Monnet’s Action Committee for the U.S. of Europe, its Successor and the Network of Europeanists.

Introduction

Much attention has recently been given to European Community lobbying. The reason is no doubt the proliferation of lobbyists gravitating around EC institutions, especially since the mid-1980s, when a new “re-launch” of the EC was clearly under way. Lobbying is not a new phenomenon in the EC. If one accepts a rather broad definition of the term, then actors involved in lobbying EC institutions since 1957 have included a constellation of national associations and European federations for agriculture, industry, labor, business, finance and commerce. Yet the growing number of professional lobbyists (including lawyers and accounting firms), European special interest groups, and representatives of multinational firms, countries, counties and cities, is a relatively more recent development. Although publications on lobbying in the EC are numerous, there is a lack of systematic study in this field. 1

Who lobbies whom or where and for what specific reasons? The interests of the various groups range from those lobbyists who try to lobby the Commission on highly technical matters, or to obtain a specific grant or project, to those who attempt to influence the future shape of the EC by drawing attention to issues such as enlargement and its implications for the institutions of the EC, subsidiarity, or “how better to communicate EC information to Community citizens.” The Action Committee for Europe, which is the successor to Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe, belongs to this last category.

The first Action Committee began its work in 1956 and initially gathered key representatives from democratic political parties and non-communist trade unions of the Europe of the Six. After the defeat of the European Defense Community in 1954, Monnet had indeed arrived at the conclusion that one would have to work with these key forces to obtain a parliamentary majority on other European projects in the future and put pressure on governments to progress on the road to European unity. In 1975 Monnet wound up his Action Committee, estimating that its task had been accomplished. Not only was Monnet getting old, but European heads of state and government now met frequently in the European Council. There seemed to be a common European will on the part of these governments to solve common European problems. Under those circumstances, did the Monnet Committee still have a mandate? If the European Communities had to weather another EDC-like crisis, though, then, thought Monnet, the time would come to build a new action committee.

Since the early 1980s the Action Committee has been reborn from its ashes, mainly at the initiative of Max Kohlmann, who had previously been Vice-President of Monnet’s Committee and headed the European University Institute in Florence until 1981. Kohlmann was highly encouraged to do so by some high level political figures such as Helmut Schmidt, Leo Tindemans and Ted Heath, to name but a few key
individuals associated with the activities of the new Action Committee for Europe. Mitterand hailed its forthcoming birth shortly before Christmas 1984 at the Château de Rambouillet. This was one of the rare public manifestations of the Action Committee, which has shown a marked preference for operating behind the scenes. Max Kohlmann was the first Secretary General of the Committee. With the recent move of the Action Committee's headquarters from Brussels to Paris, Jacques Chaban-Delmas became its President, while René Foch, a close Associate of Monnet since the creation of Euratom, is the new Secretary General. Contrary to Monnet's Committee, the new Action Committee not only includes influential political and trade union leaders, but also key representatives from business and industry. The Committee takes advance-guard positions on EC problems, while it also seeks to improve the chances of programs initiated by Community institutions—especially the Commission. The Action Committee thus functions both as a think tank which elaborates new proposals, and as a lobby, albeit of a special type, which promotes its own projects and those of EC institutions. A preliminary investigation shows that the Action Committee has been closely involved in the initial stages of the "1992" initiative, the debates over the Maastricht Treaty, and the creation of a European pillar in the Alliance.

At first sight, both Action Committees seem to be perfect examples of epistemic communities, as defined by Peter Haas and others in a recent issue of *International Organization*. According to James K. Sasenius, "epistemic communities can be viewed as distinctive de facto natural coalitions of 'believers' whose main interest lies not in meeting material objectives but, rather, in expanding to become winning coalitions capable of ensuring the adoption of specific policy projects. An epistemic community can thus be understood as changing the perceived zone of possible agreement through well-understood ways that are favorable to its objectives." Peter Haas and Emanuel Adler further indicate that their influence "persists mainly through the institution that they help create and inform with their preferred world vision." Decision-makers are most likely to listen to epistemic communities in times of high uncertainty about specific issues. Finally, members of epistemic communities can exert their influence through "think tanks, regulatory agencies and the type of governmental policy research bodies that are more common outside the United States." 2

I would like to argue that the members of both Action Committees—the old and the new—belong to a special kind of epistemic community, which we might call a region-related epistemic community.3 A network of believers in a specific kind of idea of Europe and international relations, which finds its formal expression in the creation and remodeling of European institutions that perpetuate the idea. The believers in Jean Monnet's Europe might like to call such a network, a "network of friendship," others have called it a free masonry of European politicians and high officials, or, less flattering, a Euromafia.

Some of the questions to be addressed are: What kind of Europe did the members of the first Committee advocate, and, just as importantly, what did they not want? Diaries, archives, interviews, speeches, and publications of the Committee can help identify a common vision. Was this vision shared with key policy-makers across the Atlantic? What was the social and organizational structure of the Monnet
Committee? Who were the intimates of the Monnet network? How did the Committee deal with the frustration or discontent of some of its members? How influential was it? Where, in what countries, in what kind of governmental environment, and in what specific policy areas was it most effective? How did members communicate with one another? Through formal meetings of all the members, one to one conversations, letters, telephone? Were public manifestations of the Committee, such as the publication of the Committee’s resolutions and declarations rather more or less important than informal activities such as personal conversations and consultations? How did the Committee compensate for its loose structure and relative lack of institutional base? What foundations, universities, and think tanks helped the Committee gather information and write reports on current issues? Where did the money to support the Committee come from? From its members, or also European and American research foundations?

The new Action Committee can then be subjected to a similar set of questions as well as to some new ones. How was the new Action Committee for Europe organized, may we ask? Why did it reemerge at all after Jean Monnet disbanded the old Committee? What circumstances prompted its revival? Was it uncertainty, a period of crisis? What was the initial membership of the Committee? Does it include members from the business community? Are its members now too old to be influential, or is the Committee open to membership of the current and future generations of European leaders? How does the Committee interact with European Community institutions, consulting firms, universities, research institutions, and interest groups? Does the Committee utilize their resources? Does it enter in competition with some of these various organizations and groups? Is the new Committee action oriented in the sense that it tries to advocate original and specific solutions to specific problems or is it rather more concerned with general statements about the European Community? Whom does the Committee “lobby” in the European Community? Jacques Delors, influential individuals at lower levels of the EC hierarchy, national governments? Finally, how does the Committee interact with non-EC countries, and especially the United States? Do similar action committees or councils, which support European integration, exist in the United States?

Studying the activities of the Action Committee for Europe in comparison with its predecessor, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, might help us to understand some of the dynamics and structures of this particular network or community, and to see how the Action Committee relates to or interacts with other epistemic communities or interest groups, not only at the European level but also at the international level. At the international level, we will briefly allude to the interconnections between the two action committees and organizations such as the Trilateral Commission or the Bilderberg group.

The European idea and the network of Europeanists.

What then were the main ideas that inspired and motivated Monnet’s action and which he tried to put as the main tenets of his Action Committee for the United States of Europe? Monnet summed it all up in a note to Max Kolfschoten in 1963: “Since 1950, the aim of European integration has been to suppress
the spirit of superiority, of domination which has animated European nations - caused wars and almost doomed Europe and can again, if it is not destroyed, doom the world. How can we do it? Appear among nations the principles of these nations and of civilization: rules, institutions. By creating Europe, we establish a balance with the United States. By creating a partnership which is now possible between Europe and the United States, we also make it possible to arrive at an agreement between East and West. This is then the beginning of the organization of peace. A few words are of crucial importance here: war, supremacy, civilization, institutions, partnership and peace. War: Jean Monnet and many of his friends and collaborators had lived through one if not more European wars. This common experience created special bonds between them and made them share a common goal: to tone down nationalism in Europe. Supremacy, domination: in order to best organize the peace, Germany must neither be able to dominate the peace, nor feel that it was bound to remain eternally in an inferior position vis-à-vis France or the United Kingdom. The best way to create the conditions for a lasting peace was to make nations work towards the solution of common problems which then transformed into common interests. Civilization, institutions: when it came to human nature, Monnet was no optimist. Hence his profound conviction that you needed institutions to serve as a collective memory and to submit European nations and peoples to rules which would gradually modify their behavior and make them work together instead of against each other. Max Kohlmann, during one occasional bout of pessimism about the European Community, told my students not too long ago that we had a choice: either we united or we went back to the "jungle." And this to Max Kohlmann meant nothing less than an absence of common rules, a lack of a common vision, perhaps another war. Finally, partnership and peace: only by making Western Europe economically and politically strong through European integration, could one enter into an Atlantic partnership with the United States. The European Communities must not be allowed to drown in an Atlantic soup while they were still in their formative stages, but the sooner Europe united, the sooner one could begin to build a strong and prosperous Atlantic Community. Prosperity and stability in Western Europe would then irresistibly attract Eastern European satellites and ultimately create the conditions for peace with the Soviet Union.

Yet European integration or unity were relatively vague terms. What did they in fact mean? Cooperation between governments through loose associations such as the OEEC, or the Western European Union, or was it something more? Jean Monnet made this amply clear in his letter to the leading figures who agreed to join his Action Committee in October 1955. The letter served as a sort of constituting charter for the Committee: "Mere cooperation between governments will not suffice. It is indispensable for States to delegate certain of their powers to European federal institutions responsible to ('mandataires de') all of the participating countries as a whole." By the end of 1955, the Eisenhower administration had reached a similar conclusion and opted for the supranational six-nation approach as opposed to "cooperative arrangements" such as the OEEC which did not involve "waivers of sovereignty in favor of an authority such as now existed for the CSC (European Coal and Steel Community)." The decidedly lukewarm attitude of the United States towards the Free Trade Area negotiations initiated by the British, and,
subsequently, towards the creation of the European Free Trade Area, can be traced back to this tendency to favor "genuine integration" à la Monnet, not only because of the "expected economic and technical advantages" but also because this kind of integration was thought to lead to European political union. Only such a union could capture the imagination of European nations and especially of West Germany. By channeling German energies and loyalties towards European integration, one would increase economic efficiency in Western Europe while creating a new link between Germany and the West, thereby strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.

