

Draft only. Comments are welcome.

**The EU and Transnational regions: A Maritime perspective.<sup>1</sup>**

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**Introduction.**

Not uniquely but perhaps more than most other social scientists, anthropologists have always been conscious of the extent to which 'reality' is problematic given *a priori* sociocultural biases as to what one sees and hears, counts or gives accounts of the human context. In doing field work, two things strike most anthropologists: Firstly, the extent to which people can differ on the relevant content and boundaries of given sociocultural spaces. Individuals and groups see or fail to see different resources in variously defined spaces, prioritize these resources differently, and vary considerably as to the use rights/responsibilities of humans relative to those resources. Secondly, people locate themselves in various 'spaces' simultaneously or sequentially, i.e., identifying themselves in one region with one set of perimeters at one time but, within that same space, as part of another more or less extensive region at other times.<sup>2</sup>

This paper will address the issues that arise from such cognitive variability. It will focus on the maritime component of the EU since this neglected sector reveals the extent to which cultural constructs of spatiality, particularly as these relate to those constructs labeled 'regions,' have not only molded the evolution of the EU but have been and will continue to be the source of its most vexing problems (cf. Appendices I and III)

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<sup>1</sup>Prepared for the annual conference of the European Community Studies Association, session on Cultural frontiers: Approaches in anthropology and geography to a changing Europe, Eve Darian-Smith, organizer, Charleston, SC, May 11-14.

<sup>2</sup>This was brought home to me particularly when, still a graduate student, I was caught in the middle of a violent confrontation between some 300 participants in a motorcycle rally and some dozen Hispanic ranching families who grazed their stock in a rural area of New Mexico that the motorcyclists and their fans had selected as the site for their day's activities. The motorcycle crowd was genuinely mystified as to why ranchers were threatening them with shotguns and rifles for despoiling their land. 'It's just empty wasteland,' I heard repeated over and over. The ranchers, on the other hand, were outraged that grazing land for their cattle was being torn up by more than 100 bikers, many on heavy-duty Harley Davidsons. In short, despite what geographers or ecologists might empirically have to say about the econiche, Hispanic ranchers and the largely urban-based biker crowd saw the terrain in terms of their own sociocultural relation to and use of the space—and neither view, it should be noted, was consonant with that of the geographers.

## Borders and boundaries.

A brief digression is needed at the outset to address a distinction that will be made in this paper between 'borders' and 'boundaries.' The two terms tend to be employed as synonyms though most anthropologists, at least, seem to agree that 'boundary' is the more appropriate term to employ when addressing cognitive space, e.g., issues centering on the need to address differences or commonalities between 'thee and me' or insiders versus outsiders.<sup>3</sup>

In this paper, 'border' shall be used exclusively to identify a politically or juridically defined line that encompasses a territorial unit—a physical space within which residents, citizens, aliens, and visitors have specific access to or exclusion from particular rights, duties, privileges and responsibilities. Political and juridical rules prevail as the border's *raison d'être* even though there may be disagreement to the specific areal configuration of the territory encompassed, who has legitimate sovereignty, and identity of the affected population. 'Boundary' will be used to refer to the margins of a construct akin to the 'fuzzy set' of mathematicians. While the core of the construct may be absolutely clear, the periphery is marked by uncertainty and often fluid and ambiguous. The unit and its boundaries stem from situationally-defined inclusionary/exclusionary criteria<sup>4</sup> for knowing when one 'has gone too far' or

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<sup>3</sup>For example, Chris Shore (Ethnicity as revolutionary strategy: Communist identity construction in Italy, in S. Macdonald, ed., *Inside European identities: Ethnography in Western Europe*, Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1994), discusses 'the social and symbolic boundaries that separate Italian communists from non-communists are now well defined' (p.40). While agreeing with his usage of boundary, I find it odd that the boundaries that separate the communists from the rest of the society are much more problematic since in the next sentence he tells us that, 'Like all communist parties it sees itself, somewhat ambiguously, as standing both "outside" yet "inside society."

<sup>4</sup>'Boundary,' in the English language, is used in a far wider range of settings than is 'border.' As well as its common substitution for 'border,' we can, for instance, also talk of exceeding the boundaries of good taste, a playing field's boundaries, the boundaries of kinship, natural boundaries, and, as noted above (citing Shore's work) we commonly refer to symbolic boundaries. In most if not all of these examples, a native speaker would rarely select the term 'border' since this latter term carries (as some linguists would put it) 'a sense of sharpness of demarcation that makes it seem 'inappropriate' in these examples (and others that could be listed). It is interesting that when borders are being contested, one statistical count of 1763 usages (in 264 articles in the New York Times) of 'borders' and 'boundaries,' 1142 references were made to boundary (rather than border) disputes. This may indicate that when indicated that the term 'boundary' is more likely to be used if it is the border itself that caused the friction. In the articles where the phrase 'border dispute/conflict' etc., was used, 309 addressed issues where, while the conflict occurred at the border, the dispute itself was caused by some other issue than the border itself—e.g., religious disputes in India, incursions by 'terrorist' exiles in an adjacent state, a river dam several hundred miles diminishing the flow of water, or the Berlin Wall (where the issue

breached the margins of 'inside' versus 'outside.' Although polities may also mark the borders of regions to indicate the external limits of their sovereignty, the situational and temporal fluidity of regional identity indicates that 'boundary' usually is the more appropriate term (see Appendix I for broader implications of this argument).

**Borders, boundaries: EU nation-states and regions.**

When explored in greater depth than possible here, the process by which the ECSC evolved into today's EU (outlined in Appendix I) is important for understanding the impetus for and co-evolution of various features of the EU, e.g., the changing roles of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the creation and thrust of the Cohesion and Structural Funds.<sup>5</sup> Especially in point here are the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)<sup>6</sup> for, in studying the similarities and differences between these last two, it is clear that EU and national leaders cognitively ground their understanding of and approach to maritime regions within the same framework that informs their understanding of terrestrial regions. Oceanic zones are created with their perimeters and parameters assumed to be consonant with the model utilized to identify, say, the wine-growing regions of Spain, the olive-producing regions of Italy, or—as in the formative period of the ECSC—the coal and steel producing

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was rarely the East/West German border per se but the intrusive and exacerbating presence of a Western Berlin in East Germany).

