

**EXPLAINING OPPOSITION TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION
IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE**

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In June 1992, Danish voters shocked Europe by defeating the Maastricht treaty by a handful of votes in a national referendum. In September of the same year, the treaty narrowly escaped defeat in France where support for European integration was usually high. A year later, and an ocean away, Canadian voters nearly eliminated the ruling Progressive Conservative party from Parliament, in part for its negotiation and ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At almost the same time, the opponents of NAFTA in the United States came very close to defeating the agreement in the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, despite the strong backing of a new Democratic president. Then finally, on January 1, 1994 opposition to NAFTA exploded in violence in the southern state of Chiapas, Mexico as the Zapatista National Liberation Army battled government troops for control of key towns. The Maastricht treaty, which established the European Union (EU), and NAFTA were eventually ratified by all parties, but not before revealing the deep divisions within some of the member societies over the merits of regional integration.

Students of integration have never made opposition to integration a primary focus, nor have they completely ignored it. Early neofunctionalists, for example, asserted that pluralistic countries with well-organized interests were more likely to sustain a process of integration than non-pluralistic countries because groups benefiting from the process would pressure governments to press forward. Although they were naturally more interested in the activities of groups advancing integration, they also recognized the possibility that opposition groups could block the process. This recognition, however, existed primarily on the theoretical level; very little empirical research on opposition groups was actually carried out.¹

The past twenty years have seen even less attention paid to opposition groups in Western Europe, or anywhere else, due mainly to the absence of much visible opposition activity. But that has changed. At present, the opposition to integration is too large to ignore in both North America and Europe. Several scholars have begun to take opposition groups seriously again, but few have focused on them exclusively.² This study seeks to contribute to this emerging area of research by taking a "first cut" at a systematic explanation of when and why opposition arises to integration efforts.

¹Ernst Haas, the father of neofunctionalism, illustrated the importance of political groups to the European integration process in the 1950s with his systematic analysis of pro- and anti-integration parties and interest groups in *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford University Press, 1958). Leon Lindberg, in the 1960s, shifted attention away from group opposition to elite opposition at the highest level, particularly the resistance of Charles de Gaulle ("Decision Making and Integration in the European Community," *International Organization*, 19(1)(1965): 56-80; "Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System," *International Organization*, 20(2)(1966): 233-65). Finally, at the end of the neofunctionalist era, Joseph Nye reasserted the importance of opposition groups to the success or failure of the integration process, especially in the developing world ["Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model," in *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*, eds. Lean N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (Harvard University Press, 1971)]. All of these efforts considered opposition important, but none gave priority of place to opposition movements.

²David Arter, *The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century* (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1993); Alan Cafruny and Carl Lankowski, *Europe's Emerging Identity: Opposition Movements vs. Regional Integration in the European Community* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming, 1995).

We believe this is an important undertaking for two reasons. First, the ruckus caused by opposition groups on both continents in the 1990s necessitates attention by political scientists. In other words, with the appearance of a significant political phenomenon, analysts are afforded an enviable, albeit daunting, opportunity to develop better descriptions and explanations of it. Second, and more importantly, the study of opposition to integration will shed light on the process of integration itself. Any reliable theory of integration must take into account opposition to the process.

MEASURING OPPOSITION TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION

In this study we seek to explain why opposition to regional integration varies in strength over time, within and between countries. To accomplish this goal we must 1) gain an overview of North American and European opposition to integration, and 2) explore the relationship between the strength of opposition and a set of potential explanatory variables. We begin by identifying and measuring our dependent variable, opposition to regional integration.

Measuring opposition to regional integration requires solutions to several difficult problems. The first problem is how to define "regional integration." We adopt a broad definition: *regional integration is the process by which nation-states in a given geographic region proceed, by mutual agreement, to reduce the significance of the legal borders that separate them.* At its most basic level, integration signifies an increased freedom to move goods and services, capital, and people across national frontiers. At a higher level, it means the coordination of government decisions throughout the region so as to make the policies of one government indistinguishable from the policies of another in a particular issue area. At its highest level, regional integration denotes rendering borders completely insignificant.³ At this level, member states would no longer exist in any practical sense, but no assumptions are made of how a borderless region would be governed.

This definition owes its greatest intellectual debt to economists such as Bela Balassa⁴ and Jacques Pelkmans,⁵ since they are most explicit about including regional entities without supranational institutions—such as free trade areas—in the process of integration. For instance, Balassa, in his classic description of the stages of integration, begins with free trade areas, moves through customs unions, common markets, and economic unions and ends with total economic integration, which requires a supranational authority.⁶ Political scientists, on

³Brent F. Nelsen, "Norway, the European Community, and the Integration Process," in *Norway and the European Community: The Political Economy of Integration*, ed. Brent F. Nelsen (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 213-14.

⁴Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1961).

⁵Jacques Pelkmans, "Economic Theories of Integration Revisited," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 18(4)(1980): 333-54.

⁶Balassa, 2.

the other hand, have traditionally been more concerned with the establishment of new institutions governing new political communities, or new psychological states that signify the transfer of loyalties from the nation-state to a "new center."⁷ We believe that our conception is broad enough to include the creation of common institutions and the transferring of loyalties, but it does not require any of these developments for integration to occur. Indeed, the focus of our definition is on the concrete measures taken to eliminate borders. Beyond our requirement that these measures be taken by mutual agreement, we are not concerned with the method employed. Thus, by our definition both the EU, with its sophisticated supranational institutions and decision-making procedures, and NAFTA, with its absence of supranational intent, constitute two manifestations of the same phenomenon, regional integration.

