The Europeanization of Movements?

First Results from a Time-Series Analysis

of European Collective Action, 1985 - 1993

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THANK GOD THOSE ANIMAL RIGHTS PEOPLE GOT US OFF THAT THING!
The town of Shoreham is a sleepy ferry port on the south coast of England. But in January 1995, it was the catalyst for a nationwide campaign against the export of live calves to the continent, where they are slaughtered after gruesome journeys and weeks in wooden crates. After an earlier campaign in the early 1990s, the practice of "in-crate feeding" that continental chefs say produces the most tender veal was banned in Britain. But a market is a market, and the response of British cattle breeders was to ship live calves to the continent, where cattle operations and governments are less fastidious than in Britain.

In 1994, a campaign of pressure from British animal rights groups aimed to stop the trade and, as a result, most British ferry companies gave up the practice. But Shoreham and other smaller ports continued to ship live calves to the continent, and a few air shipping companies found the trade lucrative enough to justify chartering aircraft to do the same.

That was the background of what happened in Shoreham and of the events that followed, which we shall use in the first section of this paper to illustrate what we will call "the Europeanization of social movements." The remainder of the paper will be devoted, first, to outlining some of the dimensions and problems of European collective action; second, to explaining how we propose to examine it through
event analysis and, third, to presenting preliminary data that quantitatively indicate its dimensions over the past decade.

A. Carrying Calves to Market

In January 1995, under an array of hand-lettered signs reading "Shame on Shoreham" and "Misery for Money," a coalition of vegetarians, animal activists and local residents assembled on the south coast of England, with the press in attendance, to protest the shipping of live calves through Shoreham’s port. Brought together by a local animal rights group, they had the support of the stodgy Royal Society for the Protection Against Cruelty to Animals and of many ordinary Britons whose love of animals is notorious on the continent. "What is wrong is the sheer hypocrisy of it," said one demonstrator, a retired engineer; "If we don’t allow animals to be treated that way here, how can we allow them to be shipped over there?" (New York Times, 12 January 1995).

In response to the protest and to the publicity it generated, the Shoreham Port Authority suspended its contract with the meat shipper and, under pressure from the protests, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd took time out from the stalemated Bosnia negotiations to call for European Union legislation on the whole question of animal welfare. But the campaign was far from over. Encouraged by the success of the
Shoreham protesters, militant animal rights groups began to block ports like Dover and Plymouth and airports like Coventry. In response, Sir David Naish, President of the National Farmers Union, vented his anger at the protesters, whom he called a "sinister minority of boot boys in balaclavas."¹ And on a cold afternoon in late January, Jill Phipps, a 31-year old mother, was run over by a cattle truck that she and other demonstrators were trying to prevent from entering Coventry airport (The Guardian, 8 February 1995).

The response to Phipps' killing was immediate, and served to escalate the conflict. One group of protesters attacked the home of the head of an aviation company that ships live calves to France; another protested at the farm of Agriculture Minister William Waldegrave, who admitted that some of his calves were sold for export; a third called for a boycott of Prestwick airport, which had been shipping animals to the continent from Scotland. As Jill Phipps was buried after a packed funeral service at Coventry cathedral (its rebuilt ruins a symbolic reminder of an earlier European conflict), protesters successfully stopped cattle flights to the continent by running onto the city's airport runway (The Guardian, 8 Feb., 1995).

As public outrage grew, the RSPCA was displaced in the news by the more militant Animal Liberation Front, which promised to avenge
Phipps' death. In early February, a group of demonstrators sailed down the Thames from Putney and scaled the embankment to reach the Houses of Parliament, where they unfurled a banner in Phipps' memory. Borrowing a tactic from Greenpeace, other animal rights protesters used inflatable Zodias to harass animal transport ships and prevent them from docking. A few days later, near Northampton, four incendiary bombs were found attached to trucks that were used by a shipper to transport livestock. And when a plane belonging to Air Algérie, which ships calves to Europe for a British export company, crashed at Coventry airport, Animal Rights militants were widely suspected of planting a bomb on it.2

B. Across the Channel

The extended publicity given the protests in Britain, and the death of Jill Phipps in Coventry, soon caused echos on the continent. The Dutch meat industry promised to guarantee that calves imported from the UK would only be fattened on farms where they had room to forage. In Nieuwpoort, in Belgium, after more than 1,500 people were arrested in the British port of Brightingsea for blocking a shipment of calves and sheep to that Belgian port, the mayor sent a fax to the British police informing them that he would refuse the ship docking facilities (Glasgow
*Herald*, 11 February, 1995). And in Brussels, actress and animal rights activist Brigitte Bardot joined a protest group with a petition for the EU opposing live animal exports. "I am here, she said, "to protest, to fight, and to give homage to Jill." The Swedish Agriculture Minister offered Bardot her support, telling her that "the people of Sweden are behind you".³

Faced by agitation on both sides of the channel and by an insistent British demand for a policy review, EU agriculture ministers met in Brussels in mid-February to try to work out more humane animal shipping regulations. But under the presidency of the veal-eating French, the talks collapsed over the issue of the length of time that slaughter-bound animals could be kept in transit, with southern European members -- veal-lovers all -- holding out for longer transit times against the British, who insisted on a 15 hour limit (*Glasgow Herald*, 21 February 1995).⁴ When a Commission compromise was rejected, the issue had to be tabled for at least a year, while the Presidency of the EU would be held by the veal-loving Spanish and Italians.⁵

**C. British Parochialism or Euro-Movement?**

What is happening in this story? From the point of view of the protesters’ detractors, it was simply another example of Little-English
parochialism coming up against the more sophisticated tastes of continental Europeans. For their supporters, it pitted British pluck against the inhumane forces of market capitalism and European bureaucracy. From the point of view of the newspapers, it made good copy, with pictures of windblown matrons in mackintoshes standing stalwartly in the rain on ferry docks against a driven tide of cattle-prodded calves and agriculture ministers admitting that they weren't above profiting from a lucrative trade between their sylvan acres and continental abattoirs.

But from another point of view, the story can be seen as exemplary of two phenomena, both of which have become increasingly prominent in discussions of Western Europe since the 1960s: Europeans’ growing recourse to contentious collective action and Western Europe’s growing integration. These two phenomena, and their problematic relationship to one another as European countries move closer together, are the subject of this paper. We will ask whether collective action has become so general in Western Europe, and its relation to the process of European integration so great, that a Europeanization of social movements is in Europe’s future.
I. Europe, A Movement Society?