<sup>5</sup>The Maastricht Treaty also provided for the establishment of a Cohesion Fund which differs from the Structural Funds in that the latter has the aim of reducing regional disparities, the former has been constituted to reduce economic disparities between member states, specifically in the environmental and transport infrastructures only, in order to enable *all* the member states to 'join the final phase of economic and monetary union as rapidly as possible, by helping those with the greatest number of handicaps to overcome them.' (emphasis mine The European Union's Cohesion Fund, European Commission publication, catalog number CC-85-94-753-EN-C, p.4) In point of fact, funds are to be distributed to only the 'four cohesion countries...on the periphery of the Union Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland' (p.5). A total of Ecu 15.1 billion is allocated over the years 1993-1999 distributed as follows: Spain 52-58%; Greece 16-20%; Portugal 16-20%; Ireland 7-10% (p.7).

<sup>6</sup>Among the differences are (1) the CAP consumes almost half the EU's budget but spends only a tenth of its money on restructuring, i.e., cutting down the size of the productive sector. The CFP takes less than 1/20 of the budget and spends almost all of it on restructuring—and relatively little on fisheries research or enforcement. By 1996 the EU's total vessel tonnage is set to reduce the number of vessels catching flatfish by 15% under 1992; boats preying on groundfish (e.g., cod) are to be reduced by 20%. (2) 'Unlike farming, fishing has been subject to GATT rules since 1962.' Thus, despite that there are floors on both the price a fisherman must accept for his fish (he may withdraw it from the auction floor) and on the prices at which imports may be sold, consumer food preferences and the requirements of processors, has led to what *The Economist* identifies 'the the price-pushing that disfigures the farming industry' (*The Economist* August 13, 1994:45-6, p.46).

regions. Such perceptions have not only identified goals and shaped processes of decision-making in management endeavors thereby playing a major role in both the desired results and unanticipated consequences of such endeavors. The basic model, however, is not only inadequate for fisheries management, it is in most cases counter-productive—responsible in large measure why the CFP is incapable of inhabiting the inexorable decline of EU stocks and the EU fishing industry.

There are both strengths and weaknesses to utilizing maritime regions to study the more general issue of EU regions. The strength comes from the fact that only a few such locales have a long history; their dynamics can be studied with less of the cognitive 'baggage' that impedes recognition of flawed assumptions built into the identity and utility of such regions. The weakness of the comparison has two components. Firstly, relative to terrestrial locations, we still have very incomplete information about oceans—though we have gone from discounting any degree of environmental volatility to being aware of a high sensitivity to human activity. Secondly, we know far less about the biological characteristics of individual stocks and, more importantly, the extent to which human technology and utilization of specific locales for commercially valuable stocks effects the entire biomass and ecosystem. Despite that the current basis for both agricultural and maritime management focuses on single regions or, at best, an aggregate of micro-regions, linearly linked into a food chain, we are now beginning to explore how exploitation of specific stocks as well as fossil fuels has a potential for re-ordering the entire global, macro-regional food web.

### **Maritime regions.**

Although 70% of the global surface is covered with water, humans have long emphasized the land surface, that portion that (with a few rare exceptions) they occupy. Further, despite the historic importance of the sea as an avenue for trade and a source of protein, the maritime dimension of nation-states is usually taken for granted, save as a venue for domination via the merchant and military fleets of a country.<sup>7</sup> Given the historical emphasis on industrial and agricultural production, the usual tendency of those who are geared to living out their lives

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<sup>7</sup>Even tourism, currently among the world's largest producers of GDP and the major source of revenue for some 25% of the world's nations, focuses on seaside resorts—i.e., the shore. Cruises, growing in popularity, not only stress the ports visited but, while at sea, shipboard activities are designed to distract one from being aware that one is 'on the water.' That the sea itself might be worthy of attention is dismissed as 'boring,' as one cruise ship director put it when I suggested that some portion of the trip might be devoted to informing passengers about the waters through which they were sailing,

on land thinking of polities as terrestrial entities and, lastly, the reality of the relatively insignificant economic role that fisheries play in the national economies of most countries,<sup>8</sup> it is not surprising that there was little emphasis put on defining the maritime regions. Yet, in Europe 16 states have coastal waters in the Mediterranean, the North Sea, the Baltic, and the Atlantic—and Ireland, the UK, Spain, France, Germany, Denmark and Sweden have two or more such seas.

Until this century, Europe led the world in exploiting the fisheries of its coastal waters and continental shelf. Even as late as the end of the 1960s, over 30% of the world's total catch came from western European waters. Little more than a decade later, landings had dropped to about 20%—a decline due to both a drop in stocks in European waters and an increase in catches from other parts of the world (an increase due in part to the need for Europeans to develop their distant water fleets, compensating for declining local catches by exploiting stocks in other parts of the world).

Until the mid-20th century maritime borders generally had been set at 3 nautical miles out to sea from the shoreline high-water mark and, due to European global domination, international maritime law followed suit—though even in Europe, there was never consensus.<sup>9</sup> The second half of the century, however, has seen a dramatic extension of national borders—though few citizens have been aware that some of their countries have doubled the territory over which they claim sovereignty<sup>10</sup>—and, over the past 30 years, the UN Law of the Sea negotiations have gone from being little noted (even by the governments participating) to being a major global arena.

There is growing awareness that, worldwide, the fish stocks are in crisis and that oceans, even more than land masses, are sensitive to distant, and what, unfortunately, is still perceived by many to be unrelated changes in currents,

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<sup>8</sup>Throughout the Union there are fewer than 300,000 fishermen, although another 1.5 million or so are indirectly employed by the industry. Even the largest fleet in the EU, Spain's fleet of 19,000 vessels (the majority, admittedly, small family-fished boats), accounted for only 1% of Spain's annual 1993 GDP of \$483 billion. But the fleet is vital to the economy of certain Spanish regions, such as Vigo where 25% of the jobs are linked to fishing (for Galicia as a whole unemployment is 20%).

<sup>9</sup>The U.S. had, for over a century, set the limit at 12 miles while in 1972 Iceland was the first to unilaterally impose a 50-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (3 years later extended to 200 miles) from which all foreign fishing boats were banned. This excluded whole fleets from the UK, Spain and other countries that had traditionally fished in these open waters of the 'high seas' and the famous 'Cod waters of the 1970s' resulted.

