"COMMON, COLLECTIVE OR COMBINED DEFENCE AS THE PATH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION"

DRAFT

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Introduction

The present state of European Union studies in the defence and security field reflects the dichotomy of the Cold War period -- a dichotomy between the study of the European Community/Union as a "civilian power" conveniently bracketed off from security considerations, and the study of European security in an international relations framework, which still fights shy of integration theory and largely disregards the European Union (EU) as an international actor.

The theoretical dimensions of the Cold War dichotomy were clearly set out in the long-lived debate between François Duchêne and Hedley Bull.¹ According to one point of view, the new European Economic Community arrangements could be regarded as having solved the security problem in Europe by binding France and Germany into a permanent "civilian" relationship. Thus, Duchêne contended, a transnational "civilian power" was in the process of replacing military power, and reversing the traditional power relationships in Europe. In that case, military competition would become impossible between partners within the Community, while external relations would be controlled by, on the one hand, the lack of military threat posed by the Community to its neighbours, and on the other hand, the economic power of the Community which would make military aggression from the outside unlikely. According to the other point of view, the new pattern of civilian relationships altered nothing in the international anarchy of relations between sovereign states. Still, Hedley Bull argued, the only power was military power. In that case, although it was possible that at some time in the future the European Community would become a sovereign state in its own right, the modern security state would remain the basic unit of international relations, and the only question was what sort of alliances such states would form.

The course of European history, from the late 1950s until 1989, produced a curious effect. It became temporarily possible for both visions to be held, without apparent contradiction. In accordance with Bull’s framework, the Western European states aligned themselves more or less unanimously with the United States, under the security alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Duchêne’s framework meanwhile flourished at the economic level. It did so in a positive security vacuum, unruffled by any higher-level concern that the Community’s security dimension was ultimately provided by NATO. This provision was assumed permanent. It was relatively unremarked, during the forty-year standoff with the Eastern bloc, that NATO provided something even more tangible in terms of West European integration.² NATO’s function as an integrator of armed forces on the European continent cannot be overestimated. This function has appeared more valuable in retrospect, since the demise of the Warsaw Pact has given way to the eruption of national and sub-national armed conflict on the European periphery.

In the 1970s, the development of interdependence and regime theories added considerable weight to the functionalist model of European integration which was closely allied to Duchêne’s premises. Haas, Keohane and Nye, and Krasner all provided more sophisticated backing to Duchêne’s contention that economic and organisational power, and the skilful use of international organisations, could, in the modern world of global interdependence, replace or be superior to the military power traditionally wielded by unitary states.³ The standard view of European integration, with its functionalist model of the way limited transnational economic regimes (such as the European Coal and Steel Community) would by their spillover effects automatically create more complex and increasingly political interdependencies, fitted this mould perfectly.

But the problem of military power was only momentarily removed from theoretical


consideration. The dissolution of the blocs in 1989, and collapse of Warsaw Pact cohesion, shattered illusions that the European Community was immune from the need to take decisions about security. In some quarters this produced extreme reactions, like the ultra-realist response which predicted rather old-fashioned power struggles between European states, and a scenario in which Germany would be sure to want to have its own independent nuclear weapons.4 In general, the analyses of international relations theorists and defence experts followed somewhat less outrageously in the same direction. There were three broad schools of post-Cold War strategic studies. The first was a realist retrenchment, which clung to the Cold War containment paradigm, and betrayed an ideological attachment to its hard categories.5 The second was subscribed to by both liberal and neo-realist traditions, recognising that a paradigm was lost, yet urging intellectuals to "wait and see" what institutional patterns would emerge before attempting prophecy.6 The third, critical of realist and neo-realist world views, argued that it was time to change the paradigm pro-actively.7 Of these three schools, the third was small indeed. Yet it was this train of thought which might have found some commonality with integrationist tradition:

At the same time, however, European integration theory was in trouble. The classic route for integration, proceeding first to economic harmonisation and cooperation, then to the


development of the necessary political institutions, and finally to full integration of all the nation-state’s functions, including foreign policy, security and defence cooperation, was not the one being followed by events. Defence cooperation, and other areas of security policy, received a surprising boost post-1989, while economic integration suffered unexpected setbacks, and political integration progressed fitfully in the face of popular, and populist, dissent. A rapidly developing defence union in the shape of the Western European Union (WEU), and an embryonic European army in the shape of the Franco-German Eurocorps, marched curiously alongside a new wave of "Europe-of-nation-states" rhetoric and glorification of narrow national interests. In this climate, theorists were cautious. The long-standing parallel approaches to Europe-building on the one hand, and to adapting to the new strategic situation on the other, maintained their hold, though their products jarred increasingly, not only with each other, but with reality.

Events, particularly the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, continued to force security onto the 1992 agenda. The disillusion about Europe’s positive security vacuum had begun a few years earlier (most noticeably in response to the American Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983), and had already led to the reactivation of the Western European Union as a focus for the emerging European Defence Identity (EDI). This shift of perspective was formalised in the Hague Platform of 1987.8 The Single European Act of 1986 adumbrated Title V of the Maastricht Treaty. But it was with Maastricht that defence and security entered unequivocally the post-Cold War European integration framework.9 The time is now ripe therefore for theorising defence and security integration in a way which impacts on integration theory in general. In the past five years, bringing defence and security studies into the European integration framework has been largely a matter of one of the following: (a) descriptive study of institution-building like WEU and Eurocorps; (b) analysis of transatlantic relations, mainly reverting to the traditional realist categories of international relations; (c) defence analysis


9 "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence." Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Title V Article J.4.1.
consisting of threat assessment and review of defence capabilities, at the European level; and (d) a consumer-choice model of security alternatives, otherwise known as the European security architecture debate. Theoretical responses to the change in the relation between Europe-building and European security have lagged behind.\textsuperscript{10}

For the first two or three of the post-Cold War years, the defence structures of the major powers and organisations were themselves subject to upheavals of an uncoordinated kind, lacking strategic innovation or direction. The early stages of the NATO force structure review, resulting in the flaccid 1991 strategic concept, are a good example.\textsuperscript{11} Similarly, the French-German versus British-Italian defence debate in the run up to Maastricht had little bearing on the shape of Europe's future security concerns. More recently, however, new kinds of cooperation have been emerging, and current developments in European security and defence cooperation have policy implications which are particularly interesting. These need to become part of the integration picture.

When these developments are seen as part of the full picture, we shall need to rethink some of the old questions. We shall want to know what theoretical perspectives are relevant to the emergence of a European defence identity which is nonetheless destined to remain locked into much broader security structures. Three immediate questions suggest themselves: 1) Is security integration necessary for economic or political union? 2) Can security integration follow a separate course? 3) Or will it be security integration which determines the parameters of "European integration"? A further question follows closely: 4) Is sovereignty (whose emblem is security) indivisible?

