Norden's Eclipse:
The Impact of Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy On Nordic Cooperation in the United Nations

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Introduction

Since Finland and Sweden joined Denmark in 1995 as members of the European Union (while Norway rejected membership), scholars have attempted to discern the effects of membership on these Nordic countries as well as Nordic influence on policies in Brussels. The Nordic countries have often been called "the other European Community" because of their deep cultural ties, the similarity of their socio-political systems, and their widespread practice of intergovernmental cooperation and consultation exemplified by the Nordic Council. Will these common Nordic social structures, policies, and identities be transformed by broadened EU membership? Research thus far has attempted to gauge the impact of broadened membership on domestic arrangements such as monetary policies, social policies, environmental policies, security policies and so on. For instance, Europe's attempt to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has generated considerable speculation about the continued viability of Swedish and Finnish neutrality policies. Much less attention has been paid to the impact of CFSP on the external dimensions of Nordic foreign policies, particularly those in which there is considerable Nordic collaboration. The United Nations has long been a priority in the foreign policies of all Nordic countries and a forum in which coordination and harmonization is high. This paper will assess the degree to which variant EU membership has altered the patterns of Nordic cooperation in the United Nations.

The first section of this paper reviews the tradition of Nordic collaboration in the United Nations. The substance of the Nordic profile is identified and the norms and principles of Nordic collaboration are assessed. The Nordics have created a unique position within the bloc system of politics within the UN, and it is this independent Nordic position in world politics that is threatened by Europeanization. The second part of the paper details the intensification of European foreign policy coordination, from the practices of EPC to the innovations of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 which introduced greater flexibility in European foreign policy making. The increased role of a single EU voice in international organizations is presented. In the final section of the paper the impact of intensified European foreign policy coordination on Nordic foreign policy cooperation is assessed. Empirical data demonstrating the dramatic cessation of common Nordic initiatives within the UN is compared to the steady growth of European initiatives. Interviews with Nordic delegates at the United Nations reveal the impact of variant EU membership on the traditional practice of Nordic collaboration.


Nordic Cooperation in the United Nations

Nordic prime ministers, foreign ministers, and parliamentarians affirm the importance of multilateral cooperation and active internationalism in the United Nations repeatedly in statements. Despite the failure of efforts to create a Nordic defense alliance after WWII, the Nordic states institutionalized an elaborate process of foreign policy consultation and cooperation in many international organizations, including joint Nordic seats on the Executive Boards of the IMF and the World Bank. The practice of Nordic cooperation within the UN has become so entrenched that it became nearly sacrosanct. Cooperation in the UN is not a legal imperative, but under the Nordic Treaty of Cooperation, the Helsinki Agreement, Article 30 urged that Nordic states "should, whenever possible and appropriate, consult one another regarding questions of mutual interest which are dealt with by international organizations and at international conferences." The United Nations was and remains a key focal point for the internationalist foreign policy activities of all these countries.

That the Nordics are committed to the success of multilateral cooperation on the global level is clear to the most casual observer of the United Nations. In the more than fifty year history of the organization, Nordic contributions to the UN have been notable. The first two secretary-generals of the organization, Trygve Lie of Norway and Sweden's Dag Hammarskjöld, set the standard for impartial, effective and active UN leadership. Other examples of Nordic contributions to UN leadership are numerous, from Swede Jan Eliasson and Dane Peter Hansen serving as Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to Halfdan Mahler at the WHO and Finland's Martti Ahtisaari's leadership in UNTAG, the transitional operation for Namibian independence. Gro Brundtland's chairmanship of the World Commission on Environment and Development resulted in the very influential Brundtland Report that launched the sustainable development paradigm. Since the late 1970s, Nordic citizens have accounted for about 10% of all executive leadership positions at the UN, including Special Representatives and Assistant/Under-Secretary Generals. At all levels of the Secretariat, Nordic citizens are well represented among the career ranks of international civil servants.

The Nordic countries have also been prominent supporters of the United Nations system in financial terms as well. The Nordics do not only pay their assessed contributions on time, but they provide a much larger relative share of the financial resources to the Organization, its agencies and programs than their size would indicate. Particularly notable is Nordic financial support of the United Nations Development Program where Nordics provide one-third of the Program's core funding. In associated agencies and programs such as UNICEF and UNFPA, Nordic financial support comprises about 40% of these respective budgets. The Nordics are widely recognized as being leaders among the developed nations in terms of multilateral development assistance. The Nordic profile as committed and concerned donors of development assistance is widely acknowledged throughout the UN system and one for which they have a well-regarded reputation.

Additionally, the Nordic countries have long supported international and multilateral efforts to ensure international peace and security. Nordic support for collective security dates back to the League of Nations. The practice of preventive diplomacy, of using the "quiet diplomacy and good offices" of the Secretary-General's office, was developed under the activist leadership of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld during the deadlock of Cold War. Once

2 For the remarkable story of Hammarskjöld's tenure as Secretary-General, see Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 2 ed., New York: W.W. Norton, 1991.
leadership of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld during the deadlock of Cold War. Once international conflict occurs, the Nordics have supported multilateral solutions. Since 1948, there have been 48 UN missions in which over 750,000 UN troops have monitored cease-fires, observed implementation of peace-agreements, and even rebuilt devastated political and social systems. Nordic troops have participated in every one of these missions. During the Cold War, Nordic forces made up 25% of all peacekeeping operations. Since 1964 every Nordic country has established a Stand-by force of troops that are dedicated for UN operations and can be deployed within one month. The Nordic commitment to peacekeeping is coordinated through regular and frequent meetings of the Foreign Ministries and Defense Ministries. A specific institution to coordinate peacekeeping matters, the Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, was established to organize joint training and deployments. There is a UN Training Center in Nõmisa, Finland to improve training of Nordic peacekeepers.