How do we know when integration is taking place? Some integration does develop informally as transactions across borders increase,⁸ but most occurs as a result of agreements between governments. These agreements must be ratified through a domestic political process that affords the opposition opportunities to express its opinion. Our focus, therefore, is on the most important integration proposals put before the domestic authorities in three North American and eighteen European countries (see Tables 1 and 2). Combined, the countries and proposals produce 81 cases (see Table 3). The countries chosen for the study are similar in important ways: they have well developed economies and democratic political systems.⁹ Given the preliminary nature of our effort, the addition of other regional groups—such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Andean Group, the Central American Common Market (CACM), and Mercosur—would have complicated the study by adding many developing economies and nondemocratic governments to the sample.

Delineating opposition to these proposals presented a second problem that has several parts. First, what constitutes "opposition?" Our response is summarized in Table 4, which identifies five sources of opposition: the political fringe, interest groups, political parties, grassroots organizations, and party factions within prointegration parties. The table also indicates the decision criteria we used for determining the presence (or absence) of opposition. A second issue involved attempting to capture the magnitude of opposition. We have developed an ordinal scale ranging from zero (No Opposition) to five (Party Fragmentation). The higher the score the greater the intensity of opposition. Therefore, "Party Opposition" is deemed more significant than "Interest Group Opposition," and

⁷See, for example, Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, 16; Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1963), 6; Paul Taylor, *The Limits of European Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 26-27.

⁸See Karl W. Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1957); William Wallace, "Introduction: The Dynamics of European Integration," in *The Dynamics of European Integration*, ed. William Wallace (Pinter Publishers, 1990); Janne Haaland Matlary, "Norway and European Integration: A Theoretical Discussion," in *Norway and the European Community*.

⁹The exception, of course, is Mexico.

"Grassroots Opposition" more important than either. The scale also signals the magnitude of difference between categories. For example, "Party Opposition" is more important than "Interest Group Opposition" by only one step, but two steps separate "Grassroots Opposition" and "Interest Group Opposition."¹⁰

Underlying this scale is an argument about what constitutes significant protest in modern democracies. Opposition on the political fringes may get a bit noisy, but, by definition, it has virtually no impact on the political system. Major interests, on the other hand, do tend to influence the system, because they represent more voters and have a traditional voice in national debates. But generally more important voices are heard on the floors of parliaments. Thus political parties constitute a more important source of opposition. If the people supplement or bypass the voices in parliament by creating an extraparliamentary organization and take to the streets in major demonstrations, an even more important source of opposition—the mass public—has been mobilized. Finally, if major prointegration parties fragment over the issue, new political cleavages open up that may in fact threaten the existing party system. Such a threat, in our view, constitutes the highest level of opposition.

When we apply this scale to a given case, we are able to arrive at a cumulative case score (see Table 5). This overall score indicates the degree of opposition toward that particular opposition proposal. Two caveats are in order. First, the score does not indicate the effectiveness of the opposition. An integration proposal could, for instance, pass the legislature despite an opposition score of fifteen. Our purpose here, then, is not to explain why opposition is successful or unsuccessful, but why it exists. Second, while the score does indicate the strength of opposition, it lacks some precision. Only one significant political party, for example, needs to express opposition to the proposal for that category to yield its entire three points to the overall score. Likewise, if several parties making up a broad range of the political spectrum oppose the integration proposal, that category still yields three points to the total. The measure has room for improvement but remains somewhat imprecise because of the limitations of the data.

The third problem associated with measuring opposition to regional integration involved our generation of data. Our combined country-specific expertise and language skills allowed us to cover a small fraction of the countries in the study. The remaining information was derived from limited print sources and consultations with a large number of embassy officials and country experts. We have attempted to verify and corroborate our information as much as possible. The enterprise has been fraught with difficulty, however, especially when trying to confirm the *absence* of opposition in particular categories. As a result, it was particularly difficult to complete our study of countries with traditionally low levels of opposition such as Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Table 6 outlines the sources of opposition and the

¹⁰Astute observers will note the absence of any category measuring public opinion. A public opinion variable, however, would have three major problems. First, it would be incomplete because polls track public opinion on integration in only the four largest European countries in the 1950s. Second, the questions asked in each country are often very different (on these two points see, Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990], 417-18). Third, opposition to integration will appear first at the elite level, which is where we focus, before emerging as significant in public opinion polls (Martin Slater, "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 21(1,2)(1982):81).

scores for each of the cases.

OPPOSITION TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE RED-GREEN-BROWN "COALITION"

The opposition to integration, taken as a whole, is an alliance of convenience comprised of leftists, agrarians, and nationalists—the red-green-brown coalition (see Table 7).¹¹ Most opposition movements that emerge in specific countries at specific times do not contain all three elements: only eight of the cases (CAN2, AUS4, FR5, IRE2, NWY6, SPN1, SWT3, UK2) register opposition from the reds, greens, and browns. Furthermore, none of these "coalitions" operated as a single political entity but rather as a loose collection of interests united only by their opposition to integration. Nevertheless, if opposition arises, it is nearly certain to come from at least one of the elements of the red-green-brown coalition.