The similarity between the views of Monnet and that of some policy-makers in the United States was no coincidence. Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as well as some close advisors of John F. Kennedy, belonged to a unique network of friends, close acquaintances and colleagues, who considered the advancement of European integration as an essential element in pursuing the larger goal of an acceptable peace settlement. American Europeanists, many of them friends of Monnet and his collaborators, contributed substantially to gathering support in the United States for European integration, which in turn played a small role in lending legitimacy to the ideas of supporters of European unity in some European countries. American and European "Europeanists" did, of course, pursue separate and distinct interests, but as a key American supporter of European integration has noted, at the time "they were somehow secondary." On the European side, Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European Economic Community, later bore testimony to this unique period of cooperation in which people shared common goals and often built close bonds of friendship in the process of "co-conspiring" in a common enterprise. "It was real cooperation—free of all the overtones which are now hampering our relations. There was no question about making choices. It was a natural feeling of people working for the same goals. Defense against Communism was a common cause. Building Europe was a common cause—unreservedly—taken as such by both partners. And this influenced the way they cooperated. There was an exchange of documents without any special care of secrecy."

By making the most of their contacts with Americans close to the president, as well as in the lower echelons of the American administration, Jean Monnet and his collaborators were able to circumvent the heavy organizational machinery of the American government, and to influence American policy in its formative stages, lobbying for their idea of a united Europe. Kennedy's informal organizational style facilitated such contacts. A simple lunch between, say, Monnet, Kennedy, Under Secretary George Ball or White House Adviser McGeorge Bundy, probably did more to promote the views of Jean Monnet and his fellow "conspirators" than some official visits by European statesmen. This was so even during the Eisenhower administration, which has been singled out as a military type of organization. People in high places and their dedication to the common goal of European integration made it possible for Monnet and other supporters of European integration to maintain a continuous exchange of views with their friends and colleagues across the Atlantic. I am not arguing, of course, that Monnet and other European advocates of European integration determined American policy towards European integration, neither am I suggesting
that American leaders dictated European initiatives for European integration. What I am describing, rather, is a cross-fertilization process among the views held by the members of a group that we might call, for lack of a better term, the Euro-American intelligentsia for the unifying of Europe, and in which Monnet’s Action Committee played a crucial role, with Monnet and his closest collaborators playing the leading parts. A few examples will serve to illustrate the point.

George Ball, one of Kennedy’s top advisers in European affairs, also happened to be a friend of Monnet. Ball had first met Monnet during the Roosevelt administration, in the context of administering Lend-Lease. In 1945, Ball then served Monnet as his personal counsel when the Frenchman came to Washington as president of the French Supply Council. Among other later cooperative ventures with Monnet, Ball became involved in the preparation of the Coal and Steel Community treaty after the announcement of the Schuman Plan in May 1950. The Ball–Monnet connection was put to good use when the Democrats resumed power in the early sixties. The most favorable period for shaping and influencing any given American policy is during its formative stages, that is just before or after an administration takes office. Already in August 1960, Kennedy had asked Adlai Stevenson to help him develop a program of action for the first few months of the new administration, somewhat “reminiscent of the celebrated Hundred Days of the first term of Franklin Roosevelt.” Stevenson then commissioned George Ball to write the report for him. Ball immediately set to work and lost no time in asking Monnet to contribute to the project by helping him define American policy towards Europe as well as “measures for the strengthening of ties between Europe and the United States.” He insisted that Monnet keep the project strictly confidential since the program was “known to only four or five people in the United States.”

This small group included Rober Schaezler, who became Ball’s deputy under Kennedy. Schaezler, in turn, asked his close friend Max Kohlstein, who served as Vice-President of Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe, to contribute his thoughts to the project. Schaezler also conducted extensive talks with René Froch on U.S.-European relations in the nuclear field. The final product, the so-called Stevenson Report, heeded the suggestions of Monnet and his colleagues, and included a twenty-page paper outlining a plan for a “Policy for Partnership Between a United Europe and America within a Strong Atlantic Community.”

In January 1961, just before the new administration took office, George Ball, Robert Bowie, John Tuttle, and Walt Butterworth, met with Monnet in Europe. Monnet, who preferred to do business over simple, even frugal, but high-quality meals, repeatedly invited his American friends to discuss U.S.-European relations over lunch or dinner. On January 1, Bowie was invited to lunch at Monnet’s residence at Houarney. Professor Robert Bowie, formerly Head of the Policy Planning Staff, had long been convinced of the necessity of uniting Europe and had made his views known in a report to the Eisenhower administration entitled “The North Atlantic Nations. Tasks for the 1960s,” which was later put to good use by the Kennedy administration. Then, a fortnight before Kennedy was inaugurated as president of the United States, Monnet arranged for Ball to meet with his collaborators, Max Kohlstein and Francois Duchêne, at the headquarters of the Action Committee in Paris on Avenue Foch. The succession of
dinner and lunches continued when Monnet came to Washington in March. On the first day of the month Ball invited Monnet for an informal dinner at home. Also present at the dinner were top members of advisors of the Kennedy administration who were involved in European affairs, including Ambassador to the United Kingdom David Bruce, White House Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Robert Schaeffer, and last but not least, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whom Kennedy commissioned to write a very influential report on American foreign policy at the very beginning of his administration. After more lunches and dinners with Monnet, Ball took him to see the president, with whom Monnet discussed his plans for an Atlantic partnership over lunch, and during other long conversations.16

On 6 December 1961, President Kennedy addressed the National Association of Manufacturers in New York. Kennedy spoke of the need to replace the old Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act due to expire in June of 1962 with a "new and bold instrument of American trade policy." What the president was selling was a new trade program tailored to meet the challenges and to exploit the opportunities of the Common Market. During the interregnum, Kennedy had asked Ball to write a report on foreign economic policy. Ball's task force report proposed to focus a new trade program on how to deal with the mounting challenge of the Common Market. The United States should, Ball insisted, "use the European Economic Community both as a justification for a major new round of trade negotiations and a precedent for reducing tariffs by percentage cuts across the board rather than the traditional item-by-item haggling."17 "If United States production is not to be at a serious disadvantage in the rapidly growing Common Market," wrote Ball, "the President must be armed with weapons enabling him to bargain effectively for the generalization to the United States of the internal tariff cuts within these markets—or, at least, for the substantial reduction of their external tariffs."18

Some high-ranking members of the Kennedy administration were not so keen on the Trade Expansion Act and objected most strongly to the TEA's 80-percent, or dominant supplier authority clause. The TEA gave the president the general authority to make reciprocal 50-percent reductions across the board for most categories of products; Exceptions were made for those few products previously qualifying for escape clause relief. In addition, the protection of national security could be invoked to "impose duties or suspend concessions" on some goods.19 But the new act went much further than the 50 percent basic authority. It also authorized the president to reduce tariffs down to zero if he determined that "the United States and all countries of the European Economic Community together accounted for 80 percent or more of the aggregated world export value of all articles within such category."20 The EEC was defined as encompassing those members it had at the time the authority was used, a clause that obviously left the door open for British entry. What the proponents of the 80 percent clause objected to was not the degree of the reduction sought, but its underlying motivation: the intention of some members of the administration to employ it as a bargaining tool to force the British to join. The clause would indeed have been rendered almost meaningless if the British remained out of the Common Market. If one restricted the geographical scope of the 80 percent authority to the United States and the EEC without the United Kingdom, only two
categories of products applied, margarine and aircraft. This was hardly the way to engage in significant negotiations. For Ball, it was a way of ensuring that the Labor party would not view the Trade Expansion Act as an alternative to British membership. For his critics, the 80 percent clause posed the danger of making that particular clause contingent upon a foreign policy aim: getting the British to participate in the Common Market.

As a matter of fact, Monnet and Kohnstamm were also opposed to the 80 percent clause, which they considered as clear evidence that the TEA was designed to bring down the Common External Tariff, thereby robbing the emerging European Economic Community of one of its most distinctive features. In a "My dear George" letter, Monnet warned against "the dangers" posed by the part of the TEA which contemplated going beyond a 50 percent reduction of the external tariff. At "first statistical glance" such a reduction seemed to Monnet and his collaborators to "virtually amount to a policy of free trade for industrial products," which "is very much what the British [had] proposed in 1956." As this early stage in the history of the Common Market, Monnet contended, "the common tariff and the common commercial policy which follows from it is the field in which European policies have gone furthest. Accordingly, it is for the moment essential to the sense of union between the European people just as in the past the tariff was one of the formative elements of American unity. Free trade between Europe and America today would undermine the European institutions, the existence of which is the only hope of our obtaining a real Atlantic partnership between equals and a partnership will only be possible between equals."21

During the discussions on the Trade Expansion Act, a senator, frustrated with Ball's advocacy of what seemed to him a European position, felt compelled to remind him "that he was in the pay, not of M. Monnet, but of the United States."22 Yet Ball did not see eye to eye with Monnet on everything. He did seek to protect United States' interests. He and Schuetzel attempted to convince Monnet and Kohnstamm that the 80 percent clause was needed "from the standpoint of political tactics." Congress, they argued, would never grant the president far-reaching authority for the TEA if the executive branch did not present a proposal which demonstrated their profound conviction that the Common Market represented an important challenge for the United States. If unimpressed with the sincerity of the administration's proposal, Congress would simply transform the new TEA into something that closely resembled the old Trade Agreement Act. Ball and Schuetzel saw the proposal for the 80 percent authority as a symbol of the administration's attempt to modify American attitudes towards the tariff. The Common Market challenge was the pretext, the 80 percent authority the means to magnify the importance of the Common Market and win Congress over to the administration's proposal.

For a while Monnet and Kohnstamm remained unconvinced. In October 1962, Schuetzel pleaded with them to break the silence of their Action Committee, whose position in general had been decidedly reserved on the Trade Expansion Program. Anticipating the next session of the Action Committee in mid-December 1962 in Paris, Schuetzel put his suggestion in the form of a question: "would that not be an appropriate time to bring the Action Committee down hard in favor of extensive negotiations with the
United States taking full advantage of the Trade Expansion Program?" "In fact," he added on a rather menacing note, "I would think silence on the part of the Action Committee with reference to this piece of business could not help but be construed in the United States as a rebuff from its closest friend, namely Jean and his associates."23 This time the answer was more forthcoming. In early November, Max Kohlmann wrote to Schaeftel: "As to the meeting of the Action Committee you may be assured that this resolution will contain the sort of thing you suggested. We certainly will come out in favor of extensive negotiations in order to take advantage of the Trade Expansion Act."24 The Action Committee's joint declaration of 17 December 1962 called attention to President's Kennedy Independence Day Speech in which he looked "forward to the interdependence of the United States and Europe as equal partners." The Trade Expansion Act which Congress had passed would enable the United States to negotiate on the partnership in the economic field. The Action Committee asked that the United States and the European Community enter into negotiations without delay for a reduction of American and European customs duties.25 In this specific case, Ball and Schaeftel's efforts were thus crowned with success, since Monnet's Committee ended up supporting the Trade Expansion Act, despite Monnet's initial misgivings.

