THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND
THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

In December 1990, the twelve members of the European Community (EC) embarked on an ambitious project of "Political Union" (EPU) designed in priority to progressively unify their foreign and security policies. This initiative came as a response to East European developments, with the need to face up to two main challenges: German unification, and demands for economic and political support from countries of Eastern Europe freeing themselves from communism. German unification required an acceleration of European Economic and Monetary Union and spurred the search for a political structure that would prevent a German drift toward the East. East European demands put the EC under such pressure that they threatened to jeopardize the EC economic integration effort. A framework had to be created to deal with them in a cohesive manner.

With the goal of gradually unifying the foreign and security policies of its member countries, the EC is treading on a territory that did not traditionally belong to her. In the past, European security has relied mainly on the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. With the transformation of Eastern Europe, another institution has raised to prominence: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). After a year of ups and downs in the Soviet Union, a war in the Gulf, and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, there is a broad consensus that the new European security system will require both the CSCE and NATO, the CSCE to build a "European peace system" based on democracy, economic interdependence, and mutual confidence; and NATO to guard against resurgent military threats both within and outside Europe, and as the tangible mark of the security bond existing between the United States and Europe. Every European country, including the Soviet Union, agrees that
the U.S. should be a participant in the European security system, although there might be differences on the specific form this participation should take.

Thus the Political Union project is potentially a challenge for both NATO and the CSCE. It is a challenge for NATO because it questions the traditional structures of the Atlantic Alliance which have relied for more than 40 years on uncontested American leadership. These internal tensions are compounding the pressure for NATO to adapt resulting from the changing external security environment.

For the CSCE, it is a challenge because of the potential contradiction between the reinforcement of Europe as a Western entity implied in the EPU project, and the pan-European nature of the cooperation attempted in the CSCE. The EC has been very supportive of the CSCE since its very beginning and remains at the forefront of initiatives to support East European democratic development and adaptation to a market economy. But there is a real risk that strengthening political ties in the West might increase the gap between the EC and other European countries, including both the members of EFTA, four of which are neutral\(^1\), and the former communist nations.

These tensions will be at the root of our investigation. We will try to bring elements of response to two main questions: 1) How can the EPU project be made compatible with the maintenance of the transatlantic bond that has been, and remains one of the pillars of the European security system? 2) What are the conditions for EPU to be compatible with the ambitions of the EC to become the core of the new pan-European order? The debate is still at its inception. It will be shaped partly by broader international developments, not the least by future events in the Soviet Union. However, it is not too early to lay out the parameters that will determine the position of the EC in the new European security architecture.

\(^1\) The members of EFTA are: Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway. The first four are neutral.
I. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The potential for conflict in the Atlantic Alliance created by the EPU project has been highlighted by a series of warnings sent by the Bush Administration to the members of the EC and the Western European Union (WEU) since European plans for cooperation in security and defense policy began to take shape at the end of 1990.² While declaring its support for "an enhanced European security and defense role," the U.S. Government has insisted on adding the qualification "provided it is supportive of the Atlantic Alliance,"³ and spelled out a number of conditions that would fulfil this requirement⁴.

To the Europeans, the American attitude, at least in its perceived aggressiveness, is somewhat puzzling. It has been a consistent feature of U.S. policy since the creation of NATO's integrated military command in the early 1950's to encourage European unity on the assumption that a strong Europe would translate into a stronger contribution to the security of the Alliance. The Bush Administration itself has made the support of European integration an important feature of its foreign policy from its very first days.⁵ But, as well documented by William Cromwell, "public rhetoric notwithstanding, U.S. policy has often manifested reserve, suspicion, and even hostility toward the idea of a European pillar, particularly though not exclusively in matters of security and


defense - traditionally the turf of NATO.⁶ As long as the Cold War lingered, efforts to develop an independent European defense identity were subdued; the most daring of them failed. Despite periodical revivals of the "burdensharing" debate, no government on either side of the Atlantic seriously entertained the idea of modifying NATO's structures to give Europe larger responsibilities. As a consequence, American leadership in the Atlantic Alliance remained unchallenged.

But today, the world has changed. The conditions that presided to the establishment of the Atlantic Alliance more than 40 years ago no longer hold: the Soviet threat has faded, European economic potential matches that of the United States, European integration within the EC is proceeding at an accelerated pace under the triple drive of the 1992 Single Market plan, the Economic and Monetary Union scheme, and the creation of "Political Union." As a result, the Atlantic Alliance will have to adapt, increasing the relative weight of the Europeans and decreasing the weight of the North Americans in its structures and decisions.