The left is the most consistent opponent of integration. It is represented in 64 cases, compared with 18 for the agrarians and 31 for the nationalists. In 28 of these cases, the left stood alone in opposition to integration. Furthermore, the further left a labor union or political party positions itself on the ideological spectrum, the more likely it will oppose integration. Communist parties and unions (in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland), the left wings of traditional leftist parties (in the Nordic countries, Mexico, and the United States), and parts of the new left, including left-wing environmentalists (in Austria, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) are the most likely to take a public stand against a proposal that is often backed unanimously by the mainstream political establishment. The particular reasons for this posture vary but center on a general skepticism toward any proposal that seems to benefit capital at the expense of "the people." Integration is seen as a means of survival for an economic system built on the exploitation of workers, the environment, or both. In addition, integration threatens the welfare state and solidaristic societies so painstakingly constructed by social democrats in several European countries, primarily in Scandinavia. Integration renders useless many of the national economic tools needed to build and maintain societies insulated from the most disruptive external forces. Thus, the left has little interest in a process that seems to undermine every socialist achievement.¹²

On the other end of the political spectrum, the nationalist right takes exception to the integration efforts of much of the political mainstream. Some of these "brown" elements are

¹¹For an analysis of this coalition in Norway, see Brent F. Nelsen, "The European Community Debate in Norway: The Periphery Revolts, Again," in *Norway and the European Community*.

¹²See Kevin Featherstone, *Socialist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative History* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1988); and Robert Geyer, "Socialism and the EC After Maastricht: From Classic to New-Model European Social Democracy," in *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond*, eds. Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

very far to the right, as in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These groups espouse authoritarian, anti-immigrant, nationalistic positions that make any reduction in the significance of borders unacceptable. Other nationalistic elements opposed to integration, however, are more moderate. In nine countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) some industrial groups opposed early integration proposals—especially the European Coal and Steel Community—because they feared increased government interference in their activities. In all of these countries subsequent integration proposals were generally embraced by industry. A number of Conservatives in Britain, Gaullists in France, Reform party members in Canada, and Republicans in the United States, however, have also opposed some integration attempts on grounds they will reduce national sovereignty. This argument, in fact, may find deeper resonance within the general populations of many European and North American countries than might be assumed from elite rhetoric. Such an assertion, if empirically supported, would demonstrate the existence of a largely untapped store of opposition to future integration.

Between left and right are the farmers who have resisted certain integration proposals as threats to their livelihood. Agrarian resistance is most visible in locales where farming is difficult or inefficient and subsidies are high (in Austria, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). But farmers, even in these countries, do not always resist integration. For instance, free trade areas that include agriculture will have support from agrarian interests that see new market possibilities, and common markets will attract farmers if generous subsidies are offered (e.g., through a Common Agricultural Policy). In short, agricultural interests approach integration pragmatically rather than ideologically. Farmers will resist when they perceive a threat to their interests.

The red-green-brown coalition is the natural opposition to integration. However, it does not oppose every integration proposal in every country. The presence and strength of opposition varies within and between countries. What brings out opposition, and what determines its strength? These are the questions to which we now turn.

HYPOTHESES AND MEASUREMENT

The literature provides intriguing clues to help us determine which factors may influence the rise of opposition to the integration process. These clues—or hypotheses—may be grouped under three broad categories: timing, economic explanations, and integration theory.

Timing

The experience of European integration suggests that countries that initiate the process manifest lower levels of opposition than those joining later. Five of the original six countries in Europe—Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—experienced very low levels of opposition prior to joining the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community. The exception was France, where significant party and interest group opposition to both proposals was observed. Several countries, including Britain

and Denmark, joined these organizations later, but only after heated debates over the merits of integration. We suspect that one reason for the higher levels of opposition is that later entrants have derived a greater knowledge of the integration process from observing the experience of existing members. This knowledge allows the opposition to fire at a concrete target.¹³ Thus, *we expect that countries joining an existing regional group will demonstrate stronger opposition to integration than the original members.*

An initial exploration of the effect of timing on resistance to integration lends support to the notion that the earlier the ascension to the European Community (the experience of North America is too limited for analysis here), the more muted the opposition. Table 10 compares average opposition scores for four EU membership cohorts. Average scores for new members are all higher than the average scores for the original six countries. Greece, Portugal, and Spain do not display scores much out of line with the original group, but unlike most of the other new members, they never had the opportunity to join the Community in the 1950s. For them, the opportunity was new—as it was for the original six in 1951.

To subject this notion to a more rigorous test, we have constructed a series of dummy variables to model the influence of *timing* on the strength of opposition. **Time** takes a value of "1" for the original six participants in the process of European integration, and a "0" otherwise. **Time1**, **Time2**, and **Time3** were formulated similarly for EC entrants in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, respectively (see Tables 10 and 11 for membership cohorts). Additionally, we created the variable **NAFTA** to account for the three North American participants in the integration process.

Economic Explanations

All of the integration proposals in this study, with the exception of the European Defense Community, have as a major component a set of economic agreements that create free trade zones, single markets, or common currencies. It thus seems natural to look for economic factors that may have contributed to the strength of the opposition to these proposals. Many observers, for instance, have argued that integration moves forward in prosperous times, but is resisted during recessionary times. Expanding markets and greater economic coordination sound great when the economic pie is growing for everyone. During hard times, however, expanded markets also mean greater competition for scarce customers and the threat of increased joblessness. Economic downturns may in fact prevent governments from putting integration proposals forward, but *we would also expect that opposition would be relatively greater in economic hard times than in boom times.*

A second economic factor that may influence the strength of the opposition concerns the economic dependence of the individual country on the global economy. Countries highly dependent upon international trade for their prosperity may be more likely to achieve a consensus on the need for any arrangement that guarantees open access to foreign markets. On the other hand, countries that depend little on the international market for their economic welfare may find it more difficult to forge a consensus in favor of integration. Thus, *we would expect greater opposition to integration when economies are relatively closed to the*

¹³Slater, 84.

world and the opposite when they are open.