In the 1960s and 1970s, Europeans witnessed an increase in levels of collective action. Actors from across the political spectrum press their claims through an expanding array of channels, including both interest group lobbying and protest politics. Among the expanding forms of political expression, we find French farmers passing out wine and cheese in Paris to protest cheap imports from Eastern Europe while their Spanish counterparts blockade roads with bushels of lemons for similar reasons, claiming that European Union trading guidelines will drive them to starvation.

The rise in collective action is not limited to Europe's contentious farmers. Over the past decade, a wide range of social and political actors, from left-wing anti-nuclear weapons activists to right-wing skinheads, have taken to the streets. For weeks in both 1994 and 1995, for example, a lead story in many European newspapers was about the Spanish fishermen who first attacked French, British and Irish tuna boats in the Bay of Biscay, and then invaded fishing banks in the Atlantic which Canada had unilaterally declared closed to fishing.⁶

Nor have the main actors in collective action from the 1960s -- students and workers -- ceased to protest as farmers' and fishermen's
protests filled the headlines. In France, they struck and demonstrated against the reform of the educational system, and against increased unemployment and racism (Duyvendak 1994; Fillieule 1994; Favre and Fillieule 1995). But in other countries as well, the "new" social movements that were born in the wake of the 1968 student protests continued to engage in direct action through the 1970s and 1980s (Flam 1994; Kriesi et al, 1995; Rochon 1988). Post-1968 Europe has in many respects become "a movement society", one in which previously unacceptable forms of behavior entered the conventional repertoire of contention.\textsuperscript{7}

This growth in collective action has accompanied tremendous institutional change across the continent, surrounding the process of European integration. As Euro-regulation presses in on national legislation and individual states work to align their national policies, citizen groups have been shaken out of their complacency, scrambling to address new issues and respond to new opportunities.

Some observers see an emerging juncture between the growth of European collective action and the integration of Europe. Philippe Schmitter puts this as a provocative question:

- How long will Euro-proletarians, Euro-professionals,
- Euro-consumers, Euro-environmentalists, Euro- feminists,
Euro-regionalists, Euro-youths or just plain Euro-citizens
tolerate such a benevolent hegemony [as that of the
European Union] before demanding a greater voice?^8

But while there is little doubt that the process of integration has
affected citizens all over Western Europe, how citizens’ groups respond
to it remains unclear. We do know that many interest groups have
established offices in Brussels to lobby the European Union on behalf of
their interests.\textsuperscript{9} As regulations governing many sectors of European lift
have shifted to the EU, organized business, environmental groups,
regional governments, women’s groups and even indigenous peoples’
representatives (European Commission 1994) have begun to lobby the
Commission and have been invited to participate in policy formation. But
we have not yet investigated systematically the degree to which collective
action of all kinds is shifting to the European level.

If, as many think, Europe is becoming a polity, it follows that
collective action will eventually gravitate from the national to the
European level. And if this is the direction of collective action in
general, it would seem to follow that, not only Euro-interest groups, but
also social movements will eventually form at the European level.
Therefore, identifying and beginning to measure \emph{Euro-centered collective
action} is the first step in understanding whether a Europeanization of
social movements is on the rise. Conceptualizing the dimensions of that hypothetical phenomenon and beginning to measure it statistically will be the major aim of this paper.

A. Dimensions of Europeanization

Before turning to the substantial problems of measurement and analysis that we will face in this project, it is important to make clear that the term "Europeanization of collective action" can mean many things. Three dimensions of Europeanization are theoretically possible. They relate to the sources that can trigger collective action, the processes of collective action and its actual outcomes.

1. The Sources of Collective Action: Building on the example of the British Animal Rights protesters in the Shoreham story, we can say that collective action is Euro-centered when domestic actors are stimulated to take action -- wherever it is taken -- as a result of decisions taken by the European Council of Ministers or the European Commission. But note that, in their responses to European regulations, domestic actors may act against other private groups -- as the original Shoreham protesters did; against their own governments -- as did the protesters at the farm of the British Agriculture Minister; against other foreign
nationals -- as the crash of an Air Algérie plane suggested; or directly against the EU -- as Brigitte Bardot and her fellow protesters did in Brussels. In fact, one of the difficulties we will encounter in tracing European collective action is that its targets are not always the same as the sources of the grievances of the actors. This leads to the second dimension of Europeanization -- the process of collective action.

2. The Process of Collective Action: Collective action can take place in many ways. The Shoreham protest was clearly aimed at an EU policy, but most of it was domestically based. A Europeanization of the process of collective action can occur in three ways: first, -- as in the case of the mayor of Nieuwpoort's fax to the Brightlingsea police -- it occurs when collective action in one country triggers a sympathetic response in another; second, it can occur when actors in different countries mount coordinated protests -- as, for example, in the European peace protests of the early 1980s; and, third, it occurs when the EU or its agents become the direct targets of collective action. As we will see below, this is the rarest of all three channels.

3. The Outcomes of Collective Action: Finally, as we saw in the EU Agriculture Ministers' negotiations following the British veal protests
of early 1995, an episode of collective action may have a European outcome either when other countries take action in response to it -- as in the case of the Dutch meat packers who agreed that the British calves they import would be allowed to forage -- or when the European Union is influenced to remedy a perceived ill or to find a compromise among the interests of different parties or member states. And in the long term, inter-European conflicts or issues will have European outcomes when trans-European social movement organizations develop out of conflicts within the Union. But with the exception of a few sectors, like environmental groups (Dalton 1994), this long-term result is still very much in the future.

B. Collective Action Problems

Merely to sketch this typology of the dimensions that the Europeanization of collective action can take is sufficient to indicate the difficulties that stand in the way of the Europeanization of social movements:

First, with regard to the sources of collective action: there is a problem of information for domestic actors. Virtually all EU directives and regulations are administered by national governments -- and not by the EU directly, and it is often difficult to identify their ultimate source.
Although the British Animal Rights activists were clear about the fact that the ultimate source of their grievances lay in Brussels, not all social actors are as sophisticated as they were and not all grievances are so transparently placed at the EU's door. Particularly given the location of implementing authority for EU regulations in national executives and courts -- rather than in national legislatures -- political discussion about their implementation is likely to be muffled and bureaucratic. As a result, the EU sources of domestic grievances are seldom obvious unless some well-placed group or movement points them out. Indeed, one major reason why domestic groups turn to spectacular forms of protest is to attract media attention that will diffuse information to the general public about the source of their claims.