The Multilateral Force also occasioned dissensions within the group of Europeanists. Some Europeanists in the Kennedy administration argued that the United States should investigate possibilities for giving more participation to Europeans in the nuclear field. The project of a Multilateral force was part of this effort. The MLE was an American proposal for a mixed-manned nuclear missile fleet armed with Pershing missiles, presumably destined to give Europeans more control over nuclear weapons. Initially owned and controlled by NATO, the force was seen by some American Europeanists as a possible step towards a European nuclear force, but only if and when Europe united politically. In the meantime it was mostly designed to reduce the sex-appeal of the French and British nuclear ventures, which these Europeanists, not least George Ball, wanted to disappear, or at the very least, to be safely integrated within NATO. When Schaeftel suggested that the Action Committee take a look at the "nuclear issue" in late 1962, Kohlmann's answer was no. There was no point in trying to convince Monnet to move along those lines since he even refrained from discussing these matters "with his closest associates for fear that this might complicate the negotiations with the United Kingdom."26 Only after De Gaulle's resounding "no" to British entry into the Common Market did Monnet actively begin to take a closer look at the MLE. Together, Kohlmann, his colleagues, and their American contacts, later worked on a charter for the Multilateral Force. Yet it took another year and a half for the Action Committee to mention this delicate question in its common declaration in Bonn on June 1 1964.

There was a constant flow of information between American Europeanists, Monnet and Kohlmann. For example, Robert Schaeftel, Kohlmann's best American friend, often asked him to provide a reading of the European situation, in order to supplement unreliable journalistic accounts from American newspapers. When Schaeftel seemed somewhat puzzled by a given line of policy Monnet or others advocated, Kohlmann provided lengthy reassurances or explanations. Kohlmann also offered
information on how to approach key European personalities, what to say to them and when. He further
identified those individuals in Europe and in the United States who adopted an uncooperative attitude
about European integration, and more often than not, requested his American friends to do some work on
them. In exchange, Monnet and Kohnstamm's American contacts volunteered handy advice on how best to
approach Congress, for example to negotiate a cooperative agreement between the United States and
Euratom. With no particular care for security considerations, Schuetz regularly showered Kohnstamm
with policy documents or study papers from the State Department, asking for his views, or providing
background material for a forthcoming article of his. In turn, the Americans suggested that Kohnstamm
write timely articles in support of initiatives such as the Multilateral Force. As the Common Market
became more of an economic challenge for the United States, the Americans found Kohnstamm a
convenient channel to vent their frustrations over slow progress in the Kennedy Round, and the
monstrosities of the Common Agricultural Policy.

For two main reasons the informal cooperation of the Eisenhower-Kennedy years began to show
signs of fatigue and to decline in influence, particularly during the last years of the Johnson administration
and under the Nixon administration: First, the lack of progress of Europeans themselves towards the twin
goals of economic and political integration, which translated into a lack of interest on the part of Americans
for European integration, and second, the disappearance from governmental circles of the generation of
American Europeans, and hence of contact points for expressing the views of European supporters of
European integration. Increased economic competition between the United States and the European
Economic Community, as well as a European tendency to criticize or oppose certain American political or
military initiatives, did much to usher in an eclipse in the support of the United States for European
integration. In recent years, however, the Single European Act, Maastricht, and other significant
developments in Europe have revived the interest of the American administration and American academic
and business circles in European integration. Signs of this interest include the burgeoning budgets of
certain academic institutions, and the occasional reliance on the advice of the old guard of American
Europeans by some members of recent American administrations. Faced with the challenge of a highly
volatile European situation, Washington has dusted off the idea of a partnership between the United States
and a tightly integrated European Community, which Kennedy advocated some thirty years ago. No longer
reduced to the expression of "Fortress Europe," the EC is now seen once again by the American
government as a potential element of stability on the European continent.

The Action Committee for the United States of Europe

Who then agreed to join Monnet's Committee and on what terms? In November 1954, a few
months after the defeat of the European Defense Community, Monnet announced his intention not to seek
the renewal of his mandate as President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.
Monnet explained his decision to the Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC, "the institutions of our
Community only exert the powers that have been delegated to it. They are not empowered to extend them. Only parliaments and governments can decide to transfer new powers to European institutions. The driving force has to come from outside. Thus Monnet intended to leave the ECSC to promote European integration "from outside." But what did this mean concretely? It was an enigmatic mixture of a Front for the United States of Europe which would be open to specialized European movements as well as to business organizations. He subsequently changed his mind and when he founded his Action Committee in October 1955, only political and trade union leaders were invited to join. Monnet later explained that business organizations were feared towards profit, while political parties and trade unions were generally free from such concerns and possessed an overall picture of the situation. 

Contrary to some European movements, the Action Committee was no mass organization but rather an elite action group designed to promote concrete achievements towards the creation of a United States of Europe. On the side of efficiency Monnet calculated that any new European project would need to be approved by European parliaments, which ultimately controlled governmental policy. At the time of the creation of Monnet's Committee, political parties were once again powerful. Monnet calculated that since parliamentary majorities changed according to electoral fortunes, the best strategy would be to try to enlist the cooperation of the leaders of as many political parties as possible - both in and out of power - around simple, concrete objectives. As for trade unions, they represented millions of workers, and were closer to day-to-day concerns and changes. Political and trade union leaders who were members of the Committee were asked to obtain the support of their organizations for the projects and policies it advocated. They did not just represent themselves but rather their organizations. In this sense a commentator was not far from the mark when he claimed that the Committee was "something like the collective democratic conscience of the European Community."

The corporate members of the initial Monnet group included the Christian Democratic, Socialist and Liberal Parties, as well as the non-communist trade unions of the six countries of the European Coal and Steel Community. The Gaullist Union for the New Republic did not join the Committee, while Nenni's Italian Socialist party only joined in 1967. Valéry Giscard D'Estaing's Independent Republicans and the French Party for Progress and Modern Democracy became members in 1969. In view of the importance which Monnet attributed to British membership in the Communities, the joining of the British Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties in October 1969 was quite an achievement for the Action Committee, and foreshadowed British entry in the Communities a few years later. In 1973, the percentage of all voters from the six initial members of the ECSC plus the British who cast their votes in favor of a party which was represented on Monnet's Committee made up 73% of all votes cast within these seven countries. Yet the picture was by no means uniform. Monnet's Committee appeared strongest in Germany where 90.4% of voters voted for one of the parties represented in Monnet's Committee. The next strongest representation was in the United Kingdom where the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties made up 90.80% of all votes cast. At the lower end of the spectrum lay France with only about 30.99% of the votes cast. Since De Gaulle had returned to power in 1958, Monnet had been no prophet in his own country, and
the influence of Monnet’s Committee in France remained relatively low even after De Gaulle left power. As for trade unions, 14,711,000 workers were represented through those unions which were members of Monnet’s Committee.

In creating his Action Committee, Monnet’s intention had not been to create a political power that would rival with that enjoyed by governments but rather to spur influential democratic forces to convince these governments to create the United States of Europe. For Monnet these influential democratic forces were political parties and trade unions. By the early 1980s when Max Kohl dismissed the Committee, the influence of political parties on government policy had markedly declined. This partly accounts for Max Kohl’s decision not to ask members to sit on the new Committee as representatives of their organizations. By that time Pascal Fontaine’s conjecture that the Action Committee for the United States of Europe might one day become closer to a pressure group if parliamentary representation played a diminished role in decision-making had somewhat materialized.

Among its 34 founder delegates, Jean Monnet’s Committee for the United States of Europe could boast such famous names as Guy Mollet, Erich Ollenhauer, Amintore Fanfani, Kurt Kiesinger, Théo Lefèvre, Maurice Faure, Ugo la Malfa, René Pleven, Auguste Cool and Giulio Pastore. Presidents and General Secretaries of parties or trade Unions, heads of parliamentary groups, such was the level of representation on Monnet’s Committee. Some of these personalities continued to participate in the reunions of the Committee even when they held important governmental functions. For example, Willy Brandt and Herbert Wehner, President and Vice-President of the SPD, stayed on the Committee when they respectively became Vice-Chancellor Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Pan-German Affairs in 1966. Alec Douglas Home and Geoffrey Rippon, who represented the British Conservatives on the Committee, similarly continued on the Committee when their party won the elections in 1970 and Mister Home acceded to governmental office. Helmut Schmidt, then Minister of Finance and Leo Tindemans, then Vice-president of the Belgian Council, both took part in the Committee’s last board meeting in May 1973 and later became key contributors to the new Action Committee. In fact whether they continued on the Committee or not, quite a few Committee members were later called to high political office. Amintore Fanfani and Aldo Moro both became Prime Minister of Italy, Giuseppe Saragat became President of Italy, and Théo Lefèvre became Prime Minister of Belgium. Although there was relatively little turnover in the membership of the Committee during the first years of the Committee, the change in membership intensified in the 1960s. New names and organizations appeared on the Committee’s roster, while some members were promoted out of the Committee.