In order to discover how this can be done, it is necessary to: 1) analyze the content and objectives of the EPU project; 2) spell out the potential bones of contention in the Atlantic Alliance created by the project.

A. THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION PROJECT

1. A gradual process

It is important to emphasize at the outset the gradual nature of the EPU project. EPU is not a blueprint; it is a goal to be pursued. The process is designed to be essentially pragmatic, each step being followed by an assessment before a further step is taken. Because of this characteristic, EPU is likely to encounter difficulties and setbacks, phases of acceleration, and possible

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reorientations. Nevertheless, the members of the EC are determined that there should be no "taboo" subjects in the discussions of the European Council devoted to political issues, and that EPU has a vocation to deal with all aspects of foreign and security policy, including defense.

One of the strongest guarantees of the gradual nature of the process is the inter-governmental character of the EPU project. Both the Council's position, as outlined in the December 1990 Rome communiqué, and the Commission's draft proposal for a common foreign and security policy circulated at the end of February 1991 entrust the European Council with exclusive decision-making authority in foreign and security policy, while making room for joint initiative by the Commission and consultations with the Parliament. As far as decision making is concerned, both provide that the general guidelines of the common foreign and security policy should be established by the Council on the basis of consensus. Even the federally-minded Commission upholds unanimity voting (with possible abstention) for the definition of the principles of the common security and defense policy, although it would expand qualified majority voting to other areas of foreign policy. Both the Commission and the December 1990 ministers' document leave the Council in charge of defining the procedure for decision-making on implementation of the agreed policies, thus preserving the option that unanimity will remain the rule down to the lowest level on sensitive issues. At the same time, progress toward a more supranational mode of decision-making is left open with the option of expanding the scope of qualified majority voting. These strong built-in guarantees should ensure that the sovereignty of nation-states is not jeopardized.

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8 European Commission, ibid., articles Y3 and Y13.
2. The scope of the common foreign and security policy

On that basis, a consensus had developed that a number of domains belonging to the political aspects of security could be earmarked for early joint action. The December 1990 European Council communiqué singles out:

Arms control, disarmament and related issues; CSCE matters; certain questions debated in the United Nations, including peace-keeping operations; economic and technological cooperation in the armaments field; coordination of armaments export policy, and non-proliferation. 9

The European Commission goes somewhat further, adding the establishment of a common armaments R&D policy. However, this is unlikely to be acceptable to the Council because a common armaments R&D policy would give the Commission oversight over defense industrial policy -- currently limited by Article 223 of the Rome Treaty -- something which is perceived by EC governments as jeopardizing their sovereignty on defense issues. However, the growing involvement of the Commission in defense production and trade through its general industrial policy and the application of Common Market regulations to non defense specific items may be an incentive for EC governments to step up their efforts to coordinate their procurement and R&D policies. This would make sense, in particular if they plan to adopt common arms export and non-proliferation policies.

EC involvement of these fields, as well as in United Nations security activities and arms control would represent a significant deepening and broadening of the cooperation process over the current "European Political Cooperation" (EPC) framework, although limited cooperation in the "security basket" of the CSCE is already taking place.

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3. Defense

Most EC governments, with the possible exception of federalist Belgium, are not ready to embrace the creation of a European defense structure that would supersede national military establishments. Before a full-fledged European defense policy can be implemented, several obstacles will have to be lifted: countries like Britain and France, which are former colonial powers, members of the UN Security Council, and owners of nuclear deterrent forces, are wary of entering a system that may constrain their ability to assume what they consider as their worldwide security responsibilities; transitional or special arrangements will have to be found to accommodate membership of the neutral countries in an EC that would be endowed with a comprehensive defense policy; the reluctance of Germany to become involved in military action outside the borders of Europe will have to be overcome because a European defense identity makes no sense without German participation.

Given these obstacles, it seems easier to start from existing realities, i.e., national armed forces, and progressively work on coordinating their missions and structures.¹⁰ All European governments agree that the best place for an initial effort is the Western European Union (WEU). However, they disagree on the issue of the relationship that the WEU should entertain with the EC on the one hand, and with NATO on the other hand.

