JOSEF JANNING

STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

THE BERTELSMANN PROJECT ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Paper presented to the
Second International Conference
of the
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES ASSOCIATION

George Mason University
Fairfax, Virginia
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I. THE CONTEXT: SOME ACADEMIC FRUSTRATIONS

At the outset of the preparations for this project, in early 1986, stood academic frustration: frustrations on the state of the European Community, frustrations on the state of research on European integration and - not least - a critical evaluation of the relevance of the field for political analysis and political decision-making.

The European Community seemed doomed to degenerate into a museum of European politics, filled with the masterpieces of political rhetoric and symbolic action. The West European model had entered a stage of stagnation; its attraction was neither economically nor politically based. The White Paper issued by the European Commission by the end of 1985 and the Single European Act of 1986 received mixed attention. From the insider's point of view the SEA offered too little to generate a new impuls for European integration and the White Paper on the internal market initially failed the crucial test for credibility: The political horizon of the time was crisis management of the coming month, political debate on European issues was shaped by the rhythm of the Presidency of the Council.

With no intent to belittle what had been achieved in the various fields of research on European integration, the state of the art was disappointing. A significant portion of academic energy was devoted to recapitulate the historical lines of development or to reflect on long-term, generalized overall models of integration in Europe as such. Yet it was safe to assume the European realities had long since falsified any overly simplified models or strategies. Especially in Germany, neither one of the dominant schools of integration research had been able to predict or even adequately describe the logics of the integration process.1

The normative school, which still has a strong institutional backing in the academia, had largely turned to the in-depth-

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analysis of the early years of integration, frustrated by the developmental trends in the European Community. The failure of Spinelli’s draft of a European Constitution had contributed to the crisis of normative thinking about Europe. Probably, the negligent attitude to the power potentials within the Community was the basic reason for the irrelevance of this approach. European politics was not in search for a model but for an operational strategy.

The integrationist school, on the other hand, seemed to be fully occupied with studying the complicated machinery of the Community’s processes. Though the results offered new and sometimes fascinating insights to opinion-shaping and decision-making within the various bodies, sub-bodies or sub-sub-bodies, the output was disappointing from a conceptual point of view. Functionalist assumptions were almost daily falsified by political realities: the European Community simply did not live up to the efficiency and output requirements of functionalist standards.

A third trend did not really exist as a school. This line of research tried to apply theories and methodologies developed for the analysis of national foreign policies and international relations to the study of European integration. Contrary to EC studies these approaches had been applied to almost all aspects of the foreign relations of Germany, European States and other areas of the world. Among the numerous books published in German and on German foreign policy, very few proved to have no blind spot on the EC-component of the subject. Among the noteworthy exceptions are some studies on the vitality of the EC to German foreign policy interests\(^2\) and some reports on the effects of the German financial contribution to the Community budget\(^3\). The general debate on the Federal Republic’s EC-policies and its role in the European Community in scientific journals was weaker in comparison to any other of the major member-states.\(^4\) No

\[\text{References}\]


4. There is always an exception to the rule: Wolfgang Wessels & Elfriede Regelsberger (eds.), The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community: The Presidency and Beyond, (reports given at the symposium held at the College of Europe, Bruges, 5-7 November 1987), Bonn 1988.
systematic analysis on the EC-strategies of German governments and actors has been published except for the formative years.

II. THE APPROACH: STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

On the background of these observations, the project "Strategies and Options for the Future of Europe" was conceived to be different. The unique offer of the Bertelsmann Foundation was unconditional and not bothered by any of the above mentioned frustrations and inhibitions to the study of European integration. The Foundation's basic approach was highly political: It was inspired by the obvious failure of the integration process to solve the policy problems at hand. Could the social sciences make a contribution to overcome political stagnation by generating new ideas and concepts?

The project's design developed from this perspective. The studies should not concentrate primarily on historical or structural analyses of the past. The focus should rather be on the issues of the immediate future, based on our hypotheses on the causes for the crisis of European integration by the mid-1980s.


* Disparities Between Issues and Institutional Structures
Hardly any of the current political issues can be limited to the national context of European policy-making. The problems at hand have migrated into Europe and the European institutions have so far failed to effectively compensate for this loss of sovereignty in key policy areas. Segmented decision-making processes on the Community level result from the dominance of national decision-making structures. The asymmetry of competences contributes to the prevention of leadership and authority on the European level.

