THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1981-1991

PART 1: THE RELEVANCE OF SECURITY TO EC DEVELOPMENT

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PART 1: THE RELEVANCE OF SECURITY TO EC DEVELOPMENT

Summary

The intention in the first Part of this study is to construct an initial framework for the analysis of security in the EC and to formulate some tentative hypotheses about the underlying pressures for security cooperation which have characterized the Community's development as an international actor.

Following an introductory chapter on terms of reference and positions taken with regard to a defence identity, a chronological account of the main issues relevant to security cooperation provides the basis for analysis. This analysis takes the form of a discussion of the sociological dimensions of security in the nation state, from which a comparison is then drawn with the main themes in the Community's history. Similar patterns of influence, or pressure, emerge, suggesting some structural similarities between the EC and the nation or federal state, which give rise to them. But there are significant differences, pointing to the way in which the Community has evolved as a distinctive international actor and to the new context in which its need for security is being articulated.

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Introduction

From the mid-1970s, pressures have arisen and questions have been raised about the need for the Community to develop a security dimension in partnership with, or independently of, the Alliance. From the beginning of the 1980s, these questions were being embodied in concrete proposals for integrating security into the EC.

The intention in Part One is to construct an initial framework for studying these proposals in greater detail and explaining their significance. The aim is to formulate some tentative hypotheses about the underlying pressures for security cooperation which have characterized the Community's development as an international actor, and which are expressed in the manifold arguments and proposals which make up the security debate.

Following an introductory chapter on terms of reference and positions on security in the Community, a chronological account of the main issues relevant to security cooperation provides the basis for analysis. This analysis takes the form of a discussion of the sociological dimensions of security in the nation state, from which a comparison is then drawn with the main themes in the Community's history. Similar patterns of influence, or pressure, emerge, suggesting some structural similarities between the EC and the nation or federal state, which give rise to them. But there are significant differences, pointing to the way in which the Community has evolved as a distinctive international actor and to the context in which its need for security is being

articulated.

Some working definitions

Two points of definition need to be made. The term
'security' is used throughout this part of the discussion in
the narrow sense of military security. This follows the
pattern of most commentaries on this topic and, more
important, it respects the terms in which the historical
questions arose in the Community. (The inadequacies of this
definition will be raised in Chapter 4, where the discussion
broadens to the analysis of the concept of security.)

A further problem of definition arises in relation to
the term 'EC security cooperation'. All but one EC member
states already cooperate on security in NATO and the majority
also in the Western European Union (WEU). Canvassing in the
background, so to speak, are two other organizations which
envisage a role in future European security arrangements - the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and
the United Nations. Closer cooperation on security in any or
all of these agencies would not in itself constitute 'security'
cooperation' in the sense intended here. The aspiration to
construct a European Pillar of NATO could be realized either
by a restructuring of NATO with a degree of independence under
Community control, or by a restructuring of NATO with greater
responsibility given collectively to all its European members.
We need some measure of the structural change that would
distinguish what we might call an EC-pillar from a Euro-pillar
- a common Community security competence from a wider European

balance of forces which will determine the outcome of conflict. With the expanding linkage between economic and strategic issues making it increasingly difficult to isolate foreign trade from foreign and security policy, the spillover from military to non-military spheres of action, and from military to non-military spheres of dependence, has inevitably raised the issue of autonomy to a higher level.

A nation's security policy is not explicable only as a response to the physical challenge of external threat and the consequent challenge to the autonomy of the state and its institutions. It is no more fully explained in terms of a felt need for protection than religion is explicable in terms of a felt need for redemption, or education by the need for certificates. The tasks of a security force, the functions it performs, are more extensive than the achievement of its instrumental goals. Its functions include the symbolic purpose of expressing the nation's identity, both in the internal forum and the external.

Military defence in a nation state functions as an identity symbol and as a means of defending the coherence of diverse components of the society - its institutions, ideological make-up, language, culture, ethnic mix etc. The integrity of the whole and the autonomy and cohesion of its parts pose complex problems of security. These are not addressed exclusively by security forces, either at the instrumental or at the symbolic level. But security constitutes one among several institutions and offices which share this dual function in varying ways and to varying degrees. While their role is mainly instrumental - in contrast to a Head of State, whose function is mostly symbolic - their national reach, their

internal cohesiveness as an organization, and their monopoly of force throughout the territory extends their function to the symbolic one of representing the nation's wholeness and identity. The defence forces portray the nation to itself and stand for the sacrifice which all may be called to make in its defence. For that reason, they are displayed universally to underline the national significance of great events. They are the front line and the bottom line on which the survival of the whole ultimately depends.

