THE EC, SECURITY AND PEACEFUL CHANGE IN EUROPE

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The inclusion of a common foreign and security policy was one of the more controversial aspects of the Maastricht Treaty on Political Union. In the defence arena, the proposed relationship of the EC to the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was also hotly debated. Rapid and major change in the international political environment, including war in the former Yugoslavia, gave great salience to the attempt to formulate common foreign, security and defence policies, while revealing the weaknesses in present arrangements to these ends. [Salmon, 1992, pp. 233-5]

This paper argues that the EC needs to rethink its idea of security. Particularly, there has been a discussion among scholars regarding a broader meaning of security. Recent debates about a security policy for the EC, on the other hand, rehaerse outdated Cold War bifurcated conceptions of security policy as military security of the state apparatus on the one hand and integration policies enhancing societal welfare on the other. This is odd since the origins of the EC, especially the ECSC, show that it has an expanded and still useful conception of security to hand.

The articulation of a broader notion of security for the EC has significant implications. First, in its foreign policy the EC should continue in its tradition of being a civilian model, leaving other military security matters to other fora such as the UN, the CSCE and NATO. Second, if security is understood more broadly, then the range of relations that the EC has, for instance with its neighbours in the East, can and should be interpreted in security terms.

The paper is in four parts. The first briefly considers the concept of security and an older discourse on the idea of peaceful change. The second part relates the security aspect of the origins of the ECSC to the academic discussion of peaceful change. The third part of the paper considers the recent development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EC. The fourth and final part considers the EC's security policy in regard to its relation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Security and Peaceful Change

In his book, *People, States and Fear*, Barry Buzan asserts that security is an undeveloped and contested concept. He goes on to examine the nature of national security in terms of threats and vulnerabilities at various levels, the individual, the state and international political and economic system. [Buzan, 1983, pp. 3-9, ch. 3] Buzan canvasses many meanings of security but notes the centrality of military threats to national security. [Buzan, 1983, p. 75]

Even before the end of the Cold War, numerous authors had been arguing for an expanded meaning of security more appropriate to the changed circumstances of the international system in the late twentieth century. Military security of the state in terms of threats from other states was seen as too narrow a focus. Recently, there have been a number of articles that argue for the extension of the idea of security in international relations in terms of its scope. Security, it is argued, cannot be understood merely in terms of a narrow military/strategic point of view. Rather national security must also encompass economic security, social and cultural security and environmental security. [Jessica Tuchman Matthews, 1989; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 1991; Job, 1992, p. 16]

Others have argued that security needs to be reconceptualised from the point of view of its subject; national, that is, state, security is insufficient. A comprehensive understanding of security in international relations today must take account of individual, collective and global security matters. These alternative foci for security mean different notions of the complementarity of the subject’s security; national security was inherently competitive, whereas common security, it is argued, should be mutually empowering. [Azar and Moon, 1988; *Common Security*, 1982; Richard H. Ullman, 1983; Grant, 1992; Job, p. 15; Daniel Deudney, 1990]

While welcome, these extensions of the meaning of security cannot be the final word since they still portray security as a static concept. Throughout history, but especially today, we are made aware that security is not fixed; rather the world is constantly in flux and so are individual, national and global security concerns. Even change is not evenly paced and, as we know, accelerates during some periods and for some regions and actors, only to slow in others. Europe demonstrates this proposition very clearly. A changing world means that the nature and focus of security concerns are also in flux. We must, therefore, examine the concept of peaceful change to complete an examination of the broader concept of security.

*International Peaceful Change*
In circumstances of change, there can be no security without a mechanism or procedure providing for peaceful change. Without this, in international relations, the only available procedure to effect change is through the threat or use of force. To use an analogy: I may not feel secure, even if my current situation might appear so. I will only feel secure if I can be assured that getting to a secure situation tomorrow can be achieved without the threat of violent struggle. How many sleepless nights do we have in our cosy beds worrying about what will happen the next day?

An examination of the concept of international peaceful change must first situate it logically in terms of the conflict process. Peaceful change is part of the pre-conflict phase, i.e., it is a method for conflict avoidance. It is an alternative to violent modes of dispute settlement. It is temporally prior to processes that manage or control conflict and those that aim to settle or resolve a dispute after violent conflict has broken out. Putting it more negatively, peaceful change becomes irrelevant after the outbreak of conflict, unless peaceful order can be re-established. The case of Yugoslavia is instructive.