This Nordic peacekeeping tradition continues after the Cold War: Nordic soldiers and civilians made up nearly 10% of the 40,000 troops involved in the UNPROFOR Mission in Bosnia. In addition, many of the important leadership positions dealing with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia were filled by Nordics: Swedish Lieutenant General Lars-Eric Wahlgren was one of the Peace Force commanders, Norwegian Brigadier General Trygve Tellefsen was a commander in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Norway’s Thorvald Scolltenberg was a UN Special Representative for the region, and Swede Carl Bildt was the EU’s chief negotiator in the Bosnian conflict.

It must be stressed that all this Nordic activity in and support for the United Nations is precisely that—Nordic. The Nordic identity is so prevalent that despite changes in external or internal circumstance, the international political community perceives the Nordics as group of states which pursues international justice and human rights and social development rather than narrow national interests. The extent of an explicit, distinctive Nordic profile is striking. “Denmark and Sweden seem to be generally thought of as Nordics before they are thought of as individual countries, with a higher positive value connotation than would be assigned to them separately.” Early studies of UN politics detected a clear Nordic Bloc distinct from the Western and other industrialized nations by the 1960s. These studies found exceptionally high voting cohesion of about 90% among the Nordic countries.

The Nordics present a distinctive profile in the UN. The Nordic states are noted champions of the development of human rights laws; the promotion and financial support for the concept of social and human development and the alleviation of poverty; gender equality and the active support for improving the position of women in development; the integration of sustainable development into all areas of the United Nations activities; and support for preventive diplomacy and collective security. These concepts that have been mainstreamed into UN discourse are concepts that have received consistent Nordic support.

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6 For the remarkable story of Hammarskjöld’s tenure as Secretary-General, see Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 2 ed., New York: W.W. Norton, 1991.
10 Ibid.
The underlying principles of Nordic cooperation in the United Nations include a strong multilateralist ethic, a small state commitment to and appreciation for the concept of collective security, and the externalization of the norms of Social Democratic governance. The multilateralist ethic refers to the rejection of unilateral diplomacy and the preference for interaction through bodies such as the United Nations to pursue interests. The Nordic countries have contributed widely to multilateral development efforts through UN channels because this is seen as "proper and progressive." As small states in an international system dominated by great powers, the Nordics have supported the UN because as Lena Hjelm-Wallen suggests, it is the guarantor of the rights of small states. Indeed, responding to Krushchev’s complaint about the independence of the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld elaborated the small state perspective when he said that it was not the Soviet Union or any other great power that needed the UN for its protection, it was everyone else. By making the international system less tense, it was less likely that small states would be trampled upon by the collision of great powers. Finally, by active participation in international institutions, the Nordics hoped to promote the values that they hold dear.

We see in the international organizations an opportunity to disseminate the ideas we believe in, often in close cooperation with the other Nordic countries. By patient work in the UN system’s different organs we have also been able to direct the attention of the international community to the questions that we consider important.

These ambitions created a rather large agenda for five relatively small states. By pooling their efforts, Nordics were able to make their positions known and to have a voice and influence beyond what their size would suggest. The degree of Nordic cooperation in international institutions has ranged from consultation in the area of disarmament to complete coordination of a common position on the Executive Boards of the World Bank and IMF where the Nordics hold a joint seat. The tradition of foreign policy collaboration occurs at all levels, from the first secretaries to the bi-annual meetings of the Foreign Ministers devoted to UN affairs. The Nordic states have engaged in preparatory meetings in the national capitals, often dividing the work load among the delegates to create a joint Nordic position on any given issue. Often one Nordic delegate has had responsibility for drafting a joint statement that would then be subject to debate, by all Nordic colleagues. Once consensus on a position was reached, the Nordics would present a common position on that issue. On-site meetings and consultation complemented this preparatory work. During the work of the General Assembly’s main committees, the Nordic delegations traditionally have frequent meetings—as often as 1-2 times daily—to discuss developments, share information and to determine how to uphold a Nordic perspective.

The norms of Nordic cooperation in the UN System can be understood to include respect for national autonomy, consensus decision-making, equality of participation, and pragmatism. The fundamental premise of Nordic cooperation has been respect for national autonomy. Cooperation is not expected or intended to result in supranational decision-making procedures, though Gunnar Nielsson has suggested that political integration in a behavioral sense may result. Control over final decision-making has never been relinquished. The intergovernmental

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15 "Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy", p. 241.
nature of Nordic foreign policy cooperation is inviolable. Joint or common statements always involve the participation of officials from all governments, even in the context of the World Bank in which fixing and teleconferences ensure all national viewpoints have been accommodated.

Respect for national autonomy has meant that the Nordic countries in their collaboration have required consensus as a method of decision-making. Coercion or majority decisions are deemed unthinkable. Persuasion is the method of choice to overcome dissent among the group. This is best achieved in a setting of informality and familiarity that characterizes the meetings of Nordic delegates as well as Foreign Ministers. The extensive interaction both before and during UN sessions has meant that substantial national differences have been smoothed over. While there is considerable harmony of interest among the Nordics in a wide range of areas, disagreements can occur and national perspectives prevail. For instance, in the context of the IMF and the World Bank where a joint position must be articulated, in the few instances where a Nordic common position cannot be found, no statement or position will be issued.

Equality of participation is another norm in Nordic cooperation. All Nordics participate equally in devising various divisions of labor regarding information gathering and sharing and rotating leadership positions, from the rotating appointment to the IMF-IBRD Executive Board to supporting each other for nominations to the Security Council. While representation on the Boards of the agencies and programs may vary, the sum effect has been extensive representation on a "Nordic" basis. Pragmatism has imbued cooperative practices. The Nordic countries search for areas in which considerable common ground already exists and they build coordination on that existing foundation, proceeding to investigation, deliberation, and recommendations. This collaborative process creates relationships and practices that may extend into new areas.