When Monnet let the members of his Action Committee know in 1975 that he now thought the task of the Committee had been accomplished, Fanfani’s number two man, Mr Antonozzi, Vice-Secretary of the Italian Christian Democrats, insisted that the Committee must continue because the United States of Europe had not yet become a reality. The role of the Committee was to ‘insure a moral continuity.’ Antonozzi compared the Committee to the star of the Magi. Jacques Van Hee, right, Secretary General of
Monnet's Committee simply answered: "that star was backed by big resources." In an article in *International Organization* Walter Yordon later described the Committee as "one of the world's most prestigious organizations." While the Committee frequently experienced difficulties in keeping all that financially, what made its strength and allowed it to survive through various crises, notably during De Gaulle's presidency, was most of all the network of key figures of which Monnet and his Action Committee were the hub. Many of the personalities associated with Monnet's Committee indeed felt a sense of mission, a moral need to perpetuate the effort to unite Europe, while at the same time feeling a particularly strong attachment to Monnet. At the time of Monnet's decision to end the Committee, one of the most dedicated members of the Committee, Herbert Wehner, described it as a "circle of friends who did not consider one another as political enemies but rather as friends serving the same cause... Young people had not lived through the crises and tragedies of the past and Jean Monnet's thinking and the work of the Action Committee were a treasure that could not be allowed to simply sink into oblivion." Within this circle of friends, Monnet was the epicenter. For Max Kohrs: "the Action Committee and the person of Monnet [were] inseparable." Accordingly you could not really "talk about the Committee and its action without talking at the same time about Jean Monnet and his special place in Europe." So intricate was the connection between the two that you could claim that if "to a large extent, the Action Committee was a good excuse for Jean Monnet's Action on people, such action would have been much more difficult, partly even impossible, without the Committee."35

When Monnet had announced his resignation as head of the ECSC's High Authority, prospects for European integration were rather bleak. A few months later in May 1955, Paul-Henri Spaak showed Monnet and proudly announced that the Benelux memorandum, partly Monnet's doing, would be submitted to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Messina. With another European "relaunch" seemingly on the move, Monnet considered withdrawing his resignation. After all, Moses Monnet, his position at the High Authority offered him not only an "ofical platform" but also material resources, would it not be better to continue to exert influence through this rather privileged conduit? Unfortunately for Monnet's plans, by that time, the French government was dead set against his renewal at the Head of the High Authority.36 Monnet thus had to go back to his original plan and to put his best energies into trying to develop another power base from which he could exert influence and which would have some political legitimacy. In doing so, Monnet had to forego the array of "offices, advisers, secretaries, drivers, telephones and telex machines" from which he had benefited at the High Authority.

Monnet's core group

To an outsider, the Monnet Committee might be construed as a pretty small affair. Its permanent secretariat was physically located at 83 Avenue Foch in Paris in a rather imposing large apartment which belonged to the brother of Monnet's wife, Silva Monnet, could often be heard loudly conversing with her brother in the adjoining rooms, which Jean Monnet's Action Committee gradually invaded. The statistics of
the Committee's "Association de gestion administrative" were filed in Lausanne on March 15, 1957, with Professor Henri Reben, a trusted associate of Jean Monnet, acting as its administrative secretary. In January 1956, during the Committee's first session, its members adopted the statutes and elected Monnet as their president. The Dutchman Max Kohlhamm was appointed as Secretary General of the Committee during its third meeting in 1956, and later became the Committee's Vice-President, while the Frenchman Jacques Van Helmont became Secretary General of the Committee. Richard Mayne and François Duchêne, both citizens of the United Kingdom, were also part of the team at Avenue Foch but for shorter periods than either Kohlhamm or Van Helmont. If we add to this group two or three devoted secretaries and occasional translators, we have the Committee's nervous center, from now on we shall call it Monnet's core group.

Jacques Van Helmont remained at Avenue Foch throughout the life of the Action Committee, with a hiatus of about five years from June 1958 to January 1963, when he worked as Director at Euracon to set up its control and security system. He also assisted Euracon's president Eustache Hirsch as special counsel for the project of a European University. While at Avenue Foch Van Helmont was responsible for the day to day operation of the Committee, and worked very closely with Monnet. Yet Monnet does seem to have somewhat underestimated him and to have relied mostly on Max Kohlhamm for advice on the kind of policies to pursue, or on what people to see, how to approach them and what to say to them. Monnet, who did not speak much German, relied on Kohlhamm to maintain a strong political power base in Germany for key issues on the Committee's agenda such as the ratification of the Common Market and Euracon treaties. German support was all the more important in light of Monnet's Action Committee relative weak power base in France. One of Monnet's foremost concerns in creating the Committee had been to enlist the German socialists who had so far voted against European ventures such as the ECSC and the European Defense Community. As always the practical man, Monnet first made sure that he had the backing of the DGB (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund) whose leaders entertained close personal and political links with the SPD and had long been supportive of European integration. Monnet then proceeded to approach Erich Ollenhauer who had replaced Kurt Schumacher as President of the SPD, and Herbert Wehner, Vice-President of the SPD. Monnet emphasized the advantages to be derived from the creation of a European atomic community. The German socialists were probably delighted at the prospect of thwarting the ambitions of German industrialists for the creation of a private atomic industry, which would have further constricted the return of the golden days of German capitalism. After making sure that the Action Committee would in no way be financially dependent on any outside group, Ollenhauer and Wehner decided to join the Committee. Max Kohlhamm often served as an intermediary between Monnet, Ollenhauer and especially Wehner, who felt a deep friendship for Monnet. Wehner's French was rather slim and he found it difficult to communicate his thoughts and feelings with sufficient subtlety and clarity to Monnet. To compensate for this language barrier, Wehner occasionally asked Kohlhamm to translate a letter to Monnet from German into French or to call up Monnet to make sure that he understood that he could count on his support and friendship.
Despite occasional bouts of discouragement with the Action Committee and a passing temptation to be a candidate for the burgomastership of Amsterdam, Kohlstaedt continued to assist Monnet as Vice-President of the Action Committee until its dissolution in 1973. Yet the immediate proximity to Monnet, who was known to exhaust his collaborators, proved too much for Kohlstaedt who felt the need to spend more time with his wife and did not particularly like Paris. Coming onto his own, he decided to move to Brussels, where he was most useful to Monnet as his Brussels antenna. Monnet’s office at Ave Foch and Max Kohlstaedt’s headquarters in Brussels operated in a sort of symbiosis. Kohlstaedt frequently traveled to Paris to talk with Monnet and the other members of the team. There the Monnet team drafted several versions of resolutions or declarations, which they submitted to the members of the Committee for approval. This was a rather tiring process since Monnet aimed at reaching a consensus.

There were 18 sessions of the Committee from its beginning until its end in 1975. With rare exceptions, all resolutions and declarations discussed at the meetings or in between the meetings, were unanimously adopted by the Committee. The Multilateral Force is probably the issue which caused the most dissension within the Committee, with MM. Brutelie of (SFIO), Kies (Dutch Trade Union Federation), Laroque (Belgian Socialist Party), Major (Belgian General Federation of Labour), Piumlin (French MRP), Rosenberg (DB) and Briner (DB), and Vondeling (Dutch Labour Parliamentary Group) voting against the part of the declaration on the “beginnings of a joint policy on nuclear questions.”

The declaration recognized that the MLF was only a transitional solution on the road to an “equal partnership with the United States which would include a European organization in close association with that of the United States of America.” It epitomized the very dilemma between the desire for more control by Europeans over their own defense and the need for integrating such defense with that of the United States. While it insisted that “the defense of the free world” could “only be ensured in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance” it also suggested that the political unification of Europe would one day make it possible to “form an authority capable of controlling and administering the European contribution to joint defence.”

Several processes were involved in preparing the sessions of the Committee. Monnet’s small team made it necessary to divide up the work. This was done according to what Monnet thought were the most useful qualities of his associates. Jacques Van Helmont wrote with relative ease, which was definitely not the case of Jean Monnet. It is mostly Van Helmont who drafted and redrafted the numerous versions of resolutions and declarations of the Action Committee, sometimes up to 37. Monnet made a first rough draft and discussed it with Kohlstaedt, Van Helmont or some other member of the team, who added their comments, suggestions and corrections to the paper. Monnet added or removed sentences, again asked for comments and relied on Van Helmont to rewrite the successive versions and to mould all of this into a coherent whole at the end. Discussions took place either at Avenue Foch, at Monnet’s residence at Houarraya in the French countryside, or wherever else Monnet happened to be during his various trips throughout Europe or the United States. When Monnet was in the United States, he often tried and
succeeded in reaching his collaborators wherever they were, be it by letter, phone or by telegram. Monnet asked for information on latest developments in Europe and inquired about the reactions of the members of the Committee to the resolutions. Monnet, Kohnstamm, Van Heemstaete, Mayne or Duchêne also exchanged information through detailed reports in which they recounted their meetings with members of the Committee, especially heads of state or government, policy-makers, professors and journalists.

Whenever possible Monnet went to see members of the Committee or other important personalities on his agenda personally. It was mostly Kohnstamm who accompanied him on his visits although there were no fast rules there. When Monnet could not personally meet someone, Kohnstamm or another member of the team at Ave Foch served as his emmissary or informant. Kohnstamm’s theater of operations was mostly located in West Germany and the Benelux countries, while Van Heemstaete and Monnet dealt more specifically with the Italians and the French. Mayne and Duchêne went to see the British, but again there were exceptions here. Finally, Monnet often relied on Kohnstamm to represent him in the United States. In 1957 and 1958, Kohnstamm made numerous trips to the United States to negotiate a United States-Euratom treaty. These trips were exhausting and nerve-wracking, as he encountered many obstacles, most of all in Congress. The US-Euratom negotiations offer a particularly interesting case study of the articulation of Monnet’s and Kohnstamm’s roles. Monnet prepared the ground for Kohnstamm’s later trips by securing the support of Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and Lewis Strauss, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee, for Euratom. Almost exclusively responsible for the negotiations, Kohnstamm and his European collaborators worked with the State Department and the Atomic Energy Committee in lobbying against the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, thus forming a unique pattern of association.

Depending on the themes of the resolutions or declarations, the drafts were circulated not only to members of the Committee but also to friends of Monnet in the United States, to officials of the European Communities or to policy-makers who did not belong to the Committee but were trusted friends of Monnet. In more than one instance, a resolution was actually circulated first to officials of the European Communities and then to all members of the Committee. For example, when Monnet considered backing De Gaulle’s project for European political cooperation, Robert Marjolin, who had worked for Monnet at the Commissariat du Plan and was now Vice-President of the EEC Commission, counseled Monnet not to show the project to all members of the Committee at this stage. Marjolin judged it to be ‘too brutal vis-à-vis the Communities’ and advised Monnet to first discuss it with Walter Hallstein and Unser Hirsch, respectively President of the EEC Commission and President of Euratom. The flow of information went both ways: from Monnet’s friends working at the Communities, and from the Action Committee’s core group to the Communities. In this particular case Monnet’s Committee fulfilled one of the essential qualities of all lobbies: to provide information in order to receive information. Here the flow of information was most informal since Monnet counted many friends in the Communities, some of whom had worked for him at an earlier stage of their careers. François Fontaine and Jacques Rabier, who had worked for Monnet when he
headed the Commisariat au Plan, now held important positions in controlling information, since one became Director of the Information Service of the Communities in Paris, while the other held the position of Director General of Information in Brussels. Both of them were frequent visitors of Ave Foch and can be counted among Monnet's core group of trusted friends.43

When Kohlrausch, Duchêne or Mayne could not come to Paris, the comments reached Monnet via letter, or by telephone. Van Helmont had a square wooden table right in Monnet's office and took notes on Monnet's phone conversations, including those with Kohlrausch in Brussels, or with members of the Committee as a whole. Among the members of the Committee, some were consulted more frequently than others and at an earlier stage of the discussion of the declarations and resolutions. While working for a common endeavor, friendship ties were built between these members, Monnet and his core group of associates. When Monnet and Kohlrausch embarked on their tours of European cities to prepare for a forthcoming session of the committee, it is these dedicated members of the committee whom they consulted first. We shall only name a few here: Guy Motel of the SFIO, Ugo La Malfa of the Italian Republican Party, Giovanni Malagodi of the Italian Liberal Party, Herbert Wehner and Willy Brandt of the SPD, Ludwig Rosenberg of the DGB, Kurt Birrenbach and Kurt Kiesinger of the CDU, Auguste Cool of the confederation of Belgian Christian trade unions, Maurice Faure of the French Radical Party. Among these, some were active later in revising the Committee in the early 1960s, and participated in the new "relaunch" of European integration. For example, Maurice Faure worked on the Dooge Committee.