<sup>10</sup>Norwegian fishermen are currently calling for Norway to extend her territorial waters to 250 miles offshore in order to protect her stocks from, especially, the Spanish fleet.

pollution, and shifts in the relative proportions of stocks in the maritime and coastal spawning waters. As noted, fisheries managers (and others) still utilize a model to direct fishing effort that consists of linking Region A to Region B, Region B to Region C.... It is akin to having various pieces of a jigsaw puzzle: While one takes account of the total picture, linking each individual piece to its adjacent or nearest neighbors takes precedence.

•An example comes from the recent meeting of Ministers and deputy ministers from Denmark, Germany, Finland, Åland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Poland, and Sweden (along with observers from the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission & the Commission of the European Community). This was the first fisheries conference of the Baltic Sea States and, as was pointed out in a report prepared for the Conference by the Nordic Council of Ministers, it came at a crucial time since, cod and salmon stocks in north Europe were dangerously low.<sup>11</sup> The outcome of the deliberations was a decision to set up an interactive system for the exchange of information, as well as a coordination of programs for fisheries management among 'a network of fisheries managers of Baltic Sea states' (Anon., Plan to coordinate Baltic Sea controls. *Fishing News International* October, 1994: 47). The Nordic Council of Ministers agreed to prepare a review of the technical and formal limitations in each country's administration in order to facilitate the exchange of information for each sub-region within the Baltic Sea macro-region. Briefly summarized, the process of management would go as follows: (1) each micro-region (often defined primarily for management purposes in terms of a specific fish stock with high commercial value, e.g., herring) will be analyzed by the staff of the national Fisheries Minister or Ministers within whose territorial waters (EEZ or Exclusive Economic Zone) the data were collected; (2) the findings will be summarized for each polity (e.g., total number of salmon or cod caught in Norwegian waters); (3) local and aggregate figures will be sent to a central coordinating office for the Baltic Sea Region—which, to name just two sub-regions, includes the Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Riga; (4) periodic meetings of representatives of the nations involved will meet to negotiate a consensual agreement on fisheries management for the region.

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<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, Norway, heavily into fish farming, has produced such a plethora of farmed salmon that they became a glut on the world market with prices dropping precipitously as much as 100%. The Norwegians forced to withhold and store domestic salmon supplies rather than face steep losses relative to production costs.

Such coordinating organizations are emerging around the world. The problem, however, is that the entire process is so protracted and attempts at consensual management so constrained by, for example, different national attitudes about the significance of the data, the appropriate analytical model or the need to balance economic and political concerns with management decisions, that—when political consensus has not resulted in environmental inadequacy—the response is out of date when finally negotiated.<sup>12</sup>

In the case of this example, problems range from questions as to the accuracy and the comparability of data drawn from countries such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania given the extraordinary restructuring problems that they are facing—not the least being budgetary—to the issue already discussed, the use of a methodology that relies on an additive approach to managing a macro-region. This cannot successfully address the systematics of the Baltic Sea, let alone the still larger region to which it in turn belongs, a region made up of the Baltic and the North Sea (and beyond) waters and stocks connected through the Skagerrak and Kattegat.<sup>13</sup>

•Although the original CFP policy asserted that all EEC members would have common access to all Community waters, enlargement has led to some sectors being identified as 'special regions,' e.g., 'the Shetland Box' north of

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<sup>12</sup>A recent example of how critical the temporal dimension is in fisheries matters came from the dispute between the EU and Canada on EU vessels fishing in the Grand Banks that are part of Canada's continental shelf but beyond her 200-mile EEZ borders (see below for an extended discussion of the dispute). As one commentator in Canada's leading weekly publication noted from his vantage point in London: The fish war was a clear defeat for politicians who long for Europe to speak with a united voice on foreign affairs. Spain looked to its European partners for support and found little more than irritation and pressure to compromise. 'Had we been facing a strong, absolutely united Europe, it would have been a lot, lot tougher,' acknowledged one Canadian official. An EU official lamented: "We were like the old Ottoman Empire. It was a fast-moving issue, but we had to listen to all 15 ambassadors argue all day long. It left us way behind Canada in propaganda and tactics." Indeed, the debacle poses an uncomfortable question: If the EU states cannot coalesce around an issue as insignificant to their existence as turbot, has the prospect of forging a common foreign policy for Europe become a chimera? (Bruce Wallace, *Splitting Europe*. Spain's allies failed to offer strong support. *Macleans* May 1, 1995:14).

<sup>13</sup>Another component that should be included but probably will not, is the extent to which the North-Baltic Sea region will be effected by the new 10-mile Oresund tunnel and bridge link between Denmark and Sweden, now scheduled to be open to traffic in the year 2000. Stiff opposition, especially from the Swedes, delayed implementing an agreement because of concerns as to how the construction work itself (as well as the actual utilization) might effect the aquatic environment, particularly since about 30% of the water transfer in the Baltic takes place via the Sound that separates the Danish city of Copenhagen from the Swedish city of Malmö. One of the world's busiest traffic junctions, nearly 2.3 million people are located within a 50-km radius. This will be the Nordic countries' largest concentration of population and Europe's 20th largest urban conglomerate.

Scotland where there are limitations on the number of vessels permitted to fish in the region, and 'the Irish Box' (the Irish Sea and the waters to the west of Ireland), a preferential fishing zone reserved for UK and Irish fishermen. This latter is a region with a limited temporal span, created as a special 10-year 'opt out' when Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986. The intent was to permit the fishing fleets of the UK and Ireland time to modernize before competing with, especially, the more technologically sophisticated freezer trawlers of the Spanish fleet. What will emerge in its place is currently being negotiated; it is likely that the Irish Sea will remain closed to other EU vessels (especially the much-feared Spanish)<sup>14</sup> as they have no history of fishing in these waters. Equally likely, however, is that the waters to the west of Ireland will be opened up to all EU vessels under the common access agreement. All the fisheries managers with whom I spoke independently opined that the debate would center around limited the number of vessels in the area or the number of days vessels would be allowed to fish, versus the more typical EU procedure—defining a TAC (Total Allowable Catch) and, using such criteria as 'size of existing fleet and

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<sup>14</sup>The original CFP was negotiated by the original 6 members in 1970 but enlargement of the EEC in 1973 required a new program. The Commission finally published a draft policy in mid-1982 but unanimity was required and, despite 6 months of intense negotiation, Denmark continue to refuse to sign off. Open access to all EEC waters by all EEC members had allowed its fishing industry to expand faster than any other Community member since joining; it refused to accept the new limitations on its access to community waters. Lack of consensus would mean that when the CFP then in place expired at the end of 1982, fleets from all member countries could fish when and where they wanted and without catch limitations. For a brief period no CFP was in place but, by the end of January, the Danes finally agree to sign.