Second, with regard to the political process of collective action: if there is any sociological generalization that can confidently be made about social movements, it is that their capacity to mobilize people does not result from grievances alone. Pre-existing social or institutional networks are necessary to organize and sustain contentious collective action. This is the thesis that Charles Tilly developed when he placed "organization" in a triangular relationship with interest and collective action in his "mobilization model" (1978). Social networks and pre-existing political ties were what Doug McAdam found in investigating the
sources of Freedom Summer volunteers in the United States (1988). And networks are what James Scott did not find in the Malaysian peasants he followed, which is why their "resistance" failed to produce social movements (1986). Without such networks behind it, potential collective action frequently disperses into aimless violence or remains at the level of individual alienation.

While some economic and public interest groups -- for example, organized business -- are well placed to take advantage of European decision-making to form trans-national lobbies and associations, others are not, either because they lack the connections across national boundaries necessary to initiate trans-national communication, trust and collective action or the domestic social networks to sustain it.11 Even where the collective benefits of Europe-wide collective action are obvious, the transaction costs of organizing and sustaining it are often too high for most people.

Consider the European labor movements, in many ways the best organized of Europe's professional groups: for labor, European collective action is "a story...about something that unions for the most part are not doing that they need to do" (Turner 1995). Even where we do find sympathetic or coordinated collective action among workers across national lines, it is most often fleeting and episodic -- as in the
sympathy strikes of factory workers in one national branch of a multinational corporations, when it closes operations in another, that occasionally hit the headlines.

Finally, the outcomes of collective action are often indirect, even when -- as in the British Animal Rights' campaign described above -- a protest targets trans-European processes or actors. It was not the Shoreham protesters themselves who brought pressure to bear on the European Union, but the British government acting as their proxy. If the British responded slowly and only partially to domestic protesters' demands, that was due to its position at the center of a parallelogram of group forces, between farmers, shippers, ferry and airline companies and activists, on the one hand, and its policy priorities in the European Union, on the other. Once protest enters the machinery of the political process, it encounters political games and institutional mechanisms that take it out of the range of its initiators (Tarrow 1994: ch. 10).

These observations can be generalized into a long-term speculative hypothesis about the eventual direction of social movement activity in the European Union. Given the difficulties that most citizens have in ascribing the sources of their grievances to the EU; taking account of the high transaction costs of coordinating collective action across national boundaries; and remembering the primary role of national governments
in the EU: rather than seeing a direct displacement of collective action from the national to the supranational and transnational levels, we are more likely to see pressure continuing to be exerted domestically to demand that national governments take action on behalf of aggrieved citizens' groups in the community. This may lead to a partial transformation of national states from autonomous centers of sovereign decision-making to the mediating representatives of domestic collective actors -- who cannot themselves reach the European level -- in the EU. If true, this would be a portentous change, but a very different one than the formation of transnational social movements, the short-circuiting of national governments and the direct targeting of the European Union. It is a result that would be more compatible with the notion of a "multi-level political system" (Sbragia 1992), than with that of a single European polity.

But all this is still couched at the level of speculation, based on impressions gleaned from scholarly case studies and newspaper coverage of individual episodes. What we still lack are systematic studies of collective action and of its sources, processes and targets. It is to the development of an appropriate database, methods and research findings on the Europeanization of collective action that we will devote the remainder of this paper.
II. A Preliminary Assessment of Collective Action In Western Europe, 1985 - 1993

While the European Union consists of a set of institutions, its institutionalization has been piecemeal and incremental - a process, rather than a sudden change. Thus, in attempting to assess its effects on collective action, it was necessary to find a tool that would allow us to carry out an analysis over time of the possible changes in the directions of collective action as integration proceeded. This argued for a quantitative time-series measurement tool which could compare collective action over time to the progress of European integration. Although qualitative, case-based research will ultimately be necessary to interpret our findings and unravel the processes of Euro-collective action, we reasoned that if we wish to relate a hypothetical rise in collective action to the institutionalization of Europe, we would have to look for more systematic measures of such actions over time. Event analysis seemed the logical answer. As Mark Beissinger puts it, "events data are explicitly temporal, and therefore give us some understanding of how forms of collective behavior relate to key developments within the polity" (1995: 3).
A. Instrumentation

In keeping with this logic, we decided to base our analysis upon the extensive record of contentious collective action events established by media coverage. Working from events data generated by public media sources places this research in the tradition of a number of similar studies, most of which, however, have been limited to single nation-states. In addition to all the well-known methodological problems involved in the use of media sources, the difficulty of this analysis was to find a single, comparable source that would allow us to study variations in contentious collective action in a number of different Western European countries comparatively and over time. And given the enormous volume of information produced by even a single news source, the mechanical work of collecting and coding events data for so many countries itself posed a daunting problem.

Therefore, we decided to employ a recent technical advance in computerized data collection and coding of media sources from on-line information, in place of manual coding of "hard" or microfilm sources, which has been typical of such research in the past. In particular, we make use of an automated coding software protocol called PANDA that was modeled on a system developed at the University of Kansas, the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS). PANDA is a computer program
and set of coding protocols designed to "read" and code domestic collective action events data from on-line news reports.\textsuperscript{17}

PANDA embodies three particular features which recommended it for use in this project:

First, it identifies a full range of political actions -- including non-institutional collective action -- as well as identifying a full range of social actors involved in them, including private, sub-national groups and government agencies. This design feature allows us to identify instances of collective action that are often ignored in studies of political behavior.

Second, as a machine-based coding system, PANDA is fast, consistent, and relatively inexpensive to use. In each of these respects, it offered us an economical alternative to manual coding (c.f.: Schrodt and Gerner 1995).

Third, PANDA is designed to "read" and code information from on-line sources, which means that it can be linked to media sources that are available on the Lexis-Nexis system.

Finally, the programming of PANDA was designed to identify synthetic, or "second order" variables beyond the basic parameters of standard events data (e.g., the source, target and the occurrence of the event itself). These synthetic variables include what the designers of the
program call the issue in contention in the identified event and the domain of the event. "Domains" are different categories of either routine or extra-institutional political action. The majority of domains relate to facets of institutional, rules-governed political behavior. But in addition, the coding system is designed to identify extra-institutional political behavior, ranging from contentious collective action to war-making. This feature means that we will eventually be able to comment on the relative amounts of both institutional and extra-institutional political activity undertaken by different kinds of actors in the events we study.\textsuperscript{18}

With the advantages of machine-coded, standard-form media data and an inclusive population of political events, the PANDA system allows us to transcend the limitations of both the case-study method and of laborious hand-coding of collective action events that have shackled many investigators in the past to single newspaper sources.\textsuperscript{19} This allows us to examine European collective action in general; that portion of collective action which targets the EU or its policies; and, eventually, to begin to ask whether transnational social movements are forming around the European Union.

