-- first draft !! --

THE EC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:

DIMENSIONS, TRENDS, AND PROSPECTS

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CONTENTS

I. WHY BE CONCERNED WITH EC EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY?

II. EXPECTATIONS
   INTERESTS AND CAPACITIES
   MATERIAL CAPABILITIES
   A NEW POLITICAL SUBJECT
   EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL NORMS
   EXPANDING EC AUTHORITY

III. PATTERNS: THE EC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
   REGIONAL PATTERNS
   SECTORAL PATTERNS

IV. HYPOTHESES
   EVALUATIVE CONCEPTS: HISTORICAL PROJECTS
   MARKET CREATION: ENVIRONMENTAL MODERNIZATION
   A NEW COLLECTIVE IDENTITY? SOCIAL ECOLOGY
   MECHANISMS: PRECOCIOUS STATES, EVOLVING DM RULES

V. CONCLUSIONS
THE EC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: DIMENSIONS, TRENDS, PROSPECTS

by Carl Lankowski

I. WHY BE CONCERNED WITH EC EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY?

This may initially strike one as a strange question. After all, the environment has become a virtually universal concern of politics and policy-making. Nevertheless, the question deserves to be posed because what is and is not included in the term, environment, cannot be taken for granted. For the sake of simplicity, one can imagine two ways of considering "the environmental." One way draws lines around anthropogenically traceable degradations of the biosphere, taking as the baseline extant social institutions and cultural orientations. This approach is, broadly speaking, not only anthropocentric, but in a way, ethnocentric as well. Interest in the environment comes from and is pretty much limited by "fixing" (as in abating) undesirable transformations of our natural surroundings. Methodologically, this approach is Cartesian, in the sense that it instinctively proceeds by isolating effects prior to engineering responses to them. Such an approach does not question the parameters of human action. A more holistic approach can be defined in contrast which dares to judge our productive and consumptive practices by the character of our relationship to our "natural" surroundings itself.

From this holistic point of view it is natural to wonder about the extent to which our concern with the environment drives history towards reorganization of the forms which mediate allegiance and public action. It may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient
have internalized such an ecologically holistic outlook. Everyone is well aware that the intended and actual functioning of human institutions are distinct. Similar outcomes may be achieved by means of the actualization of entirely different human concerns. Despite all this, theoretically and methodologically it would be difficult not to assume that variations in outlook are strongly associated with variations in the goals, agendas, organization, and modus operandi of human institutions.

Of interest in this context is the destiny of the state system and the role of the EC in shaping that destiny. Is the EC destined to reflect forever the state system in which it is insinuated? This question has found two sorts of answers. One sort is methodologically tied to states and interprets international institutions (including environmental ones) as attenuators of action based on unenlightened self-interest. (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993, Keohane and Hoffmann 1992) Some have even emphasized the reinforcing effect of the EC on the capacities of member states and hence on their unwillingness to cede authority to a federal entity. (Puchala 1990) The other sort is impressed with the challenges imposed on member states by forces none can hope to master alone. Self interest again drives the system, but this time towards institutionalized cooperation, a "politics of scale." (Ginsberg 1989, Kennedy 1993) But the debate is or should be wider than this.

Popular reaction to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union has opened a new chapter in contemplating Europe's future. The general tenor can be summarized thus: reject federation with strong centralizing and homogenizing tendencies; reject narrow nationalism
and particularism; embrace regional cooperation organized at several levels -- global, regional, sub-national -- and with a greater role for non-economic NGOs at every level. Europe has been discussed in this way (Galtung 1989), but the discussion has died in the academic Balkans of disciplinary boundaries, the political scientists, economists, sociologists, and anthropologists all doing their own thing.

Is "the environmental question" really about a refractoring of the evolution of the state system, its metamorphosis? How can we know unless the question is first posed? This paper is aimed at posing and justifying this question.