* Deficits in European Decision-Making
The respective processes are impeded by a number of problems. In the context of the European Community, the procedural rules used in the Council of Ministers and the principle of rotation of the Council Presidency have proven to be rather inefficient tools for the purposes of political control. The enormous complexity and interdependence of the EC system makes adequate implementation of political progress virtually impossible, both in terms of substance and time. The distribution of competences lacks clarity and parliamentary control is insufficient by democratic norms. The center of Community decision-making frequently evades factual control. Thus European policy is faced with a crisis of credibility and acceptance of its results. Finally, there is insufficient transparency as to the inter-institutional communication. Effective checks and balances are hardly visible to those outside the political machinery.

* The Missing Global Awareness of Europe
Key European issues stand in a global political context and represent an important factor in international relations. Against the background of an increasing global interdependence of states and regions, the political developments worldwide have immediate repercussions on Europe: Crises, conflicts and wars in other parts of the world never fail to have an effect on the European states as well. European politics, however, do not provide for the appropriate consultative structures, the necessary consensus on strategies or the instruments needed for their implementation. So far a conceptual and structural definition of the role of Europe in world affairs has been lacking.
Consequently, the aim of the project had to be the development of options to increase a European capacity for decision-making in the sensitive areas indicated above. The initial question of the project was: How can the political problems be solved with a European approach? In the operationalization of this question the political issues were given first place. The overall approach was set up in four phases:

A. Defining the Issues

The first step of research identified the key issues the scope of which exceeded national capacities for adequate action. Taking stock had to cover those fields that were of particular importance for the functional performance of political systems or that had already been subject to an extensive transfer of regulatory competences to the supranational level. Among the issues that combined both a current relevance to European politics and an obvious significance for the future development of Europe six areas were chosen for further investigation: Economic policy and the internal market, monetary policy, technology, agricultural policy, environmental policy and finally foreign policy and security. The aim of phase A was to analyse both structure and scope of these issues and to evaluate the present debate on respective policy options.\(^8\)

B. Defining Criteria

The second phase was designed to evaluate developmental trends and to derive sets of criteria from the issue analyses in the sense of a demand analysis. In subsequent studies each one of the issue areas defined in the first stage of the project was looked at individually. In depth studies were undertaken in cooperation with experts in the respective fields on the following topics: criteria for the functioning of the internal market\(^9\), social requirements of the

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8. The results were published as: Forschungsgruppe Europa, Europäische Defizite, europäische Perspektiven - eine Bestandsaufnahme für morgen, Gütersloh 1988 (for the English edition see FN 7.)

9. The case study was promarily done on the German industry and interest groups; published as: Forschungsgruppe
internal market\textsuperscript{10}, internal security after the abolition of border controls\textsuperscript{11}, preconditions for the development of the European Monetary system\textsuperscript{12}, budget demands of European politics\textsuperscript{13}, instrumental alternatives in environmental policies\textsuperscript{14}, criteria for a European transport system\textsuperscript{15}, indicators for technological competitiveness\textsuperscript{16}, necessities in the field of cultural affairs\textsuperscript{17}, criteria for the "Europeanization" of defense structures in Western Europe\textsuperscript{18} and most recently experiences from the integration of the former GDR into the European Community\textsuperscript{19}.

C. Setting goals and developing models

The third phase of the project involved the participation of an interdisciplinary group of experts. Merging existing structures, perceived demands and future options and injecting them into a

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10. For the results see phase C., FN 22.

11. The text is currently prepared for publication.

12. For the results see phase C., FN 20.

13. For the results see phase C., FN 21.

14. For the results see phase C., FN 24.

15. The text is currently prepared for publication.

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17. The results are published as: Europäische Kultur: das Zukunftsgut des Kontinents. Vorschläge für eine europäische Kulturpolitik, Gütersloh 1990; typescript available in English, French and Italian.


discussion of possible models for the future was the goal of this step.
Subsequently, proposals for political solutions to European problems have been developed and discussed in both the academic and the political context. Until now the following have been completed:
- a model for the creation of a European Central Bank;\textsuperscript{20}
- a federal framework for the growth of the EC budget;\textsuperscript{21}
- a charta of social rights in the internal market;\textsuperscript{22}
- the proposal for a European public transport system;\textsuperscript{23}
- a concept for the application of market instruments in environmental policies;\textsuperscript{24}
- a draft for the reformulation of European defense structures.\textsuperscript{25}
Currently under way are a proposal for the maintenance of internal security, the draft of a European cultural federation and a model for the European energy system of the future.

