POLITICAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The Greek Experience

By

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The Greek accession to the European Union (EU) has been characterized in Greece as the most important political event in the metapolitefsis (post-Junta) period. This event has extensively been analyzed mainly in relation to the economic consequences and the legal textures of European integration. The political consequences of accession still remain a poorly researched and analyzed topic.

This paper purports to analyze the Greek Euroelections (1981-1994), with particular though not exclusive emphasis on the prospects for political modernization. In the analysis I shall try to show that the Greek accession to the EU and the consequent participation in the Euroelections tend to establish a rationale conducive to the development of a new political culture characterized by the political legitimization of the multiplicity of expression: to the extent that this happens, the traditional political bipolarity cannot but subside into a more democratic political discourse. Even so, I shall argue that the durability of such a discourse will in the end depend on the prospects for modernization in Greece.

In what follows section I tries to unfold the electoral strength of the major political parties in the elections examined; section II analyzes the main positions of the parties in relation to Greece’s participation in the EU; section III tries to shed some light on the effects of this participation on the process of modernization in Greece, and in the final section some concluding remarks are made.

I

The electoral strength of the major political parties and the historical tendencies involved in these European elections are analyzed in relation to (a) the national election results and (b) the degree of urbanization for which election statistics are available.

A. The first European elections were held in 1979, about 18 months before the Greek entry to the Community. When Greece became the tenth member of the Community on 1 January 1981 the Greek representatives to the European Parliament (EP) were appointed in accordance with the relative strength of the political parties in the Greek parliament. The first European election was held in Greece on 18 October 1981 concurrently with the national parliamentary election. We call the former EB1 (Euroelection 1981) and the latter NB1 (National election 1981). From there on Greece follows the regular European elections cycle. Thus the second European election was held in Greece on 16 June 1984 (EB4) and was followed by a national parliamentary election a
year later on 2 June 1985 (N85); the third European election was held on 18 June 1989 (E89) concurrently with the national parliamentary election (N89); while the fourth European election was held on 14 June 1994 (E94), about 9 months after the last parliamentary election held on 10 October 1993 (N93). It is interesting to note here that of the four European elections examined, two were held concurrently with the national parliamentary elections.

(Table 1 here)

Table 1 shows the election results for the entire period examined, with reference to those of the political parties which managed to win at least one seat in the EP in at least one of the four European elections held. As the table indicates, two parties steadily dominate the political scene in both the national and the European elections: One is the main representative of the traditional Right in Greek politics called in the metapolitefsi period the New Democracy party (ND); and the other is the representative of the traditional Centre in Greek politics regrouped and radicalized in the metapolitefsi period through the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). In the four elections examined, these two parties have managed to win an average of 85.05 per cent of the total vote cast in the national parliamentary elections, compared to an average of 74.44 per cent of the total vote cast in the European elections. This means that there is a high degree of polarization in the Greek political scene, and that this polarity tends to decrease in the European elections. This declining tendency, which is found in other European countries as well, has been explained on the ground that European elections are 'second order' elections and thus voters can vote with their heart in the European elections, but they must use their mind in the national elections (Curtice, 1989).

The third major political axis in the Greek electoral scene consists of the two political parties of the Left: One is the orthodox Communist Party of Greece (KKE), and the other the pro-Eurocommunist Party of the interior (KKEes.). These two parties took part separately in the 1981 and 1984 elections. In 1987 the KKEes. was transformed into a non-communist party, called the Greek left (EAR), which the following year came to an agreement with the KKE and, together with some other progressive left forces, formed the Coalition of the Left and Progreses (SYN(I)). This progressive left coalition took part in the 1989 elections. The following year, in its 13th Congress, the KKE decided to take a monastic path and contested alone the 1993/94 elections, while the remaining of the progressive left forces (called
here SYN(II)] continued their own separate path through the 1993/94 elections. The election results depicted in Table 1 allow for the following main conclusions: first, the battle between the orthodox KKE and the Eurocommunist/post-communist forces over the hegemony of the Greek left is still unsettled, though the traditional communist forces are doing better especially in the national elections; second, the performance of both parties is better in the European elections (14.62 per cent on the average), where the voters vote with their heart, than in the national elections (11.15 per cent on the average), but third, there is over time a percentage decline of the total vote of the two parties in both the national and the European elections, with the exception of the 1989 national election. This means that the two parties of the Left are not in a position to actually absorb the losses of the two major parties, and especially those of PASOK.

On the right of the ND party two political formations have contested the elections and managed to win a seat in the EP: One was the Party of the Progressives (KP) which participated in the 1981 election, and the other was the Nationalist Party (EPEN—the KP’s successor) which took part in all the subsequent elections, but only in 1984 managed to elect a member for the EP. The weakness of the extreme Right, as an independent political formation, is associated with two main reasons: One is its political relationship with the leadership and the people of the Junta, and the other is the readiness of the ND party to incorporate within its own structure extreme right people and politicians. This means that the extreme Right, as culture and ideology, is present in Greece and influences her social and political process.

