Something Worth Fighting For: The Evolution of Lobbying Coalitions in the Emissions Trading System

Crispin Mäenpää
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By Crispin Mäenpää

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About the author

Crispin Mäenpää holds an M.A. in European Political and Administrative Studies from the College of Europe, Bruges (Falcone and Borsellino Promotion). He previously studied at Trinity College Dublin where he achieved a B.A. in History and Political Science and was awarded the Patrick Keatinge Undergraduate Prize. Mr. Mäenpää completed part of his undergraduate at the University of California, San Diego. He currently works as a consultant/lobbyist in Brussels, specializing in the Digital Single Market.

Contact Details:  
crispin.maenpaa@coleurope.eu  
www.linkedin.com/in/crispinmaenpaa

This paper is a revised version of the Master’s thesis supervised by Professor Rudolf Hrbek.
Abstract

This thesis attempts to understand who fought for influence within the European Union’s policy area of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS is a key aspect of the European Union’s (EU) climate change policy and is particularly important in light of the conclusions at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. It was first established in 2003 with Directive 2003/87/EC and completed its first major revision in 2008 with Directive 2009/29/EC. Between these two key Directives, the interplay between industrial and environmental incentives means that the ETS has created a dynamic venue for divergent interest groups. So as to identify the relevant actors, this paper applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier. Using position papers, semi-structured interviews, and unpublished documents from the EU institutions, this paper answers its primary research question in its identification of an economy-first and an environment-first lobbying coalition. These coalitions have expanded over time with the environment-first coalition incorporating Greenpeace and the economy-first coalition expanding even further in both scope and speed. However, the economy-first coalition has been susceptible to industry-specific interests. In its application of the ACF, the research shows that a hypothesised effect between the ACF’s external events and these lobbying coalitions is inconclusive. Other hypotheses stemming from the ACF relating to electricity prices and the 2004 enlargement seem to be of significance for the relative composition of the lobbying coalitions. This paper finds that there are certain limitations within the ACF. The findings of this thesis provide a unique insight into how lobbying coalitions within a key EU policy area can form and develop.
According to Newton Dunn, “anybody goes into politics...to change things. If you believe in something, then you fight for it”\textsuperscript{1}. Mr. Dunn was shadow-rapporteur for the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) Directive in 2003 ETS. The ETS is identified by the European Commissions as being the “key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from industry at the lowest costs”\textsuperscript{2}. Accordingly, the ETS acts as a cap-and-trade system upon emissions and initially restricted the amount of annual emissions in accordance with the EU’s commitments to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Bredin and Muckley describe how the “ETS allows firms to trade the amount of emission permits that they hold and as a result has applied a market value to this externality”\textsuperscript{3}. Interestingly, the dual goal of having a market value and also reducing emissions means that the ETS has become a dynamic lobbying venue for both environmental and market-driven interest groups.

The “significant public policy experiment”\textsuperscript{4} of the ETS was initially introduced with Directive 2003/87/EC and had its first major revision with Directive 2009/29/EC. During this time, certain economic interests have declared that the “ETS has a significant impact on the competitiveness”\textsuperscript{5} of their industries, while some Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) decry that the ETS is “an abject failure”\textsuperscript{6} and that it is “obstructing other tried and tested measures that would lead to more certain results”\textsuperscript{7}. Certain bodies have gone even further in declaring that the “ETS must be abolished no later than 2020”\textsuperscript{8}.

Given the prominence of the ETS, it is necessary to understand the lobbying groups that mobilised themselves around this policy between the initial Directive 2003/87/EC and the amending Directive 2009/29/EC. This is a unique case for examination as it provides an insight into lobbying coalitions over an extended period of

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\textsuperscript{1} Interview with Mr. Bill Newton Dunn, Former-MEP (ALDE), Telephone, 22 April 2015.


\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 10.

time, between 2003 and 2009. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) provides a theoretical framework that identifies Advocacy Coalitions which act within policy subsystems such as the ETS. The ACF has been developed “to deal with intensive public policy problems”9 and is recognised as “one of the most ambitious policy frameworks”10. This paper applies the ACF in order to answer its key research question of what advocacy coalitions formed between the 2003 and 2009 ETS Directives. Moreover, this paper explores a new ACF-based hypothesis which examines the unique dynamics between these advocacy coalitions and what the ACF classifies as external events. In carrying out research, interviews were conducted and several published, and unpublished, documents were analysed.

Ultimately, research revealed that two distinct lobbying coalitions had formed within the ETS policy area, these are classified as economy-first and environment-first, Interestingly, these coalitions do not contain all the actors and stakeholders between the 2003 and 2009 Directives, and they also vary in size, with the environment-first coalition expanding much less than the economy-first coalition between the Directives. The environment-first lobbying coalition had a more stable membership than the economy-first coalition. Furthermore, a key finding of this paper includes the observation that certain external system events seem to affect the membership of coalitions. However, it is duly noted that no dominant external event can be identified and that this interpretation may be due to the inelasticity of the ACF in relation to external events.

The subsequent section provides a theoretical explanation concerning the ACF. Consequently, the ACF is applied to the ETS. The following section outlines what the ACF determines to be relatively stable parameters, and then a new hypothesis that connects the ACF’s external events to the size of the lobbying coalitions is tested. The final section provides a summation and conclusory note.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework and Research Procedure

The ACF has been heralded as “one of the most ambitious policy frameworks which tries to provide an overview of the entire policy process”\(^\text{11}\). Despite an original focus on the American political system, the ACF has been revised “to deal explicitly with European corporatist regimes”\(^\text{12}\).

At the macro-level, the ACF assumes that “most policy-making occurs among specialists within a policy subsystem but that their behaviour is affected by factors in the broader political and socioeconomic system”\(^\text{13}\). A policy subsystem is characterised by both a functional/substantive dimension and a territorial one, in this case climate change policy and the EU, respectively. Notably, Sabatier et al. acknowledge the inherent difficulties in defining the appropriate scope of a subsystem due to the “existence of overlapping and nested subsystems”\(^\text{14}\). While the macro-level denotes the presence of ‘specialists’ within the subsystem, it is necessary to acknowledge that these specialists, or policy participants, come from all levels of government, interest groups, research organisations and the media\(^\text{15}\). Furthermore, “the behaviour of policy participants within the subsystem, is...affected by two sets of exogenous factors”, namely the ‘Relatively Stable Parameters’ and the ‘External Subsystem Events’. The relatively stable parameters are “stable over long periods of time, approximately 100 years or more”\(^\text{16}\); they are unlikely to change and represent issues such as a “constitutional structure” and “fundamental sociocultural values”. Conversely, the ACF’s ‘External Subsystem Events’ can be subject to change and are identified as issues such as public opinion and socioeconomic conditions.