In those instances when one Nordic country vetoes or speaks in a way that has not been anticipated, it is seen as undermining the strength of the Nordic voice. Indeed, there has been an implicit "duty to consult" the Nordic partners if a national delegate is to change position from agreed upon stances, even if no common position has been undertaken. The practice of consultation, harmonization, and coordination of Nordic policies within the UN organization has become widespread and normal. The ease and automatic nature of consulting Nordic colleagues was described by one Nordic delegate as "as natural as breathing."[1]

The significance of Nordic cooperation is that it gave these small countries a voice and profile that far exceeded their size or weight in the organization. Their advocacy of international solutions based upon the rule of law, their expertise in peacekeeping and international mediation, their substantial financial commitment to international social and economic development has accorded the Nordic countries wide recognition within the UN system. While some have defined the Nordic position in the UN as excessively moralistic or even sanctimonious, there is little doubt that it has gained them an important position in international relations.

The niche that the Nordics occupy as bridge-builders and mediators has gained them the trust of conflicting blocs at the UN, in geo-political terms between East and West during the Cold War, and in geo-economic terms between North and South during the divisive debates of the 1970s over the New International Economic Order. Fundamentally, while the Nordic states have exemplified western values—a commitment to democracy, a free market economy, rule of law—their effectiveness and reputation within the UN has rested on a perception of the Nordics as being different from the rest of the West (or North). For instance, the Nordic approach to

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whose foreign aid resembles an export promotion program.\textsuperscript{19} Their political philosophy of compromise and reconciliation creates a quite different profile than the blatant power maneuvering of larger western powers such as the United States, France and Great Britain in the United Nations. In interviews about Nordic influence in the United Nations, "observers were unified in their opinion that member states’ perception of the Nordic states as honest brokers, committed multilateralists, and even ‘model member states’ was the Nordics’ greatest political asset."\textsuperscript{100} The financial commitment to development and the distance the Nordics have established from the Western bloc has resulted in a harmonious Nordic-South relationship within the organization. In the post-Cold War era, as the debates between rich and poor in the General Assembly once more gain center stage, the honest-broker role is one that will remain necessary.

The perceived distinction between the Nordics and the rest of the North (or West) in the United Nations, their bridge-building and honest-broker role, their international pursuit of a just, secure world in which poverty is eliminated, reflects a particular Nordic self-understanding.

Of course there are important differences between the Scandinavian states, but the sense of being part of an exceptional family of nations is apparent throughout the region. As Ole Waever succinctly puts it, ‘Nordic identity is about being better than Europe.’\textsuperscript{11}

If the Nordics have a reputation and profile in the UN that is beyond what could be expected of states of this size, and the “success” of that profile is premised upon being distinct from Europe, how will increased Nordic membership in the EU affect the Nordic profile in the UN?\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{The European Union and Political Foreign Policy Cooperation}\textsuperscript{12}

The European Union has attempted to increase its foreign policy profile and attempts to speak with one voice to the rest of the world. In the area of economic foreign policy, this has largely been attained as the Commission speaks on behalf of member-states in all external economic relations. The European Community has legal competence to speak on behalf of member states in international organizations that deal with issues in which the EC has competence within the single market. Thus, in FAO, in UNCTAD, in the WTO, the EC has legal authority to make statements and represent member states.

Foreign policy cooperation in political and security areas has been fraught with greater ambiguity. Security cooperation among the 15 is especially contentious: the national and transnational security arrangements of the European security regime range from comprehensive (OSCE) to neutrality. Security questions lie at the heart of national sovereignty, and member states have been reluctant to compromise national approaches to defining security. While limited, political foreign policy cooperation on the European level has been more active and successful. The effort to create a stronger foreign policy profile in “political” areas received a symbolic boost in the Maastricht Treaty wherein the objective of creating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was elaborated. Under Pillar Two of the Treaty, an intergovernmental framework for pursuing both “common positions” and “joint actions” under the auspices of the Union was created. Subsequently, the Amsterdam Treaty stipulated increased coordination by introducing

\textsuperscript{19} Katrin Vorlön Løtvold, "The Disillusionment of Nordic Aid" in Steven W. Hook (ed) Foreign Aid Toward the Millennium, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995.


\textsuperscript{12} The European Economic Communities became the European Union in 1993 with the acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty. While technically the Union did not exist prior to 1993, for ease of discussion we will refer to the Union throughout.
intergovernmental framework for pursuing both "common positions" and "joint actions" under the auspices of the Union was created. Subsequently, the Amsterdam Treaty stipulated increased coordination by introducing qualified majority decision-making and the option of "constructive abstention" in order to accelerate a common EU political foreign policy profile.

**European Political Cooperation (EPC)**

The founding Treaty of the European Union, the Treaty of Rome, was primarily concerned with the creation of a single market. The 1957 Treaty did however foresee a common global political role for the Community particularly in economic areas such as trade negotiations and economic relationships with overseas territories, and concluding international economic treaties. Since the late 1960s, the EU has created a dense network of international agreements and networks that go far beyond commercial and economic relationships. This process of foreign policy cooperation, called European Political Cooperation (EPC), attempted to harmonize the foreign policies of member states. It was an inter-governmental process that required unanimity for common action. In effect, each member had a veto over any common action. The objectives of EPC were to "ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly; in increase solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable." To share information, a telex network known as Coreu was established between member-states' Foreign Ministries. Members agreed to consult with each other on all important foreign policy questions, and to refrain from taking up final positions without prior consultation within the EPC framework.