The enlargement of the ND party towards the extreme Right was supplemented in the 1970’s by a similar enlargement towards the forces of the traditional centre. The so-called Party of Democratic Socialism (KODISO) was the product of these realignments and took part in the 1981 elections where managed to win 4.25 per cent of the total vote for the EP and elect a representative there. The party also participated in the 1984 European election, but without any success, and terminated thereafter its operation: its leader, Giangos Pesmazoglou, and several other party members and cadres found refugee into the ND party.

When Constantine Karamanlis, the founder of the ND party, moved to the presidency of the state in the late 1970’s, the party lost its internal cohesion. As a result, the party has so far experienced two splits. The first was in 1985 when a group of ND deputies, headed by Costas Stephanopoulos who had lost the leadership battle in September
1985, formed a new party called Democratic Renewal (DIANA). In the 1989 Euroelection DIANA won a seat in the EP, while in the 1994 Euroelection the party was unsuccessful and terminated its operation. The second split occurred in 1993 when Antonis Samaras, foreign minister in the Mitsotakis government, decided to form a new party named Political Spring (POLA). The party participated in the 1993 national election and in the 1994 Euroelection, and its electoral performance seemed to be a relative success: in 1993 the party got 4.87 per cent of the total vote and 10 seats in Parliament, while in the 1994 Euroelection it won 8.65 per cent of the total vote and 2 seats in the EP. The future performance of the party, which seems to represent a challenge to the traditional bipolarity, will be affected not only by the fluidity of the political alignments but also by the very complexity of the Greek social structure where the urban petty bourgeoisie and the agrarian strata are both major components. It is interesting therefore to have a look at the election results by the degree of urbanization.

B. In Table 2 the European elections are analyzed in relation to three geographical categories: the rural areas (0-1,999 inhabitants), the semi-urban areas (2,000-9,999 inhabitants), and the urban areas (10,000 inhabitants and over). As the table indicates, PASOK comes out stronger in the rural areas (41.5 per cent on the average) compared to an average of 38.9 per cent for the semi-urban areas and 36.2 per cent for the urban areas. The membership of the party, however, gives a slightly different picture: according to recent statistics, about 19.5 per cent of the party members participated in the third party congress held in 1994 were white collar workers (of which 71 per cent in the greater public sector and 29 per cent in the private sector), compared to: 18 per cent of the total working in the agricultural sector, 6.9 per cent listed as urban workers, 4.7 per cent as self-employed persons, 4.8 per cent as unemployed, 9.7 per cent as pensioners, 4.6 per cent as students, 4.5 per cent as housekeepers, and the remainder in various other professions (Ta Nea, 5 April 1994).

(Table 2 here)

The performance of the ND party has considerable fluctuations but on the average the party appears stronger in the semi-urban areas (38.2 per cent) compared to an average of 37.8 per cent for the rural areas and 32.7 per cent for the urban areas. The membership of the party's central committee, however, gives a completely different picture: according to 1991 statistics, of the total central committee
members about 75 per cent were of the liberal professions (e.g. lawyers, doctors, engineers etc), and only 13 per cent were of the salaried professions. In one of the party districts (Larissa) the occupational background of the party members was in 1989: 30.38 per cent of the total self-employed persons, that is, people engaged in large or small business, 24.68 per cent private sectors employees, 21.52 per cent public sectors employment, and 23.42 per cent unemployed or housekeeping (Alexakis, 1993:142-145).

The electoral performance of the new party of POLA has a regional distribution similar to that of ND: the party appears stronger in semi-urban areas where it got 9.20 per cent of the total vote in 1994 compared to 9.00 per cent for the rural areas and 8.30 per cent for the urban areas. As regards the parties of the Left the distribution gives a completely different picture: both parties appear stronger in the urban areas where they got on the average 19.52 per cent of the total urban vote, compared to an average of 12.62 per cent for the semi-urban areas and 11.04 per cent for the rural areas. There is, however, an important difference between the two parties of the Left: whereas the orthodox communist party (KKE) draws its urban support mostly from the working people, the urban vote of the left coalition (SYN) comes to a large extent from middle-class people and intellectuals (Moschonas, 1986:246-250; Nikolakopoulos, 1994).

It is clear from the preceding analysis that, with the exception of the two parties of the Left, the major political parties examined here are to a large extent 'catch-all' parties. The social and political content, however, of this large array of voters differs from party to party: whereas the popular vote of the ND party has historically been incorporated into the hegemonic power bloc of the Greek society (ranging in the past from the palace and the army through the church to the dominant fractions of capital), the popular vote of PASOK has tended to become an independent actor in the process of social and political realignments. And here the question arises: to what extent has this social and political complexity affected the position of the political parties on Greece's EC membership and the prospects for modernization in Greece?

II

The Greek politics on European integration can easily be analyzed within the context of three historically defined political

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1 It is for this reason that PASOK has presented itself as a 'multiclass movement'. For a definition of the term see Wright, 1993:34.
strategies: (a) the traditional conservative and neoliberal strategy, (b) the social-democratic strategy, and (c) the orthodox communist strategy.

