THE CFSP AND BEYOND:
THE EU’S TERRITORIAL AND FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

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Security and security policy are on the agenda of the European Union (EU) as never before. The inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as a second pillar of the European Union is evidence enough of that. Further, the innovation in the defence arena regarding the proposed relationship of the EU to the Western European Union appears to show that the EU is grappling with security policy in earnest, though the results have been decidedly mixed. War in the former Yugoslavia has served to heighten the sense of urgency to giving a security profile to the EU as conflict in the Balkans has dispersed refugees across the continent of Europe and threatens to spread beyond its present confines.

This paper argues that in dealing with security issues, the EU can draw on two traditions of thought from its own development, but that it has in practice predominantly focused on one, a military, territorial conception of security. The other approach, the functional route to security manifested in the origins of the European Coal and Steel Community, has progressively been relegated in the public pronouncements of the Community/Union on peace and security.

The paper takes its inspiration from David Mitrany’s critique of the European Economic Community (EEC) in his article, "The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional", to advance a critique of the EU’s approach to security from a functional perspective and to suggest an alternative. [Mitrany,
1966] It is in three parts. The first part describes the current security discourse of the EU, especially the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), outlining territorial assumptions and the notion of excluding of external threats as the basis of security policy in the EU. The second part outlines Mitrany's critique of the EEC as an exclusive regional organization and relates this to the origins of security policy in the EC/EU (notably in the establishment of the ECSC) and also to current security politics in the EU. The third part considers the example of the EU's relations with Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the two traditions of security policy for the EU.

**Security Policy in the EU: Maastricht and After**

While hedged around with 'if's, 'but's and 'maybe's, the CFSP is a major change in the status of security policy of the EU. Unfortunately the development of the CFSP has drawn on a traditional notion of foreign and security policy, particularly in its institutional focus on security policy as the responsibility of Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Defence. While this might be put down simply to bureaucratic infighting and turf-wars, there is no doubt that baggage comes with the association of security and security policy with Departments that have traditional been understood to deal with security as an external threat to national security, national interest, or (most broadly) international order. Here I will present a brief outline of the origins and development of the CFSP and then examine its underlying assumptions.

**The Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy**

Any story of the CFSP as it has been established has to tell the story of the development of European Political Cooperation (EPC). CFSP develops straight out of EPC. The history of the CFSP as it is related by the EU itself and in texts about the EU can be briefly summarised as follows: the EEC Treaty created a community
whose focus, i.e., treaty basis, was economic. The external relations of the member states for which the EEC itself had competence were certain economic relations. However, as the EEC grew in wealth, power, size and stature, it had more weight internationally, both economically and politically. However, external economic relations which were coordinated through the EC Commission were not matched with a common foreign policy stance of the EC. This led to confused positions of EC member states and a feeling that the EC’s potential power in the international system was not being sufficiently exploited. There was also a perception within the EC and outside that it lacked focus in its relations with the rest of the world.

EPC was partly a response to these developments, though it never overcame the problems that created it. It emerged in the early 1970s as a mechanism whereby the member states of the EC consulted on and coordinated their foreign policies, through regular meetings of their Foreign Ministers. EPC remained outside the treaty framework of the EC: it was intergovernmental, political, ad hoc and voluntary. Despite the EC’s growing economic power, EPC has remained declaratory rather than effective, that is, EPC entailed consulting other EC states on foreign policy issues and issuing statements on, for instance, the situation in South Africa or the Middle East. When significant issues appeared, especially those implicating national security interests, EPC more or less fell by the wayside, as was the case of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands conflict, where the British Government merely sought an EPC rubber stamp for its own unilateral actions. [George, 1991, pp. 218-20] The progressive development of the EPC and its routinization within the business of the EC ultimately led to its institutionalised in Title III of the Single European Act (SEA), though it remained a intergovernmental political framework.

