BETWEEN MAASTRICHT AND SARAJEVO:
EUROPEAN IDENTITIES, NARRATIVES, MYTHS

Francis A. Beer and Jeffrey S. Kopstein
Political Science Department
University of Colorado
Boulder, CO 80309
303-492-7802/7138
beer@spot.colorado.edu
kopstein@spot.colorado.edu

Paper Prepared for the
Third Biennial International Conference of the
European Community Studies Association,
Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington DC
May 27-29, 1993
BETWEEN MAASTRICHT AND SARAJEVO: EUROPEAN IDENTITIES, NARRATIVES, MYTHS

Francis A. Beer and Jeffrey S. Kopstein

Abstract

European identity emerges from narrative. The multiple narratives of Historical Europe include Cold War Europe, a hegemonic narrative, or myth. The end of the Cold War has lessened the political authority of this narrative, increasingly opening it to revisionist interpretations and releasing previously repressed competitors to contend in a more pluralistic, multivocal European environment. The legitimate heir of Cold War Europe is Europe-Maastricht, an integrative identity that beckons into the future with a Eurooptimistic vision. Based on instrumental rationality and development, it promises peace and prosperity. It is, however, challenged by an increasingly powerful Europe-Sarajevo, a disintegrative identity that emphasizes deeper historical ethnic and cultural roots and threatens the dominant political and economic construction of Europe during the last half century.
BETWEEN MAASTRICHT AND SARAJEVO: EUROPEAN IDENTITIES, NARRATIVES, MYTHS

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War; political difficulties over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and the expanding Balkan war have been a few of the major events that have stimulated a growing literature on the future of Europe. Mostly situated within politics and political science, this literature constructs itself and Europe using standard categories of conservative or liberal, realist or functionalist discourse. It enriches our understanding of the stream of unfolding historical experience and helps to place it in received traditions that give it shared meaning (cf. Joffe, 1993; Kurth, 1993; Gati, 1992; Goldstein, 1992; Jackson, 1992; Sbragia, 1992; Tverton, 1992; Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991; Wistrich, 1991; Mearsheimer, 1990; Hoffmann, Keohane, Mearsheimer, 1990; Snyder, 1990).

There are, at the same time, other traditions and topoi available to frame the same events. There has, for example, been a good deal of contemporary concern, coming from various disciplines, with problems of identity and difference. Much of this has focused on the individual, but wider aspects of political identity and difference have also received attention (cf. Saxonhouse, 1992; Bauman, 1991; Connolly, 1991; Jacques, 1991; Safran, 1991; Bloom, 1990; Glass, 1989; Taylor, 1989; Braudel, 1988; Norton, 1988; Tugendhat, 1986). We feel that the politics of identity will help determine the ultimate trajectory of Europe. What is meant by political identity is quite simple: who we think we are, and what are the basic assumptions about political life that we bring with us into politics. Underlying this line of analysis is the assumption that the subjective side of political life cannot be easily dismissed or reduced to other "variables." If modernity engenders wider and more inclusive definitions of boundaries and membership, then we can expect that over time this will lead to larger political units. If, on the other hand, modern identity is rife with particularisms, then we have cause to be far less sanguine about the entire project of "Europe."

The concern with identity intersects with narrative. Narrative is far from simple though it is popularly understood in simple form. In linear essence, it focuses on stories--characters undertaking action and interactions structured in plots (Miller, 1990). Such stories may seem to be trivial or juvenile, developmentally restricted or disabled, but this impression is deeply misleading. Indeed, narrative is a fundamental way in which we define our understanding of reality and ourselves. It helps us bring a closure, even though artificial, arbitrary, and temporary, to the infinite indeterminacy of our worlds and our selves (Schleifer, Davis, and Mergler, 1992). The seriousness of the narrative enterprise is illustrated, for example, in the work of

1. Thanks to G. R. Boynton, Josephine Squires, and Nina Tannenwald for helpful suggestions.
Mircea Eliade and Claude Lévi-Strauss. For such authors, stories of everyday life and religious myths embody and maintain the structure of society. For the distinguished historian William McNeill, narrative is at the center of the historian's craft, and the dominant narratives become "mythstories" for their societies. In the work of Roger Shank (1990), stories structure computational models of human cognition; frames and scripts are major building blocks of artificial intelligence. More to the present point, Paul Ricoeur (1988: 247) states that "individual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history." Self is thus embedded in narrative; narrative is the matrix that identifies, locates, indexes, specifies, and recognizes the emergent pattern of the self (cf. Kerby, 1991; Spence, 1982).