Peaceful change presumes that the situation of the parties after the dispute will differ from the status quo ante. That there should be some sort of change is fundamental to peaceful change. Nevertheless, the final outcome after the change cannot be determined in advance. There has been some confusion in the literature on this point. Peaceful change must, some have reasoned, mean that the outcome is peaceful. In logic, this need not be the case. All that is required is that the change be achieved by peaceful means; the outcome can be chaos, yet the change would still qualify as peaceful change. In peaceful change, procedure not outcome is what matters. [Manning, ed., 1937, p. 173-5] To be concrete for a moment, the change in Eastern Europe was (for the most part) peaceful change despite the resulting instabilities and tensions in the region today. One of the EC's security aims should be to help ensure that change in Eastern Europe continues to be peaceful. This would provide increased security not only for the EC's Eastern neighbours but for the EC itself.

The discussion of peaceful change thus far might appear rather arcane and abstract. The term peaceful change has not been in the currency of international relations discourse for some time now; having been replaced by more neutral terms such as peaceful adjustment. Indeed, mention of the phrase tends to conjure up images of the dying days of the League of Nations. [Inis L. Claude, 1971, p. 222-5] Despite this long-time redundancy, obsolescence, and its dubious connotations, I want in this paper to begin by examining the concept of peaceful change as it was developed in the 1930s. This shows how it is elemental to understanding security in the broader sense. After that, the discussion of security and peaceful change in the 1930s and 1940s is related to the origins of the first
European community in coal and steel.

Four approaches to peaceful change emerged during the 1930s, especially at the International Studies Conference on Peaceful Change sponsored by the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation; these are legalism, nationalism, realism and functionalism. [IIIS, 1938; for discussion of legalism and nationalism, see Long, 1993, pp. 4-7] I shall discuss the last two as these are the ones that are relevant to the discussion of security in contemporary Europe.

The Realist Theory of Peaceful Change

Realism is a theory of international relations that is familiar to most. The realist approach to peaceful change maintains the fundamental tenet of realism: the means and the prospects for peaceful change are critically determined by the distribution of power, usually expressed in military terms, between states.

In a recent, influential book on change in the international system, Robert Gilpin denies the possibility of peaceful change between the major powers in the contemporary world: ‘In the absence of shared values and interests,’ he argues, ‘the mechanism of peaceful change has little chance of success.’ [Gilpin, 1981, p. 209] The reason for this is that states clash over interests and that ‘[a]lthough men [sic] desire peace, it is not their highest value.’ [Gilpin, 1981, p. 209] Gilpin puts what he calls the dilemma of peaceful change starkly as follows:

Until a state is pressed by others, it has little incentive to make concessions for the sake of peace; it gives highest priority to its own security and economic interests. However, once a challenging state is in a position to make its demands effective, it demands greater concessions than would be deemed acceptable earlier; for its part, the challenged state now dares not meet these demands. [Gilpin, 1981, p. 207]

Gilpin’s is an archetypal rendering of the realist conception of peaceful change. Change in the international system is brought about, in this view, by changes in the relative capabilities of the states in the system.

Gilpin’s view owes much to the formulation of the question by E.H. Carr in his The Twenty Years’ Crisis [Carr, 1939]. Carr equates peaceful change in inter-war Europe with concessions by the established powers to the currently weaker but rising powers. He draws an explicit parallel between domestic political conflict in the class war of the workers and capitalists, with the international conflict between the so-called satisfied powers, Britain and France, and the revisionist states, primarily Germany, Italy and Japan. Carr focuses on two approaches to peaceful change in the
context of German claims to restoration of territory and proposed revisions of the Versailles Peace. He dismisses as utopian the view advanced by Lauterpacht that peaceful change internationally implies a mechanism analogous to that used to achieve it domestically, that is, a legislature, and thus a world state. [Lauterpacht, 1937, pp. 141-2] Carr prefers the appeasement route to peaceful change. This entails the recognition by the satisfied powers of the justice of the claims and the emerging reality of a challenge to their superior status by the revisionist powers. [Carr, 1984, ch. 13] For Carr, Power, used, threatened, or silently held in reserve, is an essential factor in international change; and change will, generally speaking, be effected only in the interests of those by whom, or on whose behalf, power can be invoked. "Yielding to threats of force" is a normal part of the process of peaceful change. [Carr, 1984, p. 218]

The realist approach to peaceful change can be summarised as the recognition of superior force by the weaker party and a willingness or resignation to the need to adjust status to reflect the power differential between the state parties rather than risk war. This approach emphasises states, military power, and change through coercion and in terms of territorial transfer. Realism has understood peaceful change as it has understood the international system generally, through the ultimate arbiter of force. Territory and status are reflections of power and its distribution in the international system; changes in territory and status reflect the same factors.