Foreign policy coordination and consultation was one thing. Security policy in the EU was another. It was always something of a problem for EPC and defence matters were so controversial as to be explicitly excluded from consideration. Article 6 of Title III
of the SEA refers to security policy. The High Contracting Parties (the EC member states) were 'ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security,' for instance, within the framework of the CSCE and on issues that required the application of trade sanctions. But cooperation on 'hard' security matters, i.e., defence cooperation, was expected to continue within the framework of NATO. The SEA also refers to the need to keep up technologically with others, the U.S. and Japan presumably, to ensure security in a.6(b).

With the development of the CFSP, military and strategic dimensions of security have on paper become more important though political and economic aspects of security policy are still the primary focus of the EU. [Delors, 1991, p. 104] Title V of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy can be understood in part as a reaction to the weaknesses of the EPC, such as its voluntary and declaratory nature and the lack of significant policy output. The CFSP goes back further, however, inasmuch as it is also linked to previous efforts to create defence identity in Europe, such as the Pleven Plan of 1952 that aimed to create a European Defence Community.¹

Title V envisages 'systematic cooperation' on foreign and security policy which codifies the procedure of EPC once again, with the possibility of the Council of Ministers defining a common position. Member states are expected to 'inform and consult each other within the Council' and exert 'combined influence' through 'concerted and convergent action.' [Article J.2.1] The range of issues covered by the CFSP under Maastricht include coordination, consultation of EU members and the creation of common positions in the OSCE; on arms control negotiations in Europe; on nuclear non-proliferation issues; and regarding economic aspects of security, particularly the control of the transfer of military technology to

¹ The plan for a European Defence Community failed, of course, because of concerns about German rearmament and British hesitancy and ultimate reluctance to join in the project. [Pinder, 1991, pp. 6-7; Nugent, 1991, pp. 39-41]
third countries and arms exports. [European Council declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty; also in European Union, p. 31] These provisions are within the political and economic aspects of security, the traditional concern of EPC.

According to Maastricht, Joint Action is to be implemented on matters determined by the Council with general guidelines set by the European Council. Majority voting applies to joint action [Article J.3.2] and ‘[j]oint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.’ [Article J.3.4.] That it is to be ‘gradually implement[ed]’ suggests that this article is quite weak. Furthermore, following the difficult negotiations of Maastricht, the CFSP has become what is now known as the Second Pillar of the Union (with Justice and Home Affairs as the Third). The practical implication of the ‘Pillar’ formulation is to keep CFSP an intergovernmental, political, consensus mechanism, not formally coming under the scrutiny of the European Court of Justice or the European Parliament, let alone the direction of the Commission.

The joint actions that have taken place under the CFSP are exemplified by EU actions to provide humanitarian assistance in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the provide observers for the Parliamentary elections in Russia. Joint actions are for the most part within the usual bounds established by EPC, though the extreme situation in Bosnia has led to a more active approach than typifies most EC/EU decisions. [Bulletin of the European Union 1/2-1994, p. 66, and 10-1994, p. 47]

The EU addressed the military aspects of security at Maastricht. But the operative article, J.4, is hedged around with qualifications even greater than those that apply to the development of the CFSP. Three of the six parts of this article concern what the Article does not do. Specifically, it is not subject to the majority voting provision of joint action, it is not prejudicial to participation in NATO or to bilateral relations with third countries. [Article J.4.3-5] Furthermore, the main instrument of defence cooperation is to be an already existing international
organization, the Western European Union (WEU), which is described as 'an integral part of the development of the [European] Union,' notwithstanding the fact that the treaty creating the WEU expires in 1998 [Article J.4.2] and that the memberships (of the EU and the WEU) are not consonant, requiring the creation of WEU associate member and observer status. We must wait until the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference that is set to review the timetable and prospectus set out by the Maastricht Treaty to see if anything further is going to be put in place regarding defence cooperation. Presently, the development of the Eurocorps - defence cooperation initially between France and Germany, but now also including other (but by no means all) EU member states - holds both potential advantages and problems for the EU/WEU defence identity. On the one hand, if it is at all successful, it would signify greater cooperation on defence matters than previously. On the other hand, the Eurocorps promises to create a second tier in CFSP just as the EU is trying to cope with centrifugal tendencies in other policy areas such as Economic and Monetary Union. These problems only arise, however, if the Eurocorps becomes an effective vehicle for defence cooperation rather than the paper agreement it appears today.