For this preliminary phase of the study, we will examine both general Western European and Euro-centered collective action, of both a
conventional and institutional variety, working from the public record provided by the steady stream of news reports on political action.\textsuperscript{20} The raw material we begin with is limited to one particular media source -- but an international and an exhaustive one -- Reuters' world-news service.\textsuperscript{21} In comparison with other news sources, Reuters has been shown to provide greater -- and more dense -- coverage of collective action events (Schrodt and Gerner 1995).

Employing these sources and methods, we have constructed a dataset designed to identify the collective actions, both conventional and contentious, that were covered in Reuters news releases between the beginning of 1985 and the end of 1993. Within that population of events, we will interpret all actions on the part of private social or political actors that can be related to decisions of the European Union or their implementation, as a crude measure of the Europeanization of collective action. This quantitative assessment will be our first step towards trying to understand in later phases of the project whether a Europeanization of social movements is beginning to result from the process of European integration.

In the next section, (and discarding reports on the weather and natural disasters, sporting events, descriptive articles, the text of speeches, polling results, etc.), we will briefly describe all the reports of
discrete and recently-occurring political events in all the countries of the European Union covered for our time period in the Reuters news releases we analyzed, whether they related to the European Union or not. In Section Four, we will turn to a brief quantitative profile of Euro-centered collective action. In conclusion, we will speculate about what our findings hint at with respect to the formation of European social movements.

III. A Sketch of Western European Collective Action,

1985 - 1993

As is well known, a wide range of social movements, public interest groups and citizens' initiatives have been active in Western Europe over the past two decades, undertaking both contentious and routine collective action for causes including regional, ethnic, religious, cultural and political concerns. Early in the last decade, and following the Reagan missile-waving, a wave of concern with nuclear warfare took hold, with a range of anti-nuclear and anti-NATO protests undertaken by various facets of the peace movement (Klandermans et al, 1990; Rochon 1988). This resulted both in protests and -- in concert with the 1970s
environmental and women's movements -- helped to produce the early electoral successes of Green parties across the continent.

Other activism included women seeking equal rights, industrial action by the labor movement and periodic outbreaks of protest by farmers, fishermen, and miners, which received both journalistic and scholarly attention. Towards the end of the decade, fed by the crashing down of borders that attended the end of the Cold War, a scattered wave of violence against immigrants shook western Europe, along with more limited, but well-attended anti-racist rallies against them. In between, assorted regionalist, terrorist and animal rights protests punctuated the decade.

A. Frequency

Across Western Europe, we have identified 2,641 collective action events by private social and political agents. Types of events which fell into this population ranged from institutional activity, (e.g.: formal appeals filed by Sinn Fein to the European Union protesting treatment of IRA prisoners in Northern Ireland), to violent, extremist actions (e.g.: the bombings of Peugeot showrooms in Spain by the Basques in protest at tightened French border restrictions). Table One presents frequency
counts of collective action events of the thirteen most frequently recurring types in Western Europe over the decade.

Table One about here

Collectively, organized labor accounted for the largest amount of contentious collective action -- primarily industrial actions and work stoppages -- which constitute the majority (908 events) of the recorded events across Western Europe during this period. Additionally, we have separated the actions of three particular professional groups for comparison. These include farmers (37 events), fishermen (83 events), and miners (69 events). Whatever the long-range effects of the "new" social movements that became common in the 1970s, and of the "post-material" attitudes that it is often claimed animate them (Inglehart 1977 and 1990), material claims by groups in the working population still constituted the majority of collective actions we found in Western Europe over the past decade.

Apart from organized labor, the highest frequency of collective actions in the decade came from environmentalists (233 events), youth and student groups (173 events), and a disturbing increase in racist and anti-immigrant activity, especially after 1989 (221 events). Irish and
Basque nationalists also continued to be ruthlessly active during this period. The IRA, and its political wing, Sinn Fein, took 153 reported and identified actions, while Basque separatists, including ETA and Herri Batassuna, launched 97 recorded events. We intend to look more closely at these frequencies in the next phase of data analysis.

B. Variations in Time, Sector and Space

Is the general level of collective action on the rise in Western Europe? Figure One reports on the distribution of the events uncovered by our procedure between 1985 and 1993, aggregated by month in six-month averages. As this figure suggests, Europe is still in movement in the early 1990s, but there would appear to be a decline from the high point at the middle of the 1980s decade, the downslope of the cycle of protest uncovered by Kriesi and his collaborators in their study of four European democracies. However, it is difficult to identify either a consistent increase or decrease in levels of collective action over time, or anything resembling the kind of cycle that one of us identified in an earlier period in Italy (Tarrow 1989) or that Beissinger has identified for the Soviet Union or its successor states during the late 1980s and early 1990s (1995). The picture which emerges is of two periods of heightened activism -- which correspond roughly with the calendar years 1985 and
Table One: Frequency Counts of European Collective Events, 1985-1993/
Categorized by Initiating Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and Students</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Nationalists</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Nationalists</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<td>Miners</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fringe Groups</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Rights</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,248</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
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*The fringe category contains the groups Red Brigades, Action Directe, and November 17.*
Figure One: Collective Action Events in Western Europe

Source. Authors' analysis of PANDA codings of Reuters Data.
1993. Levels of activism fell off decidedly between these two peaks. We will only know when the full data for 1994 and 1995 become available whether the increase in collective action towards the end of our period constitutes the beginning of a new European cycle or only one of the many permutations in collective action found throughout the decade.

**Figure One about here**

Within this general pattern, we find much more shifting patterns of collective action for individual social actors or groups. The early part of the decade appears to resemble a true cycle of protest -- at least in the sense of a variety of social actors contributing at the same time to an increase in the overall frequency of collective action (Tarrow 1994; Kriesi, et. al, 1995). Mineworkers, for example, were out in force -- especially in the UK -- over the early part of the decade. So were workers in general, with about 500 events in 1985 alone. Likewise, the environmental and peace movement activism described upward movements during the same period.

In contrast, the smaller "peak" in the early 1990s shows mainly unchanging or lower frequencies of collective action by most European social and political actors. Compared with the campaigns of 1984 and
Figure Two: Collective Action by Selected Groups in Western Europe, 1985-1993 (Annual totals)

Source: PANDA/Reuters data.
1985, the British anti-pit closure campaign of 1993 was unnoticeable. The peace movement was also much more active over the first year of this period than in subsequent periods and the presence of the environmental movement had levelled off. The 1990s rise in collective action was almost entirely attributable to reports of racist and anti-immigrant activity -- variously attributed to skinheads, neo-Nazis, and bands of violent youth -- that has emerged since the opening of the borders between East and West Europe after 1989. Roughly 80% of all such activity that was reported in the Reuters releases appeared after 1989. These shifts are traced in the number of collective events in each sector recorded from the Reuters data in Figure Two.