In order to suggest answers to such questions, it is necessary to consider the nature of the new developments in European security and defence cooperation. Defence is now


\textsuperscript{11} "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7-8 November 1991.
constitutionally a function of the European Union. Maastricht’s Title V allows for the creation of a "common defence", issuing from the practices of common foreign and security policy-making and, in due course, common defence policy-making. At present, the "common defence" mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty is a long way off. Also, the content of Maastricht’s "common defence" has deliberately not been too closely defined. Nevertheless, Maastricht charts a course towards the goal of common European defence, and one of the specific aims of the Inter Governmental Conference review in 1996 will be to check how far this goal is being realised, and how far it is realisable.

Maastricht also formally links the Western European Union with the defence function of the EU. Ten of the EU states are full members of the WEU, while Denmark and Ireland (together with the three new EU states, Austria, Finland and Sweden) are WEU observers. Thus the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 refers to the WEU as "the defence component of the European Union". But Western European states already have an operative defence organisation in NATO -- albeit a "collective defence" organisation. NATO's "collective defence" framework is established in the guarantee of mutual assistance set down in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This framework ensures that "an armed attack against one or more of them ... shall be considered an attack against them all", and invokes Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognises the right to "collective self-defence". Of the pre-1995 EU states, only Ireland is outside the North Atlantic Alliance (France and Spain are members of the Alliance, although they are outside the integrated military command of NATO), and even Ireland is arguably covered by the NATO security umbrella. Furthermore, the trend is towards "combined" rather than common, or even

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12 "The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements." Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Title V Article J.4.2.


14 Austria, Finland and Sweden, the three states which joined the EU on 1 January 1995, are not full members of the WEU. Nor are they NATO members. All assumed observer status of the WEU along with EU membership. All are active members of the CSCE/OSCE. All are signatories of PfP, and Finland acts as an occasional observer of NACC.
collective, alliance structures in the future. The most significant indicators of this trend are the proposals made at the NATO summit in January 1994 to provide a framework for the combined operation of NATO and WEU in Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The Partnership for Peace (PfP) proposals, which had a higher profile at the summit conference, further illustrate this trend by providing a framework for combined peacekeeping operations between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries.

The CJTF initiative is used here as a case study to test the following theoretical claims: (a) that security integration follows economic and political integration (functionalist models), and (b) that sovereignty is indivisible (realist models). The first claim returns to our original three questions. The second claim, being the substance of our fourth question, touches the core of both integration and security theory. New empirical work in this area examines CJTFs as an example of the asset-sharing arrangements which are now being made between the WEU and NATO. This provides a key to reassessments of both integration and international relations theories. In this study, we shall first follow through the different dimensions in which security integration is taking place — that is, in new multilateral peacekeeping arrangements; in the sharing of military assets; multinationality of forces; command and control arrangements; use of intelligence; and provisions for political control. Then we shall examine the implications of the CJTF mechanism both for European security structures, and for European policymaking. Finally, we shall discuss the theoretical implications of these new developments. The issues they raise will become central to the European debate as the EU approaches new security and geopolitical configurations.

**Dimensions of Security**

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NATO and WEU are two different methods of defence integration. CJTF, as a mechanism for combining the assets and command structures of both, represents a new departure. For NATO, the strategic implications are now much clearer than they were in 1991. NATO strategy has embraced international peacekeeping as its "number two" mission (after collective self-defence). Through peace-support operations, offered on a case-by-case basis to the United Nations, NATO will be able to act out-of-area (as it has begun to do in Bosnia). Thus the global context of the military alliance is gaining in importance by comparison with the territorial defence of Western Europe. This evolution is consistent with US foreign policy, which has made "assertive multilateralism" a plank of its policy towards international organisations, and has used this to resolve burden-sharing issues, in particular with Western Europe. For WEU, the strategic and policy implications are not clear. CJTF is an offer WEU cannot refuse. But the EU has not formulated a consistent policy with regard to this new form of military integration, and may simply lack the political machinery to do so. Thus military integration may precede political integration in this case. Analysis of CJTF shows features related (theoretically) to other levels of European integration. Shared assets, multinationality, unified command and control, and shared intelligence count among those features. Also implied are questions of political control and accountability. The recurrent theoretical question is how far political and military integration can proceed along different paths, and whether one will be determined by the other.

NATO and WEU: the effect of peacekeeping

In the early days of WEU reactivation, the WEU was seen very much as a rival to NATO. William Taft, US permanent representative on the North Atlantic Council, spoke bluntly to...

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17 MC 327 "NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations", a decision of NATO’s Military Committee taken 5 August 1993.

18 Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty defines specific territorial limitations to the application of Article 5. Thus NATO action outside "the territory of any of the Parties" or "the North Atlantic area" is problematic.

a series of European audiences in February 1991: "I would like to say just a word about the American public and its view of [NATO]... To get specific... The US public would not understand what was going on if the Europeans stopped using NATO or began replacing it with other structures to perform its historic tasks." 20 There was some American interest at that time in exploiting the potential of the WEU as a mechanism whereby NATO members could act out-of-area if the case arose. While NATO itself might be prevented under Article 6 of its Treaty from going out-of-area, there was nothing to prevent the WEU from doing so, if necessary with Atlantic partners. Such potential arrangements accord with the principle of "double hatting". This means having forces ready to act as either NATO units or WEU units, depending on the tasks and on the geography; as well as on the international politics of a given security crisis.

As the "new world order" idea has taken shape, however, NATO has formulated distinctive plans for out-of-area action. Based on the post-Cold War explosion of demand for peacekeeping, these plans constitute a new strategic concept which embraces WEU. They offer peace support operations both to the United Nations and to what is now a UN regional organisation, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 21 "Peace support" covers a range of activities from diplomatic initiatives to full-scale military operations. Coming under the auspices of the UN, none of these will be subject to either Article 5 or Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO and the WEU are now collaborating on peace support operations, though they were in competition during 1992, as events in former Yugoslavia forced peacekeeping onto both of their agendas. NATO first offered support for CSCE peacekeeping operations at a North Atlantic Council meeting in Oslo on June 4, 1992. The WEU followed closely with an offer of support for both CSCE and UN peacekeeping on June 19, 1992 at its Bonn-Petersberg meeting. The wording used was broadly the same as NATO's, but the WEU's Petersberg Declaration added that WEU forces might also be deployed for "tasks of combat forces in


21 As from 1 January 1995 the CSCE has become the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
crisis management including peacemaking”. NATO closed the gap in December 1992, by stating that: "We are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the Secretary General (of the UN) might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions.”

Practical experience in former Yugoslavia also shaped the outcome of the institutional competition between NATO and the WEU. The EU’s action in this area has not been notable for its success, except in one instance. The Adriatic embargo, which the EU initiated through the WEU in July 1992 to implement the UN’s resolutions, almost failed. It had the necessary naval assets, but lacked the intelligence resources to carry out its mandate. In order to overcome these difficulties, it merged during its first year with a parallel operation under the command of NATO, which had access to superior surveillance systems. Enforcement of the embargo followed from November 1992, command and control arrangements were set up and tested, and the experiment was deemed a success in terms of military cooperation. In June 1993 it became Operation Sharp Guard, and has since served as a model for a more permanent procedure for combining NATO and WEU operations. This evolved into the Combined Joint Task Force concept in the latter half of 1993.