At least some students of the EC have noted the relativization of the role of the nation-state as a focus of political allegiance and locus of policy-making competence in the European context and have even tied this to the historical experience of important nations. (Maul 1992) This is a valuable contribution, especially since it grows out of a discussion of "security" issues. With these efforts in mind, the following paragraphs are aimed at exploring the reasons for expecting that there is more to the external environmental question than meets the eye, i.e., that it affects the forms of world politics as well as the particular policy substance and that these two mutually condition each other. Part III then inspects the trends in the "environmentalization" of the EC's external relations, and Part IV offers some concepts to interpret the patterns. I conclude by observing that it is useful to think of the EC as a superstructure which, in being made to converge with its own social and political infrastructure, may have an effect on what world politics is and how it is done.
II. EXPECTATIONS

Whatever the lofty dreams of ardent integrationists may have been, the European Communities were framed by treaties which set in motion a project of market creation. Whatever the aims of visionary environmentalists today, the EC continues to define itself first and foremost in this way. Why should one expect there to be greater engagement with the environment in the EC's external affairs?

INTERESTS, PRESSURES AND CAPACITIES

In general terms, the perceived interests and capacities of EC decision-makers lead one to expect increasing attention to environmental issues in the Community's external relations. As market integration has proceeded and the EC has emerged as the world's largest trading block, the logic of international relations has compelled it to coordinate positions and set policy in the interests of internal cohesion as well as external calculability. In this sense, external environmental engagement is an aspect of the Community's general gains as a foreign policy actor. There are "harder" and "softer" facets of the EC's international profile. On the "hard" side are explicit treaty-based commitments, above all, the common commercial policy. The member states have ceded sovereignty to the EC in almost all areas of external trade policy. Vast tracts of environmentally relevant decision-making have been assigned, willy nilly, to the Community. Crucial questions as basic as the definition of tradeable goods, technical standards and certification procedures, are now matters for the EC -- and, therefore, for multilateral negotiations -- to decide. On the
"soft" side, cumulative experience has taught member states that the effectiveness of EC policy cannot be assured without transcending the dimensions of action established by EC treaty language. Since the boundaries of policy areas are always the subject of haggling, both by member states and third parties, external coordination vis-à-vis specific countries or groups of countries has been required in order to maintain a semblance of cohesion. European Political Cooperation (EPC) grew out of the acknowledgement of this point already in 1970, though it had been implicit since the beginning of the integrative project, showing up in such areas as DeGaulle's plans for a European political directorate (the Fouchet plan). EPC has since been formalized as part of the EC by the Single European Act and is about to be formalized still further by the terms of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.

MATERIAL CAPABILITIES

The EC's historical legacy, strategic position, and projectable resources, all combine to provide it with the means of influence, should it desire to use it. Member states and the Community itself have long-standing links with former colonies. It borders on the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Its member states are more willing to disburse aid than is the United States.

A NEW POLITICAL SUBJECT

A basic tenet of liberal democracy and mainstream political science alike is that representative institutions convey changing
orientations to decision-makers, who register them in making policy. Since the turn of the century, the main axis of politics in Europe and the United States has been the functioning of the market economy and the distribution of goods (and bads) resulting from the capitalist division of labor. Relative redistribution of labor to the service sector brought about by mechanization and automation and the elaboration of the welfare state comprise the structural preconditions of what has been referred to as the "new politics" or "post-industrial politics." The "new social movements" -- above all the environmental movement -- is the best example of this trend. The appearance of the movements arguably had the effect of challenging the meaning of work, the central social institution.

Where the various movement segments were highly organized and condensed in "scenes," alternative political parties appeared, as was the case with the German Greens. In the context of Europe's parliamentary regimes and electoral systems of proportional representation, and given the high turnout at elections (compared to the United States), even modest electoral success produced significant leverage at least at the rhetorical level among the governing parties.

Policy outcomes could be expected to vary with the acceptance of the environmentalists' message, as well as with the short and long-term costs associated with policy innovation. The latter might be affected by economic swings and/or major, costly events, such as German unification. The quality of the message itself must be viewed as a major variable in the struggle for acceptance and sacrifice. This turns in part on the ability of the movements to generate credible, i.e., analytically sound and technically
feasible, solutions to perceived problems. Distribution of analytic skills also affects the way the mass media treat the movements, and thus the receptivity of their message.

