First draft for ECSA panel

From: Reinhardt Rummel

To: Desmond Dinan
    James Steinberg
    Stephen Szabo
    Samuel Wells

Integration and Security in West Europe's Political Union

April 8, 1991
Introduction

West European defense cooperation has recently become a topic among transatlantic and West European policy makers. All the relevant institutions are busy with discussing proposals:

(1) The EC's Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union is elaborating the blueprints for a draft treaty specifying the competences and procedures of EC decision making in security affairs. Relations to WEU are also on the agenda, not so with NATO.

(2) NATO has almost completed a review process of its future role, strategy and force structure. Despite some recent official interinstitutional contacts, NATO has hardly started to think of links with WEU and EC.

(3) The Presidency of the Western European Union recently (22 February 1991) published plans on the future role of WEU as a bridge between NATO and EC.

All of these efforts are designed to (re)organize the security structures in Europe. So far, none of the major conceptual problems has been settled and no master plan has emerged except that NATO, WEU and EC are likely to be interlocked in one way or the other. These three Western organizations will then have to be connected with any of the future all-European structures of security which are in the making, too. The following reflections will deal with some of the proposals and problems of linking NATO, WEU and EC.

1. The challenge: organization follows function

A large part of the debate on West European security cooperation is focusing almost entirely on institutional questions. This is particularly the case in the EC context, partly also in WEU. While institutional preconditions and arrangements do matter, it seems indispensable at a juncture of fundamental change in terms of international relations and security demands to start all deliberations of defense cooperation in Western Europe with a careful assessment of the nature and the scope of challenge to cope with in a new security setup. What is the specific task which we want a particular institution to cover? Function should drive institution building, not the other way round.
What is the most relevant feature with regard to the post-Cold War and the post-Iraq War era? It seems that it is the nature of security shifts from the clearly definable defense issue to the much less definable political issue. Certainly, we will have to continue to cope with military machineries, be it in the Soviet Union or in the Middle East, but "military solutions" of conflicts are much less an end in itself than they used to be. Stability in today's Europe is not achievable anymore by military balances. Other assets come into play such as economic performance and freedom of communication. Likewise, the instability caused by Saddam Hussein in the Middle East is not neutralized by fighting a war. Additional, more long-term measures, such as change of the political culture of the region and a new technology transfer policy from North to South, have to come into play to control the Gulf conflict. This means that the security policy of the new era will be much more political, and will deal with a large range of policies beyond the military one. The conclusion to draw from this observation is that at the heart of the security policy of the future must be increasingly more policy coordination than defense coordination. Hence, the importance of a politicization of NATO, a much wider role to play for the European Community, and an obvious need for the two organizations to develop a joint approach to security.

A second important feature of security challenges in the future is the differentiation of threats. It would be wrong to aggregate the threats in an effort to generalize them. Western nations are not in an unspecified situation of a defense tous azimuths. Just to introduce one differentiation: The NATO allies have two kinds of neighbors: the East Europeans and the people beyond the southern rim of the Mediterranean. Both groups of neighbors do not have much in common in terms of dangers they might cause or in terms of responses the Western allies might consider. Any war of significance in Eastern Europe could involve the Soviet Union and - given Moscow's potential - could ultimately lead to the destruction of Western societies. By contrast, wars at NATO's southern periphery could be very costly but do not have the potential of destroying our societies. The conclusion here is that in the first category of challenge (involvement of USSR) NATO has to be in the forefront of any Western response, while in the second category of challenges (only Southern neighbors are involved) WEU could be developed to deal with some of the threats. Whether in these cases WEU could or should go it alone or rather needs to be backed by NATO or the United States is a question to be seriously debated. See also the experience with the Gulf war.