Figure Two about here

Turning our attention from sectors of collective action to its distribution across different countries, we find in Figure Three a substantial concentration of movement activity in the largest ones. Among those nations which have been members of the EU since its expansion in 1985, the UK, France and Germany collectively accounted for more than 62 percent of the total events, with contentious Italy and Spain in a surprising minority.
Figure Three: Collective Action Events in Selected EU Member States, 1985-1993

Annual Data

Source: PANDA/Reuters Data
The major variations over time are: the dominant presence of the UK early in the decade -- largely accountable to labor conflicts and to the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland -- while the later part of the period shows a spectacular increase of the presence of Germany and its largely-racist inspired collective action.\(^{24}\)

The meaning of the concentration of collective action events in these three countries is not yet clear. It may be a reflection of various aspects of national context, of the particular movements active today, or even of the nature of media biases of the sources used in the investigation. We are strapped in investigating possible source biases by an absence of comparable studies. This ambiguity in our data remains to be examined.\(^{25}\)

**Figure Three about here**

**C. The Normalization of Movements**

One of the ironies of the "movement society" thesis is that, as contentious collective actin has become more common, it may have become quasi-institutionalized.\(^{26}\) As della Porta finds, even European police forces have responded to the increase in collective action with less violent and more institutionalized forms of protest policing (1995). And
as McCarthy and his collaborators found in the United States, there are increasingly institutional means of channeling collective action into routine forms (1991). Do our data show that European social actors have responded to the greater ease of collective action in Europe with increasingly cooperative and less contentious forms of behavior?

In attempting to address this question, we will bring to bear the entire set of collective action events, ranging from institutional lobbying activity to extra-institutional protest and to instances of extremist violence. We will evaluate the degree of cooperation or conflict inherent in political events, and assign these events a corresponding conflict score, ranging events from most cooperative to most conflictual. Students of international relations often use such a measure to interpret the large volume of information found in events-data sets. The Goldstein scale of cooperation and conflict is such one widely used measure which scores events data along a continuum between extremely cooperative and absolutely conflictual behavior (Goldstein 1992; Schrodt and Gerner 1995).

By using a computer program written specifically to assign "Goldstein scores" to PANDA event codes (J. Bond 1995: 15 - 27), we are able to place collective action events along a continuum between conflict and cooperation and follow changing levels of contention in
collective actions over time. By assigning each of the events in our dataset a corresponding value on the Goldstein scale, do we find a shift toward more cooperative behavior over the decade? Such a shift would lend support to the hypothesis that the process of integration is contributing to the normalization of protest in Western Europe.

**Figure Four about here**

Figure Four presents weighted monthly mean conflict/cooperation scores for collective action events in Western Europe between 1985 and 1993. This measure allows us to assess general trends in the level of contentiousness over time. Comparing these scores across six-month periods, we find no support for the ‘normalization of movements’ hypothesis. As a visual comparison of Figure Four suggests, movements show no trend toward accomodationist tactics over the decade.

On the contrary, a statistical comparison shows a slight but consistent *increase* in the Goldstein index over the decade (represented by a weighted annual mean of -1.92 for 1985, as compared to a similar score of -2.10 for 1993. Second, and as these same figures suggest, social actors more consistently chose tactics of contention over the
decade (e.g., those which are assigned negative values on the Goldstein scale) than tactics of accommodation. Neither of these observations will surprise students of social movements, but they certainly offer no support to the routinization of protest hypothesis.²⁷

IV. Euro-Collective Action

We can now turn to the portion of our dataset which indicates the magnitude and the sectors of collective action directed against the European Union or its policies.²⁸ Drawing from the events dataset, we can offer a number of insights into the general movement of contentious collective action around the process of European integration. There are two facets of this relationship to consider; The first concerns the emergence of a pattern of responses by social or political actors to EU policies. The second concerns cross-national activity. These two issues are intertwined, in the sense that the EU is a transnational target. But as a number of the cases already discussed — and those discussed below — suggest, social actors have found a wide range of ways to take domestic action against EU policies and, in this respect, against transnational targets.
Figure Four: Goldstein (Conflict/Cooperation) Scores of European Collective Action Events
Six Month Weighted Means

Source: PANDA/Reuters Data
Additionally, in an era characterized by increasing transnational exchange, the effects of actions in one country can have widespread ramifications elsewhere. For example, when striking pilots for Spain’s Iberia airlines canceled 210 flights over three days in June of 1984, they caused much air traffic across Europe to be suspended. Likewise, the impact of strikes and lock-outs which seized West Germany’s automobile industry forced thousands of workers waiting for these parts and products to stop production across Europe. Given these complexities, we now cautiously turn to a consideration of the range of ways in which European actors have begun to respond to the process of integration by targeting the EU and its policies.

A. A Small and Non-Linear Progression

Our most important finding regards the frequency of contentious collective action around the EU: the events we located in our media source represent a very small percent (38 events, or 1.6%) of total collective activities reported in that source. This number includes not only actions launched against the institutions of the European Union, but also actions targeting other -- usually domestic -- actors, but visibly motivated by claims against EU proposals, policies, or their national
ratification and adoption. Table Two gives us the distribution of actions invoking the EU, sorted by the groups which initiated the activity.

Table Two about here

As the data in Table Two show, the only significant sector of collective action picked up by our data gathering technique which invoked the European Union were farmers, with 22 events, or over 50% of the total. This is not surprising, given the centrality of the Common Agricultural Policy in the corpus of EU-regulated exchange across national boundaries. Somewhat more surprising is the relative absence of the environmental sector, with no more than 5 events, over 50% of the total. This may reflect a continued centrality of national level decision making to the European movements, or the general decline in environmental activism that some have observed since the 1980s. Or it may reflect the fact that environmental concerns are so well institutionalized in the EU’s decision-making (with a Directorate devoted to them), that collective action from outside the Union is unnecessary.

A word of caution is in order in interpreting the data in Table Two: before concluding that Euro-collective action is wholly insignificant, it should be noted that this population of events was located
by an extremely conservative method of sampling EU-related actions. In order to be included in the dataset, a reported event had to be tied explicitly to a particular EC policy or institution. Consequently, reports of farmers taking action in anger over "cheap imports" would not be included in the dataset unless there was an explicit mention of the EU in some form in the Reuters news report.