The first meetings of the Committee took place in France, yet as Monnet's influence and that of his Committee further declined in France, the Committee started meeting in Brussels, Bonn and Berlin. The May 1965 meeting in Berlin is generally remembered by the Monnet team as a brilliantly organized meeting, which contrasted with the amateurism of previous meetings notably at the Institute Brietling in Paris, where Monnet's staff did almost everything. Willy Brandt had spared nothing for the occasion. The dates for the meeting were particularly well chosen, since 15 years had passed since the announcement of the Schuman plan and 20 years since Berlin had capitulated. Monnet wanted to use these dates as a symbol of the reconciliation of West Germany with Europe through European unification, and looked forward to the two halves of Germany to be brought together within the fold of the European Community.

It is not our purpose here to describe the various meetings of the Committee, and the circumstances surrounding them, this has been done elsewhere, neither can we attempt here to determine to what extent the Committee's action was successful in suggesting or supporting certain policies. The very nature of the Monnet's committee, which relied not only on its members but also on the even larger network of connections of the members of the Committee and of Monnet's friends, would necessitate a detailed account of both the overt and covert activities of the Committee. What we can do is to concentrate on the anatomy of the Committee, and on its lesser well publicized, behind the scenes activities. To give an idea of the Committee's potential zone of influence it is useful to mention that some members of the Committee held many different hats besides representing political parties or trade unions. On a national level some
members were also members of government or of national parliaments. On the European level, some belonged to the European Parliament, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the EEC Economic and Social Committee or the European Movement. Finally, on the international level, labor leaders also held key positions in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, or the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

At the Atlantic level, some of the members of the Monnet Committee appeared on the guest lists of the Bilderberg group. The Bilderberg meetings had started in the early fifties and brought together leading figures from industry, government, labor, political parties and universities together to discuss Atlantic problems. Not surprisingly, the European communities were frequently discussed within that framework. Although the Bilderberg meetings did not aim at making policy, the very informal atmosphere of these meetings which were off-the-record made it possible for members of the Committee to discuss key issues on the Committee’s agenda with other distinguished guests. For example, Max Hoffman, who later headed the Trilateral Commission, Amintore Fanfani, Guy Mollet, Kurt Barrenbach, Ugo la Malfa took part in some of the meetings. On the American side George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and David Rockefeller, President of the Chase Manhattan Bank, all of whom had ties with Monnet and his Action Committee, were represented at the meetings in the early 1960s. How then did the Committee compensate for its loose structure and its relative lack of institutional base? It can be argued that it was this loose structure and the large and influential network of which the Committee was only the center that made its strength. Yet the Committee could not have operated without a minimum of organization, which Monnet’s core team of dedicated associates provided. Neither could it have operated without financial means. Even though one generally claims that the Committee was exclusively financed by the annual contributions of its members, representing their organizations, its statutes make it extremely clear that the Committee could also accept “any other resources such as grants, bequests, or subscriptions which [its] administrative Commission was empowered to accept or refuse”. The Committee did experience difficulties in gathering sufficient and timely contributions from its members during its lifetime. During the last years of the Committee, one of Monnet’s secretaries, Ms Zingg, was so dedicated to Monnet that she worked for him for free from five o’clock onwards, after finishing her work for Baron Robert Rothschild. The Commission of the European Communities also put one assistant and one full-time secretary at the disposal of the Committee. Beyond that, Monnet’s personal fortune, funds from industrialists such as Giovanni Agnelli, Managing Director of FIAT, German industry, the Ford Foundation, Shell, Unilever, British Aircraft and British Steel, helped remedy the situation.

The Committee was an Action Committee, yet this action needed to rest on reasoned knowledge and expertise which Monnet and his staff did not always possess. To remedy the situation the Committee relied on Monnet’s friends at the Communities, on journalists and on university professors. The Committee also outgrew several appendages, which were not officially part of the Committee. First, there was the Committee’s Documentation Center, animated by François Duchêne. The Center was legally incorporated
in Lausanne, but was physically located at Ave Roch. There was actually no distinction between Monnet's headquarters at Ave Roch and the Documentation Center. "Everything was together; we weren't very theoretical."

The second appendage was the Institute of the European Community of University Studies. Max Kohlmann presided over the Institute, which was incorporated in Lausanne in 1958 and was physically located where its president happened to have his main center of activities. The Institute's original aim was to use the stimulus of European universities and "other institutions of equivalent level, particularly in Europe" to "study the long-term problems posed by European integration" and to train "persons competent in these matters." One of the tasks of the Institute was also to prepare the ground for the creation of a European University. The Institute was originally financed by a sizable grant from the Ford Foundation, where Monnet counted as a dedicated, long-time friend, Shepard Stone. In addition, the University of Lausanne founded a Chair for European integration with the financial assistance of the Ford Foundation. Professor Rolben was appointed to the Chair in April 1957 and directed the Centre de Recherches Européennes of the University of Lausanne, which wrote reports on various European topics, some of which were ordered by Monnet, notably on the United Kingdom and Europe. Finally, Monnet asked Professor Rolben to create an Institut de Recherches in Lausanne and asked him to replace him there as president of the Institute. The Institute was created in 1963, with the task of assembling Monnet's archives in Lausanne.

Another way to remedy the Committee's lack of technical expertise was to occasionally rely on the advice of professors, European Communities officials or policy-makers to prepare reports for the Committee, which were sometimes discussed during the meetings. Professor Triffin, Professor Halstein, Robert Marpès were some of the contributors. On the American side Robert Browe also gave advice to Monnet especially on the constitutional aspects of European integration.

To briefly summarize the overt manifestations of the Committee, we can best try to extract a few common themes from its resolutions and declarations. While resolutions bound the Committee members to the realization of a specific action sometimes assented with a deadline, common declarations voiced general positions of the Committee on European integration. Resolutions and declarations were sent to a broad list of about a hundred government officials, parliamentarians, journalists, EC officials, industrialists, and friends of Monnet. Some were also submitted for parliamentary approval in each country. Such was the case for the Declaration on the organizing principles of Euratom (February 18, 1956), and also for the resolutions on British entry in the European Community (June 15, 1967). Resolutions and declarations, as well as some reports presented during the sessions, were then widely publicized in the press both in Europe and in the United States.

One of the recurring themes of the Committee has been to encourage the development of the European Communities. The Committee's first meetings focused mostly on the creation of Euratom and the ratification of the EEC and Euratom treaties. The Committee similarly encouraged the election of the European Parliament by popular vote, the fusion of the three executives, the establishment of an economic...
and monetary union, the creation of a new Social Fund, technological development and EC aid to third world countries. A second theme was the political unification of Europe. Here Monnet had to face the opposition of some members of the Committee, who wondered whether Monnet had not turned "Gaullist" since he appeared to endorse the plan for political cooperation of General de Gaulle. The importance of political cooperation among the members of the European Communities was nevertheless mentioned in the July 1961 Declaration. After the Paris Summit in 1972, Monnet presented a project for a provisional European government, which partly contributed to the creation of the European Council, and shared some features with the Fouchet plans. A third theme, which almost amounted to an obsession for Monnet, was the entry of the United Kingdom in the European Communities. Another leitmotiv was that of the establishment of a partnership between equals between the United States and a united Europe. Finally, the Committee favored the reunification of Germany within a united Europe, the organization of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, and the establishment of official relations between the EEC and China.5

The Committee and Jean Monnet, since the two were inseparable, seems to have been most successful in supporting the ratification of the Rome treaties, and in general in influencing the proposals of many European Community officials, some of whom also happened to be friends of Monnet and his collaborators. As for member governments, we have seen that support for the Committee's proposals varied from country to country. French opposition certainly sounded the death knell of many of the Committee's initiatives, on the other hand it can be argued that other member countries tended to favor the positions of the Committee even more as a way of voicing their opposition to de Gaulle. The Committee's activities also had good press in the United States, where it was considered to be a friendly ally on the other side of the Atlantic.

The difficulty in assessing the range of influence of the Committee stems most of all from the fact that the Committee's circle of influential figures does not stop with its own members, but extends far beyond that circle to include Monnet's friends and acquaintances, as well as friends of the members, or of Monnet's core group at Avenue Foch. Not only did many of these key personalities hold several hats, but they also used to meet in several forums besides the Committee, including the Bilderberg meetings. The picture that emerges is that of an elite of important personalities who all favored a general commitment towards European integration, although to varying degrees. Many of these people considered each other as friends. When Monnet decided to wind up his Committee, it is this circle of friends which some of the members of the former Monnet Committee tried to perpetuate, until the Committee was reborn from its ashes in 1985, with a new name: the Action Committee for Europe.

