workers. In areas where emotions can run high, as with the topics of dual citizenship or discrimination, reform actors should introduce emotionally positive counter examples into the controlled debate, thus sketching the above-noted image of a modern German future as a kind of blueprint for the migration reform. This approach can prevent communicative failures associated with conducting emotional debates on a dry, technical level, or with making local debates too abstract.
8. ONGOING PERFORMANCE MONITORING: KEEPING THE REFORM ON TRACK

The foregoing sections outlined the individual building blocks of reform (intermediate goals) that will be implemented in various areas and in different order. Once initiated, these strands of reform must be reviewed by the strategy group over their entire period of implementation, progress and impact – thus amounting to an ongoing performance monitoring. The individual strands of reform are:

- The continuous communication, adapted to the individual intermediary goals and the specific affected or interested target groups, and with the involvement of the relevant reform drivers;
- Negotiations with those actors that are not among the actual reform actors, but who are necessary for implementation – thus, the Länder/local authorities in the case of settlement services, the Bundesrat for laws that require its approval, or additional federal ministries/agencies that will be involved only with individual elements of the reform;
- The changes in laws and regulations in accordance with the reform – thus, the national administration, in a unified process of organized legislative preparation, formulates the foundations for the individual intermediary goals with an eye toward legal requirements and outcomes, taking into account the internal subject-area knowledge within the participating reform actors;
- The implementation of practical intermediary goals in accordance with the reform – thus, that the administrative bodies tasked with implementing the reform, such as settlement services and the visa authorities, exemplify the idea of a culture of welcome, particularly when working with migrants;
- The measurement of the effects and impact of implemented intermediate goals, and monitoring to ensure that they conform to the overall spirit of the reform;
- The process of giving and obtaining feedback on the reform’s course from other reform actors, the participating political parties and their voter bases, so that potential new or reemerging conflicts can be identified at an early stage.

These are challenges that in sum demand an enormous expenditure of oversight effort. The capabilities of the strategy group’s task force will likely be stretched to their limits. One solution may be to supplement this body with a monitoring unit located within one of the primary participating federal ministries. On substantive grounds, the natural choice for this would be the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. This would also conform with a broadly held opinion among migration researchers, who have argued in favor of a central point of coordination for migration policies that to date have been fragmented across the federal government, preferably in this non-security-policy-oriented ministry (Kotte 2013).

This need is even greater for the implementation of a migration reform intended to increase the immigration of skilled workers. Following completion of the reform, it would be especially useful to combine responsibility for migration policy at a single point, thus avoiding putting the success of the reform at risk by retaining these distributed responsibilities. However, as is mentioned in the case study for the 2005 immigration reform, structural issues are also power issues, and the contents of reform face the danger of being blocked on principle if they are perceived as posing a threat to ministerial or political influence. A potential fourth intermediate goal of “combining responsibilities for migration policy within a single state institution” would thus be desirable, but should not be an official part of the reform so as to avoid endangering the reform as a whole. During the reform, it must be seen whether the monitoring unit and the strategy group’s executive body are the basis.
for a development that can ultimately lead to a concentration of responsibility in a single state office. However, whether this eventually comes to pass is a political decision.

The ongoing performance monitoring of the individual strands of reform will moreover be overshadowed by an ambivalence that results from the reform’s timeframe: the tension between authentic reform narrative and quantifiable performance reports. After the first reform steps, a considerable time will pass before a certain fixed number of skilled foreign workers have immigrated and also chosen Germany as a new permanent home. The time lag between initial reform costs and the later outcome of reform is generally a problem for actors who are subject to election cycles. This effect is intensified in the case of migration, because conflicts or disaffection related to migration are short-term and locally visible (changes in the neighborhood), while the benefits remain abstract and appear more generally over the middle and long term (creative potential and economic growth). It is thus of vital importance to communicate that the migration reform is just as prolonged and potentially difficult to grasp as – for instance – demographic change, the consequences of which it will serve to moderate. It must be made clear: There are challenges and problems that we must come to grips with. This (reform) journey has the ultimate goal of changing the future – and that will take time to accomplish.

This admittedly rather vague statement of course stands in contrast to the release of quantifiable performance reports, which should substantiate the positive course of the reform. They should be made available and communicated as soon as possible, as testimony to the reform’s impact. Now the process, which began with the establishment of a clear reform objective (increase in immigration among skilled workers), has come full circle. However, it will take some time until, for example, the number of work permits issued to skilled foreign workers in professions with skills shortages noticeably rises, the increase in foreign students and the share of those remaining in the country can be registered, or the population decline as compared to the years of the reform’s beginning is attenuated. These are all examples of how the quality of the migration reform’s outcomes might be illustrated, in addition to the utilization of welcome centers or the rise in naturalization figures mentioned in Section 7 (ongoing reform communication).

Ultimately, additional indicators must be developed in the course of the reform process to verify and illustrate the effects of the implemented elements of reform. This should include a state instrument that as far as possible ascertains or brings up to date the demand for skilled labor, and makes this transparent as part of the reform-communication framework. In general, owing to the broad spectrum of reform communication, this whole constellation of issues can also be described as a kind of expectations management (among the public and the reform actors). From the overall narrative to the success of individual measures to the goal of reform itself, the big picture can be sketched and the reform’s progress demonstrated with the help of individual, smaller steps.