As movement concerns become "mainstreamed," governments have only three choices vis-à-vis the EC: cease respecting the social contract (bring an end to liberal democracy), represent these concerns at that level in order to prevent "environmental dumping," or steer a middle ground. The middle ground consists of using the EC system as an alibi to do less (or more) than would otherwise be expected, based on the preferences of the population and the strengths of the organized social forces and parties. Let us pray that the first option is not exercised. The second option implies that the Community must try to get other areas in the world to adapt to its standards. As for the alibi strategy, it owes its existence to stubborn differences in environmental priorities among the member-states, while its attractiveness is enhanced by the secrecy of Council deliberations and the weakness of the European Parliament. The problem with this alibi function is that it undermines the perceived efficacy and representativeness of both the EC and the national government, thus becoming a systemic contributor to delegitimation and disaffection.

Evolving International Norms

In addition to pressures brewing within the EC, the EC's problem set has been transformed to the extent that other significant actors demand action in the environmental field. Especially since the 1972 UN environmental meeting in Stockholm, this has definitely been the case. The question here concerns
leadership of the EC. On balance, has the EC exploited an increasingly permissive international setting, or has it been dragged into environmental agreements? From this angle, one would have to expect that, in line with the "new politics" hypothesis, the EC would be relatively more precocious than other international actors.

In short, Community decision-makers, caught between pressure "from below" and pressure "from outside," must try to transform the external setting of EC activities. Assuming the continuation of a strong movement sector, the more the EC comes under pressure to democratize itself, the more it must try to alter the external environment.

EXPANDING EC AUTHORITY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL DOMAIN

The EC's capacity to act in the environmental field has been dramatically enhanced, first, by inclusion of an explicit legal basis for doing so in Article 130R of the Rome Treaty, adopted as part of the Single European Act. Although the effects of Maastricht are controversial in this field, it is at least arguable that the EC's environmental mandate has been further expanded by some clauses altering decision-making procedures on certain environmental topics and others which designate new environmentally-relevant areas of competence for EC action. Second, the constitutional evolution of the EC includes assignment of presumptive powers to the EC in the external sphere once it has acted "internally" in that sphere. (Haigh 1992) Third, the increasing role of the European Parliament has amplified the green voice, since the EP tends to be "greener" than most national
parliaments. This would be enhanced by new grants of authority foreseen by Maastricht, in effect giving the EP a veto over legislation. In this situation, a virtuous cycle (from the green point of view) may develop, whereby Commission and Parliament collaborate with "environmentally precocious states" in the legislative process, in effect isolating recalcitrant ones. At this point, the comparative capabilities of the member states enter into the picture. Some environmentally precocious states will have more influence than others.

In sum, there are good reasons to expect to find a significant environmental dimension in the EC's relations with the rest of the world. This expectation derives from problems of interdependence (transboundary effects), the functioning of the internal market, and the emergence of an environmental political subject.

III. PATTERNS: THE EC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

UNCED crowned the debate opened in earnest by the Brundtland Commission Report (World Commission 1987) on sustainability. Less than two years after Brundtland, the Commission received a kind of environmental Cecchini report on the environmental impact of the 1992 internal market program. (Task Force 1989) Just prior to the Rio Earth Summit, the Community's Fifth Action Programme on the Environment was published. (1992)

TREATIES

One way of describing the EC's engagement in international environmental affairs is to register the trends in its role as signatory of environmental treaties. Multilateral treaties are the
subject of this section. Omnibus treaties with a bilateral character (between the EC and states or groups of states) in which the environment plays a role are dealt with below under the heading of regional cooperation.

The EC was permitted by the member states to become a party to multilateral environmental agreements beginning in 1975 with its accession to the Paris Convention on Marine Pollution. In 1981, the EC's Register of Current Community Legal Instruments began listing internationally environmental agreements under the external relations classifications. In that year, fourteen citations can be found. Four support the COST multilateral environmental research effort which associated EFTA and EC countries on topics such as sewage sludge and acid rain. Two other citations referred to fisheries agreements with a conservation dimension involving the North Atlantic and North Sea. There were four other international agreements listed, as follows:

Berne Convention (Rhine) 1977 263 A 0429(11)
Paris Conv. (marine pollution) 1975 274 A 0221(11)
Barcelona Conv. (Medit. pollution) 1977 276 A 0216(11)
Bonn Convention (Rhine-chemicals) 1977 276 A 0707(11)

Recorded were also three Council decisions and one Council regulation registering agreements between member states and third parties on protection from fissile material, animal protection, sea dumping, and fisheries.

