METAMORPHOSES AND MODELS

By various accounts, bipolarity has ended, superpowers have disengaged, the East-West ideological contest is over, and global politics are being restructured. More evocatively, Joseph Nye has written, "...the tectonic plates that have undergirded world politics for half a century have shifted".¹

All of these descriptions of current metamorphoses have their genesis in the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's military forces from East-Central Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the prospects for a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.

Events on other continents in 1989-90 added to the portrait of a world order in flux--the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas (FSLN) government in Nicaragua, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Namibia peace accord, and negotiations on Cambodia. In these episodes, erstwhile superpower adversaries have joined purposes; conflicts that had eluded settlement for years were either resolved or moved towards resolution. And, in the Gulf war against Saddam Hussein, Soviet acquiescence to U.S. military

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action, and support for U.N. resolutions, have been critical. Because the United States and Soviet Union both seem less willing or able to compete with one another globally, one might postulate a decreasing frequency and intensity of political/military crises in the "Third World".

Such a hopeful scenario is accepted by few observers. In Europe, there is ample reason to suspect and fear that the end of the post World War II division of the continent has already begun to release an onslaught of intra-state nationalisms and inter-state rivalries.\textsuperscript{2} Empirical efforts to understand the consequences of multipolarity versus bipolarity suggest that the former "...entails more violence, more countries at war and more casualties; bipolarity, fewer but longer wars".\textsuperscript{3}

The Cold War's cessation, then, may spell not more peace, but rather an intensification of conflict. To some, these conditions spell dangers that warrant extreme measures to preserve stability.\textsuperscript{4} The Gulf War against Saddam Hussein has, for many academics and policy-makers, provided proof that an end to the Cold War, the demise of bipolarity, and superpower disengagement do not guarantee much in the way of worldwide tranquility.

On what, then, can we depend as a guarantee of peace and security in this "new world"? Relying on past concepts and theoretical models, a tempting alternative is a return political realism--realpolitik.

Power as the fundamental commodity of international relations, national interests as the guiding principles of policy-makers, and
balances of power as the means by which to pursue such interests without war are tenets of realism. Despite "...the uncertainty of all power calculations..." the language and policy prescriptions of realpolitik have dominated U.S. government policy since World War II.\textsuperscript{6} The concentration of power into a bimodal distribution was, itself, thought to be a contribution to stability between the U.S. and USSR and among their smaller allies.\textsuperscript{7}

As uncertainties and dangers of the post-Cold War environment become evident or are imagined, there will be interest in older, comfortable paradigms. The re-cycling of realpolitik, indeed, began in the late 1970s; by the early 1980s, this "neo-realism" had many scholarly adherents and the debate vis-a-vis other paradigms was ardent.\textsuperscript{8}

"Realists" will argue that, after the demise of a bipolar concentration of power, nation-states will return to a general struggle for power, defined primarily in military terms, as they pursue national interests. National interests require that states seek to acquire "military capabilities sufficient to deter attack by potential enemies", a capacity that can be augmented by an alliance with other states. In such conditions, peace and stability "result through the operation of a balance of power propelled by self interest...".\textsuperscript{9}

In this view, only an interlocking grid of balances will avoid inter-state warfare or limit the spread of civil wars beyond one country. Whether in the Middle East, Asia, Africa or Latin America, a lifting of superpower rivalry connotes to realists a
heightened need to maintain in each region an equilibrium of power—presumably by manipulating economic assistance and arms transfers, while injecting one's own forces if necessary to assert the role of larger, wealthier nation-states in maintaining balances.

Arms and influence, used in the pursuit of great powers' national interests, become the only means by which to balance forces around the world, thereby avoiding war.

Such policies are wrong, however. Security now requires much broader "coverage" and far more dynamic qualities than national security policies premised on the "...use of force or the credible threat to employ it..." as the "ultimate factor" in regulating the international system. Absent the predictability of the Cold War international system, and the minimal conflict at the center of that system (Europe), we must not fall back on a force-centered, nation-specific understanding of security that expects peace to be present only if power is balanced.