The EPC was not intended to replace the foreign policies of member-states reflective of some sort of federalist political development in Europe. The "foreign policies" of the European Community could not be equated with a nationally coherent foreign policy, but should be understood in the context of on-going European integration. The institutional arrangements, the actors involved in policy-making, were rather complex and entailed on-going discussions and information sharing among members. Hundreds of meetings occurred annually in the Council of Ministers, chaired by a six-month rotating presidency. These were supplementary to the twice annual European Council where heads of states would meet for high-level discussions. The European Council could set the agenda, but most of the heavy-lifting occurred within the Council of ministers. The European Commission is the administrative arm of the European Union and has the exclusive right of policy initiative under the Treaty of Rome, but with regard to foreign policy this was largely seen as limited to initiatives relating to the single market and external economic relationships.

In general, the intensity of EPC from its inception in 1969 until the mid-1980s reflected the general "Euro-sclerosis" infecting all of European integration in that period. The Single European Act of 1985 (SEA) symbolized not only a reinvigoration of development of the internal market, but it created a partnership between the Commission and Council in foreign policy-making. It required the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Commission to meet at least 4 times annually under the framework of the EPC. This was a recognition that a strict separation could no longer be maintained between economic foreign policy, which was the "supranational" responsibility of the Commission, and intergovernmental political foreign policy coordination, which was the responsibility of the Council. The SEA shifted EPC away from informal..

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consultations to regularized and structured policymaking, and it directed EPC to consider coordinating member-state positions on political and economic aspects of security more closely. EPC, while modest, nonetheless developed the foundation for creating a European foreign policy: it defined the role of the presidency in representing EPC, it engaged the Commission, and it maintained a decision-making procedure of consensus.

The Maastricht Treaty, CFSP and the Amsterdam Treaty

While the name of the process of foreign policy making was changed to CFSP and established under the second pillar by the Maastricht Treaty, it was remarkably similar to the EPC. The process of decision-making in foreign policy coordination remained inter-governmental and largely consensus-oriented. The innovation was the possibility for joint or common actions and joint positions that are binding on member-states. The European Council presents priority areas of European cooperation, and the Council of Foreign Ministers articulates the strategies for joint action or a joint position. While there are no explicit sanctions for member-state non-compliance, it is understood that member-states are to "refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations." Article 122 of the Maastricht Treaty requires national foreign policies to conform to common positions, and that common positions be upheld in international organizations and conferences even when all the members are not participants. Thus, the Union was to make greater effort to speak with one voice in the foreign policy areas deemed of common interest to the Union. The Union under Maastricht went gone beyond a diplomatic talk shop to a structure that demands compliance in commonly agreed areas.

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 provided for further changes to encourage a coherent European voice in foreign policy. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the principle of "constructive abstention" so that a member-state constructively abstain from a joint action, but not prevent the Union from pursuing a common action so long as there are 2/3 or 10 members voting positively. A semblance of unanimity remains, however, because a member-state may oppose the adoption of any CFSP decision by qualified majority one the grounds of "important and stated reasons of national policy." The Treaty also created the post of High Representative, or Mr. CFSP that would be responsible for policy planning and early warning to make European foreign policies proactive rather than reactive. It is expected that the office of the High Representative will take on greater foreign policy responsibilities after July 1999, so the process of European foreign policy making will then become clearer.

The tools that are employed in implementing a common foreign policy for the Union include declarations, common positions, and joint actions. There are clearly areas in which the members of the European Union cannot agree to align their foreign policies; notable examples include relations with Turkey, policy toward China, the deteriorating situation in Algeria, even the instability of Zaire-Congo. There has been some notable progress, however. The most common tool of the EU's CFSP is the use of declarations. Declarations are used to react to international events, and are a public expression of consensus. In areas where there is no consensus, no declaration will be issued. While under the EPC declarations referred to the "Community and its Member states," since 1993 the declarations have been signed as "The European Union" which symbolizes a unity of purpose. There have been over 330 declarations in the CFSP period.

34 The Treaty on European Union, Article 214.
Common positions indicate a coordination of member-states individual foreign policies on a given issue. Whitman elaborates the 35 common positions that have been elaborated in 17 areas. These include embargoes on military exports (to the Former Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Sudan, Myanmar, and Afghanistan) and priorities for the Union’s relations with countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Ukraine, East Timor, and Cuba. In the failure of the Union to respond to a pressing foreign policy issue such as Algeria, Whitman has suggested that member-states have desired to retain a domaine privée.

In 1992, the European Council directed the Council of Ministers to outline the basis for common action in five areas: Eastern and Central European democratization and cooperation; the Middle East Peace process; supporting democratic transition in South Africa; humanitarian assistance and peaceful resolution in the former Yugoslavia; and support for democratic transition in Russia. By 1998, additional joint actions had been targeted in the following areas:

1. Preparations for the 1995 Review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
2. Combating the use of Anti-Personnel Land-mines
3. Cooperation with the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Corporation
4. Conflict in the African Great Lakes Region
5. Extra-territoriality and the Helms-Burton Act
6. Transparency and Export Controls for the Nuclear Suppliers Group
7. Controls on the Exports of Dual-Use Goods

The European Union and the United Nations

As the above list of common positions and joint actions suggest, the active foreign policies undertaken by the Union “have been overwhelmingly either inspired by, responded to, or been implemented through, multilateral organizations and/or international agreements.” The Amsterdam Treaty provides for the Presidency of the Council to negotiate agreements with states or international organizations which would then be subject to review and acceptance by the Council.

