ULTRA-NATIONALIST AND REGIONALIST PARTIES: 
NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE EU IN ASSERTING PAN-EUROPEAN VALUES

The purpose of my paper is to show that the substantial support for ultra-nationalist and regionalist political parties in Western Europe has hindered attempts by the European Union to fully institute ideas of pan-Europeanism within its area. The strength of these parties show that, despite the forewarnings of classical liberalism on the dangers of European nationalisms to European peace and prosperity, separatism and xenophobia are still attractive sentiments to many who seek new solutions to social and economic problems. The traditions of pan-Europeanism and ultra-nationalism/ regionalism have thus clashed in today's European political theater, with no sign of settlement. But it is also the position of this paper that there exist several other, largely untapped solutions to this problem of promoting European solidarity and peace that could be called upon. These solutions disregard the grand schemes of liberalism and the "inevitabilities" of realism and try to look at inter-ethnic conflict from fresh perspectives.
I Introduction

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Western Europe was in a state of physical desolation and economic chaos. After all the deaths and displacements had been tallied, leading European policy-makers quickly reached the conclusion that the Second World War was hardly an unanticipated incident, rather, its causes were easily linked to the failure of the Versailles settlement to eradicate the status quo and create a Europe less conducive to interstate military conflict. E H Carr, writing two years before Nazi Germany invaded Poland, recognized that "the statesmen of 1919 had seriously overestimated the possibility of imposing penal restrictions for a prolonged period on a defeated Power, and of constructing a new world order on the basis of common action in defense of the status quo".  

In Carr's antebellum Europe, nations were very antagonistic towards each other, holding different grievances that required "different, and sometimes incompatible remedies," making conflict almost inevitable. Thus the challenge for post-war European policy-makers was to minimize the likelihood of future war by somehow reducing the natural feelings of antagonism between states. The solution was to unify Europe under a framework of common institutions, that is, to create a quasi-European state.

Over the course of four decades, the European Community—now the European Union—has made significant strides towards unifying West Europeans under the framework of the Common Market and its various institutions. The European Commission today has
the legal authority to protect the principles of the Community's treaties and can levy sanctions against individuals, corporations, and even states that act contrary to the spirit of the treaties. The European Court of Justice also safeguards Community law, and it has upheld the precedence of Community law over national and local statutes. The European Parliament, whose members are directly elected, has increasingly positioned itself as the people's link to the European process, allowing the Community to narrow its "democratic deficit" and make it more accountable to the "common European". And with the ratifications of the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union within the last ten years, today's EU now has jurisdiction over a wide range of policies, including environmental law, economic and monetary union, public health and consumer affairs. All of these developments have been undertaken in the name of European unity, fulfilling Jean Monnet's prophecy of community through interdependence.

Unfortunately for the proponents of European union, there are many actors—both in and out of state and local governments—who perceive the EU not as a community but rather as a menace. Of course, politicians from de Gaulle to Thatcher have maintained that national sovereignty must be protected at all costs and have thus sought to limit the extent of the EC/EU's legal realm. However, there have also been factions—claiming to speak in the name of their nation or sub-national region—who have berated the very idea of pan-European and inter-ethnic solidarity as anathema to attaining greatness for their smaller, elite communities.
Some of these people act as ardent nationalists, as defined by Ernst Gellner, as they strongly believe that "the political and national unit should be congruent". Such nationalisms have often taken very negative, xenophobic tones, expressing intense hatred towards all "foreigners" and treating them as threats to national identity. According to this logic, the EU has threatened their beloved nations by forcing cosmopolitanism and interdependency upon them. Pan-Europeanism is undesirable because it invites outsiders to mingle within their protected communities and entices insiders to escape from their national identities.

There are, in addition, others within the European Union who identify with, and swear their fidelity to, their sub-national region. These people degrade the states under which they live as illegitimate, and they refuse to identify with those who are supposedly their co-nationals. Like the ultra-nationalists above, the regionalists are extremely hostile towards those from outside the boundaries of the region. They see their lands as sovereign as any recognized nation-state, and they have sought federal, and even separatist, solutions to unfetter themselves from central government and, more importantly, to create new communities and identities based upon the designs of their medieval predecessors.

These factions, organized as political parties and running candidates for public office, have gradually gained electoral and moral support throughout Western Europe. The results of the 1994 European Parliament elections are telling. The Belgian anti-immigrationist Vlaams Blok, the French reactionary National Front,
the Danish "People's Party Against the European Union" and the Northern Italian regionalist Northern League all now hold substantial numbers of seats, often gained at the expense of center and leftist parties who generally have been more favorable towards trans-national institutions. All of the above parties hold in common the sentiment that Europe is composed of several distinct nations whose individual cultures and identities must be protected by all means.