1) One group of countries see the WEU primarily as a part of the European integration process. This is the position advocated by the French and German Governments in a letter submitted by Foreign Ministers Genscher and Dumas to their colleagues on February 4, 1991. This is also the view supported by

¹⁰ As suggested by French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas: "Dumas Pledges To Back U.S. Mideast Efforts," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report West Europe, No.49, March 13, 1991, p.21 (Further references to this source will be abbreviated under the form: FBIS-WEU-#).
Spain, Italy, Belgium and Greece, as well as by EC Commission President Jacques Delors.\textsuperscript{11}

The Genscher-Dumas letter states that:

The work of WEU should be organized in order to establish organizational relations between Political Union and WEU, thus enabling the WEU, with a view to being part of Political Union in course, to progressively develop the European common security policy on behalf of the Union.\textsuperscript{12}

Although less ambitious than a plan put forward by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis in September 1990 for an immediate merger of the EC and the WEU\textsuperscript{13}, the Franco-German proposal makes it clear that the WEU shall have no future of its own, but only survive as a part of EC institutions. A first consequence is that EC and WEU membership should be harmonized as soon as possible, with Greece and Denmark becoming members of the WEU at the earliest possible date.\textsuperscript{14} A second consequence is that the Union treaty to be agreed upon in 1991-92 should include a review commitment. The Genscher-Dumas letter foresees this review for 1996, a timing that would allow for completion by 1998, to correspond with the lapse of the original fifty year lifetime of the WEU founding treaty (Brussels Treaty).

Other countries, most prominently Britain and the Netherlands, want the European Treaty to remain noncommittal on the future relationship of the two


\textsuperscript{13} "Italian Foreign Minister Proposes Military Dimension for EC," The Financial Times, September 19, 1990, p.4.

\textsuperscript{14} The last non-WEU EC member, Ireland, being neutral, special arrangements will have to be found. See discussion in part II.
institutions. Nevertheless, all EC countries have agreed that a link should be established in the new Union Treaty between the EC and the WEU. But the nature of this link remains disputed. The Netherlands, with the support of Britain, rejects the idea of placing the WEU "under the aegis" or "under the direct authority" of the European Council, feeling that this would go too far in anticipating the future absorption of the WEU by the EC.

A compromise is attempted in the draft treaty submitted by the Luxembourg presidency to the EC Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union on April 15, 1991. However, this draft remains rather vague. It suggests that:

The Union's decisions regarding security which have implications for defense can be fully or partially implemented within the framework of the WEU. But it leaves the details to an accompanying general political declaration of the WEU governments stating their intention to cooperate with the European Union, and to a document spelling out concrete steps for coordination.

2) The competing view is that of the WEU as NATO's "European pillar."

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17 The following steps have been identified: synchronization of the dates and places of meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers and of the ministerial level meetings of the Council of the Political Union dealing with security policy; harmonization of the sequence and duration of the presidencies of the two institutions; establishment of regular contacts between the WEU General Secretariat and the General Secretariat of the EC Council; development of links between the European Parliament and the WEU Parliamentary Assembly; "The Future of European Security and Defense Cooperation," op.cit., pp.8-9.
Here the primary consideration in defining the future status of the WEU is that NATO should remain the main forum for planning and consultation on defense matters affecting the Alliance.

At the political level, this means that the WEU would serve to articulate a more distinctive European perspective in the Alliance. European positions would be discussed in the WEU and the outcome of the debate would later be introduced as contributions to deliberations in the Alliance, which would make final decisions.\textsuperscript{18} Concertation in the WEU should take place with enough transparency so that it would not present other NATO members with "faits accomplis."

At the military level, this means that the Alliance's force structure should be reorganized in order to make room for a distinct European component. This European component could be shaped as part of a NATO "rapid reaction force" to be used for contingencies in Europe, while European elements of the force could intervene under WEU auspices outside Europe.

This perspective can be summarized by saying that the WEU should work as a \textit{bridge} between NATO and the EC. In that case, the new Union treaty could establish a formal link between the WEU and the EC, but this should not come at the expense of existing Atlantic arrangements. The WEU should be able to exercise its bridging role \textit{permanently}, in equidistance between the EC and NATO. At the very least, the Union treaty should not anticipate the future of the WEU-EC linkage.

A direct implication of the "bridge" concept is that there is a need for close coordination of developments in the EC and in NATO. Since February-March 1991, European security and defense cooperation projects have been recognized as meaningful enough to justify this coordination. The role of a Western European defense entity is now being thoroughly discussed in the context of the

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.7.}
NATO strategy review launched in July 1990.19 But as shown by the discussions in the early months of 1991, many issues remain in dispute.

B. THE EUROPEAN UNION, COMPETITOR FOR NATO?

The bones of contention have been highlighted in several speeches of U.S. officials and several messages sent by the U.S. Government to the Europeans since December 1990. As a condition for its support to the European defense effort, the Bush Administration sets three requirements:

- European initiatives should not duplicate the Alliance.