A tentative inference that can be drawn from the data in Table Two is that there is no evidence of a trend in the frequency of Euro-collective action as the community's level of integration has proceeded. Instead, the table hints at the presence of two separate peaks: the first between 1985 and 1986, coinciding with expansion of the Community to include three less affluent, southern European states; and the second occurring around 1992, as the Community negotiated and adopted the terms of the Maastricht treaty. The numbers of events are too insignificant to talk about trends or even correlations, but their co-occurrence with major changes in the EU are tantalizingly similar to what David Snyder and Charles Tilly found out about collective violence in nineteenth-century France: rather than correlating with linear trends like hardship or inflation, it co-occurred with moments of political crisis or systemic change (1972).
Table Two: Collective Action Events Invoking the EC (By Group and Year)

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*Source: Authors' Analysis of PANDA/Reuters Data*
B. An Illustrative Typology

How did the EU fit into the collective action events recorded in Table Two? It generally appeared as their source, and protests were most commonly the result of an issue against which the actors mobilized. Typically, movements involved in actions of this type sought greater accommodation in the terms of national integration into the Union. Typically, as well, these actors launched their actions against domestic targets, as we indicated was a likely possibility earlier in this paper. In this final section, we will identify a number of types of action among the cases identified in our dataset which invoked the institutions or policies of the EU.²⁹

1. Domestic Action Against EC Policies: By far the largest category of events we found in our search saw domestic actors protesting about European Community policies, but acting domestically. What may be most interesting about these events was their broad range of targets. In April of 1985, for example, more than 100,000 French farmers blocked roads across France to protest Common Market plans to freeze 1985-86 farm prices and let Spain and Portugal into the European Community. The next summer, Spanish farmers had their own turn to
take to the streets. With some 12,000 tractors they blocked roads across the country in protest of European Community farm policies.

In the fall of 1986, West German farmers got into the act, as thousands of farmers marched against European Community agriculture policies by converging on market towns. Spanish farmers again took their turn in the streets in August of 1986, as hundreds of them blockaded roads with crates of lemons to protest "discrimination" against them by the EU. This protest expanded the following month, with convoys of tractors blocking roads across Spain, demanding cheaper fuel and a better deal from the government and the Community.

French farmers added another tactic to their repertoire in 1988, as they plowed up a park underneath the Eiffel Tower to protest EU proposals to leave land fallow as a way of curbing falling agricultural prices. Portuguese farmers also held their share of protests against the restructured markets which the EU promised. In July of 1989, they blocked roads in and around Obidos with tractors in protests against the import of fruit from other European Community countries. French farmers took to the streets again in September of 1991, when up to 200,000 of them marched through Paris, handing out free wine, cheese and sausage in a peaceful protest against falling prices and incomes and an influx of inexpensive East European agricultural imports. As the EU
continued to hammer out its common agriculture policy, Italian farmers rejoined the protests too, with hundreds of thousands of them marching through the streets of Rome to protest the Common Agriculture Policy reforms in November of 1991.

2. Actions Against Institutions  A second category of domestic action differs from the examples above in terms of a clearer -- though only sometimes more direct -- target of activity. French farmers in Lyons, for example, burned tires and hay on the steps of provincial government offices in protest against the Common Agricultural Policy.

A second variation finds domestic actors targeting domestic institutional outposts of the European Union. For example, rockets were launched at the European Union’s office in Athens in December of 1990 by the leftist guerrilla group, November 17. The group claimed it was retaliating for an EU loan in support of a Greek government austerity program.

A more peaceful protest against EU outposts occurred in December of 1984, as the European Commission’s offices in Dublin were occupied by members of Sinn Fein in protest against strip-searches of women IRA prisoners in Northern Ireland. This action is interesting not simply as an example of contentious action, but because it presents
an instance of a national movement choosing to target the domestic outpost of an emerging transnational authority when the source of the protest was a domestic human rights issue.\textsuperscript{30} The Union provided a new opportunity for domestic actors, who could appeal to an ostensibly higher authority to intervene where their own lobbying efforts had proven unsuccessful.

Similar patterns of activity are sometimes aimed at the local outposts of other foreign governments. Spanish farmers angered over French import restrictions on their produce, for example, dumped 30 boxes of tomatoes in front of the French embassy in Madrid, blockading a main square and bringing traffic to a standstill. In a variation of this pattern are a number of examples where collective action is aimed at domestic outposts of transnational businesses. This kind of action emerged, for example, in farmers’ protests in 1992. Angered over the shape of EU-US trade negotiations, French farmers blocked access roads to Euro-Disneyland, attacked outlets of the McDonald’s hamburger chain and occupied a Coca-Cola factory in protest. A much less peaceful variation on this tactic was seen in a series of bombings of Peugeot-Talbot car showrooms in Spain by Basque separatists angered over tightened French border restrictions.
3. Closing National Borders: Another way in which we see domestic movements taking action against cross-national targets and issues is at their own national borders. Over the decade, we found social actors closing national borders five times, either by groups blockading border points, or -- more selectively -- by stopping particular vehicles. Farmers once again were quick to adopt this tactic. In June of 1984, for example, 60 French farmers took control of a border crossing into Spain, intercepted trucks bringing produce across the border, and dumped their contents -- 140 tons of apricots -- onto the highway.

More recently, members of the French Young Farmers' Union (CNJA) vowed to "throw the English into the sea," and blocked the cross-Channel ferry -- preventing passengers from boarding or disembarking -- in protest against an EC farm accord. Similarly, environmental activists, complete with a full chamber orchestra, staged a sit-in blocking a border crossing between East and West Germany to protest the export of West German waste.

As these examples suggest, social actors have been hesitant to venture far beyond their national homes, and have instead found creative proxies for foreign interests and short of crossing borders. To date, we have few examples of more explicitly transnational movement activity. Most of the examples of it that we could identify were launched by the
environmental movement and, in particular, by Greenpeace, which -- over the decade -- launched acts of civil disobedience in the United States, in the French South Pacific nuclear test site, on the open seas in pursuit of Norway's whaling fleet, as well as across the UK and Europe. It comes as no surprise, then, that Greenpeace has also been among the first groups to see the opportunity for mobilization presented by the EU.

4. Targeting the EU: In 1988, members of Greenpeace pinned a huge banner to the European Community's headquarters in Brussels to protest EC acid rain policy. The EU offices in Brussels have also become a target for extremists. In July of 1990, the Union evacuated its Brussels headquarters after receiving a bomb threat from a pro-Iranian group. Likewise, hostages were seized from those same offices in September of 1990. More peaceful was the protest group that Brigitte Bardot joined in Brussels in 1995 against the import to the continent of live British calves.

