Introduction

On December 20, 1991, the German government announced that it would unilaterally recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. Although Germany had made its position clear months earlier, the announcement sent shock waves throughout Europe, the United States, and the former Yugoslavia. Some six months earlier, in an emotional speech Chancellor Kohl had argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall should be a lesson to all Europeans about the importance of the right of self-determination for all people. However, Le Monde had compared Germany's position on recognition with the Nazi's creation of an independent Croatia under German trusteeship during World War II. And Germany's decision led the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, to ask, "where is the spirit of Maastricht?", and to warn Germany's Foreign Minister Genscher that "If you do that [recognize Slovenia and Croatia] you will set Europe back twenty years." The New York Times editorialized that Germany's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia could cause permanent damage to the EC's effort to construct a common foreign policy. Why then, did Germany push so hard for diplomatic recognition of these two states against the preferences of its EC partners and in contrast to its normal post-war preference for multilateralism, and what did this episode mean for the future of a common European diplomatic and security policy? Did the episode signal the dominance of state sovereignty over the creation of constraints on state autonomy implied in the process of European integration?

This paper will explore the relative weights of EC influence, on the one hand, and domestic pressure on the other on the events leading to Germany's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991--and the EC's recognition of these countries in January 1992. Did the push for recognition,

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against the preferences of Britain, France, and the United States, signal Germany’s intention to pursue unilateral policies, as was popularly asserted at the time? Was that push driven by domestic pressures and perceptions of national security requirements separate from those hammered out in the European Community? Or, did Germany’s position and the strategy Genscher pursued simply signal Germany’s first awkward steps toward asserting a leadership role in the Community on foreign policy issues?

A clear understanding of these events can provide insight into three sets of issues. First, an analysis of this outcome is important for our larger understanding of choices made in the process of constructing particular institutions perceived to be necessary for both German and European security. Clearly the construction of those institutions will be an incremental process, and institutions will emerge as cumulative responses to particular crises. To the extent that emerging institutions are robust, individual states will be constrained in their own security options. To the extent that these institutions remain weak, the states of Europe will be required to act unilaterally, outside the European Community.

Second, the outcome itself presents a conceptual puzzle when considered in the light of the larger project of European integration: within the European Community, many separatist movements have called upon the principle of self-determination to justify claims for autonomy. Catalonia, for example, has asserted itself as an independent entity, not only within Spain, but within Europe. Does Europe’s (and Germany’s) adherence to self-determination as a principle of foreign policy legitimate internal fragmentation, and undermine the sovereignty of states within the European Community? Some observers argue that as the European Community grows and forges links to particular regions in Europe, sub-state actors and groups will bypass the nation-state altogether and begin to make direct demands on the Community.

Finally, an understanding of this episode can provide insights into the particular influence of the EC on the national policy of its strongest member and the influence of national policies on common European policies. An exploration of these issues in the context of the debate surrounding the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia can contribute to a clearer understanding of the state’s role within the evolving European Community.

I begin by briefly stating the argument suggested by an analysis of this
episode. I then recount in somewhat painful detail the events leading to the European Community's diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in January, 1992. Finally I turn to the task of interpretation and explanation, drawing briefly on neo-realist theory and the theory of hegemonic stability to interpret and support the arguments suggested by the empirical evidence.

Two caveats are in order here. This version of the paper is based largely on news articles taken from both from the United States and German press. It therefore relies almost exclusively on journalistic accounts of events. The final version of the paper will include interview material with both EC officials and officials in the German foreign policy establishment, as well as official documentation of events. Second, the paper does not address directly one of the central issues of the debate over the war in the former Yugoslavia: did the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia cause more bloodshed than necessary? Would it have been wiser to withhold recognition in order to obtain stronger minority rights in Croatia and to bolster the peace process? Germany argued that Serbia was the main violator of the cease fire agreements, and that recognizing the breakaway republics would assist a settlement by showing that the world at large no longer considered them rebel states. Failure to recognize them, Germany argued, would actually worsen the fighting by encouraging the Yugoslav Army to continue its attacks. Opponents of recognition argued that threats to recognize the breakaway republics would only encourage the Yugoslav Army and Serbs who might be caught on the wrong side of newly proclaimed national boundaries to take up arms to reconfigure the map to their liking rather than allow the international community to impose a less-agreeable solution. In particular, the United States and the EC had warned that premature acknowledgment of the republics' autonomy would deepen the ethnic rifts in Yugoslavia—especially in the ethnically mixed and hitherto neutral republic of Bosnia—and could encourage ethnic separatism throughout Eastern Europe.

Despite the importance of these questions and debates over their answers, the focus of the inquiry is on the effect of recognition, not on the war in the Balkans, but on the European Community and its relationship with its sovereign member states. Indeed, questions about the effect of European actions with regard to Yugoslavia may be impossible to answer. The post-Cold War world is a messy and uncertain one, and the debate over the effects of
Germany's recognition of Croatia contains arguments that are often nothing more than weapons in various political arsenals used to assign guilt and blame in a situation that is poorly understood.

The Argument in Brief

I argue here that this episode shows that in the post-cold war period, the nation-state in Western Europe will play an increasingly important role in issues of diplomacy and security. The extent to which member states permit the Community to constrain their autonomy and expand its powers will be a function of the interplay of domestic and international forces, not the least of which will be the strength of multilateral institutions. This was particularly clear in the case of Germany's decision to recognize Croatia. Germany showed a preference for multilateralism, despite arguments to the contrary and fears that the German population was pushing Bonn to revive its 1941 links with Croatia. But a preference for multilateralism in this case meant a preference for European support of a policy that Germany felt best suited its national interest. The substance of that policy--applying the principle of national-self determination to justify diplomatic recognition of Croatia--did not require the support of international security institutions, as other policies such as diplomatic pressure in the peace process might have done. Those institutions were too weak to support a more interventionist common foreign policy. And the outcome did not require the further strengthening of those institutions.

This argument is constructed on the assumption that there is the inextricable link between political power, negotiating strength, and military power. War is indeed an extension of politics, and only non-self-interested negotiators (such as third-party mediators) can conduct negotiations without the backing of military power. This is the lesson for the European Community: political union and military union are tightly linked. Foreign policies cannot be coordinated without the coordination of military capabilities. As long as cooperation in security issues is not resolved within the European Community, member states will assert their national interests. Where the Community is weak, the state will be strong. In other issue areas, such as trade and even macroeconomic policy coordination, EC institutions are strong and member states are constrained. However, in security issues, where
institutions remain weak, members will continue to assert their national interest when no overarching institution provides security.

The Story: June 1991—February 1992

In April 1990, with $4 million in financial backing from the Croatian emigre community, the ultra-nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) emerged the victor in Croatia's first democratic elections since 1945. The victory opened the gateway for Croatia's new president, Franjo Tudjman, to create a state that would be identified with the Croatian "nation", and one in which he refused to grant strong minority rights to the 600,000 strong Serb population. Many Serbs in Croatia believed that the HDZ victory meant the installation of a fascist Croatian state. In the aftermath of the elections, local Serb leaders demanded autonomy, legitimating that demand through a referendum. Although the idea of autonomy did not initially mean that Serb-dominated territory would be taken out of Croatia, it eventually developed into such a demand and then into a policy of secession by force.