At the NATO Summit in January 1994, Heads of State and Government endorsed the CJTF concept. It was presented as an arrangement which would strengthen the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and which offered immediate operational advantages to WEU. Still within the global peacekeeping framework, CJTF proposed the setting up of specific task forces for "peacekeeping and other contingency” operations. From January 1994, NATO’s military commanders were tasked with developing the details of the CJTF concept, within the framework of NATO’s ongoing force structure review.

CJTF clearly sets the tone for the future relationship between NATO and WEU activities. It is seen as part of a review of the balance of responsibilities between the European and the

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North American allies. The equipping, staffing and financing of future operations, along with new command and control arrangements, are to be decided in the context of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity represented by the WEU.

The CJTF concept is designed to provide a concrete basis for the maintenance of Alliance and European forces which will be "separable but not separate". Avoiding the duplication of effort and resources which would result from distinct and independent military structures is cited as the rationale. The new concept has at its core the establishment of mobile CJTF headquarters, for which specific groups of officers, from existing NATO regional headquarters, are now being developed as the nucleus.

Militarily, the concept is based on the US Joint Task Force Concept introduced in the late 1970s, with multinationality added. The idea is to develop flexible, contingency-dependent force packages for different types of military mission (task forces). These task force packages could be drawn from any of the different armed services, land army, airforce, navy and others (joint). They could also be drawn from a wide range of national and multinational contributors (combined). Thus CJTF caters for participation from either a narrower or a wider group of nations, rather than relying on all and only NATO members to contribute in every contingency.

Shared military assets

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26 NATO Press Service: Speech by the late NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to the WEU Assembly, "NATO and the WEU are two viable building blocks in our broader effort to create a new Euro-Atlantic security order," Paris, 29 November 1993.
The CJTF concept gives maximum flexibility as to how assets are assigned and used, in that there is a case-by-case commitment only from participating states. It is important to note that NATO of itself has no military assets to speak of. Assets belong to contributor states, and are assigned to the organisation. The proposal to set up CJTFs will enable the Alliance to utilise the military assets thus assigned, in peacekeeping and other out-of-area activities. Because of the peace support arrangement with the UN, there will be no need to amend the North Atlantic Treaty.

CJTF provides a mechanism whereby the Alliance can utilise its military assets (a) for operations outside the NATO Treaty area as defined in Article 6; (b) in respect of non-Article 5 action (not arising from the Treaty's collective defence guarantees); and (c) in integrated operations with non-NATO partners. "[CJTF] ... would allow new flexibility for organizing peacekeeping and other tasks. It would enable NATO to take effective action in contingencies that do not evoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty."\textsuperscript{27}

Specifically, CJTF is aimed at WEU participation, allowing in principle for WEU command of agreed CJTF operations. This means for example that French forces, which are not part of NATO's integrated command structure (but which represent one of Europe's vital assets), could participate fully in CJTF operations. It could also overcome French objections to the inevitable US command of NATO operations through SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), if WEU command became a reality. Spanish forces would also be captured by this mechanism, and the EU enlargement process promises to bring in other assets shortly.

Force-structure planning in the NATO area has been moving for some time towards the capability required by a CJTF concept. Several Multi-National Divisions (MNDs) have been created so far. Of these, the most elaborate is the ARRC (ACE -- Allied Command Europe -- Rapid Reaction Corps), which is under British command, and allows for a distinctive British input. French input is also distinctive, and embodied in a parallel (and sometimes seen as rival) enterprise, the Eurocorps. Major advantages of the Eurocorps project in the French

\textsuperscript{27} U.S. Department of State, Excerpts of North Atlantic Council Intervention by U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, speaking at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, 2 December 1993.
view are (a) legitimisation of the stationing of French troops on German soil; (b) integration of German troops into a European army, however embryonic, prior to an anticipated massive withdrawal of US troops from Europe in the next few years; and (c) standardisation of equipment between participating European armies, independently of NATO. Included in the French rationale for the Eurocorps is a defence-industrial strategy. However, as will be demonstrated below, Eurocorps troops will not have operational credibility without NATO command, control and intelligence (C2I) infrastructure.

The NATO-Eurocorps relationship is fully within the framework of the MND, and CJTF, concepts. While the force retains its independent command for normal purposes, it accepts the operational command of NATO’s integrated structure for military operations. The operational capability this gives to the fledgling European Army is considerable, and the Eurocorps may thereby achieve some of the more important command roles in multinational operations where it is not deemed by the Allies that direct SACEUR command is essential. However, NATO’s senior military planners think it unlikely that any significant roles will go to the Eurocorps, even in its new NATO-friendly guise. Officials indicate that the ARRC has been earmarked as a provider of potential mobile headquarters for the CJTFs, and that unless a particular contingency makes it politically desirable to use the Eurocorps, the ARRC will be the command structure of choice for NATO’s key nations. British national policy has been oriented in this direction, since it has made the ARRC its instrument for the creation of a special British role in NATO, and national policy goals have so far been met. Nevertheless, Britain will be at least as much constrained as France (which bitterly opposed British policy on the ARRC) by the outcomes of this policy process. That is, European responses to security questions will depend increasingly on American willingness to support operations through the use of Alliance assets, and the major European states are committing themselves to this decision-making framework.

**Multinationality of forces**

The task force approach gives a considerable amount of flexibility for either NATO or the WEU to choose from the military forces offered by nations willing to contribute. This flexibility will be used partly to ensure military effectiveness, and partly political
acceptability, depending on the type and location of the conflict. An obvious advantage of CJTF is that it will overcome some of the concerns military planners have in dealing with multinational task forces set up for specific contingencies. They have stressed the need for such forces to become more effective in terms of unity of command and control, as well as common doctrine, planning, training and the interoperability of their equipment...

Nevertheless, the CJTF arrangement raises a number of questions. Using NATO-linked headquarters implies a highly US-dominated structure. The US agreement to leave its staff officers in place, even if the US is not participating in a specific CJTF operation, may solve the problem of re-staffing headquarters at short notice, but it may also cause political problems. The US might be seen as still seeking significant political-military control, even when it is not contributing forces to an operation. In addition, there is likely to be a lack of influential staff positions in these headquarters for staff officers from outside NATO's integrated military structure (as in the case of France and Spain). There are no indications that countries which contribute a large proportion of forces to CJTF operations (as France might be expected to do) will be represented proportionately within the headquarters. Particular concern arises about the role of US permanent officers in CJTF headquarters, if that headquarters should be called upon to run a WEU-commanded operation. Would these officers have too decisive an influence over the outcome of the WEU operation?