At the United Nations, the process of consultation and coordination of joint actions, common positions, and declarations is the responsibility of the member-state currently holding the presidency. Member-states may reinforce personnel at their permanent missions to facilitate the coordination of EU policies. While the direction and strategies of CFSP are set in Brussels, the implementation occurs in New York. Meetings of member-states’ delegates for all issue-areas are held daily, in accordance with provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. Since 1997, observers at the UN have noted the flurry of paperwork and declarations on behalf of the European Union emanating from the member-state currently holding the presidency.

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28 Discussion with UN Librarian, April 15, 1998.
Nordic Adaptations to the CFSP in the United Nations System

Expanded but variant Nordic-EU membership has introduced a period of dramatic change and transformation of domestic politics in all Nordic societies. It has had dramatic impact on collaborative Nordic foreign policies as well. In the lead-up to expanded membership, all three Nordic applicants—Finland, Sweden and Norway—participated as observers in the evolving CFSP process. During negotiations for accession, it was made clear that there could be no “bloc” operating within the EU. If all had joined, the various cooperative arrangements of the “other European Community,” from the common Nordic labor market and passport free zone to cultural cooperation, would be subsumed into European collaborative practices. As one Swedish diplomat recalled:

We had the opportunity to observe the coordination of the Europeans before the referendum and we Nordics had figured out how we would proceed by developing new forms of cooperation within the EU. Then, however, Norway voted no, and we understood that we would have to find new ways to continue (Nordic) cooperation.33

Nordic Prime Ministers and Parliamentarians formed a Reform Group to examine the changing conditions of Nordic cooperation in light of the variable relationships established with the European Union. By the February 1995 Nordic Council meeting in Reykjavik, the Reform Group proposed a model of Nordic cooperation that would rest on three pillars (seemingly a nod to Maastricht). The first pillar comprises the continuing cultural, educational and language ties among the region. The second pillar addresses the Nordic relationship with the EU specified as either through membership or the European Economic Area for Norway and Iceland. The third area for Nordic Council attention is cooperation with the adjacent areas, the Baltic countries and northwest Russia. The institutional basis for Nordic cooperation was scaled back considerably as 13 institutions devoted to Nordic cooperation were dismantled after expanded Nordic membership in the EU.

The third pillar of Nordic cooperation is an area of increasing joint Nordic activity. Baltic representatives have been invited to regular meetings at the ministerial level of the Nordic Council, and a Baltic Investment Program, valued at about $130 million, was established in 1992 and expanded in 1996. The Nordic Council which established at the height of the Cold War in 1952 was always forbidden from discussions of defense or foreign policy. As a barometer of the intensity and rapidity of change, the revised Nordic Council and Council of Ministers is now predominantly concerned with “extra-Nordic” issues.

During accession negotiations, the Nordic countries insisted that they could continue their traditional cooperation with each other regardless of status of EU membership. The EU accepted this declaration with the provision that such cooperation would not interfere with Union directives and policies. Under the European pillar of Nordic cooperation, efforts have been made to help non-EU members Norway and Iceland keep up with EU developments. The Nordic countries meet informally before EU Council of Ministers meetings in order to share views and coordinate activities in areas of mutual interest. Arrangements to establish regular contacts between the Nordic EU Permanent Representatives in Brussels and the Nordic Council of Ministers has also been proposed. The Nordics have been careful to emphasize the informal nature of joint Nordic preparations prior to EU Council of Minister meetings gives the sensitivity

that Europeans have shown to the possibility of concerted Nordic actions in EU decision-making. A primary activity of the Nordic Council now consists of providing a conduit between EU and Non-EU Nordic countries and assessing how EU developments might impact the Nordic region. Indeed, Nordic Permanent Representatives in Brussels are central in providing early-warning of such EU measures.

**Measuring the Impact of Expanded Membership**

At the UN, the tradition of Nordic cooperation was to continue. Judging from the incidence of voting cohesion of the Nordic countries in the roll-call votes of the General Assembly presented in Table 1, the positions taken by the Nordics remain highly consistent. Voting cohesion, defined as at least 3 Nordic countries voting the same way, has not fallen below 85% despite the transformation of EU membership.

---Table 1 here---

However, voting cohesion is a rather blunt indicator because it reflects only similarity of attitudes. Voting cohesion does not reveal how the patterns of cooperation may have changed. Klaus Tornudd differentiates between voting cohesion which could arise capriciously to situations in which consensus requires negotiation. To examine only outcomes, in these cases voting cohesion, is to ignore the substantial efforts that might contribute to or explain instances of voting cohesion.

By looking at artifacts of conscious cooperation and coordination such as joint statements or speeches, a clearer picture emerges of the impact of variant EU membership on the Nordic profile. Table 2 presents the number of joint statements or documents authored by the Nordic countries from 1990-1997 in the General Assembly Plenary. The data show a dramatic decrease in the number of joint Nordic statements in the 50th session of the General Assembly immediately after EU membership. The number of total number of joint speeches or documents declined from 18 in the 49th session (1994-1995) to two in the 50th session (1995-1996) subsequent to expanded membership.

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This trend is also apparent in the main committees of the General Assembly as Table 3 demonstrates. The highpoint of Nordic cooperation in the committees was in the 40th session (1991-92) when the Nordics had 51 joint statements, speeches and declarations. By the fiftieth session, the number of joint Nordic statements/documents had fallen to 4 in all the committees. The most significant decrease of collaborative Nordic activity occurred in the Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs) and the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary Questions) committees. Most dramatically, the number of joint undertakings by the Nordic countries in the

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Fifth Committee fell from 20 in 1993-94 (before expanded Nordic-EU membership) to 0 in 1995-96. In only two of the six main committees of the General Assembly were there any joint Nordic actions after 1995.