These concerns with identity and narrative inform our discussion of Europe. We argue that European identity emerges from a historical narrative. The Cold War is a special kind of narrative, a hegemonic narrative, or myth, whose authority was embedded in that of the dominant Cold War regime. The end of the Cold War has lessened the narrative's appeal, increasingly opening it to revisionist interpretations and releasing previously suppressed competitors. Other stories now contend in a more pluralistic, multivocal European environment. The winner, if there is one, of this contest will be the future of Europe.

Historical Europe and Cold War Europe

Historians—political, economic, social, and cultural—positioned at different expanses of space and time, with different visions, have constructed the identity and narrative of Historical Europe. They have embedded its long anchor in sedimented depths of Oriental and Occidental tradition, Judaic and Islamic experience, the classical heritage of classical Greece and Rome, medieval Christian and feudal orders, the humanism of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the growth of nation-states, colonialism and imperialism; democracy and capitalism. Wherever Europe is spoken, monasteries, archives, and libraries thickly describe the tapestries of Historical Europe for the contemporary heirs waiting to claim their legacy. The identity of Europe is lodged in these multiple stories, emerging from the past, but maintained in the present. Historical Europe is the collective name of all of these European stories.

One story from this group is of particular recent importance. The century of total war, in the telling phrase of Raymond Aron, created the frame for the myth of the Cold War and Cold War Europe. Cold War Europe, in turn, constituted itself through a particular view of the world and itself. We formulate its central elements as follows:

The Cold War was a struggle between ultimate evil, represented by the Soviet Union, and the forces of good, represented by Europe, and their allies.
The Atlantic Alliance between Europe and North America provided a wider umbrella of association and security. Europe had a center, defined geographically by Northwestern Europe and functionally by economics. Europe also had a periphery that blended into Central and Eastern Europe.

This narrative, reinforced by events, has been the hegemonic discourse, the dominant frame and interpretation, the myth of European politics for the last half century.

The Cold War and the Communist Enemy

Common knowledge and common sense of the Cold War constructed the world as a story of Manichean struggle between good and evil. Archetypal memory and millennia of historical enmity reinforced powerful distinctions between two hostile groups: a white, Christian, occidental Self and a dark oriental Other (cf. Said, 1993; Chen, 1992).

A system of concentric circles defined the essential Other, the Enemy. At the periphery of the outer ring, were the neutral nations. In the stark world of John Foster Dulles, however, there were no neutrals. In the next ring came the opposing Communist nations formally tied together through formal and informal political, military, economic, or cultural bonds, for example the Warsaw Pact; COMECON; agreements for military assistance, trade and aid. Nearer the center of this Russian doll was the Soviet Union, and, successively the Communist Party, the Kremlin, the Politburo, Stalin and his successors.

This narrative was strongest and most persuasive during the early years of the Cold War. The Sino-Soviet split, combined with other differences in the camp of Communist nations; the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's renunciation of part of his legacy; the stresses and strains of peaceful coexistence—all of these gradually weakened the definition and credibility of the Enemy. As the half century of what John Lewis Gaddis called "the long peace" waned, Westerners had less and less reason to believe, based on their personal lives, that the fundamental choice was between being Red or dead. Yet, anchored in the primacy of earlier formative experience, the Cold War and the Communist Enemy continued to frame and orient the post-World War II identity of Europe.