The Action Committee as a fleet in being

The last European summit took place in December 1974 in Paris. From now on heads of state and government would meet three times a year as European Council. A few months earlier, two members of
Monnet's Committee, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, had decided to back Monnet's proposal for a "provisional European government," where heads of state and government of the nine EC countries would meet at regular intervals to work towards the goal of a European union, which had been announced at the Paris Summit in October 1972. The last European Summit appointed Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, also a member of Monnet's Committee, to write a report on European Union by the end of 1975. Although Monnet wound up his Committee on 9 May 1975, faithful members of the Committee continued to meet informally to discuss European issues. Their intention was to perpetuate the personal links of Monnet's Committee to further European unity. Since Leo Tindemans was a member of the team, Max Kohnstamm, whom Monnet had once told that he might be responsible for continuing the Committee, lost no time in asking Leo Tindemans if he would want to discuss his ideas about European union with members of the ex-Committee, before he wrote the final version of his report. Tindemans accepted and offered to be their host at Val Duchesse in Brussels. The meeting took place on Saturday, October 18 1975 and gathered those members of the Committee who, at the end of the Committee, had expressed the wish to maintain contacts with other members. Besides Tindemans and Kohnstamm, the gathering counted such well-known names as Edward Heath, Maurice Faure, Andre Bergeron (General Secretary of the CGT-FO), Giovanni Malagodi, J.M. DenUyl (President of the Dutch Council of Ministers) and Georges Debien. West Germany was especially well represented with Herbert Wehner, Karl Carstens, Kurt Birkenbach, Ludwig Rosenberg and Helmut Schmidt. Almost all participants agreed that the final goal of political unification should be mentioned in Tindemans' report, but without aiming at a Federal union at least for the short term, and without expecting that economic union would automatically lead to political union. There was a consensus that European institutions should be strengthened while most of the discussion centered on economic development. The participants agreed to meet again next spring in Bonn. After the meeting, Max Kohnstamm counseled Tindemans to consult with Helmut Schmidt and to keep his report short. "The influence of your report", he said, "will be inversely proportional to its length."

Yet Tindemans did not follow this particular piece of advice. Van Heemont, who also helped to insure the continuation of the circle of old members of the Monnet Committee, later commented on the final report, which he judged to be "an important and useful study, but too vast to be defended as such." Not only was the report 75 pages long, but it was all too vague on many important points, including on the means to strengthen the institutions of the European Communities.

Meanwhile Max Kohnstamm, who had just taken up his new post as first President of the European University Institute in Florence, found less and less time and energy to devote to anything else but the creation of the new institution. The meeting in Bonn, which should have been organized by Helmut Schmidt never happened, yet Kohnstamm periodically mulled over the plus and cons of reviving the Committee. Maybe the new Committee could help bring in Greece, Spain and Portugal in a way that would strengthen the Community? In a time of economic crisis, the Committee might also prevent the Community from breaking apart. But how should the new Committee be put together? Kohnstamm reached the
conclusion that no attempt should be made to bring in political parties and trade unions as such but only to ask key figures from these parties and trade unions to become part of the Committee. Industrialists should also be asked to join, as well as representatives from future members of the Community. Finally, Max Kohlmann thought of bringing in young parliamentarians, although this might have the drawback that they would not be sufficiently influential yet to defend the positions of the Committee efficiently. But where would the money come from, especially if political parties and trade unions did not participate in the Committee as such? What would the Committee's name be? Who would preside it, administer it? Max Kohlmann was willing to start it from Florence, where he benefited from an efficient secretariat, but he needed a small team to assist him, as had been the case for the Monnet Committee. Under no circumstances was the Committee to amount to just another discussion circle of which there were already too many. At any rate, would the Committee be useful since heads of state and governments now met regularly in the Council of Europe? Circumstances had changed: with a directly elected European Parliament and the creation of European political parties, would the committee still have a mandate? Emilio Colombo answered yes: key political forces would not be found in the European Parliament, where you also would not find leaders of trade unions or of important firms. Neither would political parties at the European level hold the power; the real power was at home and not in Brussels or Strasbourg. Accordingly, a new committee could play an important role in bringing together leaders of the European Parliament with key policy-makers at the national level. All very well, thought Kohlmann, but this was to ignore a simple fact: Monnet was Monnet. Yet Kohlmann did write to Helmut Schmidt suggesting that if he and other members were interested, he might want to revive the Committee after his job in Florence ended. A good starting point for the committee might then be monetary union. At any rate, Schmidt and Kohlmann agreed that it would be best to wait until the Fall of 1979 for a new meeting so as not to mix up the revival of the Committee with the first direct election of the European Parliament in June 1979.56

About one year after the European elections, Tindemans asked several members of the European Parliament to take part in an informal discussion in Strasbourg. Also present that day were Max Kohlmann and Jacques Delors.57 In February 1981, Kohlmann then embarked on a feasibility study under the auspices of the European Cultural Foundation to examine the possibility of bringing together powerful personalities from the political, industrial, trade union and university spheres to encourage them to work together and develop concrete proposals to relaunch European integration.58 In October 1981, Kohlmann retired from his position as President of the European University Institute and was thus free to devote his time to ponder over the future of European integration and the desirability of creating a new committee. He consulted with Helmut Schmidt, Emile Noël, Secretary General of the European Commission, other top-level officials both at the Commission, President Wisse Dekker of Philips, the Governor of the Bank of Belgium, University professors at the Université de Louvain la Neuve, and gradually reached the conclusion that the only way to relaunch European integration was through a rather limited but coherent program to be presented as a Franco-German initiative. The best time to implement...
such a program would be, according to Kohnstamm, from January 1983 to June 1984, a period which would coincide with the German and French EC presidencies. 59

On October 1 1982, Helmut Kohl replaced Helmut Schmidt as Chancellor of the German Federal Republic. A former member of Monnet’s Committee, Kohl soon declared that the CDU and his government would give a “high priority” to European affairs and “European political union.” Encouraged by such a move, Kohnstamm lost no time in contacting Richard von Weizsacker, Burgermeister of Berlin, with whom he shared his thoughts for a German proposal to relaunch Europe, which would be discussed with the French and then submitted to the other members of the European Communities. By February 1983, Kohnstamm reached the conclusion that only a “package including the ‘parachèvement’ of the internal Market, measures in commercial and industrial policy and probably an increased use of the European Investment Bank and the so-called N.I.C. (Ortels facility) for investment purposes” would have “a chance to be accepted” and to help relaunch the Community. Around the same time Edward Heath considered the possibility of “gathering together a group of influential figures in order to persuade those in power” to take a bold common action.” 60 With the Council of Stuttgart approaching, Kohnstamm wrote Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo and Gaston Thorn, President of the European Commission, proposing a “crisis scenario” to make sure that the Council would be the starting point of the revitalization of the Community and not the beginning of its unraveling. Kohnstamm proposed that Kohl receive a special mandate from the Council to prepare a report which would then be submitted to a special European Council in early 1984. 61

Meanwhile Kohnstamm again thought of reviving the Monnet Committee, especially if Stuttgart did not have any real results. The Stuttgart Council of June 1983 was a no real success but neither did it sound the death knell of the Community. In late August Kohnstamm wrote to Wisse Dekker for help. The only way to rescue a stagnating Community, he insisted, was to start with the creation of a European market for electro-technical and communication industry, where there did seem to be some impulsion to move on. 62 Kohnstamm soon became involved in the efforts of UNICE (Union des Confédérations de l’Industrie et des Employeurs d’Europe), the Kangaroo Group of the European parliament and the Roundtable of Industrialists 63 to promote the completion of the internal market. In early 1984, some informal meetings took place at Kohnstamm’s home in the Ardennes with representatives from Philips, the Kangaroo Group and key industrialists. J.C. Ramaer, the Philips representative in Brussels, anticipated great benefits from the revival of the Monnet Committee to obtain political support from a wide group of influential personalities for Dekker’s proposals. In the fall of 1984 and in early 1985 Dekker presented his Agenda for Action or “Europe 1990” plan for market liberalization in speeches and in letters to heads of state and government, the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament. 64

Preliminary meetings

In parallel with Kohnstamm’s efforts, Schmidt and Tindemans wrote to former members of the Monnet Committee who had taken part in the Val Duchesse meeting and “who remained active in the
political and trade unions activities of the member states" asking them if they would be willing to get together in the near future to discuss ways to "ensure that the thoughts and methods of Jean Monnet continue to serve as a guide on the road towards European Union." As had been the case with the Monnet Committee, Max Kohlhaas prepared the reunion in late 1983 and early 1984 by paying personal visits to all participants. In light of the disappointing results of the European Council meeting in Athens, everyone felt a sense of urgency. A draft statement of the group’s aims was circulated to all of the participants before the meeting to serve as a sort of charter for the group. The meeting took place at Stavanger Castle in Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1984, just before the European Council in Brussels which was yet another failure. Nélio Tindemans, Max Kohlhaas, Helmut Schmidt, Emilio Colombo, Joop den Uyl, George Dobroune (Leader of the European Trade Union Congress), Maurice Faure, Ted Heath, J. Houthays (Leader of the Belgian Trade Unions) all took part in the meeting. Rainer Barzel, André Bergeron, and Jean-François Deniau could not fit the meetings into their schedules, while Karl Carstens indicated that he would participate in the work of the group at the end of his term as President of the Federal Republic. Participants agreed to revive the Monnet Committee but to adapt it to modern circumstances. There was no point in trying to secure the participation of political parties on a representative basis since they were already "involved in the issues and workings of the Community." Maurice Faure agreed with Helmut Schmidt and Joop den Uyl that the main task of the Committee would be to "define a grand strategy in order to wake up a decaying Europe." There was to be no publicity until the Committee was set up. In the meantime, again following in the footsteps of Monnet’s Committee, with this difference that its was mainly outside experts who then prepared the reports, several group members were asked to prepare a number of papers for the next preparatory meeting. Mr Colombo on the purpose and goal of the European Community, Mr Schmidt on the EMS, Mr Deniau on a unified home market, Maurice Faure on Security and Defense, and Ted Heath on the entry of Spain and Portugal and International Relations. Finally, Helmut Schmidt insisted that it was "important to realize that Europe was not at the centre of thinking in the French Socialist party, although it was at the centre of Mitterand’s thinking," hence the importance of enlisting a French Socialist on the Committee, "somebody who impressed Mitterand, and whose participation in the Committee had his tacit approval." Soon afterwards Max Kohlhaas and Simon May, who was detached from the European Commission for the occasion, set out to do just that, while they also examined concrete ways to organize a new Committee. Under no circumstances was the Committee to be composed only of "has beens", one must "look for younger people, either in office, or in position of de facto influence, or close to those in power." There would be no permanent Chairman for the group, since a major figure might always be "controversial in some way"; instead, there would be a rotating chairmanship or the presidency would be handed to the host at each meeting. In the short run it was all right for the work of the Committee to be financed from official sources such as the Commission; the money could be channeled through a private institute such as
the Centre for European Policy Studies. In the long-run, however, it was best to seek funds from private sources.67

Max Kohlmann had first met Jacques Delors at a dinner in Florence in 1979, and had kept in touch ever since. By June 1984, shortly before the European Council of Fontainebleau, Delors informed Kohlmann that Mitterand agreed to let him join the new Committee. Kohlmann immediately wrote him back telling him how elated he was that he would be part of the Committee. He also suggested that the Fontainebleau Council appoint a sort of new Comité Spécial to establish a coherent crash program with limited objectives to relaunch European integration. Kohlmann also made the same suggestion to Léo Tindemans and Maurice Faure. Two such Committees were created as a result of the Fontainebleau Council: the ad-hoc Committee on a People's Europe and the ad-hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs. The second one of Duque Committee, was by far the most important. The two committees were composed of representatives of heads of state and government of the member states. Significantly, Mitterand chose Maurice Faure, one of the signatories of the Treaty of Rome and an active member of the Monnet group, to represent France in the Duque Committee. Maurice Faure played a significant role since the general plan of the Duque report very much followed a report which he had presented during the first reunions of the Committee. The Duque report put the realization of a homogeneous internal economic space at the head of the list of priorities, then the creation of a technological community and the strengthening of the EMU. It also emphasized the need for a Common external policy and for the improvement of the decision-making structures of European institutions. These priorities were very much those of the Monnet group.