When Spain and Portugal were admitted to the EC at the beginning of 1986 a new crisis emerged. With the largest fleet of any member state—and an international reputation for rapacious fishing that had led to its expulsion from various waters where it had negotiated fishing rights (e.g., various Africa coastal states eager to obtain fees for allowing foreign fishing vessels to exploit waters inaccessible to their own largely in-shore artisanal fishermen), Spain saw access to EC waters as one of the real plums of EC membership but, contrariwise, EC members such as the UK were fearful of the competition their own fleets would face from this highly sophisticated trawler fleet. Thus, as a condition of admission, Spain (and Portugal) had to agree that they would have only very limited access to EC waters until January 1, 1996 in order to allow the fleets of existing members time to modernize their own fleets. Indeed, during the negotiations to admit Austria, Sweden, Finland and (at that time) Norway to the EU in 1994, Spain threatened to veto their admission if, as was being rumored might occur in order to protect declining stocks, 1996 did not bring her full fishing rights in EU waters. The issue of Spanish fishing rights was the main reason why the Norwegian referendum on EU membership failed; Norwegians were persuaded by the argument that membership would allow the EU fleets, and especially Spain, to 'rape and destroy' their stocks under 'the totally incompetent fishing regime of the CFP.' (The contentious issue of Norway's whaling program also played a role though this seems to have been negotiated successfully and Norwegians were told their fisheries would be protected by the appointment of a Norwegian as the EU Fisheries Commissioner.)



number of fishermen in a polity, allocating the resource 'equitably' among the various European fleets. Again, however, all these 'solutions' fail to address the consequences of such a management regime, namely, that the vessels will either redirect their efforts elsewhere (possibly outside of EU waters but within waters that are immediately adjacent and thus capable of having an impact on stocks within the protected zone) or will redirect their efforts on some hitherto 'underutilized' stock within the same region, thereby altering the food chain and risking increasing predation by other fish on the already endangered stocks the managers are trying to protect (Anon., EU fails to agree on Spanish deal. *Fishing News International*, December 1994: 2).<sup>15</sup>

The recent conflict between Canada and the EU also illustrates the issue in point here. After Canada seized the Spanish vessel the Estai, bringing charges of high-seas piracy and a flagrant violation of international sea law, a tense confrontation between the EU and Canada made international headlines for several weeks in March and April of 1995, centering around Canada's claim that she had the moral right to protect stocks that were so endangered that for two years her own fishermen had been barred from fishing for them in her own EEZ. Spain, on the other hand, argued that it had developed a new technology that permitted its vessels to exploit a maritime region (that portion of Canada's continental shelf labeled 'the Grand Banks' but lying beyond her declared 200-mile EEZ borders) and an underutilized stock that Canadian fishermen had not previously considered. Their position was that, now shown the way, Canada would take advantage of Spanish innovation to deplete these stocks as she had done with stocks in her own EEZ waters. Further, both the Spanish Fisheries Minister and the EU Fisheries Commissioner argued that the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)<sup>16</sup> original Greenland halibut/turbot allocation of 16,000 mt to Canada and 3400 mt to the EU was inequitable and, though it had

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<sup>15</sup>The UK is in a Catch-22 situation. It is resistant to increasing the intrusiveness of the EU into what it considers are purely national issues, equally, it decries what it labels the 'excessive regulatory zeal of Brussels Eurocrats.' On the other hand, it has signed agreements re the fisheries and fishery regions, agreements that are about to expire. While it must abide by the terms of these agreements it also wishes to protect what stocks are left for its much shrunken fishing industry—and withdrawal from the EU in order to protect that industry is not a rational or viable response. It should be noted that Ireland is in favor of increased controls and is arguing for the creation of a new, much larger protected 'sensitive' region

<sup>16</sup>A non-governmental organization to which the majority of nations fishing in the northwestern Atlantic region belong and whose members negotiate allocation of stocks in the region 'on an consensual and equitable basis'

been a party to the NAFO negotiations, the EU unilaterally allocated a larger amount to Spain under the EU CFP quota system.

An agreement was finally reached on a reallocation of the stock in question, Canada taking a reduction in exchange for an agreement to have better monitoring of vessels fishing in the disputed region.<sup>17</sup>

However, José Antonio Suarez of the Shipowners' cooperative in Europe's largest fishing port, Vigo in the Spanish autonomous region of Galicia on Spain's northwestern coast, told a reporter from the leading international fishery industry publication that not only would Spain continue to fish the Grand Banks, to 'try to fish other species, such as shrimp and ray, which are not restricted,' but the industry would pressure the Spanish government to negotiate with the EU to allow Spain's 36 factory trawlers access to the Barents Sea and the waters off Greenland.

We believe we could move six to eight of the vessels to the Barents Sea. Then there is Greenland where we could put four or five more,' said Suarez. (Giles Tremlett and Paola Buonadonna, Spain still defiant on fish quota. *The European* April 21/27, 1995:2).

Now, the problem in all this is that, unlike grape vines or olive trees or rice, not only do fish swim but fishermen and their vessels move. Also unlike vineyards, olive groves, and coal mines, maritime regions are multiple use locales. When fishermen are unable to fish in one locale—whether because it is no longer economically viable to fish there or because, to give the stocks a chance to rebuild, fishery managers reduce fishing effort through, say, low TACs or fleet reductions—the outcome is an increase in pressure on stocks in another locale, a shift to another stock in the same locale, or the loss of a community's fishing industry (often to be replaced by leisure developments with their attendant pollution problems). In addition to the impact most visibly observed in the local mari-region, unpredictable consequences begin an ever-widening ripple effect that extends, ever more broadly, throughout the food web.