The Atlantic Community and Democratic Allies

Cold War history already fills whole libraries with sources and details. We can here only sketch out brief elements from the standard account. The story begins with the Allied victory over the Axis powers, a combination of triumph and tragedy. The Allied achievement led, paradoxically, to the disintegration of the Grand Alliance that had successfully prosecuted World War II. Al-
lied agreements at Yalta dividing Europe into Eastern and Western spheres of influence; tensions at Potsdam, particularly surrounding the political implications of the first atomic bombs; and Allied conflicts over the administration of Berlin all prefigured what was to come.

Central to the account were the ruthless suppression of democratic institutions and dissent and the construction of Communist national regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly highlighted by the Czechoslovakian coup. These, combined with terrible winter of 1946-1947, encouraged Western fears of Soviet penetration and violation. Historical memories of invasion and conquest—the Moors in Spain, the Turks at the gates of Vienna—were an element of the deep background of Western response.

One of the foundational texts was George Kennan’s Long Telegram of 1946, the essence of which was published in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "Mr. X" and was the basis for the National Security Council document, NSC 68, that defined American strategic doctrine (see May, 1993; Jensen, 1991). These writings developed the ideas that came to be associated with the metaphor of containment. Containment constructed an updated and protracted version of the siege script, which had figured so prominently in European military history against walled castles and cities both in Europe itself and the Middle East. Containment promised to reduce the costs of resistance. The Allies had little stomach for a conventional war against massive Soviet ground troops in Europe. The unwillingness of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander to allow General Patton to push forward against the Russians to the East was an early sign of Allied military caution. Memories of losses from two World Wars that had begun from the "cult of the offensive" warned both the Soviet Union away from adventurism and the Allies away from military engagement that was not absolutely necessary (Snyder, 1984).

The balance of terror was another important metaphor. Balance of terror took a standard strategem of European historical diplomacy, balance of power, and added to it. Nuclear weapons supplemented the conventional historical arsenal. An important psychological dimension was also mixed in. Just as fire had produced panic in crowded medieval fortresses, atomic bombs now served to induce terror in the Enemy. Indeed, they were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki for their "shock" effect on both the Japanese and the Europeans (cf. Bundy, 1988, 80; Alperovitz, 1985).

Western leaders also had the task of alleviating the terror of their own populations and encouraging their will to resist the Enemy. NATO thus entered the narrative as the house in which Allied nuclear weapons would be kept. Within NATO, The United States, together with Britain and France, provided the nuclear umbrella against potential Soviet nuclear weapons. Under the strategic doctrine—a genre of military narrative—of the sword
and the shield, the institutions of NATO grouped and coordinated Western military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional forces and other related activities (see Beer, 1969).

The developing story of the postwar order, and the pressures it implied, thus included the Atlantic Community as a protective habitat for European integration. The interior of the Atlantic Community comprehendened not only military elements, but also economic and political dimensions. In the early stages of Atlantic economic cooperation, the Truman doctrine and Point Four program aimed specifically at assisting Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan at the reconstruction of Western Europe. Formal economic institutions subsequently fleshed out the design. The OEEC, later the OECD, led to the creation of its Enemy double, COMECON. The NATO Parliamentarians Conference never attained the flowering of the advocates of full Atlantic Union. Nevertheless, it contributed to the institutional superstructure of Atlantic Community. Atlantic institutions, including United States political, military and economic power fit together with, and buttressed, Europe.

Europe: Boundaries, Centers, and Peripheries

The iron curtain and the Berlin wall bounded Europe to East. Winston Churchill, in his defining speech at Fulton, Missouri in March, 1946, described the eastern perimeter of Europe. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," he said, "an iron curtain has descended across the continent" (Yergin: 1977, 176). The iron curtain was the Eastern surface of Europe. It defined Europe's limits and liminality. The eastern boundary was the farthest extension of European identity. It had physical location, like the North Cape. And it had texture. Instead of ice, it had the texture of steel. The hardness and finality of the iron curtain warned away any who would be daring or foolhardy enough to traverse it. The boundary of Europe never lost the character that Churchill gave it. Yet gradually it was redefined and resymbolized. Guard dogs, barbed wire, landmines, and the Berlin Wall extended it in space and time.