By December, 1987, only six months after the coming into force of the Single European Act, external environmental citations totaled 32, 22 of which were agreements, of which 20 involved territorial contiguity with third parties. In addition to the
international agreements already mentioned above, the 1987 (tenth semi-annual) report listed 18 newer agreements. The entire list is given on the next page.
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN FORCE—ENVIRONMENT, DECEMBER 1992

Berne Convention (Rhine) 1977 263 A 0429(11)
Paris Conv. (marine pollution) 1975 274 A 0221(11)
Barcelona Conv. (Medit. pollution) 1977 276 A 0216(11)
Bonn Convention (Rhine-chemicals) 1977 276 A 0707(11)
trade in endangered species 1982 273 A 0303(01)
protocol to Medit. pollution 1981 276 A 0216(02)
future NW Atlantic fisheries 1978 278 A 1024(01)
cons. or migratory species 1982 279 A 9623(01)
cons. Euro. wildlife, habitats 1982 279 A 0919(01)
long range trans-boundary air pol. 1981 270 A 1113(01)
future NE Atlantic Fisheries 1981 280 A 1118(01)
Antarctic marine life cons. 1981 281 A 0905(01)
salmon cons. in North Atlantic 1982 282 A 0302(01)
Protocol Medit. pol. from land 1983 283 A 0312(01)
fishing & cons. life in Baltic 1983 283 A 0826(02)
Protocol to Baltic 1983 283 A 0826(03)
N. Sea oil & other pollution 1984 284 A 0716(02)
Protocol to Rhine chemical pol. 1985 285 A 0705(01)
Atlantic tunas cons. conv. 1986 286 A 0618(01)
Final act Atlantic tunas 1986 286 A 0618(02)
Protocol Atlantic tunas 1986 286 A 0618(03)
Protocol marine pol. from land 1987 287 A 0127(01)
Four comments are in order here. First, the volume of agreements rose substantially over 1981 (four agreements). Second, the agreements are grouped in narrow areas, fishing and marine pollution in particular, bearing out Haigh's (1992) point about the EC—"constitutional" sources of formal EC participation. Third, some of the agreements (again fisheries, the Antarctic) are regional, implementing versions of global conventions on the same subject, or had been negotiated in the framework of pan-European organizations, such as the Council of Europe or the UN Economic Commission for Europe. Finally, other Council decisions and resolutions cited (ten, all told) refer partly to aspects of the same conventions listed as agreements, though several carefully specify particular areas to which the EC apparently had denied negotiating authority (e.g., regarding vertebrate animals used for experimental purposes).

As far as the direct impact of the internal market program and new environmental authority granted the EC by the Single European Act is concerned, a surprising picture emerges. By the end of 1992, the total citations of multilateral environmental acts in force — 37 — is just five more than at the time the SEA had been adopted in 1987. A single net addition to agreements is registered along with a very modest increase in Council decisions, regulations, and resolutions (14 total, for a net increase over 1987 of four). At least up until now, the SEA has had no discernible effect on numbers of multilateral environmental agreements. On the precedent of its participation in the 1981 acid rain convention, the Community was designated as the agent for the
member states in the multilateral ozone diplomacy that produced the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol:

Vienna Convention on ozone 1985 288 A 1031(01)
Montreal Protocol to Vienna ozone 1988 288 A 1031(02)

Other reportable agreements not yet cited are the Basle Convention on the international shipment of hazardous waste and the Convention on the Protection of the Alps, both signed but not yet ratified.