The purpose of this paper is to show that the conspicuous support for ultra-nationalist and regionalist political parties in Western Europe has hindered the EU's attempt to fully institute ideas of pan-European, inter-ethnic solidarity within its area. The strength of these parties shows that, despite the forewarnings of classical liberalism on the dangers of European nationalisms to European peace and prosperity, separatism and xenophobia remain attractive sentiments to many who seek new solutions to social and economic problems. The tradition of pan-Europeanism has thus clashed with the phenomena of ultra-nationalism and regionalism in today's European political theater.

This paper will first examine the tradition of pan-Europeanist philosophy and its manifestation in today's EU, especially in regard to the Maastricht Treaty's institution of European citizenship. This will be followed by a discussion on the sources and programs of contemporary ultra-nationalism and regionalism, with special attention given to the National Front of France and the Northern League of Italy. It will be shown that the clash of
contrasting ideologies represents an impasse in the theoretical struggle between classical liberalism and realist assumptions.

Finally, this paper aims to open a discussion on new proposals that deal with mitigating ethnic conflict and expanding the boundaries of one's identity. Proposals that disregard "assumptions" of nationalisms and European identity attempt to view these conflicts in a different light, suggesting that change is possible, if not immediate. It is this author's contention that, in light of the failure of classical liberalism's pan-European schemes to create a new, harmonious Europe, these proposals should be reviewed by European and national policy-makers for fresh perspectives on ethnic conflict within the European Union.

II The Tradition of pan-Europeanism

European intellectuals have pushed continental peace and pan-European identities for centuries. These thinkers worked under the assumption that, if a political entity is created that encompassed all Europeans, and if this entity is outfitted with legal institutions to govern its "citizens," Europeans throughout the continent will automatically identify themselves as Europeans, as opposed to Frenchmen, Germans, Scots, etc. Such an identification would logically obviate inter-ethnic conflict, as Europeans will have a common stake in the smooth progress of the entire continent.

This theoretical tradition can be dated back to Dante, who wished to see a union of all Christian peoples under one secular monarch and guided by the papacy. Acting on behalf of the whole
Christian polity, the monarch would have "the task of providing happiness on earth," while the papacy would have "the duty to lead humanity to spiritual happiness." It was through this Catholic unity that peace in Europe could be maintained.

In 1795, Immanuel Kant searched for ways to attain "perpetual peace." Kant sought a peace which would "nullify all existing reasons for a future war, even if these are not yet known to the contracting parties." He saw nations as the source of much conflict in Europe "independent of external laws, for they are a standing offense to one another by the very fact that they are neighbors." His Enlightenment-based knowledge led him to conclude that nationalism was an expression of "savagery," "[nationalists] would rather engage in incessant strife than submit to a legal constraint which they might impose upon themselves, for they prefer the freedom of folly to the freedom of reason."

While Kant discounted the formation of an "international state" to curb the violence of inter-ethnic relations, he did support the establishment of a "federation of peoples" or "pacific federation." Such a federation would bind nations to a contract or constitution, under which all signatories would agree to "secure and preserve the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other confederated states." Only when the freedom of all is recognized by all can perpetual peace be realized.

Furthermore, Kant argued that states and nations, in order to ensure peace, must treat all strangers with hospitality and grant them "a right of resort, for all men are entitled to present
themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to command possession of the earth's surface...which the human race shares in common. History and experience had shown him that "inhospitable conduct" and other forms of ethnic antagonism often resulted in "widespread wars, famine, insurrection, treachery, and the whole litany of evils which can afflict the human race." Recognizing the growing cosmopolitanism of his time, Kant optimistically believed that the "universal right of humanity" could be accepted by all nations in the near-future, after which perpetual peace would become a reality.

Nearly two decades after Kant's writing, Henri Comte de Saint-Simon wrote "The Reorganization of the European Community," subtitled, "The necessity and the means of uniting the peoples of Europe in a single body politic while preserving for each their national independence." Lamenting the hostilities among European nations during the Napoleonic Wars, Saint-Simon urged national leaders to found and support new institutions which would bring nations together for "the advancement of the human mind" and for regional peace. Specifically, he proposed a "common parliament" for all of Europe; "set above the national governments and invested with the power of judging their disputes." This parliament would be the locus of a new European cosmopolitanism, engaging in a new corporate will "beyond the limits of one's own fatherland considering the interests of Europe instead of national interests." In conclusion, Saint-Simon stated that such a reorganized political system will produce peace in Europe by
pooling the interests of all nations and promoting tolerance of different cultures and ideologies.