In the course of 1990 and 1991 presidents of the six Yugoslav republics met repeatedly to discuss the future of the federation. President Slobodan Milosevic declared from the outset that he would not accept the transformation Yugoslavia into a loose association of sovereign states, and, particularly after Tudjman's victory, he openly declared the right of all Serbs to live in a single state, should Croatia decide to leave the federation. Slovenia, on the other hand, expressed extreme impatience with the idea of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the Slovenes proved uncompromising on the issue of independence. One chronicler of the Yugoslav tragedy, Misha Glenny writes, inability to resolve the "Serbian Question" in Croatia, and Milosevic's insistence on a tight Yugoslav federation, made the region ripe for conflict, and ensured that Croatia would not gain independence peacefully.

During this period of escalating tension in Yugoslavia, European leaders basked in the belief that the Cold War's end had ushered in a new era of peace in Europe; in particular they were preoccupied with the West's first post-cold war military confrontation in the Persian Gulf and paid little attention to developments in Yugoslavia. In deliberations over the appropriate reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Germany played a minimal role: its constitution
did not permit participation in out-of-area conflicts, and it appeared that the fragmentation of Germany’s party system, commitment to strict multilateralism, and a domestic struggle with its own "national identity" would prevent Germany from taking a leadership role in European diplomatic and security issues.⁵

Nonetheless, political forces were taking shape within Germany that would come to play an important role in the policy process when the question of Yugoslavia was finally raised to the top of the foreign policy agenda. 500,000 migrant Croatian workers lived and worked in Germany, of which 200,000 were eligible to vote. Bavaria’s large Croatian community had strong ties to the CSU, and already in 1990 had begun to lobby for Germany’s support of Croatia’s interests. In late August 1990 Horst Teltschik, Kohl’s closest foreign policy adviser, met—"without the knowledge of the Foreign Office"—a personal emissary of Franjo Tudjman, a contact that his CSU colleagues had been cultivating for over four years. From this emissary, Teltschik learned that Croatia sought German recognition of its independence from Yugoslavia.⁶

The German press, in particular the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), presented a strong anti-Serb bias, portraying the Croates as committed to "European" values, while caricaturing the Serbs as being hardly European at all. FAZ editorials argued that the people of Croatia and Slovenia had voted democratically to secede, and it was the Communist government of Serbia that responded with violence. After the revolutions of 1989 for self-determination and against communist rule, how could democratic peoples possibly continue to support central communist regimes?

By January 1991 the European Community was again forced to turn its collective attention to the massive changes taking place around its edges. Soviet troops were used to put down demonstrations for independence in Latvia and Lithuania; by March, referenda in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia showed overwhelming support for independence. With much less international attention, these moves were mirrored in Yugoslavia: the Slovenian parliament voted to invalidate federal law in Slovenia, and the Croatian parliament asserted its own veto power over federal laws. The fate of Yugoslavia seemed increasingly dim. On March 25, in a four hour private meeting, Milosevic and Tudjman agreed to hold off a breakup of the federation for two months. That agreement ended on June 25 with the Croatian declaration of independence.
In retrospect, however, it is clear Slovenia's uncompromising stand on independence pushed Tudjman in the same direction, despite early indications he might be willing to compromise on a new Yugoslav federation. But on June 6, 1991, a gun battle in Borovo Selo in northwestern Croatia left 12 Croatian policemen and 3 Serbs dead; the Yugoslav military (JNA) went on alert and began to call up reserves. On June 25, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. The European Community was still hoping for the negotiation of a looser federation of Yugoslavia, requesting an immediate cease-fire and the return of all troops to their barracks. With one voice the Community insisted that Croatia and Slovenia suspend further steps toward independence for three months to allow a negotiated revision of the 1974 constitution. Further, the Community threatened to cut $1 billion in aid to Yugoslavia unless a peaceful resolution of the crisis could be negotiated.7

After shuttling a number of times between Belgrade and Zagreb, the foreign ministers of Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands announced on June 28, what became known as the "Brioni Accord". The accord stipulated the withdrawal of all Yugoslav troops from Slovenia--effectively ending the war there--but left open the question of Croatia. Both Slovenia and Croatia agreed to a three-month suspension of their independence declarations as a condition for the withdrawal of troops. The EC was still hoping to save Yugoslavia, and its position was formulated without extensive knowledge of the situation in the region and with one eye always to developments in the Soviet Union. EC governments had been in continual negotiations with the Soviet Union and officials were visibly worried about its disintegration; they did not want Yugoslavia to serve as a model. Irritated with the EC preference to keep Yugoslavia united, seemingly at all costs, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky of Austria said, "whoever continues to place the emphasis on the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, does not understand that the problem has already evolved beyond that state."8 Indeed, by December, 14,000 refugees from the war in Yugoslavia had registered in Austria, while another 65,000 and 50,000 had registered in Germany and Hungary, respectively.

Initially refusing to break ranks openly with the EC position, Kohl argued for Croatian and Slovenian independence behind closed EC doors, while opposition to EC policy brewed at home. Echoing statements made by Francois Mitterand and John Major, who contended that "the territorial integrity of a
single Yugoslavia must take precedence. . . over the aims of Croatian and Slovenian nationalists," Kohl argued publicly that the EC should continue to negotiate with the government of Yugoslavia and give financial aid only as long as Belgrade did not threaten to use force to keep the country together. In private, however, Germany pushed for a common policy of self-determination for both Croatia and Slovenia. Critics of the official policy emerged even within Kohl's own party, the CDU. Volker Rühe, then the party's General Secretary, argued that it was not defensible to apply another yardstick to Yugoslavia "when we achieved the unity and freedom of our country through the right of self-determination." The SPD, too, opposed the EC position. Its foreign policy spokesman, Norbert Gansel, argued that Western tolerance of Belgrade's actions might give the impression that the West would tolerate Soviet intervention in the Baltics. In later parliamentary debate, Ulrich Klose, the new leader of the Social Democrat's Bundestag delegation, told Mr. Kohl that it was entirely up to him whether "thinking in alliances" or the "idea of freedom" prevailed in Europe. Genscher was increasingly pressed by both the CDU and the opposition; at a meeting on July 1 of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Bundestag, both the SPD and the CDU argued that he should actively push the EC to adopt Germany's position on recognition of the two republics. He was bombarded by the argument that Bonn and the EC had ignored the issue of self-determination too long, and that this right was the basis of international law. At a July 9 meeting of the parties of the Liberal International in Berlin, the FDP too, adopted a policy of recognition.

It is worth noting here that Germany was not the only country to feel domestic pressure: French intellectuals had begun to lead street demonstrations against Serbian aggression, demanding a "bolder" response from Europe. But it was in Germany that domestic political pressure was strongest. By early July, parties across the political spectrum supported a policy of independence for the two Yugoslav republics on the condition that the army retreat and that all the republics accept the EC as mediator. Further, representatives of the 16 states of Germany requested EC recognition of the two if the Yugoslav army continued to attack. The state government of Hesse (controlled by a SPD-Green coalition) even went so far as to offer material aid to Slovenia and Croatia, with the argument that "the FRG could no longer hide behind the EC whose indifference could well be explained by the
constraints felt by members with minority problems of their own."