THE INTERNAL MARKET AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

It is interesting to note the dramatic slowing of international agreements since 1987. Is it a pure coincidence, or does it reflect the more or less single minded attention devoted during this period to the internal market (1992) program? Whatever the case, action on the environment played a major role in Lord Cockfield's famous 1985 White Paper which defined the components of the internal market legislative program. And action taken in the environmental domain under article 100A either affected transnational media (air, water), or industrial processes (titanium oxide use) or waste issues having significant transnational effect. Not only did harmonization affect these media directly; they created official product and industrial process standards with legal status that compelled third parties to adjust to EC action if they desired to export to the European market.

-- over 200 legally binding environmental directives and regulations promulgated at EC level, most in the past ten years;

* 59/288 White Paper measures fall under category: "veterinary-phytosanitary controls" -- many concerning hormone use, organic farming, and pesticide use.
REGIONAL PATTERNS

The EC joins areas that can affect its own environmental quality. Transnational effects, anticipated or actual, supply the motive for much of the EC's external environmental activity. In addition to the international agreements to which the EC is a party, mentioned above, the EC has launched programs to manage shared ecosystems.

Mediterranean countries. The Community's involvement occurs in the context of the Barcelona Convention and the bilateral agreements on economic development reached since 1975. The original bilateral agreements involved only minor attention to environmental matters. After nearly a decade of study and the Council adopted Regulation No. 563/91 in March, 1991, setting up the "Medspa" action program. Medspa is a framework for financing waste, biotope management, and soil protection projects over a ten year time horizon. The Commission organized a meeting of environmental ministers of the EC and Mediterranean states in April, 1990 which adopted the "Nicosia Charter," aimed at organizing the Mediterranean for sustainable development. A Commission strategy document was discussed at a ministerial follow-up meeting in April, 1992 in Cairo. Unfortunately, despite the looming UNCED conference in Rio, the scope of discussion was very narrow, not going beyond abatement strategies to embrace EC policies which contribute in a
major way to environmental stress in the Mediterranean: the CAP, tourism and inter-Mediterranean trade policies.¹

Eastern Europe. The hoped for and anticipated economic take-off in Eastern Europe poses a compound threat to EC environmental policy. Even prior to the collapse of Eastern Europe's neo-Stalinist regimes efforts were launched to deal with ambient pollution emanating from the East. The Chernobyl disaster was only the most dramatic instance of this requirement. Fears of eco-dumping also drive EC environmental policy towards Eastern Europe. Would businesses invest in Eastern Europe because of lower environmental standards? Also, to the extent that the Community is planning for enlargement to the East, environmental standards must be brought up to the acquis communautaire.

Strong motives involving general political-economic strategy vis-à-vis the East are also at work. On the one hand, market reforms after 1989 can only work if investment is forthcoming from the West. This will only occur to the extent that environmental liability questions can be solved. Eastern European countries are therefore in the midst of a gigantic cleanup effort which also requires Western financial and technical assistance. On the other hand, Western energy consumption can be supported by Russian resources. But Russian production requires better technology and a framework in which the energy situation in the rest of Eastern Europe can be managed. It was in this context that the European energy charter was launched. The question is to what degree this powerful lever will be used to advance the general aims of ecological reconstruction.

¹ See European Environmental Bureau, Environment in Brief No. 39, May, 1997
At the June, 1990 meeting of the environmental ministers from the EC and Eastern Europe, the principle was adopted that Western investors would adopt Western environmental standards in their operations in the East.

The main instrument for providing technical assistance and finance for environmental projects is the PHARE program launched in 1989 by G24 and administered by the EC Commission. The Europe Agreements signed between the EC and Poland, Hungary and (then) Czechoslovakia in 1991, provide a more comprehensive framework for EC-EE environmental cooperation. These agreements call, in general, for systemic convergence with the EC, implicitly holding out the prospect for eventual EC membership.

Taking the Europe Agreement with Hungary as an example, environment is included in Title V, Chapter II, Article 69 on the approximation of laws. Under Title VI, cooperation in the areas of energy, nuclear safety, environment, water management, and transport are spelled out with some specificity in articles 78-81, inclusive.

Work is also progressing on international conventions on the Elbe (signed in 1991), the Oder, and the Danube.