The symbolic role of the military relates not only to the internal integrity of the society it serves - societal identity - but also to its integrity as a nation in the external forum - national identity. This dual role can be distinguished in terms of different goals in different spheres. Societal identity is related to the protection and representation of the cohesion of the diverse elements and institutions within the state. National identity relates to the external policy of a state and to the cohesion of the different tasks which make up a comprehensive and coherent foreign and security policy.

It is not the instrumental role of military security against perceived external threats which is at issue here. That a nation be capable of defending itself against external challenges to its sovereignty is a basic requirement of international law. A credible security policy serves to symbolize, as well as to defend that sovereignty. Foreign policy and defence policy are intimately related. If it is absurd to have the latter without the former, it is difficult to conceive of a coherent and unified foreign policy in a nation state without some form of defence to implement it.

Community, and the nature of the pressures for a common

defence which arise from the organization's structure. First,

the focus is on the contrary position: the 'defence-

obligatory' viewpoint that a defence identity is axiomatic -

an imperative arising from the nature of the Community within

the international system.

1.1 A defence imperative?

In this view, a common defence is the logical and

necessary outcome of the integration process, without which

the Community cannot realize its objectives in other spheres

of cooperation and cannot achieve the level of integration

implied in its aspiration for a European Union. The failure

to integrate security will likely lead to the unravelling and

disintegration of the Community. This idea derives from two

lines of argument, neither of which is compelling.

1.1.1 The theoretical argument

According to classical neofunctionalism, the process of

integration would lead to automatic progression from economic

to political levels of cooperation. There is an inexorable

logic in the mechanics of integration: the experience of

economic cooperation among the member states creates spillover

pressures which automatically give rise to a shift in

loyalties towards central institutions. These then become the

focus of new political pressures and demands from

transnational elites, bureaucracies and interest groups to

provide the political structures and unity necessary to

circumstances such as the Gulf War are largely explicable, of course, in terms of the instrumental needs of potential allies. But domestically, these demands converge with symbolic purposes.

3.2 The functions of security in the EC

The functions of security ascribed to the nation and federal state - defence against external threat, defence of independence and autonomy, representation of societal and national identity - constitute four levels on which the need for a policy and organization of security rests and from which the pressure for security arises in most states. It is not an option, which the state can exercise or not at the will of particular political leaders. Nor is the pressure for defence solely a military or a political necessity, the one arising from the existence of threats or potential threats to national security and sovereignty, the other from popular perception of military necessity. It is also a sociological need to act as other nations do, in displaying its societal and national identity through the symbol of military power and force.[3]

If one is to draw some parallels with the European Community, care must be taken to respect the different entities being compared. One must be cautious in extending to a Community in transition the properties which create the pressures for security in a nation state. The need for certain institutions or offices to exercise a symbolic role in the nation state arises from a unity already existing, from which the state draws its legitimacy. The Community lacks the centre of authority and legitimacy which the nation state possesses, and by virtue of which its major institutions function as both the object and the agent of unity. Solidarity is achieved in the nation state by the constant interaction which this implies - of human agency and social structure, of institutions and state leadership.[4]

The achievement of political integration in the Community, by contrast, is almost entirely a top-down process, dependent on elites translating interests into longterm visions. What are here described as the functions of security in the EC are the underlying and relatively constant pressures to express and, at the same time, to impose a coherence and an identity which the Community does not yet possess.

It is a matter of judgment how we distinguish between pressures arising from more or less constant socio-economic needs of the Community and 'needs' imposed on the Community by groups and institutions in pursuit of ideological goals. General de Gaulle illustrated the latter case more bluntly with his famously contemptuous dismissal of the grandiose pretensions of the European Commission.[9] In both cases, however, the identification of needs and the attempt to translate them into spillover, or other pressures, for extending the level of integration are a top-down procedure. Political integration in general, including security cooperation, is an elite-driven process, unlike the market- and technology-generated pressure for change in the economic sphere.