Indeed, a common European policy on self-determination was an increasingly sensitive issue within the European Community. Many separatist movements within the Community had called upon the principle of self-determination to justify claims for varying degrees of autonomy. Catalonia, as noted above, had asserted its independence within Europe, and France and Belgium were facing similar problems with regions that had pressed for more autonomy. Further complicating the issue was the belief that recognizing the right of self-determination without securing the protection of minority rights was imprudent and unjustifiable. However, EC members were faced with demands for minority rights within their own states even while collective rights for minorities ran counter to the prevailing liberal principle of ensuring only individual rights.

Meanwhile, as European officials debated these issues, the fighting in Croatia escalated, and Yugoslavia refused any binding mediation on the part of the EC. This put the European Community was under increasing pressure to find a peaceful settlement in this the first major test of its ability to handle post-Cold War conflict. This was a seemingly impossible task: an international institution was attempting to deal with the problem of the use of force without any force of its own. The West European Union (WEU)--described by Joseph Joffe as the "sleeping princess who had been kissed over and over but refused to wake up"--held a special session of military chiefs to discuss the potential options that might be required to back up the EC's political position, but it lacked a mandate to send troops outside of the NATO area. And the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), forbidden by its charter to engage in direct intervention, could only act once consensus was achieved among all of its members. On July 3, CSCE officials met in Prague in an emergency meeting to request that the European Community send an observer mission to Zagreb. But already at that meeting conflicts of interest among its members became readily apparent. Kohl instructed Genscher—who at that time was the chairman of the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center—to make clear that continued cooperation with Yugoslavia would be dependent on the cessation of the threat and use of force."15 Der Spiegel reported that the Soviets at that meeting were hesitant about sending observers to Yugoslavia as they didn’t want this case to serve as a possible precedent for
Western interference in the Baltics.\textsuperscript{16}

For the first time at an EC foreign ministers meeting in the Hague on July 5, Germany argued assertively that the EC should take the position "that the peoples of [should] Yugoslavia decide for themselves about their fate," and that the Community should consider joint recognition of both Croatia and Slovenia.\textsuperscript{17} Other members, however, refused to adopt this position, claiming that recognition would lead to "more war, use of force, and bloodshed."\textsuperscript{18} Germany deferred, agreeing to a compromise solution: a loose confederation in Yugoslavia with the demand that the Yugoslav army pull back, and diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia if Yugoslavia did not comply. In order to compel the warring parties to accept binding mediation on the part of the EC, arms sales and economic aid to Yugoslavia from the EC were suspended.

In Croatia the bloodshed continued. After more than 20 people were killed in fighting between Croats and ethnic Serbs in Croatia Tudjman walked out on high level peace talks on July 22. When he asked for a delegation to help negotiate an end to the hostilities—as the EC had done in Slovenia with the "Brioni Accord"—Croatian Prime Minister Ante Markovic received a lukewarm response from EC officials who claimed they "couldn't do much about Croatia."\textsuperscript{19} By early August, Croatian defense officials conceded that Serbs already controlled about 15 per cent of Croatian territory.

Both in the domestic German debate and in European discussions at the ministerial level, the subject of the use of outside military force in the conflict was broached. The French suggested a European peacekeeping mission in Croatia; the Germans responded that such a force should only be deployed under the auspices of the United Nations. Even then, SPD foreign policy spokesman, Norbert Gansel, argued, German troops should be excluded for historical reasons. Lammers, the foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU, remarked that the situation in Yugoslavia clearly demonstrated that the constitutional constraint on the deployment of German troops in "out of area" conflicts was untenable in the long run. Further, Volker Rühe argued that if European troops were to be sent to Yugoslavia, they must be armed and equipped so as to present a credible deterrent to further aggression.\textsuperscript{20} From the other side, the French position drew the disapproval of the British and Dutch who opposed the creation of an EC military capability outside of NATO.

Indeed, the Yugoslav case presented an important opportunity for
Europeans to debate the shape of Europe’s new security institutions. The end of the Cold War presented Europe with an unprecedented opportunity to reconstruct them; indeed the Cold War had persisted for forty-five years precisely because World War II’s victors were unable to build such institutions. The substitute for agreement had been political and military stalemate that was stable as long as power positions remained fixed. But stalemate had never been a satisfactory way to preserve the peace. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the dramatic reduction of armaments (especially nuclear weapons) throughout Europe, and the demise of the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself presented Europe with both the challenge of new conflicts such as Yugoslavia and the challenge of building new security institutions.

Those challenges were transformed into a source of dispute after the revolutions of 1989. Many argued that NATO should be preserved to counter a potential new Russian threat, to contain "out-of-area" conflicts, and to prevent Germany from becoming an independent military power in Europe. Others, however, argued that NATO was built as a Cold War alliance, and if it continued to persist as a military alliance—including the United States and excluding Eastern Europe—it would be sure to face the problems of internal friction and instabilities on its borders that it could not contain. Critics of NATO argued for a new collective security system in Europe, one that would be able to resolve conflicts through diplomacy, and one that would be accepted as legitimate by all of the major players. These arrangements could—now that the Cold War was over—be built on new concepts of common security, linking human rights with territorial guarantees, and promoting democracies that would protect minorities and guard against human rights abuses. Proponents of collective security arrangements argued that the powers and prestige of the CSCE should be enlarged. Other critics of NATO preferred a West European security organization and the strengthening of the WEU—an organization that would have a European identity but would constitute a bridge to NATO and the CSCE as well.

Preferences for alternative security arrangements were guided as much by political motivations as by rational arguments. France, which rejected participation in NATO’s military arrangements, preferred a European arrangement that would downgrade the military role of the United States in
Europe. Britain, with its "special relationship" to the United States, preferred to maintain, strengthen, and reconstitute NATO. Germany's role was shaped by the two-fold need to assure its neighbors that it would not revert to unilateral, aggressive policies and to assure its allies that it would not resort to "neutrality." Kohl affirmed a steadfast commitment to NATO, but he accepted limitations on German military power to allay everyone's fears of a resurgent Germany. And Kohl, Genscher, and leading SPD politicians joined to endorse a much greater role for the CSCE, including the creation of permanent CSCE institutions. Political elites in Germany were split along party lines with regard to a European military arm; some German "Gaulists" and some members of the SPD supported a European military organization to circumscribe the influence of the United States in West European security matters; "Atlanticists" professed continued support for NATO and the continued military presence of the United States in Europe.

Despite these internal security debates, Germany had joined with France to create Europe's only internationally integrated military unit, a 5,000-strong brigade deployed along the Rhine. Presenting it as the possible nucleus of a European army, Mitterand and Kohl announced in October 1991 plans to expand the Franco-German brigade to a corps of about 50,000. The headquarters of this corps was planned for the French city of Strasbourg. This, of course, was an unprecedented post-war initiative that required uniformed German officers to serve on French soil for the first time since Hitler's Wehrmacht was driven back across the Rhine in 1945.²¹

Because these debates over proper security arrangements were far from being resolved when the Yugoslav crisis erupted, potential options for dealing with that crisis fed into the larger debate about Europe's security future. In line with its opposition to a "European" military force outside of NATO Britain vehemently rejected the request of the Croatian foreign minister that the EC send peacekeeping troops to his country. France, on the other hand, called for a European military force to be interposed between the rival groups to prevent the spread of fighting, true to its own political preferences for a European military force. Indeed, France had sent 2,000 troops to the area under the auspices of UN peacekeeping forces at the onset of the fighting.²² And while Germany supported the French initiative, its credibility was
severely compromised by the fact that its constitution prohibited the use of German troops in such a mission.