The Atlantic and the Mediterranean opened Europe to the West and South. Within the Cold War's negative frame and the sheltering umbrella of the Atlantic Alliance, the positive dynamic of European cooperation and integration could occur. Inside these boundaries, Europe tended its garden. The center of Europe was defined geographically by Northwestern Europe and functionally by economics. In the face of the Communist threat, France and Germany had a dominant national security interest in putting behind them their historical enmity. The spatial center of Europe consisted of the original Six, bound together by a foundational skeleton also laid down in iron metaphor, the European Coal and Steel Community. Building on this core, another organization, Western European Union, allowed the major European powers to control possible German rearmament.
As we have recounted, Western leaders needed to restore the confidence of Western European publics in their abilities to re-
construct their world in the light of their own visions and
dreams. Just as the military pillar of nuclear weapons balanced
the conventional forces of the Soviet Union, so the political
pillar of the European Community balanced the economic force of
Central and Eastern Europe. The early steps of European Community
constructed the economic dimension of the counterweight to the
Soviet Union. The ECSC was solidly based on the converging eco-
nomic self-interests of France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux
countries. The "spill-over" of these interests in peaceful
"security communities" implied the constructive evolution of ECSC
institutions, tasks, and membership through the integrative
learning of a dynamic European regime (cf. Puchala, 1984; Lind-

An outer circle of European cooperation originally consisted
of those states outside the original Six that desired a looser
form of association. The European Free Trade Area initially pro-
vided an institutional setting for European fellow travellers.
This periphery of European space and activity was gradually
pulled in as many of these reluctant partners were brought into
closer relations with the center. The center came to include ad-
ditional layers of states and tasks. Formal neutrals like
Switzerland, Austria, and Finland developed networks of relations
with Europe. The West was also able to fish successfully at the
edges of the Communist bloc, helping Hungary and Yugoslavia to
become more independent and prosperous.

The periphery of Historical Europe had always blended into
Central and Eastern Europe (see Stavrianos, 1981). This was also
true for Cold War Europe, and the magnetic pull of the center,
embedded in the Atlantic Community, eventually helped to bring
down the Berlin Wall, the alliance of Eastern European states and
their Communist parties, and the Soviet Union.

Post-Cold War Europe

Europeans toast the end of the Cold War story, but there are
ashes in the wine. The myth of the Cold War has lost much of its
power with the disappearance of the Enemy. Paradoxically, the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union have also undermined Europe’s belief and purpose and, with
them, Europe’s identity. Cold War Europe contained within itself
the seeds of what would emerge, but the new identity of Post-Cold
War Europe remains unclear. We can, however, try to sketch
certain important parts of an emerging narrative. This story con-
tains three major components, the death of the ancien regime, the
Cold War; the legacy of the legitimate heir, Europe-Maastricht;
and the dark shadow of the half-sister, Europe-Sarajevo.

Cold War Europe is Dead
The Cold War has come to an end. It is over as an experienced myth, even if historical narratives continue to be written (e.g. Brinkley, 1992; McCullough, 1992). The war between good and evil is finished. The democratic western allies won the Cold War. The myth of the Cold War was a true story, cosmologically and practically. The theory was confirmed by hard evidence. There was a deadly, evil Enemy—concrete, observable—that was finally destroyed. Western leaders had political virtue. Their wise policy of balancing and containment, prudence and perseverance, was vindicated (Isaacson and Thomas, 1986). Their truth finally brought the Cold War and the Cold War regime to a close. As the myth predicted, the truth has made us free.

The Soviet regime collapsed like the Czarist regime that preceded it. The Soviet Union has dissolved into the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose collection of the former Russian empire’s component parts. The arms race and the threat of nuclear war have receded. Totalitarianism has disappeared in the European context. Lenin and Stalin have passed away, their heirs and legacy scattered. The Soviet Union is gone, the Communist Party has disintegrated as a political force. If contemporary empirical research in international relations tells us anything, it is about the close relationship between democracy and peace. We are, so popular writers tell us, in the springtime of democracy and at the end of history. As the superordinate category of evil itself—defined in the Cold War narrative—has disappeared, so the litany of subordinate evils, particularly war, should soon follow it into the dusty archives of past narratives.