D. Building options into strategies

The final phase combined the sectoral options and proposals into a general strategy for the future of Europe. This meant to draw conclusions from the interdependencies of sectoral actions and to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Rolf H. Hasse, die Europäische Zentralbank: Perspektiven für eine Weiterentwicklung des Europäischen Währungssystems, Gütersloh 1989; available also in English (The European Central Bank, Gütersloh 1990); forthcoming is a Japanese edition.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Dieter Biehl & Horst Winter, Europa finanzieren - ein föderalistisches Modell, Gütersloh 1990.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Wolfgang Däubler, Sozialstaat EG? Die andere Dimension des Binnenmarktes, Gütersloh, 2nd edition, 1990; also available in English (Social Justice in the EC, Gütersloh 1991).
  \item \textsuperscript{23} This study by Kenneth Button will be published in Summer 1991.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Lutz Wicke & Burkhard Huckestein, Umwelt Europa. Der ökologische Umbau zur europäischen Marktwirtschaft, Gütersloh 1991 (in print).
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Unpublished.
\end{itemize}
study the prospective institutional consequences of their implementation. As most of the models developed in the context of phases B. and C. focused on the European Community it seemed to be advisable to follow a three step approach: to assess the implications of change on the European continent for the future of European integration, to develop a model for the reform of the European Community and to propose a strategy for a European policy vis-à-vis its partners and rivals in the world.

As the concluding step of the research program "Strategies and Options for the Future of Europe" the project is evaluating the results and organizes follow-up studies on the implementation of its proposals in the current intergovernmental conferences.

III. THE WORKING STRUCTURE: FOUR LEVELS

All the phases of the project have been strictly dialogue-oriented. It was intended to communicate the research findings and policy proposals to as many opinion leaders and actors in the political, administrative and scientific communities as possible, in order to involve them in a broadly based discussion. In this perspective the project tried to combine scientific orientation with political-

26. The findings have been published as: Werner Weidenfeld & Josef Janning, Der Umbruch Europas: Die Zukunft des Kontinents, Gütersloh 1990 (typescript available in English).

27. See Werner Weidenfeld et al., Wie Europa verfaßt sein soll. Vorschläge zur institutionellen Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Gütersloh 1990; also available in English (The Shaping of A European Constitution, Gütersloh 1990), in French and Italian. A larger collection which includes the current drafts and the papers submitted by the members of an expert group, will appear as: Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Wie Europa verfaßt sein soll. Materialien zur politischen Union, Gütersloh 1991 (in print).

28. This topic is currently investigated by an international study group entitled "Europe's Role in World Affairs". This group's recommendations will be published by the end of 1991.
cultural participation. Implementing this approach in the structure of the project, the working structure was set up at four levels:

- The first level was composed of the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Research Group on European Affairs at the University of Mainz.

- As a second working level, an international and interdisciplinary advisory board of experts from the academia, business, administration and politics was formed to provide critical supervision of all phases of the project. The meetings of the board were meant to constitute the nodes in a network of criticism, information, stimulation and support. Without this support an ambitious venture like the "Strategies and Options for the Future of Europe" could not succeed in the highly specialized environment of research.

- On a third level in the working structure the organization of specialist seminars and study groups to develop multisectoral issues was placed. Throughout the four phases more than fifty meetings of that kind have taken place to open a wide range of expertise to the research done in Mainz. Two study groups have been set up to work on overall strategic concepts.

- The fourth level was that of major conferences designed to involve decision-makers as well as a broader segment of the political public. In 1988, the conference debated the prospects of Europe seen from the outside, based on the presentations of Henry Kissinger and Valentin Falin. In 1989, the issue of a European Central Bank was discussed by leading representatives from the central banks and scientific experts - this time introduced by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the late chairman of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen. In 1990, the high level meeting in Rome was held on the issues of political union and the cultural identity of Europe.


Parallel to the concluding works the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Research Group on European Affairs have developed a second stage of the project to be carried out from 1991 through 1994.

At the core of the second stage will be the adaption of the project's approach to the new state of affairs in Europe. The dynamics of change in both East and West will shape the outer appearance of European affairs within the coming years. European integration has assumed a center position in the aspirations of the emerging democracies of the East. On the way to European unity a range of issues and risks will have to be overcome. The project will seek to identify and analyse them and intends to develop rational solutions and political strategies with regard to Europe's new challenges.