With regard to the diplomatic issues raised in the European context, Germany continued to exhibit its habituated proclivity toward multilateralism and cooperation with the European Community, in the full knowledge of the fact that it could not back up common policy with military force. This knowledge, it would seem, contributed to its preference for self-determination and diplomatic recognition of Croatia; it was a policy that needed no military backing. But at this point, Germany was not willing to pursue that policy alone; it wanted Europe to come along. Genscher, in particular, had been attempting to maintain solidarity and prohibit Germany from causing a split on the issue within the European Community. Although he did not retreat from his position on recognition in negotiations with other EC members, he continued a public show of solidarity with the EC position. Treading the narrow path between the two positions Kohl invited Tudjman to a meeting in Germany--the first European leader to do so--but he cautioned the Croatian president not to count on recognition any time soon because Germany was bound to the common EC policy.

Nonetheless, EC intransigence toward the German position was beginning to openly irritate Genscher, who was engaged in other diplomatic battles within the European Community. France resisted the German initiative to grant greater powers to the European Parliament. And the French position on monetary union was seen as a plan to "sacrifice the power and stability of the DM on the altar of an untested common European currency." With regard to Yugoslavia, the irritation was starting to show. For example, a ministerial meeting at the Hague was planned for August 6 with representatives from the Yugoslav federal government. Genscher argued that representatives from Slovenia and Croatia should also be invited. He came to the meeting and further demanded that the EC place economic sanctions on Serbia and demanding that recognition for Croatia and Slovenia be placed on the agenda. Domestic political consensus and frustration with the de facto veto that the Serbs, through their domination of the Yugoslav federal government, exercised over peacekeeping missions bolstered the position that recognition of the two republics was a prerequisite for any such peacekeeping efforts. Recognition of the two republics would internationalize the dispute, allowing it to be
taken up in the United Nations.

The Hague meeting was a disappointment all around. The issue of recognition was not broached and, although EC aid was frozen, a German plan to impose trade sanctions on Yugoslavia remained seriously flawed because, as long as diplomatic recognition was withheld, EC sanctions would be imposed on Croatia as well. The WEU had earlier failed to agree on measures to uphold a cease-fire, and NATO members were stymied by differences over the "out-of-area" responsibilities of the alliance. A cease-fire agreement was reached, but it would be broken in less than two weeks. By the time Germany actually extended diplomatic recognition to the two republics, fourteen cease-fires were signed and broken.

In the wake of this August meeting, the press began to report German threats of possible unilateral recognition of the two republics. On August 8, the New York Times reported that Kohl threatened unilateral sanctions and recognition of Croatia and Slovenia if cease-fire violations continued. The threat of unilateral German sanctions was not insignificant: Germany accounted for 20% of Yugoslavia's foreign trade; indeed it was the country's largest trade partner. Yugoslavia also enjoyed labor remittances from its 600,000 migrant workers in Germany. The actual sanctions threat was also worthy of notice; Germany normally has shied away from any sanctions policy because of its own dependence on foreign trade. Further, Germany continued to press the issue of Croatia's recognition. As one Spanish minister put it, "we think the Bonn-Paris axis has been replaced by the Bonn-Berlin axis."

Toward the end of August and the beginning of September, events in the Soviet Union began to undercut one of the principle reasons for EC insistence on continued recognition of federal Yugoslavia. After the August 19 coup, one by one, the republics of the Soviet Union began to declare their independence. As the EC was forced to recognize the independence of these republics, its rationale for not recognizing the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was weakening. These events were not lost on Tudjman. On September 2, the New York Times reported that Croatian officials stated that their drive for support was boosted by the collapse of the Soviet coup, the willingness of the republics to defect from the Soviet Union, and West European recognition of the Baltics. The report further suggested that Tudjman was trying to convince
Croatian radicals that they could portray themselves as the victims of Serbian aggression and thus gain the support of both Europe and the United States. Serbian victory in the field, he argued, could be translated into defeat at the negotiating table.  

The fighting, of course, continued unabated. On August 25, the JNA launched a full-scale military offensive in support of ethnic Serb irregulars in Croatia. Two days later Tudjman held an unprecedented meeting with Yugoslavia's top military leaders, Defense Minister Veljko Kadejevic, and chief of staff, Gen. Blagoje Adzic in an effort to forestall the all-out mobilization of Croatian forces and an escalation of the fighting. But a cease-fire negotiated at the meeting collapsed the following day. *U.S. News and World Report* claimed that since June 300 victims had perished, and 50,000 refugees had been driven from their homes. And although the Yugoslav federal presidency agreed to participate in peace talks that were to open in the Hague on September 7, the fighting continued and Croatia and Slovenia formally declared immediate secession from Yugoslavia on the very day that the negotiations began. On the following day, Macedonia voted to declare its independence. Throughout the next three months, cease fires were negotiated and broken. The Yugoslav army attacked Dubrovnik, demanding the city's surrender and forcing the EC to order its peace monitors to leave the city. It attacked and held Vukovar, leading Croatian officials to plead with the International Red Cross to help its besieged citizens. Its planes bombed militia positions on the outskirts of Zagreb. Amnesty International accused both Serbs and Croats of committing atrocities against civilians, and some officials in Europe were disturbed by the fact that the Tudjman government has refused to disassociate itself from the Croatian fascists who had ruled in the 1940s.

On November 8, 1991, the EC imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia that, if enforced, were bound to hurt: one-half of all of Yugoslavia's trade was conducted with the European Community. However, sanctions also hit Croatia, further deepening German support for diplomatic recognition. Later, the United States joined the sanctions effort, denying trade with all six republics on December 6. On October 10, the foreign ministers of the EC agreed to withhold recognition of individual republics as separate states
outside a federal framework for two months.

Perceptions of a general lack of success in previous efforts on the part of the European Community prompted UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to step in. On Nov. 27 the UN Security Council passed a resolution pledging to send a peace-keeping force of up to 10,000 members to Croatia, with the condition that Serbian and Croatian forces adhere to a UN-mediated cease fire accord. On December 6 conflict intensified as Yugoslav forces stepped up their shelling of Dubrovnik and Osijek. Cyrus Vance, the special representative of the UN Secretary General, called the shelling "appalling" and said the renewed violence made it "much harder to even consider" deploying a peace-keeping force. As of December 19, the bloodshed in Croatia had not eased enough to allow a peace force to be deployed.31

Events moved quickly in December as opinion on the conflict began to shift, and Serbia came increasingly to be perceived as the aggressor. On December 2, the European Community lifted trade sanctions against all of the republics except for Serbia and Montenegro, and Germany severed all of its transport links with Serbia and the Yugoslav government. Germany decided to apply sanctions only to Serbia and Montenegro. Germany was also beginning to finally build support within the EC for a common policy of diplomatic recognition for Croatia and Slovenia. In August, Kohl had warned that "not only the Germans but others will give consideration to the issue of independence."32 On December 6, Kohl told Tudjman that he wanted to recognize Croatia with the greatest possible number of EC states before Christmas.33 He announced December 8 that Germany would recognize the two republics, and that Sweden, Italy, Austria, and Hungary were likely to follow. This announcement disturbed many EC members in that Germany appeared to be moving outside the EC policy framework, without further discussion on borders or human rights. The effort to block Germany's move had already begun a week earlier when Lord Carrington wrote to Hans van der Broek, the Dutch foreign minister who held the EC's rotating presidency until January, claiming that German recognition would destroy the Hague peace conference: it would prompt Serbia to leave the conference and cause Croatia and Slovenia to lose interest in the proceedings. Milosovic also threatened that recognition would lead the JNA, which now occupied one-third of Croatian territory, to undertake further
military action against Croatia.\textsuperscript{34} And France, Britain, and the United States supported recognition only as part of a larger peace settlement.\textsuperscript{35}