A. The main political representative of the conservative/neoliberal strategy is the ND party, that is, the party which negotiated the Greek entry to the Community. That entry was justified on the ground that, in the framework of European solidarity, “the national independence of all members is consolidated; democratic freedoms are shored up; economic development is accelerated; and social and economic progress becomes, with the cooperation of all, a common fruit” (Karamanlis’ statement quoted in Moschonas, 1982:22). In 1994, fourteen years after the Greek entry, the ND party reaffirmed its commitment to this European strategy. In a declaration issued on the occasion of the last Euroelection it is argued that the ND party, which brought Greece to the United Europe, strongly supports the deepening of European integration and the enlargement of the European Union. In keeping with the programme of the European People’s Party, ND proposes the adoption of a European constitution based on the principles of democracy, efficiency and subsidiarity, and also the formation of a socially-sensitive European economic policy.2

The European strategy of the ND party has never become an object of dispute within the party itself, though there have been social concerns on the negative consequences of accession. This broad political agreement in the party was cultivated by Karamanlis himself on the ground that the Greek desire for Community membership was inspired primarily by political considerations focused on consolidating democracy and the future of the country. What instead has become over the years a matter of dispute within the party is the nature of the policy to be adopted for the economic development and the modernization of Greece. Karamanlis seemed to believe, as the statement quoted above indicates, that Greek economic development and modernization within the Community would be the logical outcome of a process of steady productive investments reinforced and supported by Community flows into Greece of technology and capital. This active production policy of modernization required a more or less interventionist state so as to foster economic development and also maintain social cohesion through social policy measures. Actually that

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2 On these points see the party’s documents: “For a strong Greece in a humane Europe”, ΤΜ Νο3, 13 April 1994; “Strong Greece, respected in Europe”, Euroelections, 12 June 1994, and “The basic positions of the European People’s Party”. Euroelections 1994 (All in Greek)
was the exact meaning of the ideology of 'radical liberalism' adopted by ND in Karamanlis's years (Alexakis, 1993:224-245).

The failure of the ND party to win the 1981 election implied not the rejection by the electorate of this very European strategy but the willingness of large sections of the population to elect a new government on a platform promising 'alangí' domestically, in the form of radical socio-economic changes, and a tougher stand in its dealings with the EC. It was no accident, therefore, that the parties which had previously taken a critical position on the Greek accession, PASOK and KKE, got about 53 per cent of the total vote in the 1981 European election.

The departure of Karamanlis from the ND's leadership marked the beginning of a process of ideological transformations in the party from radical liberalism to simple and pure liberalism. When Mitsotakis became party leader in 1985 this process was intensified and the party's ideology was gradually clarified so as to assume the postulates of neoliberalism (Alexakis, 1993:246-271). The neoliberal economic strategy implied that Greek economic development and modernization within the Community would now be the logical outcome of the full operation of the market mechanisms in a integrated internal Community market and the privatization of the major state-controlled economic activities. It is an open question whether the electoral success of the ND party in the 1989/90 elections should be attributed to the neoliberal strategy of the party or to the political climate of the conjuncture reinforced by the clouds of the Koskotas affair or to both. What seems to be clear is that the electoral defeat of the party in the 1993 national election was produced not so much by the formation of a new political party in the broader conservative camp but mainly by the negative social consequences of the neoliberal policies adopted. The election of a new party leader, Miltiades Evert, and the return to the ideology of radical liberalism were measures unable so far to control the declining trend of the party, as the 1994 European election results indicate. The party received only 32.66 per cent of the vote, just a little above the percentage vote of the 1981 European election (31.33) which was the worst performance of the party in European elections, while the newly formed party of POL.A managed to substantially increase its electoral vote (6.29 per cent) compared to the 1993 election results (4.53 per cent).

The party of POL.A was mainly formed on the grounds of a national cause, the issue of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and thus assumed from its very inception a nationalist ideological flavour. In the past, nationalist overtones appeared with the
formation of the extreme Right as an independent party in the *metapolitefsis* period. But, as I tried to show elsewhere (Moschonas, 1982:330-345), the extreme Right was formed not so much to differentiate itself from ND on domestic or EC issues, but mainly to advance the cause of the Junta leaders centred on their unconditional release from prison. The poor performance of the extreme Right in the elections, whether national or European, is a clear indication of that. Irrespective of the poor performance of the extreme Right, however, its independent political operation, combined with its reliance on traditional conservative voters, tends to reproduce the ideological clusters of right-wing nationalism in the Greek political culture.

This right-wing nationalism is also reproduced by the PΟΛΑ party, though its programme on socio-economic issues has centrist political connotations. The party supports the federal political organization of the European Union, but on the condition that the principle of subsidiarity and the national identity of the member states are respected. In this sense the European strategy of the party tends to assume ethnocentric connotations, contrary to the more or less pure pro-European views of the ND party. The party of PΟΛΑ also supports the democratization of the Community institutions, the deepening of European integration and the enlargement of the Union, on the condition that the Community budget is increased, the financial resources are redistributed to the benefit of the less developed areas or countries, the Social Charter is implemented, and the social dimension of the internal market is strengthen. Although the party's proposed transcendence (hypervasis) of existing political and social divisions points to the unknown (Tsoucalas, 1994), I would nevertheless argue that its successful electoral performance in the future could create a climate conducive to the development of a new political culture characterized by the political legitimization of the multiplicity of expression. This trend however will greatly depend on the political performance of the Left and on developments within PASOK itself.