NATO military planning for peace support operations begins by: "Taking into account the principle of case by case decisions of the Alliance ... and recognising that national participation in peace support operations will remain subject to national decision." 28 The Alliance has taken care to ensure member states' autonomy in deciding whether to sign up for specific peace support operations, and this concern for autonomy is carried over into the CJTF concept. At the same time NATO and WEU have developed force structures, in particular the Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), which are largely based on the principle of multinationality, down to the divisional level and below. Since these forces are to be deployed early during a crisis, this structure will make autonomous national decision-making difficult. The speed of reaction of these forces, together with the degree of

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integration, is bound to increase pressures on the smaller states to conform with majority or large-power decisions on deployment. Member states may feel obliged to participate at the earlier stages, but be powerless to influence the later stages of decision-making. While this structure is intended to signal the Alliance’s cohesion once the decision to deploy forces has been made, it may have negative effects on overall political cohesion, given the scope for policy divergence.

Another effect may be the gap between policy-making and implementation. Member states could as a group achieve consensus on a deployment policy, for instance on a containment policy in former Yugoslavia requiring the deployment of 10,000 troops. But they could subsequently fail to produce the necessary assets to implement that policy in their individual case-by-case commitments. Such a scenario is not unknown in the UN for example. Decision-making procedures about peace support operations and force-package deployments do not foster cohesion. Indeed, given the number of Allies and their very different geographic, economic and political priorities, there is a high probability of dissent. In addition, decisions about crisis management may need to be made under crisis-typical time constraints. In such circumstances, it may not be possible to avoid damaging the national interests of some members. Member states may even perceive that they are being blackmailed in some way by their Alliance partners. Germany, for instance, is particularly sensitive to the possibility of being pressured by Alliance partners to participate in military operations which would meet with fierce resistance from domestic opinion.

Perhaps the most damaging effect of multinational integration, if these decision-making processes do not function satisfactorily, will be a lack of decisive action in all cases. If the combined forces of NATO and WEU cannot be used for peacekeeping on behalf of the UN, because the legitimate concerns of member states lead to immobilism, both organisations will lose credibility.

**Unified Command and Control**

Under the CJTF arrangement, the WEU is integrating into structures over which it has very little control in policy terms. The PfP countries for their part have even less. Command and
control (C2) arrangements are far more than a technical means to ensure the effectiveness of military operations. In a multinational environment, they are also telling with respect to who has political and military control. Thus analysing the C2 arrangements envisaged for future peace support operations gives insight into national interests and political intentions. C2 arrangements also illuminate the relationships between the organisations which mandate multilateral military activities, those who conduct them, and the auspices under which such activities take place.

The CJTF concept supplements NATO's traditional Integrated Military Structure. While day to day operational planning, training, and military contacts continue to be conducted through the normal NATO command structure, the CJTF headquarters will operate in a specific contingency. Depending on the type of contingency, a task force from the nations committed to the task will be selected and subordinated. As long as the operation continues, both the task force and the headquarters will remain under the command of whichever body has been chosen. This will depend on the political decisions taken.

CJTF is supposed to allow for WEU to have command and control of some operations at least. However, as reported earlier, the chances of C2 being in WEU's rather than NATO's hands are negligible. Also, the differences between the C2 arrangements envisaged for the CJTF combinations on the one hand, and the PfP combinations on the other, are considerable. Command and control of the potential task forces is not even in principle extended to Central and Eastern European partners, as it is to WEU countries. If PfP countries are involved in peacekeeping operations, the UN will be in command. Also, PfP countries are not expected to be involved in peace enforcement operations (falling mainly under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter), but only in the lower levels of peacekeeping, such as lightly armed operations to maintain existing ceasefires (under Chapter Six of the UN Charter, and under UN command).

Policy guidelines on command arrangements within NATO require that wherever NATO assets are deployed directly, as NATO assets, NATO will be in command. If NATO assets are specifically assigned to the UN, however, then the UN is in command. Similarly, if NATO assets are assigned to WEU under the CJTF arrangement, then WEU will be in
command. But this is only likely to occur if there is a political need to designate an operation a "WEU operation". In this case, American troops are unlikely to be involved. American troop deployment is a special problem in this context, since the US policy-preference for keeping US troops strictly under US command has not altered in the age of multilateralism. On the contrary, it has become more insistent. All of the policies of assertive multilateralism (UN peacekeeping and CJTFs included) are concerned with ensuring smooth mechanisms of cooperation with able partners, while maintaining US command of US troops. US command through NATO is acceptable, but the UN command of combat operations involving US troops is not. Thus the mechanisms sought are as follows: either those of the peace support concept, which allow the US, through NATO, to opt for the UN mandates corresponding to its command and control preferences (the Gulf War being the model of choice); or those of the CJTF and its PfP derivative, which preserve the option for the US to leave selected peace operations in the hands of the WEU or the UN, while retaining significant political control and influence over the agenda.

Since C2 arrangements are not merely to do with technical aspects of efficiency and coordination, but confer political authority on those in charge of operations, it is important to note these details of the C2 environment being created by CJTF. Those European states which are used to exercising some influence through NATO, and to being one of the military heavyweights in the European Union, may find their positions on security matters much weaker in the future. While decision-making in the WEU may become easier, those decisions will count for less. The WEU forum proposes, NATO disposes. Meanwhile decision-making in NATO may become less accessible both to the WEU and to individual European states, as the pool of countries with whom key NATO states could combine becomes larger. "Political" decision-making in the NATO context also will count for less. What will matter will be the ad hoc decisions on participation in particular operations, and who can most successfully control those decision-making processes.

**Shared intelligence**

Once again, just as in the case of other military assets, it is important to note that the intelligence assets which NATO has at its disposal are mainly national assets, and that the
most important of them are American. Thus NATO's sharing of intelligence assets depends directly on US national decisions. Such decisions could veto or undermine a combined operation. This is indeed what happened, as will be demonstrated later, with the American change of policy on Operation Sharp Guard.

CJTFs are meant to operate on behalf of either NATO or the WEU. However, the WEU is at a serious disadvantage, not only with regard to command and control infrastructure, but also with regard to intelligence capabilities, by comparison with US-supported NATO operations. A WEU Assembly report emphasises that in such possible WEU operations, a CJTF headquarters can be effective only "if essential collective Alliance assets such as satellite intelligence and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) are available at the same time." According to the report, the WEU Planning Cell "needs to have access to NATO and national intelligence including secret material if its work is to be taken seriously. An intelligence agreement between the WEU and NATO is urgently needed."29

Europe's post-Gulf War analyses, particularly French analyses, highlighted the lack of independent satellite photographic, signals and communications capability. As a first step, the WEU set up a satellite information analysis station in Spain. Unfortunately the analysts there have been using only Landsat photos (which are technically inferior and can in any case be bought elsewhere) and, when budgets permit, the technically much better French SPOT (Système Probatoire d'Observation de la Terre) photos. Nothing which matches the US system is yet available through WEU. For the longer term, the French government for instance has increased the budget for the Direction du Renseignement Militaire, its newest intelligence service, from 39 million francs in 1993 to 243 million in 1994. These sums are being used to upgrade European satellite capability. In May 1994 the Federal Security Council of Germany agreed to pay up to 20 percent of the cost of the HELIOS 2, part of a new French-designed satellite system consisting of two photo-reconnaissance satellites, two radar satellites, and a released relay satellite. On a national basis, France is also buying signals intelligence satellites.