Addressing the underlying pressures for security cooperation in the Community, with the model of the nation state in mind, it is immediately clear that the qualifications just made about the lack of existing solidarity and legitimacy in the EC exclude the question of any structural pressure symbolically to represent the internal cohesion of the organization - as de Gaulle discerned. What was noted above under the label of 'societal identity' can only apply to a community which already has an internal identity to reinforce. There remain three areas, therefore, in which similar

pressures to those operating in the nation or federal state may exist. A fourth factor, peculiar to the Community, must be added.

3.2.1 The fear of external threat

It is obvious that member states of the Community have lived with fear of external threat since the start of the Cold War. For most of that period, however, this fear was a major deterrent, not an aid, to the kind of security cooperation under discussion, as the states found NATO rather than the Community to be the appropriate forum for cooperation. The momentum to take more responsibility for West European security under the EC framework began in the 1970s, with the coordination of foreign policy in European Political Cooperation. As has been argued above, EPC must be seen as an embrionic form of security cooperation in the political sphere. Only in 1981, over a year following the NATO Euromissile decision, did the perception of vulnerability to external threat begin to generate moves in the area of military security also. This vulnerability was now being perceived in terms of the lack of American will to deter an attack on European territory and in terms of serious doubts about the strategy and leadership of the United States.

The momentum from these security motives was short-lived. It was stimulated almost entirely by the perceived brinkmanship of the first Reagan Administration. Although the impulse for security cooperation continued after 1984, there is no evidence that its source lay in the traditional concern with security from external threat. The thaw in East-West relations and the rapid unfreezing

of the Cold War, - though within the same bipolar system - removed
the argument of vulnerability from the case for an EC defence.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the unification of
Germany and the democratization of Eastern Europe in 1990 created a
security vacuum and a potential threat to stability which Europe
had not experienced since the Second World War. It is difficult to
disentangle the factors constituting the Franco-German push for a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht and the
readiness of other member states to negotiate it. While the threat
of general instability in Eastern Europe possibly played a positive
role in relation to a CFSP for some member states in the later
stages of negotiations, this is matter for more detailed
documentary analysis. The rhetoric of 'instability' may well
disguise other motives for advancing the cause of a defence
identity. For the French, however, it was likely the more
immediate threat of a unified Germany, reviving the old security
fears, which encouraged their co-sponsorship of the initiative in
April 1990.

3.2.2 The need for independence

Little more needs to be added here to highlight the
significance of security cooperation in the search for greater
independence and autonomy of the Community. As we have seen, the
history of the EC is marked by repeated efforts to resolve the
ambiguity at the heart of its relations with the United States.
The overwhelming need for American protection in the struggle to

establish the institutional base and framework of governance
frustrated the desire of some - above all the French - to liberate
the Community from a dependence which, from the late 1960s,
encroached on its economic performance as well as its security.
Progressively throughout the 1980s, as the lack of security
autonomy was perceived as the source of more general dependence,
its achievement was valued as a means, and not just as an end, of
wresting greater autonomy from the United States.

3.2.3 The need for a European identity

Repeatedly since the 1969 Hague Summit, the need to 'speak
with one voice' and to establish 'a European identity' has been
expressed in treaty agreements, resolutions and declarations of the
Community and the European Parliament. The need 'to demonstrate to
all that Europe has a political vocation' and 'must prepare itself
to discharge the imperative world duties entailed by its greater
cohesion and increasing role' captures the mood and aspirations of
the negotiations leading to the Luxembourg Report on European
Political Cooperation.[6]

The aspirations evident in these phrases reflect a symbolic
concern about the perception of the Community in the world. A
major power in a dense geostrategic space cannot avoid the pressure
- externally, as well as internally - to display the trappings of
power, including the military dimension. As Geoffrey Edwards
writes, the greater the EC's economic power, the more it will be
treated by others as a political entity with demands placed on it
accordingly. This logic will force the EC into acquiring the

traditional trappings of the nation state 'for reasons that do not

always have much to do with any external threat'. [7]   Alfred

Pijpers makes the same point.

> ...the more Europe, collectively, tries to influence the
> outside world, the more the outside world will see it as
> a collective, and treat it accordingly. The EC cannot
> conveniently hope to issue strong declarations on
> European identity and wage worldwide trade wars on the
> one hand, and on the other hand dissolve itself as soon
> as the United States, the contadora-Group, or the PLO
> make their often conflicting political demands. [8]

Germany after - even before - unification is an excellent example

of this logic of a major power, projecting an international

economic identity, being pushed into adopting a political and

military role, over an above the military and strategic exigencies

of any particular occasion. The projection of a global economic

identity by the EC has similar consequences. An economic giant

cannot bathe with its small neighbours in the international pool

without disturbing their environment. Of its nature, the

international system cannot tolerate a mighty economic power which

eschews a role in the security problems in which it is inescapably

implicated.