B. PASOK was formed in 1974 and began its operation as a movement characterized by socialist and nationalist overtones, thereby reinforcing in the Greek political scene a left-wing nationalism. On the Greek accession to the EC this left-wing nationalism found its theoretical

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3 On these points see the party's document: "We represent Greece in Europe", 1994 (in Greek).

4 The lines of demarcation between 'right-wing nationalism' and 'left-wing nationalism' are not always clear. For a discussion on these points with reference to the German SPD, see Berger, 1994.
rationalization in the context of the then popular dependency theory. Thus PASOK took the position that "the peripheral and externally controlled character" of the Greek economy required a "correctly planned national investment effort", a precondition undermined by the accession to the EC. In this sense the acceptance of the policy of accession was considered to be "equivalent to a policy of national desertion" for it "abdicates Greek responsibility for the future of the country by transferring it to foreign decision-making centres which by their nature cannot be inspired by the national and political ideals and by the vision of socioeconomic change which warms the soul of the Greek people" (Papandreou's statement quoted in Moschonas, 1982:24).

This left-wing nationalism had reinforced in PASOK's programme an ethnocentric strategy for socioeconomic and political modernization wherein the national state had to play the central role. Thus, in opposition to the accession supported by the ND party, itself "dominated by the permanent dependency complex of the Greek Right and by the need to always rely on foreigners and foreign models", PASOK proposed "a policy of multi-dimensional and equal cooperation with all the European countries, not only with the countries of the EEC, as well as with the developing countries". In this context PASOK stated its willingness, once in power, to "ask the Greek people to express, in a free referendum following a full public debate, their own decision on the accession to the EEC" (Idem).

The proposed referendum was never held either because it was at the time practically impossible, since the President of the Republic, Constantine Karamanlis, would not agree on such a decision, or because PASOK itself was never seriously committed to its anti-EEC declarations. Thus, once in power PASOK tried to establish good grounds for accommodation with the EC reality. In a memorandum submitted to the EC in 1982 PASOK emphasized the Greek peculiarities and the subsequent need for Community financial support and for temporary derogations from EC rules. Following the Commission's reservations on the latter, PASOK's main objective centred on the redistribution of Community financial resources so as to enable Greece and other less developed Community regions to make the necessary adjustments thereby strengthening the Community's cohesion (Kazakos, 1992: Verney, 1993).

This policy of accommodation seemed to find popular support, although PASOK had already begun to experience the strains of power. In the European election of 1984, which had assumed the characteristics of a national election under the pressure of the ND party, PASOK got 41.59 per cent of the total vote, compared to only
38.09 per cent for ND, but substantially below its 1981 national election performance (48.07 per cent)\(^5\). In the national election of 1985 PASOK managed to regroup its forces thanks to its decision not to support Karamanlis for re-election as President of the Republic. That decision was presented to the electorate as a consistent policy aimed to remove the conservative obstacles and thus open the way towards deeper social and political changes. In actual practice, however, PASOK’s re-election in 1985 marked the beginning of a process which led to the curtailment of both its socialist inclinations and its nationalist overtones. The Minister of National Economy, Gerasimos Arsenis, himself a supporter at the time of ethnocentric solutions, was immediately replaced by Costas Simitis, a strong pro-EC supporter. The austerity programme which was then introduced not only reflected the Greek economic necessities but also marked the beginning towards deeper integration into the Community’s market economy rules. This European orientation of the PASOK government became official with the acceptance of the Single European Act in 1986, at a time when similar adjustments were made by labour or social-democratic parties in Europe, especially in Britain, Denmark and France (Verney, 1993; Haahr, 1992; Featherstone, 1988).

The Maastricht Treaty on European Union found PASOK well advanced into the family of the west European socialist parties. Thus its position on European integration is now similar to that of the other parties grouped under the umbrella of the Party of European Socialists. In the recent European election the European Socialists declared their willingness to struggle for a Europe of the people, not of the economic interests, that is, a Europe with economic development and employment opportunities, a Europe democratic with a humane face. In such a Europe, a party document states, strong PASOK means strong Greece able to protect her national interests, her economy, her society\(^6\). These of course are usual party declarations which are deprived of any substance. In the present context, however, the statements made by PASOK do specify certain elements of its European strategy which can be found throughout the party’s history. In broad terms I would argue that PASOK’s policy on the Greek membership in the EC unfolds within a field of possibilities defined by two opposing views: the Eurocentric view where Greek developments are considered to be part and parcel of EC developments, and the ethnocentric view where Greek developments, though influenced by EC events, have nevertheless a

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\(^5\) For an analysis of this election results, see Moschonas, 1986:246-262.

logic of their own and thus deserve primacy.

In the pre-accession period, from 1974 until 1979, PASOK followed the ethnocentric interpretation in a manner which did not allow different views within the party to be openly heard. When the accession became an accomplished fact in 1979 PASOK began to moderate its position and, once in power, adopted Eurocentric views thereby producing an unstable compromise between these two interpretations, which lasted until the middle of the 1980's. From there on the Eurocentric view has gradually assumed primacy; while ethnocentric voices are always held in an effort to find accommodation within the party. The former Minister of Finance, Dimitris Tsolonas, has turned out to be the key representative today of the ethnocentric strategy, whereas the Eurocentric strategy has the support of such prominent members as Vaso Papandreou, Theodoros Pangalos and Costas Simitis.