Turning to the micro-level, the ACF utilises a model of the individual that “is drawn heavily from social psychology”\(^\text{17}\). In this respect, Sabatier et al. align themselves to the work of March and Olsen with the concepts of a “logic of appropriateness” and a “logic of consequences”\(^\text{18}\). The ACF ascertains that individuals filter information according to their pre-existing beliefs and are “very suspicious of people with dissimilar beliefs”\(^\text{19}\). Scholars within the field of the ACF have further broken down this mode of the individual into a

\(^{11}\) Cairney, op. cit., p. 4.
\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 191.
\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 193.
\(^{16}\) Weible et al., ‘Guide to the ACF’, loc. cit.
\(^{19}\) Weible et al., ‘Guide to the ACF’, op. cit., p. 127.
three-tiered belief system of deep core, policy core, and secondary beliefs. Deep core beliefs are “very resistant to change” and are their change is seen as being “akin to a religious conversion”. Policy core beliefs are normative/empirical beliefs that are still resistant to change but are more malleable than the deep core beliefs. A suitable example would be an actor’s views on the “proper balance between government and market”. On the lowest tier stands secondary beliefs, which are empirical beliefs and policy preferences. These beliefs have been identified as being “most susceptible to change in response to new information and events”.

At the meso-level, it is contested that “the best way to deal with the multiplicity of actors in a subsystem is to aggregate them into ‘advocacy coalitions’”. Accordingly, these advocacy coalitions bring together organisations and individuals who “engage in politics to translate their beliefs into action”. Stemming from the belief system at the micro-level, the ACF assumes that “policy core beliefs are the fundamental ‘glue’ of coalitions because they represent basic normative and empirical commitments.” Furthermore, while they “share a set of normative and causal beliefs”, an identifiable advocacy coalition must “often act in concert”. As noted by Weible et al., this feature, often referred to as a nontrivial degree of coordination, is frequently overlooked in the literature. The ACF identifies a policy subsystem of meso-level advocacy coalitions grouped according to their micro-level beliefs, and they can be affected by the macro-level of stable parameters and external events.

Research Agenda and Procedure

Having discussed the ETS and the ACF, the question arises on what advocacy coalitions emerged in the ETS and how did external factors characterise or influence their

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22 Cairney, op. cit., p. 2.
23 Cairney, loc. cit.
25 Cairney, loc. cit.
development? This paper formulates a new hypothesis that tests the effect of external factors in regard to the coalition membership of material and purposive groups.

**H: If there is a significant change in the external subsystem events then this will have a stronger effect on increasing the size of material advocacy coalitions than purposive advocacy coalitions.**

This hypothesis builds on existing ACF knowledge. It tests the assumption that purposive groups have more general commitments and thus their beliefs, which is characterised as the ‘glue’ of an advocacy coalition, can stick more easily to several policy subsystems. Conversely, the more specific interests, profit, of material groups means that their involvement is dependent on the profit effects caused by external events and the spillovers which directly contribute towards their involvement in advocacy coalitions.

Through an analysis of consultation minutes, working groups, party manifestos, and interviews, the next section identifies the major actors for the 2003 and 2009 Directives. Furthermore, patterns of ‘nontrivial coordination’ are identified through joint press-releases and the information supplied through interviews. This approach forms the basis in answering the research question’s desire to identify the relevant Advocacy Coalitions. Additional documents have been sourced from the Council and the Commission through the ‘Access to Documents’ scheme. Finally, and of particular note, the personal documents of Rapporteur Avril Doyle for Directive 2009/29/EC were sourced from the European Parliament’s Historical Archives in Luxembourg. These documents offer a unique primary account into actions of the advocacy coalitions towards the ETS.

2. Environmental David vs. Industrial Goliath

The actors involved in respect to the 2003 and 2009 Directive are mapped in Table 1 and Table 2. These tables group actors according to their category (Member State, EU Institution, or NGO) and their policy core beliefs which are defined according to their views on the “proper balance between government and market”. In this sense, actors in ‘green’ represent those that are presumed to favour more environmental protection from the government, while ‘red’ represents those that favour less regulation and the functioning of the market. ‘Orange’ represents unknown or undetermined preferences. For the Council, the characterisation of the Member States is sourced from the ‘Manifesto Project Database’, which analyses Party Manifestos across the EU Member States. The variable

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utilised is the percentage of the ruling party’s respective manifestos that is dedicated to referencing ‘Environmental Protection’\textsuperscript{31}. If this share is higher than 4 percent, then the Member State is coloured green, if not it is coloured ‘red’, and where data is unavailable it is ‘orange’. While, a variable for ‘Free Market Economy’\textsuperscript{32} is also available, this is deceptively low within the Manifesto Database and thus taints the research merit of its application. Interestingly, the Member States that this approach identifies broadly correspond to what interviewees also acknowledged. This approach is applied to all Member States and their colour is based on the party that was in power during the final vote in the Council during each legislative process (July 2003 and April 2009 respectively).

The identification in the European Parliament (EP) and Commission follows an institutional logic whereby DG environment (DG ENV) is Green, while DG Enterprise (DG ENTR) is coloured red. Similarly, the Committees within the European Parliament that handled the dossier are coloured based on their institutional logic. However, the 2003 EP Committee for Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy is coloured green as its shadow-rapporteur, Mr. Newton Dunn, revealed that he “had personally decided that it was important and must try and save the planet, literally”\textsuperscript{33}. This perception may be influenced by his science-based degree in Physics and Chemistry which meant he “maybe paid more attention [to Climate Change]”\textsuperscript{34}. This quotation also reveals the importance individual actors can play within the wider framework of an Advocacy Coalition. Finally, the NGOs during the 2003 Directive are identified from the initial 2001 Commission consultation procedure\textsuperscript{35}.