- NATO should remain the main decision-making forum for security and defense policies affecting the whole of the Alliance.

- Members of the Alliance which are not members of the EC or the WEU should not be marginalized.20

These conditions correspond broadly to the three major areas of dispute issues in the NATO strategy review.

1. The danger of duplication

A risk of duplication arises from the potential desire of the EC to deal with security threats that have traditionally be handled by NATO, according to Articles V & VI of the Washington Treaty (the Atlantic Alliance founding treaty), which commit the parties to assist each other, including with the use of armed force, in case of an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America.


The dispute does not regard threats coming from the Soviet Union, which, however remote they may be in the present circumstances, would be taken up by the Alliance as a whole, but has to do with possible security problems arising in Eastern Europe. Could Western Europe decide that some of these problems are entirely a European affair, which should be dealt with without external participation? France, and Spain would like to be able to respond "yes." Germany may support them. But the United States and some other NATO allies want to exclude the hypothesis of independent West European security initiatives in Eastern Europe because they fear that they could be drawn into a conflict with the Soviet Union as a consequence of decisions in which they would have had no part, with the always possible danger of military escalation.

Rather than articulating theoretical positions, it seems more fruitful to look at the concrete situation in Eastern Europe. In the near to medium term, it is difficult to conceive of a conflict in the region that would require a Western military intervention. Border or ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe could be handled in a CSCE and possibly, United Nations, framework, or through ad hoc arrangements. If there were a need to send military forces to Eastern Europe to enforce an embargo, protect a threatened ethnic group, or separate warring factions, Western governments would make sure to have full Soviet backing before their undertake the operation. Consultations would then occur not only among Alliance members, but also with other countries involved in the CSCE process. It may be decided that it is politically more appropriate to send a European-only force, which would intervene under UN or CSCE mandate, possibly using NATO infrastructure. But it is highly unlikely that there would be a unilateral action either by NATO or by a West European defense entity to meet a security threat in Eastern Europe. The issue of duplication cast in that light is thus mainly rhetorical.

2. Security threats external to Europe

In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there were calls from NATO and U.S. officials for NATO to move beyond its current treaty limitations to
take up security problems arising out of Europe. But these calls met with such a strong resistance from some European countries, most prominently France, Germany and Spain, that the concept seems to have been abandoned in the strategy review. On the other hand, it is obvious that in the future, most of the threats to European security will come from outside Europe.

To solve this dilemma, over the winter 1990-91, the idea has emerged that there could be a "division of labor" between a European defense entity and NATO, with NATO taking care of European security threats and Europe developing capacities to intervene out of Europe, in areas where NATO is precluded to operate for political reasons. This idea, originally put forward by the British, now seems to be gathering support in the United States after an initial period of caution.

But from the perspective of European integration, this model has a major drawback: it limits the European defense identity to be the "European pillar of NATO." This implies that there would be no independent European defense policy and that any employment of a European force would be subject not only to preliminary NATO consultations, but to NATO decisions.

This, of course, is a distant problem. As demonstrated in the Gulf war, for the moment, the Europeans do not have the capacity, nor the training, nor the inter-operability, nor the reconnaissance capabilities for large scale interventions out of Europe without U.S. support. However, some European countries see the issue as a matter of principle: if there is to be a European defense structure at the disposal of a political entity called Europe, this means that this structure should not be limited in its action by preliminary NATO decisions. In particular:

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a) The European force should not be arbitrarily restricted to interventions outside Europe; b) Its employment should not be bound to mandatory consultations in the Alliance, nor to a general pledge to abide by their outcome, even if in practice, there is broad agreement that consultations are likely.

The military plans currently being studied in NATO obviously discuss a potential European contribution only in terms of the "European pillar" approach. There are no alternative schemes to develop a European defense force in the near future for both political and practical reasons. On the one hand, the Europeans disagree among themselves on the nature and missions of the European defense identity. On the other hand, no European entity has planning structures that can match those of NATO. Joint military action cannot be improvised. It requires coordination of force planning, joint maneuvers and exercises, standardization of equipment and, maybe most importantly, reconnaissance and intelligence capacities.

The WEU would be the most appropriate setting to start working on these issues. Before this has been done, there is little point for the Europeans in pretending to act independently from NATO in the military field.