According to Tsolonas there are two national strategies which lead to diametrically opposed foreign, defence and economic policies. One is the European perspective centred on the belief that Europe will eventually become a single economic, political and security area as a political entity. Tsolonas casts doubts upon this eventuality and calls instead for an ethnocentric policy within the EC in support of the national interests. In such a policy, says Tsolonas, the modernization of the economy becomes an integral part of the issue of national independence (Tsolonas, 1994).

Simitis on the other hand argues that the dilemma 'national strategy or European strategy' is a false one because it lacks substance. The real question, he says, centres on the orientation of the national strategy, its main concerns and its goals. In the current epoch, the national strategy cannot limit itself to national matters alone, but must also aim to upgrade the position of the country within the international community. This means, says Simitis, that the traditional 'national interest' questions constitute only one aspect, and not the primary one, of the national strategy. A real national strategy must take into account the fact that the EC is close to the completion of economic integration, while making serious steps toward political integration. This development will eventually redefine the conditions of international competition in the sense that the international division of labour will be conditioned by the antagonisms of supranational entities. Thus the logic of the nation-state will gradually but steadily be replaced by post-national arrangements. This means, says Simitis, that it is in the 'national interest' to upgrade the position of the country through cooperation and define the rules of the game.
together with our partners in the EC, instead of only trying to draw from the EC financial resources by any means (Simitis, 1990).  

C. These two differing strategies represent the analytical threads which connect PASOK with the two parties of the Left: the European strategy characterizes the Eurocommunist tendency of the Greek left, while the ethnocentric strategy is a key characteristic of the political logos of KKE. From the pre-entry period the Greek Eurocommunists (KKEes) took the position that the EC objectively represented a new field of class struggle. The reason being that the road to democratic socialism in Greece, which had become the ultimate objective of the Eurocommunists, was thought to be identical with the 'European' road to socialism: contrary to the "simplistic model which assumes that country by country will be cut off slice-slice from the international capitalist system to be added to the world socialist system", nowadays history moves in a complex fashion which implies that "aggregates of people and countries (Europe, Non-Aligned, Third World)" will gradually "gain autonomy from the international imperialist centre" and will thus begin to "differentiate themselves socially towards a socialist transformation" (quoted in Moschonas, 1982:391). This reasoning became the guiding principle of the progressive left coalition (SYN) formed in 1988. As a common document put it, the Greek left will not remain a mere spectator of the process of rapid internationalization, isolated in its national borders. What is needed today, the document says, is a broader cooperation of the Left in Europe and the formation of a common programme as a left-wing alternative solution to the neo-liberal and neo-conservative policies of multinational capital. Likewise, the progressive left coalition SYN(II) which remained after the departure of KKE in 1990 has repeatedly emphasized its determination to fight within the process of European integration, together with the social and political movements of contemporary left and the ecology, for a new Europe sensitive to questions of social justice, ecological protection and democratic rights (Konstantopoulos's statements in Eleftherotypia, 5 June 1994).  

The orthodox KKE adopted in the pre-entry period an ethnocentric strategy in relation to the process of European integration,

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8 For an overview of the Greek Left see, for example, Kapetanganis, 1993.
9 For the entire text of the document see Rizospastis, 8 December 1988.
with emphasis on the issue of national independence. The rejection by
the KKE of the Greek accession to the EC found economic justification
in the law of the uneven and combined development of capital, which
entails the perpetuation of dependence and underdevelopment. As a
party document puts it, the KKE is opposed to accession because
"Marxist-Leninist analysis shows that a developing country, such as
Greece, is inevitably led by association with, or entry into, an
imperialist bloc, such as the EEC, into ever greater dependence and
progressive social, political, national, cultural, and moral
disintegration" (quoted in Moschonas, 1982:429). When accession
became an accomplished fact in 1979, the party's policy changed from
the previous slogan 'NO to the EEC of the monopolies' to the new slogan
'Total disengagement from the EEC of the monopolies'. But, until the
realization of this 'total disengagement', the KKE was forced to adjust
itself to the 'new conditions of struggle'. In this new capacity the
party had to face certain challenges: the challenge of waging a struggle
for the "elimination of the negative consequences of the entry", the
"defeat of the coordinated attack of the indigenous and the Common
Market monopolies against the standards of living of the workers", and
the "introduction in our country of the achievements of the labour
movement in the EEC countries". In the EP in particular, the
participation of the KKE aims at the "popularization of the party's
positions", the "advancement of the concerns of the workers", the
coordination of the struggle of the KKE with that of the fraternal
parties in it against the monopolies", the "continual exposure of the
imperialist character of the EEC", and the "propagation of the KKE's
position on the need for the disengagement of our country from the
EEC" (ibid, p.456). To this ethnocentric interpretation the KKE returned
in the early 1990's after a brief period of moderation during its
participation in the progressive left coalition(SYN)\textsuperscript{11}.