Addressing the International Peace Conference at Paris in 1849, Victor Hugo stated his belief that peace—not war—was the state of nature as designed by the Lord, and just as the world of the Lord was born out of chaos, so too shall humankind eventually emerge from warfare into a world of universal peace. He issued the following proclamation to the nations of Europe in hopes of hastening this goal:

We who are assembled here, say to France, to England, to Prussia, to Austria, to Spain, to Italy, to Russia. A day will come when from your hands also the arms you have grasped will fall. A day will come when war will appear as absurd, and be as impossible, between Paris and London as it would be now between Rouen and Amiens, between Boston and Philadelphia. A day will come when all of you, nations of the Continent, will, without losing your distinctive qualities and your glorious individuality, be blended into a superior unity, and constitute a European fraternity. A day will come when the only battlefield will be the market open to commerce and the mind opening to new ideas.

To ensure a sustained peace, Hugo proposed the institution of a "United States of Europe," a giant, cosmopolitan political and economic entity. This union, assisted by technological developments in transportation and communication, could effectively bridge the cultural gaps which had separated nations from interacting and allow all Europeans to proclaim to each other, "You are brethren!"

In the twentieth century, following this theoretical tradition, the engineers behind the European Coal and Steel
Community and its descendant, the European Economic Community, similarly sought to reconstruct the continent to reduce the competing interests of states and thereby minimize the possibility of future violence. Jean Monnet neatly encapsulated both the causes and new solution to European warfare in 1943.

There will be no peace in Europe if States re-establish themselves on the basis of national sovereignty, with all that this implies by way of prestige policies and economic protectionism. Alliances will be concluded between European countries: we know how much they are worth. Social reforms will be prevented or delayed by the pressure of military expenditure. To enjoy the prosperity and social progress that are essential, the States of Europe must form a federation or a "European entity" which will make them a single economic unit.

The ECSC and later the EEC were established with these very same concerns in mind. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, acted as a constitution of sorts, whose laws were obligated upon all member-states and their citizens. By instituting the Common Market, Frenchmen, Italians, and all other members of the Community were encouraged to cooperate with each other to accomplish common goals—the physical and spiritual resurrections of the European continent. Consequently, Europeans were encouraged to surrender their nationalist identifications and sentiments, which were deemed anathema to peace. This feeling was expressed by West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard in 1965:

The German people has learned to its cost that a policy of power inspired by extreme nationalist feelings is destined to fail, because an attempt at hegemony on the part of any one European nation arouses all the others against it. We are fully conscious of the fact that Europe
cannot be German, French or Russian, but must aim at union and reconciliation.  

The call for pan-European solidarity today is manifest in the doctrine of the EU. Just as the cessation of ethnic hostilities was the spiritual basis of the ECSC and the EEC, the comprehensive union of various European policy areas is the foundation of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU). The TEU’s preamble states that the treaty "marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe, where decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens." And one of the tools to be used in facilitating European unity is the introduction of cross-national citizenship of the Union. European citizenship grants rights and freedoms to nationals of all member-states, and is to be recognized throughout the area of the European Union.

Part Two of the TEU spells out these rights specifically. European citizens are free to move and reside throughout the EU, with the Council having the obligation to "adopt provisions with a view to facilitating the exercise of [these] rights." National political boundaries lose their utility, as all European citizens are granted "the right to vote and to stand as [candidates] at municipal elections in the Member State in which [they reside], under the same conditions as nationals of that State." And in lieu of national and local governmental authorities, citizens may petition the European Parliament on Community matters which affect them directly, and given the wider scope of Community involvement granted in the TEU, citizens can petition the Parliament on almost
any matter.\textsuperscript{27}

The European Union’s institution of European citizenship is seemingly the realization of Saint-Simon and Hugo’s nineteenth century dreams. With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and its promotion of pan-European identification, the coming of the elusive, mythical "perpetual peace" - at least in Western Europe - should be hastened. But, as we shall see, theorizing about, and even legalizing, pan-European solidarity has not yet guaranteed such a peace. Rather, this supranational initiative has been unable to gain the support of certain groups throughout Western Europe who believe that national and regional identities must be protected at all costs, even that of continental peace.