3. NATO consultations and the danger of marginalization

This issue can be broken down in two interrelated problems linked to the scope of the consultations and the consultation procedure.

a. The scope of consultations

In the past two years, there has been attempts led by the U.S. Government to expand the scope of NATO consultations. A functional expansion was sought after the 1989 revolutions, as it seemed that NATO was losing its legitimacy as a military alliance.23 The Gulf crisis has stimulated pressures to expand NATO

consultations geographically, to deal with security threats arising out of Europe. The latter efforts rest on the argument that in the future, NATO's role will be more and more one of "crisis management" and less and less one of straightforward military response to an identified threat. They find a legal justification in Article IV of the Washington Treaty, which provides for consultations among the members of the Alliance "whenever, in the opinion of any of [the Parties], the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." This commitment is not bound by the same geographic limitations than the mutual assistance commitment of Article V.

U.S. attempts to expand NATO's attributions are not new. They have been prominent, for example, in the "Year of Europe" initiative of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1973. But the Europeans have always been wary of broadening NATO's responsibilities because they have feared that this would transform NATO into a kind of "U.S.-controlled directorate for world affairs." In the past, their rejection was largely based on a refusal to view all issues primarily through the prism of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation and to become entangled in the worldwide competition of the superpowers. In the future, how supportive the Europeans will be of U.S. global initiatives is likely to depend on whether U.S. policies are faithful to the cooperative approach outlined by President Bush in his vision of a "New World Order."  

b. Consultation procedure

The emergence of a European defense identity could disturb the NATO consultation process in two ways. First, a "European caucus" could develop within NATO, depriving the organization of its flexibility. U.S. Administration officials, who raise this concern, refer to the GATT trade negotiations, to some CSCE discussions, or to the more recent experience of the constitution of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), where the United States has been presented with non-negotiable European positions. A second,

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related risk, is that some of the allies may be marginalized in the process. This is true for the United States, but still more for the members of NATO that are neither members of the EC or the WEU, especially Norway and Turkey. An isolation of these two countries would be all the more damaging to European security that they are the only members of NATO to share a common border with the Soviet Union. In addition, Turkey is the European gate to a troubled Middle East.

There is no magic solution to these dilemmas. It is, however, possible, to suggest a few avenues worth pursuing to make room for a European security identity, while preserving the transatlantic bond.

C. BRIDGING THE GAP

The point of departure in a search for solutions consists in drawing a distinction between the commitment made in the Treaty of Washington to defend the fundamental values of Western civilization, which are the glue of the transatlantic relationship and have also been accepted as the philosophical underpinning of the "common European home," and the specific, historical shape taken by this defense commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Once this distinction has been accepted, three requirements will have to be met.

1) There should be a commitment of both the Europeans and the U.S. to early consultations on all security threats to the Alliance.

This has two implications for the Europeans. First, they will have to fully acknowledge that in the future, European security will largely depend on events occurring outside Europe. As a result, consultations with the United States on worldwide security threats will become more frequent. It can be argued that the stronger European foreign policy cohesion becomes, the lesser the risk of being subordinated to unilateral U.S. initiatives. Second, transparency would require that issues be consulted in NATO before a European consensus has taken final

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22 Scowcroft, op.cit.
form, so as to avoid the risk of a divisive European block being created within NATO. But as European unity proceeds, it is inevitable that the Europeans speak more and more with a unique voice in the Alliance. This will be an incremental process leading to a gradual rebalancing of the European and American weights in the Alliance. But in the near future, as long as European security decisions remain the result of an intergovernmental process, the risk for the United States to be confronted with a non-negotiable European position will be much smaller than in other fora such as the GATT trade talks, where a single actor, the European Commission, is negotiating on behalf of all twelve member states.

In return for European flexibility, the United States presumably will have to invite consultations in NATO before reaching interagency accord, and to avoid making unilateral decisions. Although Europeans are, as a rule, rather satisfied with the way the Bush Administration operates, they recall with apprehension the Reagan era, when important security decisions regarding Europe were made without their consent, or even without their being informed. They would like to obtain firm guarantees to edge against the return of a less cooperative U.S. Government.

On the other hand, the Europeans seem justified to resist U.S. pressures to expand consultations in the Atlantic Alliance framework to other than security issues. Other fora, such as the CSCE or strengthened U.S.-EC bilateral relations would be more appropriate to deal with economic, environmental or other issues. In that perspective, it might be desirable to enhance EC-U.S. bilateral links beyond the provisions of the modest "Transatlantic declaration" signed on November 20, 1990.\(^{26}\)

2) It will be necessary to establish special arrangements to avoid the isolation of Norway and Turkey from the new European security identity. An end to Norway’s isolation may occur with Norwegian accession to the EC, which

is predicted by a number of analysts for the mid' or end 1990s. Turkey's specific situation, however, is likely to endure longer than Europe can afford to deny the country a special place in European security arrangements. An information mechanism between Turkey and the WEU exists since the mid' 80s, and Turkey, as well as other European non-WEU countries, has been invited to send representatives to some WEU meetings devoted to the Gulf crisis. In the future, it may be desirable to go beyond these ad hoc invitations and to grant Turkey and Norway some form of observer status or associate membership in the WEU.