This multiplicity of political positions on the issue of
European integration reflects ideological differences, political
expediencies, the complexity of the Greek society, and the conflicting
social interests involved in it. I would argue that these factors (a) find
expression in the Greek political culture and (b) tend to condition the

\textsuperscript{11} For an analysis of the current position of the KKE, see the party's document.
"The positions of the Central Committee on the West European Capitalist
Integration", January 1993. See also A. Papariga, "Capitalist crisis and
'European Union'", ELEFTHEROTYPIA, 17 April 1994, and RIZOSPASTIS, 10
June 1994.
content and the form of the process of social and political modernization in Greece.

A. In an interesting interpretation of the relationship between culture and politics in modern Greece, Diamandouros defines culture on a macro-historical perspective "as a complex and dynamic characteristic of a whole system" constantly "negotiated by the continuing and multifaceted interaction between state and society" (Diamandouros, 1993:2). In this context he identifies two historically defined and socially conditioned conflicting cultures, the traditional or underdog culture and the modern or modernizing culture, both of which have become the central and permanent feature of society and have affected the country's politics and development.

The traditional or underdog culture carries with it the Balkan-Ottoman heritage and has been influenced by the Orthodox Church and its anti-Western positions. It has "a powerful statist orientation coupled by profound ambivalence concerning capitalism and the market mechanism" and a "decided preference for paternalism and protection", while showing a "diffident attitude towards innovation". It is, says Diamandouros, in many ways a predemocratic culture characterized by "a distinct preference for small and familiar structures compatible with the unmediated exercise of power and closely associated with the clienlistic practices which for so long dominated and, in a different form, continue to influence political life". This culture has become particularly entrenched among "the very extensive, traditional, more introverted and least competitive strata and sectors of society" and has been "more fully elaborated by the intellectuals adhering to this tradition". It is a strata involved in such activities as "subsistence agriculture, petty commodity production not geared to exports, finance, import-substitution industries, and the inflated and unproductive state-and-wider public sector" all marked by more or less the same characteristics: i.e. "low productivity, low competitiveness, the absence or tenuousness of economic, political, and cultural linkages to the outer world and to the international economy, the aversion to reform and, hence, the lack of a concrete project de société" (Diamandouros, 1993:3-4).

The modern or modernizing culture, on the other hand, is pro-Western in its orientation drawing its intellectual origins from the tradition of political liberalism. It has, therefore, a tendency to look to "the nations of the advanced industrial West for inspiration and for support in implementing its programmes". Modern culture supporters, says Diamandouros, have over time been identified with "a distinct
preference for reform, whether in society, economy or polity, designed to promote rationalization along liberal, democratic and capitalist lines”. In this sense they have tended to favour rather than to oppose “the creation and proliferation of international linkages” and to promote “Greece’s integration into the international system”. The social and political actors of this modernizing and reformist culture are “the popular strata and elites more closely identified with cultural, economic” and “political activities linking them to the international system” as well as the “Greek diaspora communities” and their “intellectual exponents, both inside and outside the Greek state” (Diamandouros, 1993:5-6).

It is interesting to note that Diamandouros’s analysis leads him to the following two conclusions: One, that “the capacity of the less competitive and threatened strata tenaciously to defend their vested interests and the shared assumptions of the underdog culture” has produced “a structured indeterminacy in the Greek polity and society”; and two, that “the social and political strata adhering to, and supporting, each of the two rival cultures cut across the entire political spectrum and do not neatly coincide with one particular party”. As a result all the political parties, “from right to left”, are unwilling to “risk incurring the ‘political cost’ associated with open and determined support for measures which all admit are necessary for the rationalisation and restructuring of both economy and polity”. Nevertheless Diamandouros believes that the Greek accession to the EC and the consequent need for socio-economic and political adjustment “constitute the single most important force which, acting as an unequivocal ally of the forces adhering to the modernising culture, is slowly but inexorably helping to tip the balance of the historical development in favour of the permanent ascendancy of that culture” (Diamandouros, 1993:17-20). The question however regarding not only the prospects for, but also the content and the form of, modernization within the EC actually remains unanswered. It is to this question that we now turn.

B. In a stimulating and very often quoted article, written in 1968, Pinder re-introduced into the European integration literature the terms ‘negative integration’ and ‘positive integration’ in an effort to analyze distinctive phases in the process of economic integration in Europe. He used ‘negative integration’ for that part “of economic integration that consists of the removal of discrimination”, and ‘positive integration’

12 For a slighly different interpretation see Charalambis and Demertzis, 1993; and Demertzis, 1994.
as the "formation and application of coordinated and common policies in order to fulfil economic and welfare objectives other than the removal of discrimination" (Pinder, 1968)\textsuperscript{13}.

In this sense negative integration actually refers to measures which aim at the completion of the internal market, whereas positive integration defines a process leading towards economic and political union. These two aspects of integration, i.e. integration of markets and integration of policies and institutions, affect the member states of the EC and condition their process of socio-economic and political development. I shall call this, referring to Greece, EC reinforced modernization upon the Greek society and polity, understood as a historical process consisting of three interrelated elements: (i) the modernization of markets, (ii) the modernization of practices, and (iii) the modernization of structures.