The Functional Theory of Peaceful Change

The misplaced focus on territory and status in previous discussions of peaceful change was the reason David Mitrany developed his functional approach to international relations. [Mitrany, 1936; Maurice Bourquin, ed., 1936] Mitrany’s *A Working Peace System* is well known in international relations but generally as a seminal work in the development of a theory of integration usually labelled neo-functionalism. [Mitrany, 1943; Ernst Haas, 1964] It was rather more than this, however, being the first sketch of a new vision of international relations, including an alternative conception of peaceful change to the territorial perspective of the realists.

The functional approach envisages the bypassing of sovereign states through functional international organizations and the consequent relocation of dispute resolution to those organizations. Functional organisations would be created to fulfil specific welfare needs. For Mitrany, the functional approach would ‘make changes of frontiers unnecessary by making frontiers meaningless through the development of common activities and interests across them.’ He believed that ‘the true task for peaceful change is to remove the need and the wish for the changes of
The functional approach, then, was a direct criticism of territorial basis of the realist approach to peaceful change. Mitrany wanted fervently to get away from the predominance of states. He did not want to abolish states; rather he wanted to subvert their primacy in international relations. [For critical commentary on Mitrany’s functionalism, see, inter alia, Haas, 1964, pp. 23-5; Reginald J. Harrison, pp. 31-9; Charles Pentland, pp. 71-4, 79-80, 82-87]

Mitrany’s functional approach emphasised cooperation between non-governmental organisations in specific sectors of the economy and society. Cooperation across national boundaries occurred because the maximisation of social welfare, though a goal of states, was not attainable within the boundaries of each national state separately. He believed that it was on technical issues that cooperation would advance first and fastest. Cooperation would be embodied and facilitated through international organisations concerning themselves with the specific function that was within their mandate. Mitrany pointed out that modern government gave a strong indication of the direction of functional development of government towards specialised technical agencies, the Tennessee Valley Authority par excellence. In the international realm, Mitrany initially cited the development of international organisation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, highlighting the importance of such functionally oriented bodies as the UPU, the ITU, the IMO, as well as the creation and operation of the ILO. He later advocated the functional route as the means to the economic reconstruction after World War Two. He was a strong supporter of the economic agencies attached to the League, and was convinced of the need to give powers to the UN Economic and Social Council commensurate with those of the UN Security Council, if what we would today call a ‘new world order’ was to take root. [Mitrany, 1943, p. 44, 45ff; Mitrany, 1944, pp. 15-16, 20; cf. Mitrany, 1936, ch. 3]

While Mitrany was projecting a peaceful world society as an end point and functionalism as the route to peaceful change because a world order organized on functional lines would be ‘[n]ot a peace that would keep nations quietly apart, but a peace that would bring them actively together; not the old static and strategic view of peace, but a social view of it.’ It would be in sum, not a protected peace but a working peace. [Quoted by Haas, 1964, p. 10, 12; cf. Bourquin, 1936, pp. 214-5] The mechanisms by which peaceful change would be effected are the international functional organisations themselves. Thus Mitrany believed that the old political and diplomatic route for dealing with disputes would be circumvented. The diplomatic route was the cause of conflict as each dispute between states was interpreted as a national issue, often of vital importance. [Mitrany, 1943, p. 56] Ernst Haas argues that according to functionalism,
International conflict is best tamed by entrusting the work of increasing human welfare to experts, technical specialists, and their professional associations. Being interested in tasks rather than power, they can be expected to achieve agreement where statesmen will fail. [Haas, 1964, p. 11]

Another important (but frequently neglected) element of Mitrany’s formulation is that his functional vision does not entail the replacement of the state by a regional or global international organisation. Indeed, for Mitrany, the idea of technical cooperation through functional international agencies was to avoid the need to create formal, constitutionally based political organs on the international plane. [Mitrany, 1943, p. 55; Mitrany, 1966, pp. 211-12] Rather, Mitrany’s vision of functionally organised world was one with many overlapping, non-congruent international functional organisations. [Cf. Pentland, p. 64]

Mitrany’s approach to peaceful change has two stages. First, the mechanism of functional international organizations and technical bureaucratic decision-making was expected itself to make for less resort to violence to effect change. Second, functional organisations would also create the necessary common feeling internationally to make peaceful change possible, contrary to the viewpoint of the realists. This leads to three ways in which such a functional approach can be judged: first, regarding the success of cooperation on the substantive issues, i.e., the functions performed; second, the progress of cooperative decision-making internationally in the international functional organisation; and lastly, the progress of a sense of common feeling (the ‘we-feeling’, it is sometimes called), both in the organisation itself and in the wider world community.