Are there feasible alternatives to a post-Cold War neorealism? Can a new international condominium be fashioned in which more, rather than less, security is appropriated for political systems and their populations?

SECURITY, THREATS AND CapacITIES

As a prescription for security in the post-superpower, post-Cold War world, a balance of power thesis is an invitation to disaster. The notion of constructing lasting regional stability with military assistance programs, prepositioned equipment for rapid deployment forces and periodic deployments of major powers'
ground, naval or air units has never worked in Asia, Africa or Latin America.

Likewise, these tools of a balance of power are certain to fail in the Middle East. A military equilibrium is neither immutable nor a substitute for security. After the Gulf War is over, American, Soviet or other outside guarantors will never ensure peace unless longstanding regional issues are addressed and a permanent architecture is erected within which to abate future threats to Middle East stability.

On a broader plane, however, several problems underlie the inadequacy of a military equilibrium as a substitute for security in the Middle East or in any region:

First, security is almost always confused with power. Security is a dynamic ratio of threats versus capacities. Security may thus be enhanced by trying to lower threats perceived from others or by enlarging one's own capacities—or both. Accumulating the raw material of power—economic output, growth and productivity, military prowess, readiness, projection capability, social cohesion and political legitimacy—does not equal security. Rather, security is a function of the ratio between these elements and economic, political and military threats perceived to imperil a political unit. Threat abatement strategies that depend on diplomacy to reach arms control agreements, trade or sociocultural ties, etc. may thus enhance security as much if not more than policies meant to maintain power.

The confusion between security and power also derives from the
notion that friendly governments can be protected by adding greatly to their arsenals of tanks, warplanes, and missiles. This ignores entirely the difference between a regime's legitimacy and its ability to blunt an armed attack on its border. Power, whatever it means, must not be confused with or substituted for security; not by accident, the most insecure regimes often accumulate the most raw power. In the bipolar, hegemonic world of the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR contributed heavily to the military arsenals of regimes in greatest peril from within; in Asia, cases such as Afghanistan, Iran and South Vietnam are obvious examples. And, in Africa, the principal rationale for U.S. aid programs during the Cold War was frequently the assumed Soviet/communist threat to an existing government.11

Such a confusion of power and security obscures the reciprocal causation between threats and capacities. Raising a state's capacities, but particularly those of military power, often heightens the threat profile of that country to its neighbors. Enhancing capacities in the domain of military effort in ostensible pursuit of security may become threatening and, because of others' compensatory enlargement of their capacities, undercut security.

In a "realist" portrait of world politics, indeed, power is applied (when persuasion fails) "...through threats or promises to do either harmful or helpful things..."; and, "given the nature of military force, the threat to do harm is the more common means by which it [such force] can be employed in exercising power".12 Thus, threats from others imperil national interests, while
countervailing threats reinforce security. In a realist world, enhancing capacities to issue credible threats are the means by which power is exercised to assure national interests. The never-ending cycle of threats and counter-threats appears to suffice as a path to security, and the contribution of threats built on military capacities to insecurity is ignored.

Prescriptions that rely on realist images of world affairs also err by ignoring long-term consequences of force-based security policies. If superpower disengagement precipitates multiple balances of power around the world, then unending commitments will have to be made to the maintenance of such equilibria. Since the ratio of threats to capacities is never stabilized at "1.00", a decision to rely on one kind of capacity—military strength—as a source of balance will necessitate constant and expensive repairs to the conditions of an equilibrium. This has been evident for several decades in the Arab-Israeli standoff, for example, that has at best been a violent peace.

But the longitudinal consequences of policies that appear to be compelling for the moment can have deeply troubling consequences. Americans are cognizant, for instance, of the West's substantial support for Saddam Hussein—from weapons, intelligence, energy supplies and food—during his war against Iran during the 1980s. That the United States and a multilateral coalition had to combat Saddam in 1991 was not unrelated to our willingness to support Iraq as a "balance" vis-a-vis the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran over almost a decade. We and our European allies contributed
greatly to the arsenal that was in Saddam's possession by 1990.