Domestic pressure for recognition within Germany was rapidly increasing. Bonn's domestic intelligence service warned the government that several thousand Croatian men had left their homes in Germany to join the fighting in their homeland; they might continue the fighting from Germany with terrorist means if the conflict was not resolved. The Bavarian police announced a series of arms seizures, arresting two Germans, two Croats, and two citizens of Arab states seeking to smuggle ground-to-air missiles, automatic weapons and several million rounds of ammunition from Germany to Croatia. Earlier, the federal police announced that they had information indicating that Serbian extremists planned terrorist attacks against German leaders, with Genscher's name at the top of the list.\textsuperscript{36}

Beginning on December 13, Genscher and Perez de Cuellar exchanged a series of letters, debating the wisdom of recognition. Genscher argued that failure to recognize the two republics would signal to Serbia that its military attacks had been successful. Indeed, European Community peace observers in the field reported, as early as August, that Serbia bore primary responsibility for sustained fighting. What is more, he contended that the 1975 Helsinki Accords on Security and Cooperation in Europe guarantee not only national borders but also internal administrative boundaries like those dividing Croatia from Serbia. Caving into Serbia would send the message that force could pay off in the end.

Perez de Cuellar wrote back requesting that Germany refrain from recognizing the two republics "in a selective and uncoordinated manner." He cited EC opposition to the move and pleas from both Bosnia and Macedonia that recognition might lead to wider conflict. Indeed, the president of Bosnia visited Genscher in November to plead against recognition, arguing that it would invite Serbian and Croatian aggression against Bosnia. And officials in the Dutch government were clearly convinced that the recognition threat only goaded Serbia to seize as much territory as it could and tempted Croatia to provoke skirmishes in the hope of drawing foreign intervention. While Croatian officials stated publicly that recognition would intensify attacks, all peace negotiations to this point had been futile, and it was by no means clear that recognition by Germany would intensify the fighting in the long
run. On the night of December 13, the UN Security Council, in a move instigated by France and Britain, began to debate a resolution aimed at Germany, warning that no country should disturb the political balance in Yugoslavia by taking unilateral action.

Genscher knew that to avert a diplomatic crisis he would have to build a coalition within the EC for recognition. He had been doing the groundwork. On December 2 Lambadorff had announced that Italy, Austria, and possibly Poland were ready to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. On December 5, Swedish Foreign Minister Ugglas called for recognition, but warned that Sweden would remain in step with the EC. Bonn tried particularly hard with France, because the governments that seemed to have firmly agreed on recognition "looked embarrassingly like the World War II coalition that backed fascist Croatia." German officials, speaking at a congress of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's CDU in Dresden, said Bonn would go ahead with the controversial step even if its main European ally France does not support it. "If we agree with the French, we will have a conditional recognition," said one official, who asked not to be named. "If not, we'll just go ahead and recognize them." Spokesmen for Kohl argued defensively the Bonn-led, pro-recognition group has gone beyond what they call "the 1941 coalition" to include at least Belgium and Denmark. It was still unclear, however, whether Germany had built a strong enough coalition to push through a common EC policy on recognition.

Between December 13 and December 15, Genscher lobbied fellow foreign ministers vigorously, placing numerous phone calls to heads of state and foreign ministers in Europe and around the world. Calling this "the mother of all battles" Genscher apparently won over Roland Dumas with the argument that the Americans were beginning to undermine the European peace process through the United Nations. As soon as he was able to pry France away from its previous position, the alignments in the EC shifted, and it was clear that the European Community as a whole would pursue a policy of diplomatic recognition for Croatia and Slovenia.

On December 15, German officials announced that Germany was prepared to go ahead with the recognition of the two republics before Christmas. In a small effort to be conciliatory, Kohl said that he would wait until after a meeting of EC foreign ministers in Brussels the following day before actually announcing recognition. However, support for recognition in the EC was shaky,
and German officials made clear that Bonn’s decision would not be affected by the outcome of the meeting. One official said, "We will move ahead whether any, all, or none of the European states join us." ⁴¹

But Genscher’s lobbying appeared to pay off. At the Brussels meeting of Foreign Ministers, Germany’s position had finally prevailed on the issue of recognition; all that remained was the important question of political conditionality. The U.N. Security Council had backed away from a confrontation with Bonn over Yugoslavia, and it seemed the European Community as well as the United States did not want a major clash with over this issue. ⁴² At the EC foreign ministers’ meeting on December 16, after intense debate, a compromise was hammered out. Two issues were on the agenda: 1) the timing of recognition, 2) the conditions for recognition and the procedure for application. Germany, supported by Belgium and Denmark, argued for recognition before Christmas. Lord Carrington, chairing the meeting as Europe’s chief negotiator in Yugoslavia, argued that caving in to German pressure on this issue would "torpedo" the peace process. Britain, Greece, Spain, France, and the Netherlands agreed with Carrington, but Genscher countered that every hesitation only made the situation in Yugoslavia worse and that a twenty-four hour deadline for recognition would be appropriate! Italy suggested a four week deadline, with which the majority concurred. If the conditions were met, recognition on the part of EC member states would take place on January 15, 1992.

The issue of conditionality was much thornier, and proved to be the Achilles heel of the compromise. After the Maastricht conference, French and German officials hammered out a set of criteria for the recognition of the newly independent states in the post-communist world. Those criteria would roughly follow those set out by the CSCE: protection of minorities, recognition of CSCE principles, recognition of the borders and territorial sovereignty of neighbors, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The foreign ministers at this meeting decided that petitions of the former Yugoslav republics for recognition would be submitted for consideration to a standing commission established in September in the Hague which was composed of five constitutional experts (federal court justices) from the EC. The transcript of the declaration at the end of this meeting specifically stated that "the application of those republics which affirm [the above
preconditions, principles, and procedures] will be presented by the chair of
the conference on Yugoslavia to the Hague commission for approval before the
date of execution [January 15]." Petitions would have to be submitted before
December 23 to meet the January 15 recognition deadline. But the Brussels
agreement did not make clear what steps would be taken if the preconditions
for recognition were not met. Bosnia and Macedonia were also expected to
submit applications, but Macedonia would only be considered if it changed its
name and renounced any claims on Greek territory.

Both Croatia and Germany anticipated the issue of conditionality. Ulrich Albrecht has argued that Croatia did not meet the requirements for the
protection of minority rights, and that up to this point, Germany’s pressure
for recognition had been in direct conflict with the commission’s findings. Nonetheless, some perfunctory actions were undertaken. On December 4, the
Croatian parliament unanimously passed a statute which guaranteed the Serbian
minority cultural autonomy and representation in communal self-administration.
Croatian television proclaimed this as fulfilling the preconditions for
diplomatic recognition by the West. On December 13, the German government
announced that the governments of Slovenia and Croatia had fulfilled all the
preconditions for recognition. To lend legitimacy to this decision, the German
foreign office found a human rights lawyer to give the Croatian law on
minorities a clean bill of health. It was clear from the outset that Germany
would essentially ignore the Hague commission’s recommendations and that it
had decided unilaterally that Croatia fulfilled the requirements for
recognition before its petition was submitted to the European Community. The
republics would simply have to commit themselves to the principles set forth
by the Hague commission. Apparently, "accepting" conditions was tantamount to
"fulfilling" them. Indeed, on December 17 Genscher announced that recognition
was now "automatic" and no further action in the German cabinet or in the EC
would be necessary. At the meeting he made it clear that the Hague commission
would have to decide before Christmas, and should it decide that Croatia did
not meet the criteria, then Germany would go ahead with recognition
nonetheless.