Security and Peaceful Change in the Creation of the European Coal and Steel Community

The increased pace and radical nature of change in the new Europe requires us to be open-minded about attempts to create a flexible operative peace and security system. Change is likely to be the fundamental element of the international system in Europe for the next several years. The old ideas of peaceful change are again relevant. The literature on peaceful change has a close link to the origins of the EC, particularly the ECSC. While there were many reasons for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, [Haas, 1958, ch 8] it is nevertheless true to say that the functional idea of peaceful change and security was a contributor to the way in which this community
was created.\(^1\) Part of the rationale to the origin of the present EC can be seen as peaceful change, especially at its core, the Franco-German relationship. This is especially clear in the first community, the ECSC, which Mitrany saw as a working peace system.

Given the position of the ECSC within the EC system today, it is excusable that for the most part the ECSC Treaty is discussed in terms of the treaty it begat, the Treaty of Rome, or in its contribution to energy or industrial policy.\(^2\) [Nugent, 1991, pp. 34-9; Pinder, 1991, pp. 3-6; George, 1991, ch. 7]

The origins of the ECSC as seen from a security standpoint rest in the debate over post-war reconstruction. The discussion about the need for flexibility in collective security arrangements led to discussion of an analysis of peaceful change in the 1930s. Mitrany's functional approach to world politics was a reaction to the debate, which then became a prominent theory in the explanation of the need for international organisations in the reconstruction of Europe.

David Mitrany was a fervent supporter of the ECSC. He not only supported the creation of a Coal and Steel Community in the heart of Europe, he prescribed it as a solution to security in Europe. In ‘The Road to Security’, Mitrany calls for reconstruction efforts in Europe to be built around cooperation on steel and coal by France and Germany. He cites this as a potentially more fruitful route to international peace and security than the re-establishment of a League of Nations type arrangement, that is, the UN. Mitrany emphasised that economic welfare and security were closely linked; there was no question of the priority of one over the other. He argues that ‘it is generally agreed that [preventing German rearmament] involves control not merely of the actual armament industries, but also of the heavy and chemical industries, as well as other industries and services.’ Mitrany noted that some had argued therefore that

the only effective means of prevention is joint control over the whole sector of an industry. That means a willingness to accept also for ourselves, in the common interest, such joint control as would prevent the use of a particular industry or material for aggressive purposes.

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\(^1\) Neo-functionalism, the theory designed to account for the development of the European Community, ultimately rest on the same dynamics as functionalism - technological and economic function determine political form. [Haas, 1958; Pentland, p. 111]

\(^2\) Nevertheless, methodologically, there is a flaw in reading the ECSC merely as a forerunner of the EC. Those who were the main proponents and architects of the ECSC, by definition, could not know that the outcome would be the EEC or the Community we know today. As well as being understood for what it actually became, the ECSC can also be analyzed in terms of what it was and what was hoped it would become.
Concluding this line of argument, Mitrany states of this method, that it would not oppress the Germans as had the Versailles Settlement at the end of the First World War because 'the controls would be part of an equally effective service to the German people, and would apply to other countries as well.' [Mitrany, 1944, p. 17]

By contrast, Mitrany was none too impressed with larger attempts at European integration as manifested in the European Economic Community. His reasoning echoes his war-time analysis of the need for a working peace system. The proponents of European integration who supported the EEC Treaty were aiming for a European federal state, he argued. Mitrany criticised this on the grounds that it reasserted the territorial basis of political organisation; in other words, why should cooperation on all economic issues be constrained by a continental treaty? Why should cooperation with non-Europeans take second place? This had serious implications for the prospects for world peace; why, Mitrany asked, should a European Union 'suddenly be guided by sweet reasonableness and self-restraint'? [Mitrany, 1966, p. 187]

According to Mitrany, '[t]he very concept of a closed regional union is a contradiction of the historic European idea...'- that is, European civilisation had prided itself on its openness. Attempts to find a European identity, which would have to be strenuous given the differences between Europeans, would detract from world peace and what today would be called the EC's role as a world partner. [Mitrany, 1966, p. 184-6]

While others have noted that the Council of Ministers of the EEC enshrined and reinforced state interests and bargaining, in comparison to the powers of the Commission and especially to the ECSC's High Authority, Mitrany complained that the EEC would hinder international cooperation between the new bloc, i.e., the EEC, and the rest of the world.

The ECSC and Euratom are straight functional bodies and can get on with their allotted task without offending the position of other countries, while remaining open to link up with them. ... The point is that for service units like the ECSC and Euratom, as for all the specialized agencies of the U.N. and any future functional bodies, wider association means more points of co-operative contact; for a self inflating organization like the EEC, more fields of control must mean internationally more points of competitive contact. [Mitrany, 1966, pp. 109-10]

Mitrany's argument about the difference between the ECSC and the EEC can be illustrated by an interesting contrast between the preambles of the ECSC and the EEC Treaties. The security rhetoric of the ECSC Treaty contrasts with the predominantly welfarist EEC Treaty and also with the EC's subsequent self-image as a unitary regional union, predominantly but not exclusively focusing on economic matters. The Treaty of Paris mentions peace three times, and peace is generally given high priority in terms of the aims of the new Coal and Steel Community. It opens
as follows:

Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it,
Convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can make to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations,
Recognizing that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which will first create real solidarity...