In addition, at least as of mid-1991, the Commission wanted EE to become part of the CORINE pan-European environmental data collection and analysis program.

The North/South Dimension: The Lomé (IV) Convention. Lomé-IV was signed in December, 1989. Two major departures from previous renewals were the new ten year period of validity and the explicit chapter on the environment, featured under Title 1 (articles 33-41) of Part Two -- "Areas of ACP-EEC Cooperation." The environmental
articles are drawn in ambitious language. Article 36 refers to a "comprehensive approach embracing the social and cultural dimensions." Despite this departure, at least one analysis of EC relations with developing countries detects slippage in the standing of the ACP countries in favor of Latin America, Mediterranean countries, and Eastern Europe. (Grilli 1993) In effect, environmental policy follows the regional dynamic of international trade and investment.

UNCED—The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, June 1992. Along with nearly 160 country delegations (including all EC member states) the European Community was accredited to UNCED. It was the plan of the EC to play a leading role in Rio. Certainly, its negotiating positions on Agenda 21, and the conventions on biodiversity and greenhouse gases were progressive when compared to the United States' positions.

SECTORAL PATTERNS

The EC is bound by the terms of the Single European Act (Article 130R) to make environmental policy an integral facet of all other Community policies. In furtherance of this principle, the Commission has deliberated about evaluating entire policies for environmental soundness. Part of this second-order environmental impact assessment concept is reflected in the Fifth Environmental Action Plan (1992), which is organized on sector-specific lines and seeks to establish priorities of action for the EC in industry, energy, transport, tourism, and agriculture. Each of these sectors has an international dimension. Hence, one must consider action in
these areas to be a component of the EC's international environmental policy.

IV. HYPOTHESES

If the causal sources for environmental action are correctly identified in section II above, what requires explanation the limited quantity of policy the operation of these causal sources suggest would be the case. The general explanation offered is that governments are unwilling to cede powers to Brussels and cannot, given the EC's current distribution of authority, effectively coordinate policy. This is because environmental policies are understood as compensatory corrections for dysfunctions of its basic market design.

EVALUATIVE CONCEPTS: HISTORICAL PROJECTS

This situation can be interpreted in terms of efforts or contending, only partly commensurable historical projects to adjust to one another. The EC is primarily a structure designed to create and maintain a market. But many actors are increasingly impressed with the need to design and protect a sustainable community.

MARKET CREATION: ENVIRONMENTAL MODERNIZATION

Social and economic heterogeneity drives the process of defining conditions of trade. The environmental modernization strategy turns on highlighting the economic payoffs of environmental hygiene. Competitive advantage can be approached from
the point of view of cost and product development. Part of this approach involves a minuet between technological innovation, the state which supplies legislated limit-values, and quasi-public, industrial standard setting agencies. This minuet defines the market and helps to "fix" competitive advantages in the name of environmental, health and safety concerns. Meanwhile, limit values on emissions are designed to internalize environmental costs, prompting a search for economic use of by-products, thus reducing the waste cycle.

Therefore, there is less paradox than meets the eye in the fact that the most avid trading states and groups -- e.g., Germany, the EC -- are also the sites of the greatest precocity with respect to market qualification in the interests of environmental hygiene. This gives rise to cynicism about the true motivation behind European policies. The recent transatlantic row over import bans on American beef treated with BST is a case in point. More generally, there will be differences associated with differential risk assessments within the EC and between the EC and third countries. But the BST case also points at least indirectly to the limits of environmental modernization as a strategy. Risk assessment is ultimately a political quantity. The acceptability of various technologies will vary from place to place. Nuclear power generation and recombinant DNA processes in the biotechnology sphere belong to this category.

A NEW COLLECTIVE IDENTITY? SOCIAL ECOLOGY

Social ecology means redesigning the institutions of collective life from the point of view of ecological balance. The
institutional and architectural side of the environmental movement has been localized in green and alternative parties and regionalist movements. At EC level, it has been represented in the European Parliament since the 1984 election in the form of the Rainbow Group (comprising Greens and regionalists) and the Greens Group (separately) since 1989. Depending on the precise classification criteria used, these groups and their close allies have around 60 seats (out of 518 at the time of this writing). The shock waves emanating from Danish rejection of Maastricht in June, 1992, set in motion a broad discussion of European architecture which will undoubtedly inform the 1994 EP elections.