Our cluster of economic factors is tapped by two indicators. **Economic performance** is defined as the change in unemployment over the two years prior to the decision on the integration proposal. This measure was chosen to reflect the *perception* of economic hard times, which in certain instances, may be more important than objective reality. To test the second hypothesis—that closed economies produce more opposition—we used a common measure of **economic openness**: exports plus imports as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product.¹⁴ More open economies will yield larger numbers. The data for these indicators was drawn from OECD statistics. Although other sources were available, we wanted to insure that if the data were biased, it would be systematic, and therefore less likely to invalidate our results.

Integration Theory

Some integration theorists have noted a difference between economic and political integration.¹⁵ Economic integration is the process of reducing national borders as barriers to economic activity. Implied in this definition is the gradual melding of economies as the importance of national borders diminishes. Thus, economic integration begins when economic factors are allowed freer movement between nation-states and ends (in theory) when the economies of two or more nation-states are perceived and treated as one economy. Political integration is the process of reducing national borders as a demarcation of state sovereignty. This means that states will no longer have sole jurisdiction over a certain piece of territory. It does not mean that a supranational body will be created. States may "pool" their sovereignty or create a new state; the method is not important. The definition does imply, however, that political integration has occurred when the polities of two or more nation-states are perceived and treated as one.

Economic and political integration usually go hand in hand. Economic integration can scarcely begin before some coordination of policy is required to govern the new system. As Pelkmans points out, economic integration among mixed economies cannot occur without some intervention on the part of the governments involved.¹⁶ Increased political intervention means more policy coordination and delegation to supranational institutions (if they exist) and, thus, a transfer of sovereignty. The transfer of sovereignty away from national parliaments would seem to be more controversial within the domestic political systems than the creation of larger markets. Thus, *we expect opposition to integration to rise as the political dimension of the integration proposal becomes more significant.*

To test this set of hypotheses, we have developed a dummy variable to indicate the type

¹⁴See, for instance, Kaare Strøm, "Party Competition and the Politics of Economic Openness and Growth," *European Journal of Political Research*, 17(1)(1989): 1-16.

¹⁵This is implicit in Pelkmans, "Economic Theories," but explicit in Matlary, "Norway and European Integration."

¹⁶Pelkmans, "Economic Theories," 334-35.

of integration. If an integration proposal was primarily economic, it was coded "0;" if it was primarily political it received a "1" (see Table 8). To explore this relationship further, we developed a finer measure of the mix between economic and political integration in each of the integration proposals. We loosely based our "integration scale," or level of integration, on Balassa's stages of integration.¹⁷ The scale is found in Table 9. Moving up the scale from "0" to "7" increases the economic scope and (or) the political dimension of the integration. As with the previous hypothesis, we expect political integration to be more controversial than economic integration. Thus, *opposition should increase as the level of integration increases.*

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The Correlates of Opposition

Table 11 presents a series of bivariate correlations designed to give us a better initial picture of how the set of political, integration, and economic variables relate to opposition. Each column contains correlations between opposition to integration scores and selected explanatory variables for the pooled sample,¹⁸ as well as for each European Union expansion cohort. We deleted missing data listwise. Note that we have included variables indicating the existence or absence of nationalist (brown), agrarian (green), and leftist (red) opposition groups.

We observe from Table 11 that opposition to integration is strongly influenced by the existence of nationalist, agricultural, or leftist groups, either singly or in combination. Red opposition is more strongly correlated with opposition score, both in the pooled sample and across the expansion cohorts (except for the EC 6), than the other two components of the coalition. Organizational strengths of the left probably account for this finding. Since left-wing interest groups (e.g., unions, environmental groups, women's organizations) are often closely tied to political parties or party factions, a general mobilization of some portion of the left against integration means the activation of several types of political actors, thus raising the opposition score. In sum, higher opposition scores are due in part to the successful mobilization efforts of the most consistent ideological opponents of integration, the reds.

Green opposition, although not as strong as red opposition, is also highly correlated with opposition score, especially in the pooled sample and in the EC 6, 1970s, and 1990s cohorts. Organizational strengths also seem to explain this finding since agrarian interest groups and political parties (especially in Scandinavia) are closely linked. Perhaps more interesting, however, is the fact that agrarian opposition is more strongly correlated with opposition scores in the EC 6 (where average scores are low, see Table 10) and the 1990s (where average scores are high) cohorts than even red opposition. This suggests that when agricultural interests are at stake--as they were in France in the 1950s and in the Nordic and

¹⁷Balassa, *Theory of Economic Integration*, 2.

¹⁸Given the small number of data points for each "case" or country, generating meaningful country-by-country correlation coefficients was not feasible, and are therefore not reported.

Alpine regions in the 1990s--green interests can mobilize a variety of elements in the political system.

Unlike the reds and greens, the browns are not as likely to activate several different political actors in an effort to mobilize against integration. Right-wing opposition is often represented by political parties on the fringe of the political system and less likely than left-wing or agrarian parties to have sympathetic allies among interest organizations or in parties closer to the political center. Thus right-wing opposition will seldom mobilize more general opposition to integration (although one major exception may be Britain in the 1990s) and may have the opposite effect, as is suggested by the 1980s cohort.¹⁹

Economic factors do not appear to exert much impact on opposition levels. While the relationship between economic openness and opposition is inverse (-.124)--that is, the more trade-oriented the society, the less the opposition to increased linkages--it is far from significant ($p < .313$). Moreover, one of our most startling findings was the absence of a relationship between economic performance and opposition to integration. Not only are there no significant findings, but the signs of the correlation coefficients are generally in a direction not predicted by our hypothesis. That is, our results indicate that as an economy weakens, political opposition to integration proposals also weakens. If later found to be significant, this could mean that publics and politicians favor increased economic and political ties to give their economies a "kick-start" by gaining greater access to markets and investment capital. The North American case certainly lends some support to this point of view. Free trade negotiations took place within the context of economic recessions in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. For both Canada, and especially Mexico, NAFTA held out the prospect of a more rapid recovery from domestic economic problems. Of course, another explanation for these findings is that our measure is not a discriminating reflection of domestic economic performance. One of the most commonly employed measures of economic activity is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. In results not reported here, this measure also failed to exert any statistically significant influence on opposition. Lagging the scores also failed to offer additional information.