The methodology of the first stage will be applied to four crucial areas:

* the implications of the internal market and the consequences for political, economic and monetary union
* the challenges of reform in Eastern Europe
* the new position and responsibility of Europe in the world
* the role and perspectives of Germany in Europe

Comparable to the opening of the first stage, the initial step of research undertakes a comprehensive analysis of issues and problems in Eastern Europe, to be completed by the end of 1991. This year's major conference will focus on the European response to the challenges in the Mediterranean - a strategy paper which suggests a range of actions and new instruments will be published in October 1991.

31. Among the speakers were Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, the President of the Italian Senate Giovanni Spadolini, the President of the German Bundestag, Rita Süßmuth, the former Prime Minister of Belgium Leo Tindemans. The papers and proceedings will be published in the summer of 1991 in German, English, French and Italian.
IV. SOME ELEMENTS OF EVALUATION

The success of this specific project was unexpected in the degree of responsiveness that the findings received among decision-makers and experts. Probably, the reasons for that are threefold. First of all it was due to the extraordinary initiative of a private foundation to initiate a complex research program in a field that seemed to be unattractive to many conventional institutions. The project methodology, i.e. the strict concentration on issues and their solution, proved to be constructive: it was the deadlock over unresolved problems that blocked the energy of the integration machinery.

On a second level the issues were obviously well chosen. Each one of the sectoral studies, which were mostly designed as early as 1987, has assumed a political relevance during the period of the first stage. Modesty requires to add that all of the topics identified in the first volume had in fact acquired a critical momentum - a decision of a new quality might not have been on the negotiating table but certainly was in the air.

Finally, the success of the internal market program, the reforms of Gorbachev and the options they created for change in Eastern Europe forced upon European politics an entirely unexpected maneuverability. Time spans of European decisions shrunk faster than anybody had foreseen. In principal, all of the major long term goals of European integration including the doubling of Community membership are in the process of operationalization and implementation within the next ten to twenty years - utopia now.

In light of the frustrations sketched out in the introduction to this paper, four observations come to mind in the evaluation of the project's results and the research experience over the part four years.

In retrospective, the movement of integration has proven to be more basic than was assumed by many. The driving force of integration in the 1980's and most likely in the 1990's was and will be the output demand of political systems in Western Europe. The revitalization of Community policies seems to be largely a function of the concentration on policy issues. In the key area of structural adaption of the European economies and the overcoming of respective structural unemployment European governments were domestically tied by the high regulatory level of their social systems and labor relations. Thus, inducing change had become an extremely complex and time consuming business.
Moving the issue to the European level was the option tried last - the internal market program initially ignored the prevailing forces within the member states and only gradually became occupied with the treatment of policy implications as in the case of the social dimension of the internal market. Another case for this argument is monetary union although it contained a high degree political psychology. Integrating the German "force de frappe" into a European central bank obviously was imperative to French politics beyond the scope of the issue itself.

The French position on monetary integration suggests the effect of at least two other stimuli for integration: One of them can be termed "reassurance", i.e. the desire to reinforce relationships in terms of change. Here the Community proved to be a suitable frame for the continental member states and - increasingly so - for Great Britain as well.

The other stimulus is a more procedural one. Enforced also by the winds of change from the East West European policy-makers have realized the necessity of keeping the integration process meaningful in order to preserve the instrument as such. Like a bicycle, European integration is in need to maintain a certain speed to remain stable. Observing this rule seems to be wise because both the Western crises in the past and the Eastern national identities in the present imply the growth of centrifugal tendencies.

Secondly, the general patterns of growth in the European Community's competences have demonstrated an irregular and unsystemic structure.

In the current motives for the deepening of the Community the spill-over effect seems to be of limited relevance. The long-standing hypothesis of functional integration rested on the assumption that integration was not just an overall but a specific success. The reality of EC-policies rather supports the contrary: In the 1980's the management of the highly integrated sectors of EC-competences was among the prime causes for stagnation.

Noteworthy, the greatest momentum of integration arose from those sectors, that had remained largely outside of the treaties - the EMS and foreign policy. The one issue fully within the legal frame of the EC, the completion of the internal market, only became a success with the operationalization of a new approach. In hindsight "spill-over" appeared to be mostly just a "spill": with regard to the issues listed above regulatory capacities of the member states were spilled and could only gradually be recaptured on a higher level of political decision-making.