Proposals for a Multinational Intelligence Agency, which could be set up and operate outside NATO structures, were made in 1994. Pressure is also being exerted to reassess the European satellite station, and the capacity of WEU to operate its own independent intelligence-gathering and communications system. However, there is little to suggest that a purely European organisation could compete with what NATO has to offer. This may not appear problematic as long as a high degree of coincidence between American and European interests is assumed. Yet there are many areas of significant policy divergence between Europe and the US, even where their general interests and political intentions remain similar. Peacekeeping is precisely such an area.

At present, neither individual states within the European Union, nor the WEU, can conduct their own operations without NATO's C2I infrastructure and logistic support. Thus, at a time when the EU is assuming a political identity, and developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU lacks the capacity for independent action. The US Secretary of Defense left no doubt about where decision-making responsibility would lie when he explained how CJTF is expected to function: "In the case of WEU operations, the WEU commander would have full authority even if drawing on NATO collective assets. The SACEUR would train, package and provide the assets to the WEU. NATO would make CJTF assets available to the WEU or other groups, provided that NATO remains the central forum for decision-making about common security issues."30 NATO's C2I is one of the critical areas which the US has in its power to deny, not by a formal veto but a de facto one, to European partners. The late NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner was optimistic that "common WEU stances will be increasingly introduced into Alliance consultations."31 But politically acceptable solutions may be hard to achieve where one partner always holds the trump card. This will undoubtedly lead to political tensions between NATO and the European core, if interests diverge, as they did in the 1980s over the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).


31 NATO Press Service, "NATO and the WEU are Two Viable Building Blocks in Our Broader Effort to Create a New Euro-Atlantic Security Order", Paris (speech by the late NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, to the WEU Assembly, 29 November 1993).
Political control and accountability

Politically, the CJTF concept is ambiguous. On the face of it, the concept is intended to allow the WEU to draw on NATO assets once the decision has been made that the WEU, rather than NATO, should take action. This is presented as part of the effort to strengthen the development of a European Security and Defence Identity and could, according to the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, imply that NATO would accept CJTFs under WEU operational command, instead of under SACEUR. Indeed, French foreign policy might be seen as one of the main targets of the CJTF strategy. Since French reluctance to commit its forces to NATO’s integrated military command structure has remained firm, alternative mechanisms for overcoming that reluctance have had to be found, if only because France’s military assets are too important to be left outside the NATO-WEU coalition framework.

At the same time, CJTF is intended to be used as the format for cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries in the context of PfP. It would provide sufficient flexibility for future participation by non-NATO (and non-WEU) member countries, for example in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), in peacekeeping and other similar military operations. Thus it reflects the increased demand on NATO to commit itself more strongly to pan-European security (supporting the CSCE), as well as to supporting the UN. But Central and Eastern European partners, while seeking military cooperation with the West, and accepting PfP as the best offer, are far from convinced about NATO’s commitment to pan-European security. In the proceedings of their NACC working group on cooperation in peacekeeping, they have expressed disquiet on several counts, including the orientation of NATO’s peacekeeping doctrine, and the procedures NATO envisages for the negotiation of mandates and C2 arrangements with the UN. In some of these concerns they may find common cause with WEU partners.


The major advantage claimed for CJTF is that of offering the WEU an operational capability much earlier than would otherwise be possible, thus contributing to EU autonomy and to the evolution of an independent CFSP. However, serious questions may also be raised in this context. Firstly, the matter of political control is not settled by declaratory statements, which place overall political control in the hands of the UN, or alternatively in the hands of individual nation-states. In defence and security policy areas in particular, political control is often exercised most effectively by technical means. How command arrangements are decided, and how intelligence is shared, are two of the key indicators. Secondly, the fundamental question of accountability is blurred in the pursuit of national interests through multinational organisations. Who is to be held accountable for an operation which is mandated by the UN, commanded by the WEU, staffed by the French and British militaries, equipped from national assets assigned to NATO, and politically controlled by the supply of military information gathered by the US and processed by NATO? Neither the institutions of the EU, nor those of the Atlantic Alliance, nor those of the UN, are fully attuned to such eventualities. In cases where there is consent about the WEU taking action and the US not participating in that action, the CJTF concept should be militarily sufficient. However, serious controversy could arise in cases where the WEU countries want to take action, but the US does not. And even greater damage would result from a situation in which the US initially agreed to a WEU operation using NATO assets and CJTF headquarters, but later withdrew from this position (as in Operation Sharp Guard).

WEU parliamentarians have voiced concern that, as long as "it remains to be seen to what extent NATO and the Americans will agree to waive their right of refusal", and "in the absence of procedures automatically ensuring that the assets of the Alliance will be made available to it, WEU must maintain its autonomous military planning capability and develop its own operational capability in order to act independently or at the request of the European Union". In other words, as long as there is no commitment by NATO not to block WEU decisions by denying necessary assets, the CJTF concept will ensure overall US leadership and control, while enabling the US to carry less of the burden. In fact, the concept might be

seen as a step towards maintaining NATO as the main forum of security consultation, as well as a manoeuvre to maintain European reliance on NATO and US military assets.

Implications of CJTF for European security structures and policy

How does this new departure in defence organisation relate to European security policy-making? Analysis of decision-making in the European Union has focused on the polarised categories of the supranational and the intergovernmental. Typically, defence is viewed as an area of tension between efforts to form a European superstate, in which decisions on defence and security would emanate from supranational bodies, and the opposing efforts of nation-state governments to retain sovereignty over the institutions of their own national defence. NATO is usually seen as an exemplar of the intergovernmental, while WEU arouses both the hopes and fears of supranationalism. Where, then, does the CJTF combination fit in? Neither EU autonomy, nor member-state autonomy, shows net benefit (though both get payoffs) from the new arrangement. CJTF, giving as it does undue weight to an intervening variable (US asset-sharing willingness), overrides the tension between supranational and intergovernmental modes of decision-making. It brings fully into play "the soft power of using institutions to co-opt others to share the burden".35 Thus the European Security and Defence Identity could only be embraced officially by NATO (in January 1994) once CJTF had been institutionalised. This is because CJTF transforms ESDI, by changing the relations between NATO and WEU, and in so doing it gives the US a powerful institutional tool for co-opting European powers to share peacekeeping burdens. It is in this way that we shall attempt to analyse security structures, not as competing "architectures", but as a multi-layered set of power relations between states and alliances. Multilateralism and defence cooperation are the name of the game, and the trick is organising multilateralism in one's own interests.36 There


are significant strategies emerging from within the EU, for example, which show that this is clearly understood at some levels. The 1993 Balladur plan for a European Stability Pact is just such a strategy. It offers Eastern Europeans alternative routes to both security and economic integration, by making acceptance of the Pact a "necessary but not sufficient" condition for EU membership. It is competing in the field of soft power (considerably softer, some would add, than its NATO-NACC-PfP rival), but it is competing. Official awareness of the problems EU independent policy-making faces is expressed more openly than hitherto. Institutional power is now being tested. Soft power turns into hard power under pressure of events, however, as the Sharp Guard experience demonstrated in November 1994. The effects of CJTF arrangements in crisis situations, such as those which have arisen over policy divergence on former Yugoslavia, are revealing, and will be examined under policy implications.