The integration variables are correlated with opposition score in the pooled sample, but the relationships, while significant, are not particularly strong. Across the cohorts, the integration level does not seem to play a role in encouraging opposition, but the type of integration (economic or political) is correlated with opposition scores for the 1970s and EC 12 cohorts. Thus some relationship between a growing political dimension in the integration process and the rise of opposition does seem to exist.

Do these findings hold for Canada, Mexico, and the United States? Given the limited number of data points (5) for this subsample, it is very difficult to make any statement with certitude. But the effects of both the economic openness of the economy, as well as economic performance seem to offer limited insight into the dynamics of integration in North America. For the sample, increased economic receptiveness to expanding markets and investment diminished opposition to the process ($r = -.141$), although this linkage is not statistically significant. Economic performance also shows some promise, but the results, again, are not

¹⁹The entire 1980s cohort (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) was ending a transition to democracy from an authoritarian right-wing past by joining the European Community.

significant. These outcomes are sketchy²⁰, but nevertheless encouraging.

Models of Opposition

We have discovered some interesting leads regarding the domestic determinants of opposition to integration. But before considering a multivariate analysis of the data, we offer two methodological points. First, the type of data we have generated contains both cross-sectional and time-series components. This data is generally defined as a **pooled time series**. Attempting to derive unbiased, efficient, and robust parameter estimates for this type of sample sometimes presents the analyst with an interesting set of problems of which we are aware.²¹ Second, given the limited number of integration proposals for many of our countries, our sample is (thankfully) less prone to the problems associated with autocorrelated errors. Therefore, for this exploratory effort, we have attempted to keep as close to the data as possible by not employing Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation techniques. Instead, we have relied upon a "constant coefficients" model, as well as a crude approximation of the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) technique.²²

Our results are presented in Table 12. We have chosen to report unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels for each are in parentheses. Equation 1 includes the estimates of a model which incorporates indicators designed to assess the contribution of timing in the European subsample. In the interest of parsimony, we have included only the most powerful factors.

Recall that the variables Time1-Time3 are dummies referring to the era when particular groups of countries joined the EC. Recall as well our argument that charter members of an organization committed to integration would experience less opposition. Table 12 reveals an interesting pattern. Strong support exists for the notion that Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom exhibited higher levels of opposition than did the reference cohort, the Benelux countries, France, Germany, and Italy. For Greece, Portugal, and Spain, and Austria, Finland, and Sweden, the magnitude and direction of the regression coefficients suggest that later joiners have had the luxury of time to observe the process and "learn the ropes," which seems to result in reduced opposition to membership. Also noteworthy is the importance of the type of integration. As the political scope of the enterprise expands, opposition has tended to increase. Thus, it may be that while timing does exert an influence, the nature of the enterprise appears to be the more telling factor. With regard to economics, the level of a country's dependence on the world market is also a significant factor in reducing reluctance to expanding trade and investment ties with its European neighbors.

Equation 2 incorporates a dummy variable (NAFTA) intended to capture the recent activity in North America. Although the coefficient for NAFTA is not significant, it does

²⁰Indeed, they are so sketchy that we chose not to report them in Table 10.

²¹For an excellent treatment of these topics, see Lois W. Sayers, *Pooled Time Series Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1989)

²²See Sayers for a greater explication of these pooled time series models.

provides another piece of evidence that more recent participants in the task of reducing boundaries tend to exhibit higher levels of opposition. In addition, the movement to closer economic and political ties tends to strengthen the propensity for societies to oppose integration.

Our indicators of levels of integration and of economic performance did not contribute any additional insight into why and how opposition to integration emerges.

CONCLUSION

This paper opens an investigation into opposition to integration across time and national boundaries. We believe we lay much of the groundwork for further analysis by 1) offering a realistic definition of regional integration that identifies the economic and political processes going on in Europe and North America as different manifestations of the same phenomenon, 2) developing a method of measuring opposition to integration, 3) identifying the primary components of an anti-integration coalition, and 4) testing several explanatory hypotheses derived from the integration literature.

Our findings are encouraging, but not conclusive. The most powerful results involve the influence of the various elements of the red-green-brown coalition. The portions of the political spectrum with the best organizational skills, the left and the farmers, contribute most to increasing the general opposition to integration proposals. The political right is less able to lead a strong opposition movement. Thus, our advice to political leaders attempting to ratify a new integration measure is to make sure the left is neutralized and the farmers are happy. The timing of integration also seems important. Later joiners are likely to experience raised levels of opposition, although the specific circumstances surrounding a country's late accession may dampen opposition, as it did in Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1980s. The lesson here is get in early. Some of our evidence suggests that the type of integration proposed also contributes to the strength of opposition. Economic integration is less likely than political integration to inspire general opposition. Finally, in terms of economic factors, only economic openness seems to affect opposition movements. The more dependant a country is on the outside world, the more likely it will experience low levels of opposition. This relationship, however, is not strong, and many counter examples of open countries with high opposition scores--such as Norway and Switzerland--do exist.

While some of our results were disappointing, we did find evidence that the composition of the opposition coalition, timing, economics, and the type of integration proposal do affect the level of domestic opposition. We believe these findings open many avenues of investigation that will bear fruit as independent variables are better conceived and measures improved.