\textsuperscript{31} Manifesto Project Database, \textit{Coding Scheme: CMP}, retrieved 17 April 2015, \url{https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/1}
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Interview with Newton Dunn, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Newton Dunn, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{35} European Commission, \textit{Chairman’s Summary Record of Stakeholder Consultation Meeting (with Industry and Environmental NGOs) of 4 September 2001, Brussels, 17 September 2001}
Table 1: Actors around ETS Directive 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>Environment Oriented</th>
<th>Undetermined</th>
<th>Market Orientated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources: Author’s Elaboration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Actors around ETS Directive 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>Environment Orientated</th>
<th>Undetermined</th>
<th>Market Orientated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden</td>
<td>Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta</td>
<td>Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Elaboration
Similarly, the NGOs during the 2009 Directive are identified from the minutes of the 1st\textsuperscript{36}, 2nd\textsuperscript{37}, 3rd\textsuperscript{38}, and 4th\textsuperscript{39} ECCP working groups that were held throughout 2007 and served “as a major input to the legislative work of the Commission”\textsuperscript{40}.

Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, it is clear that the number of actors increased between 2003 and 2009: the 53 actors in 2003 increased to 87 by 2009. It is important to note the effects of the 2004 enlargement in strengthening the market orientation of the Council of the European Union, a so-called “East-West dimension had become manifest in the [2008] ETS reform process”\textsuperscript{41}. Furthermore, the Market Orientated grouping outmatches the Environmental grouping during both Directives. However, Dreger contends that “ENGOs countered the input of business interests well” in 2003\textsuperscript{42}. The number of ‘undetermined’ actors in 2009 can be partly explained by the fact that the 2007 ECCP Working Groups were by invitation, meaning the Commission invited balanced opinions from consultancy companies and non-aligned bodies. While Table 1 and Table 2 provide insights into the distribution of actors and their policy core beliefs, namely an economy-first or environment-first distinction, it does not necessarily answer the research question in identifying the Advocacy Coalitions. It is therefore noted that Advocacy Coalitions “share similar policy core beliefs and engage in nontrivial degrees of coordination”\textsuperscript{43}. This paper shall identify such advocacy coalitions, and their development, through an analysis of actors showing ‘nontrivial degrees of coordination’. This is operationalised with joint press-releases, the information given in interviews, and the unpublished documents of the EU institutions and Rapporteur Doyle.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} European Commission, \textit{1st Meeting of the ECCP}, op. cit., p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Weible \textit{et al.}, ‘Guide to the ACF’, op. cit., p. 128.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Environment-first Advocacy Coalition and Development

Turning to the environment-first group, which share the same policy core beliefs, research revealed that CAN-Europe initially issued position papers by itself, as seen with the ‘Emissions Trading in the EU’ position paper issued on the 05 October 2000. This trend continues after the September 2001 Stakeholder Consultation Meeting organised by the Commission, as in December 2001 CAN-Europe issued another individual position paper. The first joint position paper among the environment-first grouping emerges in February 2002 as CAN-Europe, Birdlife International, Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), and WWF issued an ‘Open Letter to EU Ministers on the Proposal for Domestic Trading of GHG Allowances’. Furthermore, this emerging Advocacy Coalition can be seen as CAN-Europe’s individual position papers reference that “NGOs are generally sceptical of cap and trade system”. This shows they have been discussing a common position and thus coordinating opinions. A joint press-release to the European Parliament prior to their first plenary vote was issued by CAN-Europe, Birdlife International, and the WWF. Once Directive 2003 was adopted, CAN-Europe, WWF, Greenpeace, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), and FoEE issued a joint statement welcoming its adoption by Parliament. However, “Friends of the earth signed on to some of the policy briefings but they were less engaged”. Indeed, a Commission official noted that Friends of the Earth were, and still are, “the most negative on emissions trading out of the NGOs”. Accordingly, it can be surmised that CAN-Europe and WWF formed the basis of this initial ENGO advocacy coalition.

Moving forward, Mr. Wyns, formerly of CAN-Europe, revealed that while CAN-Europe represented “130 something other members”, they managed a “small working group” which “would formulate core elements of a position on ETS and then get approved by all the members.” This working group contained a representative from CAN-Europe,

50 Interview with Mr. Joris den Blanken, EU Climate Policy Director, Greenpeace, Brussels, 14 April 2015
51 Interview with a European Commission Official, Brussels, 28 April 2015.
52 Interview with Mr. Tomas Wyns, member of the Belgian government delegation during the 2003 ETS negotiations and former Policy Officer at CAN-Europe, Brussels, 21 April 2015.
WWF, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth. Analysis shows that Greenpeace was actively incorporated into this advocacy coalition from around 2006 when they issued a joint press release with CAN-Europe and WWF, which even referenced a joint study previously completed just by the WWF and CAN-Europe. Additionally, the personal unpublished documents of Rapporteur Doyle show that she received an email on 29 August 2008 from CAN-Europe which discussed how the “European NGOs have analysed the amendments” and further presented their assessment. This NGO Briefing contains the logos of CAN-Europe, WWF, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Oxfam. Interestingly, WWF also sent emails to Rapporteur Doyle which carbon copied (cc’d) CAN-Europe, FoEE, and Greenpeace into the exchange. Finally, emails sent from Jules Kortenhorst of European Climate Foundation (ECF) included a WWF position statement. The other ENGOs were not cc’d into the correspondence and the ECF later tried to introduce Ms. Doyle to “a close advisor to President Sarkozy on matters relating to climate change”. However, an ENGO representative commented that the ECF was very fresh within the ETS debate and funded certain ENGOs which “enabled them to function at that time”. Nonetheless, coordination with the ECF was not occurring.

Within the Parliament and the Commission, it can be assumed that the Parliamentary Committee ENVI and the DG ENV formed part of the advocacy coalition. As did DG ITRE in 2003 as revealed by Mr. Newton Dunn, although its leanings in 2008 are indeterminate. However, while the Council had environment-orientated Member States, an interview with Joris den Blanken, the EU Climate Policy Director at Greenpeace, revealed that the interests of “industry were generally stronger in the Council”. In 2008, documents show that Denmark was against free allocation, while Finland wanted to...