Yet, the end of the Cold War has created a crisis for Atlantic institutions, particularly those involving military security. The Atlantic Alliance has lost its major raison d’être, the external Enemy; it has lost the cohesive power of hate and fear produced by the threatening Communist Other. The friends are still friends. After all, they are democrats. Yet, in the absence of compelling danger, friends can go separate ways. They have separate interests that are not always easy to coordinate, even in the face of security problems like the Balkan War (Levine, 1992).

Europe-Maastricht Beckons

Churchill embodied and dramatized the balance of terror in the metaphor of two scorpions in the bottle, each poised to sting the other to death. One of the scorpions has disappeared, not with a bang but a whimper, not through nuclear devastation but from economic exhaustion. The other is deeply damaged. The Soviet Union is America’s vanquished foe, but also a possible prophecy of America’s future. The United States is, at least briefly, the sole remaining superpower. Yet America’s unipolar moment is troubled by the enormous economic and social sequelae of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the weakening of the United States have increased the relative weight of all other players, especially Europe. In this context of exhausted adver-
saries, Europe is, in Johan Galtung’s phrase, an emerging super-

power.

The center of Europe reborn is Europe-Maastricht. Maastricht
is the living symbol of the new Europe, embodying hopes for a
common European identity born of rational self interest and
positive reinforcement. The treaty of Maastricht speaks the
language of instrumental rationality, of a currency union that
will lead to greater wealth for all, but the more important issue
is that of identity. Behind the Eurooptimists lies the idea that
giving up national control over currencies reflects a more funda-
mental shift in political identity away from national to supra-
national units. For the Eurooptimists it is not a matter of eco-
nomics being less important than identity. Nothing could be far-
ther from the truth. It is precisely because material life and
its institutional substructures are so important that the will-
ingsness to begin changing the locus of control must symbolize the
potential for a shift in center of political authority. Europe’s
emerging identity is shaped by instrumental rationality but has
much greater ambitions for the creation of a new Europe and new
Europeans. Self interest will lead to a new European Self.

Yet the new European narrative and identity are increasingly
fragmented. Without the dynamic focusing power of fear, greed
alone may not be enough to structure political reality. The Euro-
pean superpower emerges, but with deep political problems of its
own. Europe is no longer compressed constrained, distorted and
diminished, dwarfed and stunted by the Cold War and the Atlantic
Alliance. The earthshaking fall of the wall have loosened and
disturbed other structures. The same post-Cold War dynamic of ex-
haustion and deconstruction that destroyed the Soviet Union and
has seriously weakened the United States is also at work in West-
ern Europe.

The European Community labors heavily in troubled waters.
European farmers resist harmonization into GATT. Widespread do-
mestic resistance has threatened, though unsuccessfully, the
ratification and implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. The
potential economic benefits of deeper union have met obvious
strong resistance in Britain, Denmark, and France, but these are
only the most visible cases.

Europe-Maastricht is an heir of the Cold War; it implies
centers and peripheries similar to those that have gone before.
The core states remain poles of power and growth. Interestingly,
France, Germany, and the Benelux nations—in the core of the
original Six—have wished to move ahead most rapidly most rapidly
with the steps toward enhanced monetary cooperation after Maa-
stricht. Around the latest turn in the track, the same racers
still lead the pack. Yet, European Monetary Union has been trans-
fomed into a multi-speed vehicle where the historical sovereign
governments of individual nation states will continue to deter-
mine their own trajectories and velocities.
The Germans have finally achieved reunification, but its future and consequences are unclear. The effects of the new Germany on wider European relations run in different directions. German vision and economic strength help to pull Europe forward. Yet Grossdeutschland frightens many of its neighbors whose memories of the Kaiser and the Führer do not always match those of some Germans. Germany's current situation has a similarly ambivalent impact on Germans themselves (Kopstein and Richter, 1992). Germans have dreamed for half a century of reunification. West and East Germans are now finally reunited and families brought back together. Yet the wall has left lasting scars; pains balance joys. The German family is one of rich Wessi uncles and aunts and poor Ossi cousins now suddenly living together in the same house. West Germans have paid the price of reunification in higher taxes, unemployment, inflation, and a modest weakening of the symbol of national pride, the Deutschmark--as well as refugees and racist violence. East Germans, who enjoyed the dignity, security, and distance of their own state and society have ironically also paid many of the same costs. In addition, they have had to accept their inferiority and subordination, a new living situation and lifestyle that does not always seem better than what went before (cf. Priewe and Hickel, 1991; Maaz, 1990).