Finally, the error of relying on a realist perception of a post-Cold War world order is compounded by the inapplicability of military power to emerging threats. A strategy for global security that stresses capacity enhancement, with particular attention to military effort, while doing little to reduce threats ignores the mismatch between most forms of military power and external threats that political systems increasingly confront today. Massed tank armies, supersonic jet fighters and large naval combatants have no utility in defending sovereignty against debilitating worldwide economic trends, religious fundamentalism, destabilizing mass migrations, terrorist attacks, or punitive actions of multilateral organizations. The "diffusion of power away from states to private actors" has been observed in the latter part of the twentieth century; given the transnational problems that political leaders must now confront, it is apparent that a "military balance is not sufficient" to provide security in such an environment.\textsuperscript{13} Some capacity based on a state's armed forces may be required for the self-defense of certain states. But proportionately large standing forces and burdensome commitments of national resources to a military-industrial complex are, most certainly, an insufficient guarantee of a country's security.

In these important respects, misleading policy prescriptions are derived from an understanding of international relations embedded in theories of realism and balances of power. American reactions to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait evoke precisely
those images—that war is always possible and often probable given the inherent desires of malevolent men to dominate others. Large and capable national military forces become the *sine qua non* of protecting states' security and self-interest against adversaries grown too powerful; such strengths must be exhibited by a great power in order to rally others to align against malevolent rulers bent on aggression. Thereafter, supported by the larger nation-states, regional balances of power must be maintained to thwart any resurgence of these designs.

The United States and other large or relatively wealthy states' reluctance to perceive security—a dynamic ratio between threats and capacities—as dependent on other than capacities of armed forces is evident as plans are made for military equipment removed from Europe. Although a considerable portion of U.S. stockpiles in Europe have been utilized in Middle East combat, much will remain that is no longer required for defense in Central Europe. "Cascading" is the euphemistic term being used to suggest the transfer of principal American weapons (e.g., U.S.-built M-1 main battle tanks) to other allies in Europe and around the world. Whether sold or as part of military assistance programs, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and other CFE-affected items may not be destroyed but simply removed from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) arena of the CFE accord. In the Soviet case, tanks stored beyond the Urals will not be counted as remaining in their ATTU arsenal (and movement of equipment east of the Urals has become a significant issue in moving ahead with ratifying the
treaty). The Soviets have announced no plans to provide more T-72s, BMPs, or other items to Syria, India, Yemen, Libya, or other longstanding clients; but Moscow's need for cash, and the ability of, for example, Libya to pay "up front" for weapons may well enhance the Soviet propensity to make such sales.

Prior to CFE, but since the Gorbachev period began in early 1985, Soviet arms transfers to less developed countries increased by several billion dollars, from $13.8 billion in 1985 to $19.1 billion in 1987, before beginning to decline in 1988 and 1989 (to $16.5 billion in the latter year). When finally calculated, 1990 Soviet arms deliveries likely will have fallen back to under $15 billion, but the pattern of Soviet military transfers revealed (through 1988) strong consistency with pre-Gorbachev, pre-reform behavior. Comparing late-Brezhnev years versus the early Gorbachev era, there were few differences in Soviet military ties to the Third World.

American deliveries in 1989 were calculated to have been about $6 billion to less developed countries. Sales and grants by other countries (e.g., China) are not diminishing, however, even as the "cascading" of weapons and equipment from Europe begin their uncertain paths towards the "Third World". Any diminution seen in arms export data in the last few years of the 1980s, then, may have been transient, as larger nation-states retain their intention of influencing events and conflicts globally in pursuit of what they deem to be national-interests.

But is this the only way? After the decades of superpower
stasis, must we necessarily seek security through a continued emphasis on military capacities manipulated by the arms transfers and military assistance programs—or interventions from gunboat diplomacy to huge deployments—of larger and/or wealthier states in the Euro-Atlantic or Pacific Rim?