III The Ultra-nationalist Challenge

It has been well documented that nationalism has been a potent force in Western Europe for centuries. Spiritual attachment to the nation and the quest to establish a utopian nation-state, after all, have been claimed to be the causes of states’ rapid militarization, the persecution of minority populations, and the creation of a zero-sum political atmosphere fertile for interstate antagonisms and even world wars. Yet after the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, the institution of a bipolar world order was less conducive to overt nationalism. According to Kenneth Waltz, the two opposing world hegemons were able to control inter-group conflict within their spheres of influence by defining precisely who the threats to security were, sanctioning against those
satellites that engaged in "irresponsible behavior" by acting independently. Likewise, leaders of client-states became convinced that it was more profitable to maintain the status quo and refrain from asserting individual initiatives.

John Mearsheimer concurs that the Cold War order was insurance against European ultra-nationalism, whose doctrine preached the idea "that other nations or nation-states are both inferior and threatening." But when the Soviet Union began to collapse, the "universal threat" to the security of Western Europe was removed. In the wake of international political upheaval, old ethnic and nationalist tensions returned to the fore of European domestic debates. As Iokibe Makoto states:

With the heavy lid of the bipolar order removed, it is only natural that cultural factors bearing on social composition, such as ethnicity and religion, as well as geopolitical relations indigenous to a region--in short, issues rooted in history and geography--should regain their former importance.

Jan Urban also agrees with this assessment of post-Cold War Europe. The decline of the world bipolar structure has been a boon to enterprising nationalist zealots, who claim to their co-nationals that the time is right to secure national boundaries and restore national greatness. These goals can be accomplished by politically and socially excluding all "foreigners," who have co-habitated with them and were grudgingly tolerated under pressure from the old regime. The fervor of these zealots has gained large audiences, ultimately manifested in the growth of ultranationalist political parties and social organizations.
Nationalist factions have been particularly hostile towards European integrationist projects. According to Garret Fitzgerald, integration has forced several changes upon national structures, which in turn have caused crises of national sovereignty and identity. Countries have undergone "substantial psychological reorientation"; that is, in order to function within today's European framework, they cannot cling so tightly to their unique linguistic and cultural heritage, and even their political systems and national currencies have lost their former importance. Europeans are being told that "traditional" aspects of their culture are "no longer relevant to the conditions in which Europe finds itself in the closing decade of the twentieth century."  

Ultra-nationalists have seized upon this issue, rejecting the liberal universalism of the EU's proponents as contradictory to cultural purity. The most extreme of these politicians have demanded the right to deport non-nationals—especially those of non-European descent—back to their "home countries," claiming that the best way to tackle social and economic problems is to get rid of the source of all misery. These movements are likewise intolerant of pluralist societies, and they often portray race and identity as variables in the struggle for national and local political power.

France's National Front, under the guidance of its charismatic leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, may be the prototypical European ultranationalist political party. The Front has pronounced its admiration of apartheid, and the base of its political platform is
the promise to kick all French Muslims across the Mediterranean. Early party campaign literature argued that these "savage minorities" had contributed nothing to France but crime and disease and had turned the nation into "a depository for good for nothings, dross, delinquents, [and] criminals." They claim the presence of immigrants has destroyed the purity of French culture, evidenced by the construction of a new mosque every four days—by their count—and immigrant workers undermine the economy by sending their francs to their families back home, creating a balance of payments crisis as a consequence.

The solution to all these economic and social problems, therefore, is twofold: restrict the inflow of future immigrants and redefine French citizenship altogether. Since the First Republic, French citizenship has been legally independent of ethnic considerations, the Declaration of Rights of 1795 proclaimed that all peoples residing in France are sovereign. As Hobsbawm has argued, the French Revolution's ideology was quite contrary to that of ethnic nationalism, or that which uses racial or cultural criteria as prerequisites to civic participation.

The National Front, if elected into the presidency, would change this. Le Pen wants to institute a policy of "national preference," giving priority to "ethnic Frenchmen" for housing, education, and employment. Citizenship in France will be based on blood, and the citizenship of immigrants naturalized over the last twenty years would be reviewed and possibly reversed. Le Pen and his acolytes assert that such measures will alleviate the
financial burdens of the "poorest Frenchmen" and will prevent "anti-French discrimination." 43

The National Front has not been the passing phenomenon that many had hoped. Until 1984, Le Pen and his party were lucky to capture more than 2 percent of the national electorate, since 1984, they have had the support of between 10 and 15 percent of Frenchmen, and around 25 percent in many Southern regions. 44 These election results show that a substantial number of Frenchmen tacitly agree with Le Pen's views on culture and identity. And they point to a firm opposition towards inter-ethnic citizenship and other pan-European values.