However, it is not sufficient simply to initiate the individual elements aimed at achievement of the intermediate goals, and subsequently measure the outcomes. The intermediate step – appropriate implementation by the relevant administrative bodies – must also be monitored. It has become apparent that it is precisely in the interface between the administration and citizens (or customers) that steps are not always implemented in accordance with the legislators’ intent regarding a new law or regulation (Greive 2014). The expansion of settlement services and anti-discrimination measures should not take place simply on paper, but must effectively bring about change in the sense of a new service orientation, regardless of the responsible institution or funding source. Otherwise, the outcomes will always fail to meet expectations. The monitoring unit can determine the need for further adjustments through surveys of target groups or external reports, and integrate the findings thus acquired into the reform process. A good example of an impact assessment in this area is the current study “Wirkungsanalyse des rechtlichen Rahmens für ausländische Fachkräfte” (BMWi 2014, Impact Analysis of the Legal Framework for Skilled Foreign Workers).
9. SUMMARY CONCLUSION:
A MIGRATION POLICY FOR GERMANY’S FUTURE

Despite oft-cited references to “predictions are tricky, particularly with regard to the future,” forecasts are nonetheless developed in many policy areas in the hopes that we not only learn from past experience but improve decision making by basing it on accurate information. The contribution presented here follows this logic but also bears a double burden: It not only outlines the potential contents of a migration policy for Germany, it also plans for this contingency from the perspective of those actors needed to implement such a policy, even though they have yet to determine the necessity of migration reform.

Germany’s current migration policy is better than its reputation would suggest. It has improved over the last 20 years, though this has been an arduous process marked by its own contradictions. Any improvements made have been driven less by a commitment to making migration policy “fit for the future” than by the need to respond to a changing reality in Germany. These improvements can also be attributed in part to the benefits associated with Germany’s integration into the European Union. Nonetheless, the migration policy debate in Germany continues to languish under self-critical navel-gazing at the cost of finding effective policy solutions. As a result, Germany’s migration policy fails to seize present opportunities and – even worse – live up to Germany’s self-proclaimed standards as a modern, pluralistic society at the heart of Europe. Establishing a forward-looking and active migration policy that anticipates challenges rather than relying on a policy machinery that responds ad hoc to problems is part and parcel of such standards. Indeed, to date, Germany has failed to embed migration policy within a fully coherent strategic framework.

Policymakers’ fears of overwhelming the public with a massive reform are understandable. Nonetheless, we are presented with a unique window of opportunity that should be seized: The ideological trench wars of the 1980s and 1990s have subsided, Germany is stable and enjoys relative prosperity, ethnic and religious diversity is an obvious feature of German society and right-wing populism – unlike that seen in other parts of Europe – is not a nationwide movement. It is worth hoping that the current German government will take advantage of the present opportunity to overhaul migration policy and pursue consistency in migration legislation. This is no easy task, but it is also entirely feasible. The findings of the migration reform outline presented here are summarized below and are designed to help those tasked with undertaking such a reform.

1. Migration reform must be comprehensive in its design. This is required of any reform that is intended not only to bring an end to the fragmentation of competences and responsibilities but also to cover all aspects of a modern migration policy. Economic arguments provide effective leverage in winning public support for migration regulations, but migration policy will run aground if it is not accompanied by sociopolitical measures and services.

2. The reform must have a clearly defined, verifiable objective that can be understood. It must also feature structured elements (intermediate and action goals) that target the main goal and address all aspects of migration policy. “Increasing the number of immigrant skilled workers” is, for example, a main goal and “establishing transparent immigration regulations, structurally anchoring a culture of welcome, and creating a legal framework for societal participation” are three intermediate goals that can be targeted (for details, see Section 3, Figure 1).

3. Participating reform actors – in this case Germany’s current grand coalition members – must believe in and agree on the purpose and goal of the reform.

4. Implementing the reform requires a strategy group
whose members have the political expertise and clout to act as a command center in planning the reform, organizing the requisite know-how, resolving internal conflicts, negotiating with external actors and pushing forth a reform communication strategy that is appropriate to each stage in the process of implementation. Ideally, this strategy group would include the ministers of labor and the interior, the heads of the Federal Employment Agency and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and representatives from the chancellor’s office.

5. The reform must be embedded within a broader agenda that does not necessarily emphasize the issue of migration but, rather, highlights the advantages of migration for German society as a whole. This is important if policymakers wish to avoid or at least take the wind out of hostile knee-jerk responses and attempts to mobilize against immigration. The issue of demographic change identified here offers one such broad agenda that is an appropriate context in which to pursue the migration reform outlined here.

6. Reform actors should seek to raise their profile through the reform and its achievements (and they should also be provided opportunities to raise their political profile) but not at the cost of the reform or other actors.

7. The implementation of individual reform steps should be sequenced in such a way as to ensure success. In other words, begin by stating abstract goals, follow this with the local implementation of tangible reforms and then take up the politically controversial goals. In order to ensure the visibility of reform outcomes, external actors involved with carrying out specific reform elements (Länder/municipalities) should be brought into the process as early as possible and also the financing of reforms should be clarified early on.

8. In order to ensure widespread public support for the reform, drivers and supporters of reform (employers’ associations, municipal umbrella organizations, internal party working groups, NGOs working on migration and human rights issues, settlement services providers) should be involved in implementing individual reform elements and in accordance with their individual interests.

9. The reform must be accompanied by an ongoing communication strategy that is fine-tuned for each step along the way – whether this involves communicating an abstract, formal aspect or the local implementation of a reform. The communication strategy should target those on the fence as well as those groups directly affected by the reform. When possible, the advantages of the reform should be linked directly with the real-life examples of individuals.

10. In parallel with each phase of the reform process, the strategy group should track progress made with the help of a monitoring unit. In addition to measuring the specific impact of each measure along the way, monitoring should involve ensuring whether or not the overall tenor of the reform is met by the administrative units responsible for implementation. A tool that helps calculate needs assessment for specific aspects of migration policy (e.g., calculating the exact number of skilled workers needed) would also be of considerable use. Finally, in order to prevent conflicts or premature frustration from taking hold, expectations among participating reform actors should be managed on a regular basis.
LITERATURE


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