The Maastricht debate was presaged by programmatic statements of the German Green Party, first at the domestic level (Reconstruction Program 1986), and then at the international level (Group of Green Economists 1992). Just as the negotiations over the Single European Act were completed in late 1985 and early 1986, the Greens, complying with the programmatic imperatives of political party development, hammered out a medium-term "Reconstruction Program." (BuVo 1986) What was interesting about this "program to overcome unemployment, poverty and environmental destruction" is its attempt to relate to present-day institutions the Greens' vision of an ecological, socially just, non-violent and decentralized society of the future. The Reconstruction Program was the Greens' most comprehensive and coherent programmatic document up to that time.

The document displayed the multidimensionality of its ecological concerns by spelling out the means by which air, water and soil were to be decontaminated and secured against further
pollution; production processes made safer, cleaner and less resource-dependent; comprehensive recycling introduced; energy, agricultural, and transport systems transformed; urban development guided; armament industries converted to civilian use; and research and technological development brought under public control. The Program also advocated measures to democratize the economy and provide for income redistribution.

In addition to the political appeal its authors hoped it would generate, it was designed to set the basic strategic coordinates of the green project for the medium term. For the purposes of this analysis what is most striking is its almost total obliviousness to the aims and strategy of the EC's "1992" single market program. The framework was decidedly national, i.e., the Greens' internal market referred to that of Germany. Only in the area of air pollution control was there explicit recognition of the need to cooperate in a European framework. Beyond that, in 92 pages of text, the Reconstruction Program's only reference to the EC was a negative one -- the failure of a determined French socialist effort to run a Keynesian-inspired reflationary policy from 1981-83. And from this it drew the lesson that West Germany, world export champion, should drastically curtail its exports, presumably leaving its market share to firms operating out of other countries, turning instead to products to be consumed domestically. The Reconstruction Program embraced a left-Keynesian strategy, in the sense that it assumed that public investments in the environmental and social spheres could be accomplished by way of fiscal manipulation and prohibitive regulations. In sum, the Party simply
did not acknowledge EC-Europe as a relevant arena of strategic action in 1986–87.

Not that the Party failed to recognize the necessity of cooperative international action for the environment. In January, 1987 the Greens Bundestag group approved major funding for the development of a program-like document on international economic policy. The resulting working group, comprised of elected members and staff economists from the Fraktion's economics and international committees, aimed at producing the international analogue to the Reconstruction Program, i.e., a reform strategy for the medium term based on Green principles.2 (Arbeitskreis Ökologische Weltwirtschaft 1990).

The working group strove to ground the international responsibilities of the highly industrialized, capitalist West in the Reconstruction Program, arguing that national reform made international reform attainable. An implicit economic self-containment concept animated the analysis. But there was also an important conceptual break with the Reconstruction Program. The desirable dimension of the economic space was regional and transnational, not national as in the Reconstruction Program. Significantly, the working group acknowledges that "the development of supranational structures in Europe is in principle the best response to the decreasing decision-making abilities of the old nation states." That said, the text became contradictory by condemning the EC's alleged incapacity to meet "the challenges of

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1. There is some irony in the fact that the fruit of their labor received wider attention in its English translation, *Ecological Economics in One World*, published by the Green Group of the European Parliament in June, 1991 -- six months after the West German Greens were voted out of the Federal German Parliament.
regional and global solidarity," while simultaneously pressing forward with an EC reform program. Moreover, the EC reform initiatives did not appear to be internally consistent. On the one hand, the demand was raised for democratization of existing EC institutions and "establishing multilateral EC merger controls." On the other hand, the authors called for the inclusion of what is now Russia in a transformed EC which was to have metamorphosized into a "decentralized European-wide federation." This federation was to be realized by an East European reform program based on pan-European institutions such as the CSCE. European cooperation, in turn, was to be expanded to global fora. According to the authors, the UN's inclusivity made it the best framework for working out all important interregional economic issues.