•Similarities grounded in a relatively common technology link factory workers, olive growers, coal miners, or wine producers throughout the EU. In fisheries, however, fishermen within the same 'national fleet' can vary widely in

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<sup>17</sup>In the original agreement, Canada was to receive 16,000 mt while the EU (i.e., Spain and Portugal) would receive 3400 mt. In the first few months of 1995, Spain took between 3000 and 5000 mt (charges of 'cooking the books' were leveled against Spain). The final agreement reached in April 1995 was that Canada would receive 10,000 mt and the EU 10,000 mt—with whatever amount that the EU had caught between January and April not counted as part of the 10,000 mt allocation.

their technology and their attitudes towards (as well as their rationales for) exploitation of maritime resources. In what has become over the last several years an annual conflict in the Bay of Biscay, Spanish tuna fishermen use longlines and hooks but UK, Irish and French tuna fishermen use the more cost-effective drift nets (limited by the EU to a certain mesh size and a maximum 2.5 km length). Indeed, last year the Spanish Navy had to rescue a captured French vessel that Spanish fishermen had seized, claiming that, in addition to drift netting being unselectively rapacious and technologically capable of sweeping everything into their nets (thus leading to thousands of tons of unwanted or illegally sized fish that were simply dumped back dead into the sea), the French nets were in violation of EU rules. Yet, in the south of Spain, tuna fishermen in the Straits of Gibraltar use (presumably legal size) drift nets, arguing that they must do so to compete with North African fishermen who are not subject to EU management rules. (Anon., Tuna wars divided Spain. *The European*, August 19/25, 1994: 2).<sup>18</sup>

•My final example is intended to illustrate that the construction of regions bears little relation to ecosystemic logic. The countries in the region of North African labeled 'the Mahgreb' are, 'for obvious reasons,' not part of the EU, despite that, only a few miles distant from each other, countries around this pond share both the benefits and the costs of the common Mediterranean ecosystem. On the other hand, far more remote locales—e.g., Greenland,<sup>19</sup> the Portuguese Azores, mid-way in the Atlantic and Madeira, west of the African

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<sup>18</sup>The complexity of the situation is revealed in current negotiations between the EU and Moroccan. Under a 3-year agreement that expires May 1, 1995, the EU pays Morocco to permit 700 EU vessels to fish in Moroccan waters. Morocco wishes to allow only 380 (all Spanish or Portuguese), a 50% reduction in the annual TAC of 85,000, an increase in the number of Moroccan crewmen from 15% to 35%, and transfer of the some of the processing to its own factories. A Moroccan report noted, "It is unacceptable for vessels which fish in Morocco to employ 8080 Europeans and just 905 Moroccans, especially when you consider that one job at sea creates 8 at home" (Giles Tremlett and Rory Watson, Moroccan threat to Iberia fleets. *The European*, August 14/20, 1995: 2).

Such a cutback, however, would cost 4000 jobs in the Iberian fleet. Spanish government officials face the following dilemma. Agreement will increase unemployment at home and civic unrest at a time when the government is already shaky but rejection of an agreement might lead to a total loss of fishing rights. Further, Spain wishes to work with Morocco to improve its economy and lessen the growing stream of Moroccan immigrants whose increased presence is leading to growing racial rhetoric and acts of violence against the immigrants.

<sup>19</sup>When Denmark joined the EC in 1973, Greenland automatically became a member also. However, Greenland won home rule in 1979 and seceded from the EC, the only people thus far who have done so. Fishing and subsidies from Denmark (c DKr 3 billion p.a.) constitute practically the whole of their national accounts.

coast; and the Spanish Canaries (just off the Africa coast, parallel with the southern portion of Morocco)—are, in point of fact, identified as part of Western Europe. Thus, as overseas territories of France we find parts of the European Union in such unlikely places as the Caribbean (Guadaloupe and Martinique), the Indian Ocean (Réunion), a few miles off Newfoundland's southern coast (St. Pierre and Miquelon), Micronesia as well as Melanesia, and on the northeastern coast of South America, Guyane.<sup>20</sup> What is striking here is that, despite that we are aware of the systemic nature of the global maritime ecosystem and, while those who manage the CFP find it difficult to link the North Sea with the Irish Sea, or the Bay of Biscay with the Mediterranean, there is little difficulty in relating the economic problems of islands in the India Ocean with metropolitan France.

### **Conclusion.**

The last decade of the 20th century saw the European Union arrive at a crucial point in its existence. Its opening years saw the organization flushed with the successes achieved under Delor's leadership and facing a future in

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<sup>20</sup>Despite its proclaimed rejection to 'European colonialism' and similarly grounded ideological stances re Third World countries, France, Portugal, Spain, and the UK all retain ties with their former colonial empires that engages the EU collectively not only in supporting continuation of such economic and hegemonic ties but, most peculiarly, allows a region identified geographically as 'Western Europe' to include as part of this region such locations as: the Azores (mid-Atlantic), Madeira (both belonging to Portugal); the Canaries (a Spanish possession and, like Madeira, in the Atlantic off the African coast); and France's overseas territories of Guadaloupe, Martinique (in the Caribbean), Guyane (in the western Atlantic and bordering Venezuela on the west), Réunion and various scattered islands in the western Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Channel; French Polynesia; New Caledonia in Melanesia; Clipperton Island (in the eastern Pacific, c. 800 mi WSW of Acapulca, Mexico; and, offshore of Newfoundland in the north Atlantic, the two small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Indeed, some EU Structural Funds and all EU Cohesion funds allocated to France go not to 'metropolitan' France but to sustain the economies of various of the overseas locales just listed. France, Spain, and Portugal present especially interesting cases of overseas EU regions. Their polities includes the overseas territories of the Azores (mid-Atlantic), Madeira (both belonging to Portugal), the Canaries (a Spanish possession and, like Madeira, in the Atlantic off the African coast); and France's overseas territories of Guadaloupe, Martinique (in the Caribbean), Guyane (in the western Atlantic and bordering Venezuela on the west), Réunion and various scattered islands in the western Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Channel; French Polynesia, New Caledonia in Melanesia; Clipperton Island (in the eastern Pacific, c. 800 mi WSW of Acapulca, Mexico; and, offshore of Newfoundland in the north Atlantic, the two small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. There are, in addition, the funds allocated to the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries—not a few of which are still within the 'spheres of influence' initially identified during the heyday of colonialism (cf., the famous EU Banana War in which Europeans must pay more for bananas from countries with whom certain European countries have close ties—despite admitting the fruit without a tariff—and enraging the banana-loving Germans who claim they are either paying excessive prices for inferior-tasting bananas inferior in taste or far too dearly for those desired but outside the tariff-privileged regions).