Table 1

Countries Included in the Study

Europe	North America
Austria	Canada
Belgium	Mexico
Denmark	United States
Finland	
France	
Germany	
Greece	
Iceland	
Ireland	
Italy	
Luxembourg*	
Netherlands	
Norway	
Portugal	
Spain	
Sweden	
Switzerland	
United Kingdom	
*data incomplete	

Table 2

Integration Proposals in Europe and North America 1951-1994

Proposal	Year	Countries Involved	Description
ECSC	1951	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands	The European Coal and Steel Community pooled the production of coal and steel to provide a common base for economic development and political integration
EDC	1954	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy*, Luxembourg, and Netherlands	The European Defense Community proposed to create a common European defense with a joint army and budget. The proposal failed to pass the French National Assembly.
EEC	1957	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands	The European Economic Community committed members to the establishment of a common market in Europe.
EFTA	1960	Austria, Denmark, Finland [†] , Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom	The European Free Trade Agreement established a free trade area in industrial goods.
Anglo-Scandinavian EC Membership	1972	Denmark, Ireland, and United Kingdom	These three former "outsiders" joined the European Community.
EFTA/EC FTAs	1972-1973	Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland	Free trade agreements were established between the EFTA members and the European Community.
Greek EC Membership	1980	Greece	Greece officially became a member of the European Community.
Iberian EC Membership	1985	Portugal and Spain	Portugal and Spain officially became members of the European Community.
SEA#	1986	Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom	The Single European Act created a single internal market by 1993—the original objective of the Treaty of Rome.

US/Canadian FTA	1988	United States and Canada	The Free Trade Agreement established a free trade area in industrial goods
EEA	1992	Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland	The European Economic Area was the extension of the EC's single market to the members of EFTA
Maastricht Treaty	1992-1993	Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom	The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) committed the member states to economic and monetary union and a common foreign policy (under certain conditions), among other things
NAFTA	1993	United States, Canada, and Mexico	The North American Free Trade Area encompasses most goods, services, and capital
EU Membership	1994	Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden	These four countries decided in 1994 whether or not to become members of the European Union. Austria, Finland, and Sweden chose to join, Norway chose to stay out

* The EDC was never debated or brought to a vote in the Italian Parliament

† Finland joined EFTA in 1961 under a special agreement often referred to as FINEFTA

Portugal and Spain joined the EC so close to the adoption of the SEA that the treaty and membership were not considered separate issues

Table 3
Cases and Codes

Country	Cases	Codes
Canada	Ratification of FTA	CAN1
	Ratification of NAFTA	CAN2
Mexico	Ratification of NAFTA	MEX1
United States	Ratification of FTA	US1
	Ratification of NAFTA	US2
Austria	Membership in EFTA	AUS1
	Ratification of FTAs	AUS2
	Membership in EEA	AUS3
	Referendum on EU Membership	AUS4
Belgium	Membership in ECSC	BL1
	Membership in EDC	BL2
	Membership in EEC	BL3
	Single European Act	BL4
	Maastricht Treaty	BL5
Denmark	Membership in EFTA	DEN1
	First EC Application	DEN2
	Referendum of EC Membership	DEN3
	Referendum on the SEA	DEN4
	First Maastricht Referendum	DEN5
	Second Maastricht Referendum	DEN6
Finland	Membership in FINEFTA	FIN1
	Ratification of FTA	FIN2
	Membership in EEA	FIN3
	Referendum on EU Membership	FIN4
France	Membership in ECSC	FR1
	Rejection of EDC	FR2
	Membership in EEC	FR3
	Single European Act	FR4
	Maastricht Treaty	FR5
Germany	Membership in ECSC	GMY1
	Membership in EDC	GMY2
	Membership in EEC	GMY3
	Single European Act	GMY4
	Maastricht Treaty	GMY5
Greece	Membership in EC	GRE1
	Single European Act	GRE2
	Maastricht Treaty	GRE3
Iceland	Membership in EFTA	ICE1
	Ratification of FTA	ICE2
	Membership in EEA	ICE3
Ireland	First EEC Application	IRE1
	Membership in EC	IRE2

	Referendum on the SEA	IRE3
	Maastricht Treaty Referendum	IRE4
Italy	Membership in ECSC	IT1
	Membership in EEC	IT2
	Single European Act	IT3
	Maastricht Treaty	IT4
Luxembourg	Membership in ECSC	LUX1
	Membership in EDC	LUX2
	Membership in EEC	LUX3
	Single European Act	LUX4
	Maastricht Treaty	LUX5
Netherlands	Membership in EC	NE1
	Membership in EDC	NE2
	Membership in EEC	NE3
	Single European Act	NE4
	Maastricht Treaty	NE5
Norway	Entrance into EFTA	NWY1
	Application of EEC Membership	NWY2
	EC Referendum	NWY3
	FTA with the EC	NWY4
	Debate over joining the EEA	NWY5
	EU Membership Debate	NWY6
Portugal	Membership in the EC	POR1
	Maastricht Treaty	POR2
Spain	Membership in the EC	SPN1
	Maastricht Treaty	SPN2
Sweden	Membership in EFTA	SWN1
	Ratification of FTA	SWN2
	Membership in EEA	SWN3
	Membership in EU	SWN4
Switzerland	Membership in EFTA	SWT1
	Referendum on EEC Association	SWT2
	Referendum on EEA Membership	SWT3
United Kingdom	Membership in EFTA	UK1
	First EEC Application	UK2
	Membership in the EC	UK3
	EC Referendum	UK4
	Single European Act	UK5
	Maastricht Treaty	UK6