The three analytic categories, inferred above from the overview of

security-related events and actions of the EC, represent relatively

constant underlying pressures at work in the Community which can

fruitfully serve as a basis of further enquiry. A fourth source of

influence, peculiar to the Community, arises from the particular

character of the EC as a Community in transition. The process of

transition itself -the integration dynamic - gives rise to security

aspirations, over and above the perception of threats, the desire for autonomy and the need for external identity which have been described.

It may be said, of course, that every international actor is in process of transition, as it responds, imperceptibly or dramatically, to changes in its external environment. One may see a similarity between transition within the Community and the transition process which periodically marks a shift in power, status and external orientation in the nation state. The US in 1945 and Germany today are dramatic cases in point. But this similarity is superficial. These are cases where unpredictable international changes forced a reappraisal of foreign policy, but within the existing and continuing framework of the nation state. The Community, by contrast, is in conscious transition from an association of nation states to a new status in the international system, for which there is no exemplar or precedent. It is that self-aware process of transition which gives rise to new integrative pressures which must now be addressed, in which security cooperation plays a significant part.

3.2.4 The integration dynamic

The term 'integration dynamic' is not intended to evoke the neofunctionalist case for automatic progression from economic to political levels of cooperation. It refers to the institutionalization of the integration process whereby sectoral integration becomes a vehicle of further deepening, an instrument of the goal of achieving an 'ever-closer Union'. Thus security is

viewed, not only as a response to the more normal pressures common to other international actors, described above, but also as the means by which a community in transition moves closer to its ultimate shape or destiny. Whether this destiny be a nation state or a federal state, or some entity at a less integrated point on the continuum of international actors, matters less than the fact that the Community is conceived as a _transitional_ actor, in process of achieving a new status. It has already been shown that the security motive has been a profound influence on the origin and development of the EC. The need for security, in other words, has driven the motor of integration. What is at issue here, however, is the obverse relationship: the need for integration giving rise to security cooperation.

There are unlikely to be many cases of pressure for security cooperation being brought to bear explicitly - still less exclusively - on grounds of the integration dynamic. But there are several instances where pressure cannot be explained solely in terms of the normal motives, and where integrationist inferences must be drawn.

One such instance was the relaunching of the Community at the Hague Summit in 1969, with the establishment of European Political Cooperation and the formalization of foreign policy cooperation. While a common foreign policy, to which EPC aspires, does not necessarily entail common defence, it is inextricably linked to those security questions which are one remove from the military. It is impossible that the goal of EPC could be realized without a common position being achieved on a wide range of the political questions which fall under the heading of 'soft' security.[9]

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Although explicit reference to the concept of security would not emerge in any EC agreement until 1981 (The London Report), the founding of EPC in 1970 established the first stage of 'soft' security cooperation on which later stages were built. After the failures of 1954 and 1962, EPC represented a third and successful attempt by the Community to institutionalize the aspiration for a political community.[10] The integrationist motive was clear in the bargaining which secured a measure of political unification in return for enlargement, as Ifestos notes.

> The statements of the European leaders during this
> summit...indicate that there was an accumulation of
> positive political will translated into widespread
> readiness to take steps toward 'strengthening' and
> 'deepening' European integration. An essential element
> in this...was the members' future (common) positions in
> foreign policy issues....EPC was not just a
> circumstantial creation of a new policy, but an intended,
> profoundly important step towards political unity.[11]

In the conditions of the time, EPC was, in the words of the Hague communique,

> the best way of achieving progress in the matter of
> political unification, within the context of
> enlargement.[12]

EPC was a response to other pressures, too, notably the French push for greater independence in relations with the United States. But it was a key element in the general desire to overcome the inertia of the 1960s and to set a new target for integration in the decade to follow.