The working group's schizophrenia over the EC derived from the rapidly evolving situation in Europe and the differentiation of internal party positions on foreign policy. Born during the spring of 1988, the first draft was completed by mid-1989. Between that time and the submission of the final versions one year later, reality had overtaken the program. Not only had East European neo-Stalinist regimes collapsed, but the rush to German unification was also rendering obsolete a major pillar of the Greens' foreign policy of self-containment.

The draft reflected the confusion within the party over its own identity. On the one hand, the fluid situation in Europe seemed to hold out the prospect of programmatically credible radical intervention. On the other hand, it appeared that the party was powerless to stop either the process of German unification or the process of EC integration. In this situation, the relevance of the
pan-European CSCE faded. United Nations institutions could not respond to the European situation alone.

What clearly comes through in the Greens international program is resistance to attempts to draw state-like boundaries around the Community on the Maastricht model. The post-Maastricht discussion confirms this orientation. What emerges is a vision of a porous, inclusive and diverse Community whose member states are institutionally compelled to cooperate with one another and whose policy-making institutions are open to participation by NGOs. Enhancement of sub-national regional powers is an essential part of this mix.

The question is the degree to which this orientation is having an effect on the Community's international environmental profile. Not surprisingly, the posture of critical non-engagement keeps the Greens out of much of the policy discussion, leaving day-to-day representation to the Green Euro-parliamentarians and the NGOs. On the other hand, the Maastricht debate in Germany has led at least to the elevation of the role of the federal Länder in EC affairs. Since environment is a matter over which they have a significant policy-making position by the terms of the German Basic Law, and since two of the federal states in the Bundesrat majority have red-green governments, the policy process is not entirely devoid of green voices.

MECHANISMS: PRECOCIOUS STATES, EVOLVING DM RULES

In order to prevent "regulatory arbitrage," environmentally precocious states will attempt to have high standards set for all.
The capacity to prevail depends on several factors. One major one has to do with the process of industrial standard-setting, a subject as important as it is underresearched. The key is industrial innovation. If industry responds to the movement sector with new products and technologies, a member state can occupy the high road in Council, assured that environmentalism will be good business. This is the essence of environmental modernization. But precocious states' action rests on constant pressure to adjust to an environmentally precocious population. From the point of view of the functioning of liberal democracies, the key in this sphere is an organized political subject, a party that can significantly redistribute votes within the party spectrum. Because of its size, industrial structure, and Green Party, Germany has been the only member state able to play this role so far. Perhaps the most important question concerns the impact of unification on this role, but that is the subject for another paper.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The EC is an organization out of synch with its social base. However inchoately, the environmental issue is a major vehicle for reconvergence. Adopting a phrase from one of the most insightful native students of the transformations of European society, Europe is in the process of de- and re-programming itself (Touraine 1971, 1978, 1980), or at the very least tugging hard at the emergency brake on the train of European history. (Offe 1982) Moreover, the availability of the EC as an arena of action multiplies the possibilities for rearranging forms of cooperation to take account of demands for participation, representation and the creation of
new solidarities. This process resonates externally. The driving force is the tension between two historical projects vying for support in the Community.

Three scenarios present themselves for the medium term with respect to the "environmentalization" of the EC. 1. The most likely scenario is that the EC will muddle through, environmental policy outputs a vector result of institutional changes associated with the Maastricht process. A second scenario now seems rather unlikely: centralization of authority in Brussels. The visionary strong federal model of the fathers of the postwar integration project may have been a useful point of orientation for creating a market, but it undermines itself by paradoxically increasing the role of the state in the short term. Moreover, it does not correspond to the requirements of an ecologically oriented society. The third scenario involves a fuller dispersion of authority. Scenario 3 implies multiplying the number of voices involved in policy-making. In the environmental area, especially in its social-ecological variant, a sound rationale exists to proceed in this way. Opening decision-making to NGOs, regions, and municipalities will both reduce the political risks national governments confront and enhance the efficacy of policy.
REFERENCES