As was stated before, the National Front is only the most striking example of an ultra-nationalist party opposed to the supra-nationalist and integrationist schemes of the liberal, utopian philosophers of yore. The Republikaner of Germany advocate a "Germany first" program similar to Le Pen's, jobs and social benefits should be allocated based on ethnic background. 45 The Republikaner also advocate anti-immigrationist policies, blaming crime and unemployment on refugees from Eastern Europe. 46 The Republikaner have exploited the "foreign invasion" and have played upon the basic fears of many German voters, the far-right party has had impressive support in the Lander of Hesse and Baden-Württemburg, securing their position "as the major party on the far right in Germany's changing political system. 47

What all this translates to is that, in France and elsewhere within the European Union area, there are substantial and organized
oppositions to the EU’s drive toward instituting pan-European solidarity and identity. Ultra-nationalists are reluctant and even hostile toward the idea of being coerced into accepting those they regard as outsiders now as brethren. Centuries of attachment to national heritage and boundaries, clearly cannot be merely ignored or dissolved instantly, despite the presence of inter-European institutions and networks that the utopian liberals assured would be the solution toward realizing perpetual peace.

IV  The Regionalist Challenge

Just as the waning of the Cold War gave ultra-nationalist parties the opportunity to flourish, so too did intra-national regionalist parties benefit from changes in the world order. Tom Gallagher theorizes that the major, pan-national parties of many European parliamentary systems were dependent upon the Cold War’s bipolar conflict for political support. They could brush aside charges of corruption, inefficiency, or inattention to the needs of specific geographical polities with claims that opposition and fringe parties were incapable of handling foreign affairs and defense issues which so affected the maintenance of state and society. So as the world order began to decay, so did popular support for the large parties.

It is no longer proving so easy to muffle discontent by erecting a consensus based on steady national growth and the need to close ranks against a specific and menacing foreign threat. Parties bound up with administrative tasks for many years suddenly find that they have no new ideas or projects which will enable them to retain the initiative in an altered political
landscape.\textsuperscript{48} To Italy's Northern League, the Christian Democrats and Socialists running the government in Rome had ignored the specific needs of the northern provinces for too long. Basically, the party has complained that the industrial, productive and progressive North has been over-burdened by taxation, whereas the agricultural, inefficient, and Mafia-dominated South has received an inordinate percentage of total state benefits and services—which they usually squander. This situation has contributed to a great North-South divide, the North now refuses to be associated with a "Mediterranean and baroque Italy which, beneath a veneer of development fueled by public works projects, had seemingly failed to break free of an archaic past."\textsuperscript{49}

These developments have led the League to reexamine the entire notion of Italian national identity. Spokesman Gianfranco Miglio has argued that the various Italian regions were forcibly united and homogenized in the nineteenth century. "Beyond geographic, statistical and ethnological considerations, the nation is as much a political myth as the socio-economic category of 'class.'"\textsuperscript{50} The reality of the Italian nation is this:

The Italian peninsula contains populations which, because of climatic, anthropological and historical reasons, are so different that for centuries they have developed constitutions even more different than those of major European nations. Unifications are possible only by erasing the particular aspirations of the people to be unified.\textsuperscript{51}

And rather than celebrating Italian heritage, the League has tried to popularize the concept of a distinct Northern Italian culture,
complete with its own unique folklore and heroes. One symbol of the party is the image of a medieval knight who organized Northern Italians against the domination of the German Empire.\(^2\)

Similarly, the League has perceived the government in Rome as a form of foreign occupation which must be resisted. Thus the party has sought the creation of a new federal republic of Italy. Regions should be given more autonomy in the handling of economic and social affairs, and local public offices "should be filled as much as possible by local people, i.e., those whose families have lived in the territory for more than a generation and, therefore, share the cultural and ethnic background of those they govern."\(^3\) The federal state would then be left with the responsibilities of monetary policy, foreign affairs, and defense.\(^4\)

Like the National Front, the League advocates a narrow immigration policy. Party leader Umberto Bossi has pledged to protect all Italians from being "overwhelmed by enormous waves of illegal immigrants" who displace Italians from their jobs and who "have ended up as tools of the Mafia."\(^5\) Yet despite formal assurances that federalism seeks to improve the life of all Italians, the League has at times shown deep xenophobia for Southern Italians as well. The party has accused the state of "Southernizing" Italy, meaning that it has exported the South's "innate" corruption and Mafia involvement northward, compromising the "idyllic moral" character of the North.\(^6\) It has denounced intra-state migration of Southerners who want to exploit the better economic and social conditions in the North. These migrants are
the League's bogeymen—they have gradually created a situation of uncontrolled urbanization, strained public welfare resources, and a general decline in the quality of life and in health standards. Bossi has even branded Southern Italy as a territory with more cultural affinity to Greece than to his kin.