which, freed both from the tensions of the Cold War and the need to accept the hegemonic role of the United States, leaders saw the path to achieving the joint aims of, on the one hand, integrating and achieving socioeconomic equity among the various participants while, on the other hand, reestablishing Europe's lead position in the global system of markets, geopolitics, and ideational orientation. Reading the rhetoric of the time, one can see what without too much stretching of the imagination can be labeled a millenarian outlook. Yet, in a relatively short time, that view of the future has altered. EU leaders and the populace at large seemed plagued by uncertainty and pessimism: structural funds have not achieved and are far from attaining relative socioeconomic parity—and unemployment for the EU as a whole seems stuck at about 12%; immigration is increasing and with it signs of heightened national chauvanism among the EU citizenry; there is a clear lack of vision concerning the issue of how to deal with the array of problems presented by the eastern European countries (not to mention their coresidents on the Mediterranean pond, the North Africa states); the media and public at large are attacking the EU for its indecisiveness on the dangerous situation in the Balkans, especially those presented by the warring parts of the former Yugoslavia—along with the Macedonia/Greece and Greece/Turkey disputes; and, while European Parliament members as well as the public at large seems willing, even eager to adopt 'a European perspective,' the actual operations of the Commission and the Council of Ministers are at least as if not more embedded in and guided by national needs, goals, and passions as in the late 19th century.

This paper has argued that an important root cause of many of these problems is the inability of those critical in determining the direction in which the EU moves to understand the ways in which regions and regional boundaries truly operate. As the focus on the maritime sector illustrated, the world is not flat: 'regions' and the boundaries that identify them are constructs comprised of multiple components. Regions are immutable in neither space or time; they simultaneously exist in multiple dimensions. While any identifiable region has a certain degree of autonomy—not only do the fishing communities of southern Spain differ from those of northern Spain but those who exploit the Bay of Biscay have have both imposed and been required to develop sociocultural systems specific to it and different from those developed in the Irish or Baltic Seas—these waters as well as the people, their markets, their states, are inextricably tied to a series of ever more extensive regions. It is critical to understand that, while some issues need to be addressed at the local regions and

others viewed in terms of a region several removes up the systemic ladder, no management of resources or humans can afford to ignore the ripple effect. While the problems of an in-shore fishing village in Galicia need to be addressed differently from those of a city a few miles away that is a center for Spain's distant water fleet of freezer trawlers, the real or potential disappearance of a few dozen jobs in the one may have the same consequences for the shaping of EU decision-making as the loss of several thousand jobs in the other.

In sum, if the EU—and other institutionalized 'management systems' as well—are to make progress in dealing with the congeries of problems such entities are being required to address, regional identities and regional boundaries are like that well known series of Chinese boxes. While it is important to learn to differentiate what issues require what components in order to understand the how, when, where, and what of the structures and processes involved, the more crucial and immediate issue is to recognize that any given region has no fixed dimensions, characteristics or even temporally constrained identity—that, in point of fact, regions exist only as they are shaped by our construction of the questions we are asking and the ways available or capable of being designed in order for us to address those questions.

## Appendix I.

### States and regions, borders and boundaries.

Limiting the discussion of current dynamics from the perspective of the European Union (EU), we may note that there has been an evolutionary process that began with the initial phase of the establishment (1952) of the ECSC, where the emphasis was on defining an intranational region. While the keynote theme was international cooperation around activities within the European coal, iron, and steel producing heartland,<sup>21</sup> establishing the structure and managing the process centered on the need to avoid laying the groundwork for future conflicts arising from the economic and social problems within each of their own national regions. Faced with the need to rebuild European industry while, at the same time, avoiding nationalistic competition in such areas as, say, production, prices, or market share, national leaders in both the public and private sectors were anxious to rationalize the process so as to lend stability to their own governments, rebuild their nation-state identity, and create a viable national economy. Remembering inflation, depressions, civil unrest and two major European wars, all in less than 50 years, this phase was structured around coordinating activities in particular regions of specific states in ways that would avoid internal challenges and the inevitable result of that unrest, international confrontation, whether in the market place or on the battlefield<sup>22</sup>

Following the signing of the two Treaties of Rome in 1957, the EEC came into existence on January 1, 1958.<sup>23</sup> This may be labeled the international phase, a period during which the EEC emerged as an international organization of sovereign states and, though still guided by national interests, beginning to recognize the need to go beyond coordination to integration. The keynote theme now became coordination. The agenda was still driven by the concerns of its two giants: France, on the one hand, wanted free access to market its agricultural goods to German industrial cities while Germany wanted free access to market

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<sup>21</sup>—most importantly, France and West Germany, but, as well, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and northwestern Italy

<sup>22</sup>This was not the first such regional grouping. In 1921, Belgian and Luxembourg set up a free trade agreement which, having been joined by the Dutch government in exile in 1944, was implemented as the Benelux agreement in 1948; the Council of Europe was established in 1949 and by 1950 had 15 members; the Nordic Council was established in 1952. The European Free Trade Association, though established in 1960 as a rival association to what was by then the tripartite entity of the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC, was the least regional of the organizations attempting as it did to draw in any European countries not 'behind the Iron Curtain' (including Finland as an associate member).

<sup>23</sup>On July 1, 1967, the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC unified in a single structure, the EC.

its manufactured goods. Thus, though other matters were also part of the treaties—e.g., harmonizing legal systems, initiating a joint aid program for development—the emphasis was on designing a common agricultural policy (France) and promoting free trade (Germany).