By contrast the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC mentions peace once and it relegates that reference to the last clause. Instead, references to prosperity, standards of living and union are promoted:

Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,
Resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe,
Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples...

The EC and Contemporary Security Policy

The rest of this paper makes the case that with the changes in the security structure of Europe today, it is the lessons of the creation of the ECSC (and especially the aspirations behind it) that are the more relevant to European security, both of the EC and beyond.³

Yet the developing discourse of security policy in the EC appears to move away from these lessons. The ECSC has not been the model for the EC’s security policy. Rather security policy has been interpreted as related to external political, economic, but particularly defence policies. Mitrany observed that the traditional functions of a federal executive is external trade, defence and foreign policy. It is this discourse that has dominated in the negotiations leading to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty. The discourse on security policy is in the context of European Political Cooperation and the Western European Union. Economic aspects to security policy are being relegated below the political and military dimensions. [Delors, 1991, p. 104]

The narrow conception of security in the EC allows security policy to be interpreted bureaucratically as the business of defence and foreign ministry apparatuses. It thus becomes an addendum to the development of European Political Cooperation; is read in the context of past

³ The lessons of the ECSC are themselves a source of debate, of course. Ernst Haas modified Mitrany’s approach into neo-functionalism in his case study of the ECSC. Haas was convinced that political leadership played a greater role than Mitrany had allowed. [Haas, 1958]
abortive attempts at creating a European Defence Community; and culminates rather naturally in the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty. [George, 1991, ch. 13; European Union, p. 29]

The discourse on the development of an EC security policy can be briefly described as follows: the EEC Treaty created a community whose focus, i.e., treaty basis, was economic. Thus the external relations for which the EEC itself had competence were certain economic relations. However, as the EEC grow in wealth, power, size and stature in the international system, it had more weight internationally, both economically and politically. In response to this development, in the early 1970s a system of European Political Cooperation (EPC) emerged whereby the member states of the EC consulted on and coordinated their foreign policies. This system was outside the treaty framework of the EC, and was therefore, intergovernmental, political, ad hoc and voluntary. EPC has remained for the most part declaratory rather than effective. [George, 1991, pp. 218-20]

Another reason for the development of EPC (while also being something of a problem institutionally) was that the distinction between foreign economic relations and foreign political relations became increasingly blurred. A good example of this is in regard to relations with Middle Eastern states. [Dinan, 1991, pp. 413-6] Progressive development of the EPC and its routinization within member states’ business led to its institutionalised in Title III of the Single European Act (SEA).

Security policy was always something of a problem for EPC and defence matters were even more controversial. Article 6 of Title III of the SEA refers to security policy. While the High Contracting Parties were ‘ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security,’ cooperation on ‘hard’ security matters, i.e., defence cooperation, was expected to continue within the framework of NATO and the WEU rather than in the EPC. There is also an emphasis on the need to keep up technologically to ensure security in a.6(b). Crucially, however, the whole article is premised by the notion that security cooperation would contribute to ‘the development of a European identity in external policy matters.’ Security is seen as a route to European identity, meaning the present member states of the EC. Such a view of security policy is also expressed by Delors. [Delors, 1991, pp. 104-7] This identity, however, is based on difference with reference to outsiders. While some of Title III might look like it involves a broader conception of security, it is nonetheless tied to defence - political and military - against outsiders rather than being a version of cooperative security as is envisaged in the functionalist perspective and was manifested in the ECSC originally. The critical difference between the views of security is that in the SEA
security is understood as an exclusive concept; in the ECSC it is inclusive. This distinction has carried over into the CFSP.

The voluntary nature of the EPC has led to criticisms about the flimsiness of the mechanism and the lack of significant policy output; that is, its declaratory rather than effective nature makes the EPC a mechanism of limited usefulness. The development of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty on Political Union can be understood in terms of the weaknesses of the EPC. The new Common Foreign and Security Policy 'established' in Title V can also be linked to previous efforts to create political or defence unity in Europe. Such efforts in the early 1950s failed because of concerns about German rearmament and British hesitancy. [Pinder, 1991, pp. 6-7; Nugent, 1991, pp. 39-41]

It can be argued that current circumstances make it both easier and more urgent that a common security policy be established now than in the 1950s. For instance, there is no longer the great concern about German resurgence as a military threat; there is no dire threat from the East; and Britain is now part of the European Community. On the other hand, the conduct of European foreign policy and then the participation of the EC states and the WEU in the Gulf War highlighted flaws in the current arrangements. [James E. Goodby, 1992, pp. 155-162; Salmon, 1992, pp. 248-53] Events in what was Yugoslavia have also not created a good impression of the unity of the EC member states on security issues, and this particular set of problems was the immediate backdrop to the development of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty.