The Character of the CFSP

The emphasis so far has been on the historical development of the CFSP and its limitations. This section will take a look at some of the guiding principles of the CFSP and its underlying assumptions. While it might not be as strong as some of its proponents would like, there are reasons to be sceptical about the CFSP should it be realised.

To put it very bluntly, the aim of security policy in the EU as manifested in EPC and the CFSP is premised on the territorial exclusion of threats to security; the exclusion is ultimately performed through coercive measures, in the final analysis, military force. Security policy in the EU, then, is essentially a
state-centred perspective writ large onto the proto-European state. As I noted above, security and security policy has been narrowly conceived as the business of defence and foreign ministry apparatuses. This creates and reinforces the 'history' of security policy as an addendum to the development of European Political Cooperation, that can be read against the backdrop of past abortive attempts at creating a European Defence Community, that have culminated rather naturally with the EU's growing maturity and power in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Maastricht Treaty. [George, 1991, ch. 13; European Union, p. 29] The problem here is an evacuation of the substance of security: security policy is what foreign and defence department officials do and security is what security policy provides. Besides the reductionism of this position, there is the serious question whether reviving plans for a European Defence are appropriate at all given the changed international context.

More fundamentally, security policy in the EU implicates identity, specifically the identity of the European Union. Indeed, in some ways, what is secured above all is EU identity. The article on EPC in the SEA is premised on the notion that security cooperation would contribute to 'the development of a European identity in external policy matters.' Security is seen as a route to European identity, meaning the present member states of the EU. [Delors, 1991, pp. 104-7]

EU identity is being created through difference to others, however. The CFSP implicitly interprets security policy as for the EU member states in the face of threats from outside the EU. While some of Title III of the SEA might look like it involves a broader conception of security, it is nonetheless tied to defence - political and military - against outsiders. It is confrontational rather than cooperative security. The view of security in the SEA as an exclusive concept is carried over into the CFSP.

The creation of outsiders to the EU might be considered inevitable. After all, there are limits to engagement and membership. Yet, the significance of being on the inside or the
outside will increase as the EU as a group of states grows more 'powerful', as we have seen with the recent defection from EFTA of Austria, Sweden and Finland. Unfortunately, the negative implications of the inside/outside distinction are worsened by the view of the EU as some sort of Third Power. This used to be the view of the EC between the US and the Soviets; today, it is the EU versus a North American bloc and an Asian bloc. Furthermore, the Third Power view of the EU complements and reinforces a federalist vision of the Union by highlighting the need for internal coherence and solidarity in the face of external challenges. In the discourses of the CFSP, the EU's capabilities and modalities of internal cohesion and external expression are implicitly compared to those of a state and also rest on an understanding of power ultimately determined by the possession of military force. Certainly, the development of a security policy suggests that some within the EU hope that it will in future be a Great Power, though many other Europeans equally fear such a development. [Hill, 1990, p. 54; Johan Galtung, 1973]

Ultimately, however, the paradox of the security discourse of the EU as found in the CFSP is that it looks for problems and threats. As it concentrates on security interpreted as defence against outsiders, it jeopardises the EU's openness and the prospects for international cooperation and ironically the EU's own security! The paradox of the CFSP is a result not of flawed analysis but lack of analysis. Security policy has relied rather conservatively on notions of security derived from national Foreign Ministries and Defence Ministries. Furthermore, security policy is seen as instrumental to the development of a regional union - it is another part of the federal puzzle alongside Economic and Monetary Union - rather than being valued for the security it could provide. [Delors, 1991, pp. 104-5] An alternative conception of security and security policy is available to the EU; an alternative that features prominently in the history of the Union.

The Functional Alternative
That the concept of security in the EU's security policy has remained undeveloped in one respect somewhat surprising. It is surprising for a couple of reasons. First, while the discussion above might appear new, the criticisms of the territorial, military-oriented, and exclusionary conceptions of European security are long-standing. In short, one does not need to be a post-modernist to embrace the criticisms of the territorial basis of the CFSP.