The regionalism of the Northern League propelled the party into government after the landmark 1994 national elections. Of course, most of the League's vote is concentrated in the northern provinces of Italy, where it garnered upwards of 25 percent of the electorate, and where it is now the second-strongest party (nationwide, the League is fourth). In Milan, the League's mayoral candidate in 1993 received more than 40 percent of the vote. And with Bossi's increased visibility over the last year, barring a major party crisis, the League should remain a major force in Italian politics for the foreseeable future.

Yet the League's fortune may be the EU's misfortune. With its elements of xenophobia, racism, and separatism, the politics of the Northern League show that there are regions within West European countries where residents believe that they constitute a unique ethnic group, whose culture is different from or incompatible with those of others. They perceive themselves as natural nations, and they are incensed that the central state as well as their intra-state rivals have complicated their aspirations of becoming nation-states. Above all, regionalist politicians feel somewhat resentful towards other groups who are viewed as stifling their identity and culture.
Of course, not all regionalist parties champion such xenophobic platforms and ideologies as does the Northern League. There are movements, most notably among the Scots and the Catalanians, who also wish to preserve their unique identities but without the elements of social separatism and racism. But others, such as the Flemish Vlaams Blok, make the Northern League seem tame by comparison. The Blok is adamant in its demands for an independent Flemish state, where Flemish housewives would be encouraged to produce "flaxen-haired Flemish kinderen" in order to keep its ethnic population strong. The Blok is also quick to blame all social and economic problems on the immigrant communities from Morocco and Ghana. And in true nationalist form, the Blok demands the "recovery of all lost Flemish lands [including Brussels] and unification of all Flemings." These inflammatory policies obviously have currency in Flanders: the Blok won 18 seats in the Belgian parliament in 1992, carrying a quarter of the electorate in Antwerp.

As we can see, the EU is now further handicapped in its quest to instill pan-European solidarity and identity throughout its area. The EU does have a Council of Regions which functions as a consultant on sub-national needs, all in the hope of drawing the various regions into the process of integration. Yet this body is largely regarded as powerless, leaving the question of how regions can best make amends with the state and each other unresolved.
In conclusion, the recent successes of ultra-nationalist and regionalist parties at the polls show the basic failure of the EU to effectively popularize the notion of one Europe for all Europeans. Having borrowed from the tradition of European liberal utopianism, the EU has all of the requisite pan-European institutions. Just as in the preceding utopian schemes, the EU’s proponents had assumed that the presence of these institutions was sufficient; they believed that common governing mechanisms could easily and instantly wipe centuries of national and regional antagonism out of the memories of all Europeans. The National Front and the Northern League are harsh reminders that there are potent forces existing in Western Europe which cannot be eradicated by institutions and proclamations.

V. New Approaches to European Peace?

Deliberately or unintentionally, ultra-nationalist and regionalist parties have clashed with the liberal utopian ideologies on pan-European harmony. And, in the process, they have undermined Monnet’s dream of building a single European entity under which peoples can easily dismiss and forget the historical and cultural factors that had isolated them from each other for centuries. Does this mean that national and regional identities are necessarily uncontestable realities within the European Union and that supra-national identification is a dead issue? Or are there viable methods available to the EU that may help instill a stronger sense of pan-European solidarity and truly make inter-
regional and inter-ethnic conflict in Western Europe obsolete?

Of course, the "New Right" in Europe has its own ideas. Led by the Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes pour la Civilisation Europeene (GRECE), they seek to elevate the whole of Europe to global greatness by recognizing and championing "the cultural identity of Europe." But GRECE's method toward restoring European grandeur is to return those of Third World descent to their home countries, under the pretext that violence is the consequence of multiethnic societies. Europeans must awaken to a certain "sensibility" which has been repressed by years of egalitarian ideas. "Racial" Europeans possess a unique ethnocultural identity which cannot be adopted by other peoples. Therefore the key to strengthening bonds among Europeans is their race, only when they realize their common denominator can they embrace each other and resolve their socio-political conflicts.