Table 4

Dependent Variables Opposition to Integration

Category	Description	Score
No Opposition	No public opposition from any quarter	0
Fringe Opposition	Opposition from political, social, and/or regional fringe; political parties involved have little or no parliamentary representation and average less than 5 0% of the popular vote in general elections during the relevant decade, public actions are disjointed, sporadic, and carry no weight with the major political forces in the country	1
Interest Group Opposition	Significant societal interests (e g , labor, agriculture, environmental, etc) actively oppose integration	2
Party Opposition	Some significant political parties (i e , averaging more than 5 0% of the popular vote in general elections during the relevant decade) take an official stand against integration	3
Grassroots Opposition	Extra-parliamentary organizations are formed to block integration, public demonstrations are coordinated, gain significant press coverage, and carry significance for the political elite	4
Party Fragmentation	Organized intra-party opposition arises within the party(ies) officially committed to integration	5

Table 5

Sample Case Report

Norway 1994 EU Membership Debate

Category	Facts	Comment	Score
Fringe Opposition	The far left is involved in "Nei til EU", Christian fundamentalists, Red Alliance	It is difficult to distinguish between the fringe and other groups because "Nei" dominates the opposition, Christian fundamentalists believe the EC is the Kingdom of the Antichrist	1
Interest Group Opposition	Agriculture, most labor unions, environmental groups, women's groups	Unions are split on the issue due to ties to Labor party	2
Party Opposition	Center party, Socialist Left Christian People's Party		3
Grassroots Opposition	"Nei til EU", many public demonstrations		4
Party Fragmentation	Social Democrats (Social Democrats Against the EU), Progress Party	Progress Party is divided but the issues go beyond the EU	5
Total Case Score			15

Table 6

Opposition Scores

CASE	FRINGE (1)	INTEREST GROUPS (2)	PARTY (3)	GRASSROOTS (4)	PARTY FRAGMENTATION (5)	SCORE
CAN1 1988 FTA	X	X	X			6
CAN2 1993 NAFTA		X	X			5
MEX1 1993 NAFTA			X	X		7
US1 1988 FTA		X				2
US2 1993 NAFTA		X		X	X	11
AUS1 1960 EFTA	X		X			4
AUS2 1972 FTA		X				2
AUS3 1992 EEA	X	X		X		7
AUS4 1994 EU	X	X	X			6
BL1 1951 ECSC	X	X				3
BL2 1954 EDC	X				X	6
BL3 1957 EEC	X					1
BL4 1986 SEA						0
BL5 1993 MAASTRICHT						0
DEN1 1960 EFTA						0
DEN2 1961 EEC		X				2
DEN3 1972 EEC	X	X	X	X	X	15
DEN4 1986 SEA	X	X	X	X		11
DEN5 1992 MAASTRICHT	X		X	X	X	13
DEN6 1993 MAASTRICHT	X		X	X	X	13
FIN1 1961 FINEFTA			X			3
FIN2 1973 FTA	X		X		X	9
FIN3 1992 EEA						0
FIN4 1994 EU	X	X	X	X	X	15
FR1 1951 ECSC		X	X		X	10
FR2 1954 EDC	X		X	X	X	13
FR3 1957 EEC	X	X	X		X	11
FR4 1986 SEA			X		X	8
FR5 1993 MAASTRICHT	X	X	X		X	11
GMY1 1951 ECSC	X	X	X			6
GMY2 1954 EDC	X		X			4
GMY3 1957 EEC			X			3
GMY4 1986 SEA						0
GMY5 1993 MAASTRICHT	X					1
GRE1 1980 EC	X	X	X			6
GRE2 1986 SEA		X	X			5
GRE3 1992 MAASTRICHT		X	X			5
ICE1 1970 EFTA		X	X			5
ICE2 1972 FTA						0
ICE3 1992 EEA		X	X	X		9
IRE1 1961 EEC	X					1
IRE2 1972 EC	X	X	X	X		10
IRE3 1986 SEA	X					1
IRE4 1992 MAASTRICHT	X	X		X		7
IT1 1951 ECSC		X	X			5
IT2 1957 EEC			X			3
IT3 1986 SEA	X					1
IT4 1993 MAASTRICHT	X					1
LUX1 1951 ECSC		X	X			5

LUX2 1954 EDC			X			3
LUX3 1957 EEC			X			3
LUX4 1986 SEA	X	X				3
LUX5 1993 MAASTRICHT	X	X				3
NE1 1951 ECSC	X	X				3
NE2 1954 EDC	X	X				3
NE3 1957 EEC	X					1
NE4 1986 SEA	X					1
NE5 1993 MAASTRICHT						1
NWY1 1960 EFTA						0
NWY2 1962 EEC	X	X	X	X	X	15
NWY3 1972 EC	X	X	X	X	X	15
NWY4 1973 FTA						0
NWY5 1992 EEA	X	X	X	X		10
NWY6 1994 EU	X	X	X	X	X	15
POR1 1985 EC		X	X			5
POR2 1992 MAASTRICHT		X	X			5
SPN1 1985 EC	X	X				3
SPN2 1992 MAASTRICHT		X	X			5
SWN1 1960 EFTA						0
SWN2 1972 FTA						0
SWN3 1992 EEA	X					1
SWN4 1994 EU	X		X	X	X	13
SWT1 1960 EFTA						0
SWT2 1972 FTA	X					1
SWT3 1992 EEA	X	X	X	X	X	15
UK1 1960 EFTA						0
UK2 1961 EEC		X	X			5
UK3 1972 EC	X	X	X		X	11
UK4 1975 EC	X	X	X	X	X	15
UK5 1986 SEA			X			3
UK6 1993 MAASTRICHT					X	5