The Single European Act 1986 signaled a new phase in the EU's development; the focus was now on the formation of a transnational organization. The EC was a community of states but the boundaries marking eligibility for membership were drawn within a macro-regional entity, Western Europe. Though the structure was still organized around the nation-states—with the decision-making apparatus, despite formal statements to the contrary, firmly grounded in leadership and power drawn from and reflecting the individual states—the EC itself now had certain sovereign, policy making powers not held by any of the individual states but still negotiated through those individual states. Another layer, transnational regions within the EC, was becoming institutionalized due to the creation of special funds earmarked for these regions but the negotiations on the distribution of such funds was and still are carried on via the national governments of the regions concerned. The concern to equalize or 'harmonize' the economies of the participating states and regions shows that the keynote theme was synthesization

Finally, the most recent stage, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which shifted the keynote theme to integration. In this phase, the evolutionary stages previously mandated are given a structure for implemented and we have seen the full emergence of a supranational entity which, if it unfolds as envisaged, will see that entity accrue the traditional rights of sovereign states, e.g., the power to make war, coin money, issue passports, have a supreme juridical entity, and a truly functional, law-making Parliament.

It should go without saying that there are some difficult problems to address and not the least of this is the problem of growth and the even more intractable problem of scale. Given that nothing succeeds like success, there is still the concern that, as the noted biologist Prothera once commented, 'A mouse the size of an elephant would no longer look like a mouse.' What are the boundaries of the European Union? If the next door neighbors of western Europe are 'europeanized' by propinquity, then will the next century see central Asian states; and if Turkey, why not Lebanon or Israel? While these seem far-fetched questions, 30 years ago the issue of admitting Turkey or Russia would have seen equally ridiculous. Further, while there is quibbling about some Eastern European countries, it seems beyond the realm of the thinkable to



consider membership of countries on 'the other side of the common European pond (i.e., North Africa); they are not Europe.<sup>24</sup>

Most importantly, the regions themselves have begun to deal directly with the EU. Regions and even individual cities that dominate regions are now firmly establishing themselves in Brussels. Such entities are growing increasingly capable of directly negotiating and creating networks of information and influence that make them ever less dependent on their own national centers of power and authority. Though national identity is still significant (e.g., positions at, particularly, the upper levels of the Commission must show national balance), there is clear evidence of the emergence of a cosmopolitan, i.e., supranational, EU culture among the Commission staff and even the Members of Parliament. The 'subsidiary' debate gives support to the claim that, regardless of resistance on the part of state leaders, this evolving structure is beginning to take on a form that, increasingly, resembles an hourglass—the EU institutions the top half, the regions the bottom half. While the centralized states—located in the narrow neck between the two previous halves—is still important because its dimension has a determining effect on, say, the flow of resources and information between the two halves, relative to the trajectory of the Union the functioning and functions of those states are ever more circumscribed.

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<sup>24</sup>Yet, we know that 'the continent of Europe' is an artificial entity; Europe exists only as the western fringe of the Eurasian land mass and, that we identify it as 'one of the seven continents,' is particularly odd when we remember that as school children we all learned that 'a continent is a large body of land surrounded by water.'

## Appendix II. The UN Law of the Sea.

In the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(1964), states had the right to exploit the mineral resources (and rights to sedentary species but not fish) in coastal waters to a depth of 656' (200 meters), but this depends not really on defined borders but on the technological ability of a state to exploit those resources. Various nations, however, began to extend their territorial waters to 200 miles (322 kilometers, a figure based on the desire to gain a monopoly over fish resources of the continental shelf—what is commonly called the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that began in 1973, was finally sent out for signing in 1982. By 1984, 157 states had signed, though 4 (including, critically, the U.S. and Canada) had not. The key provisions were:

- Territorial Seas could extend up to 12 nautical miles;
- a state's claim to economic rights could extend up to 200 nautical miles ; and (the sticking point for the U.S.)
- mineral resources beyond the 200-mile limit, in the region defined as the 'high seas' or waters common to all and owned by none, would be subject to UN management whose mandate was to recognize the rights to the wealth of such resources of landlocked states whose land mass did not border on the seas and oceans of the world (identified by the UN as a collective labeled 'Geographically Disadvantaged States').

The objection of the hold-outs was that the very countries with the sophisticated technology that would allow mining such resources, would be constrained by a UN bureaucracy set up to control such efforts.<sup>25</sup>

•Finally, and most problematic, two or more states less than 400 miles apart agree to the median-line principle—a drawing of equidistant maritime borders. The result is a complex system of maritime borders that often cross resource-rich zones—as, for example, in the North Sea between Norway and Britain.

The following are 3 examples drawn from the EU of the difficulty the median-line 'solution' can produce. (1) When the North Sea was being marked off for West Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, West Germany objected that, relative to the length of its coastline, the median-line approach allocated it an unacceptably small area. After drawn-out negotiations, Denmark and the

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<sup>25</sup>The refusal of the US and others to sign the treaty due to this feature led to its modification and, under the Clinton administration, the US became a signatory. Thus, in June 1994, the treaty was accepted.

Netherlands gave 7000 and 5000 km<sup>2</sup> respectively, permitting Germany to extend its claim to the potentially rich natural gas and oil resources being sought in these waters.

(2) A claim by the UK to a 200 mile zone around Rockall Island (an uninhabited islet 220 miles west of the Outer Hebrides in the north Atlantic, annexed by the UK in 1955) has been strongly contested by both Denmark and Ireland and the dispute is still simmering (Rockall and the limits of national jurisdiction of the UK, E. D. Brown, 1978, *Marine Policy* 2: 181).

(3) Spain has the largest fishing fleet in the EU, making up roughly 1/3 of the EU fleet. When Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986 they agreed to special conditions limiting their access to Community waters to 150 of a named 300-vessel list at any one time. In addition, the UK and Ireland secured a special agreement to keep EU (meaning Spanish) vessels out of the 90,000 square miles zone that identifies an EU maritime region known as the Irish Box (made up of the Irish Sea and north Atlantic waters off the west coast of Ireland). Beginning on January 1, 1996, however, up to 40 Spanish (and some Portuguese vessels) will be allowed into the Box. The Iberian vessels, however, are freezer trawlers, factory ships that average twice the size of, in particular, the Cornish fleets that have traditionally fished the waters. They, in retaliation, decided to drift net fish in the Bay of Biscay. This enraged the Spanish fishermen in that area, most of whom fished with long lines, baited with hooks (which, it is generally acknowledged, are much more 'eco-friendly' since, unlike drift nets that sweep up everything and result in an estimated 30% of discards—'trash fish,' i.e., unmarketable fish or endangered fish prohibited from being landed or allowed only under a quota and allows only those over a minimum size). The Spanish fleet, denied access to EU waters until 1996 and barred by various Third World nations from being able to fish in those waters, turned to the international waters outside Canada's 200-mile zone in the rich Grand Banks area off Newfoundland.