A third feature of the present and future security environment of the West is the change of challenges over time. Thus, the NATO allies are in a precarious situation as long as the
Soviets still remain militarily present in Germany and East European countries while Moscow's further course is rather unpredictable and NATO member countries have already shifted gears. This type of anticipation of complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe by 1994 can be very costly. The transition period from now to 1994 holds a set of uncertainties and dangers which is quite different from a post-withdrawal constellation. Western institutional response will have to be adapted accordingly. NATO is absolutely indispensible and should be strengthened during this transition period, but because of Soviet sensitivity - cannot provide much of a direct help to East European countries. Here is a slot for West European organizations, especially EC and WEU, even if their response to East European demands for security cooperation remains a modest one. After the Soviet withdrawal NATO is likely to be in a position to meet some of the security needs of East European countries while West European security bodies might become less relevant in this respect.

A fourth feature of the future security situation in Europe is determined by the domestic environment of NATO allies. To take the example of Germany. If Bonn's allies are interested in a military German contribution to out of area contingencies (and both Eastern Europe and the Middle East are out of the NATO area), it can only be assured via the European avenue. As long as NATO remains limited to its borders the EC and/or WEU would have to establish forces of their own to allow the Bundeswehr to join multilateral actions beyond the treaty area. Domestic dilemmas in Germany could thus determine the institutional options for West European and transatlantic security cooperation.

To determine functions before developing institutions is only one of the guiding principles for the establishment of the future Atlantic-West European security structure. A second principle is to examine carefully the stage of evolution of the integration process before assigning functions to the West European institutions. Conditions have to be fulfilled before transferring security and defense missions to either EC or WEU. (See the analogy with the Economic and Monetary Unions) A third principle to observe is to look at the given institutions as a complementary set rather than as mutually exclusive bodies. This demands skillful orchestration of institutional evolution.

2. EC and WEU: Inserting security in the Political Union

With the inception of two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) on December 15, 1990 the European Community (EC) has set new targets expected to lead to greater integration of its internal policies and greater effectiveness in its external action, in other words, a
move towards some form of distinct European Union (EU). The IGC on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the IGC on Political Union (PU) are working in parallel during 1991. They will negotiate amendments to the Rome Treaty. These amendments which might take the form of another Act (see the Single European Act of 1987) are expected to be ratified in the parliaments of the twelve member states by the end of 1992. Thus, at the beginning of 1993 the Community is planed to have advanced in three respects:

- completed the Internal Market,
- established the contractual grounds for EMU,
- set the constitutional stage for PU.

If all goes well the perennial plan for a EU will take on a much more elaborate shape. If things go wrong, the Community will not fall apart, but it will have missed a chance for a giant leap forward. In any case, major optional developments are ahead: Is it the reaction to a growing diversity among West European nations or the unavoidable consequence of spill-over in the functional approach to West European integration? Is this the final euphoric phase in the creation of the "United States of Europe" or is it simply another desperate move of the West European group of states to adapt to changes in the international system? Is this the birth of a new hegemonic power in Europe or the preparation of an altruistic contributor to the network of all-European cooperation inside and outside the CSCE framework? In answering these questions the following considerations will be confined to the PU part of the new relance européenne. They will be based on an analysis of the Italian and the Luxembourg EC Presidency's preparatory reports on PU. These documents (PU-Reports) compile the individual views of the member states concerning major aspects of PU. ¹

The concept of PU is meant to intensify the integration process in West Europe, to deepen the Community. Deepening means advancing in three respects:

- develop the political system of the Community,
- extend its competences,
- increase the resources for common policies.

The political system of the Community is in several respects incomplete and asymmetrical. Its lack of efficiency, its democratic deficit and its intelligibility are well-known and widely identified deficiencies. The PU-Reports mention a number of areas in which to develop the political system: the (Spanish) idea of a European citizenship, the (German) proposal of a Council of regional representatives, the (British) idea of participation of national parliaments in the European decision-making. Other suggestions are intended to enhance the role of the major Community institutions, especially the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Council. One of the questions here is whether the present balance among these institutions is kept or altered. Most of the decision-makers claim that the institutional balance should not be changed. It seems, however, almost inevitable, if not wise, to review the traditional status of all institutions on the background of qualitative changes inside and outside the Community.