Title V envisages 'systematic cooperation' on foreign and security policy which codifies the procedure of EPC once again, with the possibility of the Council defining a common position. Member states are expected to 'inform and consult each other within the Council' and exert 'combined influence' through 'concerted and convergent action.' [Article J.2.1] Joint action will also be gradually implemented on matters determined by the Council with general guidelines set by the European Council. Majority voting will apply to joint action [Article J.3.2] and '[j]oint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.' [Article J.3.4.] That it is to be 'gradually implement[ed]' suggests that this article is quite weak.

The range of issues covered by the CFSP under Maastricht will be the CSCE process; arms control negotiations in Europe; nuclear non-proliferation issues; and economic aspects of security, particularly the control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and arms exports. [European Council declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty; also in European Union, p. 31]

The provisions for defence cooperation are included in Article J.4 but once again they are hedged around with qualifications. Three of the six parts of this article concern what the Article does
not do. Specifically, it is not subject to the majority voting provision of joint action, it is not prejudicial to participation in NATO or to bilateral relations with third countries. [Article J.4.3-5] The main instrument of defence cooperation is to be an already existing international organization, the Western European Union (WEU), which is described as 'an integral part of the development of the [European] Union,' notwithstanding the fact that the treaty creating the WEU expires in 1998 [Article J.4.2] and that the memberships (of the EC and the WEU) are not consonant, requiring the creation of WEU associate member and observer status. It is not within the scope of this paper to examine the negotiations that led to Maastricht, nor its intrinsic weaknesses. Rather I will briefly canvass some of the criticisms of Maastricht from the point of view of security policy. I will then turn to a critique based on the earlier analysis in this paper.

The first line of criticism comes from those who see the provisions in Maastricht as inadequate and that this means that the CFSP will repeat the EPC's 'flop'. [Hill, 1990, pp. 48-53; Philip Zelikow, 1992, pp. 20-6] The second line of criticism is that the emphasis on European structures or defence will compete with and/or undermine NATO. NATO is seen by its advocates as a decently functioning organization, whereas the EU/WEU is untried and experience so far does not bode well. [Fred Chernoff, 1992, pp. 3-6; Zelikow, 1992, pp. 26-7; Adrian Hyde-Price, 1991, pp. 208-10]

There is a final source of criticisms of the CFSP, however. To put it strongly, the EC is betraying itself in the attempt to formulate a security policy with a defence emphasis. Current circumstances in the former Yugoslavia and the experience in the Gulf have oriented the discussion of security policy in the EC towards the management and settlement/enforcement phases of conflict resolution. [Delors, 1991, p. 102, 106-8; Salmon, 1992, p. 250-2] It continues to be true, however, that the EC's strongest tools for persuasion are its economic measures, along with some diplomatic procedures, which are most appropriate in the pre-conflict and conflict management phases.

The use of economic inducements and sanctions is part of the EC's foreign policy viewed as a civilian model. [Hill, 1990, pp. 41-8] The civilian model of EC foreign policy entails the recognition that the international system is not moved solely by military force, and that the use of military force to solve conflicts has a poor track record. Such a foreign policy relies on 'persuasion rather than coercion; the use of multiple avenues and forms of discussion rather than seeking exclusively to reinforce European institutions; and the relative willingness to envisage open diplomacy...' [Hill, 1990, p. 44] While the civilian model of EC foreign policy has been criticised by some, it is the closest that any views of the EC's foreign (and security) policy gets to reflecting the sui generis
nature of the EC. Viewing the EC either as a potential or actual power bloc or as a 'flop', as Hill puts it, implicitly compare the EC's capabilities and modalities to those of a state and also rest on an understanding of power ultimately determined by the possession of military force. [Hill, 1990, p. 54; Johan Galtung, 1973] The power bloc vision of the EC underlies the view that the EC should get a common security policy understood in military terms. However, a common security policy now would also fall into the trap that Mitrany identified, specifying insiders and outsiders. By concentrating on security interpreted as defence against outsiders, it jeopardises the EC's openness and the prospects for international cooperation.