53 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 3.
58 A. Doyle, ETS-Position des Organisations Non Gouvernementales’, MEP 007DOY 1010/ETS 3DOCU-090 Position Statement, pp. 1-6, [Unpublished]
59 Ibid., p. 7.
60 Information received in an Interview.
61 Ibid.
62 Interview with den Blanken, op. cit.
extend the same allocation rules to heat production by CHP\textsuperscript{64}. While the ENGOs did not have coordinated activity in this institution, it is apparent that certain Member States were pro-environment. Accordingly, the core of the environment-first Advocacy Coalition was initially based around CAN-Europe, WWF, and later involved Greenpeace. This advocacy coalition was recognised by Pieter de Pous, the EU Policy Director at the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), who commented that “EEB’s not been a very active player in the ETS debate, best you ask at CAN, WWF, or GP”\textsuperscript{65}. FoEE, Oxfam, and the ECF were operating in a more peripheral role, while support was also forthcoming from the relevant DGs and Committees. The central and peripheral actors in the environment-first advocacy coalition are shown in Figure 1. It can be assumed that other actors who shared the same policy-core beliefs, as shown in Table 1

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Key Actors in the Environment-first Advocacy Coalition}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Source: Author’s Elaboration}

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{65} Correspondence with Mr. Pieter de Pous, EU Policy Director, European Environmental Bureau, Email, 16 March 2015.
and 2, but that did not engage in ‘nontrivial coordination’ can be attributed as having a supportive role.

**Economy-first Advocacy Coalition and Development**

When looking at the economy-first advocacy coalition that covers the market leaning actors, it is apparent that BUSINESSEUROPE, formerly UNICE, was at the centre of the debate from the outset. On 02 April 1998, UNICE issued an individual position paper on the ‘Principles for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading’\(^{66}\). This was in the aftermath of the Kyoto Agreement, and before many ENGOs or even CEMBUREAU, the European cement association, moved on the issue. Indeed, CEMBUREAU merely includes a periphery mention of the Green Paper on emissions trading in their 2000 Activity Report\(^{67}\). While BUSINESSEUROPE continued to issue individual position papers throughout 2001, the emergence of a coalition within the cement and steel industries, which were “the most eager proponents of voluntary agreements”\(^{68}\), can be seen. In 2002, CEMBUREAU was active in a “newly formed alliance of energy intensive industries [AEII] (together with lime, glass, pulp and paper, non-ferrous metals and steel industries)”\(^{69}\). An Advocacy Coalition was emerging between CEFIC, EUROFER, CEMBUREAU, EUROMETAUX, CEPI, EUROPIA, and EURELECTRIC, the organisations composing the AEII. A member of the AEII revealed that “meetings, calls and emails [were] exchanged”\(^{70}\). Interestingly, UNICE supported the AEII’s statements, as their position paper of 15 October 2002 “firmly supports the joint statement”\(^{71}\) of the AEII.

A seemingly key development in the economy-first advocacy coalition occurred in 2005 when BUSINESSEUROPE established the Alliance for a Competitive European Industry (ACEI). Strikingly, this included most of the members previously outlined in the AEII\(^{72}\). Joris den Blanken of Greenpeace commented that the AEII was “a group related to

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\(^{70}\) Interview with a European Industry Association, Telephone, 27 April 2015.


BUSINESSEUROPE. However, a representative from a Business Association commented that BUSINESSEUROPE didn’t really work with AIEE in coordinating a common understanding, and a European Industry Association contended that the ACEI “is more generally focused on European industry competitiveness [and] it also has a slightly different scope in terms of sectors represented.” Accordingly, this merger seemed to primarily be symbolic, as it didn’t contribute to ‘nontrivial coordination’ in relation to the ETS. However, other industries increased their involvement to the ETS through the AEII, and by 2008 the following organisations joined the AEII: EULA, EURO ALLIAGES, Euro Chlor, EUROGYPSUM, EXCA, and Glass Alliance Europe. Thus it is shown that the AEII brought many more organisations into the economy-first advocacy coalition. BUSINESSEUROPE operated as peripheral core actor within the economy-first advocacy coalition, while CEMBUREAU played a significant role as defined within the AEII. This is evidenced by the fact that the AEII is registered at CEMBUREAU’s head office.

The unpublished documents of Rapporteur Doyle highlight the numerous industries involved in the ETS debate. The level of coordination throughout the documented emails is not as clear-cut as with the environment-first coalition. The economic actors do not cc other organisations into their emails, which may be due to the sectorial interests at play within the economy-first coalition. In this respect, Rapporteur Doyle archived these correspondences according to industries such as Steel, Chemical, and Cement/Gypsum. While the European organisations frequently lobbied their amendments and justifications, it is also interesting to note that individual companies voiced their concerns. In this respect, the firm CRH Europe Materials, which is based in Dublin, emailed Rapporteur Doyle “the position of the cement industry in Ireland”. This contained a joint memorandum from the Cement Manufacturers Ireland and CEMBUREAU and may have been designed as a personal touch, given that Mrs. Doyle was an Irish

73 Interview with den Blanken, op. cit.
74 Interview with a European Business Association, Telephone, 20 April 2015.
75 Interview with a European Industry Association, op. cit.
MEP\textsuperscript{82}. While it is difficult to ascertain if this was a more effective means, it contributes to the characterisation of the ETS as a field of Multi-Level Governance where national and supranational bodies interact. A European Industry Association commented that while the “AEII has not been fragmented, it always developed a common position whilst respecting each sectors’ specificities”\textsuperscript{83}. Accordingly, the personal documents of Rapporteur Doyle reveal these ‘specificities’ and showcase that while a common position within the AEII may have been reached, various European organisations and firms still acted independently.

Turning to the EU institutions, it is assumed that the Commission’s DG ENTR would favour the economy-first advocacy coalition while the same logic applies to the EP’s committee of INTA in 2009; conversely the position of ITRE is unknown. Interestingly, MEP Karl Heinz Florenz (EPP) can be accredited to the economy-first coalition, as he was “leading the pack [in the EP] in accommodating some of the concerns from industry concerning emission allowances”\textsuperscript{84}. Furthermore, the personal documents of Rapporteur Doyle show emails from EUROFER in which a Mr. Axel Eggert tries to distance their organisation from the belief that “Karl-Heinz Florenz would have taken the EUROFER position”\textsuperscript{85}. These emails are corroborated by Mrs. Doyle’s handwritten notes, exclaiming: “Axel, former EP assistant to Karl Heinz Florenz!”\textsuperscript{86}. Regarding Member States, no clear indicators for ‘nontrivial coordination’ with the economy-first advocacy coalition can be established. However, an interviewee identified that the Netherlands was strongly influenced by the steel industry\textsuperscript{87}. Similarly, it is widely reported that Poland was concerned that measures within the 2009 ETS would “threaten the economic viability of the many coal-fired power stations in these countries”\textsuperscript{88}. Unpublished documents retrieved from the Council of the European Union reveal that the Czech Republic’s amendments, in 2008, centred on achieving “Free allocation for electricity production”\textsuperscript{89}, which contrasts with the position of Denmark outlined earlier. Furthermore, Italy’s amendments focused on

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Interview with a European Industry Association, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{84} Information received in an Interview
\textsuperscript{85} Doyle, ‘Secteurs Industriels’, 0020, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Information received in an Interview.
\textsuperscript{88} Skjaerseth \textit{et al.}, ‘System Revised’, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 75
removing specific percentages, as this was deemed unsatisfactory “as long as the proposal does not specify for the sector and sub-sector exposed”\textsuperscript{90}.