European security structures

There were possibilities for fundamental restructuring of NATO from January 1994, utilising European Defence Identity aspirations to shape the core of a politically more balanced organisation. A formula might have been found to allow WEU to occupy the central geopolitical space in a new NATO, which would continue to bridge the Atlantic effectively, and which would also hammer out a wider set of security arrangements with the CSCE-wide range of states to the East.

In fact, the January Summit moved towards greater caution with regard to Eastern Europe, and less openness with regard to fundamental restructuring of the Alliance. The emphasis remains on ad hoc coalitions -- neither common nor collective security, but an advanced machinery for coalition-building. Individual states may decide to participate in NATO's

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"peace support" operations, on a case-by-case basis. Les Aspin points out how: "Other nations such as France -- as well as peace partners over time -- could establish a presence at a CJTF headquarters and commit forces for CJTF contingencies while remaining separate from NATO's integrated military structure."  

NATO's ability to function as a broker of ad hoc coalitions, drawing together the most appropriate mix from its sixteen members for any specific contingency, not only follows logically from the force restructuring exercise, but also points the way to an extension of this function via the CJTF concept. On the face of it, CJTF is simply a method of combining elements from different national forces in order to carry out specific missions. The CJTF formula adopts the pattern already established in NATO for peace support operations. States participate on a case-by-case basis. Task forces are set up in specific contingencies, and last only as long as the mission they are expected to fulfil. States may choose which UN missions they want to support, and which they turn down. The only difference is that CJTF is not limited to the sixteen NATO nations. This is where reconfiguration starts. 

Even if CJTF is limited, as it will be in the first instance, to full WEU members, all of which are also NATO members, the relationship of nation states in Europe to each other and to existing security organisations will be altered. France (and Spain) may begin to participate fully in NATO's military operations while remaining outside the integrated military structure. Theoretically, Austria, Finland, Sweden, even Ireland (the WEU observers which are unlikely to join NATO), could do so in the future. Some of the central European states may participate, via the WEU route, as their association with the EU progresses. Indeed, as the Balladur initiative suggests, military integration may come first in future, or even be a prerequisite to economic and political integration. Organising at the WEU level, before combination with NATO, relieves NATO's non-European members of administrative and most importantly financial responsibility, facilitating a new approach to the problem of burden-sharing. The possibility of the WEU organising, and even commanding, forces in combined operations, opens the field much wider in politically sensitive areas. NATO assets

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could be used without American troops being involved in missions, or even present in large numbers on the European continent.

This represents a substantial reconfiguration also with regard to CSCE. NATO has already assumed many of the military tasks of the CSCE through the creation of NACC. There will be more fundamental reconfiguration through the new Partnership for Peace program. The CJTF formula has been adapted to serve PfP. While the framework agreement signed by all the Central European and most of the ex-Soviet states provides for a permanent consultation, training, and transparency arrangement between NATO and the PfP signatories, there is also the possibility of undertaking peacekeeping operations at the request of the UN or CSCE. This would be done on the same basis as the CJTFs, with Central and Eastern European states participating on a case-by-case basis, and decisions on the particular Task Force and its command structure being dependent on the contingency. Like the WEU countries faced with the CJTF offer, the Central and Eastern European countries are finding that NATO's offer is one which they cannot refuse. Although it falls far short of their requirements for security guarantees and membership of NATO, it may enable them to carry out peacekeeping operations which they would not be able to contemplate themselves. And conversely, it might be very useful to NATO countries to be able to support such operations technically and logistically, without having to risk their own troops on the ground.

The CJTF concept therefore implies structural changes in the decision-making processes affecting European security policy. In effect, these innovations amount to a reconfiguration of the major European security organisations. Recent predictions had envisaged structural changes of this order. A more European NATO in which America would play a less engaged role was one scenario; another was a more cooperative security arrangement between the former Warsaw Pact and NATO states; and yet another was a three-tier NATO, in which the WEU would occupy the first tier at the European core, NATO would represent the second sixteen-nation tier, and the CSCE would take care of the vast (mainly East European) periphery or third tier.39 In reality, the structure which now presents itself is NATO at the

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39 Examples are to be found in Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a European Security Organization", World Policy Journal, Spring 1990, 215-250; Jonathan Clarke, "Replacing NATO", Foreign Policy No.93, Winter 1993-94, 22-40; Robbin
centre of a web of international peacekeeping forces. But given that the WEU is firmly woven into this web, providing potential military resources to a degree which is unlikely to be matched by its control over decision-making, this reconfiguration is particularly important for European security policy.

Policy implications

The reconfiguring of international security organisations which we have described raises important questions for European policy making. European states, whether individually or collectively as the EU, are bound to be concerned about (a) their capacity to engage in independent action, (b) their capacity to disengage from multinational actions, and (c) the problem of policy divergence. This problem is most likely to occur, for geopolitical reasons, between European and transatlantic allies. But while EU members move towards the common policy positions of CFSP, none of the ESDI institutions, captured as they are now in the logic of the CJTF concept, can guarantee a capacity for independent action by the EU states.

On the one hand, the power to engage in independent action is rendered negligible by the dependence on NATO intelligence gathering and communications. "The ARRC requires a multinational intelligence and targeting group ... that will link intelligence assets, fuse and process their data, and ensure timely and relevant products. This raises the problems of shared intelligence and data fusion .... Conceptually, therefore, the 'pendulum of control' must move to favour NATO commanders in this new era of multinationality."40 The ARRC is not unique in this respect. The same would be true of other multinational forces. The Eurocorps, despite its professed 'European' profile, is operationally just as dependent on the intelligence provisions which only NATO can provide. Neither individual states, nor the WEU, have the capacity for conducting their own peacekeeping operations. Whether acting


alone (for example, Britain in the Falklands, or France in North Africa), or in an EU grouping (as in the former Yugoslavia), their military operations are increasingly dependent on NATO's C2I infrastructure and logistic support. These are assets which the US has it in its power to deny. But there is no European alternative, because creating such an alternative would be more expensive, and less reliable, than tapping into American resources, and might even, it is argued, precipitate the large-scale American troop withdrawal that Europeans fear.