Elsewhere in Western Europe, the Italian scandals, continuing violence in Northern Ireland, riots in Denmark, resurgent nationalism and subnationalism, group identification along ethnic boundaries all indicate continuing serious divisions (Moynihan; Greenfield, 1992).

Europe-Sarajevo Threatens

At the far end of Cold War Europe's periphery, the repressed world of Central and Eastern Europe comes slowly forward as Europe-Sarajevo. It is the remainder, containing everything missing from Europe-Maastricht. Europe-Sarajevo is the world without--without borders, without electricity. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe continue an earlier imperial collapse, the deconstruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Czechs and Slovaks, Ruthenians and Ukrainians, Rumanians and Magyars, Croats and Serbs, Bulgars and Pomaks--each has more weight and freedom. These groups and others struggle for the separate identity that was earlier denied to them through the Cold War and the long preceding history of Balkan crises.

Sarajevo, calling on the deeper heritage of Historical Europe, symbolizes something altogether different from Europe-Maastricht. Balkan crises redux, the images of division and subdivision, the body rhetoric of physical destruction, of brother killing brother tell us that the "United States of Europe" is not yet. If there is an underlying instrumental rationality in the Balkans, then this only indicates that rationality does not always lead to peaceful, unified or even humane political outcomes. A further possibility runs to the core of all assumptions of European unity. Not only are the cultural commonalities of the
European heritage not as binding as we might like them to be, but the dissection of Bosnia is only the latest demonstration that identities may bend very slowly to the iron will of instrumental rationality.

Cold War Europe could be defined as it was because Central and Eastern Europe were defined as Asiatic and, therefore, out of Europe. Yet Central and Eastern Europe were not only more Asiatic; they were also more in its authentically European. More Asiatic because of the great Eastern reaches and autocratic history of the Soviet Empire. More European because of their distance from another Other, a repressed Enemy within, more potent for being integrated with the Self. This Enemy was the United States, whose dominant postwar position allowed an insidious military, economic, and cultural penetration. It was more powerful for being unacknowledged, avoided, denied. Cold War Europe was an externally imposed identity—based on a victor’s justice, inscribed in a victor’s story. Cold War Europe, in this light, identified with the aggressor. Central and Eastern Europe remained more alien and more alienated. They were farther on the distance gradient, less violated, more pure.

With the Soviet collapse, Central and Eastern Europe offer the possibility of an ethical fiction (Booth, 1988). They present at least the symbolic opportunity to dissolve the morass of manipulation, the web of fear and greed, the moral corruption articulated by Böll and Fassbinder. Following Grass, it may now be possible to reverse the standard Cold War escape story, to escape to the East. In that light, East Germany is the real Germany; Dresden is a city that looked as German cities would have looked if Germany had won the war. Ironically Historical Europe has survived Cold War Europe. Historical Europe still lives in the East, separate from American occupied Europe, its purity protected from the protracted rape of last half century by the superficial veneer, the ugliness, of Oriental despotism.