Meanwhile, Max Kohlmann and Simon May were busy gathering their flock for the next preparatory meeting of the new Committee. Using Jean-François Deniau as his emissary, Kohlmann asked Jacques Chaban-Delmas, President of the French National Assembly, if he would join the new Committee. Monnet had always held him in high esteem, and Kohlmann thought he would be a good political asset for the Committee. Kohlmann also wrote to M. Borieux, President of the EDF. When Jacques Delors was chosen as the next President of the Commission of the European Communities, Max Kohlmann was overjoyed and sent him a telegram: "Your nomination is the best thing that happened to Europe since very many years ago. Best wishes for the success of the mission you accept."68 If Delors's nomination was the best thing that happened to Europe, it posed problems for the Committee since Delors would now have to be replaced by another French Socialist. The difficulty was temporarily surmounted by asking Delors to come to the next preparatory meeting of the Committee's as a guest. Kohlmann continued to exchange letters and phone calls with Delors and to meet with him when Delors took on his headquarters at the Commission in Brussels. In the interval Kohlmann suggested possible appointees for the Delors team.

Ted Heath hosted the second preparatory meeting on September 11 and 12 at Leeds Castle. About ten members of the former Monnet Committee, their assistants and Delors attended the meeting. They decided to name the Committee "Action Committee for Europe." Some of the discussion focused on ways to enhance the Committee's influence. Heath made the important point that "today unlike in the fifties..."
when Monnet's committee was established, public pressures were needed for governments to act. The Committee should therefore have "as its major objective to act on public opinion and the media." This advice was not really followed in practice, since the Committee has so far remained a largely private, behind-the-scenes affair; its initiatives are generally not mentioned in the press, with rare exceptions. Yet at the time, members of the Committee considered publishing the Committee's program in major newspapers or periodicals with a full list of signatories, and making public speeches to contribute to public education on European issues. As for the behind-the-scenes activities, those who had subscribed to the Committee's program were to be encouraged to "lobby" for it in the organization they belonged to and/or in other constituencies in which they had influence. Members could also put pressure on parliamentarians in member states to table resolutions requesting their governments to act on the proposals contained in the group's program. The financial question raised some difficulties. While most members agreed that trade unions and industrialists should be approached, some dissented on the idea that the European Commission and Parliament should also contribute to the Committee. Most of all, although the Committee would not and could not be a "research department" it must at least have a program, a "package" with clear objectives and a time table. The Committee would have two main tasks 1) to develop proposals and 2) to lobby for them. To fulfill the second task and to be more representative of the various political forces, the committee must be enlarged to about one hundred members in the spring of 1985.

A few weeks after the Leeds Castle meeting, Jacques Delors informed Kohlmann that President Mitterand offered Rambouillet for the next and last preparatory meeting of the Committee. Several meetings took place with key officials from the Commission in Brussels to improve the technical background of the Committee in preparation for Rambouillet. The topics covered included the EMS, the internal market and new technologies, and institutional questions. During one of these sessions Kohlmann defined the Committee as a "political pressure group at the service of a vigorous revival of European construction." The Committee, he said, proposes a mobilizing slogan: "no frontiers between Europeans in 1995!" Just before the meeting, participants received a dossier which contained a few "programme papers", one on the EMS, another entitled: "No barriers by 1995: a proposal and a method for the abolition of barriers between the Community's member states over the next decade," still another on a community-wide telecommunications policy, and finally a note on the raison d'être of the Committee. The note reaffirmed the objective of the Treaties of Paris and Rome: To strengthen peace and liberty in the world through the establishment of an ever closer union among the people of Europe and to improve their living and working conditions. Even though the initial program of the new committee focused on the completion of the internal market and the development of a common currency, it did not lose sight of the political objectives of European unity, but considered that these could best be attained by "unifying and revitalizing our economies." The note concluded: "In his memoirs, Jean Monnet, describing the dissolution of his Committee, writes: 'If we were to face fresh crises like those which have made the Committee
necessary, there would still be time to form a new political force. A decade of near stagnation constitutes such a crisis. Therefore the time to act is now."

In addition to the original core Monnet group, François-Xavier Ortoli of TOTAL and Giovanni Agnelli of FIAT, were present at the Rambouillet meeting on December 20 and 21 1984. Jacques Delors took part as observer while François Mitterrand presided over lunch during the last day of the meeting. The Communique at the end of the meeting mentioned that the first priority of the Committee would be to promote an integrated common market and to encourage major progress towards a full European Monetary system. The committee would also "promote Western European interests in foreign policy and security" and "take into account the recent initiatives of the European Parliament, as well as the final report of the Delors Committee." Key European politicians, trade unionsists and industrialists in Community member states would be invited to join. What was not said in the communique is that Kohlmann had been invited to serve as Secretary-General of the Committee, with Simon May as his deputy. They were put in charge of contacting potential members of the Committee, including from Spain and Portugal. Since the Committee might ultimately constitute a very large group, the participants considered creating a steering group. They agreed that the next meeting would take place in Bonn on June 6 and 7 1985.76

The Action Committee for Europe

On January 14 1985, in his first speech before the European Parliament, Delors proposed to complete the internal market by 1992. Just after Christmas, Kohlmann had written him a long letter in which he made a few suggestions for the speech. A few months later the Council endorsed the goal of a single market by 1992 and asked the Commission to write a detailed program with a timetable. Soon Internal Market Commissioner Lord Cockfield drafted his famous White paper which he completed by June 14. As originally planned, the founding meeting of the Action Committee for Europe took place on June 6 and 7 1985, that is a few weeks before the Milan European Council, which decided that an intergovernmental conference should be convened under article 236 of the EEC Treaty and thus became the starting point for the Single European Act.77 On June 6 Karl Carstens opened the meeting. Max Kohlmann then presented a project of declaration. Vicomte Etienne Davignon, now a member of the Committee, later discussed ways of financing the Committee. Davignon proposed that political parties, trade unions and industrialists each assume responsibility for raising one third of the Committee's financial needs. The next day, President Delors gave a presentation. Right afterwards, a declaration followed by a resolution were unanimously adopted. Assuming that unemployment could only successfully be tackled by restoring economic dynamism, the declaration focused on three main points where action was urgently needed: the completion of an internal market without frontaliers by 1992, progress in advanced technology and the strengthening of the EMS, along with the encouragement of solidarity between poor and rich regions in the EC. The Committee also made a direct appeal to the Milan European Council, which again stressed these three points, while also insisting that the European Council must reinforce the decision-making structure of
the Council of Ministers. Participants then gathered at the Schaumburg Palace for lunch. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a speech which he concluded by saying that the most important task of the Committee was to convey to the young generation the historical necessity of the process of European unification. Only if we succeed in transmitting this heritage will we be able to make this process irreversible.\textsuperscript{27} The meeting was followed by a press conference at the Hotel Steinerberger.

During the next months Davignon worked on gathering financial contributions for the Committee, while Kohlmann and his Assistant were busy enlisting new members from Greece, Spain and Portugal and especially from the British Conservative Party. Since most of the trouble at the forthcoming Luxembourg European Council on December 2 and 3 was likely to come from Margaret Thatcher, the offensive on this front was reinforced by a direct intervention of Karl Carstens, who sent her a letter right before the European Council in which he reminded her of the priorities of the Committee. Another priority for the Committee was to get another member from the Socialist Party. On this score, Mitterrand and Jospin both asked Henri Nallet to represent the French Socialists on the Committee. Nallet had been Agriculture and Community Advisor to Mitterrand and later on Minister of Agriculture. He was also a close friend of Delors.\textsuperscript{28}

In 1986 and beyond, the close association between the Committee and the European Commission continued. Delors and Kohlmann were in frequent touch with one another and whenever possible the Commission made experts available to the Committee to prepare reports for the Committee’s meetings, especially on economic and monetary issues. The Commission also provided interpreters for the Committee’s meetings. In addition, the Commission made a 22,000 ECU subsidy available to the Committee for 1986, as had been the case for 1985. When Kohlmann’s assistant decided to take on an important position in a large telecommunications company, Delors quickly replaced him with Kevin Walsh.\textsuperscript{29} The Committee also received the occasional help of the Belmont European Community Law Office.\textsuperscript{30} The American connection continued to be relied upon on occasion. In October 1986, Kohlmann wrote to George Vest of the Department of State, asking him whether it would be possible to try to form an American counterpart to the Action Committee for Europe in the United States, a sort of “Committee for U.S.-Europe equal partnership.”\textsuperscript{31} Yet Kohlmann found it increasingly tiring to work for the Committee. At the end of 1988, he would be close to 75 and now wanted to prepare for his departure as Secretary General of the Committee to spend time with his children and to work on his memoirs. He felt largely frustrated for having to take care of some of the finances of the Committee and would have been very grateful to have a fully-equipped multi-language secretariat at his disposal. Finally, Kohlmann wondered whether he had sufficient authority and connections to really bring the Committee to life.\textsuperscript{32} Yet, as in the past, when he worked for Monnet’s Committee, Kohlmann continued to travel to see the different members of the committee in preparation for its next plenary meeting. As in the past, he kept on writing long reports on the various discussions he had with the members of the Committee.
A Bilderberg meeting came in handy to discuss the organization of the next meeting of the Committee in Italy with members who happened to be present at Bilderberg, including Max Koehnstrann, Giovanni Agnelli, Etienne Davignon, Helmut Schmidt, Patrick Sheehy (Chairman of British and American Tobacco Industries Inc.) and David Steel (Leader of the British Liberal Party). The next plenary meeting took place in Rome in March 1987. Thirty years had passed since the signing of the treaties of Rome. Enrico Colombo agreed to chair the meeting. In order to better prepare for it, members had drafted long reports on topics to be discussed in Rome. On the first day, participants examined the state of the Community and its future perspectives, as well as defense and security issues. President Francesco Cossiga received members of the Committee in the evening. On the second day, the discussion, introduced by Delors, focused on how to translate the expectations of the SEA into reality. As always, the meeting was followed by a press conference. The result was a short declaration which emphasized the necessity of creating a European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance and of making further progress in growth and economic and social cohesion to fight unemployment. In an effort to enhance the Committee's work and to go beyond general statements, the Committee decided on the creation of two working groups, one on the development of the Community, another on the establishment of a European Pillar within the Alliance, chaired by Chaban-Delmas.