---Table 3 here---

Over the same period, European coordination in the form of joint statements, declarations and documents have grown steadily as can be assessed in Table 4. The highpoint of EU collaboration in the Plenary seems to have been from 1991-1993, which the number of European communications numbered in the 90s annually. This includes both EU and Commission statements. While the number of speeches in the GA Plenary on behalf of the Union grows steadily over the period, the number joint documents falls off over the course of the period.

---Table 4 here---

European cooperation in the main committees of the General Assembly shows steadily accelerating cooperation during this period as the number of joint statements and documents reaches a high of 95 in 1996-97. As Table 5 demonstrates, in every committee except the First (Disarmament and International Security), European cooperation is increasing. The greatest level of joint activity is in the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Questions) where there were 181 joint EU statements or documents submitted from 1990-1997. European cooperation in the First Committee has declined rather dramatically over the course of the decade, from 13 joint statements/documents in the 46th Session (1991-92) to only one in the 51st Session (1996-97).

---Table 5 here---

European cooperation has even extended to making joint statements in the Security Council, an arena in which the Nordics rarely presented a common position. The number of EU statements in the Security Council has increased from none in 1993 to 16 in 1996. This does not imply joint European decision-making in the Security Council (Permanent members France and Great Britain jealously guard their prerogatives in that body), but instead a European effort to present a common European view on issues before the Council.

What is clear from the data is that there is a visibly reduced Nordic profile in the world body which has been eclipsed by the growing intensity of European Union cooperation in the UN. Observers from the developing world have commented upon the reduced presence of the independent Nordic bloc. Stanley Mahlaha of Zimbabwe remarked on the disappearance of a united Nordic position on development assistance in the committees of General Assembly.18

Nordic delegates responsible for policies in the areas of peace and security as well as economic and social development have described the continued but less frequent meetings with their Nordic colleagues. There are Nordic meetings held in the capitals in preparation for the General Assembly meetings, just as before, and the meetings in New York continue although on a less frequent basis. The joint Nordic meetings in New York, which previously occurred daily, might now be on a weekly or monthly basis, depending upon issue area and seniority level of the participants. Most importantly, the purpose of these Nordic meetings has changed. The meetings are not held to align Nordic policies and present a common Nordic position or statements on issues before the General Assembly or its committees; rather, these meetings are limited to information-sharing and discussions of evolution of the EU position. The focus of continued Nordic cooperation is not to present a cohesive Nordic unit to the rest of the world, but to work together informally to find ways to influence European policy within the UN.

The intensive activity that once characterized Nordic cooperation has been transferred into the European setting. As was noted above, the European Council sets the agenda for foreign policy priorities, and the Council of Ministers, comprised of the foreign ministers of all EU members, hold meetings in advance of the General Assembly sessions in Brussels. In New York, the EU member-state that holds the presidency is responsible for organizing the daily meetings for member states. The objective of these meetings is to work out a common position, and the presidency then speaks on behalf of the EU. Other EU members are free to speak on whatever issue they like, but they may not contradict the common EU position that has been negotiated. Meetings of the EU head of delegations occur 1-2 times weekly, while the counsellors or first secretaries in various areas have meetings with their EU counterparts once or twice daily. The sheer scale of coordinating the 15 members of the EU is so time-consuming that it crowds out efforts at Nordic consultation. Thus, the high level of Nordic convergence in Table 1 cannot be attributed to conscious efforts to align Nordic positions, but it results from the common Nordic values that persist. Fundamentally, the Nordics still have common positions on a variety of issues, but these positions are not the result of active negotiation and cooperation.

While coordination has been marginalized and the Nordic profile has faded in the political bodies of the UN—the General Assembly and its main committees—the story in the programs and funds that report to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is somewhat different. The specialized agencies and programs of the UN are the operational side of multilateral social and economic development. Funding for these programs is voluntary, and the rotating membership by Western European states on the boards of these agencies is according to contribution. The Nordics rank among the highest contributors to organizations like the UN Development Program and the Population Fund. In these institutions, the Nordics have endeavored to maintain a distinct Nordic identity given their relatively higher contributions to the programs and funds. In these bodies, Nordic coordination and cooperation is “quite intensive” and they have opposed the “Europeanization” of foreign policy making in these areas because other EU members “don’t pull their weight.” In the agencies and programs, the Nordic tradition of preparatory meetings in the Nordic capitals, a division of labor among Nordic participants, and daily meetings during the meetings of the Board continues. One important difference noted by a Danish delegate, is that unlike EU coordination, there is not imperative to find a common Nordic position. In fact, there is a desire to avoid bloc politics on the boards of the development agencies, so the Nordics have a division of labor in which different Nordic countries take the lead on different issues. They share working papers and coordinate positions, but this coordination is

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19 Separate interviews with Danish and Swedish delegates involved in economic and social development, Permanent Missions of Denmark and Sweden to the United Nations, March 25, 1999.
not reflected in a flurry of joint statements because of the desire to avoid bloc politics on the boards. Thus, the Nordics can and do act unilaterally, as the Swedish decision to withhold its funding from UNICEF recently demonstrates. Of course, the Swedes informed their Nordic colleagues of their intention, but the Swedes did not have to worry about obtaining Nordic agreement for their action.