The second reason is that, to put it (too) strongly, the EU is betraying itself in the attempt to formulate a security policy with a defence emphasis. Clearly, recent circumstances in the former Yugoslavia and the experience in the Gulf have oriented the discussion of security policy in the EU towards the management and settlement/enforcement phases of conflict resolution. [Delors, 1991, p. 102, 106-8; Salmon, 1992, p. 250-2] It continues to be true, however, that the EU's strongest tools for persuasion are its economic measures, along with some diplomatic procedures, which are most appropriate in the pre-conflict and conflict management phases. This so-called 'civilian model' of EU foreign policy entails the recognition that the international system is not moved solely by military force, and that the use of military force to solve conflicts has a poor track record. Such a foreign policy relies on 'persuasion rather than coercion; the use of multiple avenues and forms of discussion rather than seeking exclusively to reinforce European institutions; and the relative willingness to envisage open diplomacy...' [Hill, 1990, p. 44] A major feature of the 'civilian model' of EU foreign and security policy is the functional approach. The functional alternative to the CFSP can be found in an extension of Mitrany's criticisms of the federalism and regionalism of the EEC and his writings on the origin of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Mitrany's Critique of the EEC

Although functionalism has since been hailed as a theory of
integration, its originator, David Mitrany, was none too impressed with larger attempts at European integration as manifested in the European Economic Community. His reasoning echoes his war-time analysis of the need for a working peace system. The proponents of European integration who supported the EEC Treaty were aiming for a European federal state, he argued. Mitrany criticised this on the grounds that it reasserted the territorial basis of political organisation; in other words, why should cooperation on all economic issues be constrained by a continental treaty? Why should cooperation with non-Europeans take second place? This had serious implications for the prospects for world peace; why, Mitrany asked rather provocatively, should a European Union "suddenly be guided by sweet reasonableness and self-restraint"? [Mitrany, 1966, p. 187]

According to Mitrany, "[t]he very concept of a closed regional union is a contradiction of the historic European idea..." - that is, European civilisation had prided itself on its openness. Attempts to find a European identity, which would have to be vigorous given the differences between Europeans, would detract from world peace and what today would be called the EU's role as a world partner. [Mitrany, 1966, p. 184-6] Mitrany argued that creating loyalty to this new regional bloc would fulminate international discord. "To build up a cohesive loyalty national movements have often had to disinter or invent all sorts of historical, social, and emotional affinities, above all to keep alive the fear of some common external danger. Regionalism, starting with more differences than affinities, would have to go even further in that." [Mitrany, 1996, p. 184] He also noted that the precarious balance necessary to keep together the diverse interests within the EEC, especially turning to foreign policy and defence, would expend energy on internal matters that could otherwise be devoted (more profitably) to advancing the general cause of international peace and security.

At the heart of Mitrany's critique is his view that the supporters of the EEC were hoping to create a federal state and the
EEC was indeed a proto-federal state at the regional level. As such, the EEC was based on territorial assumptions about authority and jurisdiction rather than functional assumptions. Mitrany contrasted the new regional economic bloc with the other European Communities, arguing that the EEC would hinder international cooperation:

The ECSC and Euratom are straight functional bodies and can get on with their allotted task without offending the position of other countries, while remaining open to link up with them. ... The point is that for service units like the ECSC and Euratom, as for all the specialized agencies of the U.N. and any future functional bodies, wider association means more points of co-operative contact; for a self inflating organization like the EEC, more fields of control must mean internationally more points of competitive contact. [Mitrany, 1966, pp. 109-10]

According to Mitrany, the argument for a federal union of Europe relied on a view of international economic interaction that was faulty. Quoting American jurist, Sarah Wimbaugh, Mitrany [1966, p. 182] argued that "Geographical association no longer corresponds to the actual interests of neighbours." Regional organization cut across international cooperation.