Contrary to our initial assumptions, the European Community demonstrated to be an adequate frame for political solutions. The attractiveness of integration decisively increased after the Brussels
special summit of February 1988. It should be noted, however, that this constellation (i.e. a convincing approach to a pressing issue combined with the ability to generate significant additional transfers on the budget side) is less likely to return in the near future.

Two reasons are basically responsible for the relevance of European integration: First of all, the Community is in fact positively or negatively involved in just about every issue at hand and can therefore not be disregarded in the development of solutions. Secondly, the Community structures provide one advantage inspite of their overall deficiencies - flexibility on the part of the decision-making center. The prize paid for this degree of maneuverability seems to be the prevailing democratic deficit on the EC-level.

With regard to political responsiveness to scientific suggestions, the history of the projects indicates a considerable demand for concepts and ideas. After all, the current dynamics of integration are fueled by the pressure of political decision-making versus bureaucratic decision-shaping. Neither the development of the EMS into a central bank system nor the opening positions in the Inter-Governmental Conferences have been pushed by the national administrations. In these areas politics seems to be well ahead of institutional thinking - a situation that supports the sensitivity of decision-makers to concepts from outside their staffs. Furthermore, the public awareness of the relevance of European integration has risen significantly. Until recently the European Community's public image suffered from the socio-psychological consequences of its overall success. The inspiring concepts had become reality and reality had become complicated, conflictual and frustrating: Historic achievements tend to be regarded as trivial from the day to day point of view.

Quite clearly boredom over tomato-mountains and milk-lakes has been surpassed by a renewed excitement over the prospects of change and unity in Europe. Many people sense a relevance of the current developments to their individual lives.

On this background, respective resources in higher education and social science research fall short of public demand - the best case-scenario for academic work on European integration in the future.
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Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Born 1956, Josef Janning holds a B.A. in political science from Elmira College, N.Y. and a M.A. in political science from the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Germany. He has been lecturer in international relations at the university in Bonn and has taught political science at the Department of International Affairs at the University in Mainz. He is author, co-author and editor of a number of books on European politics and has published widely on European foreign policy and security policy. Mr. Janning also serves as Assistant Editor of the European Journal of International Affairs, Rome.
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With no intent to belittle what had been achieved in the various fields of research on European integration, the state of the art was disappointing. A significant portion of academic energy was devoted to recapitulate the historical lines of development or to reflect on long-term, generalized overall models of integration in Europe as such. Yet it was safe to assume the European realities had long since falsified any overly simplified models or strategies. Especially in Germany, neither
one of the dominant schools of integration research had been able to predict or evenly adequately describe the logics of the integration process.\footnote{Cf. the sceptic evaluation by Wolfgang Wessels, Bilanz der wissenschaftlichen Debatte zur Europapolitik 1980-1990, in: Werner Weidenfeld & Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1980-90 - eine Bilanz, Bonn 1990, pp.21-31.}

The normative school, which still has a strong institutional backing in the academia, had largely turned to the in-depth-analysis of the early years of integration, sobered by the developmental trends in the European Community. The failure of Spinelli’s draft of a European Constitution had contributed to the the crisis of normative thinking about Europe. Probably, the negligent attitude to the power potentials within the Community was the basic reason for the irrelevance of this approach. European politics was not in search for a model but for an operational strategy.

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2} Cf. Rudolf Hrbek & Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), EG-Mitgliedschaft - eine vitales Interesse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland? Bonn 1984.
\item \textsuperscript{3} See Bernhard May, Kosten und Nutzen der deutschen EG-Mitgliedschaft, Bonn 1982.
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\item \textsuperscript{5} The one title available dates back to the late 1970s and provides little more than a detailed descriptive chronology: Herbert Müller-Roschach, Die deutsche Europapolitik 1949-1977. Eine politische Chronik, Bonn 1980.
\item \textsuperscript{6} Noteworthy are the studies by Rudolf Hrbek, die SPD - Deutschland und Europa. Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration (1945-1957), Bonn 1972; Werner Weidenfeld, Konrad Adenauer und Europa. Die geistigen Grundlagen der westeuropäischen Integrationspolitik des ersten Bonner Bundeskanzlers, Bonn 1976; Peter Jeutter, EWG - Kein Weg nach Europa. Die Haltung der Freien Demokratischen Partei zu den Römischen Verträgen 1957, Bonn 1985.
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\(^9\) Bestandsaufnahme für morgen, Gütersloh 1988 (for the English edition see FN 7.)