Another area in which the Nordics have retained a rather high profile is in the area of international development cooperation reform. The Nordic commitment to development issues is exemplified by the Nordic UN-Reform project in which the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish governments studied the problems of international development cooperation and offered an agenda and proposals for reform. The project involved the under-secretaries for International development cooperation from each Nordic country, and has become a major initiative pursued by the Nordics to improve the operational activities of development assistance and humanitarian relief through reform of the various agencies and organizations of the UN System involved in these areas. 41

Making Adjustments

While the skeletal practice of Nordic cooperation continues in the General Assembly, and it is even fleshier in the operational bodies, the Nordics clearly have had to adjust to a new mode of cooperation within the United Nations. The number of cooperation partners has not only expanded from 4 or 5 to 15, but the diversity of partners is considerable. Delegates interviewed compared Nordic cooperation to EU cooperation and emphasized the pragmatism that characterizes the Nordic approach. Because there was already a great deal of common ground among the Nordics, cooperation was less about finding common ground than determining how to best utilize resources and energy on various issues. Much of the effort expended during EU meetings is spent finding common ground amongst member-states with often quite divergent views. This is a considerable change from cooperation with Nordic colleagues in which common ground was already in existence.

The style of coordination is somewhat different as well. A member of the Finnish delegation compared the “organic” nature of Nordic cooperation, which was not only intergovernmental but inter-parliamentarian, inter-bureaucratic, inter-municipal and inter-societal, to European cooperation. 42 The multiple contacts across Nordic societies led to high levels of trust, and the commonalties of these societies were expressed in collaboration in international organizations. Nordic cooperation bubbles up at all levels of society. European cooperation, she feels, is different and much effort is spent creating a common European position or policy. Consequently, coordination might reflect a more authoritarian leadership style than the equal and active participation of Nordic cooperation. EU cooperation in the UN is based upon the presidency speaking for the whole Union, and no country should contradict these views. The requirement of one voice speaking on behalf of the EU might encourage member states to sit back and wait until it is their “turn” to assert national priorities rather than the Nordic norm of equal and constant participation of all parties.

One of the pressing questions about the impact of the UN on the Nordic approach to the UN has to do with the independent profile that the Nordics had established which allowed them to

act as bridgebuilders and mediators. Has EU membership entailed a loss of independence from the rest of the "North" and diminished role for Nordic bridgebuilding? Nordic delegates do report a sense of constraint in their "freedom of movement." An anecdotal example was offered by a Swede noted that in 1995, after the French had conducted its nuclear weapons tests, Swedish parliamentarians and citizens went to the South Pacific to protest. Pondering about officials participating in the protest, he reflected, "I don't think that would happen today." The capacity for the EU-Nordics to distinguish themselves from the "rest of the West" and retain an independent role and profile within the world body is uncertain.

While the mechanics and independence of creating a Nordic profile in the United Nations have changed, the substance of Nordic policies has remained constant. All Nordic delegates interviewed were adamant that their core values and positions had not been changed by membership. Swedes, Finns and Danes alike remarked upon the new political configuration across Europe which is largely to the left, and which has enabled the Nordics to find new partners within the European context. All pointed to the happy working relationships they had established with the British within EU cooperation. Rather than adjusting policies toward some European position, Nordic delegates interviewed all claimed that "Europe has become more Nordic." They have reflected that the EU has taken on a bridge-building role in North-South relations based upon its commitment to social development and social policy. Europe is understood to have a more social approach to development than other countries of the North, and the Nordics would like to see this role developed. As one Swede reflected, "There is still a need for bridge-building in the UN, and perhaps Sweden can lead Europe there." What happens when the political alignment in Europe is not so fortuitous is an open question.

National Adaptation

Variant Nordic EU membership has entailed various national strategies and responses to the new cooperative arrangements. Sweden, as the largest and perhaps most dominant member of the Nordic cooperative regime, has perhaps had the greatest difficulty in adjusting to being one in a crowd of fifteen. Swedes seemed to chafe at the constraints of finding an EU position on all issues in the General Assembly. All the Swedes interviewed expressed envy of Norway's continued freedom to pursue an independent course of action. One Swede told an enlightening story in this regard:

My first case of cooperating within the EU context was very revealing. In preparation for the Social Summit in Copenhagen, there was a working group in which the EU president at the time, (name deleted—larger EU country), was to speak on behalf of the EU15. It was understood that no EU member should speak but the president, so that Europe could speak with one voice. We had worked out our positions in advance, but in the working group which was negotiating the language, the representatives from the G-77 (group of developing states) had asked that language relating to the equality and equitable treatment be replaced with 'respect for women.' The presidency said of course we can consider this proposal, and I stood up and said that that was absolutely unacceptable to Sweden. I walked over to my Norwegian colleague and I said I wish to apply for asylum." 

As a neutral country, Sweden's investment in international multilateralism and collective security is quite high. One Swede expressed concern about the regionalization of collective security and the apparent marginalization of the UN in responding to threats to security. He noted that not all regional collective security organizations may be capable of dealing with conflicts, and that it sets a precedence in which the UN may slip into irrelevance in the area of peace and security.

While there may be a few Europeans that share this concern—perhaps the Netherlands—no other European country has invested their security credibility quite so heavily in the UN as Sweden has.

Denmark has adjusted to increased Nordic EU membership with the greatest ease. Long the only Nordic country in the EU, Denmark had to straddle European cooperation and Nordic cooperation regionally and internationally. As European foreign policy cooperation grew more intensive and CFSP more authoritative in the 1990s, Denmark might have had greater difficulty in mediating between these two modes of foreign policy cooperation. The entry of Sweden and Finland has meant that Denmark can avoid the bifurcation of foreign policy coordination, and the Nordic perspective may gain greater attention within European contexts. Denmark can share briefing responsibilities of non-EU Nordic countries with Finland and Sweden.