The 1980s saw the beginnings of yet another attempt to revive the integration impulse in the Community. The Genscher proposal of January 1981 set in motion a sequence of initiatives related to security cooperation which would culminate in the agreement on a Common Foreign and Security Policy at Maastricht in December

1991.[13] While Genscher's advocacy of a security identity noted the deteriorating climate of East-West relations as the concrete motive, his emphasis on Europe's political, rather than economic, needs, indicated his underlying belief that the achievement of a European Union would be served by a common security policy.[14]

Despite the progressive dilution of his proposals, through the London Report in the same year, and the Solemn Declaration on European Union in 1983, the impetus for integration through high-political initiatives was not lost, as Simon Bulmer writes:

> ... the Genscher initiative and ...the Solemn Declaration [were] to sustain progress in cooperation/integration through EPC precisely because this was not possible in the EC arena due to the agricultural/budgetary dispute.[15]

The commitment to move towards a European Union and the belief that a security dimension was inescapably linked to this destiny were not enthusiastically held by all and were strongly rejected by some. But, in however minimalist a form, they survived sufficiently in the 1980s to find expression in Title III of the Single European Act in 1986. By the time of the East European revolution in 1989, the economic success of the SEA had generated such optimism in the future of the Community that further steps in the political aspects of European Union could be contemplated.

The reactivation of the Western European Union in 1984 was clearly motivated more by its intended impact on the process of EC integration than by any perception of its role as a traditional player in the military-strategic game. It was linked to the failure to expand EPC in the defence sector and was viewed - by France, above all - as an instrument of European integration.[16] It revival did not lead to dramatic initiatives on European

defence. Had it done so, it would have given rise to the two-tier
Community which, in principle, it threatened. Such a consequence
would have been more likely had the revival been influenced more by
the traditional perception of security threats and defence needs
than by the integration impulse. But the WEU, in its new
incarnation as an integration symbol and challenge, played a key
role in facilitating the emergence of a commitment to a future
-defence policy at Maastricht.

The catalyst for the announcement of an intergovermental
conference on Political Union, to parallel that on Monetary Union,
was provided by the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold
War. Each of these interrelated events posed different threats to
the security of Western Europe and, in particular, of France. They
provided the justification for the Mitterand-Kohl proposal to the
Irish presidency in April 1990 for a conference on Political Union
which would define a common foreign and security policy in the
light of the new international situation.[17] It is not
immediately apparent that the CFSP was motivated by the need to
integrate the Community, rather than the security vacuum created by
the end of the Cold War. Undoubtedly, security fears were aroused
by German unification, particularly for the French and, to some
extent, the British. But it would be superficial to see the CFSP
as an adequate response. A Common Foreign and Security Policy -
even in the terms of the most maximalist among the Maastricht
negotiators - is only meaningful as a step in a longterm
aspiration for European Union. It would make little sense as a
response to immediate security problems. The traditional language
of security relating to instability and potential threat must be

viewed in the light of the longer-term interests of the Franco-German leadership which used it on the opportune occasion. The events of 1989/90, and the climate within the Community at the time, provided the opportunity for France and Germany to advance their long-established goal of integration with and through security cooperation.

The integration function of security cooperation can be compared with the function of Community law, as Dehousse and Weiler explain it. In European integration, law is usually perceived as a dependent variable, reflecting the socio-economic changes which give the real push to integration. But law is both the object and the agent of integration.

> The legal system is sometimes animated by a dynamic of its own, and one could argue that, even if law is not the main catalyst of change in the integration process, many changes are greatly conditioned by legal and institutional elements.[18]

Similarly security - for the added reason that it has been the most sensitive and jealously-guarded area of high politics - is seldom accorded the status of an independent variable in the dynamics of integration. But it, too, has been an agent as well as an object of the process. Its function, in this regard, derives from the transitional character of an actor in conscious search of a union which, however ill-defined, is a destiny considerably more integrated than its present level of association.

3.3 Conclusions

As already stated, care must be taken not to exaggerate the parallel between the functions of security cooperation in the nation state and in the EC. The term 'function' is not meant to

bear any more weight than 'pressure' or 'influence', deriving from structural features rather than surface strains. The four underlying sources of security-related behaviour are postulated as a necessary part of the framework required for more detailed study of the problem. They are not an exhaustive list of the factors stimulating the move to a defence identity at every level of organization.