The modernization of markets is a process which automatically derives from the operation of the EC and thus cannot but carry with it the political legitimization of the forces in Greece which support in principle European integration and the Greek membership in the Community. This broad political (with the exception of the KKE) consensus, however, does not imply the existence of a broad social consensus as well, because the process of market modernization tends to undermine established concrete social interests, thereby inflating social antagonisms and political protests. It is true that positive Greek attitudes towards membership have over time been listed high: in 1993, for example, 73 per cent of respondents regarded membership as a 'good thing' for Greece, compared to an average of 57 per cent for the EC as a whole (Laffan, 1994:120). This positive appearance, however, should not confuse reality, for market modernization reinforces social reorganization and thus produces social and political tensions. KKE, by opposing European integration, expects to draw political support from this social reality. The irony is that, in the context of its overall strategy which excludes political alliances, KKE turns to become an obstacle to the other two aspects of modernization, i.e. the modernization of practices and the modernization of structures.

The modernization of practices is a process wherein a Community dimension gradually becomes an integral part of the Greek political culture as a result of Greece's EC membership. The participation in EC institutions creates conditions of osmosis in the sense that Greek participants tend to assimilate Community practices, while at the same time accumulating knowledge, and thus to enrich

\textsuperscript{13} The terms were first introduced by Tinbergen in 1954 in his \textit{International Economic Integration} (Elsevier, 1954).
Greek political culture. For example, politicians learn to place particular problems in a broader socio-political context and also become gradually accustomed to complex practices of interest articulation and multi-national cooperation; bureaucrats are forced to operate in more rationalized decision-making processes, thereby learning to appreciate the art of continuous bargaining and compromise; representatives of working class or professional organizations acquire new experiences regarding tactics, strategies and modes of organization and representation; while students of almost all levels of education, participating in EC education programmes, learn to appreciate the difference, brought to the fore in multi-lingual and multi-cultural environments, and also the courteous rivalry for excellence. This kind of EC reinforced modernization of practices, having the political legitimization derived from the simple fact of the EC membership irrespective of the degree of political and social acceptance of that membership, tends to create conditions conducive to the enhancement of the modernization of structures.

The modernization of structures takes place within the economic space defined by the derived (from the EC) modernization of the market and refers to concrete state policies in congruence with the EC policies. It is a sort of positive integration which aims at the fulfillment of socio-economic and political objectives other than the simple removal of discrimination and barriers to trade. This highly political process of modernization can take various forms depending on the specific historical conjuncture and the configuration of power prevailing in it. In the Greek political conjuncture, briefly analyzed above, one could delineate the following three forms of structural modernization: (i) the neoliberal form of modernization, (ii) the technocratic form of modernization, and (iii) the democratic form of modernization.

The neoliberal form of modernization relies on the full operation of the market mechanisms in an effort to enhance economic efficiency, productivity and competitiveness. In this sense the modernization of structures tends to be incorporated into the logic of the modernization of the market in the enlarged EC environment. This means that the modernization of the market (negative integration) assumes primacy over the modernization of the structures (positive

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14 In relation to this theme one can read Tsoucalas, 1993; Fatouros, 1993; Koryzis, 1993; Choullaras, 1993.

15 For a brief discussion of these terms, in a different context, see Moschonas, 1990, 215-218. See also Fotopoulos, 1993, especially ch. 11, and Adkin, 1994.
integration) in the sense that the latter tends to be defined in the space of private initiative by pure economic criteria of efficiency and profits. This exclusion of the social dimension from the equation of the economic policy tends to create and reproduce regional disparities and social inequalities (primarily in terms of employment opportunities and earnings) and thus to intensify the social and political antagonisms (cf. Fotopoulos, 1993). The ND government headed by Mitsotakis was the only Greek government in the metapolitefsis period which embarked upon such a neoliberal form of modernization. Its defeat in the 1993 national election was the result not only of the formation of a new party (POLA) in the broader conservative camp, but also of the social dissatisfaction and the consequent formation of new social realignments. I would argue that the continuation of POLA in the Greek political scene creates conditions for a multiplicity of political expression and makes more difficult the re-introduction of a neoliberal form of modernization.

The technocratic form of modernization tends to claim that changes are more technical than ideological, thereby giving emphasis to the role of the experts and of the state bureaucrats. This form of modernization does rely on the neoliberal logic, which entails the primacy of the modernization of the market, but also brings the state into the economic equation, for two main reasons: to better define the modernization of the structures (positive integration) and to minimize the social costs of the full operation of the market. This means that the pure economic criteria of productivity and efficiency are now supplemented by the criteria of social sensitivity and justice which define state social policy. The ND governments under Karamanlis/Rallis and the PASOK governments have greatly relied on this form of modernization, even though there are substantial differences between the two parties: ND expresses historically established power interests and traditional conservative forces in Greek society in a manner perpetuating the hegemony of the traditional political culture, while PASOK managed to form a new class alliance containing established and newly formed power interests together with broad marginalized or even radicalized popular forces and thus challenged or even transformed certain aspects of the traditional political culture. The irony is that in actual practice this technocratic form of modernization was destined to oscillate (under the force of the Greek political conjuncture and the imperatives of European integration) between the EC logic of market modernization, which tends to produce social tensions, and the consequent political necessity for state social policy measures (called in Greece populist measures), which tend to
undermine the very process of economic management and modernization.