AN ALTERNATIVE: REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY

As the curtain lifted to a post-hegemonic world, the new stage was revealed to be one of threat-rich environments and capacity-poor states. We were tacitly aware of this for forty-five years. But in the vocabulary of strategic rivalry, the other superpower's interests were presumed to foment every conflict. Our principal adversary was always lurking behind revolutionary movements, left-wing coups, general strikes and student barricades.

Now, however, even that dubious post-World War II "order" in international affairs has waned. Understanding the "international system" as "...largely characterized by anarchy under the mantle of sovereignty", and then inferring from the continued relevance of force its necessity as a guarantee of security\textsuperscript{17}, are likely responses to this environment. Considering the United States as the "only superpower", and the world system to now be unipolar, is a variant of this force-as-guarantor-of-peace model, requiring that American military might be the front line of any response to aggression that threatens U.S. interests in distant venues.\textsuperscript{18}

The alternative construction of international security, in which the intervention of powerful nation-states, their militaries and their weapons would be neither sufficient nor necessary to
maintain peace and stability, is an interlocking web of regional collective security arrangements.

In strategic terms, collective security differs fundamentally from common defense. In the latter, dominant or hegemonic powers often gather allies around them, sharing not values but opposition to a clear and ominous adversary. Alliances for common defense are meant to implement strategies of containment and deterrence—to prevent war by balancing capacities, not by reducing threat. Capacities, invariably, are defined in military terms, and measurements of such strength are construed narrowly to include the size of standing armed forces, the numbers of certain kinds of weapons and equipment, and the modernity or sophistication of that equipment.

Collective security, however, emphasizes the other side of the security ratio, namely threat reduction. Rather than enhancing capacities, especially military strength per se, collective security strategies are grounded in analyses that suggest threat abatement can be achieved in many cases before resorting to measures that expend resources to heighten capacities.

Collective security begins with the premise that threats may arise from within, not externally, and that avoidance of peril is at least as critical as countering threats with capacities. Collective security arrangements are bound to include, not exclude, potential sources of concern for the peace, stability and well-being of all participants. Non-offensive defense strategies of members, studies of conflict reduction by joint academic/policy
centers, mediation via crisis resolution organs, collective and binding economic sanctions for punitive responses, and peacekeeping forces to separate disputants—these and other measures are all part of collective efforts to avoid resort to military capacities. Collective security does not deny a right of self-defense, but is intended to avoid the exercise of that right through abatement of threats.

Collective international action is, more and more, required by virtue of the transnational nature of conditions that imperil states. To "invest resources in managing transnational interdependence" has become the foremost challenge of policy-makers in the United States and other powerful states at the end of the twentieth century.19

In the "Third World" we have seen incremental movement towards alternative security arrangements during the late 1980s and outset of the 1990s. Members of ASEAN have played a larger role in seeking the resolution of civil war in Cambodia. As the Vietnamese withdrew combat units, the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot accelerated their efforts to oust Hun Sen, installed by Hanoi in 1979. ASEAN members have been eager to secure a settlement that would keep Hanoi out of Cambodia while avoiding further American, Chinese or Soviet involvement in the conflict. Thai Defense Minister, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, drafted a cease-fire agreement to present to warring factions at a Japanese-sponsored meeting in Tokyo during early June, 1990.20 The Japanese, by hosting the meeting, also sought to re-enter Southeast Asian diplomacy. By seeking an end to
external power intervention and a widened role for collective mediation and/or peacekeeping, ASEAN members have begun to develop new security roles. This is far from becoming collective security, and there is ample evidence of an arms race within the region being fueled by mutual mistrust\textsuperscript{21}. Nevertheless, a potential exists that ought to be enhanced through extra-regional support.