The PU-Reports envisage the transformation of more competences to Brussels. This concerns areas of formerly intergovernmental cooperation such as environment, health, energy, research, technology, consumer protection. They also refer to issues which are consequences from the establishment of the Internal Market such as immigration and asylum regulations, the fight against drug abuse and international crime. A third area of extended Community competences is foreign and security policy. (See below.)

New Community policies can not be implemented without an appropriate financial base and the recruitment of skilled personnel. Therefore, the question of more autonomous financial sources for the Community are once again on the agenda including the idea of granting the Community the legal basis to establish a little tax of its own.

Taken together these proposals will form a copious and heterogenous agenda for the twelve foreign ministers during the IGC on PU. If negotiations are successful and the Community is deepened on schedule, enlargement might be reconsidered seriously in early 1993. The dynamics of West Europe's integration has always been an interplay of deepening and widening. Research which has looked into the Northern enlargement in the 1970s and the Southern enlargement in the 1980s has confirmed a positive correlation between widening and deepening. The same may well be expected from the Eastern enlargement of the Community in the 1990s which has already begun with the merging of the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany - even though this was a very particular case. The Eastern enlargement round will be more complicated than the previous ones. It affects four groups of potential candidates of a very diverse
nature: the (seven) EFTA countries, the (three) advanced East Central European reform countries, the (three) less advanced South East European reform countries including the Yugoslav conglomerate, and the (fifteen) members of the Union of Soviet Republics. The Twelve and the Community have made the decision that they would not accept further members before the current round of deepening is successfully concluded by 1993.

Unlike widespread assumption in the European public and, notably, in North America, the Community does not face a dilemma in making a choice between deepening and widening. Policy-makers in Brussels regard deepening a precondition and a preparation for widening. It also helps to manage the expected widening in the second half of the 1990s in an orderly way. Moreover, the Community wanted to make sure that major options for its further development such as a common currency and a common defence policy are not excluded by a premature expansion of the number and the type of new member states. In this regard, the present deepening effort can be seen as a preemptive move in the perspective of an unavoidable enlargement. If so, the deepening measures will have to anticipate the future size of the Community and will have to shape its internal structure accordingly. This imperative is likely to be a heavy burden for the negotiators of the PU treaty.

3. PU as a way to adapt to change in the international environment

The reason for deepening the Community does not consist of integration strategy alone. More prominent incentives derive from the conviction of the Twelve that they should react in common to the new challenges in external relations. However, the internal rivalry among the Twelve should not be underestimated as either pull or push factor for new initiatives of integration. These internal incentives have become particularly important in a fundamentally changed international environment. The end of the Cold War, German unification and the war against Iraq have affected each of the Twelve in a particular fashion with a repercussion on their status and their interests.

The project of the Internal Market and of EMU finds its roots more in the demands of international competitiveness of European economies than in the mechanics of regional integration strategy. Member states calculate that external strength is generated by common action and by more internal coherence. Coherence is not achievable via technical harmonization or, simply, the creation of a European Central Bank. It is a policy process, as well, if not predominantly. Major decisions on the transfer of economic welfare within the Community can not be arranged in an intergovernmental or technocratic way. A full-
size policy system is needed to cope efficiently with resource allocation and social conflict. Neither the Internal Market initiative nor the plans for EMU originally included these considerations. After the date and the agenda for an IGC on EMU had been set up at the end of 1989 policy-makers increasingly felt that a political component should be added to the new economic and monetary competences of the Community.