3) A third element of solution will consist in making military arrangements more flexible, taking advantage of the fact that in the new security situation characterized by a variety of multidimensional risks, the premium will be on discrimination in the political and military response to crises.

The project of a "rapid reaction force" that could wear at times a NATO "hat," at other times, a WEU "hat," and in still other instances, remain under national command, seems to offer sufficient flexibility to meet the requirements of a European defense identity, to retain a clear connection with NATO and to allow for French participation when it operates under WEU command. To the extent that the new structures will emphasize inter-operability over integration, they will be more acceptable for the French, who have restated their determination not to rejoin NATO's integrated military command.27

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The debate of the respective role of the Europeans and the United States in NATO is being carried out with little consideration of the present security situation in Europe. Western governments do acknowledge that the strengthening of democracy and the creation of viable economic systems will do more for the security and stability in Eastern Europe than military arrangements. However, there sometimes seems to be a disconnect between the

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support of economic and political reform in the East and the project of developing a Western European defense identity. The risk cannot be excluded that, regardless of the relationship between the EC and NATO, the new arrangements will reinforce the West European character of the EC's efforts at the expense of the creation of a pan-European security system.

II. EUROPEAN UNION AND A PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

The decision to accelerate the pace toward Political Union seems to indicate that the debate over "deepening" versus "widening" has been solved in favor of the former. However, if "widening" has been postponed, at least until 1993, it is in no way a foregone option, if only because the constant pressures of EFTA and East European countries will force the EC to confront their applications for membership sooner rather than later. But the question needs to be asked whether "deepening" through Political Union will not make it more difficult in the future for the EC to take in new members. Part of the response will depend on EC foreign policy positions in the CSCE process.

A. EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION AND EC MEMBERSHIP

For analytical purposes, it is useful to look successively at two categories of potential future EC members: neutral EFTA countries, and East European countries, primarily Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

1. Neutral countries

The difficulty created for neutral states by the development of a common foreign and security policy is not only an issue for the future. It is already being posed by the presence in the EC of one neutral state, Ireland. However, the magnitude of the problem is likely to be compounded by access to the EC of a series of neutral states: Austria in 1993 or 1994, Sweden shortly thereafter, and eventually Finland and Switzerland. The EC has not made the abandonment of neutrality a condition for membership, although individual EC officials have declared that "the EC cannot permit itself to be neutralized by the accession of
a neutral country. Austria, for its part, has already endorsed the EPU objectives, including the security dimension, however upon the assumption that there will be no such thing as a European federal army, and the Swedish Government does not seem to see its neutrality as an obstacle to its membership application, although it has also expressed reservations on the development of a military dimension in the EC.

A number of observers suggest that with the end of the Cold War, the traditional concept of neutrality has lost its meaning and that the position of neutral countries will have to evolve in such a way that it can be rendered compatible with the emergence of a European security identity. A demonstration of the changing nature of the neutrality concept was made by Austria during the Gulf war when the country granted overflight rights for military planes and allowed the use of its territory for the transit of tanks headed for the anti-Iraqi front. Following this example, it could be conceived that neutral countries participate in EC security operations at least when they are mandated by the United Nations or, in the future, possibly by a beefed-up CSCE.

It is possible, however, to sustain the opposite view and to argue that the development of an EC security and defense policy will make it more difficult for neutral countries to access EC membership. It is a view often defended on the left of the political spectrum. At government level, it is the position of

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31 See, for example, Mike Gapes, After the Cold War, Building on the alliances, Fabian Society, London, September 1990, p.15.
Denmark, which is trying to promote EC membership of its Nordic neighbors and also advocates a close association with East European countries.  

The more the EC develops a defense dimension, the higher the barriers to neutral countries' access to membership. This would be particularly the case if the WEU became part of the European Union. Here, ironically, there is a meeting of minds between those who want to leave EC membership open to neutral countries and those who want to build a strong European defense identity. Both oppose the harmonization of EC and WEU membership, the former in order not to shut the EC door to the neutrals, the latter because they fear that an overlap of memberships would weaken the European defense identity and dilute its cohesion. They argue that even if special arrangements were made to accommodate neutral states, their views would weigh on the Council's decisions. Further, others raise the hypothesis that if the European defense identity were closely associated with NATO, this may give an indirect say to neutral countries in NATO decisions. It could also mean that NATO may be implicitly drawn to extend security guarantees to a number of nations that would neither have the will, nor the means to reciprocate.