Table 7

Orientation of Groups Opposing Integration

Cases	Red (left)	Green (agriculture)	Brown (right)
CAN1	X	---	X
CAN2	X	X	X
MEX1	X	---	---
US1	X	---	---
US2	X	---	X
AUS1	X	---	---
AUS2	---	X	X
AUS3	X	---	---
AUS4	X	X	X
BL1	X	---	X
BL2	X	---	---
BL3	X	---	---
BL4	---	---	---
BL5	---	---	---
DEN1	---	---	---
DEN2	X	---	---
DEN3	X	---	---
DEN4	X	---	---
DEN5	X	---	X
DEN6	X	---	X
FIN1	X	---	---
FIN2	X	---	---
FIN3	---	---	---
FIN4	X	X	---
FR1	X	---	X
FR2	X	---	X
FR3	X	---	X
FR4	X	---	X
FR5	X	X	X
GMY1	X	---	X
GMY2	X	---	---
GMY3	X	---	---
GMY4	---	---	---
GMY5	---	---	X
GRE1	X	---	---
GRE2	X	X	---
GRE3	X	X	---
ICE1	X	X	---
ICE2	---	---	---
ICE3	X	X	---

IRE1	---	---	---
IRE2	X	X	X
IRE3	X	---	---
IRE4	X	---	X
IT1	---	---	X
IT2	X	---	---
IT3	X	---	---
IT4	X	---	---
LUX1	X	---	---
LUX2	X	---	---
LUX3	X	---	---
LUX4	X	---	---
LUX5	X	---	---
NE1	X	---	X
NE2	X	---	X
NE3	X	---	X
NE4	X	---	X
NE5	X	---	X
NWY1	---	---	---
NWY2	X	X	---
NWY3	X	X	---
NWY4	---	---	---
NWY5	X	X	---
NWY6	X	X	X
POR1	X	---	---
POR2	X	---	---
SPN1	X	X	X
SPN2	X	---	---
SWN1	---	---	---
SWN2	---	---	---
SWN3	X	---	---
SWN4	X	X	---
SWT1	---	---	---
SWT2	X	---	X
SWT3	X	X	X
UK1	---	---	---
UK2	X	X	X
UK3	X	---	X
UK4	X	---	X
UK5	X	---	---
UK6	---	---	X
Total	64	18	31

*data missing

Table 8

Type of Integration

<u>Economic Integration</u>	<u>Political Integration</u>
US/Canadian FTA	ECSC
NAFTA	EDC
EFTA	EEC
EFTA/EC FTAs	Anglo-Scandinavian Membership
SEA	Greek EC Membership
EEA	Iberian EC Membership
	Maastricht Treaty
	EU Membership

Table 9
Level of Integration

<u>Category</u>	<u>Score</u>
No Formal Integration	0
Free Trade Area--Industrial Goods (FTA, EFTA)	1
Free Trade Area--Goods, Services, Capital (NAFTA)	2
Restricted Common Market (ECSC)	3
Incomplete Common Market (EC 1965-1985)	4
Common Market (EC 1965-1985)	5
Restricted Economic and Political Union (Maastricht)	6
Restricted Defense Union (EDC)	7

Table 10

Average Opposition Scores by Membership Cohort

ECSC6		1970s EC Expansion		1980s EC Expansion		1990s EU Expansion		FTA		NAFTA	
Belgium	3	Denmark	15	Greece	6	Austria	6	Can.	6	Mexico	7
France	10	Ireland	10	Portugal	5	Finland	15	US	2		
Germany	6	Norway*	15	Spain	3	Norway*	15				
Italy	5	UK	11			Sweden	13				
Lux.	NA										
Neth.	3										
Ave.	5.4	Ave.	12.8	Ave.	4.7	Ave.	12.3	Ave.	4	Ave.	7

*Rejected Membership

Table 11

Opposition to Integration: Bivariate Correlations
(Significance levels in parentheses)

	Pooled Sample	EC 6	1970s Expansion	1980s Expansion	EC 12	1990s Expansion
Brown	.253 (.037)	.355 (.113)	.371 (.098)	-.910 (.004)	.340 (.024)	-.253 (.383)
Green	.400 (.001)	.638 (.002)	.373 (.096)	-.544 (.206)	.171 (.265)	.488 (.055)
Red	.513 (.000)	.347 (.123)	.690 (.001)	---	.417 (.005)	.465 (.069)
Int. Type	.249 (.040)	.188 (.412)	.562 (.008)	-.108 (.817)	.269 (.077)	.244 (.362)
Int. Level	.288 (.061)	.280 (.218)	.197 (.391)	-.271 (.566)	.041 (.788)	.373 (.155)
Openness	-.124 (.313)	-.531 (.013)	-.110 (.663)	.206 (.657)	-.208 (.171)	-.233 (.384)
Eco. Perf.	-.094 (.446)	.126 (.585)	-.003 (.988)	-.206 (.657)	-.164 (.287)	.047 (.802)
	N=68	N=21	N=21	N=7	N=44	N=16

Table 12

Opposition to Integration: Regression Analysis
 (Significance levels in parentheses)

Equation	1	2
Time 1	2.618 (.047)	3.004 (.026)
Time 2	-.786 (.681)	-.373 (.846)
Time 3	-.173 (.901)	.304 (.832)
NAFTA		2.947 (.209)
Int. Type	2.809 (.010)	3.230 (.004)
Openness	-4.067 (.063)	-3.617 (.100)
R2	.204	.222
Adjusted R2	.147	.154
N	76	76