On December 17, the New York Times ran an editorial questioning the
wisdom of "conditional recognition", stating that after recognition the
conditions could be flouted and all leverage would be lost because the EC
could not simply withdraw recognition if the conditions were not met. The precedent, the editorial argued, was important because of its demonstration effect. Would the West be able to hold to these conditions in the recognition of Ukraine, Belorus, and other self-proclaimed states emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union? Indeed, in the aftermath of these events it appeared that other considerations, such as political stability, whether a state would change its name, a state's possession of nuclear weapons, and military power would count as much in the recognition calculation as the requirements for political liberalization. Indeed, only a few days after Gorbachev's resignation, the United States and other Western countries extended recognition to Russia and several other successor states. In justifying the decision to recognize these states, Secretary of State James Baker said that he had received sufficient assurances from the four nuclear republics that they would ensure democratization and the creation of market economies, and that they would maintain strict control over nuclear weapons.

Emerging from the Brussels meeting, Hans van der Broek said diplomatically that he hoped that the prospect of recognition would put pressure on Serbia. Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Minister, called the outcome "an exceptional compromise." Serbia, of course, assailed the EC decision, warning that it would recognize the Serb-inhabited regions of Croatia and Bosnia as new, separate republics. The Serbian media labelled the recognition as part of an elaborate German plot to dominate Europe and establish the "Fourth Reich."

In Germany, Chancellor Kohl was attending the first all-German CDU party convention in Dresden when the agreement was reached in Brussels. The new party platform had been approved, calling for a more forceful foreign policy and a repeal of the constitutional ban on the deployment of German forces in out-of-area conflicts. The decision on Croatia was certainly a political coup for Kohl within his party. He was given a standing ovation by 1,000 party delegates when he described the EC's conditional decision to recognize the two republics as a resounding success for German foreign policy. And he announced that the German government would recognize any Yugoslav republics that undertake by December 23 to adopt the conditions set out by the EC. He also described the agreement as a success from the perspective of a common
European foreign policy: ". . . we made clear from the start that we never wanted to be alone on this issue. . . the fact that we have now succeeded in winning the support of the rest of the EC for our initiative testifies to our commitment to the common foreign policy which we pledged to pursue at Maastricht." Genscher explained the recognition as a move to protect German security interests: "If a war were to spill over the border, Germany, along with Austria, would be one of the countries first and worst affected in the West."  

Buoyed by this success, Germany urged the EC to extend the same recognition soon to the republics of the Soviet Union, and Genscher announced that Bonn would provide economic aid for Croatia and assist it in its efforts to join international organizations. On December 23, Germany formally recognized Slovenia and Croatia. The next day, the president of Bosnia pleaded that UN peacekeeping forces be sent to his republic before January 14. Serbia, true to its threat, unveiled a plan on December 26 to form a new, smaller Yugoslavia which included territory taken during the civil war with Croatia. And on December 31, UN special envoy Vance won formal agreement from Serbian and Yugoslav leaders for a cease-fire plan, the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, and the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia. Croatia, under the plan was required to surrender territory lost to the Serbs.  

Did Croatia meet the EC conditions for political liberalization required before the January 15 recognition? As of this writing, this is unclear. Before granting recognition, the EC demanded that Tudjman give his personal assurance that language be added to the Croatian constitution that would guarantee the rights of the Serb minority. Croatia and Slovenia were granted diplomatic recognition by the EC on January 15, 1992. I am not certain how much the EC actually cared about this issue.  

Meanwhile, the U. N. Security Council resolved to send 14,400 peacekeeping troops to Croatia both to enforce the truce and to protect the ethnic Serb minority. And on February 27, 1992, Milosevic stated that the UN decision marked the end of civil war and "was a great success for Serbian policy," while Tudjman stated that he "fully and unconditionally" supported the deployment of UN troops. 10,000 people had perished in the war; and 13,000 Croats were wounded. Although fighting between ethnic Serbs and Croats continued, the worst was over for the time being. Unfortunately, the war in
Bosnia was only just beginning. On February 29, 1992, voters in Bosnia overwhelmingly supported independence in a republic-wide referendum, and one month later, Bosnia was at war. On April 7, the EC and the United States recognized Bosnia as an independent state. Self-determination was now the guiding principle of European Community policy, at least in the Balkans.

Interpretations and Explanations

Three questions prompted this inquiry. First, why did Germany push so hard for diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia against the preferences of its EC partners? The story above suggests two explanations: 1) the pull of domestic politics, and 2) security concerns in the post-Cold War world in the absence of clearly defined security institutions. A clearer understanding of the source of Germany’s preferences can help to answer the second question: what does this episode tell us about the future of a common European diplomatic and security policy? If Germany’s actions are interpreted as unilateral, and if the episode is indicative, then the future of a common security policy looks dim indeed. If, however, Germany’s behavior is interpreted as generally in line with the principle of multilateralism, then we can argue that Germany simply took a leadership role in shaping EC policy in this case. Finally, what, if anything, does the episode mean for the future of European statehood? The substance of the issue is symbolic in this respect; Europeans, whose sovereignty has been increasingly constrained by the expanding powers of the Community, were being asked to recognize the sovereignty of a region that was formerly integrated into a federal state. The process of decision in this case also provides clues; was the episode an indication of the assertion of state sovereignty over the interests of the community, or did it demonstrate the community’s dominance over the sovereign member states?

The Pull of Domestic Politics

Domestic politics began to play an important role in the shaping of German foreign policy as the Cold War and U.S. dominance in Europe began to decline. Public opposition to the placement of Pershing missiles on German soil in the early 1980s and the Lance missile debate in 1988 and 1989 and its impact on policy outcomes demonstrated the importance of public pressure and
Germany's increasing weight in multilateral security organizations. The Gulf Crisis revealed a split within the political elite over the appropriate role of the German military in international conflicts. Kohl had suggested that the constitution be amended to allow the military to participate in out-of-area conflicts, arguing that the military had a responsibility to participate in actions defined by Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. The opposition parties were divided on the issue, and when the crisis in Yugoslavia began to loom large as a foreign policy issue, the question had not been settled. Thus, Germany's military options abroad were constrained by domestic deadlock. In the Gulf War, Germany had been accused of pacifism and of not doing enough, and any common European policy that would have called for intervention would have led to similar accusations. Diplomatic recognition as a policy demanded little in the way of implementation. Indeed, it may have been a response to domestic indecision on Germany's role in multilateral security organizations and in world politics.