In March/April of 1995, Canada attempted to constrain fishing in the Grand Banks off the Newfoundland Coast. Though much of the area is within Canada's 200 mile limit, two segments extend beyond (the 'nose' and the 'tail'). Arguing that over-fishing in this area was affecting the ability of stocks within her zone to recover from the disastrous collapse that forced Canada two years ago to close the cod fishery and created almost total unemployment among Newfoundland's 50,000 Newfoundland fishermen and factory workers, Canada captured a Spanish freezer trawler, towed it into port, and confiscated the catch.

This led to an international crisis with the EU charging Canada with 'piracy' and the Canadians responding with charges of 'ecological rape.' It was not until April 16, that extended emergency negotiations between Canada and the EU produced a settlement,<sup>26</sup> partially as a result of simultaneous discussions taking place at a 2-week UN conference addressing the broader issues—in particular, the so-called straddling stock that move across regions and the borders that identify them for management purposes. Indeed, Canadian Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin (a former disk jockey and skilled in the use of the media), took his case to the world, arranging a media show for TV newspeople, on a barge in the East River where, pointing to (illegally) small-mesh, 16-story long nets held high on a crane, he waved the palm-length fish from the Estai, and exclaimed: We're down now finally to one last, lonely, unattractive little turbot clinging on by its fingertips [sic!] to the Grand Banks, saying "someone reach out and save me in this eleventh hour" (John deMont, Tobin's war, *Macleans* April 10, 1995:14-16, p.16).

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<sup>26</sup>Though Tobin boasted that Canada was the victor, the final settlement allocated 10,000 metric tons of the turbot to Canada, 10,000 to the EU (effectively Spain and Portugal) with the 5000 metric tons already taken by these two countries in the first two months of 1995 not to be included. In short, Canada's allocation dropped from 16,000 mt (60% of the total) to 10,000 mt while the EU portion went from 3240 mt (12% of the total) to a de facto 15,000 mt. Further, Canada agreed to repeal the law which allowed it to seize foreign vessels in the international waters of the Grand Banks. What Canada gained was: observers on ships, third-party inspections of vessels ticked for having serious violations, nets with 4.7" mesh to be phased out and replaced by larger mesh nets

### Appendix III

#### A brief overview of EU 'regions.'

Regions are cultural constructs, what geographers often label 'spatial abstractions' that attempt to bundle (usually in terms of statistical aggregates) the complex components that make up the daily lives of humans living in some locale identified and conveniently packaged to address certain political, economic, or sociocultural factors to which the folk or the managerial elite assign importance.<sup>27</sup>

Although the emphasis on regions has been present since the initial formation of the ECSC, and was addressed throughout the 1960s, it was not until 1969 that 'formal proposals for coordinating coordinating regional policies, drawing up programs for problems areas, establishing a special fund and a committee for regional matters, and encouraging public and private sources to invest in regional development scheme' (Clout et al, p. 204). It was the enlargement of the EEC in 1973 that brought recognition that the Community has a whole needed to address regional differences. A Commission for Regional Policy was established and George Thomson was appointed its Commissioner. He had the task of organizing and analyzing widely (and wildly!) divergent data (gathered by various member states with little if any concern for a common framework, for common definitions, for common foci) into some cohesive whole that would allow the EC to identify 'problem regions,' i.e., areas with persistently high unemployment or outmigration. The result was the *Report on the Regional Problems in the enlarged Community* (known as the Thomson Report) and, basically, it established the ground rules for European regions. They were locales that, despite wide disparities within each (e.g., very rich and very poor), could *as entities with bureaucratic utility and as statistically identified entities*, could be marked as sites where efforts could be made to manage human activities as these were related to and had an effect on such aspects of everyday life as settlement, migration, education, employment, transportation, leisure, health, and the like. Funds were earmarked for 'problem regions' but, interestingly, such locales were defined not by Thomson's relatively neutral criteria but in terms of the amount of money available to deal with such regions given the funds available. Thus, areas that were listed as 'moderately poor' by Thomson's measures, would not be listed because limited monies required that

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<sup>27</sup>See, e.g., the basic textbook by H. Clout, M. Blacksell, R. King, D. Pinder, *Western Europe: Geographical perspectives* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 3rd ed., 1994, p.196

only 'very poor regions' (e.g., the Mezzogiorno and Ireland) would be targeted for ERBD assistance.

West Germany dug in its heels and refused to agree to Thomson's recommended £900 million for 1974-6, giving a figure of £250 million instead. After almost a year, it was agreed that some £540 million would be used to fund regional development and, more critically I think, regions to be targeted would be identified by national standards rather than Thomson's criteria. Most significantly, EBRD funds were to be allocated among the Nine according to a quota system, Italy, the UK and the Republic of Ireland were net beneficiaries while France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg were net contributors.<sup>28</sup>

Now, the logic that allocates a pool of finite resources—in this case development programs that redistribute monies so as to equalize those resources by moving an affluent excess—in terms of an arbitrarily determined 'quota system' (which, at bottom, rests on neither an adequate quota nor a logical system but is determined on the basis of political 'equity' and trade offs among member states)<sup>29</sup> is an approach where success (no matter how measured) seems improbable. It becomes an invitation to disaster when applied to the management of an ecological system in crisis. Yet the quota system that underwrites the Byzantine logic of the CAP, that provides guidance for the appointment of EU Commissioners and the hiring the Commission staff, and is the basis for the allocation of various categories of development monies—within the EU, in eastern Europe, and to developing nations abroad—is being applied to the design of maritime regions and sets the program for fisheries management.

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<sup>28</sup>Italy, the UK & the republic of Ireland were to receive 40%, 28% and 6% respectively; France 15%, W Germany 6.4%, the Netherlands 17%, Belgium, 1.5%, Denmark 1.3% and Luxembourg 0.1% (M. L. Kiljunen, *Regional disparities and policy in the EEC*. In D Seers, and C. Vaitsos, eds. *Integration and unequal development: The experience of the EEC*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp 199-222. 1980).

<sup>29</sup>I have sometimes considered analyzing the EU using the standard anthropological model of 'a redistributive chiefdom'; certainly, initial forays have provided provocative similarities in what most consider evolutionarily divergent sociocultural types.