New and Old Worlds In Order And Disorder

Today’s Europe appears in shades of post-modern darkness and scattered light, worlds of virtual reality connected as hypertexts in a cyberpunk *nouvel roman, sans clef*, degree zero. The Cold War was a war, but it was not a shooting war, except occasionally in the alleys and subterranean passages of "The Third Man" and Smiley’s world, the streets and squares of Warsaw or Prague, the mountains of Afghanistan, the jungles of Angola or Nicaragua. The dominant mode of Cold War was "virtual warfare," an Orwellian twilight zone where peace was war and war was peace. War was not "hot war" but "cold war." Not the Clausewitzian war of physical friction but Virilio’s and Lotringer’s, DeLeuze’s and Guattari’s war of pure fiction. In a sense, the Cold War was fought on television; in the United States it existed just after Jeopardy and before The Brady Bunch.
In the post-Cold War period, peaceful coexistence is transformed to take new referents and meanings. Europe is multiple co-existing worlds in constant internal change and external motion. There may be a New World Order, but it is ordered in much different and more complex ways than what preceded it, with both too many and too few characters and plots. In contemporary European narratives, the boundaries and locations of simulacra transform and displace. Criteria of identity and difference, production and reproduction, economics and psychology, appear and disappear, shift and blur, come together and move apart dissolving any attempts at closure (cf. Bourdieu, 1993; Derrida, 1992; Attali, 1991; Baudrillard, 1983).

Europe’s worlds are past, present, and future all in cohabitation. Cold War Europe now settles as one among many narratives and identities in the archives of historical Europe, its orthodox received wisdom to be sifted with all the other lessons of European history. Present Europe contains the past, but not necessarily in the orderly linear form, sorted neatly by ideological keys, that we are used to. For example, the symbolic lexicon contains multiple entries under Sarajevo. If these are organized by reference to standard major events and put in sequential chronological order, a partial list might look something like this:

1429. Fell to the Turks.
1878. Awarded to Austria-Hungary at the Congress of Berlin.
1914. Site of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife and the immediate cause of the chain of events leading directly to World War I.
1918. Incorporated into Yugoslavia.

Merely to begin making such a list exposes its arbitrariness. There is no law that specifies historical experience as a list, or Gregorian dates as major organizing categories of such a list. Lived experience and life worlds are broader and deeper, more and less continuous than such a list-narrative suggests.

Brzezinski (1993) writes that the modern world is out of control, lacking the coherence of either internal or external discipline. It is fashionable to believe that the center can not hold. Perhaps. But one must ask, which center, out of whose control? The Cold War myth is gone, leaving an order faced with challenges of adaptation and evolution. The corseted Realist stability of Cold War Europe was a frame for the European Community. It contained the rational logic and enhanced the empirical probability of functionalist linear progress toward European integration. Whether the elites that dominated the Cold War can maintain and continue the myth, and the Europe-Maastricht identity that follows from it, through the next generations remains to be proven in the order and disorder, continuity and discontinuity, of a rapidly changing post-Cold War world.
We have not reached the end of history, but the end of a particular interpretation and episode of history. The myth and identity of Cold War Europe have ended. New worlds and new Europe are, as always, struggling to be born. As Europe-Maastricht and Europe-Sarajevo move forward though hyperspace, the new post-Cold War Europes jettison and leave behind the shards of Historical Europe, already receding from the distant horizons of memory. Yet, as Historical Europe remains in its own ash heap, it is simultaneously recycled. The new worlds carry history forward as memory at the same time that they leave it behind as experience. Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, Gasperi, Spaak are permanently inscribed as icons of supranational identity in the canon of the new Europe. Yet De Gaulle and Thatcher, articulating the continuing pull of traditional national identities, are also new European prophets. The new Europes approach the millennium carrying also the ghostly epiphanies of Augustine and Aquinas, the imperial dreams of Ferdinand and Isabella, Catherine and Frederick the Greats; the diplomatic combinations of Metternich, Talleyrand, and Bismarck, of Castlereagh, Canning, and Disraeli; the nationalistic visions of Garibaldi and Mazzini; the poetic dreams of Dante and Milton; the drama of Chaucer and Cervantes, of Proust and Mann; the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, Bentham and Rosseau, Hobbes and Locke, Hegel and Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and, yes, Heidegger; the artistic genius of Rembrandt and Rubens, Monet and Picasso; the music of Chopin and Wagner; the separatist hopes of Herzl and Jabotinsky and countless other public and private identities, narratives, and myths.
REFERENCES


Moynihan, D. Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. Oxford University Press.