\(^10\) The case study was primarily done on the German industry and interest groups; published as: Forschungsgruppe Europa (ed.), Binnenmarkt '92. Perspektiven aus deutscher Sicht, Gütersloh, 3rd edition, 1989.

\(^11\) For the results see phase C., FN 22.

\(^12\) The text is currently prepared for publication.

\(^13\) For the results see phase C., FN 20.

\(^14\) For the results see phase C., FN 21.

\(^15\) For the results see phase C., FN 24.

\(^16\) The text is currently prepared for publication.

\(^17\) The text is currently prepared for publication.
for the "Europeanization" of defense structures in Western Europe\textsuperscript{18} and most recently experiences from the integration of the former GDR into the European Community\textsuperscript{19}.

C. Setting goals and developing models

The third phase of the project involved the participation of an interdisciplinary group of experts. Merging existing structures, perceived demands and future options and injecting them into a discussion of possible models for the future was the goal of this step. Subsequently, proposals for political solutions to European problems have been developed and discussed in both the academic and the political context. Until now the following have been completed:
- a model for the creation of a European Central Bank;\textsuperscript{20}
- a federal framework for the growth of the EC budget;\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17.} The results are published as: Europäische Kultur: das Zukunftsgut des Kontinents. Vorschläge für eine europäische Kulturpolitik, Gütersloh 1990; typescript available in English, French and Italian.

\textsuperscript{18.} For the results see Werner Weidenfeld, Walther Stützle, Curt Gasteiger & Josef Janning, Die Architektur europäischer Sicherheit: Probleme, Kriterien, Perspektiven, Gütersloh 1989; cf. also Werner Weidenfeld & Walther Stützle, Abschied von der alten Ordnung: Europas neue Sicherheit, Gütersloh 1990.

\textsuperscript{19.} See Werner Weidenfeld et al., Die doppelte Integration: Europa und das größere Deutschland, Gütersloh 1991.

\textsuperscript{20.} Rolf H. Hasse, Die Europäische Zentralbank: Perspektiven für eine Weiterentwicklung des Europäischen Währungssystems, Gütersloh 1989; available also in English (The European Central Bank, Gütersloh 1990); forthcoming is a Japanese edition.

\textsuperscript{21.} Dieter Biehl & Horst Winter, Europa finanzieren - ein föderalistisches Modell, Gütersloh 1990.
a charta of social rights in the internal market;\textsuperscript{22}
- the proposal for a European public transport system;\textsuperscript{23}
- a concept for the application of market instruments in environmental policies;\textsuperscript{24}
- a draft for the reformulation of European defense structures.\textsuperscript{25}

Currently under way are a proposal for the maintenance of internal security, the draft of a European cultural federation and a model for the European energy system of the future.

\textbf{D. Building options into strategies}

The final phase combined the sectoral options and proposals into a general strategy for the future of Europe. This meant to draw conclusions from the interdependencies of sectoral actions and to study the prospective institutional consequences of their implementation. As most of the models developed in the context of phases B. and C. focused on the European Community it seemed to be advisable to follow a three step approach: to assess the implications of change on the European continent for the future of European integration\textsuperscript{26}, to


\textsuperscript{23} This study by Kenneth Button will be published in Fall 1991.

\textsuperscript{24} Lutz Wicke & Burkhard Huckeinstein, Umwelt Europa. Der Ausbau zur ökologischen Marktwirtschaft, Gütersloh 1991 (in print).

\textsuperscript{25} Unpublished.

\textsuperscript{26} The findings have been published as: Werner Weidenfeld & Josef Janning, Der Umbruch Europas: Die Zukunft des Kontinents, Gütersloh 1990 (typescript available in English).
develop a model for the reform of the European Community and to propose a strategy for a European policy vis-à-vis its partners and rivals in the world.

As the concluding step of the research program "Strategies and Options for the Future of Europe" the project is evaluating the results and organizes follow-up studies on the implementation of its proposals in the current intergovernmental conferences.

III. THE WORKING STRUCTURE: FOUR LEVELS

All the phases of the project have been strictly dialogue-oriented. It was intended to communicate the research findings and policy proposals to as many opinion leaders and actors in the political, administrative and scientific communities as possible, in order to involve them into a broadly based discussion. In this perspective the project tried to combine scientific orientation with political-cultural participation.