Finland seems to be the most "Euro-phoric" of all the Nordic countries. The only Nordic first round participant in EMU, Finns seemed to have embraced Europe with enthusiasm. Finnish opinion of European integration and cooperation is much higher than in other Nordic countries. Finland's infatuation with Europe is certainly returned, if the Economist is any sort of barometer. "Many point to them as the very model of how a 'small country' should operate within the EU's institutions: not preachy like the Swedes, not difficult like the Danes... merely modest and purposeful, matching a sense of principle with a sense of proportion."46 Finns, though, are still Nordic. A recent opinion poll of Finns found that 96% of Finns find Nordic cooperation important for Finland, and 93% said that European cooperation was important.47 This same poll, however, found that Finns ranked Nordic cooperation most important for the Finnish economy and for European relationships, but least important in the areas of culture, science and the United Nations. This poll reflects two important points. Finns, being linguistically distinct from her Nordic partners, has always felt less a part of the Nordic cultural wellspring. During the Cold War, Nordic cooperation was practically the only foreign policy tool open to Finns given the sensitivities of the Soviet Union next door. Thus, Nordic cooperation for Finland has may have been more instrumental than affective as it was for the other Nordics. It may be that Finns feel more comfortable than Swedes in the European context because they are accustomed to being the junior partner, and accustomed to cultural distinctions because of their own position in the Nordic cooperative regime.

Nonetheless, decades within the Nordic cooperative regime have shaped Finnish approaches to cooperation. The Nordic approach to cooperation, with its emphasis on equality of participation, consensus and pragmatism are norms that Finns have embraced. Facing the presidency of the EU in the second half of 1999, a Finnish diplomat conveyed concerns about the conflicting styles of EU and Nordic foreign policy cooperation in the UN.

Finland does not have an agenda, but we have priorities we would like to address. We would prefer to act as a facilitator, but I think that often the EU requires a leader. The coordination style has been set by the larger countries which use the EU to pursue national interests. This is not the Finnish or Nordic way.48

Of course, the most difficult national adjustment has been required of the Nordic countries that remain outside the EU. While the Nordic EU members may experience frustrations and time-consuming demands made by EU foreign policy coordination at the UN, perhaps even greater difficulties are experienced by the Norwegian delegates to the UN. Faced with the diminution of Nordic collaboration, the Norwegians have had to scramble to find a new purchase on their place within UN as the EU increases its voice at the cost of a Nordic one.

46 The Economist, March 13, 1999, p. 64.  
Former partners now have considerably busier schedules, and Norwegians have remarked that the biggest struggle is getting information and having influence.\textsuperscript{49} Norway now must operate bilaterally to get information, and the old Nordic division of labor is sorely missed.

Norway has an indirect relationship with the EU, which has bearing on these concerns. With regard to information gathering, Norway is briefed weekly by the Nordic EU members on EU developments at the UN. These weekly Nordic meetings are an opportunity for the Norwegians to raise issues and concerns that the Nordic EU members can raise within the EU’s foreign policy coordination process. As part of the process of integrating associates to the EU, the presidency of the EU at the UN presents associated countries with the common positions and statements; associates are able, if they choose, to support the EU position. Delegates report that Norway does about 30\% of the time.

Another coping strategy has been to begin cooperating with JUSCAN, a group of countries that are the residual members of the UN’s West European and Other group that are not in the EU. JUSCAN includes Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This is obviously not a cohesive group, and the purpose of JUSCAN meetings is an informal exchange of views and information. During sessions, there can be one or more JUSCAN meetings per day. There is no attempt to create common positions, joint statements or anything of the sort. JUSCAN does not negotiate as a group. It is to balance and mediate between the institutional powers of the EU and the G-77 within the UN. Norway benefits from cooperation in JUSCAN because Norway has become an important source of information for the EU Nordics about the positions of those outside the EU.

Norwegians agree that the EU has moved closer to the Nordic position, and hence the problem for them is not as acute as it could have been. Despite the strain of information gathering, one Norwegian remarked that “it’s working better than we could have feared.”\textsuperscript{50}

Conclusion

What has been the impact of variant EU membership on Nordic foreign policies at the UN? The substance of Nordic policies, and the values that they promote remain intact. What has changed is the practice of Nordic foreign policy coordination and the disappearance of an independent Nordic profile within the UN. During the Cold War and the divisive development debates of the 1970s and 1980s, the Nordics played an exceedingly important role in international relations as bridge-builders and mediators, as committed multilateralists and supporters of collective security. Developing states viewed the Nordics as trustworthy and credible allies that also had the respect by their colleagues in the North. The Soviets and Americans benefited from the mediation that Nordics undertook to prevent calamitous international confrontation. This Nordic profile in the first fifty years of the United Nations Organization conferred a reputation of moral rectitude. Whether the respect of the world translated into influence was and is hotly debated, but there was important role and presence that the Nordics held in the global arena of the United Nations.

In the post-Cold War era, the Nordics may be less visible in international relations and in fact there may be less of a need for a neutral, balancing bloc within the United Nations. While less visible, the Nordics may be more influential as the values that they promote—international

\textsuperscript{49} Interview, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, April 1, 1999.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, April 1, 1999.
peace and security, effective international development assistance and humanitarian relief, respect for human rights and the rule of law, environmental protection and sustainable development—find resonance in the EU common policies in the world body. The Nordics were always respected for the positions and principles that they held, but were criticized for having very little influence over others in the developed world. Traditional Nordic values may gain greater currency as the Nordic trademark itself wanes.

Table 1: Nordic Cohesion* on Roll-Call Votes in the General Assembly

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<td>97.3%</td>
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Source: UN Index to Proceedings, 1990-1997

The overall cohesion score reflects the number of votes in which all Nordics voted the same way. National figures reflect the number of votes in which a country voted with the Nordic majority. When two Nordic countries dissented on the same vote, this was only counted as a single non-compliant vote in the overall cohesion score.
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Table 3: Joint Nordic Statements/Documents in the Main Committees of the General Assembly

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### Table 5: Joint European Union* Statements/Documents in the Main Committees of the General Assembly

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*Referred to as European Community through 1993.