On the other hand, the power to disengage from multinational actions is severely reduced by the level of multinationality in NATO's new Rapid Reaction Force structure and command. Not only is it understood that the multinational force commander must have a greater say in what has hitherto been the prerogative of individual nations, but the capacity of WEU member-states to remain outside NATO's ad hoc peace support operations is in doubt. NATO's military planning stipulates that no such operations will be undertaken, except in accordance with the principle of case-by-case decision-making by the Alliance, and also stipulates that national participation in peace support operations will always remain subject to a national decision. Nevertheless, the new force structures and command structures taking shape around NATO's RRF concept introduce a new element into decision-making: the integration of forces at ever lower levels, these being the earliest deployment levels in a conflict, will make it difficult for any one partner to disengage. Multinationality now extends down to division level, in the various MNDs which are most likely to be engaged at the beginning of an operation. It will be difficult for individual member-states to refuse participation in, say, non-combattant roles in a preventive deployment or monitoring situation, if by doing so they risk endangering the enterprise. By the same token, it will become more difficult for individual members to disengage once conflict has begun, however great the escalation.

The prospects now are for fewer US forces in Europe, but for the availability of all multinational forces (many of which will of necessity be forces answerable to WEU, or Eurocorps forces) to take part in out-of-area operations under NATO command. The successful use of NATO infrastructure, logistics, and training in the Gulf War is the template on which NATO's new peace support function is being built. This does not take account of two political issues. Who decides when to intervene and when not? And how long will
European populations be willing to host the machinery of US foreign policy? These political issues are the essence of the European Defence Identity debate.

The likelihood of policy divergence raises further questions about the wisdom of counting on American cooperation in cases where there may be fundamental differences of approach. Peacekeeping doctrine, for example, is an area where wide divergences have been revealed in the course of coordinating policy on Bosnia. There is a 'European' view of peacekeeping (shared by the Canadians) which makes impartiality paramount, emphasises consent-promoting techniques, and insists on the conceptual separation of traditional peacekeeping (under Chapter Six of the UN Charter) from the strictly military peace enforcement missions which may also be mandated by the UN (under Chapter Seven). This view is well informed by the experience of European ground troops (primarily French and British) in the former Yugoslavia. The American view of peacekeeping, in contrast, prioritises 'overwhelming force', conceptualises the range of peace support operations as points on a continuum, distinguished only by the level of violence involved, and posits a 'middle ground' between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which is anathema to European practitioners. Predictably, the view projected in NATO's military planning and doctrine for peace support operations (that is, the environment within which the CJTF mechanism is supposed to work) reflects American rather than European doctrine.41

This is a particularly interesting example, since it provides the background both to a significant event in our CJTF case study, and to an important piece of evidence about the effect of operational military integration on higher-level policy making. As noted earlier, a successful prototype CJTF was the Adriatic embargo, translated into Operation Sharp Guard in June 1993. Technically, this operation proved impeccable. In policy coordination terms,

however, it came perilously close to shattering alliance cohesion, because of the different understandings of impartiality and the mixing of peace operations. On 11 November 1994, the US announced its intention of withdrawing from Operation Sharp Guard. Unable to persuade either the UN Security Council or its European allies to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government (the US policy preference), the US proposed to implement a Congress decision of 5 October 1994 which, though it would not provide arms to Bosnia, would stop the funding of the operation to enforce the arms embargo. American ships would no longer participate fully in the Adriatic embargo. More significantly (for the French and British ships operating as forces answerable to WEU), the US would limit the sharing of intelligence on Adriatic shipments with its European allies, thereby rendering them deaf and blind. Such a denial of American intelligence to a NATO-WEU operation, set up to enforce a UN resolution, would have reversed EU policy on Bosnia overnight.

Sharp Guard illustrated graphically the exercise of political control by technical means which is the essence of the CJTF strategy. In the event, however, the outcome of the Sharp Guard crisis illustrated something else, which might be termed the spillover effects of military integration. Although an American domestic decision almost put an end to the participation of the European partners in humanitarian intervention in Bosnia (the EU policy preference), the crisis caused was so severe that the American administration succeeded in finessing that decision so that the arms embargo would remain unaffected for the time being. Thus the peacekeepers on the ground prevailed. EU policy gained a respite, and French and British troops did not have to scramble ignominiously out of Bosnia under NATO air cover, as they might have done had the impartial UNPROFOR mission been abandoned. In the Bosnian case, the independent European position has been slow to materialise politically. Yet independent policy has been operationalised through the engagement of European troops in the UNPROFOR mission. This operational strength has in turn affected US policy, preventing or delaying the implementation of policies (such as extensive use of air power, or the lifting of the Bosnian arms embargo) which stood to undermine the UNPROFOR mission.

There is some evidence from the above example that, whereas defence integration does not necessarily follow economic and political integration, political integration does follow operational military integration. For example, new levels of policy-making have ensued from
Franco-British cooperation in Bosnia. Practical coordination was needed to begin with, on the rules of engagement in the Bosnian field, followed by doctrinal coordination on the theory and practice of impartiality. Militaries conferred, creating a community of expert knowledge which impinged on policy-making. Without this experience, there would have been no strong EU foreign policy position of the kind which was revealed in November 1994, capable of convincing an American administration to tailor its Bosnian policy to European needs.

Three possible paths of development with regard to European integration are suggested in response to the above. First, the EU may be seen as a sub-component of the Atlantic Alliance (with the WEU as an integral pillar of NATO). This shows some signs of being developed along the lines of the "new Atlantic Alliance" theory, in which the security dimension would fall into place as just one dimension of a wider community shared by Europe and America. This would maintain the congruity of security and economic-political areas, though the area would not be that of Europe. Second, pressure from NATO or the transatlantic partnership may provoke the elusive "closer union" between European states (as did SDI in 1983, and the Reykjavik Summit\(^3\) in October 1986), in order to secure those interests which they have in common and which are different from the interests of the US. Divergent US and European Bosnia policies have had the same effect. This would achieve most efficiently a new security union congruent with the economic-political union of Europe, though it would reverse expectations of functionalist integration theory in making security the driver of political integration. Third, a path between these two alternatives would have most interesting implications for integration theory, since it would mean a successful separation of sovereignty and security.

\(^{32}\) The study of this phenomenon as an epistemic community has yet to be done. See Peter M. Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, Special Issue of International Organization, Vol.46, No.1, Winter 1992.

\(^{33}\) At Reykjavik, the private agreement reached by Reagan and Gorbachev on dismantling Intermediate Nuclear Forces, without consultation with the European allies on whose territories those weapons were deployed, left Western European leaders with a sharp sense of their lack of leverage on American policy-making, and led directly to the drafting of the Hague Platform on European Security Interests by the WEU states in 1987.
Theoretical Implications

In the countries of the European Union, military integration is proceeding ahead of political integration. This is clearly the case for European members of the Atlantic Alliance, for whom new layers of European military cooperation are being created through existing NATO structures. But it also applies to some of the future enlargement countries (from the former Warsaw Pact), for whom military cooperation is now on offer as a prerequisite to economic cooperation. This is a process which could turn conventional neo-functionalist integration theory on its head. Realists, on the other hand, might find it a convenient illustration of the primacy of power relations.