How to negotiate such a political component? The initial suggestion was to bring the IGC on EMU to an end and then open a second conference on political matters. A follow-on idea was to incorporate the political subjects in the IGC on EMU. The plea for a separate and parallel IGC on PU finally surfaced in April 1990 when Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President François Mitterrand made a respective common proposal. The proposal for a PU was triggered by the accelerated process toward German unification and by an increasing demand for a central role of the Community in the transformation process of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Paris feared that the larger and more sovereign Germany would reorient its foreign policy priorities toward the east of Europe and reduce its Western ties. Therefore the French supported and partly engaged in the reform process of NATO in order to keep this framework as a strong multilateral structure for the integration of the German military power. In addition the French policy wanted to integrate the economic and political assets of Germany in the Community by speeding up and extending the integration in Western Europe. Decisions on the two IGCs at the European Council meetings in Dublin in April and June of 1990 reflected this approach.

Apart of the new "German question" which emerged as a problem of size and orientation for some of the West Europeans, the Twelve were confronted with the demand for help from Eastern countries in order to ease their way to democracy and liberal economy. The Community had not been fully prepared for this task and needed better instruments and more resolve to meet some of the East European expectations. These and a number of other consequences of the end of the Cold War, such as the reduced influence of both Washington and Moscow in Europe, stimulated the West Europeans to consider the development of a more forceful collective external policy and to play a key role in the formation of a post-Cold War order in Europe.

Since August 1990 the project of PU has been receiving further encouragement from the developments in the Gulf starting with Iraq's military occupation of Kuwait and reaching its preliminary peak with the countermove of the international alliance begun on January 17, 1991 and based on UN Resolution No. 678. The fact that war was once again living reality had a farreaching impact on the Community's plans for a common foreign policy.
Until the Iraqi aggression the Community was pretty much preparing for an important, yet basically civilian, power role in Europe. To raise now the question of whether the Twelve should have a security policy was to ask whether they should have the capacity to act as a world policeman, and therefore whether they should have a military capacity as such. This in turn brought up the question of the Twelve's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and their relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union. The old debate on a common security policy has taken on a different dimension. The initiative of the French foreign minister Roland Dumas and the German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of February 1991 for a security policy of the Community is telling in this regard.

Taken together this makes at least three separate driving forces for PU:

- political flanking of economic and monetary integration,
- preparing for tasks in Eastern Europe,
- preparing for reaction to security challenges beyond Europe.

Each of these driving forces aims at the elaboration of specific ingredients of PU:

- The flanking of EMU demands an evolution of the political system of the Community, mainly a strengthening of the executive branch ("economic government") and an increase of the participation of political forces in the decision making process (European Parliaments, national parliaments, representatives of the regions).

- The demands from Eastern Europe require the conceptual capacity and the resources for the development of a cooperative network in Europe, in short, a strengthening of the Community as a civilian power.

- The security challenges from outside Europe drag the Community or most of its member states toward a military power: common West European threat assessment and the establishment of a common or coordinated arms export policy as well as the creation of common or coordinated deployment forces.

In fact, the Community and its member states have started to negotiate on such ingredients of the PU. The plans for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are designed to strengthen the civilian power component of the Community. After the rapid dissoluton of the postwar order in Europe new and reliable political and institutional
structures are needed. With the United States in relative decline and massively entangled in the Gulf and the Soviet Union under domestic pressure of secession, danger of economic breakdown, and the risk of revisionary military policies, reliable international actors are scares. The Community might be such a strong actor, but it would have to shoulder a wider range of responsibilities. In Europe major parts of former defense duties have been transformed into tasks for a new type of security policy which is primarily based on nonmilitary instruments. This is the field where the Community has always claimed to dispose of a comparative advantage which it now can bring to bear, just as it has tried to do in the context of its Mediterranean Policy since the mid-seventies. In this respect, the nature of the Community's foreign policy supposed to undergo major change. Its economic foreign policy (style EC external relations) and its traditional diplomacy (style European Political Cooperation) will be transformed into a foreign policy of a new type (style CFSP) which remains to be developed in detail.