In particular, one cannot exclude the spillover mechanism from the pressures for security cooperation. It is likely, for example, that the economic demand for cooperation in the defence industrial field will progressively influence the case for cooperation in the area of defence itself. As further integration proceeds in the areas of arms procurement, technology and research, it is inevitable that the cooperation between national weapons industries and the integration of fragmented markets will trigger the demand for closer harmonization of defence policies and cooperation between defence forces.[19]

2.5 Security cooperation & the end of the Cold War

The initial changes in Eastern Europe took place in the wake of a revival of fortunes for the process of integration and a revival of optimism for the future of the Community. To some extent, the speed with which the satellite countries of the Eastern bloc sought to break their ties with the Soviet Union was accelerated by the hope of closer links and eventual membership of the Community. A European identity beckoned and the most powerful - at the time, even glamorous - expression of this identity was that of the EC. A Franco-German joint letter to the Irish presidency of the Community in April 1990 called for an intergovernmental conference on political union, with a view to implementing 'a common foreign and security policy'.[36] This was approved and the process of achieving further security cooperation was set in train for the summit meeting at Maastricht in December 1991.

The enthusiasm for deepening and the optimism about its successful conclusion at Maastricht, which were palpable in the summer of 1990, were short-lived. The argument of overload becomes all the more persuasive in the uncertainties and instability which rapidly emerged in Central and Eastern Europe. With hindsight, one must judge that Maastricht was ill-prepared and that the security and foreign policy provisions agreed exceeded the capacity of the Community to make them work.

> Governments were overloaded with domestic and international business and, like all overloaded policymakers, left loose ends untied and long-term prospects unexplored.[37]

This was not evident at the time. The Political Union process

at Maastricht was politically irreversible by the time the

bills for ending the Cold War could be assessed. George Ross

notes:

> ...when the EC needed to focus most upon
> consolidating its own internal coherence - the
> deepening imperative - it found itself called upon
> to face a snowball of unforeseen external
> events...An agenda geared to deepening and
> predicated on Cold War stability was suddenly and
> irrevocably challenged.[38]

Little needs to be added here to that snowball and to the

catalogue of new threats which appeared in its wake. The

unravelling of ethnic hatreds in the former Yugoslav

republics, the economic-ethnic crisis of relations between

Czechs and Slovaks, the Ukraine and Russia, Albania and

Greece, Hungary and Rumania, Armenia and Azerbaijan directly

threaten the boundaries of Western Europe. Lawrence Freedman

notes that, in the longer term, there are significant ethnic

and political links between some of these territories and

Germany and France which could exacerbate the asylum problems

already evident and create new tensions between major states

in the European Community.

> It is impossible for one part of a continent as
> compact and densely populated as Europe to
> experience economic and social dislocation on a
> massive scale without the other part being severely
> affected.[39]

Less tangible shifts in political relations may be taking

place, with longer-term implications for the integrationist

agenda. In place of the traditional exchange relationship, in

which European unity served the interests of the US as well as

the EC, there is now an emerging pattern of rivalry at several

different levels of domestic and international politics and

economy which is as likely to divide as to solidify the
members states of the Community. The ending of the division
of Germany has liberated the former FRG from the legal basis
of the political leverage which France exerted over it. In so
doing, it has posed a new German Question in a form more
likely to irritate than to cement the bonds of solidarity
between these core members. In so far as security
cooperation, in particular, owes its dynamism to the
partnership of France and Germany, the end of the Cold War
must place a question over its future progress.

Nonetheless, the agreement concluded at Maastricht
constituted a further step in security cooperation, this time
finally breaking the taboo on defence which had forbidden its
mention in the formal documents for almost forty years. The
Treaty commits the signatories to the formulation of a defence
policy in the future, though without committing them legally
to a common defence. It establishes an organic link between
the Western European Union and the Community, of which it is
now 'an integral part' of its development.[40]

As matters stand with Maastricht, defence cooperation is
still an open question.[41] What has long been an aspiration,
is now explicitly on the agenda, with procedures laid down to
'strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in
all ways', including military defence. From the legal aspect,
what has been achieved in terms of military security is
probably unclear enough to leave open a window of escape for
the neutral EFTA countries who wish to join the Community
without the breaking the last thread on which their permanent

neutrality hangs, viz. non-membership of a military alliance.

Politically, the intention at Maastricht is clearly in
the direction of a closer political union, integrating all
aspects of security. In so far as that intention has been a
constant since the beginnings of the Community, and may
therefore be judged to belong to the acquis politiques, the
neutrals may not feel sanguine about the implications of
membership. But they aspire now to a more diffident
Community, whose step is faltering on the road to a Union
which seemed within reach when they first applied. No one can
now predict that their eventual membership of the Community
will not alter its destiny further. On the eve of the
Maastricht Summit, 'time is not on the side of the architects
of a 'grand design' for the new Europe'.[42]