Mitrany's final criticism of the development of the EEC is that a regional bloc is inherently undemocratic and bureaucratic. In an argument that anticipates the recent criticisms of the 'democratic deficit' in the European Union, he attacked the idea of direct elections to the European Parliament. He suggested first of all that there was an inexorable process in modern politics that increased the power of the executive over the legislature. The EP he reasoned was unlikely to overcome this tendency. He then claimed that the distance of the EP from its constituents and the nature and complexity of EEC business made for a complete lack of accountability:

While ... it is a fair claim that the present communities ... fall short in democratic content as long as they lack a representative assembly, it is an illusion to think that in a "more perfect union" an elected parliament will gather unto itself more power than is now left to national parliaments even in the best of democratic states. It is likely to be less. It will have neither the cohesion nor the acquired
traditions of a national parliament, while the executive will be under greater pressure of public business but also less exposed to the watchfulness of parties and press and popular opinion. [Mitrany, 1966, pp. 196-7]

One can only note that the distance and the relative lack of control by national parliaments of foreign and security policy as contrasted with other policies is magnified still further in the EU as Mitrany indicated it would be for a whole range of 'European' policies.

Mitrany's criticisms of the EEC are directly applicable to recent attempts to forge a Common Foreign and Security Policy. For Mitrany, the EEC as a regional federation was not a route to peace; by extension, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is not a route to security.

The European Coal and Steel Community - A Functional Alternative?

As was demonstrated above, at the same time as he was criticising the EEC as a regional bloc, Mitrany was a fervent supporter of the ECSC. Indeed, Mitrany not only supported the creation of a Coal and Steel Community as a functional organization in the heart of Europe, he prescribed it as a solution to security in Europe beforehand. In 1944, in his pamphlet, 'The Road to Security', Mitrany called for reconstruction efforts in Europe to be built around cooperation on steel and coal by France and Germany. He cited this as a potentially more fruitful route to international peace and security than the re-establishment of a League of Nations type arrangement, that is, the UN. Mitrany emphasised that economic welfare and security were closely linked; there was no question of the priority of one over the other. He argued that 'it is generally agreed that [preventing German rearmament] involves control not merely of the actual armament industries, but also of the heavy and chemical industries, as well as other industries and services.' Mitrany noted that some had argued therefore that

the only effective means of prevention is joint control over
the whole sector of an industry. That means a willingness to accept also for ourselves, in the common interest, such joint control as would prevent the use of a particular industry or material for aggressive purposes.

Concluding this line of argument, Mitrany stated of this method, that it would not oppress the Germans as had the Versailles Settlement at the end of the First World War because 'the controls would be part of an equally effective service to the German people, and would apply to other countries as well.' [Mitrany, 1944, p. 17]

Mitrany's argument about the difference between the ECSC and the EEC can be illustrated by an interesting contrast between the preambles of the ECSC and the EEC Treaties. The security rhetoric of the ECSC Treaty contrasts with the predominantly welfarist EEC Treaty and also with the EU's subsequent self-image as a unitary regional union, predominantly but not exclusively focusing on economic matters. The Treaty of Paris mentions peace three times, and peace is generally given high priority in terms of the aims of the new Coal and Steel Community. It opens as follows:

Considered that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it,
Convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can make to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations,
Recognizing that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which will first create real solidarity...

By contrast the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC mentions peace once and it relegates that reference to the last clause. Instead, references to prosperity, standards of living and union are promoted:

Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,
Resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe,
Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples...

While there is clearly the influence of historical context to take account of, it is nonetheless significant that economics and
security are divorced increasingly in the EEC as compared to their integration in the ECSC.

While there were many reasons for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, [Haas, 1958, ch. 8] in the realm of ideas at least, the functional approach to security was a contributor to the way in which the community was created. Following Mitrany, the functional approach to security undertaken, even if imperfectly, in the ECSC stands as a clear, practical functional alternative to the tradition of EPC/CFSP.