In Africa, a five-nation multilateral West African peacekeeping force, number more than 6,000 troops, was sent to Liberia in an inept, but precedent setting, attempt to end civil war and bloodshed in Monrovia. Under the vague umbrella of the 16-member "Economic Community of West African States", a summit meeting in Mali at the end of November, 1990 sought an accord to end the Charles Taylor-led uprising and install an interim government. Again, there are many problems with this action, including Nigeria's dominance that raises fears of a regional hegemon-in-the-making. Yet, the notion of collective security has begun to emerge. A more limited effort has started in Central Africa where Uganda, Zaire and Burundi sent small teams of military officers to join a peacekeeping force in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{22}

Civil wars, not only imminent danger of inter-state warfare, are increasingly viewed as perilous for entire regions. Such conflicts rarely remain confined within the borders of one state since guerilla units seek sanctuary in neighboring countries, which invites retaliatory strikes. Weapons produced by larger powers are invariably used, often supplied through covert operations by the intelligence organizations of those major international actors.
Mercenary soldiers or units are injected into such disputes and bankrolled by the same intelligence organizations. It is small wonder, then, why Third World and non-aligned leaders have struggled to develop their own abilities to mitigate threats and to close off opportunities for de facto recolonization.

But the construction of robust regional architectures for collective security will be extraordinarily complex. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) has existed for years, but has little chance to quickly evolve into a continental organ for conflict resolution or peacekeeping. Previous efforts at OAU peacekeeping have worked to the disadvantage of those depending on OAU actions, e.g., in Chad during the early 1980s.23 The OAS, and the moribund Rio Pact, have equally little evolutionary potential, primarily because a legacy of inaction and/or hegemonic dominance would preclude any self-generated reform.

How can such alternatives to a balance-of-power, realist world order be generated? They will depend on 1) the inauguration of a "test-bed" Euro-Atlantic organization as a follow-on to CSCE, 2) the continued cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union in zones of regional conflict, and 3) the financial and material support of the richer developed countries (especially Japan and Germany).

The 1990s should be a decade in which the construction of regional collective security organizations is inaugurated, with Europe's endeavors providing an initial framework for examination in other locales. Institutionalizing CSCE in the reluctant and
modest ways to which the United States agreed, and for which the Paris CSCE summit gave its approval, will be inadequate. The small secretariat to begin work in Prague and the minimal responsibilities in other domains (election monitoring, and a center for conflict resolution) provides neither an opportunity to assess the potential of collective security nor an experiential base on which other regions can draw. The ideal forum for giving birth to a new "Euro-Atlantic Security Organization", as a follow-on to CSCE, would be the 1992 Helsinki "II" meeting.

Many tasks and responsibilities related to security can be given to a new Euro-Atlantic organization, administratively housed within a permanent "Security Commission" of the organization's secretariat. Difficulties with the CFE accord underscore the importance of moving ahead with Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). CSCE has "housed" the CSBM talks, with progress evident both at the Stockholm session in 1986 and in 1989-90 discussions. As force levels in Europe come down, unilaterally or in concert with CFE-specified numbers, it becomes all the more vital to link transparency, information exchange, etc. to each incremental reduction. Notwithstanding delays in CFE implementation, a successor to CSCE must forge ahead in the domain of confidence and security-building measures, seeking to reassure all member states about each others' military activities via prior notification, observation, data exchange and other more innovative ideas (e.g., zones of national confidence along states' frontiers).

Some capacity to deploy peace-keeping forces should also be
developed—to keep sides apart while adjudication, arbitration, or other conflict-control mechanisms are utilized. Small numbers of such units should be maintained and dispersed in multinational garrisons throughout Central Europe. Contingents from all member states, proportional to their population, could be assigned to the Euro-Atlantic organization, with accompanying transportation assets.

An alternative—the metamorphosis of NATO into a larger, collective security entity—would raise the thorny issue of criteria for entry. Would democratic processes somehow be used as a litmus test? What would be the basis for exclusion or denial of entry? Far better than NATO's disruptive enlargement is a CSCE-born organization, from the outset incorporating all areas in which conflict may arise and avoiding the vestiges of common defense against an adversary that is no longer evident.