5. Cross-Border Cooperation: Several groups adopted the tactic of cross-border cooperation -- with individual national movements taking more or less coordinated actions. This was the pattern, for example, when the British protesters we met earlier tried to prevent veal transport
ships from leaving Shoreham while Belgian protesters worked to prevent
the ships from landing. In a more coordinated variation on the theme of
cross-border cooperation, Belgian and French farmers blocked their
common border in 1992 in protest of EU-U.S. trade accords. But the
most dramatic evidence of the growth of trans-national collective action
occurred not against the EU at all, but against the decision of several
NATO members to accept Pershing missiles on their soil.

6. Transnational Movement Events: Finally -- and most rarely --
we found in our dataset one example of substantial cross-national
collective action in which some 50,000 farmers gathered in Strasbourg to
protest against proposed EU agreements on subsidies, which were to be
decided the following week. This protest included contingents from every
EC member state, as well as delegates from Switzerland, Austria,
Canada, Japan, and South Korea. The event was well-planned, dramatic
and well-covered by the press; but in the light of its absolute novelty, we
are not convinced that Western Europe is on the way to becoming a
trans-national movement society.
V. Preliminary Conclusions

It is too early in the development of this project to offer conclusions concerning the meaning of the trends we have discussed. To begin with, we have used as our units of analysis various forms of collective action, whomever the social actors who used them were, and making no attempt to discriminate among unions, interest groups, movement organizations or temporary aggregates of citizens. A second reason for exercising prudence is that we are using a mechanized method of identifying and coding events that still needs to be examined for its reliability and tested against other sources.

The variations in levels of collective action at the European level, and the degree to which challengers move toward the Union and away from their national governments and other domestic collective actors may indicate the presence of a combination of push and pull factors. Push factors would include the relatively closed nature of particular states to particular movements, like the factors that were identified in France by Herbert Kitschelt (1986) and Hanspeter Kriesi and his collaborators (1995; Duyvendak 1994). Where states prove unresponsive to domestic challengers, social actors may have reason to undertake transnational
action, as the benefits of attempting an end-run around the state begin to outweigh the costs and difficulties of such actions.

In addition to such push factors, those groups which have been quick to appeal to the EU also may be responding to the pull of opportunities created by the Union. Changes in EU policies or its attempts to subsidize groups of national actors offer new political opportunities to challenging groups. One of the best known examples of this process concerns the women’s movement. In Britain, women’s groups have brought suit against their national government for failing to align UK labor standards with European Community directives concerning fair treatment of labor, and equal protection for women. For these activists, opportunities created at the transnational level increased the benefits of more institutional, legal political action on the part of women’s groups.

Ultimately, the influence of the EU on civil society may be most evident in influencing the repertoire of political tactics that collective actors adopt across the continent. The Union has shown an interest in orderly, institutional and representative approaches from a variety of movement actors. Dieter Rucht has noted the rapid pace at which environmental organizations have responded to the access and funding offered by the EU. As he demonstrates, the scarcity of resources for
environmental groups at the national level makes EU money all the more attractive, but it also may move them towards more institutionalized tactics (Rucht 1993: 75-97; Also see Dalton, The Green Rainbow, ch. 8).

In both of these examples, we see evidence for the suggestion that the Union has the potential to normalize social actors’ participation into the routines of institutionally sanctioned forms of behavior. Lobbying established administrative agencies and filing civil suits are classic examples of such institutionalized participation. For observers concerned with the cooptation of social actors, this is an ominous trend, for it stands in direct opposition to the fundamental power of resource-poor social actors -- that is, the ability to disrupt the routines of institutional participation (Piven and Cloward 1979). But for those for whom national polities are closed or unresponsive, the EU may offer an opportunity for activism that they would otherwise lack.

Ultimately, turning towards the EU will depend on each actor’s calculus of costs and benefits. Movements may increasingly make use of the European Union and of other transnational institutions if the benefits seen in performing an "end-run around the state" are recognized as outweighing the significant transaction costs of maintaining collective identities and mounting sustained collective action campaigns across a
half-continent. Many of the examples already observed suggest that movements are working to take advantage of available opportunities where the costs are currently lowest.

To date, however, these opportunities appear to continue to reside where they have been for the last two hundred years for social movements -- in the national state (Tilly 1984; Tarrow 1994). We have found little such explicitly EU-directed contentious collective action, and what we have found might best be understood as a small wrinkle in the broad fabric of collective action across Europe. At the same time, we do find examples of social actors both taking action against Union policies and occasionally engaging in coordinated or conflictual activity across national boundaries. The cases of the Shoreham protesters and the recent "tuna war" between Spanish, French and British fishing fleets illustrate that -- while rare -- such encounters have explosive potential for inter-state relations in the EU.

Yet we must make two final observations about the current state of this phenomenon. First, truly transnational social movement action -- where national movements cross borders to act, or where they coordinate action across borders -- has been slow and erratic in coming. Additionally, the propensity of social movements to take transnational action appears to be highly episodic rather than evolutionary. In this respect,
mobilization is tied to contingent -- and changing -- structures of opportunity. We suspect that it is also closely linked to particular, critical events which have an impact on the core concerns of affected social movements. Whether the European Union will produce a fundamentally new and permanent structure of opportunity for social movements, or add to the changing opportunities produced by shifting alignments, changing alliances and unexpected events, is a question that we can only confront after much more research has been done.
Notes


2. These news stories are from The Australian, 2 February 1995, the Financial Times, 6 February, 1995 and The London Times, 7 February 1995.


4 Because EU rules could make the British government liable for millions of dollars in farmers’ claims if exports were halted, the cost to the British government of the protests, and the broken contracts they produce, could be substantial. See "Clamour over calves," The Financial Times, 14-15 January, 1995.

5. The campaign ended where it had begun, with a significant victory for animal rights forces in Shoreham, when a Tunisian-registered ship chartered to export 20,000 calves was turned away by port authorities. The exporters replied by threatening a suit against the authorities, accusing the government of bowing to "rent-a-mob anarchists" (The Independent, 11 March 1995).

6 For a description and analysis of this episode, see Tarrow, "The Europeanization of Conflict" (1995b).

7. See Tilly 1978, for the concept of the repertoire. For contemporary applications, see Traugott, et. al, 1995. On the conventionalization of contentious collective action, see Tarrow 1994: ch. 11.


12. A quantitative time-series measure also seemed important to avoid generalizing from often spectacular, but possibly atypical cases of collective action, like the one that introduced this paper and would allow us to compare the magnitude of collective action that could reasonably be ascribed to European integration to variations in collective action in general.