Given the position of the ECSC within the EU today, however, it is understandable that for the most part the ECSC Treaty is discussed in terms of the treaty it begat, the Treaty of Rome, or in its contribution to energy or industrial policy. [Nugent, 1991, pp. 34-9; Pinder, 1991, pp. 3-6; George, 1991, ch. 7] The ECSC is a victim both of its own success as a mechanism for security and of the increasing bifurcation of economic welfare and international security within the EC/EU. While Mitrany contrasted the ECSC and the EEC, it is not clear to me that he would still defend the ECSC today — nor, given the developments in the ECSC, whether Mitrany was entirely correct on his estimation of the ECSC as a functional organization or as a guarantor of security in Europe in the way he intended. It is arguable, at least, that the symbolic value of the ECSC and subsequently the EC were more significant for the peace of Europe than their functional value.

The Functional Alternative for the EU: Limits and Prospects

What does the alternative tradition of functional security and David Mitrany’s articulation of it mean for security policy in the EU? I will address this here in two parts: first in terms of the substance of security policy and then in terms of institutional design.

Security from the functional perspective is integrative rather than exclusionary, community-oriented rather than externally-focused, and concerned with economic and social interaction besides
high political and military affairs. It also implies not only that security policy must integrate economic aspects of security but that trade policies must include elements of security. The example of security in Central and Eastern Europe might be helpful at this point. This offers a scenario in which to highlight the differences between territorial and functional security in action in the EU.

The EU and Security in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)

Along with the prospect of a resurgent and nationalistic Russia and a potentially volatile Southern flank, Central and Eastern Europe is the area of greatest security concern to the EU member states because of proximity, current instability and the history of weapons build-up, of which the nuclear arsenal is only the most notable. The challenges in Central and Eastern Europe are immense: ethnic conflict both within and across state boundaries, economic decline and transition, border disputes, the sudden demise of international coordination, migration. Yet, it is unclear how the CFSP can be of any practical utility as a security policy either to provide security for the EU itself or for the Central and East Europeans. Indeed, the debate over Eastern enlargement, over the terms of the Europe Agreements, and over assistance to the fledgling democracies and market economies, has served, if anything to alienate Central and Eastern Europeans. In sum, notwithstanding the Stability Pact, the CFSP is irrelevant or worse for European security.

The EU is conducting a wide range of relations with Central and Eastern Europe either itself, as separate member states or in wider international fora such as the EBRD and the World Bank. Aid and trade are being facilitated by such contacts, though there is some dispute about the efficacy of the measures being taken. [Keohane, Hoffmann, Nye, 1993] However, the economic objectives and principles underlying the projects in Central and Eastern Europe have not been linked to security. Instead there are free market rules: improving market access, retraining of workers, and
economic, technical and financial assistance constitute major planks of the Europe Agreements. In its report to the European Council for the Summit in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, the Commission proposed further measures towards creating a Europe-wide free trade area and to overcome obstacles to investment in Central and Eastern Europe.

One proposal that follows from Mitrany’s functional approach would be to be open to the trade of the Central and Eastern European countries in order to meet needs most effectively and to cooperate across Europe. Unfortunately, Mitrany’s fears regarding the EEC have purchase as we see the entrenched interests within the member states of the EU blocking concessions to the CEE countries or demanding/extorting compensation from the wealthier member states for their cooperation. The result has been a set of Europe Agreements that exclude the key commodities that the CEE countries would trade and concessions on items that are of marginal significance and whose level of trade will never reach the level of the concession!

It is not clear in any event that a glorified free trade area rather like the EEA is integrative enough to guarantee security. Delors has expressed his dissatisfaction with the ‘soulless’ aspect of economic integration. [Delors, 1991, p. 104] This is transplanted into relations with the CEE countries. While a 1992-style programme fits ‘spirit of the age’, there is a lack of connection to security, even in the broadest sense, however. The institutionalised insecurity of the global market is hardly a robust basis on which to create European security. Economic interdependence of trade and investment, it has been argued, makes war less rational and therefore less likely. This has proved a flimsy argument in the past and looks no more likely to work in the future.