Given that the uprooting of millions of people from their European homes is as impractical as it is morally reprehensible, perhaps we should look at other approaches that accept the demographic status quo and try to resolve national and regional conflicts within these given parameters. Perhaps the literature of contemporary peace studies--so often applied to and associated with all other regions of the globe--should be reviewed for their applications in Western Europe. Whereas the realists have assumed that nationalist and ethnic conflict are inevitable in a world of international anarchy, and whereas the utopian liberals have proposed fanciful world governments under which all present
disputes would simply be forgotten, modern peace theorists have examined the history of conflicts and have hypothesized that peace is possible, but only if peoples can rethink age-old "assumptions" of how the world works. As described by Elias and Turpin, the goals of today's peace research are to discover what kind of thinking has kept leading us to war and "to know how we can fundamentally change our thinking so that a peaceful future is more than simply a pipe dream." 67

I William Zartman suggests that conflicts can be viewed in three different ways, each complemented by its own resolution framework. The first view sees conflict "as a single contest of parties, each trying to impose a unilateral solution to a problem", the second deals with conflict as the product of cost-benefit analysis, and the final view sees it "as the result of changes in patterns of world order or regimes." 68 Zartman hypothesizes that once we understand conflict in one or all of these views, the easier it becomes for negotiators to defuse the conflict and initiate the peace process. 69

Zartman's third perspective—that conflict results from changes in regime—may be most applicable for understanding inter-ethnic conflict and the revamped nationalisms in Western Europe. As was mentioned before, the disintegration of the Cold War bipolar order caused upheavals in the domestic affairs of many states. The need to reconstruct European economies after the Second World War necessitated the migration of great numbers of people from agrarian regions to industrial centers, and from across the Mediterranean.
into Europe. Traditional European communities were transformed—having to accommodate these new populations—and many of the original residents felt their own identities being threatened. The surrender of local sovereignty to the European Union, moreover, was likewise greeted by many with suspicion. According to Zartman, these modifications and challenges to age-old assumptions on the physical properties of identity and citizenship create "growing structural shifts, new issues, or an exhaustion of old answers" which form the basis of a new regime.\(^70\)

How, then, can the EU assert the ideas of Monnet and Maastricht facing such opposition from a well-grounded regime? Zartman acknowledges that the complete shift to a new regime is an evolutionary process which "incorporates necessarily slow, incomplete, debated, and resisted changes in perceptions instead of unambiguous realities."\(^71\) To reach a resolution, the EU must negotiate with the dissatisfied parties and institute the same "general routines, rules and behaviors" for all relevant ethnic conflicts.\(^72\) In these direct negotiations, the EU would have to convince the National Front, the Northern League, and others that the structural changes which have shaken Europe since 1945 are irreversible and they should accept the status quo. Furthermore, the EU must impress these dissenting factions on the idea that inter-ethnic pan-Europeanism has created an environment where the diminishing of ethnic identity is more than compensated by the benefits of economic prosperity and a zone of non-belligerence that the new regime has made possible. In short, the EU needs to extol
its own inter-ethnic benefits and actively position itself as a better alternative than constant zero-sum squabbling.\textsuperscript{73}

Mary Kaldor describes the new wave of European ethnic nationalism as a "social condition" arising from the collapse of the Cold War's statist structures, whose leaders "do not have the legitimacy to be considered 'representative' of the people because they practice exclusionary policies."\textsuperscript{74} These new nationalisms are culturally separatist and vie to protect heritage and identity by restricting or even eliminating all sources of internal diversity or external influence.\textsuperscript{75} If these movements continue to prosper with their xenophobic ideologies, she argues, as in the Balkans, Western Europe may become an assemblage of "small, autarchic, authoritarian, poor states" prone to "endemic continuous violence."\textsuperscript{76}

Her solution to combatting xenophobic parties is to rethink and strengthen the role of the EU as "a new kind of political institution with elements of supra-nationality, that is, sovereignty in certain fields of activity, which allows it to interfere in member-state affairs and overrule them on some issues."\textsuperscript{77} The EU should strengthen the power of its Council of Regions by minimizing the input of the very states which compose it--and which have severely limited whatever could have been achieved through their usual wrangling--and dealing more directly with the nations and regions. In this way, social and economic sources of conflict can be discussed and dealt with quickly and to everyone's satisfaction.\textsuperscript{78} The EU is also in a position to promote
transnational networks in business and in education, which could
displace closed communities with pan-European communities of
interest or a new "transnational civil society." Thus, Kaldor
places great hope in the EU’s direct and indirect transformation of
communities and citizenship by taking its mission as a supra-
national body even more seriously than it has previously

Finally, the feminist perspectives on nationalism and peace
should also perhaps be heeded in discussing European ultra-
nationalism and regionalism. Birgit Brock-Utne describes the
general feminist perspective

Women working for peace today share three general characteristics: they use nonviolent
techniques, actions, and strategies, they value
all life in nature, especially the life of children, and their work is transpolitical,
often aimed at reaching people in the opposing
camp. The feminist movement does not attempt
to overthrow any particular government but
rather to displace one way of thinking with
another. The tools of feminism are necessarily
nonviolent, and they harken back to a long tra-
dition of women’s nonviolent campaigns.