The new PU is planed to develop the Community as a military power as well. Defense matters for the first time are not excluded from negotiations of the Twelve. As far as the PU-Reports go, CFSP is supposed to deal with security matters while defense questions remain the prerogative of WEU and NATO. During their deliberations in the IGC the twelve foreign ministers will have to find convincing criteria for an institutional separation of security and defense matters without denying or distorting the substantial interrelationship of the two areas. Moreover, the triangular relationship of the Community, WEU and NATO needs to be sorted out in terms of legal competences, political guidance and operational missions.

4. PU as a constituent part of the European Union

According to the PU-Reports all aspects of foreign and security policy will be considered for common activity. Matters of CFSP will be processed in one communitarian body, the Council of Ministers. The EC Commission is acquiring some additional though not exclusive competences of foreign policy initiative, while the European Parliament is suggested to win more information and consultation rights, but no rights of initiative. Beyond this common denominator of the Twelve the PU-Reports present various preferences of how to organize a future CFSP. This pertains mainly to the status and function of the European Council and the transfer of competences.

Different views are held on the transfer of national competences to Brussels. National political leaders have drawn divers conclusions from external challenges such as the Gulf
war or the instabilities in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The British Primeminister John Major's government is not prepared to shift competences in foreign and security matters from London to the Community. He is in favor of a consensus approach without any majority ruling and believes in an intensified intergovernmental cooperation as the most efficient mode of operation for CFSP. Most of the other member states think that if this model were to guide the negotiations on CFSP the economic giant EC is likely to remain a political dwarf.

These member states regard the transfer of competences from the national to the communitarian level as indispensable and expect more international influence from the introduction of majority rule. Paris (with a certain support from Bonn) favors a major role of the European Council in foreign and security policy. According to the French goût the heads of state and government should agree on common areas of priority. Once these are established by consensus it would be the task of the Council of Ministers to implement policies within these priority areas. The Council of Ministers could decide with qualified majority. Belgium, hoping to drag the European Council into the institutional setup and legislation of the Rome Treaty, supports the French approach. The Hague, on the other hand, is rejecting all moves to strengthen the competences of the European Council without a proportionate elevation of the European Parliament. Therefore, the Netherlands have come out quite skeptical on the letter which President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl addressed to their homologues in the Community in early December 1990. The Franco-German tandem clearly proposes to give more influence to the European Council in foreign policy and security affairs. If this model is accepted by the IGC on PU, and implemented, the Community is likely to resemble more and more the French semi-presidential system, at least in matters of foreign and security policy.

In a relatively short period from 1987 to 1993 and provided present plans are accepted the EC will have been pushed beyond an economic into a political community. This period reminds of the beginning 1950s when the West European core countries tried to establish the European Political Community, a community which included a defense component with a multinational army. This attempt failed. The renewed attempt forty years later is a more modest approach. Defense will only gradually be incorporated in the European Union. In a first step, the PU-Reports speak of defense as an area which - in terms of integration - poses particular problems for some member countries. The PU-Reports state that, at a later stage, a mutual defense guarantee could well be considered among the Twelve. For the time being, policy-makers intend to ameliorate the interrelationship between the Community and the West European Union (WEU).
This certainly reenforces the relevance of WEU but does not lead to a merger of (parts of) WEU and the Community during the present round of IGC negotiations as the Italian government had originally suggested in the Summer of 1990. Many observers regard the ending of the (WEU) Treaty of Brussels in 1998 as a target date for the fusion of both institutions. This leaves many questions unanswered particularly the problem of how to arrange relations with NATO, especially after 1993 if the Community is becoming enlarged by member states which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance. How does the "bridge" or "channel" function looks like which the WEU is attributed to in relation to NATO? Who gives the guidelines to WEU? NATO or the European Council? How are EC member countries (like Greece and Denmark) and European NATO member countries (like Norway or Turkey) connected to WEU? What is Irelands position, and that of Austria once it has joined the Community?

If successful, PU could, as of 1993, strengthen the Community internally and externally. Its decision-making capacity could grow and its democratic foundations could be enhanced. This does not lead to a clarification regarding the type of a union or state which would finally emerge from the overall integration process. The principal of subsidiarity is likely to play a more important role, however, than in the past. The Community reaches a level of development where the appropriate distribution of power and authority has to be raised in a fundamental way. Taken together the results of the IGCs on EMU and PU could restructure the West European entity in a significant way.