It is as President of the Assemblee Nationale that Chaban-Delmas welcomed the Committee in Paris for its third meeting on January 18 and 19 1988. There were two main sessions, Chaban-Delmas chaired the first one on the establishment of a European pillar in the Atlantic Alliance. Delors chaired the second one on the development of the Community. At the end of the meeting, Francois Mitterrand received the members of the Committee at the Elysee Palace. The meeting produced no resolution but a declaration which exhorted the Community to complete the Internal market, and, beyond that, to achieve monetary union and to create a European Pillar in the Atlantic Alliance. The Committee proposed to member states of the Western European Union to draft a report which would "form the basis of an Intergovernmental Conference to draft the necessary changes in the W.E.U. Treaty to specify the rights and obligations of the European Member States who desire to create together the European Pillar." 78

At this point we leave the Action Committee for Europe, which is now presided by Chaban-Delmas, with Rene Foch, a close associate of Monnet since the creation of Euratom, acting as the new Secretary General of the Committee. Recently, after meeting in Brussels in October 1992, the Committee adopted five resolutions. Not surprisingly, the top of the agenda was occupied by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. But the Committee insisted that the "ratification debates must not paralyze the Community. " Faced with the threat of an economic crisis, the Action Committee asked the Commission to prepare a plan for an economic recovery which would meet the problems of the hour and the expectations of public opinion." Again, not surprisingly, the Committee asked for a "strategy for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the present CIS. The Committee also stressed the urgency of examining the institutional consequences of enlargement. Last but not least, the Committee again stressed
the need for the WEU to become the "defense component of the European Political Union and the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." 79

In September 1988, the Committee counted 92 members from government, political parties, trade unions, banking, business, the European Parliament and the European Movement. Out of these 92 members, which included members from Denmark, Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, 13 were former members of Monnet's Committee for the United States of Europe. Resolutions and declarations from the Committee are being sent to a broad list of top European officials including François Mitterrand, Roland Dumas, Helmut Kohl, Elisabeth Goujou, R. Lubbers, Jean-Luc Dehaene and Jacques Delors.

The main difference between the Action Committee for Europe and the former Action Committee for the United States of Europe, is, of course that Monnet does not chair it. Neither Kohl nor Chaban-Delmas or René Fouché can claim the same connections and degree of influence and Monnet possessed, although, as we have seen, Monnet's power base was very weak in his own country, France. Neither, perhaps, can they claim the same amount of energy and power of persuasion. Beyond that, the new Committee counts many more members than the Monnet Committee. This is both a plus and a minus: although the Committee needs a large group to lobby for its views, it might also be argued that it is hard to agree on anything with such a large group. The Committee has tried to remedy this in a number of ways. A core group of members of about 15 to 20 people occasionally write reports and insure the "sainsi" of the Committee. Former members of the Monnet group play a relatively significant role within this group, although their importance should not be overestimated. In addition, footnotes, stating the dissenting views of some members of the Committee, have now crept into the Committee's last resolutions. As we have seen, another difference is that members now not only come from new EC countries but also from industry or banking. The fact that some members of the Committee belong to important firms or banks, poses the question of the "désinterusement" of the Committee and blurs the distinction between the Action Committee as an epistemic community dedicated to the goal of European union, and the Action Committee as an interest group which promotes a certain type of Europe by focusing mainly on the economic and monetary aspects of European integration. The financing of the Committee, which relies not only on contributions from its members but also on funding from major firms as well as from the Commission, further confuses the issue. Is the Committee acting as a pawn of the European Commission? Here one should not condemn the new committee too quickly: only about one tenth of its wide membership, which includes members of the European Parliament, is made out of industrialists or bankers. In addition, although the Committee maintains a continuous exchange of views with the European Commission and supports some of its initiatives, it also evolves its own proposals, even if it sometimes does so with technical help from the European Commission. There is thus no major difference here with the Monnet Committee which also made use of the expertise of friends of Monnet who happened to work for the European Communities. Yet what is mainly lacking in the new Committee is a core group of close associates working around a well-connected, energetic president. In other words: a team. But perhaps the
main disappointment of the Committee is that it has not succeeded in fulfilling what Ted Heath and Helmut Kohl thought would be its most important task: to "act on public opinion and the media", and to "convey to the young generation the historical necessity of the process of European unification. The Committee has so far remained a largely elite, behind-the-scenes affair.

3 Ibid. 388
10 For more details see: Pascale Wimard, op. cit.
11 Ball to Monnet, 1 September 1960, Ball's papers, Box 7, PL.
12 As we pointed out earlier, Poch also belonged to the Monnet team and later became the Secretary-General of the second Action Committee.
15 George Ball, A great game, George Ball's Private Papers, PL.
16 Ball, Memos, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982, p. 197
20. Monnet to Ball, 18 January 1961, MKS.
22. Kohlhammer to Monnet, 26 February 1962, MKS; Schaeffler to Kohlhammer, 25 October 1962, MKS.
23. Max Kohlhammer to Robert Schaeffler, November 9, 1962, MKS.
25. Kohlhammer to Schaeffler, November 9, 1962, MKS.
29. Pascale Fontaine, p. 196.
30. Pascale Fontaine, p. 52.
32. Max Kohlhammer, Vœux à l'attention de Monsieur monnet, 20 février 1975, p. 3, MKS.
35. Kohlhamm to Schachtel, September 26, 1960, MKS.
37. Ibid.
38. In the early days of the Schuman Plan, Kohlhamm was part of the Dutch delegation in Paris. Later on, as Secretary of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, he belonged to the inner group of trusted Monnet advocates who were charged with setting up the institutions of the ECSC. Kohlhamm's pragmatic skills, and his knack for building consensus over political and cultural barriers, gave him the key function of interpreting, bringing together, and shaping into a coherent form the views of his colleagues of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.
39. From World War II onwards, Kohlhamm was closely involved with German affairs. In 1947, acting as the private Secretary to Queen Wilhelmina, he was charged with establishing contacts with Germany through the Dutch Reformed Church. He then gained valuable contacts in Germany as a deputy delegate to the Ruhr Authority in 1949, and later on as part of a United Nations study group on the re-unification of Germany, through which he met Adenauer. When he was moved to the Dutch Foreign Office, he was put in charge of the German Desk.
40. Monnet also helped mend the rift between the members of the French Socialist Party (SFIO), who had split about half and half on the EEC vote in France. The SFIO deputies later voted for the Eurocom and the EEC treaties, while Guy Mollet took part in the reunions of the Action Committee from the very beginning. For more details, see: Pascal Fontaine, op. cit., pp. 32-34; Jean Monnet, Mémoires, op. cit., pp. 612-613 and Walter Yendorf, op. cit., p. 886.
42. Conversations with Margolin, October 18, 1960, MKS.
43. See Pascal Fontaine, op. cit., p. 57.
46. Pascal Fontaine, op. cit., p. 41. The administrative and financial commission was composed of one to twelve members.
48. Shepherd Stone was an old friend of Monnet and was also Director of the International Affairs Program of the Ford Foundation. Both Stone and Agnelli took part in the Hildenberg meetings.
49. Interview with Ms. Schoenfeld, Lasnante, March 1993.
50. Statutes of the Association of the European Community Studies of University Studies, EDM.
52. Pascal Fontaine, op. cit., pp. 43-44, and p. 50.
55. See an Heltmont to Max Kohlhamm, 8 January 1976.
57. Tindemann to Kohlhamm, June 2, 1980.
58. 24 February 1981, Kohlhamm to Raymond Georis, Terms of reference for the Action Committee as discussed at Meeting in the Hague, 8 January 1982.
61. Kohlhamm to Colombo, no date and Kohlhamm to Thom, 4 May 1983.
63. The Kansio Group was funded by business interests and made it a priority to set up a detailed agenda for removing technical, administrative and fiscal barriers. The Roundtable of Industries was composed of the heads of large European multinational corporations and was created in part through the efforts of Wisse Dekker and Peter Gyllerhammar, the chief executive of Volvo; see: Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," International Organization 45, 1, Winter 1991, pp. 22-23.
64. IC Ramler, Europe 1990, An Agenda for Action, Korte Historie.
66 Record of Meeting at the Château Stayenberg, 16 March 1984. Memo concerning main decisions taken at our meeting March 18th at Stayenberg Castle, Brussels.
67 Summary of a discussion over lunch between Max Kohl and S. Wary on March 29, 1984, at rue de Bourseau 64, Brussels.
68 Kohl and Delors. 20 July 1984.
69 Dossier Rambouillet and Brief Summary of those decisions taken at Rambouillet not announced in the communiqué.
71 Summary of decisions taken at the launching meeting of the Action Committee for Europe: Bonn, 6-7 June 1985
72 Declaration du Comité d'Action pour l'Europe à sa réunion constitutive, les 6 et 7 juin 1985, à Bonn.
73 Note on conversation with President Delors, 28 October 1986.
74 Kohl and Delors, 10 September 1986.
75 As of 15 September 86.
76 Kohl and Vest, September 26, 1986.
77 Kohl and Stanley Crossick, Belmont European Community Law Office.
78 Kohl and A. Moll, 21 April 1986.
80 Resolutions adopted by the Action Committee for Europe at its 22nd meeting of October 1986.