Second, it appeared that a domestic political consensus on diplomatic recognition was forged early on and that it drove Genscher's negotiating position within the European Community. The London Times reported that Genscher had "rather unsubtly" told other EC ministers at Maastricht that Germany had pressing domestic reasons for its position, and that others should make concessions because of those domestic pressures. But there is something that does not ring true about "domestic pressure" as an explanation for this policy preference. Although the Croatian and Catholic ties in Bavaria might explain the CDU/CSU position, they do not explain the SPD or the FDP insistence on national self-determination as the guiding principle of Germany's post-war foreign policy toward the post-communist world. Both parties made the argument about the right of self-determination as the basis of international law, but they could have easily used the issue to oppose the CDU and support the multilateral peace process. But intellectuals and political elites across the political spectrum made cogent arguments about national self-determination, and were clearly aware that the principle was the essential legal foundation for German unification in the eyes of the international community. And if the FDP and the SPD had left that argument to the CDU, they may have lost the support of voters in the five new states of Germany.
Although Genscher was certainly pushed by a political consensus among party elites, that consensus itself is difficult to explain. Unlike the Lance missile debate in which domestic opinion was overwhelmingly decisive, there was little *mass public* outcry on this issue. Despite the fact that polls showed that Germans feared the additional immigration that would "almost certainly" result if the Yugoslav war were drawn out and bloody, there was little, if any political mobilization around the issue. 59 Many politicians in Germany who had supported recognition at the outset had second thoughts when it appeared that their position would cause a crisis in the Community. "We can hardly talk one week in Maastricht about a common foreign policy and then the next week go it alone on Croatia," argued Friedbert Pflueger, one of the Bonn deputies to openly question the wisdom Germany’s position. "We’re a prisoner of our own rhetoric," said another deputy at the CDU conference. "We’ve threatened to go ahead with recognition so often that we would now look absurd if we did not do it." 60 What is more probable is that domestic "politics" was used as a smokescreen to cover more unitary national interests dictated by the international environment at the time.

**National Security Concerns in an environment of weak institutions**

Germany’s insistence on the policy of recognition challenged the authority of the United Nations, the United States, and the European Community. One year after reunification, and only days after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, Germany displayed overwhelming political might within multilateral institutions and threatened to act unilaterally if its partners would not cooperate. A sovereign Germany could do what a divided Germany never dared, that is, press openly for a policy that it perceived as crucial to its own national interest. Germany’s military power is limited; in the negotiations on German unity, Germany agreed to reduce its army from 490,000 to 370,000 soldiers and to not acquire nuclear or chemical weapons, thereby refraining from arming itself with the military capabilities appropriate to its great-power status. As both a Western and a Central European power, Germany is in a unique position where it is embedded in Western security institutions yet its security interests are also quite sensitive to internal developments in states on its eastern borders.

As noted above the post-Cold War period has ushered in tremendous
uncertainty with regard to the status and power of European security institutions. Incremental decisions and compromises made after the Soviet threat vanished have given them overlapping and contradictory jurisdictions. Kohl strongly advocated both political and security union at the Maastricht conference, and the security arrangements constructed at Maastricht were an attempt to merge and streamline various agencies. But in the end, its provisions were vague. The relationship between the WEU and the EC was left ambiguous and NATO was allowed to continue within an EC context. The treaty provisions represented a compromise between the Anglo-Italian commitment to the United States and NATO and the Franco-German commitment to a European defense force—the WEU—as the security organ of European political union.61 But that defense force was not yet in place and plans were not made for such a force until in May, 1992, France and Germany agreed to build a joint 35000-member military force outside the auspices of NATO, as a pillar of European defense under the WEU. The planned army would be placed under NATO’s "operational command" in the event of a threat to West European security. However, at Maastricht, the EC Commission and the European Parliament were left without teeth, as merely consultative bodies with regard to security policy. The result of these ambiguities and compromises was a fragmented security policy which was demonstrated by Europe’s indecisive behavior in the Gulf War and in the war in Bosnia. It may have been no coincidence that Germany left Maastricht more uncertain than ever about its own security future in the hands of the European Community and other multilateral organizations; it was after the Maastricht summit that Germany declared that it would act unilaterally on the issue of Croatian independence.

Since the period under consideration here, uncertainty over Europe’s common security policy has intensified. France, who withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 reclaimed limited voting rights in its military committee in 1993, and voted on peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.62 It appeared that the war in Bosnia served to shift France’s position on the appropriate security institutions in Europe. Meanwhile, NATO itself continued to struggle to find a new post-Cold War purpose. By May 1993 the United States had failed to convince its European allies of the need to jointly arm Bosnian Muslims and to bomb Serbian targets. It was clear that Europe continued to look to the United States for leadership in security issues. And
when the United States refused to commit ground troops to the United Nations mission in Bosnia, as Europe had done, Europe refused to act, and NATO's credibility as a security institution was undermined. "We are all looking to the United States to take the lead again," reported Willem van Eekelen, secretary general of the WEU. "Our European credibility has fallen very low."63

Although the dispute over the recognition of Croatia was a diplomatic rather than a security issue, the war in the former Yugoslavia had important security implications for Germany. Recall that 65,000 refugees from the war had registered in Germany, by December 1991 and that Genscher had reminded his EC partners that if the war were to widen, Germany, along with Austria, would be one of the countries first and worst affected in the West. By July, 1992, of the 425,000 people who managed to flee the war in both Croatia and Bosnia, Germany had accepted more than 200,000. Austria and Hungary took more than 50,000 each; Sweden took nearly 45,000, and Switzerland took 17,500.64 On the day after Germany's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, Chancellor Kohl argued that "a unified Germany is a Central European nation that is geographically close to the conflict zone and that has itself benefitted from the protection of foreign democracies. It is in a special position to understand the yearnings of isolated republics."65

When asked about Germany's role in this issue Genscher replied, "We need to avoid a vacuum."66 In short, Germany had security concerns that could not be met, either by Germany alone or by existing security institutions.

The story told here provides ample evidence that Germany did not act unilaterally. Multilateralism has been the cornerstone of German foreign policy since the end of World War II. Although the commitment to multilateralism was imposed by Germany's security dependence on the United States, it took root among the political elite across the political spectrum and continued after that dependence waned. German politicians have often sought international support for their positions in domestic political debates. Genscher had been working for months behind the scenes to build a coalition that included other European allies. In this case, Germany led the way toward the decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, but when the decision came, it was no longer alone.

The decision not to wait for conditionality requirements to be met,
however, is puzzling. Clearly the coalition for recognition that Genscher built was shaky. He may have been unsure about the Community's commitment to recognition, and he may have entertained the scenario that opponents of recognition could argue that Croatia did not meet the conditionality requirements. He may even have feared that, in the end, his Community partners would withhold recognition. In any case, the story told here provides more support for an argument about multilateral commitments than it does for an argument about unilateral action.

These multilateral instincts were visible at the Maastricht Summit as well. There also, Genscher was interested in coalition-building. While Germany got most of the protective guarantees it had demanded for the DM in the treaty, Genscher backed off on key points in the political union treaty, including his demand for a strengthened European parliament, which he had earlier insisted was vital to the whole package.