Once again, while coordination could not be identified with the Member States, sympathetic participants may be identified. The central and peripheral actors within the economy-first coalition are shown in Figure 2. As was assumed for the environment-first coalition, those actors that shared the same policy-core beliefs, detailed in Table 1 and 2, but that did not engage in ‘nontrivial coordination’ are determined to have a supporting role.

In summation, research has highlighted that both the environment-first and economy-first advocacy coalitions that developed between 2003 and 2009 did not include all of the actors that were involved around the respective Directives (as identified in Table 1 and Table 2). The environment-first coalition expanded to include Greenpeace within its core body, while the economy-first coalition brought in several sectors including alloys, ceramics, chemicals, chlor alkali, and expanded clay industries. Furthermore, this coalition was

Figure 2: Key Actors in the \textit{Economy-first} Advocacy Coalition

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Key Actors in the \textit{Economy-first} Advocacy Coalition}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Source: Author’s Elaboration}

\textsuperscript{90} Council of the European Union, ‘Meeting Document’, \textit{loc. cit.}. 25
consolidated under the framework of the AEII. Remarkably, one cannot find a strong indicator for ‘nontrivial coordination’ by the Foundation for International Environmental Law (FIELD) and thus contrasts with Dreger, who identifies them to be one of “the most influential ENGOs”\textsuperscript{91}. Having identified the advocacy coalitions, this paper will now place these coalitions within the more consistent external events of the ACF, namely the ‘Relatively Stable Parameters’.

3. Relatively Stable Parameters

The ‘Relatively Stable Parameters’ identified under the ACF are: the basic attributes of the problem area and distribution of natural resources; the fundamental sociocultural values and social structure; and the basic constitutional structure. They locate the ETS policy subsystem within its field of Climate Change.

Basic Attributed of the Problem Are and Distribution of Natural Resources (Externality and Steel)

Sabatier comments that identifying the basic attributes of the problem area has been influenced by Public Choice theorists\textsuperscript{92}. GHG emissions, which lead to climate change, are recognised as an “externality”\textsuperscript{93}. This means the issue of climate change transcends international boundaries and is suitable to government intervention. Additionally, the basic attributes of this problem is informed by scientific learning, as seen by the publications of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The reports of the IPCC move towards “understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change”\textsuperscript{94}. The ACF dictates that this would make the field susceptible to policy change\textsuperscript{95}. Turning to the natural resources, Graph 1 shows steel production within Europe, an extension of iron ore deposit locations. Sabatier ascertains that such resources “strongly affects a society’s overall wealth and viability of different economic sectors”\textsuperscript{96}. However, given that approximately 70% of the Euro area’s GDP exists

\textsuperscript{91} Dreger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{95} Weible \textit{et al.}, ‘A Guide to the ACF’, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 120.
in ‘Services’\textsuperscript{97}, this aspect of the ACF requires updating so as to better fit the EU. Nonetheless, the characterisation of steel may be of benefit regarding ETS parameters, as the Directives affected “the production and processing of ferrous metals”\textsuperscript{98}.

**Graph 1: EU Steel Production by Process in the EU27, 2006 (million tonnes)**

![Graph 1](image)


**Fundamental Socio-Cultural Values and Social Structure (Environment)**

Environment features strongly in the socio-cultural values of the European Union. This can be seen with the 1999 Eurobarometer survey where 69.1\% of respondents identified environmental protection and the fight against pollution as “an immediate and urgent problem”\textsuperscript{99}. An interview conducted with Bill Newton Dunn, MEP since 1979 and shadow-rapporteur for the Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy Committee during the 2003 ETS Directive, revealed how “the mood was less clear whether climate change was really happening, but it was good to take steps now”\textsuperscript{100}. This highlights how


\textsuperscript{100} Interview with Newton Dunn, *op. cit.*
the consistent socio-cultural values and social structure within the European Union encouraged action upon climate change. This analysis lends credence to the ACF assertion that “while such norms are not immutable, change usually requires decades”\textsuperscript{101}.

**Basic Constitutional Structure (Co-Decision and Multi-level Governance)**

For Cairney, the ACF’s assessment of the ‘basic constitutional structure’ suggests that it “provides a source of stability within sub-systems”\textsuperscript{102}. Importantly, the EU’s basic constitutional structure was consistent throughout this paper’s research period and was based upon the 2001 Treaty of Nice. Furthermore, both Directives 2003 and 2009 were based on the ‘rules’ outlined in Article 251 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, namely the co-decision procedure.

Having placed the ETS policy subsystem within its Relatively Stable Parameters, attention now turns to the new hypothesis that tests the effect of external factors in regard to the coalition membership of material and purposive groups.

### 4. Impact of External System Events

The External System Events identified by the ACF include: Changes in Socio-Economic Conditions, Changes in Public Opinion, Changes in Systemic Governing Coalition, and Changes in Other Policy Subsystems. This section examines each their respective relationship to the hypothesis,

**H: If there is a significant change in the external subsystem events then this will have a stronger effect on increasing the size of material advocacy coalitions than purposive advocacy coalitions.**

**Changes in Socio-Economic Conditions (Prices and Crisis)**

Changes in socioeconomic conditions can act in “undermining the causal assumptions of present policies or by significantly altering the political support of various advocacy coalitions”\textsuperscript{103}. This paper discusses the effect of the ETS on electricity prices and the effect it had on advocacy coalitions. Furthermore, the financial crisis is identified as a dominant factor that widely affected socioeconomic conditions.