Member countries are confronted with irreversible decisions concerning the authority in foreign, security and defense policy. National prerogatives in these sensitive areas are at stake and the precise ideological orientation of the Community as an international power is an open question. The nation-state in West Europe could undergo considerable reform via more elaborate sub-national as well as supra-national competences and structures. Yet, the PU of 1993 will not include the decision for a constituent assembly which would be asked to elaborate the constitution of the European Union. The European Parliament's aspirations in this regard will once again be turned down. Regarding the statehood of the European Union the Community remains in many ways open to the wider Europe.

5. NATO and WEU: Constructing the new American-European roof

---

2 Foreign Ministers Dumas and Genscher in their January 1991 joint proposition for a common security policy have mentioned a slightly earlier date.
Washington always welcomed closer security and defense cooperation among West European nations provided it is not to the detriment of the Alliance and on the assumption that there would be an essential Atlantik link. The guiding perception was to remain a part of the same organization across the Atlantic, even if two equal powers should develop over time. Secretary James Baker proposed in a speech in Berlin in 1989 the development of such an interlocking approach and pledges to this end were made in the November 1990 joint declarations. Once, however, the Europeans start a serious effort to introduce new and down the road autonomous defense structures in Western Europe, Washington will remind the Europeans that NATO is in its very existence part of the essence of the European integration.

Thus, the United States will welcome coordinated WEU defense positions in NATO councils, but not on an inflexible basis. Hence the US opposition to a structure where the European Council is directing WEU. To facilitate coordination between WEU and NATO national permanent representatives in both organizations could be the same. This then is no guarantee against a bloc-voting of the Europeans in NATO but makes it less likely. This discussion becomes more sensitive if WEU is assigned forces and missions of its own. Under a firm American-European umbrella the organization of military cooperation between Western Europe and the US would depend on the contingency in a given situation and on the level of West European institutional development in the long run.

(To be continued...)

6. PU as an actor in an all-European security structure

Perceived from the outside in 1993 the most visible sign of the Community with an established PU might be the practical performance of its new executive branch in foreign and security policy. It is likely to be based on the instruments of the new EMU rather than on combined national military forces. The Community could push a large part of the individual member states' external policies to the background and, thus, emerge as a more unified international actor which presumably shows some attitudes of a political giant in international relations, particularly in the United Nations, in the trans-European network, in the trans-Atlantic partnership and in the connection with the Third World. When it comes to projection of military power the Community will probably remain in the background. NATO member countries will, at things considered, continue to form the appropriate grouping for such missions.
Concerning the all-European order, the Political Union will help to develop it as well as form a constituent part of it. These two functions remain to be specified using the Charter of Paris for a New Europe\(^3\) as a framework of orientation. As far as the PU is regarded as a constituent element of a transeuropean order reference should be made to the last forty years of integration policy in Western Europe. During this period a Community was built up which can be regarded as a security system per se. The evolution of interdependencies among formerly hostile nation states and the quality of their transnational cooperation have reached a point of no return. The system has a number of remarkable characteristics:

- Nation states have deliberately given up part of their sovereignty to a supranational authority,
- economic and social asymmetries are eased,
- ethnicities and minorities are respected,
- migrations are regulated under a common regime,
- the importance of borders is gradually reduced,
- trade policies are handled in common,
- differences in size and status of countries are rather reduced than increased.

These qualities helped to establish peace among the Community's member states. The system has coped fairly well with all those types of conflict which are also to be found on the present crisis agenda of Eastern Europe. Could this model of security via integration be a solution for the East European problems as well? The Community can either export its security concept or include East European states in the system by enlargement. Either way, East European countries would have to comply with the rules of the integration game which is not easy. In any case, the Community and its member states have decided to continue their integration efforts despite the restructuring of the postwar order in Europe. Trends toward renationalization are rather weak to date. The Twelve seem determined to intensify their cooperation and to contribute an element of stability to the all-European order.