Even the thorny issue of monetary union demonstrated a commitment to multilateralism over economic sovereignty. Wayne Sandholz argues that German preferences for the EMU could not have been guided by economic benefits—indeed EMU would decrease German control over a fundamental aspect of its postwar economic policy. Furthermore, there was no assurance that a European central bank would perform as well as the Bundesbank in ensuring price stability. But Genscher supported EMU, even though the Bundesbank was much more cautious. It was Genscher who called for the summit to create a committee of experts to draw up a plan for currency union—the proposal that led to the Delors committee. Sandholz hypothesizes that support for EMU was part of Genscher's belief in the importance of German unification. EMU was part of the project to "deepen" Europe before it was paralyzed by Eastern Europe's demands of "widening." EMU, he argues, was a tailor-made means for Bonn to prove that a larger Germany would remain a good European citizen.67

Theoretical Implications and Conclusions

What does this case tell us, if anything, about the future of a common European diplomatic and security policy? And what does the episode tell us about the future of the state in Europe? Two theoretical positions are relevant. Wayne Sandholz and John Zysman take a neo-realist position when they argue that international institutions are a bargain among member states.
That bargain is perceived as obsolescent when an external threat exposes its weaknesses and shortcomings. To respond to the external crisis, states change institutional procedures. "Structural situations create the context of choice and cast up problems to be resolved, but they do not dictate the decisions and strategies. The choices result from political processes and have political explanations." Crisis creates the space for new bargains to be struck to either strengthen or dismantle the institutions in the interest of facilitating a response that will meet the interests of the states striking the deals. Domestic factors will help shape government responses to the international changes. Governments must be receptive to both the pressures from international institutions to respond to a crisis in a particular way and the pressures from the domestic arena demanding not necessarily the same response. There are hierarchies of bargains and linkages among them. Initial bargains create conditions that force continued progress toward a goal or cause the breakdown of previous bargains. Leadership is a crucial determinant of the ultimate institutional outcome of the new bargain that emerges. For Sandholz and Zysman, the emergence of global economic competition and the decline of American hegemony spurred Europeans to modernize their bargains over the shape of the European Community in order to expand its powers. This new bargain was struck with the hope that it would facilitate economies of scale in order to position Europe to better compete in the new international economy.

Clearly a dramatic change in the international environment is forcing European states to reconsider their old diplomatic and security bargains. The demise of the Soviet threat and the Soviet Union itself, the retreat of the United States from Europe, the transformation of post-communist Europe, and the rise of ethnic conflict compels Europe to see the weaknesses of NATO, the WEU and the CSCE, and to change institutional procedures. We have seen here that domestic factors are indeed shaping at least Germany's response to these changes, as are existing institutional commitments. Each particular crisis--the emergence of new independent republics in the former Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the violent breakup of Yugoslavia--has presented an opportunity to strike new bargains that could have provided the foundation for a set of new related bargains and strengthened institutions to emerge. But unlike the process that surfaced with regard to economic cooperation, Europe has been
stymied in the effort to expand its security institutions in the face of these crises in ways that would meet its member states' national security needs. The long hesitation and the weakness of institutions in the face of these challenges requires explanation.

Hegemonic stability theory provides some insights. It suggests that multilateral institutions are only robust when they are led by a dominant power. It is commonplace to note that U.S. capabilities and willingness to lead in the organization of the post-War global economy was essential to the creation of cooperative arrangements in Western Europe and the coordination of those arrangements with international economic regimes. To pursue the goal of "embedded liberalism," the United States provided aid to West European economies for the purpose of developing their export industries, and encouraged the establishment of cooperative institutions such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Payments Union in order to transform Western Europe from a group of competitive economies into complementary national economies. Assuming that cooperation would result in rapid economic growth in Europe, and that growth was the condition necessary for global trade creation, the United States provided both military security and financial backing. Further, the U.S. government exercised political pressure on European leaders and permitted economic discrimination against its own economy to encourage regional cooperation that would eventually be compatible with global regimes.

What has been little discussed is that the hegemon in this case was external to the region. It was an outside power which both paid the costs and took the blame for being heavy-handed. The provision of U.S. security and aid prevented any one state within Western Europe from appearing to exercise dominance in the cooperative effort. Indeed, a major incentive for the creation of cooperative institutions was the "gulliverization" of Germany to prevent emergence of an internal hegemon. Will efforts toward the creation of new EC political and military institutions flounder for want of an external hegemon to pay the costs of cooperation, as events in the Balkan war suggest?

The debate over Croatia's recognition and its outcome raise the question of the emergence of an "internal" regional hegemon in Europe. Germany certainly took the lead in this case. Does the potential exist for Germany to assume a larger regional leadership role in diplomatic and security issues?
The key role of the hegemon in creating cooperative institutions is its willingness to pay the costs of integration and enforce the norms and principles required for the nesting of those regional regimes into the global order. The story told here suggests that Germany is not ready to play that role, and even if it were ready, other members of the European Community are not yet ready to accept an internal hegemon. The debate over Croatia permitted Germany to assert itself over an issue that did not affect the perceived vital interests of the other member states. It took a substantive position (adherence to the principle of self-determination) that did not require future bargains or the strengthening of institutions. Germany took the lead but forced others to follow for the sake of the appearance of unity. But Germany has not been able to bear the costs, or shape new norms, rules and principles for new diplomatic and security institutions in Europe. It is still constrained by its own constitution and by the burden of history.

Without the leadership that Sandholz and Zysman consider necessary for the construction of new institutions, and without the dominant power stressed in hegemonic stability theory, we are likely to see what the neo-functionalists call "muddle-about" or "spill-back." Without leadership to bear initial costs, there will be few payoffs from greater collaboration. "Regional bureaucrats [either] debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues, but decrease their actual capacity to allocate values. . . [or they] retreat. . . possibly returning to the status quo ante initiation." 71

A retreat would mean a return to the pre-war Europe of states, each acting in its own national interest with regard to security and international diplomacy. The episode examined here suggests that this outcome is unlikely, attesting to the independent strength of the institutions in place. When Germany broke ranks, Europe followed. Preserving some unity was preferred over achieving a particular substantive outcome. In this same light, a second interpretation of this episode could be that some member states of the EC could not advocate self-determination on their own because they would then—as governments—be advocating self-determination for separatist movements within their own borders. But if the EC advocated such a policy as a supranational institution, member states would not have to take direct responsibility for the decision.

At present, members of the European Community are "muddling about"
neither building institutions nor tearing them down. This episode presents a
good example of this concept: European states, increasingly integrated into a
federal system were being asked to support the breakup of a federation and
support the principle of national self-determination for others, while they
signed treaties that increasingly constrained their own national sovereignty.
Yet, the breakup of Yugoslavia did not seem to present an immediate security
threat to members of the European Community. The episode actually laid down
the common principle of recognizing national self-determination that European
leaders continued to follow. It is a low-cost strategy that is more likely to
find agreement among members than more demanding policies such as military
intervention in regional conflicts. Genscher suggested the importance of this
principle for future decisions in a statement made on December 18, 1991: "In
the Soviet Union there is a process of dissolution by agreement, while in
Yugoslavia, an army acting outside political control is trying to preserve or
restore a structure. . . . There is therefore a chance that with responsible
action by the presidents of the (Soviet) republics, a Yugoslav situation will
be avoided."72

But the stalemate cannot last for long. European security institutions
must meet the security demands of members or individual states will be forced
to do it themselves. In this light Germany’s move to recognize Croatia was a
"wake up call" to Europe, that muddling around would eventually have to stop.
Finally, it seems unlikely that the principle of self-determination can serve
as the sole foundation for a common European diplomacy in every conflict and
crisis which is likely to arise in the uncertain post–Cold War environment.


55. Robin Gedye, "Yugoslav Crisis: Ovation for Kohl over Recognition."


72. Richard Murphy, "Germany to Announce Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia," Reuters, December 19, 1991,