More importantly, however, military integration is occurring on a different track from political and economic integration. Instead of taking place in the context of Maastricht and the European Union, military integration is taking place primarily through the CJTF mechanism, and the management of the NATO-WEU partnership by the United States, which holds the ultimate decision-making power over the use of essential resources. In this form, military integration is unlikely to enhance the European defence identity, or to promote the transformation of common foreign and security policy into a common defence policy as envisaged in the Maastricht framework. Here we consider the forms military integration is taking in the EU. Neither common defence nor collective defence fit the developments initiated by CJTF, and we have therefore characterised them as "combined defence".

Common Defence. There are strong factors preventing the achievement of a "common defence" for Europe in the full sense of the Maastricht term. The national interests of the European nation-states are not by any means the only, or even the strongest factor. What the present study shows is that the international security organisations, and the manipulation of these organisations by dominant states, both inside and outside Europe, appear to be far more

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important factors.

"Common defence" implies both the common ownership of major defence assets and a common political process for decision-making on security. These are features usually associated with national (or supranational) sovereignty, and enshrined in constitution or treaty. Without a unified political authority (similar to that obtaining, say, in the post-Civil War USA), a common defence is unimaginable. Should this combination be achieved in Europe's case, it would bear out classic integration theory, in which security integration would follow political integration, which would first follow economic integration. This is the path mapped out for the European Union in Maastricht's Title V (J.4.1), the political finality of which is a larger state of Europe. It is the only model which ensures congruity between political and security institutions. But there is too much competition from the other defence integration track, as outlined above, for this outcome to be predictable.

**Collective Defence.** There is still a strong trend towards a European "collective defence" (based on WEU) taking over the primary NATO role of collective self-defence in Europe. This is a trend encouraged in a limited way by the US as it moves towards new goals of assertive (and pluralist) multilateralism, in which NATO is a more fluid concept than it appeared up to now. However, the distinction between collective defence and collective security should be borne in mind. Collective security is the kind of security framework offered by the UN and CSCE. Sometimes associated with cooperative security (and its emphasis on confidence-building measures), collective security does not include security guarantees. A collective security regime aims to prevent or manage conflict which occurs within the group of signatories, rather than to defend the group against outsiders. In the civilian power sense (echoing Duchêne), the EU already is a collective security regime, and a successful one at that.

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"Collective defence" is a more traditional alliance form. It implies a territorial alliance of sovereign states in which an attack on one is deemed an attack on all (as in NATO's Article 5). It is thus based explicitly on security guarantees, and (in the post-1945 world) is usually associated with integrated command structures and extensive asset-sharing, enshrined in international treaties and agreements. The WEU could assume this function easily enough as a sub-component or "European pillar" of NATO. But it would continue to depend on the availability of infrastructural support which is presently not guaranteed to WEU by NATO.

**Combined Defence.** As our case study shows, this collective defence function is being undermined by the forcing of the new "combined" options on an underdeveloped WEU, which cannot but choose the new style of cooperation offered by NATO through CJTFs. A new security configuration of combined defence arrangements looks likely to prevail in Europe in the short to medium term. This combined security configuration covers the European Union, wider Europe (to the East), and transatlantic partnerships. It separates sovereignty, defined in terms of the security-state unit, from the restructuring of political and economic sovereignty as debated in the integration of the European continent.

"Combined defence" along the lines sketched out for CJTF allows for a somewhat weaker collective defence relationship, or even for several of these within the larger entity. With decision-making on a case-by-case basis, there would not be the same watertight security guarantees as could be presumed in Cold-War NATO. Yet there could be sub-sets, such as the WEU states, or the Visegrad Group, which might offer each other more permanent security guarantees. Combined defence appears to maximise choice, but its force structures are constraining. It allows for extensive asset-sharing, but on an ad hoc alliance basis where the largest asset-holders would clearly call the tune.

In sum, military integration is proceeding, but it is following a different track from economic and political integration. While, under the impact of Maastricht, the WEU is beginning to provide some kind of EU-wide framework for the coordination of security policies within the

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46 The Visegrad Group (composed of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland) dates from 1990, and takes its name from a joint declaration on trilateral security cooperation issued after a meeting in Visegrad, Hungary, in February 1991.
Union, the military assets of the WEU are being locked into the broader structure of NATO with its dominant transatlantic dimension. Even given the strains of the post-Cold War realignments, this relationship is unlikely to be prised apart. Its disintegration is not in the interests of either European or transatlantic partners. However, this does not preclude significant policy divergence.

The theoretical implications are now clearer. In answering the questions we put earlier, we can at least point the way to further work.

1) Is security integration necessary for economic and political integration? The answer must be no, insofar as the Union has progressed to Maastricht and beyond with only the most slender of military-organisational ties at EU level. What might be regarded as a necessary prerequisite, however, is the existence of a security environment within which the participating states are already in some sense "integrated". NATO has clearly furnished this environment in the past.

2) If this suggests that security integration can follow a separate course, however, we have to think again. Europe cannot both follow the US lead (as it did in the Gulf), and forge a common European foreign policy (as it has tried to do in Bosnia) which must, for geopolitical reasons, be different from that of its US ally. The answer to whether security integration can follow a separate course is therefore, yes -- but only so far. It seems from our examples that, whereas defence integration does not necessarily follow economic and political integration, political integration may follow operational military integration (which is a variation on the functionalist paradigm).

3) Will security integration then determine the parameters of European integration? Interestingly, there has been some effect observed along these lines, for example, on the processes of EU enlargement. Balladur-type security pacts have now been invented as alternative-to-NATO and prior-to-EU membership requirements. In this paradigm, security integration arrangements have deliberately been made a prerequisite to economic and political integration.
4) Finally, is sovereignty indivisible? The trend towards CJTF-type multilateralism can be read two ways. Either as the maintenance of nation-state sovereignty through the case-by-case decision-making process, which will ensure that no state is bound by the security interests of an ally state. Or as the fragmentation of security interests such that allies will tend to cluster around issues in different combinations and with different levels of commitment. The second reading suggests a high degree of divisibility.

The problem of needing to be part of a larger entity, and only being prepared to do the minimum, may have the effect of driving policy-making towards immobilism. It may however have the effect of driving policy-making towards more cooperative security structures, rather than the collective defence structures of the Atlantic Alliance. A state may be sovereign to limit its involvement (e.g. no US ground troops), but not to withdraw infrastructural assets once committed (e.g. American intelligence in Operation Sharp Guard). Dividing sovereignty, in international peacekeeping for example, may make no-longer-sovereign states more safe.

In further study, functionalists might do well to consider the spillover effects of operational military cooperation. How should they be regarded? Like those of economic cooperation? Under what circumstances does military cooperation create new institutions for political decision-making? Meanwhile, the realist question about what sort of alliances the modern security state would form is one that should still exercise us. In separating sovereignty and security, are these states now forming alliances which undermine the modern security state? If this separation is occurring, European integration theory will have to take account of it, and ask whether it is generalisable. If interests are now so ineffectually aggregated by the sovereign state, in particular with respect to the security of national populations, perhaps it is appropriate that the defence and promotion of security interests should be separated from the nation-state, and that defence structures and policies should cease to be regarded as a necessary level of the state's apparatus.