13 On quantitative and qualitative research in comparative and international politics, see Keohane, King and Verba, 1993 and the gloss on their book with respect to the relationship of the two modes of research in Tarrow 1995b.

14 For a bibliographic essay on this type of research through 1988, see Olzak 1989. For a discussion of the concept of "the event" and its several meanings, see Tarrow 1995c. For discussions of the advantages and problems of events-based approaches to social movement activity, see Franzosi, (1987), and Rucht and Ohlemacher, (1992). Single-country research of this type has been pioneered by Tilly (1995), first working with Shorter (1974), and with Snyder (1972). Other single-country analyses of this type are reported by Paige (1975), Olzak (1992), Tarrow (1989), Olivier (1989), Soule (1994) and Beissinger (1995). Comparative and multinational studies have been carried out using similar sources by Tilly, Tilly and Tilly (1975), Kriesi et al, 1991 and 1995, and Eckert and Kubik (in progress).
15 The use of media-generated reports on events has been shown to have a number of inconsistencies and lacunae. In the summary of John McCarthy (1993), these are: (1) selection bias; in the selection of some from the many events that could have been chosen; (2) description bias; bias in the descriptions of the events selected for reporting; and (3) researcher bias; in the reliability and validity of media trace recovery by the investigator. The standard literature on media biases includes Danzger, 1975, Snyder and Kelly 1977 and, more recently, Franzosi 1987 and 1990a and b and McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1994. These tests are largely based on domestic data from American newspapers and does not go very far in the direction of investigating the possible sources of bias in comparative newspaper sources.

16. KEDS is a "sparse parsing" tool designed for analysis of international conflict events by Philip Schrod at the University of Kansas. For additional information, contact Schrod at the Department of Political Science at Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas, Lawrence KS 66045 and see Schrod and Weddle, "KEDS: A Program for the Machine Coding of International Events Data." (1993). For an example of its use, see Schrod and Gerner (1995).

17. We wish to express our thanks for the assistance and guidance of the PANDA (Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action) research team at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. PANDA is a collaborative project of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival at CFIA and the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) project of the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas. The former organization has provided generous research support to Doug Imig for the past two years and advice and cooperation to both authors in the preparation of this paper. For information about access to the PANDA codebook and dataset, contact Doug Bond at the Program on Nonviolent Direct Action and Cultural Survival, CFIA, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02137. For preliminary information, see Bond and Bond, "Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action", 1995.

18 Lest there be any confusion, we will not attempt to distinguish conventional from non-conventional events in this paper. For an explanation of the coding decision rules as well as the coding protocols which underlie PANDA's assignment of issue and domain codes to events, see Bond and Bond 1995: 21 - 2 and 16 - 17.

19. Perhaps only those who have coded collective action events from ordinary "hard" or even microfilm based newspapers will appreciate to the full extent the advantages of working from an on-line news source like Lexis-Nexis. In addition to providing access to a number of different news sources (thus making it possible to correct for the biases of single sources), an on-line system can be scanned for key words, dates, particular actors or countries, and be "read" both qualitatively and quantitatively, which is in effect what we hope to accomplish in this project. The use of on-line news databases also makes it practical to utilize entire populations of events, avoiding the disadvantages of sampling particular days of the week, months
of the year or years of a century that have dogged other studies in which manual coding is a financial and a temporal constraint.

20 PANDA assigns each reported action to one of 155 event categories. To do this, the system matched verb phrases found in the media reports with extensive vocabulary lists. The "institutional" events identified in our search include lobbying, filing informal or formal appeals, and certain types of litigation; examples of extra-institutional activity included rallies, vigils, demonstrations, marches, visual, audio or performance protest, unruly or illegal gatherings, processions, picketing, walk-outs and embargoes, actions which disrupt, subvert, overload, delay or slow down routine processes and procedures, boycotts, the withholding of services or materials, strikes as well as instances in which actors block, obstruct, seize or occupy roads, buildings, borders, airports, production facilities, etc.

21. Reuters is well suited to our major research question for a number of reasons: It is written in a consistent style, making it easier to define a set of reliable protocols for coding than if we were using a variety of national media sources; it covers each of the nations of Western Europe in depth; and it is available on-line, through the Lexis-Nexis News Service.

22. What we mean by this is that governmental agents have been excluded as actors (although they often appear as the targets or subjects of collective action. Excluded as well are private actors engaged in routine behavior. Thus, while a "stoppage" of production due to a strike is coded as collective action, a similar stoppage due to a lack of raw materials is not. While the selection of events was machine-coded, each event was visually examined for "false positives" before being included in further phases of the analysis.

23. Kriesi et al, 1995: ch. 5, deal with the cyclical aspects of their findings in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland between 1975 and 1989. The data are arrayed by one of Kriesi's collaborators, Ruud Koopmans, who also takes up the general theoretical issue of the cyclicity of protest raised by Brand (1992) and Tarrow (1989 and 1994).

24 For consistency, we have included the former DDR in the German data from the beginning of our period, although we are all but certain that its contribution to the findings was minimal until 1989.

25 A comparison of the frequency of collective action in France and Germany with the frequency data in the Kriesi study for these two countries will not take us very far, since Kriesi and his collaborators used a different time period, did not include Britain in their study and dealt with only one of the smaller European democracies in our study, the Netherlands. We intend to compare the time-lines of at least the British data to what is found in the London Times, which is easily accessed through its regular index, to compare the frequency distributions of the events covered in the two sources.
For this argument, see Tarrow 1994: ch. 11. The term "normalization" was first used by Piven and Cloward in a 1992 publication to indicate that social scientists have been "normalizing" protests in their research paradigms. We use to ask if there has been an objective shift from more conflictual to more conventional repertoires.

It remains for a subsequent stage of this project to regress monthly cooperation/conflict scores on total event counts. A rudimentary assessment of the data strongly suggests -- and again, not surprisingly -- that those periods marked by increased levels of activity are also marked by increasingly conflictual movement actions.

In searching for mentions of the EU, we included all variations on the following terms: EC, EEC, E.C., E.E.C., EU, E.U., European Community, European Economic Community, Common Market, European Court, Maastricht. We are currently examining the dataset to uncover possible other usages that may have disguised Euro-centered events from our mechanical search procedure.

Unless otherwise noted, all the following information was culled from the 38 events located through Lexis-Nexis from newspaper sources and identified through our mechanized media-reading procedure from Reuters.

This is true only if Northern Ireland is defined as a constituent part of the United Kingdom, which Sinn Fein does not do.
Sources