Brock-Utne argues that men and women generally have had
fundamentally different orientations toward life and identity
whereas males tend to define others as enemies, women tend to work
collectively and to reach out, even to those in "so-called opposing
camps." And whereas men settle disputes in an atmosphere of
bitterness and revenge, women search for long-term solutions to
prevent any future outbreaks of antagonism and violence. For the
millennia that men have dominated politics and society, war has
been a fact-of-life, without either benefits or resolution in
sight. Therefore, she proposes that the voices of women be given
more attention. They should now be given the opportunity to construct a "pragmatopia"—a realizable future, as opposed to a utopia—governed "by caring and life-enhancing values, not profit-seeking and conquering ones." 

J. Ann Tickner has applied Brock-Utne's feminist values to an understanding of nationalisms and nationalist politics. Because the male conception of politics has dominated in most Western societies, "national identities as citizens have been tied to the heroic deeds of warrior-patriots" who sacrifice their lives to protect the nation and advance its interests. This conception, consequently, depends "on a devaluation of the identities of those outside the boundaries" of the nation. Thus the rigid conceptions of national identity embodied by the National Front and the Northern League are actually the products—if extreme variants—of male hegemony over politics and society.

Therefore, in order to defuse inter-ethnic antagonisms in Western Europe, a feminist conception of politics needs to be popularized and instituted. A new view of citizenship should replace the old norms of society, patriotism should be thought of as "support for one’s own nation while not inflicting harm on others." In addition, maternal values, such as the peaceful resolution to all inter-group conflicts, are advantageous because they are forward-looking. They envision a world where all children can mature and prosper without the threat of violence hanging over them.

Is it conceivable, then, that the EU could best espouse
sentiments of pan-Europeanism and battle ultra-nationalist and regionalist over-zealousness by increasing the involvement of women in its affairs? If so, then the future is already promising. In 1995, the number of female members of the European Commission jumped from one to six over the last Commission. Women currently represent France and Italy, countries where, as we have seen, ultra-nationalist and regionalist parties are now major players in state politics and elections. While it cannot be assumed that these female commissioners all practice "feminist diplomacy," is it reasonable to believe that the presence of these women can alter the relations between the EU and the various peoples who inhabit it? Given their visibility and institutional power, can they effectively promote maternal values in order to ensure Europe's future—and Monnet's prophecy—as an entity of prosperity and social progress?

The purpose of this paper was to show that the EU's theoretical bases of pan-European identity and solidarity, while they have never been universally approved, today face substantial challenges from emerging ultra-nationalist and regionalist political parties, who define citizenship and identity in narrow, ethnic terms. The fierce xenophobia and separatism expressed by these groups are evidence of the great complications the EU must deal with to fulfill Monnet's dream of a Europe devoid of nationalist antagonisms and war. Yet it has also been argued, that one should not conclude that peace can never prosper in such a
socio-political environment. Rather, it is suggested that we look at alternative approaches to resolving inter-ethnic conflict within the EU's area, especially in light of the overall failure of the liberal utopian grand designs to do so.

There is no guarantee that any of the revisionist resolution schemes described in these pages will eliminate inter-ethnic conflict once and for all. Certain aspects of these designs may be as utopian and unfounded as those of the old liberals. However, it should be noted that these approaches represent only a mere fraction of the many conflict resolution theories available. Therefore, it is suggested that European policy-makers discover this largely untapped theoretical paradigm for themselves, as they search for fresh ideas to promote pan-Europeanism in the post-Cold War world.

Notes

1 Carr 215
2 Ibid. 258-259
3 Dinan 257
4 Gellner 1
5 New Statesman and Society, June 17, 1994, p 19
6 Kende 234
7 Ibid
8 Kant 93
9 Ibid 102
10 Ibid 102-103
11 Ibid 104
38. Wolfreys 420
39. Ibid 424
40. Hobsbawm 19-20
41. Wolfreys 424
42. Ibid
43. Biorcio 50
44. Brechon and Mitra 65, The Economist, April 30, 1988, pp 45-49
45. Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 1994, p 4
46. Betz 681
47. Ibid 670
48. Gallagher 471
49. Ibid 474
50. Miglio 24
51. Ibid 25
52. Tambini 230
53. Miglio 20
54. Los Angeles Times, Oct 1, 1993, A5
55. Tambini 240
56. Ibid 232
57. Gallagher 477
58. Ibid 481
59. Betz 666
60. The Spectator, Feb 1, 1992, p 13
61. Ibid
62. Betz 680
63. Ibid. 668-669
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