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\textsuperscript{102} Cairney, *Understanding*, op. cit., p. 281.
\textsuperscript{103} Sabatier, ‘An ACF of Policy Change’, *loc. cit.*
In its impact assessment of Directive 2003 the Commission recognised the “indirect effect accruing from rising electricity prices”\(^\text{104}\). In this respect, members of the economy-first coalition seem to have actively framed this external event, as in 2003 they denounced the “unintended and unjustified impact of the Emissions Trading Directive on electricity prices”\(^\text{105}\). Furthermore, the contact with DG ENTR had a “special emphasis on electricity prices”\(^\text{106}\). Accordingly, this event is characterised as a ‘significant change’, as it was brought into the policy subsystem by the economy-first coalition that operated in line with the ACF assumption that “external events provide new resources to some coalitions – it is up to them to exploit the opportunity”\(^\text{107}\). By 2007, electricity prices were established as a key issue on the agenda; during the 3rd meeting of the ECCP Working Group, several business organisations made presentations on “the Impact of the EU ETS on Electricity prices”\(^\text{108}\).

Conversely, the environment-first coalition did not enter the fray on the issue of electricity prices. CAN-Europe did not produce any press releases on the issue, nor did WWF discuss electricity prices during Agenda Item 4: ‘Carbon Price signals, allocation methodologies, and international aspects including electricity prices’ during the 3rd ECCP Meeting\(^\text{109}\). This indirect effect seems to have mobilised an expansion within the AEEI, as 2005 documents show that “work on electricity prices and the functioning of the electricity market was continued in close cooperation with IFIEC”\(^\text{110}\). This effect can lend credence to the hypothesis that a ‘significant change’ in an external event will increase the size of material groups to a greater extent that purposive groups. The correlation exhibited may be particularly prominent, given that electricity prices affected the material profit of such groups.

Turning to the financial crisis, research revealed that 2008/2009 was simply too early to have an impact on the advocacy coalitions\(^\text{111}\). Mr. Wyns of CAN-Europe


\(^{106}\) Ibid. p. 11.


\(^{108}\) European Commission, 3rd Meeting of the ECCP, op. cit., p. 10.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.


\(^{111}\) Interview with den Blanken, op. cit.
commented that the 2008 negotiations centred on the principal that “we are going to grow [economically]”\textsuperscript{112}. This sentiment was mirrored by a European Industry Association, who ascertained that the system was designed with growth in mind and that “no one was pre-empting where we are now”\textsuperscript{113}. Given this situation, the effects of the financial crisis upon the advocacy coalitions within this paper’s timeframe is indeterminate. However, analysis shows that the economy-first coalition began to advocate that the Commission should “not add extra burden that might break the industry’s back”\textsuperscript{114}. The emerging effects of this external event can also be seen by Greenpeace’s representative, who commented how the position of the Rapporteur Avril Doyle for the 2009 Directive was “very much restrained”, due to the ambition of the EU to be prepared ahead of the Copenhagen climate summit and also the unfolding financial crisis, which meant she could not afford to strongly oppose the French EU Presidency proposals\textsuperscript{115}. Further research with an expanded timeframe is required to fully understand how the financial crisis impacted the advocacy coalitions within the ETS policy subsystem. However, the financial crisis was not a factor in affecting the membership of the advocacy coalitions between the 2003 and 2009 ETS Directives.

**Changes in Public Opinion (Eurobarometer)**

This paper analyses the Eurobarometer question, ‘What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?’. Graph 2 situates this question in respect to the relative percentage of respondents that answered the ‘Economic Situation’, ‘Protecting the Environment’, or ‘Don’t Know’. Strikingly, while environmental concerns generally feature quite strongly in the public opinion of the EU, Graph 2 highlights that EU citizens still view the economic situation as being of greater concern. The figures show that while the ‘economic situation’ is more prioritised, it also has greater fluctuations. Furthermore, the preference attributed to the ‘economic situation’ was declining from 2003 to 2007, the period within which the ETS was introduced and revised. This was complemented by a general trending increase in the priority to ‘protect the

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Wyns, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{113} Interview with a European Industry Association, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{115} Interview with den Blanken, \textit{op. cit.}
environment’. It was only after the 2009 Directive that “competitiveness has really become a priority and the question today is how we can learn from the past”\textsuperscript{116}.

The lack of a ‘significant change’ corresponds to the hypothesised assumption that ‘public opinion’ had not influenced the memberships within the ETS policy subsystem between Directive 2003 and 2009. Mr. Newton Dunn, a former MEP, shadow-rapporteur for the ITRE committee during the initial 2003 Directive, and member of the ENVI Committee in 2008, revealed that while the issue of climate change was “more important in 2008 than early 2001”, he had decided in 2003 that “this was important and we must try to save the planet, literally”\textsuperscript{117}. Thus, while a slight increase in environmental concerns between the Directives is seen, no ‘significant change’ is apparent. Regarding the environment-first coalition, Mr. den Blanken of Greenpeace commented that public opinion did not bring about Greenpeace’s involvement in the ETS debate but that it was “a policy choice, just a strategic policy choice”\textsuperscript{118}. This may lend credence to the hypothesis that changes in external factors do not implicitly affect purposive groups. Additionally, according to one interviewee,

“Everyone thinks we should reduce emissions and save the planet, and everyone has the belief that industry should reduce. No one understands that industry is just a very small part. The ETS is 50% of emissions, and industry makes up only half of that. The bigger part is building, transport and electricity. Industry has already reached their limit in emissions reduction”\textsuperscript{119}.

\textsuperscript{116} Interview with a European Trade Association, Brussels, 29 April 2015.
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with Newton Dunn, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{118} Interview with den Blanken, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{119} Information received in an Interview.
**Graph 2** What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?, *Eurobarometer, 2003-2010*

Public opinion may in fact be misinterpreting the dynamics of the ETS debate. Accordingly, a strong realignment in this perception would shift the focus on new industries and thus may bring more organisations into the economy-first advocacy coalition. Once again, the shift in public opinion towards the economic crisis may provide worthy analysis for research that extends beyond 2009. However, the lack of a ‘significant change’ contributes to the hypothesis that public opinion was unable to impact the advocacy coalitions. If a ‘significant change’ were present, it would be methodologically difficult to account for the degree to which this change in public opinion is independent and external to an advocacy coalition. The link between public opinion and advocacy coalitions is not unidirectional, and is more complex than a simple action reaction characterisation, as seen by the UN Secretary General in 2007 telling Greenpeace to “mobilize public opinion” concerning climate change\textsuperscript{120}.