The civilian model of EC foreign policy and the functionalist perspective on security and peaceful change mesh well together, on the other hand. As we have seen, the origins of the ECSC are in peaceful change literature which lays emphasis on the pre-conflict rather than conflict management or settlement phase. Not only would a security policy that followed functionalist lines fit with the civilian model of EC foreign policy but it also reflects tenor of the changed circumstances of post-Cold War Europe, particularly to its East, where the EC is faced with its primary security concern. [Mortimer, 1992a, pp. 19-34] Peaceful change and security in Eastern Europe requires from the EC a security policy based not in the old military meaning of the word but in a broader social and economic sense. For this, a broader notion of security is required and also a return to the ideas that moved the ECSC rather than the failed EDC.

In the end the failure is less flawed analysis and more a lack of analysis. Security has not been developed as a concept, but rather is taken to mean the activities broadly covered by Foreign Ministries and Defence Ministries: It is certain aspects of foreign policy plus defence policy. Furthermore, security policy is seen as instrumental to the development of a regional union, rather than being valued for itself. [Delors, 1991, pp. 104-5]

The EC and Security in Central and Eastern Europe

Central and Eastern Europe is the area of greatest security concern to the EC member states because of proximity, current instability and the history of weapons build-up, of which the nuclear arsenal is only the most notable. The challenges in Central and Eastern Europe are immense: ethnic conflict both within and across state boundaries, economic decline and transition, border disputes, the sudden demise of international coordination, migration. This section examines how the EC might preserve its own security by creating conditions in and forging relations with states in Central and
Eastern Europe conducive to security there. I do not, however, mean to suggest that the extension of Western international institutions into Eastern Europe is the only way to achieve security in the East. What is clear, however, is that it is not merely a matter of military, state security or of security guarantees.

There is a large and growing literature on the extension of the EC into East-Central Europe and further. [Laursen, 1991-2; Michalski and Wallace, 1992; Pinder, 1991; Nugent, 1992] The EC has a number of different links with Eastern Europe, including the development of trade and cooperation agreements, the Europe Agreements, as well as the Commission's part in coordinating the aid programmes PHARE and TACIS, and the majority share holding of member states in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The matter of future membership is also being actively discussed. These developments hint at an increased functional (and civilian) aspect to the European Community. While the ideas of a multi-speed or variable geometry Europe are still being debated, what they offer is a European Community which is not a singular structure but rather one of a multiplicity of overlapping activities, varying according to function. [Edward Mortimer, 1992a, 1992b; Wilson, 1992, pp. 25-6]

The literature on the changing EC and its changing context does not on the whole discuss the security implications of a multifaceted EC. Nevertheless, EC policy in the East is a security policy both for the recipient countries and for the EC member states. The EC's relations with Eastern Europe are taking on a functional character and have security implications. In addition, we have a situation today analogous to that in the 1940s: the end of a war and a desire to seek mutual security of those across former alliances. This part of the paper, therefore, describes and prescribes EC security policy in the region in light of the parallels with the functional conception of security in the ECSC. In short, relations with Central and Eastern Europe are interpreted as means of functional cooperation, whether trade and cooperation agreements, Europe Agreements, or through widening the EC to include these countries as members.

EC policy for East European security might develop in three ways. Given the examination of the ECSC above, a new Coal and Steel Community might be proposed. After all, this worked

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I will not be discussing the common line of argument of this research, such as the 'wider/deeper debate', the potential dilution of decision-making, the lack of political will or coherent vision, the various needs and claims of the applicants and potential applicants. The paper does not attempt to assess the chances of achieving peaceful change and enduring security in Eastern Europe. I am also side-stepping a critical issue in this literature - which state is admitted or given an agreement, on what terms, and when.
once to create security in the heart of Europe, why not a second time? A second view would propose some variant on the 1992 Programme for Eastern Europe, especially an extension of the EEA to the Visegrad states. Finally, it might be argued that what is required is an entirely new substantive area of cooperation, but one that fits the security and economy criteria as the ECSC did in 1950; energy and communications have been suggested. The first of these is not being actively considered; the latter proposals are, but not from the perspective of a security policy.

**A New Coal and Steel Community**

The idea of an extended Coal and Steel Community seems highly unlikely. There are both economic and security reasons for this. First, the ECSC is not the healthiest part of the current European Community. It has been accused of gross inefficiency, [The Economist, 6-13 March 1993, p. 16-7] and in any case, the dirigiste nature of this community appears out of tune with the spirit of the times as exemplified by the free market oriented 1992 Programme and the demise of the socialist states in Eastern Europe. The effectiveness of the ECSC, especially its supranationalism as manifested in the powers of the High Authority, was challenged by successive crises of oversupply, with the result that it was member states that decided policy rather than the ECSC.