All of these reasons seem to indicate that in an interim period, it might be desirable to keep WEU membership limited to those EC members which are willing to make a strong commitment to a common defense. In the meantime, interim solutions could be found to allow the selective association of neutral countries to EC decisions on the political (vs military) aspects of security. Most EPU proposals put forward either by individual governments or the EC Commission provide for abstention on decisions pertaining to security and defense, and exemption from their execution, provided that the abstaining member refrains from any action that would be detrimental to the course pursued by the European Council. In the longer term, it is hoped that the

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integration process will create pressure on the Irish and other potential neutral members for them to reexamine their position and eventually accept participation in a full-fledged European security and defense identity.

2. Eastern Europe

The problems raised by membership of former Soviet satellites in a European Union endowed with a security and defense policy do not have to be solved immediately. According to most observers, access to the EC by Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia is unlikely before the end of the decade. But it is not too soon to think about the issue, especially because the association agreements currently under negotiation with these three countries will explicitly hold the promise of full EC membership.34

There is little doubt that East European governments would welcome the development of a strong EC security dimension as a means to fill the security vacuum in which they perceive themselves. Their active policies of rapprochement with NATO demonstrate their quest for Western security guarantees. In the absence of clear cut NATO response, they are looking for alternatives. The European Union is but a distant one. However, a clear sign that they would like to keep open the option of joining a West European defense entity is given by the refusal of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria to include in new cooperation treaties currently negotiated with the Soviet Union a clause stating that neither country will participate in any alliance directed against the other.35

Western governments see the problem from a different angle. For them, membership of East European countries in an EC with a full-fledged security and defense policy raises two dangers. The first is the risk of antagonizing the

op.cit., Articles Y3, Y13.


Soviet Union, which is the very reason why NATO has resisted East European demands for formal Western security guarantees. The second relates to the extent of the security guarantees that the EC may be ready to give to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

To the extent that a West European defense entity would not carry the same Cold War image as NATO, it may be more acceptable to Moscow. But the image carried by the European defense identity will largely depend on how its relationship to NATO is perceived. If it is seen as a simple appendix of NATO, East European membership will be more difficult. If on the contrary, it is understood as the emanation of an autonomous political entity, East European membership is much less likely to raise Soviet apprehensions.

But as long as the Soviet Union has not conclusively taken the path to democracy, West European countries are unlikely to be willing to provide their East European neighbors with firm security guarantees similar to the ones they offer each other through the mutual assistance commitment of the Brussels Treaty. And if the defense component of the European security identity were closely integrated in NATO through the WEU, East European membership in the EC would probably be opposed by other NATO members because this would indirectly compel NATO to provide these countries with security guarantees that they have been formally denied. As in the case of neutral countries, these considerations argue for maintaining defense in the WEU and keeping the EC integration process limited to non-military affairs, in order not to jeopardize the EC’s chance for close cooperation with the East.36

The weight of these arguments, of course, depends heavily on the future course of the Soviet Union, which is impossible to predict over a ten year time span. In the meantime, it seems possible to explore transitional solutions. For example, political consultations between the EC and Czechoslovakia, including the discussion of security issues, have already started and will be stepped up in

the framework of the new association agreements.\textsuperscript{37} It may be desirable to expand them to other countries and to frame the association agreements in such a way that a gradual expansion of the security consultations over time may be possible. Another option would be to associate East European countries to proposals put forward by the EC in the security discussions of the CSCE (see below). There are also suggestions for developing an information mechanism between the WEU and some East European countries similar to the one existing with Turkey and Greece. In addition, it might be possible to invite these countries to participate in some WEU meetings.\textsuperscript{38} There is a very strong case for associating East European countries with the work of the WEU at least at the same level as they are developing their relations with NATO.