\section*{Changes in Systemic Governing Coalitions (Transitions and Elections)}

The ACF dictates that a change in a systemic governing coalition can represent “the election of a new government with beliefs that favour one coalition over another”\textsuperscript{121}. Thus there exists an almost paradoxical nature regarding the effect of a change in a systemic governing coalition within the ACF. Due to the multilevel characterisations of the EU, a change in a systemic governing coalition can emerge from within the Member States of the Council, the Commission, or the European Parliament. Each shall be dealt with in sequence.

There were no dramatic national elections that affected the ETS debate between the Directives\textsuperscript{122}. However, the Council experienced an enlargement in 2004 in which the majority of these nations favoured a market orientated approach. Nevertheless, a significant degree of ‘non-trivial coordination’ could not be identified. Importantly, while the Member States themselves weren’t folded into advocacy coalitions, this expansion increased the economy-first coalition as it attracted national organisations into their representative associations. In this respect, the dominant nation represented in EURACOAL became Poland, with six national organisations\textsuperscript{123}. Conversely, the effect on

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{121} Cairney, ‘Policy Concepts’, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{122} Interview with a Commission Official, \textit{op. cit.}
\end{flushleft}
the purposive environment-first grouping was less pronounced, as seen by the organisations within CAN-Europe. No organisation joined from Cyprus, Estonia, or Slovakia, two joined from the Czech Republic, while a single organisation joined from each of the other new Member States\footnote{CAN-Europe, ‘Members’, retrieved 15 April 2015, http://www.caneurope.org/about-us/61-about-us/membership}. This contrasts with the six organisations from the Netherlands, seven from Belgium, twenty from Germany, and twenty-five from the United Kingdom\footnote{CAN-Europe, ‘Members’, op. cit.}.

Evidently, enlargement strengthened certain economy-first members to a greater extent than it did the environment-first members, consistent with this paper’s hypothesis. Moving to the Commission, the change in governance between Prodi (1999-2004), Barroso I (2004-2009), and Barroso II (2009-2014) did not represent a significant external system change to the ETS subsystem. Firstly, Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union clearly states that “the Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end”\footnote{Article 17, TEU}, thus it is less susceptible to the partisan politics that may dominate national executives. Secondly, interviewees noted that the relevant “DGs were indeed very settled”\footnote{Interview with Wyns, op. cit.}, and that “since 2003, it’s kind of business as usual”\footnote{Interview with a European Industry Association, op. cit.}. Additionally, there have only been five Secretaries-General of the Commission thus ensuring a high level of consistency in the “preparation of the institution’s work”\footnote{O. Costa and N. Brack, ‘How the EU Really Works’, Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2014, p. 72.}. It is clear that the Commission’s leadership transition did not represent a significant change in governing coalition and correspondingly an effect upon the advocacy coalition’s memberships, or indeed resources, is not evident.

procedure. Mr. Newton Dunn MEP summarised the situation in that the Parliament was “a very green group”\textsuperscript{131}.

Graph 3: Composition of MEPs in Incoming Parliament’s Fifth Legislature (1999-2004)

\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Newton Dunn, \textit{op. cit.}
Changes in Other Policy Subsystems (International and European levels)

Sabatier declares that “subsystems are only partially autonomous” and further adds that “decisions and impacts from other policy sectors are one of the principal dynamic elements affecting specific subsystems”\textsuperscript{132}. Accordingly, as the ETS was frequently characterised as a “learning-by-doing”\textsuperscript{133} approach, this paper shall analyse the possible impact of other policy sectors through the perspective of the international dimension, and then briefly through the European dimension.

The initial establishment of the EU’s ETS was facilitated by the international policy sector and the “unexpected policy window created by Kyoto”\textsuperscript{134}. In particular, the departure of America from the international sector was influential as a Commission

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{132} Sabatier, ‘An ACF of Policy Change’, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 137.
\end{footnotesize}
official succinctly summated that “Bush walked out and then Europe held it together”\textsuperscript{135}. Thus, this initial international event motivated the advocacy-coalitions to combine and express their beliefs. The key international policy decisions regarding the ETS and the Kyoto protocol emerged from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Between the publication of the EU’s ETS Directives in 2003 and 2009, there have been eleven UNFCCC meetings. Of particular interest are those sessions which contained a Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). This entails the annual meetings which occurred at Montreal in 2005, Nairobi in 2006, Bali in 2007, and Poznan in 2008\textsuperscript{136}. The major output from these conferences occurred with the adoption of the so-called ‘Bali-Roadmap’ in 2007.

The ‘Bali-Roadmap’ was designed to “guide negotiations over the next two years”\textsuperscript{137}. The output from this conference cemented “a negotiating framework in place” and included “developed and developing countries in the negotiations on ‘considerations’ for a final agreement”\textsuperscript{138}. Importantly, the emission reductions communicated by countries were mere “pledges, as are the financial promises”\textsuperscript{139}, thus it was not as binding as the Kyoto outcome and certainly wasn’t credible as a significant change. The key focus was on the “developing country Commitments”\textsuperscript{140}, which “resulted in a lower level of ambition, particularly for the developed countries”\textsuperscript{141}. However, while the policy impact on the EU wasn’t strong, the US’s objections almost caused a breakdown in the negotiations\textsuperscript{142}. Accordingly, the developments of the Bali Roadmap further consolidated the EU as a ‘green leader’. However, it is unclear whether developments within the UNFCC served to mobilise the advocacy coalitions to such an extent as occurred with the Kyoto Protocol, as interviewees could not identify an effect to any degree of confidence\textsuperscript{143}. This can partly be attributed to the fact that the ‘Bali-Roadmap’ was not a ‘significant change’ for the EU.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Interview with a Commission Official, \textit{op. cit.}
  \item \textsuperscript{136} United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Meetings’, retrieved 23 April 2015, \url{http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/6240.php}
  \item \textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} EcoQuity, ‘Debrief on Bali Roadmap’, December 2007, p. 1, retrieved 30 April 2015, \url{http://www.ecoquity.org/docs/Bali-debrief.pdf}
  \item \textsuperscript{141} Ngwadla \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} Fletcher \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{143} Interview with various interviewees.
\end{itemize}
Another significant event in the international policy sector, the Copenhagen Conference, did not directly occur within the timeline bounded by the 2003 and 2009 Directives. However, documents retrieved from the Council show that Mr Jean-Louis Borloo, the French Minister for Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Town and Country Planning, spoke on behalf of the Council and “welcomed the prospect of reaching an agreement [on Directive 2009] before the initiation of the Copenhagen round”\textsuperscript{144}. Accordingly, it can be determined to be a looming external system event that the ETS policy subsystem was aware of. Rapporteur Avril Doyle publicly stated that the 2009 Directive meant that “exceptional circumstances called for exceptional measures. All those involved in the EU institutions have clearly understood the need for Europe to drive this process forward and deliver it in time for the 15th meeting of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change next year in Copenhagen”\textsuperscript{145}.