While coal and steel were appropriate focus for cooperation between the Six in 1950, they no longer enjoy the prominence in nor are as fundamental to capitalist economies that they once did. Furthermore, the different partners to this cooperation (i.e., primarily Germany and France in the 1940s and 1950s as opposed to the EC and the Central and East European states currently) and the difference in their relative status render the ECSC a bad analogy for contemporary security policy. From the point of view of negotiations, it is indicative that steel is a supersensitive commodity for the EC, making the idea of a widened ECSC less plausible. [J. Pelkmans and A. Murphy, 1991, pp. 141-2]

Nor is the coal and steel as critical in terms of the wider notion of security. The security significance of the ECSC was that coal and steel were both critical to the domestic peace time economy and to the effectiveness and strength of a modern wartime state. With the development of high technology weapons and the recognition of the need to keep up with high tech in order to preserve European security, coal and steel appear to lose some of their significance.

**Another 1992 Programme**
Given the apparent success of the 1992 Programme, the EC could try to extend the principles of 1992 to these countries or adopt a 1992-style programme for, say, 2005 for selected countries. Such a programme implies a clear process and a strict timetable. The lesson learned from the accessions of Greece, Portugal and Spain, however, was the opposite; that exceptions and delays were the only way of effecting swift admission into the EC, which was considered a good thing in itself. On the economic front, there appears to be a trade-off between including the applicants quickly and implementing a 1992-style programme. There is furthermore the relative backwardness of these economies and the lack of fundamental legal structures for a market economy.

With regard to free market principles, though, this is more or less what is being done in terms of the association agreements and so on. It is certainly a major part of the role that the EC has assigned itself: improving market access, movement of workers and economic, technical and financial assistance constitute major planks of the Europe Agreements. In its report to the European Council for the Summit in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, the Commission proposed further measures towards creating a Europe-wide free trade area and to overcome obstacles to investment in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, it is not clear that such a programme is integrative enough; rather the arrangement would constitute a glorified free trade area rather like the EEA. Delors has expressed his dissatisfaction with this aspect of economic integration; that is, that it is soulless. [Delors, 1991, p. 104] While a 1992-style programme fits 'spirit of the age', there is a lack of connection to security, even in the broadest sense, however. There is no mechanism for peaceful change save the invisible hand of the market and the arguments of those liberals who argue that interdependence makes war less rational and therefore less likely. This has proved flimsy in the past and looks no more likely to work in the future.

**Infrastructure Projects**

The Commission report to the European Council for the Edinburgh Summit also identified another area for cooperation between the EC and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, namely Trans-European Networks. These networks would involve transport, telecommunications and energy. Infrastructure projects would give a large infusion of needed investment and would result in a relief of the bottlenecks to further economic development and growth. Regrettably, once again, this is interpreted purely from the financial standpoint. The EC seems most concerned as to how the
projects will be financed; the security issue is assumed or neglected.

This is especially regrettable since the security basis of infrastructure projects to improve communications across Europe is not clear. It is certainly not as critical a security concern as was coal and steel to post-war Germany and to Franco-German relations. The overall conclusion to this discussion is that the security implications of relations with Central and Eastern Europe have been taken too much for granted. They have been seen in terms of economic criteria on the one hand and defence criteria on the other.

Conclusion

Security in the post-Cold War world is being rethought. No longer is the narrow meaning of national security as the military security of the state considered a useful one. The redefinition of security continues despite the military contingencies in the Balkans. Thus, this paper turned to the literature on security and the older discussion of peaceful change. This literature linked to the origins of the ECSC and thus to the European Community. It was argued that the EC has to hand a more subtle meaning of security. This motivated an examination of the EC’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Yet, this relied on a narrow meaning of security as preventive diplomacy and military means of defence. On the other hand, in the region of greatest security concern to the EC relations have been interpreted from the economic perspective primarily with the security implications assumed away or neglected. The paper suggested three possible means for security cooperation, parallel to the experience of the ECSC, between the EC and its Eastern neighbours.

Two general reflections need to be added to the foregoing analysis. First, the existence of other fora for ‘hard’ security cooperation means that this need not be an area left uncared for; there is still a role for NATO, perhaps. The argument of this paper is that, given that there are other security fora, the EC should concentrate on what is best suited to, and that this is a contribution to security, through a functional approach to peaceful change in international organisation.

Finally, this paper has discussed peaceful change in the context of a new meaning for security. There is a growing sense that the events of 1989-91 in Europe call for a new conception also of peaceful change, not only because of the scale of the changes but because of the nature and means through which the change was effected. Current conceptions of peaceful change are inadequate. It appears that a new conception of peaceful change is required: one based on normative standards, on the incorporation of domestic peaceful change into international peaceful change, and
on the role of international institutions as barometers of and routes for peaceful change. This amounts to what might be called a new Grotian perspective on peaceful change. [Claire Cutler, 1991] It may yet be the largest change to the ideas of security that exist at present.
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