27. See Werner Weidenfeld et al., Wie Europa verfaßt sein soll. Vorschläge zur institutionellen Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Gütersloh 1990; also available in English (The Shaping of a European Constitution, Gütersloh 1990), French and Italian.
   A larger collection which includes the current drafts and the papers submitted by the members of a expert group, is published as: Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Wie Europa verfaßt sein soll. Materialien zur politischen Union, Gütersloh 1991.

28. This topic is currently investigated by an international study group entitled "Europe’s Role in World Affairs". This group’s recommendations will be published in the fall of 1991 as: Werner Weidenfeld und Josef Janning (eds.), Global Responsibilities: Europe in Tomorrow’s World, Gütersloh 1991.
Implementing this approach in the structure of the project, the working structure was set up on four levels:

- The first level was composed of the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Research Group on European Affairs at the University of Mainz.

- As a second working level, an international and interdisciplinary advisory board of experts from the academia, business, administration and politics was formed to provide critical supervision of all phases of the project. The meetings of the board were meant to constitute the nodes in a network of criticism, information, stimulation and support. Without this support an ambitious venture like the "Strategies and Options for the Future of Europe" could not succeed in the highly specialized environment of research.

- On a third level in the working structure the organization of specialist seminars and study groups to develop multisectoral issues was placed. Throughout the four phases more than fifty meetings of that kind have taken place to open a wide range of expertise to the research done in Mainz. Two study groups have been set up to work on overall strategic concepts.

- The fourth level was that of major conferences designed to involve decision-makers as well as a broader segment of the political public: In 1988, the conference debated the prospects of Europe seen from the outside, based on the presentations of Henry Kissinger and Valentin Falin.29 In 1989, the issue of a

European Central Bank was discussed by leading representatives from the central banks and scientific experts - this time introduced by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the late chairman of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen. In 1990, the high level meeting in Rome was held on the issues of political union and the cultural identity of Europe.

Parallel to the concluding works the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Research Group on European Affairs have developed a second stage of the project to be carried out from 1991 through 1994. At the core of the second stage will be the adaption of the project's approach to the new state of affairs in Europe. The dynamics of change in both East and West will shape the outer appearance of European affairs within the coming years. European integration has assumed a center position in the aspirations of the emerging democracies of the East. On the way to European unity a range of issues and risks will have to be overcome. The project will seek to identify and analyze them and intends to develop rational solutions and political strategies with regard to Europe's new challenges.

The methodology of the first stage will be applied to four crucial areas:


31. Among the speakers were Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, the President of the Italian Senate Giovanni Spadolini, the President of the German Bundestag, Rita Süßmuth, the former Prime Minister of Belgium Leo Tindemans. The papers and proceedings will be published in the fall of 1991 in German, English, French and Italian.
* the implications of the internal market and the consequences for political, economic and monetary union
* the challenges of reform in Eastern Europe
* the new position and responsibility of Europe in the world
* the role and perspectives of Germany in Europe

Comparable to the opening of the first stage, the initial step of research undertakes a comprehensive analysis of issues and problems in Eastern Europe, to be completed by the end of 1991. This year's major conference will focus on the European response to the challenges in the Mediterranean - a strategy paper which suggests a range of actions and new instruments will be published in October 1991.

IV. SOME ELEMENTS OF EVALUATION

The success of this specific project was unexpected in the degree of responsiveness that the findings received among decision-makers and experts. Probably, the reasons for that are threefold. First of all it was due to the extraordinary initiative of a private foundation to initiate a complex research program in a field that seemed to be unattractive to many conventional institutions. The project methodology, i.e. the strict concentration on issues and their solution, proved to be constructive: it was the deadlock over unresolved problems that blocked the energy of the integration machinery.

On a second level the issues were obviously well chosen. Each one of the sectoral studies, which were mostly designed as early as 1987, has assumed a political relevance during the period of the first stage. Modesty requires to add that all of the topics identified in the first volume had in fact acquired a critical momentum - a decision of a new
quality might not have been on the negotiating table but certainly was in the air.