American, Soviet, German, Japanese, and policy makers in other large or advanced nation-states must strive to see beyond national security to global security.24 Their cooperation to limit disputes and conflicts around the world, because of the capacities they possess in military, economic and political contexts, will have greater consequences for threat abatement than any effort solely within the Third World. The U.S. and USSR retain military might, with American forces clearly able to project force in various regions much more readily than is the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated by American requests for other states to pay for much of the U.S. commitment of forces against Iraq, the
large-scale military deployment of U.S. armed forces in combat roles is far more costly than can be absorbed (without grievous economic consequences) by the United States itself.

Thus, the economic role of the G-7 countries, and particularly Japan and Germany, become critical components of alternative security architectures. Moscow and Washington need to agree that regional conflicts are no longer grounds for their confrontation; other countries need to join in the search for global security by contributing heavily to the costs of creating multilateral institutions in South and Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. A "Fund for Regional Security", established by the G-7 states, might be an appropriate way by which to channel monies for initiating regional collective security organizations. Regardless of the mechanism, however, the investment by advanced industrial states in such alternatives to a "realist" paradigm of world security is essential.

Where ought these regional security organs direct their attention? The answers are painfully evident—to bringing cease-fires and negotiated settlements to civil wars and insurgencies in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Sudan, Mozambique, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Peru, El Salvador, and many more. Implicit to this charge is the reference of disputes to mediation, and the monitoring and extension of human rights and democratic processes—tasks undertaken not in a manner of neo-colonial oversight from Europe or North America, but rather by acts of regional organs of collective security.
How ought all of this begin? Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, with Japan and Germany as observers, should act as co-sponsors to convene "regional Helsinki processes" soon--after the 1992 meeting in Helsinki, but not later than 1993-1994--with many of the initial goals seen in Europe. Especially important in early stages would be activities in the domains of human rights and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). In regions wherein existing organizations have already shown signs of pushing ahead in these arenas, institutionalization of the process, to include a secretariat, assembly and specialized commissions in security and human rights fields, could be undertaken.

But these notions about specific steps are less important in the near term than recognizing broader principles to guide a post-Cold War search for security. Superpower disengagement need not connote a revitalized global power struggle, with peace everywhere hanging on a precarious balance of power. Capacities built on armed might yield implicit threats to others, undercutting the delicate ratio from which security results.

Alternative strategic visions that guide collective security can be implemented, although we cannot expect weak-capacity states caught in a threat-rich environment to take these steps alone. The erstwhile superpowers and their principal allies have that clear responsibility--to lead in the construction of post-hegemonic global security. And, for the United States there is no greater burden than taking a leading role in preparing for a new global security environment in the twenty-first century.
NOTES


7. Kenneth Waltz, in Man, State and War makes the case that bipolarity connoted distinct advantages for peace and stability.

8. One example of this energetic debate was in International Organization Number 38 (Spring, 1984) which contained several important essays about "New Realism".

9. For a succinct, capsulized version of "realist" views of international politics, see Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, Third Edition (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), p.76. Quotations in this paragraph were taken from Kegley and Wittkopf's summary.

10. An intelligent exposition of this view, using these phrases, is Vernon V. Aspaturian's "The United States and the Shape of the New Europe", paper prepared for the Conference on "The New Europe and U.S. Interests", Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA. (November 30-December 1, 1990), p. 8. Although I disagree with his view, Aspaturian has made very clear presentation of such an perception of post-Cold War international relations.


15. This was the conclusion of Mark Kramer, "Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 36, No. 5 (September/October, 1987), pp. 63-65.


18. This, again, is the argument of Vernon Aspaturian, *op. cit.*

19. This, of course, is Joseph Nye's argument in *Bound to Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). Nye advocates a principal U.S. role in such transnational responses, but nevertheless points to the changed nature of world security and the requirement for American adaptation to those new conditions.


23. The OAU's actions in the Chad-Libya conflict were described as having a "weathervane quality..." by Rene Lemarchand, "The Crisis in Chad", in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and Richard L.
Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 246. The OAU peacekeeping force of some 3,000 men deployed to Chad in early 1982 was described by the same author as exhibiting "utter impotence..." (p. 248).