Security via integration produces security inside the Community but is no guarantee against risks and dangers from outside. The Twelve can not control events in their neighborhood or beyond but they can add to a stabilization or destabilization of their external environment. With the successful inception of PU (and its future CFSP including WEU)

\(^3\) The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, in: Europe (Documents), No. 1672 (14 December 1990), pp. 1-8.
the Community is likely to contribute to stable structures in Europe in a variety of ways each endowed with its specific mode of operation.

(1) Common foreign and security policy
This type of external policy needs to be hammered out in the negotiations among the foreign ministers and regulations will be moulded in treaty paragraphs. The first issue area for a test of the new CFSP is likely to be relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, maybe at the beginning only the policies in connection with the CSCE.

(2) EC external relations
These relations consist of the traditional trade and cooperation agreements as well as the new type of association agreements (also called European Agreements). The Community will develop a network of these economic contracts with post-socialist countries on the Continent.

(3) European Political Cooperation
EPC is likely to extend its network of bilateral dialogues with the Soviet Union as well as with East European countries.  

(4) Development policy
Foreign aid policy has not yet been connected with all-European relations but should not be excluded from contemplations on new ways of supporting reform and liberal economy in the East. A Stabex system for some East European countries? The European Investment Bank, for instance, was already used once in a similar situation in the 1970s when Portugal received a loan.

(5) Security and defense policy

Arms control. The PU to come is likely to represent the West Europeans' view in negotiations on arms reductions, in talks on ceilings and, even more important, on bottom lines of national and regional armed forces. This will become particularly relevant at the

---

4 See for example regular calendar meetings such as the meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister in Madrid (February 22, 1991) as well as adhoc meetings such as the Kremlin visit of the Troika on the Iraq war (February 18, 1991).
start of a CFE II round after the 1992 CSCE meeting. Until then NATO remains the main forum of West European consensus building on arms control.

**Military technology.** The PU may develop roles for virtually all major issues connected with military technology: production, cooperation, transfer, export, export control, proliferation, conversion. Particularly important might by questions of how to control the export of military knowhow and the technological capacity for military reconstitution. Is the creation of a West European agency (see Euratom) a solution to the problem or should such an agency be designed for Europe as a whole (see the new Conflict information center). No trans-European agency has been developed yet in this regard and it must remain an open question whether the size of the CSCE is the best framework for the development of control regimes or whether it should be rather the Western Economic Summit or a new Northern hemisphere grouping if not the UN or a combination of all of these bodies.

**Peace keeping.** Here, too, a body on the European level is missing as the new conflict information center does not have the quality of a conflict management agency with a strong authority and instruments for sanctions as suggested by, among others, the German CSCE delegation. In any case, a conflict management capacity in Europe has to be connected in one way or the other to the UN Security Council for reasons of division of labor and other reasons.

**Defense relations.** With the WTO dissolving in the course of 1991 East European countries are in need of bilateral and multilateral connections to fill an obvious vacuum for both software and hardware support. The PU of the Community can not provide military operational help nor defense guarantees, but it can establish a defense dialogue that helps to overcome some isolation problems of East European countries or helps them to balance their continued dependence on the Soviet Union in terms of military equipment. Moreover, the close connection between PU (CFSP and WEU) and NATO will constitute the main counterweight to the remaining Soviet military power and assures the central strategic axis of stability in Europe.

In summing up it seems that there are more tasks for a PU in the years ahead than it will be able to address. At least the present propositions tabled for the creation of a new CFSP seem to fall short of the wide scope of responsibilities which figur on West Europe's future agenda. The plans seem to lack careful analysis of two factors: the true character of the security challenges in and for Europe and the diversity of national views of these
challenges including the ways to cope with them in the future. In this regard the Twelve should learn from their own experience during the last forty years.