B. EPU AND THE CSCE PROCESS

The EC has been very active in the CSCE process since its inception.\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, it is possible to argue that the CSCE process and EC's political unification have been mutually reinforcing. Without the EC's impetus in the preparation of the Helsinki Final Act between 1973 and 1975, it is unlikely that the CSCE would have been born at all. In turn, the launching of the CSCE, together with the 1973 Middle East crisis, have been the testing grounds for the development of European Political Cooperation. Later, it is largely because of the commitment of the Europeans that the CSCE process did not break down when the tensions between the superpowers reached a new peak in 1980-1983. The Europeans have also succeeded in keeping the cohesion between the political and human aspects of the CSCE on the one hand, and its military

\textsuperscript{37} "EC To Complete 'Super-Association' Agreements," in FBIS-WEU-90-248, December 26, 1990, p.2. As a result, consultations on political issues will go further with the East European countries than with EFTA.


aspects on the other hand, while the Soviet Union despised the former and the United States was not interested in the latter. European, and particularly German interest in arms control has been instrumental in expanding the CSCE's purview to the Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) negotiations in 1987-88.\textsuperscript{40} The Europeans have also been very active in the CSCE negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), although the development of joint positions by EC members has been precluded by the military dimension of these negotiations. However, in many cases, Western Europe has succeeded in profiling itself as the lead mediator between the superpowers, with the active support of neutral and East European countries.

The extent to which the EC will use its newly acquired political cohesion to promote the CSCE process may be a key to the construction of a new, cooperative European security architecture. EC members may not be of one mind on the issue. One of the reasons why Germany has accepted accelerated (Western) European integration, in addition to making German unification admissible to its EC partners, is that it will make it easier for them not only to accept German opening to the East, but also to bring their support for the desired rapprochement. Thus, EPU will create a framework for a "European Ostpolitik." Germany's economic weight will make it very difficult for any other EC country to successfully resist this trend. On the other hand, French support for European integration stems very much from Paris desire to anchor Germany in the West. President Mitterrand's vision of a "European Confederation" based on the EC differs from the German concept of the pan-European security system. Implicit in the French vision is the judgment that a pan-European system based on the CSCE would be a system of states with equal rights and weights, devoid of cultural moorings, floating in a kind of political and philosophical "no man's land." On the contrary, a European Confederation would have a hierarchy and a clear identity, both being provided by its anchoring in

\textsuperscript{40} The CFE negotiations were carried out in the CSCE framework between the 22 members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, with a reporting mechanism to other CSCE participants. Open on March 9, 1989, they were concluded by the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in Paris on November 19, 1990.
the EC, the core and pillar of the system. European countries which have not reached the same level of democratic and economic development as the core EC nations, as well as countries that are not geographically situated in Europe, such as the United States and Canada, may belong to the system, but only with a lesser status. The primacy of the EC in President Mitterrand's vision largely explains that the French have at times backed the U.S. resistance to a strengthening of the CSCE.

But there is wide room for maneuver before the CSCE becomes a competitor for the EC. It may even be that an active role in the CSCE would help the EC profile itself as a meaningful international political actor, as it has happened at the birth of EPC in the early 1970's. There are several steps that the EC could take to foster cooperation in the security field with Eastern Europe while reinforcing its own political cohesion.

1) The EC could invite East European countries to present joint positions in the CSCE arms control and military confidence building process. 2) It could support Eastern proposals to reinforce the efficiency of the CSCE, something that is already being done by individual Western nations. For example, a Czech proposal to develop a mechanism for emergency high level meetings to deal with threats to security in Europe, which will be submitted to the June 19-20, 1991 CSCE ministerial meeting in Berlin, will be cosponsored by Germany, Hungary, and Poland, and is also supported by France. 3) Going further, the EC could sponsor specific confidence and security building measures applicable in Eastern Europe that would be guaranteed by all of the other CSCE participants. If and when it develops a military dimension, the EC could make it clear that its forces could be put at the service of the United Nations or of a reinforced CSCE for peacekeeping or other operations.

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41 This mechanism would be designed to face broader security threats than the existing emergency mechanism dealing with "unusual military activities." It would, for example, encompass such occurrences as the Soviet use of force in the Baltics in January, to which, according to most CSCE members, the emergency mechanism for "unusual military activities" did not apply.
CONCLUSION

There is much more to the creation of a European security system than the military dimension. As demonstrated by the post-World War II West European example, most important for peace among nations are economic interdependence, human contacts in all walks of activity, and democratic institutions. Through its own initiatives and those of its individual member states, through its majority participation in the EBRD, the EC is at the forefront of efforts to support economic growth in Eastern Europe and to integrate East European countries in the web of Western commercial, financial, and technological relations. It is also a beacon of democracy which the East Europeans yearn to emulate with the concrete support of the Council of Europe, "welcoming structure" into the Western system of values, and "passage obligé" before any membership in the EC can be considered. The EC is the core of a "European identity" which is striving to raise out of the ashes of the Cold War. This "European identity" clearly does not stop at the former inter-German border, nor at the German-Polish border. It is therefore essential to make sure that the EPU project does not develop in a way that would lead to the isolation of those countries in the Eastern part of the continent whose identity is clearly European.