In such a dilemma the Left is supposed to offer the alternative through a new form of modernization. The democratic form of modernization entails a new synthesis of market modernization (negative integration) and structural modernization (positive integration) based on changes in the centres of power and the production process. Here the state acquires a key role in the developmental process, in conformity of course with the requirements of European integration, political power becomes more decentralized in the spirit of the principle of subsidiarity, and decision-making institutions are susceptible to the principles of efficiency, democracy and social control. In the Greek historical conjunction, PASOK and the parties of the Left, KKE and the progressive left coalition (SYN), have made programmatic commitments on these questions. The point is that they have so far been unable to find a common denominator for political cooperation.

The differences involved tend to dominate the scene and are deep and substantial. Specifically, PASOK has over the years demonstrated a clear divergence between democratic declarations and technocratic-centralized practices along with various forms of state and party clientelism (cf. Clogg, 1993; Karioti, 1992). At the same time the Left has been preoccupied by its internal divisions. In the first post-Junta period the two parties of the communist left, KKE and KKEes, had embarked upon an intense struggle between themselves for the hegemony of the communist left, while at the same time PASOK was given the space to organize social alliances and build a left-wing identity. Later, with the formation of the Left Alliance (SYN), the traditional forces of the left embarked upon a new struggle to win the hegemony in the centre-left socio-political space, hoping to force PASOK into a minority position. The failure of this new strategy resulted in the new division of the Greek left where the KKE is now fighting once again for the communist symbols and for the hegemony of the narrowly defined communist space.

On the issue of development and modernization, the meta-communist Greek Left (SYN) argues for a planned development in accordance with the requirements of European integration and the international competition (cf. Kyrkos, 1987). The traditional communist Left (KKE), on the other hand, proposes a planned development in the context of an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle which, by its nature, gives primacy to the issue of national independence (cf. KKE, 1993).
The irony is that, while the multiplicity of the political expression in the space of the Greek left is in congruence with the democratic principle, this very division of the left tends to isolate and strengthen PASOK, thereby undermining the prospects for the introduction of a socially sustained democratic form of modernization.

IV

This divergence of policies and strategies are not peculiar to Greece, and remind us of the old theoretical debates about two interrelated sets of issues: (a) the issue of modernization vs. radical development, and (b) the issue of reform vs. revolution.

The modernization theory has Weberian connotations and rests on the assumption that modernization is a total process and thus constitutes a 'universal pattern'. This implies a gradual move from tradition to modernity wherein social development is understood as a process of functional-structural differentiation of roles and institutions as one moves from simple to complex systems. Thus modernization is rendered synonymous with westernization and implies a process towards a functionally integrated national or even supranational political system (Bernstein, 1971; Mouzelis, 1978 and 1986). As argued above, these theoretical presuppositions tend to define the policies and strategies of the Greek conservative forces and of PASOK, the latter especially since the middle of the 1980's when the party fully accepted the process of European integration.

The theory of radical development, on the other hand, has Marxist connotations and rests on the assumption that in a world system of social relations the modernization theory fails to take into consideration the fact that western modernization was created principally through the midwifery of European imperialism. Thus, in a historical conjuncture of development and underdevelopment, 'modernization' actually presupposes a process of radical social transformation either through a prior development of capitalism (cf. Warren, 1980) or through an immediate break with dependence and capitalist domination (cf. Amin, 1974). As argued above, the Greek forces of the New Left have tended to subscribe to the former solution in the context of a Eurocommunist/Eurosocialist strategy, whereas the traditional Greek communist forces (and PASOK until the late 1970's) have supported a more radical solution.

This divergence of positions among the parties of the Left has its origins in the old theoretical debate between social reform or
revolution (cf. Luxemburg, 1971), transformed today into a debate on the content and the form of the reforms themselves. As Luciana Castellina, a prominent member of the European Left, has put it, “most of us now agree that power has to be taken, achieved, through consensus”, and thus “changes have to be brought about through consensus and through a gradual process”. But, adds Castellina, “once you say this, it is not the end of the problem because you can conceive those reforms in different ways: reforms could be seen as a gradual transformation, with the intention of a transformation of society’s structures and its values; or reforms can simply be seen as an adjustment to the present system. This is the discussion” (Castellina, 1987:31).

I have argued above that the Greek forces of the New Left tend to confine themselves within the latter solution, whereas the traditional Greek communist forces (KKE) support the former solution. But even so, the problem within the Left remains unsolved because the rapid changes brought into the production process have not only changed the traditional role of the working class but have also produced new problems (e.g. ecology) and new movements. Thus, according to Castellina, the forces of the Left “have a role which poses the question of how to put together the tradition of the working class, the labour movement, with those new events and phenomena”. And, she adds, if “we [the people of the Left] don’t succeed in putting these things together, well, then we can give up being communists. We may be a progressive coalition but that’s all” (Castellina, 1987:33). The dilemma then is obvious and catalytic for the Left.
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——— (1994) "'Transcendence' or Politics without History?" _To Vima_, 19 June (in Greek).


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### Table 2
**Election Results by Degree of Urbanization, 1981-1994**

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