What might be the functional alternative in this context? In the ECSC security was provided through functional cooperation in militarily as well as industrially significant sectors. Heavy industry is arguably less important in Western economies, but still
largely so in the East. In any event, the task is to find the area on which functional cooperation could most join industrial and military activities. This might be today be in certain dual (civil and military) technologies. However, the EC Commission report to the European Council for the Edinburgh Summit gives us a hint, I think. The idea of Trans-European Networks involving transport, telecommunications and energy. Infrastructure projects would give a large infusion of needed investment and would result in a relief of the bottlenecks to further economic development and growth. From a financial standpoint, they look a distant prospect. Though it is not clear that infrastructure projects to improve communications across Europe are as central to common security as was coal and steel to post-war Germany and to Franco-German relations, the absence of such integrating initiatives makes the likelihood of a failure of economic transition and development greater as it does the distance, physically and psychologically, from the CEE countries to the EU.

The experience of the ECSC suggests another approach. It was functional cooperation between countries that had previously been adversaries on production central to civilian industrial development and to military power. The post-Cold War version of this scenario suggests a pan-European consortium on nuclear technology, informatics and biotechnology. The aim would be to bring together the technical knowledge and specialists in an area which is of increasing significance to advanced economies but also to the development of weapons of mass destruction. The critical aspect of this proposal would be to bring in Russian scientists — following the example of the ECSC, it is the former adversaries who need to cooperate.

The Institutional Form of the EU

There is a large and growing literature on the extension of the EU into East-Central Europe and further. [Laursen, 1991-2; Michalski and Wallace, 1992; Pinder, 1991; Nugent, 1992] The EU has
a number of different links with Central and Eastern Europe, including the development of trade and cooperation agreements, the Europe Agreements, as well as the Commission's part in coordinating the aid programmes PHARE and TACIS, and the majority share holding of member states in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The matter of future membership of CEE countries is also being actively discussed.

At the same time, the EU is considering ideas for a multi-speed or variable geometry Europe. Instead of all member states adhering to the same set of policies, variable geometry suggests that different states will take different packages of common policies. This has certainly been a pragmatic response on the part of the member states of the EU to difficulties with advancing to deeper integration involved in, for instance, Economic and Monetary Union or the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Such pragmatism and the form that it has taken suggests that, despite the rhetoric of the CFSP, the European Union is less and less a singular structure and more a multiplicity of overlapping activities and processes, varying according to function. [Edward Mortimer, 1992a, 1992b; Wilson, 1992, pp. 25-6] Such developments would have been applauded by Mitrany as functional reactions to the realities of international life, though the modalities - political dialogue, the Stability Pact, the various trade and aid packages need to be taken much further in the way that they give Central and East Europeans a stake and a say in the exchange.

To summarise, in terms of the institutional form of the EU, both internally and with reference to the CEE countries, there are indications that a functional approach is reasserting itself, despite the conception of security as found in the CFSP. However, Mitrany would no doubt tell us that the problem of European security is far from solved since there is no integrated, cooperative approach to security evident in EU policy towards the CEE countries but rather an irrelevant security policy and a set of economistic trade and aid policies that fail adequately to deal with the fundamental security questions at stake in Europe.
One final implication of the functional approach follows from the insight that international institutions should have a narrow focus on a single issue. This is that while the EU should concentrate on economic security matters, other institutions can quite appropriately address other security functions: the existence of other fora for 'hard' security cooperation means that this need not be an area left uncared for; there is still a (limited) role for NATO, even from the functional perspective. From the perspective of the functional approach this is a somewhat controversial matter, as it reimports concerns with military and territorial security into the ambit of national and international organization in an anomalous way where it is separate from other functions rather than considered part of a broader approach to security. From the perspective of the organizations themselves, however, the functional approach might be considered a useful rationalization of an already emerging or established division of labour.

Conclusion

The EU has unfortunately chosen to emphasise traditional exclusionary, territorial and military-oriented notions of security in the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, despite its own access to and comparative advantage in a functional alternative conception of security and security policy. As we saw, the Common Foreign and Security Policy relies on a narrow meaning of security as preventive diplomacy and military means of defence that is ill-suited to the region of greatest security concern to the EU relations, Central and Eastern Europe. Certainly, Mitrany's critique of the EEC applies nicely to the CFSP and the origins of the EU in the ECSC also points to some directions for security policy guided by the tradition of the functional approach, such as openness in trade with the CEE countries and technical cooperation with Russia.


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