Finally, the success of the internal market programme, the reforms of Gorbachev and the options they created for change in Eastern Europe forced upon European politics an entirely unexpected maneuverability. Time spans of European decisions shrunk faster than anybody had foreseen. In principal, all of the major long term goals of European integration including the doubling of Community membership are in the process of operationalization and implementation within the next ten to twenty years - utopia now.

In light of the frustrations sketched out in the introduction to this paper, four observations come to mind in the evaluation of the project's results and the research experience over the past four years.

In retrospective, the movement of integration has proven to be more basic than was assumed by many. The driving force of integration in the 1980's and most likely in the 1990's was and will be the output demand of political systems in Western Europe.

The revitalization of Community policies seems to be largely a function of the concentration on policy issues. In the key area of structural adaption of the European economies and the overcoming of respective structural unemployment European governments were domestically tied by the high regulatory level of their welfare systems and labor relations. Thus, inducing change had become an extremely complex and time consuming business. Moving the issue to the European level was the option tried last - the internal market program initially ignored the prevailing forces within the member states and only gradually became occupied with the treatment of policy implications as in the case of the social dimension of the internal market. Another case for this argument is Monetary Union although it contained a high degree political
psychology. Obviously, integrating the German "force de frappe" into a European central bank-system was imperative to French politics beyond the scope of the issue itself.

The French position on monetary integration suggests the effect of at least two other stimuli for integration: One of them can be termed "reassurance", i.e. the desire to reinforce relationships in times of change. Here the Community proved to be a suitable frame for the continental member states and - increasingly so - for Great Britain as well.

The other stimulus is a more procedural one. Enforced also by the winds of change from the East, West European policy-makers have realized the necessity of keeping the integration process meaningful in order to preserve the instrument as such. Like a bicycle, European integration is in need to maintain a certain speed to remain stable.

Observing this rule seems to be wise because both the Western crises in the past and the Eastern national identities in the present imply the growth of centrifugal tendencies.

Secondly, the general patterns of growth in the European Community's competences have demonstrated an irregular and unsystemic structure. In the current motives for the deepening of the Community the spill-over effect seems to be of limited relevance. The long-standing hypothesis of functional integration rested on the assumption that integration was not just an overall but a specific success. The reality of EC-policies rather supports the contrary: In the 1980's the management of the highly integrated sectors of EC-competences was among the prime causes for stagnation. Noteworthy, the greatest momentum of integration arose from those sectors, that had remained largely outside of the treaties - the EMS and foreign policy. The one issue fully within the legal frame of the EC, the completion of the internal market, only became a success with the operationalization of a new approach.
In hindsight "spill-over" appeared to be mostly just a "spill": with regard to the issues listed above regulatory capacities of the member states were spilled and could only gradually be recaptured on a higher level of political decision-making.

Contrary to our initial assumptions, the European Community demonstrated to be an adequate frame for political solutions. The attractiveness of integration decisively increased after the Brussels special summit of February 1988. It should be noted, however, that this constellation (i.e. a convincing approach to a pressing issue combined with the ability to generate significant additional transfers on the budget side) is less likely to return in the near future.

Two reasons are basically responsible for the relevance of European integration: First of all, the Community is in fact positively or negatively involved in just about every issue at hand and can therefore not be disregarded in the development of solutions. Secondly, the Community structures provide one advantage inspite of their overall deficiencies flexibility on the part of the decision-making center. The prize paid for this degree of maneuverability seems to be the prevailing democratic deficit on the EC-level.

With regard to political responsiveness to scientific suggestions, the history of the projects indicates a considerable demand for concepts and ideas. After all, the current dynamics of integration are fueled by the pressure of political decision-making versus bureaucratic decision-shaping.

Neither the development of the EMS into a central bank system nor the opening positions in the Inter-Governmental Conferences have been pushed by the national administrations. In these areas politics seems to be well ahead of institutional thinking - a situation that supports the sensitivity of decision-makers to concepts from outside their staffs. Furthermore, the public awareness of the relevance of European integration has risen significantly. Until recently the European
Community's public image suffered from the socio-psychological consequences of its overall success. The inspiring concepts had become reality and reality had become complicated, conflictual and frustrating. Historic achievements tend to be regarded as trivial from the day to day point of view.

Quite clearly boredom over tomato-mountains and milk-lakes has been surpassed by a renewed excitement over the prospects of change and unity in Europe. Many people sense a relevance of the current developments to their individual lives.

On this background, respective resources in higher education and social science research fall short of public demand - the best case-scenario for academic work on European integration in the future.
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