How did this external event affect the membership of the advocacy coalitions? Interestingly, the horizon dominating Copenhagen summit affected the EU institutions more than the advocacy coalitions. It shortened the feasible timeline of the policy process and may have thus contributed to the widespread surprise that the 2009 Directive “went through very smoothly”\textsuperscript{146}, especially considering the centralization of the system. CEMBUREAU ascertained that “as the outcome of the COP15 with the Copenhagen Accord will not lead to any significant reductions of GHG emissions elsewhere in the world, the exposure to international trade has actually become more critical”\textsuperscript{147}, while EUROMETAUX deemed that the “Copenhagen failure will accelerate technology drain”\textsuperscript{148}. Thus, the economy-first lobbying coalitions tried to utilise the external system event for their own gain. Similarly, Greenpeace desired the “EU to increase its domestic climate target” by


\textsuperscript{146} Interview with Wyns, *op. cit.*


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“strengthening the EU Emissions Trading Scheme”\textsuperscript{149}. This would place the EU “at the heart of a coalition to deliver a new internal climate regime”\textsuperscript{150}. Despite these statements, the effect upon the advocacy coalitions themselves was less apparent except in limiting their lobbying avenues.

When analysing the effect of other European policy areas, a European Industry Association lamented the “kind of silos approach” wherein “the ETS is the ETS and there is no link with the contribution of the Energy Intensive Industries to the low carbon economy”\textsuperscript{151}. Interviewees could not concretely identify other EU policy areas within which either the economy-first or environment-first coalitions had learned. Greenpeace commented that they “could have learnt more from REACH [the Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals] in terms of industry influence”\textsuperscript{152}. A Commission official recognised that “relations have always been much better [on the ETS] than when worked on REACH”. However, the European “2020 package led to a huge policy overlap”\textsuperscript{153} and “overlapping targets aren’t effective”\textsuperscript{154}. Agreed in 2009, these overlaps mean that there is a movement towards the ACF specification that “subsystems may overlap with each other (i.e. they interact with each other frequently enough so that a subset of actors is part of both)”\textsuperscript{155}. This situation can create more meaningful impacts from other policy subsystems.

In summation, the advocacy-coalitions did not experience sufficiently impactful policy learning from other EU policy areas; indeed, Mr. Wyns commented upon how the “ETS was something completely new”\textsuperscript{156}. Accordingly, the hypothesis relating a significant change in external events to an effect on the lobbying coalitions is not apparent within the European policy sphere.

\textbf{Conclusion: General Findings}

This paper has applied the ACF to study the policy subsystem of the ETS. The important contribution of this research lies in identifying the emergence and development of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Ibid.
  \item Interview with a European Industry Association, op. cit.
  \item Interview with den Blanken, op. cit.
  \item Interview with a European Trade Association, op. cit.
  \item Interview with a European Business Association, op. cit.
  \item Sabatier et al., ‘An Assessment, op. cit., p. 137.
  \item Interview with Wyns, op. cit.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
lobbying coalitions and testing a new hypothesis on the effect of external system events upon these respective coalitions.

In relation to its core research question regarding the presence of advocacy coalitions, this paper finds that, between the 2003 and 2009 Directive, there were two distinct advocacy coalitions active within the ETS policy subsystem, an environment-first coalition and an economy-first coalition, respectively. These coalitions emerged in the early 2000s, with the economy-first coalition, through the AEII, considerably expanding the number of European organisations within its fold. The environment-first coalition had much more modest growth as it incorporated Greenpeace into its core body from around 2006. The unpublished documents of Rapporteur Doyle reveal that the environment-first coalition acted more cohesively, as its email correspondences cc’d in other organisations and they frequently emailed analyses from other organisations within their coalition. Similarly, the “small working group” 157 hosted by CAN-Europe seemed to be more cooperative than the ad-hoc “meetings, calls and emails”158 of the AEII. Furthermore, the unpublished documents of Rapporteur Doyle revealed that various sectorial industries campaigned on their individual interests which was touched upon by an interviewee’s assessment that the AEII respected “each sectors’ specificities”159. The ACF proves highly useful in being able to identify advocacy coalitions that shared similar policy core beliefs and engaged in ‘nontrivial coordination’.

However, the relative explanatory effects of the proposed hypothesis (If there is a significant change in the external subsystem events then this will have a stronger effect on increasing the size of material advocacy coalitions than purposive advocacy coalitions) are less conclusive. The socioeconomic change in electricity prices and, to a lesser extent, the effect from the 2004 enlargement may have affected the development of the material lobbying coalitions to a greater degree than their purposive counterpart. However, the ‘significant change’ in public opinion and the financial crisis fell outside the research parameters of this paper, and thus can be identified as areas of research interest for additional studies. Furthermore, there was not a ‘significant change’ in the governing coalition of the Commission or the “very green group”160 of the European Parliament, while the impact of the international policy system affected the lobbying avenues within the

157 Interview with Wyns, *op. cit.*
158 Interview with a European Industry Association, *op. cit.*
159 Ibid.
160 Interview with Newton Dunn, *op. cit.*
institutions more than the lobbying coalitions. Accordingly, this paper has limited findings regarding the effects of external system events upon advocacy coalitions. An analysis of changes in the ACF’s external events is affected by the fact that economies have their ups and downs, public opinion changes constantly, the relative power of government fluctuates, and decisions spill over between sectors on a daily basis\textsuperscript{161}.

Future revisions of the hypothesis should incorporate instances of “abnormal’ fluctuations”\textsuperscript{162}. An analysis of this refined hypothesis upon policy subsystems may provide more conclusive findings. Thus, while this paper’s hypothesis sees some minor success through the effects of electricity prices and the 2004 enlargement, further studies with the refined hypothesis are required for a more thorough understanding concerning the relationship between external events and advocacy coalitions.

\textsuperscript{161} Nohrstedt, ‘External Shocks’, op. cit. p. 1046.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
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